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A Token of Individuality

Questiones libri Porphirii

by Thomas Manlevelt

A Token of Individuality

Questiones libri Porphirii

by Thomas Manlevelt

A critical edition with introduction and indices

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On the cover: The front cover illustration is taken from folio 25^{va} of the manuscript of the *Questiones libri Porphirii* by Thomas Manlevelt. The back cover illustration is from folio 17^{va} of this same manuscript.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION

1.	About this text	5
1.1.	Thomas Manlevelt: on first acquaintance	5
1.2.	Denial of substance	7
1.3.	Primacy of individuality	12
2.	Thomas Manlevelt, life and works	15
2.1.	Bibliography	15
2.2.	Biography	17
2.2.1.	Biographical framework.....	18
2.2.2.	Career in Paris	19
2.2.3.	Bibliographical data from works and manuscripts ...	21
2.2.4.	Anglicus?	22
2.2.5.	The spelling of the name 'Manlevelt'.....	23
2.2.6.	Thomas's English background and the dating of his works.....	25
2.2.7.	Thomas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony	27
3.	Why this text is to be ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt	29
3.1.	The manuscript	29
3.2.	Comparison with other texts.....	33
3.3.	Geographical circumstances	34
3.4.	The dating of the <i>Questiones libri Porphirii</i>	37
3.5.	The Franciscan context	41
3.6.	The theologian background	43
4.	Historical background	47
4.1.	Porphyry's book, and what it is about.....	47
4.1.1.	The <i>Organon</i>	47
4.1.2.	The <i>Categories</i>	48
4.1.3.	The <i>Isagoge</i>	50
4.1.4.	The three questions.....	52
4.1.5.	Commentaries on the <i>Isagoge</i>	53
4.2.	Thomas Manlevelt's Ockhamism.....	56
4.3.	Ockhamism in Oxford and in Paris.....	60
4.4.	Parisian denials of substance	62

4.5. The University of Paris	65
4.6. The University of Oxford	69
4.6.1. Manlevelt and Bradwardine: <i>De incipit et desinit</i>	70
4.6.2. Manlevelt and Bradwardine: <i>Opus artis logicae</i>	73
5. Form and contents of this text	79
5.1. <i>Questiones</i>	79
5.1.1. The structuring of the <i>Questiones</i>	80
5.1.2. References given	82
5.2. Why a commentary?	83
5.3. The originality of Thomas Manlevelt's approach	86
5.4. Thomas Manlevelt's theory of signs	91
5.5. A brief summary of the contents of the <i>questiones</i>	99
5.5.1. The <i>individuum</i>	99
5.5.2. The accident	105
5.5.3. The general structure of the text	114
5.5.4. A comparison to other <i>questiones</i> -commentaries on the <i>Isagoge</i>	114
5.5.5. Thomas Manlevelt's commentary, <i>questio</i> by <i>questio</i>	122
6. Description of the manuscript used	139
7. The editorial principles	147
Bibliography	149

QUESTIONES LIBRI PORPHIRII

Sigla	163
⟨Questio 1⟩ Utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam	165
⟨Questio 2⟩ Utrum scire quid sit genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam	171
⟨Questio 3⟩ Utrum noscere quid sit genus sit necessarium ad assignationem diffinitionum	175
⟨Questio 4⟩ Utrum universale sit ⟨in⟩ intellectu	180
⟨Questio 5⟩ Utrum genus sit equivocum	190
⟨Questio 6⟩ Utrum genus sit cui supponitur species, et hoc est querere utrum illa diffinitio generis sit bene data	194
⟨Questio 7⟩ Utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum	198

⟨Questio 8⟩ Utrum genus predicetur de pluribus differentibus specie	203
⟨Questio 9⟩ Utrum omne genus predicatur in quid	206
⟨Questio 10⟩ Utrum genus differat ab individuo	210
⟨Questio 11⟩ Utrum individuum predicetur de uno solo	215
⟨Questio 12⟩ Utrum aliquod individuum sit terminus communis...	221
⟨Questio 13⟩ Utrum proprietas unius individui inveniatur in altero	227
⟨Questio 14⟩ Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo	231
⟨Questio 15⟩ Utrum homo sit species animalis	239
⟨Questio 16⟩ Utrum genus et species sint sibi invicem relativa	243
⟨Questio 17⟩ Utrum in diffinitione speciei sit necesse poni genus ...	246
⟨Questio 18⟩ Utrum ista diffinitio speciei ‘Species est que predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit’, sit bona.....	252
⟨Questio 19⟩ Utrum omne quod est ante individua, sit species specialissima	255
⟨Questio 20⟩ Utrum individuum sit nomen appellativum	260
⟨Questio 21⟩ Utrum unum sit genus omnium; hoc est querere, utrum talia transcendentia aliquid, res, ens, sint genera	264
⟨Questio 22⟩ Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora	270
⟨Questio 23⟩ Utrum genera generalissima sint principia rerum	278
⟨Questio 24⟩ Utrum infinita relinquenda sint ab arte	284
⟨Questio 25⟩ Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.....	291
⟨Questio 26⟩ Utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus	296
⟨Questio 27⟩ Utrum species sit pars generis	301
⟨Questio 28⟩ Utrum aliquid differat a seipso	306
⟨Questio 29⟩ Utrum aliqua substantia differat ab alia separabili accidente	310
⟨Questio 30⟩ Utrum aliquid ab alio differat inseparabili accidente ..	314
⟨Questio 31⟩ Utrum differentia specifica semper faciat aliquid ab alio differre specie	319
⟨Questio 32⟩ Utrum omne faciens per se differre sit differentia specifica	325
⟨Questio 33⟩ Utrum differentia per se suscipit magis et minus	333
⟨Questio 34⟩ Utrum hec differentia <i>animatum sensibile</i> sit constitutiva substantie animalis.....	338
⟨Questio 35⟩ Utrum hec differentia <i>immortale</i> sit constitutiva Dei ..	343

⟨Questio 36⟩ Utrum eadem differentia sit discretiva generis et constitutiva speciei	348
⟨Questio 37⟩ Utrum differentia specifica sit necessaria ad divisionem generis	352
⟨Questio 38⟩ Utrum differentia specifica sit necessaria ad diffinitionem faciendam.....	357
⟨Questio 39⟩ Utrum ista diffinitio differentie sit bene data: ‘differentia est qua abundat species a genere’	364
⟨Questio 40⟩ Utrum aliqua alia diffinitio differentie convertitur cum differentia	368
⟨Questio 41⟩ Utrum proprium dicatur quadrupliciter	374
⟨Questio 42⟩ Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem	381
⟨Questio 43⟩ Utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum	388
⟨Questio 44⟩ Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus	395
⟨Questio 45⟩ Utrum aliquod accidens sit genus substantiale	403
Index nominum	407
Index verborum notabilium	409
Index exemplorum	439

APPENDIX

QUESTIONES SUPER PREDICAMENTA

⟨Questio 2⟩ Utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus	445
Samenvatting	459
Curriculum Vitae	463

INTRODUCTION

The present text, the fourteenth century *Questiones libri Porphirii* attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, is a new text. Not only in the sense that the only manuscript that has been handed down to us has never been edited before, but also in the sense that its contents have so far never been the subject of any historical or philosophical research. Thomas Manlevelt, the author to whom the commentary can be ascribed, moreover, is one about whom not much is known.

By way of a first introduction to this new text, I will supply it with a geographical and temporal context, and thus place it against its proper intellectual background. Then I will sketch the contours of its doctrinal and investigational persuasion, and indicate the main points of interest of this commentary on the *Isagoge*. I will also give consideration to uncertainties surrounding its authorship.

As noted, only one manuscript of the present text has been handed down to us. This means that I am being saved the burden of comparing different manuscripts. This is outweighed by the burden of solving all textual obscurities, mistakes, reiterations and omissions in this single manuscript without having recourse to any other.

The logical tracts of Thomas Manlevelt promise to be a rewarding field of investigation in years to come. Critical editions, so scarce thus far, will become available. Apart from this present edition of his commentary on the *Isagoge*, the near future will bring at least two more volumes. Forthcoming is an edition of Thomas Manlevelt's *parva logicalia*, comprising *De suppositionibus*, *De confusionibus* and *De consequentiis*, by C. Kann, S. Lorenz and R. Grass. As a follow-up to the present edition, I intend to produce a critical edition of its twin text, the *Questiones super Predicamenta*, thus completing the commentary on the *logica vetus* attributed to Thomas Manlevelt. This commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* consists of one hundred and twenty-six *questiones*, the second of which, on equivocal concepts, serves as an appendix to the present edition.

CHAPTER ONE

About this text

The text to be edited below is an intriguing, fourteenth century example of the long tradition of commentaries on a third century AD text, the *Isagoge* by Porphyry – or, as it is spelled here, Porphirius. The *Isagoge* itself was meant to be an introduction to another, still older and in the course of time even more vastly commented-upon text, the *Categories* by Aristotle.

We have to accept a fair amount of uncertainty as to the authorship and the exact date and place of origin of this text. As is the case with many fourteenth century texts, and fourteenth century philosophy and philosophers in general, hard data on this text are scarce.

That there is only one manuscript available of our text does not make things easier. There are assumptions to be made about its authorship, and about its place and date of origin, but none of these things can be said with absolute certainty.

With some reservations however, which will become clear in the course of my introduction, I feel safe to assume that this text, a commentary on the *Isagoge* in the form of *questiones*, was composed by Thomas Manlevelt in the late 1330s or thereabouts in pre-University Louvain. But who is Thomas Manlevelt?

1.1. *Thomas Manlevelt: on first acquaintance*

The one manuscript available of these *Questiones libri Porphirii* has the text ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt. A line of text at the top of the first folio, supposedly put there by the end of the fourteenth century, states that these *questiones* were compiled by the able doctor Thomas Manlevelt the Englishman: ‘Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per Thom. Manvel Anglicum doctorem solempnem.’¹ Moreover, the author of these ‘excellent questions on the Old Logic’ is identified on the cover

1 Schum 1887, 528f.

of the manuscript itself as Thomas Manlevelt: ‘Item questiones optime Thome Manlevelt super veteri arte.’²

In the handbooks of philosophical history, the name of Thomas Manlevelt is linked to a set of widely-used logical treatises, presumably composed in Paris around 1330, and spread all over the European continent in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.³ Only recently has this logician gained some wider attention. In his 2008 paper ‘Thomas Maulevelt’s Denial of Substance’,⁴ Robert Andrews sets out to appraise our author’s ontology, which is described by him as one ‘more radical than any other of the Middle Ages, and unparalleled until the time of Hume.’⁵ This would bridge a gap of more than four centuries, as David Hume lived from 1711 until 1776.⁶

The text with which Andrews is concerned, is a commentary (*questiones*) on Aristotle’s *Categories*, also ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt. It is one of the lengthiest of the later Middle Ages, surviving in a single, densely-written manuscript of over a hundred folios. The commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* ascribed to Manlevelt is the twin text to the commentary on the *Categories*, covering the first forty-odd folios of this very same single, densely-written manuscript.

Andrews has no doubts about the intellectual background of Thomas Manlevelt. To him it is clear that this logician ‘was following in the footsteps of William of Ockham, another Englishman, writing a bit earlier in the beginning of the 1300s.’⁷

2 Schum 1887, *ibid.* More about this ascription in the manuscript itself, and on how this compiling should be understood, see below, section 3.1. Chapter 3, of which this section is the first part, is devoted to the textual and circumstantial evidence that seems to warrant the ascription of this text to Thomas Manlevelt. Chapter 6 will give a detailed description of the manuscript.

3 See, for example, Spade 1998, 403 f.

4 Andrews, 2008. This paper was presented at a conference, *Skepticism in Medieval and Renaissance Thought*, in Uppsala, Sweden, on May 8, 2005. Andrews has a slightly different spelling of our author’s name: ‘Maulevelt’ instead of ‘Manlevelt’. More about the diverse ways in which Thomas’s name is spelled, below, subsection 2.2.5.

5 Andrews 2008, p. 347.

6 On Hume, see e.g. D.F. Norton (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hume* (Cambridge, 1993), or any present day reference work. No handbook will be amiss on Hume’s ideas about substance, or the related issue of causation.

7 Andrews 2008, 348. Another early Ockhamist text, the *Defensorium Ockham*, is discussed in Andrews, 1997 and edited in Andrews, 2000. I will come back to this text in connection with a minor geographical point concerning our own text. See below, section 3.3.

We will accept this intellectual dependency of Manlevelt on William of Ockham (c. 1288–c. 1348) as a working hypothesis, keeping to it as long as our own textual evidence warrants it.⁸ As will become clear, this working hypothesis happens to be fully warranted by the text edited below.⁹

1.2. *Denial of substance*

The next chapter in this Introduction, dealing with Manlevelt's life and works, will be hampered by a lack of available data. Assuming, however, that Manlevelt is the author of the present text as well as the accompanying commentary on the *Categories* partly edited by Andrews, something like a portrait of Manlevelt can be sketched.

Andrews explains how Ockham had applied his reductive principle to Aristotle's ten categories, on the occasion of writing – like Manlevelt – a commentary on the *Categories* of Aristotle.¹⁰ The categories in medieval

8 One point on which I will find occasion to deviate from Andrews's presentation of facts is his taking Thomas Manlevelt to be an Englishman. True, he is also called Thomas Anglicus, but as will be pointed out below, subsection 2.2.4, there is at least as much reason to think he was German or from the low countries. This would mean that at the university in Paris, where some vague footsteps of his can be traced, he would have belonged to the English-German nation anyway.

9 Andrews refrains from substantiating his Ockhamist claim about Manlevelt with factual evidence. But had he chosen to do so, evidence could have been brought forward in sufficient abundance. Manlevelt holds that everything in reality is strictly individual in nature and that generality is only to be found in concepts in so far as these refer to the things in reality. If this should sound nominalistic in a too general manner, Manlevelt's tenet that each concept or conceptual act in the mind is as individual in nature as well, should already be linked to a more strictly Ockhamist background. But there is more, on a general level and in the details: the acceptance of only two categories of things existing in reality, namely substance and quality; the way in which God is freely discussed about in logical matters; the main division of supposition in personal, simple and material; the individual character of all linguistic items; the absence of any hierarchy among the three main levels of language, spoken, written and thought; the indivisibility of a continuum; the way in which all terms, that is to say, all universals as well, are in the end 'degraded' to the level of mere accidents (of the human mind, that is), etc. Even Manlevelt's half-hearted denial of substance, about which we will have more to say in the pages to follow, must be looked upon as something 'naturally' taking place in an Ockhamist environment, seeing that another one to deny substance, John of Mirecourt, was an avowed partisan of Ockhamism as well. (But about 'Ockhamism', and any philosopher's 'avowed partisanship' of it, see below, section 4.2 of this Introduction.)

10 Andrews 2008, 348.

ontology comprised all those vindicated by Aristotle, to wit: substance, plus nine accidents (quality, quantity, relation, action, undergoing, space, time, situation, having). Eight of the categories fell victim to Ockham's razor; in his ontology, only substance and quality remain as distinct entities.¹¹ All of the other categories are merely aspects of substances or qualities, or ways of talking about these substances or qualities. But on the other hand they are nothing less either.¹²

The interesting thing is what Andrews tells us about Manlevelt's way of finishing off this Ockhamist enterprise. Like Ockham, he was engaged in a radical reduction in the number of the categories as realities of whatever kind. One by one all of the lesser categories are deleted. Manlevelt, however, is willing to go a step further than Ockham. He entertains a radical hypothesis: substance does not exist.¹³ The only category which describes the things of the world is that of quality.¹⁴

For a first glimpse of the originality to be found with Thomas Manlevelt, the audacity of his thinking and the subsequent prudence with which he tends to tone down the impact of his findings – elements abundant in his commentary on the *Isagoge* as well – we will follow the general line of his dismantling the categorical framework. It is a specimen of originality that for reasons that I will go into in the next chapter would stay unnoticed for centuries.¹⁵

- 11 Substance and the third species of quality, to be precise, is all that is left of reality. See Maurer 1994, 388.
- 12 For a much more detailed discussion of Ockham's ontology, see McCord Adams, 1987.
- 13 *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Q. 16 CONCL. 1, 56^{rab}, 'probabiliter posset sustineri physice loquendo, nullam penitus substantiam esse in istis inferioribus, accipiendo substantiam pro composito ex materia et forma, vel pro aliqua parte talis compositi,' Q. 16 CONCL. 2, 56^{va}, 'probabiliter posset sustineri, nullam substantiam esse in rerum natura.' Edited by Andrews, as an appendix to Andrews 2008.
- 14 Ironically, reducing the number of categories to only one, namely quality, is precisely what Ockham himself would be accused of by his realist opponent Walter Burley, in the latter's second commentary on the *Physics* (after 1324). On this, see Dutilh Novaes, in her forthcoming article on the Ockham-Burley dispute. According to Dutilh Novaes, however, Burley's understanding of Ockham's position with respect to the categories seems slightly off the mark. One may speculate, she adds in a footnote, that Ockham's reasons for not going this far might have been essentially theological, just as he accepted entities falling in the category of relation in particular theological contexts.
- 15 For a thorough investigation of how this remarkable reduction of the number of categories came about, the reader is to consult Andrews 2008. In what follows I am heavily indebted to Andrews' article.

The first thing to notice, says Andrews,¹⁶ is that the very title of Manlevelt's *questio* on the reduction in the number of categories is unusual: *Utrum aliqua substantia sit* ('whether there is any substance').¹⁷ He goes on to explain that titles of commentary questions in the Middle Ages are significant, for they indicate that a specific problem was thought worthy of discussion. Some titles are indeed routine exercises which everyone was expected to ask and answer, while others reflect the particular interests of an author or philosophical school. Non-routine titles that seem to reflect the particular interest of our author in commenting on the *Isagoge*, for example, are those of the tenth and of the last *questio*: whether a genus differs from an individual,¹⁸ and whether some accident is a substantial genus,¹⁹ respectively. The individuality of even the first of the universals is investigated, as well as the substantiality of the accident. These two very titles present us with our author's logico-semantical program in a nutshell.

But let us return to his commentary on the *Categories*. Among all the traditions and debates of *Categories* commentaries, no one ever posed the question Manlevelt does: 'Does substance exist?'²⁰ Neither would anyone other than Manlevelt answer this question in the negative. The reason for this, one suspects, is that it was held as obvious and self-evident that, of course, substance exists.

In two conclusions of his *determinatio* Manlevelt claims that physically speaking, it can be argued that there is no substance anywhere in the world, whether terrestrial²¹ or celestial,²² that is to say, as long as the

16 Andrews 2008, p. 349.

17 *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Q. 16, 55^{va}–57^{rb}, 'Utrum aliqua substantia sit'.

18 Q. 10, 8^{rb}–9^{rb}, 'Utrum genus differt ab individuo'.

19 Q. 45, 43^{rb}–43^{va}, 'Utrum aliquod accidens sit genus substantiale'.

20 John of Mirecourt, who did deny substance, never raised the question so explicitly. He certainly did not embed it in a commentary on the *Categories*. In fact, Mirecourt's opinion on this matter is not too clear, anyway. See also below, section 4.4. On Mirecourt: Courtenay 1995.

21 *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta* Q. 16 CONCL. 1, 56^{rab}: 'Prima conclusio est ista, quod probabiliter posset sustineri physice loquendo, nullam penitus substantiam esse in istis inferioribus, accipiendi substantiam pro composito ex materia et forma; vel pro aliqua parte talis compositae.' (ed. Andrews).

22 *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta* Q. 16 CONCL. 2, 56^{va}: 'nullum inconveniens, ut videtur, sequitur si ponatur corpora supracaelestia esse composita ex diversis existentibus perpetue (perpetuum *ms.*) sibi invicem adhaerentibus; et si ponatur cuiuslibet orbis motorem esse unum accidens adhaerens orbi, et ipsum movens – sicut gravitas adhaeret lapidi, faciens ipsum descendere. Nec ad hoc requiritur aliqua substantia.' (ed. Andrews).

opposite is not demonstrable – which it indeed is not.²³ He not only argues that substance is unnecessary for explanatory purposes, but – taking the consecrated host as evidence – also explains how natural phenomena may be understood in the absence of substance: ‘accidents (...) support and adhere to each other.’²⁴ The picture is of a world in which physical objects are aggregates of their properties. These properties adhere to one another, and form each other’s substrate, without the need for an intangible and inaccessible substance.

This radical reformulation of nature, Andrews says, is otherwise completely unknown in the Middle Ages.²⁵ According to him it does, however, sound surprisingly similar to the deductions of the British Empiricists four hundred years later, especially those of David Hume.²⁶

However, Manlevelt’s third conclusion of his *determinatio* all too abruptly (to Andrews’s liking) recants all he has speculated about sub-

23 *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta* Q. 16 CONCL. 1, 56^{tb}: ‘omne illud potest probabiliter teneri cuius oppositum non potest evidenter probari; sed illud est huiusmodi; igitur etc. Maior videtur evidens. Et minor declaratur, quia omnes apparentiae possunt evidenter salvari, non posita aliqua tali substantia; igitur non potest evidenter probari aliquam talem substantiam esse in istis inferioribus. Consequentia est satis evidens.’ (ed. Andrews).

24 *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta* Q. 16 CONCL. 1, 56^{tb}: ‘positis tantummodo accidentibus sibi invicem subsistentibus et adhaerentibus, salvatur generatio et corruptio, augmentatio et diminutio, alteratio et loci mutatio, sicut patet in hostia consecrata.’ (ed. Andrews). William of Ockham never seems to get near to even a hint of such a substance-less picture of the world. In section 4.4 below, Manlevelt’s suggestions are summarily compared to similar passages in Buridan, Autrecourt, Mirecourt and Crathorn. It would be interesting to devote a more thorough comparative study to these authors on precisely this matter.

25 Below, however, we will pay due attention to some contemporaries of Thomas Manlevelt who at first sight seem to be not too far off our author’s mark.

26 Andrews 2008, 352 draws special attention to an indeed remarkably Manlevelt-like passage from David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Ch. I, Sect. VI, ‘Of Modes and Substances’. It runs: ‘I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.’

stance. Andrews says²⁷ that it flatly asserts the existence of substance, in accordance with all of the traditional doctrines, and that Manlevelt provides no arguments for his reversal of position. He simply states at the beginning of the conclusion that – presumably also on the non-demonstrability of its opposite – ‘it can be held as probable what everyone commonly holds’,²⁸ and, at the end, that ‘Since everyone holds this position, it need not be explained further.’²⁹ In fact, however, Manlevelt’s claiming that no substance exists may be less blunt than Andrews seems to suppose. For one thing, he holds that both the existence and the non-existence can be held *probabiliter*. This does not mean that both hypotheses are equally probable, but that both of these can be argued for. ‘Reasonably’, taken literally, might be a better translation for ‘probabiliter’ than ‘probable.’ The non-existence, then, of substance is argued for on physical grounds, the existence of substance on authoritative grounds. Moreover, Manlevelt’s recanting of his speculation is not unmotivated. After all, he does no more (but no less either) than claim that it is possible to bring forward as a hypothesis that no substance exists, as long as its opposite (that substance does exist) is not proven to be evidently true. Of course, this hypothesis alone is revolutionary enough. But as long as his own hypothesis is not proven to be evidently true either, there is room to allow for the existence of substance. On the other hand, according to Ockham’s razor ‘entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity’, so why not do away with substance after all, as there is no *necessity* to cling to substance. From that point of view, Manlevelt, who explicitly adheres to this principle,³⁰ was indeed under some obligation to maintain his anti-substance hypothesis.

27 Andrews 2008, 355.

28 *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Q. 16 CONCL. 3, 56^{vb}, ‘probabiliter posset sustineri tamquam illud quod ab omnibus communiter ponitur, quod est una prima substantia quae a nullo dependet; quae scilicet est ipsemet deus. Et quod sunt aliae substantiae separatae individuales et incorruptibiles. (...) Et quod sunt aliae, scilicet partes istarum substantiarum corruptibilium, utpote materia et forma, quae vocantur partes essentielles, quarum quidem partium quaedam sunt incorruptibiles, sicut materia (...) et anima intellectiva; et quaedam vero ponuntur corruptibiles, sicut aliae formae substantiales.’ (ed. Andrews).

29 *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Q. 16 CONCL. 3, 56^{vb}, ‘Et ista conclusio, quia ab omnibus ponitur, amplius ad praesens non declaratur.’ (ed. Andrews).

30 See the edited below, Q. 14 AD ARG. CONTRA CONCL. 10, I, 13^{va}: ‘utendo radice Aristotelis primo *Physicorum*, ubi elicitur quod pluralitas sive diversitas non est ponenda sine ratione cogente.’

However this may be, Andrews holds that his own sense of caution made Thomas Manlevelt abandon his radical experiment.³¹ But it was an experiment which was to recur, says Andrews, with a vengeance, in the era of Early Modern Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution.³²

Andrews concludes his evaluation of Manlevelt's denial of substance by admitting that Manlevelt's speculation remains a footnote to the history of philosophy, since his work was uninfluential in his lifetime, and remained unread until our own.³³ But an interesting footnote it is.

1.3. *Primacy of individuality*

The present study will stick with the first part of the manuscript that has just been proven by Andrews to contain such a gem. In fact, Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge*, which immediately precedes the commentary on the *Categories*, forms an intrinsic unity with it, as the traditional double-headed commentary on the Old Logic. Traversing the commentary on the *Isagoge* we will find out that Thomas Manlevelt applies the very same tactics of extending Ockhamist tenures and insights to any logical, and if need be metaphysical or theological subject matter. We are confronted with a radical variety of nominalism, outdoing Ockham in a number of ways. The individualizing tendency is stretched to its limits on the subject's as well as on the object's side, in an untiring effort to work out the primacy of the individual over the universal in any kind of detail. Manlevelt not only stresses the capacity of each individual instance (or 'token'³⁴) of a term to stand for individual things in the outside world,

31 Andrews 2008, 355 f.

32 Andrews 2008, 357.

33 Andrews 2008, 357.

34 For a clear exposition of the narrowed particular meaning of an utterance-token in a particular context in juxtaposition to the general meaning of an utterance-type, see Nuchelmans 1973, 4. It should be kept in mind, however, that this is a modern distinction, which is not used as such by ancient and medieval thinkers. Throughout his study on the ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity, Nuchelmans nevertheless makes ample use of the distinction to identify the propositions that do bear truth and falsity. Thus, Nuchelmans 1973, 202 holds that with Ockham it is as a rule particular acts of thinking, speaking or writing that fulfill this role. The borderline between a *propositio* in the token-sense and a *propositio* in the type-sense with Ockham was rather vague, as he seemed to attribute a certain duration to these acts, allowing the same *oratio* (e.g. 'Sortes is seated') to be first true and then false (in the case of Sortes first sitting and then standing up). It remains to be seen if this borderline was sharper with Manlevelt.

he also stresses the token character of each instance of rational activity in itself.³⁵ As each instance of a term – be it a genus, a species, or any of the remaining five universals – is an accident of the individual human mind doing the thinking, our author’s ‘singularising’ of the domain of the universals is coupled with an ‘accidentalising’ of this same domain.

The link between terms and reality may look disturbingly thin, if the linking takes place on an accidental level only. But our author is not one to do away altogether with logic’s intrinsic capacity for dealing with things outside the mind – a capacity that to the medieval mind stems from the significative character of terms. Uninhibited as he may be in his Ockhamist fervency, we are also frequently confronted with Manlevelt’s inability – or is it unwillingness? – to ultimately liberate himself from convention. Just before things really get out of hand, Thomas Manlevelt is always prepared to weaken his findings, by calling them nothing more than a kind of thought experiments or explicitly keeping open the possibility that things might be otherwise,³⁶ just like in the case of the rejected category of substance.

Has this sense of caution prevented Manlevelt from getting into serious trouble with the authorities, as Andrews suggested? This is hard to tell. But circumstances must have been favourable in one sense or another. For otherwise this provocative Ockhamist text with its daring thought experiments may not have been handed down to us in even this one single manuscript.

35 On this, see especially Q. 4, *Utrum universale sit in intellectu*, 3^{vb}–4^{ra}.

36 E.g. Q. 21 *CONCL.* 1, 20^{rb}: ‘Prima conclusio est quod ens non est universale, quia non est genus nec species etcetera, et alia numquam ponebantur universalialia ab aliquo. Circa istam conclusionem tamen nota quod ponitur tamquam probabilis et non tamquam necessaria, precise cum argumentum ab auctoritate negative non tenet. Quamvis inducat evidentiam, non tamen necessario concludit.’ Or Q. 42 *CONCL.* 9, 40^{va}: ‘Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis.’

CHAPTER TWO

Thomas Manlevelt, life and works

The proper way to get acquainted with a philosopher is through his writings. Unfortunately, the present state of investigation does not allow us to draw up anything remotely like a definite bibliography of Thomas Manlevelt. For a tentative bibliography of Thomas Manlevelt however, just as for his biography, we should best turn to Lorenz's 1996 paper on life and work of our author.¹

2.1. Bibliography

As undoubtedly written by Thomas Manlevelt, Lorenz classifies the small tracts on terminist logic, the *parva logicalia*,² that have earned him a place in modern handbooks on medieval logic.³ In the many manuscripts through which they are preserved they usually come as a trio: *De suppositionibus*, *De confusionibus* and *De consequentiis*.⁴ The authenticity of the first two of these has never been questioned; the authenticity of the third, *De consequentiis*, has to Lorenz's mind been established by Brands.⁵

- 1 Lorenz 1996, 151–155. Apart from Lorenz 1996, to be consulted about Manlevelt's bibliography are Kaczmarek 1994, xxxvi–xli, Piltz 1977, Schultes and Imbach 1996, and De Rijk 1982.
- 2 'Parva logicalia' is here used in the sense of 'short treatises on logical subjects in a terminist vein'; for two other shades of meaning of 'parva logicalia', see Braakhuis 1997, 135 f.
- 3 Maierù 1972, 277–287 has excerpts from Manlevelt's tracts on supposition and confusion, edited from ms. Vat. Lat. 3065 (*De terminis confundentibus*, ff. 25^{vb}–28^{ra}, *De suppositionibus*, ff. 65^{vb}–68^{rb}). Maierù makes explicit comparisons between Manlevelt's tracts and Ockham's treatment of these same subjects in the *Summa logicae*. Read, 1991, 74, 76 has some excerpts from Manlevelt's tract *De suppositionibus*, edited from ms. Edinburgh 138, ff. 62^r–72^f.
- 4 This famous trio of tracts, widely used in the later medievals, is shortly to be presented in a critical edition by Lorenz, Kann and Grass. That these three tracts may have formed part of a logical *summa* by Manlevelt is suggested by Maierù 1972, 32, n. 93.
- 5 Lorenz 1996, 153, with reference to Brands 1996, 184f. The same work has also been ascribed to William of Sutton, but on the ground of doctrinal considerations,

With these three logical tracts comes a set of rules that can also safely be attributed to Manlevelt: *De ampliacionibus*, *De restrictionibus*, *De appellationibus*, *De alienationibus* and *De remotionibus*. Furthermore, Lorenz shows no doubt about the ascription to Manlevelt of a *Tractatus de fallaciis*.⁶ Manlevelt must also have been the author of a tract on *Insolubilia*, that has however not been recovered yet.⁷ A work of a more polemical character, the anti-modist *Tractatus de improbatione modorum significandi*, edited as an anonymous text by Kaczmarek,⁸ is also to be attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, says Lorenz, as long as it not proven otherwise.⁹ A *De incipit et desinit* that in half of its known manuscripts is ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt is reckoned by Lorenz to be more justly ascribed to Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290–1349).¹⁰ Until it is seriously researched, Lorenz refrains from making a definitive statement on Manlevelt's supposed authorship of the commentary in the form of *questiones* on the *Ars vetus*, known from the Amplonian Library, the first part of which, *Ques-*

Brands shows that this tract *De consequentiis* is quite in line with Manlevelt's *De suppositionibus*, and therefore is to be ascribed to Manlevelt as well.

- 6 There are other such tracts sometimes ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt, but not considered by Lorenz. For example there are two manuscripts of a tract on *Fallaciae breves*, mentioned by De Rijk 1982, 13, 29. In De Rijk's as yet unpublished handwritten card-index in Leiden, mention is made of a tract *De inventione medii*. A work somewhat out of style with all these, to be found in Lehmann 1928, but also left unmentioned by Lorenz, was catalogued by the founder of the Bibliotheca Amploonia as *glosa egregii poete Maulevelt super Persium cum textu*. Piltz 1977, by the way, mentions quite some manuscripts ascribed to Manlevelt, but does not come up with titles not taken into account by Lorenz.
- 7 Lorenz 1996, 154, esp. n. 39.
- 8 Kaczmarek 1994.
- 9 By lack of investigation into Manlevelt's works, Kaczmarek 1994, xxvi refrains from attributing this anti-modist tract to our author. Lorenz, who devotes a long footnote (Lorenz 1996, 155, n. 42) to a critical examination of Kaczmarek's opinion on this matter, is more confident on Manlevelt's authorship. As long as a critical textual investigation of the tract does not show that it is *not* by Manlevelt, says Lorenz, we may safely ascribe it to him. And such a critical investigation has not taken place yet, let alone that it has thrown serious doubts on Manlevelt's authorship. Pinborg (1967, 196 n.) had been of the opinion that in this case the name of a better-known author (Thomas Manlevelt) was substituted for the name of a lesser-known author (John Aurifaber, fl. 1330). Another serious candidate for the authorship of the *Destructiones modorum significandi*, favoured by Pinborg but dismissed by Kaczmarek, is Peter of Ailly (1350–1420). That Thomas Manlevelt tends to be confused with authors chronologically so widely separated from one another, says enough about his own obscurity. Lorenz, by the way, dismisses Pierre d'Ailly's possible authorship as a 'Pseudo-Kontroverse'.
- 10 For more about this tract, and about the relationship of our author to Thomas Bradwardine in general, see below, subsection 4.6.1.

tiones libri Porphirii is edited here in full, and the second *questio* of the second part of which, *Questiones supra Predicamenta*, is edited here as an appendix.¹¹ After giving the text its hitherto wanting research, I feel warranted to indeed ascribe these commentaries on the old logic to Thomas Manlevelt.

None of the manuscripts containing these texts are older than the later part of the fourteenth century. As will be seen, the earliest known manuscript of any of Manlevelt's works which has a precise date attached to it stems from 1364.

Possible additions to the list of works ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt by Lorenz: commentaries, to wit, on the *Physics* and *De anima*, will be discussed below,¹² as the authenticity of these works is dependent on the authenticity of the text presented here.

2.2. Biography

The problematic state of the bibliographical information on Thomas Manlevelt is more than matched by the almost total lack of biographical information. For 'next to nothing is known about Thomas Maulfelt.' This lamentation by Brands in his 1996 paper on Manlevelt's theory of supposition¹³ is echoed some years later by Grass in his study on the theory of *consequentiae* in pre-university Erfurt,¹⁴ in which Thomas Manlevelt plays a not unimportant role. In his 2008 paper on Manlevelt's denial of substance, Andrews too cannot but concede that indeed little is known about our author's life.¹⁵ No great advance seems to have been made, then, since 1974, when N.W. Gilbert presented 'the mysterious "Thomas Maulefelt"' as 'a writer about whom we are almost completely uninformed': 'This logician leads a fugitive existence even by fourteenth century standards.'¹⁶

As it is, hardly any fact can be accepted with a safe degree of certainty about the life and times and whereabouts of the fourteenth-century philosopher Thomas Anglicus dictus Maulfelt.¹⁷ Indeed, if I want to

11 Lorenz 1996, 154: 'Ob diese Kommentare tatsächlich von Manlevelt stammen, bleibt einer eingehenden Untersuchung vorbehalten.'

12 Section 3.2.

13 Brands 1996, 185.

14 Grass 1998, 56.

15 Andrews 2008, 347.

16 Gilbert 1974, 113.

17 Maierù 1972, 31 holds that Manlevelt being an Englishman is about the only thing

compile some sort of biography of this logician, I will have to confine myself to a sketchy outline as the highest attainable goal for the moment, without upholding any pretence that the sketchy results attained so far will never stand in need of correction. But I do not have to start from scratch, either.

The most extensive discussion of Manlevelt's life is in Lorenz's aforementioned 1996 paper, 'Thomas Manlefeld (Maulefeld), Zu Leben und Werk'¹⁸ and this is the paper that provides us with the framework of Manlevelt's biography – a framework heartily accepted by Andrews as well in his 2008 paper.

2.2.1. *Biographical framework*

Following Lorenz, Manlevelt's tentative biography then runs as follows.¹⁹ He was born in England,²⁰ but spent most of his active academic life in Paris in the 1320s and 1330s as a *magister artium*. He was a dedicated propagator of the *logica modernorum* and took it as his task to make away with the older logico-semantic theory of the *modi significandi*.

One of his pupils in Paris was John Aurifaber,²¹ who around 1330 spread Manlevelt's teachings to Erfurt. By the end of 1330 Thomas Manlevelt was elected procurator of the English nation at the Paris faculty of arts. He probably was still teaching in Paris in 1337, but by 1339 had surely left Paris.²² Later he found employment as a teacher in pre-university Louvain, probably at the convent school of St. Peter.²³ It is unknown if after that he worked anywhere else.²⁴

we know about him. In n. 9 Maierù refers to line of text above the manuscript edited here ('Hec questiones fuerunt compilatae per Thom. Manlefeld Anglicum doctorem solemnem'), and to the Erfurt manuscript Ampl. Q 255 'Explicit tractatus fallaciarum lectus Lovanii per mag. Thomam Anglicum dictum Manlefeld. As I will presently make clear, the mentioning of Louvain, although passed over by Maierù, is not without meaning, either.

18 Lorenz 1996.

19 See Lorenz 1996, 164.

20 This assumption, based on Thomas being called Anglicus, is somewhat unsettled by the circumstance that Lorenz nor anyone else has thus far been able to find a trace of him in England. See Lorenz 1996, 157.

21 This anti-modist logician is not to be confused with the 16th century John Aurifaber (Goldschmidt), friend and disciple of Martin Luther, and editor of the latter's table talks. On the 14th century Aurifaber, see Pinborg 1967, among others.

22 Lorenz 1996, 158.

23 Lorenz 1996, 157 ff.

24 This tentative biographical framework by Lorenz is more or less canonized by the mini-biography of Thomas Manlevelt in *The Cambridge History of Medieval*

His fame rests chiefly on his already mentioned works in the *parva logicalia*, which seem to have been spread mainly as a trio, comprising *De suppositionibus*, *De confusionibus* and *De consequentiis*. Widely popular in the fourteen hundreds, they were in use as textbooks and commented upon at universities in Germany and beyond: Leipzig, Erfurt, Prague, Vienna, Krakow, Uppsala. Manuscripts of his work remain in Edinburgh, Erfurt, Klagenfurt, Munich, Prague, Vienna, Uppsala.²⁵

2.2.2. Career in Paris

There are marginal notes to be made to this proposed *vita* of Thomas Manlevelt, for sure. Let us just take a closer look at Lorenz's reasons for situating the key period of our author's career in Paris in the 1320s and 30s.

Historical investigations have resulted in pinpointing not more than one single official document in which our author is supposed to be mentioned. In his book about the university of Erfurt in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, Lorenz not only links Thomas Manlevelt to the Erfurt curriculum, but grants him a place in Parisian history too, by identifying him as the 'Thomas Anglicus, attorney on behalf of the *Natio anglicorum*' who in the *Chartularium* of the University of Paris is twice mentioned for the year of 1331 as a *Magister actu regens*.²⁶

Of course, the twice mentioning of a certain 'Thomas Anglicus' in the Parisian charters is rather poor when taken as hard evidence for Manlevelt having stayed in Paris, as Lorenz seems to do.²⁷ Thus, the identification of our Thomas with the 1330 English master at Paris

Philosophy: 'fl. 1320s–30s. English logician, associated with nominalism. Parisian master of arts; subsequently taught in Leuven.' In Pasnau (ed.) 2010, 979.

25 On the use of Manlevelt's *parva logicalia* in Europe see for example Pinborg 1967, 146, 196. For their use in Krakow, see Markowski 1971, 202 *et al.* Andrews 2008, 347, n. 1 draws special attention to two publications on the established influence of Thomas Manlevelt in Uppsala. The influence of Manlevelt is witnessed in Anders Piltz, *Studium Upsalense. Specimens of the oldest lecture notes taken in the medieval University of Uppsala* (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1977). A Manlevelt manuscript is also discussed in Andrews 1993.

26 The reference in Lorenz 1996, 158 n. 53 is to charters dated January 12 and 21, 1331. Reproduced in Denifle and Châtelain (eds.), 1891, pages 363 and 365, respectively.

27 Lorenz's identification of the Parisian 'Thomas Anglicus' with Thomas Manlevelt begs to be questioned, and has in fact been questioned by Courtenay, among others. Stephen Read, in a conversation with the present author on 6 November 2006, stated that the mentioning of this 'Thomas Anglicus' 'does not prove anything at all'.

has already been estimated as ‘extremely tenuous’ by Fitzgerald,²⁸ who points out that the Parisian master of Arts, ‘Thomas of England’ is only identified as ‘Thomas Maulfelt’ in a single Melk manuscript²⁹ and that most of the manuscripts of this ‘Manlevelt’ date from the 1360s at the earliest. The dating of our author’s manuscripts may be right, but forms no conclusive counterproof to his presence at Paris in 1330. Moreover, Fitzgerald definitely did miss at least two other manuscripts identifying ‘Thomas Anglicus’ as ‘Thomas Manlevelt’ or any of its variant spellings.³⁰ Kaczmarek tends to support Lorenz’s hypothesis, but comes up with a couple of other Thomases that might just as well have been the Thomas Anglicus mentioned in the Parisian charters.³¹

One circumstantial fact we can be really certain of has no direct relation to the vita of Manlevelt, namely, that his writings were widely used and held in high esteem in the fifteenth century middle European universities of Leipzig, Erfurt, Prague and Vienna. To name but one example: in the early years of its existence, the University of Leipzig, founded in 1409, favoured nominalism; among the prescribed textbooks are those of William Heytesbury and Thomas Manlevelt.³² To realists, on the other hand, Manlevelt was a main target of sometimes vicious attacks, on a par with the most famous or infamous of nominalists. Thus, in 1406 in a dispute in Heidelberg, his name was included in a list of infamous masters accused of heresy by their realist opponent, that also included Ockham, Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen.³³ Manlevelt being part of this

28 Fitzgerald 2002, 31. Fitzgerald’s concern with this matter is provoked by the possibility that Albert of Saxony might have drawn insights from, or been influenced by, Thomas Manlevelt teaching in Paris. Somewhat beyond the scope of our study is Fitzgerald’s other concern, about Albert maybe not being Buridan’s pupil at all, otherwise than has hitherto been generally assumed.

29 Fitzgerald’s reference is to Melk, MS. 1941.

30 Apart from the manuscript edited below, Erfurt, MS. CA.Q.288, also Erfurt, MS. CA.Q.253 is overlooked.

31 Kaczmarek 1994, xxxiv.

32 See for example Lorenz, 1996, 147.

33 On the 1406 disputation in Heidelberg, see Kaluza 1997. Jerome of Prague (1379–1416), follower and friend of John Hus, and ardent supporter of Wyclif’s brand of realism, is reported to have launched the realists’ attack in a ruthless manner: ‘Magister Jeronimus asseruit et temerarie tenuit pocius et melius esse adherendum doctrine dicti Johannis Wicleph quam doctrine sancti Augustini, palam, publice et notorie. (...) Et propter hoc intulerit magistros Okkan, Maulveld, Buridanum, Marsilium et eorum sequaces non dialecticos, sed diabolice hereticos.’ Cited after Kaluza 1997, 138, n. 27. The quotation is from L. Klicman’s edition of the acts of the following doctrinal process against Jerome of Prague in Vienna, 1410–1412.

realist assault may serve as a perverse proof of his fame in those days. The spread of Manlevelt's logical writings all over Europe could not have taken place if not from a centre of philosophical authority. Paris then is the only place that seems to come into account. Seen from this point of view, the spread of his logical tracts does throw some light on Manlevelt's vita after all.

2.2.3. *Bibliographical data from works and manuscripts*

Let me examine the information indirectly pertaining to the life of Thomas Manlevelt that can be had from his works and the manuscripts containing these.

If there are doubts to be raised about Manlevelt's supposed stay in Paris, his having taught in pre-university Louvain seems to be undisputed. There is at least one manuscript in which the name of Thomas is linked directly to Louvain. The text concerned is an exposé by Thomas on the fallacies, and the manuscript is to be found in Erfurt. The text ends: 'Explicit tractatus fallaciarum lectus Lovanii per mag. Thomam Anglicum, dictum Manlovel.'³⁴ There is no doubt about Thomas's authorship of this tract on the fallacies. So there seems to be no reason for doubt about his lecturing in Louvain, as reported in the manuscript of this tract, either.

The dating of Manlevelt's work is less straightforward. His treatise on supposition is dated by Courtenay somewhere before 1360.³⁵ As his witness for this he takes Pinborg, who mentions that the earliest copy of Manlevelt's *Tractatus de suppositionibus* appears in a manuscript from Erfurt, now at Göttingen. This manuscript, belonging to the Franciscan monastery in Göttingen, was written by one Nicolaus in Erfurt, 1364. Apart from the text by Manlevelt it contains mainly Franciscan tracts on theological, juridical, astronomical and philosophical matters.³⁶

This dating of the treatise on supposition may not seem to be too spectacular. It does at least offer a corroboration of the thesis that Manlevelt did indeed compose his logical treatises before 1360, but it does little to pinpoint the exact date, which should be around 1330, if he did indeed compose them in Paris, and if he is indeed to be identified with the Thomas Anglicus that Lorenz wants to identify him with.

34 Reference to this text is made by Lorenz 1996, 157 n. 48. Also by Maierù 1972, 31, n. 91.

35 Courtenay 1987, 234.

36 Pinborg 1967, 145 f.

Courtenay does not seem to have found a reason to advance a *post quem* dating of Manleveld's tract on supposition that is considerably earlier than its *ante quem* dating around 1360. However, as long as there is no hard evidence for a *post quem* dating of any of Manleveld's writings that would indisputably run against the otherwise feasible biographical framework laid out by Lorenz, it would seem unwise not to follow Andrews in his support of Lorenz's hypothesis that Thomas Manleveld did work in Paris around 1330.³⁷

2.2.4. *Anglicus?*

Another question is in how far *Thomas Manleveld dictus Anglicus* is really an Englishman. I will not follow Courtenay where he takes Thomas Manleveld to have been one of the logicians working in Oxford, even though Courtenay's estimation does corroborate mine when it comes to Manleveld's Ockhamist frame of mind.

The English treatises and textbooks in logic produced in the second and third quarters of the fourteenth century at Oxford, Courtenay explains,³⁸ provided more than just so many introductions to the various areas of the *logica moderna*. They made continental students aware of different approaches and assumptions in late mediaeval logic. William Sutton, whose work became popular in German universities, compared the theories of Ockham and Burley on supposition, favouring the latter.³⁹ Manleveld, along with Heytesbury and Dumbleton, identified himself more closely with terminism, and within that, with Ockhamist presuppositions. Feribrigge and Hunter, on the other hand, show no traces of nominalism. Manleveld's influence seems to have been confined to the German universities, while Heytesbury, Billingham, Strode, Feribrigge, and Hunter were also influential south of the Alps.⁴⁰

One can only agree with Courtenay that Thomas Manleveld may be labelled 'English' in as far as he took active part in the development of the then prevalent British way of philosophising. But was he really an Englishman?

37 More about the *terminus post quem* and the *terminus ante quem* of the present text in section 3.4 below.

38 Courtenay 1987, 236.

39 Courtenay 1987, 236f.

40 Courtenay 1987, 237.

True, he is called Thomas Anglicus in several manuscripts,⁴¹ but this may reflect nothing more than that he probably studied in England and was associated with English logicians (or with the English nation at the University of Paris, which had German and Dutch members as well⁴²) in the minds of continental scholars. Thus he may have been named ‘Thomas the Englishman’ because he approached logic and philosophy in general in an ‘English’, that is to say: non-modistic frame of mind, which was deemed an important characteristic in the modistic stronghold that Erfurt was.⁴³

If his being called Englishman is insufficient to establish his English descent,⁴⁴ could we perhaps learn more of Manlevelt’s origin from his proper name?

2.2.5. *The spelling of the name ‘Manlevelt’*

Unluckily, even the way his name is to be spelled is subject of debate. Besides being called Thomas Anglicus, his proper name is spelled in many ways, ranging from Manlevelt to Maulfield, and even Manlovel. We have already met with some different ways of spelling in the article by Andrews and in Schum’s presentation of the latter-day scribbling on the manuscript of our text.⁴⁵

Not laying any claim to completeness, Kaczmarek in the introduction to his 1994 edition of *Destructiones modorum significandi* proceeds to sum up twenty odd variations of Manlevelt’s surname, found scattered among the scientific publications in which more often than not passing mention is made of the fourteenth century logician.⁴⁶ The list runs: Malvelt, Manfelt, Manlefeld, Manlevel, Manleveld(t), Manlevelt, Manlovel, Mansfeld(?), Mauelfelt, Maulefeld, Maulevelt, Maulfeld(t), Maulfelt, Mauliwelt(h), Maulveld, Maulvelt, Mauwelveit, Mawelfelt, Mawlfelt, Mawlpfelt.

Having scrutinized these variations from a lexico-historical point of view, Kaczmarek points out the English Maulefeld, with its German

41 Erfurt, MS. CA.Q.253; Erfurt, MS. CA.Q.288; Melk, MS. 1941.

42 More about the four ‘nations’ at the University of Paris below, in section 4.5.

43 On this see Kaczmarek’s introduction to his edition of the *Destructiones modorum significandi*, in Anonymus 1994. Also Spade 1998, 402 f.

44 Below, it is examined in how far his being named ‘Anglicus’ may be connected to his possible membership of the English nation at the University of Paris.

45 See above, section 1.1, where reference is made to Schum 1887, 528 f.

46 Kaczmarek 1994, xxxvi ff.

variation Maulfelt, as the most likely form of the logician's surname. Kaczmarek's amply elucidated surmise is that Maulfelt's is a farmers' descend, his roots laying somewhere in the West of East Anglia or thereabout.⁴⁷

One does not have to be an expert on the subject matter treated so meticulously by Kaczmarek to raise an obvious objection. It is clear enough to even the layman's eye that Kaczmarek's reasoning is somewhat speculative, here and there. Seeing the maze of suppositions on which Kaczmarek's conclusions rest, they obviously cannot be taken as the last word on the matter either. That Manlevelt or Maulfelt must have a geographical connotation, if not to say denotation, seems to be quite sure. A manuscript of Manlevelt's *Suppositiones*, written in Prague in the second half of the fourteenth century, ends thus: 'Expliciunt suppositiones magistri Thome Malvelt', to which the scribe added: 'de tali loco' as an explanation of the magister's name.⁴⁸ All that can be said on basis of the foregoing is that neither the form of our philosopher's name nor its English origin can be established with certainty. In any event, he must have taught at Louvain, and at least some variations of his name (Maulveldt, Mauleveld, Manlevel, Manloval) suggest a Low Countries origin, rather than an English origin. All this does not go to say that Thomas Manlevelt himself must have come from the duchy of Brabant. Neither can this be taken as decisive disproof of his being of English birth.

But why the real name of our Thomas Anglicus should not be in some way connected to the German hometown of Martin Luther, Mansfeld,⁴⁹ to make but one wild guess in another geographical direction, is far beyond the scope of this study.⁵⁰

47 Kaczmarek 1994, XLI. That Manlevelt's name does indeed have a geographical meaning is also indicated, as we will presently see, by the scribe of one of the mss. of his tract on supposition, who added 'de tali loco' as an explanation of the name spelled by him 'Malvel'. See De Rijk 1982, 11.

48 See De Rijk 1982, 11.

49 In a footnote to his list of variations of our philosopher's name, Kaczmarek explains why precisely this variant is provided with a question mark. The variant stems from the catalogue of the Erfurt Collegium Universitatis ca. 1472, and it is Kaczmarek's opinion that the writer has mistakenly read or written Mansfeld for Maulfeld, an all too understandable mistake, precisely because of the nearness of Erfurt to the town and county Mansfeld. Indeed, there is a speculative tinge to Kaczmarek's line of reasoning.

50 It would have been nice if there was a town, village or cottage by the name of 'Manlevelt' or any of its variations to be found in the vicinity of present-day Louvain, but alas, scrutinizing maps and atlases did not yield any such result.

For the present edition, the choice for ‘Thomas Manlevelt’ as the spelling of our author’s name is not entirely arbitrary. It stays close enough to the spelling used in the note jotted down above the very beginning of our text, ‘Thom. Manlevel’. Also it is in accordance with the spelling used by Maierù in his handbook on late scholastic logical terminology⁵¹ and the intended spelling used in the forthcoming edition of the *parva logicalia* by Kann, Lorenz and Grass.⁵²

Let me say a few more things on his English background and on the dating of his works.

2.2.6. *Thomas’s English background and the dating of his works*

In his 1975 book *The Mediaeval Liar*, Spade cites a medieval text in which Manlevelt’s *Insolubilia* is mentioned together with the *Insolubilia* by Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1295–1349), Roger Swineshead (fl. before 1335; d. ca. 1365) and William of Heytesbury (b. before 1313; d. 1372/3).⁵³ The grouping of Thomas Manlevelt with three English thinkers seems to fit in well with Manlevelt himself being called Anglicus. But as I have already noted, there remains a shadow of doubt whether Thomas Manlevelt indeed was English, despite this namegiving. N.W. Gilbert remarked in 1974 that Manlevelt is not even listed in any British biographical register that he had been able to consult.⁵⁴ To my knowledge no such listing has been discovered since then.

Looking at the biographical data of the other two thinkers, the least one can say about this mentioning is that it is not incompatible with the tentative dating of Manlevelt’s philosophical activity around the thirties or forties of the fourteenth century. This tentative dating of Manlevelt’s works seems to be corroborated even further by a characteristic that is lacking in them, but that is to be found a little later on in the fourteenth century. A philosopher writing around the fifties and early sixties like Albert of Saxony (d. 1390), by way of traceable quotations makes implicit

51 Maierù 1972, *passim*.

52 This spelling of our author’s name has also been used by Brands 1996 and by Kann 1994, but strangely enough not by Lorenz, who is also involved in the forthcoming edition of the *parva logicalia*, in his 1996 tentative biography, whose title has ‘Thomas Manlefeld (Maulefeld)’, sticking to the letter f instead of v, and keeping open the possibility of the letter u replacing the letter n.

53 Spade 1975, 29f. The text cited by Spade is an anonymous, probably early 15th century *Quaestiones libri insolubilibium Hollandrini*.

54 Gilbert 1974, 99 n. 42. Lorenz 1996 does not come up with any such findings either.

mention of several early fourteenth century thinkers,⁵⁵ while such quotations seem not to be found with Manlevelt. Explicit mention is made by Thomas Manlevelt of only a handful of more or less contemporary thinkers, all of whom had died years before he took to writing anyway: Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253),⁵⁶ Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274),⁵⁷ and Peter of Spain (d. 1277).⁵⁸

For curiosity's sake, attention must be drawn to a remarkable if not coincidental similarity in a minor detail: in both Manlevelt's and Albert of Saxony's commentary on the *Isagoge* reference is made to Plato's eagle's nose.⁵⁹ It is unclear whether this must be looked upon as a sign of intellectual kinship between the two. On the other hand, Manlevelt's use of the adjective 'aquilinus'⁶⁰ to designate Plato, might link him to Albert of Saxony after all, seeing that Albert makes use of the very same, rather uncommon epithet to designate Plato. A possible philosophic relationship between our author and Albert of Saxony is also taken into account by Fitzgerald, who draws attention to the remarkable affinity Manlevelt's writings on supposition show with Albert's. The problem is, Fitzgerald says, that no one really knows what a connection between them would even be supposed to be.⁶¹ If Lorenz's assumption that Thomas was teaching in Paris around 1330 is right, the connection can hardly have been other than a kind of teacher-pupil one, with Albert on the pupil-end.⁶² This conclusion would not be subscribed to by Fitzgerald, whose view of the matter is that our author's treatments of material and simple supposition seem to be elaborations on Albert's views rather than vice versa. Fitzgerald cannot but conclude, however, that at this stage of research into Thomas Manlevelt, it is just too early to hazard even a guess about the interrelationship between him and Albert of Saxony, even though there are striking similarities. Research will greatly benefit by the critical

55 See, for example, Fitzgerald's 2002 edition of Albert of Saxony's *Twenty-Five Disputed Questions On Logic*.

56 Q. 44: *In Posteriorum analyticorum*.

57 Q. 14: *Summa theologiae*.

58 Q. 14: *Summulae logicales*.

59 Q. 30 CONCL. 3, 29^{vb}, of our text; Albert of Saxony, *In Porph.*, p. 260, § 268.

60 Q. 30 CONCL. 3, 29^{vb}: 'omnis sciturus vel omne scitum differt a Platone aquilino; Sortes est sciturus; igitur Sortes differt a Platone aquilino.'

61 Fitzgerald 2002, 31.

62 Just like John Aurifaber may well have been Manlevelt's pupil at the Parisian faculty of Arts around 1331.

edition of Thomas Manlevelt's *parva logicalia*.⁶³ More questions will then probably come somewhat closer to an answer. Chief among these will be the question concerning the relationship between Manlevelt's theory of supposition and Ockham's theory.⁶⁴

2.2.7. *Thomas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony*

Meanwhile, the interconnection between Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony did receive some more probing attention on the occasion of both philosophers' respective thoughts on a technical aspect of supposition theory, the so-called 'descensus copulativus'. This is a rather unusual mode of 'descending to singulars' for terms used in personal supposition in a proposition.⁶⁵ Via this *descensus copulativus*, the descent to singulars for the term 'man' in the proposition 'Socrates differs from every man' will result in the conjunctive proposition 'Socrates differs from this man and that man and ...', and not 'Socrates differs from this man or that man or ...' Read⁶⁶ and Brands⁶⁷ have written articles about this subject matter; Kann pays considerable attention to this matter in the introduction to his study on Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis logica*.⁶⁸ Without going into the technical details here, it is worthwhile to notice that all three adhere to the hypothesis that it was Thomas Manlevelt who influenced Albert of Saxony.⁶⁹ They take Manlevelt's tract *De suppositionibus* to have been written

63 See above, section 2.1, where reference is made to the forthcoming critical edition by Lorenz, Kann and Grass.

64 Recently, Dutilh Novaes has proposed an intensional interpretation of Ockham's theory of supposition, contrary to the more common referential interpretation (Dutilh Novaes 2008). Rather than a theory of reference, she holds that Ockham's theory of supposition is a theory of (propositional) meaning, providing a formal method for the semantic analysis of (certain) propositions, generating their possible meanings. An interesting matter of further study would be whether or not Manlevelt's theory of supposition would lend itself to such an intensional interpretation as well.

65 For a general account of the descent to singulars one may consult Spade 2002, chapter 9: 'The Ups and Downs of Personal Supposition'. For a more specific account on the nominal conjunctive descent or *descensus copulativus* see Dutilh Novaes 2008a, 454 ff. Maierù, 1972, 232 ff. treats *descensus* in its relation to *confusio*. On *descensus copulativus* in the context of *suppositio confuse tantum* with Manlevelt, see Maierù 1972, 277 f.

66 Read 1991.

67 Brands 1996.

68 Kann 1994.

69 Thus Kann 1994, 19 holding that there are indications that Albert of Saxony 'Positionen Manlevelts übernommen bzw. sich mit ihm auseinandergesetzt haben könnte.'

after William of Ockham's 1324 *Summa logicae* and before 1344,⁷⁰ that is to say, before the *Perutilis logica*, which should be dated between 1351 and 1355.⁷¹ Not only does Albert of Saxony tread in Manlevelt's footsteps when it comes to the *descensus copulativus*, even using the same problematic proposition 'Sortes differt ab omne homine', but both thinkers' main partition of the types of supposition show a highly remarkable likeness as well. They both accept an initial tripartition in simple, material and personal supposition, while limiting simple supposition to conventional terms: spoken and written terms do have simple supposition, but mental terms (having 'natural supposition') have not.⁷² The differences between Thomas Manlevelt's and Albert of Saxony's theories on the main division of supposition as well as on the *descensus copulativus* are not in the main lines, but in the details, suggesting that Albert of Saxony developed his own ideas while involved in a philosophical discussion with Manlevelt, whose ideas had crystallized into the tracts at Albert's elbow. If so, this forms a further strengthening of my surmise that Thomas Manlevelt did his major work in the 1330s and 1340s.

70 1344 being the year of the earliest known commentary on a tract ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt, *De consequentiis*. Brands 1996, 185.

71 The 1350s are the period from which the most and the most important of Albert of Saxony's writings stem, as well as those of John Buridan – which puts a considerable burden on those maintaining that Manlevelt may have been a Buridanist instead of an Ockhamist. That Buridan's *De consequentiis* may be of the 1330s does not make this different, in as far as the 1350s still is the undisputed era of Buridan's main writings.

72 Berger, 1991, 43 holds that to the best of his knowledge the terminology of *significare naturaliter proprie/communiter* is due to Albert of Saxony. In a footnote he cites Brands, claiming however that this terminology was already employed by Manlevelt in the 1330s. For a more nuanced discussion on simple supposition, also in relation to 'natural signification' in distinction to 'natural supposition', see Panaccio's forthcoming article on Ockham and Buridan on simple supposition.

CHAPTER THREE

Why this text is to be ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt

As we have seen,¹ Manlevelt's main biographer Lorenz is not sure if the commentaries on the old logic contained in manuscript ERFURT. Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek CA 4° 288 (also referred to as Erfurt, *Bibl. Ampl.* 288), the first part of which is edited here, are to be added to Manlevelt's bibliography. That is to say, by lack of serious investigation of this text, Lorenz refrains from making a definitive statement on Manlevelt's supposed authorship. Other possible additions to the list of works ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt by Lorenz: commentaries, to wit, on the *Physics* and *De anima*, will be discussed below. For the moment I will first investigate the candidature of the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* itself as an authentic work by Manlevelt.

The very least that can be ascertained about the authorship of this text is that it is ascribed to Thomas Manlevelt, that there are no reasons beforehand to assume that this ascription would be incorrect, and that there is reason enough to take the ascription to be correct. The authenticity of the second part of our Erfurt manuscript, i.e. the commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* automatically follows.

3.1. *The manuscript*

Even the circumstantial fact that the sole manuscript of the present text is to be found in the Bibliotheca Amploniana may not be entirely without meaning when we take a look at the doings and interests of its founder, Amplonius Rating de Bercka.² Amplonius was a representative of the group of Masters that around the year 1400 travelled from one university to the next, lecturing as they went, and obtaining their own collection of books while *en route*.³

1 Introduction, 2.1.

2 On Amplonius and his library see Speer 1995 and Kadenbach 1995.

3 The Bibliotheca Amploniana in Erfurt, obtained as a gift made by Amplonius in 1412

The works collected by Amplonius in his Erfurt library centred mainly around philosophy in all its branches, with special interest in logic, mathematics and philosophy of nature as well as medicine, and works on theology, and juridical works on private law and church law. Seeing its founder's interest in logic, there seems to be nothing improbable about his wandering off to Louvain and buying a commentary on the Old Logic by Thomas Manlevelt there.

This then, is the context in which the only remaining manuscript of this commentary on the *Isagoge* by Porphyry has been preserved. There is no positive proof or even a hint that this commentary or its twin commentary on the *Categories* in any way entered the logical curriculum at Erfurt University, but Manlevelt's works on the *parva logicalia* did indeed. Already in 1420 not only the logical works by Aristotle were commented upon in Erfurt, but also the *parva logicalia*. In modern logic, which tended to develop into a 'logic of language', an important role was played by the *termini mentales*.⁴ In this connection Manlevelt's views were treated alongside those of John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen and others.⁵ The meagrest of conclusions to be drawn from this then would be that probably a set of commentaries on the Old Logic by precisely Thomas Manlevelt would find a home there.

A word on the coherence between these two commentaries on the old logic first. Above I have already hinted at the doctrinal agreement and the similarity of tactical approach in the two commentaries.⁶ On this evidence alone, the more than tentative conclusion can only be that the author of our commentary on the *Isagoge* was the same one that composed the commentary on the *Categories* studied by Andrews. The connection between the commentaries is established right away by the

and still enlarged during the 15th century, is today one of the most important collections of manuscripts in Germany, and the biggest preserved medieval collection of a late-medieval scholar in the world. The Bibliotheca Amploniana may also give us some insight into the late-medieval teachings at the University of Erfurt, founded in 1392, of which Amplonius was the founding master and second rector. From the very start this university was held in high esteem, and around the middle of the fifteenth century had proven itself as a worthy champion of the nominalist cause of the 'via moderna' against the realists of the 'via antiqua'. Again, see Speer 1995.

4 On this, see Markowski 1995, esp. 40, 51, with a reference to the *Puncta materiarum librorum quasi omnium que pro baccalariatus gradu Erfordie leguntur et examinantur*, Erfurt, BA, cms Qu 241.

5 Markowski 1995, 40. Manlevelt's views are treated in the *Puncta materiarum librorum quasi omnium que pro baccalariatus gradu Erfordie leguntur et examinantur*, 33^{vb}.

6 Introduction 1.1.

first *questio* of the commentary on the *Isagoge*, which is concerned with the necessity of knowing something about genus and species etcetera (the subject matter of the *Isagoge*, that is) before turning one's attention to the categories.⁷ A distinction on equivocation made in the fifth *questio* is said to serve for the commentary on the *Categories* as well.⁸ The 22nd *questio* of the commentary on the *Isagoge* takes up a theme normally reserved for treatment in a commentary on the *Categories*: whether there are ten highest genera and no more and no less than ten.⁹ Moreover, apart from the many implicit references,¹⁰ in for example the 33rd and 43rd *questio* of the commentary on the *Isagoge* there are explicit references to the commentary on the *Categories* that is to immediately follow.¹¹ That the two commentaries are in fact to be looked upon as the two chapters of one continuing story, is visualized by the table of contents that rounds off the manuscript. Without any hint of a subdivision, the table of contents, filling the last few folios of the manuscript, does not even make a distinction between the two parts in the enumeration of the *questiones*. The *questiones* on *Isagoge* and *Categories* are simply numbered through there.

From this safe starting ground let me now see if it can be ascertained that Thomas Manlevelt and none other is the name to be attached to these two commentaries. In fact it is the name, and the only name, actually attached to the manuscript.

7 Q. 1, 1^{ra}–1^{vb}: 'Queritur circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam.'

8 Q. 5 DIST. 2, 5^{ra}: '(...) et totum istud presuppono usque ad *Questiones de predicamentis*.'

9 Q. 22, 20^{va}–22^{ra}: 'Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora.' *Deo volente* I will go into this matter on a later occasion, and compare Manlevelt's view on the number of categories with the views expressed by Albert the Great and John Duns Scotus, who indeed take up this theme in their commentaries on the *Categories*, and with those by Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, who take up this theme in other works, but then, did not compose a commentary on the *Categories*. John Buridan did also shine his light on the number of categories, but seems to have worked in quite another direction than our author did; see King 1994. For the views of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on this matter, see Bos and Van der Helm 1998.

10 Q. 5. DIST. 2, 5^{ra}, Q. 8 CONCL. 7, 7^{tb}, among many others.

11 Q. 33 CONCL. 4, 33^{va}: 'Sed de isto plus patebit *supra Predicamenta*.' Q. 33 CONCL. 6, 33^{va}: '*supra Predicamenta* diffusius patebit de ista materia.' Q. 43 AD 7., 41^{vb}: 'Et hoc diffusius pertractabitur *Supra Predicamenta*.' Q. 43 (Ad secundum in oppositum), 41^{vb}: 'Qualiter vero compositum ex subiecto et accidente fit in predicamento, et qualiter non, patebit *Super Predicamenta*, quia ibi potius habet locum.' See also Q. 5 CONCL. 5, 5^{va}, and Q. 6 AD 3., 6^{ra}.

According to the catalogue edited in 1887 by W. Schum, the text stems from the middle of the fourteenth century, and its author is identified on the cover of the manuscript itself as Thomas Manlevelt: ‘Item questiones optime Thome Manlevelt super veteri arte.’¹²

The ascription to Thomas Manlevelt is corroborated by a line of text, supposedly added in the late fourteenth century at the top of the recto-side of the first folio: ‘Hec questiones fuerunt compilatae per Thom. Manlevel Anglicum doctorem solempnem.’¹³ This compiling must be understood, not as a gathering together of materials from different sources, but in a technical sense.¹⁴ A compiled commentary, then, is a revised version on the basis of reports jotted down by students during lectures. Frequently the compiled version was accepted as an edited text and used for further copies. Such a compilation was usually made by the master himself, or in some cases by one of his pupils.¹⁵ There being no explicit mention here of the name of a student making the compilation, seems to suggest that this compilation of *questiones* on the *Isagoge* was done by Manlevelt himself. This would mean that the manuscript edited here is either an autograph of Thomas Manlevelt, or a copy based on it.

This seems to leave little doubt about Thomas Manlevelt really being the author of the present text. One last word of caution may be warranted, however. The manuscript, of course, was bound in its cover many years after the text was written down, while even the line of text at the top of the first page – if the dating by Schum is correct – was only added decades after completion of the manuscript. Seeing that the text of the commentary itself does not make any mention of its compiler (nor of the place or date of its compilation, for that matter), there seems to remain then – notwithstanding the name of Thomas Manlevel(t) being added twice later on, and although there is no clear counter-evidence – room for at least a shadow of doubt on its authorship.¹⁶

12 Schum 1887, 528f.

13 Schum, *ibid.*

14 An explanation on the technical term ‘*compilatus*’ is to be found in Fluëler 1999, 513 f., where Fluëler also gives a list of compiled versions of Buridan’s commentaries.

15 Fluëler, 1999, 511 ff., presents a case where the compilation of one of Buridan’s commentaries is not made by Buridan himself, but by one of his students, sitting in front of him.

16 For a complete description of the ms, see below, chapter 6.

It would seem wise then, to look a little deeper into the evidence about the authorship of the present text, and about its place and date of compilation.

3.2. *Comparison with other texts*

It will be worthwhile to compare the works that are without any doubt genuine Manlevelt – in as far as the present state of knowledge about these *parva logicalia* allows us – with the *Questiones libri Porphirii*, to establish whether this text can be taken as genuine Manlevelt as well. At first sight, this comparison seems to indicate that the attribution to Thomas Manlevelt is correct. That is to say, doctrinal concurrence is demonstrable and there are no clues leading us to conjecture that the early attribution of this text to Manlevelt would be false.

There is one reference to a tract, Manlevelt's authorship of which is undisputed: *De suppositionibus*.¹⁷ The doctrinal point in question, in the context of which this reference is made, is vintage Ockhamist nominalism, namely that 'man in general' is nothing but a universal term: "homo in communi" nihil aliud est quam terminus universalis'. Here, as elsewhere in our commentary, the sparse things that Manlevelt has to say about supposition are completely in line with the theory on supposition unfolded in his tract devoted to it. For example, the main division of supposition in material, personal and simple division, as expounded in the 15th *questio*,¹⁸ is the same that we find in the tract *De suppositionibus*: 'Suppositio dividitur in suppositionem materialem, simplicem et personalem.'¹⁹ And so, although there is only one reference to the tract *De suppositionibus* in this commentary on the *Isagoge*, this one reference is interesting enough, for it supports our conjecture that the commentary on the *Isagoge* was composed by Manlevelt after he had finished his theoretical tracts on the *parva logicalia*.

Unfortunately, there are no other references to *De suppositionibus* or any of the remaining tracts on the *parva logicalia*. What we do have, however, are references to two of his own works that have hitherto

17 Q. 25 AD 3., 25^{va}: "homo in communi" nihil aliud est quam terminus universalis, sicut diffusus in tractatu *De suppositionibus* est declaratum.

18 Q. 15 (Distinctio), 14^{vb}: 'In ista questione presupponitur distinctio de suppositione materiali et personali et simplici'.

19 Cited after a draft of the forthcoming edition by Kann c.s.

never been listed among the titles of Thomas Manlevelt. The first is a commentary on *De anima*, referred to not only in the commentary on the *Isagoge*,²⁰ but in the commentary on the *Categories* as well.²¹ The second must be a commentary on at least one of the books of Aristotle's *Physics*, for in the 23rd *questio* there is mention of a *Questio de tempore sive quarto Physicorum*.²² And in the 24th *questio* there is mention of a *Questio de infinito*, commenting on the third book of the *Physics*.²³ Which brings me to the conclusion that if the *Questiones libri Porphirii* is to be genuinely attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, then two more titles have to be added to his bibliography as well: *questiones* on *De anima* and on *Physics*. Of course, these additions will remain of a highly hypothetical character only, as long as no texts are found to give body to this compartment of Manlevelt's supposed bibliography.²⁴

3.3. Geographical circumstances

A remarkable geographic indication which is to be found in the pages of our present commentary on the *Isagoge* should not be left unmentioned:

Et in ista significatione tota multitudo Romanorum dicitur genus Romanorum vel Romanum a principio productivo, scilicet, Romulus, et tota multitudo Brabantiorum a principio contentivo circumscriptive, scilicet Brabantia (...)²⁵

20 Q. 26 AD 2., 26^{va}: 'ut patet in questione de ista materia super secundum *De anima*'. Q. 14 CONCL. 10, 14^{tb} seems to contain such a reference as well: 'de quo apparebit tertio *De anima*'. Other possible references to these *Questiones super De anima* are in Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}, and AD 3., 4^{ra}.

21 *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Q. 2 AD 5., 46^{ra}: 'Et de ista materia haberetur quodammodo diffusius in questionibus secundi *De anima*, ubi tractaretur de speciebus representationis.'

22 Q. 23 DIST. 2, 22^{va}: 'de quo alibi diffusius patet, utpote in *Questione de tempore sive quarto Physicorum*.'

23 Q. 24 CONCL. 3, 24^{ra}: 'et de longitudinibus gyrationis que sunt infinite quodammodo extensive, habentur multe conclusiones scientificæ, sicut patet in questione tertii *Physicorum De infinito*.'

24 *De anima* was heavily studied and commented upon in Manlevelt's days and intellectual environment. It would be interesting to compare his Ockhamist-hued *questiones* on *De anima*, if ever these were to be found, with the psychological *expositio*s and *questiones* that have originated from the so-called 'School of Buridan' in mid-fourteenth century Paris, i.e. John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Marsilius of Inghen, and Albert of Saxony. On these, see Marshall 1983.

25 Q. 5 CONCL. 1, 5^{tb}

Brabantia, of course, is the duchy of Brabant, which in Thomas's days encompassed the present day Belgian provinces Brabant and Antwerp, as well as the Dutch province Northern Brabant. Why would the duchy of Brabant and its inhabitants come to be mentioned in a medieval text on logic, or on any subject, for that matter? Of course, it would be stretching our point too far, if we would link this mentioning of the duchy of Brabant directly to the background of our Thomas himself, and claim that he must have been a Brabantian, like the once infamous philosopher who has been given the name of this very province: Siger of Brabant (1240–1281).²⁶ On the other hand, it would seem equally unwise to deny any possible connection between the mentioning of this specific duchy, which never plays even the slightest role in logical history, and the background of this specific manuscript. If not the philosopher himself is to be pointed out as the linking pin, either as someone born there or as someone teaching there, then maybe it is the copyist who was born or raised in Brabant, or whatever other link one can think of.

In fact, the mentioning of the duchy may really be meaningful. There does exist at least one other manuscript in which the name of Thomas is linked directly to the duchy. The text concerned is an exposé by Thomas on the fallacies, and the manuscript is to be found in Erfurt. The text ends: 'Explicit tractatus fallaciarum lectus Lovanii per mag. Thomam Anglicum, dictum Manlovel.'²⁷ There is no doubt about Thomas's authorship of this tract on the fallacies. So there seems to be no reason for doubt about his lecturing in Louvain, as reported in the manuscript of this tract, either. The city of Louvain in Belgian Brabant in Thomas's days was still

26 Brabant, of course, is also the homeland of Siger of Brabant, the philosopher who was the target of Thomas Aquinas's severe criticism during his lifetime, but who in his afterlife was rehabilitated by Dante, who placed him in the Fourth Sphere of Heaven, the Sun, home of theologians and fathers of the church, and who put benevolent words about him in the mouth of his guide there, none other than the very same Thomas Aquinas. (*Paradiso* x, 133–138): 'Questi onde a me ritorna il tuo riguardo, / è 'l lume d'uno spirto che 'n pensieri / gravi a morir li parve venir tardo: // essa è la luce eterna di Sigieri, / che, leggendo nel Vico de li Strami, / silogizzò invidiosi veri.' ('This, whence to me returneth thy regard, / The light is of a spirit unto whom / In his grave meditations death seemed slow. // It is the light eternal of Sigier, / Who, reading lectures in the Street of Straw, / Did syllogize invidious verities.' tr. Longfellow) See Krop's introduction to Siger of Brabant 1992, 8, 16 on Siger's relationship to Dante and to Brabant, respectively. On Siger, Thomas Aquinas and Dante: Ebbesen 1998, 273.

27 Reference to this text is made by Lorenz 1996, 157 n. 48.

awaiting the foundation of its university. Lorenz's guess is that Thomas was probably lecturing in the School of St. Petri there.²⁸

To further substantiate the claim that Thomas Manlevelt was indeed lecturing in Louvain and did compose his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* there, let us take a look at the anonymous tract already mentioned above,²⁹ the *Defensorium Ockham*. The *Defensorium Ockham*, a fierce defence of the radical reductionism of William of Ockham, offers, according to its editor Andrews, a rare glimpse of how Ockham's theories began to transform the mindset of his immediate successors, showing how Ockham's theories exhibit an immediate plausibility, and how his strategies were enthusiastically adopted.³⁰

Ebbesen is quite sure that the anonymous author must have been working in Denmark.³¹ He points out that the geographical examples in the text are only two, namely Denmark (four times) and Rome (five times). When the two localities are used in conjunction, it is to indicate two distinct places: here and there. Now tradition prescribes that 'here' is the place where the speaker and his audience are, and 'there' is a well-known place far away, usually Rome. Thus, in his *Summa logicae*, William of Ockham uses England or more specifically London to indicate the 'here'. That Denmark is used in the *Defensorium Ockham* instead of Ockham's English examples, leaves room for only one explanation: the 'here' for the author of the *Defensorium Ockham* is Denmark.

Mutatis mutandis, the fact that Thomas Manlevelt makes mention of Brabant and its inhabitants in *Questio* 5 of the present text leaves room for just one explanation, viz. that the author and his audience must be placed in precisely this duchy. And the reason for this is exactly the same as the reason why the author of the *Defensorium Ockham* must be placed in Denmark. In both cases Rome is the standard well-known place far away,³² the 'there', and Denmark and Brabant respectively are the 'here'.

The very least that can be said about Brabant for being in all likelihood the place of origin of this commentary on the *Isagoge* is that it does in no way contradict Lorenz's assumption that Manlevelt must have been drawn from Paris to pre-university Louvain. In fact, the one fits in quite nicely with the other.

28 Lorenz 1996, 159f.

29 Introduction 1.1, n. 4.

30 Andrews 1997, 99.

31 Ebbesen 2000, 277.

32 Q. 2 CONCL. 3, 2^{rb}: 'tu scis quod Roma est pulchra civitas, quia tu credis dicentibus'.

Ebbesen calls the case of the *Defensorium Ockham* unique. For no other known work may be claimed to have originated in the teaching of philosophy among Nordic Franciscans.³³ Thomas Manlevelt's case seems to be quite as unique. For what other mature work in philosophy is known to have originated in pre-university Louvain?

So what we have on the one hand is a manuscript of a text which is certainly by Thomas, in which he is said to have lectured in Louvain, Brabant. And on the other hand we have a text which is probably by Thomas, in which the highly uncommon geographical example of Brabant is used, and which for that reason can safely be taken to have originated there. It seems to be warranted, then, to look upon this coincidence as a piece of circumstantial evidence that the present commentary on the *Isagoge* really is by Thomas. And if this is so, the present text may in its turn be taken as complementary, if not superfluous proof that Thomas indeed did lecture in some school in Louvain.³⁴

3.4. *The dating of the Questiones libri Porphyrii*

A *terminus post quem* is not hard to establish for our text, even by the most cautious of standards. If its author is working on the continent, as seems obvious from the references to Brabant, and if he is even in the widest sense a follower of Ockhamist doctrines, the *terminus post quem* of the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* is to be assumed around 1330. That year is generally taken to mark the beginning of the rapid spread of Ockham's doctrine and method in Paris.³⁵

Above, we have seen that Courtenay advanced an *ante quem* dating of Manlevelt's tract on supposition around 1360.³⁶ Following this dating of Manlevelt's *Tractatus de suppositionibus*, and supposing that the

33 Ebbesen 2000, 277. I will go deeper into the Franciscan connection below, section 3.5.

34 Above, in section 3.1, attention was paid to the sense in which these *Questiones libri Porphyrii* are to be understood as a compilation. Namely as a revised version of a reported work. According to Flüeler, 1999, 513, such compiled commentaries were made especially in Paris. This is not to say that compilations were not made elsewhere as well. Manlevelt had been teaching in Paris before coming to Louvain, and may very well have continued this practice there. So this text being a compilation is in no way inconsistent with my supposing that it originated in Louvain.

35 Courtenay 2008, 130 makes mention of Ockham's *Summa logicae* being studied and intellectually digested in Paris by 1329.

36 Introduction 2.2.3.

Questiones libri Porphyrii were composed still somewhat later than that, the present text would at least share this *ante quem* dating around 1360. This *ante quem* dating does not conflict with my provisional adherence to Lorenz's biography of Thomas Manlevelt. As I have explained, by lack of a *post quem* dating of any of Manlevelt's works running against the otherwise feasible biographical framework laid out by Lorenz, we should stick to this biographer's hypothesis that Thomas Manlevelt worked in Paris around 1330, and left for Louvain not too long afterwards, by the end of the 1330s. Fitting the present commentary in with Lorenz's tentative biography of Thomas Manlevelt leads me to assume that the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* were composed in Louvain in the late 1330s or 1340s.

Manlevelt's fame did not rest on the commentary on the *Categories* treated by Andrews, nor on the commentary on the *Isagoge* edited below. Otherwise than would have been the case with almost any other philosopher, this lack of fame on account of his commentaries on the Old Logic was not due to their status as works of youth. In fact, while most philosophers did their work on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* at the start of their academic career, in all probability these commentaries were not works of youth at all, but are samples of Manlevelt's mature thinking, written after his Parisian *parva logicalia*. In the foregoing I have explained my reasons for sticking to Manlevelt's biographical framework as put forward by Lorenz, according to whom Manlevelt spent most of his active academic life in Paris in the 1320s and 1330s, and later went to Louvain.³⁷ For one thing, the reference made in the *Questiones libri Porphyrii*, supposedly written in Louvain, to an earlier tract *De suppositionibus*, being one of Manlevelt's Parisian *parva logicalia*, fits in well with this tentative biography by Lorenz. On the hypothesis then that the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* must chronologically be placed *after* the completion of his renowned logical treatises, and *after* he had left Paris for a place of considerably less intellectual splendour, Louvain, the only reason conceivable for their lack of general renown is precisely that they were written in the by then outlying intellectual district of pre-university Louvain, far from the Parisian centre. Otherwise it would be hard to understand why Manlevelt's sound but unspectacular logical treatises on supposition, confusion and consequences were lastingly used and commented upon all over the Continent, while our commentary

37 See above, subsection 2.2.1.

on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and its accompanying commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* seem to have had little or no impact at all, in spite of the highly original and adventurous character of both these commentaries. Had works like these seen the light of day in the Parisian centre of intellectual activity, they could not have failed to make a stir. If not endowing their author with everlasting fame, they would at least have caused considerable scandal.

But is there not another *terminus ante quem* to be found, that would support a more definite dating of our text than that provided by Courtenay's?

It is generally acknowledged that 1330 marked the beginning of the rapid spread of Ockham's doctrines and method in Paris. This makes its University a favourable surrounding for a thinker like Manlevelt, building on the philosophical groundwork laid out by Ockham, be it as only a follower, or as an innovator in his own right. Unpleasant things however were bound to happen some ten years later, around 1340, when philosophy in an Ockhamist vein became the target of repression in Paris. Adhering to Manlevelt's biography as reconstructed by Lorenz, one must reckon that our author had already left Paris for Louvain by then. Kindred spirits like Autrecourt and Mirecourt had been working in Paris shortly before the trouble began (Autrecourt, 1335–1337) or would be working there shortly after (Mirecourt, 1344–1347). But what shape did these troubles exactly take? The order of events unfavourable to Parisian Ockhamism is meticulously unfolded by Thijssen in his study on *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200–1400*.³⁸

On December 29, 1340, the masters of the faculty of arts at Paris issued a statute prohibiting the dissemination of six listed errors.³⁹ The final paragraph of the 1340 statute alludes to previous legislation concerning 'the doctrine of William called Ockham' (*de doctrina Guillelmi dicti Ockham alias statuimus*). The Ockhamist hermeneutics is allegedly based on the idea that texts have an objective, literal meaning, independent of the subjective intention of the author. It appears to assume that this objective literal sense of texts could be grasped by virtue of the properties of speech (*proprietas sermonis*). The authors of the 1340 statute criticize the Ockhamists for ignoring other important hermeneutical clues for

38 Thijssen 1998. On this crisis over *virtus sermonis*, see also Courtenay 1984a.

39 Thijssen 1998, 57.

interpreting texts, such as the author's intention (*intentio auctoris*) and the context of discourse (*materia subjecta*). In short, the Ockhamists were reproved for employing too narrow a concept of the literal sense of texts, one that suffocated the authorial meaning and neglected the context of discourse.⁴⁰

The Statute is, and aimed to be, of considerable doctrinal importance. The issue it addresses – the interpretation of the Bible and of other authoritative texts – was of major importance in the intellectual climate prevalent in the middle of the fourteenth century. The text of the Statute, although it is anti-Ockhamist, is directed not against Ockham personally but against his followers in Paris.⁴¹ In Ockham's own supposition theory, the distinction of propositions for making their possible readings explicit may be said to be a key element.⁴²

In the light of this Statute of December 29, 1340, the view to be distilled in a certain text on the (non-)distinction of propositions may give a *terminus ante quem* for the date of this text. The Faculty of Arts had in the third article of this Statute condemned the view that no proposition should be distinguished. So, if an author flatly denies that a proposition should under any circumstance be distinguished, we may be sure that this particular text of his stems from before the issuing of the Statute in 1340. Van der Lecq and Braakhuis have in fact used this device to date a certain text by John Buridan.⁴³

Unfortunately, the Statute is of no help in determining a more exact *terminus ante quem* for the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* than that provided by Courtenay, as its author throughout the text feels free to make distinctions.⁴⁴ He is an Ockhamist alright, but certainly not one in the dogmatic sense of the Statute.

40 But of Ockham himself this is simply not true. Ockham is *always* talking about 'distinguishing' propositions. Moreover, Ockham himself is always saying things like 'what Aristotle really meant is ...', thus clearly considering the *intentio auctoris*. In this sense it could even be argued that the 1340 statute actually is rather Ockhamist in spirit.

41 Braakhuis 2000, 94 approvingly cites these conclusions from a 1994 article by Kaluza.

42 Dutilh Novaes 2008, esp. 378–383, draws attention to the fact that the phrase 'propositio est distinguenda' occurs countless times in Ockham's *Summa logicae*.

43 Introduction to John Buridan, 1994; see also Braakhuis 2000.

44 E.g. Q. 25 DIST. 2, 25^{ra}: 'ista propositio "plures homines sunt unus homo" est distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi in sensu proprio vel in sensu transsumptivo', Q. 29 DIST. 1, 29^{ra}: 'ista propositio (...) est distinguende penes amphiboliam: in sensu proprio falsa est; in sensu transsumptivo secundum quod iam expositum est, est vera. Et ista distinctio in ista materia maxime est necessaria, quia Porphyrius et alii

3.5. *The Franciscan context*

What is interesting about the manuscript of the *Tractatus de suppositionibus* used by Courtenay, apart from its role in providing a *terminus ante quem*, is the Franciscan context it constitutes for Thomas Manlevelt's text on supposition.⁴⁵ The manuscript is kept in a Franciscan monastery and contains mainly tracts by Franciscan writers. A question may come to mind: was Thomas himself a Franciscan as well? And was he, or was he not, a theologian as well as a logician? These same questions have been raised about an equally unknown thinker from roughly the same era and comparable intellectual background: the author of an anonymous Ockhamist treatment of the categories, brought to attention and later edited by Andrews under the title '*Defensorium Ockham*'.⁴⁶ I will have a look at the answers given to these questions, and then try and answer the same questions concerning Thomas Manlevelt.

When sketching the spiritual silhouette of the otherwise unknown early Ockhamist author of the *Defensorium Ockham*, Andrews comes to the conclusion that he was probably a Franciscan.⁴⁷ He sums up the following criteria in support of this conclusion: the author's model in Ockham; his Franciscan position on divisive issues as the univocity of being and the plurality of forms; a verbatim passage from John Duns Scotus, as well as the Subtle Doctor's being mentioned directly and indirectly; his cavils about Ockham's theories, similar to those of Walter Chatton.

Applying these same criteria to the author of the text to be edited below, I find that he meets the bulk of them. Manlevelt clearly has his model in William of Ockham; while not advancing an opinion on the plurality of forms, he definitely adheres to the univocity of being;⁴⁸ while never directly being referred to, the Subtle Doctor forms is constantly

doctores in ista materia loquitur transsumptivo potius quam proprie, q. 30 DIST. 3, 30^{ra}: 'ista propositio "hoc accidens est inseparabile" in communi locutione stat loco istius "hoc accidens ab aliquo subiecto est inseparabile", et ideo, si cui placeat, potest distingui secundum amphiboliam, q. 40 CONCL. 6, 38^{va}: 'distinguendo predictam propositionem secundum ampliationem sensus proprius est falsus, sicut predictum est; sensus vero transsumptivus in quo dicit eam auctor, est verus' More about Manlevelt's distinguishing of propositions below, subsection 5.5.1.

45 On this manuscript and its dating, see above, subsection 2.2.3.

46 Andrews 1997 and Andrews 2000, respectively. See above, section 3.3.

47 Andrews 2000, 190.

48 Q. 21 CONCL. 2, 20^{rb}: "'ens" predicatur de pluribus univoce'.

present on the background of Manlevelt's discussions, if only under the realists' guise of the 'antiqui' so regularly rejected; a certain argument in our text, brought forward by way of an 'opinion' about three propositions containing the same subject, two of which are dubious and one of which is known with certainty, might very well be a verbatim citation from John Duns Scotus;⁴⁹ cavilling Ockham – whether or not our author is guilty of such a thing – seems to me the least of all possible hallmarks of the Franciscan mind.

On the basis of the criteria applied, one cannot but assume that if the author of the *Defensorium Ockham* was a Franciscan, our author of the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* was a Franciscan as well. And if we may add the overwhelming attention paid to the individual in its individuality as an extra criterion, the case for our author being a Franciscan becomes even stronger. After all, from Roger Bacon onward, the individual was the key subject of Franciscan thought.⁵⁰

One of the few philosophers cited by name in the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* is Robert Grosseteste,⁵¹ virtually the founding father of the Franciscan school in England.⁵²

There is no lack of circumstantial evidence of our author's Franciscan hue, either. For example, one of the oldest transcripts of a text by Thomas Manlevelt is to be found in a manuscript from Göttingen, 1364, transcribed by one Nicolaus in Erfurt.⁵³ This Nicolaus himself was probably

49 Q. 21 OPINIO 2, 19^{vb}: 'Aliqui arguunt sic: quandocumque alique tres propositiones sic se habent quod in dubio sunt due, et tertia certa sive (s)cita, et quod habent idem subiectum, tunc aliud est predicatum propositionis scite a predicato propositionis dubie; sed sic se habent iste tres propositiones: "ista quantitas est substantia", "ista quantitas est accidens", "ista quantitas est ens"; nam prima et secunda alicui sunt dubie, et tertia est eidem scita; igitur aliud est predicatum in mente propositionis scite a predicato alicuius aliarum propositionum. Et per consequens unus est conceptus entis distinctus a conceptu substantie et conceptu accidentis.' On this type of argument, which is to be found in exactly the same manner somewhere in the *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta* by John Duns Scotus, see Honnefelder, 295.

50 Bérubé 1964, 14: 'L'École franciscaine se fera le champion de l'intellection de l'individuel'.

51 Q. 44, ad argumentum in oppositum: 'secundum Lincolnensem, primo *Posteriorum* capitulo de *per se*, homo est risibilis ratione suorum principiorum essentialium, ita quod talibus principiis simul unitis sic videlicet quod homo existat, Deus non posset facere quin homo esset risibilis'.

52 See Bérubé 1964, 14 on 'son influence prépondérante dans la formation de l'École franciscaine d'Angleterre'.

53 On this manuscript, see Pinborg 1967, 146, n. 23. Also, 2.2.3 above.

a Franciscan;⁵⁴ in any case the manuscript contains several texts of Franciscan origin, and the manuscript belonged to the Franciscan monastery in Göttingen.

3.6. *The theologian background*

If the author of the *Questiones libri Porphyrii*, Thomas Manlevelt, was a Franciscan, the further question that comes to mind is: was he a theologian as well?⁵⁵

Once again I turn to the author of the *Defensorium Ockham*, who explicitly refused to address theological problems,⁵⁶ and about whom the same question was asked. To Ebbesen it was unclear whether he was a theologian.⁵⁷ This author did explicitly state that in logical matters he did not want to be a theologian. But after all, this statement lends itself to opposing interpretations. Either he was a theologian who wanted to theologize in his theological works only and not in a treatise devoted to logical matters, or he wanted to say that he was not a theologian and that as a logician he was of the opinion that theological matters were not to be touched upon in a logical context. Anyway, to Ebbesen it was less than obvious how the treatise could fit into the arts course of a university; there were too many references to theological matters for an arts faculty work.

For an arts faculty work on logic, there is an abundance of references to God and theological matters in Manlevelt's text as well. Not only is

54 Pinborg, *op. cit.*, 145, n. 22.

55 A curious remark in the second question of our author's commentary on the *Categories* is a token of his keen awareness of the difference between laymen and clergy, although laymen and clergy are alike in their knowledge of things in the world without necessarily having knowledge of the concepts by which they know these things: '(...) conceptus se ipso concipiunt confuse tantum et remisse. Propter quam confusionem et remissionem laici non possunt se intelligere tales conceptus, nec etiam clerici, nisi ex consequenti et argumentative, facta diligenti inquisitione qualiter intellectus se habet in concipiendo rem extra.' (*Questiones in Predicamenta* Q. 2, reply to the third argument of the last string of 'ad oppositum' arguments; 46^{rb}). What Manlevelt seems to mean is that not only laymen, but also the generally well-educated clergy tend to go by imperfect knowledge. One is vaguely reminded of Buridan fighting the 'theologizantes'. On this, see De Rijk 1997. It would be a matter of further study to determine if Manlevelt would have joined Buridan in his fight.

56 'quia in logica nolo esse theologicus'; see Andrews 2000, 191.

57 Ebbesen 2000, 276.

God the subject matter of the 35th *questio*,⁵⁸ where God's place within the Porphyrian Tree is discussed,⁵⁹ but He is brought into the discussion in many other *questiones* as well. Right in the first *questio* the nature of God's knowledge is compared to human knowledge;⁶⁰ the truth of faith is set off against the truth of reason.⁶¹ Logical rules are explicitly stated to not always hold in theological matters.⁶² Theologians do get their say in our text.⁶³ What the theologians have to say does not necessarily tally with what the logician or the natural philosopher has to say.⁶⁴ But when it comes to crossing the boundaries between logic and theology, our author adheres to the same ambiguous stance as the author of the *Defensorium Ockham*. In *questio* 43 he touches upon the subject matter of the unity of the Son of God and His assumed nature, and says explicitly that such matters are to be decided elsewhere.⁶⁵

So we do not come to a decisive answer to the question whether Thomas Manlevelt may have been a theologian. We are left just as empty-handed as Ebbesen was concerning the anonymous defender of Ockham. In conclusion I have to admit then that Manlevelt's taking holy orders can neither be confirmed, nor denied. However, the range of Manlevelt's ideas as well as the sort of problems he is prone to tackle, very neatly fit in the outline of the Franciscan worldview. After all, this freely bringing up God and matters divine in a logical context, while at the same time drawing of an intransgressable line between natural knowledge and logic on the one hand and theological knowledge on the other hand – which, incidentally, we also see in the commentary on the *Categories* that forms

58 Q. 35: 'Utrum hec differentia "immortale" sit constitutiva Dei.'

59 On the closely related problem for medieval philosophy concerning the inclusion of God within the framework of the Aristotelian categories, see Tabarroni 2003. For an overview of diagrammatic representations of the Tree of Porphyry in texts of the Arts Faculty, 1200–1500, none of which containing a branch for God, see Verboon 2010, 57–78.

60 Q. 1 DIST. 1, 1^{ra-1b}.

61 E.g. Q. 42 CONCL. 5, 40^{1b-va}.

62 Q. 29 CONCL. 2, 29^{1b}: 'omne quod ab alio differt, potest concludi ab eodem differre per aliquod medium, quod est accidens separabile. Et hoc precise verum est in materia naturali; quod dico propter personas in divinis in quibus forte ista conclusio non haberet locum.'

63 E.g. Q. 14 CONCL. 2, 13^{ra} for the theologian's view on the nature of angels; Q. 24: on the divisibility of the continuum; Q. 25 and 27: on human nature.

64 In Q. 42 CONCL. 5, 40^{1b} it is conceded that 'primum mobile non movetur' is possible according to the theologians.

65 Q. 43 DIST. 1, 41^{1b}: 'isti duo modi unitatis propriissime dicuntur unitates per se, quia sunt maxime unitates que fiunt ex distinctis rebus excepta sola unitate filii Dei et nature assumpte, de qua nihil ad presens quia alterius existit speculationis.'

the sequel to our text – is a defining feature of Franciscan, if not more specifically, Ockhamist thought.

I am going to conclude this chapter of my investigation in a moderately confident tone. I have not proven anything about the life and career of Thomas Manlevelt. While I do feel confident that my findings fit in quite well with the biographical framework laid out by Lorenz, and that these findings thus give further acceptability to Lorenz's tentative biography of Manlevelt on the one hand, and sufficient plausibility to the *Questiones libri Porphirii* forming part of Manlevelt's – somewhat extended – bibliography on the other hand.

For this reason I feel warranted to present this text as Thomas Manlevelt's.

CHAPTER FOUR

Historical background

This chapter will sketch the historical background of the *Questiones libri Porphirii* edited here. In a broad historical sense, there is the long tradition of commentaries on the *Isagoge* into which Manlevelt's text is to be placed. So firstly, in section 4.1 I will explain why the *Isagoge* is worth commenting upon, and to what commentaries it has given rise. In a narrower historical sense, Manlevelt seems to have taken part of the Ockhamist movement of the early fourteenth century, and is intellectually associated with the universities of both Oxford and Paris. So secondly, in sections 4.2–6 I will see in how far Manlevelt can be called an Ockhamist, say something about Ockhamist trends in Oxford and Paris, and spend some thoughts on Manlevelt's possible connections with either of these universities.

4.1. *Porphyry's book, and what it is about*

4.1.1. *The Organon*

The authority of the text commented upon in the *Questiones libri Porphirii*, the *Isagoge* by Porphyry (c. 234–304), is derivative of the authority of the text to which this *Isagoge* was meant to be an introduction: the *Categories* by Aristotle (384–322).¹ The *Isagoge* was more than one thousand years old by Manlevelt's time, and the *Categories* was six centuries old by Porphyry's time and therefore sixteen hundred years old by Manlevelt's time. The *Categories* in its turn was the first of a series of six treatises by which Aristotle single-handedly laid the foundations on which the complete system of logic was to rest for more than two millennia.² Together

- 1 For a most excellent survey of the history of commentaries on the *Isagoge* the reader is referred to Libera 1996 and to the author's introduction to Porphyry 1998.
- 2 In the Philosopher's own words: 'When it comes to this subject [i.e. logic], it is not the case that part had been worked out in advance and part had not; instead, nothing existed at all.' *De sophisticis elenchis* 34, 183b34–36. Cited by Smith 1995,

these six treatises were to find their place in philosophical history and curriculum under the collective title of *Organon*: apart from the *Categories*, these were the *Perihermeneias* or *De interpretatione*, the *Analytica priora*, the *Analytica posteriora*, the *Topica* and the *De sophisticis elenchis*.

The subject matter of each of these works is indicated in a few words. *De interpretatione* is about the structure of propositions and their truth-values. The *Prior Analytics* is about inference, by way of the syllogistic method; in fact, it contains the first ever systematic exposition of a theory of correct inference itself. The *Posterior Analytics* is about demonstration: valid reasoning leading to scientific, certain knowledge. The *Topics*, leaving the field of strict demonstration for that of dialectics in a broader sense, is about equally valid reasoning in fields where there is no certainty to be had, leading to knowledge that is probable at the most. In this treatise Aristotle unfolds his own theory of the Predicables, which was to be developed by Porphyry in his *Isagoge*; of the eight parts of the *Topics*, two are about accident, one about genus, one about property, and two about definition. The *Sophistical Refutations* is about logical fallacies and as such can be looked upon as an appendix to the *Topics*.³

4.1.2. *The Categories*

Pinpointing the subject matter of the *Categories* has always been more problematic.⁴ The *Categories* presents us with Aristotle's ten-fold categorization of what there is. The ten highest categories are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, and

27. Smith's is as good and insightful an introduction to the logic of Aristotle as one can get in forty pages.

3 Smith 1995 groups *De interpretatione* and the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* together as covering the field of demonstration, and the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations* as covering the field of dialectical argument. Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, traditionally not a part of the *Organon*, might also be grouped with these works on dialectical argument.

4 Even its position within Aristotelian logic is matter of debate. See Smith 1995, 28f. An ancient tradition took it to be a preface to the whole of logic, giving a theory of the meanings of the terms of which propositions or composed. There is some irony, then, in the fact that the *Categories* was to lose that role to its own prefatory treatise, the *Isagoge*. But an even older tradition entitled it 'Prefatory Materials for the *Topics*', thus binding it closer to the more 'dialectical' compartment of Aristotelian logic (*Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, and maybe even including the *Rhetoric*) than to the works concerned with demonstration in a strict sense (*De interpretatione* and the two *Analytics*). That the *Isagoge* in its role as introduction to the *Categories* picks out part of the contents of the *Topics* lends some plausibility to this last tradition.

passion.⁵ But what is the nature of these categories: are they primarily things, words, or concepts?⁶

Now, in the categories of being items are collected and sorted out by which man can name reality, and this categorization is the basis for forming complex wholes (for instance ‘white man’) and propositions and judgements (for instance ‘men are white’) that in their turn are the basis for inferences, in the end constituting real knowledge about the world. So the theory of the categories is fundamental for philosophy.⁷ One

5 For a general survey of the discussions on the categories through the ages, see H. Baumgartner a.o., ‘Kategorie, Kategorienlehre’, in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* IV, Darmstadt 1976, cols. 714–725.

6 To avoid misunderstanding, one should keep in mind that ancient and medieval philosophers are said to have taken for granted a parallelism between thought and reality. This means that they accepted that there are things that exist in reality and that there can be, and is, knowledge of those things. The assumption of this characteristic of Medieval as well as Ancient thought is usually indicated as ‘the parallelism postulate’. The key text on the parallelism postulate might well be De Rijk 1988. These things as conceived by human understanding are designated by a term. So human understanding does involve a subjective element when the thing is conceived or named, but thanks to the parallelism, the thing conceived matches the thing in reality. The question need not be asked whether a kind of gap has to be overcome: there is no gap. For an explanation of the role of the parallelism postulate in the semantics and ontology of Aristotle, see De Rijk 2002a and 2002b. Latest insights tend to limit the scope of the parallelism postulate. See, for example, Dutill Novaes’s forthcoming article on Burley.

7 A word here on the relevance of Aristotle’s categories for present-day philosophical practice. The twenty-first century had its philosophical kick-off in Paris, where, on the 25th and 26th of February 2000 an international symposium was held at the Centre Georges Pompidou, entitled *Quelle philosophie pour le XXI^e siècle?* Subject of this symposium was Aristotle’s categories, that, according to the *avant-propos* to its textual edition (J. Benoist e.a. 2001), during twenty centuries had dictated the elementary grammar of philosophical reasoning. The question asked at the symposium was: what rests today of these categories? Must we abandon them? Or should we rethink them anew? One may be tempted to say this question about the relevance of Aristotle’s categories for today’s philosophizing is already answered by looking at the list of ten renowned contributors to the symposium, who each have lent their names to one of Aristotle’s categories, by writing an essay about it. If, say, J.R. Searle deigns to write some twenty-odd pages about the category of time, then things are not looking too bad for this category, at least from an inspirational point of view. On the other hand, as I. Hacking remarks in his contribution on the category of quality, having lived a fruitful life for twenty centuries, Aristotle’s *Organon* had definitely had its time by the 18th century. So it is hardly to be expected that it will arise to its former philosophical omnipresence in the century we are now living in. Or is it? (For a system of thought ‘definitely moribund in the 18th century’ it was a present enough source of inspiration in the intervening centuries, if we only think of C.S. Peirce’s 1867 paper ‘On a New List of Categories’, F. Brentano’s early 20th century

could even say that one's choice of a particular theory of categories depends on what kind of philosopher one is.⁸

What, then, is the nature of the members of the categories? Are these members (primarily) terms which refer to something in reality? Or are they things so far as (and only so far as) these are captured in a linguistic expression or thought? In the context of medieval philosophy, a penchant towards one or the other of these options will place a thinker in the camp of either the 'realists' or the 'nominalists'.⁹

4.1.3. *The Isagoge*

Now, keeping in mind that the categories, about which these intricate questions are asked, are the highest genera, and that genus is the first of the five universals or predicables treated by Porphyry in his *Isagoge*, it will come as no surprise that the problems involved with the nature of the categories will also come to the fore when the nature of these predicables is discussed. In fact, it was the *Isagoge* that ignited the never-ending war between realists and nominalist on the nature of the universals.

The author of the *Isagoge*, the little introductory book to the *Categories* that virtually came to function as an introduction to the whole body of Aristotelian logic in the centuries to come,¹⁰ was not an Aristotelian himself. Pupil of the founder of Neo-Platonism Plotinus (204?-270),

Kategorienlehre, or W.E. Johnson's turn-of-the-19th century theory of determinants and determinables – a distinction recasting the Porphyrian one between universal and particular.)

- 8 E. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*, 1923 (1911) (*Gesammelte Schriften* 2, 4): 'Was für eine Kategorienlehre man wählt, hängt davon ab, was für ein Philosoph man ist.' Cited in Bos & Van der Helm 1998, 184.
- 9 These labels, clear as they may seem, should be used with some caution. It is not that 'nominalists' deny the usefulness of universal concepts in referring to certain aspects of concrete things in 'reality', rather they tend to take more seriously than the 'realists' the Aristotelian conviction, shared by all, that reality consists of concrete things only; in the light of the 'linguistic' character of all speaking and thinking about reality they reject every instance of ontological projection of our mental objects and other thought-constructions. See De Rijk 1994, 8 n. 4.
- 10 According to Barnes in the introduction to his 2003 translation of the *Isagoge*, Porphyry's little book is really meant as an introduction not to the *Categories* in particular, but to logic in general, comprising as it does the theories of predication, definition, and proof. Whether meant as such by its author or not, the *Isagoge* at least *de facto*, being the introduction to the first part of the *Organon*, was the introduction to the whole of Aristotelian logic. See Porphyry 2003, xv.

Porphyry was honoured by Simplicius, the sixth century commentator on Aristotle, as being the most erudite of all Neo-Platonists.¹¹

Written in Sicily¹² at the request of the Roman senator Chrysaorius, the *Isagoge* originally seems to have been only an occasional piece of work. In this work Porphyry builds on Aristotle's treatment of the so called predicables in his *Topica*. But there was one little difference to begin with. With Aristotle the predicables were four in number; with Porphyry their number is five. Aristotle's definition is not included in Porphyry's list, while species and difference are added. So to sum up in familiar Latin the complete series of five predicables, or *quinque voces*, as they came to be called in the Middle Ages, we get: *genus, species, differentia, proprium* and *accidens*. We will not go into the logico-philosophical consequences of this re-listing of the predicables here, but accept the five as listed by Porphyry, because that is the list that was to go down in history.¹³

- 11 Porphyry must count as *the* pivotal figure in the transition of ancient philosophy to the middle ages and beyond. Not only did he compose the *Isagoge* and compile Plotinus' *Enneads*, thus contributing two texts of everlasting endurance, but even greater was his indirect influence on the course of philosophical history, by providing Augustine (354–430) with his essential reading material. In the *Confessiones* Augustine makes no secret about the powerful influence the 'books of the Platonists' exercised on him – the 'Platonists' in fact being an inextricable mix of Plotinus and Porphyry, in Latin translations. The Churchfather seems to have been initially unaware that Porphyry was also the author of *Against the Christians*. Once he had discovered Porphyry's hostility, that became a leading motif of his later discussions on Platonism, notably those in Books 8–10 of the *De civitate Dei*. On Augustine's change in appreciation of Porphyry, see O'Donnell 2001, 22.
- 12 Porphyry's move to Sicily, and in consequence, his writing the *Isagoge* there, would seemingly not have happened, had it not been for a fit of melancholy on the part of this famed pupil of Plotinus. 'I myself at one period had formed the intention of ending my life; Plotinus discerned my purpose; he came unexpectedly to my house where I had secluded myself, told me that my decision sprang not from reason but from mere melancholy and advised me to leave Rome. I obeyed and left for Sicily (...). There I was induced to abandon my first intention but was prevented from being with Plotinus between that time and his death.' Porphyry, *On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of His Work*, 11. Translated by S. MacKenna, cited from the 1991 Penguin edition.
- 13 Was it Porphyry's logico-technical acumen that attracted so many readers, interpreters and commentators throughout history? Another one of Porphyry's works, the philosophical allegorization of a passage in Homer's *Odyssey*, best-known under its Latin title *De antro nympharum*, was translated by Thomas Carlyle, and subsequently illustrated by William Blake. But there seems to be room for doubt about the literary qualities of the *Isagoge* helping to pave the way to its everlasting logico-philosophical glory. Schopenhauer compares Porphyry favourably to all other Neo-Platonists, when it comes to clear and coherent writing; in fact Porphyry is the only one among them that one can read for one's pleasure. 'Die Lektüre der

4.1.4. *The three questions*

Also to go down in history was the intrinsic linking of logic and metaphysics, the basis for which was laid by Porphyry in raising three questions somewhere in the beginning of the *Isagoge*: (1) Are genera and species substances? (2) Are they corporeal or incorporeal? (3) If the latter, are they in sensible things or separated from them?¹⁴ Even though Porphyry dismisses these questions right away as being of a too metaphysical nature to be treated in an introductory work of logic such as the *Isagoge* was meant to be, he in fact had laid the foundations for the war about universals that would rage through the Middle Ages. Are the predicables, or universals, something really existent or not?

Porphyry's literally stated intention notwithstanding the notorious Three Questions would continue to be raised and – in utterly divergent ways – be answered in connection with the *Isagoge*. The first who did try to provide his readers with the answer to the problem Porphyry refused to resolve in a logical context, was the one to have coined the term 'universalia' as well, viz. Boethius, in his two commentaries on the *Isagoge*, which thus proved to be instrumental in providing Latin medieval philosophy with its main subject-matter, and the terminology to discuss it. The irony has been remarked by many an observer: the medieval preoccupation with the ontological status of universals arose out of Boethius' comments on a passage where Porphyry discards the question as unimportant in a logical context.¹⁵

Neuplatoniker erfordert viel Geduld; weil es ihnen sämtlich an Form und Vortrag gebracht. Bei weitem besser, als die andern, ist jedoch, in dieser Hinsicht, Porphyrius: er ist der einzige, der deutlich und zusammenhängend schreibt; so dass man ihn ohne Widerwillen liest.' (*Parerga und Paralipomena*, cited from *Sämtliche Werke* v1, 60) Baumstark, on the other hand, in his monograph on Syrian commentaries on the *Isagoge*, criticizes Porphyry's lack of style, accusing him of being tedious, dry and all too fond of schematizations. Faults for which Porphyry's Syrian intellectual background is to blame, says Baumstark. 'Porphyrios war hellenisierter Syrer. Seine εἰσαγωγή, obwohl nach bestimmter Überlieferung im römischen Westen geschrieben, ist denn in ihre Dürre und Trockenheit, der schmucklosen und stillösen Sachlichkeit des Ganzen und der bis zur Langeweile schematischen Behandlungsweise des Einzelnen ein echtes Kind syrischen Geistes.' (Baumstark 1900, 133)

14 *Isagoge* prooem., 2 (1.10–15): 'Mox de generibus ac speciebus illud quidem, sive subsistunt sive in solis nudis purisque intellectibus posita sunt sive substantia corporalia sunt an incorporea, et utrum separata an in sensibilibus et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo.' (Tr. Boethii)

15 Boethius, PL64 82B–86A

In his introduction to the French translation of the *Isagoge* Libera rightly speaks about the paradox of the *Isagoge*: ‘Nul livre, sans doute, n’a eu dans l’histoire de la philosophie un destin comparable à celui de l’*Isagoge*: susciter (et entretenir) durant des siècles la controverse que son auteur avait, en le composant, explicitement voulu éviter.’¹⁶ Probably these Three Questions coming with the *Quinque Voces*, the Five Words, added just that little bit of complementary interest needed for this introductory work to become an instant classic. For an instant classic it was.

4.1.5. *Commentaries on the Isagoge*

Not only did the *Isagoge* continue to be translated and commented upon, from late Antiquity until the present day, be it on its own or as part of the logical canon, but in the Middle Ages its string of commentaries even led to a spin-off of tracts dedicated to its very subject matter: the universals.

An excellent overview of the immensely influential afterlife of Porphyry’s occasional piece is provided by Libera in *La querelle des universaux*, and in the introduction to his Greek-French-Latin edition of the *Isagoge*.¹⁷

16 Porphyry 1998, xxxiii

17 Libera 1996, Porphyry 1998. All this translating and commenting should be seen in its proper perspective. Porphyry’s *Isagoge* shares the interpretative fate of the Aristotelian body of work it came to be so indissolubly attached to. As is the case with almost anything that Aristotle has written, the interpretation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* has come to be the subject matter of many centuries’ worth of debate, the process of interpreting having started already in Late Antiquity. With respect to Aristotle’s *De generatione et corruptione* and other *libri naturales* first available to the Latin west from the end of the twelfth century onward, Thijssen 1999, esp. 15 ff., has argued that the full significance of the response to these texts – be it in the form of translations or in the form of commentaries or autonomous tracts about their subject matter – can be better understood with the help of the terminology of ‘appropriation’ and ‘naturalization’ as employed by Sabra in his insightful 1987 article on the reception and reworking of Greek science in medieval Islam. The same goes for the response to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. The *translation movement* then, according to Thijssen’s adoption of Sabra’s insights to Western Latin circumstances, represents the *process of appropriation*, which was a decidedly active process: the Greek science and philosophy were not pressed upon the Latin West, no more than they were pressed upon medieval Islam. The *commentary literature* then represents the *process of naturalization*. Over time, the imported Greek knowledge came to be totally absorbed and thoroughly transformed in its new Latin context, even in such a way, says Thijssen, that the Western culture became its new natural home. Of

The Latin tradition of commentaries can be given a not altogether arbitrary starting point in the year 1255.¹⁸ In that year at the Arts Faculty in Paris the study of all known works by Aristotle was prescribed to all students. Other universities followed or had already preceded Paris. And so, for the next four hundred years, these works came to be routinely studied and commented upon all over Europe. The main vehicle by which Aristotle's ideas – and Porphyry's ideas along with them – were mastered, assimilated, and further developed was the commentary literature. Thijssen has to admit, however, that unfortunately so far only few doctrinal aspects of the commentary tradition have been studied. In the next chapter of this Introduction I will return to the commentary tradition in relation to the present text.

When trying to come to terms with Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge*, it is important to know something about the tradition of commentaries on the *Isagoge*, and the answers to the main questions posed by it. The explanations and the general line of a solution indicated by Boethius are held to be of even importance with the questions posed by Porphyry. The dichotomy between *res* (things) and *voces* (words) that was to hold sway from the eleventh century onwards goes right back to this very same dichotomy in late Antiquity, expressed in such a clear a manner in Boethius' logic: 'The *Categories* is not about things, but about words.'¹⁹ To the medieval logicians, the same held for the *Isagoge* as well, and so from the eleventh century onward, logic was taken to be a *scientia sermonicalis*, a linguistic science. For a fair enough presentation of the medieval interpretation of Porphyry's questionnaire one may best turn

course, Sabra's nor Thijssen's contentions are very revolutionary. Hardly any modern scholar would disagree with them about the element of activity in translating Greek philosophical works into Latin. As acknowledged by Thijssen, this aspect is also emphasized, for instance, by Lohr 1982, 82–84. One might turn to De Rijk 1977 as well. The *Isagoge* itself of course was a key element in the Greek body of science, logic and wisdom absorbed in medieval Islam. It promises to be a worthwhile venture, if one was to seek out in how far Sabra's ideas about the ultimate petrification of medieval Islamic philosophy (Sabra 1987, 238ff.) are also applicable to the late scholastics loosing themselves in hair-splitting and sterility. On a whole different scale, the labels of 'appropriation' and 'naturalization' in a Sabraian sense would also come in handy to give some *cachet* to the humble handi-craft of editing obscure medieval manuscripts for a twenty-first century academic readership.

18 Thijssen 1999, 17.

19 Boethius, PL 64, 162B: 'non de rerum generibus, neque de rebus, sed de sermonibus rerum genera significantibus in hoc opere tractatus habetur'.

once more to Libera, who devotes a paragraph to precisely this subject in his already oft-quoted introduction to the French translation of the *Isagoge*.²⁰

Has the dichotomy ever been overcome? If so, one would expect to find a consensus among present day scholars, on a convincing interpretation firmly rooted in tradition. According to De Rijk,²¹ the categories are neither the terms (words) nor the things as such, but are the things for so far they are signified by the terms, and, in a manner of speaking, adapted to our sensations of them and our intellection of them. Categorization: just what the word means. Libera, who gives this fair summarization

20 Porphyry 1998, LXII–LXXXV, where we learn that a large portion of the original problem, to wit the Stoic contribution to the Stoic-Platonic-Peripathetic amalgam that Porphyry's theory of the universals turned out to be, was to play no role at all in the medieval discussion, while the Platonic contribution as well as the Peripathetic contribution wore one and the same Aristotelian mask. Porphyry's first question, whether genera and species are substances, was posed in Stoic language, according to Libera, and was given a peripathetic and anti-stoic answer by Porphyry himself. Not, however, in the *Isagoge* itself, but in his commentary on the *Categories* and in a work known under the title of *Sentences (Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*, ed. B. Mommert. Leipzig 1907). Genus and species, as the abstract essences of the material things, were not just a *figmentum*, an 'empty concept' without a real counterpart (such as the universal of the Stoics), but a veritable entity present in its totality in each of the things determined by it, and acquiring the status of a universal in our thought by way of abstraction. This is how the instigator of the whole discussion on the status of universals thought about it himself. But as remarked before, Porphyry's posing the question proved to be historically fertile and his answer did not. Moreover, the whole Stoic or anti-Stoic aspect of the matter got lost as well. All in all, the deficiencies in the transmission of texts by Porphyry and his contemporaries, combined with the unfavourable destiny of the Stoic sources, has prevented the medievals to take full measure of the discussion potentially instigated by Porphyry. The 'conceptualistic' interpretation was partly preserved via Boethius, but soon got to be replaced by other models, inspired by the Aristotelian psychology and epistemology. This change of paradigm is witnessed, Libera says, by the Latin translation of the Greek ἐπίνοια: intellectus. From 'concept' as with Porphyry, it came to mean 'intellect' (νοῦς) as in the sense of Aristotle's *De anima*.

21 De Rijk 1980; 1988. De Rijk is leading in the field of study of the *Categories*; from his very first endeavours in philosophy in the 1950s the categories have had his keen interest and up to his latest publications the categories hardly ever go without mention. De Rijk's dissertation was about Aristotle's *Categories* and one of his latest books, the critical edition of the tract on *intentiones* by Geraldus Odonis (De Rijk 2005), contains a neat summarization of his findings on Aristotle's categories as well. Perhaps the most rewarding presentation of De Rijk's views on this matter is to be found in a series of 1980s articles in *Vivarium* – containing refinements when compared to the dissertation, and presenting things in a more detailed manner when compared to the introduction to his edition of Geraldus Odonis. The full-fledged account of De Rijk's view on these matters is to be found in his monumental two-volume study *Aristotle. Semantics and Ontology* (De Rijk 2002a and 2002b).

of De Rijk's views,²² points out that this presentation of Aristotle's true intention is very close to the thesis on this matter by Simplicius – a fact that is not likely to be denied by De Rijk. But just the same Libera rounds off his description of De Rijk's and Simplicius' views by stating that he does not subscribe to them. Instead of looking for an 'authentic' Aristotelian interpretation, Libera holds that the interpretational tradition on the subject matter of the *Categories* cannot be done justice if any ambiguity of the Aristotelian position is excluded beforehand. So even nowadays there is no consensus among the champions of ancient and medieval philosophy on Aristotle's real intention on the status of the categories.²³ To Manlevelt's mind, however, the true nature of the categories, and that of the universals, did not seem to be a matter of discussion anymore. Their status had already been ascertained once and for all, and had been discovered, we may safely surmise, by William of Ockham: a universal is a concept referring to a multiple of which it is a natural sign. That is the context within which he worked and within which we must try to understand him.

4.2. Thomas Manlevelt's Ockhamism

Ockham, of course, is famous for Ockham's razor, the principle (actually deriving from Aristotle) that 'entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity'.²⁴ While Ockham sliced away at the undergrowth of medieval realism,²⁵ Manlevelt will be seen taking up this razor, boldly slicing away at our very conceptual framework.

22 Porphyry 1998, XL–XLI.

23 There is not even consensus about which scholars are to be reckoned 'mainstream' Aristotle scholars. Some would say that De Rijk is not a mainstream Aristotle scholar. The mainstream would in that case adhere to the view that Aristotle was really a realist about the categories. See, for example, Frede 1985.

24 See Spade 1999 and Dutilh Novaes's forthcoming contribution to the *Companion to Burley* on how the 'razor' by itself is quite innocuous. The point is what is to be considered as 'beyond necessity'.

25 Andrews 2008, 348 holds that in doing this, Ockham was responsible for an enormous conceptual shift within philosophy, and has been accorded credit variously for the Scientific Revolution, the Protestant Reformation, and the modern world view. For the Scientific Revolution credit, Andrews refers to P. Duhem *Le Système du monde*, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913–1959). For the Protestant Reformation credit, Andrews refers to Heiko Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Theology* (Durham, Labyrinth Press, 1983) 4–5. For the modern world view credit, he refers to Gordon Leff, *William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975) xiii.

With regard to the Ockhamist background of Thomas Manlevelt, signalled by Andrews,²⁶ the regrettable thing is that Manlevelt does never mention William of Ockham by name. Of course, this is no argument against his Ockhamism; Manlevelt just displays the reluctance for naming any contemporary, be it philosophical friend or foe, that for one reason or another is shared by all medieval authors – detrimental as it may be to our understanding of what was going on and of who was engaged in a polemic with whom. This does not mean that Manlevelt refuses to take sides. He does range himself with the *moderni* and their ‘modern way’ (*via moderna*) and turns himself with them against the ‘old way’ (*via antiqua*), associated with thirteenth century scholasticism.

In fact, ranging himself with the ‘moderni’ may be the most one can hope for as a means for a fourteenth century thinker to denominate himself.²⁷ Ockham had scarcely any avowed disciples, even though we have already met at least one of them, be it an anonymous one, in the author of the *Defensorium Ockham*.

In so far as thinkers were termed ‘Ockhamists’ at all, this label was used in a disparaging way. Thus we read about ‘Ockhamiste’ and a ‘secta Occanica’ in a series of statutes and ordinances issued by the Parisian Arts Faculty and its English-German nation respectively in the years 1339–1341, directed against the teaching and discussing of the ‘scientia Okamica.’²⁸ Scotists in late fourteenth-century Paris qualified the

26 Andrews 2008.

27 The ‘Ockhamism’ of even the most famous (or infamous) of Ockhamists has been called into question. ‘That such figures as Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Mirecourt were called “Ockhamists” tells us more about their social attitudes – or the attitudes of those who so labeled them – than about their philosophical positions.’ (Boler 1982, 471 n. 56). Concerning the ecclesial condemnation in 1347 inflicted upon Nicholas of Autrecourt, De Rijk holds that a comparison, let alone a connection, with the condemnation of William of Ockham is inappropriate (Nicholas of Autrecourt 1994, 3). The term ‘Ockhamism’ only came in general use in the 19th century, as a general label for the 14th century thinkers who followed in the doctrinal footsteps of William of Ockham. Contemporary writers did not generally refer to this school of nominalist thought as ‘Ockhamism’. One 1425 manuscript even speaks of the century of Buridanism, and not that of Ockhamism. As a term ‘Ockhamism’ did survive the twentieth century, and is not likely to lose its usefulness to present-day investigators. Whether or not they called themselves so, there is a clear-cut enough group of thinkers conveniently labelled by the term ‘Ockhamism’. See, for example, the acts of a symposium on ‘Ockham and Ockhamists’ edited by Bos and Krop in 1987.

28 For a rendering *in extenso* of these documents, and a highly nuanced interpretation thereof, see Courtenay & Tachau 1982.

Ockhamists as ‘rudes et terministae’. Only since the 1474 Paris decree on Nominalism, they come to be called, and call themselves, ‘nominalists’.²⁹

Given the widespread use of Ockham’s logical criteria of demonstration and evidence there is good reason to label ‘Ockhamist’ in the wide sense the nominalist movement that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was known as the ‘modern way’, and that was to branch off in an Ockhamist school in a stricter sense, besides a Buridan school of nominalism, and a Marsilian school. And for the same good reason Thomas Manlevelt may safely be labelled an Ockhamist as well. To be even more specific: an Ockhamist in the strictest sense, seeing the high level of doctrinal concordance with the Venerable Inceptor.³⁰

No such doctrinal concordance is to be found with either of the other two schools of nominalism. This is not the place to go into the intricate relationship between Buridanism and Marsilianism. The least that can be said about it is that these two varieties of nominalism are mutually closer related to each other than either of them to Ockhamism in its strictest sense. For my present purpose it will suffice to indicate the differences of Manlevelt’s thought to either Buridanism or Marsilianism, and therefore to the amalgamation of the two schools. In our case it is Buridanism that Manlevelt is compared to.

With a career spanning roughly the same span of years as that of John Buridan, Thomas Manlevelt was not in any sense a Buridanist. Doctrinal concordances with the work of William of Ockham abound, but specific concordances with the work of John Buridan, other than sharing a common ‘nominalist’ worldview, are few, while doctrinal divergences are many. Buridanist key terms such as ‘contractio’ (referring to the relation between the more general and the less general, including the relation between genus and species as well as the relation between species and individual) are hardly to be found in the works of our author,³¹ and both

29 Maurer 1994, 388 is of the opinion that Ockham’s traditional title of nominalist is justified by the Venerable Inceptor himself, who in *Summa logicae* 1, 3, p. 11.27 refers to universals existing in the mind as ‘mental names’ (*nomina mentalia*).

30 This high level of doctrinal concordance between Thomas Manlevelt and William of Ockham is surely deserving of further study. On the medieval problem of universals, and Ockham’s role in solving this problem by replacing the *via antiqua* conception with his own *via moderna* conception, see Klima 2008.

31 On ‘contractio’ in the Buridanist technical sense, see for example King 1994, 407 and especially 424 n. 26. It has to be admitted, though, that Manlevelt does talk about signs being contracted, in Q. 2 DISTINCTIONES, 2^{ta}: ‘Divisio vero logicalis vocatur ista qua aliquod signum commune contrahitur pro aliquibus significatis per aliquam

thinkers have quite different ways of tackling the question of the number of the categories, to take but two random examples. If not to be taken as a proof, then at least as a strong indication that Manlevelt cannot have been a Buridanist in a strict or even a wide sense is the historical circumstance that Manlevelt's logical tracts in use at various European universities had to make place for those by John Buridan.³² This would not have been necessary had the two of them shared the same doctrine.

Moreover it must be remarked that historians of philosophy nowadays tend to deny there ever having been a 'Buridanist school', any more than an 'Ockhamist school'.³³

differentiam vel per aliquam suam speciem, sicut hoc signum commune "animal", quando additur sibi hec differentia "irrationale", contrahitur ad standum pro aliis suis significatis,' and also in Q. 35 DIST. 1, 34^{vb}: 'differentia addita alicui non convertibili cum eo cuius est differentia constitutiva, contrahit ipsum, ut totum resultans ex ipso et tota differentia convertibiliter cum eo cuius est differentia, contrahit ipsum cui additur ad standum tantummodo pro significato vel significatis illius cuius est differentia, sicut hec differentia "rationale mortale" addita subiecto vel corpori vel animali contrahit ipsum ad standum tantummodo pro significato vel significatis.' And in Q. 37 CONCL. 4, 36^{ra}: 'nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species secundo modo per se, quia talis divisio potest fieri per proprium quod competit tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si fiat talis divisio: animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur differentia specifica, et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que contrahunt genus ad standum precise pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium "risibile" contrahit hoc genus "animal" ad standum precise proprie pro suppositis "hominis".'

32 Lorenz 1996, 147f.

33 Courtenay 2004, 8 holds that 'If a Buridan school existed, and I think it is a label that obscures more than it enlightens, it was based on a compatibility of intellectual outlook on certain issues, not on any institutional context.' From several different perspectives, institutional, geographical, and intellectual, Thijssen 2004 rejects the notion of a Buridan school in the fourteenth century altogether. He sees the five big names commonly associated with Buridanism 'John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Nicole Oresme, Themon Judeus, and Marsilius of Inghen as a small intellectual network of nearly contemporary masters of arts, who were familiar with each other's work and at times responded to one another. This concept seems more adequate than that of a unified Buridan school in explaining the dynamics of conflict and alliance that we encounter in the texts.' (Thijssen 2004, 42) A difference with the supposed school of Ockhamism – if we may add our own little note here – is that there never has been written a Buridan *defensorium* while we do have a *defensorium ockham*, and that on the other hand the spreading or teaching of Buridanist ideas was never officially prohibited in any university. So there seems to have been some kind of Ockhamist alliance after all. No doubt, Manlevelt's feeding ground has to be looked for in this direction.

4.3. *Ockhamism in Oxford and in Paris*

Quite roughly the development and spread of Ockhamism or whatever label this nominalist movement is given, can be divided in two phases, with a geographical shift marking the beginning of the second phase. Between 1330 and 1350 there was the rapid spread of Ockham's doctrines and method in Paris and Oxford. From 1350 onward the 'modern way' got to be less closely associated with Ockham's teachings, and Paris became more important than Oxford, at this time.

A neat arrangement of things happening in the field of late medieval logic is presented by Spade.³⁴ Confining his attention to the two centuries span between 1300 and 1500, its most original contribution, he says, was made before 1350, especially at Oxford. This had everything to do with the revival of terminism, after it had oddly undergone a sharp decline on both sides of the Channel in the 1270s. In France, terminism was replaced for half a century by modism until the 1320s, when John Buridan suddenly restored the theory of supposition and associated terminist doctrines. In England, it was Walter Burley who very early in the fourteenth century began to do new work in the terminist tradition. Spade distinguishes three distinct stages in English logic after 1300. The best work was done between 1300 and 1350, the period during which Burley and Ockham were the paramount figures, setting the high standard for the next generation, associated with Merton College, Oxford, to live up to. Spade mentions the names of Richard Kilvington, William Heytesbury, Thomas Bradwardine, Adam Wodeham and Richard Billingham. The name of Holkot could have been added by Spade as well. But Thomas Manlevelt, who did hold the Oxford logicians in high esteem,³⁵ is not directly linked by Spade to this logical heyday. Instead, he places our author in the stage of consolidation, lasting from 1350 until 1400, along with logicians like Richard Lavenham, John Wyclif, Ralph Strode and Richard Feribrigge – a time of sophisticated, but no longer especially original work.³⁶ Spade acknowledges that this is a period not yet well

34 Spade 1998, 402 ff.

35 See Q. 10 (9th), where Manlevelt makes mention of the good work being done 'in universitate Ocsonienti'. More on this below, subsection 4.6.2.

36 Thomas Manlevelt thus is placed by Spade in presumably the wrong period, and probably the wrong intellectual context (that is to say: the wrong country). But this misplacing need not be the reason for Spade's failing to appreciate Manlevelt's originality. The reason will rather be Spade's not being acquainted with Manlevelt's

researched. I may add that indeed in a circumstantial way Manlevelt fits in well with this period in so far as he himself has not been the object of thorough historical investigation either. And it is precisely this circumstance that allows one to place him maybe a little closer to the hotbed of logical originality than directly warranted by Spade's admittedly rough division of late medieval logic. That is to say: nothing really prevents one from placing him in Spade's first stage of English logic after 1300, namely the period between 1300 and 1350, when the best work was done. In fact, there is reason enough to positively place him there, the overall high quality of his work being a main argument. Another argument happens to be provided by Spade himself, who in an earlier study cites a medieval text in which Thomas Manlevelt's tract on *Insolubilia* is mentioned alongside the *Insolubilia* of Bradwardine and Heytesbury³⁷ – which clearly connects Manlevelt to the period in which the best work in English logic was done. The very least that can be said is that he needs not to be associated in any way with the third stage of development of English logic, lasting from 1400 until 1500 and labelled by Spade as one of shocking decline. Medieval logic, he says, 'was effectively dead in England after 1400.'³⁸

Is it Spade's placing Thomas Manlevelt in the wrong stage of development of British logic, which prevents him from acknowledging the originality of his work? No, any lack of appreciation seems rather to be caused by the inaccessibility of all Manlevelt's works unedited until now – a drawback that the present edition will only partially do away with.

In fact, however, one will still have to take into account the possibility that Thomas Manlevelt was not a British logician at all, but a continental thinker who worked under a strong British influence.³⁹ Ockham's confrere Adam Wodeham however is known to have been instrumental in transmitting much English learning (and, we may safely presume, much Ockhamist teaching) to Paris. This explains Manlevelt's Ockhamist frame of mind, whether he has some Mertonian background or whether he received his complete intellectual education in Paris.

highly original but hardly-known logical works. This edition of his *Questiones libri Porphyrii* should contribute to a keener appreciation of Manlevelt's standing as a logician and philosopher.

37 See Spade 1975.

38 Spade 1998, 403.

39 See above, subsection 2.2.4 of this Introduction.

4.4. *Parisian denials of substance*

After having overcome an initial reluctance, of which the above mentioned 1340 Statute of the Paris Arts Faculty bear witness,⁴⁰ the ‘modern way’ becomes settled as a relatively stable, and in some respects scientifically fruitful, philosophical school that endured and spread throughout central Europe in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. Famous names in this Parisian setting are John Buridan and Gregory of Rimini.⁴¹ Infamous among these second phase Parisians were John of Mirecourt and Nicholas of Autrecourt, who denied the existence of substance. As we have seen, our own author was one to deny substance too, albeit in a cautious enough way and in parentheses, so to speak.⁴² Nevertheless, it is hard to tell what prevented the works of Thomas Manlevelt to join in the censorship that befell those of Mirecourt and Autrecourt: his caution, or the presumable fact that he made his daring statement about the non-existence of substance not in Paris, centre of learning, but in Louvain, and so out of the immediate sight of those keen enough to prevent philosophers to dare think such thoughts.⁴³

40 See above, section 3.4 of this Introduction.

41 The results of the work done in Paris by John Buridan in the field of natural philosophy spread to the new universities of central Europe, presumably carried there by Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. That is to say: both these illustrious men were long taken to have been pupils of Buridan. Quite recently, however, Fitzgerald has come up with a reversal of this story. See Fitzgerald 2002, especially the introductory chapter titled ‘Albert, Buridan, and Maulfelt’. According to Fitzgerald, Albert was already an old man when he came to Paris, and long from becoming Buridan’s pupil there, he was the one to criticize Buridan’s thoughts as expressed in his *Summulae*, causing Buridan to revise these. So if anything, Buridan was influenced by Albert of Saxony, rather than the other way round. But this is not the place to go into this, notwithstanding its possible importance for the interpretation of the data known about our own author. A name to remember in connection with the spread of the ‘modern way’ to the new universities in the German countries in late 14th century is Henry Totting of Oyta. More about him below, subsection 5.5.4.

42 Further witness of the fact that the status of the category of substance became a subject of discussion in the first half of the 14th century is to be found in a text discussed in Courtenay 1995, whose anonymous author, a contemporary of Nicholas of Autrecourt, shares the latter’s ideas about the indemonstrability of substance.

43 Too farfetched is another possible hypothesis: that the works containing Manlevelt’s controversial ideas did share the fate of those by Mirecourt and Autrecourt, and as a result are untraceable apart from this one manuscript that we are using for our edition.

I have already contemplated a spectacular manifestation of this Ockhamist frame of mind in Manlevelt's denial of substance.⁴⁴ So far, I have closely followed Andrews' interpretation of this remarkable text when it comes to its historical roots and its uniqueness. In all fairness it has to be conceded, however, that maybe Manlevelt's doing away with the category of substance was not such a unique thing in his time after all.

The name comes to mind of a more cautious thinker like John Buridan, but also the names of more outrageous figures like John of Mirecourt and Nicholas of Autrecourt. All of them were working in Paris around the same time I think that Thomas must have been there, but wild ideas did not seem to be limited to Paris alone, when one takes into account an Oxford thinker like Crathorn.⁴⁵ Putting Manlevelt's attack on substance in a more contemporary context may also throw some more light on the precise nature of his Ockhamism.

Mirecourt, a known follower of William of Ockham working in Paris around 1344–1347, may be looked upon as no less a forerunner of David Hume than Thomas Manlevelt is taken to be, by rejecting the Aristotelian notion of causality.⁴⁶ Even closer to Manlevelt's position is that of Autrecourt, working in Paris somewhat earlier, in 1335–1337, who held that the existence of substance is unprovable – a view that not only merited him the honorary nickname 'medieval Hume', but in Autrecourt's case met with severe oppression by the ecclesiastical authorities.⁴⁷

Buridan, deriving crucial information from the Eucharist – that is to say: information not to be had anywhere else in the world – comes on the evidence of transsubstantiation to the conclusion that accidents too cannot be denied their subsistence.⁴⁸ The wording may not be spectacular, but the impact is no less devastating to the traditional Aristotelian categorical framework than the downright denial of the existence of substance, as proposed but hastily withdrawn by Thomas Manlevelt.

44 This Introduction 1.1.

45 The list of Manlevelt's contemporaries holding more or less 'Humean' ideas does not have to stop short here, as a glance at the anonymous text edited in Courtenay 1995 will suffice to convince anyone interested in the matter.

46 See Weinberg 1964, 269 ff. See also De Rijk 1994, 8.

47 See Weinberg 1948, and in a more condensed form Weinberg 1964, 273 ff. See also De Rijk's edition of texts by Autrecourt.

48 See De Rijk 1994, 19, 26, 35.

Crathorn, lecturing in Oxford around 1330, is one who dares to deny the existence of substance as well.⁴⁹ That is to say: he advocates a complete agnosticism as regards the knowability of substance.⁵⁰ Being a Dominican philosopher and theologian, his intellectual background however was quite different from that of the other thinkers. His Dominican background makes it unlikely that he will have taken William of Ockham as his intellectual master, while the others, with the exception of Buridan, must be reckoned as belonging to the Ockhamist 'school', if ever there was one. Moreover, Crathorn made his remarkable pronouncements in Oxford, and not in Paris, where the others were at work.

Apparently, Manlevelt's denial of substance did not come out of the blue.⁵¹ The prime category was seen with a critical eye, if it did not come under downright attack, both in Paris and in Oxford. The question is not whether Thomas Manlevelt was the first to deny its existence, or if he was only inspired to do so by others. When it comes to his intellectual background, what matters is rather if his doing so should be seen within a primarily Oxonian, or a primarily Parisian context.

Ockham has himself never denied the existence of substance. (So when viewed from an Ockhamist point of view Manlevelt has really taken a decisive step by doing so.) Ockham seizes upon the fact of transsubstantiation during the Eucharist to set out the categories of quality and quantity against one another, without concerning himself with the category of substance. Just like Buridan, however, Thomas Manlevelt finds occasion in the very same Eucharistical fact to doubt the demonstrability, if not the very existence of the category of substance.⁵² In one of the preliminary arguments of the *questio* on the existence of substance in his commentary on the *Categories*, it is stated that 'naturally speaking we don't experience, nor have any reason to believe, that there is any more substance in an unconsecrated communion wafer than in a consecrated one (according to theologians); for the same reason we cannot experience or prove that there is any substance in an

49 See Schepers 1970 and 1972. See also De Rijk 1994, 43.

50 'Substantia enim per propriam speciem non cognoscitur pro statu isto.' Cited by Schepers 1972, 113 n. 41.

51 Maybe the first 'reductionist' in any relevant sense of the term was Peter John Olivi (1248–1298). Historically, however, he is somewhat beyond the scope of this study on Thomas Manlevelt.

52 For Buridan on this, see De Rijk 1994, especially 19–28. For Manlevelt on this, see Andrews 2008.

unconsecrated communion wafer, and likewise for any other thing whatsoever.⁵³ The least that can be said is that both of them, unlike Ockham, tend to question the privileged position of substance when it comes to its subsistence. Does this mean that one has to draw Manlevelt out of the Ockhamist corner and push him over to the Buridanist corner?

Mirecourt and Autrecourt were Ockhamists taking the same remarkable step with regards the category of substance, and they were also in Paris, which is quite in line with our hypothesis that Manlevelt was also an Ockhamist working in Paris: evidently, it was an endeavour that Ockhamists there and then were willing to embark on. As yet, there is no need then, by sticking to our Parisian hypothesis, to place Manlevelt under a Buridanist, rather than an Ockhamist sphere of influence.

Crathorn working in a Manleveltian vein in Oxford poses no necessity to give up my Parisian hypothesis either. Prima facie at least the case for Oxford is in no way stronger than the case for Paris, and thus the former cannot pose any counterweight to the evidence pointing to Manlevelt being a Parisian. True, Pinborg tends to push Manlevelt all the way into the British corner, with Bradwardine and the other Calculators, to be more specific.⁵⁴ But Lorenz, finding full support in Andrews, is quite convinced of Manlevelt's Parisian whereabouts, while he does not rule out the possibility of him having received a preliminary training in Oxford.⁵⁵

4.5. *The University of Paris*

In some ways, Thomas Manlevelt's name seems to be connected both to the University of Paris and to the University of Oxford. In the next subsection I will have something to say about Oxford. Now I will take a look at the University of Paris, with its four 'Nations' – a system that

53 *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Q. 16 3., 55^{vb}, 'non habemus aliquem experientiam vel rationem naturaliter loquendo quod magis substantia sit in hostia non consecrate quam in hostia consecrate, et per nihil possimus experiri vel ratione probari substantiam esse in hostia consecrate, sicut patet per theologos; igitur pari ratione per nihil possimus experiri vel probare substantiam esse in hostia non consecrate; et pari ratione nec in aliqua alia re.' (ed. Andrews). Translation by Andrews 2008, 350.

54 Pinborg 1967, 146.

55 Lorenz 1996, 157f.

needs a brief word of explanation.⁵⁶ It will turn out that this four Nations system leaves room for Manlevelt having resided there. It may even throw some light on his name and loyalties.

Final authority in the Parisian arts faculty lay in the general congregation of the arts masters, presided over by the rector. This congregation was itself the combination of four smaller organisms, loosely based on a geographical classification: the French, Picard, Norman, and English nations. The English nation included students from central and northern Europe, and was in time to be called the English-German or even simply the German nation.⁵⁷ In Paris only the largest faculty, that of arts, had nations. The nations comprised masters of arts from the arts faculty, and included professors of higher faculties with a degree in arts.⁵⁸ Incoming students in arts were enrolled by mutual agreement with a master, who would be responsible for overseeing his studies. The master so chosen had to belong to the nation with which the student would be affiliated on the basis of geographical origin.⁵⁹

Now as we have seen, there is a Thomas Anglicus mentioned twice as a *Magister actu regens* and the proctor of the English nation in the *Chartularium* of the University of Paris for the year of 1331.⁶⁰ If this is really Thomas Manlevelt, this would mean that by that time he would have been a member of the English nation.⁶¹

56 See the statute of 1290 in Denifle and Châtelain 1891, 46–47, # 570.

57 Boyce 1928, 30: 'During and prior to the fourteenth century the nation had always been designated as the English nation; (...) it retained the name *Anglicana* until well into the fifteenth century. (...) The first use of *Alemania* as a title of the nation occurred in August, 1400, but it was not until 1442–1443 that it was normally used.'

58 Together, the four nations acted as the faculty of arts, providing, for instance, for the needs relative to the curriculum, the degrees, and the organisation of teaching. In addition to those common duties, the nations exercised activities as separate corporate components. The members of the nation were headed by a proctor (*procurator*) chosen for a period of one month by the masters and often re-elected several times. Each nation had its own revenues and expenditure, treasury, seal, *libri nationis*, patron saints, and authority to regulate its own members. See Thijssen 1998, 58; Gieysztor 1992, 114.

59 Courtenay 2004, 4

60 Denifle and Châtelain 1891, 363, 365–368, 392, cited by Lorenz 1996, 158 n. 53. See above, subsection 2.2.2, footnote 26.

61 The *Liber procuratorum* of the English nation has survived and was edited by Denifle and Châtelain. It offers a conscientiously kept administration from 1339 onward, but bad luck has it that it contains only a few scattered notes from the years 1333 and 1337. The name of Thomas Manlevelt is not to be found in the entire *Liber procuratorum*, a fact which Lorenz accepts as a proof by negative demonstration that Manlevelt must have been a teacher in the Parisian arts faculty precisely in the years 1333 and 1337, and certainly not after 1339. See Lorenz 1996, 158

But even if this identification should be correct, does this mean that our author was really an Englishman? First appearances notwithstanding, this is not necessarily so. Lorenz has to confess that he could not find a trace of our author in England.⁶² This would be very strange, if it did not just leave open the possibility that Thomas Manlevelt 'dictus Anglicus' was not an Englishman after all. The English nation was quite heterogeneous in its makeup, consisting of masters not only from England, but from northern, central and north-eastern Europe as well. In the fourteenth century, when Manlevelt is supposed to have been one of its members, its roll included masters from the British Isles, Holland and part of Flanders, from the Germanies and the Scandinavian countries, and also from Hungary and the Slavic lands.⁶³ As stated, geographical boundaries were indefinite and quarrels over this lack of clarity were frequent, especially between the English nation and the Picard nation, made up of masters from the Low Countries and from northern France.

In most cases the boundaries of the nations coincided with the boundaries of groups of dioceses. The various enumerations of these dioceses in present-day literature, not altogether consistent the one with the other, may very well reflect the source of conflict between the nations in those days. According to Courtenay, the Picard nation included as their students those from the dioceses of Beauvais, Noyon, and Laon on the southern edge of Picardy, and all dioceses north and east (Thérouanne, Tournai, Cambrai, Liège) up to the left bank of the Meuse, thus including a portion of Holland and a small portion of the diocese of Utrecht.⁶⁴ This would include the duchy of Brabant. Kibre, on the other hand, names Laon, Cambrai, Liège, Utrecht and Tournai as the dioceses making up the Flemish province of the Picard nation.⁶⁵ None of these dioceses were then part of the duchy of Brabant. Boyce, after warning us once again that the geographical boundaries which defined the areas from which the members of the various nations emigrated to Paris were in most cases vague and indefinite, holds that the continental area of the English-German nation comprised approximately all the land lying north or east of the Meuse, thus including Holland, and parts of the dioceses of Utrecht and Liège (the other portions of which were claimed by the Picards).⁶⁶

62 Lorenz 1996, 157.

63 Such is the precise listing of the roll by Kibre 1948, 19.

64 Courtenay 2004, 4 n. 3.

65 Kibre 1948, 19.

66 Boyce 1928, 28 f.

Clarity seems to have been brought in this matter by the outcome of a mid-fourteenth century conflict between the two nations, dragging along from 1356 until 1358.⁶⁷ The conclusion of the debate was that the English-Germans and the Picards settled on the River Meuse in the Low Countries as the boundary between the two nations.⁶⁸ That is to say: the boundaries only took definite shape after the ‘Englishman’ Thomas Manlevelt’s presumed lecturing in Louvain, the heart of the disputed region of Brabant.

The least that can be said is that before the settling of the boundary along the river Meuse, the move from Brabant to the Picard nation in Paris was not the obvious one. The fact that the most famous of all Brabantian philosophers, Siger, belonged to the Picard nation, has generally been taken as a sign of Siger’s Frenchifying.⁶⁹ In other words, a Brabantian should more rightly have joined the English nation, rather than the Picard nation.

The gist of all this is that the borderline position of Louvain in Brabant, only entering the Picard nation for good in the second half of the fourteenth century, leaves ample room for the admittedly speculative conclusion either that Manlevelt as a Brabantian may have belonged to the English nation in Paris,⁷⁰ or that Manlevelt if he really was from English, or more precisely Oxonian-Mertonian origin, may easily have come into contact with the Brabantians in the English nation at the Parisian arts faculty. Thus, both directions are open: Thomas Manlevelt as an Englishman moving from Paris to Louvain, or Thomas Manlevelt as a Brabantian meriting the nickname ‘the Englishman’ in Paris, before returning to Louvain. And then again, he could also simply be German, or any other of the above-mentioned nationalities clearly belonging to the English-German nation, while not being English.

Thijssen has rightly drawn attention to the fact that in Paris, possibly because of the Venerable Inceptor’s English origin, Ockham’s ideas found

67 See Kibre 1948, 21–23 for some more quarrels between the Picard and English-German nations.

68 Thijssen 2004, 26.

69 For example, Siger of Brabant 1992, 16. In his introduction to Siger’s text, its translator into Dutch, Krop, bases his idea of Siger being Frenchified on Van Steenberghen’s 1977 monograph *Maître Siger de Brabant*.

70 Above, in subsection 2.2.4 of this Introduction, I already put forward the suggestion that Manlevelt’s being called Thomas Anglicus in several manuscripts may reflect nothing more than a possible association with English logicians or with the English nation at the University of Paris, which had German members and members from the low countries as well.

more adherence in the English-German nation than in any of the other nations of the arts faculty.⁷¹ Whatever the precise impact of the 1340 ‘anti-Ockhamist’ statute alluded to in the previous chapter of this Introduction may have been, the Parisian climate for an Ockhamist way of thinking seems to have been favourable enough in the few decennia preceding the statute. And that is exactly the period in which Manlevelt must have worked there. This also explains why his logical tracts, conceived in this period, could receive the warm welcome that was in fact bestowed upon them on the European mainland, taking full advantage of the splendour Paris had in the field of intellectual developments. As can be seen from the example of John Buridan, whose ideas were enthusiastically received in Middle-Europe without Buridan himself ever setting foot there,⁷² the intellectual infrastructure was such that an innovative thinker like in our case Thomas Manlevelt did not have to travel in person, for his ideas to take hold all over Europe.

4.6. *The University of Oxford*

Relaying my attention from Germany and Brabant to England, I will now look at a possible connection of Thomas Manlevelt with the University of Oxford. To be more precise, I will see in how far our author’s name can possibly be linked to Merton College.

When sketching the overall development of British logic, it has already been seen that among all Oxford Masters the Mertonians in particular contributed much to the development of logic in the early fourteenth century. Even more important were their achievements in the field of physics.

While in a way continuing the fine logical tradition started off by William of Ockham, Merton cannot, contrary to popular belief, claim Ockham as one of its illustrious Fellows. Nevertheless, as maintained by Weisheipl in his 1968 article on ‘Ockham and some Mertonians’, the contributions of the Mertonians cannot be appraised properly without reference to William of Ockham.⁷³ Many of the later writings of Walter

71 Thijssen 1998, 63–67.

72 To be consulted on this matter is, for example, De Rijk 1994.

73 This is not an opinion shared by all scholars. There are those to whom it feels more like quite different circles. Dutilh Novaes, for instance, never had the impression that except for Burley, the other Mertonians really knew much about Ockham. On the other hand, if our surmises are correct, Thomas Manlevelt is closely enough

Burley, for example, were directed against the nominalism of William of Ockham under the guise of 'true' Aristotelianism. The fundamentally new physics as well as the vigorously orthodox theology of Thomas Bradwardine stands in sharp contrast to the teachings of Ockham. But later Oxonians, even at Merton, were more favourably disposed towards the views of Ockham. By the end of the century, however, John Wyclif again reacted strongly against the nominalism of Ockham.⁷⁴

The attractive simplicity and disturbing unorthodoxy of Ockham's views both in theology and in philosophy, says Weisheipl, had the inevitable result of arousing sharp opposition as well as ardent enthusiasm.⁷⁵ Thomas Manlevelt, if his name is to be connected to Merton at all, is of course to be placed among the enthusiasts.

4.6.1. *Manlevelt and Bradwardine: De incipit et desinit*

Now, one of the medieval thinkers whose authorship has been confused with that of Thomas Manlevelt was Thomas Bradwardine.⁷⁶ The latter, already mentioned several times before, was a prime member of the so-called Oxford Calculators or 'Mertonians'. He was famous for his work on *insolubilia*⁷⁷ and the science of motion as well as his opposition to contemporary Pelagianism.

A genre closely related to the *insolubilia*, and one practised by Bradwardine as well, was that of the *probationes*,⁷⁸ in vogue since the 1330s.⁷⁹ It was concerned with procedures for proving sentences of all types, and the scope of one of its subgenres was limited to propositions containing the terms 'incipit' and 'desinit'.⁸⁰

associated with Ockham as well as the Mertonians. This might in itself serve as a secondary clue that a direct acquaintance of the Mertonians with Ockham is not to be ruled out beforehand.

74 Weisheipl 1968, 164.

75 Weisheipl 1968, 173. Which goes to show once again that Ockham is pre-eminently a philosopher to leave a school behind him. After all, why should a philosopher who was honoured with a *defensor Ockham* not also lend his name to the philosophical trend that had our author as one of its most original partisans? And who is to doubt that in a slightly later period a thinker like Henry Totting of Oyta was an 'Ockhamist'?

76 As already mentioned above, section 2.1.

77 On this, see Read 2002, and especially the edition and translation of Bradwardine's *Insolubilia* by Read: Thomas Bradwardine 2010.

78 The main name for *probationes* is another Mertonian, Billingham.

79 On the subject of *probationes*, one may consult De Rijk 1982, 3–5.

80 The genre of the *probationes* and its subgenre on the terms 'incipit' and 'desinit'

Thomas Bradwardine's treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit', edited by Nielsen in 1982, has been transmitted in four manuscripts. Two of these manuscripts are to be found in the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana; one in the Bibliothèque Royal Albert 1^{er} in Brussels; one in the Dominikanerkloster in Vienna. The Vienna and Brussels manuscripts name Thomas Manlevelt as the author of this work.⁸¹ The two Vatican manuscripts however point out Thomas Bradwardine as its author.⁸² Nielsen's deciding the question of authorship with a very high degree of likelihood in favour of Thomas Bradwardine has to my knowledge never been challenged.⁸³

A marginal note might be made, however.⁸⁴ Nielsen shows the possibility of establishing a doctrinal concordance between the treatise

being in vogue in the 1330s does not mean that no attention was paid to these subject matters earlier on. Braakhuis 1997 cites a manuscript containing an overview of teachings in logic in Paris, 1230–1250. One of the subjects treated by then was that of the *sincategoreumata* including a paragraph 'de verbis "incipit" et "desinit"':

81 The Vienna manuscript has the ascription in its incipit as well as its explicit: 'Incipit tractatus de incipit et desinit magistri Thome Maulfeld', ed. Nielsen 1982, 47; 'Explicit tractatus de duabus dictionibus "incipit" et "desinit" editus a magistro Thoma Manlovel', ed. Nielsen 1982, 83. The Bruxelles manuscript has the ascription in its explicit only: 'Explicit tractatus de istis duabus dictionibus "incipit" et "desinit" editus a magistro Thoma dicto Manlovel Anglico', ed. Nielsen 1982, 83.

82 Nielsen 1982, 2 f.

83 The ascription to Manlevelt, if correct, would directly have linked him to a genre in vogue since the 1330s, and would thus be entirely in line with our tentative dating of his philosophical activity around that time. Even if incorrect, however, the ascription at the very least counts as an indication that to contemporaries and near-contemporaries Thomas Manlevelt's name did not sound absurd when put forward as being the author of a work stemming from the 1330s or 1340s – Thomas Bradwardine having died in 1349. And this, in turn, counts as an indication that his philosophical activity may indeed very well be dated around that time.

84 In fact, quite another marginal question might be posed as well, one that would put our whole enterprise upside down, if answered in the affirmative: would it be possible that not Thomas Manlevelt but Thomas Bradwardine is the author of the commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* edited here? Luckily, this question can be discarded right away and need not disturb us further, if only because, after all, it is the name of Thomas Manlevelt and not the name of Thomas Bradwardine that is connected with our manuscript in the writing above the first columns. No, there really is no need to fear some kind of diabolical reversal of the ascription of our manuscript, in connection with the possible ascription of the Bradwardinian text on 'incipit' and 'desinit' to Thomas Manlevelt. Apart from there being no *prima facie* doctrinal reasons obliging us to consider Thomas Bradwardine's authorship, there is no internal evidence at all pointing in Thomas Bradwardine's direction. On the contrary, in as far as references to the author's own works are to be found in the texts, these are either to a title undoubtedly written by Thomas Manlevelt, and not known from the bibliography of Thomas Bradwardine (namely the tract on Supposition), or to works not known from Manlevelt's bibliography, but not known from Thomas

on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ and Bradwardine’s other writings. In his tract *De continuo* Bradwardine touches on the question whether one should assign internal or external limits to the so-called permanent thing. Here he strongly suggests the point of view that decision of this question should be in favour of an external limit:

... et alicuius rei permanentis, ut hominis, non est aliquod ultimum intrinsecum sui esse.⁸⁵

This point of view is considered to be of fundamental importance in the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’:

Secunda suppositio est hec quod non est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse.⁸⁶

On the evidence of a doctrine on ‘desinit’ espoused in Manlevelt’s *Confusiones*, Nielsen holds that Thomas Manlevelt defends the view that permanent objects are limited internally:

Similiter hec dictio ‘desinit’ dicitur exponi uno modo per unam (*scil.* propositionem) affirmativam de presenti et negativam de futuro, ut in hac propositione ‘Sortes desinit esse’ hoc est ‘Sortes nunc est et immediate post hoc Sortes non erit’. Alio modo exponitur per unam negativam de presenti et affirmativam de preterito ut ‘desinit esse motus’ id est ‘nunc non est motus et immediate ante hoc fuit motus.’⁸⁷

Nielsen concludes that this view is strictly opposed to the one sustained in the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’, and this would disqualify Thomas Manlevelt as its author.

Bradwardine’s bibliography either (namely the commentaries on *De anima* and *Physica*). One might say that this apparent lack in Manlevelt’s bibliography does not amount to so much, seeing the still highly provisional status of his biography and bibliography. Has Thomas Bradwardine written any commentaries at all on works by Aristotle? Lohr 1973 only mentions, under the heading ‘doubtful’: *De fallaciis elenchorum* in *Quaestiones super XII libris Metaphysicae*. Weisheipl 1969 sums up eight certain works and four uncertain, among which no commentary on Aristotle whatsoever. Moreover, the fact that Brabant plays a geographical role in our manuscript does point in the direction of Thomas Manlevelt, as we have seen, but points away, if anything, from Thomas Bradwardine. To wit: Thomas Bradwardine – whose life is comparably well-documented, at least in comparison to our author’s life – was all over the place, so to speak, as confessor of king Edward III. But there is no mentioning of his following the king to Brabant, let alone that he would have been a teacher in pre-university Louvain (see e.g. Lohr 1973, Weisheipl 1968 and all the more recent handbooks).

85 Cited by Nielsen, 1982, 3.

86 Ed. Nielsen, 1982, 47. It should be noticed, however, that this *ultimum instans* is not specified here as either an *ultimum intrinsecum* or an *ultimum extrinsecum*.

87 Cited by Nielsen, 1982, 4.

Is Nielsen's citation from Manlevelt's *Confusiones* really proof of his holding the view that the ceasing of permanent objects is limited internally, rather than a non-obliging explanation of what we mean when we say that something ceases to be? If so, the view held by Manlevelt in the *Confusiones* does not seem to tally well with the view to be distilled from his treatment of accidents ceasing to be in the commentary on the *Isagoge* edited here. In the forty-second *questio* Manlevelt seems to be a strict adherent to the Aristotelian dictum that

... non est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse.⁸⁸

And so it might turn out that the doctrinal concordance between the treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit' and Bradwardine's other writings established by Nielsen can also be established between this treatise and at least one of Manlevelt's other writings, viz. the one here presented. In short, Nielsen holds that the treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit' fits Thomas Bradwardine and does not fit Thomas Manlevelt, while I hold that this treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit' may fit Thomas Manlevelt after all, when his *Questiones libri Porhirii* is taken into account. But of course, this is not the place to seriously challenge Nielsen's widely accepted ascription of the treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit' to Thomas Bradwardine. The most that may be said at this moment is that the question of the authorship of this treatise could be given a more thorough treatment now than when Nielsen published his edition. As is acknowledged by Nielsen, it was very difficult for him to find a solution to this question, because at the time the knowledge of Manlevelt's career and works was very limited. Since 1982, at least some light is thrown on these matters, and this light may also clear up the matter left somewhat unsatisfactory solved on Manlevelt's side by Nielsen.

4.6.2. *Manlevelt and Bradwardine: Opus artis logicae*

In the same issue of the *Cahiers de l'Institut de Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* that contains Nielsen's edition of the treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit', there is a reprint of Pinborg's edition of another treatise attributed to Bradwardine: the *Opus artis logicae*. That there remains more to be said about the authorship and interrelationship of the diverse works attributed to Bradwardine and/or Manlevelt may be gathered from the introduction to this reprint, where it is remarked that in some respects

88 Q 42 CONCL. 4 40^{rb}.

this tract seems to stand closer to the ideas of Manlevelt, but on the other hand illustrates the same doctrinal trends as the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’.⁸⁹

In fact Pinborg takes up again an aspect already pointed out by him in his introduction to the earlier version of this edition: if the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ is by Bradwardine, the *Opus artis logicae* can hardly be attributed to him and vice versa. The author of the treatise on ‘incipit’ criticizes Ockham’s analysis of propositions like ‘Sor bis bibit vinum’ and ‘Sor incipit esse grammaticus’ as involving a thus far unnamed type of supposition, and asserts instead that the terms ‘vinum’ and ‘grammaticus’ have no supposition at all. In the *Opus artis logicae* as well as in Manlevelt’s *De suppositionibus* they are supposed to have *suppositio confusa tantum*.⁹⁰

The least that can be said about it is that it is an intricate matter. Further insights into Manlevelt’s theories on confused supposition will be needed to clear up the intricacy. On the correlation between syncategoremata and words introducing confused supposition, including modal terms, verbs introducing opaque reference and incipit/desinit, all listed in Manlevelt’s *Confusiones*, one may consult the relevant quotations in Maierù’s standard work on late scholastic logical terminology,⁹¹ but the indispensable step forward can only be made when the critical edition of Manlevelt’s logical treatises *De suppositionibus*, *De consequentiis* and *De confusionibus*, now in preparation by Kann, Lorenz and Grass, has seen the light of day.⁹²

Without stretching the matter further than necessary or warranted by the present state of investigation, there are at least some indications that the linking of Manlevelt’s thoughts to the intellectual circle of the Oxford calculators or Mertonians might not be that far-fetched after all. One such indication is to be found in the present text. In it, Thomas Manlevelt speaks with more than a hint of appreciation about the groundbreaking investigations taking place in Oxford, at the time of his composing his commentary on the *Isagoge* in Louvain, presumably.⁹³ Would he do

89 Pinborg 1982, 151.

90 Pinborg 1981, 29 n. 7.

91 Scattered through the body of the text and the footnotes Maierù 1972 contains several quotations edited from the manuscripts of Manlevelt’s logical treatises.

92 A definite date for this edition has not yet been set.

93 Q. 10 (9^{tb}): ‘Pro ista questione et pro omnibus consequentibus et subsequentibus se argumentis est notandum quod nihil determinative, sed tantummodo exercitative

that, if he were not educated there, or in another way thoroughly acquainted with the latest developments over there?⁹⁴

Another such indication is to be found in the Bibliotheca Amploniana in Erfurt, where one of the manuscripts contains the *Insolubilia* by Thomas Manlevelt, along with other logical texts by authors, who are all of undisputedly listed as calculators, like Bradwardine and Burley.⁹⁵

Insignificant as it may seem, even Manlevelt's use of the letters of the alphabet to stand not only for people and things,⁹⁶ or their accidental properties,⁹⁷ but also for propositions⁹⁸ lends his work a somewhat Mertonian hue. So 'A' or 'B' can stand not only for Sor or his whiteness, but also for propositions like 'Omnis substantia est homo'. Bottin has pointed out that it was Bradwardine who introduced this attitude, widely

dicitur in eisdem, et hoc ad istum finem ut aliqua inveniantur quia multum sit inventum quia iste est modus inveniendi, sicut patet in universitate Oconienti in qua plura nova inveniuntur quam in aliquo alio studio generali.

- 94 Other European authors were aware of Mertonian activity at the time even if they did not have clear links with Merton. What distinguishes Manlevelt from them is his overtly expressed appreciation for the 'experimental' method to obtain new knowledge.
- 95 The manuscript dates from the first half of the fourteenth century, and is listed number 076 by Schum, number 11 by Amplonius himself. The contents are listed by Sylla 1995, p. 327. A close scrutiny of this text by Manlevelt might be the best way to figure out whether there really is a Mertonian influence.
- 96 For instance, in Q. 11 and Q. 29, respectively. Q. 11 CONCL. 5, 9^{va}: 'capiatur hoc individuum mentale "iste homo" demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et vocetur totus Sortes A, et Sortes preter digitum B, et vocetur individuum mentale Sortes C, tunc sic: C predicatur univoce de A et de B, igitur C predicatur de pluribus, et C est individuum propriissime acceptum, igitur individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus', etc. Q. 29 AD 4. 29^{tb-va}: 'Ad quartum conceditur quod omne istud quod differt per aliquod accidens, tantum differt quantum istud accidens ipsum facit differre, ut si A per aliquid differat a B, tunc A tantum differt a B quantum istud accidens facit ipsum A differre a B', etc.
- 97 For instance in Q. 42 CONCL. 4, 40^{tb}: 'capiatur aliquis calor naturalis sine quo hoc animal non potest existere. Qui calor vocetur A, et incipiat aliquod agens in hoc instanti remittere A; tunc sic A post instans non erit, quia immediate post hoc instans corrumpetur secundum aliquid sui', etc.
- 98 For instance in Q. 4 and Q. 10. Q. 4 SECUNDO QUANTUM AD SECUNDAM PROPOSITIONEM, 3^{tb}: 'Et vocetur hec propositio in intellectu "omnis homo est substantia" A, et ista propositio "omnis substantia est homo" B, tunc sic: quidquid est pars A, est pars B, et e converso, ergo A est B, quia ex eisdem partibus resultat totum', etc. Q. 10 CONCL. 4, 8^{va}: 'vocetur ista propositio "Hec substantia est" A, in qua demonstraretur hoc genus generalissimum *substantia*, et ista propositio "Substantia est" B', etc.

adopted among the Mertonians after him, toward the use of the letters of the alphabet as singular names of sentences.⁹⁹

Thomas Manlevelt's very name, often suffixed as it is with the identifying adjective 'Anglicus', may be interpreted as a further indication of his being associated with the Mertonians, who in their own days were not called Mertonians at all. As pointed out by Sylla, contemporary and slightly later Continental philosophers rather tended to call the members of the group simply 'Anglici' or 'Britannici'.¹⁰⁰ And this is precisely the way in which Manlevelt was not only given credit in the Brussels manuscript of the 'incipit et desinit' text variously ascribed to him or Thomas Bradwardine,¹⁰¹ but also the way in which he is introduced in the late fourteenth-century note¹⁰² added to the sole manuscript of this present edition: 'Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per Thom. Manlevelt Anglicum doctorem solempnem.' Manlevelt being called 'Anglicus' should of course not be counted as conclusive evidence of his being a 'Mertonian'. Mertonians being called English does not mean that everyone called English should be a Mertonian. By calling the members of the Merton School 'Anglici' or 'Britannici', their contemporaries and near-contemporaries were doubtless associating them with the larger group of British logicians whose contribution to logic was considered noteworthy, sometimes further associating these 'British' with nominalism.¹⁰³ And this seems to be a denomination that fits quite well with Thomas Manlevelt in any case, no matter whether his Britishness should be taken literally or associatively: a nominalist he was, and his contribution to logic was noteworthy enough, seeing the widespread use of his logical tracts. By the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries however, the members of the narrower Mertonian group were being called *Calculatores*, and this is an epithet never awarded to Thomas Manlevelt.¹⁰⁴

Apart from the doctrinal evidence, Nielsen points to the mode of composition of the treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit' as proof of Bradwardine's

99 Bottin 1985, 244.

100 Sylla 1982, 540f.

101 See above, note 81.

102 In the dating of this addition to the manuscript we follow Schum 1887.

103 Sylla, 1982, 541.

104 Taking in consideration the present state of knowledge about the Mertonians as well as about Manlevelt, it may well be just too early to definitely establish his exact relationship to them. In Q. 24 of his commentary on the *Isagoge* Manlevelt – to give just another example – sets out to answer the question whether there is to be had knowledge of infinity. It is a matter of further investigation, to estimate to what degree he is indebted to the Mertonians in his treatment of this matter.

authorship. The fact that the author has clearly attempted to construct his exposition along axiomatic lines tallies well with Bradwardine's predilection to do so in the works of which he is the incontestable author.

One may wonder, however, if this predilection for the axiomatic manner really is exceptional enough to serve as an identifying mark for Bradwardine's (or anyone's) authorship. The anonymous author of the early fourteenth century *Defensorium Ockham*,¹⁰⁵ to take just one example, makes an attempt to see Aristotle's *Categories* as a book that proceeds *more geometrico* and for his own part tries to follow in Aristotle's footsteps.¹⁰⁶ This is not to say that proceeding *more geometrico* is so widespread that even Aristotle already knew its ins and outs, but it is to say that in the fourteenth century such a proceeding was widespread enough for a defender of Ockham to read it into Aristotle.

Furthermore, if one sees what Nielsen exactly means by Bradwardine's proceeding *more geometrico* in the treatise on 'incipit' and 'desinit', namely that it is modelled according to the scheme 'definitiones – suppositiones – conclusiones', the case for Bradwardine's authorship does not really seem to get stronger in this respect. Nielsen's remark that the fact that Bradwardine in this treatise has chosen to substitute 'distinctio' for 'definitio' makes no difference of significance, and may even be turned into its opposite. For the substitution of 'distinctio' for 'definitio' leads us from Bradwardine's terminology into that of Thomas Manlevelt. And the scheme 'distinctiones – suppositiones – conclusiones' is precisely the scheme that lays at the core of Manlevelt's handling of many a *questio* on Porphyry's *Isagoge* or Aristotle's *Categories*.

That Manlevelt's way of handling things is not too different from the Mertonians' is borne out by Fitzgerald, who in the introduction to his critical edition of *Albert of Saxony's Twenty-Five Disputed Questions On Logic* brings forward that Manlevelt's treatment of terms like 'aliud', 'non-idem', 'differt' and 'incipit' and how they affect the personal or material supposition of terms in his tract *De confusionibus* (the authenticity of which has never been questioned) is reminiscent of the treatment 'secundum usum Oxonie'.¹⁰⁷

105 Edited by Andrews 1997.

106 Ebbesen 2000, 275.

107 Fitzgerald 2002, 31. As we have already seen, Fitzgerald dates Manlevelt's philosophical activity a couple of decennia later than we do, in faithful adherence to Lorenz's tentative sketch of our author's vita. That may explain why Fitzgerald concludes his comparison of Manlevelt's method to the treatment 'secundum usum Oxonie' with a specification relating to the late 14th and early 15th centuries.

A last remark on the authorship of the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’: in the discussion on the authorship of the anti-modist treatise *Destructiones modorum significandi*¹⁰⁸ it was brought forward that the name of a better-known author (in that case: Thomas Manlevelt) may in some cases be substituted for the name of a lesser-known author (in that case: John Aurifaber).¹⁰⁹ May the tables in the case of the treatise on ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’ not have turned for Thomas Manlevelt, resulting in the substitution of Thomas Bradwardine’s still better-known name for his?¹¹⁰

108 See above, subsection 2.2.5.

109 Pinborg 1967, 196 n.

110 And a well-known name ‘Bradwardine’ was indeed. We have already seen Siger of Brabant being honoured with a place in the Fourth Heaven of Dante’s *Paradiso* among the souls of the wise. Thomas Bradwardine was awarded a place in Literature’s pantheon hardly less honourable than Siger’s. In one of Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, the *Nun’s Priest’s Tale* verses 3240–3242, he was placed on a pedestal, on a par with St. Augustine and Boethius: ‘But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren/ As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn,/ Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn.’ (‘But I can not separate the valid and invalid arguments/ As can the holy doctor Augustine,/ Or Boethius, or the Bishop Bradwardyn.’) Chaucer, by the way, was the neighbour of Ralph Strode, himself an admirer of Thomas Bradwardine, and Fellow of Merton College in 1359–1360, thus belonging, as the reader may recall, to the stage of consolidation of British logical excellence, according to Spade’s measurement lasting from 1350 until 1400 – a time of sophisticated, but no longer especially original work. As Ralph Strode must have been very young when Thomas Bradwardine died in 1349, it is unlikely that the two Mertonians ever met in person. Ralph Strode was awarded his own philosophical praise in Book 5 of Chaucer’s *Troilus and Criseyde*, verses 1586–1589: ‘O moral Gower, this book I directe/ To the and to the, philosophical Strode,/ To vouchen sauf, ther nede is, to correcte,/ Of youre benignites and zeles goode.’ (‘O moral Gower, I address this book to you, and to you, philosophical Strode, that you may promise to correct it, where need is, of your righteous zeal and benignity.’) If any reader should find fault with this digression, let the writer of this Introduction be his sole target. If however one should take pleasure in these bits of literary lore, thanks must be given to Stephen Read, who put me on their track.

CHAPTER FIVE

Form and contents of this text

Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* combines its highly original contents with an almost 'classical' styling of its *questiones*-format. This format is the subject of the first part of this chapter. Later in this chapter a suggestion will be made as to why Manlevelt would mould his treatment of the universals to the shape of a commentary rather than an autonomous tract.¹

5.1. Questiones

The form in which this commentary is written, *questiones*, is one of the standard ways of presentation of a philosophical standpoint accepted in the later medieval intellectual community. Basically, it is the thirteenth-century standardization of the way authoritative philosophical texts had been handled since Hellenistic times.

This kind of commentary consists of a series of highly formalized disputes about the problems to which a chosen text has given rise.² Originally such questions formed only the latter part of a teacher's lectures. Gradually, the amount of straightforward, sequential commentary was replaced with a discussion of special problems. In time, consideration of these special problems, or questions (*questiones*), completely replaced the commentary.³

1 The reader is again referred to Libera 1996 and to that author's introduction to Porphyry 1998 for a most excellent survey of the history of commentaries on the *Isagoge*. Once more, the summary in De Rijk 1977 of things discussed here has proved very useful to the present writer.

2 Weijers 1997 stresses the fact that there is no general study on the subject of teaching methods in the Faculty of Arts. She points out that most studies published on the *questio* are related to theology. She adds (p. 341) that 'il vaudrait mieux parler des *questiones* de la Faculté des Arts au pluriel, car il y en a de nombreuses espèces (celles dans les commentaires, les questions indépendantes des textes de base – soit la *questio* disputée pendant une dispute, soit les questions à propos des matières enseignées – les questions servant d'exercices, celles des compendia pour les examens).'

3 On the rise of the commentary in *questiones*-format see Kenny & Pinborg 1982, 30f.;

By being ‘published’ – i.e. by copies of the lectures being rented or sold – the *questiones* format became the most important category of scholastic literature. Because it utilized the basic form of a scholastic disputation, this genre became almost synonymous with the notion of *scholastic method*.⁴

The *Questiones libri Porphyrii* has all the usual characteristics of a commentary in the *questiones* genre, and more specifically, it may by its formal distinguishing marks alone be dated as an early fourteenth sample of the genre.⁵

5.1.1. *The structuring of the Questiones*

Especially in earlier phases of the development, one finds cases of several *questiones* being telescoped into one: first the arguments of a number of different *questiones* are given, and then the *questiones* are solved one after another. This practice is absent in the present text. Each *questio* stands on its own, in the sense that the argumentation concerning the subject-matter dealt with is neatly rounded-off within the scope of each successive *questio*. One is saved the intricate linking of *questiones* as is sometimes done for example by John Duns Scotus in his commentaries on the old logic and the *Metaphysics*, where the treatment of the subject matter touched upon in one *questio* is sometimes postponed to a later *questio*.⁶

Grant 1996, 40 f. It is generally assumed that this form of commentary was instigated by the rules laid down in Aristotle’s freshly rediscovered *Topica*. According to De Rijk 1977, 24, however, the role played by the *logica nova* in these matters did not exceed that of a secondary, though powerful impulse. Gilbert of Poitiers and Clarembald of Arras, fervent propagandists of the *questio* in the first half of the twelfth century, still were deeply immersed in the *logica vetus*. If the exact starting-point of the *questio*-way of philosophizing is to be pin-pointed, it would be the year 1122, when *Sic et non* was written by Peter Abelard. As already indicated by its very title, the scholastic method as an explicit technique of establishing the truth by opposing pro and contra is to be found here *in nuce*. The most important rule is that of the logico-semantic analysis: ‘mind the different meanings terms may have in various statements’. In a sense, then, the development of the scholastic method was in fact that of medieval logic and semantics.

4 Grant 1996, 41.

5 On the general characteristics of the genre, see Kenny & Pinborg 1982, 30–33.

6 See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. R. Andrews e.a. (St. Bonaventure 1999). In the commentary on the *Isagoge* questions 7 and 8 and questions 9–11, respectively, are telescoped into one. The same holds for questions 16–17, 18–19, 20–23, 30–36 and 37–38, respectively, of the commentary on the *Categories*.

Another way of structuring such sub-questions, by dividing a *questio* into several articles, is absent in the present text as well. What we do find, however, is the fourteenth- and fifteenth-centuries' practise of structuring the solution according to conclusions and corollaries, each being defended and *dubia* being solved.

In this text as in any other commentary of the genre, the last part of a *questio* contains the refutations of the arguments leading to the solution opposite to the one advocated by the author. And for this text as well as for any other commentary of the genre goes that for determining the author's own argument, the most important part is, of course, the solution with its distinctions.

The intrinsic order within each successive *questio* is clear and highly homogenous: typically, the question, stated in the *titulus questionis* as a question usually introduced by '*Consequenter queritur utrum*', is first supplied with some confirmative arguments – in the main not more than three or four, followed by usually just one argument 'ad oppositum', traditionally the opinion of Porphyry himself or another authority of the same calibre. These arguments pro and contra are answered in the last portion of the *questio*. Between the listing of these arguments and their answering we find the body of the *questio* (or *corpus questionis*). Without the author bothering to introduce it by such a standard phrase like '*ad hoc dicendum/dico*', this body is usually made up of one or two distinctions, more likely than not consisting of the logico-semantic fine-tuning of the nuances of the key terms used, followed by a numbered set of conclusions, from which we can learn the author's own insights in the matter. The average number of conclusions is about half a dozen, sometimes less, and sometimes running up to no less than ten (*questio* 44), eleven (*questio* 14) or even twelve (*questio* 31). Ample use is made, in presenting these conclusions as well as in the answering of the initial arguments at the start of the *questio*, of the terminological subtleties laid bare in the *distinctiones*. Within the scope of a given conclusion, counterarguments are sometimes taken up and are in their turn countered again. Occasionally this leads to a confusing to and fro of arguments, counterarguments and sub-counterarguments.

Exceptions to this regularity of composition are few. In the 19th *questio* the first initial argument is countered right away, and not addressed again in the successive answering of the initial arguments at the end of the *questio*. In the 21st *questio* the place normally reserved for the distinctions is occupied by a set of (mostly anonymous) opinions on the subject whether 'being' is a genus. The 32nd *questio*, concerned with whether

only the *differentia specifica* causes differences *per se*, is complete with a distinction and some conclusions and all, but here there is a declaration inserted at the head of the body of the question, that is to say: between the argument ‘ad oppositum’ and the distinction. The 41st *questio*, whether ‘proprium’ is said in a fourfold manner, again leaves out the distinctions and replaces them with an opinion in need of reprobation. In the 44th *questio*, taking the example of a white raven as its starting point, there are no distinctions as well, but there is a set of suppositions instead. On the whole, however, the tapestry of one of the forty-five *questiones* is interchangeable with that of any of the others.

Of course, there is nothing unique in this text’s highly formalized pattern of letting the conclusions in the body of a *questio* be preceded by distinctions. This same pattern is to be found, for example, in the commentaries on the *Isagoge* and *Categories* by Albert of Saxony.⁷ I have already paid attention to the similarity in a minor detail: the reference made in both Manlevelt’s and Albert of Saxony’s commentary on the *Isagoge* to Plato’s eagle’s nose.⁸ As I remarked there, it is unclear whether this must be looked upon as a sign of intellectual kinship between the two.

5.1.2. References given

From the fourteenth century onwards there is an increasing tendency to give exact references – a tendency unfortunately not yet shared by Manlevelt, which must be taken as an indication that the present text will probably not stem from a period later than the first half of the fourteenth century.

References to opponents are strictly anonymous, ‘*aliqui*’ serving the purpose of introducing them. References to authorities are quite standard; apart from Porphyry himself and Aristotle, we find Boethius, Avi-

7 It remains a matter of further investigation, however, to make sure in how far this similarity between Thomas Manlevelt and Albert of Saxony goes with a similarity of contents. Unless a thorough study would prove otherwise, the first impression remains that from a philosophical point of view the commentaries on the old logic by Albert of Saxony are less interesting than those by our author. Compare the remark by Fitzgerald 2002, 31 that Manlevelt’s tract *De confusionibus* is a more detailed treatment than Albert’s. To Fitzgerald this suggests that our author’s treatment is really closer in time to the treatments *after* Albert, rather than *before* Albert. He does not seem to take into consideration the possibility that Manlevelt may be a sharper logician than Albert. A first comparative glance at both authors’ question-commentaries on the *Isagoge* will follow below.

8 See above, subsection 2.2.6. The use of the adjective ‘*aquilinus*’ occurs in Q. 30 CONCL. 3, 29^{vb}, of our text; Albert of Saxony, *In Porph.*, p. 260, § 268.

cenna and Averroes, and an occasional reference to Robert Grosseteste, Peter of Spain or Thomas Aquinas.⁹ Ockhamists nor Scotists are mentioned as such by Manlevelt, but for the reasons given in the previous chapters it is safe to assume that that the ‘*moderni*’ brought up by him can be identified as nominalists, or maybe even more specific as Ockhamists, while for Manlevelt the realistic tenets of the realists, or maybe even more specific: the Scotists are outworn and truly outdated.

5.2. *Why a commentary?*

The genre of the *Questiones*, being the perfect embodiment of the scholastic method, has the advantage of granting us the fullest insight in a particular author’s own thoughts on a subject. Therefore we must consider ourselves lucky that we have Thomas Manlevelt’s *questiones* on the *Isagoge*, and not for instance an *Expositio* on the same subject. In the genre of the *Expositio* it was common for medieval authors to limit themselves to a faithful explanation of an authority’s (usually Aristotle’s) view, without any criticism of this authoritative (usually Aristotelian) point of view. Whereas in the *Questiones*, which are only rather loosely connected with the authoritative text, there is ample room for the occasional deviance from authority (usually disguised as adherence to authority anyway).¹⁰ For all its originality the present text, attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, fits in quite well with the state of developments as sketched thus far, albeit that he pushes this form to its extremes. Not only does he dig deeper into this particular brand of logico-semantical subject matter connected with Porphyry’s *Isagoge* than anyone else, but quantitatively he breaks new ground as well, by composing a commentary on the *Isagoge* which is of itself already of an unprecedented size, and which is solidly interlocked with its subsequent commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, thus forming one huge treatment of the basic elements of logic. Manlevelt’s commentary on the *Isagoge* contains 62.000 words; both commentaries on the Old Logic together contain a total of 150.000 words.¹¹

9 For the exact references, see the Index to the edition below.

10 See De Rijk 1997a, 308 on Buridan’s *Questiones* and *Expositio* on the *Metaphysics*, with a sidestep to Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

11 Buridan’s more or less contemporary commentary on the *Isagoge*, for example, totals about 25.000 words, while the commentary by Oyta, writing considerably later than Manlevelt, has somewhat less than 50.000 words.

Even though he does not mention the Venerable Inceptor by name, it is safe to surmise that for Manlevelt the ongoing problem about universals had come to a conclusion by William of Ockham's presentation of them as mental signs or conceptual acts indicating individual things in reality. So it was no longer useful to write a tract on their status, seeing that their status had been secured once and for all by his great nominalist predecessor. Not that Manlevelt referred to himself, his predecessor or any of the other logicians working in the same frame of mind as 'nominalists'; he just labelled those who saw the Ockhamist light 'moderns', as opposed to those who had not seen it and who were simply referred to as 'some' or 'others'. In his work the term 'olden ones' (*antiqui*) is reserved for the really ancient philosophers, such as the contemporaries of Aristotle or Porphyry. In this we witness a sharp development if not reversal in the use of terms. William of Ockham himself had referred to his more realistic opponents as 'moderns', presenting his own view as being in accordance with the intention of the real 'Olden Ones': the revered philosophers of antiquity. As noticed before, when they come to be mentioned by Manlevelt he labels them 'antiqui' as well. So the term 'antiqui' did not shift meaning when used by Ockham and Manlevelt, respectively, but its counterpart 'moderni' did. And so it turns out that one and the same term is used in an honorific and more pejorative way within one and the same context.¹²

But why, with manners on their status settled, did Manlevelt take the trouble to occupy himself with the universals at all, and why did he choose the medium of a commentary in the form of *questiones* on the *Isagoge* – a commentary of a sheer volume never seen before in the history of commentaries on the *Isagoge*?

The impression that the logical, linguistic or ontological status of the universals is no longer an issue, is warranted by the very beginning of the text of the Commentary. Contrary to what is usual in other commentaries on the *Isagoge*, there is no discussion on the nature of logic, let alone the status of the universals that make up the basic scheme of logic. Instead there is a discussion on the use of knowing something about universals, in order to know something about the categories, that is, the way we intellectually organize our knowledge about the world and

12 A shift in the meaning of 'antiqui' takes place as well, as can be witnessed from the works of the 15th century logician Nicholas of Amsterdam, who sees William of Ockham himself as one of the 'antiqui', constantly referring to 'Ockham and the antiqui'. On Nicholas of Amsterdam see Bos's forthcoming study on this logician.

all the individual things in it. In other words, Manlevelt takes everything the 'moderns' had to say about the status of universals and about the status of the categories as one of the universals for granted, and sets out to explain the precise functioning of these universals, and the relationship between what is the subject matter of the *Isagoge* and what is the subject matter of the *Categories*; in fact, his commentary on the *Categories* proceeds seamless from his commentary on the *Isagoge*.

Seeing that Thomas Manlevelt takes the work done by William of Ockham as the strongest possible foothold, it is not to be expected that his explanation of the working of the universals, in so far as he is breaking new ground, will be incompatible with the general line of logico-semantic philosophy set out by the Venerable Inceptor. At least, Manlevelt will have no intention to deviate from Ockham's line of thinking; he simply sets out to bring the Ockhamist theory on the universals a step further by bringing into map not the individual things indicated by the rightful use of our universals, but these very universals themselves, that in their rightful use turn out to be just as individual as the things in the world indicated by them. It remains to be seen, however, what Manlevelt really does by thus exploring the boundaries of our human intellect: furthering the cause of Ockhamism or destroying the very basis under our intellectual dealings with the world.¹³ My commentary on Thomas Manlevelt's commentary will hopefully prove helpful in

13 If Manlevelt may be called a champion for the individual in the field of logic, he indeed addresses the right issues. In the Prologue to his general study of the development of the problem of individuation in scholasticism from 1150 to 1650, Gracia points out that this problem of individuation was especially fascinating for late medieval scholastics, not only on the basis of its perennial philosophical interest and the implications it has for other philosophical issues such as the problem of universals, but also because of its substantial theological ramifications. Among the theological doctrines to which the problem of individuation is related, five in particular stand out: the Trinity, original sin, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and the nature of angels. (Gracia 1994, ix) As the problem of individuation only occurs when a philosopher maintains that there are natures or essences in individuals, in some way common to the individuals and yet diversified in them, this problem of individuation, in the usual 'metaphysical' sense of the term, does not arise in Manlevelt's philosophy, just as it does not arise in Ockham's philosophy, or Buridan's philosophy, for that matter. (Compare Maurer 1994 and King 1994.) But this does nothing to mitigate the implications of his strictly individualist tenets in logic for the other philosophical and theological issues, as sketched by Gracia. The problem of universals of course makes out the kernel of Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge*, but some of Gracia's theological doctrines are just slightly touched upon as well: the Trinity in Q. 29 and the nature of angels in Q. 14.

evaluating the merits of Manlevelt's endeavour and will just as hopefully show these merits to be worthy of deeper investigation, but will certainly and perhaps regrettably not provide the last word on this matter.

The question why Thomas Manlevelt did not write a tract on universals instead of this commentary has already been answered. The reason why he chose to tackle the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* in one sweep is obvious too: he wanted to deal with the basic concepts allowing us to think, speak and theorize about reality. And the question why he chose the genre of the commentary in the form of *questiones* to do so is not difficult to answer either. As already noticed, the most important principle with this type of commentary is that of logico-semantic analysis, the painstakingly pinpointing of the different meanings terms may have in various statements. With Manlevelt one finds this analysis brought to a higher degree, as it were: here it is the terms used to speak about the use of terms themselves that are scrutinized. Apart from being the genre best equipped to go into technical detail, the *questiones*-form offers the proper stage to bring forward the pros and cons about a certain matter, and perhaps most important, it is the genre in which one can safely raise controversial themes and present controversial opinions on these themes, provided that one stresses the hypothetical character of this free-floating philosophising in time, be it on the pro- or con-side of the matter. 'It is just something that might be said by way of thought-experiment.'¹⁴ Thus one may even freely introduce God on one of the branches of the Porphyrian Tree,¹⁵ or maintain that substance does not exist.

5.3. *The originality of Thomas Manlevelt's approach*

How far does Thomas Manlevelt depart from the customary way of dealing with the subject matter of the *Isagoge*?

In the introduction to his trilingual edition of Porphyry's *Isagoge*,¹⁶ where Porphyry's Greek text is accompanied by the Latin *Translatio Boethii* and provided with a French translation by Libera and Segonds, Libera points out that certain questions raised in the Middle Ages in connection with the *Isagoge* are typically neo-platonic in character, going

14 See for example the ninth conclusion of the forty-fourth questio: 'Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis.'

15 Q. 35: 'Utrum hec differentia "immortale" sit constitutiva Dei.'

16 Porphyry 1998, CXXXV–CXL.

back to the source of the treatise itself: the neo-platonic thought-world of its author, who was the pupil and biographer of Plotinus, and the editor of Plotinus' philosophical lifework, the *Enneads*. Among these neo-platonic questions are those concerning the very subject of the treatise, the universal as such.

Other questions are special to the Middle Ages, but still are prompted by the placing of the *Isagoge* at the head of the corpus of Aristotle's logic, within the philosophical canon. These are the questions centring on the status of logic as a science. What is the subject of logic: the *modus sciendi* in general, being, the syllogism? Is logic a 'real' science of things, or a science of language and thinking? Also, the famous (or infamous) questions raised but immediately discarded by Porphyry himself get a full treatment: those about the ontological status and independent being of universals. Following this path even further, certain authors do not shy away from treating fundamental metaphysical problems, like the nature and cause of individuality. Common stock is also the questioning of the sense and rightness of the definitions of the respective universals as put forward by Porphyry.

Giving no more than the mere tables of contents of four diverse commentaries on the *Isagoge* – by Martin of Dacia (d. 1304), Peter of Auvergne (d. 1303), Radulphus Brito (d. 1320) and William Russell (first half fifteenth century)¹⁷ – as a first instructive means to superficially assess the developments taking place during the Middle Ages, Libera shows the permanency of certain questions or groups of questions.¹⁸ From the question of the ontological status of the universal, to that of ascertaining if the accident is a universal or if its inherence in a subject is part of the definition of accident, not to mention the problem of the number of universals and the sufficiency of the division made by Porphyry.

Thus surveying the evolution of the commentaries on the *Isagoge*, one immediately sees the development of philosophical interests in the Middle Ages, as well as the changes of style and the technical methods and languages.

Certain technical distinctions, says Libera, run from one text to another, undergoing, however, an evolution. He gives the example of the

17 Mag. Theol., OFM, Oxford; a Scotist living in the first half of the fifteenth century, who around 1425 was the subject of lawsuits on account of heresy.

18 Porphyry 1998, CXXXV ff.

distinction between the diverse types of universals – metaphysical, physical, logical – treated in an impartial manner by Martin of Dacia in the late thirteenth century, but with a fierce realistic approach later on by the Scotist William Russell. In Thomas Manlevelt, one might add, one finds neither fierceness nor impartiality. He just treated the universals in a nominalistic approach and felt he had only to do with the logical type.

The evolution hinted at by Libera is to be described in terms of the tendency of the commentators to treat the questions raised about the *Isagoge* in a particular theoretical frame of mind, harbouring the achievements of their own respective schools of thought. While Martin of Dacia and Peter of Auvergne were still open-mindedly dealing with Aristotle and Plato, William Russell was directly confronting the theses put forward by Ockham and the ‘Ockhamists’, indifferently citing ancient authorities like Averroes and Avicenna alongside modern authorities like Albert the Great, Antoine André and John Duns Scotus. As such, Thomas Manlevelt may well have been one of the Ockhamists of days past, at whom the criticism of William Russell was directed.

Where, then, would be the place of Manlevelt within this sketch of developments? Clearly, his point in dealing with the *Isagoge* is not to confront Aristotle and Plato, but rather to harness a nominalist, anti-realistic stance in a strongly Ockhamist vein. In this he takes a stance diametrical opposite to that of William Russell, who would later defend the realistic Scotist’s viewpoint by attacking the Ockhamists. In fact, Plato has shrunk to the role of none more than the occasional opponent to Sortes in the various propositions used as examples for all kinds of logical purposes. The citing of authorities, for that matter, is done by Manlevelt in a way that resembles that of the Scotist opponent of the century to come. As already noted, with him, more or less ancient authorities like Boethius, Avicenna and above all Averroes stand side by side with more or less modern authorities like Robert Grosseteste, Peter of Spain and Thomas Aquinas. Albeit that these moderns are only mentioned sporadically.

In fact, Manlevelt seems so confident with the achievements of nominalism, that he does not care too much for a lot of the traditional, partly neo-Platonist flavoured problems posed in connection with the *Isagoge*. Seemingly, Manlevelt takes these problems to have already been solved once and for all from the outset. The subject matter of Porphyry’s tract (and therefore the status of the universal as such) is taken for granted, just as well as the status and subject matter of logic as a science.

While he refrains from handling the number and sufficiency of the universals as stated by Porphyry, Manlevelt does treat the number of the categories instead. Normally, one would expect to find this matter treated in a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, rather than in a commentary on the *Isagoge*.

Of course, he does not make a clean break with all the traditional questions, but while implicitly or explicitly solving time-honoured questions concerning the connection between Sortes old and Sortes young,¹⁹ and the colour of the raven,²⁰ Manlevelt seems to be more than any other thinker focussed on the problems concerning individuality, the atomisation of the extramental world, the token-character of our diverse instances of knowledge of a world that is itself radically broken down to individual things, etcetera. Thus Manlevelt presents us with a striking glimpse on the developments of philosophical interests, as reflected in his particular, sometimes quite radical handling of the problems occasioned by his commenting on Porphyry's age-old *Isagoge*.

Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* does not contain the usual preliminary chapters on the status and nature of logic, the formal subject of logic, or the place of logic within philosophy, let alone on the nature of philosophy itself. One will also look in vain for any treatment of the question as to the ontological status of the universals, a matter so pre-eminently tied up with the reading of the *Isagoge*, that traditionally no commentator would dare to leave it untouched. The fourth *questio*, whether universals are in the intellect, does not so much discuss the ontological status of the universal, as its exact way of being in the intellect.

Porphyry's questionnaire came down to knowing if the genera and species subsisted by themselves or were to be found, as universals, only in the intellect by which a human being does his thinking. If I now try to connect Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* to the tradition of commentaries and interpretations before him, the first thing that has to be said – with the risk of repeating myself – is that Manlevelt does not run through this questionnaire at all. Apparently he does not deem it necessary, because the matter has been settled in a satisfactory

19 Q. 28 CONCL. 5, 28^{va}: 'generaliter: omne ens differt a non ente, et omnis terminus cum alio termino a quo vere negatur, vere predicatur de seipso mediante hoc verbo "differt", sicut si "senex" vere negatur a Sorte, tunc hoc est vera: Sortes differt a Sorte sene, et sic de quocumque alio termino qui vere de Sorte negatur.'

20 Q. 44, 41^{vb}-43^{va}: 'Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus.'

manner. And the one who has done this settling can be no other than William of Ockham, who does treat Porphyry's questionnaire in his own commentary on the *Isagoge*.²¹

What was it then that was to be found in the intellect when it came to universals?

According to scholastic realism it is an intelligible form (*species intelligibilis*), abstracted from the sensible images by the light of the active intellect. According to Ockhamist nominalism it is a concept, i.e. a conceptual act, referring to a multitude of singular objects of which it is the natural sign. And here it is that Manlevelt comes into play: by exploring exactly what it means for a conceptual act to be a sign of such a multitude of singular objects, and exactly how such a sign does what it is supposed to do. Thomas is breaking new theoretical ground here, and deserves every scholar's keenest attention, if only because what he does here is completely lacking in Ockham.

It will turn out that Manlevelt does not shy away from drawing the logical consequences from the basic tenet already adhered to by William of Ockham himself: a mental concept as well as any thing in extramental reality is really and truly an individual.²² Even a universal, though it is universal insofar as it is a sign of many things and is predicable of them, as the sign itself it is really and truly an individual. A spoken or written word is really an individual sound or blot of ink, though it can be a conventional sign of many things. A mental concept is also really and truly an individual; its universality is its function of being a natural sign of many things. Ontologically, then, every universal is a particular thing: 'quodlibet universale est una res singularis.'²³ Individuals, Ockham says, cutting even more grass from under Manlevelt's feet, are also primarily diverse (*primo diversa*): there is nothing that is one and the same in any two individuals.²⁴ We could not wish for a stronger statement of the rad-

21 Ockham, OP II, 10–16 (*Expositionis in librum Porphyrii prooemium* § 2). Ockham's most extensive and penetrating account of the subject is to be found however in the *Ordinatio*, DIST. 2, QQ 4 to 8. For a comprehensive treatment of Ockham's views as expounded in these questions from the *Ordinatio*, one may well consult Maurer 1994.

22 See Maurer 1994, 388, whose concise wording of Ockham's standpoint is thankfully reproduced here.

23 *Summa logicae* I, 14, p. 48.31.

24 *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, Q. 6, p. 212.18–23: 'dico quod aliqua esse "prima diversa" potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quia nihil est unum et idem in utroque, sed quidquid est in uno simpliciter et absolute de se non est aliquid quod est in alio; et isto modo

ical incommunicability of individuals, says Maurer.²⁵ One may wonder if he would not deem Manlevelt's subsequent treatment of individuality on the level of words and concepts *too* strong a statement of this very same radical incommunicability of individuals.

What one does find in this particular commentary on the *Isagoge* then, is a full treatment of all five Porphyrian universals, never termed 'predicables' by Manlevelt, but always thus: 'universals'. Considerable attention is paid to the individual, sometimes (but not by Thomas Manlevelt) called 'the sixth predicable',²⁶ and to the fifth of the Porphyrian predicables, the accident. It is things accidental and individual that seem to be the main interest of Thomas Manlevelt in a nutshell. The ideas expounded in this text on these subjects will form the core interest of future research, where an attempt will be made to unravel some of the leading threads running through Manlevelt's *questiones* on the *Isagoge*.

5.4. *Thomas Manlevelt's theory of signs*

To a nominalist's mind like Thomas Manlevelt's, universals derive their universality from their being signs of a multiplicity of things in the outside world.²⁷ But a full-fledged theoretical treatment of signs is not included in the *Questiones libri Porphirii*.

Manlevelt's theory of signs, as far as it can be distilled from his commentary on the *Isagoge*, seems to be quite in line with William of Ockham's theory.²⁸ For one thing, Manlevelt's juxtaposition of written, spoken and mental terms throughout this commentary is easily compatible with Ockham's view on the three levels of language.²⁹ As succinctly

concedo quod omnia individua sunt se ipsis primo diversa, nisi forte aliter sit de individuis ex quorum uno generatur aliud propter identitatem numeralem materiae in utroque.'

25 Maurer 1994, 388.

26 Manlevelt is quite explicit about this in the first conclusion of Q. 20, 18^{vb}: 'nullum individuum est universale.'

27 For a survey of medieval theories of signs, see Meier-Oeser 2008.

28 The crucial *questio* to be searched for bits and pieces of a theory of signs is Q. 14: 'Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo.'

29 In passing, Manlevelt also mentions still different types of conventional signs, like a piece of red cloth in front of a tavern signifies there being red wine to be had, and a piece of bluish-green cloth wine from the Garonne region. Also, there is the finger-language used in certain monasteries. Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}: 'Alia vero possunt poni universalialia ad placitum, quamvis ex communi usu non ponantur, sicut signa communia ex consuetudine aliquas res significantia appellative, sicut panniculus

explained by Spade,³⁰ spoken words, according to Ockham, are subordinated to concepts, and written expressions are related in the same way to spoken expressions. But for Ockham subordination is not a kind of signification relation. He agrees with everyone else that written expressions are conventionally (*ad placitum*) correlated with spoken ones, and spoken ones conventionally related with mental expressions. But he denies that this correlation amounts to a signification relation.³¹ Spoken words do not make me think of concepts, and written words do not make me think of spoken words. What a written term in personal supposition signifies is exactly what the spoken term in personal supposition signifies, which in turn is exactly the same as what the mental term in personal supposition signifies: the individual things in the outside world. The only difference being that a written or spoken term has conventional signification (but signification nevertheless), and a mental term has natural signification.³²

Neither does Manlevelt ever seem to imply a signification relation between written and spoken terms on the one hand, and mental terms on the other. Instead he accepts the three as equivalent, the written and spoken term having conventional signification (*ad placitum*), and the mental term having natural signification.³³

But again the focus is on the individualizing aspects on the part of the signs: each sign is a sign in its own right. And from this individualizing tendency when it comes to signs, it is a small step to stressing the indi-

rubeus positus ante tabernam significat vinum rubeum, et pannus glaucus significat vinum de Garunna, et motus digiti secundum quod aliqui claustrales utuntur, appellative significant sua significata. De quibus, quia non sunt in usu, non dicitur.' The example of a circle signifying wine in the tavern, by the way, is also given by Ockham, as mentioned by McCord Adams 1987, 122. Both cases brought forward by Manlevelt seem to have been stock examples of things that in the broadest sense may function as signs, anyway. Meier-Oeser 2008, 5 makes mention about 'the famous *circulus vini*, a wreath of foliage, attached outside the tavern, indicating that wine is sold inside, or the conventional gestures of monastic sign languages' already being used by Peter Abelard some two centuries before Manlevelt (Peter Abelard: *Log. 'Ingredientibus'* (1927: 335)).

30 Spade 2002, 77.

31 Spade 1982, 189 makes a reference to Ockham's *Commentarium in Perihermeneias* 1 (16a3-4).

32 For an apt visualization of a spoken or written term's subordination to the mental term, while standing in a relation of signification to things in the outside world, see Spade 2002, 140.

33 Q. 22 DIST. 2, 21th: 'aliqua sunt eadem secundum equivalentiam que differunt genere, sicut signum vocale et signum scriptum.'

vidualizing aspects when it comes to concepts, in their role as signs. It is the token-character of concepts that comes to the fore in an unprecedented manner. If Ockham stressed the individual character of all things in the extramental world, now Manlevelt in a like manner stresses the individual character of all things mental. But his radicalizing of the Ockhamist way of thinking is not without consequences or risks for the status of human knowledge. Will not the generality that is a key property of all genuine knowledge get lost in the process?³⁴

As far as logical terms are considered in their capacity to stand for individual things in the outside world, Manlevelt joins Ockham in stressing the token-character of the references made to the individuals in the outside world. Thus one might say that on the *res*-side of the matter there is nothing but individuals to refer to. But Thomas Manlevelt draws our attention to the fact that in our minds there is nothing but singular instances of referring as well. On the ratio-side of the matter as such, Manlevelt once again stresses the token-character of each instance of rational activity.³⁵ By doing so, he is nothing less than ‘singularising’ the domain of the universals, and our acts of understanding.

Questio 4, whether a universal is in the intellect, offers a fine example of Manlevelt’s ‘singularising’ method. One can hardly fail to notice the emphasis he puts on the token-character of the universals in actual use.³⁶

There is no doubt in Manlevelt’s mind about the mental universal being in the intellect in a subjective manner, that is to say, as an accident in a subject. The mental universal (just like any other concept) is an accident of the intellect in the same way as the vocally expressed universal is in the air. The only kind of universal that is not an accident is the written one, because the writing itself as a physical thing (say, the little lines of ink on a piece of paper) is a substance or rather a string of substances.³⁷

34 For a background to this question, one may consult Nuchelmans 1973 on type-utterances and token-utterances as bearers of truth and falsity, especially with Ockham (p. 202), Holkot (p. 206 ff.), Burleigh (p. 225), Pierre d’Ailly (p. 260) and Paul of Venice (p. 266). That Buridan may be counted among the renewers but not among the reckless renewers, may be clear from *De Rijk* 1994.

35 See Q. 4, 3^{rb}–4^{vb}: ‘Utrum universale sit in intellectu.’

36 On singularity, one may compare our author’s ideas to those expressed by Ockham in *Summa logicae* pars I cap. 14 (*De hoc communi ‘universale’ et de ‘singulari’, oppositè sibi*).

37 Q. 4 CONCL. 1, 3^{vb}: ‘omne universale mentale est in intellectu subiective’; CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}: ‘universale vocale est in aere tamquam in subiecto, sicut omnis vox, (...) et universale scriptum non est in aliqua substantia tamquam accidens in subiecto, quia est substantia vel substantie’. On the written universal, Manlevelt seems to deviate

In his opinion that the (mental) universal is an accident of the intellect, and that each of these mental universals is a singular accident for that matter, Manlevelt is in agreement with William of Ockham. In the *Summa logicae* it is stated that the universal that is naturally a sign predicable of many things is nothing else than an *intentio animae*, and that this *intentio animae*, signifying a plurality of things in the extramental world, is in itself singular.³⁸ Manlevelt was certainly not the only one to agree with Ockham on this matter. In fact, this opinion on the mental universals seems to have been common ground among thinkers not necessarily to be labelled followers of the Venerable Inceptor. With the Mertonian Richard of Campsall (d. ca. 1350/60), one finds the same idea of universals being singular accidents of the soul.³⁹ And as if to stress the non-Ockhamist origin of this line of thinking, Campsall as well as Ockham himself bring in the testimony of no less an authority than Avicenna.⁴⁰

Manlevelt however is not content to simply rephrase what has been stated before. He goes on to investigate what it means in actual practice to have this succession of singular universals, each signifying a multi-

from Ockham, who holds that universals are not in any way substances. See, for instance, the last paragraph of *Summa logicae* pars I, cap. 15: '(...) propositio non est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; igitur partes eius non sunt nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat igitur quod nulla propositio ex substantiis componi potest. Componitur autem propositio ex universalibus, universalis igitur non sunt substantiae ullo modo.' Manlevelt himself does not make a big thing out of this apparent deviation from Ockham's line of thought. In fact he says that we need not waste words on the written (and the spoken) universals: 'non oportet sermonem prolongari' (Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}). Remarks in this same vein are usually made by Manlevelt either when things become too self-evident, or when things quite on the contrary tend to become too out-of-the-way.

- 38 *Summa logicae* pars I, cap. 14: 'universale naturaliter, quod scilicet naturaliter est signum praedicabile de pluribus (...) non est nisi intentio animae' (*Opera Philosophica* I, 49); 'tenentes quod universale est quaedam qualitas mentis praedicabilis de pluribus, non tamen pro se sed pro illis pluribus, dicere habent quod quodlibet universale est vere et realiter singular: quia (...) intentio animae, significans plures res extra, est vere et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures res, quamvis significet plures res' (*Opera Philosophica* I, 48).
- 39 'Ideo dicendum est quod genus et species et huiusmodi universalis non sunt res extra animam (...) sed sunt formae universales existentes in anima sicut in subiecto, quae tamen sunt formae singulares in essendo sicut alia accidentia in anima.' Cited in William of Ockham *Opera Philosophica* I, 48 n. 2. For Campsall see E.A. Synan, 1982, 15 ('Contra ponentes' §8).
- 40 Reference with Ockham is to Avicenna, *Metaph.*, v, c. 1, with Campsall to the same work, c. 2.

plicity of things in the outer world, going on in our minds. In doing this, he remains perfectly in line with the main tenets of Ockhamism, and with the course later medieval logic would take in general. As succinctly explained by Meier-Oeser,⁴¹ thirteenth century terminist logicians like William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain had not been particularly interested in the concept of signification. Leaning on the insights unfolded by Biard,⁴² who characterizes Ockham's logic as 'régie par le concept de signe',⁴³ Meier-Oeser points out that with Ockham, however, the concepts of sign and signification take centre stage in logic.

The description fits quite well with Manlevelt as well: logic is seen as exclusively concerned with signs, primarily with mental signs, secondarily with vocal or written signs.⁴⁴ Traditional ontological issues, as for instance the questions of universals and the number of categories – the first of which, of course, is the main subject of the present text, and the second of which finds a place within the context of Manlevelt's treatment of the universals⁴⁵ – are reformulated as semantic questions. Ockham's logic, says Meier-Oeser,⁴⁶ marks an important step in the progressive 'mentalization' of the sign, characteristic of the mentalist logic arising in the early fourteenth century, and remaining dominant throughout the later Middle Ages. Thus, Ockham's semantics, as well as his theory of mental language built on trans-idiomatic mental words (*verba mentis*) or mental concepts governed by a trans-idiomatic mental grammar, transformed terminist logic into a theory of thought processes. In general, the importance of the concept of sign was undisputed among logical authors from the fourteenth century onward. This is not to say that Ockham's specific theories did not come under severe criticism by his opponents. Also, they were no less severely modified by his followers – among them Thomas Manlevelt.

The possibilities and difficulties of us having two or more universals in mind at the same time run as a leading thread to the conclusions of

41 Meier-Oeser 2008, 11 f.

42 Biard 1981, Biard 1989.

43 Biard 1989, 102. Cited by Meier-Oeser 2008, 11.

44 In the present text by Thomas Manlevelt, the number of references to signs as logic's core business is legion. Usually the mentioning of 'sign' comes in a pair with 'term': 'signum vel terminus'. With Manlevelt as well as it already was with Ockham, it is the sign within a propositional context that counts.

45 Q. 22, 20^{va}–22^{ra}: 'Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora'. On Manlevelt's treatment of the number of the categories, see above, footnote 9 to section 3.1, and below, the paragraph on Q. 22 in subsection 5.5.5 of this Chapter.

46 Meier-Oeser 2008, 12.

Questio 4, about a universal being in our intellect.⁴⁷ Experience shows that it is possible for two mental universals to be in one intellect simultaneously, as we can have a proposition like ‘man is a living being’ in our mind.⁴⁸ This fact of experience can also be proven in a more fundamental way. Two accidental things that are not mutually incompatible can be in the same subject simultaneously, like light and sound in the air, or whiteness and sweetness in milk. Well then, just such mutually non-conflicting accidental things are the subject and predicate of the proposition ‘man is a living being’; therefore two universals can be in one intellect simultaneously.⁴⁹ Experience also tells us that it is possible to have two universals of the same *species specialissima* simultaneously in one intellect, like in ‘man is man’.⁵⁰

Manlevelt is taking a step in a more psychological direction⁵¹ with the next conclusion, which states that an intense universal and a weakened universal can be simultaneously in the intellect. To show this, Manlevelt once again points to our daily experience: we can learn one thing while our head is with another thing.⁵² From here on, Manlevelt seems to

47 Q. 4, 3^{rb}–4^{vb}: ‘Utrum universale sit in intellectu.’

48 Q. 4 CONCL. 2, 3^{vb}: ‘Secunda conclusio est ista quod duo universalia mentalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Ista conclusio probatur per experientiam, qua experimur nos habere talem propositionem in mente nostra: “homo est animal”’

49 Q. 4 CONCL. 2, 3^{vb}: ‘Item, quecumque duo accidentalialia et non repugnantialia possunt simul (esse) in eodem subiecto, in quo quodlibet eorum naturaliter potest esse; sed talialia duo accidentalialia sunt subiectum et predicatum istius conclusionis “homo est animal”, que sunt duo universalialia, igitur aliqua duo universalialia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Maior videtur evidens, quia nulla ratio potest assignari quare talialia duo accidentalialia non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicut lumen et vox, quia in nullo repugnant quia possunt simul (esse) in aere, sicut dulcedo et albedo que simul sunt in lacte, et sic de aliis.’

50 Q. 4 CONCL. 3, 3^{vb}: ‘Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua duo universalialia eiusdem speciei specialialissime possunt simul esse (in) intellectu. Ista declaratur, quia talis propositio mentalis: “homo est homo”, “animal est animal” potest tota simul esse (in) intellectu; et predicatum et subiectum sunt duo universalialia mentalialia eiusdem speciei specialialissime, igitur duo universalialia mentalialia eiusdem speciei specialialissime possunt simul esse in intellectu. Maior videtur haberi per experientiam; minor nota est de se.’

51 On this point Manlevelt’s ideas seem to advance beyond the mere ‘mentalization’ of the sign, which Meier-Oeser considers to be a defining trait of logic from the early fourteenth century onward, and begin – as will be touched upon below in the paragraph on Q. 4 in subsection 5.5.5 – to foreshadow the psychologically oriented logic of Port-Royal by some centuries.

52 Q. 4 CONCL. 4, 3^{vb}: ‘universalialia intensum et universalialia remissum possunt simul esse intellectu. Ista declaratur per experientiam, quia experimur nos frequenter addiscere aliquam rationem de qua remisse arguamus, et simul cum hoc cogitare de aliqua alia ratione intense.’

be breaking new ground, making serious business of the melting of logical principles with psychological observations. The rather startling fifth conclusion is that two intense universals cannot be in the intellect simultaneously. This is already demonstrated by experience, as we cannot intensely think about two different things at the same time, just like we cannot write while giving a speech. The principle that two most intense universals are in no way incompatible – adduced earlier to support the conclusion that two universals can be in one intellect simultaneously – does not hold. The reason is not an incompatibility of the universals, but an incompatibility of attention on the part of the intellect itself. The intellect cannot intensely occupy itself with two different things at the same time. True, the subject and predicate of the mental proposition ‘man is a living being’ are in the intellect simultaneously, but not both equally intense.⁵³ In his treatment of the principal arguments of this *questio*, Manlevelt explains that the intensity of the universals is a matter of succession: first the subject of the proposition is in the mind in an intense manner, and then the predicate.⁵⁴ This makes one wonder how genuine human knowledge is possible. If not even the subject and predicate of one and the same proposition can be paid intense attention simultaneously, how do we save the possibility of this subject and predicate really getting joined before the intellect? After all, the establishing of the right relationship between subjects and predicate is what knowledge and science are ultimately built on. What kind of worldview arises from such radical nominalism? An extramental world seemingly existing of nothing more than a myriad of loose particles. And the intellect grasping nothing more than a myriad of loose mental little contents.

53 Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 3^{vb}–4^{ra}: ‘duo universalia intensa non possunt simul esse in intellectu. Ista declaratur iam per experientiam, quia experimur nos non posse distinctis cogitationibus intense de distinctis rebus cogitare, sicut non possumus scribere et cum hoc aliquam orationem intentissime dicere. Contra istam conclusionem instatur, et videtur quod contrariatur predictis, nam talia duo universalia intensissima in nullo repugnant, igitur possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, circa quod habent fieri. Ad istud breviter dicitur quod causa quare non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, non est repugnantia universalium, sed est repugnantia advertentiarum ipsius intellectus, qui non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore, advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus. Et si dicatur quod ista duo universalia que sunt subiectum et predicatum istius propositionis mentalis “homo est animal”, (sunt) simul in intellectu sicut supra positum est, ad istud breviter dicitur quod ista duo universalia non sunt simul intense (...).’

54 Q. 4 AD 4., AD PROBATIONEM PRIME PROPOSITIONIS, 4^{rb}: ‘Est ergo primus conceptus causatus per subiectum, et alius per predicatum secundario causatum (...).’

In passing, Manlevelt seems to suggest that intellectual difficulties of this kind are just part of the burden we have to bear by being alive. These shortcomings will be over once the soul is freed from its corporeal cage. For what different interpretation can be given to his contention that the intellect cannot intensely pay attention to different things, as long as it is in a body.⁵⁵

If, however, Manlevelt's radicalizing of Ockhamism entails the possible destruction of human knowledge, is not this radicalizing of Ockhamism then an act of self-destruction on the part of Ockhamism? In other words, in going one step beyond where the Venerable Inceptor himself made a halt, does Thomas Manlevelt not lay bare the intrinsic incompatibilities of the very Ockhamist program? It makes one think of what Libera has to say about the reasons for the continued existence of realism after Ockham. One of these reasons has to do with the intrinsic shortcomings of Ockhamism, and the weak spots in its challenging of rival systems.⁵⁶

But let me turn my attention first to the text of Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* itself. After all, apart from the obvious objective of having something to lecture about, why did he compose this commentary? Not to involve himself in the battle of the universals, because that battle had already been fought, and, to Manlevelt's firm conviction, was won by William of Ockham. What Manlevelt set out to do was to elaborate the status of the five predicables in an Ockhamist sense. The work that was to be done was to be found in the field of semantics.

In this sense, the present text, attributed to Thomas Manlevelt, fits in quite well with the state of developments as sketched in the first part of this chapter.

55 Q. 4 CONCL. 5, 4^{ra}: 'intellectus, (...) non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore, advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus.'

56 See Libera 1996, 402 for a listing of reasons why realism could survive Ockham, chief among which 'les insuffisances et faiblesses mêmes de la position nominaliste sur plusieurs points de doctrine ou d'argumentation précis.' Mention is made of some of these deficits: 'celui de la critique occamiste du représentationnisme thomiste, qui méconnaît le sens et la portée de la théorie thomassienne de la forme intelligible (...), ou, dans le système d'Occam lui-même, celui de la réduction du concept à un signe naturel et celui de la notion cardinal d'intuition intellectuelle du singulier.'

5.5. *A brief summary of the contents of the questiones*

Some of the subjects that Thomas Manlevelt feels inspired to tackle on the occasion of his reading of the *Isagoge* most certainly deserve a full thematical treatment. This edition will have served its purpose if it does indeed give rise to further studies, in which the main ideas expounded in the text of the *Questiones libri Porphirii* will be treated. It may prove helpful, however, to start with a brief summary of the contents of each of these successive *questiones*.

5.5.1. *The individuum*

Manlevelt's *Questiones libri Porphirii* do lend themselves to a grouping along the lines of the five universals.⁵⁷ However, there is one extra element that keeps cropping up. And this element is the *individuum*, which is always in the back of Manlevelt's mind, guiding his thoughts and serving as his ultimate goal of investigation. True, the individual is never with so many words added as an extra universal to Porphyry's list of five, to which he faithfully adhered. Indeed, as we have seen, the *individuum* is explicitly denied his status in the first conclusion of Q. 20.⁵⁸ But the apparent *contradictio in terminis* notwithstanding, 'individuum' is *de facto* accepted as the sixth 'universal' in one meaningful passage towards the end of Manlevelt's commentary.⁵⁹ Here, *individuum* together with *species*, *proprium*, *accidens* and *differentia specifica* form an exhaustive list of all that divides the *genus* (*dividit genus*).⁶⁰

The primacy of the individual over the universal cannot be better expressed than it has been by the thirteenth century Franciscan thinker Roger Bacon: one individual is worth more than all universals in the world.⁶¹ This primacy of the individual found a fierce defender in Bacon's

57 See below, subsection 5.5.3.

58 See above, section 5.3. In Q. 20 CONCL. 1, 18^{vb} it is stated: 'nullum individuum est universale.'

59 Q 37 CONCL. 5, 36^{rb}: '(...) omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel differentia specifica.'

60 The overview of diagrammatic representations of the Tree of Porphyry in texts of the Arts Faculty, 1200–1500, contained in Verboon 2010, 57–78, makes it clear that individuals tend to find a place in these quite naturally, as a kind of little 'roots' to the trees.

61 'Unum individuum excellit omnia universalialia de mundo,' from Roger Bacon's *Liber I Communium Naturalium* pars 2, d. 2, c. 7 (ed. R. Steele, page 94). The force of Bacon's wording is testified by its regularly being used as a reference in present

fourteenth century fellow-Franciscan William of Ockham. And the quickest glance on the present commentary on the *Isagoge* will reveal that Thomas Manlevelt, whose possible Franciscan background was touched upon earlier,⁶² is a warm supporter of the individual as well. What does this primacy of the individual over the universal amount to?

To Thomas Manlevelt as well as to Ockham, it is of the greatest importance to draw a sharp distinction between the level of thinking (*ratio*) and that of things (*res*).⁶³ The two domains must be kept apart in all considerations.

Now according to Ockham reality outside the knowing subject consists of individual things (substances and qualities) and none other than individual things. Things of a general nature do not exist in extramental reality. There are no *genera* or *species* as such to be found in the real world, nor any other universal, let alone such out of the way things as Platonic Ideas.

So the only object of our thought that can be found in reality is the individual. This individual is somehow known in a non-abstract manner.⁶⁴ On the other hand, the intellect does not know the individual in its individuality (*sub propria ratione singularitatis*).⁶⁵ It is observed by De Rijk⁶⁶ that even Ockham does not escape from understanding the *singulare* according to its external, sensible qualities. On the *res*-side, Ockham saw no other possibility than to interpret the 'humanity' and the 'whiteness' of an individual person as some kind of entities, albeit that they only exist in a concrete form, in a concrete individual. And, one may add, even to Ockham there is no other way to convey knowledge about an individual on the *ratio*-side than to make use of notions that each in turn will be catalogued as one of the five predicables, which are general in character.

Ockham was not unique in giving the individual, as far as we have knowledge about it, a certain prominence in his logical considerations. As observed by Libera in his authoritative study on the war of the uni-

day studies on the philosophical status of the individual, for example in Aertsen 1996, XI, De Rijk 1983, 8.

62 Above, section 3.5.

63 For the importance of this distinction, and the gradual sharpening of it, within the works of Ockham, see Bos 1987, 7 ff.

64 *Ordinatio* 1, d.3, q.5.

65 *Ordinatio* 1, d.2, q.6.

66 De Rijk 1983, 20.

versals, the problem of the intellectual knowledge of the individual was a distinguishing mark of the fourteenth century treatises on the universals. 'En ce qui concerne les universaux, le trait saillant du xive siècle est l'arrivée au premier plan du problème de la *connaissance intellectuelle intuitive du singulier*.'⁶⁷

But it is the change of view that matters. Whereas other thinkers broke their minds over the question how the universal is individualised, taking the universal as their starting point to try and reach the individual, Ockham thought it would be wiser and certainly less foolish to investigate how the singular, the individual could become a universal, and in what highly limited sense it could do so.

In short, to cite Spade on this matter, one does not need a *metaphysical* 'principle of individuation'; one needs an *epistemological* 'principle of universalization'.⁶⁸ On this, Ockham is honest enough to admit that he simply does not have the answer. In forming universal concepts, he says, 'nature works in a hidden way'. Nevertheless, it is clear that the focus has been shifted in Ockham from a metaphysical question to an epistemological one.⁶⁹

In his commentary on the *Isagoge* Thomas Manlevelt however does not address the epistemological question, but simply accepts the fact of there being universal concepts applied to individual things.

It is no new thing of course for Thomas Manlevelt to treat the individual in connection to the five predicables. In fact, the individual already found its natural place within Porphyry's own *Isagoge*. Its inclusion in the considerations from this very start onward has resulted in its sometimes half-seriously being referred to as the 'sixth predicable'.⁷⁰ This is not to be said, however, that all the questions raised about the individual in the context of the predicables are necessarily standard. Starting from Porphyry's text and the questions instigated by him, the commentators gradually moved on to exploring fields that were not at all covered by the *Isagoge* itself. When the theory of the predicables was moulded into a *compendium examinitorium* (basically, a series of questions that a student must be able to answer in order to pass an exam on the subject) in Paris in the first decades of the thirteenth century, no mention of

67 Libera 1996, 306.

68 Spade 1994, 109.

69 Spade 1994, 109f.

70 See for instance Bos 1987, 73. On the candidature of the *individuum* as sixth predicable see also above, section 5.3.

the individual was made in the division of Porphyry's text as presented there, but at any rate two out of the twenty-nine questions which the student should be able to answer in an exam were about the properties of individuals.⁷¹ These questions did not move the student an inch from the text under examination. Halfway into the thirteenth century, the fundamental metaphysical hints made in passing by Porphyry began to get full attention. In the subsequent commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *questiones* are devoted to such problems as the nature and cause of individuation and whether the universals are separated from the singulars. In his introduction to the French translation of the *Isagoge Libera* traces such *questiones* in the commentaries by modist thinkers like Martin of Dacia (d. 1304) and Radulphus Brito (d. 1304), and by Peter of Auvergne (d. 1320).⁷² So even though other thinkers, like John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), do not devote any *questiones* in their commentaries on the *Isagoge* to the individual and even William of Ockham does not have a chapter on the individual in his *Expositio*, to include some *questiones* on the individual was not an unusual thing to do in Thomas Manlevell's days, when compiling a commentary on the *Isagoge*. And it did not go out of usage afterwards. Henry Totting of Oyta's commentary, for example, probably written in the 1370s, also includes a couple of *questiones* on the individual. The second of these is completely sensible, moreover, when seen in an Ockhamist way: whether a principle of individuation is necessarily required for there being an individual.⁷³ Of special interest in this context seems to be the commentary by William of Russell, who according to Libera openly challenges the theses by Ockham and the 'Occamistae', especially the one that states that the individuals of one species are by themselves (*se ipsis*) alike and dislike, and the one that in his view reduces the universal to a 'natural sign of the singular things' like smoke for a fire.⁷⁴ Russell's own stance is a hardened realist's. According to him, a logical universal has as its basis a truly existing common nature existing in a plurality of things in the outside world.⁷⁵

71 See Porphyry 1998, cxxxi–cxxxiv, taking as his point of reference a manuscript edited by Cl. Lafleur from c. 1230–1240.

72 Porphyry 1998, cxxxv–cxxxix.

73 Heinrich Totting von Oyta, *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*, Q. 11: *Utrum necessario ad esse individui principium individuationis requiratur* (ed. J. Schneider).

74 Porphyry 1998, cxxxix.

75 'Est (...) universale logicum, quod est intentio communis fundata super rem communem, de pluribus praedicabilis. Est etiam universale metaphysicum, quod est illa res communis subiecta tali intentioni, quae est vera res existens in pluribus extra

But notwithstanding the fact that he is by no means original or unique in spending a few *questiones* on the *individuum*, Thomas Manlevelt stands apart from all other commentators in the prominence given to the individual-related questions.

In his commentary, the *questiones* dealing explicitly with the individual come right after the introductory *questiones* dealing with universals in general, and the *questiones* about the first among the predicables, the genus. In fact, in the tenth *questio*, *genus* and *individuum* are directly linked to each other, when Thomas Manlevelt explicitly raises the question whether genus differs from *individuum*. This may all seem evident enough, but it all depends on how one considers the *individuum*: whether *large* (in first intention) or *stricte* (in second intention).

The predicable generally taken to be of the least importance, the accident, is accordingly treated in the very last *questiones* of our commentary, but takes on an unexpected importance, when seen in the light of the individuality that is so important to Manlevelt's logical scheme of things. Is not the individual most properly characterized by its individual accidents?

In this, as in all matters, Thomas Manlevelt starts from an unmistakable Ockhamist stance. From there, however, he goes where no Ockhamist has gone before.

Individuality-related problems neither touched nor resolved in Manlevelt's commentary are those concerning the *principium individuationis*, which as already remarked is not really something an Ockhamist deems worthy to trouble our minds about, and those concerning our direct knowledge of individual things, which is an epistemological problem and not a logical one. Then, of course, problems like these are better reserved for commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and on the *De anima*, respectively. But Thomas Manlevelt shies away from no logical question concerning individuality. Throughout the commentary he tackles all kinds of questions, approaching all sides of the matter. Thus he has interesting things to say about the individual character of all reality. He presents *individuum* largely taken as a transcendent term.⁷⁶ He draws a sharp

animam.' Cited by Libera in Porphyry 1998, cxxxix, from A.D. Conti, 'A Short Scotist Handbook on Universals: The *Compendium super quinque universalialia* of William Russell, O.F.M.', *Cahiers de l'Institut de Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin*, 44 (1983), 39–60. The citation is from page 46.

76 Q. 11 CONCL. 3, 9^{va}: 'Tertia conclusio est ista quod "individuum" large acceptum est transcendens. Ista statim patet quia "individuum" sic acceptum convertitur cum "ente".'

distinction between *individuum* in its *large* or first intentional sense, and *individuum* in its strict or second intentional sense,⁷⁷ and even seems to be discerning a strictest sense, meaning *individuum* taken personally.⁷⁸ The individualising tendency with Thomas Manlevelt is not restricted to the *res*-side of the matter, but is manifest on the *ratio*-side as well, in the way he stresses the concrete, individual character of references, propositions and knowledge.

But what does Manlevelt really mean by all this? The individual on the *res*-side: what does it look like? And the individual on the *ratio*-side: how does this function? What does the individual's central place in Manlevelt's thinking really amount to? Does it involve a turning upside-down of the relative value of the five predicables, accident being the distinguishing mark of the individual? It is a question commonly asked by all commentators coming before and after Thomas Manlevelt, also by those differing from him in intellectual outlook: in what measure does the individual add something to the species? And the answer would be: what is added is the accidental.⁷⁹ So it seems only natural that the relative value of the predicables is turned upside down when the individual is the centre of attention.⁸⁰

Being an Ockhamist, Thomas Manlevelt not only takes it for granted that reality is strictly individual in nature and in no sense common or universal – which is to say that in the outer world there are only individual things, and that all universality is to be confined to our concepts referring to these things – , but he also fully subscribes to Ockham's tenet

77 Q. 10 DIST., 8^{va}: 'Distinctio premittenda est ista quod iste terminus individuum potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet, large vel stricte. Large secundum quod est nomen prime intentionis, significans re(m) materialiter existentem sive istud sit signum sive res que non est signum. Stricte secundum quod est nomen secunde intentionis, significans signum quod significative sumptum non predicatur de pluribus saltem univoce. Et sic accipit Porphyrius individuum quando dicit quod individuum est quod predicatur de uno solo.'

78 Q. 11 CONCL. 5, 9^{va}: "'individuum" strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis.'

79 See, for example, the titles of the 19th and 20th question of the early fourteenth century *Quaestiones super Isagogen Porphyrii* by the modist Radulphus Brito, as summed up by Libera in Porphyry 1998, cxxxvii f. Q. 19: 'Utrum individuum addat aliquid reale super speciem'. Q. 20: 'Utrum illud accidens quod individuum addit supra speciem includatur in significato individui.'

80 An altogether different topic would be the conventionality of written and spoken terms, which would add another dimension to the different ways of looking at things.

that ontologically, as an actual act of knowing, that is as an actual mental quality, a universal is really and truly an individual: ‘quodlibet universale est una res singularis.’⁸¹ Just like a spoken or written word is really an individual sound or blot of ink, while being universal insofar as it is the conventionally established sign of many things and is predicable of them, a mental concept is also really and truly an individual, while being universal insofar as it is a natural sign of many things.⁸²

What Manlevelt seems to have for his program is to draw out the consequences of this Ockhamist individualism on the conceptual side of affairs, and see what all this means for our possibility to gain knowledge of things.⁸³

5.5.2. *The accident*

Closely related to this emphasis on the individual is the attention paid by Manlevelt to all things accidental.

The forty-second out of forty-five *questiones libri Porhirii* is the first one directly concerned with the discussion of the fifth out of five predicables. It puts us in the middle of Manlevelt’s view of things real and things logical.

The subject matter of this *questio* is as traditional as can be: whether an accident can be present without the subject being destroyed.⁸⁴ Before answering this question however Manlevelt sets up three *distinctiones* in which he draws a sharp line between first and second intentions, between logic and reality.

81 William of Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 14, *Opera Philosophica* I, p. 48.31.

82 On William of Ockham’s successive thoughts on the universal, see Maurer 1994. This concise rendering of Ockham’s view on the matter of universals fitting so neatly with our author’s view may count as a sure sign that Manlevelt indeed is an Ockhamist in any reasonable sense of that term.

83 See McCord Adams 1987, 105 ff. for an account of Ockham’s thoughts on the matter. Ockham, she explains, will be identifying each universal with a really existent mental act. In creatures, a mental act is a quality, namely, an accident inhering in a mental substance (*Summa logicae* I, c. 17 (*Opera Philosophica* I, 58, 60); *Quodlibeta* V, Q. 13 (*Opera Theologica* IX, 521)). Only particulars really exist. Hence, each mental act is a particular. All universals – genera, species, differentia, propria and accidents – are particular qualities, and hence: an accident. What makes names universal and what sorts them into one category rather than another is not what they *are*, but what and how they signify. All that really exists are particular substances and particular qualities.

84 Q. 42, 39^{vb}–40^{vb}: ‘Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem.’

We should remember that to the medieval mind there existed only two things: the extramental world and our knowledge about it. And these are supposed to fit neatly together. Busying himself with the logical side of this bifurcated reality, Manlevelt works out the nominalist scheme to its utter Ockhamist consequences. The logical scheme and reality should fit one another like the proportionate mall fits a clay figure. But what if the clay of reality keeps slipping off the sides of the mall, no matter how hard you try to fit the one to the other? What if reality turns out to be a completely shapeless lump of clay once you try to lift the mall for even a second?

If the picture just presented is appropriate, it should give an indication of the out-of-the-way world-view Manlevelt's project results in. But a word of caution may be in order here. Manlevelt invariably takes one step back after presenting his most revolutionary ideas, and states that these are only a kind of thought-experiment. This can be interpreted as a sign of modesty, maybe, or as a sign of prudence. I feel inclined to be just as modest (or prudent) in presenting my interpretation of these rather wild ideas.

The program carried out by Thomas Manlevelt involves the consequent keeping apart of logic and extramental reality. And maybe it is not a coincidence that he stresses this bifurcation in this very *questio* on the accidents, by dedicating a set of *distinctiones* to it. But in the course of this *questio* Manlevelt at least gives the impression of being simply unable to uphold the strict bifurcation.

Yes, we get to see strange scenes unfold before our eyes, with the blurring of the border between logic and extramental reality: the whitening of a black-skinned Ethiopian,⁸⁵ a fire existing without heat, an animal losing his natural body-heat.⁸⁶ Are we not witnessing then the dawning of a Heraclitean sort of reality, in which everything tends to flood over into everything else? Everything seems to be constantly moving; nothing seems to remain the same from one instant to the next. And mixed into this Heraclitean frame is there not a hint of Anaxagoreism as well?

85 Q. 44 AD OPP., 43^{ra}: 'intellectus potest assentire huic propositioni "corvus est albus" et huic "Ethiops est albus", et hoc intellectis significatis vocabulorum, quia corvus et nigredo sunt res totaliter distincte, et nigredo non sequitur corvum nec Ethiopem ratione suorum principiorum essentialium, sed ratione alicuius complexionis accidentalis.'

86 Q. 42 CONCL. 4, 40^{rb}: 'Patet igitur quod sine omni caliditate potest ignis existere, et per consequens omnis caliditas est separabilis ab igne, et consimiliter sine omni calore naturali potest hoc animal existere.'

Might not all be all in all? With Manlevelt we have an Ockhamist setting eye on all this strangeness. But remarkably enough insights into the floating world not at all unlike those developed by Thomas Manlevelt are also traceable in the works of his contemporary Francis of Mayronnes, also known as the Prince of Scotists.⁸⁷ So the shift from a stable and solid Aristotelian worldview to a highly instable and fluent Heraclitean worldview, unexpected as its occurrence may be, was not at all limited to thinkers of a highly nominalist frame of mind, but occurred within the realist camp of Scotists as well.

In the first distinction preceding the body of Q. 42, Manlevelt distinguishes two ways in which an accident may be accepted. First, for the term that is predicated in an accidental manner, and in this way we have the fifth universal. Secondly, for a thing belonging to a subject with which it does not form a unity, and in this way we use the term in its first intention, signifying something in the outside world.⁸⁸ Thus, this preliminary distinction is just enough to draw a sharp enough line between the physical world and the world of logics; between the first intentions and the second intentions; between falsehood *de virtute sermonis* and truth *secundum intellectum auctoris*. In fact, it is the very subject-matter of this *questio* that is thus decided: whether an accident is present or absent without the subject being destroyed. For it is true not *de virtute sermonis* but *secundum intellectum auctoris*, who *means* to say that an accident *may* be present or absent without the subject being destroyed.⁸⁹

Maybe the distinction between the different ways in which an accident is accepted, will also shed some further light on the status of the individual thing, that is to say: the connection of the presumably 'stable' individual subject to its presumably changeable accidents.

Questio 42 has just that for its subject matter: can an accident be present and absent without the subject being destroyed? In other words: is this description of the accident given by Porphyry a correct one?

87 On Mayronnes, see Bos 2003.

88 Q. 42 DIST. 1, 40^{ra}: 'Prima distinctio est ista quod "accidens" accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, hoc est, non per se primo modo vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Et sic accidens est quintum universale. Et isto modo iste terminus "accidens" est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur "accidens" pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto cum quo non facit per se unum, sive talis res sit signum, sive non. Et sic iste terminus "accidens" est nomen prime intentionis.'

89 Q. 42 CONCL. 2, 40^{ra}: 'hec propositio: "accidens adest et abest etcetera" est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius "accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem".'

The twofold manner, then, in which ‘accident’ can be accepted, is in fact announced somewhat earlier in Manlevelt’s commentary, namely in the first distinction of the thirtieth *questio*, where the problem is raised whether one thing can differ from another by an inseparable accident.⁹⁰ Here it is stated simply that accident is accepted in a logical context for a term that is predicated in an accidental manner, and in the context of reality as a thing which inheres in a subject in an accidental manner.⁹¹ The full treatment however of this subject matter is in the forty-second *questio*.

First, ‘accident’ can be accepted as a term which is accidentally predicated. That is to say: a term which is not predicated *per se*, in the first nor the second way in which *per se* is said. These two ways in which a term can be predicated *per se* may need some clarification. This clarification is to be found elsewhere in Manlevelt’s commentary.⁹² In the first way a term is said to be predicated *per se* not according to any of the parts of the subject, but according to the subject as a whole; the second way according to a part of the subject. Thus, genus and species are predicated *per se primo modo*; *differentia* and *proprium* are predicated *per se secundo modo*. And accident is predicated *per se* neither *primo modo* nor *secundo modo*. For accident, as already indicated by its very name, is predicated not *per se* at all, but only accidentally.

90 Q. 30, 29^{va}–30^{tb}: ‘Utrum aliquid ab alio differat inseparabili accidente.’

91 Q. 30 DIST. 1, 29^{va}-b: ‘In ista questione primo premittitur distinctio de accidente reali et de accidente logicali, non quod sic differt, scilicet quod nullum accidens logicale sit accidens reale scilicet realiter alicui subiecto inherens, sed quod accidens logicale accipiatur tantummodo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, et reale pro re que accidentaliter inheret alicui subiecto, de quo plus dicitur capitulo de accidente.’

92 In the second distinction of the ninth *questio*, the two ways of predicating are discerned when considering the predication *in quid* and *in quale* in Q. 9 DIST. 2, 7^{vb}: ‘Secunda distinctio est ista quod predicari in quid vel predicari in quale accipitur dupliciter: uno modo primo, idest, non ratione alicuius partis, alio modo non primo, quia ratione alicuius partis.’ On *differentia* and *proprium* being predicated *per se secundo modo*, see for example the fourth conclusion of the thirty-seventh *questio*: ‘Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla differenti a specifica est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species secundo modo per se, quia talis divisio potest fieri per proprium quod competit tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si fiat talis divisio: animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur differentia specifica, et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que contrahunt genus ad standum pecise pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium “risibile” contrahit hoc genus “animal” ad standum precise proprie pro suppositis “hominis.”’

Secondly, ‘accident’ can be accepted as a thing inherent to a subject with which it does not form a unity on itself, whether such a thing is a sign, or not.

In the first manner, accident is the fifth universal, and the term ‘accident’ is a name of second intention.

In the second manner, the term ‘accident’ is a name of first intention, and is not to be confused with the fifth universal. Just like, as it is remarked in passing in the aforementioned distinction of the thirtieth *questio*, no logical accident is a real accident, in a real manner inhering in a subject.

‘Presence and absence’ and ‘subject of an accident’ are likewise accepted in the same twofold manner, that is to say: either in a real manner on the level of first intentions, meaning the real inherence or separation, or in a logical manner on the level of second intentions, meaning the affirmative or negative *divisio*.

Something is *logicaliter* said to be ‘present or absent’ by affirmative or negative division; *realiter* by real inherence or real separation.⁹³

And then ‘subject of an accident’ is *logicaliter* taken to be that of which an accident is accidentally predicated; *realiter* that in which an accident realiter inheres.

Taking this sharp distinction between logic and reality as his starting point, Manlevelt goes on to draw some conclusions that may be said to range from the over-obvious to the highly remarkable.

The first conclusion states the obvious, namely that the law of contradiction does not allow that an accident can be both present and absent, either in logic or in reality.⁹⁴ The famous definition of the accident as something that is present and absent without the subject being destroyed, is easily saved however, if we are prepared not to stick with its literal meaning, but take into account the intention of the author. And that is what Manlevelt does in the second conclusion. What is really meant by the definition is that the accident can be present and absent without the

93 Q. 42 DIST. 2, 40^{ra}: ‘Logicaliter aliquid dicitur “adesse et abesse” per divisionem affirmativam vel negativam, realiter per realem inherentiam vel per realem separationem.’

94 Q. 42 CONCL. 1, 40^{ra}: ‘Prima conclusio est ista quod nullum accidens adest et abest preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc qualitercumque accipitur “accidens” sive “adesse et abesse”, quia ex hoc sequeretur quod aliquid competeret alicui et istud non competeret eidem, quod est manifesta contradictio, sicut pretangebatur (in) argumento principali.’

subject being destroyed.⁹⁵ And this is the interpretation that Manlevelt is to follow throughout his discussion of the famous definition.

As remarked before, this is not the first nor the only time that Thomas Manlevelt opposes the literal meaning, that is to say the meaning *de virtute sermonis*, to what is really meant by the author, that is to say the *intentio auctoris*.⁹⁶ In the thirtieth *questio*, for example, we read about an accident being inseparable in a general manner of speaking, but not in its literal sense.⁹⁷ Elsewhere the meaning *de virtute sermonis* is equated to the proper sense and opposed to the figurative sense: a certain proposition is held to be false *de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio*, but true *in sensu transsumptivo*.⁹⁸ A pair of opposites to be reckoned with in this context, although not to be equated to the opposition between the meaning *de virtute sermonis* versus the *intentio auctoris*, is the *actus exercitus* in opposition to the *actus significatus*. Both of these are logical acts, but whereas the proposition fulfilling an *actus exercitus* is to be identified by the use of e.g. the copula ‘est’, the proposition referring to an *actus significatus* is to be identified by the use of e.g. the verb ‘predicatur’. The difference between these two logical acts is succinctly brought to the fore by Nuchelmans: ‘The very act of predicating, of which the conventional copula indicates that it is being simultaneously performed by the speaker, may subsequently be made the object of a reflective predication of higher level in which the initial performed act is merely conceived of and described rather than effectively performed, and thus becomes an *actus significatus*.’⁹⁹ In the twenty-fifth *questio*, whether several men by participating in a species are one man,¹⁰⁰ the two pairs of

95 Q. 42 CONCL. 2, 40^{ra}: ‘Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec propositio: “accidens adest et abest etcetera” est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius “accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem”’

96 See above, section 3.4.

97 Q. 30 CONCL. 3, 29^{vb}: ‘si dicatur quod si hoc accidens sit inseparabile, igitur est non separabile, igitur non-separabile, dico quod ista propositio “hoc accidens est inseparabile” in communi locutione stat loco istius “hoc accidens ab aliquo subiecto est inseparabile”, et ideo, si cui placeat, potest distingui secundum amphiboliam, et dici in sensu propria et in sensu transsumptivo vera secundum quod iam declaratum.’

98 Q. 31 CONCL. 9, 31^{ra}: ‘conceditur communiter ista propositio: “Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime nullo termino existente”, que quidem proprie falsa est de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio, sed vera est in sensu transsumptivo. Et est sensus “Sortes et Plato habent formas similes ultimata similitudine”, et hoc extendendo nomen “similitudinis” ad substantiam.’

99 Nuchelmans 1987, 57.

100 Q. 25, 24^{va}–25^{va}: ‘Utrum participatione specie plures homines sunt unus homo.’

opposites happen to be nicely matched when it comes to interpreting the proposition that ‘several men are one man.’ In its proper sense, that is to say according to its meaning *de virtute sermonis*, we have to do with an *actus exercitus*. But taken not in its proper but in its figurative sense, we have to do with an *actus significatus*, and then the *intentio auctoris* can be reconstructed thus: of several men, that is to say, of several names of men is predicated ‘one man.’ ‘Sortes is one man,’ ‘Plato is one man,’ and so forth.¹⁰¹ This is not to say, of course, that in general there exists a one-to-one relationship between *actus significatus* and the *intentio auctoris* on the one hand, and *actus exercitus* and the *virtus sermonis* on the other hand.

Of course, the paired opposition between the *actus exercitus* as the literal meaning and the *actus significatus* as the intention of the author comes in very convenient for any nominalist trying to do away with all hints of realism. Ockham himself has made proper use of it on several occasions. He uses the opposition to lay out the ways in which genera and species can or cannot be said to be substances, and the ways in which substance can or cannot be said to be not in a subject. In at least one passage he explicitly links each of these logical acts to its proper intentional domain: the *actus exercitus* has to do with first intentions; the *actus significatus* with second intentions.¹⁰²

Manlevelt finishes off his treatment of the status of the diverse terms, and at the same time his commentary on the *Isagoge*, by securing the status of each and every predicable as accidents, in a way.¹⁰³ Accidents taken in their being of second intention, that is.

101 Q. 25 DIST. 2, 25^{ra}: ‘Secunda distinctio est ista quod ista propositio “plures homines sunt unus homo” est distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi in sensu proprio vel in sensu transsumptivo. Sensus proprius est actus exercitus, qui accipitur ex virtute sermonis et ex constructione grammaticali, sicut termini iacent. Sensus vero transsumptivus sive improprius est actus significatus, scilicet iste: de pluribus hominibus, hoc est, de pluribus nominibus hominum predicatur unus homo. Qui actus significatus debet sic exerceri: “iste homo est homo, et iste homo est homo, et sic de singulis”, vel sic: “Sortes est unus homo, Plato est unus homo, et sic de singulis”’

102 Ockham *Summa logicae* I 72; *Oph* I 222.216–228 on genera and species being substances; *Summa logicae* I 43, *Oph* I 123.7–16 and *Expositio in librum predicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 9, *Oph* II 184.67–73 on substance being in a subject. For an exposition of Ockham’s view on these matters, see Kaufmann 1994, 128 ff.

103 Q. 45 CONCL. 1, 43^{ra}: ‘omne genus substantiale est accidens, et omnis species substantialis, et omnis differentia, et omne proprium, quia quodlibet istorum est terminus, et ultra: igitur aliquod accidens est genus substantiale, et aliquod accidens est species, etcetera.’

The reason for this is that each term can be said to be used in an accidental manner to refer to something, up to the least likely candidate for such a way of referring: the substantial genus. Manlevelt does not have to look very far to find an example, for Aristotle provides him with the master, who only accidentally is called a man or an animal.¹⁰⁴ Essentially, of course, a master is the master of a slave. ‘Master’, in other words, is an item belonging to the category of relation. And for this reason ‘man’, being an item belonging to the category of substance, can only be predicated trans-categorically, that is to say, accidentally of ‘master’. So even the prime example of a substantial genus, animal, can be used in an accidental manner to refer to something, and therefore, in this way is an accident.

To push matters still a little further, Manlevelt even mentions God as being an accident in this way, for God is used in an accidental manner to refer to the knower of some proposition *A* – an item belonging to the category of relation.¹⁰⁵ It was already revolutionary for Manlevelt to hold that an accident can be truly ascribed to God, namely, ‘knowing the (contingent) proposition *A* at a time when this proposition *A* happens to be true’.¹⁰⁶ After all, in the very first *Questio* of this commentary on the *Isagoge* God was given full honour as being the First Science and First Cause, without Whom no knowledge whatsoever would be possible.¹⁰⁷ But now God himself, or at least the term ‘God’ is awarded the status of a mere accident. But if even a substantial genus is an accident, so is every substantial species, and every difference, and every property, for all of these are terms and as such are accidents, in the way that they are verified of something in an accidental manner, just like ‘man’ is verified in accidental manner of ‘master’.¹⁰⁸

104 Aristoteles, *Categoriae*, 7, 7a35–39, tr. Boethii: ‘ut si servus ad dominum dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel scientiae susceptibilem vel hominem, relicto vero solo dominum esse, semper servus ad illud dicitur; servus enim domini servus dicitur.’

105 Q. 45 CONCL. 1, 43^{ra}: ‘sicut “homo” est accidens domino, ita “Deus” est accidens scienti *A* propositionem.’

106 Q. 43 CONCL. 3, 41^{va}: ‘accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio “Sortes sedet”, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur *A*, tunc hoc accidens “sciens *A*” competit Deo, quia hec est vera: “Deus est sciens *A*”, et hoc accidens potest adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicut de se notum est.’

107 Q. 1 CONCL. 1, 1^{rb}: ‘prima scientia que est prima causa est necessaria, et sine ipsa nulla cognitio potest haberi.’

108 In his two-volume study on Aristotle’s semantics and ontology, De Rijk makes a case for an onomastic approach to Aristotle’s ‘speaking about things’. That is to say, the

Of course, all terms are not accidents in every sense of the term ‘accident’. In this context, Manlevelt distinguishes three senses of ‘accident’, the first one being the sense in which all predicables – as terms – are accidents because they are verified of something in an accidental manner. The second sense of ‘accident’ is the well-known one of being able to be there or not be there without the subject being destroyed, for example ‘sitting’ as an accident of ‘man’. And the third sense in which something extrinsic which is an accident is in reality inherent in a subject, such as for example the term ‘black’ connotes something extrinsic to a raven, which is realiter in the raven as an accident in a subject.

The second sense, needless to say, is not the sense in which any substantial genus is an accident. For of whatever subject the term ‘animal’ is predicated in a true manner, of this same subject ‘animal’ cannot be veritably denied without the subject being destroyed in the process.

What are we to make of this? Is this just an innocent device by Manlevelt, to hold that every predicable in a sense is only an accident? Or does this conclusion weigh heavier, if only we take in account the place it takes our text, namely, as its finale?

The least one can say is that the link between terms and reality tends to look rather thin, if the linking takes place on an accidental level only. Of course, adhering to a conventional relationship linking the terms to reality is nothing unusual. In fact, it is the Aristotelian manner of seeing these things. But is Manlevelt not taken (albeit with some reserve) to be the author of a treatise, devastating to the modist way of thinking?¹⁰⁹ Might not, then, his stressing of the merely *accidental* status of the five Porphyrian *predicables* when applied to the real world, be a thinly-disguised way of criticising the ‘natural’ link supposed to exist between terms and things by some, presumably the modists so severely attacked by him in another context? But I am entering the field of speculation here.

basic mental activity involved on this score, according to De Rijk 2002a, 404, should be taken in terms of onomastics (‘naming’, ‘appellating’), rather than, as is commonly done, in terms of apophantics (‘sentence predication’ and ‘statement-making’). Should perhaps Thomas Manlevelt’s approach be taken in terms of onomastics as well? And would Manlevelt then be immune to De Rijk’s verdict on present-day scholars like Cohen, Matthews and Bäck, namely that their apophantically inspired conclusions about Aristotle are ‘entirely beside the point?’ (De Rijk 2002a, 407) This would be a fruitful matter of future investigation, that can best be undertaken on the occasion of the critical edition of Thomas Manlevelt’s *Questiones super Predicamenta*, which I intend to produce as a follow-up to the present edition.

¹⁰⁹ See above, section 2.1 on the anti-modist *Tractatus de improbatione modorum significandi*.

5.5.3. *The general structure of the text*

The foregoing interpretation of Manlevelt's intentions may serve as a starting point and a guiding thread for future studies, in which any one of his basic themes could be scrutinized. To finish off this Introduction, first the general structure of his text needs examining. The general grouping of *questiones* in Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* then is as follows.

QQ. 1–4 are concerned with general questions about our knowledge of the universals as related to our knowledge of the categories, and to our capacity to make divisions and definitions, and about the location of universals in our intellect.

The first universal, *genus*, is treated in QQ. 5–13, with QQ. 11–13 concentrating on the individual rather than the genus.

The second universal, *species*, is treated within the context of QQ. 14–27, with QQ. 20 and 24 again concerning itself with the individual, and QQ. 21–23 with more general themes like the *transcendentia*, the exact number of *genera*, and the highest *genera*.

The third universal, *differentia*, gets ample treatment in no less than thirteen consecutive *questiones*: QQ. 28–40.

The fourth universal, *proprium*, is awarded one *questio*: Q. 41.

The last four *questiones*, QQ. 42–45 are dedicated to the fifth universal, *accidens*.

5.5.4. *A comparison to other questiones-commentaries on the Isagoge*

It is up to future investigations to thematically probe a little deeper into the text of Manlevelt's commentary. Meanwhile, a bird's eye one-by-one view on the respective *questiones* may already give an indication as to what problems are raised and solved in the text to follow.

In fact, the mere enumeration of the *questiones* asked by Thomas Manlevelt about Porphyry's text and the comparing of these *questiones* to tables of contents of *questiones*-commentaries by fellow-nominalists¹¹⁰ is enough to strengthen my conviction that Manlevelt was a nominalist of an Ockhamist denomination.

¹¹⁰ This quick scan of question-titles is a not uncommon short-cut to obtain a good first impression of a questions-commentary. Kenny and Pinborg 1982, 30: 'The selection of *tituli* (*questionis*) reflects current interests, and so a mere list of questions is often indicative of the time and place of origin of the commentary.'

I will limit my attention to three examples.¹¹¹ John Buridan and Albert of Saxony are two philosophers whose names are frequently mentioned in connection with Thomas Manlevelt; Henry Totting of Oyta's views on logic have not recently been studied, but on first sight a comparison between his and Manlevelt's views may be worthwhile. Let us see to what questions the *Isagoge* gave rise to for John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Henry Totting of Oyta, respectively.¹¹²

John Buridan: *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*:¹¹³

1. Utrum logica sit scientia;
2. Utrum logica sit scientia speculativa vel practica;
3. Utrum universale sit subiectum proprium in libro Porphyrii;
4. Utrum universalia sint substantiae;
5. Utrum ista propositio 'animal est genus' vel 'homo est species' debeat concedi vel negari;
6. Utrum propositio in qua subicitur terminus materialiter sumptus sit universalis particularis indefinita vel singularis;
7. Utrum definitio generis sit bona;
8. Utrum definitio speciei sit bona;
9. Utrum definitio individui sit bona;
10. De arbore Porphyrii;
11. Utrum definitio differentiae sit bona quam ponit Porphyrius;
12. Utrum definitio proprii sit bona quam ponit Porphyrius;
13. Utrum definitio accidentis sit bona;

¹¹¹ Otherwise a comparison to, e.g. the *Tractatus de universalibus* by Ockham's critic Wyclif might have come into consideration. Wyclif does round off the fifteen chapters of his treatise with four chapters discussing six questions, whose enumeration do not promise much in the way of a concordance between Manlevelt's logico-semantical inspired treatment of the universals and Wyclif's seemingly more theologically-orientated interest in the matter: 1. – Is substance said univocally of primary and secondary substances?; 2. – Can a universal be generated, changed, or created?; 3. – Is annihilation compatible with the postulation of universals as set out above?; 4. What are we to say about specific distinctions?; 5. – Whether genus and species could be fuller, or extend over more suppositis than they do now?; 6. – Is everything universal? And if so, is it not superfluous to posit universals of the second intention of nature? (John Wyclif 1985, 125–178)

¹¹² A similar comparison between the mere tables of contents of commentaries on the *Isagoge* by Martin of Dacia, Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito and William Russell is given by Libera in Porphyry 1998 cxxxv ff.; somewhat deeper goes the comparison of Andrew of Cornwall's questions on the *Isagoge* with the Porphyry questions by Simon of Faversham and John Duns Scot in Andrews 1999.

¹¹³ Source: John Buridan 1986.

14. Utrum sint quinque praedicabilia non plura neque pauciora;
15. Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque praedicabilia seu universalia;
16. Utrum genus species differentia et proprium suscipiant magis et minus sicut et accidens.

John Buridan: *Tractatus de differentia universalis ad individuum (pars secunda)*, a.k.a. *Duae quaestiones de universali*:¹¹⁴

1. Utrum universale sit actu praeter animam;
2. Utrum universale sit praeter animam unum unitate alia ab unitate numerali.

Albert of Saxony: *Alberti de Saxoniam Quaestiones in Porphyrii librum praedicabilium*:¹¹⁵

PROOEMIUM:

1. Utrum de quinque praedicabilibus sit una scientia;
2. Utrum universale sit proprium subiectum scientiae huius;
3. Utrum quodlibet universale sit ens;
4. Utrum hic terminus universale sit genus ad quinque universalia;
5. Utrum isti termini genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens et individuum possint definiri;
6. Utrum praedicabilia sint quinque et non plura neque pauciora;
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO UNICA DE GENERE:
7. Utrum definitio generis sit bona;
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO PRIMA DE SPECIE:
8. Utrum definitio speciei quam ponit Porphyrius sit bona;
QUAESTIO SECUNDA [DE SPECIE]:
9. Utrum definitio individui quam ponit Porphyrius sit bona;
QUAESTIO TERTIA [DE SPECIE]:
10. Utrum haec propositio sit vera, scilicet 'aliquis homo est species';
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO UNICA [DE DIFFERENTIA]:
11. Utrum definitio differentiae sit bona;
ALBERTI PARVI QUAESTIO UNICA DE PROPRIO:
12. Utrum definitio proprii sit bona;
QUAESTIO UNICA DE ACCIDENTI ALBERTI PARVI:
13. Utrum definitio accidentis sit bona.

¹¹⁴ Source: John Buridan 1987.

¹¹⁵ Source: García 1988.

Henry Totting of Oyta: *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii*:¹¹⁶

1. Utrum notitia quinque universalium sit inter species scientiae collocanda;
2. Utrum universale sit subiectum scientiae Porphyrii;
3. Utrum obiecta scientifica conclusionum in Porphyrio traditarum sint omnibus incomplexis significantibus realiter condistincta;
4. Utrum cognitio quinque universalium sit necessaria et ad cognitionem praedicamentorum, ad diffinitionem et ad divisionem, nec non ad ea, quae requiruntur ad demonstrationem;
5. Utrum universale sit aliqua res extra animam, ab omnibus suis singularibus participatum;
6. Utrum sint tantum quinque universalia;
7. Utrum universale sit genus ad quinque universalia, ista scilicet genus, species, differentia, proprium et accidens;
8. Utrum genus sit principium specierum sub se contentarum;
9. Utrum diffinitio generis a Porphyrio data sit bona;
10. Utrum unum individuum sit tantum de uno solo praedicabile;
11. Utrum necessario ad esse individui principium individuationis requiratur;
12. Utrum diffinitio speciei specialissimae data a Porphyrio sit bona;
13. Utrum species possit salvari tantum unico ipsius individuo existente;
14. Utrum ens dicatur univoce de decem praedicamentis;
15. Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo;
16. Utrum inferius possit praedicari de suis superioribus;
17. Utrum aliquid differt a seipso differentia communiter dicta;
18. Utrum differentia specifica sive differentia inter proprie dicta habeat facere diversitatem essentialem entium specificis distinctorum;
19. Utrum differentia sit divisiva generis et constitutiva speciei;
20. Utrum aliqua diffinitionum differentiae a Porphyrio datarum sit bona et convertibiliter conveniens eidem;
21. Utrum diffinitio proprii a Porphyrio data sit bona, ista scilicet: 'Proprium inest soli omni et semper';
22. Utrum omne proprium realiter sit distinctum ab eo, cuius est proprium;

¹¹⁶ Source: Henry Totting of Oyta 1979.

23. Utrum diffinitio accidentis data a Porphyrio, scilicet quod 'adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem', sit bona;
24. Utrum corvus potest intelligi albus et Aethiops nitens candore.

Thomas Manlevelt: *Questiones libri Porphirii*:

1. Utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam;
2. Utrum scire quid sit genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam;
3. Utrum noscere quid sit genus sit necessarium ad assignationem diffinitionem.;
4. Utrum universale sit (in) intellectu;
5. Utrum genus sit equivocum.;
6. Utrum genus sit cui supponitur species, et hoc est querere utrum illa diffinitio generis sit bene data;
7. Utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum;
8. Utrum genus predicetur de pluribus differentibus specie;
9. Utrum omne genus predicatur in quid;
10. Utrum genus differat ab individuo;
11. Utrum individuum predicetur de uno solo;
12. Utrum aliquod individuum sit terminus communis;
13. Utrum proprietas unius individui inveniatur in altero;
14. Utrum species sit res distincta a termino sive a signo;
15. Utrum homo sit species animalis;
16. Utrum genus et species sint sibi invicem relativa;
17. Utrum in diffinitione speciei sit necesse poni genus;
18. Utrum ista diffinitio speciei 'species est que predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit', sit bona;
19. Utrum omne quod est ante individua, sit species specialissima;
20. Utrum individuum sit nomen appellativum;
21. Utrum unum sit genus omnium; hoc est querere, utrum talia transcendentia aliquid, res, ens, sint genera;
22. Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora;
23. Utrum genera generalissima sint principia rerum;
24. Utrum infinita relinquenda sint ab arte;
25. Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo;
26. Utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus;
27. Utrum species sit pars generis;
28. Utrum aliquid differat a seipso;
29. Utrum aliqua substantia differat ab alia separabili accidente;

30. Utrum aliquid ab alio differat inseparabili accidente;
31. Utrum differentia specifica semper faceat aliquid ab alio differre specie;
32. Utrum omne faciens per se differre sit differentia specifica;
33. Utrum differentia per se suscipit magis et minus;
34. Utrum hec differentia 'animatum sensibile' sit constitutiva substantie animalis;
35. Utrum hec differentia 'immortale' sit constitutiva Dei;
36. Utrum eadem differentia sit discretiva generis et constitutiva speciei;
37. Utrum differentia specifica sit necessaria ad divisionem generis;
38. Utrum differentia specifica sit necessaria ad diffinitionem faciendam;
39. Utrum ista diffinitio differentie sit bene data: 'differentia est qua abundat species a genere';
40. Utrum aliqua alia diffinitio differentie convertitur cum differentia;
41. Utrum proprium dicatur quadrupliciter;
42. Utrum aliquod accidens absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem;
43. Utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum;
44. Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus;
45. Utrum aliquod accidens sit genus substantiale.

As I set out at the beginning of this chapter,¹¹⁷ certain *questiones* receive a more complex treatment than others; they may contain sub-arguments and reports of alternative positions.¹¹⁸ It is Andrews's readily to be endorsed surmise that this sort of complexity grows out of a tradition of successive treatments of an issue. It is generally previous authors and their opinions that are responsible for alternative opinions inserted into the ordinary progression of argument. Increased complexity is then a sure sign that we are getting further along in the chain of development of tradition. An obvious mark of continuous tradition is similarity of questions, which is all the more remarkable when the questions are only loosely prompted by the original text. Similarities in preliminary arguments do not so much argue direction of influence, but do indicate a shared tradition.¹¹⁹

117 This Introduction, section 5.1.

118 As indicated in section 5.1, this applies especially to *questiones* 19, 21, 32, 41 and 44.

119 Andrews 1999, 108.

The outcome then is that common arguments and turns of phrase are the signs of direct influence. Therefore, if it so happens that one author quotes and rejects views which another author sets forth as his considered opinion, one can be sure that the first author has read the other, and not the other way around.¹²⁰

Keeping this in mind, I will confine myself now to a bird's eye view of the lists of *questiones*. What is to be seen then is that the commentaries by John Buridan and Albert of Saxony more or less form a pair, and the commentaries by Thomas Manlevelt and Henry Totting of Oyta more or less the other pair.

Albert and John seem content to run through the definitions given of the respective universals, while refraining from going into matters too loosely prompted by Porphyry's original text. Of the thirteen questions posed by Albert, no less than ten are also to be found in John's commentary. Of course this is largely to be explained by the superficiality of their questioning, but when Albert and John do distance themselves somewhat from Porphyry's text, their questions are also similar when the one commentary is compared to the other. That concerning the number of universals is to be found with John as Q. 14, with Albert as Q. 6. True, Henry poses the same question in his Q. 6, but Manlevelt instead of this raises the same question about the number of categories in his Q. 22.

There are differences as well. For example, John on a par with Thomas and Henry is consequently speaking only of universals, while Albert speaks about predicables as well as universals.

Henry chooses a somewhat more traditional opening to his commentary than Thomas does by raising a couple of preliminary questions concerning the scientific status of an investigation into the universals, omitted by the author of the present text. As soon however as it is the universals themselves that are at issue, Henry is remarkably close to Thomas in the questions that he raises.

Thomas's first three *questiones*,¹²¹ concerning the necessity of knowing the universals for building up scientific knowledge, are taken up together by Henry in Q. 4,¹²² while Thomas's Q. 4, whether a universal is in

120 Andrews 1999, 109 ff.

121 Circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam; Utrum scire quid sit genus etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam; Utrum noscere quid sit genus sit necessarium ad assignationem diffinitionem.

122 Utrum cognitio quinque universalium sit necessaria et ad cognitionem praedica-

the intellect, is rephrased by Henry as Q. 5: whether a universal is something extramental. Both have a *questio* (Thomas's Q. 7 and Henry's Q. 8, respectively) on genus as the principle of its species. Whether an individual is predicated of only one is Thomas's Q. 11 and Henry's Q. 10. An explicit question on an individuating principle is raised by Henry (Q. 11), but not by Thomas. The answering of Henry's Q. 14, whether being is said univocally of the ten categories, plays a pivotal role in Thomas's Q. 21, whether there is one genus of all things. The wording of Q. 15 by Henry is exactly the same as Thomas's Q. 25: 'Utrum participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo'. From there on both philosophers go on to ask whether inferiors can be predicated of superiors (Thomas Q. 26, Henry Q. 16). Whether something differs from itself is again a question taken up by Henry (Q. 17) and Thomas (Q. 28) alike. Henry's Q. 18 and Thomas's Q. 37 both seem to turn on the necessity of the specific difference for the division of a genus, while the more general question whether differentia is dividing the genus and constituting the species is asked in Q. 19 (Henry) and Q. 36 (Thomas) respectively. Apart from a few more general *questiones* shared by both, attention should also be drawn to Henry's last *questio* (Q. 24), 'Utrum corvus potest intelligi albus et Aethiops nitens candore', echoing Thomas's penultimate *questio* (Q. 44) 'Utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus'.

Henry Totting of Oyta is not one of the best-researched among the late-medieval philosophers, but with all due provisions one can be fairly sure that he was an Ockhamist (if one is allowed to use this label) working in Prague, Paris and Vienna in the second half of the fourteenth century.¹²³ In the introduction to his edition of the *Quaestiones in Isagen Porphyrii* Schneider draws some interesting parallels with Ockham's thoughts on the matters touched upon by Henry.¹²⁴ A comparison between Henry's commentary and that by Thomas Manlevelt promises to be even more interesting. Here there is a striking similarity of *questiones*, which is all the more remarkable because the questions are only loosely prompted by the original text. In other words: what shows itself here according to the criteria laid down by Andrews is an obvious mark of a continuous tradition. A closer textual scrutiny of both texts should

mentororum, ad diffinitionem et ad divisionem, nec non ad ea, quae requiruntur ad demonstrationem.

¹²³ For information on Oyta, it is still Lang 1937 we best turn to.

¹²⁴ Henry Totting of Oyta 1979, 3 ff.

reveal any similarity in preliminary arguments to further strengthen the plausibility of this shared tradition. It might even be that this particular tradition was started by Manlevelt himself, just like the tradition concerning the so-called ‘descensus copulatin’ was supposedly started by him and then picked up by Albert of Saxony.¹²⁵ Ideally, such scrutiny of both authors’ commentaries on the *Isagoge* will bring to light some signs of direct influence in the form of common arguments and turns of phrase. It will be interesting to find out if the one author (Henry) does indeed quote and reject views which the other author (Thomas) sets forth as his considered opinion – the surest sign one can wish for that the one may have read the other.

5.5.5. *Thomas Manlevelt’s commentary, questio by questio*

Let us not get carried away. Let me begin with taking a look at the text to be edited below. Thomas Manlevelt – I have made this remark before – does not start his investigation by raising the traditional questions either on the very subject of the treatise, the universal as such, or on the status of logic as a science. Instead, in Q. 1 he places the subject matter¹²⁶ of the first and second halves of his commentary on the Old Logic in perspective: is it necessary to know about the universals (i.e. the subject matter of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, commented on in the present text, the *Questiones libri Porphirii*) to have complete knowledge of the categories (i.e. the subject matter of Aristotle’s treatise, commented on in the *Questiones super Predicamenta*). What strikes the reader about this very first *questio* is the unconcerned way in which God is brought up in a logical context.¹²⁷

In QQ. 2 and 3 one learns that knowledge of the universals is necessary to completely be able to make logical divisions and definitions.¹²⁸ In short, without knowing the universal there would be no science whatsoever.

125 See above, subsection 2.2.7 of this Introduction, for the discussion by Read, Brands and Kann on this particular topic.

126 Every field of scholastic science has its own *subiectum*. This *subiectum* lends a unity to a particular science, distinguishes a particular science from other sciences, fixes a place for this particular science within the whole of all sciences, and so forth. For a discussion of this *subiectum* as it was looked upon around the year 1300, with an emphasis on the *subiectum* of theology, see Krop 1987, 33 ff.

127 Q. 1 DIST. 1, 1^{rab}; Q. 1 CONCL. 6, 1^{va}.

128 To put it in a few words, *divisio* (division) is simply the way to descend from a highest genus to its lowest species – by doing what the word says: making divisions. Just as categorizing is simply the way to ascend from the lowest species to the highest

In Q. 4 it is stated that the mental universal,¹²⁹ which is a natural universal, is in the mind in a subjective manner,¹³⁰ and that two such universals may be in the mind simultaneously. The attention paid to the respective universals in the process of knowing presents itself as a topic, which is to recur in the remainder of Manlevelt's text. More will have to be said about this in future studies. Note the token-character of the universals in actual use,¹³¹ and the tendency towards a psychological-epistemological account of logic. Manlevelt seems to be breaking new ground here, oddly foreshadowing the psychologically oriented logic of Port-Royal by some centuries.

Q. 5 presents us with the rather disturbing conclusion that 'genus' is equivocal, and even that a concept in a sense is equivocal.¹³² This matter

genus – by putting things together. That which divides a genus, constitutes a species, in Porphyry's treatment of the predicables. Now the theory of the predicables, which was universally held to be the proper introduction to Aristotle's treatment of the categories, was exemplified by the tree of Porphyry. But this tree of Porphyry was the result of a dichotomizing process of division, taking one of the categories, substance, as its starting point. So in a way the theory of division seems to be even more basic than the theory of the predicables. No wonder, then, that division, the theory of which was developed by Boethius, is generally accorded an important role in the medieval scheme of thinking. In his treatise *De divisione* Boethius provided not only medieval logic but all of medieval philosophy with some of its basic conceptual tools. It is a study of different sorts of division – e.g. the division of a genus into its species or the division of a whole into its integral parts – and as such forms an important part of the logical heritage on which the scholastic period built. Boethius' *De divisione* was indeed part of the canon of the *logica vetus*, which means that all subsequent medieval philosophizing on the subject was wont to take this tract as its starting point. Logical divisions and definitions, then, are more or less complementary ways of classifying terms or concepts. Simply put, division is the laying out of a term or concept in its underlying terms or concepts (for example: a genus in its respective species). Thus: animals (genus) are either rational animals (species) or irrational animals (species). Definition is the pinning down of a term or concept by combining the genus it belongs to with its specific difference. Thus: a man (species) is an animal (genus) that is rational (difference). Much more about this in Manlevelt's own distinctions on divisions in Q 2, 2^{ra} and on definitions in Q 3, 2^{vb}.

129 A universal as it is to be found functioning within our mind, in contrast to its being found functioning in writing or speech.

130 That is to say: as an accident inhering in a subject.

131 A token in this sense is an individual instance of a universal. For a clear exposition of the narrowed particular meaning of an utterance-token in a particular context in juxtaposition to the general meaning of an utterance-type, see Nuchelmans 1973, 4. See also above, section 1.3, especially the foot-note relative to this subject.

132 A term is called equivocal, in a generally accepted Aristotelian manner, if the one term goes with different meanings. In the first *distinctio* to Q. 12 'utrum aliquod individuum sit terminus communis' (10^{vb}), Manlevelt gives a general definition of equivocity in a common noun: "Commune equivocum" dicitur istud quod competit

is taken up in some detail in the second *questio* of the commentary on the *Categories*: ‘*utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus*’, added as an appendix to the present edition. This is certainly a matter deserving further study.¹³³

Q. 6 states the relationship between *genus* and *species*: there are always more than one *species* to one *genus*. The exact way *species* are contained under a *genus* is explained in Q. 7. Furthermore, in Q. 6 one learns that *species* underlie being as well as *genus*. A sharp line is drawn between *genus* as a building block in our conceptual framework, and things in reality falling under a *genus*.

The conclusions of Q. 8 definitely stand in need of further investigation. Is every genus by itself predicated¹³⁴ of several things (first conclusion), or is no genus so predicated (fourth conclusion)? And is every genus predicated of several things by some significante of it (sixth conclusion), or is no genus thus predicated? Might this apparent contradiction have anything to do with different levels of supposition?¹³⁵ The three main types of supposition do play an important role in the settlement of several questions to come.¹³⁶

pluribus ratione diversorum conceptuum, sive isti conceptus sint simplices, sive compositi, ita videlicet quod istud commune competit uni mediante uno conceptu simplici, et alteri mediante alio, et tertio mediante tertio, quamvis ex istis conceptibus unus conceptus componatur’. A more detailed exposition of the diverse types of equivocation is given here in the distinctio to Q. 5 ‘*utrum genus sit equivocum*’ (5^{ra}).

133 The more interesting is this theorizing about the possibility of there being equivocal concepts, as this seems to be a glaring contradiction to what Ockham holds: ‘*Aequivocatio vero nullo modo est conceptuum*’. (*Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 19. *Opera Philosophica* pars II, 266).

134 Predicating is the labelling of a certain thing by a certain term. What is at stake here is whether the highly individual things in the outside world can be adequately labelled by such a highly general term as a genus happens to be. Further on in his commentary, in the distinctio to Q. 26 ‘*utrum inferiora predicentur de superioribus*’ (26^{ra-7b}) Manlevelt makes a distinction between predicating in a large sense and in a strict sense. In a large sense, it extends to all kinds of predication, whether true or false, affirmative or negative, etc. In a strict sense, it is restricted to affirmative, true predication.

135 Supposition in medieval logico-semantic theory is the way a term in a proposition stands for something. This something can be either a thing or things in the outside world (personal supposition), or the concept itself (simple supposition), or the word itself in its written or spoken form (material supposition). As remarked in footnote 99 to subsection 2.2.7 above, Dutilh Novaes has recently proposed an intensional interpretation of at least Ockham’s theory of supposition, contrary to the more common referential interpretation (Dutilh Novaes 2008).

136 Thomas Manlevelt delivered some short but highly influential tracts on the ‘new’ logic while lecturing in Paris in the 1320’s. One of these tracts, explicitly referred

In Q. 9 it is explained that every genus is essentially predicated. This does mean that a genus cannot also be predicated *in quale*. This is made

to in our commentary on the *Isagoge*, was on the theory of supposition (Q. 25, AD 3., 25^{va}). The commentary on the *Isagoge* does not contain any theorizing about supposition, apart from a main dividing of supposition into material, personal and simple in the *distinctio* to Q. 15 'utrum homo sit species animalis' (14^{vb}), but a theory of supposition is presupposed by the scant references to supposition made use of in the commentary. For example, throughout Q. 26 'utrum inferior predicentur de superioribus' (25^{vb}–26^{vb}) use is made of the diverse subtypes of personal supposition, also in relation to the predicate or the copula in a proposition. It will be worthwhile to see in how far these references are compatible with the elaborate theory presented in Manlevelt's tract on supposition, once its critical edition is published. The contents of Manlevelt's tract on supposition, meanwhile, are neatly brought into a diagram by Maierù 1972, 314. This diagram visualizes four levels of division and subdivision of supposition, according to Manlevelt. The first and main division is into material, simple and personal supposition. Of these three, only personal supposition is further subdivided, first into determinate, distributed and confused personal supposition. Then confused personal supposition is further subdivided into merely confused personal supposition and confused and distributive personal supposition. Finally, the confused and distributive personal supposition is again subdivided into mobile and immobile. The first thing to be remarked about the initial threefold division of supposition as advocated by Thomas Manlevelt is that it is very much like the schematization to be distilled from Ockham's *Summa logicae*. (For a visualization, see Spade 2002, 274.) The only differences are that before making the tripartite division into simple, material and personal supposition, Ockham distinguishes between proper and improper supposition, and that he infuses one level of division of the personal supposition: personal division is first subdivided into discrete and common personal supposition, and then common supposition is further subdivided into determinate and confused, whereas Manlevelt skips the common personal supposition. Ockham's distinction between proper and improper supposition is not worked out in too many details, and needs not distract us. Suffice it to say that with improper supposition we have to think of the reference a term has when it is used figuratively and not literally. If Ockham's discrete personal supposition is roughly to be equated to Thomas Manlevelt's distributed personal supposition, the pictures of both schematizations completely match. An even more perfect match to Ockham's scheme, down to every detail of the personal supposition, is to be found with Albert of Saxony, who however makes no mention of improper supposition. This Albert of Saxony is worth mentioning if only because according to Brands 1996 he has severely criticized Thomas Manlevelt's theory. But a possible misunderstanding must be put aside now. From the likeness of the schematizations of the supposition theories by Manlevelt, Ockham and Albert of Saxony the impression might arise that all medieval theories of supposition were alike, and that all of them started off with a tripartite division of supposition into simple, material and personal division. But the truth is far from that. Spade (2002, 272–275) put in diagrams the divisions of supposition proper by medieval thinkers from the thirteenth century handbook-writer Peter of Spain (d. 1277) onward, and a quick glance at these diagrams shows that this threefold division was to be found with hardly anyone apart from the three nominalists just mentioned. This picture is confirmed by the diagrams in Maierù 1972, 306–317.

clear by the example of the genus ‘coloured’, that is predicated *in quale* of substance, albeit in an accidental manner.¹³⁷

Q. 10, which most certainly stands in need of a fuller treatment than it is rewarded in this bird’s eye view, addresses the key matter of Manlevell’s undertaking: whether genus (the most all-compassing of universals) differs from individuum (the least all-compassing of predicates, and therefore not even counted among the universals, even though it may seem to get a hint of the status of a universal in the enumeration referred to before).¹³⁸ As names of first intention,¹³⁹ genus and individuum do not differ, both signifying beings in reality which, after all, are all individual in nature. Here as in so many other places, one is again reminded that the generality of the universals is in their second-intentional use, not in their first-intentional use. In their first-intentional use, all universals signify things in reality, which are individual in nature. In their second-intentional use, all five universals signify signs or names which in their turn, and significatively taken, are predicated of more than one of these individual things. (Each occurrence of these signs, one should keep in mind while studying Manlevell’s commentary on the *Isagoge*, is an individual occurrence of such a particular sign – whether spoken, written or mental.)

That is why in Q. 11 it is stated that individuum in its strict sense (i.e. in its second-intention use) is univocally predicated of more than one thing. It is, namely, predicated univocally of so many signs that in their turn, and significatively taken, are predicated of only one thing.

Q. 11 nicely lends itself to a comparison with Manlevell’s undisputedly authentic tract on supposition; by which it will turn out that the countering of the second initial argument is in full accordance with

137 Q 9 CONCL. 2, 7^{vb}: ‘aliquod genus predicatur in quale in primo, sicut patet de hoc genere “coloratum”, quod predicatur in quale de substantia.’ Q 9 AD 4., 8^{ra}: ‘genus predicatur tam in quid quam in quale de suis propriis speciebus, sicut hoc genus “corpus animatum” (...). Predicatur etiam genus in quale accidentale quamvis non de suis speciebus.’

138 Q 37 CONCL. 5, 36^{rb} that is: ‘(...) omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel differentia specifica.’

139 Simply put, as a name of first intention a term itself refers to things in the outside world. As a name of second intention a term refers not to a thing in the outside world, but to a concept or a term which (as a name of first intention) in its turn refers to things in the outside world. Thus, ‘man’ in ‘I see a man in the street’ is a name of first intention, while ‘man’ is a name of second intention in ‘Man is a species.’

that tract. The third and final conclusion of Q. 11 treats *individuum* in its first-intention use as a transcendent term.¹⁴⁰

The fifth conclusion of Q. 11 brings up an interesting argument about the shared individuality of the whole Sortes and Sortes except his finger.¹⁴¹ This argument was to be further developed in the mid-fourteenth century by William of Heytesbury and Albert of Saxony. It has recently been named the ‘Socrates-Minus Argument’.¹⁴²

Q. 12, whether *individuum* is a general term, offers some distinctions on univocity and equivocity, in their relationship to generality.¹⁴³ Thomas Manlevelt seems to toy with the possibility of there being equivocal concepts – a theme taken up in Q. 2 of his commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, to be added as an appendix to the present edition. His conclusions

140 A transcendent term, in this context, is a term that is applicable to everything there is in the outside world, like ‘being’, ‘something’, ‘thing’. Now what can be said of all things (*ens, unum, verum, bonum*, sometimes supplemented with *res* and/or *aliquid*, the last two originally stemming from Avicenna), can be said of several things as well. But on the other hand, what can be said of several things cannot always be said of all things. On this simple truth rests the distinction drawn by Ockham, which allows him to say in a straightforward manner why ‘ens’ cannot be one of the categories: ‘accipiendo “universale” pro illo quod praedicatur de pluribus, et non de omnibus, per quod “ens” excluditur.’ (*Expositio in librum Porphyrii de praedicabilibus*, Prooemium, *Opera Philosophica* II, 16, l. 195–198.)

141 Q. 11 CONCL. 5, 9^{vab}: ‘Quinta conclusio est ista quod “individuum” strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis. Que declaratur sic: et (I) capiatur hoc individuum mentale “iste homo” demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et (II) vocetur totus Sortes A, et Sortes preter digitum B, et vocetur individuum mentale Sortes C, tunc sic: (III) C predicatur univoce de A et de B, igitur C predicatur de pluribus, et C est individuum propriissime acceptum, igitur individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus. Et quod C predicatur univoce de A et de B, declaratur, quia hec est vera: “A est iste homo, et B est iste homo”, quia idem est conceptus proprius absolutus ipsius A et ipsius B.’ Etc. The whole man without his finger also figures in Q. 34 AD 4., 34^{va}: ‘aliquod animal est pars integralis animalis, sicut totus homo preter digitum est animal, et tamen est pars integralis animalis compositi ex digito et tali residuo.’

142 The ‘Socrates-Minus Argument’ is called so after the present-day ‘Descartes-Minus Argument’, originally invented by Peter van Inwagen. The gist of both these arguments is that arbitrary undetached parts of physical objects, like ‘all of Socrates except his finger’ simply do not exist. See Fitzgerald 2009. It would be an interesting point of further investigation to find out in how far Manlevelt’s argument is in line with the Socrates-Minus Argument developed by William Heytesbury and Albert of Saxony.

143 Manlevelt distinguishes here between complex and incomplex equivocal terms. His example of a complex equivocal, ‘Sortes or Plato’, is not known to me from any other medieval philosopher.

offer a suggestion of a theory on what now would be called something like ‘the uniquely referring use of denoting phrases’¹⁴⁴ which is quite compatible with present-day insights on the subject.¹⁴⁵

Q. 13 lays a link to Manlevell’s treatment of the *proprium* in Q. 41. The fourfold possible relationship between *proprium* and *species* established there in a traditional Porphyrian fashion is foreshadowed here when it comes to the possibility of a property of one individual to be found in another individual. This is indeed possible, except however for property in its strictest sense: belonging to some individual alone and totally and always.¹⁴⁶ An intriguing distinction is added, namely that between an individual for this moment, and an individual *tout court*,¹⁴⁷ again turning on the theory of the ‘uniquely referring use of denoting phrases’.

After the group of *questiones* 5–13 in principle concerned with *genus*, but automatically returning to *individuum*, QQ. 14–27 highlight the second universal, *species*, but the focus of attention is automatically turned upward back to *genus*, then even still further up to the conceptual realm of the transcendent terms and again downward to the *individuum*.

The core of nominalist teaching is hit upon right away in Q. 14, where in the seventh conclusion it is stated that every *species* in the sense of a universal is a *sign*.¹⁴⁸ The first thing to note is that the idea that

144 That is to say: a phrase denoting one, and only one unique individual thing in the outside world.

145 Without, of course, quite anachronistically wishing to attribute to Thomas Manlevell the precise ideas on this subject as developed by philosophers like Russell or Strawson.

146 Manlevell’s thoughts on this subject stand in need of a closer scrutiny, which however will be postponed to a later occasion. One may wonder, for instance, if a property belonging to some *individual* alone and totally and always can justly be called a property at all. A property, after all, belongs to a *species*, and not to an individual.

147 That is to say: an individual, the circumstances being as they are, as opposed to an individual, no matter what the circumstances. Thus, ‘Sophroniscus’s son’ is an individual’s name if said Sophroniscus happens to have only one son. Q. 13 DIST., 12^{ra}: ‘potest “individuum” adhuc accipi dupliciter, quia quoddam dicitur individuum *ut nunc*, et quoddam *simpliciter*. *Individuum ut nunc* potest istud dici quod pronunc non competit alicui nisi uni soli, ita quod non competat pluribus, quamvis sine nova impositione posset pluribus competere, et talia individua sunt omnes termini habentes tantum unum suppositum. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphyrius quando dicit quod filius Sophronisci sit individuum, idest, iste terminus “filius Sophronisci”, si solus sit ei Socrates filius. *Individuum vero simpliciter* dicitur istud quod non potest univoce pluribus competere sine nova impositione, sicut “Socrates” et “hoc album” et “hoc veniens”, etcetera.’

148 Q. 14 CONCL. 7, 13^{ra}: ‘omnis “species” quinto modo accepta est signum simplex vel compositum.’

a concept, in the sense of a conceptual act, is a sign is by no means self-explanatory. It is rather a basic Ockhamist tenet, arrived at by the Venerable Inceptor after quite some deliberation.¹⁴⁹ It will not be without significance that the ‘ad oppositum’ takes into explicit consideration the opinion of the ‘moderns’, that is: the Ockhamists. A small but interesting thing is that in his treatment of the first counter-argument to his tenth conclusion Manlevelt speaks of the ‘radix Aristotelis’, and not about Ockham’s razor.¹⁵⁰ After all, what Ockham was supposed to have done, and what Manlevelt was ostensibly doing in Ockham’s footsteps, was nothing other than truly adhering to the teachings of the Philosopher. One of the meanings of species is that of ‘similitudo representativa’. In this sense species is a sign or term as well, according to Thomas Manlevelt in his sixth conclusion.¹⁵¹ For William of Ockham the main struggle had been to choose between the species in its sense of ‘similitudo representativa’¹⁵² and the concept in its sense of ‘conceptual act’ as the candidate for the generalizing capacity of signs or terms.¹⁵³ It would be interesting to see what Manlevelt would have to say about this matter in his commentary on *De anima*, referred to in Q. 26, but alas, this commentary is not otherwise known to us.

In Q. 15 the different ways in which man can be said to be a species of animal are expounded. Ample use is made here of the theory of supposition. Manlevelt’s trinity of material, personal and simple supposition is

149 See Maurer 1994, esp. p. 387. With William of Ockham a *fictum* theory of the concept is only slowly abandoned for an *intellectio* theory.

150 Q. 14 AD ARG. CONTRA CONCL. 10, I, 13^{va}: ‘Ad primum istorum dicitur quod ista conclusio est asserenda et non dubitanda utendo radice Aristotelis primo Physicorum, ubi elicitur quod pluralitas sive diversitas non est ponenda sine ratione cogente.’ This last phrase, forbidding us to accept a plurality (of things, or causes) if there is no rational need to do so, is to be found in the works of Ockham with slight alterations: ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate’ or even closer ‘pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate’. This is what came to be called ‘Ockham’s razor’. Manlevelt could not have referred to this razor, however, for the simple reason that the term only came into use centuries after Ockham’s death. Moreover, the ‘radix Aristotelis’ was already known to John Duns Scotus as well, and had thus been in use in Franciscan circles for quite some time.

151 Q. 14 CONCL. 6, 13^{ra}: ‘aliqua “species” quarto modo accepta est signum vel terminus, quia conceptus lapidis que est similitudo representativa lapidis, est terminus mentalis de quo dicit Aristoteles, tertio *De anima*, quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis’.

152 Quite literally, a likely image in the mind, representing the things in the outside world.

153 Once again, see Maurer 1994.

not as straightforward as one might think in retrospect. Thomas Manlevelt is in accord on this matter with Albert of Saxony, for example, who also adheres to this main tripartition of supposition. But things are quite different with a thinker like John Buridan, for whom simple and material supposition are one and the same thing.¹⁵⁴ This once again corroborates my conviction (already firmly based on so many other grounds) that Manlevelt is not in any sense to be sided with the Buridan camp.

Q. 16 again leans on the different ways of supposition 'genus' may have, to explain the interrelationship between genus and species. A remarkable feature of Manlevelt's treatment of genus in its simple supposition (i.e. genus as a universal as such), is that he sees a genus-species relationship between 'universale' and 'genus' (i.e. 'universale' stands as the genus to 'genus' as one of the five lowest species, the other four being 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium' and 'accidens') as well as between 'genus' and 'this or that genus'.

Q. 17 affirms that if a species is rightly defined, genus forms part of its definition, while Q. 18 holds that any definition of species of which genus forms no part, is not a right definition.

Q. 19 makes room for something other than the species specialissima coming in a sense directly before the individuals, and that is 'individuum' – in its capacity as a sign, one may safely gather. And this again may give the impression that *individuum* is accepted *de facto* if not *de jure* as somewhat approaching the status of a sixth universal.¹⁵⁵

Q. 20 is in fact concerned with this matter. Every appellative term¹⁵⁶ is a universal, so if 'individuum' in its strict sense (i.e. in its secondary use) is to be reckoned an appellative term, it must indeed be accepted as a universal. And it is just its non-appellative character that prevents 'individuum' from really being a universal.

The transcendent terms find their treatment in Q. 21. In line with William of Ockham and the generally held Franciscan opinion since John Duns Scotus' ontological breakthrough, Thomas Manlevelt holds

154 See Maierù 1972.

155 Manlevelt is, however, quite explicit about *individuum* not *really* being a universal in the first conclusion of Q. 20, 18^{vb}: 'nullum individuum est universale'. On the candidature of *individuum* as sixth predicable see also above, section 5.3 See also Bos 1987, 73.

156 An appellative name (*nomen appellativum*), in contrast to a proper name (*nomen proprium*), is used to refer to a class of things, instead of a single thing. In the course of Q. 20 Manlevelt is using appellative and proper terms and concepts in exactly this sense.

that 'being' – which is not a universal – is a univocal concept. Just like the universals, the transcendent terms should be looked upon from a semantical point of view as predicates.

In the sixth principal argument of Q. 22 one is presented with the opinion that only the categories substance and quality exist in reality, which opinion is attributed to 'the moderns'. Of course, one can safely substitute the name of William of Ockham and his followers for 'moderns' here. Not only does Manlevelt willingly accept this reduction of the number of real categories; in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* he is even willing to go a decisive step further, by questioning the very existence of substance as well,¹⁵⁷ so that it is left to the category of individual qualities to make up reality in its entirety. This makes one wonder about the status of concepts as mental qualities: they would not have a (mental) substance either. In their second-intention use however, i.e. as categories not of things in reality but of signs or names or predicates, Manlevelt in a sense accepts the traditional number of ten as a starting point from where to lay bare the inefficiency of precisely this tenfold division of the categories.¹⁵⁸ In this procedure he is to be ranked with the Franciscan

157 See above, section 1.2 of this Introduction, for our résumé of Robert Andrews's findings on this matter, and also for our author's apparent shyness in the face of his own drastic conclusions.

158 Traditionally, the number of categories is taken to be ten, and no more or no less than ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, condition, action, affection. After all, Aristotle said there were ten, specifying them as the ten just mentioned (*Categories* IV, 1b25–27). The English terms are taken from the translation by Ackrill. Apart from the consistent numbering of ten categories in the little treatise of the same name, however, Aristotle does not seem to pay too much attention to this exact number of ten in other works where the categories are brought forward. True, the well-known list of ten from the *Categories* is taken over without any ado in (or rather: from) the *Topica* (*Topica* I, 9, 103b22–104a1). But in the *Analytica posteriora*, for example, posture and condition are placed within another category, so that there are only eight categories left (*Anal. post.* I, 22, 83b17). In the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* posture and condition are left out altogether (*Metaphys.* VII, 1017a22–30), while time is left out as well in the eleventh book (*Metaphys.* XI, 12, 1068a7), so that there are only seven categories left, just like in the *Physics* (*Phys.* V, 2, 226a23). An even shorter list is given in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where only the first six of the original categories are retained (*Ethica Nicom.* I, 6, 1096a25). But Aristotle not only tends to shorten the list of categories now and then, at one point at least he seems to lengthen the list of categories by one. In the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* he rather carelessly includes motion in an informal list of categories (*Metaphys.* VII, 4, 1029b25). Now in the *Categories* motion was treated among the so-called *post-predicamenta*, but historically motion has tended to be promoted by many a philosopher to the status of 'eleventh category'. Thus Avicenna, who is one of the medieval philosophers who originated the systematic discussion of the problem

mainstream (John Duns Scotus;¹⁵⁹ William of Ockham¹⁶⁰). On the other hand, his way of arguing is quite unlike John Buridan's handling of the matter.¹⁶¹ Note that the question concerning the number of the categories is usually and quite naturally not treated in a commentary on the *Isagoge*, but in a commentary on the *Categories*. This may rank as an added sign that Manlevelt's commentary on the *Isagoge* is really meant to be the first part of an integrated commentary on the whole of the old logic, of which his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* forms the second part. In his countering of the initial arguments Manlevelt again gives testimony of his Ockhamist background, by sharply keeping apart the three levels of language¹⁶² – spoken, written and mental – without putting them in the usual hierarchical order. Over and over again Thomas Manlevelt stresses the token-character of all linguistic items in mental or extramental reality.

of the number of categories, in his commentary on the *Physics* concludes that motion should be accepted as a category (Avicenna, *III. Physic.* 3. and 2. cap. Cf. Avicenna *III. Metaphys.* 3).

- 159 On John Duns Scotus on this matter, as well as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, see Bos and Van der Helm 1989. Especially from Duns Scotus onwards, not only positive terms are studied, but also non-positive terms, such as 'blindness', fictional terms (for instance 'chimera'), terms of second intention, negative terms etc., which complicates the interpretation of the categories, and the establishing of their number.
- 160 Ockham takes a traditional stance when it comes to the number of categories. In his commentary on the *Categories*, the only thing Ockham has to say about their number is that it is difficult to prove that there are only ten categories (Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 7, §1 (*Opera Philosophica* pars II, 161)). In the *Summa logicae* Ockham does not really say very much more: there are held to be ten categories by all authors, but when it comes to interpreting their views, there are differences between his contemporaries as compared to the classical authors. Ockham seems to approve the number of ten, following Averroes in his interpretation of them, namely that they are the incomplex terms with which to answer the diverse ways of posing questions about a substance or an individual instance of substance (*Summa logicae*, I, cap. 41 (*Opera Philosophica* pars I, 116)). The reference is to Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, VII, t. 14 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, f. 77^v). Even where Ockham is most explicit about this matter, in the *Quodlibeta*, he takes the number of ten categories for granted, only stressing with ever so much insistence that they are incomplex terms, and not real things in the extra-mental world (*Quodlibeta* v, q. 22 (*Opera Philosophica* pars II, 569)).
- 161 On Buridan, see King 1994.
- 162 On the threefold division of language, see Spade 2002, 51–86. On Manlevelt's Ockhamist way of dealing with the supposed hierarchy between the three levels of language, see above, section 5.4. The starting point for all subsequent discussion on this matter is right at the beginning of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* (16a3–8), where we are told that 'spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words' (tr. E.M. Edghill).

In Q. 23 the status of the highest genera as principles of things is affirmed, but not without Manlevelt classifying the different senses in which something can be called a 'principle'.¹⁶³

Not unimportant for a thinker so deeply occupied with the strictly individual nature of extramental as well as mental reality is the affirmatively answered Q. 24: whether we can have knowledge of things infinite. After all, if we are to have knowledge of reality, which only exists of individuals; and if these individuals presumably are infinite in number; we must have knowledge of things infinite. But what – one would be tempted to ask Thomas Manlevelt – happens to the universal, all-embracing character of our knowledge, if this knowledge in its turn consists of individual instances (tokens) of concepts, propositions and judgements, and if this knowledge, moreover, is spread among so many individual minds, while these minds are not even substances, but only some kind of amalgam of individual mental qualities?¹⁶⁴

163 Manlevelt tends to treat the first predicable, genus, in close connection with the notion of 'principium'. This is not surprising, considering that 'principium' (principle) is the Latin translation of the Greek 'γενος', which has a strong physicalistic flavour, not only in the pure biological sense, but also in the genealogical sense. And of course there is the grammatical sense as well. In no less than three *questiones* Manlevelt devotes *distinctiones* to a classification of the diverse types of principle. It turns out that these classifications are compatible. In the *distinctio* to Q. 5 'utrum genus sit equivocum' (4^{vb}–5^{va}), one learns that genus can be called 'principle' in two distinct ways. First as the *principium productivum* ('pater genus filiorum'). Second as the *principium contentivum*, which comes in two variations: *cicumscriptivum* ('locus in quo quis generatur vel producitur') and *predicativum* ('animal dicitur genus hominis'). Two more types of principle are introduced in the *distinctio* to Q. 7 'utrum genus sit principium suarum specierum' (6^{vb}). The *principium compositivum* (of which there are two: matter and form) and the *principium terminativum*, which is the formal cause. Now, if we are aware that the *principium productivum* is the efficient cause of a thing (either in a universal or in a particular manner), the *principium productivum*, the *principium compositivum* and the *principium terminativum* together yield the four Aristotelian causes. The *principium contentivum* falls outside of this scheme of Aristotelian physical causes. In the two *distinctiones* to Q. 23 'utrum genera generalissima sint principia rerum' (22^{rb}–22^{va}), which basically are a working out in detail of the classification in Q. 7, the special status of the *principium contentivum* is accentuated by its being called the *principium logicale*. In the second conclusion of Q. 23 (22^{vb}) the *primum principium contentivum* is subdivided in 'per se' (either quiditative or non-quiditative) and 'per accidens'. The *principium terminativum*, on the other hand, is subdividing into *intrinsicum* (with further subdivisions) and *extrinsicum* (with further subdivisions). It might be worthwhile to compare this detailed schematization of the diverse types of principle with the equally detailed schematization in a Thomistic mold, as to be found in Gredt 1929, Volume I, 211 ff.

164 This breaking down, as it were, of the individual and the individual's thinking is even more remarkable in the light of the short philosophical history of dealing with the

The relationship by which it can be said that individuals belong to a species is subject matter of Q. 25. With the help of the distinction between *actus exercitus* and *actus significatus*,¹⁶⁵ it is explained that the proposition that several men are one man, which may be said to be true in its transitive sense, is nevertheless false in its proper sense. In the course of answering this question, individuals are presented by Manlevelt in their bare individuality.

The proper way of concepts fitting into a conceptual framework is established in Q. 26. In a large sense, every term can be predicated of any other term ('An animal is a man'). But in a strict sense, i.e. in the sense that a term is truly affirmed of another term, a categorically lower term can never be predicated of a categorically higher term, but only serve as its subject ('Man is an animal'). And that is why as a universal, a species is 'part' of a genus, such as stated (and qualified) in Q. 27 (man is an animal, but horses are animals too).

The third universal, *differentia*, is abundantly treated in no less than thirteen separate *questiones*: 28–40. Again Manlevelt's preoccupation with the individual is in the forefront. In this, his handling of the third universal is a confirmation of the impression made by his handling of the first two universals. The very title of the first of these *questiones*, whether something can differ from itself (Q. 28), makes it clear that to Thomas Manlevelt *differentia* is more than just the third constituent making up a proper definition: *Species = Genus + Differentia*. Other *questiones* are just as out of the ordinary. Differences between one individual and the other are treated, whereby attention is paid to the role of separable and inseparable accidents,¹⁶⁶ respectively (Q. 29 and Q. 30). The specific difference gets its treatment in Q. 31 and Q. 32. From the first conclusion of Q. 32 one can make up the strict sense of individuality employed by Thomas Manlevelt.¹⁶⁷ On the other side of the

subject at all. Before Thomas Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*, philosophers never seem to have shown much interest in the individual's thinking at all. For a recent reminder of this, in the context of review of a book on Averroes's commentaries on *De anima*, see Janssens 2010, p. 160.

165 On *actus exercitus* and *actus significatus* see Nuchelmans 1987.

166 The distinction between separable and inseparable accidents is introduced in the *Isagoge* itself, immediately after the definition of what an accident is (v 2, around line 13.1), together with the enduring examples. To be asleep is a separable accident, being black is an inseparable accident of the raven and the Ethiopian. On the way the medieval commentators treated this aspect of Porphyry's exposition, see Van Rijen 1989, 136 ff.

167 Q. 32 CONCL. 1 32^{rb}: 'Prima conclusio est ista quod aliquid facit per se differre quod

creational spectre, even God and His rationality get to be regarded from the differential point of view in Q. 35.¹⁶⁸ Not to mention the specimen of Trinitarian syllogistic, a subject matter then popular in Parisian circles, which is to be found in the second conclusion of Q. 29.¹⁶⁹

Of course, the more obvious questions are asked as well: concerning the relationship of *differentia* to *genus* and *species*, respectively (Q. 36), and the role of the *differentia* in making divisions (Q. 37) and definitions (Q. 38). Whether more and less are applicable to difference in itself is the subject matter of Q. 33. The Porphyrian definition of *differentia* itself and its possible alternatives are scrutinized in Q. 39 and Q. 40. The eighth conclusion of Q. 40 deserves attention. Manlevelt seems to imply here, when stating that there can be more definitions of one and the same thing,¹⁷⁰ that the traditional idea of one essential definition applying to one thing (along with several nominal definitions) is to be abandoned.

The fourth universal, *proprium*, is treated in one *questio* only (Q. 41). But within this limited space, Manlevelt neatly juxtaposes the 'realistic' common opinion holding that a *proprium* is a thing in reality, and the modern (Ockhamist) view by which it is superseded, namely that a *proprium* is not a thing but a term, and a second intention term at that, just like all other universals.

To the last of the five universals, *accidens* – which had already been given an important enough role in the treatment of the other four – four *questiones* are dedicated. The first of these, the traditionally asked question whether an accident can come and go without its subject perishing with it (Q. 42) is seized upon by Manlevelt to fine-tune in an Ockhamist manner our understanding of the various senses of 'accidens', 'adesse et abesse' and 'subiectum accidentis' – discerning between thing and term; first and second intention; logic and reality.

non est differentia specifica, quia omne quod est, facit seipsum ab alio per se differre, quia seipso a quocumque alio differt, et tamen non omne quod est, est differentia specifica.'

168 Q. 35 *passim*.

169 On the subject of logic and trinitarian theology in Paris in the fourteenth century, see Maierù 1984. Maierù's article centres on Pierre d'Ailly. Other thinkers mentioned are Gregory of Rimini, and Henry Totting of Oyta, who around 1375–1380 gave attention to paralogisms on material *de divinis*. The table of contents of this latter philosopher's *Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii* were compared with Manlevelt's commentary in the foregoing subsection 5.5.4.

170 Q. 40 CONCL. 8, 38^{va}: 'unius rei possunt esse plures diffinitiones proprie dicte, utpote diffinitio naturalis et diffinitio dialectica.'

In the fifth conclusion Manlevelt seems to develop his own brand of a double-truth theory.¹⁷¹ He does not shy away from discerning truth for the natural philosopher from truth for the theologian – a firmness that is somewhat mitigated again in the ninth conclusion.¹⁷²

Q. 43 presents us with an analysis of the diverse senses of ‘unity’,¹⁷³ before deciding in what senses a subject and an accident can be said to be

171 The infamous ‘double-truth theory’ holds that a proposition can at the same time be true in theology and false in philosophy and vice versa. It is ascribed to Siger of Brabant (see Krop’s introduction to Siger of Brabant 1992) and the Averroists, and was condemned by the clerical authorities. Mahony 1982, 619 n. 68, however, holds that Siger did not maintain this theory, and neither did any of his contemporaries. De Rijk 1977, 274 points out that somewhat later Autrecourt and Mirecourt did hold on to the view that certain truths of revelation are opposed to philosophical propositions demonstrable by reason. Robert Holkot even dares to distinguish a logic of faith (*logica fidei*) from the natural logic (*logica naturalis*).

172 Q. 42 CONCL. 9, 40^{va}: ‘Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis.’

173 In the second *distinctio* to Q. 43 (41^{rb-va}) Manlevelt makes a list of no less than ten different types of unity. This list, however, is incomplete, ending as it does in an ‘etcetera’. And of the kinds of unity that Manlevelt does list not all are really discussed in any detail. The items on the list which are more or less thoroughly examined by Manlevelt, are subdivided into unities by itself, *per se*, and unities by accident. Of the unity *per se* Manlevelt gives four types. First there is the *unum essentialiter* (matter and form, among which he one is the potentiality of the other), second, there is the *unum secundum gradus accidentaliter* or *gradualiter*, which comes in two varieties, depending on whether the oneness has extension or not. An example of the former would be whiteness, the gradations of which, while mutually exclusive, take place in exactly the same spot. Mind, the unity under consideration is that among the shades of white, not between the white and its subject. An example of the latter would be gladness, the mutually exclusive degrees of which are not to be localized extensionally, but take place in an individual subject, that is, in our soul. It might well be that Manlevelt is breaking new ground here, transferring his findings from the external world to the internal world, trading the fixed point in space for the intellectual soul, serving as an anchor for the gradual unity of a man’s happiness. For my happiness might strengthen or diminish, but it nevertheless is my happiness. Interesting enough, of course, is the pinpointing of the intellectual soul as the non-spatial individuating instance of a mental accident. In doing this, Manlevelt stresses the boundaries between the non-spatial inner-world and the spatial outer-world. If we take the example of Sortes, it must be conceded that the spatial body of Sortes is the individual subject of his whiteness, and the non-spatial intellectual soul of Sortes is the individual subject of his happiness. Unfortunately, the commentary on the *Isagoge* is not the place for Manlevelt to work out the apparent connection between the spatial and the non-spatial unity of Sortes. One should rather look for such a theory in a work Manlevelt refers to elsewhere in this manuscript, namely his commentary on *De anima*. It would really be a pity, should a manuscript of this commentary never turn up, seeing the importance Manlevelt attaches to the individuality of the intellectual soul. In fact the intellectual soul comes in as an honourable third in a short list of examples given by Manlevelt of the third kind

‘one.’ The third conclusion adds zest to the discussion by holding that in one of the discerned senses, even God can be said to have His accidents.¹⁷⁴

In Q. 44 Manlevelt goes out of his way to show in what sense Porphyry could justly hold that a raven can be understood to be white. In doing so, Manlevelt gives an exposition of the way a thing understood (or believed, or willed) and the understanding (or believing or willing) of the thing are interrelated.

Q. 45 is the rather spectacularly worded final chord: whether an accident is a substantial genus. The ‘natural’ tie between terms and things is reflected upon in a critical manner; all terms, either substantial or accidental, are downgraded to the status of accidents. The first and last of the five universals, *genus* and *accidens*, are thus contrasted and correlated all the same. With which we seem to have touched upon the heart of Manlevelt’s view on logic and reality: two realms only thinly connected to each other on the humble level of the accident.

of unity *per se*: the one by indivisibility. Honourable, because the other examples are God and an angel. The fourth kind listed as unity *per se* is the *unum continuatione*, whether corporeal (as in the parts of a piece of wood) or incorporeal (as in the parts of the sun). Lesser kinds of unity are the unity of place or subject (like the whiteness and sweetness of milk have their unity) and the accidental unity in a strict sense, to wit the aggregate of a subject and an accident. Thus the answer to the main question ‘*utrum ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum*’ is: no. Which is to say that all the single individual things making up our extramental world, consisting as they do of accidents inhering in a subject, do not possess so strong a unity after all. Further types of unity are hardly touched upon: unity of number, of species, of genus, of definition, ‘et cetera’.

174 Q. 43 CONCL. 3, 41^{va}: ‘*accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio “Sortes sedet”, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur A, tunc hoc accidens “sciens A” competit Deo, quia hec est vera: “Deus est sciens A”, et hoc accidens potest adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicut de se notum est.*’

CHAPTER SIX

Description of the manuscript used

The only witness extant of the Commentary on the *Isagoge* attributed to Thomas Manlevelt is the manuscript Erfurt, *Bibl. Ampl.* 288 f. 1^{ra}–43^{va} (henceforward: siglum *E*). This manuscript is the basic text of the present edition. It is a quite good manuscript. The text seems to have been written by an able enough scribe, and is of good overall standard. Obviously, however, the text is incomplete or corrupt in some places, and is thwarted by self-repetition in other places, not to mention the minor mistakes and cases of miswriting, apart from the occasionally left-out ‘non’.

I have for the present edition used *E* by working from a microfilm, without having the original manuscript at hand. So I could not attempt to give anything approaching a full description of the codex. For such a full description of the codex, the reader should consult the work done by Schum and Markowski in their respective catalogues of the Amplonian Library in Erfurt.¹ Based on their work, however, the technicalities may be summarized thus:

288. paper with a watermark showing a pear with some foliage; bound in wood with green leather back; two-column text in quarto, format 215×150 mm.; middle or latter half of the fourteenth century; 146+1 folios.

f. 1^{ra}–43^{va}: Thomas Manlevelt (*attr.*), *Questiones libri Porphirii. Inc.*: Queritur circa initium Porphirii, utrum necesse sit aliquem scire. *Des.*: Expl. expliciat qui plus vult scribat. Expl. quest. libri Porph.

f. 43^{vb}–145^{vb}: Thomas Manlevelt (*attr.*), *Questiones super Predicamenta. Inc.*: Circa libr. pred. Ar. potest primo queri utrum aliquid sit equivocum. *Des.*: sicud per ipsam cras – ad argumentum vero in oppositum, quid sit demonstrandum.

f. 146^{ra} + 1: *tabula questionum* to both these commentaries.

The technicalities as given by Markowski, far more concise as they are, do contain some additions as well as some corrections to the version that is explicitly referred to by Schum. The main correction is in the fixation

¹ Markowski 1987, 201; Schum 1887, 528 f.

of the number of commentaries in this manuscript to only two, instead of Schum's three. Markowski's limiting the number of commentaries to only two: one on the *Isagoge* and the other on the *Categories*, is correct; Schum's including a commentary on the *De interpretatione* is incorrect.

As can be gathered from Schum, the manuscript of which the *Questiones libri Porphyrii* forms the first entry used to have on the outside a paper note saying '13. loyce', which is to say that it was listed as number 13 among the logical works in the *Catalogus Amplonii*, the catalogue made by the collector Amplonius himself, and in which it was specified: 'Item, questiones optime Thome Manlevelt super veteri arte, videlicet: super ysagogis Porphyrii, predicamentis Aristotelis et libris peryrmenias Aristotelis.'

There is no doubt that the *questiones* on the *Isagoge* take up the first 43 folios of the manuscript, and that the *questiones* on the *Categories* start from there. But Schum is certainly mistaken when he lets this commentary on the *Categories* end on folio 140 with 'ad argumentum in oppositum dicitur, quod sententia Arist. est necessaria', after which the *questiones* on the *De interpretatione* are supposed to begin with 'Nunc queritur consequenter circa capitulum de prius; primo queritur utrum aliquid sit prius primo tempore' and end on folio 145 with 'sicut per ipsam cras – ad argumentum vero in oppositum, quid sit demonstrandum.' In fact there is no trace of a commentary on *De interpretatione* in the manuscript. Markowski, not repeating the mistake made by his predecessor, rightly divides the manuscript in two separate texts: the *questiones* on the *Isagoge* taking up folio's 1^{ra}–43^{va}, the *questiones* on the *Categories* taking up folio's 43^{rb}–145^{vb}.² The portion of the manuscript mistakenly identified by Schum as being the commentary on *De interpretatione* evidently starts off, as is already clear from the fragment of text provided by Schum himself, with a discussion of one of the so-called post-Predicamenta: *prius*. It is not clear whether the original description of the text by Amplonius himself was wrong, or if Schum was simply wrong in identifying his own manuscript number 288 with the original Amplonian manuscript number 13. It is highly unlikely, in any case, that the manuscript 288 is missing its latter part, which should have contained the commentary on the *De interpretatione*, hinted at by Amplonius. In fact the manuscript is neatly rounded off by a

2 Markowski 1987, 18. Kaczmarek 1994, xx n. 28 wrongly follows Schum rather than Markowski when it comes to the contents of Cod. Amplon. 288.

complete listing of all foregoing *questiones* on the *Isagoge* and *Categories*, suggesting that the two texts should be (or in any case were) read as a whole.

Despite their punctual execution, the small, sharply-pointed letters of the manuscript make rather hard reading. The beginning of a new *questio* is marked by larger writing. The initials, which mainly toward the end of the *Questiones libri Porphirii* are sometimes missing, are in black, and rudimentarily decorated. These decorations contain fleurs-de-lys protruding from the left end of the initial, and fishscales filling up the open space within the initial. Not mentioned by either Schum or Markowski are the funny little drawings that are now and then inserted between text blocks. There is something looking like a warning finger extending from the initial on folio 34^v; in other instances there are two blessing fingers. There is a fish for example on folio 25^v. From folio 17^v onward, the initials are decorated with sombre, but comically executed faces.³

There was at least one hand at work in the manuscript apart from the one that wrote the body of the text. At the top of the very first folio there is the remark, identified by Schum as stemming from the late fourteenth century, that is to say, a couple of decennia after the completing of the text itself: 'Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per Thom. Manlevel Anglicum doctorem solempnem.'⁴ The manuscript itself contains many variants, erasings, corrections and scribblings in the margins, which at least in some minor cases seem to be by another hand. But I cannot say this with certainty.

In the course of the text there do occur some variations in the handwriting, but these are so minor that they do not justify however the conclusion that one scribe took over the work from another. For example, from the fifth *questio* onward, which runs from 4^{vb} to 5^{ra}, the text is

- 3 I am not sure how much is to be made of these iconographical bits and pieces. The fish and the fishscales may be an all too general Christian reference. But one cannot help but notice that the fleur-de-lys as a heraldic symbol is particularly associated with the French monarchy. And the hand with two extended fingers may refer to the royal scepter, which in France at least since the days of Louis IX, better known as Saint Louis (1214–1270), was tipped with an open hand of benediction on the top, known as the main-de-justice. This would give our manuscript a distinctive French aspect. Which, of course, fits in quite well with Manlevelt having spent an important part of his career in Paris.
- 4 If, however, Markowski is right in dating the body of the work to the thirteen seventies, eighties or even nineties, there seems to be room to surmise that the added remark is not from a later date after all.

written in a more spacious hand, that makes easier reading than the text before that. The word 'sicut' here is written in full and ends in a 't' instead of the 'd' that rounded off the abbreviations before. This notwithstanding, it seems improbable that another hand was at work here, seeing that other typical characteristics as well as the overall character of the writing remain unaltered.

Textual oddities remain constant throughout the text as well. Apart from the alternation of 'sicud' and 'sicut', mention can be made of the writing of 'scit' instead of 'sit', which is clearly meant, of 'Scicero' instead of 'Cicero', and 'sivitate' instead of 'civitate'. It is unclear what conclusions (if any) may be drawn from such spelling about the geographical origin of the manuscript.

In a frame under column 4^{vb} is written 'quia est eius principium', which is the beginning of the text of the next column: 5^{ra}. This framed little string of words should best be viewed upon as an 'editorial' device. After all, four folios together made up one quarto. The framed little text may thus have served either to help make sure that the text, once completed, is bound in the right order of quarto's, or as reminder for the scribe himself: once the first quarto is laid aside, the second quarto must begin thus and so. Similar examples of pieces of texts announcing the continuation of one quarto to the next are to be found at the bottom of 12^{vb}, 20^{vb}, 28^{vb} and 36^{vb} – which, incidentally, suggests a grouping of quarto's in pairs.

Considering the number and the visual rather than aural character of the clerical errors, the repeating and the omitting of lines, the transposition of words, the miswriting of certain words occasionally resulting in the replacement of a nonsense word for a word having a superficial resemblance to the nonsense word as well as sense in that given context, one can hardly come to any other conclusion than that the text edited here is a copy of another text.

The slight variations in text width, letter height and line spacing suggest that the present text was not made without interruptions. Some fragments seem to have been inserted at a later stage, at spaces left open for this purpose.

In the catalogues by Schum and Markowski, no reasons are given why this manuscript is supposed to originate from the middle or later half of the fourteenth century. The guess however seems to be well-educated nevertheless.

The writing material is paper, which indeed was already a common material in the middle of the fourteenth century. The text is written

in two columns, and has a number of characteristics which, if I take S.H. Thomson's handbook on *Latin Bookhands* for my compass,⁵ leads me to conclude that it may very well stem from the fourteenth century. Schum's estimation that it stems from the middle of the century can be endorsed, if this is to include the sixties and seventies of the fourteenth century. And Markowski's estimation that it is from the seventies, eighties or nineties is not really far off the mark, either.

Schum does not say anything about the place of origin of either the manuscript or its scribe, and neither does Markowski. But Germany seems to be a very likely candidate, taking into account Thomson's catalogue.

Bared of all aesthetic pretence, the rapid hand of this manuscript has a more than superficial likeness to the various examples presented by Thomson from the second half of the fourteenth and the first decades of the fifteenth century in Germany, especially that of a 1367 collection of various commentaries on Aristotle and other scholastic texts written, probably, at Cologne. Like the 1367 collection, this manuscript at least in some places reveals great haste. Thomson links the scholastic hand to the legal, with which it had many features in common, in ductus, ligatures, shading, abbreviations and in the formation of individual letters.

Closer scrutiny reveals that some individual letters in the manuscript have a form that came to characterize the German manuscripts from the third quarter of the fourteenth century onwards. For example, the initial 'h' has a straight last stroke which we may find hereafter in German scripts. While the final 's', which is a reversed '3', closed or almost closed at the right, will appear consistently hereafter in German scholastic hands.

Other letters in the manuscript show a remarkable resemblance to their counterparts in Thomson's 1367 example as well. In the one text as well as in the other, only the lower loop of the letter 'a' is made in the first stroke; both the 'o' and the 'e' are made with two jabs and are frequently hardly distinguishable; the letter 'r' shows a separation at the top, but the horizontal stroke is connected to the vertical at the bottom.

The evidence, of course, is not conclusive. But a random look at the book on medieval manuscripts by Arndt and Tangl⁶ leaves room for no other conclusion than that the greatest resemblance of this manuscript is to the reproduction therein of a text from 1374.

5 Thomson 1969.

6 Arndt and Tangl 1976.

So the hypothesis seems warranted that the manuscript used for this edition stems from Germany, around the 1360s or 1370s.⁷ One conclusion, then, to be drawn from this hypothesis is that this manuscript can hardly be expected to be an autograph by the presumed author of this commentary on Porphyry, if the addition 'Anglicus' to his name really means that Thomas Manlevelt is an Englishman. As explained by Thomson, the geographical peculiarities of a manuscript say a lot about the provenance of its scribe, and less about the place where it was written. A scribe tends to retain the peculiarities of the environment where he acquired his penmanship, no matter where in the medieval world he was to practise his art later on. So an Englishman would not trade his English way of writing, even when practising his art in Germany. If this text really is Manlevelt's and if Manlevelt really is an Englishman, the manuscript must be reckoned on this evidence alone to be one that was not written out by the author himself, but one that was written off by a German scribe. In this case, if the 1360s or 1370s really are the periods around which the manuscript was written, it is still possible that the original text stems from a somewhat earlier time.

But let us not make too much out of this. Even if my educated guess about the German hand is right, this does not necessarily mean that the manuscript itself was written in Germany. It could as well be taken as an indication that the scribe may have been a German. And this scribe may or may not have been working in the German heartland; he might just as well have been doing his job somewhere else. Or this scribe was not a German at all, but one who merely took a German education and was writing in a more or less 'German' hand.

Earlier on in this Introduction, I have brought forward some pieces of circumstantial evidence suggesting that this particular text stems from pre-university Louvain. As for now, it must be noted that my speculations on the German hand of writing is anything but incompatible with the text stemming from Louvain. The scribe may have been a German, working in Louvain. Or the scribe was a Brabantian, writing in a German hand.

All geographical speculations set aside, the overall high quality of the text, together with its obvious copy-character, suggests that the present text is not too far distanced from the basis text; it may even

7 Surmises about the probable time and place of origin of our manuscript may be strengthened by comparison of this to other manuscripts as well. For now it must suffice to compare our manuscript with the readily available, well-chosen examples in the books by Thomson and by Arndt and Tangl.

be a copy of a first-hand *reportatio* or rather, a first-hand compilation of Manlevelt's *Questiones libri Porphyrii*.⁸ But as long as this is the only known manuscript of this particular text, no definitive conclusions as to its precise status can be drawn.

8 On the diversity of texts captured under the general heading of 'reportatio', see Hamesse 1997. On the sense in which this text is to be taken as a compilation, see above, section 3.1.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The editorial principles

In editing this text, the usual medieval orthography has been followed.¹ Ambivalent spellings allowing adjectival as well as adverbial interpretations, such as in ‘vere’, and ‘maxime’, are thus left ambiguous.

The punctuation of the present edition is entirely the editor’s.² The numbering of the *questiones* is also my work, but is entirely warranted by the simple succession of the *questiones* themselves, and moreover by the listing of the *questiones* making up both this present commentary on the *Isagoge* and, subsequently, the following commentary on the *Categories*, at the very end of our manuscript.

The numbering of arguments, counter-arguments, conclusions etc. within each *questio* is the editor’s work as well, but is usually warranted not only by the inner logic of the text, but by textual devices employed by the scribe in the manuscript itself as well, and the occasional numbering added in the margins of the manuscript.

The numbering of the folios is in line with the handwritten numbers written in the right hand upper corner of each successive folio.

The many references in the text to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, etc. are traced in the notes according to their standard, present-day editions. References to Aristotle are complemented with the Latin text in the *Aristoteles Latinus*. Where applicable, references to Aristotle are also complemented with a reference to Hamesse’s 1974 critical edition of the anonymous medieval anthology *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*.

- 1 The obvious drawbacks notwithstanding, this is preferred to rather anachronistically presenting this medieval text in classicized form. On the dilemma, compare De Rijk 2005, 14.
- 2 A medieval text is always poorly punctuated, to such an extent that one wonders time and again how people were able to seriously study such a text. Our text is no exception.

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QUESTIONES LIBRI PORPHIRII

Sigla

Siglorum interpretatio

Sigla codicis matritensis

E	Erfurt, Bibl. Ampl. 288
E ^c	manus corrigens E
E ^m	manus notas marginales praebens E

Alia sigla

AL	<i>Aristoteles Latinus</i> . Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Academiae consociatarum auspiciis et consilio editum. 1939 sqq.
<i>Auctoritates</i>	J. Hamesse, <i>Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique</i> . Louvain/Paris 1974
AverL	<i>Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem</i> , consilio et auspiciis Academiae Americanae mediaevalis adiuvantibus Academiae consociatis. Cambridge, MA 1953
AviL	<i>Avicenna Latinus</i> . Louvain-Leiden 1968 sqq.
<i>Opera</i>	<i>Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis</i> . Venetiis apud Iunctas 1562–1574 (Frankfurt a.M. 1962)
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina</i> , accurante J.P. Migne. Parisiis 1844 sqq.

Abbreviationum interpretatio

add.	addidit
cf.	confer
col.	columna
corr.	correxit
del.	delevit
exp.	expunxit
f.	folium
incert.	incertum
iter.	iteravit
litt.	littera, litterarum
mg.	margo, in margine
scr.	scripsit
seq. lac.	sequitur lacuna
sup. lin.	supra lineam

transp.
verb.

transposuit
verborum

⟨ ⟩
(?)

textus ab editore suppletus sive correctus
lectio incerta editoris

Thomas Manlevelt (*attr.*)
Questiones libri Porphyrii

⟨QUESTIO 1⟩

1^{ra}

5 Queritur circa initium Porphyrii, utrum necesse sit
aliquem scire quid genus sit et quid species etcetera
ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non,

quia: istud quod est impossibile sciri, non est necesse sciri; sed quid
sit genus, est impossibile sciri, igitur quid sit genus, non est necesse sciri.
10 Maior videtur de se nota, et patet per equipollentias modalium et per
significationem terminorum. Et minor patet, quia quid sit genus nec est
verum nec falsum, igitur non est scibile, igitur non potest sciri, igitur
impossibile est sciri quid sit genus. Assumptum, videlicet quod 'quid sit
genus' nec est verum nec falsum, patet, quia non est oratio indicativa,
15 quia est oratio interrogativa, igitur nec est vera nec falsa. Consequentia
patet per Aristotelem, primo *Perihermeneias*.¹

⟨2.⟩ Item, si necesse sit aliquem scire quid sit genus et quid species
etcetera, tunc scientia generis est necessaria ad scientiam predicamentorum.
Ista consequentia videtur evidens, et consequens est falsum, igitur
20 et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis demonstratur: nulla scientia generis
est necessaria ad scientiam predicamentorum, igitur scientia generis
non est necessaria quoad scientiam predicamentorum. Ista consequentia
patet, quia arguitur *ab universali ad suam indefinitam*; et antecedens
patet inductive, quia ista scientia – demonstrata scientia Sortis – non est
25 necessaria ad scientiam predicamentorum, quia sine ista scientia predicamentorum
potest haberi, igitur ista scientia non est necessaria ad

3 1] Hec questiones fuerunt compilate per Thom. Manlevel Anglicum doctorem solempnem. *add. E^m* (Schum: 'Ueberschr. des späten 14. Jh.') 19 igitur] istud *add. necnon exp. E*

1 Vel potius Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, 4, 17a1–4: 'Est autem oratio omnis quidem significatiua non sicut instrumentum sed (quemadmodum dictum est) secundum placitum; enuntiatiua uero non omnis sed in qua uerum uel falsum inest; non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio quidem est sed neque uera neque falsa.'

scientiam predicamentorum. Et consimiliter arguitur de quacumque alia scientia generis, igitur nulla scientia generis est necessaria ad scientiam predicamentorum.

⟨3.⟩ Item, nullum est necesse scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum, igitur non est necesse aliquem scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam. Ista consequentia est evidens, quia arguitur ab universali ad suam particularem; et antecedens patet inductive, quia non est necesse istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam, nec istum et sic de singulis. Et quod non sit necesse istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam, patet, quia non est necesse istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam, quia arguitur *a negatione superioris ad negationem inferioris*.

⟨4.⟩ Item, ex opposito sequitur oppositum, nam sequitur: necesse est istum scire quid sit genus ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam; igitur necesse est istum aliquid scire.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius, sicut patet per istum textum ‘cum sit necessarium Chrysaore etc.’²

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio istius questionis est ista, quod ‘scientia’ accipitur tripliciter: uno modo propriissime, scilicet pro notitia causata demonstratione; alio modo accipitur largius, scilicet pro notitia evidenti veri necessarii; tertio modo accipitur largissime, scilicet pro notitia evidenti et probabili alicuius veri. | Et ista distinctio intelligitur de notitia complexa, quia de ista ad presens intendimus.

Per primam notitiam cognoscuntur tantummodo conclusiones demonstrationum. Per secundam notitiam possunt sciri principia quamvis demonstrabilia. Per tertiam sciuntur quecumque vera quamvis contingentia. Et omnes iste notitiae sive scientie presupponunt unam scientiam incomplexam indivisibilem, qua tam complexa quam incomplexa omnia cognoscuntur. Et ista scientia est prima scientia, scilicet, ipsemet Deus qui est omnium prima causa.

11 istum] quid *add. necnon del. E* 20 accipitur] dupliciter *add. necnon del. E*

2 *Isagoge*, prooem., 1 (1, 1–7): ‘Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaori, et ad eam quae est apud Aristotelem praedicamentorum doctrinam, nosse quid genus sit et quid differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, etc.’

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod necessitas est duplex, scilicet complexa et incomplexa. Necessitas incomplexa est res que non potest non esse. Complexa adhuc subdividitur, quia quedam est absoluta sive categorica, et quedam conditionata sive hypothetica.

5 Prima necessitas est propositio categorica necessaria. Secunda est conditionalis vera, quia omnis conditionalis vera est necessaria in qua coniunctio est nota consequentie, et non promissionis complende et voluntatis exprimende ⟨et⟩ conservende.

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod aliqua scientia est necessaria ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam. Ista statim patet, quia prima scientia que est prima causa est necessaria, et sine ipsa nulla cognitio potest haberi.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla scientia que ⟨non⟩ est prima causa, est necessaria aliqua necessitate ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam. Ista conclusio probatur inductive, quia quacumcumque tali scientia demonstrata, sive sit scientia Sortis sive Platonis sive alicuius alterius individui, sine ista potest cognitio predicamentorum haberi, quia sine scientia Sortis potest scientia predicamentorum haberi a Platone, et e converso. Igitur nulla ⟨talīs⟩ scientia est
20 necessaria aliqua necessitate ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam.

25 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod non necesse est habere cognitionem generis ad ⟨cognitionem⟩ predicamentorum habendam. Istud probatur inductive, quia non istum necesse est, nec istum, et sic de singulis, quia non tamen istum necesse ⟨est⟩ scire aliquam scientiam, igitur non istum necesse est habere aliquam scientiam generis ad scientiam predicamentorum habendam. Ista consequentia patet per rationes superius recitatas.

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod possibile est aliquem habere scientiam predicamentorum sine scientia generis. Ista statim patet, quia possibile est aliquem habere scientiam aliquorum predicamentorum sine ⟨scientiam⟩ aliquorum predicabilium, utpote aliquarum substantiarum specialissimarum sine scientia generis.

35 *Contra istam conclusionem* instatur, quia genus et species sunt correlativa, igitur ad cognitionem unius sequitur cognitio alterius, et e converso.

6 quia] quia *iter. E* 22 non] nullum *E* 24 est] scire aliquam *add. necnon del. E*
25 non] tamen *add. E*

Ista consequentia patet per Aristotelem in *Predicamentis*, capitulo de *relatione*,³ ubi dicit quod ⟨qui⟩ diffinite noverit unum relativorum, diffinite cognoscit et reliquum; et antecedens est textus Porphirii;⁴ igitur videtur quod species non potest cognosci sine cognitione generis.

Ad istud dicitur quod species non potest cognosci perfecte sine cognitione generis, quia species non potest cognosci nisi cognoscatur aliquid aliud esse genus respectu talis speciei, sicut pater non cognoscatur esse pater nisi cognoscatur habere filium, et sic intelligit Aristoteles in *Predicamentis*.

1^{va} ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod ad perfectam cognitionem predicamentorum habendam necesse est necessitate conditionata cognitionem generis et aliorum universalium | haberi. Et hoc nihil aliud est dictum nisi quod talis conditionalis est vera: si predicamenta perfecte cognoscuntur ab aliquo, ab eodem haberetur cognitio generis et aliorum universalium. Ista conclusio statim patet, quia predicamenta non sunt alia quam universalia; ergo, quicumque cognoscit perfecte predicamenta, ipse cognoscit universalia. Ista consequentia est de se nota, et antecedens etiam patet, quia predicamentum est coordinatio predicabilium, et omne predicabile de pluribus univoce est universale, sicut patet per diffinitionem universalis, et omne universale est genus vel species etcetera; igitur omne predicamentum componitur ex universalibus, et per consequens predicamentum non potest perfecte cognosci nisi cognoscantur universalia.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Ultima conclusio est quod ad perfectam cognitionem predicamentorum habendam non est necesse necessitate absoluta cognitio universalium haberi. Ista statim patet, quia non est necesse necessitate absoluta aliqua cognitio predicamentorum vel universalium habere, quia nulla categorica est necessaria per quam significatur talem cognitionem haberi primo et principaliter.

11–12 conditionata] ad *add. E* 12 universalium] haberi. Et hoc nihil aliud est dicere nisi quod talis conditionalis est vera si predicamenta perfecte cognoscuntur ab aliquo. Ab eodem haberetur diffinitio generis et aliorum universalium *add. E. Iste textus iteratur cum differentiis paululis initio verso folio 1.* 14 cognitio] coniunctio *E* 16 quam] non *E* 24 sexta] universale *add. E*

3 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, VI: 8a37–38: ‘si quis aliquid eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur definite sciturus est’ – tr. Boethii.

4 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 7–9): ‘Nosse autem oportet ⟨quod⟩, quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’

Et si dicatur quod ista categorica est necessaria: ‘Deus est,’ et ista significat scientiam universalium, quia significat Deum secundum que est scientia necessaria omnium, *ad istud dupliciter dicitur*, primo quod conclusio intelligitur de scientia humana naturaliter generabili et acquiribili.

5 Secundo dicitur quod, quamvis ista propositio ‘Deus est’ significaret scientiam universalium esse, non tamen principaliter, quia voco ‘principaliter significare’ istud propriis conceptibus, quibus corresponderent proprii termini ad placitum, sicut ista propositio: ‘scientia universalium est principaliter scientiam universalium esse,’ quia propriis conceptibus
10 vel proprio conceptu scientie, et voco ‘proprium conceptum scientie’ istum conceptum qui significat scientiam sic quod ipsam non significaret si non esset scientia, sed significat ipsam quia est scientia. Sed sic non est de isto conceptu *Deus*, quia, quamvis significaret scientiam, quia significat Deum qui est scientia, non tamen significat scientiam quia est
15 scientia, et ideo non est proprius conceptus scientie.

Post hoc respondendum est ad rationes:

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum dicitur concedendo maiorem et negando minorem. Et ulterius negatur quod nihil potest sciri nisi sit verum vel falsum, quia res extra sciuntur que nec sunt vere nec false veritate vel falsitate
20 propositionali, quia ‘hominem scitur esse animal,’ et ‘hominem esse scitur aliquid’ nec est verum nec falsum. Et ulterius dicitur negando istam “quid sit genus” nec est verum nec falsum,’ quia si supponat personaliter, tunc ‘quid sit genus’ in ista propositione: ‘scio quid est genus’ significat istam propositionem vel consimilem ‘genus est universale’ vel
25 ‘genus est istud quod predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid’. Unde tantum est dictu, ‘scio quid est genus,’ ‘scio quid genus est universale,’ et tunc li ‘quid’ non ponitur interrogative, sed ‘quid est genus’ est oratio indicativa. Potest etiam ista oratio interrogativa ‘quid est genus’ cognosci et sciri extendendo nomen ‘scientie’ ad quamcumque
30 cognitionem sive intellectionem.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum argumentum dicitur concedendo quod necesse est scire quid sit | genus ad scientiam predicamentorum perfecte habendam necessitate conditionata, et non necessitate absoluta. Et ulterius, tunc negatur consequentia: ‘igitur aliqua scientia generis est necessaria,’ 1^{vb}

10 proprio] proprie E 21 ulterius] conceditur *add. necnon del. E* 22 quid sit] quod est E 26 dictu] dictum E

quia nulla scientia generis est necessaria, sicut probat articulum. Sed bene sequitur: 'igitur necesse est aliquam scientiam generis haberi', ponendo li 'scientiam' post necesse, quia tunc stabit confuse tantum.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo hoc antecedens 'nullum necesse est scire quid sit genus', et ulterius, negando consequentiam 'igitur non est necesse aliquem scire', et hoc ideo, quia arguitur a termino stante confuse et distributive ad terminum stantem confuse tantum. Et ideo non valet de forma, quia posito quod hec sit necessaria: 'homo est', tunc ista consequentia non valet: 'nullum hominem necesse est esse', quia ibi arguitur a sensu diviso ad sensum compositum, que consequentia non valet, sicut satis patet in *fallacia compositionis et divisionis*. Et per hoc patet ad residuum.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum dicitur quod Porphirius nihil aliud vult ⟨quod⟩ talis conditionalis est necessaria: si 'Chrysaorius debeat habere perfectam scientiam predicamentorum, oportet ipsum scire quid sit genus, quid species', nec ex hoc sequitur quod necesse est ipsum scire quid sit genus aliqua necessitate absoluta.

4 nullum] nullum *sup. lin. E^c*
17 absoluta] absolute *E*

5 consequentiam] dicitur *add. E*

14 quod] in *E*

⟨QUESTIO 2⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum scire quid sit genus
etcetera sit necesse ad divisionem faciendam.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Nam multi grammatici et addiscentes grammaticam faciunt diversas
divisiones grammaticales, ignorantes tamen quid sit genus et quid sit
species. Non ⟨ergo⟩ est necesse ad divisionem faciendam.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Experientia haberetur quod multi logici in ydiomate nativo
faciunt divisiones diversas, qui tamen ignorant quid sit genus et quid sit
10 species.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Possibile est dividi genus in suas species ab aliquo ignorante
tale divisum esse genus, vel talia dividenda esse species; igitur non est
necesse sciri quid sit genus ad divisionem faciendam. Ista consequentia
est plana, et antecedens declaratur, quia possibile est quod aliquis faciat
15 talem divisionem ‘animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale’, et quod
ipse ignoret quod animal est genus, et quod homo sit species, quia de
se notum est, et experientia satis potest haberi quod iste sunt taliter
distincte et disparate propositiones: ‘quoddam animal est rationale’ et
‘quoddam animal est irrationale’ et ‘animal est genus’, quia ipse due
20 sciuntur a laycis; tertia non scitur nisi ab instructo in logica.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Divisiones naturales, utpote forme a materia et partium inte-
gralium ab invicem, possunt fieri sine scientia generis vel speciei generis;
igitur scientia generis non est necessaria ad divisionem faciendam.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Sine scientia generis quecumque divisio potest fieri;| igitur 2^{ra}
25 scientia generis non est necessaria ad divisionem faciendam. Ista conse-
quentia est plana, et antecedens patet inductive.

5 Nam] nam *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 11 dividi] quid sit *add. necnon del. et exp. E*
21 partium] antegralium *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum videtur quod sit textus Porphirii.¹

⟨DISTINCTIONES⟩ In ista questione presupponuntur distinctiones posite in precedenti questione. Et ulterius ponitur ista distinctio quod quedam est divisio realis et quedam logicalis.

Realis divisio vocatur ista qua partes essentielles vel integrales alicuius rei ab invicem separantur, quali divisione anima separatur a corpore et una pars integralis lineae ab alia parte.

Divisio vero logicalis vocatur ista qua aliquod signum commune contrahitur pro aliquibus significatis per aliquam differentiam vel per aliquam suam speciem, sicut hoc signum commune ‘animal’, quando additur sibi hec differentia *irrationale*, contrahitur ad standum pro aliis suis significatis.

Et ista divisio subdividitur, quia quedam est essentialis et quedam accidentalis.

Essentialis dicitur ista qua aliquod commune dividitur vel per suas differentias specificas sive essentielles, vel per sua inferiora per se.

Prima divisio(ne) potest ⟨genus⟩ dividi in suas species per suas differentias specificas. Secunda divisione, scilicet, per sua per se inferiora, potest species specialissima de se dividi per sua supposita, sed non per differentiam specificam, quia species specialissima non habet divisiones specificas divisivas, sed tantummodo constitutivas. Exemplum primi, ut ‘animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale’; exemplum secundi, ut ‘hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato’.

Divisio vera accidentalis est ista qua aliquis terminus substantialis sive accidentalis dividitur per aliquos terminos accidentales, ut ‘hominum alius longus, alius brevis’, ‘alborum aliud dulce, aliud amarum’.

Et ex isto infertur unum correlarium, videlicet quod divisione accidentali minus commune dividitur per communiora, quia clarum est quod quilibet istorum terminorum ‘breve’ et ‘longum’ communior est quam iste terminus ‘homo’.

7 pars] integra *add. E* 8 vero] vere *E* | aliquod] aliqua *E* | signum] singnum (*sic E*)
 8–9 contrahitur] contrariatur *E* 9 aliquibus] sciendum *add. E* 18 Secunda] Sed
 ista *E* | sua] specie *add. necnon del. E* 24 accidentalis] dividitur *add. necnon del. E*
 | est ista qua] est ista qua *mg. E^r* 25 terminos] sive *add. E* | hominum] *add. 2 litt.(?)*
E 30 quam] quam *iter. E*

1 *Isagoge*, prooem., 1 (1, 1–7): ‘Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaori, (...) nosse quid genus sit et quid differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, (...) ad ea quae in divisione (...) sunt, etc.’

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Istis habitis sequuntur aliquae conclusiones, quarum prima est ista quod ad nullam divisionem realem faciendam est necesse scire quid sit genus. Et patet conclusio ista de se.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod ad nullam divisionem logicalem faciendam est necesse scire quid sit genus. Ista conclusio declaratur, quia divisio essentialis qua dividitur genus per suas específicas differentias, potest fieri sine hoc quod sciatur quid sit genus, quia clarum est quod aliquis potest facere istas duas propositiones: ‘quoddam animal est rationale’, ‘quoddam est irrationale’ et per consequens sic dividere: ‘animalium quoddam rationale et quoddam irrationale’ sine hoc
10 quod sciat istam ‘animal est genus’.

Divisio etiam qua species specialissima dividitur in sua per se inferiora potest fieri ab aliquo sine hoc quod talis sciat quid sit species, quia aliquis potest scire istas duas propositiones ‘Sortes est homo’ et ‘Plato est homo’
15 et per consequens sic dividere ‘hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato’ sine | 2^{rb}
hoc quod sciat istam propositionem ‘homo est species’.

Item, aliquis potest scire quod homo est species sine hoc quod sciat quid sit species, quia scire quid sit species, est scire speciem diffinitive, vel saltem scire aliquod predicatum verificari de specie in quid, et hoc
20 non oportet sciri ab aliquo qui s(c)it quod homo est species, quia iste terminus ‘species’ non predicatur in quid de isto termino ‘homo’, nec e converso. Et patet ista per predicta.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod necesse est scire quid sit genus ⟨necessitate⟩ conditionata ad faciendam aliquam divisionem qua scit ⟨talem⟩ esse generis in suas species vel speciei in sua per se inferiora. Et hoc nihil aliud est dictu quam quod talis conditionalis est necessaria: ‘si aliquis scit quod aliqua est divisio generis in suas species vel speciei in sua per se inferiora, ipse scit quid sit genus, quid species, etcetera’. Ista conclusio declaratur, quia, si aliquis scit aliquam divisionem
30 esse generis in suas species, ipse scit quod genus dividitur in suas species, et per consequens ipse scit quod aliquid est genus, et aliquid species.

Contra istam conclusionem arguitur: possibile quod aliquis cui credis dicat tibi ‘genus dividitur in suas species’ sine hoc quod tu scis quid sit genus et quid species, et tamen tu scis quod genus dividitur in suas
35 species, sicut tu scis quod Roma est pulchra civitas, quia tu credis

9–10 dividere] diffinire E 12 sua] suas E | inferiora] inferiores E 15 Plato] Platonis E
20 quia] quorum E 22 ista] igitur E 24 genus] ad *add. necnon del. et exp.* E 34 tamen] tunc E

dicentibus; igitur ad faciendam aliquam divisionem generis in suas species non est necesse scire quid sit genus, etcetera.

Ad istud dicitur breviter quod conclusio intelligitur de notitia distinctiva, qua aliquis scit dividere genus in suas species, et qua scit tale divisum esse genus et talia dividenda esse species. 5

Post hoc sequuntur responsiones ad rationes principales.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad quarum primam dicitur concedendo antecedens et consequentiam, quia nesciunt se dividere genus in suas species sic quod sciant tale divisum esse genus, et talia dividenda esse species, quia ad sic divisum respondetur scire quid sit genus ad intellectum predictum. 10

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum est idem, quia, quamvis logici faciunt divisionem, nesciunt se artificialiter dividere in suas species, vel speciem in sua per se inferiora, sic quod sciant talia divisa esse genus vel species et talia divisa esse genus vel species, et talia dividenda esse species vel per se inferiora ad species, ad quem intellectum loquitur Porphyrius. 15

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertiam rationem similiter patet per predicta, quia conceditur antecedens, quia clarum est quod aliquis potest dividere genus in suas species et ignorare se dividere genus in suas species, sicut supponit argumentum. Et ulterius conceditur quod ad faciendam divisionem generis in suas species non est necesse scire quid sit genus etcetera, sed ad faciendam divisionem generis in suas species artificialiter, sic quod 20
2^{va} dividens sciat talem | divisionem esse generis in suas species et talem divisum esse genus et talia dividenda esse species, necesse est scire quid sit genus etcetera, et sic intelligit Porphyrius.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad aliam rationem dicitur quod Porphyrius sic intelligit de 25
divisione logicali ad intellectum predictum, et non de divisione reali de qua concludit argumentum.

⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad ultimum argumentum patet diffinitive per predicta in precedenti questione.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Qualiter argumentum ad oppositum 30
intelligitur, patet etiam (per) predicta.

4 aliquis scit] quamvis sit E 14 esse] species *add. necnon del. E* 19 ad] per E
26 reali] realiter E 30 Qualiter] etcetera *add. E*

⟨QUESTIO 3⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum noscere quid sit
genus sit necessarium ad assignationem diffinitionum.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Non est necessarium aliquam diffinitionem assignari; igitur nosci quid
sit genus, non est necessarium ad diffinitionem assignandam. Conse-
quentia videtur evidens, et antecedens patet, quia si esset necessarium
aliquam diffinitionem assignari, tunc impossibile esset aliquam diffini-
tionem non assignari. Ista consequentia patet ⟨per⟩ equipollentias moda-
10 lium, et consequens est falsum, sicut de se notum; igitur et antece-
dens.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Secundo, aliqua est diffinitio quam non intrat genus, igitur
nosse quid sit genus, non est necessarium ad diffinitionem assignandam.
Consequentia est de se nota; et antecedens declaratur, quia ista diffinitio
15 albi: ‘album est ens habens albedinem sufficientem’ ad declarationem sui
non habet aliquod genus in se, quia ens non est genus, sicut patet per
Porphyrium,¹ nec aliquid est genus quia convertitur cum ente, nec albedo
est genus, sicut de se notum est.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Diffinitio entis non continet aliquod genus, quia ens non
20 habet aliquod genus supra se veniens, cum sit transcendens.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Diffinitio generis generalissimi non habet aliquod genus,
quia: vel istud genus esset convertibile cum genere generalissimo, vel
superius, vel inferius ad ipsum. Non superius, quia genus generalissi-
mum non habet genus supra se. Nec convertibile, vel inferius, quia nihil
25 genus per tale inferius diffinitur, sicut animal non diffinitur per ali-
quod genus inferius ad ipsum, vel per aliquod genus convertibile cum
ipso, quia diffinitio debet dari per notiora. Sed convertibile, vel inferius

7 quia] sic *add. necnon del. E* 9 non] non *sup. lin. E* 18 sicut] Aris(?) *add. E*
22 istud] istud *sup. lin. E^c* 24 Nec] non *add. E* 25 genus per tale] per tale genus
transp. E. 25–26 per aliquod] aliquod per *E*

1 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 5–7): ‘Neque enim est commune unum genus omnium ens nec
omnia eiusdem generis sunt secundum unum supremum genus (...)’

eiusdem alterius non est notius ipso, sicut elici potest ab Aristotele primo *Physicorum*,² ubi vult quod noti(or)a nobis sint confusa magis.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Si genus diffinitur per genus, esset processus ⟨in⟩ infinitum, quia oporteret genus diffiniri per aliud genus.

⟨6.⟩ Item. Possibile esset aliquem assignare aliquam diffinitionem qui tamen non cognosceret quid esset genus; ergo noscere quid sit, non est necessarium ad assignandam diffinitionem. Consequentia est nota; et antecedens patet de pueris qui formantur ad respondendum diffinitive ad multa interrogata, qui tamen ignorant quid sit genus, sicut patet de illis qui instruuntur ad respondendum | diffinitive talibus interrogationibus ‘quid est nomen?’, ‘quid est pronomen?’, ‘quid est verbum?’ etcetera.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 1.⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius in principio sui prohemii,³ ut videtur.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 2.⟩ Item. Omnis bona diffinitio datur per genus ad differentiam specificam, ergo necesse est noscere quid sit genus ad diffinitum assignandam. Consequentia videtur evidens, et antecedens per Aristotelem, tertio *Topicorum*.⁴

⟨DISTINCTIONES⟩ In ista questione presuppositis distinctionibus in questionibus precedentibus declaratis additur una diffinitio quid ⟨rei⟩ et una quid nominis.

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA: DIFFINITIO QUID REI⟩ Diffinitio vero quid rei accipitur dupliciter, quia quedam est que datur per essentialia, idest: per terminos essentialia nihil extrinseca connotantes cuiusmodi sunt genus diffiniti, et differentia specifica, et vocatur diffinitio propriissime dicta. Alia est diffinitio quid rei que datur per propria sive accidentalialia et per genus diffiniti, ut si homo diffiniretur: ‘homo est animal risibile’ vel ‘homo est animal recte sedens’, et vocatur per Aristotelem ‘diffinitio

7 assignandam] assignationem E 10 instruuntur] informantur E | ad] ins(?) add. necnon del. E 19 una] est sup. lin. add. E 26 homo] est animal add. necnon del. et exp. E

2 Aristoteles, *Physica* I, 1, 184a21–22: ‘Sunt autem nobis primum manifesta et certa que confuse magis’ – tr. vetus.

3 *Isagoge*, prooem., 1 (1, 1–7): ‘Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaori, (...) nosse quid genus sit (...) ad definitionum assignationem etc.’

4 Vel potius Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 4, 141b25–28: ‘si quidem oportet per genus et differentias diffinire eum qui bene diffinit’ – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 328 (93): ‘Omnis bona definitio debet constare ex genere et differentiis, quia ista sunt priora et notiora quam species quae definitur.’ (Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 4, 141b25–28).

data per additamentum,⁵ et a Boethio vocatur ‘descriptio’ sive ‘descriptiva oratio’.⁶

5 ⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA: DIFFINITIO QUID NOMINIS⟩ Diffinitio vero quid nominis vocatur oratio indicans quid nomen significat, convertibilis cum tali nomine, quam non oportet aliquod genus intrare.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod sine genere potest diffinitio quid nominis assignari. Ista conclusio patet inductive, quia sine isto genere et sine isto et sic de singulis.

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla diffinitio quid rei potest assignari sine omni genere vel sine genere istius. Ista conclusio probatur: omnis diffinitio quid rei declaratur per genus, et, si non datur per genus, non est diffinitio quid rei; ergo nulla diffinitio quid rei potest assignari sine genere. Ista consequentia patet, et antecedens patet per predictam distinctionem.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod, si sit notitia generis, omnis diffinitio potest assignari, quia sub ista notitia generis et sine ista nec de singulis.

20 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Ex ista sequitur quarta conclusio, quod nulla notitia †generis(?) humana sive e ... a(?)† est necessaria ad aliquam diffinitionem assignandam. Et ista similiter patet inductive.

25 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est hec quod diffinitio quid rei potest assignari ab aliquo sine hoc quod sciatur quid sit genus diffinitive ab eodem. Ista declaratur, quia possibile est aliquem investigare naturam hominis et eandem diffinire ad hoc quod sciat hominem esse animal rationale mortale sine hoc quod sciat istu(m) terminum ‘homo’ esse speciem, vel aliquem | terminum esse speciem, et sine hoc quod sciat 3^{ra} aliquem terminum esse genus; impossibile est aliquam diffinitionem quid rei assignari ab aliquo sine hoc quod sciatur ab eodem quid sit genus; (igitur) etcetera.

7 diffinitio] rei et *add. E* 10 genere] vel sine communi (*sic add. E* (istius *add. necnon del. E*) | istius] istius *add. necnon del.(?) E* 24 diffinire] devinire *E* 25 terminum] tantum *E* 26 terminum] tantum *E* | esse] hominem *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 27 terminum] tantum *E*

5 Aristoteles, *Metaphyica*, VII, 1031a1–3: ‘Palam itaque quia solius substantie est diffinitio. Nam et si aliarum categoriarum, necesse est ex additione esse.’ *Auctoritates* 129 (164): ‘Definitio accidentium fit per additamentum, scilicet substantiae.’ (Cf. S. Thomas, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 4, n. 1345. Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Z5, 1031a1–3).
6 Locus non inventus.

Ista consequentia patet. Et antecedens patet, quia iste due propositiones ‘homo est animal rationale mortale’ et ‘aliquis terminus est genus,’ vel ‘aliquod est genus’ vel ‘genus est quod predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus’ etcetera sunt omnino propositiones disparate vel in nullo ad se invicem dependentes vel aliquam ordinem habentes; igitur una potest sciri sine relinqua, et e converso, quia, si non, pari ratione dicerem quod ista propositio ‘Deus <est>’ non potest sciri nisi sciretur ista ‘Sortes currit,’ quia ita disparate sunt predictae propositiones sicut iste.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod necesse est necessitate conditionata scientem se diffinire diffinitione quid rei scire quid sit genus etcetera, et hoc nihil aliud est dictu nisi quod ista conditionalis est vera: si aliquis diffiniat diffinitione quid rei artificialiter sic quod sciat se diffinire diffinitione quid rei, ipse scit quid sit genus. Ista conclusio declaratur, quia si talis taliter debeat diffinire, ipse scit quid est diffinitio quid rei, et si scit quid diffinitio quid rei sit, quod talis diffinitio per genus datur, et si sic diffiniat sciendo se diffinire, ipse scit quid sit genus, quia, si ignoret quod est genus, nec sciret utrum diffiniret per genus vel non. Patet igitur conclusio predicta.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod possibile est aliquem scire aliquam diffinitionem dari per genus sine hoc quod talis sciat quid sit genus diffinitive, sicut patet de se, quia possibile est discipulum credere magistro dicenti istam diffinitionem ‘animal rationale mortale’ per genus assignari, sine hoc quod sciat quid sit genus diffinitive, sicut de se patet.

⟨ALIE CONCLUSIONES⟩ Alie conclusiones circa istam materiam possent hic poni, que satis faciliter ex precedentibus eliciuntur.

Ad rationes principales respondetur:

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primam dicitur concedendo consequentiam et consequens loquendo de necessitate absoluta.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo antecedens, et consequens ad intellectum iam dictum. Consequentia tamen in uno sensu posset negari, sicut patet per penultimam conclusionem istius questionis, et patet totum per superius dicta.

⟨AD 3. ET 4.⟩ Ad tertium per idem, et etiam ad quartum.

1 quia] quia *iter. E* 2 aliquis] alius *E* 7 potest] ?? *add. necnon del. E* 11 ista] alius *E* 14 diffinitio] per genus datur *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum etiam patet, quia conceditur quod non omnis diffinitio datur per genus, sicut diffinitio quid nominis, sed sufficit quod datur per aliquod notius sive communius.

5 ⟨AD 6.⟩ Ad sextum dicitur totum concedendo, sed auctor intelligit talem esse indiffinibilem: si quis debeat diffinire diffinitione quid rei artificialiter, | oportet ipsum cognoscere quid sit genus et quid species 3^{rb} etcetera.

⟨AD 1. IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad primum in oppositum: patet per iam dicta qualiter auctor intelligit.

10 ⟨AD 2. IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad aliud dicitur: negando antecedens, quia diffinitio quid nominis est una diffinitio, tamen non oportet aliquam talem dari per genus. Si tamen intelligatur per veram diffinitionem propriissime dictam, et sic conceditur antecedens, et negatur consequentia loquendo de necessitate absoluta, sicut superius dicebatur.

15 Et sic est finis questionis.

⟨QUESTIO 4⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum universale sit ⟨in⟩ intellectu.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non,

quia si esset ⟨in⟩ intellectu, ⟨vel esset⟩ ab intellectu causatum, vel ab
obiecto. Non primo, quia intellectus secundum Aristotelem, secundo¹ 5
et tertio² *De anima*, est potentia passiva, et per consequens non causat
aliquid in genere cause efficientis.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod intellectus alteraret semetipsum cau-
sando in ipso universale, et per consequens moveret semetipsum. Quod
est contra Aristotelem, sexto *Physicorum*,³ ubi vult quod omne ⟨quod⟩ 10
moveretur, ab alio moveretur. Ab hoc deducitur, cum non sit processus in
infinito, aliquid esse movens immobile.⁴

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, cum omne agens sit actu tale quale patiens est in
potentia et non actu, sicut patet primo *De generatione*⁵ et secundo *De*
anima,⁶ sequeretur quod intellectus idem numero esset aliquo modo actu 15

9 Quod] non *add. E* 11 deducitur] deductus *E*

1 Locus non inventus.

2 *Auctoritates* 185 (136): 'Intellectus est pars animae. Intelligere est pati' (Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, Γ4, 429a10–11, 13–14.); *Auctoritates* 187 (155): 'Intellectus noster est ens in potentia.' (Cf. S. Thomas, *In De anima*, III, lect. 11, n. 759; Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, Γ6, 430b23–24).

3 Vel potius Aristoteles, *Physica* VII, 1, 241b24: 'Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri' – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 155 (183): 'Omne quod movetur ab aliquo movetur.'

4 Aristoteles, *Physica* VII, 1, 242a19–20: 'Neque in infinitum adibit, sed stabit alicubi et erit aliquod quod primum causa erit motus' – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 155 (184): 'In moventibus et motis non est ire in infinitum et ergo necesse est devenire ad primum motorem.' (Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica*, H1, 242a15–20).

5 Cf. Aristoteles *De generatione et corruptione* 1, 9, 326b30–34: 'Quo autem modo existit generare entibus et facere et pati, dicamus accipientes principium dictum multotiens. Si enim est hoc quidem potestate, hoc autem actu tale, innatum est non tum quidem, tum autem non pati, sed ubique secundum quantum est tale, magis autem et minus secundum quod tale magis et minus.' Cf. *Auctoritates* 168 (13): 'Agens et patiens sunt in principio dissimilia et in fine sunt similia, similia in genere, dissimilia in specie.' (Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione*, A7, 324a10–14, 323b31–33).

6 *Auctoritates* 181 (91): 'Agens et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia, in fine vero similia.' (Aristoteles, *De anima*, B5, 417a18–21; Cf. S. Thomas, *In De anima*, II, lect. 10, n. 351).

quale non esset actu, quod includit contradictionem. Nec potest dici quod causaretur ab obiecto: primo, quia omne agens naturale agit per contactum, sicut patet per Aristotelem, tertio⁷ et quinto⁸ *Physicorum*; sed obiectum non tangit intellectum, cum intellectus sit indivisibilis, et
 5 per consequens intangibilis, ergo obiectum non potest aliquid causare in ipso intellectu. Secundo quia universale frequenter est quando obiectum non est, sicut conceptus universalis rose potest esse rosa non existente, sicut in experiendo patet, et per consequens talis conceptus non causatur a rosa, quia non ens nihil causat.

10 <4.> Item. Nullum predicabile de pluribus est <in> intellectu; omne universale est predicabile de pluribus; ergo nullum universale est <in> intellectu. Maior patet per diffinitionem universalis, et minor probatur, quia, si aliquod predicabile de pluribus esset <in> intellectu, cum omnis predicatio sit in propositione, sequeretur quod propositiones essent <in>
 15 intellectu vel saltem possent esse in quibus universale esset predicabile de pluribus, et per consequens tales propositiones possint esse in intellectu: ‘omnis homo est homo’, ‘omnis homo est substantia’, et sic de aliis. Sed consequens est falsum; igitur etcetera. Et quod consequens sit falsum, declarat primo quantum ad primam propositionem, secundo quantum
 20 ad secundam.

<PRIMO QUANTUM AD PRIMAM PROPOSITIONEM> Si tales propositiones essent in intellectu: ‘omnis homo est homo’, ‘omne animal est animal’, in quibus idem predicatur de seipso, sequeretur quod due res eiusdem speciei specialissime non facientes per se unum possint simul esse in eodem
 25 subiecto, et per consequens due scientie eiusdem speciei specialissime, utpote due grammaticae vel due logice, possunt simul esse | in eodem ^{3^{va}} subiecto, quod est contra Aristotelem in *De sensu et sensato*.⁹ Apparet etiam ratione quod sit inconveniens, quia non alia ratione due logice possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto quam tres vel quattuor, et sic in
 30 infinito.

11 predicabile] *corr. ex* predicabilis E 12 per] per *iter. E* 17 sic] nec E
 18 consequens] genus E 21 Si] ?? *add. necnon del. E* 29 sic] nec E

7 Aristoteles, *Physica* III, 2, 202a7–9.

8 Aristoteles, *Physica* V, 3, 226b23(?). Cf. Aristoteles *Physica* VII, 2, 243a5: ‘Simul autem dico, quia nihil ipsorum medium est’ Cf. *Auctoritates* 155 (185): ‘Movens et motum simul sunt et inter ea non est dare medium.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica*, H2 243a3–6).

9 Cf. *Auctoritates* 198 (27): ‘Unus sonus numero non potest pervenire ad aures plurium, sed unus in specie.’ (S. Thomas, *In De sensu ...*, I, lect. 16, n. 238; Cf. Aristoteles, *De sensu et sensato*, 6, 446b23–25).

Item, pari ratione duo colores et due albedines non facientes per se unum possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, quod non videtur valere.

Item, in tali propositione non esset maior ratio quare unus conceptus esset subiectum et alter predicatum quam e converso; igitur uterque est subiectum, vel nullus; sed non uterque; igitur nullus. Quod non uterque, 5 probatur, quia cum subiectum in tali propositione confuse et distributive supponat et predicatum confuse tantum, sequitur quod idem terminus supponeret confuse et distributive, et confuse tantum. Et per consequens sub eodem termino et respectu eiusdem predicati et copule contingeret descendere copulative et non contingeret descendere copulative. 10 Istam consequentiam patet per diffinitionem suppositionis confuse et distributive, et confuse tantum; sed consequens est impossibile et includens contradictionem, ergo istud ex quo sequitur.

⟨SECUNDO QUANTUM AD SECUNDAM PROPOSITIONEM⟩ Pro secunda propositione probatur predictum consequens esse falsum, nam, si tales 15 propositiones: ‘omne animal ⟨est⟩ substantia’, ‘omne animal est ens’ et consimiles possunt esse in intellectu, sequeretur quod una et eadem propositio numero respectu eiusdem significati esset necessaria ⟨et⟩ impossibilis; sed consequens est falsum, igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Consequentia demonstratur. Et vocetur hec propositio in intellectu ‘omnis 20 homo est substantia’ *A*, et ista propositio ‘omnis substantia est homo’ *B*, tunc sic: quidquid est pars *A*, est pars *B*, et e converso, ergo *A* est *B*, quia ex eisdem partibus resultat totum. Et antecedens est de se notum, et ultra: ergo *A* est *B*, et *A* est propositio necessaria et *B* est propositio impossi- 25 bilis, et ultra, igitur una et eadem propositio respectu unius et eiusdem significati, est necessaria et impossibilis.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur: omnis conceptus communis univocus est ⟨in⟩ intellectu, aliquod universale est conceptus univocus, ergo universale commune est in intellectu. Maior videtur evidens, quia non potest inveniri aliquod subiectum primum ipsius conceptus; et 30 minor ab omnibus tenetur, quia omnes ponant quod sit universale mentale quod est per se et primo universale, quia est naturaliter universale.

4 alter] alicuius *E* 7 sequitur] scitur *E* 17 quod] et *E* 24 et] est *A* *add. E*
 | necessaria] cessaria *E* 25 propositio] est *add. E*; necessaria *add. necnon del. et exp. E*
 28 est] et *E*

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio premittenda est hec quod duplex est universale, quod quoddam est universale naturale sive per se, et quoddam est universale ad placitum sive per accidens.

Et quodlibet istorum membrorum subdividitur. Nam universale naturale est duplex quia: quoddam est universale naturale predicatione, quoddam reale; primo modo predicatum vocatur universale logicale; secundo modo vocatur universale physecum. Primum universale quidem ⟨est⟩ conceptus predicabilis de pluribus si plura habeat supposita vel posset habere plura supposita. Quod dico propter conceptum mundi et solis et lune et sic de consimilibus. Unde universaliter: omnis conceptus appellativus posset dici isto modo universale, quia omne tale universale est quoddam signum simplex vel compositum. Secundum vero universale ⟨est⟩ res sine qua pauci vel nulli effectus naturales in spera activorum et passivorum possunt effici, et talia universalia | sunt Deus et omnis corpora supercelestia. 3^{vb}

Universale ad placitum sive per accidens est duplex: quoddam est ex communi usu, scilicet, vocale et scriptum. Vocale est terminus appellativus vocalis simplex vel compositus; scriptum est terminus scriptus appellativus simplex vel compositus.

Et de tali universali naturali predicatione et per se est principale propositum, de quo ponende sunt aliquae conclusiones.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Quarum prima est ista quod omne universale mentale est in intellectu subiective. Ista probatur sic: omnis conceptus mentalis est in intellectu subiective; ⟨sed omne tale universale est terminus mentalis; igitur etcetera⟩. Maior est de se nota, quia omnis talis terminus mentalis est conceptus simplex vel compositus, et omnis conceptus est in intellectu subiective. Minor declaratur, quia omne universale mentale est predicabile de pluribus, et omne predicabile de pluribus ⟨est⟩ terminus, et nullum tale universale est terminus vocalis vel scriptus, ergo omne tale universale est terminus mentalis.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod duo universalis mentalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Ista conclusio probatur per experientiam, qua experimur nos habere talem propositionem in mente nostra: ‘homo est animal’.

8 si] per *E* | supposita] supponatur *E* 12 compositum] vel *add. necnon del. E*
 12–13 universale] universaliter *E* 13 activorum] auctorum *E* 17 terminus]
 scriptum *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 25 terminus] terminus *sup. lin. E*; conceptus
add. E 28 est] conceptus *add. necnon del. E* | terminus] terminus *sup. lin. E*

Item, quecumque duo accidentalialia et non repugnantialia possunt simul
 (esse) in eodem subiecto, in quo quodlibet eorum naturaliter potest
 esse; sed talialia duo accidentalialia sunt subiectum et predicatum istius
 conclusionis ‘homo est animal’, que sunt duo universalialia, igitur aliqua
 duo universalialia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Maior videtur
 evidens, quia nulla ratio potest assignari quare talialia duo accidentalialia non
 possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicut lumen et vox, quia in nullo
 repugnant quia possunt simul (esse) in aere, sicut dulcedo et albedo que
 simul sunt in lacte, et sic de aliis.

Argumenta vero contra istam conclusionem magis valentia tangebantur
 superius inter rationes principales, que inferius suo loco solventur.¹⁰

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua duo univer-
 salia eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse (in) intellectu. Ista
 declaratur, quia talis propositio mentalis: ‘homo est homo’, ‘animal est
 animal’ potest tota simul esse (in) intellectu; et predicatum et subiectum
 sunt duo universalialia mentalialia eiusdem speciei specialissime, igitur duo
 universalialia mentalialia eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse in
 intellectu. Maior videtur haberi per experientiam; minor nota est de se.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod universale inten-
 sum et universale remissum possunt simul esse intellectu. Ista declara-
 tur per experientiam, quia experimur nos frequenter addiscere aliquam
 rationem de qua remisse arguamus, et simul cum hoc cogitare de aliqua
 alia ratione intense.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod duo universalialia
 intensa non possunt simul esse in intellectu. Ista declaratur iam per
 experientiam, quia experimur nos non posse distinctis cogitationibus
 intense de distinctis rebus cogitare, sicut non possumus scribere et cum
 hoc aliquam orationem intentissime dicere.

Contra istam conclusionem instatur, et videtur quod contrariatur pre-
 dictis, nam talialia duo universalialia intensissima in nullo repugnant, igitur
 possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, circa quod habent fieri.

Ad istud breviter dicitur quod causa quare non possunt simul esse in
 eodem subiecto, non est repugnantialia universalialium, sed est repugnantialia

7 in eodem] in eodem iter. E 10 Argumenta] con add. necnon del. E 22 hoc]
 hoc sup. lin. E^e | cogitare] cogitari E 23 ratione] re E; mis add. necnon del. E
 28 intentissime] detentissime E; cogi(ta)mus add. E 30 repugnant] repugnat E
 33 universalium] universalialia E

10 Videas infra, AD 4.

advertentiarum ipsius | intellectus, qui non potest, saltem dummodo est in corpore, advertere se intense distinctis advertentiis distinctis rebus. 4^{ra}

Et si dicatur quod ista duo universalia que sunt subiectum et predicatum istius propositionis mentalis 'homo est animal', (sunt) simul in intellectu sicut supra positum est, ad istud breviter dicitur quod ista duo universalia non sunt simul intensa, sicut postea suo loco planius patebit.¹¹

De aliis vero universalibus, in quibus sunt subiective, non oportet sermonem prolongari, quia clarum est quod universale vocale est in aere tamquam in subiecto, sicut omnis vox, secundum quod patet per Aristotelem tertio *De anima*,¹² et universale scriptum non est in aliqua substantia tamquam accidens in subiecto, quia est substantia vel substantie.

Alia vero possunt poni universalia ad placitum, quamvis ex communi usu non ponantur, sicut signa communia ex consuetudine aliquas res significantia appellative, sicut panniculus rubeus positus ante tabernam significat vinum rubeum, et pannus glaucus significat vinum de Garunna, et motus digiti secundum quod aliqui claustrales utuntur, appellative significant sua significata. De quibus, quia non sunt in usu, non dicitur.

Postea dicitur ad rationes principales.

(AD 1.) Ad primam dicitur quod ipsum universale causatur ab obiecto in intellectu aliquando. Et ulterius dicitur quod ista propositio Aristotelis 'omne agens naturale agit per contactum'¹³ intelligitur de agente tangibili et de agente immediato. Modo, clarum est quod obiectum non est immediatum agens respectu causationis universalis, quia agit mediante sua specie, nec etiam intellectus est patiens tangibile, et ideo auctoritas non est ad propositum. Quare autem intellectus sit potentia passiva respectu aliquarum actionum et respectu aliquarum activa, diffinitive

1 ipsius] ipsius iter. E 2 intense] cense add. necnon exp. E 8-9 sermonem] sermonem corr. mg. E 13 possunt] simul add. necnon del. E 16 significat] unu add. necnon del. E 23 contactum] int causare add. necnon del. E 27 intellectus] intellectu E

11 Locus non inventus. Fortasse refert ad Thomam Manlevelt, *Questiones super De anima*. Textum invenire non potui.

12 Vel potius Aristoteles *De anima* II, 8, 420b10.

13 Cf. Aristoteles *Physica* VII, 2, 243a5: 'Simul autem dico, quia nihil ipsorum medium est'. Cf. *Auctoritates* 155 (185): 'Movens et motum simul sunt et inter ea non est dare medium.' (Aristoteles, *Physica*, H2 243a3-6).

patebit suo loco, quia manifestum est quod secundum maiorem partem *modernorum* nullam distinctionem ponentium inter animam et intellectum et voluntatem, anima habet se active respectu aliquarum operationum sicut respectu nutritionis et respectu motus animalis et sic de singulis. Sed sufficiat ad presens quod satis fiat argumento qualiter, scilicet, auctoritas supra quam fundatur predictum argumentum, sit intelligenda. 5

⟨AD 2.⟩ Et ulterius ad alia argumenta que probant quod intellectus non causat ipsum universale, primo quia sic alteraret semetipsum et moveret semetipsum et exueret seipsum: nec hoc est inconueniens in agentibus ex proposito, sed agentibus et mobilibus naturalibus que non moventur vel movent ex proposito, esset inconueniens, et hoc intelligit Aristoteles. 10

⟨AD 3.⟩ Et per hoc idem patet ad secundam propositionem, quia Aristoteles intelligit eam de mobilibus et motibus naturalibus et incorporabilibus. Sed totum istud plane patebit in questione de actualitate et passibilitate ipsius intellectus.¹⁴ 15

⟨AD 4.⟩ ⟨AD PROBATIONEM PRIME PROPOSITIONIS⟩ Ad aliud breuiter dicitur concedendo quod tales propositiones ‘omnis homo est homo’ et ‘omne animal est animal’ possunt esse in intellectu. Et ulterius conceditur quod due species specialissime possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto. 4th Et ulterius ad Philosophum dici⟨tur⟩ quod due tales res | faciunt per se unum, sicut due albedines vel due colores. Et ulterius potest dici ad Aristotelem quod ipse intelligit de duabus scientiis sive de duabus grammaticis sive de duabus logicis non facientibus unum. 20

Ad aliud, uno modo potest dici negando istam consequentiam: ‘si tales due res possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto, ergo tres et quatuor et sic in infinitum’, sicut non sequitur: ‘Sortes potest portare duas tales lapides, ergo potest portare tres’, quia maioris difficultatis est per motum organorum ⟨quam⟩ intelligere pluribus conceptibus, sicut patet per experientiam quod homo posset advertere se ad cogitandum de multis, et ⟨ad⟩ intelligendum cum tanto visu quod emitteret sudorem vel aliquod ⟨aliud⟩, similiter organa corrumpuntur, et fieret amens, sicut patet de multis astronomis qui nimis voluerunt comprehendere de motibus corporum celestium. Utrum vero sit dare maximam multitudinem 25 30

10 que] *ex quia E* 11 *ex] in add. E* 20 Philosophum] *Philosophum corr. mg. E; primam add. necnon del. E* 28 conceptibus] *quam pluribus(?) add. E*

14 Thomas Manlevelt videtur ibi referre ad commentarium eius *Questiones super De anima*. Textum invenire non potui.

talium conceptuum que potest simul in intellectu esse vel minimam que non potest, alterius est speculationis.

Ad aliud dicitur negando istam quod non est maior ratio quare unus talium conceptum est subiectum vel predicatum quam uterque, quia
5 conceptus qui primo pona(n)tur esse propositiones in intellectu, causantur successive, quia per servitium et obsequium sive motum organorum corporalium, qui quidem motus fiunt successive.

Et si dicatur quod in intellectu non est resistentia respectu conceptuum, ergo nec erit ibi successio, quia omnis successio, ut videtur, est
10 ratione alicuius resistentie, sicut elicitur ab Aristotele, quarto *Physicorum*,¹⁵ et a suo Commentatore, capitulo de *vacuo*,¹⁶ *ad istud dicitur* rationabiliter negando istam consequentiam. Quidquid sit de veritate antecedentis ‘nec est resistentia in intellectu respectu talium actuum, ergo ibi nulla est successio’, sicut non sequitur: ‘in aere nec est resistentia
15 respectu luminis recipiendi, igitur lumen non recipitur successive’, (nego,) quia antecedens est verum, et consequens falsum, sicut apparet ad sensum, quod per successivum ascensum solis dies fit. Et ad Aristotelem et Commentatorem dicitur quod intellexerunt de motu locali naturali secundum quod ‘naturale’ distinguitur contra ‘propositum’ sive
20 ‘liberum arbitrium’. Est ergo primus conceptus causatus per subiectum, et alius per predicatum secundario causatum, nisi sententia propositionis requirat, sicut in talibus propositionibus patet: ‘omnem hominem videt homo’, ‘animal est omnis homo’, in quibus ratione bonitatis intellectus accipiuntur aliquando non de virtute sermonis, sed ad bonum
25 intellectum et verum, secundum quod loquitur Aristoteles secundo *Perihermeneias*,¹⁷ quando dicit quod nomina et verba transposita idem significant.

Unde in talibus propositionibus secundum *aliquos* id quod reddit suppositum verbo secundum bonum intellectum, est subiectum, sive sit
30 primus conceptus sive ultimus. *Alii* vero generaliter dicunt quod omnis conceptus precedens copulam, sive reddat suppositum verbo | sive non, 4^{va} est subiectum. Sed primum videtur melius dici.

3 aliud] istud E 8 respectu] universalium *add. necnon del. E* 14 est] in *add. E*
19 distinguitur] in(?) *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 22 requirat] requirant E | talibus] est
add. E 24 non] non *sup. lin. E^c*

15 Aristoteles, *Physica* IV, 10–14. Locus non inventus.

16 *Auctoritates* 152 (145): ‘Successio motus causatur ex resistentia medii, vel mobilis, vel ex resistentia utriusque.’ (Averroes, *In Phys.*, IV, com. 71, f. 162 A).

17 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione* 10, 20b10–11.

(AD PROBATIONEM SECUNDE PROPOSITIONIS) Et ad probationem secunde propositionis dicitur, negando istam: una et eadem propositio respectu eius significati est necessaria et impossibilis. Et ad probationem dicitur admittendo: ista propositio ‘omnis homo est substantia’ sit in intellectu, et vocetur *A*, et quod ista propositio ‘omnis substantia est homo’ vocetur *B*, et ulterius negatur ista: quidquid est pars *A* est pars *B*, quia nihil quod est pars *A*, est pars *B*, quia ille partes que constituunt ipsum *A* causabantur certo ordine sicut prius dictum est quod primo causabatur conceptus signi universalis et secundo conceptus subiecti et tertio conceptus copule et quarto conceptus predicati. Et iste ordo causationis requiritur ad hoc quod tales conceptus constituent propositionem, et quia ista propositio ‘omnis substantia est homo’ non causata per causationem ipsius *A* nec est in intellectu, quia *A* est in intellectu. Sed si debeat esse in intellectu, oportet quod causatur de novo debito ordine, secundum quod dictum. Et quod debitus ordo requiratur, hoc potest patere aliquo modo per simile: et scribatur ista propositio ‘est homo animal omnis’, et vocetur *A*, et alibi scribatur ista ‘omnis homo est animal’ et vocetur *B*, tunc clarum est quod, quantum est de virtute sermonis, quod quamvis partes ipsius *B* constituent propositionem veram, et partes ipsius *A* equivalent partibus ipsius *B*, ita quod sint eodem modo partes secundum equivalentiam, tamen partes ipsius *A* nullam propositionem constituunt nisi ex bonitate intellectus aliter accipiantur et ponantur. Patet ergo quod non semper eodem modo partes vel equivalentes constituunt propositionem equivalentem, et hoc nulla alia de causa est nisi quod deficit debitus ordo partium, sed iste debitus ordo in propositionibus scriptis attenditur penes situationem partium, sed in propositionibus mentalibus attenditur penes causationem.

Alii dicunt aliter ad argumentum concedendo eandem propositionem numero respectu significati esse necessariam et impossibilem, sed non eodem modo acceptam. Unde ista propositio mentalis ‘omnis homo est substantia’ accepta et situata ab aliquo in cuius intellectu existit secundum quod li ‘omnis’ est adiectivum istius subiecti, ‘homo’ et secundum quod li ‘homo’ est subiectum et secundum quod supponat confuse et distributive, et quod iste conceptus *substantia* supponat confuse tantum, est propositio vera; sed ista eadem propositio aliter accepta secundum quod li ‘omnis’ est adiectivum istius subiecti ‘substantia’, est propositio falsa. Nec reputatur hoc inconueniens quod una et eadem propositio

numero diversimode attenditur respectu eiusdem significati sit necessaria et impossibile. | Sed primum dictum pluribus magis placet.

4^{vb}

⟨QUESTIO 5⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genus sit equivocum.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic,

quia hoc genus *substantia* est equivocum, ergo genus est equivocum. Consequentia de se nota, et antecedens declaratur, quia equivoce significat hoc genus *substantia* substantiam que est terminus, et substantiam que non est terminus, quia clarum est quod equivoce predicatur in istis duabus propositionibus: ‘secunda substantia est substantia’ et ‘compositum ex materia et forma est substantia.’

⟨2.⟩ Item. Hoc genus *animal* est equivocum, ergo genus est equivocum. Consequentia est ⟨de se nota⟩. Et antecedens probatur, quia hoc genus *animal* predicatur de animali vivo et picto, et hoc equivoce sicut patet per Aristotelem in *Predicamentis* in principio, ubi dicit quod animal est equivocum ad animal vivum et ad animal pictum.¹

⟨3.⟩ Item. Iste terminus ‘genus’ est equivocum ad terminum, et ad multitudinem descendendum ab aliquo uno principio, et ad tale principium; ergo, genus est equivocum. Consequentia patet de se. Et antecedens patet per Porphyrium.²

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius, qui dicit quod ens non est genus, quia predicatur equivoce.³

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio est ista quod iste terminus ‘genus’ multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro principio, alio modo pro predicamento. Pro principio accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro principio

16 descendendum] descendendum (*sic*) E | ab] aliquis *add. necnon del. E* 22 principio] productivo *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 1, 1a3: ‘Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur.’ – tr. Boethii.

2 *Isagoge*, I, 1–3 (1, 17–2. 10).

3 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 6–8): ‘Sed sint posita, quemadmodum in Praedicamentis, prima decem genera quasi prima decem principia; vel si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce, inquit, nuncupabit, non univoce.’

productivo sive generativo, alio modo pro principio contentivo. Pro principio productivo, sicut 'Romulus fuit genus Romanorum', 'pater genus filiorum', et sic de similibus. Pro principio contentivo adhuc dicitur uno modo pro principio contentivo circumscriptive, alio modo pro principio contentivo predicative vel significative vel communicative, quod totum 5
reducitur ad idem. Exemplum primi, sicut 'locus in quo quis generatur vel producitur' dicitur genus talis producti, quia est eius principium contentivum circumscriptive. Exemplum secundi sicut iste terminus 'animal' dicitur genus hominis | quia est eius principium predicative vel 5^{ra}
10 significative, quia predicatur de homine in quid et de aliis ab homine differentibus, et significat quidquid 'homo' significat, et aliquid plus, et est communior quam iste terminus 'homo', et diffinitur proprie, et ideo dicitur eius principium diffinitivum contentivum predicativum.

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod iste terminus 15
'equivocum' accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo pro equivoco a casu, alio modo pro equivoco a consilio. Et uterque istorum modorum accipitur dupliciter, scilicet, uno modo pro equivoco equivocante, et alio modo pro ⟨equivoco⟩ equivocato, et totum istud presuppono usque ad *Questiones de predicamentis*. Sed quantum est ad oppositum: equivocum equi- 20
vocans, idest, terminus equivoce significans, accipitur multipliciter: ⟨I⟩ uno modo strictissime prout distinguitur contra univocum strictissime acceptum. Quod quidem univocum accipitur pro terminis qui mediante unica impositione sive unico conceptu sive unica ratione diffinitiva predicantur de pluribus in quid, et non perfectius neque prius de uno quam 25
de alio, idest, non cum ista additione 'perfectius' predicatur de aliquo illorum respectu alterius illorum, sicut homo predicatur de suis suppositis, quia Sortes non est perfectius homo quam Plato, nec quam Cicero. ⟨II⟩ Secundo modo accipitur 'equivocum' pro illo quod predicatur de pluribus in quid diffinitive, quamvis non predicetur de eisdem pluribus 30
unica impositione, ⟨et⟩ non unico conceptu. ⟨III⟩ Tertio modo accipitur 'equivocum' pro aliquo quod predicatur de pluribus mediantibus diversis conceptibus specificis. Et totum istud diffusius patebit infra,⁴ quampropter ad presens breviter intermitto.

6 generatur] gen *add. necnon del. E* 9 hominis] quia est eius principium *sub col. E; cf. principium f. 5^{ra} | quia] ex *add. necnon del. E* 11 significat] significant *E* 24 quam] quod *E**

4 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (xiv) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, QQ. 1-4, ff. 43^{vb}-48^{ra}. Atque infra, Q. 12.

(CONCLUSIO PRIMA) Est igitur prima conclusio quod tota multitudo
 hominum est genus. Que declaratur sic: omnis multitudo que descen-
 debat ab aliquo mediate vel immediate ab aliquo uno predicabili in quo
 habet aliquam denominationem distinctivam ab aliis multitudinibus,
 est genus; sed tota multitudo hominum est eiusmodi, igitur tota multi- 5
 5^{rb} tudo hominum est genus. Maior est de se nota hac | significatione vocali
 posita a Porphirio;⁵ et minor declaratur, quia tota multitudo hominum
 descendebat saltem mediate ab uno tamquam a principio materiali, a quo
 principio habet istam denominationem 'genus humanum'. Que quidem
 denominatio est distinctiva ipsius multitudinis ab aliis multitudinibus, 10
 utpote a multitudine asinorum et sic de aliis.

Et sic per idem potest probari quod quelibet multitudo habens talem
 denominationem ab aliquo principio, sive productivo, sive contentivo,
 sive contentivo circumscriptive, sive predicative, (sive significative,) est
 genus. Et in ista significatione tota multitudo Romanorum dicitur genus 15
 Romanorum vel Romanum a principio productivo, scilicet Romulus;
 et tota multitudo Brabantiorum a principio contentivo circumscriptive,
 scilicet Brabantia, et tota multitudo contentorum in predicato substantie
 potest dici genus substantiale ab isto principio contentivo predicative sive
 significative quod est substantia, et sic de aliis multitudinibus habentibus 20
 aliquam denominationem distinctivam ab aliquo uno principio.

(CONCLUSIO SECUNDA) Secunda conclusio est ista quod isto modo
 accipiendo 'genus' tota multitudo entium non est genus, quia, quamvis
 descendat ab uno principio, scilicet, a primo ente, tamen ratione talis
 principii non habet denominationem distinctivam ab aliis multitudini- 25
 bus entium, sicut de se patet.

(CONCLUSIO TERTIA) Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne principium
 productivum, vel contentivum circumscriptive, vel predicative sive signi-
 ficative, a quo vel ratione cuius aliquod principiatum habet denomina-
 tionem distinctivam ab alio predicamento, est genus. Ista conclusio patet 30
 per distinctionem primam.

Et ex ista sequitur correlarie quod pater alicuius in aliqua signifi-
 catione dicitur genus, et non tantum pater, sive causa efficiens, verum
 pari ratione causa materialis vel formalis, sicut predictum est de genere
 humano, quod sic denominatur ab 'humo' tamquam a principio mate- 35
 riali. Hoc idem etiam patet de loco qui est principium contentivum cir-

1 multitudo] intellectio E 4 multitudinibus] vellet *add. necnon del. E*

5 *Isagoge*, I, 3.

cumscriptive, et hoc intelligendum est de loco communi et non proprio, quia a loco proprio non fiunt tales denominationes distinctive | sicut a 5^{va}
loco communi, utpote a patria vel a civitate vel a territorio aliquo.

5 <CONCLUSIO QUARTA> Quarta conclusio est ista quod alius terminus est genus tamquam principium contentivum predicative sive significative, et patet totum per differentiam.

10 <CONCLUSIO QUINTA> Ultima conclusio est ista que manifeste sequitur ex predictis, quod genus est equivocum, et hoc sive accipiatur materialiter, sive significative. Et patet totum, sed non accipiatur simpliciter, quia
15 unus conceptus est equivocus sicut patebit in principio *Predicamentorum*.⁶

<ALIE CONCLUSIONES> Ex predictis possunt elici diverse conclusiones, scilicet, quod Sortes est genus et quod individuum est genus et quod res que non est predicabilis de pluribus est genus, et sic quasi de infinitis aliis
15 consimilibus que causa brevitatis aliis relinquuntur.

<AD 1.> Ad primam igitur rationem patet per iam dicta, quia conceditur antecedens, consequens et consequentia.

<AD 2. ET 3.> Consimiliter ad secundum dicitur totum concedendo, et ad tertium.

20 <AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM> Et ad argumentum in oppositum patebit infra suo loco, videlicet, qualiter intendit sic quod ens predicatur esse et quare ens non est genus, quia hoc requirit unam questionem per se. Et sic sit finis istius questionis.

14 est] predicabilibus *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 23 sit] sint *E*

6 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, Q. 2: Utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus, ff. 43^{va}-46^{va}.

⟨QUESTIO 6⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genus sit cui supponitur species,
et hoc est querere utrum illa diffinitio generis sit bene data.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non,

quia si sic, tunc aliquid posset esse genus, quamvis non haberet nisi 5
unam speciem sub se. Ista consequentia est per se nota, et falsitas conse-
quentis patet per textum Porphirii,¹ qui dicit quod generi uni correspon-
dent plures species.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod ens esset genus. Consequentia 10
patet, quia enti supponatur aliqua species tamquam per se inferius; et
falsitas consequentis patet per Porphirium,² qui negat ens esse genus.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod accidens esset genus. Ista con-
sequentia patet, quia accidenti supponitur aliqua species tamquam per
se inferius. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod
qualitas non esset genus generalissimum, cuius oppositum vult Aristo- 15
teles in *Predicamentis*.³

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est textus Porphirii,⁴ qui novit predic-
tam diffinitionem generis tamquam ab antiquis philosophis positam et
probatam.

5^{vb} ⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ In ista questione et in omnibus subsequentibus suppono 20
istam significationem 'generis', scilicet quod genus | accipitur pro princi-

7 generi] consequentia E 12 accidens] antecedens E 13 accidenti] antecedenti E

1 *Isagoge*, II, 13 (7, 1–3): '... cumque sit genus unum, species vero plurimae – semper enim in plures species divisio generis est.'

2 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 6): 'Neque enim est commune unum genus omnium ens (...).'

3 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 4, 1b25–28: 'Eorum quae secundum nullam complexio-
nem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam significant aut quantitatem aut qualitatem
aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.' – tr.
Boethii.

4 *Isagoge*, I, 4–5 (2, 10–17): 'Aliter autem rursus genus dicitur cui supponitur species
(...) Tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur, de tertio apud philosophos sermo est;
quod etiam describentes assignaverunt genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et
differentibus specie in eo quod sit praedicatur, ut animal.'

pio contentivo predicative cui supponitur ⟨species⟩. Addo istam distinctionem quod ‘superpositio’ et ‘suppositio’ quantum est ad presens accipi⟨un⟩tur dupliciter: uno modo logicaliter, alio modo localiter. Localiter sicut paries superponitur fundamento et fundamentum supponitur
 5 parieti. Logicaliter, sicut magis commune superponitur minus communi et ⟨minus⟩ commune supponitur magis communi.

Et isto secundo modo accipi⟨un⟩tur suppositio ⟨et superpositio⟩ in proposito.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Quibus declaratis prima conclusio est ista quod non
 10 omne istud est genus cui supponitur species. Ista patet per Aristotelem,⁵ et iam patet de ente.⁶

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod non est genus nisi habuerit sub se plures species actu. Ista conclusio patet per textum superius declaratum,⁷ scilicet, quod ‘genere uno existente speciebus vero
 15 pluribus’.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista consequentia est bona: ‘una species est, igitur alia species est.’ Quod probatur sic: ⟨I⟩ una species est, igitur genus est; et genus est, igitur ⟨II⟩ plures species sunt; igitur, ⟨III⟩ si una species est, alia species est. ⟨I⟩ Prima consequentia
 20 patet per hoc quod genus et species sunt relativa, et per consequens *posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt*. ⟨II⟩ Secunda consequentia patet per secundam conclusionem. ⟨III⟩ Et ultima consequentia patet a primo ad ultimum, quia, si ista consequentia est bona ‘una species est, igitur plures species sunt’, ista consequentia erit bona: ‘una species est, igitur
 25 alia species est’.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod quodlibet genus potest non esse genus, ipso existente in rerum natura. Que declaratur

8 proposito] posito E 11 iam patet] iam factam(?)E 20 relativa] relative (del.?) E

5 Aristoteles, *Metaphys.* III, 3 998b22–27: ‘Non est autem possibile genus existentium unum esse neque unum neque ens. Nam necesse differentias cuiuslibet generis et esse et unam esse quamlibet, impossibile autem predicari aut species ⟨generis de propriis⟩ differentiis aut genus sine suis speciebus, quare si unum genus aut ens, nulla differentia nec unum nec ens erit.’ (Recensio Guillelmi). *Auctoritates* 121 (76): ‘Ens et unum non sunt genera.’ (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, β 3, 998b22). *Auctoritates* 121 (77): ‘Differentiae non sunt extra rationem generis.’ (St. Thomas, *In Metaphys.*, III, lect. 8, n. 433; Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, β 3, 998b23–26).

6 Videas infra: Q. 21.

7 Videas supra, 1.

sic: quocumque genere accepto ipsum potest esse, quamvis nullus alius terminus ⟨sit⟩, igitur ipsum potest esse quamvis nullam speciem sub se habeat, igitur ipsum ⟨poterit⟩ non esse genus ipso existente in rerum natura.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus 5
‘genus’ de nullo predicatur per se. Ista declaratur ex precedenti conclu-
sione, quia si predicaretur de aliquo per se, istud non posset non esse
genus ipso manente in rerum natura.

6^{ra} Ex istis conclusionibus possunt infinite alie elici que satis extranee
apparent, | quas diligentie studentium derelinquo. 10

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod omne illud est genus 10
cui immediate supponitur sua species. Ista statim patet quia omne istud
est genus cuius est aliqua species, igitur omne istud est genus cui imme-
diate supponitur sua species. Ista consequentia est de se nota. Et antecede-
dens patet per illum textum Porphirii,⁸ qui dicit quod genus et species 15
sunt relativa, igitur *posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt*, quia neu-
trum illorum includit verbum de possibili.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod aliquid est per 20
se superius ad aliud quod non est suum genus. Ista patet de ente, quod
est superius ad omnia genera; non est tamen genus eorum. 20

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando consequentiam,
quia nulli generi potest una species supponi nisi alia supponatur.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam quando tamen 25
queritur de virtute sermonis, et negando aliud. Et ulterius dicitur quod
antiqui quamvis ita stricte non dixerunt, tamen voluerunt quod omne
istud est genus cui immediate supponitur species tamquam per se infe-
rius ad tale genus. Sed enti nulla species supponitur immediate, hoc est:
isto termino ‘enti’.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam precipue secun- 30
dum illam opinionem⁹ que tenet quod omne ens est substantia vel quali-

1 accepto] accipitur E 2 ipsum] ipsum *mg.* E^c 6 precedenti] presenti E
9 extranee] extranie E 11 quod omne illud est genus] quod omne illud est genus
iter. E 13 est] est *iter.* E | est] species *add. necnon del.* E 13–14 immediate] nota
add. necnon del. et exp. E 14–15 antecedens] aliud E 15 illum] illum *sup. lin.* E^c
22 nisi] ordo *add.* E 23 quando] quam E 29 negando] nota E

8 *Isagoge*, VII, 3 (14, 10–11): ‘Commune autem est et perempto genere vel differentia simul perimi quae sub ipsis sunt (...)’

9 Videtur Thomas Manlevelt referre ad opinionem Guillelmi de Ockham.

tas, quia sic qualitas non supponitur accidenti, sed potius e contra, quia omne accidens est qualitas et non omnis qualitas est accidens. Sed de istis longior fiet sermo in *Predicamentis* ad Aristotelem.¹⁰

5 <AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM> In oppositum patet per predicta qualiter videlicet predicta descriptio intelligatur.

Et sic est finis questionis.

¹⁰ Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (xiv) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, Q. 64: Utrum omnis qualitas sit accidens, ff. 94^{vb}-95^{rb}.

⟨QUESTIO 7⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genus
sit principium suarum specierum.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Omne principium est intrinsecum vel extrinsecum, sed genus non 5
est principium intrinsecum nec extrinsecum, ergo nullo modo est prin-
cipium. Maior patet per Aristotelem, primo¹ et tertio² *Physicorum*, et
6th quinto *Metaphysice*.³ Et minor declaratur, nam | genus non est princi-
pium intrinsecum quia non est materia nec forma, sicut genus *animal*
non est materia vel forma istius speciei *homo*; nec principium extrinse- 10
cum, quia non est efficiens nec finis, sicut patet.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omne principium est prius principiatio, sed genus non est
prius specie, igitur genus non est principium speciei. Maior elicitur
ab Aristotele, primo *Physicorum*,⁴ et minor patet per Porphyrium,⁵ qui
dicit quod genus et species sunt relativa et per consequens sunt simul 15
naturaliter.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Genus est species, igitur genus non est principium speciei.
Consequens apparet evidens, quia nihil est principium sui ipsius, et
antecedens patet per Porphyrium,⁶ qui ponit quod idem est genus et
species respectu diversorum subalternorum sicut genus subalternum. 20

6 nullo] nihil *E* 8 non] non *sup. lin. E^c* 11 sicut] declaratur *add. E*
16 naturaliter] naturalia *E* 17 principium] sui ipsius *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

1 Locus non inventus.

2 Locus non inventus.

3 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* v, 1, 1012b35–1013a23.

4 Aristoteles, *Physica* I, 5, 188a27–28: ‘Oportet enim principia neque ex alterutris esse neque ex aliis, et ex his omnia’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 141 (20): ‘Principia non fiunt ex aliis neque ex alterutris, sed ex his fiunt omnia alia.’ (Aristoteles, *Phys.* A5, 188a27–28).

5 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 7–9): ‘Nosse autem oportet ⟨quod⟩, quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est et in utrumque rationibus utrisque uti.’

6 *Isagoge*, II, 8 (5, 21–23): ‘Ea vero quae in medio sunt extremorum, subalterna vocant genera et species, et unumquodque ipsorum species esse et genus ponunt, ad aliud quidem et ad aliud sumpta.’

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius⁷ dicens ‘etiam principium quoddam est suarum specierum genus’.

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ In ista questione premittitur una distinctio que talis est quod ‘principium’ accipitur multipliciter, sicut ex predictis potest elici, 5 nam: uno modo accipitur pro principio productivo, ⟨sicut⟩ pro causa efficiente, universali vel particulari; alio modo accipitur pro principio compositivo sicut pro materia vel forma, ex quibus equales res componuntur tamquam ex principiis; tertio modo accipitur pro principio terminativo, sicut pro causa formali; quarto modo accipitur pro principio 10 contentivo, et hoc dicitur uno modo circumscriptive, sicut locus est principium vel patria, sicut patet ex textu Porphirii;⁸ alio modo predicative vel significative sicut pro predicabili in quid de pluribus specie differentibus, quod quidem continet unam predicationem vel significationem ⟨sicut⟩ sua per se inferiora.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod genus est principium contentivum suarum specierum predicative. Et ista conclusio patet ⟨per⟩ iam dicta.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod genus est principium compositivum suarum specierum. Ista declaratur, quia ⟨I⟩ 20 hoc genus *animal* est principium compositivum istius speciei que est *animal rationale mortale*, et per consequens predicaretur in quid et in quale. ⟨II⟩ Item, omne ⟨pari ratione⟩ predicatur in quid ratione generis quam in quale ratione differentie, et per consequens, si predicetur in quid, et predicatur in quale, et si predicetur in quale, | non est species. Ista 6^{va} 25 consequentia patet per textum Porphirii,⁹ qui ponit quod species per hoc distinguitur a differentia quod differentia predicatur in quale et species non.

6 particulari] principia vel in universali tantum *add. E* 8 principiis] termino *add. E*
17 iam] per *add./transp. E* 21 mortale] esset species *add. E* 22 Item] vero *add. E*;
seq. lac. 4 litt. E

7 *Isagoge*, I, 4 (2, 12–13): ‘Etenim principium quoddam est huiusmodi genus earum quae sub ipso sunt specierum (...)’

8 *Isagoge*, I, 2 (1, 22–25): ‘Dicitur autem et aliter rursus genus, quod est uniuscuiusque generationis principium (...) a loco in quo quis genitus est. (...) etenim patria principium est uniuscuiusque generationis (...)’

9 *Isagoge*, XVI, 1 (18, 16–17): ‘Proprium autem differentiae quidem est in eo quod quale sit praedicari, speciei vero in eo quod quid est (...)’

⟨AD I⟩ Ad primum istorum breviter dicitur concedendo quod ista definitio est speciei, quia pari ratione *animal rationale mortale* est species animalis quam *corpus animatum* sit species corporis, ut patet per textum Porphyrii.¹⁰ Item, *corpus animatum* est genus et non est genus generalissimum, igitur genus subalternum, et per consequens est species. 5

Et si dicatur quod, si esset species corporis, et consimiliter, si hoc totum *animal rationale mortale* esset species, tunc esset species istius generis *animal*, et per consequens ista genera predicentur de istis speciebus in quid, quia omne genus predicatur in sua specie in quid. Sed hoc consequens est falsum. Quod declaratur sic: non convenienter respondetur ad questionem factam per *quid* de istis speciebus per ista genera, igitur ista genera non predicantur de istis speciebus in quid. Consequentia patet per textum,¹¹ et antecedens declaratur: nulla responsio est conveniens que non est apta nata remove dubium interrogantis; sed talis responsio est huiusmodi; igitur talis responsio non est conveniens. Maior videtur de se nota, quia ideo reponso dicitur conveniens vel non conveniens. Minor patet, quia qui querit: ‘Quid est animal rationale?’ bene scit quod illud de quo queritur est animal; igitur respondendo ‘Animal rationale est animal’ non removetur dubium interrogantis, nec poterit etiam per talem responsionem removeri, igitur talis responsio non est conveniens, quia non est apta nata remove dubium interrogantis. 10 15 20

Ad istud dicitur quod *corpus animatum* sit species corporis, et *animal rationale* species animalis. Et ulterius dicitur distinguendo de predicatione in quid, eo quod poterit accipi. Accepta extendit se ad omnem predicationem quidditativam non connotativam sive ad omnem predicationem non connotativam que est per se, et isto modo potest concedi quod predicta genera predicantur de predictis speciebus in quid. 25

Et ulterius dicitur negando istam consequentiam: ‘Si predictae species essent species predictorum generum, tunc ista genera predicarentur de eis in quid; quia nunquam haberetur quod omne genus predicetur ⟨in quid de suis subiectis⟩. 30

2 speciei] species *E* 17 rationale] mortale *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 26 se] per *add. E* 30–31 in quid de suis subiectis] quibus sua subiecta in quid. *E*

10 *Isagoge*, II, 6 (4, 28–30): ‘(...) animatum corpus species quidem est corporis (...) rationale animal species quidem est animalis (...)’

11 *Isagoge*, II, 3 (4, 10–11): ‘(...) species est quod ponitur sub genere et de qua genus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur.’

⟨AD II⟩ Ad aliud dicitur negando istam: ista diffinitio ‘animal rationale mortale’ non predicatur in quid, et ulterius negatur: ista diffinitio predicatur in quid et in quale, ergo non predicatur in quid et | in quale, ergo non predicatur in quid, et ulterius conceditur quod predicatur in quale. 6^{vb}

5 Et ad Porphyrium dicitur quod ipse non negat speciem predicari in quale, sed dicit speciem per hoc differre a differentia quod species predicatur in quid et differentia in quale, et cum ⟨hoc⟩ stat quod predicetur in quid et quod predicetur in quale, sicut homo differt ab asino per *rationale*, et cum hoc stat quod sit sensibilis sicut asinus. Ista materia plus
10 patebit infra.¹²

Ad rationes principales.

⟨AD 1.⟩ ⟨Ad primam⟩ dicitur concedendo istam quod omne principium est intrinsecum vel extrinsecum; et ulterius ⟨negatur⟩ minor, scilicet genus non est principium intrinsecum vel extrinsecum speciei, quia
15 genus est principium extrinsecum contentivum speciei, sicut patet per primam conclusionem, et ⟨est⟩ principium intrinsecum speciei, sicut patet per secundam conclusionem. Verumtamen genus ⟨est⟩ principium extrinsecum contentivum suarum specierum, sed non est principium intrinsecum compositum omnium suarum specierum, sicut patet per
20 predicta.

Et ulterius negatur ista consequentia: ‘genus non est causa efficiens vel formalis speciei, igitur genus non est principium extrinsecum speciei’, quia pluribus modis dicitur ‘principium extrinsecum’, sicut patet per distinctionem questionis.

25 Et ad totum residuum maior patet.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod principium sit prius principiatio prioritate naturali sicut causa prior effectu. Non tamen oportet quod sit prius prioritate temporis. Et primo modo genus aliqua sua specie est prius, et cum hoc stat simultas que requiritur ad relationem,
30 scilicet simultas temporis.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam, et ulterius ad probationem dicitur concedendo quod nihil est principium sui ipsius proprie loquendo et primo. Nec probatur ista propositio quod genus non

2 predicatur] predicuntur E | diffinitio] consequentia E 9 sensibilis] scencibilis E
13–14 scilicet] si iste E 15 sicut] sed E 29 hoc] hac E | relationem] relatio E
31 ulterius] dicitur *add.* E 33 propositio] ad quam *add.* E

12 Videas infra, q. 34.

est principium speciei, que quidem species est ipsum genus, sed cum hoc stat quod sit principium alterius speciei. Sed animal non est principium istius speciei que est animal, sed istius speciei que est animal rationale.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum patet quid sit dicendum per predicta.

5

⟨QUESTIO 8⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genus
predicetur de pluribus differentibus specie.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Nullum genus predicatur | de pluribus differentibus specie, igitur 7^{ra}
‘genus’ non predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Consequentia est
nota. Et antecedens probatur, quia, si aliquod genus predicetur etcetera,
sicut gratia exempli hoc genus *animal*, tunc sic ‘animal’ predicatur de
10 pluribus pro se vel pro suo significato. Non pro se, sicut de se notum est,
quia sic sequitur quod ipsummet esset illa plura de quibus predicatur;
nec pro suo significato predicatur de pluribus, quia pro nullo suo signi-
ficato predicatur de pluribus, sicut probatur inductive; et quod non pro
hoc significato predicetur de pluribus, patet, quia sic sequeretur quod
15 hoc suum significatum esset illa plura vel significata illorum plurium de
quibus predicatur. Quod est falsum.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Nulla differunt specie, igitur genus non predicatur de plu-
ribus differentibus specie. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens probatur:
nulla eiusdem speciei differunt specie, sed omnia sunt eiusdem speciei,
igitur nulla differunt specie. Maior nota de se; minor declaratur, quia
20 omnia sunt in aliqua specie qualitatis utpote in specie naturalis potentie
vel impotentie, quia omne quod est, est naturaliter potens aliquid faciliter
faciendi vel patiendi; non autem patiendi, igitur videtur quod omnia sunt
in illa specie, quia Deus est naturaliter potens faciliter aliquid faciendi,
et conceptus mentis est naturaliter potens faciliter aliquid faciendi vel
25 patiendi, utpote faciendi corruptionem vel remissionem vel intentionem
vel aliquid huiusmodi. Item. Deus est qualis, et omne quale est alicuius
speciei illius generis, et non potest poni in aliqua alia specie nisi in specie
naturalis potentie vel impotentie.

5 differentibus] specie. Consequentia est nota *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 8 animal]
genus *add. necnon del. E* 9 vel] *vel sup. lin. E^c; et ad. Necnon del. E* | significato]
materiali *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 20 potentie] potentia *E* 22 non autem] autem
non *E*

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius.¹ Hic ponit quod predicari de pluribus differentibus specie competit omni generi.

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio istius questionis est ista quod ‘aliquid predicari de pluribus’ intelligitur dupliciter, scilicet secundum actualitatem vel secundum aptitudinem, idest, actualiter vel aptitudinaliter. Secundo modo ‘predicari’ accipitur in opposito per totum. 5

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod omne genus predicatur de pluribus pro se vel pro suo simili vel equivalenti, quia patet totum quod omne genus habet plures species | de quibus predicatur, igitur et cetera. 7th 10

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod omne genus materialiter acceptum predicatur de pluribus stantibus materialiter in tali propositione. Ista patet, quia omnes iste propositiones sunt vere: ‘iste terminus scriptus “animal” est animal’, ‘iste terminus prolatus “animal” est animal’, et sic de aliis. Similiter ‘iste terminus “genus” est genus’ et ‘iste terminus “genus” est genus’, et sic de aliis. Et patet totum. 15

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne genus predicatur de pluribus stans significative in tali propositione, quia omnes tales sunt vere: ‘Sortes est animal’, ‘Plato est animal’, etcetera.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod nullum genus predicatur de pluribus pro se. Ista patet per argumentum principale. 20

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod nullum genus predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo significato. Et patet ista conclusio per argumentum principale.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod omne genus predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo significato. Ista declaratur, quia hoc genus *animal* predicatur de Sorte pro aliquo suo significato, et predicatur de Platone pro aliquo suo significato, igitur de pluribus predicatur pro aliquo suo significato, et tamen de istis pluribus non predicatur pro aliquo suo significato nec de istis pluribus predicatur pro aliquo suo significato 25 30

8 se] et *add. necnon del. E* 23 pluribus] et patet *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 25 Sexta] septima *E* 26 pluribus] et patet *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

1 *Isagoge*, I, 5 (2, 15–17): ‘(...) genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur (...)’ *Videas Aristoteles, Topica*, I, 5 102a31–32: ‘Genus autem est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid est praedicatur.’ (tr. Boethii).

quocumque demonstrato, sed de istis pluribus predicatur demonstratis Sorte et Platone, et de isto suo significato et pro isto suo significato.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod, si naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit una species in predicamento qualitatis, tunc nullum genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Et patet ista conclusio per argumentum principale, sed que veritatis sit, patebit suo loco,² quia hoc non est ad propositum.

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod omne genus predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus. Et patet ista conclusio per diffinitionem generis.

15 ⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad argumentum principale dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad probationem dicitur negando istam conditionalem: si predicatur de pluribus, vel igitur pro se predicatur de pluribus, vel pro suo significato predicatur de pluribus; sed conceditur ista quod predicatur de pluribus pro se vel pro suo simili et predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo significato, et si queritur quid est istud quod facit ibi suppositionem confusam tantum, dicitur quod hoc | totum ‘predicari de pluribus,’ propter multitudinem inclusam. 7^{va}

20 ⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum argumentum dicitur concedendo consequentiam, et ad antecedens: patebit suo loco.³

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad Porphyrium dicitur quod ipse intelligit per istam: ‘genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie’ quod genus predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus, quia auctores non ita stricte loquebantur.

25 Et sic est finis questionis.

5 specie] speciei E 6 veritatis] pe *add. necnon del. E* 7 hoc] *seq. lac. 3 litt. E*
| propositum] oppositum E

2 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, Q. 70: Utrum naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit secunda species qualitatis, ff. 98^{va}-99^{ra}.

3 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, Q. 70: Utrum naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit secunda species qualitatis, ff. 98^{va}-99^{ra}.

⟨QUESTIO 9⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum omne genus predicatur in quid.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non,

quia si sic, tunc sequeretur quod predicatur ⟨in⟩ quid de suis speciebus. Consequentia est nota, et consequens falsum, igitur illud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia si sic, sequeretur quod hoc genus *corpus* predicetur in quid de ista specie *corpus animatum*. Consequens est falsum, quia, si queratur ‘Quid est corpus animatum?’ non convenienter responderetur quod sit corpus, quia hoc scit querens, et per consequens dubium querentis per talem responsionem non removetur. 10

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod hoc genus *animal* predicetur in quid de ista specie *animal rationale*; sed falsitas consequentis patet sicut prius.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod predicetur de se ipso in quid. Consequentia probatur: omne quod predicatur, predicatur aliqua specie predicamentorum, scilicet in quid vel in quale vel in quantum vel in quotiens vel in ubi et sic de aliis speciebus predicamentorum; sed genus non predicatur in quale vel in quantum vel in ubi et sic de aliis predicationibus intentionalibus. Relinquitur igitur quod genus predicatur in quid de se ipso; sed falsitas consequentis declaratur quia, si queratur: ‘Quid est animal?’ non convenienter responderetur quod sit animal; igitur animal non predicatur de animali in quid. 15 20

⟨4.⟩ Item. Genus predicatur in quale, igitur genus non predicatur in quid. Consequentia apparet evidens, et antecedens probatur, quia hoc genus *coloratum* predicatur in quale, igitur genus predicatur in quale.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Iste terminus ‘genus’ predicatur in quale, igitur genus predicatur in quale. Ista consequentia est evidens, et antecedens declaratur, quia, si queratur ‘Qualis est iste terminus “animal”?’ convenienter responderetur quod sit genus. 25

7^{vb} | ⟨6.⟩ Item. Iste terminus ‘animalis’ predicatur in quale, igitur ‘animal’ predicatur in quale. Consequentia declaratur, quia sunt synonyma; et antecedens patet, quia si queratur ‘Qualis est homo?’ convenienter responderetur quod sit animalis. 30

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius in multis locis,¹ qui dicit quod genus predicatur in quid.

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio istius questionis est ista quod ‘predicari in quid’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro predicatione absoluta, alio modo pro predicatione dubii remotiva ad questionem factam per ‘quid?’

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘predicari in quid’ vel ‘predicari in quale’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo primo, idest, non ratione alicuius partis, alio modo non primo, quia ratione alicuius partis.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod omne genus predicatur in quid de aliquo. Ista patet per diffinitionem generis.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus predicatur in quale primo, sicut patet de hoc genere *coloratum*, quod predicatur in quale de substantia.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod non omne genus predicatur in quid primo de quacumque sua specie predicatione dubii remotiva. Ista conclusio patet de isto genere *corpus* et de ista specie *corpus animatum*.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod omne genus simplex substantie predicatur in quid de se ipso accipiendo ‘predicationem in quid’ pro predicatione absoluta. Ista patet quia ista non est predicatio connotativa: ‘animal est animal’, et tali predicatione predicatur de quocumque subiecto suo individuo, sicut patet de talibus: ‘hoc animal est animal’, ‘hoc corpus est corpus’.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod nullum genus predicatur in quid de quocumque suo individuo predicatione dubii remotiva. Ista declaratur, quia quodlibet genus habet aliquod individuum quod est compositum ex ipso genere et pronomine demonstrativa, et de nullo tali predicatur in quid predicatione dubii remotiva, sicut patet in talibus predicationibus ‘hoc animal est animal’, ‘hoc coloratum est coloratum’ et sic de similibus.

12 generis] conclusio *add. necnon del. E* 14 quale] in *add. E* 22 absoluta] quia *add. sup. lin. E*

1 *Isagoge*, I, 5 (2, 14–17); I, 10 (3, 5–14); I, 11 (3, 14–20) et cetera.

8^{ra} *Et si queratur* que est causa quare potius genus | predicetur in quid de una specie vel de uno individuo quam de alio, *ad istud dicitur* quod causa est quia aliqua sua species componitur ex tali genere et aliquo addito, et per consequens non potest haberi tales conceptus específicos nisi habeatur conceptus generis, et ita per conceptum generis non remouetur dubium querentis in quid de tali specie, et eadem est causa de aliquo individuo. 5

⟨ALIE CONCLUSIONES⟩ Ex istis conclusionibus possunt quasi infinite elici, videlicet quod aliquod genus predicatur in quale de sua specie quamvis non primo, et quod ⟨si⟩ aliquod genus predicatur in quid de sua specie, de eadem predicatur in quale, et sic de aliis quas ad presens delinquo. 10

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur argumentum dicitur concedendo quod hoc genus *corpus* predicatur in quid de ista specie *corpus animatum*, quamvis non predicatione in quid dubii remouita, nec hoc sequitur, scilicet, quod quodlibet genus tali predicatione de quacumque specie predicatur. 15

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum patet per idem.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod genus predicatur in quid de se ipso large accipiendo ‘predicationem in quid’, scilicet, pro predicatione absoluta, sed non predicatur de se ipso predicatione in quid dubii remouita, nec hoc oportet. 20

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo antecedens, quia genus predicatur tam in quid quam in quale de suis propriis speciebus, sicut hoc genus *corpus animatum*, sicut patet per predicta. Predicatur etiam genus in quale accidentale quamvis non de suis speciebus. 25

Ad Porphirium dicitur quod ipse intelligit quod genus non predicatur in quale primo de suis per se contentis.

⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum dicitur concedendo quod genus materialiter sumptum, scilicet, pro isto termino ‘genus’, predicatur in quale, quamvis non de aliquo suo contento per se. Et totum patet. 30

8^{rb} ⟨AD 6.⟩ Ad sextum dicitur negando quod ‘animal’ et ‘animalis’ sunt synonyma quia ‘animalis’ potest dici omne | illud quod ad animal pertinet sive illud sit accidens sive proprium quodcumque aliud extrinsecum sive intrinsecum.

2 individuo] indeividuo E 11 specie] etiam *add. necnon del. E* 21 hoc] hoc *sup. lin. E* 32 synonyma] senonyma E 32–33 pertinet] petinet E 33 proprium] *sup. lin. E*

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad Porphyrium dicitur ipsum similiter concedendo de virtute sermonis quia omne genus predicatur in quid de aliqua sua specie primo, non primo predicatione dubii remota, sicut patet de ista genere *corpus animatum*, quia, si queratur ‘quid est animal?’,
5 respondetur dubium querentis removendo quod sit corpus, vel quod sit corpus animatum.

3 primo] nihil *add. necnon del.(?) E*
mg. E

5 querentis removendo] querentis removendo

⟨QUESTIO 10⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genus differat ab individuo.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nullum individuum differt ab individuo; omne genus est individuum; igitur nullum genus differt ab individuo. Maior patet quia, si aliquod 5 individuum differret ab individuo, sequeretur quod aliquod individuum esset quod non esset individuum, quod includit contradictionem. Consequentia patet per exponentes ipsius ‘differre’. Minor rationis probatur inductive, quia omne ens est individuum, omne genus est ens, igitur etce- 10 tera.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Hoc genus *substantia* non differt ab individuo, igitur genus non differt ab individuo. Consequentia est evidens, et antecedens est de se nota, quia hoc genus *substantia* est singulare, sicut demonstratum.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Nullum sensibile vel existens in subiectis sensibilibus differt 15 ab individuo, sed omne genus est huiusmodi, igitur nullum genus differt ab individuo. Maior patet, quia omne tale est res singularis. Et minor patet quia omne genus vocale vel scriptum est sensibile, et omne genus mentale est existens in re sensibili.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Si genus differret ab individuo, hoc esset, quia genus predi- 20 catur de pluribus et individuum de uno solo. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia individuum etiam predicatur de pluribus, utpote de se et sibi similibus, et hoc univoce, quia iste terminus ‘Sortes’ predicatur univoce de omnibus consimilibus terminis.

⟨1. AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum dicitur: si genus non differret ab indi- 25 viduo, tunc genus esset individuum. Tunc sic: omne individuum continetur ab aliqua specie; aliquod genus generalissimum est individuum; 8^{va} aliquod genus generalissimum | continetur ab aliqua specie, et per consequens genus generalissimum esset inferius ad aliquam speciem.

⟨2. AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Item. Sequeretur quod supremum in coordina- 30 tione predicabili esset infimum eiusdem coordinationis. Consequentia

14 subiectis] subiectum(?) E 15 individuo] ad E 17 omne] omnes E
27 continetur] sub(?) *add. necnon del. E* 30 eiusdem] eiusdem *iter. E*

patet, quia in omni coordinatione predicatorum genus generalissimum est supremum, et individuum est infimum.

5 (3. AD OPPOSITUM) Item. Si sic, tunc genus generalissimum non predicaretur de pluribus, quia nullum individuum predicatur de pluribus. Et confirmatur per textum Porphirii,¹ qui dicit genus differe ab individuo per hoc quod genus predicatur de pluribus et individuum de uno solo.

10 (DISTINCTIO) Distinctio premittenda est ista quod iste terminus ‘individuum’ potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet, large vel stricte. Large secundum quod est nomen prime intentionis, significans re(m) materialiter existentem sive istud sit signum sive res que non est signum. Stricte secundum
quod est nomen secunde intentionis, significans signum quod significative sumptum non predicatur de pluribus saltem univoce. Et sic accipit Porphirius *individuum* quando dicit quod individuum est quod predicatur de uno solo.

15 (CONCLUSIO PRIMA) Prima conclusio est ista quod genus non differt ab individuo large accipiendo ‘individuum’, quia genus non differt ab ente et individuum taliter acceptum convertitur cum ente.

20 (CONCLUSIO SECUNDA) Secunda conclusio est ista quod omne genus continetur ab aliqua specie tamquam significatum alicuius speciei, non tamen tamquam inferius ad illam speciem. Ista declaratur, quia omne individuum significatur per aliquam speciem, omne genus est individuum, igitur omne genus significatur per aliquam speciem. Maior videtur de se nota, quia omne ens est alicuius speciei. Minor patet per precedentem conclusionem.

25 (CONCLUSIO TERTIA) Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus generalissimum est pars individui stricte accipiendo ‘individuum’. Et patet ista conclusio de hoc individuo ‘hec substantia’ demonstrando hoc genus generalissimum ‘substantia’ quod quidem genus est substantia secunda.

30 (CONCLUSIO QUARTA) Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus generalissimum est per se inferius ad aliud genus generalissimum. Quod declaratur sic: omne istud est inferius | ad aliud quod aliquod eius significatum significat vel pro aliquo eius significato stat eodem modo quo stat 8^{vb}

9 significans] enin *add. E*

1 *Isagoge*, I, 11 (3, 14–15): ‘(...) de pluribus praedicari dividit genus ab his quae de uno solo eorum quae sunt individua praedicantur (...)’.

suum superius, et non pro quolibet suo significato; sed taliter se habet aliquod genus generalissimum, igitur etcetera. Maior videtur de se nota, quia ideo *homo* dicitur per se inferius ad *animal* quia pro aliquo significato animalis stat eodem modo quo *animal* stat pro eodem significato et non pro omni significato animalis stat. Et dico ‘eodem modo’, idest *absolute* vel *connotative*. Et minor declaratur, et vocetur ista propositio ‘Hec substantia est’ *A*, in qua demonstraretur hoc genus generalissimum *substantia*, et ista propositio ‘Substantia est’ *B*, tunc clarum est quod in *A* iste terminus ‘substantia’ stat pro aliquo significato substantie absolute, vel saltem eodem modo quo pro eodem stat iste terminus ‘substantia’ in *B*, et in *A* non stat pro omni significato substantie, igitur iste terminus ‘substantia’ in *A* contractus per hoc pronomen demonstrative(m) ‘hec’ est inferius ad istum terminum ‘substantia’ in *B*, et iste terminus ‘substantia’ que est in *A*, est genus generalissimum, et consimiliter iste terminus ‘substantia’ que est in *B*; igitur unum genus generalissimum est inferius ad aliud.

Et si dicatur quod sic sequitur quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ esset inferius ad istum terminum ‘substantia’, et sic idem esset inferius ad se ipsum, *dicitur* negando consequentiam, et concedendo antecedens, quia iste terminus ‘substantia’ in *A* differt numero ab isto termino in *B*.

Item. Quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ in *A* est inferius ad istum terminum ‘substantia’ in *B*, adhuc probatur, quia ab isto termino ‘substantia’ in *A* ad istum ‘substantia’ in *B* est consequentia subsistendi et non e converso, igitur iste terminus ‘substantia’ in *A* est inferius ad istum ‘substantia’ in *B*. Ista consequentia patet per Aristotelem *Postpredicamentis*, capitulo de *prius*,² et antecedens declaratur, quia sequitur ‘hec substantia est, igitur substantia est’, ita quod *A* sit antecedens | et *B* consequens, et non sequitur e converso, quia non sequitur ‘substantia est, igitur hec substantia est’, sicut de se notum est.

Et ex istis possunt elici plurime alie conclusiones mirabiles quas ingeniosis dimitto.

23 subsistendi] ?? *add. necnon del. E*

2 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, XII, 14a29–34: ‘(...) quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unus duobus prius est (cum enim duo sint, consequitur mox unum esse, cum vero sit unum non est necesse duo esse); quare non convertitur ab uno consequentia alterius subsistentiae’ – tr. Boethii.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem, accipiendo ‘individuum’ primo modo, quia sic terminus ‘genus’ differt ab individuo sicut probat ad argumentum.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum igitur patet per idem quia quidquid sit de
5 consequente, quia consequens sit verum accipiendo primo modo.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium patet per idem.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur quod genus differt ab individuo secundo modo accepto per hoc quod genus personaliter sumptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis; quod non est verum de individuo
10 secundo modo accepto, quia, quamvis predicatur de pluribus univoce materialiter acceptum, non tamen predicatur de pluribus personaliter acceptum.

⟨AD 1. AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad primum in oppositum dicitur quod ‘contineri ab aliqua specie’ potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet, vel (tam)quam
15 ⟨superius⟩ vel tamquam inferius, et utroque modo conceditur quod genus generalissimum continetur sub quadam specie, sicut potest elici ex ultima conclusione.

Et si dicatur quod tunc genus generalissimum continetur tamquam inferius sub genere generalissimo, quod est contra Porphyrium,³ qui
20 dicit quod genus generalissimum sic est genus quod non potest esse species, vel quod non habet genus supra se veniens, *ad istud dicitur* breviter quod Porphyrius intelligit de generalissimo non restricto per ⟨de⟩monstationem vel obligationem ad tempus vel ad aliud huiusmodi.

⟨AD 2. AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad aliud dicitur negando consequentiam, quia
25 genus generalissimum non est individuum quod est infimum coordinationis, quia istud individuum est individuum representative univocum. Verumtamen, quamvis aliquis concederet sub diversa ratione, nullum esset inconveniens, quia nihil plus sequitur nisi quod aliquod quod alicui esset genus generalissimum, scilicet illi cui non esset restrictum, alicui
30 esset individuum infimum talis coordinationis, scilicet, illi cui est restrictum ad aliquod unum | suppositum vel signatum talis generis precise. 9th

4 idem] quia *add. E* 6 tertium] secundum *E* 31 suppositum] subpositum *E*

3 *Isagoge*, II, 5 (3, 15–17): ‘Est autem generalissimum quidem super quod nullum ultra aliud sit superveniens genus (...)’ *Isagoge*, II, 8 (5, 17–18): ‘Determinant ergo generalissimum ita, quod cum genus sit, non est species, et rursus, supra quod non est aliud superveniens genus (...)’

Unde satis probabiliter potest concedi quod idem diversis modis acceptum posset esse supremum et infimum alicuius coordinationis.

⟨AD 3. AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad ultimum dicitur negando consequentiam, et ad probationem dicitur quod genus generalissimum per hoc differt ab individuo quod ipsum personaliter sumptum predicatur de pluribus 5 personaliter sumptis univoce, quod non facit individuum.

Pro ista questione et pro omnibus consequentibus et subsequentibus se argumentis est notandum quod nihil determinative, sed tantummodo exercitative dicitur in eisdem, et hoc ad istum finem ut aliqua inveniantur quia multum sit inventum quia iste est modus inveniendi, sicut patet in 10 universitate Ocsonienti in qua plura nova inveniuntur quam in aliquo alio studio generali.

Et sic est finis questionis.

5 sumptum] ¹ litt.? *add. necnon del. E* 6 sumptis] *ind add. necnon del. E* 7 subsequentibus] *supsequentis E* 9 finem] *fine E* 10 sit] *sunt E* 11 Ocsonienti] *in universitate Ocsonienti add. mg. E; alio studio(?) add. necnon del. E*

⟨QUESTIO 11⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum
individuum predicetur de uno solo.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 De quolibet predicatur individuum, igitur non tantum de uno solo. Consequentia est nota, et antecedens patet, quia omne ens ⟨est⟩ individuum, sicut patet ex questione precedenti.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Hoc individuum ‘Sortes’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, igitur non tantum de uno solo. Consequentia nota, et antecedens declaratur,
10 quia hoc individuum ‘Sortes’ predicatur de pluribus, scilicet de omnibus similibus in voce vel in scripto, quia hec vox ‘Sortes’ est Sortes, et sic de aliis. Et quod predicatur univoce de eis, patet, quia mediante unitate conceptiva vel eadem ratione.

Et si dicatur quod primo predicatur de pluribus univoce, non tamen
15 significative sumptum, sed materialiter vel simpliciter, quod non intelligit *Porphirius, contra hoc arguitur*, quia hec vox ‘Sortes’ significat hoc *A* (littera nostra) et omnem similem, et non naturaliter, igitur ex impositione ad placitum. Ergo quando stat pro talibus vocibus, stat ⟨pro⟩ illis quibus imponebatur ad significandum, et per consequens stat significativa
20 tive sive personaliter.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Iste terminus ‘individuum’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, igitur individuum predicatur de pluribus univoce. Consequentia apparet evidens, et antecedens etiam patet, quia quod predicatur de pluribus, de se notum est, et quod univoce, patet, quia mediante eadem ratione sicut
25 mediante ista ratione qua predicatur de uno solo tantum univoce, sicut omnes tales predicationes sunt univoce: ‘Sortes est individuum’, ‘Plato est individuum’, et sic de aliis.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Omne superius predicatur de pluribus univoce, vel saltem est predicabile de pluribus univoce; hoc individuum *Sortes* est quoddam
30 superius, igitur hoc individuum *Sortes* etcetera. Maior de se nota, quia

5 quolibet] qualibet *E*; supponit *add. E* 6–7 individuum] *Sortes* predicatur de pluribus univoce *add. necnon del. E* 14–15 non tamen significative sumptum] non significative sumptum *iter. E* 16 hoc] Aristotelem? *add. necnon del. E* | hec] habet *sed expunctum E*

omne superius respectu aliorum inferiorum dicitur ‘superius’ de quibus univoce predicatur. Et minor declaratur, quia hoc individuum *Sortes* est superius ad hoc individuum ‘iste *Sortes*’, nam sequitur ‘iste *Sortes* est, igitur *Sortes* est’, | et sequitur e converso ‘*Sortes* est, igitur iste *Sortes* est’.

9^{va} <5.> Item. Hoc individuum ‘iste homo’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, igitur individuum predicatur de pluribus univoce. Consequentia nota, et antecedens declaratur quia hec pars ‘homo’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, et hec pars ‘iste’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, quia *Sortes* est iste, et quia Plato est iste, et sic de aliis, igitur istud totum ‘iste homo’ predicatur de pluribus univoce.

<AD OPPOSITUM> Ad oppositum est Porphirius,¹ qui dicit quod eorum que predicantur, alia de uno solo dicuntur, sicut individuum, ut Socrates, <et> hic et hoc et hoc.

<DISTINCTIO> In ista questione presupponitur distinctio (in) questione <precedenti>.

<CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod omne individuum predicatur univoce de pluribus, sicut probat primum argumentum, et hoc accipiendo ‘individuum’ stricte.

<CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod esset concedenda in aliquo sensu quod individuum non est individuum, quia iste terminus ‘individuum’ non est nomen proprium, nec nomen commune sumptum cum pronomine demonstrativo, igitur non est individuum. Consequentia patet per textum Porphirii iam allegatum.

Et si dicatur: ‘nulla propositio verior est illa in qua idem predicatur de se ipso’, secundum Boethium in primo sui commenti super *Perihermeneias*,² ita nulla propositio falsior est illa in qua idem negatur a se ipso, *ad istud breviter dicitur* quod Boethius intelligit quod ‘nulla propositio est verior illa in qua idem predicatur de se ipso’ uniformiter accepto, et cum hoc stat quod idem potest a se ipso negari difformiter accepta, et sic est in ista illa propositione: ‘individuum non est individuum’, quia subiectum accipitur materialiter, et predicatum personaliter.

10 predicatur] predicatur *iter. E* 11 Ad oppositum] Ad oppositum *mg. E* 13 et] ut *E*
15 precedenti] subposita *E* 21 est] individuum *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, I, 6 (2, 17–18): ‘Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (...)’

2 Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione*. Locus non inventus.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod ‘individuum’ large acceptum est transcendens. Ista statim patet quia ‘individuum’ sic acceptum convertitur cum ‘ente’.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod ‘individuum’ large acceptum est superius ad genus generalissimum, et patet ex tertia conclusione.

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod ‘individuum’ strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis. Que declaratur sic: et ⟨I⟩ capiatur hoc individuum mentale ‘iste homo’ demonstrando Sortem vel Platonem, et ⟨II⟩ vocetur totus Sortes *A*, et Sortes preter digitum *B*, et vocetur individuum mentale Sortes *C*, tunc sic: ⟨III⟩ *C* predicatur univoce de *A* et de *B*, igitur *C* predicatur de pluribus, et *C* est individuum propriissime acceptum, igitur individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus. Et quod
15 *C* predicatur univoce de *A* et de *B*, declaratur, quia hec est vera: ‘*A* est iste homo, et *B* est iste homo’, quia idem est conceptus proprius absolutus ipsius *A* et ipsius *B*. Quod declaratur sic: nam concipiat Sortes ipsum *A* conceptu proprio. Quo conceptu manente in Sorte, auferatur digitus ipsius *A*, tunc Sortes experitur seipsum eodem conceptu concipere istud
20 quod remanet post ablationem digiti, et istud quod prefuit.

Et *si dicatur* quod Sortes non hoc experitur, quamvis videatur sibi hoc experiri, *contra*: ex hoc sequeretur quod nullus potest se experiri intelligere vel concipere aliquam rem divisibilem ⟨tam⟩quam totalitatem, quod videtur esse falsum. Patet igitur quod idem est conceptus proprius ipsius
25 *A* et ipsius *B*, et per consequens talis conceptus proprius personaliter acceptus predicatur de *A* et de *B*, et per consequens individuum vocale vel scriptum tali conceptui correspondens personaliter acceptum predicatur de pluribus personaliter acceptis univoce.

Sed contra istam consequentiam instatur:

30 ⟨I⟩ *A* est iste homo, et *B* est idem homo eodem demonstrato, igitur iste homo est *A*, et iste homo est *B*; igitur *B* est *A*, et *B* est pars *A*; igitur pars est totum illius cuius est pars.

35 ⟨II⟩ Item, si *B* sit *A*, *B* et *A* non sunt plura, quia nihil cum se ipso facit pluralitatem, et per consequens per hoc quod *C* predicatur de *A* et de *B*, non potest probari quod predicetur de pluribus saltem non univoce, secundum quod intelligitur conclusio.

13 et] *c add. interl. E* 14 propriissime] proprium *E* 18 Sorte] manente in Sorte *iter. E*; sine sectu(?) Sortes *add. E* 31 *A*¹] *B E*; *lac. 3 litt. E* 35 univoce] sinorum (?) *E*

⟨AD I⟩ Ad primum istorum dicitur concedendo quod *B* est *A* non primo. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Aristoteles primo *Physicorum*,³ ubi querit, si pars sit eadem toti vel totum parti, ubi vult quod in aliquo sensu est ut sic, scilicet, quod totum est idem parti, scilicet, non primo, et in aliquo sensu est ut non, scilicet, quod totum non est idem parti, quia 5 totum non est idem parti.

Confirmatur etiam ratione, quia clarum est quod maior distinctio est inter ista que totaliter distinguuntur quam inter ista que partialiter distinguuntur; sed omne quod est minus tale, est minus tale per | 10^{ra} admixtionem sui contrarii, sicut expresse habetur ab Aristotele, quinto *Physicorum*.⁴ 10

Si igitur inter ista que partialiter distinguuntur, minor fit distinctio vel diversitas hec per admixtionem sui contrarii, scilicet, identitatis, igitur aliqualis identitas est inter totum ⟨et partem⟩, et per consequens in aliquo sensu hec est vera: ‘totum est pars’ vel ‘pars est totum’; et 15 hoc precipue de parte et de toto que habent precise eandem formam ultimam quacumque alia forma remota; sed *B* et *A* habent precise eandem animam ipso digito remoto. *Sed sic non est* de *A* et de digito, quia *A* et digitus non habent eandem animam ipso *B* remoto. Potest igitur probabiliter concedi quod ista pars hominis que includit omnes partes 20 virtuales vitales sive necessarias sive ad retentionem anime intellective est totus homo cuius est pars quamvis non primo.

⟨AD II⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod, si *A* esset *B* primo, tunc *A* et *B* non facerent plura, quia nihil facit pluralitatem cum se ipso quod est ipsummet primo, sed bene cum hoc stat: aliquid bene facit pluralitatem 25 cum se ipso quod non est ipsummet primo.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod individuum propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter acceptis mediante conceptu composito. Ista conclusio declaratur, et ponatur quod sint tres homines quorum quilibet vocatur ‘Sortes,’ scilicet, *A* et *B* et *C*; 30 tunc hoc individuum *Sortes* predicatur de *A* et *B* et *C* mediante isto conceptu composito *res que vocatur Sortes*, igitur aliquod individuum proprie acceptum predicatur de pluribus totaliter distinctis vel pro totaliter distinctis supponentibus personaliter acceptis mediante unico conceptu composito. Et totum patet. 35

6 parti] primo *add. E* 13 identitatis] adenti-tas *E*; scilicet *add. necnon del. E*
14 totum] *lac. 3 litt. E* 15 pars] in aliquo *add. necnon del. E*

3 Aristoteles, *Physica* I, 2, 185b11–16.

4 Aristoteles, *Physica* v, 6, 229b23–229a18. Locus non inventus.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod individuum proprie acceptum non predicatur de pluribus totaliter distinctis personaliter acceptis mediante unico conceptu simplici precise. Et patet ista conclusio satis ex predicta, quia quilibet talis conceptus est uni proprius. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphyrius.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primam igitur rationem principalem dicitur concedendo conclusionem accipiendo ‘individuum’ secundum quod est transcendens, sicut accipit argumentum.

10 ⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo conclusionem, scilicet, quod ‘Sortes’ predicatur de pluribus materialiter acceptis, sicut probat argumentum, et ulterius conceditur quod predicatur de pluribus significative acceptis. Et ulterius potest negari ista consequentia ‘igitur predicatur de pluribus personaliter acceptis’, quia probabiliter potest poni distinctio inter suppositionem significativam | et personalem tamquam
15 superius et inferius, quia omnis suppositio personalis est significativa et non e contra, quia ad hoc quod aliqua suppositio significativa sit, sufficit quod terminus supponat pro illo cui imponitur ad significandum, sive istud significatur a signo significante et a suo simili, sive non; sed ad hoc quod aliquid supponat personaliter, oportet quod supponat pro aliquo
20 alio a se vel a suo simili, si istud esset. Unde in ista propositione ‘omnis A est littera’, supposito quod A non imponatur ad significandum nisi talem litteram, subiectum supponit significative, et etiam pro isto cui imponebatur ad significandum, non tamen supponit personaliter. Sed secus est de subiecto ipsius propositionis ‘qualitas est vox’, et patet per totum.

25 ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo conclusionem, nec est hoc contra Porphyrium, quia ipse intelligit de nomine proprio vel de termino communi cum pronomine demonstrativo, et ita Aristoteles non est ad oppositum.

30 ⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod omne superius predicatur de pluribus non mediante conceptu simplici. Utrum tamen iste terminus ‘Sortes’ et consimiles sint proprie individua, patebit in proxima questione. Ideo ad istud argumentum ad presens non dico.

⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum dicitur negando quod hec pars ‘iste’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, saltem mediante conceptu simplici in istis propositio-

13 quia] pro pl. prop(?) *add. necnon del. E* | probabiliter] probabiliter *mg. E* 18 significatur] significatur *E^c* 27 ita] ?? *add. necnon del. E*; Aristoteles non est ad oppositum *mg. E^c* 30 mediante] concep utrum(?) *add. necnon del. E* 31 patebit] precedit *E*

nibus 'Sortes est iste', 'Plato est iste', et sic de aliis. Hoc pronomen 'iste' si correspondeat conceptui simplici demonstrativo, tunc predicatur equivoce, vel si univoce, tunc ex forma imposita quod supponeret pro aliquo.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum patet per superius dictum.

5

Et sic est finis questionis.

⟨QUESTIO 12⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod
individuum sit terminus communis.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

5 Omne convertibile cum termino communi est terminus communis;
aliquod individuum est convertibile cum termino communi; igitur ali-
quod individuum est terminus communis. Maior istius rationis patet ex
hoc, quod cuicumque competit unum convertibilium, et reliquum, et per
consequens, cum terminus communis competat pluribus, et ideo dicatur
10 commune, omne convertibile cum eo competit pluribus, et pari ratione
dicetur terminus communis. Maior declaratur, quia hoc individuum *Sortes*
convertitur cum isto termino communi ‘res que vocatur *Sortes*’.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Ponatur quod sint nisi tres homines quorum quilibet vocatur
Sortes, scilicet, *A*, *B*. Tunc sic: hoc disiunctum ‘*A* vel *B* vel *C*’ est terminus
15 communis, et cum isto disiuncto convertitur hoc individuum *Sortes*; igi-
tur hoc individuum *Sortes* est terminus communis. Consequentia patet
sicut prius, et prima particula antecedentis patet, quia hoc disiunctum
vere predicatur de *A*, et vere predicatur de *B*, et vere predicatur de *C*; igi-
tur hoc disiunctum competit pluribus; igitur est terminus communis. Et
20 secunda particula antecedentis patet, quia, quidquid est *Sortes*, est *A* vel
B vel *C*, et quidquid | est *A* vel *B* vel *C*, est *Sortes*; igitur hoc disiunctum 10^{va}
convertitur cum hoc individuo *Sortes*.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Omne superius est terminus communis; hoc individuum
Sortes est superius; igitur hoc individuum *Sortes* est terminus communis.
25 Maior videtur evidens, quia omne superius continet plura inferiora sub
se, quibus univoce competit; igitur omne superius est commune. Minor
etiam patet, quia hoc individuum *Sortes* e(s)t superius ad *A*, et est
superius ad *B*, et est superius ad *C*, nam sequitur ‘*A* est, igitur *Sortes* est’,
et non sequitur e converso; igitur *Sortes* est superius ad *A*, et consimiliter
30 probatur quod sit superius ad *B* et ad *C*.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Scribatur ista propositio in pariete: ‘*Sortes* currit’. Tunc
videns talem propositionem et intelligens concipit aliquid complexive
per istam propositionem, et per consequens habet propositionem men-
talem correspondentem tali propositioni scripte; que quidem propositio
35 mentalis vocetur *D*: tunc subiectum ipsius *D* vel est terminus communis,

vel proprius. Si communis, habetur propositum, quia omnis terminus vocalis vel scriptus correspondens conceptui communi est terminus communis, et per consequens, si istud individuum ‘Sortes’ correspondeat termino mentali communi, hoc individuum ‘Sortes’ erit terminus communis. Nec potest dici secundum, quod sit terminus proprius quia non maiori ratione erit conceptus proprius ipsius *A* quam conceptus proprius ipsius *B*, vel ipsius *C*, et non erit conceptus compositus ex omnibus istis. Conceptus proprius igitur nullo modo erit conceptus proprius. Et confirmatur, quia: volo quod lateat videntem quot sunt homines quorum quilibet vocatur Sortes, tunc clarum est quod talis homo non habet conceptum proprium cuiuslibet hominis qui vocatur Sortes, quia si haberet, per hoc posset experiri quot essent homines quorum quilibet vocatur Sortes, quod de se patet esse falsum.

10^{vb} <AD OPPOSITUM> Ad oppositum arguitur: nullum proprium est commune; omne individuum est proprium; igitur nullum individuum est commune. Maior videtur de se nota, | quia ideo aliquid dicitur proprium sive terminus proprius secundum quod in proposito accipitur, quia uni competit, et non pluribus. Commune vero dicitur quod pluribus competit, sicut patet per Donatum.¹ Modo, non competere pluribus et competere pluribus sunt contraria, et per consequens non possunt eidem simul competere. Et minor satis elicitur a Porphirio,² qui vult quod individuum uni soli competat, et non pluribus.

<DISTINCTIO PRIMA> In ista questione premititur una distinctio communis, quod ‘commune’ est duplex, scilicet, commune univocum et commune equivocum.

<COMMUNE UNIVOCUM> ‘Commune univocum’ dicitur istud quod competit pluribus mediante eodem conceptu, sive simplici sive composito, eque primo, ita quod, si sit conceptus compositus, non competit uni ratione unius partis talis conceptus et alteri ratione alterius partis, sed utrique competit ratione cuiuslibet partis talis conceptus compositi; et talis conceptus compositus est diffinitivus quia competit cuilibet suppo-

8 istis] istis: *sup. lin. E* 12 posset] quot *add. necnon del. E* 29–30 sed utrique] an utricumque? *E* 30 talis] con ... *add. necnon del. E* 31 quia] que *E*

1 Donatus, *Ars grammatica*. Locus non inventus.

2 *Isagoge*, I, 6 (2, 17–18): ‘Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (...)’

sito sive diffinito ratione cuiuslibet sue partis, sicut ista diffinitio ‘animal rationale mortale’ non tantum competit Sorti ratione ‘animalis’, sed etiam ratione ‘rationalis’ et ‘mortalis’.

5 ⟨COMMUNE EQUIVOCUM⟩ ‘Commune equivocum’ dicitur istud quod competit pluribus ratione diversorum conceptuum, sive isti conceptus sint simplices, sive compositi, ita videlicet quod istud commune competit uni mediante uno conceptu simplici, et alteri mediante alio, et tertio mediante tertio, quamvis ex istis conceptibus unus conceptus componatur.

10 ⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Alia distinctio est ista quod univocorum quoddam est complexum et quoddam incomplexum, et similiter equivocorum: complexum sicut hoc disiunctum: ‘Sortes vel Plato’, incomplexum sicut iste terminus ‘Sortes’ diversa significans proprie et non appellative.

15 ⟨DISTINCTIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia distinctio est ista, quod univocorum | 11^{ra} quoddam est primo univocum, idest non ratione alicuius sue partis precise, sed ratione totius; et quoddam est univocum non primo, quia est univocum ratione alicuius sue partis, et non totius vel cuiuslibet partis.

20 Exemplum primi: iste terminus ‘homo’ est univocus primo modo, quia non ratione alicuius sue partis precise, et similiter iste terminus complexus ‘animal rationale mortale’. Exemplum secundi sicut iste terminus complexus ‘res existens Sortes’ est terminus univocus ratione istius partis ‘res existens’ et (non) ratione istius termini ‘Sortes’, et similiter iste
25 terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ sive ‘substantia que vocatur Sortes’.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod aliqui duo termini absolute convertuntur, quorum unus est univocus et alius equivocus. Ista patet de istis duobus terminis ‘Sortes’ et ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ vel ‘substantia existens Sortes’. Et clarum est quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’
30 supposito quod significet pluribus impositionibus mediantibus diversis conceptibus, sicut ad presens supponitur, est terminus equivocus et iste terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ est terminus univocus, saltem non primo.

35 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquis terminus proprius convertitur cum aliquo termino communi. Ista patet de

1 cuiuslibet] sive *add. necnon del. ratione E* 6–7 competit] *competat E* 7 uno] unitate(?) *E* | conceptu] *concepti E* 16–17 partis precise] *parte precisa E*

eisdem terminis, quia iste terminus ‘Sortes’ est terminus proprius, et iste terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ est terminus communis, quia competit pluribus univoce.

Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur: si iste terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ competeret pluribus univoce, hoc esset mediante eodem conceptu. Consequentia nota, et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia mediante uno conceptu verificatur de *A*, scilicet, conceptu proprio ipsius *A*, et mediante alio verificatur de *B*, et mediante alio de *C*, et istud dicitur concedendo quod iste terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ competit pluribus mediantibus diversis conceptibus partialibus, sive partis, et competit etiam eisdem mediante uno conceptu partiali | ratione cuius dicitur univocum non primo, quia ratione istius conceptus partialis *substantia que vocatur vel substantia existens* competit pluribus, et ideo sicut dictum est, ratione eiusdem conceptus dicitur univocum non primo, et ratione aliorum conceptuum correspondentium in diversis propositionibus tali termino ‘Sortes’, potest etiam iste idem terminus dici equivocum non primo.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquis terminus proprius est commune equivocum. Et ista patet de se.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliquis terminus proprius habet inferius. Ista patet sic: omne commune habet inferius; aliquis terminus proprius est communis; igitur aliquis terminus proprius habet inferius. Maior nota, et minor patet per precedentem conclusionem.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliqua propositio est singularis in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo. Que declaratur sic: omnis propositio est singularis cuius subiectum est terminus proprius; aliqua propositio in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo est propositio cuius subiectum est terminus proprius; igitur aliqua propositio in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo est propositio singularis. Maior patet per diffinitionem propositionis singularis, et minor patet de ista propositione ‘Sortes est homo’, in qua subicitur iste terminus communis ‘Sortes’ sine signo.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod nulla propositio est singularis cuius subiectum est terminus communis univocus primo sine signo et sine pronomine demonstrativo. Ista statim patet, quia omnis talis est indefinita. *Et si dicatur* quod ex predicta conclusione ista esset

11 partiali] ratione *add. necnon del. E* 26 subicitur] sine signo *add. necnon del. E*

indefinita: 'Sortes est homo' per diffinitionem propositionis indefinite, quia in ista subicitur terminus communis sine signo, *ad istud breviter* quod ista diffinitio intelligitur de termino communi uni⟨vo⟩co.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod aliqua est propositio singularis cui nulla mentalis eque simplex correspondet convertibiliter. Ista declaratur, et capiatur ista vocalis 'Sortes est homo', posito quod multi sint homines quorum quilibet vocatur 'Sortes', et capiatur mentalis sibi correspondens qui vocetur *A*, tunc subiectum ipsius *A* vel est simplex vel compositum. Si est simplex, vel est proprius vel communis. Si proprius, tunc tantum competit isti Sortes vel isti, et sic de singularis. Si est simplex, vel est proprius vel communis. Si proprius, tunc tantum competit isti Sortes vel isti, et sic de singularis, cum sit conceptus proprius, et per consequens | non correspondet convertibiliter isti termino 'Sortes', quiquidem terminus vocalis, per casum, correspondet isti Sorti, et correspondet isti Sorti, et isti, et sic de singularis. Si vero sit terminus communis, cum nullus conceptus sit commune equivocum, sequitur quod sit commune univocum, et per consequens non corespondet isti termini vocali 'Sortes'. Si sit terminus compositus, tunc est eque simplex sicut iste terminus vocalis 'Sortes'. Patet igitur quod nulla propositio mentalis eque simplex correspondet convertibiliter isti vocali 'Sortes est homo'.

11^{va}

20 ⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod aliqua mentalis sibi correspondet convertibiliter, quamvis non sit eque simplex, sicut ista res que vocatur Sortes.

Ex predictis igitur patet quid sit dicendum ad titulum questionis.

25 ⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem et etiam minorem et conclusionem, videlicet quod iste terminus 'Sortes' est terminus communis equivocus. Sed si accipiatur in maiori quod omne quod convertitur cum termino communi univoco est terminus communis univocus, tunc esset maior neganda.

30 ⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo conclusionem, scilicet, quod hoc disiunctum 'A vel B vel ⟨C⟩' esset convertibiliter cum isto termino vocali, et ulterius dicitur quod, sicut iste terminus 'Sortes' est terminus communis equivocus, ita hoc disiunctum 'A vel B vel C', quia hoc disiunctum predicatur de *A* ratione istius conceptus *A*, et predicatur de *B* ratione istius conceptus *B*, et de *C* ratione istius conceptus *C*, et ita predicatur de pluribus mediantibus diversis conceptibus.

35 ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo maiorem, quod omne superius est terminus communis equivocus vel univocus, et consimiliter concedi-

tur conclusio. *Et si dicatur* quod secundum Porphyrium³ sub individuis non contingit descendere, *ad hoc respondetur tripliciter*: primo quod ipse intelligit quod sub individuo non contingit descendere univoce; secundo potest dici quod ipse intelligit de individuo mentali sibi correspondenti
 11^{vb} convertibiliter; tertio potest dici quod ipse | intelligit de individuo pro- 5
 priissime accepto. Et quolibet istarum responsionum evacuat argumen-
 tum.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur quod subiectum ipsius *D* est terminus communis complexus univocus, scilicet, iste terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ qui convertitur cum isto termino ‘Sortes’. Ex hoc tamen non
 10 sequitur quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’ sit terminus univocus.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum ad oppositum dicitur concedendo istam ‘nullum proprium est commune univocum’ accipiendo ‘proprium’ pro nomine proprio, sicut in proposito accipitur. Cum hoc tamen stat quod sit commune equivocum. Unde talis terminus
 15 dicitur proprius, non quia non competit pluribus, sed quia nullus conceptus simplex cui tale proprium nomen correspondet, competit pluribus suppositionaliter sive totaliter distinctis.

14 proprium] propria *E*

3 *Isagoge*, II, 11 (6, 13–15) (sed non ad verbum): ‘(...) individua autem quae sunt post specialissima, infinita sunt. Quapropter usque ad specialissima a generalissimis descendentem iubet Plato quiescere (...)’

⟨QUESTIO 13⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum proprietas
unius individui inveniatur in altero.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

5 Ista proprietas *risibile* competit cuilibet homini, et ista proprietas
risibile est proprietas alicuius individui; igitur proprietas unius individui
competit alteri individuo. Ista consequentia est de se nota. Et prima
particula antecedentis, scilicet, quod ista proprietas sive istud proprium
risibile competit cuilibet homini, patet de se, et per Porphyrium,¹ quia
10 quilibet homo naturaliter est risibilis. Et secunda particula, scilicet, quod
sit proprietas alicuius individui, declaratur, quia est proprietas hominis,
et omnis homo est individuum; igitur est proprietas individui.

 ⟨2.⟩ Item. Si aliqua esset proprietas unius individui que non posset
competere alteri individuo, ista videtur maxime esse ista proprietas quod
15 est *predicari de uno solo*; sed hoc competit omni individuo; igitur pro-
prietas unius individui competit alteri individuo.

 ⟨3.⟩ Item. Omnis ⟨proprietas⟩ unius individui competit alteri indi-
viduo; igitur proprietas unius individui competit alteri individuo. Ista
consequentia est de se nota, quia arguitur *ab universali ad suam indefi-*
20 *nitam* sive *a toto universali* vel *a toto in quantitate ad suam partem* sive
sub⟨iecti⟩|vam. Et antecedens declaratur inductive, quia ista proprietas 12^{ra}
que est *esse Sophronisci filius* competit vel saltem potest competere alteri
individuo, quia suppositus potest habere plures filios. Similiter ista pro-
prietas *esse in isto loco*, *esse in isto instanti*, *esse istius longitudinis*, *esse*
25 *istius longitudinis*, *esse istius coloris*, et sic de quacumque alia proprie-
tate individuali, potest competere pluribus aliis individuis. Ergo videtur
quod nulla sit proprietas unius individui quin poterit competere alteri
individuo.

3 altero] *corr. ex aliquo E* 22 Sophronisci] *Subfronisi passim E* 25 istius] *compe(?)*
E

1 *Isagoge*, IV (12, 17–19): ‘(Quod) soli et omni et semper (accidit), quemadmodum homini esse risibile.’

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius, capitulo de *specie*,² ubi dicit: ‘Individuum autem dicitur ut Sortes et hoc album et hoc veniens et hic Sophronisci filius, et sequitur individua autem dicuntur huiusmodi quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, collectio numquam in alio in eodem erit. Sortis enim proprietas numquam 5 erit in alio particularium.’

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ In ista questione presuppono diffinitionem proprii positam a Porphyrio in textu, capitulo de ⟨*proprio*⟩,³ cui addo distinctionem talem, quod preter istas modos predictos de individuo in precedentibus questionibus positos, potest ‘individuum’ adhuc accipi dupliciter, quia 10 quoddam dicitur individuum *ut nunc*, et quoddam *simpliciter*. *Individuum ut nunc* potest istud dici quod pronunc non competit alicui nisi uni soli, ita quod non competat pluribus, quamvis sine nova impositione posset pluribus competere, et talia individua sunt omnes termini habentes tantum unum suppositum. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur 15 Porphyrius quando dicit quod filius Sophronisci sit individuum, idest, iste terminus ‘filius Sophronisci’, si solus sit ei Socrates filius. *Individuum* vero *simpliciter* dicitur istud quod non potest univoce pluribus competere sine nova impositione, sicut ‘Socrates’ et ‘hoc album’ et ‘hoc veniens’, etcetera. 20

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod proprietas individualis, accipiendo ‘proprietas’ sive ‘proprium’ primo vel secundo vel tertio modo quo accipit Porphyrius ‘proprium’,⁴ potest competere pluribus indi- 12^{rb} viduis. Ista | statim patet per primum argumentum principale, quia non oportet quod talis proprietas convertitur cum isto cuius est proprietas. 25

8 de] *seq. lac. 4 litt. E*

2 *Isagoge*, II, 15 (7, 19–25): ‘Individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc album et hic veniens, ut Sophronisci filius, si solus ei sit Socrates filius. Individua ergo dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quorum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit. Socratis enim proprietates numquam in alio quolibet erunt particularium (...).’

3 *Isagoge*, IV (12, 17–19): ‘(Quod) soli et omni et semper (accidit), quemadmodum homini esse risibile.’

4 *Isagoge*, IV (12, 12–17): ‘(...) et ⟨1⟩ id quod soli alicui specie accidit, etsi non omni, ut homini medicum esse vel geometrem, et ⟨2⟩ quod omni accidit, etsi non soli, quemadmodum homini esse bipedem, Et ⟨3⟩ quod soli et omni et aliquando, ut homini in senectute canescere (...).’

5 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod proprietas individualis acci-
piendo quarto modo ‘proprium’,⁵ scilicet, secundum quod convertitur cum isto cum quo est proprietas unius individui, numquam potest univoce alteri individuo competere. Ista conclusio statim
10 patet de se, quia, si convertitur cum aliquo individuo, non potest alicui alteri competere, quia, si posset, tunc cum tali individuo non converteretur, quia hoc vocatur ‘converti cum aliquo’, quando alteri ab ipso vel a suo convertibili vel a suo contento non potest competere univoce.

10 <AD 1.> Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod *risibile* est proprietas individui, quia istius individui quod est iste terminus ‘homo’. Et iterum conceditur quod est proprietas individui acci-
15 ‘individuum’ pro proprio nomine alicuius, quia est proprietas Sortis et non Platonis, sed non quarto modo, quia non est proprietas Sortis convertibilis cum Sorte, et ita diverso modo acci-
15 diversi mode possunt ist argumenta in proposito concedi et negari. Et totum patet.

 <AD 2.> Ad secundum dicitur negando assumptum, quia ista est proprietas convertibilis cum ‘individuo’ proprie accepto, idest, cum isto termino ‘individuum’ proprie accepto.

20 <AD 3.> Ad tertium dicitur concedendo consequentiam, et negando antecedens. Et ad probationem dicitur negando quod aliquod aliud individuum a Sorte, est istius longitudinis demonstrando longitudinem Sortis, et hoc proprie loquendo. Sed transsumptively loquendo bene potest concedi, et tunc stat loco istius ‘est equalis longitudinis vel consimilis
25 longitudinis’. Et ulterius etiam dicitur quod esse istius complexionis ratione simpliciter et compunctabiliter consimilis complexionis cum Sorte aliquid aliud individuum secundum Avicennam, primo *Canonum*, capitulo de *complexione*⁶ est impossibile. Sed quidquid sit de possibilitate, numquam inveniabantur, nec invenientur aliqua duo indivi-
30 dua compu(nc)tabiliter et totaliter consimilis complexionis vel consimilis proportionis membrorum quin aliqualis dissimilitudo fuerit. Et

4 conclusio] patet *add. necnon del. E* 7 quando] *i add. necnon del. E* 22 lon-
gitudinis] demonstrato de *add. necnon exp. E* 24–25 vel consimilis longitudinis]
vel consimilis longitudinis *superscr. E* 25 istius] competi(?) *add. necnon del. E*
25–26 complexionis] e *add. necnon del. E*

5 *Isagoge*, IV (12, 17–19): ‘quantum vero, in quo concurrat et soli et omni et semper, quemadmodum homini esse risibile.’

6 Avicenna, *Canon medicinae*. Locus non inventus. Fortasse l. I, 3.1?

consimiliter dicitur de aliis proprietatibus naturalibus, ut proprie loquendo quod nullum aliud individuum a Sorte est istius bonitatis, quamvis sit consimile.

12^{va} De ista proprietate individuali que est | 'esse in isto loco' dicitur quod non est proprietas Sortis nisi ut nunc, et non simpliciter.

5

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum patet per predicta, quid sit dicendum et qualiter Sophronisci filius sit individuum.

⟨QUESTIO 14⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum species
sit res distincta a termino sive a signo.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

5 Nihil dignum imperio est terminus vel signum; aliqua species est
digna imperio; igitur aliqua species non est terminus vel signum. Maior
est de se nota, et minor patet per textum Porphyrii,¹ quo dicitur quod
‘species Priami digna est imperio’.

10 ⟨2.⟩ Item. Nulla forma substantialis est terminus vel signum; aliqua
species est forma substantialis; igitur aliqua species non est terminus vel
signum. Maior est de se nota; et minor patet secundum istum textum
Porphyrii,² quo dicitur: ‘species autem dicitur de uniuscuiusque forma’.

15 ⟨3.⟩ Item. Nulla species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato, est terminus
vel signum; sed aliqua est species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato; igitur
aliqua est species que non est terminus vel signum. Maior declaratur,
quia nullo termino vel signo existente adhuc Sortes et Plato conveniunt
⟨in⟩ specie, et Sortes et albedo differunt; sed nullo termino existente
20 Sortes et Plato non conveniunt in aliquo termino; igitur species in qua
conveniunt Sortes et Plato, non est terminus vel signum. Et minor patet
de se, videlicet, quod aliqua sit species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato,
quia sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur: omne universale est terminus
vel signum; omnis species est universalis; igitur, omnis species e⟨s⟩t
terminus vel signum.

25 Maior videtur evidens, precipue secundum *modernos*, et satis apparet
ratione, quia omne predicabile de pluribus est terminus vel signum, quia
omne tale est aptum natum esse pars propositionis, et omne aptum

7 dicitur] dicit *E* 22 arguitur] ?? 3 *litt. add. necnon del. E* 23 omnis] omne *E*
25 evidens] propter *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, II, 1 (3, 21–4, 1): ‘(...) “Priami quidem species digna est imperio” (Porphyrius adfert locum Euripidis, *Aeolus*, fr. 8.2, Van Looy-Jouan.)

2 *Isagoge*, loc. cit.: ‘Species autem dicitur quidem et de uniuscuiusque forma (...)’

12^{vb} natum esse pars propositionis est terminus vel signum, saltem propositionis usitate, magis loquendo secundum intentionem Boecii supra primum *Perihermeneias*,³ | ubi vult quod omnis propositio sit vocalis, mentalis vel scripta. Et intelligitur de propositionibus communiter usitatis, quia in rei veritate aliqua est propositio mentalis qua quidam claustrales utuntur exprimendo mentis conceptum complexe per motum digitorum. Et minor predictae rationis, videlicet, quod omnis species sit universale, patet, quia est species et predicatur de pluribus. 5

Ad istam partem possunt fieri multa argumenta, que probant aliquam naturam in communi que non est signum vel terminus, esse universale, sed quia talia argumenta in pluribus locis inveniuntur, et ista opinio est ita usualis quod a nullo *modernorum* reputatur recitatione digna. Ideo omnia ista que ad istam materiam pertinent, diximus omittenda. 10

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio premittenda est ista quod ‘species’ accipitur multipliciter: uno modo pro pulchritudine; secundo modo pro forma; tertio modo pro diffinitione; quarto modo pro similitudine representativa; quinto modo pro quoddam universali. Et omnes isti modi pluries pate(n)t in diversis locis philosophie. 15

Nam primo modo accepta manifeste patet per textum et per istam propositionem *Sacre scripture*⁴ qua dicitur: ‘species non decept te, idest: pulchritudo’. 20

Secundo modo accipitur ab Aristotele, secundo *Physicorum*,⁵ et primo *De anima*,⁶ et in quampluribus aliis locis.

Tertio modo accipitur etiam ab Aristotele, primo *Posteriorum*.⁷

Quarto modo accipitur ab Aristotele, secundo *De anima*,⁸ ubi vult quod sensus sit susceptivus specierum rerum sensibilium sine materia. 25

10 terminus] a(?) *add. necnon del. E*

3 Boethius, *In librum De interpretatione Editio secunda*, I, 413 D (PL 64).

4 Dan. 13, 56

5 Aristoteles, *Physica* II, 1, 193b3–5: ‘Quare alio modo natura utique erit habendum in se ipsis motus principium forma et species, que non separata est sed aut secundum rationem’ – tr. vetus.

6 Vel potius Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 8, 432a2; *Auctoritates* 188 (165): ‘Intellectus est species specierum, id est formarum?’ Cf. Aristoteles, *De Anima* III, 8, 431b29–432a1. *Auctoritates* 188 (163): ‘Lapis non est in anima sed species ejus.’

7 Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica Posteriora* I, 11, 77a25–26.

8 Aristoteles, *De anima* II, 12, 424a17–20. *Auctoritates* 182 (103): ‘Omnis sensus est susceptivus omnium specierum sensibilium sine materia, sicut cera suscipit figuram sigilli auri sine auro.’ Aristoteles *De anima* II, 12, 424a17–20.

Et quinto modo accipitur a Porphirio.⁹

5 <CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Et secundum quemlibet istorum modorum ponende sunt alique conclusiones. Quarum prima est ista | quod aliquod 13^{ra}
 signum est species primo modo accepta, quia signum scriptum pulchritudine et proportionalitate est pulchritudo, et per consequens est species primo modo accepta; sed nullum signum vocale vel mentale proprie loquendo est aliqua talis species. Et patet totum.

10 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod non omnis species isto modo accipiendo ‘speciem’ est signum vel terminus. Et patet ista conclusio de se, quia multe res sunt pulchritudines reales que non sunt signa.

15 <CONCLUSIO TERTIA> Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua species secundo modo accepta est terminus vel signum, quia aliqua species secundo modo accepta, scilicet, pro forma, est quoddam signum mentale vel vocale, que quidem signa sunt forme accidentales.

<CONCLUSIO QUARTA> Quarta conclusio est ista quod non omnis species taliter accepta est signum, quia non omnis forma est signum.

20 <CONCLUSIO QUINTA> Quinta conclusio est ista quod omnis species tertio modo accepta est signum vel signa, quia omnis diffinitio est oratio, sicut patet per Aristotelem, sexto *Topicorum*¹⁰ (et) per Petrum Hispanum, capitulo de *locis*,¹¹ qui dicunt quod diffinitio est oratio indicans essentiam rei; sed omnis oratio est signum vel signa; igitur omnis talis species est signum vel signa.

25 <CONCLUSIO SEXTA> Sexta conclusio est ista quod aliqua species quarto modo accepta est signum vel terminus, quia conceptus lapidis que est similitudo representativa lapidis, est terminus mentalis de quo dicit Aristoteles, tertio *De anima*,¹² quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis.

3 ista] quod aliquod signum *add. E; idem textus invenitur intio f. 13^{ra}; sequitur textus scriptus sub columna, eadem manu, sed inverso modo cordis mente mente cordissime mente secis E 20–21 Petrum Hispanum] Petrum Inspanum E 24 Sexta] Octava E*

9 *Isagoge*, passim.

10 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, passim.

11 Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicae: tractatus quintus: de locis*, ed. De Rijk 60¹⁰: ‘Diffinitio est oratio quid est esse significans.’

12 Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 8, 431b29–432a1. *Auctoritates* 188 (163): ‘Lapis non est in anima sed species ejus.’ (Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 8, 431b29–432a1).

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod omnis species quinto modo accepta est signum simplex vel compositum. Et patet statim, quia omnis talis est predicabilis de pluribus; igitur omnis talis species est signum.

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Ex predictis ulterius sequuntur aliquae conclusiones. Sequitur igitur quod proprie loquendo nullo signo existente aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma, quia aliqua sunt que precise habent eandem formam substantialem. Ista patet secundum illos qui ponunt quod tota anima est in toto corpore et in qualibet eius parte, et per consequens capud et pes sunt eiusdem speciei, quia precise eandem formam habent.

⟨CONCLUSIO NONA⟩ Nona conclusio est ista quod nullo signo existente Sortes et Plato proprie loquendo secundum communem opinionem non sunt eiusdem speciei, quamvis forte secundum opinionem Commentatoris¹³ qui posuit unum intellectum esse in omnibus, possent dici in aliquo sensu ‘eiusdem speciei’, quia eiusdem intellectus. Ista conclusio patet, quia Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem forme.

⟨CONCLUSIO DECIMA⟩ Decima conclusio est ista: transsumptively loquendo nullo signo existente Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei, idest: Sortes et Plato habent consimiles formas ultimas.

⟨CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, I⟩ Sed contra istam conclusionem instatur, et probatur quod ista conclusio non sit ab aliquo asserenda, sed potius dubitanda, quia propter nullam aliam rationem ponendum est quod Sortes et Plato habent forma(s) ultimas eiusdem speciei vel omnino consimiles nisi quia eorum ultimate operationes que sunt intelligere, etcetera, sunt omnino consimiles. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quia, si sic, tunc Deus et angelus et anima dicitur esse eiusdem speciei, quia perfectissima operatio Dei est intelligere, et perfectissima operatio angeli est intelligere, et perfectissima operatio anime intelligere; sed clarum est quod ista non sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime. Sequitur igitur quod predicta ratio non valet.

⟨CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, II⟩ Item, nulli duo angeli sunt eiusdem speciei; igitur nulle due anime sunt eiusdem speciei. Conse-

6 igitur] ? 6 litt. add. necnon del. E 15 omnibus] tunc add. E | possent] possent E
20 ultimas] seq. lac. fere 20 litt. E 22 non] non sup. lin. E 26 etcetera] scilicet E

13 *Auctoritates* 191 (201): Commentator super *tertium De anima*: ‘Intellectus est omnibus communis (...)’. Averroes, *In De anima*, III, com. 1, p. 380, l. 44–45 (ed. F.S. Crawford 1953): ‘(...) cum intellectus sit communis omnibus, cognitio autem non.’

quentia videtur evidens, quia non videtur maior ratio ex una parte quam ex alia. Et antecedens patet communiter per theologos et specialiter per Thomam in prima parte *Summe*,¹⁴ ubi vult quod nulli duo angeli sunt eiusdem speciei, quia intellectio individuorum eiusdem speciei fit
 5 ratione materie et non ratione forme, quia forma est que distinguit et facit differentiam specificam.

⟨*CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, III*⟩ Item, non habemus, ut videtur, maiorem certitudinem, quamvis forte poteremus habere maiorem |
 apparentiam, quare ultimata forma Sortis et ultimata forma Platonis sunt
 10 eiusdem speciei quam quod ultimata forma Sortis et ultimata forma aranee sint eiusdem speciei, et ultimata forma asini, quia videmus manifeste quod aranea subtilius quam aliquod ingenium humanum posset attingere cum ponit rete suum, et hoc, ut videtur ex proposito, quia ad certum finem, scilicet ut capiat muscas. 13^{va}

15 ⟨*CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, IV*⟩ Confirmatur hoc idem per multas aves, que nutrite inter homines diversas (h)istorias didicerunt, et diversa in absentiiis, eisdem presentibus narraverunt.

⟨*CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, V*⟩ Confirmatur etiam per diversa animalia que videntur diversis factis prenoscitare futura, sicut corvi
 20 cantando prenoscitant pluviam, et cigni cantando prenoscitant mortem, et porci portando stramen prenoscitant tempestatem, utpote pluviam vel ventum, et sic quasi de infinitis, ex quibus potest elici evidetia iudicium rationale inesse aliis animalibus ab homine. Confirmatur etiam per asinum Balaam qui ordinate et discrete ipsi, Balaam loquebatur.¹⁵

25 ⟨*AD ARGUMENTUM CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, I*⟩ Ad primum istorum dicitur quod ista conclusio est asserenda et non dubitanda utendo radice Aristotelis primo *Physicorum*,¹⁶ ubi elicitur quod pluralitas sive diversitas non est ponenda sine ratione cogente; igitur ubicumque non est ratio cogens manifeste probans pluralitatem vel diversitatem

12 aranea] arania E; subtilissime verum *add. E* 12–13 attingere] adtingere E

16 didicerunt] e *add. E* 17 absentiiis] seu in absentiiis quod(?) *add. E* | eisdem] eisdem E 20 cantando] cantando *iter. necnon del. E*

14 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, 50,4: 'Si ergo angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos angelos unius speciei.'

15 Num., 22, 30

16 Aristoteles, *Physica* 1, 4, 188a17–18: 'Dignius autem est minora et finita recipere, quod vere facit Empedoclis' – tr. vetus; *Auctoritates* 141 (26): 'Melius est ponere principia finita quam infinita, ex quo habetur quod peccatum est fieri per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora.' Aristoteles., *Physica*, 1, 4, 188a17–18.

specificam naturalem, talis diversitas non est ponenda, quia inter ultimam formam Sortis et ultimam formam Platonis non apparet rationabiliter diversitas specifica. Asserendum est istos specie non differre.

13^{vb} *Ad probationem in oppositum dicitur* quod ista est una ratio, scilicet, 5
quod ultimata | operatio Sortis et ultimata operatio Platonis sint omnino
consimiles et aliunde non apparet diversitas. Quod non est verum de Deo
et de angelis et de anima, quia, quamvis ultimata operatio Dei et ultimata
operatio (anime) et ultimata operatio angeli sit intelligere, tamen aliunde
apparet diversitas specifica precipue inter Deum et animam, et inter
Deum et angelum, quia, sicut probat Aristoteles, octavo *Physicorum*,¹⁷ 10
Deus est virtus infinita, et angeli sunt virtutes finite, et per consequens
differunt specifice.

Sed contra hoc instatur quia: capiantur duo ligna eiusdem speciei
specialissime sive duo longitudines, tunc, si una illarum in infinitum
procedetur, non differet specie ab alia. Et consimiliter, ut videtur, sicut 15
est de extensione, ita de intensione, quia, si una albedo in infinitum
intenderetur, non magis differret specie a remissa albedine quam remissa
albedo vel albedo minus intensa. Ita, ut videtur, quamvis prima causa sit
virtus infinita et angelus et anima sint virtutes finite, propter hoc non
debent differe specie. 20

Et confirmatur, quia magis et minus non variant speciem.

Pro istis breviter dicitur quod duplex est 'intentio' quia quedam est
intentio que fit per simile semper, sicut, si cera protrahitur in longitu-
dinem, vel una longitudo qualitercumque per simile augmentatur, vel 25
una albedo intenditur per novam albedinem supervenientem, et talis
intentio, vel remissio, si in infinitum crescat, non variat speciem, quia fit
14^{ra} semper per simile. Sed sic non | (est) in proposito, quia Deus non inten-
ditur per aliquod simile, nec e(x)cedit proprie loquendo in natura sua
aliquam aliam virtutem, quia omne e(x)cedens est divisibile in excedens
et in id quod exceditur. Quod non contingit Deo, quia est una res indivi- 30
sibilis infinite perfectionis; angelus vero et anima sunt etiam virtutes
indivisibiles finite, et ideo ista differunt specie, non solum quia ista vir-
tus est finita et ista infinita, sed quia ista infinitas consistit (in) indivisibili
et ista finitas similiter.

5 operatio] opp app add. necnon del. E 8 anime] seq. lac. 5 litt. E 23 simile] e add.
necnon exp. E | si] sera add. necnon del. E 24 simile] acnimetur E 25 intenditur]
intendatur E | novam] novem E 26 remissio] vel add. necnon del. E

17 Aristoteles, *Physica*, VIII, 6. Sed non ad verbum.

Per hoc patet ad confirmationem, quia istud dictum intelligitur de maioritate que fit per additionem similis, et de minoritate que fit per subtractionem similis. De angelo vero et de anima probabiliter potest dici quod propter aliquam rationem naturalem non est asserendum
 5 ipsos differre specie, quamvis ob reverentiam doctorum istud tenentium teneatur.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, II⟩ Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam quantum est ad sensum naturalem, quia per nullam rationem naturalem potest probari nullos duos ange-
 10 los fore eiusdem speciei. Et ad Thomam dicitur quod, qui vult, potest credere, vel qui non vult, potest dimittere, quia ratio quam adducit, neminem cogit. ⟨Ad⟩ ultimam dicitur quod forma est que facit differentiam specificam, sed cum hoc stat quod forma sit que facit specificam convenientiam, quod satis patet de animabus separatis quas nullus ponit specie
 15 differre.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, III⟩ Ad tertium dicitur quod non haberemus maiorem | demonstrativam, sed unde
 14^{rb} veniat ista superioritas aranee ad apes, alibi suo loco patebit, quia non est presentis speculationis, nisi valde per ⟨accidens⟩, sed breviter dicitur
 20 ‘instinctu nature cum fantasia indeterminata’ de quo apparebit tertio *De anima*.¹⁸

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, IV⟩ Per hoc idem, patet ad quartum, quia multa talia fiunt cum fantasia indeterminata et instinctu nature mote per mutationes superiores, et per idem patet
 25 ad confirmationem.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM CONTRA CONCLUSIONEM DECIMAM, V⟩ Et ad ultimum dicitur quod accidit miraculose, et per consequens non debet ascribi talis locutio asini alicui forme naturali.

⟨CONCLUSIO UNDECIMA⟩ Undecima conclusio est ista quod, sive species accipiatur pro re que non est signum, sive pro signo, Sortes et
 30 Plato sunt eiusdem speciei. Quia, si accipiatur pro aliqua re que non est signum, tunc sunt eiusdem speciei secundum intellectum quem ponit decima conclusio, et si species accipiatur pro signo, tunc est conclusio de se manifesta, quia Sortes et Plato concipiuntur unico conceptu speciei

8 naturalem] dubitur E; negando consequentiam quantum est ad sensum naturalem iter. E mg. 12 Ad] sed E 14 ponit] dif add. necnon del. E 19 accidens] accipitur E

18 Thomas Manlevelt videtur ibi referre ad commentarium eius *Questiones super De anima*, III. Textum invenire non potui.

specialissime, et hoc est Sortem et Platonem esse eiusdem speciei logice loquendo.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem, videlicet quod aliqua species non est signum, sicut diffuse patet per conclusiones iam positas. 5

⟨AD 2.⟩ Per idem patet ad secundum, quia conceditur conclusio.

14^{va} ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando maiorem, istam scilicet, quod nulla species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum, quia conceptus specificus in quo | conveniunt Sortes et Plato, idest, terminus vel signum, quia conceptus specificus in quo conveniunt Sortes et Plato, scilicet, quo simul Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum. Et ad probationem dicitur quod argumentum probat quod aliqua species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato non est terminus vel signum, et cum hoc stat quod aliqua species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato, sit terminus vel signum, quia ista sunt subcontraria et possunt simul stare in veritate. Verumptamen ista propositio 'aliqua species in qua conveniunt Sortes et Plato non est terminus vel signum' in sensu proprio non est vera, si ista affirmativa implicetur 'aliqua est species in qua conve(niunt) Sortes et Plato, et ista non est signum vel terminus', quia in nulla anima sive forma conveniunt Sortes et Plato, quia nulla est una forma Sortis et Platonis. Sed transsumptive loquendo potest concedi ad istum intellectum quod Sortes et Plato habent duas formas maxime similes, vel qualem formam habet Plato, talem similem substantialem habet Sortes. 10 15 20

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum igitur in oppositum dicitur concedendo quod omne universale logicale est terminus vel signum, et hoc extendendo terminum et signum tam ad signum complexum quam incomplexum. Sed universale naturale non oportet quod sit terminus vel signum, cuiusmodi universale est Deus vel prima causa et omnes alie cause universales. Et in primo sensu conceditur conclusio. 25

4 diffuse] diffuse -om(?) E 8-11 signum, quia conceptus specificus in quo conveniunt Sortes et Plato, idest, terminus vel signum, quia conceptus specificus in quo conveniunt Sortes et Plato, scilicet, quo simul Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum] signum, quia conceptus specificus in quo conveniunt Sortes et Plato, scilicet, quo simul Sortes et Plato est terminus vel signum *mg. E* 13 Sortes et Plato] Sortes et Plato *sup. lin. E*

⟨QUESTIO 15⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum homo sit species animalis.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nullius animalis est homo species, igitur homo non est species animalis. Consequentia nota, et antecedens patet inductive.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si homo esset species animalis, cum genus et sua | species 14^{vb}
dicantur relative ad invicem, sequeretur quod homo et animal essent
relativa sibi invicem. Sed falsitas consequentis patet de se, quia homo
non est animalis homo, nec animal hominis animal.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod animal esset genus hominis. Con-
sequentia nota de se. Et quod consequens sit falsum patet, quia animal
non predicatur in quid de homine, quamvis 'animal' predicatur in quid
de homine, igitur animal non est genus hominis.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Nullus homo est species animalis, igitur homo non (est) spe-
cies animalis. Consequentia videtur evidens quia arguitur *ab universali*
ad suam indefinitam. Et antecedens patet inductive.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Animal potest esse sine homine, igitur animal non est genus
hominis. Ista consequentia patet ex hoc quod genus non potest esse sine
sua specie. Et antecedens patet ex textu Porphyrii¹ quia per hoc probat
quod genus est prius sua specie.

⟨6.⟩ Item. Si homo esset species animalis, sequeretur quod homo
mortuus esset species animalis. Consequentia patet, quia homo mortuus
in aliqua significatione est homo. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia sic
sequeretur quod homo mortuus esset animal et per consequens esset
substantia animata et igitur substantia viva, ergo non esset mortuus.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius qui frequenter ponit
animal esse genus hominis, et hominem esse speciem animalis.

7 dicantur] dicuntur E

1 *Isagoge*, x, 3 (15, 19–20): 'Et species quidem cum sit, est et genus, genus vero cum sit, non omnino erit et species.' Cf. *Isagoge*, vii, 3 (14, 11–12): '(...) si non sit animal, non est equus neque homo.'

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ In ista questione presupponitur distinctio de suppositione materiali et personali et simplici.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Qua presupposita prima conclusio est ista quod homo est species animalis. Que declaratur sic: animal est per se superius ad istum terminum ‘homo’, igitur iste terminus ‘homo’ est species vel
15^{ra} individuum | eius, et non individuum, igitur species.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod homo est species *animal*. Et patet ex prima quia est species istius termini ‘animal’.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod hec est concedenda: ‘omne “homo” est species animalis’, quia omnis talis terminus
10 ‘homo’ est species animalis, et per consequens omne homo, quia homo materialiter positum, ut communiter dicitur, est neutri generis, ergo etcetera.

Sed contra hoc instatur: ‘omne homo est species animalis, igitur istud homo est species animalis’. Consequentia est bona, et tamen istud homo
15 est individuum, et sic sequeretur quod aliquod individuum esset species animalis.

Ad istud breviter dicitur concedendo quod istud ‘homo’ sit species animalis quocumque tali termino demonstrato. Et ulterius conceditur quod individuum individualitate existentie est species animalis, sed non
20 individuum representationis.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla species que est homo, nec aliquod genus quod est animal dicuntur relative ad invicem. Ista conclusio patet, quia sic sequeretur quod homo et animal
25 dicerentur relative. Falsitas consequentis patet de se.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod species et genus que verificentur de homine et animali, dicuntur relativa ad invicem, quia isti duo termini ‘species’ et ‘genus’.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur distinguendo antecedens eo quod iste terminus ‘animalis’ potest accipi materialiter vel personaliter.
30 Si personaliter, vera est, sicut patet per eius probationem. Si vero materialiter, adhuc distinguenda est eo quod potest supponere materialiter eo modo quo aliquid supponit pro se, et sic adhuc est vera, quia iste terminus sive iste obliquus ‘animalis’ non est genus hominis. | Vel potest
15^{rb} supponere materialiter eo modo quo obliquus supponit materialiter pro 35

suo recto, et sic antecedens est falsum, quia homo est species animalis, idest: istius termini 'animal'.

5 (AD 2.) Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia ista propositio 'genus et species sunt relativa sibi invicem' est vera secundum quod isti duo termini 'genus' et 'species' supponant materialiter, et non personaliter.

10 *Et si tunc arguatur* sic: omne genus dicitur relative ad suam speciem; animal est genus; igitur animal dicitur relative ad suam speciem, *ad istud dicitur* negando maiorem, quia iste terminus 'genus' quamvis sit genus, tamen propter penuriam nominum non videtur habere aliquam speciem ad quam dicitur relative.

Sed si tunc argueretur sic: omne genus dicitur universale ad speciem, dicitur concedendo; si sit subiectum, supponit materialiter, quia iste terminus 'genus' dicitur relative ad speciem, et omnis terminus consimilis.

15 (AD 3.) Ad tertium dicitur negando istam consequentiam 'igitur animalis est genus hominis', quia, quamvis in ista propositione 'homo est species animalis', iste genitivus 'animalis' ex communi consuetudine loquendi supponit materialiter pro suo recto, hoc tamen non est vera in ista propositione 'animalis est genus hominis', quia non est talis consuetudo loquendi, et tamen consuetudo maximam vim habet in modo loquendi.

(AD 4.) Ad quartum dicitur concedendo antecedens et consequens in sensu in quo sequitur ex antecedente, et hoc est in sensu in quo supponit personaliter. Cum hoc tamen stat quod homo est species animalis, scilicet quod ly homo supponit materialiter, et tunc est indefinita istius universalis 'omne homo est species animalis' accipiendo istum terminum 'homo' materialiter et per consequens universaliter.

30 (AD 5.) Ad quintum dicitur quod animal potest esse sine homine, et negando ulterius consequentiam, si ly 'animal' stat materialiter. Et ad probationem dicitur concedendo quod genus non potest esse sine sua specie, non de virtute sermonis, sed ad istum intellectum quod genus non potest esse genus sine sua specie, et hoc est dictu quod ista propositio est impossibilis: | 'genus est et nulla species est'. Et ulterius ad 15^{va} Porphirium dicitur quod iste accipit in ista propositione 'genus est prius sua specie'² istum terminum 'genus' personaliter, et non materialiter ad istum intellectum quod iste terminus 'animal' est prior quam iste

10 non] non *sup. lin. E*^c

2 *Isagoge*, x, 2 (15, 18–19): 'priora sunt naturaliter genera.'

terminus ‘homo’, sed non quod iste terminus ‘genus’ est prior isto termino ‘species’.

⟨AD 6.⟩ Ad sextum dicitur quod probabiliter potest dici quod, sicut ‘homo’ accipitur equivoce pro homine vivo et mortuo, ita ‘animal’, et ideo, sicut iste terminus ‘homo’ acceptus pro homine vivo est species istius termini ‘animal’ accepti pro animali vivo, ita iste terminus ‘homo mortuus’ vel ‘homo pictus’ est species istius termini ‘animal’ accepti in tali significatione, scilicet pro animali mortuo vel picto, et pro tali significatione non verificatur de animali ista diffinitio sive ista ratio ‘substantia animata sensibilis’ secundum quod elicitur ab Aristotele in primo *Predicamentorum*,³ ubi vult quod iste terminus ‘animal’ sit equivocus ad animal verum et ad animal pictum, et non secundum eandem rationem verificatur de utroque.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum ad oppositum patet per iam dictam.

3 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 1, 1a3: ‘Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur.’ – tr. Boethii.

⟨QUESTIO 16⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genus
et species sint sibi invicem relativa.

⟨1.⟩ Arguitur primo quod non.

5 Omnia relativa sunt simul natura, sed genus et species non sunt simul
natura, igitur genus et species non sunt sibi invicem relativa. Maior est
Aristotelis in *Predicamentis*, capitulo de *relatione*.¹ Et minor patet per
Porphyrium qui dicit quod genus est prior specie,² ex quo sequitur quod
genus et species non sunt simul natura.

10 ⟨2.⟩ Item. Si genus et species essent relativa sibi invicem, cum non
maiori ratione unum genus vel species quam aliud genus vel species,
sequeretur quod omne genus et species essent relativa sibi invicem. Et per
consequens hoc genus *substantia* et species essent relativa sibi invicem;
sed consequens falsum, igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis
15 patet, quia substantia ad nullum refertur relative.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si essent relativa sibi invicem, sequeretur quod ista conse-
quentia esset bona 'genus igitur alicuius specie genus'; sed consequens
falsum, | igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia iste 15^{vb}
terminus 'genus' est genus, et tamen nullius speciei est genus, sicut
20 potest probari inductive. Et quod iste terminus 'genus' est genus, patet
quia est ipsummet. Item, iste terminus 'genus' vere vocatur genus, igitur
iste terminus 'genus' est genus.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est textus Porphyrii qui dicit quod genus
et species sunt relativa sibi invicem, quia dicit sic: 'noscere autem oportet
25 quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, ideo
necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.'³

19 genus] *lac. 3 litt. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 7, 7b15: 'Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura.' – tr. Boethii.

2 *Isagoge*, x, 2 (15, 18–19): 'priora sunt naturaliter genera.'

3 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 5–7): 'Nosse autem oportet (quod), quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.'

⟨Distinctio⟩ In ista questione premitto conclusiones que in precedentibus questionibus premittebantur.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod non omne genus, accipiendo ‘genus’ materialiter, est alicuius speciei genus. Et patet ista consequentia de isto termino ‘genus’.

5

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus est species specialissima. Ista patet de isto termino ‘genus’ qui, quamvis vocetur ‘genus’, est tamen species specialissima istius generis quod est *universale*.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio que sequitur ex istis, quod aliqua coordinatio generalissimi et specialissimi ⟨est⟩ sine speciebus subalternis mediis, sicut patet de ista coordinatione: ‘universale genus, hoc genus’.

10

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod non omne genus et species sunt sibi invicem relativa. Ista conclusio patet ex predictis de isto termino ‘genus’ accepto pro seipso.

15

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod omne genus est alicuius speciei genus, si ly ‘genus’ supponat personaliter, et omnis species est alicuius generis species, si ly ‘species’ supponat personaliter. Et ex hoc sequitur ista indiffinita quam intelligit Porphirius, et saltem quam vult intelligere ‘genus est alicuius genus, species est alicuius species’.⁴

20

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale ⟨dicitur⟩ concedendo conclusionem quod genus et species non sunt simul natura, quia indiffinita est, et vera, sicut patet per predictas conclusiones. Et cum hoc stat quod genus et species sunt simul natura.

25

16^{ra} Pro quo est notandum quod ‘aliquid esse genus’ potest intelligi | dupliciter: vel quia vocatur vere ‘genus’, vel quia est divisibilis. Primo modo iste terminus ‘genus’ est genus, et non secundo modo, et ideo non oportet in primo sensu acceptus iste terminus ‘genus’ quod relative dicitur, sed secundo modo, et sic intelligit Porphirius. Et ulterius dicitur concedendo quod genus est prius specie subiecto et predicato stantibus personaliter et non materialiter, et hoc intelligit Porphirius.

30

18 omnis] omnes E 20 ista] istarum (?) E 22 primum] d *add. necnon del. E*
30 intelligit] intelligitur E 31 subiecto] subiectum E

4 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 5–8): ‘(...) et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species.’

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur negando istam quod non maiori ratione unum genus et species sunt relative quam aliud genus et species. Et hoc patet in presenti questione et in ista.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur quod ista consequentia ⟨est⟩ bona: 'aliquod
 5 genus est genus, ergo alicuius speciei genus', et e converso, istis terminis 'genus' et 'species' stantibus personaliter, et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod sint relativa ad invicem.

Ad ultimum dicitur concedendo quod iste terminus 'genus' est genus primo modo acceptum non secundo modo.

10 ⟨AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum patet per iam dicta.

⟨QUESTIO 17⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum in
diffinitione speciei sit necesse poni genus.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Quia ista est diffinitio speciei magis ab omnibus approbata: 'species 5
est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid
est',¹ sed in ista diffinitione non ponitur genus, igitur non est necesse in
diffinitione speciei poni genus. Prima particula antecedentis patet per
Porphirium, qui dicit quod hec quidem assignatio speciei specialissime
est et que solum ⟨species⟩ est, alie vero erunt non specialissimarum,² 10
igitur videtur quod ista diffinitio sit magis specialis et magis distincta.
Et secunda particula antecedentis patet de se.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omne quod debet poni in diffinitione alicuius, debet esse
notius diffinito; sed genus non est notius specie, igitur genus non debet
poni in diffinitione speciei. Maior videtur ex hoc evidens quod omne 15
istud quod ponitur in diffinitione alicuius, ponitur diffinitivum, et omne
notificans notius est notificato, quia omnis notificatio fit per notiora quia
aliter non notificaret. Et minor etiam patet, videlicet quod genus non sit
notius specie, quia genus et species sunt relativa, et unum relativorum
non est notius reliquo, ex eo quod unum non potest cognosci sine 20
16th reliquo, | sicut patet per Aristotelem, capitulo de *relatione*,³ ubi dicit
sic: 'Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquid eorum que sunt
ad aliquid distincte sciret, istud ad quod dicitur distincte sciturus est.'

17 notificato] notificata E 18 notificaret] notificarent E | patet] scilicet *add. necnon del. E* 19 notius] notius *iter. E* | unum] unum *sup. lin. E*; omne *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, II, 4 (4, 1–12): '(...) species est quod de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit praedicatur.'

2 *Isagoge*, II, 4 (4, 13–14): 'Sed haec quidem assignatio specialissimae est et quae solum species est, aliae vero erunt etiam non specialissimarum.'

3 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 7, 8a37: 'Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquod eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur definite sciturus est.' – tr. Boethii.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Species ponitur in diffinitione generis, igitur genus non debet poni in diffinitione speciei. Ista consequentia patet per Aristotelem, secundo *Posteriorum*,⁴ et sexto *Topicorum*,⁵ in quibus locis videtur reprobare diffinitionem circularem.

5 ⟨4.⟩ Item. Species potest diffiniri sine hoc quod genus ponatur in eius diffinitione, igitur non est necesse poni genus in diffinitione speciei. Consequentia est de se nota, et antecedens declaratur, quia species potest esse quamvis non sit genus, igitur species diffinitur sine eo.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 1.⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius,⁶ qui dicit: ‘idcirco
10 necesse est in utrorumque utrisque uti.’

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 2.⟩ Item. Genus et species sunt relativa sibi invicem, et unum relativorum non potest distincte cognosci sine reliquo, igitur necesse est genus poni in diffinitione speciei. Prima particula antecedentis patet per textum Porphyrii in precedenti questione allegata.⁷ Secunda
15 particula patet per auctoritatem Aristotelis, capitulo de *relatione*, iam allegatam.⁸

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ In ista questione premittitur prima distinctio quod ‘diffinitio’ accipitur tripliciter, scilicet, large, stricte et strictissime, hoc dictu est: communiter, proprie et propriissime.

20 *Diffinitio large accepta* extendit se ad quemcumque connotationem, sive convertibilem, sive non convertibilem cum diffinito.

Diffinitio stricte accepta non extendit se ad connotationem, sed ad descriptionem sive diffinitionem datam per additamentum, et talis diffinitio datur per genus et per proprium et aliquando per plura accidentia,
25 sive per plures terminos accidentales qui simul compositi faciunt unum accidens convertibile cum diffinito, sicut patet in ista diffinitione ‘homo est animal et bipes, recte intendens’.

13 genus] genus *sup. lin. E* | particula] patet per *add. necnon del. E* 17 questione]
pret *add. necnon del. E* 20 connotationem] vocale *add. E*

4 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* II, 4, 91a35–b11.

5 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 4, 142a34.

6 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 7): ‘(...) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’

7 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (5, 5–7): ‘Nosse autem oportet (quod), quoniam et genus alicuius est genus et species alicuius est species, idcirco necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’ Videas supra, Q. 16, AD OPP.

8 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 7, 8a37: ‘Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis aliquod eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite sciet, et illud ad quod dicitur definite sciturus est.’ – tr. Boethii. Videas supra, 2.

Diffinitio vero strictissime accepta vocatur illa que componitur ex genere diffiniti et differentia specifica cum diffinito convertibili, sicut patet de ipsa diffinitione ‘substantia animata sensibilis’.

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod quedam est notificatio remissa et quedam perfecta et quedam perfectior et quedam perfectissima. 5

Remissa vero generat aliqualem notificationem utrum quid significatur per terminum vel per notitiam confusam. Que quidem notificatio habet multos sensus.

Notificatio perfecta est illa qua scitur de aliqua re aliquas suas proprietates | accidentales sibi inesse. 10
16^{va}

Notificatio perfectior est illa qua scitur proprietates propriissimas alicuius rei secundum aliquid inesse.

Notificatio perfectissima est illa qua scitur res diffinire propriissime et proprie et communiter, hoc est qua cognoscitur differentia specifica convertibilis rei inesse, et qua cognoscuntur proprietates rei inesse, et etiam qua cognoscitur accidens talis rei sibi inesse, et per consequens ista notitia est composita ex pluribus notitiis vel saltem est plures notitias supponens. 15

Et de omnibus istis notitiis essent ponende diverse conclusiones, sed quia prius in pueri instrumentis iste questiones co(m)pilantur, igitur difficilioribus conclusionibus omissis pauca faciliores ad titulum questionis directe pertinentes ad presens sunt ponende. 20

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Quarum prima est ista quod non cuiuslibet relativi prima notitia qua cognoscitur quid tale relativum significat, est eius notitia diffinitiva per suam correlarium. Ista demonstratur, et ponitur gratia exempli quod Sortes ignorat quid pater significat et quid filius significat; tunc clarum est: si dicetur Sorti ‘pater est istud quod habet filium’, ex hoc Sortes ignorat quid iste terminus ‘filius’ significat. Adhuc non noscitur quid iste terminus ‘pater’ significat saltem distincte. 25
30
35
oportet quod, si Sortes debeat cognoscere quid iste terminus ‘pater’ significat per istam diffinitionem ‘pater est istud quod habeat filium’, oportet ipsum precognoscere quid iste terminus ‘filius’ significat aliqua alia notitia a notitia diffinitiva istius termini ‘filius’, quia, si queratur ‘quid est filius?’ et si respondeatur quod filius est istud quod habet patrem, adhuc 35

3 substantia] est *add. necnon del. E* | animata] est *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 16 cognoscuntur] rei *add. necnon del. E* 35 si] sic *E*

⟨quis⟩ ignorat quid est pater, ignorat etiam quid est filius. Igitur non cuiuslibet relativi prima notitia qua scitur quid tale relativum significat, est notitia diffinitiva.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod prima notitia alicuius relativi qua scitur ⟨quid⟩ tale relativum significat, causatur per aliquam informationem non diffinitivam sed potius narrativam. Ista conclusio quodam modo patet per conclusionem iam positam, et declaratur exemplariter, nam, si Sortes ignoraret quid significat pater et filius, tunc, si quereret ‘quid est filius?’, oportet quod narretur quod filius est
10 res que habet animam sensitivam cuius causa generativa existit in rerum natura, et quia ista oratio est longior, quamvis convertitur cum isto termino ‘filius’, ideo proprie non est diffinitio, cum secundum Aristotelem, sexto *Topicorum*,⁹ diffinitio sit oratio compendiosa indicans quid sit ⟨in⟩ re.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod possibile est primam notitiam ⟨esse⟩ diffinitivam. Ista declaratur quia: ponatur quod Sortes sciat nar[rative] quid iste terminus ‘filius’ significat et ignoret quid
16^{vb} significat iste terminus ‘pater’, sicut possibile, tunc, si Sortes quereret ‘quid est pater?’ et respondeatur scilicet quod pater est istud quod habeat
20 filium, tunc Sortes primo scit quid iste terminus ‘pater’ significat per notitiam diffinitivam, quia per istam orationem compendiosam ‘istud quod habet filium’.

 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod omnis notitia informativa ab homine vel a libero presupponit credulitatem addiscentis.
25 Ista conclusio declaratur, quia tento casu priori quod Sortes sciat narrative scilicet quid filius significat, et querat ab aliquo ‘quid est pater?’, qui sibi respondeat ‘pater est istud quod habet filium’, si Sortes non sibi credat, tunc Sortes adhuc non scit quid est pater. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod oportet addiscentem credere.¹⁰

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod possibile est aliquem scire quid relativum significat principale sine hoc quod sciat quid significat suum correlarium. Ista conclusio potest probari ex predictis, quia possibile est aliquem scire quid significat principaliter istud relativum ‘filius’ per orationem narrativam, ut, si quis dicat cui credit quod

1 quis] ex E 4–5 notitia] ali *add. necnon del. E* 5 quid] qua E 9 filius] ratio proprie *add. necnon del. E* 24 homine] *seq. lac. 2 litt. E*

9 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI. Vel potius I, 5, 101b39; VII, 5, 154a31.

10 Cf. Aristoteles, *Topica* VIII, 3, 159a11–14.

filius est res que habet animam sensitivam cuius rei causa particularis effectus existit in rerum natura, quamvis ignoret quid significat iste terminus 'pater'.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod impossibile est aliquem scire diffinitive quid relativum significat principaliter et connotat nisi sciat quid significetur per suum correlarium. Ista patet, quia impossibile est aliquem scire quid iste terminus 'pater' significat per istam diffinitionem 'istud quod habet filium' nisi sciat quid iste terminus 'filius' significat. Et patet totum ex predictis, et hoc supposito quod ista sit diffinitio patris sicut in rei veritate suppono quod sit ad presens.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod necesse est necessitate conditionata genus poni in diffinitione speciei ad istum intellectum quod hec sit vera: si species bene diffinitur, genus poni(tur) in eius diffinitione. Ista consequentia patet per textum Porphirii allegatum.¹¹

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio speciei: 'species est quod predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in esse quod quid' non est bona, sed de ista conclusione erit specialis questio immediate sequens.¹²

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur sicut iam innuit ultima ⟨conclusio⟩, quod ista diffinitio speciei non est bona, sicut patebit infra.¹³

17^{ra} ⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod omne quod ponitur in diffinitione alicuius notificante ipsum | aliqua notitia, debet esse notius, sicut patet ex predictis, sed non oportet quod sit notius notitia diffinitiva. Et ulterius dicitur quod quamvis genus et species sint relativa, tamen possibile est unum istorum aliqua notitia notius esse reliquo quamvis non notitia diffinitiva. De ista materia plenius pertractabitur suo loco.¹⁴

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam. Et ad Aristotelem dicitur quod ipse intelligit de diffinitione propriissime dicta, quia talis est semper alicuius absoluti, ideo non debet esse circularis et tali diffi-

8 quod] quod *sup. lin. E* 23 oportet] ? *del. E*; oportet *sup. lin. E*

11 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 7): '(...) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.' Videas *supra*, AD OPP, 1.

12 Videas *infra*, Q. 18.

13 Videas *infra*, Q. 18.

14 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (xiv) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, Q. 63: Utrum unum relativorum poterit distincte cognosci ab aliquo licet reliquum ab eodem distincte non cognoscatur, ff. 93^{vb}-94^{vb}.

nitio[n]e non diffinitur aliquod relativum. Unde non est <in>conveni[n]s diffinitionem relativorum esse circularem, sed potius est necessarium.

<AD 4.> Ad quartum dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad probationem dicitur negando quod species potest esse sine hoc quod sit genus, quam-
 5 vis tamen ista sit vera de virtute sermonis, sed negatur ad istum intellectum in quo frequenter accipitur a multis, quod adhuc sit possibile species <esse> sine genere. Et patet ista responsio ex textu Porphyrii.¹⁵

<AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM> Ad argumentum in opposito patet satis per predicta.

7 esse] est *E*

15 *Isagoge*, x, 3 (15, 9–20): ‘Et species quidem cum sit, est et genus, genus vero cum sit, non omnino erit et species.’

⟨QUESTIO 18⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum ista diffinitio
speciei ‘Species est que predicatur de pluribus
numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit’, sit bona.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5

Ista diffinitio non convertitur cum diffinito, igitur non valet. Consequentia patet per Aristotelem, sexto *Topicorum*,¹ et antecedens probatur, nam ista diffinitio competit enti, quod est unum transcendens et quod nec est genus nec species.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Competit enti generalissimo quod nullo modo est species, 10
quia genus generalissimum predicatur de pluribus speciei differentibus,
et per consequens numero differentibus.

⟨3.⟩ Item. In ista diffinitione non ponitur genus, sed genus et species
sunt relativa, igitur ista diffinitio non est bona. Consequentia patet per
hoc quod necesse est in diffinitione unius relativi reliquum poni, ut patet 15
per textum Porphirii in ipso illegatum.² Et antecedens notum est de se.

17th ⟨4.⟩ Item. Individuum predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in
eo quod quid, et individuum non est species, igitur predicta diffinitio
non est bona. Consequentia videtur | evidens, et antecedens declaratur:
posito quod ‘Sortes’ significet duos homines diversis impositionibus, 20
tunc: ‘iste homo est Sortes, et iste homo est Sortes’ demonstratis illis
duobus, igitur etcetera.

Pro istis argumentis *dicunt aliqui* supponendo diffinitionem quod diffinitio debet sic suppleri: ‘species est que predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus, et non specie, in eo quod quid’. Per istam suppletionem 25
nituntur excludere argumenta prius facta.

Sed contra hoc arguitur, quia, quamvis possent excludere quedam argumenta, non tamen omnia, quia non istud argumentum: unde posito

6 Ista] igitur E 10 generalissimo] lac. 3 verb. E 28 argumentum] generale(?) add. E

1 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 3, 140b21–23: ‘Si vero aliquid eorum quae sunt in diffinitione non omnibus insit quae sunt sub eadem specie, impossibile est totam diffinitionem propriam esse; non enim conversim praedicabitur.’

2 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 7): ‘(...) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.’

quod nullum esset in rerum natura, adhuc iste terminus ‘homo’ predicaretur de pluribus numero differentibus et non specie in eo quod quid, et tamen iste terminus ‘homo’ non esset tunc species, per illum textum³ quo dicitur ‘species ergo alicuius generis species’.

5 <AD OPPOSITUM> Ad oppositum videtur textus Porphirii,⁴ qui dicit de ista diffinitione quod ipsa est specie specialissime.

<CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista quod probabiliter potest teneri quod predicta diffinitio, etiam cum suppletionem, non est bona, sicut probant argumenta ad hoc facta.

10 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio ‘species est que immediate ponitur sub genere’ est bona diffinitio, quia est brevis oratio convertibilis cum diffinito indicans quid significatur in diffinito, et hoc sufficit ad bonitatem talium diffinitionum.

15 <CONCLUSIO TERTIA> Tertia conclusio est ista quod diffinitio speciei specialissime debet sic suppleri: ‘species specialissima est que ponitur immediate sub genere et que de pluribus numero differentibus et non specie univoce predicatur in eo quod quid’.

Et si queratur quare istam diffinitionem non posuit Porphirius, dico quod Porphirius loquebatur sicut diversi alii auctores solent loqui, scilicet aliqua exprimendo et aliqua subintelligendo tamquam prius dicta, sicut Aristoteles diffiniens ‘nomen’ primo per istas subintelligit aliquas particulas diffinitiones quas postea plane declarat; et ita Porphirius⁵ in proposito aliquam particulam subintelligit tamquam prius dictam, istam scilicet ‘species est que immediata | ponitur sub genere etce- 17^{va}
25 tera’.

<CONCLUSIO QUARTA> Quarta conclusio est ista quod, si cui placeat, probabiliter potest teneri predictam diffinitionem sine ista particula ‘que immediate ponitur sub genere’ esse bonam.

30 <AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM> Et ad argumentum in oppositum potest dici negando istam consequentiam ‘species, ergo alicuius generis

8 predicta] predicte E 13 diffinito] diffinitum E 27 teneri] tenere E

3 Videas infra, AD OPP.

4 *Isagoge*, II, 4 (4, 13–14): ‘Sed haec quidem assignatio specialissimae est et quae solum species est (...)’

5 *Isagoge*, II, 3 (4, 9–11): ‘Assignant ergo et sic speciem: species est quod ponitur sub genere (...)’

species', sed bene sequitur 'ergo alicuius individui species', nec Porphirius⁶ dicit 'species, ergo alicuius generis species', sed dicit 'species, ergo alicuius species'.

Sed contra hoc arguitur, scilicet quod hoc non sit intentio Porphirii⁷ per istum textum qui sequitur 'necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti', et ideo melior est opinio antedicta, scilicet quod genus et species sint sibi invicem relativa secundum intentionem Porphirii.

Verumtamen posset dici quod 'species' accipitur aliquando relative respectu generis, et sic competit sibi ista diffinitio 'species est que ponitur immediate sub genere'; aliquando accipitur relative respectu alicuius individui, et sic competit sibi ista diffinitio 'species est que predicatur de pluribus etcetera', et hoc forte intelligit Porphirius⁸ quando dicit 'sed species quidem individuorum velut ea continens, species autem superiorum velut ea que ab eis continetur', et ita species non secundum eandem rationem dicitur 'species superioris' et 'species inferioris', sed secundum diversas rationes, et per consequens equivoce et secundum hoc competunt sibi diverse diffinitiones.

⟨AD RATIONES PRINCIPALES⟩ Ad rationes principales satis patet per predicta.

6 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 6): '(...) species alicuius est species (...)'

7 *Isagoge*, II, 2 (4, 7): '(...) necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrisque uti.'

8 *Isagoge*, II, 7 (5, 13–16): '(...) sed species quidem individuorum velut ea continens, species autem superiorum, velut quae ab eis continetur.'

⟨QUESTIO 19⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum omne quod
est ante individua, sit species specialissima.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Quia si sic, sequeretur quod genus generalissimum est species specialissima, quia est ante individua, cum sit per se superius ratione individuorum. Ad hoc breviter *dicitur* quod Porphirius intelligit quod immediate sit ante individua.

10 ⟨2.⟩ Sed contra hoc arguitur et probatur quod non omne istud quod immediate est ante individua, erit species, quia sic sequeretur quod iste terminus ‘Sortes’ esset species specialissima. Consequens falsum, sicut de se patet, quia nullum individuum est species specialissima, ut patet ex textu Porphirii;¹ sed Sortes est individuum, sicut patet ex eodem textu Porphirii.² Et consequentia declaratur, quia Sortes est immediate
15 ante individua, sicut posito quod decem sint homines quorum quilibet vocatur proprie conceptu *Sortes*, tunc sequitur ‘iste homo est, | ergo Sortes est’ demonstrato aliquo istorum decem et non sequitur e converso, 17^{vb}
igitur Sortes est superius ad hoc individuum quod est iste homo.

20 ⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod hoc disiunctum *Sortes vel Plato* esset species specialissima. Falsitas consequentis patet ex hoc quod sic sequeretur, quod homo non esset species specialissima, cuius oppositum vult Porphirius.³ Consequentia patet, quia sequeretur immediate ‘Sortes est, ergo Sortes vel Plato est’, et non e converso.

25 ⟨4.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod homo esset species specialissima. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia, ut patet per textum Porphirii,⁴ homo immediate dicitur individua, et per consequens est immediate ante

20 patet] patet *sup. lin. E*

1 *Isagoge*, II, 7 (5, 2–6): ‘(...) homo, cum sit species post quam non sit alia species neque aliquid eorum quae possunt dividi, sed solum individuorum – individuum enim est Socrates et Plato – species erit sola, et ultima species et, ut dictum est, specialissima.’

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

individua. Falsitas consequentis decleratur, quia, si homo esset species specialissima, tunc prediceretur in quid de suis individuis. Consequentia patet per diffinitionem speciei specialissime, et falsitas consequens decleratur, quia ista predicatio non est in quid: ‘igitur homo est homo’, quia non convenienter respondetur, si queratur ‘quid est iste homo?’ respon- 5
dendo quod sit homo, quia talis responsio non est apta nata removeri <dubium> querentis quod habet de tali questione, quia quicumque querit ‘quid est iste homo?’ sit verum quod sit homo.

<5.> Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod albus esset species specialissima, quia est immediate ante ista individua *hoc album*. Sed falsitas consequentis 10
declaratur sicut in proxima ratione.

<AD OPPOSITUM> Ad oppositum est Porphirius in textu iam allegato,⁵ qui dicit: ‘omne quod est ante individuum proximum species erit sola, et non genus’.

<DISTINCTIO> In ista questione premittitur distinctio de anterioritate reali 15
et logicali, et quod ‘anterioritas’ in proposito accipitur brevitatis gratia pro ‘superioritate per se’.

<CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista quod omne quod est proxime et univoce ante individua, est <species> specialissima, si illud immediate et per se supponitur generi. Ista conclusio patet per auctoritatem 20
Porphirii,⁶ ad oppositum questionis allegatam.

<CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod sub specie specialissima nihil continetur nisi individuum, et hoc secundum quod est species specialissima, quia, si aliunde esset genus, utpote secundum 25
18^{ra} per textum Porphirii,⁷ | in quo declarat quod genus generalissimum est istud supra quod non est aliud genus superveniens, et species specialissima est quod sic est species quod nullo modo genus, et sub qua non est aliqua alia species.

5 queratur] sicut *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 15 premittitur distinctio] premissa distinctiones *E* 19 species] secunda *E* 25 secus] secus *sup. lin. E*

5 *Isagoge*, II, 6 (4, 32–5, 1): ‘Et omne quod ante individua proximum est, species erit solum, non etiam genus.’

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Isagoge*, II, 8 (5, 17–20): ‘Determinant ergo generalissimum ita, (...) supra quod non est aliud superveniens genus, specialissimum vero, (...) quod cum sit species, numquam dividitur in species (...)’

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquid est per se ante individua proxime quod non est species specialissima, nec genus, sed individuum. Ista conclusio patet de propriis nominibus plura proprie et diversim significantibus que sunt autem pronomina demonstrativa, quamvis equivoce, ut supposito quod Sortes significet decem homines diversim mediantibus propriis earum conceptibus; sequitur enim tunc 'iste est' demonstrato aliquo eorum decem, 'igitur Sortes est', et non e converso, ergo Sortes est superior et prior, et ante ista pronomina demonstrativa.

10 *Sed contra conclusionem instatur* probando quod Sortes sit commune univocum, nam quod sit commune, patet per argumentum iam factum,⁸ et quod sit univocum, persuadetur sic: posito quod scribitur ista propositio in pariete 'Sortes currit' quam videat Plato et intelligat, tunc ex tali visi resulta(t) aliquod complexum in mente Platonis, quod vocetur *A*;
15 tunc capiatur subiectum ipsius *A*, et quero utrum sit conceptus proprius vel (appellativus); si sit conceptus appellativus, habetur propositum, quia tunc tali conceptui correspondet iste terminus vocalis 'Sortes', nam, sicut tota vocalis correspondet toti mentali, ita pars parti, utpote subiectum subiecto, predicatum predicato, et omnis terminus correspondens uni
20 conceptui appellativo est commune univocum; Sortes est huiusmodi, igitur etcetera. Nec potest dici quod subiectum ipsius *A* sit conceptus proprius, quia non maiori ratione unius individui significati per 'Sortes' quam alterius, sed non omnes conceptus proprii individuorum significatorum per 'Sortes' sunt subiecta ipsius *A*, igitur nullus conceptus proprius
25 significatus per 'Sortes' est subiectum ipsius *A*.

Ad istud dicitur breviter sicut prius quod 'Sortes' est commune equivo- cum⁹ et non univocum saltem respectu | talium individuorum quorum 18^{rb} est nomen proprium mediantibus propriis eorum conceptibus. Et ulterius dicitur quod in mente Platonis resultat unum complexum cuius
30 subiectum non est aliquod subiectum simplex appellativum vel proprium, sed est quoddam compositum ex pluribus conceptibus, utpote tale compositum: *aliquid quod vocatur 'Sortes'*.

2 proxime] proximo *E* 11 factum] et *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 12 et quod sit univocum] et quod sit univocum *sup. lin. E* 15 capiatur] Sortes(?) *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 16 appellativus] applicativus *E* | habetur] haberetur *E* 17 tunc] tunc *sup. lin. E* 25 significatus] significati *E* 28 proprium] ?? 5 *litt. del. E* 32 vocatur] vocatur *sup. lin. E* | Sortes] De isto adhuc plenius proprium. *add. E*

8 Videas supra, Q. 12, CONCL. 7.

9 Videas supra, Q. 12, CONCL. 3.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum principale sicut superius dicebatur.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam ‘Sortes est ante individua immediate, igitur est species specialissima’, sed oportet addere ‘per se et univoce’, et sic intelligit Porphyrius.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando consequentiam, et ulterius dicitur, 5 sicut iam dictum est, quod hoc disiunctum *Sortes vel Plato* non est ante individua univoce, sed equivoce.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum conceditur quod sic species specialissima sit quod predicatur de individuis in quid proprissime; verumtamen dicendum est quod individuum est duplex, scilicet purum et impurum. ‘Purum et simplex’ dicitur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum; ‘impurum’ est compositum ex pronomine demonstrativo et nomine appellativo ut ipso subiecto. De primo intelligit Porphyrius. Unde, quamvis per ‘hominem’ non convenienter respondetur ad istam questionem ‘quid est iste homo?’, tamen convenientissime respondetur ad istam questionem ‘quid est iste?’ demonstrato aliquo individuo homine; et de istis individuis puris exemplificat Porphyrius,¹⁰ quando dicit: ‘individua sunt ut Socrates, ut hic, et hic, et hoc’. De individuis ⟨impuris⟩ exemplificat, quando dicit: ‘individuum enim dicitur ut “hoc album” et “hoc veniens” et “Sophronisci filius”, si solus sit ei Socrates filius.’¹¹ Unde inter individua 20
18^{va} non pura adhuc sunt diversi gradus | sicut ex hoc dicto potest elici.

⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum dicitur concedendo quod album sit species specialissima, et quod predicatur in quid de suis individuis puris.

Et si dicatur contra: hoc non convenienter ⟨respondetur⟩ per ‘album’, si queratur, ‘quid est hoc?’ demonstrato albo, sed si queratur, ‘quale est hoc?’, *ad istud dicitur* quod intellectibus deficiunt nobis nomina propria individuorum, et ideo oportet nos uti pronomine demonstrativis loco illorum convenientissime significantibus, sicut talia propria nomina, si essent, connotative significarent, et ideo, quia talia pronomina demonstrativa taliter possunt accipi equivoce, utpote absolute et connotative, respondens debet interrogare interrogantem, utrum accipit hoc pronomen demonstrativum ‘hoc’ absolute vel connotative, quia, si accipitur 30

9 dicendum] dicendum *sup. lin. E*; dictum *add. necnon del. Et exp. E* 13 ut] et *E*
18 impuris] nonpo *add. necnon del. E*; purus *E* 19 hoc veniens] hoc veniens *mg. E*
20 Sophronisci] et sufficit *add. necnon del. E* 21 adhuc] adhuc *E* 22 quod] hoc
add. necnon del. Et exp. E 25 est] sit *E* 27 nos] nos *sup. lin. E* 31 respondens]
respondens *sup. lin. E*

10 *Isagoge*, I, 6 (2, 18–19): ‘(...) sicut individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (...)’

11 *Isagoge*, II, 15 (7, 19–21): ‘Individuum autem dicitur Socrates et hoc album et hic veniens, ut Sophronisci filius, si solus ei sit Socrates filius.’

absolute, tunc est individuum substantie et non qualitatis, et secundum hoc aliter respondendum est. Si vero accipiatur secundum quod est individuum qualitatis, tunc convenienter respondetur si queratur 'quid est hoc?', dicendo 'hoc est album' vel 'hoc est calidum'.

- 5 <AD ARGUMENTUM AD OPPOSITUM> Ad argumentum in oppositum patet iam dicta.

⟨QUESTIO 20⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum
individuum sit nomen appellativum.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

Istud nomen ‘Sortes’ est individuum, istud est nomen appellativum, 5
igitur nomen appellativum est individuum. Maior nota, quia est nomen
proprium. Patet etiam ex textu.¹ Minor probatur, quia convenit pluribus
per appellationem posito, sicut ad presens supponitur, quod istud nomen
‘Sortes’ significet plura mediantibus diversis eorum conceptibus.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omne istud quod convertitur cum nomine appellativo, 10
est appellativum; Sortes est huiusmodi; igitur etcetera. Maior apparet
evidens. Et minor declaratur, quia convertitur cum isto ‘aliquo istorum’
demonstratis illis quorum quilibet vocatur ‘Sortes’, nam quidquid est
aliquid istorum, est Sortes, et e converso.

18^{vb} ⟨3.⟩ Item. Omne istud quod correspondet tamquam signum subordi- 15
natum conceptui, | est appellativum; Sortes est huiusmodi; igitur etce-
tera. Maior elicitur satis ab Aristotele, primo *Perihermeneias*,² ubi dicit
quod voces sunt note earum passionum que sunt in anima. Ex quo eli-
citur quod accidentia grammaticalia nominum vocalium capiunt origi-
nem ab accidentibus grammaticalibus nominum mentalium. Unde vox 20
omnis dicitur nomen, etcetera, quia correspondet conceptui nominali,
et pari ratione non dicitur appellativus nisi quia correspondet concep-
tui appellativo. Et minor declaratur: posito quod ista propositio ‘Sortes
scribit’ scribitur in pariete quam videat Plato, tunc capiatur complexum
quod resultat in mente Platonis; et queritur de subiecto illius complexi, 25
et probetur quod sit appellativum sicut in precedente questione argue-
batur.³

5 nomen] est *add. E* 24 scribit] scribit *iter. E*

1 *Isagoge*, I, 6 (2, 18–19): ‘(...) individua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc (...)’; *Isagoge*, II, 7 (5, 5): ‘(...) individuum enim est Socrates (...)’; *Isagoge*, II, 15 (7, 19–20): ‘Individuum autem dicitur Socrates (...)’

2 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, I, 16a3–4: ‘Ea quae sunt in voce sunt earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae.’

3 Videas supra, Q. 19, CONCL. 3.

⟨4.⟩ Item. ‘Sortes’ simpliciter convertitur cum isto termino communi sive appellativo ‘res que vocatur Sortes’, quia quidquid est Sortes, est res que vocatur Sorte, et e converso: quidquid est res que vocatur Sortes, est Sortes.

5 ⟨AD OPPOSITUM 1.⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur, quia sic sequeretur quod individuum esset universale, non tantum individuum existentie quia hoc nullum esset inconveniens, sed potius necessarium, sed etiam individuum predicationis.

10 ⟨AD OPPOSITUM 2.⟩ Sequeretur etiam quod prima substantia esset secunda, quia proprium nomen esset, vel species.

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ In ista questione presupponitur primo quod ‘individuum’ semper accipitur pro individuo individualitate predicationis et non existentie.

15 ⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secundo presuppono quod omnis terminus appellativus sit universale.

20 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Quibus presuppositis prima conclusio est ista quod nullum individuum est nomen appellativum. Ista conclusio statim sequitur ex iam dictis suppositionibus, quia: nullum individuum est universale; omnis terminus appellativus est universale, igitur nullum terminus appellativus est individuum, et ultimum, igitur nullum individuum est appellativum.

25 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod nullum individuum correspondet conceptui appellativo absolute, primo et principaliter. Ista | conclusio patet, quia si sic, sequeretur quod tale individuum 19^{ra} esset appellativum per argumentum superius positum.

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquod individuum quod est nomen proprium, correspondet conceptui appellativo connotative sive accidentaliter, secundario et ex consequenti. Ista conclusio declaratur, quia visa ista propositione scripta a Platone scilicet ‘Sortes currit’, tunc clarum est quod ex tali visione resultat in mente Platonis aliqua propositio que vocatur *B*. Tunc non potest dici quod subiectum istius *B* sit conceptus proprius, quia non maiori ratione esset conceptus proprius unius significati per ‘Sortes’ quam alterius et tale subiectum non est omnis conceptus proprius significati per istum terminum

‘Sortes’; igitur nullus conceptus proprius significati per ‘Sortes’ est subiectum ipsius *B*. Nec potest dici quod omnis conceptus communis absolutus sit subiectum ipsius *B*, quia non conceptus hominis vel animalis, et sic de aliis conceptibus absolutis communibus in coordinatione predicamentali substantie. Relinquitur igitur quod aliquis conceptus connotativus sit subiectum ipsius *B*, utpote talis conceptus *aliquis conceptibilis res que vocatur Sortes*; sed iste conceptus correspondet isto termino ‘Sortes’, quia, sicut tota propositio vocalis correspondet toti mentali, sic pars principalis parti principali, utpote subiectum subiecto, et predicatum predicato. Et iste terminus vocalis ‘Sortes’ non est correspondens tali conceptui connotativo primo et principaliter, igitur ex consequenti et secundario.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est terminus accidentalis, non substantialis. Ista patet ex predictis, quia nullus terminus connotativus est in predicamento substantie, sed iste terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est terminus connotativus alicuius extrinseci, igitur non est in predicamento substantie et per consequens non est terminus substantialis.

19^{rb} ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Ex ista conclusione sequitur correlarie hoc, quod iste terminus ‘res que vocatur | Sortes’ est in predicamento qualitatis. Quia: non est in predicamento substantie, sicut iam dictum est,⁴ nec est in aliquo alio predicamento accidentali a predicamento qualitatis, quia ad nullum interrogativum alicuius alterius predicamenti, convenienter respondetur per istum terminum de individuo, sicut patet. Relinquitur ergo quod sit in predicamento qualitatis, ex quo ulterius sequitur correlarie quod si queratur ‘qualis est ista res?’ demonstrato Sorte, convenienter respondetur quod ‘hec res est res que vocatur Sortes’.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod aliquod individuum sive nomen proprium convertitur cum termino appellativo, sicut patet de isto individuo Sortes et de isto termino ‘aliquis istorum’ demonstratis illis quorum quilibet vocatur ‘Sortes’.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum principale igitur dicitur negando minorem, et ad probationem negatur consequentia, scilicet: ‘convenit pluribus per appellationem, igitur est appellativum’. Sed oportet addere quod convenit pluribus univoce.

6 conceptus] *B add. necnon del. E* 17 per] *conen add. necnon del. E* 20 predicamento] *corr. ex predicamentis E*

4 Videas supra, CONCL. 4.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod patet per ultimam conclusionem, scilicet quod maior est falsa; sed omne quod convertitur univoce cum termino appellativo est appellativum. Unde, quamvis ‘Sortes’ convertitur cum nomine appellativo, non tamen univoce, sed equivoce.

5 ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium negatur maior, sed oportet addere quod omne istud quod correspondens est conceptui appellativo primo et principaliter, est appellativum; sed sic non facit ‘Sortes’, quia, si correspondet conceptui appellativo, hoc est secundarie, et ex consequenti, ex ⟨h⟩abilitate accipientis. Qui capit ex tali propositione ‘Sortes currit’ – posito casu
10 presenti – propinquum sensum quem potest habere. Et ideo, quia visa tali propositione ‘Sortes currit’ non potest videns propinquum sensum habere quem talem ‘aliquid quod vocatur Sortes, currit’, ideo ex consequenti et per accidens valde iste terminus ‘Sortes’ correspondet conceptui appellativo.

15 ⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartam patet per predicta, quia quamvis convertatur, istud non est univoce, sed equivoce, et ideo non oportet quod sit appellativum.

⟨AD ARGUMENTA AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumenta in oppositum: qualiter concludunt, patet per predicta.

6 quod] est *add. necnon del. E* 9 accipientis] excipientis *E* 10 sensum] quee *add. necnon del. E* 17 oppositum] qualiter *add. necnon del. E*

⟨QUESTIO 21⟩

19^{va}

Consequenter queritur | utrum unum sit
genus omnium; hoc est querere, utrum talia
transcendentia aliquid, res, ens, sint genera.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

5

Ens est universale, et non est species vel differentia etcetera, ergo
e(s)t genus. Conclusio videtur evidens, quia omne universale est genus
vel species vel differentia (etcetera), sicut satis vult Porphyrius in textu.¹
Et prima particula probatur, scilicet quod ens sit universale, quia ens
predicatur de pluribus univoce, igitur ens est universale. Consequentia 10
patet per Aristotelem, primo *Perihermeneias*,² ubi sic definit universale.
Et antecedens patet, quia 'ens' predicatur univoce de Sorte et de Platone
et de asino et de equo et sic de aliis individuis substantie. Et secunda
particula antecedentis, scilicet quod ens non (sit) species, patet de se.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omne istud quod predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus 15
in eo quod quid, est genus; ens est huiusmodi; igitur etcetera. Maior patet
per diffinitionem generis. Et minor declaratur, nam quod 'ens' predicatur
de pluribus specie differentibus, de se notum est; et quod predicatur
in quid, declaratur posito quod Sortes dubitet de Platone, utrum sit in
rerum natura vel non, tunc, si Sortes querat, quid sit Plato, et aliquis cui 20
queret respondeat quod Plato sit ens, tunc dubium querentis (removetur)
per talem responsonem, igitur responsio fuit conveniens, igitur 'ens'
predicatur in quid.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si queratur 'quid est substantia?' convenienter respondetur
quod sit ens per se subsistens, igitur ens predicatur in quid. Consequentia 25
nota, quia omne istud predicatur in quid per quod convenienter respon-
detur ad questionem factam per 'quid?', sicut patet per textum. Et ante-
cedens patet, quia convenienter respondetur ad questionem factam per

2 unum] unum *E*^c 8 Porphyrius in textu] Porphyrius in textu *E* *mg.* 13 equo]
Platone *E* 14 species] *seq. lac. 3 litt. E* 28–265.1 per quid] per quid *sup. lin. E*

1 *Isagoge*, proem. (1, 1–4): 'Cum sit necessarium (...) nosse quid genus sit et quid
differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens' et passim.

2 Vel potius Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, VII, 17a39–40: 'Universale est quod aptum
natum est praedicari de pluribus (...)'

quid de aliquo per eius diffinitionem, sicut patet inducendo per singula, ut si queratur, quid sit homo, convenienter respondetur quod sit animal rationale mortale, et si queratur quid sit animal, convenienter responde-
 5 tur quod sit substantia animata sensibilis; igitur, pari ratione, si queratur
 quid est substantia, convenienter respondetur quod sit res per se existens,
 quia ista est diffinitio substantie.

⟨4.⟩ Item. | Ista est conveniens interrogatio, igitur sibi correspondet 19^{vb}
 conveniens responsio et non alia quam illa, igitur ista est conveniens
 reponso. Assumptum probatur, quia, si per aliquam reponsonem que-
 10 rentis posset responderi, detur ista.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum videtur quod sit Porphirius in textu, qui
 dicit quod non est unum ⟨genus⟩ omnium sicut est unus pater omnium,
 et specialiter facit mentionem de ente, negando ipsum esse genus.³

In ista questione breviter recitande sunt alique opiniones, secundo po-
 15 nende sunt alique conclusiones, et tertio solvende sunt principales ratio-
 nes.

⟨OPINIO PRIMA⟩ Est igitur una *opinio* que fuit *Porphirii et aliorum*
antiquorum, scilicet quod ens non est genus, quia predicatur equivoce
 de aliquibus suis contentis, sicut de substantia et accidente. Et ad hoc
 20 confirmandum Porphirius⁴ allegat textum Aristotelis, qui dicit: ‘si quis
 omnia entia enuntiet, equivoce nuncupabit’.

Sed quamvis ista opinio posset esse vera quantum ad conclusionem
 principalem, scilicet quod ens non sit genus, non tamen est vera quan-
 tum ad rationem dictam, scilicet quod ens non predicatur univoce de
 25 subiecto et accidente. Quod probatur sic: omne istud predicatur uni-
 voce de aliquibus de quibus aliquid predicatur secundum nomen et
 secundum eandem rationem; sed sic predicatur ens de substantia et acci-
 dente; igitur predicatur de illis univoce. Maior patet per Aristotelem in

8 responsio] corresponsio E 12 omnium] annum E | omnium] annum E 17 fuit]
 fuiat E

3 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 5): ‘Neque est commune unum genus omnium ens (...)’

4 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 9): ‘(...) si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce (...) nuncupabit, non univoce.’ Porphyrius videtur referre ad Aristotelem, *Metaphysica* VII, 2, 1003a33–34. Cf. Aristoteles *Metaphysica* IV, 2, 1003a33–34: ‘Ens autem multis quidem dicitur modis, sed ad unum et ad unam aliquam naturam et non equivoce’ – rec. et tr. Guillelmi de Moerbeka.

principio *Predicamentorum*.⁵ Et minor patet, quia predicatur de eis secundum hoc nomen 'ens', et secundum istam rationem quo existit in rerum natura, sive sit per se sive in alio.

⟨OPINIO SECUNDA⟩ Item. *Aliqui* arguunt sic: quandocumque alique tres propositiones sic se habent quod in dubio sunt due, et tertia certa sive ⟨s⟩cita, et quod habent idem subiectum, tunc aliud est predicatum propositionis scite a predicato propositionis dubie; sed sic se habent iste tres propositiones: 'ista quantitas est substantia', | 'ista quantitas est accidens', 'ista quantitas est ens', nam prima et secunda alicui sunt dubie, et tertia est eidem scita; igitur aliud est predicatum in mente propositionis scite a predicato alicuius aliarum propositionum. Et per consequens unus est conceptus entis distinctus a conceptu substantie et conceptu accidentis.

Sed ad istud nituntur *aliqui* dicere conceptum entis non esse simplicem sed compositum, disiunctum ex conceptu substantie et accidentis, ita quod isti predicato ⟨enti in hac propositione⟩ 'hec quantitas est ens' correspondet hoc disiunctum *substantia vel accidens*.

Sed istud videtur multiplicare dictum, quia intantum experitur conceptum entis esse simplicem sicut conceptum substantie vel conceptum accidentis.

⟨OPINIO TERTIA⟩ Item. *Si dicatur* quod ens sit equivocum analogice sicut *multi* dicunt, quia per prius predicatur de substantia et per posterius de accidente,

tunc quero quid intelligunt per 'prius'. Et non possunt intelligere aliquam prioritatem nisi prioritatem perfectionis, utpote quod substantia sit perfectius ens quam accidens. Sed talis equivocatio non impedit aliquid esse genus, quia hoc genus *animal* tali prioritatem per prius competit homini quam asino, eo quod homo sit per prius animal quam asinus. Et consimiliter hoc genus *substantia*, eo quod Deus sit perfectior substantia in infinitum quam aliqua alia substantia. Et hoc est etiam quod

10 est] sit *E* 14 istud] aliud *E*

5 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* I, 1a9–10: 'Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantie ratio, ut animal homo atque bos.' – tr. Boethii.

Aristoteles dicit septimo *Physicorum*,⁶ quod in genere latent multe equivocationes.

Teneo igitur ad presens quod ens in sua maxima communitate acceptum sit univocum univocatione nominis et rationis et univocatione conceptus; non tamen nego quin ens posset aliter accipi, secundum quam
5 acceptionem esset equivocum sicut forte *antiqui* dixerunt.

⟨OPINIO QUARTA⟩ *Alia* est *opinio* tenens quod ens sit universale transcendens, et hoc propter argumentum prius factum de predicatione univoca ipsius entis; | sed tamen ex hoc, ut dicunt, non sequitur quod sit
10 genus vel species vel differentia, quia ista divisio non est universalis transcendens, sed universalis non-transcendens. Et causa quare ens non sit genus quamvis sit universale, est quia non predicatur in quid. 20^{rb}

Sed quamvis ista rationabilior sit precedenti, videtur tamen dicere preter intentionem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, qui videntur secundum eos in
15 hoc diminuti. Nunquam faciunt mentionem de universali transcendente, cum tamen materia de universalibus esse(t) ab eis diffusius pertractata, et precipue a Porphyrio.

Item, equaliter possunt salvare quod ens non sit universale, quia, sicut dicunt quod ens non es(t) genus, quia non predicatur in quid, ita possunt
20 dicere quod ens non sit universale, quia non predicatur de pluribus in aliqua interrogativa.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est quod ens non est universale, quia non est genus nec species etcetera, et alia numquam ponebantur universalia ab aliquo.

25 Circa istam conclusionem tamen nota quod ponitur tamquam probabilis et non tamquam necessaria, precise cum argumentum ab auctoritate negative non tenet. Quamvis inducat evidentiam, non tamen necessario concludit.

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquid predicatur de pluribus univoce quod non est universale. Ista sequitur ex precedenti, quia 'ens' predicatur de pluribus univoce, non tamen est

1–2 equivocationes] teo *add. necnon del. E* 15 universali] universale *E*

6 Aristoteles, *Physica* VII, 4, 249a22–24: 'Et significant ratio hec quod genus non unum aliquod, sed iuxta hec latent multa, suntque equivocationum alie quidem multum distantes, alie quidem habentes quandam similitudinem, alie autem proxime aut genere aut similitudine, unde non videntur equivocationes esse cum sint.' – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 155 (193): 'Aequivocationis latent in generibus.' (Aristoteles, *Physica*, H4, 249a22–24).

universale. Item, omne universale predicatur in aliquo interrogativo; sed aliquid quod predicatur de (pluribus) univoce, non predicatur in aliquo interrogativo; igitur aliquid quod predicatur de pluribus univoce, non est universale. Maior elicitur ex textu Porphyrii⁷ quo dicitur omnem predicationem universalem esse in quid vel in quale; cum communia (?) aliter se habea(n)t, per hoc innuens predicationes aliorum interrogativorum, utpote istorum ‘quotiens’, ‘ubi’, ‘quando’, etcetera.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod ‘ens’ est pars alicuius predicati quod predicatur in quid, quia istius predicati ‘ens per se subsistens’.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est quod ens est pars generis, quia pars istius predicati quod est ‘ens per se subsistens’. Et quod hoc sit genus patet, quia predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo | quod quid, sicut iste terminus ‘substantia’.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum principale in oppositum dicitur quod antecedens est falsum. Ad probationem: negatur consequentia, scilicet ‘ens’ predicatur de pluribus univoce, igitur ‘ens’ est universale; sed oportet addere quod ‘predicatur de pluribus in aliqua interrogativa’; vel posset dici quod ‘predicari univoce’ stricte accipiendo ly ‘univoce’ includit ‘predicari in aliqua interrogativa’, et secundum hoc posset negari quod ens predicatur univoce.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum negatur quod ‘ens’ predicatur in quid. Ad probationem: ‘quod dubium alicuius removetur per aliquam responsionem’ potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet primo et per se, vel secundario et ex consequenti. Modo, ita est quod in casu argumenti removetur dubium querentis per talem responsionem non primo et per se, sed ex consequenti et secundario, quoniam quesito ‘quid est?’, secundum Aristotelem, secundo *Posteriorum*,⁸ presupponit questionem ‘si est?’. Et ideo talis

28 presupponit] si est *add. necnon del. E*

7 Exempli causa *Isagoge*, I, 10 (3, 5–8): ‘A differentia vero et ab his quae communiter sunt accidentibus differt genus quoniam, etsi de pluribus et differentibus specie praedicantur differentiae et communiter accidentia, sed non in eo quod quid sit praedicantur, sed in eo quod quale quid sit.’ *Isagoge*, XIV, 4 (17, 10–12): ‘Et genera quidem in eo quod quid sit praedicantur de his quae sub ipsis sunt, accidentia vero in eo quod quale aliquid sit vel quomodo se habeat unumquodque.’

8 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* II, 8, 93a20, b16–17: ‘impossibile enim est scire quid est, ignorantes si est’ – tr. Iacobi; *Auctoritates* 319 (102): ‘Impossibile est quod quid est scire et ignorare, si est ipsius quod quid est, non est demonstratio’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, B8, 93a20, b16–17).

responsio non removet dubium Sortis ratione sui ipsius, sed ratione illius quod supponit. Et ideo propter hoc non oportet quod predicetur in quid ad intentionem Porphyrii.

- 5 ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur quod concesso quod hoc predicatum *ens per*
 5 ⟨*se*⟩ *subsistens* predicatur in quid, non tamen sequitur quod ens tantum
 ⟨predicatur⟩ in quid, quia est pars predicati, et non totum predicatum.
 Et ulterius dicitur quod, quamvis conclusio superius posita sit quod hoc
 predicatum predicatur in quid,⁹ posset tamen probabiliter dici quod non
 10 predicatur in quid proprie, sed large; sed potius predicatur in quid et in
 quale, sicut alie diffinitiones in argumento recitato. Nihilominus eque
 probabiliter potest teneri quod predicatur in quid large accipiendo ‘pre-
 dicare in quid’, sicut iam dictum est. Et ulterius dicitur quod substantia
 proprie non habet diffinitionem quid rei, eo quod non habet genus supra
 se quo poterit habere diffinitionem quid nominis.
 15 ⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum patet per iam dicta.

5 subsistens] existens *E*

9 Videas supra, CONCL. 3.

⟨QUESTIO 22⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum tantum sint
decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora.

20^{vb} ⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur | primo quod sint *plura*.

Quia sunt decem genera generalissima mentalia et decem vocalia et 5
decem scripta.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Secundo. Sunt plura quam decem scripta, sicut de se notum
est. Quod hoc genus *substantia* pluries quam decens scribitur, de se patet.
Et consimiliter alia genera generalissima scripta.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Hoc idem declaratur de generibus generalissimis vocalibus 10
et de generibus generalissimis mentalibus, quia plures quam decies pro-
ferunt⟨ur⟩, et concipiuntur.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Universale est genus generalissimum, et tamen non est genus
generalissimum quantitatis vel qualitatis et sic de singulis; igitur plura
sunt genera generalissima quam decem. Consequentia nota de se. Et 15
antecedens patet, quantum ad primam particulam, quia iste terminus
‘universale’ predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid,
quia, si queratur ‘quid est genus quantitatis?’, respondetur quod sit uni-
versale.

⟨5.⟩ Item. *Quale* est genus generalissimum, et non aliquod genus gene- 20
ralissimum ab Aristotele in *Predicamentis*¹ enumeratum; igitur plura
sunt genera generalissima quam decem. Consequentia nota. Et antece-
dens patet, quia cuilibet conceptui mentali correspondet unum genus
generalissimum, quia aliter esset in coordinatione predicamentali pro-
cessus in infinitum, quod reprobatur Aristoteles primo *Posteriorum*;² igitur 25

8 decens] deciens *E* | scribitur] sciretur *E* 23 quia] quilibet *add. necnon del. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 4, 1b25–28: ‘Eorum quae secundum nullam complexio-
nem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam significat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem
aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.’ – tr.
Boethii.

2 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* 1, 22, 84a8–10: ‘neque in sursum neque in deorsum
infinita predicantia contingit esse in demonstrativis scientiis’ – tr. Iacobi. *Auctori-
tates* 317 (74): ‘Non contingit ire in infinitum in praedicamentis, nec ascendendo, nec
descendendo, sed utrobique est status.’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, A22, 83b7,

in ista coordinatione *hoc album, album, coloratum, quale* correspondet aliquod genus generalissimum, et non aliud quam hoc genus generalissimum *quale*, igitur et cetera. Et quod non aliquod aliud genus, patet, quia non hoc genus *qualitas*, quia hec est falsa: ‘album est qualitas’, precipue accipiendo ‘qualitatem’ concretive.

5 (6.) Item, quod sint *pauciora* genera generalissima, probatur: omne quod est, aut continetur in predicamento substantie vel in predicamento qualitatis; igitur superfluunt alia genera generalissima a genere generalissimo *substantie*, et a genere generalissimo *qualitatis*. Consequentia videtur evidens, qui talis diversitas oritur ex diversitate rerum. Et antecedens patet secundum *modernos*, qui ponunt omnem rem esse substantiam vel qualitatem.

(7.) Item. Coordinationes accidentales habent unum signum eis correspondens, scilicet hoc genus *accidens*; igitur non sunt decem generalissima. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet, quia omne istud quod est, est substantia vel accidens, et accidens predicatur in quid et univoce de | omnibus residuis generibus a substantia. Quia, si queratur ‘quid est qualitas?’, convenienter respondetur quod sit accidens, et consimiliter ‘quid est quantitas?’, et sic de aliis novem generibus accidentium.

15 20 (8.) Item. Accidens est universale, quia predicatur de pluribus in aliquo interrogativo, et non est aliud universale quam genus generalissimum, quia non potest dici quod sit species, nam sic esset inferius ad aliud genus, quod videtur falsum. Et probatur falsitas per Aristotelem primo *Posteriorum*,³ qui vult quod talis (est) immediata ‘nulla substantia est accidens’, quod non esset verum si accidens haberet aliquod superius quod posset esse medium probandi predictam negativam, ut si sic argueretur: ‘nulla qualitas est substantia, omne accidens est qualitas,

21^{ra}

17 univoce de] omnibus residuis *E. mg.* [scripta intra angulum quadratum, cf. prima verba f. 21 ra – probatio pennae?]. Sequitur textus scriptus sub columnis, eadem manu, sed inverso modo quod a a o omnis homo †india sem-ro senie-a-† univoce dicens sic: quidquid est homo univoce singularius [singularibus?] simpliciter dicitur, ponendo quod omnis homo currit dicens *E.* 23 genus] quod(?) *add. E* 26 predictam] productam *E*

84a8–10).

3 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* 1, 4, 73b5–7: ‘Amplius quod non de subiecto dicitur alio quodam, ut ambulans, cum alterum quoddam sit ambulans at album, substantia autem, et quecumque hoc aliquid significant, non alterum aliquid sunt quod vere sunt’ – tr. Iacobi. *Auctoritates* 314 (40): ‘Item per se sunt quae non dicuntur de quodam alio subiecto, ut substantia.’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, 1, 4, 73b5–6, 7); cf. *Auctoritates* 312 (20): ‘Principium demonstrationis est propositio immediata.’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* 1, 2, 72a7).

igitur nullum accidens est substantia; igitur nulla substantia est accipiendā. Tunc clarum est quod ista non est immediata: ‘nullum accidens est substantia’, nec etiam ista: ‘nulla substantia est accidens.’

⟨9.⟩ Item. Coordinationi actionis et coordinationi passionis correspondet unum genus generalissimum, igitur non sunt decem genera. Consequentia videtur evidens, et antecedens declaratur, quia iste terminus ‘motus’ correspondet illis duabus conceptibus, et est per se superius ad actionem et passionem, quia omnis actio est motus et non e converso, similiter omnis passio est motus, et non e converso, et predicatur de eis in quid, quia, si queratur ‘quid est actio?’, convenienter respondetur quod sit motus; consimiliter, de passione. Igitur, ut videtur, motus est genus generalissimum ad actionem et ad passionem.

⟨10.⟩ Item. Predicamento *ubi* non correspondet aliquod genus generalissimum, nec predicamento *quando*, nec predicamento *situs*, nec predicamento *habitus*, sive ipsius *habere*, etcetera; igitur non sunt decem genera generalissima. Consequentia est de se nota. Et antecedens videtur evidens, quia, si istis correspondere(n)t aliqua genera generalissima, dentur illa.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM 1.⟩ Ad oppositum videtur esse Porphirius in textu, quo dicit quod sunt prima decem genera sicut prima decem principia,⁴ et alibi: ‘decem quidem generalissima sunt, specialissima vero in numero quodam sunt, non tamen infinito.’⁵ Ex quo textu videtur intentio Porphirii esse quod sunt tantum ⟨decem⟩ genera generalissima et non plura, neque pauciora.

21^{rb} ⟨AD OPPOSITUM 2.⟩ Item. Aristoteles | in *Antepredicamentis*⁶ enuntiat decem et non plura, et postea prosequitur determinando de istis decem, de aliis nullam mentionem faciendo, nec etiam pauciora precise ponendo, igitur videtur quod sint tantum decem et non plura, neque pauciora.

2 est] esse E 20 genera] generalissima *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 22 intentio] intentionem E 28 non] non E^c

4 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 5–8): ‘sed sint posita (...) prima decem genera quasi prima decem principia (...)’

5 *Isagoge*, II, 11 (6, 11–12): ‘Decem quidem generalissima sunt, specialissima vero in numero quidem quodam sunt, non tamen infinito (...)’

6 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 4, 1b25–28: ‘Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam significat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.’ – tr. Boethii.

- 5 <DISTINCTIO PRIMA> Prima distinctio quod duplex est ‘predicamentum’: quoddam est predicamentum prime intentionis, et quoddam secunde intentionis. ‘<Predicamentum> prime intentionis’ vocatur istud quod componitur ex coordinationibus primarum intentionum, cuiusmodi sunt ista decem de quibus pertractat Aristoteles in *Predicamentis*. ‘Predicamentum secunde intentionis’ vocatur coordinatio secundum *sub* et *supra* composita ex terminis secunde intentionis, cuiusmodi e(s)t talis coordinatio: ‘hoc genus’, ‘genus universale’, et sic de consimilibus coordinationibus.
- 10 <DISTINCTIO SECUNDA> Secunda distinctio est ista quod aliqua possunt dici ‘eadem’ vel ‘plura’ multipliciter, scilicet numero vel specie vel genere, vel secundum equivalentiam. Unde aliqua sunt eadem secundum equivalentiam que differunt genere, sicut signum vocale et signum scriptum.
- 15 <CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista quod ista exclusiva ‘tantum sunt decem predicamenta’ in omni suo sensu est falsa, quia, si *ly* ‘tantum’ excludat alietatem, tunc sunt iste exponentes: ‘decem sunt predicamenta et non alia quam decem sunt predicamenta’. Quarum exponentium ultima est falsa, sicut de se notum est, quia duo sunt predicamenta que sunt alia a decem. Si vero *ly* ‘tantum’ excludat pluralitatem, sic adhuc est falsa, quia iste sunt exponentes ‘decem sunt predicamenta et <non> plures quam decem sunt predicamenta’, quarum exponentium ultima est falsa qualitercumque accipiatur ibi ‘pluralitas’, quia plura sunt predicamenta quam decem, et hoc secundum equivalentiam, quia ad minus sunt
 20 decem predicamenta prime intentionis que recitat Aristoteles, et unum secunde intentionis, cuius genus generalissimum est iste terminus ‘universale’. Patet igitur conclusio.
- 25 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod plura sunt predicamenta prime intentionis quam decem. Ista patet per predicamentum *qualis*, quod est aliud predicamentum quam predicamentum *qualitatis*, quia habet alia(s) coordinationes secundum *sub* et *supra*, et aliud genus generalissimum, et per consequens <est> aliud predicamentum.
- 30 <CONCLUSIO TERTIA> Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus est superius per se ad aliquod genus generalissimum. Ista patet quia hoc
 35

13 differunt] f add. necnon del. E 15 Prima] particula add. necnon del. E 19 predicamenta] quia add. necnon del. E

genus *universale* est per se superius ad genus generalissimum, quia omne
 21^{va} genus | est universale et non e converso.

Et *si instatur* quod sic sequeretur genus generalissimum non esse
 genus generalissimum, quia genus generalissimum non habet genus
 supra se, *ad istud dicitur* breviter distinguendo istam: ‘genus generalis- 5
 simum non est genus generalissimum’, eo quod subiectum poterit accipi
 materialiter vel personaliter. *Si materialiter*, vera est, si predicatum acci-
 pitur personaliter, quia iste terminus ‘genus generalissimum’ non est
 genus generalissimum si predicatum istius accipitur personaliter, et hoc
 10 concludit argumentum. *Si vero accipitur personaliter*, tunc propositio
 falsa, et sic non sequitur ex conclusione, quia non sequitur: ‘iste terminus
 “genus generalissimum” habet per se superius genus, igitur iste terminus
 “substantia” habet per se superius genus.’

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus
 ‘accidens’ non est per se superius ad qualitatem, sed e converso, precise 15
 secundum opinionem *modernorum*, que ponit quod omnis res sit sub-
 stantia vel qualitas. Ista patet, quia omne accidens est qualitas, et non e
 converso, quia non omnis qualitas est accidens, quia figura non est acci-
 dens secundum opinionem *modernorum* quam ad presens reputo veram,
 que ponit quod figura non est res distincta a re figurata. 20

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod iste terminus
 ‘motus’ non est per ⟨se⟩ superior ad actionem, sed e converso, quia
 omnis motus est actio, vel instrumentalis, vel principalis, et non omnis
 actio est motus, quia non actio prime cause; que quidem actio non
 25 distinguitur a prima causa isti⟨us⟩ motus. Et quod actio que est prima
 causa, non sit motus, patet per Aristotelem, octavo *Physicorum*,⁷ ubi
 ponit primam causam omne movens immobile, et quod omnis motus
 sit actio patet, quia, si omnis motus est istud quo movens agit immobile,
 et per consequens est actio instrumentalis.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod omnis motus est pas- 30
 sio, et per consequens motus non est per se superior ad passionem. Ista
 conclusio patet, nam omnis motus est in mobili tamquam in subiecto, et

3 esse] esset *E* 13 se] genus *add. necnon del. E* 14 est] sic *add. necnon del. E*
 16 modernorum] quod *add. necnon del. E* 23 vel] ?? *add. necnon del. E*
 | instrumentalis] instrumentalis *mg. E^c* 30 est] poss *add. necnon del. E* 31 superior]
 superius *E*

7 Aristoteles, *Physica*, VIII, 6, 259a13–15: ‘primum immobilium perpetuum cum sit erit principium aliis motus’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 158 (217): ‘Primus motor omnino est immobilis per se et per accidens.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica*, Θ6, 259a13–15).

per consequens omne mobile in quo est talis motus, patitur tali motu; igitur omnis motus est in passivo. Primum antecedens patet per Aristotelem, tertio *Physicorum*.⁸

Et si instetur quod sic sequeretur quod omnis passio esset actio, et per
 5 consequens non essent predicamenta distincta, et quod hoc sequeretur,
 probatur, nam omnis motus est actio, omnis passio est motus, igitur
 omnis passio est actio; maior patet per precedentem conclusionem,
 et minor patet per Aristotelem, tertio *Physicorum*,⁹ *ad istud breviter*
 | *dicitur* quod duplex est passio, scilicet principalis et instrumentalis. 21^{vb}
 10 *Principalis* dicitur istud quod patitur, et *instrumentalis* dicitur istud quo
 aliud patitur. Conceditur igitur quod omnis passio instrumentalis sit
 actio instrumentalis.

De distinctione predicamenti actionis et predicamenti passionis ple-
 nius patebit in suo loco.¹⁰

15 <AD 1.> Ad primum principale dicitur concedendo quod sunt plura
 predicamenta quam decem pluralitate numerali et pluralitate specifica
 et pluralitate generis et pluralitate equivalentis, sicut satis diffinite patet
 per conclusiones supra dictas.

<AD 2.> Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod sunt plura predica-
 20 menta substantie tam pluralitate numerali quam speciei quam etiam
 generis, sed non pluralitate equivalentie, quia predicamentum substantie
 vocale, <mentale> et scriptum equivalent in significando, et non in modo
 significandi, et consimiliter plura predica<men>ta substantie equivalent.

<AD 3.> Ad tertium patet per idem.

25 <AD 4.> Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod universale sit genus
 generalissimum, et sibi correspondet predicamentum secunde intentio-
 nis, sicut iam dictum est.¹¹ Forte et si quis diligenter vellet inquirere, inve-
 niret plura predicamenta et plura genera generalissima secunde intentio-
 nis.

15 primum] dicitur *add. necnon del. E* 16 predicamenta] prima *add. necnon del. E*
 20 quam] plurale *add. necnon exp. E* 22 mentale] materiale *E* 23 substantie]
 vocalia *add. E*

8 Aristoteles, *Physica*, III, 3, 202b20–22: ‘neque doctio cum doctrina neque actio cum
 passione idem proprie est, sed cui insunt hec, motus est; hoc enim huius in hoc
 et huius actum esse alterum ratione est’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 148 (101): ‘Actio
 et passio sunt unus motus et in passo sicut in subjecto.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica*, Γ3,
 202b5–22).

9 Ibid.

10 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (xiv)
 ff.43^{rb}–145^{vb}, QQ. 90–96.

11 Videas supra, CONCL. 1.

⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum conceditur quod predicamentum concretorum qualitatis distinguitur a predicamento abstractorum, sed Aristoteles intendens brevitati coniunctim determinat de utroque, numquam tamen negando ista esse predicamenta distincta, sed quia maiorem convenientiam habent ad invicem quam aliqua alia predicamenta, ideo coniunctim de utroque determinat, sicut iam dictum est.¹² 5

⟨AD 6.⟩ Ad sextum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia uni rei correspondent diversi conceptus et diversi modi predicandi, et ideo non sequitur, quamvis omnis res sit substantia vel qualitas, quod propter hoc non sint plura predicamenta, quia predicamenta distinguuntur penes diversitatem predicamentorum secundum diversa interrogativa predicamentalia. 10

⟨AD 7.⟩ Ad septimum dicitur negando antecedens, et ulterius dicitur quod iste terminus ‘accidens’ non est supremum, quia continetur sub qualitate, sicut predictum est.¹³ 15

22^{ra} ⟨AD 8.⟩ Ad octavum dicitur concedendo quod accidens sit universale, et quod sit species, et ulterius | dicitur quod hec est immediata: ‘nulla substantia est accidens’, quia per nihil communius potest probari quod a substantia potest negari.

Et quando arguitur sic: ‘nulla qualitas est substantia’, dicitur negando istam secundum *modernos*, quia: omnis figura est qualitas, quedam substantia est figura, igitur quedam substantia est qualitas, et ultra, igitur quedam qualitas est substantia. Et hoc totum dico supponendo quod omnis res figurata sit figura. 20

⟨AD 9.⟩ Ad nonum dicitur negando antecedens. Ad probationem: patet per superius dicta,¹⁴ quia hec est falsa: ‘omnis actio est motus’, propter actionem prime cause. Sed de hoc plus patebit suo loco, sicut prius dictum est.¹⁵ 25

⟨AD 10.⟩ Ad decimum dicitur negando antecedens. Et que sunt ista genera generalissima, que illis positus correspondent, in propriis questionibus istorum predicamentorum dicebuntur.¹⁶ 30

4 predicamenta] et *add. necnon del. E* 19 potest] ?? *add. necnon del. E*

12 Videas supra, CONCL. 2.

13 Videas supra, CONCL. 4.

14 Videas supra, CONCL. 5.

15 Videas supra, CONCL. 6, ubi auctor refert ad Thomam Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, QQ. 90-96.

16 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Predicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, QQ. 99-101.

5 <AD 1. ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM> Ad argumentum in oppositum, quod Porphirius intelligit de predicamentis prime intentionis comprehendendo predicamentum *qualitatis* et predicamentum *qualis* sub uno predicamento, sicut Aristoteles coniunctim determinat de eisdem, et forte quia tempore Porphirii non fiebat ita stricta inquisitio de numero predicamentorum, sicut nunc. Et ideo Aristoteles multa que dicit in *Predicamentis*, dicit potius exercitative quam determinative, et ideo in fine capituli de relatione dicit 'dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile'.¹⁷

10 <AD 2. ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM> Per idem patitur ad secundum argumentum.

8 non] et *add. necnon del. E*

17 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 8b23–24: 'dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile' – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 303 (30): 'Dubitare de singulis non est inutile.' (Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 8b23–24).

⟨QUESTIO 23⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum genera
generalissima sint principia rerum.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nullum generalissimorum est principium intrinsecum vel extrinsecum; igitur nullum generalissimorum est principium. Consequentia nota, quia omne principium vel est intrinsecum, vel extrinsecum. Et antecedens patet quia nullum generalissimorum est materia vel forma; igitur nullum generalissimorum est principium intrinsecum. Consequentia patet per Aristotelem et Commentatorem, primo *Physicorum*¹ et quinto *Metaphysice*.² Et antecedens est de se notum, quia nullus terminus est materia vel forma; omne genus generalissimum est terminus, igitur nullum genus generalissimum est materia vel forma. Et quod nullum generalissimum sit principium extrinsecum patet, quia nec est causa efficiens, nec finalis; igitur nullum genus generalissimum est aliquo modo principium. 5 10 15

22^{rb} ⟨2.⟩ Item. Omne principium presupponitur a principiatio; nullum genus generalissimum presupponitur a principiatio; igitur nullum genus generalissimum est principium. | Maior patet per Aristotelem et Commentatorem, primo *Physicorum*.³ Et minor patet per Aristotelem tertio *De Anima*,⁴ ubi vult quod universale aut nihil est aut per posterius, et nihil quod est per posterius presupponitur. 15 20

1 Cf. *Auctoritates* 141 (17): 'Tria sunt principia naturae, scilicet materia, forma et privatio.' (Aristoteles, *Physica*, A7, 191a8–17); *Auctoritates* 143 (42): '(...) per elementa intelligit materiam et forma.' (Averroes, *In Physic.*, com. 1, f. 6A–C).

2 *Auctoritates* 124 (117): 'Tot modis dicitur principium, quot modis dicitur causa, quia omnes causae sunt principia, sed non e converso.' (Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, Δ7, 1013a16–17); *Auctoritates* 126 (140), Commentator: 'Quotiens dicitur principium, totiens dicitur terminus, et adhuc amplius, quia quod principium est terminus initialis, et non e converso.' (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Δ17, 1022a10–13:); *Auctoritates* 124 (119): 'Quattuor sunt causae, scilicet materialis, formalis, efficiens et finalis.' (Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, A3, 983a26–32).

3 Aristoteles, *Physica* I, 5, 188a27–28: 'oportet enim principia neque ex alterutris esse neque ex aliis, et ex his omnia.'

4 Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 402b–10. Vel potius Averroes, *Commentarius magnus in Aristotelis De anima libros*, I 8, 11¹⁻⁶: 'Vivum autem universale aut nichil est, aut postremum est' (Ed. F.S. Crawford). Vel *De anima* I, 1, 402b7–8.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Nulla secunda substantia presupponitur a prima substantia; sed aliquod genus generalissimum est secunda substantia; igitur aliquod genus generalissimum non presupponitur a prima substantia, et per consequens non est principium prime substantie. Maior videtur evidens,
 5 quia aliter sequeretur quod secunda substantia esset prior quam prima substantia, quod videtur falsum. Et minor est de se nota, quia omne genus predicamenti substantie est secunda substantia, sicut patet ex textu Aristotelis, capitulo de *substantia*.⁵

⟨4.⟩ Item. Si genus generalissimum esset principium alicuius, tunc
 10 esset principium speciei sub tali genere contente. Consequens videtur falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur: nullum principiatum potest esse sine suo principio; sed omnis species potest esse sine suo genere; igitur nullum genus est principium sue speciei. Maior videtur evidens, quia nullum compositum potest esse sine suis
 15 componentibus, nec aliquis effectus sine suis causis, sicut elicitur ab Aristotele, secundo *Physicorum*.⁶ Et minor declaratur, quia clarum est quod ista species *homo* potest esse sine isto genere *animal*.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Nullum genus est principium compositivum speciei, nec principium effectivum; igitur nullo modo est principium speciei. Consequencia patet per sufficientem divisionem. Et antecedens patet quia
 20 nullum genus est principium intrinsecum vel extrinsecum sue speciei, sicut prius dictum est.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est textus Porphyrii, quo dicitur: ‘sed sunt posita, quemadmodum in *Predicamentis* dictum est, prima decem
 25 genera sicut prima decem principia.’⁷

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ In ista questione prima distinctio est ista, quod ‘principium’ accipitur multipliciter, scilicet pro principio contentivo, et principio effectivo, sive pro principio compositivo.

Principium *contentivum* vocatur principium logicale, quod propter
 30 suam communitatem tamquam superius continet sub se sua inferiora.

15 effectus] affectus E

5 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 5, 2a14–16: ‘Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in quibus speciebus illae quae principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt, hae et harum specierum genera.’ – tr. Boethii.

6 Locus non inventus.

7 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 5–7): ‘Sed sint posita, quemadmodum in Praedicamentis, prima decem genera quasi prima decem principia (...)’

Et de tali prioritare sive principalitate loquitur Aristoteles, quod tale principium dicitur principium in *Postpredicamentis*,⁸ capitulo de *prius*,
 22^{va} ubi dicitur quod ‘prius’ dicitur istud a quo non | convertitur subsistendi
 consequentia.

Principium vero *compositivum* dicitur ex quo res componitur, quod 5
 quidem principium est pars rei et manet in rei, sicut vult Aristoteles,
 primo *Physicorum*,⁹ et tale est principium naturale intrinsecum, sicut
 materia et forma.

Principium vero *effectivum* dicitur causa efficiens, quod quidem dicitur 10
 principium extrinsecum, et est similiter principium naturale sive
 reale. Finis vero propinquus rei, quia coincidit cum forma, sicut vult Ari-
 stoteles, secundo *Physicorum*,¹⁰ ideo est principium intrinsecum, sicut
 forma.

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Verumtamen potest addi quartum membrum
 divisionis, scilicet principium *terminativum*, et istud subdividitur in 15
 principium terminativum intrinsecum et extrinsecum.

‘Intrinsecum’ dicitur pars rei vel essentialis, ut forma, que est pars
 generationis, vel pars quantitativa, que est pars magnitudinis vel termi-
 nans magnitudinem, sive initians continuationem et successionem, quod
 dico pro principio initiativo vel successivo, de quo alibi diffusius patet, 20
 utpote in *Questione de tempore sive quarto Physicorum*.¹¹

Principium vero terminativum sive initiativum ‘extrinsecum’ est causa
 efficiens, vel finis remotus rei et hoc essentialiter loquendo; sed quantita-
 tive loquendo, tunc istud a quo res incipit exclusive vel ad quod termina-
 tur, dicitur principium vel terminus, sicut si aliquod longum extendatur 25
 ab isto pariete ad ostium, tunc iste paries est principium extrinsecum
 illius extensionis, et ostium est terminus extrinsecus, vel e converso,
 secundum diversam considerationem diversorum.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista, quod omne genus est prin-
 cipium contentivum. Ista patet, quia omne genus est per se superius 30

11 quia] quo incidit *add. necnon del. E* 26 ostium] hostium *E* 27 ostium] hostium
E 28 secundum] secundam *E*

8 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 12, 14a35–36: ‘prius autem videtur esse illud a quo non
 convertitur subsistentiae consequentia.’ – tr. Boethii.

9 Aristoteles, *Physica* I. Locus non inventus.

10 Aristoteles, *Physica* II. Locus non inventus.

11 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questio de tempore sive quarto Physicorum*. Textum invenire non
 potui.

aliquarum suarum specierum sub eo per se contentarum. Ista conclusio satis patet ex significatione vocabuli in primo membro divisionis superius posite. Et antecedens patet ex diversis textibus Porphirii.¹²

5 (CONCLUSIO SECUNDA) Secunda conclusio est ista, quod omne genus generalissimum sit primum principium. Ista declaratur, nam quod omne genus generalissimum sit principium, patet per precedentem conclusionem.¹³ Et quod sit primum, probatur: nullum | genus generalissimum 22^{vb} habet aliquod genus prius supra se veniens; igitur omne genus generalissimum est primum principium.

10 Sed *contra istam conclusionem instatur*: nullum genus generalissimum est primum principium contentivum; igitur nullum genus generalissimum est primum principium. Consequentia nota, quia non posset esse aliquod aliud principium quam contentivum, sicut probant argumenta antecedentia. Et antecedens patet, quia omne genus generalissimum 15 habet supra se per se superius ipsum continens, sicut istud superius 'ens' quod est per se superius ad omne genus.

Item. Quodlibet istorum decem de quibus loquitur Porphirius, continetur sub isto genere generalissimo 'universale'; igitur nullum istorum est primum principium contentivum. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et 20 antecedens patet, quia ipse loquitur de decem generibus generalissimis prime intentionis, sicut patet per istum textum 'sunt posita quemadmodum in *Predicamentis*'.¹⁴

Ad primum istorum dicitur quod duplex est 'primum principium contentivum', scilicet per se et per accidens. Et primum principium 25 contentivum per se adhuc subdividitur, scilicet in primum principium per se quiditative, et in primum principium non-quiditative. Conceditur igitur quod ens est primum contentivum per se, sed non quiditative, quia non predicatur in quid, sicut patet ex precedentibus questionibus.¹⁵ Sed genus generalissimum est per se primum principium contentivum 30 et quiditative, et sic intelligit Porphirius.

Ad secundum dicitur quod universale est superius per accidens, et non per se, ad omne genus generalissimum, sicut patet ex precedenti

1 eo] concedit *add. E* 13 quam] communi *add. necnon del. E*

12 *Isagoge*, II, 7 (5, 1–16) et diversis aliis textibus.

13 Videas supra, CONCL. 1.

14 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 5–7): 'Sed sint posita, quemadmodum in *Praedicamentis*, prima decem genera quasi prima decem principia (...)'

15 Videas supra, Q. 21 AD 3.

questione.¹⁶ Et ideo non est primum principium quiditativum per se, sed per accidens respectu generalissimorum prime intentionis, de quibus loquitur Porphyrius.

23^{ra} (CONCLUSIO TERTIA) Ad superius dictorum evidentiam est tertia conclusio, quod genus generalissimum est primum principium compositivum. Ista conclusio patet, quia genus generalissimum primo ponitur in diffinitionum compositione sue immediate speciei, quia sicut vult Aristoteles, sexto *Topicorum*:¹⁷ omnis species diffinitur per suum | proximum. Sicut patet de ista specie *corpus*, que sic diffinitur: ‘corpus est substantia composita ex materia et forma’, in qua diffinitione hoc genus generalissimum *substantia* est primum principium compositivum et intrinsecum. 5 10

(CONCLUSIO QUARTA) Quarta conclusio est ista quod genus generalissimum est aliquando principium effectivum, quia audita ista voce ‘substantia’ vel viso isto termino scripto ‘substantia’ efficitur, saltem instrumentaliter, unus conceptus in mente audientis vel videntis. 15

(CONCLUSIO QUINTA) Quinta conclusio est ista quod genus generalissimum (est) primum principium iniciativum sive terminativum, sicut patet in talibus propositionibus: ‘substantia est ens’, ‘corpus est substantia’, in quarum prima genus generalissimum est principium iniciativum, et in secunda est principium terminativum. 20

(AD 1.) Ad (primum) igitur principale dicitur negando antecedens. Et ulterius dicitur quod est primum principium iniciativum materiale diffinitionum, sicut logicus accipit ‘materiam’, sicut expresse patet per Porphyrium.¹⁸ Et hoc sufficit ad propositum. 25

(AD 2.) Ad secundum dicitur quod omne principium compositivum presupponitur a principiato, ad istum intellectum quod tale principiatum non potest esse nisi sit tale principium.

(AD 3.) Ad tertium dicitur concedendo maiorem ad intellectum iam datum. Et ulterius negatur consequentia, scilicet quod igitur secunda substantia non potest esse principium rei prime substantie, quia sicut 30

16 unus conceptus] unum conceptum *E* | mente] ad *add. necnon del. E*

16 Videas supra, Q. 22, CONCL. 3.

17 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 5, 143a22: ‘in proximum genus ponendum’ – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 329 (99): ‘In definitione cujuslibet rei non debet poni genus propinquum et remotum, quia in genere propinquo fit.’ (Cf. Aristoteles, *Topica* 25, 143a19–26).

18 *Isagoge*, II, 10 (6, 3–11).

iam dictum est,¹⁹ aliquid potest esse principium contentivum alicuius, quamvis sit posterius eo in esse.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum patet per iam dicta.

- 5 ⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum dicitur negando antecedens quia est principium compositivum diffinitionum ipsius speciei vel diffinitionis, que secundum *aliquos* est species. Et ulterius dicitur negando consequentiam, quia non omne principium est principium compositivum vel diffinitionum, sicut patet per superius dicta,²⁰ quia potest esse principium contentivum et terminativum extrinsecum.

- 10 ⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Et ad argumentum in oppositum: qualiter debeat intelligi, patet per iam dicta.

2 posterius] in *add. necnon del. E*

19 Videas supra, CONCL. 2.

20 Videas supra, DIST. 1 et 2.

⟨QUESTIO 24⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum infinita relinquenda sint ab arte.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

23^{rb} Nulla de quibus | est ars et scientia, relinquenda sunt ab arte; sed
infinita sunt huiusmodi; igitur infinita non sunt relinquenda ab arte. 5
Maior est de se nota. Minor patet per Aristotelem, tertio *Physicorum*,¹ ubi
facit ⟨mentionem⟩ de infinitis tradendo diversas conclusiones scientificas
de eisdem.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Individua non sunt relinquenda ab arte; individua sunt infi-
nita; igitur etcetera. Maior patet, quia de individuis est ars et scientia 10
et conclusiones scientifice secundum quod elicitur ex textu Porphyrii,
qui ponit diversas conclusiones de individuis, utpote quod individuum
est unum numero, quod individuum predicatur de uno solo, et quod
individuum differt ab universali, et sic de aliis conclusionibus artificio-
libus;² igitur individua non sunt relinquenda ab arte. Et minor patet per 15
Porphyrium,³ qui dicit: ‘individua autem que sunt prius specie, infinita
sunt.’

⟨3.⟩ Item. De quantitate continua est ars et scientia; sed omnis quan-
titas continua est infinita; igitur de infinitis est ars et scientia, et per
consequens infinita non sunt relinquenda ab arte. Maior est de se nota, 20
quia tota geometria que est scientia terminativa, et tota astronomia, sunt
scientie de quantitate continua. Et minor patet quia omnis quantitas
habet infinitas partes, quia est divisibilis in infinitum, secundum Aristo-

9 Item] 20 *add. mg. E* 18 Item] 30 *add. mg. E* 22 continua] continuo *mg. E^f*

1 Sicut Aristoteles, *Physica* III, 5, 206a1–2; 6, 207a25–26; 7, 207b1–5, 16–17. *Aucto-
ritates* 148 (109): ‘Infinitum habet rationem partis et non totius et habet rationem
materiae et non formae.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica* III 6, 207a21–22, 26–28), cf. *ibid.*, 104,
105, 108, 109, 112.

2 *Isagoge*, passim.

3 *Isagoge*, II, 11 (6, 13–14): ‘(...) individua autem quae sunt post specialissima, infinita
sunt.’

telem, primo *Physicorum*⁴ et primo *De generatione*.⁵ Et per consequens secundum istam opinionem que ponit quod totum est omnes partes simul sumpte, omnis quantitas continua est infinita, quia est infinite partes.

5 ⟨4.⟩ Item. De quocumque habetur aliqua conclusio scientifica et artificialis, de isto est ars et scientia; sed de infinito habetur conclusio scientifica et artificialis; igitur de infinitis est ars et scientia. Maior videtur plana de se. Et minor patet, quia de infinitis habetur ista conclusio artificialis et scientifica, scilicet de infinitis non est scientia.

10 ⟨5.⟩ Item. De quibuscumque universalibus est scientia; igitur de infinitis est scientia. Antecedens patet per Aristotelem, primo *Metaphysice*,⁶ qui dicit quod ex multis experimentis colligitur unum universale, et ex multis singularibus una scientia. Et consequentia declaratur, quia tales universales sunt infinite. Utrumque istorum | est ens demonstratis duo- 23^{va}
15 bus singularibus sive individuus.

 ⟨6.⟩ Item. Scientia universalis presupponit scientiam singularium sive individuorum, quia ex multis individuus inducitur unum universale, sicut patet per propositionem iam allegatam, scilicet ‘ex multis experimentis etcetera’.

20 ⟨7.⟩ Item. Omnis notitia scientifica incipit a notitia individuorum; igitur de individuus est ars et scientia. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet per istam propositionem Aristotelis, primo *Posteriorum*,⁷ ubi vult quod ‘omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu’; sed

1 *Physicorum*] et quarto *add. E*; ?? *add. necnon del. E* 5 *Item*] 40 *add. mg. E*
10 *Item*] 50 *add. mg. E* 16 *Item*] 60 *add. mg. E* 20 *Item*] 70 *add. mg. E*

4 Aristoteles, *Physica*, I, 2, 185b10–11: ‘in infinitum enim divisibile est continuum’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 140 (10): ‘Continuum est divisibile usque ad infinitum.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica*, A2, 185b10–11).

5 Aristoteles, *De generatione* I, 3, 318a21–22: ‘Actu enim nichil est infinitum, potestate autem in divisione’ – tr. vetus.

6 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 1, 981a15–16: ‘experientia quidem singularium est cognitio, ars vero universalium, actus autem et omnes generationes circa singulare sunt’ – rec. Guillelmi. *Auctoritates* 115 (6): ‘Experientia est cognitio singularium; ars vero universalium.’ (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, A1, 981a15–16).

7 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* I, 31, 87b29–30: ‘sentire necesse est hoc aliquid et ubi et nunc’ – tr. Iacobi. Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* II, 19, 100a3–8: ‘Ex sensu quidem igitur fit memoria, sicut diximus, ex memoria autem multotiens facta experimentum. Multe enim memorie numero experimentum est unum. Ex experimento autem aut ex omni quiescente universali in anima, uno preter multa, quodcumque in omnibus unum sit illis idem est, artis principium et scientie, si quidem est circa generationem, artis est, si vero circa esse, scientie’ – tr. Iacobi.

omne quod sentitur est individuum aut singulare, secundum istam propositionem ‘universale dum intelligitur, singulare vero dum sentitur.’⁸

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 1.⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius,⁹ qui dicit: ‘infinite, inquit, relinquenda sunt, neque enim posse fieri eorum disciplinam.’

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 2.⟩ Item. Aristoteles, tertio *Physicorum*,¹⁰ dicit quod
5 infinitum in quantum infinitum est ignotum; igitur de infinito non est notitia, et per consequens neque ars neque scientia.

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio est ista quod iste terminus ‘infinite’ accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo sincategorematicae, alio modo categorematicae.
10

⟨INFINITUM SINCATEGOREMATICAE ACCEPTUM⟩ Sincategorematicae accipitur quando tenetur distributive sive divisive, et tunc reddit propositionem universalem, ut patet in talibus ‘infinite dies precesserunt diem istam’, ‘infinite homines fuerent ante istum hominem’, ‘in infinitum continuum est divisibile’. Et tunc debent tales propositiones sic exponi: ‘plures homines precesserunt hunc hominem’, vel ‘plures dies precesserunt istum diem’, et non tot quin plures; et tunc tales sunt singulares: ‘isti duo homines precesserunt hunc hominem’, et iste terminus ‘et sic in infinite’ semper demonstrando homines in tali minori qui precesserunt hunc hominem. Cum hoc tamen stat quod omnis multitudo hominum
15 que precessit hunc hominem sic accepta, sit finita. Et consimiliter est de ista propositione cuius universales iste sunt singulares: ‘in istas duas partes continuum est divisibile’, et ‘in istas tres partes continuum est
20 divisibile’, et sic in | infinitum. Cum hoc tamen stat quod omnes partes in quas continuum est divisibile, sunt finite, quia due sunt finite et
25 tres sunt finite et quattuor sunt finite, et sic in infinitum. Et ideo multi

3 oppositum] oppositum *add. mg. E* 5 Item] 2 *add. mg. E* 8 distinctio] distinctio *add. mg. E* 13 in] ?? 3 *litt. E* 14 infiniti] infiniti *mg. E^c* 16–17 precesserunt istum diem] precesserunt istum diem *sup. lin. Ec* 21 sic] sic *E^c*

8 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 31, 87b37–39: ‘sentire enim necesse est singulariter, scientia autem est in cognoscendo universale’ – tr. Iacobi. *Auctoritates* 319 (93): ‘Sensus est singularium, scientia vero universalium.’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, A31, 87b37–39).

9 *Isagoge*, II, 11 (6, 15–16): ‘(...) infinite, inquit, relinquenda sunt; neque enim horum posse fieri disciplinam.’

10 Aristoteles, *Physica*, III, 6, 207a25–26: ‘Unde ignotum est in quantum est infinitum’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 148 (105): ‘Infinitum secundum quod huiusmodi est ignotum.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica*, Γ6, 207a25–26).

logici non negant istam ‘continuum est divisibile in infinitum’ ponendo ly ‘in infinitum’ a parte predicati. Et tunc, ut dicunt, stat categorematice sive collective, quod idem est. Et tunc ad veritatem talis requiritur quod continuum posset esse actu divisum in aliquam multitudinem infinitam discrete, quod Aristoteles, ⟨primo⟩ *Physicorum*,¹¹ dicit esse impossibile, quamvis aliqui *theologi* hoc concedunt, quod non est presentis speculationis.

⟨INFINITUM CATEGOREMATICE ACCEPTUM⟩ Infinitum vero categorematice acceptum accipitur multipliciter.

10 ⟨1⟩ Uno modo privative tantum, et sic tantummodo significat privationem finis, et isto modo omne istud quod non habet finem vel terminum, est infinitum. Et sic omne indivisibile est infinitum, quodcumque fuerit.

⟨2⟩ Alio modo accipitur non tantum privative, sed etiam includit affirmationem alicuius magnitudinis vel molis vel corporis vel virtutis. 15 Et sic adhuc accipitur multipliciter secundum quod innuit Aristoteles, tertio *Physicorum*:¹²

⟨2.1⟩ Quia quod est ‘infinitum intensive’ utpote virtualiter, sicut prima causa dicitur infinita in sua virtute et potentialitate, quia non est dare ⟨aliquid⟩ quod non potest.

20 ⟨2.2⟩ Alio modo dicitur aliquid ‘infinitum durative’, quia durabit et non erit finis sue durationis.

⟨2.3.⟩ Tertio modo dicitur aliquid ‘infinitum extensive’, si aliquid tale esset, scilicet quod extendetur et non habebit finem sue extentionis. Et istud adhuc subdividitur.

25 ⟨2.3.1⟩ Quia aliquid potest dici ‘infinitum extensive’, quia extenditur et non habet finem extrinsecum sue extensionis, et isto modo longitudo gyrativa alicuius continui est infinita extensive.

⟨2.3.2⟩ Alio modo quod extenditur et non habet finem sue extentionis intrinsecum, et isto modo nihil est infinitum, nec potest esse, secundum 30 *aliquos*.

⟨2.4⟩ Quarto modo adhuc capitur ‘infinitum successive’, quali infinitate tempus et motus | celi dicuntur infiniti, de quibus est tractatum,¹³ sed 24^{ra}

5 primo] primo *Physicorum* (?) *add. necnon del. E* 12 sic] *res(?) add. necnon del. E*
 14 vel] ?? 1 *litt. add. necnon del. E* 17 est] *in add. necnon exp. E* 25 extensive] quia
 exte *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 26 non] non *sup. lin. E* 32 motus] nota de infinito
add. sub columna alia manu E | infiniti] infinita *E*

11 Locus non inventus.

12 Locus non inventus.

13 Videas infra, CONCL. 4.

ista ad presens hic ponuntur ne juvenes dampnum incurrant ignorantia terminorum.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista, quod de quolibet infinito qualitercumque accipitur et de qualibet parte infiniti est diffinitiva et notificativa scientia sive notitia et certissima. Ista patet, quia prima causa
5 distinctissime et certissime noscit quamque rem et quamque partem rei. Et quamvis ista conclusio posset manifeste declarari, cum quasi ab omnibus conceditur et quia est alterius speculationis, ideo de ipsa ad presens amplius non dicatur.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod de infinitis
10 sive de infinito intensive est scientia humana. Ista patet quia homo habet scientiam a Deo qui est infinitus in virtute, sicut patet per Aristotelem, octavo *Physicorum*,¹⁴ et homo habet scientiam de forma intensibili et remissibili, que quidem forma est infiniti gradus, igitur ars et scientia humana habetur de infinitis.
15

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod de infinitis continuatione sive extensione est ars et scientia humana, quia de quantitibus continuis que sunt infinite partes est certissima scientia geometrica, et de longitudinibus gyrationis que sunt infinite quodammodo extensive, habentur multe conclusiones scientificæ, sicut patet in questione tertii
20 *Physicorum De infinito*.¹⁵

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est quod de infinitis duratione est ars et scientia humana, quia de anima et de celo et de multis aliis perpetuis habentur multe conclusiones scientificæ; et de ⟨in⟩finito successionem, quia et de motu et de potentia; et de infinito divisibilitate, quia
25 scientia humana probat omne continuum infinitum esse divisibile. Patet igitur expresse quod, qualitercumque accipiatur infinitum sive infinita, de infinitis sive de infinito est ars et scientia humana.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod de infinito non est ars et scientia humana, sic videlicet quod ipsum infinitum secun-
30

1 ad presens] ad presens *sup. lin. E* 3 infinito] qualibet *add. necnon del. et exp. E*
5 notificativa] notificativa *E*^c; noticiaticativa *del. E* 7 declarari] sed *add. necnon del. E*
11 sive de infinito intensive] intensive sive de infinito *E* 14 et] et *E*^c; est *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 15 infinitis] individuus *E* 16 infinitis] individuus *E* 22 infinitis] indefinitis *E* 26 continuum] esse *add. necnon del. E* 27 accipiatur] excipiatur *E*
29 non] non *E*^c

14 Aristoteles, *Physica* VIII, 8, 262a3: 'quodque movetur, ut homo aut deus' – tr. vetus.

15 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questio de infinito sive tertio Physicorum*. Textum invenire non potui.

dum se et secundum quamlibet sui proportionalitatem et secundum quamlibet sui partem distincte ab homine qui non est Deus, cognoscitur. Ista conclusio patet experimento, quia experimur nos non habere notitiam distinctam cuiuscumque potentie | divine, quam distincte sciamus. 24^{rb}

5 Omne istud quod Deus potest facere, experimur etiam nos non habere notitiam distinctam et propriam cuiuslibet partis alicuius continui vel cuiuslibet gradus alicuius forme intensibilis et remissibilis, vel cuiuslibet divisionis possibilis fieri in continuo, vel cuiuslibet longitudinis gyrationis, vel cuiuslibet individui existentis in rerum natura. Hoc idem patet

10 per Porphyrium,¹⁶ qui dicit talia infinita esse relinquenda ab arte, nec eorum posse fieri disciplinam, et hoc ad intellectum iam datum. Hoc idem vult Aristoteles, primo et tertio et sexto et septimo *Physicorum*¹⁷ et in multis aliis locis, ubi vult quod infinitum in quantum infinitum est ignotum, idest: non est notum secundum quod infinitum, sic videlicet

15 quod ipsum secundum se et secundum quamlibet eius partem et secundum quamlibet eius proprietatem sit diffinitive et distincte et proprio conceptu cognitum ab aliquo alio a Deo.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur rationem principalem dicitur concedendo quod de infinito sive de infinitis est scientia, et quod Aristoteles tradit

20 multas conclusiones scientificas de infinito et de infinitis; sed hoc facit ad intellectum superius datum; nec hoc vult Porphyrius negare, sed tantummodo vult dicere, sicut prius dictum est,¹⁸ quod de infinitis non est ars vel scientia, sic videlicet quod de quolibet infinitorum sit distincta scientia et notitia propria humana, accipiendo ‘notitiam humanam’ pro notitia

25 hominis qui non est Deus. Et hoc experimur sicut prius dictum est,¹⁹ videlicet quod non habemus distinctam et propriam notitiam cuiuslibet

3–4 notitiam] non *add. necnon exp. E* 4 quam] quod *E* 7 forme] et *add. necnon del. E* | vel] quod *add. necnon del. E* 8 cuiuslibet] longis *add. necnon del. E* 11 ad] ad *sup. lin. E* 18 igitur] prin *add. necnon del. E*

16 *Isagoge*, II, 11 (6, 15–16): ‘(...) infinita, inquit, relinquenda sunt; neque enim horum posse fieri disciplinam.’

17 Aristoteles, *Physica* I 4, 187b7: ‘infinitum quidem secundum quod est infinitum ignotum est’ – tr. vetus. Aristoteles, *Physica* III 6, 207a25–26: ‘Unde ignotum est in quantum est infinitum’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 141 (22): ‘Infinitum secundum quod huiusmodi semper est ignotum.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica* I 4, 187b7); *Auctoritates* 148 (105): ‘Infinitum secundum quod huiusmodi est ignotum.’ (Aristoteles, *Physica* III 6, 207a25–26). Aristoteles, *Physica* VI: non inventus. Aristoteles, *Physica* VII: non inventus.

18 Videas supra, CONCL. 5.

19 Videas supra, CONCL. 5.

partis continui nec alicuius alterius contentis virtualiter vel potentia-
liter vel successibiliter vel extensive in finito.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur simpliciter concedendo quod conclusio
concludit ad intellectum predictum. De individuis non tamen est ars vel
scientia, sic quod de quolibet eorum habeamus distinctam et propriam 5
notitiam.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Et per idem ad tertium, quia, quamvis de quantitate continua
sit scientia, non tamen de qualibet eius parte habetur propria notitia sub
conceptu proprio talis quantitatis.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur quod de infinitis habetur ista scientia vel 10
ista conclusio scientifica quod de infinitis non est scientia, sic videlicet
quod de quolibet illorum habeatur propria notitia a nobis.

24^{va} ⟨AD 5.⟩ Ad quintum dicitur quod de quibuscumque universalibus | est
scientia, quamvis non distincta vel propria, sicut iam dictum est.²⁰

⟨AD 6.⟩ Ad sextum dicitur concedendo quod scientia universalium 15
presupponit scientiam singulorum, et hoc distinctam et propriam, sal-
tem aliquorum, sed non cuiuslibet. Verbi gratia, ad hoc quod ista univer-
salis ‘omnis urtica est acuta substantia’, requiritur quod distincte sciatur
ab aliquo de aliqua urtica singulari mediante sua notitia propria, quod
ipsa sit acuta. Et non tantum de una urtica, verum etiam de pluribus, 20
et tunc quod cum intellectus nusquam invenerit mediante sensu accep-
tam concludit istam universalem, scilicet quod omnis urtica sit acuta. Ad
cuius notitiam non requiritur cuiuslibet urticae experientia, sed sufficit
indifferenter plurium sine expressione quarumcumque circumstantia-
rum sive locationum sive colorum sive temporum, et sic de aliis circum- 25
stantiis.

⟨AD 7.⟩ Per idem patet ad septimum argumentum.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum vero in oppositum
satis declaratum est per ista que dicta sunt.

1 contentis] continentis E 15 universalium] propter *add. necnon del. E* 16 singu-
lorum] singularem E 27 patet] per E

20 Videas supra, CONCL. 5.

⟨QUESTIO 25⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum participatione
speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

5 Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo; Sortes et Plato sunt plures homines;
igitur plures homines sunt unus homo. Discursus videtur evidens, quia
arguitur expositorie. Maior patet, quia Sortes est unus homo et Plato
est unus homo, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo. Ista consequentia
10 patet, quia omnes isti termini sunt substantiales et in talibus valet con-
sequentia *a divisis ad coniuncta*, et *a coniunctis ad divisa*.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Supposito quod Sortes significet totum unum hominem pre-
ter manum dexteram, et Plato totum eundem hominem preter manum
sinisteram, tunc clarum est quod Sortes et Plato sint unus homo. Et
15 minor in isto casu patet, scilicet quod Sortes et Plato sint plures homi-
nes, quia Sortes est homo et Plato est homo et Sortes non est Plato, quia
aliquid est pars Sortis quod non est pars Platonis; igitur Sortes et Plato
sunt plures homines.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo in communi; igitur Sortes
et Plato sunt unus homo. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens
20 declaratur, quia uterque istorum demonstrando Sortem et Platonem,
est homo, et non uterque istorum est homo qui est Sortes, nec uterque
istorum est homo qui est | Plato, nec uterque istorum est homo qui 24^{vb}
est Cicero, et sic de quocumque alio discreto, igitur uterque eorum est
homo in communi, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt homines in communi. Et
25 confirmatur per istam auctoritatem Porphyrii, scilicet 'collectivum enim
multorum in una natura species est',¹ igitur multa individua colliguntur
in una natura specifica. Et per consequens multi homines colliguntur in
natura humana, igitur multi homines sunt in natura humana et non in
aliqua ⟨alia⟩ natura humana quam in natura que est unus homo; igitur
30 multi homines sunt unus homo. Et quod multi homines sunt una natura

23 et] sicut *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, II, 12 (6, 19–20): 'Collectivum enim multorum in unam naturam species est.'

humana, patet per communem locutionem precipue theologicam, qua dicitur quod tota natura humana per primum parentem fuit infecta et postea per Christum redempta, que non potest aliter intelligi quam quod tota multitudo hominum fuit primo per parentem infecta et postea eadem multitudo fuit per Christum redempta, igitur tota multitudo hominum est una natura humana, et per consequens plures homines sunt una natura, et per consequens plures homines sunt unus homo.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Expresse patet per textum Porphirii quo dicitur quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.²

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 1.⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur: quodcumque aliqua duo sunt eadem alicui tertio, ipsa sunt idem inter se; si igitur plures homines, utpote Sortes et Plato, essent idem alicui tertio, essent idem inter se, et per consequens Sortes esset Plato, et e converso. Maior patet, quia est communis omni concipienti, et patet per Aristotelem, primo *Physicorum*,³ ubi probat quod totum non est idem parti.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, 2.⟩ Item. Si plures homines essent unum homo, vel essent unus homo singularis vel unus homo universalis. Primum non potest dici, quia sic sequeretur quod singulare esset commune, quod est contra Porphirium. Nec secundum potest dici, quia, cum omnis talis homo in communi sit signum universale, sequeretur quod plures homines essent unum signum, quod de se patet esse falsum.

25^{ra} ⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ In ista questione presupponitur una distinctio, quod duplex est ‘actus logicalis,’ | scilicet *actus exercitus* et *actus significatus*. *Actus exercitus* est propositio, cuius copula sive verbum principale est hoc verbum ‘est,’ sicut patet ⟨in⟩ talibus propositionibus ‘homo est animal,’ ‘Sortes est homo,’ ‘albedo est color,’ et sic de aliis. *Actus significatus* est propositio cuius copula sive verbum principale est hoc verbum ‘predicatur’ vel aliquid sibi equivalens, cuiusmodi sunt talia: ‘competit,’ ‘inest,’ ‘dicitur,’ ‘verificatur,’ et similia. Et tales propositiones sunt huiusmodi: ‘animal predicatur de homine,’ ‘animal dicitur de homine,’ ‘animal competit homini,’ ‘predicatum inest subiecto,’ ‘animal verificatur de homine,’ et consimiles. Et vocatur primus actus ‘exercitus’ et secundus ‘significatus,’ quia per primum exercitur predicatio que per secundum

12 idem] eadem E 14 communis] et(?) *add. necnon del. E* 23 exercitus] acercitus E (sic semper) 25 in] 4 *litt. add. necnon del. E*

2 *Isagoge*, II, 12 (6, 21–22): ‘(...) participatione enim speciei plures homines unus (...)’

3 Locus non inventus.

significatur, sicut patet per istam: ‘animal predicatur de homine’, significatur ista prima que exercetur in ista propositione: ‘homo est animal’.

5 ⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod ista propositio ‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est distinguenda eo quod poterit accipi
 in sensu proprio vel in sensu transsumptivo. Sensus proprius est actus exercitus, qui accipitur ex virtute sermonis et ex constructione grammaticali, sicut termini iacent. Sensus vero transsumptivus sive improprius est actus significatus, scilicet iste: de pluribus hominibus, hoc est, de pluribus nominibus hominum predicatur unus homo. Qui actus significatus
 10 debet sic exerceri: ‘iste homo est homo, et iste homo est homo, et sic de singulis’, vel sic: ‘Sortes est unus homo, Plato est unus homo, et sic de singulis’.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod ista propositio ‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est vera in sensu proprio precipue tenendo quod partes nihil aliud sint quam suum totum. Istam conclusionem probat secundum argumentum ad principale.⁴

20 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod plures homines totaliter distincti non sunt unus homo, et per consequens ista propositio est falsa in sensu proprio. Ista conclusio est de se nota, quia omne istud quod est unus homo, est Sortes vel Plato, etcetera; sed nulli plures homines totaliter distincti sunt Sortes et Plato, etcetera; igitur nulli plures homines totaliter distincti sunt unus homo. ⟨Maior⟩ apparet inductive. Et minor est de se nota.

25 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista propositio ‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est vera in sensu transsumptivo. Ista patet, quia de | pluribus hominibus predicatur unus homo, ad intellectum 25^{rb}
 prius datum.⁵

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod uterque istorum – demonstrando Sortem et Platonem – est unus homo singularis, et per consequens est unus homo sensibilis, et unus homo non-universalis, et unus homo capiendus et sic de quibuscumque aliis conditionibus individuanti-
 bus. Et ista conclusio patet inductive.

7 improprius] improprie E 13 ista] pli *add. necnon del. E* 16 argumentum] ad *add. E*

4 Videas supra, 2.

5 Videas supra, DIST. 2.

Sed *contra istam conclusionem* instatur:

⟨I⟩ ‘uterque istorum est homo singularis; igitur uterque istorum est Sortes, vel uterque istorum est Plato’; sed consequens est falsum, sicut de se notum est.

⟨II⟩ Item, ‘uterque istorum est singularis homo capiendus’; capiatur 5 igitur homo qui est uterque eorum, et non invenitur aliquis talis; igitur hec, ut videtur, est falsa: uterque istorum est singularis homo capiendus.

⟨AD I⟩ Ad primum istorum dicitur negando consequentiam, sed bene sequitur ‘uterque istorum ⟨est⟩ homo singularis; et omnis homo singularis est Sortes vel Plato; igitur uterque istorum est Sortes vel Plato’, acci- 10 piendo consequens de disiuncto predicato. Sed propter hoc non oportet quod sequatur in sensu quo est disiunctiva, et causa quare prima est vera, est quia iste terminus disiunctus ‘Sortes vel Plato’ supponit confuse tantum, propter signum universale affirmativum mediate precedens.

⟨AD II⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod uterque istorum est 15 homo capiendus etcetera, et ulterius quando dicitur ‘capiatur’, querendum est ab arguente ‘quid debet capi?’; si dicit quod istud est capiendum quod est ‘uterque istorum’, respondetur quod nihil est tale. Per talem modum respondendi non habet arguens aliquod inconueniens quod 20 concludat.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod Sortes et Plato sunt plures homines, si ista propositio capitur de copulato subiecto. Et confirmatur etiam quod Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo, si ista propositio accipiatur in sensu copulativo, ut sic loco istius ‘Sortes est unus homo, et Plato est unus homo.’ Et ulterius dicitur negando 25 quod discursus sit expository, quia hoc copulatum ‘Sortes et Plato’, 25^{va} si accipiatur in sensu | copulativo, non facit discursum expository. Et ulterius dicitur quod in propositionibus per se valet consequentia *a divisis ad coniuncta* ex parte predicati exceptis casibus quos ponit Aristoteles, secundo *Perihermeneias*,⁶ sed non oportet in talibus semper 30 consequentiam valere ex parte subiecti.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum patet per superius dicta,⁷ quia conceditur quod plures homines non totaliter disiuncti sed tantummodo particulariter sint unus homo.

9 est] ?? 2 litt. add. necnon del. E 17 ab] ad E 27 copulativo] sed add. E^c
| discursum] excursus E

6 Vel potius Aristoteles, *De interpretatione* 11, 21a8–34?

7 Videas supra, CONCL. 2.

5 ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando istam ‘Sortes et Plato sunt homo in
 communi’, quia ‘homo in communi’ nihil aliud est quam terminus uni-
 versalis, sicut diffusius in tractatu *De suppositionibus*⁸ est declaratum. Et
 clarum est quod Sortes et Plato non sunt aliquis talis terminus. Et ad
 10 probationem dicitur quod uterque istorum est homo, et etiam concedi-
 tur quod non uterque istorum est Sortes, nec uterque istorum est Plato,
 et sic de ceteris singularibus. Cum hoc tamen stat quod quilibet istorum
 sit homo singularis, quia iste terminus ‘homo singularis’ supponit con-
 fuse tantum. Et ideo concedendum est quod uterque istorum sit Sortes
 15 vel Plato, et negandum est quod uterque istorum sit Sortes, et uterque
 istorum sit Plato. Et ad confirmationem dicitur quod Porphyrius intelli-
 git per istam auctoritatem ‘collectionem logicalem speciei’. Que quidem
 collectio facit appellationem speciei, facit significationem, ita quod ista
 auctoritas ‘collectivum enim multorum in unam naturam species est’, stat
 20 loco istius ‘species est appellative significativa multorum individuorum
 eiusdem speciei, scilicet consimilium formarum ultimarum’. Et ulterius
 dicitur concedendo quod in una significatione hoc quod dicitur ‘tota
 humana’ significat totam multitudinem hominum, sed ex hoc non sequi-
 tur quod plures homines totaliter disiuncti sint unus homo.

20 ⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad ultimum patet per superius dicta, scilicet qualiter ista pro-
 positio sit intelligenda, quia Porphyrius ponit actum exercitum pro actu
 significato, sicut in questionis secunda distinctione satis fuit declaratum.⁹

25^{vb}

11 confirmationem] conformationem E 13 collectio] que quidem add. E | facit
 appellationem] per appellativam E | ista] ?? 5 litt. add. necnon del. E 16 ultimarum]
 ultimarum E

8 Thomas Manlevelt videtur ibi referre ad tractatum eius *Tractatus de suppositionibus*.
 9 Videas supra, DIST. 2.

⟨QUESTIO 26⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum
inferiora predicentur de superioribus.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Quia si sic, tunc ista propositio esset vera: ‘animal est homo’. Consequencia est de se nota. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia hec est falsa: 5
‘omne animal est homo’, et ista ‘animal est homo’ sibi equivalet; igitur ista
‘animal est homo’ est falsa. Et quod ista sibi equivalet, probatur, et vocetur
ista ‘omne animal est homo’ *A* et ista ‘animal est homo’ *B*. Tunc sic: quan-
documque subiecta aliquarum duarum precise supponunt pro eisdem et 10
predicata similiter, si una istarum sit vera, et reliqua, et consimiliter, si
una falsa, et reliqua; sed sic se habent *A* et *B*; igitur si *A* est falsum, *B*
est falsum. Maior videtur de se nota. Minor declaratur, quia subiectum
ipsius *A* supponit pro omni animali, et non pro alio ab animali, sicut
de se notum est. Et subiectum ipsius *B* similiter supponit pro omni ani- 15
mali, quia respectu copule supponit pro omni animali, igitur supponit
pro omni animali et non supponit pro alio animali, igitur subiectum *A*
et subiectum *B* precise supponunt pro eisdem. Et quod predicata suppo-
nunt pro eisdem satis patet.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Capiatur ista propositio mentalis ‘animal est homo’, et capia- 20
tur subiectum eius, tunc sic: istud subiectum pro quocumque supponit,
pro isto naturaliter supponit, et quodcumque significat sive representat,
istud naturaliter representat; igitur manente tali natura et manentibus
omnibus rebus extra, non poterit *A* ⟨non⟩ supponere pro isto pro quo
supponit, et per consequens, cum naturaliter supponit pro omni animali, 25
quia est naturale signum omnis animalis, non potest non supponere pro
quolibet animali; igitur in ista propositione mentali ‘animal est homo’,
subiectum supponit pro omni animali, igitur ipsa est falsa, sicut ista
‘omne animal est homo’.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Quodcumque alicui competit aliqua proprietas ex sua 30
natura per aliquod extrinsecum sibi additum, poterit ista proprietas ab

6 hec] hac *E* 10 subiecta] *S E* | duarum] presup *add. E* | supponunt] et *add. E*
13 Maior] di *add. necnon del. E* 16 respectu] proprie *add. E* 20 et] at *E*
28 supponit] pro animal *add. necnon del. E*

eo removeri; sed ista proprietas, scilicet repre(senta-)|-re omne compe- 26^{ra}
 tit alicui conceptui, scilicet subiecto istius propositionis mentalis ‘ani-
 mal est homo’; igitur per hoc extrinsecum predicatum *homo* non poterit
 talis proprietas ab eo removeri. Maior videtur evidens, quia per nihil
 5 extrinsecum additum speculo bene disposito potest fieri quin speculum
 representet suum obiectum sibi proportionabiliter et debito modo pre-
 sentatum. Et minor patet de se, quia passiones anime non ex impositione
 sed naturaliter representant quidquid representant, sicut elicitur ab Ari-
 stotele, primo *Perihermeneias*.¹
 10 (4.) Item. Porphyrius² dicit expresse quod omnia superiora predican-
 tur de inferioribus; sed inferiora non predicantur de superioribus. Hoc
 idem patet per istam auctoritatem, capitulo de *specie*,³ quo dicit: ‘Oportet
 autem equa de equis predicari, ut hinnibile de equo, aut maiora de mino-
 ribus, ut animal de homine, minora de maioribus minime’ et sequitur:
 15 ‘neque enim animal dicis esse hominem quemadmodum hominem dicis
 esse (animal)’.

(AD OPPOSITUM 1.) Ad oppositum arguitur: si inferiora non predicaren-
 tur de superioribus, tunc non semper universalis affirmativa convertitur
 per accidens. Falsitas consequentis patet per Aristotelem, primo *Prio-*
 20 *rum*.⁴ Consequentia declaratur, quia ista propositio ‘omnis homo est
 animal’ convertitur sic per accidens: ‘aliquod animal est homo’, in qua
 inferius predicatur de suo superiori; igitur, si omnis talis propositio esset
 falsa, sequeretur quod predicta conversio non valeret.

(AD OPPOSITUM 2.) Item. Si hec sit falsa: ‘aliquod animal est homo’,
 25 igitur sua contradictoria erit vera, ista scilicet: ‘nullum animal est homo’.
 Tunc sic: ‘nullum animal est homo; omne risibile est animal; ergo nullum
 risibile est homo’. Consequentia falsa, sicut de se notum est, et non minor,

15 quemadmodum] dicis *add. necnon del. E* 16 animal] hominem *E*

1 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione* 1, 16a6–8.

2 *Isagoge*, II, 13 (7, 2–4): ‘(...) genus quidem semper de specie praedicatur et omnia superiora de inferioribus, species autem neque de proximo sibi genere neque de superioribus (...)’

3 *Isagoge*, II, 13 (7, 4–8): ‘Oportet autem aequa de aequis praedicari, ut hinnibile de equo, aut maiora de minoribus, ut animal de homine, minora vero de maioribus minime; neque enim animal dicis esse hominem, quemadmodum hominem dicis esse animal.’

4 Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, A3, 25a7–10. *Auctoritates* 308 (6): ‘Universalis affirmativa convertitur in particularem affirmativam.’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, A3, 25a7–10).

igitur maior, et per consequens hec est falsa: ‘nullum animal est homo’, igitur hec est vera: ‘aliquod animal est homo’. Igitur inferius predicatur de suo superiori.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM 3.⟩ Item. ‘Omne animal preter animal irrationale est homo.’ Ista propositio est vera, quia sue exponentes sunt vere, scilicet iste: 5
 ‘omne animal aliud ab irrationali est homo’ et ‘nullum animal irrationale est homo’. Et in ista exceptiva inferius predicatur de suo superiori, igitur etcetera.

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio premittenda in ista questione est ista, quod 10
 ‘predicare’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet large et stricte. Large extendit se ad omnem predicationem, sive negativam, sive veram, sive falsam, 26th
 sive universalem, sive particularem, sive indefinitam, sive singularem. | Stricte accipitur tantummodo pro predicatione affirmativa vera, ita quod convertitur cum isto termino ‘verificare de aliquo’.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod large accipiendo ‘predicari’ quilibet terminus de quolibet termino predicatur vel saltem est predicabilis, nam quilibet terminus respectu alterius termini potest esse predicatum in propositione, igitur quilibet terminus de quolibet termino est predicabilis. Consequentia est de se nota. Et antecedens patet inductive. Nam iste terminus ‘asinus’ respectu cuiuscumque alterius terminus 20
 potest esse predicatum tam vere quam false, quia negative vere et affirmative false, sicut patet in talibus propositionibus ‘nullus homo est asinus’, in qua ‘asinus’ predicatur de ‘homine’ negative et vere, et ‘omnis homo est asinus’, in qua ‘asinus’ predicatur de ‘homine’ affirmative et false.

Ex ista conclusione correlarie sequitur quod isto modo accipitur non 25
 tantum superiora de inferioribus predicari, verum etiam inferiora de superioribus predicari, tam universaliter quam non-universaliter, sicut patet de ista propositione ‘omne animal est homo’, in qua inferius, sicut patet, predicatur de suo superiori universaliter, quamvis affirmative et false. 30

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est quod inferius predicatur de suo superiori; quod quidem superius stat confuse et distributive, sicut patet in ista propositione ‘animal est homo’, cuius subiectum respectu istius copule ‘est’ supponit confuse et distributive, quia non maiori ratione pro uno suo significato quam pro alio. 35

12 sive] in *add. E* 24 est] h *add. necnon del. E* 26 inferioribus] verum *add. necnon del. E* 27 tam] quam *E* | non-universaliter] non *sup. lin. E*

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod accipiendo ‘predicari’ pro ‘affirmative de aliquo verificari’, sicut accipit communiter Porphirius predicari, ⟨inferius predicatur de suo superiori⟩, sicut patet in ista propositione ‘animal est homo’, in qua inferius affirmative verificatur de suo superiori, sicut plane probant argumenta quedam superius posita ad principale.⁵

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est quod nullum inferius predicatur de suo superiori universaliter, hoc est: nullum inferius predicatur de suo superiori stante confuse et distributive respectu talis inferioris. Ista conclusio patet inductive. Unde quamvis in ista propositione ‘animal est homo’ subiectum supponit confuse et distributive mobiliter respectu istius copule ‘est’, non tamen respectu predicati, respectu cuius, si artaretur, stare(t) confuse et distributive, per additum alicuius signi universalis communis omnibus suppositis termini distributi, statim redderetur
15 | propositio falsa, sicut patet in ista propositione ‘animal est homo’. Et 26^{va} dico significanter ‘signi universali communis omnibus suppositis termini distributi’ ad excludendum signa universalia que non artant terminum stare pro omnibus suis suppositis, cuiusmodi est hoc signum ‘uterque’, quia respectu istius signi inferius predicatur de suo superiori universaliter, sicut patet in ista propositione ‘utrumque animal istorum animalium est homo’, demonstratis duobus hominibus.

20 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod alique due propositiones possunt sic se habere quod subiecta earum precise supponunt pro eisdem, et predicata similiter, quarum tamen una esset vera et reliqua
25 esset falsa, sicut declaratur de istis propositionibus ‘animal est homo’ et ‘omne animal est homo’, quarum subiecta precise supponunt pro eisdem, et predicata similiter, ut patet ex dictis,⁶ et tamen una est vera, et reliqua falsa.

30 ⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum principale dicitur negando istam consequentiam: ‘hec est falsa “omne animal est homo”, igitur hec est falsa “animal est homo”’. Et negatur quod iste equivalent. Et ad probationem dicitur negando istam ‘quandocumque alique propositiones sic se habent quod

2 accipit] Po *add. necnon del. E* 3 sicut] sicut †ex ... bus† *E* 8 superiori] suo *add. necnon del. E* 12–13 artaretur] talem confu *add. necnon del. E.* 16 significanter] significantis *E* 20 utrumque animal] utrumque animal *iter. E*

5 Videas supra 1., 2., 3.

6 Videas supra, CONCL. 4.

subiecta earum precise supponunt pro eisdem, et predicata similiter, etcetera, quia oportet addere quod ista subiecta respectu cuiuscumque predicati positi in talibus propositionibus supponant precise pro eisdem, quod non est verum in proposito, quia quamvis subiectum istius 'animal est homo' respectu copule supponat pro omni animali, non tamen respectu predicati, respectu cuius subiectum istius 'omne animal est homo' artatur per signum universale sibi additum ad supponendum pro omni animali.

26^{vb} (AD 2.) Ad secundum dicitur negando istam consequentiam 'hoc subiectum pro quocumque supponit, naturaliter supponit, igitur manente tali natura et manentibus rebus extra non potest non supponere pro illis pro quibus supponit', quia talis consequentia precipue in materia de representatione non valet, quia, sicut in representationibus de sensibus ratione appositorum sive diverse positionis diversorum variantur representationes, ut patet in questione de ista materia super secundum *De anima*,⁷ ita etiam in representationibus intellectualibus ratione aliquorum extrinsece appositorum sumuntur diverse representationes respectu | diversorum. Et ideo dico quod, quamvis conceptus animalis respectu copule representaret intellectui omne animal, apposito tamen conceptui hominis, non representabit intellectui respectu eiusdem conceptus *omne animal*, sed tantummodo *omne animal rationale*.

(AD 3.) Ad tertium negando argumentum precipue in ista materia, quia conceptus animalis naturaliter representat omne animal. Si sibi tamen additur ista differentia mentalis *rationalis*, representabit animal rationale. Et ulterius ad exemplum dicitur quod, quamvis speculum naturaliter representat aliquod obiectum, tamen per aliquod extrinsecum sibi additum posset fieri quod non representat istud obiectum totaliter, sed tantummodo partialiter, sicut alibi diffusius patet.⁸

(AD 4.) Ad ultimum, scilicet ad dictum Porphirii, qualiter sit intelligendum, satis patet per predicta.

12 precipue] presipue E | in] ?? 2 litt. add. necnon del. et exp. E 13-14 sensibus] sensibusbus E 15 materia] de add. necnon del. E 18 respectu] respondatur(?) eadem manu add. mg. E 26 naturaliter] ?? 5 litt. add. necnon del. E

7 Thomas Manlevelt videtur referre ad commentarium eius *Questiones super De anima*. Textum invenire non potui.

8 Locus non inventus. Fortasse Thomas Manlevelt ibi refert ad commentarium eius *Questiones super Predicamenta*.

⟨QUESTIO 27⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum species sit pars generis.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nullum genus componitur ex speciebus; igitur species non ⟨est⟩ pars
5 generis. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia totum componitur ex par-
tibus. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, si aliquod genus componeretur ex
speciebus, cum non maior ratio sit de uno quam de reliquo, sequeretur
quod hoc genus *animal* componitur ex speciebus. Consequentia nota. Et
falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, cum hoc genus *animal* sit species
10 subalterna, sequeretur quod aliqua species componeretur ex speciebus,
quod est contra Porphyrium,¹ qui dicit: ‘species vero ex specie non com-
ponitur.’

⟨2.⟩ Item. Pari ratione qua species esset pars generis, individuum esset
pars speciei. Et per consequens omnia individua speciei hominis essent
15 pars eiusdem, et cum omnis partes simul sumpte sint suum totum,
sequeretur quod omnia individua speciei hominis sive speciei humane
essent species humana. Tunc sic: omnis species predicatur de pluribus
differentibus numero in eo quod quid; omnia individua speciei humane
sunt species; igitur omnia individua speciei humane predicantur de
20 pluribus. Conclusio falsa, sicut patet per Porphyrium,² qui dicit quod
individuum predicatur de uno solo, et non de pluribus. Et non maior,
igitur minor, scilicet ista quod omnia individua speciei humane sunt
species; igitur istud ex quo sequitur, est falsum, scilicet quod individuum
sit pars speciei.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si individuum esset pars speciei, vel species pars | gene- 27^{ra}
ris, sequeretur quod ista consequentia esset vera: ‘homo non est, igitur
animal non est,’ et ista similiter: ‘Adam non est, igitur homo non est.’ Con-
sequentia videtur evidens, quia ad negationem partis sequitur negatio
totius, sicut sequitur ‘fundamentum non est, igitur domus non est.’ Fal-
30 sitas consequentis declaratur, quia oppositum consequentis potest stare

15 cum] con E | sint] sunt E 17 omnis] omne E 20 pluribus] et esse *add. necnon*
del. E

1 *Isagoge*, XVI, 4 (19, 1–2): ‘(...) species vero speciei non componitur (...)’

2 *Isagoge*, II, 14 (7, 19): ‘(...) individuum autem de uno solo particulari.’

cum antecedente, sicut ista possunt simul stare: ‘omne animal est’ et ‘nullus homo est’; similiter ista possunt simul stare: ‘omnis homo est’, et ‘Adam non est’. Et si dicatur quod Adam non est pars speciei quia non est in rerum natura, hoc non potest valere, quia capiatur aliquod individuum quod est, tunc demonstrando tale individuum adhuc ista consequentia non valet: ‘iste homo non est, igitur homo non est’, quia oppositum consequentis staret cum antecedente, et per consequens poterit stare sicut cum iste homo fuerit corruptus. Tunc antecedens erit verum et consequens falsum.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius,³ qui dicit: ‘totum enim quiddam est genus, individuum autem pars, species vero et totum et pars, sed pars quidem alterius, totum autem non alterius, sed aliis; partibus enim totum est.’

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ In ista questione distinctio est ista quod ‘totum’ et ‘pars’ dicuntur multipliciter, nam quoddam est ⟨totum⟩ integrale, et ⟨quoddam⟩ est totum universale ⟨vel subiectivum, et quoddam est totum essentialis⟩, et similiter quedam est pars integralis, et quedam pars universalis vel subiectiva, et quedam est pars essentialis.

‘Pars vero essentialis’ dicitur ista, que cum aliquo componit aliquod totum essentialis, quod non excedit in quantitate talem partem essentialis. Unde pars essentialis addita parti essentiali non facit totum maius quantitative, vel remota non facit totum minus, sicut patet de forma niville, que separata ab nivilla non diminuit quantitatem niville. Consimiliter forma adveniens materie non facit totam magis extensum quam sit ipsa materia vel ipsa forma.

‘Pars vero integralis’ vocatur ista ex qua cum aliis partibus integralibus integratur totum componens. Que quidem pars addita parti facit unum totum integrale maius quantitative aliqua sua parte, sicut pes vel manus facit ipsum | totum cui additur maius quantitate. Et talis pars integralis adhuc subdividitur, quia: quedam est pars continuativa, et quedam aggregativa, et quedam multiplicativa, et quedam ordinativa, et sic de aliis.

15 multipliciter] dupliciter *E* | et] vel *E* 16 totum] in *add. necnon del. E* 23 diminuit] deminuit *E* 32 aliis] aliis *mg. E*

3 *Isagoge*, II, 16 (8, 1–3): ‘Totum enim quiddam est genus, individuum autem pars, species vero et totum et pars, sed pars quidem alterius, totum autem non alterius, sed aliis; partibus enim totum est.’

‘Pars vero subiectiva’ accipitur potius in logica, et dicitur semper ‘inferius respectu sui superioris,’ quia subicitur in propositione in qua fit predicatio directa, et quia significat partem sui totius significati per suum superius, sicut *homo* significat aliquid quod *animal* significat, et non
 5 significat istud quod *animal* significat, et ideo dicitur ‘pars subiectiva’ respectu animalis et ‘totum universale’ respectu Sortis et Platonis et de aliis individuis.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod aliqua species est pars integralis generis. Ista declaratur, quia hoc genus compositum *corpus animal*
 10 *animal* componitur ex genere et specie tamquam ex partibus integralibus, et quod hoc compositum sit genus, probatur, quia predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid. Quia, si queratur quid sit homo, convenienter respondetur quod sit corpus animal; et consimiliter, si queratur quid sit asinus, convenienter respondetur quod sit
 15 corpus animal; igitur hoc compositum *corpus animal* predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quid, igitur est genus. Et quod ibi non sit improprietas loquendi impermissibilis patet per grammaticos, qui ponunt quod duo substantiva possunt in mente copulari, quando istud quod est communius istorum precedit, et reliquum sequitur tamquam determinativum precedentis.
 20

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod genus est pars integralis speciei specialissime. Ista statim patet, quia hoc genus *animal* est pars integralis istius speciei specialissime *animal homo*. Et quod compositum *animal homo* sit species, probatur, quia predicatur de
 25 pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid. Nam, si queratur, quid sit Sortes, convenienter respondetur quod sit animal homo, et consimiliter si queratur, quid sit Plato, etcetera.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est: nullum genus absolutum componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus absolutis precipue | eque communibus. Ista conclusio patet inductive, 27^{va}
 30 discurrendo per quodlibet genus.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est quod nulla species specialissima componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus specialissimis absolutis. Ista conclusio videtur etiam patere
 35 inductive discurrendo per singulas species specialissimas.

2 subicitur] subiciatur E 17 impermissibilis] pars *add. necnon del. E* 18 ponunt] posita E 24 quod] quid E 30 absolutis] absolutus E | eque] eque *iter. E*

Et si *instetur* de isto composito *Sortes vel Plato* quod videtur predicari de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid, quia, si queratur ‘quid est iste homo?’, convenienter responderetur quod sit *Sortes vel Plato*, quia per talem responsionem posset dubium querentis removeri, *ad hoc dicitur dupliciter*: primo quod hoc compositum *Sortes vel Plato* non predicatur de pluribus univoce quoad hoc quod aliquod sit species, quia de Sorte predicatur mediante conceptu Sortis, et de Platone predicatur mediante conceptu Platonis. Secundo dicitur quod non predicatur in quid diffinitive, quod requiritur ad hoc quod aliquod sit species vel genus.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquod species specialissima componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus ⟨specialissimis⟩ non-absolutis. Ista declaratur, quia: capiatur hoc compositum *album musicum*, quod videtur esse species specialissima quia predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid, vel saltem est predicabile de individuis que possunt imponi connotative ad taliter significandum individua qualiter hec species *album musicum* connotative significat, igitur aliqua species specialissima componitur ex pluribus speciebus specialissimis connotativis.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est quod species est pars subiectiva generis et individuum speciei, quia sunt per se inferiora ad genus et ad speciem. Et patet totum de se.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est quod aliqua species est pars essentialis generis, sicut istius generis mentalis *corpus* aliqua species mentalis est pars essentialis, sicut ista species *animal*, que est species subalterna, quia ipsa cum aliqua sua parte componit unum terminum totum, quod non excedit quantitative aliquam suam partem, et tales partes, sicut declaratum fuit in distinctione, vocantur ad presens essentielles, quamvis non ita proprie sicut materia et forma.

27^{vb} Ex istis conclusionibus possunt alie elici quas causa brevitatis | ingeniosis relinquo.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum principale dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad probationem dicitur concedendo quod hoc genus *animal* componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus, quia quelibet littera est una species quantitativa, sicut hec littera *a* que significat univoce et

13 quia] hoc *add. necnon del. E* 17 individua] indivisibilia *E* 18 significat] appellative *add. E* 24 corpus] ‘animal’ *add. E*

appellative omnes tales figuras. Et ad Porphirium dicitur quod intelligit quod nulla species specialissima mere absoluta componitur ex pluribus speciebus specialissimis mere absolutis.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum conceditur quod individuum sit pars speciei.

- 5 Et ulterius conceditur quod omnia individua speciei humane sint partes speciei humane, non integrales, sed subiective. Et de talibus partibus subiectivis non oportet concedere quod omnes partes simul sumpte sint earum totum universale, quamvis posset concedi quod omnes tales partes simul sumpte essent earum totum aggregationum vel multitudinum
10 quia sunt una multitudo. Verumtamen accipiendo ‘speciem’ sive ‘naturam humanam’ in alia significatione quam logici communiter accipiunt, posset concedi quod omnia individua humana sint una natura humana, et una species humana, secundum quod theologi loquuntur, quando dicunt quod ‘Christus redemit totam naturam humanam’, ‘primus parens
15 infecit totam speciem humanam’, sed talis locutio non est in logica consueta.

- ⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando istam consequentiam: si species esset pars generis, et individuum pars speciei, tunc ista consequentia esset bona: ‘homo non est, igitur animal non est’, quia arguendo *a parte*
20 *subiectiva ad suum totum destructive* non valet. Non oportet quod valeat, sed intelligitur de parte integrali ad suum totum, sive de nomine partis integralis ad nomen totius integralis.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Et qualiter Porphirius debeat intelligi, patet per predicta.

⟨QUESTIO 28⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquid differat a seipso.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

28^a Sortes differt | a se puero; igitur Sortes differt a seipso. Ista consequentia apparet evidens, quia arguitur *ab inferiori ad superius*. Et quod sic arguitur, patet quia: quidquid est Sortes puer, est Sortes, et non quidquid est Sortes, est Sortes puer; igitur Sortes est superius, etcetera. Et antecedens patet per textum¹ quo dicitur quod Sortes differt a se, vel puero, vel iam viro. 5

⟨2.⟩ Item. Totus Sortes differt a Sorte, et totus Sortes est Sortes; igitur Sortes differt a seipso. Maior probatur quia: quelibet pars Sortis differt a Sorte, igitur totus Sortes differt a Sorte. Et minor declaratur quia: totus Sortes est aliquid, et non est aliquid ⟨aliud⟩ a Sorte; igitur, totus Sortes est Sortes. 10

⟨3.⟩ Item. De quocumque verificatur unum contradictorium, differt ab ipso de quo verificatur alterum contradictorium; sed de Sorte verificatur unum contradictorium, et de eodem verificatur alterum contradictorium; igitur, Sortes differt a seipso. Maior videtur de se nota, quia contradictoria non possunt competere eidem precipue sine aliqua differentia. Et minor declaratur, quia hec est vera: Sortes erit quando nihil erit Sortes. Tunc sic: quandocumque Sortes erit, Sortes erit aliquid; sed Sortes erit quando nihil erit Sortes; igitur Sortes erit aliquid quando nihil erit Sortes. Tunc sic: Sortes erit aliquid, quando nihil erit Sortes; igitur Sortes erit aliquid; igitur Sortes erit aliquid, quando Sortes non erit aliquid. Et quod Sortes erit, quando nihil erit Sortes, probatur quia: iste partes erunt, quando nihil erit Sortes; iste partes sunt Sortes; igitur Sortes erit, quando nihil erit Sortes. Et si ponatur aliqua instantia vel cautela de partibus Sortis, capiantur partes ligni, et arguitur sicut prius, igitur de Sorte verificatur unum contradictorium, et de Sorte verificatur reliquum contradictorium, igitur Sortes differt a se ipso. Item, hoc lignum erit quando non erit hoc lignum, igitur etcetera. Et arguatur sicut prius. 15 20 25 30

28 cautela] cautelia E | ligni] lingni E

1 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 10–12): ‘Differt enim Socrates (...) a se vel puero vel iam viro (...)’

⟨AD OPPOSITUM 1.⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur: si sic, sequeretur quod contradictoria sibi invicem contradictoria respectu illius significati respectu cuius sunt contradictoria, essent simul vera. Sed hoc est impossibile, sicut patet per Aristotelem in *Postpredicamentis*, capitulo de *oppositis*,² et
 5 quarto *Metaphysice*.³ Et consequentia patet quia: de quibuscumque differentibus verificantur contradictoria, sicut patet discurrendo per singula differentia. Si igitur | ⟨aliquid⟩ differant a seipso, de eodem verificantur 28^{rb}
 contra⟨dicto⟩ria. Et per consequens contradictoria essent simul vera.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM 2.⟩ Item. Omnis differentia vel est realis, vel rationis;
 10 sed idem non differt a se realiter, sicut probatum est, nec per rationem, quia ratio non facit identitatem, vel differentiam in rebus extra, sicut patet de se; igitur nihil differt a seipso.

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio est quod ‘aliquid differre ab alio’ potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet primo, vel non primo sed secundum partem. Primo
 15 quando aliquid totum differt ab isto a quo differt secundum se et secundum quodlibet sui partem, sicut Sortes differt a Platone. Non primo sed secundum partem quando aliquid differt ab aliquo a quo differt secundum aliquam sui partem, et secundum quamlibet sui partem ab isto non
 20 differt, sicut Sortes differt a sua manu dextera secundum suam manum sinistram, vel pedem, et non differt a sua manu dextera secundum suam manum dexteram. Et istum modum loquendi sive istam distinctionem
 possumus elicere ab Aristotele, primo *Physicorum*,⁴ ubi loquitur de identitate totius et partis, et de differentia. Potest etiam quodammodo elici
 ab Aristotele, quarto *Physicorum*,⁵ ubi vult quod idem sit in se ipso, non
 25 primo et per se, sed secundum partem, sicut amphora vini secundum vinum est in amphora vini, non secundum amphoram.

7 verificantur] de *add. necnon exp. E* 11 identitatem] ad *add. necnon del. E*
 13 differre] aliquid *add. E* 23 partis] ed *add. necnon del. E*

2 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 11, 14a11–14: ‘si Socratem sanum esse et Socratem aegrotare contrarium est, et non contingit simul eidem utraque inesse, numquam contingit, cum alterum contrarium sit, reliquum esse; nam cum sit sanum esse Socratem, non erit aegrotare Socratem.’ – tr. Boethii.

3 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* IV, 3, 1005b29–30: ‘contraria vero est opinio opinioni que contradictionis, palam quod impossibile simul existimare eundem esse et non esse idem.’ – recensio Guillelmi.

4 Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* I, 1, 184a24–25; 6, 189a22–25.

5 Aristoteles, *Physica* IV, 3, 210a31–34: ‘Amphora quidem igitur non erit in se ipsa, neque vinum; vini autem amphora erit; quodque namque est et in quo est, utraque eidem partes sunt. Sic quidem igitur contingit idem aliquid in se ipso esse, primum autem non contingit’ – tr. vetus.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista, quod nihil differt ab aliquo. Que probatur sic: omne quod est, est aliquid; igitur nihil differt ab aliquo. Antecedens est de se notum. Et consequentia declaratur, quia oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente, scilicet quod aliquid differt ab aliquo, et quod omne quod est, sit aliquid. Nam sequitur: 5
aliquid differt ab aliquo, igitur aliquid est et istud non est aliquid. Ista consequentia patet, quia arguitur *ab exposita ad exponentes*. Sed ista sunt manifeste contradictoria: ‘omne quod est, est aliquid’, et ‘aliquid non est aliquid’, igitur nullo modo stant simul.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est quod nihil differt ab alio. Que declaratur sic: nihil differt a seipso; omne quod est, est aliud; igitur nihil differt ab alio. Ista consequentia patet, quia omne quod est, est aliquid.

Item, si aliquid differat ab alio – sit, gratia exempli, istud: Sortes – , 28^{va} tunc sic inducitur: Sortes differt ab alio; | igitur Sortes differt ab hoc alio, 15
et Sortes differt ab hoc alio, et sic de singulis. Consequentia patet, quia arguitur *a termino stante confuse et distributive ad eius supposita pro quibus distribuitur*. Et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia sic sequeretur quod Sortes differt ab hoc alio demonstrato Sorte, et Sortes sit aliud. Patet, quia Sortes est aliud a Platone, igitur Sortes est aliud. 20

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est quod nihil quod est, differt ab aliquo, et quod omne quod est, ab alio differt. Et patet ista conclusio inductive, quia hoc quod est, ab alio differt, et hoc quod est, ab alio differt, et sic de singulis. Similiter hoc quod est, non differt ab aliquo et hoc quod est, non differt ab aliquo, et sic de singulis. 25

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est quod nihil differt a se. Et patet inductive.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est quod omne quod est, differt a se quod non est. Que probatur sic: omne quod est, est, et nihil quod est, est ipsummet quod non est; igitur omne quod est, differt a se quod non est. Ista conclusio patet, quia arguitur *ab exponentibus ad expositam*. 30

Ex ista conclusione eliciuntur quasi correlarie multe conclusiones speciales, utpote quod omne quiescens differt a se currente, quia omne quiescens est et non est ipsum currens; omnis stans differt a se sedente; omnis puer differt a se sene; omne senex differt a se puero; et generaliter: 35
omne ens differt a non ente, et omnis terminus cum alio termino a quo vere negatur, vere predicatur de seipso mediante hoc verbo ‘differt’, sicut

si 'senex' vere negatur a Sorte, tunc hoc est vera: Sortes differt a Sorte sene, et sic de quocumque alio termino qui vere de Sorte negatur.

5 (AD 1.) Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando consequentiam: 'Sortes differt a se puero, igitur Sortes differt a se'. Et ad probationem: quod, quamvis arguitur *ab inferiori ad superius*, hoc tamen est mediante verbo includente negationem, proposito inferiori et superiori. Et ita arguitur *ab inferiore ad superius* cum distributione negative, quam consequentiam non oportet valere.

10 (AD 2.) Ad secundum dicitur quod ibi committitur *fallacia equivocationis*, quia in maiori iste terminus 'totus' accipiter syncategorematice, et in minori categorematice. Et sic equivocatur, nam in maiori stat loco istius propositionis 'quelibet pars Sortis differt a Sorte', et in minori | stat loco istius 'Sortes qui est omnes sue partes, vel Sortes compositus ex omnibus suis partibus, vel Sortes cui nihil pertinens ad eius essentiam 28^{vb} deest, vel ad eius compositum esse etcetera, est Sortes'.

15 (AD 3.) Ad tertium dicitur negando maiorem, quia omne quod est, est istud de quo verificatur unum contradictorium, et de quo verificatur reliquum contradictorium, quia quodlibet contradictorium est reliquum contradictorium. Sed tunc ulterius ad propositum quo probatur quod de Sorte verificantur contradictoria sibi invicem contradictoria, dicitur concedendo gratia forme quod Sortes erit quando nihil erit Sortes, et quod lignum erit quando nihil erit hoc lignum, idest: nullum unum ens unitate continuitatis, vel unitate essentie vel unitate aggregationis vel magnitudinis. Et ulterius dicitur negando istam uniformiter loquendo 20 'quando Sortes erit, Sortes erit aliquid', precipue accipendo ly 'aliquid', sicut iam dictum est, pro aliquo uno continuative vel essentialiter.

Et per hoc patet quid sit dicendum ad hoc quod dicebatur.

(AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM) Argumenta vera ad oppositum concludunt verum, et ideo ad ista non est aliter (dicendum).

6 proposito] proposito E 7 cum distributione] con distinctione E 14 pertinens] pertinens E 21 gratia forme] ergo forte E 23 essentie] essentialis E | vel] non E
24 dicitur] ned *add. necnon del. E* 25 quando] quandoque E

⟨QUESTIO 29⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliqua
substantia differat ab alia separabili accidente.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nullo signo sive termino differt aliqua substantia ab alia; aliquod separabile accidens est signum sive terminus; igitur aliqua separabili accidente non differt una substantia ab alia, et non maiori ratione una separabili accidente non differt quam alia; igitur nullo separabili accidente una substantia differt ab alia. Maior videtur de se nota, quia nullo signo existente non magis vel minus differunt res inter se quam prius. Et minor patet, quia iste terminus ‘sedens’ est accidens separabile, sicut patet in textu.¹

⟨2.⟩ Item. Nulla substantia differt ab alia; igitur nulla substantia differt ab alia separabili accidente. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia arguitur *a superiori ad inferius distributive*. Et antecedens patet in proxima questione precedenti.²

⟨3.⟩ Item. Omne quod ab aliquo differt seipso vel sua parte ab eodem differt; igitur nulla substantia ab alia differt separabili accidente. Consequentia apparet evidens, quia nullum sensibile accidens est substantia vel pars substantie. Et antecedens declaratur, quia Sortes differt | a Platone seipso vel aliqua sua parte et non aliqua accidente, quia omni accidente Sortis remoto non minus adhuc Sortes differt a Platone, quia adhuc differt numero.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Si aliqua substantia ab aliqua alia differret separabili accidente, sequeretur quod tantum differret quantum tale accidens faceret differre; sed tale accidens facit differentiam specificam, sicut sedere Sortis differt a stare Platonis; igitur videtur quod, si Sortes differret a Platone ratione illius accidentis, tunc differret specie a Platone.

20 differt] a Platone seipso *add. mg. E; idem textus invenitur initio f. 29^{ra}*. 26–27 sicut sedere Sortis differt a stare Platonis] sicut accedere Sortis differt a Platone Sortis E

1 Sed non ad verbum. *Isagoge*, I, 6 (2, 22): ‘accidens ut album, nigrum, sedere’; v, 2 (13, 1): ‘dormire est separabile accidens’; VI, 2 (13, 18–20): ‘moveri (...) est accidens separabile’.

2 Videas supra, Q. 28 CONCLUSIONES.

5 <AD OPPOSITUM> Ad oppositum videtur quod sit Porphyrius,³ qui vult quod aliquid differat a seipso vel ab alio alteritate quadam, et exemplificans de separabili accidente, sicut Sortes sedens differt a seipso stante per hoc separabile accidens quod est sedens, sicut patet in isto syllogismo: omne sedens differt a Sorte stante; Sortes est sedens; igitur Sortes differt a seipso stante. Hoc patet quia per hoc accidens separabile sedens probatur Sortes differre a Sorte stante.

10 <DISTINCTIO PRIMA> Prima distinctio est ista quod aliquid ab alio potest differre dupliciter: uno modo proprie et stricte, sicut Sortes differt a Platone per semetipsum et per eius partem; alio modo transsumptive, sicut dicimus quod Sortes si sit sedens differt a Platone stante per hoc separabile accidens, scilicet *sedens*, quod stat loco istius propositionis Sortes concluditur differre ab Platone syllogistice per hoc medium *sedens*, igitur Sortes differt a Platone ita quod ista propositio Sortes per hoc separabile
15 accidens *sedens* differt a Platone. Et est distinguende penes amphiboliam: in sensu proprio falsa est; in sensu transsumptive secundum quod iam expositum est, est vera. Et ista distinctio in ista materia maxime est necessaria, quia Porphyrius et alii doctores in ista materia loquitur transsumptive potius quam proprie.

20 <DISTINCTIO SECUNDA> Secunda distinctio (est) quod duplex est 'separabile', sive duplex est 'separabile accidens', scilicet realis et logicalis.

Realis est que fit ex parte rei alicuius accidentis in subiecto cui realiter inheret, sicut quando caliditas separatur a ligno, vel ab aliquo.

25 *Logicalis* est ista quando aliquis terminus accidentalis vere negatur a subiecto, sicut patet in ista propositione: 'Sortes non est sedens', posito quod Sortes | prius fuit sedens et nunc non sit sedens. 29^{rb}

30 Et secundum hoc duplex est 'separabile', scilicet reale et logicale. *Reale*, quod realiter inheret alicui subiecto et potest non inherere manente subiecto. *Logicale*, quod affirmatur de aliquo subiecto et potest negari ab eodem subiecto significative sumpto. Et patet per exempla predicta.

<CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est quod accipiendo 'differentiam' secundum quod Porphyrius accipit et etiam secundum quod logici

6 quia] qualibet E 22 subiecto] ex parte *add. necnon del. E* 23 a] subiecto *add. necnon del. E* | vel] a *add. E* 24 a] sa(?) *add. E*

3 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 10–12): 'Differt enim Socrates Platone alteritate, et ipse a se puero vel iam viro vel faciente aliquid vel quiescente et semper in aliquo modo habendi alteritatibus.'

accipiunt, scilicet pro termino qui predicatur in quale, per quid tamquam per medium syllogisticum potest vere syllogisari aliquid ab alio differre, nihil aliud a termino ab alio differt per aliquam differentiam proprie accipiendo 'differre'. Ista conclusio patet inductive, quia clarum est quod Sortes non differt a Platone proprie per aliquem terminum, quia nullo termino assistente Sortes non minus differt a Platone. 5

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod omne quod ab aliquo differt, ab eodem differt per accidens separabile logicale accipiendo 'differre' transsumptive. Ista conclusio etiam patet inductive, quia omne quod ab alio differt, potest concludi ab eodem differre per aliquod medium, quod est accidens separabile. Et hoc precise verum est in materia naturali; quod dico propter personas in divinis in quibus forte ista conclusio non haberet locum. Sed captis quibuscumque duabus rebus naturalibus aliquis terminus sive aliquod accidens separabile logicale de uno verificatur quod non verificatur de reliquo, sicut patet discurrendo per singula, et per consequens tale accidens potest esse medium concludendi unam istarum rerum ab alia differre. 10 15

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est quod omnis differentia ab alio differt per differentiam proprie accipiendo 'per aliquid differre'. Ista patet, quia omnis differentia proprie se ipsa ab alio differt, quia omne quod est seipso a quacumque alia re a seipsa proprie differt. 20

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod nulla substantia ab alia differt separabili accidente accipiendo proprie 'differre', et accipiendo 'substantiam' pro substantia que non est signum. Cum hoc tamen stat quod aliqua substantia ab alia differt separabili accidente, et hoc transsumptive loquendo, sicut predictum est.⁴ 25

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum conceditur consequentia et consequens quantum est de virtute sermonis, sicut predictum est.⁵ Verumtamen secundum communem modum loquendi et secundum communem intellectum potest antecedens negari, quia per istam 'nulla substantia differt ab alia' intelligitur ita: 'nulla substantia differt ab alia a se'. 30

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium patet per predicta, quia argumentum concludit de 'differre per aliquid' proprie, et non transsumptive.

8 separabile] *g add. necnon del. E* 14 naturalibus] *materialibus E*

4 Videas supra, DIST. 1.

5 Videas supra, DIST. 1.

(AD 4.) Ad quartum conceditur quod omne istud quod differt per
 aliquod accidens, | tantum differt quantum istud accidens ipsum facit 29^{va}
 differre, ut si *A* per aliquid differat a *B*, tunc *A* tantum differt a *B* quantum
 istud accidens facit ipsum *A* differre a *B*. Sed non sequitur: igitur *A* differt
 5 a *B* tantum quantum istud accidens facit differre, quia istud accidens facit
 seipsum ab alio differre specificice, quod non oportet de *A*, scilicet quod
 differat specificice a *B* per suum accidens. Sed de ista materia patebit infra.⁶

(AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM) Et Porphirius intelligit transsumptive
 ‘(differre) per aliquid’ ad intellectum superius datum.⁷

7 infra] infra *mg. E* 8 Porphirius] *po add. necnon del. E*

6 Videas infra, Q. 30, distinctiones.

7 Videas supra, DIST. 1.

⟨QUESTIO 30⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquid
ab alio differat inseparabili accidente.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nihil ab alio differt per istud quo remoto non minus differt; sed huius- 5
modi est inseparabili accidente; igitur nihil ab alio differt inseparabili
accidente. Maior videtur de se nota. Et minor patet, quia quocumque
accidente Sortis circumscripto sive realiter, sive per intellectum, non
minus Sortes a quocumque alio differt.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si aliquid ab alio differret inseparabili accidente, vel igitur 10
differret per tale accidens numero vel specie vel genere; sed nullum
istorum potest dici; igitur nullo modo differt. Maior est de se nota, quia
pluribus modis, ut videtur, ⟨aliquid⟩ ab alio potest differre, sicut potest
elici ab Aristotele, quinto *Metaphysice*.¹ Et minor declaratur, quia: quod
non differat numero per tale accidens, patet quia, sicut iam dictum est,² 15
remoto tali accidente vel circumscripto, adhuc differre⟨t⟩ numero. Nec
etiam specie, quia secundum Porphyrium³ sola differentia specifica facit
se differre. Et secundum eundem intellectum inseparabile accidens est
differentia specifica.

⟨3.⟩ Item. De se patet quod nullum accidens facit Sortem differre 20
specie, et per consequens nec genere.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM 1.⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius,⁴ qui ponit quod aliquid
ab alio differt inseparabili accidente.

6 inseparabili] in *sup. lin. E* 13 aliquid] nihil *E* 18 inseparabile] in *sup. lin. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* v, 9, 1018a12–14: ‘Differentia vero dicuntur quecumque diversa sunt idem aliquid entia, et non solum numero sed aut specie aut genere aut proportione. Amplius quorum diversum genus, et contraria, et quecumque habent in substantia diversitatem’ – rec. Guillelmi.

2 Videas supra, Q. 29 CONCL. 3.

3 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 15–17): ‘Magis proprie differre alterum altero dicitur, quando specifica differentia distiterit (...)’

4 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 12–13): ‘Proprie autem differre alterum altero dicitur, quando inseparabili accidenti altero differt.’

5 ⟨AD OPPOSITUM 2.⟩ Item. Omne compositum ex aliquibus partibus ab aliquo differt per aliquam suam partem; sed aliquod aggregatum est compositum ex substantia et inseparabili accidente; ergo aliquod aggregatum ab isto differt per inseparabile accidens. Tam maior quam

10 ⟨AD OPPOSITUM 3.⟩ Item. Inseparabile accidens ab alio differt seipso; igitur aliquid ab alio differt inseparabili accidente. Consequentia est de se nota. Et antecedens patet per dicta in precedentibus questionibus.⁵

10 ⟨DISINCTIO PRIMA⟩ In ista questione primo premititur distinctio de accidente reali et de accidente logicali, non quod sic differt, scilicet quod nulum accidens logicale | sit accidens reale scilicet realiter alicui subiecto 29^{vb} inherens, sed quod accidens logicale accipiatur tantummodo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, et reale pro re que accidentaliter inheret alicui subiecto, de quo plus dicitur capitulo de *accidente*.⁶

15 ⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secundo presupponitur distinctio de inseparabilitate logicali et reali, quia logicalis est ista qua non potest verificari per aliquam negationem, sicut dicimus quod propria passio est inseparabilis a suo subiecto, hoc est, non potest vere negari a suo subiecto primo; realis est que fit realiter sine aliqua propositione, scilicet quando due res 20 non possunt a se invicem dividi sive separari. De quo etiam diffusius dicitur in questionibus ⟨de⟩ accidente.⁷

20 ⟨DISTINCTIO TERTIA⟩ Tertio presupponitur distinctio superius data de ‘differre per aliquid’ proprie et transsumptive.

25 ⟨DISTINCTIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta superadditur ista distinctio quod aliquid ab alio potest differre tripliciter: uno modo primo et per se, quando scilicet aliquid ab alio differt secundum se et secundum quamlibet sui partem; alio modo non primo sed per se, scilicet quando aliquid ab alio differt secundum aliquam sui partem et non secundum quamlibet; tertio aliquid ab alio differt nec primo nec per se, sed tantum secundum 30 accidens, quia tali ⟨modo⟩ ab eo differt secundum suum accidens.

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod aliquid ab alio differt proprie, primo et per se inseparabili accidente. Ista statim

12 accipiatur] lo(?) add. E 21 questionibus] pre(?) add. necnon del. E 29 tantum] tantum sup. lin. E

5 Videas supra, QQ. 28–29.

6 Videas infra, Q. 42 DIST.

7 Videas infra, QQ. 42, 43–45.

patet, quia inseparabile accidens ab aliquo differt seipso et secundum quamlibet sui partem, igitur ab alio differt proprie, primo et per se.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliquod individuum alicuius speciei ab alio individuo eiusdem speciei differt per accidens. Ista patet, quia Sortes secundum accidens est alterius speciei a Platone, quia Sortem secundum suum accidens esse alterius speciei a Platone nihil aliud est quam accidens Sortis esse alterius speciei a Platone. Unde ista propositio: ‘Sortes secundum suum accidens, vel Sortes per accidens est alterius speciei a Platone, vel specie differt a Platone’ debet sic exponi: ‘Sortes est, et accidens Sortis est alterius speciei a Platone.’

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliquid ab alio differt transsumptive inseparabili accidente. Ista statim patet, quia aliquid accidens inseparabile logicaliter loquendo est medium syllogisticum concludendo aliquid ab alio differre, sic arguendo: omnis sciturus vel omne scitum differt a Platone aquilino; Sortes est sciturus; igitur Sortes differt a Platone aquilino. In isto syllogismo | hoc accidens inseparabile *sciturus vel scitum* est medium concludendi Sortem differre a Platone aquilino.

Sed *hic instatur* de hoc quod dicitur, quod *scitum* est accidens inseparabile: nihil est accidens inseparabile quod vere a subiecto per negationem potest separari; sed *scitum* per negationem vere potest separari a subiecto; igitur etcetera. Maior videtur nota, quia ideo dicitur aliquid accidens inseparabile logicaliter, scilicet quia non potest a subiecto vere separari per negationem. Et minor patet, quia hec est vera: Plato aquilinus non est sciturus. *Ad istud breviter dicitur* quod accidens non dicitur ideo inseparabile quia non potest ab aliquo subiecto vere negari, sed quia ab aliquo subiecto significative sumpto tale accidens significative sumptum non potest vere negari. Et sic est de isto accidente *scitum*, quia, quamvis ab aliquo subiecto potest vere negari, tamen ab aliquo subiecto non potest vere negari. Et per hoc patet ad formam argumenti.

Et *si dicatur* quod si hoc accidens sit inseparabile, igitur est non separabile, igitur non-separabile, *dico* quod ista propositio ‘hoc accidens est inseparabile’ in communi locutione stat loco istius ‘hoc accidens ab aliquo subiecto est inseparabile’, et ideo, si cui placeat, potest distingui secundum amphiboliam, et dici in sensu propria et in sensu transsump-

4 speciei] se *add. E* 20–21 inseparabile] vel *add. necnon del. E* 24 logicaliter] logice
E 26 dicitur] ideo *add. necnon del. E*

tivo vera secundum quod iam declaratum.⁸ Et totum intelligitur cum constantia subiecti, scilicet quod aliquod accidens ab aliquo subiecto non potest vere negari, dummodo hoc verbum ‘est’ de eodem subiecto significative sumpto verificetur.

- 5 Hic possent diverse conclusiones de separabilitate et inseparabilitate accidentis poni, quas ad presens relinquo, quia infra ponentur detentius suo loco.⁹

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem precise loquendo de omni modo differendi, sive per se, sive per accidens,
10 sive proprie, sive transsumptive. Et ulterius negatur minor, quia omni accidente circumscripto a Sorte, Sortes minus differt saltem per accidens a Platone quam prius, quia prius differebat a Platone secundum
15 accidens, et nunc non. Et dicitur Sortem differre a Platone per suum accidens duplici causa, primo quia ipsum accidens Sortis differt a Platone, secundo quia per suum accidens percipitur per se differre a Platone, quia
accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quid est esse rei secundum Aristotelem, primo *De anima*.¹⁰

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod aliquid per inseparabile accidens ab alio differt quia per accidens ⟨differt⟩ numero, specie et genere, sicut
20 Sortes suo accidente numero differt a Platone per accidens. Unde, quamvis circumscripto tali accidente | Sortes differret adhuc numero a Platone, 30th
hoc esset per se et non per accidens. Et consimiliter dicendum est de differentia sive de differre specie et genere, quia secundum tale accidens Sortes differt a Platone specie et genere, sicut predictum est, quo
25 accidente circumscripto non taliter differret.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando assumptum istud, scilicet: nullum accidens facit Sortem specie a Platone differre, quia secundum quod prehabitu est,¹¹ aliquid accidens facit Sortem specie differre a Platone
30 per accidens et non per se, quamvis etiam Sortes specie differat a Platone per se, sicut in proxima questione patebit.¹²

6 relinquo] relinco E | detentius] 2 litt. (?) add. necnon del. E

8 Videas supra, Q. 29 DIST. 1.

9 Videas infra, Q. 32 DIST.

10 Aristoteles, *De anima* I, 1, 402b7–8. *Auctoritates* 174 (7): ‘Accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, id est definitio subiecti.’ (Aristoteles, *De anima*, A1, 402b7–8).

11 Videas supra, CONCL. 2.

12 Videas infra, Q. 31 CONCL. 11.

⟨AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM 1.⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum sufficienter patet per predicta qualiter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus.

⟨AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM 2.⟩ Ad secundum etiam patet, quia concedo quod aliquid per se ab alio differt per inseparabile accidens, quia ipsummet inseparabile accidens vel aliquod compositum ex ipso inseparabili accidente et subiecto ab alio differt per se, et hoc secundum inseparabile accidens. 5

Et *si dicatur* quod sic sequeretur quod accidens inseparabile esset differentia per se, quod est contra Porphirium in textu,¹³ qui dicit quod tantummodo differre specificè sit differre per se, *ad istud breviter dicitur* quod Porphirius vocat ibi differentiam per se sive specificam differentiam diffinitivam sive substantialem. Sed in proposito vocatur differre per se differre per se ipsa vel per suam partem, sive talis pars sit substantia sive accidens. 10

⟨Ad argumenta in oppositum 3.⟩ Ad tertium patet per idem. 15

4 alio] differunt *add. necnon del. E* 10 sit] siat *E*

13 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 15–17): ‘Magis proprie differre alterum altero dicitur, quando specifica differentia distiterit (...)’

⟨QUESTIO 31⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum differentia specifica
semper faceat aliquid ab alio differre specie.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Quia si sic, tunc sequeretur quod duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime differrent specie, vel saltem specie differrent. Sed consequens, ut videtur, est falsum, igitur et antecedens. Et consequentia declaratur, quia: Sortes habet aliquam differentiam specificam quam non habet Plato, posito quod Sortes sit albus et Plato niger. Tunc Sortes est disgregativus visus et Plato non est disgregativus visus, et per consequens ista differentia specifica *disgregativus visus* competit Sorti et non Platoni. Et quod Sortes sit disgregativus visus tali casu posito probatur quia: omne album est disgregativum visus; Sortes est albus; igitur Sortes est disgregativus visus.

15 ⟨2.⟩ Item. Nullus terminus facit aliquam rem vel aliquod individuum reale ab alio specie differre; sed omnis differentia specifica est terminus; igitur nulla differentia specifica facit aliquod individuum ab alio specie differre. Maior videtur plana, quia nullo termino existente non minus | specie differunt ista que prius specie differebant, sicut nullo termino
20 existente Sortes et asinus non minus specie differrent. Et minor declaratur quia: omne predicabile in quale est terminus; omnis differentia specifica est predicabilis in quale; ⟨ergo⟩ omnis differentia specifica est terminus. Maior istius adhuc patet, quia omne tale est aptum natum esse pars propositionis. Et minor patet per diffinitionem differentie.

25 ⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod ista differentia *mortale* faceret specie differre, et per consequens omne mortale ab immortali specie differret. Consequentia declaratur evidens, quia secundum Porphyrium¹ *mortale* est differentia specifica. Et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, si sic, tunc sequeretur quod Sortes specie differret a sua forma, scilicet
30 ab anima intellectiva, cum Sortes sit mortalis et sua anima intellectiva sit

18 termino] accidente *add. necnon del. E*

22 est] 2 litt. *add. necnon del. E*

27 Consequentia] di *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (9, 24–10, 21).

immortalis, quia secundum Aristoteles, secundo *De anima*,² ipsa anima intellectiva est perpetua. Sed hoc consequens adhuc est falsum, quia, si Sortes specie differret a sua forma, cum omnis differentia specifica fieret per aliquam speciem sive per aliquam formam, sicut elicitur ab Aristotele, quinto *Metaphysice*,³ et septimo,⁴ sequeretur quod Sortes a sua forma differret per aliam formam, et pari ratione ab ista alia forma adhuc per aliam formam, et sic in infinitum. Quod de se patet esse falsum, quia secundum Aristotelem, primo *Posteriorum*⁵ et octavo *Physicorum*,⁶ in causis formalibus non est processus in infinitum.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius,⁷ qui dicit quod omnis differentia specifica facit aliud, idest: facit aliquid ab alio specie differre, alie vero differentie faciunt alteratum.

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Premissis distinctionibus in duabus questionibus immediate precedentibus presuppositis,⁸ apponitur adhuc una distinctio quod talis duplex est differentia specifica, scilicet formalis et materialis. Formalis que fit gratia alicuius forme; materialis que fit gratia alicuius materie. Formalis adhuc est duplex, nam quedam est substantialis, scilicet illa que est gratia alicuius forme substantialis, et quedam accidentalis, scilicet ista que fit gratia alicuius forme accidentalis. Accidentalibus adhuc

3 cum] ab *add. necnon del. E* 11 alio] alio *corr. mg. E a.m.* 12 alie] differentie *add. necnon del. E* | differentie] differentie *sup. lin. E* 13 prima] cum(?) *add. E*
14 apponitur] una distinctio *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

2 Aristoteles, *De anima* II, 2, 413b26–27. *Auctoritates* 178 (52): ‘Intellectus separatur ab aliis potentiis animae sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.’ (Aristoteles, *De anima*, B2, 413b26–27.) Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 5, 430a23; *Auctoritates* 187 (151): ‘Intellectus est immortalis et perpetuus.’

3 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* V, 10, 1018b1–3: ‘Diversa vero specie dicuntur quecumque eiusdem generis existentia non sub invicem sunt et quecumque in eodem genere existentia differentiam habent, et quecumque in substantia contrarietatem habent’ – rec. Guillelmi.

4 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 1030b5–7.

5 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* I, 22, 82b38–39: ‘si enim est diffinire aut si notum est quod aliquod erat esse, infinita autem non est transire, necesse est finiri in eo quod quid est predicantia’ – tr. Iacobi. *Auctoritates* 317 (76): ‘Impossibile est infinita pertransire’ (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora.*, A22, 82b38–39).

6 Aristoteles, *Physica* VIII.

7 *Isagoge*, III, 3 (8, 19–9, 1): ‘Differentiarum enim aliae quidem alteratum faciunt, aliae vero aliud. Illae quidem quae faciunt aliud, specificae vocantur, illae vero quae alteratum, simpliciter differentiae.’

8 Videas supra, Q. 29 DIST. 1–2, Q. 30 DIST. 1–4.

est duplex. Quia quedam fit per se, et quedam per accidens. Per se, sicut albedo, que est forma accidentalis, per se differt a nigredine; per accidens, sicut Sortes secundum suam albedinem a Platone nigro specie per accidens differt.

5 <DISTINCTIO SECUNDA> Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘species’ accipitur dupliciter quantum est ad presens: uno modo pro forma reali substantiali vel accidentali, alio modo pro termino mentali, vocali vel scripto, qui quidem terminus est de pluribus predicabilis numero differentibus in eo quod quid.

10 <CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista quod quecumque duo individua alicuius speciei specie differunt, differunt qualitercumque accipitur | ‘species’. Ista conclusio probatur sic: quecumque duo individua alicuius speciei sunt et aliqua specie non sunt idem; igitur quecumque duo individua alicuius speciei specie differunt. Ista consequentia est plana, 30^{vb}
 15 quia arguitur *ab exponentibus ad expositam*. Et antecedens quantum ad primam particulam, scilicet quod quecumque duo individua alicuius speciei sunt, est de se notum. Et secunda particula, scilicet quod quecumque duo individua alicuius speciei aliqua specie non sunt idem, etiam patet, quia est una universalis cuius quelibet singularis est vera, et ideo
 20 patet inductive. Nam quibuscumque duobus individuis alicuius speciei captis, ista aliqua specie non sunt idem, sicut Sortes et Plato aliqua specie non sunt idem, quia specie asinina non sunt idem, igitur aliqua specie non sunt idem. Ista consequentia patet, quia arguitur *ab inferiori ad superius* postposita negatione. Que consequentia semper valet precipue cum
 25 substantia subiecti, sicut optime sequitur: aliquis homo non currit; et aliquid homo est; igitur aliquod animal non currit. Et consimiliter sequitur: Sortes et Plato specie asinina non sunt idem; et species *asina* est; igitur aliqua specie non sunt idem.

30 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla duo individua alicuius speciei substantialis differunt specie substantiali. Ista consequentia statim patet, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod alique duo individua alicuius speciei erunt, et non erunt idem specie. Consequentia patet, quia arguitur *a propositione ad suas exponentes*. Et falsitas consequentis patet, quia includit contradictionem, scilicet quod alique duo individua
 35 essent eiusdem specie substantialis, et ista eadem non essent eiusdem speciei substantialis.

19 quelibet] singulis (?) *add. necnon del. E*
 30 specie] speciei *add. E*

20 alicuius] species *add. necnon del. E*

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne individuum specie ab alio differt. Et sequitur ex prima conclusione, quia omne individuum est, et specie cum alia non est idem.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod nullum individuum ab alio differt specie. Ista declaratur, quia si sic, tunc sequeretur quod aliquod individuum esset et cum alio non esset idem specie. Quod videtur esse falsum, quia quocumque individuo accepto istud cum omni individuo est idem specie accidentali vel substantiali, sicut Sortes est idem specie cum albedine, quia tam Sortes quam albedo sunt a parte dextra alicuius vel eque distantes ab aliquo vel eque propinqua alicui, et sic de aliis speciebus accidentalibus que quasi in infinitum possunt multiplicari, quia secundum Aristotelem, secundo *Perihermeneias*⁹ et primo *Physicorum*¹⁰ infinita uni accidunt.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquod individuum ab alio individuo differt specie substantiali. Ista statim patet quia Sortes ab albedine differt specie substantiali, quia Sortes est et Sortes albedini non est idem aliqua specie substantiali.

31^{ra} ⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista | quod nullo termino existente nulla sunt eiusdem speciei accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro termino. Ista statim patet quia tunc nulla continentur sub tali specie quia per casum nulla talis species est.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma reali et non pro termino, aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei nullo termino existente. Ista conclusio patet, quia aliqua sunt eiusdem forme, utpote caput Sortis et pes Sortis, quia sunt eiusdem speciei sicut anime secundum communem opinionem que tenet quod anima intellectiva alicuius est in tota et in qualibet eius parte.

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod eodem modo accipiendo ‘speciem’ nulla duo individua suppositionaliter discreta ita quod non sint partes alicuius alterius per se unius, sunt eiusdem speciei, quia nulla talia duo individua sint eiusdem forme nec accidentalis nec substantialis, sicut de se patet, saltem secundum communem opinionem.

⟨CONCLUSIO NONA⟩ Nona conclusio est ista quod aliqua individua suppositionaliter discreta sunt earundem specierum, idest: consimilium

15 alio] aliquo E 19 existente] accidente E 24 termino] 2 litt. add. necnon del. E
27 in] de add. necnon del. et exp. E 29 duo] dua E | discreta] ista add. necnon del. E

9 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione* 2. Locus non inventus.

10 Aristoteles, *Physica* I. Locus non inventus.

specierum ultimatarum, similitudine substantiali, quia anima Sortis et anima Platonis non possunt similiores esse quam sunt. Et ad istum intellectum conceditur communiter ista propositio: 'Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime nullo termino existente', que quidem proprie
 5 falsa est de virtute sermonis sive in sensu proprio, sed vera est in sensu transsumptivo. Et est sensus 'Sortes et Plato habent formas similes ultimata similitudine', et hoc extendendo nomen 'similitudinis' ad substantiam.

10 <CONCLUSIO DECIMA> In isto igitur sensu transsumptivo sequuntur aliquae conclusiones, quarum una est ista, et est decima in ordine, quod aliqua duo individua que sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime, sunt diversarum specierum. Ista statim patet, quia aliqua duo individua que habent simillimas formas substantiales, habent dissimiles formas accidentales, sicut posito quod Sortes sit albus et Plato niger, tunc Sortes et
 15 Plato habent simillimas formas substantiales, quia duas animas intellectivas, et per consequens transsumptive loquendo sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime substantialis, et habent albedinem et nigredinem que sunt diverse species accidentales, et per consequens sunt diversarum specierum accidentalium.

20 <CONCLUSIO UNDECIMA> Undecima conclusio est ista quod Sortes et Plato et quecumque alia individua substantialia composita ex materia et forma sunt per se alterius speciei substantialis non tamen primo, quia Sortes secundum | suam materiam que est sua pars essentialis, est alterius
 31^{rb} speciei a Platone. Et patet totum.

25 <CONCLUSIO DUODECIMA> Duodecima conclusio est ista quod differentia specifica substantialis de qua loquitur Porphyrius, semper facit aliud, et hoc transsumptive loquendo ad istum intellectum quod talis differentia est medium concludendi aliqua duo esse differentium formarum substantialium, et per consequens quod talia duo habent dissimiles
 30 formas substantiales, sicut sic arguendo: 'nullum rationale est asinus; omnis homo est rationalis; igitur nullus homo est asinus'. In ista syllogismo hec differentia specifica *rationalis* est medium vere concludendi hominem non esse asinum. Qui quidem homo et asinus habent dissimiles formas substantiales, nec aliqua talis differentia potest esse medium
 35 concludendi diversitatem inter aliqua, nisi ista duo etiam habeant formas substantiales similes vel ultimatas similitudine substantiale. Et hoc

6 est] iste *add. necnon del. E*
 horum(?) *E*

21 ex] 1 *litt. add. necnon del. E*

32 hec] hec *ex*

est quod Porphirius vult dicere, scilicet quod differentia specifica semper facit aliud, et non tantum alteratum.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum principale dicitur concedendo consequens, quia non tantum duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime aliqua specie accidentali differunt, sed etiam aliqua specie substantiali, sicut patet per predicta.¹¹ Et etiam conceditur quod duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime substantialis sunt diversarum specierum specialissimarum accidentalium, sicut prius declaratum est.¹²

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod maior est falsa accipiendo ‘differre’ transsumptive, quia sic staret loco istius propositionis ‘nullus terminus est medium concludendi aliqua specie differre’, sed accipiendo ‘facere differre’ proprie, tunc bene posset concedi, sed sic non est ad propositum argumenti, nec etiam ad propositum Porphirii.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium vere breviter dicitur concedendo conclusionem, scilicet quod Sortes specie differt a sua forma non primo, sed per se, quia secundum suam partem essentialem, scilicet suam materiam. Et ulterius negatur quod omnis differentia specifica fit per aliquam speciem precise quia potest fieri etiam per materiam sicut Sortes specie differt a sua specie, per suam materiam et non per aliquam speciem substantialem. Et ideo Sortes materialiter differt sua forma specifica et non formaliter

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum, qualiter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus, patet per superius dicta,¹³ quia vult dicere quod nulla differentia specifica substantialis erit medium vere concludendi aliqua differre nisi ista specie differant, idest: nisi habeant dissimiles formas substantiales substantialiter.

7 diversarum] sub *add. necnon del. E*

11 Videas supra, CONCL. 8.

12 Videas supra, CONCL. 10.

13 Videas supra, CONCL. 12.

Consequenter queritur | utrum omne faciens
per se differre sit differentia specifica.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Nullum proprium est differentia specifica; aliquod faciens per se differre est proprium; igitur aliquid faciens per se differre non est differentia specifica. Maior videtur evidens, quia proprium et differentia specifica sunt species desparate eque primo dividentes aliquod genus; igitur, ut videtur, unum universaliter ab alio vere negatur. Et minor probatur, quia:
10 omne faciens differre, vel facit per se differre, vel per accidens; sed proprium non facit per accidens; igitur per se. Assumptum videtur de se notum, et quod proprium faciat differre, patet per textum,¹ quia accidens facit differre, igitur a multo fortiori proprium. Et quod proprium non faciat differre per accidens, patet primo quia proprium non est acci-
15 dens, quia sunt species distincte; secundo quia, cuicumque competit proprium, sic competit per se secundo modo, sicut satis elicitur ab Aristotele, primo *Posteriorum*.²

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod genus esset differentia specifica. Consequens, ut videtur, est falsum, quia nullum genus predicatur in
20 quale, igitur nullum genus est differentia specifica. Et prima consequentia declaratur, quia omne genus facit per se differre, et hoc sive accipiatur 'facere differre' proprie sive transsumptive. Proprie, quia facit seipsum differre per se; transsumptive, quia est medium vel potest esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum alique per se differentie, sic arguendo:
25 'omne animal per se differt a lapide; omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis homo per se differt a lapide'.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod aliquod accidens esset differentia specifica. Consequens, ut videtur, est falsum ratione qua prius. Et consequentia declaratur, quia aliquod accidens facit per se differre, nam hec
30 differentia ⟨*rationalis*⟩ est accidens, igitur accidens facit per se differre.

3 differre] utrum omne *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 7–17).

2 Aristoteles *Analytica posteriora* I, locus non inventus.

Maior est de se nota, et patet expresse per textum.³ Et consimiliter
 (differentia) specifica facit per se differre; hec differentia *rationalis* est
 differentia specifica; igitur hec differentia *rationalis* facit per se differre.
 Tam maior quam minor patet per textum.⁴ Et minor declaratur, ista scilicet
 hec differentia *rationalis* sit accidens, quia est accidens materie, igitur
 est accidens. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens declaratur, quia hec est
 per accidens: 'ista materia est rationalis' demonstrata materia alicuius
 hominis, quia manifeste (de) ista materia potest hoc predicatum *ratio-*
nalis successive vere affirmari et negari ab eodem. Et quod poterit vere
 affirmari patet, quia ista materia est habens rationem vel animam intel-
 lectivam, igitur ista materia est rationalis, sicut sequitur: 'ista materia est
 habens demonstrationem, igitur est demonstrabilis vel demonstrata.' Et
 quod poterit non esse rationalis, de se notum est.

(4.) Item. Si sic, sequeretur quod aliquod accidens proprie possit diffi-
 31^{vb} niri. Falsitas consequentis | patet per Aristotelem, septimo *Metaphysice*.⁵ 15
 Consequentia declaratur, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod ista differentia
disgregativus visus esset differentia specifica, quia facit albedinem per se
 differre a nigredine, et per consequens albedo haberet genus et differen-
 tiam specificam. Et tunc sic: omne habens genus et differentiam potest
 habere proprie diffinitionem; albedo est huiusmodi; igitur albedo potest
 habere proprie diffinitionem. Et per consequens aliquod accidens potest
 habere proprie diffinitionem. Maior istius rationis patet per Aristotelem,
 sexto *Topicorum*⁶ et septimo *Metaphysicorum*,⁷ et etiam patet per textum
 Porphyrii.⁸ Et minor patet, si *omne faciens per se differre* sit differentia
 specifica. 25

14 proprie] proprie E^c 23 Metaphysicorum] 6 litt. (?) add. necnon del. E 24 minor]
 etiam add. necnon del. E

3 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 7–17).

4 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 14–17): 'Magis proprie differre alterum altero dicitur, quando
 specifica differentia distiterit, quemadmodum homo ab equo specifica differentia
 differt rationali qualitate.'

5 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 5, 1031a1–3: 'soliis substantie est diffinitio' – rec.
 Guillelmi.

6 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 4, 141b25–28: 'quidem oportet per genus et differentias diffi-
 nire eum qui bene diffinit' – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 328 (93): 'Omnis bona definitio
 debet constare ex genere et differentiis (...)' (Aristoteles, *Topica*, Z4, 141b25–28).

7 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 12, 1037b29–30: 'Nichil enim aliud est in diffinitione
 quam primum dictum genus et differentie' – rec. Guillelmi. *Auctoritates* 130 (184):
 'Nichil aliud debet esse in definitione nisi genus et differentia.' (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*,
 Z12, 1037b29–30).

8 *Isagoge*, III, 4 (9, 2–6).

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur per Porphyrium,⁹ qui dicit quod differentie per se sint differentie specificae. Unde dicit sic:¹⁰ ‘inseparabilium alie sunt per se, alie vero per accidens.’ Et postea dicit:¹¹ ‘igitur ille que per se sunt, in ratione substantie accipiuntur et faciunt aliud’, idest:
5 faciunt specificae differentiam.

⟨SOLUTIO QUESTIONIS⟩ In ista questione primo premittitur una declaratio, secundo apponitur una distinctio, tertio eliciuntur quedam conclusiones, et quarto solventur rationes principales.

⟨DECLARATIO⟩ Circa primum igitur est sciendum quod omnis perceptio
10 aliquorum differentium primo fit per sensum vel presupponit sensationem qua percipiuntur aliquae differentie, nam ex hoc quod aliquae duo corpora sentiuntur esse in diversis locis, percipimus talia differre saltem numero, et quia omnis perceptio est principaliter respectu alicuius
15 accidentis, ideo prius imponimus aliquem terminum ad significandum aliquod accidens vel accidentaliter mediante quo concludimus talia differre. Et talis terminus vocatur ‘differentia communiter dicta’, eo quod communis consideratio sive magis confusa precedit considerationem discretam.

Deinde discretius considerando percipimus adhuc sensationem aliquae
20 accidentia magis propria talium differentium, utpote aliquod accidens inseparabile, vel saltem non communiter vel leviter separabile, et secundum talem considerationem imponimus unum terminum ad significandum istud accidens vel accidentaliter; qui quidem terminus non
25 potest per aliquem processum naturalem vere negari a tali subiecto ipso manente. Et talis terminus logicaliter loquendo vocatur ‘accidens inseparabile’ et ‘differentia proprie dicta’, eo quod ⟨per⟩ proprius et convenientius sive intentius sive †illativus(?)† illius vel connotatum convenit tali subiecto quia inseparabiliter, et quia potest esse medium syllogisticum ad
30 concludendum distinctius talia differre. Precedentibus igitur istis sensationibus sive visionibus accidentium, | quia accidentia magnam partem 32^{ra}
conferunt ad cognoscendum quid est rei, sicut vult Aristoteles, primo

30 sive] acc add. necnon del. E; con add. E

9 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (9, 24–10, 21).

10 *Isagoge*, III, 5 (9, 11–12): ‘Inseparabilium autem aliae quidem sunt per se, aliae vero per accidens (...)’

11 *Isagoge*, III, 6 (9, 14–15): ‘Illae igitur quae per se sunt, in substantiae ratione accipiuntur et faciunt aliud (...)’

De anima,¹² procedimus ulterius ex talibus actibus sive operationibus ad inquerendum de essentia talis rei mediante qua inquisitione primo percipimus in tali composito formam substantialem a qua procedunt tales operationes vel talia accidentia. Et tunc imponimus aliquem terminum ad significandum vel cognoscendum talem formam. Et quia talis terminus potest esse medium syllogismi ad concludendum aliqua specificè differre eo quod mediantibus talibus diversis formis percipimus aliqua specificè differre, ideo vocamus talem terminum ‘differentiam specificam’ sive ‘differentiam magis proprie dictam’ a tali specie sive a tali forma.

Deinde adhuc ulterius investigando per transitionem et per corruptionem sive per separationem et generationem talis forme, percipimus ibi aliam partem essentialem, scilicet materiam, ratione cuius imponimus aliquem terminum concretum ⟨ad⟩ significandum suum connotatum ipsius materie. Et quia talis terminus potest esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum aliqua specificè differre, extendendo nomen ‘speciei’ ad naturam, ut isti dicuntur specificè differre que sunt diversarum naturarum et dissimilium substantialiter. Ideo adhuc vocamus talem terminum ‘differentiam specificam’ et ‘differentiam essentialem’, quia connotat partem essentialem sive specialem connotative alicuius extrinseci. Et talis terminus potest dici secundum aliquam suam significationem potentia vel pura potentia, quia sic arguendo: ‘omnis pura potentia est alterius speciei a composito ex actu et potentia, vel ab actu; sed materia est pura potentia; igitur materia prima est alterius speciei a composito ex actu et potentia; vel etiam ⟨ab⟩ actu’. Prima differentia vocatur a Porphirio¹³ ‘accidens separabile’; secunda vocatur ‘accidens inseparabile’, et potest se extendere ad proprium; tertia vocatur differentia que est unum de quinque universalibus, sive specifica differentia.

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ *Distinctio apponenda est ista quod ‘differentia per se’ accipitur multipliciter.*

Uno modo, scilicet *large* pro omni eo quod predicatur per se de aliquo, et potest esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum significatum

13 terminum] concr(?) *add. necnon del. E* | significandum] vel connotative ipsius materie vel *add. necnon del. E* 14 ipsius] mane(?) *add. necnon del. E* | materie] medie(?) *sup. lin. E* 24 ab] ex *E*

12 Aristoteles, *De anima* I, 1, 402b21–22. *Auctoritates* 174 (7): ‘Accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, id est subjectum sive definitio subjecti.’ (Aristoteles, *De anima*, A1, 402b21–22).

13 *Isagoge*, III, 1 (8, 7–17).

illius de quo verificatur ab alio specificè differre, et connotat specialiter aliquem partem essentialè vel aliquod accidens, formaliter procedens sive materialiter ab aliqua tali parte vel a toto composito ex talibus partibus. Et isto modo | omne proprium est differentia per se et precise omne 32^{rb}
 5 proprium substantiale. Et isto modo non loquitur secundum aliquos Porphyrius de differentia.

Cuius oppositum tamen ad presens ego credo, quia loquens de differentia per se ponit quedam exempla de proprio, sicut patet capitulo de *differentia*,¹⁴ ubi dicit sic: ‘nam rationale per se inest homini, et mortale, et esse perceptibile discipline’, et clarum est quod *esse perceptibile* est proprium et non differentia substantialis, quia significat discrete sive connotat aliquid extra essentialè hominis, scilicet disciplinam.

Differentia vero *per se* stricte vocatur aliquis terminus discrete significans vel connotans aliquam partem essentialè compositi ex materia et forma nihil extrinsecum discrete connotans sive significans, potens esse 15 medium syllogisticum ad concludendum aliqua specificè differre. Et de ista differentia dicunt *aliqui* quod Porphyrius loquitur, quando facit mentionem de differentiis per se. Et ista est differentia completiva diffinitionis proprie dicte.

20 <CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista quod aliquid facit per se differre quod non est differentia specifica, quia omne quod est, facit seipsum ab alio per se differre, quia seipso a quocumque alio differt, et tamen non omne quod est, est differentia specifica.

<CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod accipiendo 25 transsumptive ‘facere differre’, aliquid facit per se differre quod non est differentia specifica, ad istum intellectum quod aliquid predicatur primo modo dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum significatum illius subiecti ab alio specificè differre, quod tamen non est differentia specifica. Ista statim patet, quia 30 omne genus per se primo modo predicatur de sua specie, et potest <esse> medium syllogisticum ad concludendum significatum sue speciei ab alia specie differre, et tamen non omne genus est differentia specifica. Et quod omne genus sit huiusmodi, patet per argumentum ad principale factum, scilicet in isto argumento: ‘omne animal est alterius speciei a

10 perceptibile] disl *add. necnon del. E* 30 esse] est *E*

14 *Isagoge*, III, 5 (9, 13): ‘(...) nam rationale per se inest homini et mortale et disciplinae esse perceptibile (...)’

lapide; omnis homo est animal; igitur, omnis ⟨homo⟩ est alterius speciei a lapide; ergo, ⟨homo⟩ et lapis specificè differunt'. Et sic potest argui per quodcumque aliud genus respectu sue speciei.

32^{va} | ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod eodem modo acci-
piendo 'facere differre' aliquid connotans aliquam formam facit per se 5
differre quod non est differentia specifica. Ista declaratur, quia aliquid
connotans aliquam formam predicatur per se saltem secundo modo
dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllogisticum
| concludendi significatum talis subiecti ab alio specificè differre; et non
est differentia specifica; igitur aliquid connotans aliquam formam facit 10
per se differre, quod tamen non est differentia specifica. Consequentia
videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet de omni proprio, sicut istud pro-
prium *risibile* connotat aliquam formam, quia actum ridendi vel formam
a qua procedit actus ridendi, et tamen nullum proprium est differentia
specifica. 15

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod omne conno-
tans formam intrinsecam et non extrinsecam, quod predicatur primo
modo dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllogisti-
cum concludendi significatum talis subiecti a quocumque alio specificè
differre, est differentia specifica, quia omne tale imponitur ad signifi- 20
candum concretive significatum talis subiecti connotando partem for-
malem eiusdem affirmative vel negative, nihil extrinsecum connotando
mediante qua forma percipimus istud significatum ab alio specificè dif-
ferre. Sed hec differentia *rationale* concretive significat hominem conno-
tando animam intellectivam affirmative mediante qua percipimus homi- 25
nem ab asino specificè differre. Et ista differentia *mortale* significat con-
cretive omne vivum corruptibile connotando animam negative, scilicet
ipsum posse separari a materia in qua est, et nullum extrinsecum con-
notat. Et iste differentie predicantur de se de subiecto primo modo, quia
sunt partes diffinitionis propria dicte. Ex isto sequitur unum correlarium, 30
videlicet quod aliqua differentia connotat formam tam affirmative quam
negative, sicut iste differentia composita *rationale mortale*.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquid est diffe-
rentia specifica quod non discrete connotat aliquam formam. Ista decla-
ratur sic: nam aliquid est quod predicatur de subiecto primo modo 35
dicendi per se, et connotat vel significat partem essentiali significati

2 homo] omnis E 9 subiecti] 5 litt. (?) add. necnon del. E 14 qua] conce add.
necnon del. E 27 vivum] cor ... (?) add. necnon del. E 34 aliquam] speciem add.
necnon del. E | formam] formam sup. lin. E^c

talis subiecti, et potest esse medium concludendi tale significatum ab alio
 specifice differre, et non connotat discrete aliquam formam; igitur, ali-
 qua est differentia specifica, que non connotat aliquam formam discrete.
 Consequentia videtur evidens, quia conditiones accepte in antecedente
 5 sufficiunt ad hoc quod aliquid fit differentia specifica. Et antecedens
 declaratur, quia iste terminus ‘habens puram potentiam’ verificatur de
 homine primo modo dicendi per se, quia potest poni in diffinitione | 32^{vb}
 naturali, sicut in ista diffinitione: ‘homo est habens puram potentiam et
 animam intellectivam tamquam suas partes essentielles’. Et iste terminus
 10 ‘pura potentia’ non discrete connotat aliquam formam et significat par-
 tem essentialem compositi, vel connotat materiam, igitur etcetera.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem,
 scilicet quod aliquid faciens per se differre non est differentia specifica. Et
 ad Porphyrium dicitur quod ipse loquitur de ‘per se’ primo modo, hoc est
 15 dictu omne istud quod per se primo modo verificatur de aliquo subiecto
 connotans partem essentialem significati illius subiecti nihil extrinsecum
 connotando, est differentia specifica illius, et potest esse simul cum hoc
 medium syllogisticum ad probandum istud significatum ab aliquo specie
 differre.

20 ⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam, scilicet quod
 si genus faciat per se differre, quod sit differentia specifica, et causa est,
 quia oportet plus addere, scilicet quod connotat discrete aliquam partem
 essentialem sui significati, nihil extrinsecum connotando, et hoc non
 facit genus.

25 Et si dicatur quod hoc genus *animal* videtur discrete connotare partem
 essentialem, scilicet animam, quia ‘animal’ dicitur ab ‘anima’, *ad istud*
dicitur ab *aliquibus* quod, quamvis ‘animal’ ⟨ab⟩ nomine ipsius ‘anime’
 fuit impositum ad significandum, tamen fuit impositum absolute, et
 non connotative ita quod per talem impositionem non potius connotat
 30 animam quam corpus. *Alii* dicunt, et forte melius, quod oportet talem
 connotationem fieri adiective et non subiective. Unde, quamvis ‘animal’
 connotat animam, hoc tamen non est adiective. Sed de hoc plus patebit
 infra.¹⁵

1 alio] b *add. E* 17 illius] ista *add. E* 20 dicitur] ned(?) *add. necnon del. E*
 26 scilicet] animal quia *add. necnon del. E* 27 aliquibus] qui *add. necnon del. E*
 | nomine] nominis *E*

15 Videas infra, q. 34.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod aliquod accidens est differentia specifica, sed non illius cuius est accidens. Unde ista differentia *rationale* est differentia specifica hominis, et non materie hominis. Unde bene conceditur quod aliquid idem respectu diversorum est differentia specifica, et accidens separabile et inseparabile. 5

33^{ra} ⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur negando quod accidens saltem pro suo significato proprie posset diffiniri. Et ulterius conceditur quod, quamvis accidens habeat differentiam per se, non tamen specificam | secundum quod loquitur Porphirius, quia ipse loquitur de differentia specifica que potius imponitur ad significandum ratione unius partis essentialis quam alterius, quia oportet quod connotet discrete alteram partem essentialem, et non omnem. Et sic non facit aliquam differentiam accidentis, quia ista differentia ‘disgregativum visus’ non potius connotat unam partem albedinis quam aliam, et simul cum hoc connotat aliquod extrinsecum, utpote visum. 10 15

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum, qualiter scilicet Porphirius sit intelligendus, patet per supra dicta.

⟨QUESTIO 33⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum differentia
per se suscipit magis et minus.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic:

5 omnis conceptus potest intendi et remitti, et per consequens potest
suscipere magis et minus; aliqua differentia per se est conceptus; igitur
aliqua differentia per se potest intendi et remitti. Maior videtur evidens,
quia secundum Aristotelem in *Predicamentis*, capitulo de *qualitate*,¹ ali-
quid potest esse sapientior alio et iustior alio, quod non esset si scientia et
10 iustitia, que sunt subiective in anima, non posse⟨n⟩t intendi et remitti, et
pari ratione omnis conceptus potest intendi et remitti. Item, experientia
patet quod aliquando concipimus aliquid intentius et aliquid remissius.
Et minor patet quia: omne signum de pluribus predicabile est mentale,
vocale, vel scriptum; omnis differentia est huiusmodi, sicut patet per dif-
15 finitionem differentie; igitur, etcetera.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omnis vox potest intendi et remitti; aliqua differentia per se
est vox; igitur etcetera. Maior apparet evidens, quia due voces omnino
similes possunt esse in eodem subiecto simul, et per consequens una
intendit aliam, sicut patet duobus luminibus in eodem subiecto existen-
20 tibus unum intendit aliud. Et minor patet sicut prius.²

⟨3.⟩ Item. Anima intenditur, igitur differentia que accipitur ab anima.
Consequentia est satis evidens. Et antecedens demonstratur, quia experi-
mento apparet quod puer continue crescit in fortitudine, et per conse-
quens puer est magis, et magis fortis, et non nisi per animam; igitur
25 anima maioratur, et non extensive, sicut patet per Aristotelem et Com-
mentatorem, tertio *De anima*,³ igitur intensive.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Omne habens contrarium suscipit magis et minus; differen-
tia per se habet contrarium; igitur differentia | per se suscipit magis et 33^{rb}

11 omnis] consi *add. necnon del. E* 25 anima] magis *add. necnon del. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 8, 11a5: 'magis enim grammaticus alter altero dicitur et iustior et sanior.' – tr. Boethii.

2 Videas supra, 1.

3 Locus non inventus.

minus. Maior potest elici ab Aristotele, quinto *Physicorum*,⁴ ubi vult quod omne quod fit minus tale, fit minus tale per adventitionem sui contrarii. Et minor etiam patet, quia *rationale et irrationale* contrariantur, nam sub eodem genere maxima distant, et vicissim se expellunt quia ante adventum anime intellective corpus existens in utero materno est irrationale, 5 et postea rationale.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Experimento patet quod unus homo est magis rationalis quam alius, quia magis utens ratione.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius,⁵ qui dicit quod ille differentie que per se sunt, non suscipiunt magis et minus. Et probat hoc sic:⁶ ‘nam neque genus aut magis aut minus predicatur de eo cuius fuerit genus, neque generis differentie secundum quas dividitur’, et sequitur: ‘ipse enim sunt que uniuscuiusque rationem complent, esse autem unicuique unum et idem est, neque intentionem neque remissionem suscipient.’ 10 15

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ In ista questione presuppositis adhuc precedentibus distinctionibus, precipue ⟨de⟩ differentia per se, addo unam distinctionem que talis est, scilicet quod ‘suscepere magis et minus’ potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet *realiter* et *logicaliter*. Realiter quando aliquid in essentia sua intenditur vel remittitur per aliquid simile sibi adveniens, vel ab eo recedens, sicut dicimus calorem intendi per appositionem caloris, et lumen per appositionem luminis. *Logicaliter* sive *predicative*, quando aliquis terminus de aliquo verificatur aliquando cum hoc adverbio ‘magis’, et aliquando cum hoc adverbio ‘minus’, sicut dicimus album intendi vel suscipere magis et minus, quia aliquando album verificatur de suo subiecto 20 25 cum adverbio ‘magis’, et aliquando cum hoc adverbio ‘minus’.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod omnis differentia sive per se sive per accidens mentalis potest intendi vel potest remitti realiter, sicut probat primum argumentum.⁷

4 vicissim] *seq. lac. 4 litt. E* 16 presuppositis] *pre add. necnon del. E*

4 Cf. supra, Q. 11, CONCL. 5. Locus non inventus.

5 *Isagoge*, III, 7 (9, 16): ‘Et illae quidem quae per se sunt, non suscipiunt magis et minus.’

6 *Isagoge*, III, 7 (9, 18–22): ‘(...) nam neque genus aut magis aut minus praedicatur cuius fuerit genus, neque generis differentiae, secundum quas dividitur, ipsae enim sunt quae uniuscuiusque rationem complent, esse autem unicuique unum et idem neque intentionem neque remissionem suscipiens est (...)’

7 Videas supra, 1.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod nihil suscipit magis et minus secundum idem realiter. Ista patet, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod idem secundum idem intenditur et remittitur.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod nihil suscipit magis et minus logicaliter secundum idem, respectu eiusdem. Quia si sic, tunc sequeretur quod aliquid esset minus album et magis album secundum idem precise respectu eiusdem, quod includit contradictionem.

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliquid suscipit magis et minus secundum idem respectu diversorum, | quia aliquid est magis album Sorte, et minus album Platone, posito casu possibili. Sed de isto plus patebit *supra Predicamenta*.⁸ 33^{va}

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod probabiliter potest teneri quod aliqua differentia per se potest suscipere magis et minus tam logicaliter quam realiter. Et quod realiter, patet per primam conclusionem.⁹ Et quod logicaliter declaratur, nam omnis species substantie composite habet vel potest habere differentiam per se, sicut satis elicitur ab Aristotele, septimo *Metaphysice*.¹⁰

Item. Aliqua habet vel potest habere, et non maiori ratione una quam alia, igitur omnis habet vel potest habere, igitur ignis habet vel potest habere. Ponatur igitur in esse, et vocetur differentia per se ipsius ignis accepta a sua forma substantiali *B*. Tunc sic probabiliter potest teneri quod forma ignis potest intendi et potest remitti realiter. Igitur, probabiliter potest teneri quod differentia accepta a tali forma potest suscipere magis et minus logicaliter. Ista consequentia est evidens. Et antecedens patet per Commentatorem, tertio *Coeli*, commento sexagesimo septimo,¹¹ ubi ponit formas substantiales elementorum posse intendi et posse remitti, nec video argumentum multum cogens quin idem posset teneri de quacumque forma substantiali alicuius substantie augmentabilis et nutribilis preter argumentum de pluralitate rerum †videnda(?)†.

30 ⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod nulla differentia per se primo modo potest suscipere magis et potest suscipere minus

6 et] au (?)*add. necnon del. E* 10 album] albus *E* | possibili] vacat *add. necnon del. a.m. E* 17 Aristotele] Aristoteles *E*

8 Thomas Manlevet, *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, Q. 86, utrum qualitas suscipiat magis et minus (ff. 112^{rb}-13^{rb}); Q. 87, utrum aliqua quarte speciei qualitatis suscipiat magis et minus (ff. 113^{rb}-114^{ra}).

9 Videas supra, CONCL. 1.

10 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 1030b14-1031a14.

11 Locus non inventus.

logicaliter secundum communem opinionem. Ista patet per textum Porphirii in argumento ad oppositum allegato ex predictis conclusionibus, quamvis plures alie possint elici quas studiosis reli(qu)untur, quia *supra Praedicamenta* diffusius patebit de ista materia.¹²

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem 5
in sensu composito, et non de copulato extremo, sicut patet per predictas conclusiones.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum patet per idem.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur negando quod anima intenditur, et ulterius dicitur concedendo quod puer continue fortificatur, et hoc principaliter et formaliter per animam. Et ulterius negatur consequentia ‘igitur anima intenditur’, quia idem agens precise potest †in(?) formationes(?)afforens(?) numero(?) intrinseca(?)† sicut homo fortius potest percutere †g-i-la-a† quas †scira-ve(?)†. Et consimiliter eadem anima precise mediante corpore pueri debilius agit, et mediante corpore adolescentis. Quod aptius est ad operandum mediante augmentatione nutritiva, postea fortius agit. Ista igitur fortitudo maioratur extensive et non intensive, | nisi ponatur quod fortitudo sit quid accidens distributum anime forti. De qua patebit forte in *questione de naturalibus potentiis*,¹³ et in isto capitulo de *qualitate*.¹⁴

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod differentia per se habet contrarium large accipiendo ‘contrarium’ secundum quod probat argumentum, sed non stricte, quia ad hoc oporteret quod forma a qua accipitur talis differentia, posset realiter intendi et posset realiter remitti. Et ulterius dicitur quod auctoritas Aristotelis non est ad propositum, quia Aristoteles vult dicere quod omne quod potest intendi et quod potest remitti, habet contrarium, sed non dicit quod omne quod habet contrarium, potest intendi et potest remitti. Quia aliquid habet contrarium logicaliter loquendo quod non recipit remissionem secundum admixtionem sui contrarii. Et ideo consequentia non valet, ista scilicet: ‘aliqua 30

13–14 percutere] percutere E 15–16 adolescentis] adollescentis E

12 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Erfurt sb Ampl. Q 288 (xiv) ff.43^{rb}–145^{vb}, Q. 25, utrum differentia substantialis sit substantia (ff. 63^{ra}–63^{vb}).

13 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Erfurt sb Ampl. Q 288 (xiv) ff.43^{rb}–145^{vb}, Q. 70, utrum naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit secunda species qualitatis (ff. 98^{va}–99^{ra}); Q. 71, utrum omnis potentia naturalis sit accidens (ff. 99^{ra}–^{vb}).

14 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Erfurt sb Ampl. Q 288 (xiv) ff.43^{rb}–145^{vb}, Q. 64, utrum omnis qualitas sit accidens (ff.94^{vb}–95^{rb}).

differentia per se habet contrarium; igitur aliqua differentia per se suscipit magis et minus.

5 <AD 5.> Ad quintum dicitur quod non experimur unum hominem magis rationalem quia non magis habet animam intellectivam, quamvis experimur unum hominem magis rationalem, et hoc non est idem.

<AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM> Intentio Porphyrii quodam modo patet per predicta.

⟨QUESTIO 34⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum hec differentia *animatum sensibile* sit constitutiva substantie animalis.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nullum accidens est constitutum substantie animalis; hec differentia 5
est accidens; igitur non est constitutiva substantie animalis. Maior est de
se nota, quia accidens non est constitutum alicuius substantie, quia ex
natura accidentis non constituitur substantia, sicut vult Aristoteles primo
Physicorum.¹ Et minor declaratur, quia hec differentia vocalis est vox, et
omnis vox est accidens. 10

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omne istud quod constituit substantiam animalis, est mate-
ria vel forma animalis; sed hec differentia *animatum sensibile* non est
materia vel forma animalis; igitur hec differentia *animatum sensibile* non
constituit substantiam animalis. Maior patet, quia tantum materia et
forma sunt partes essentielles animalis. Et minor videtur etiam evidens, 15
quia hec differentia *animatum sensibile* est quoddam signum de pluribus
predicabile, et per consequens non est materia vel forma animalis.

⟨3.⟩ Item. *Animatum sensibile* non est differentia, igitur non est diffe-
rentia constitutiva substantie animalis. Consequentia est plana. Et ante-
cedens declaratur, nam: nullum genus est differentia; *animatum sensibile* 20
est genus; igitur *animatum sensibile* non est differentia. Maior patet per
Porphyrium, capitulo de *genere*,² ubi vult quod genus differt a differen-
tia per hanc particulam distinctivam que est ‘predicari in quid’. Et minor
34^{ra} declaratur nam: omne quod predicatur de pluribus | specie differenti-
bus in eo quid est genus; sed hoc predicatum *animatum sensibile* est 25
huiusmodi; igitur hoc predicabile *animatum sensibile* est genus. Maior
patet per diffinitionem generis. Et minor declaratur, quia, quod hoc pre-
dicabile predicatur de pluribus specie differentiibus de se patet; et quod

3 substantie] substantia E 8 accidentis] substantie E

1 Aristoteles, *Physica* I. 2, 185a28–32.

2 *Isagoge*, I, 10 (3, 5–8): ‘A differentia vero (...) differt genus quoniam etsi de pluribus et differentiibus specie praedicantur differentiae (...), sed non in eo quod quid sit praedicantur, sed in eo quod quale quid sit.’

predicatur in quid, probatur, quia per ipsum convenienter respondetur ad questionem factam per quid de animali, nam si queratur ‘quid est animal?’, convenienter respondetur quod sit substantia animata sensibilis.

5 ⟨4.⟩ Item. Nullum animal est constitutum substantie animalis; omne animatum sensibile est animal; igitur nullum animatum sensibile est constitutum substantie animalis. Maior videtur evidens, quia aliter animal componeretur ex animalibus. Et minor est de se nota, quia in ea predicatur convertibile de convertibili, sicut de se notum est.

10 ⟨5.⟩ Item. Si animatum sensibile esset constitutum substantie animalis, sequeretur quod omne animatum sensibile esset animal. Consequentia apparet evidens; et consequens est falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, nam, si omne animatum sensibile esset animal, cum quolibet pars integralis ipsius animalis sit animata sensibilis, sequeretur quod quolibet pars integralis ipsius animalis esset animal,
15 et per consequens manus et digitus et sic de allis partibus integralibus omnes essent animalia, quod videtur absurdum.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius,³ qui dicit sic: ‘ea autem que est animati et sensitivi differentia, constitutiva est substantie animalis.’

20 ⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ ⟨Prima⟩ distinctio in ista questione premissa est ista, quod iste terminus ‘substantia’ accipitur multipliciter: uno modo pro termino absolute significante substantiam, sicut accipit Aristoteles in *Predicamentis*,⁴ quando loquitur de substantia prima et secunda, et sic est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur ‘substantia’ pro
25 essentia alicuius rei, sive ista res sit per se subsistens, sive alteri inherens. Et sic accipit Aristoteles in principio *Predicamentorum*,⁵ quando dicit: ‘equivoca sunt, quorum nomen est communis et ratio substantie secundum istud nomen est diversa’, idest: essentie, quia non tantum loquitur Aristoteles de equivocatione que fit in terminis substantialibus,
30 sed etiam de ista que fit in terminis accidentalibus, quia diffinit equivoca

27–28 substantie] sub *add. necnon del. E*

3 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 9–12): ‘(...) ea quidem quae est animati et sensibilis differentia, constitutiva est substantiae animalis (...)’

4 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 5, passim.

5 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 1, 1a3: ‘Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur.’ – tr. Boethii.

quecumque sint ista sive substantialia sive accidentalia. Et isto modo substantia est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio modo accipitur ‘substantia’ pro diffinitione. Et isto modo accipitur a Porphirio, quando dicit quod differentia est constitutiva substantie animalis vel hominis. Et isto modo adhuc substantia est nomen secunde intentionis.

34th ⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista, quod aliquid predicatur in quid dupliciter, scilicet primo et non primo. Primo, quando aliquid predicatur in quid ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione alicuius sue partis. Non primo, quando aliquid | predicatur in quid ratione alicuius sue partis, videlicet quia aliqua sua pars predicatur in quid.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista, quod nulla differentia specifica accipiendo ‘differentiam’ sicut logici accipiunt et sicut Porphirius⁶ accipit, quando dicit: ‘differentia predicatur in quale’, est constitutiva alicuius substantie, secundum quod ‘substantia’ accipitur pro re que non ⟨est⟩ signum. Ista statim patet, quia nullus terminus constituit aliquem talem substantiam.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista, quod omnis differentia specifica est constitutiva substantie accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro diffinitione, quia omnis talis differentia est completiva diffinitionis proprie dicte, que componitur ex genere et differentia, sicut patet per Aristotelem, sexto *Topicorum*⁷ et septimo *Metaphysice*,⁸ et per Porphirium in diversis locis sui textus.⁹

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista, quod nulla diffinitio proprie dicta predicatur in quid primo modo, quia non ratione sue ipsius, quia non potius in quid quam in quale, cum ponitur eius pars et substantialiter predicetur in quale, scilicet differentia.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista, quod omnis diffinitio proprie dicta predicatur in quid non primo, quia rationis sue partis, quia

6 *Isagoge*, III, 10 (11, 8–9): ‘(...) differentia est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quale sit praedicatur (...)’

7 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 4, 141b25–28: ‘quidem oportet per genus et differentias diffinire eum qui bene diffinit’ – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 328 (93): ‘Omnis bona definitio debet constare ex genere et differentiis, quia ista sunt priora et notiora quam species quae definitur.’ (Aristoteles, *Topica*, Z4, 141b25–28).

8 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 12, 1037b29–30: ‘Nichil enim aliud est in diffinitione quam primum dictum genus et differentie’ – rec. Guillelmi. *Auctoritates* 130 (184): ‘Nichil aliud debet esse in definitione nisi genus et differentia.’ (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Z12, 1037b29–30).

9 E.g. *Isagoge*, III, 4 (9, 2–6); III, 8 (9, 24–10, 21).

omnis differentia proprie dicta componitur ex genere et differentia, quod quidem genus predicatur in quid.

5 (CONCLUSIO QUINTA) Quinta conclusio est ista, quod omne istud a quo accipitur differentia specifica *animalis*, constituit substantiam animalis accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro re que non est signum, scilicet pro essentia. Istā probatur, quia omne istud a quo accipitur talis differentia animalis, est materia vel forma animalis, et omnis materia vel forma animalis constituit realiter substantiam animalis, et precise animam a qua magis communiter accipitur differentia specifica.

10 (AD 1.) Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem, accipiendo ‘secundam substantiam’ scilicet pro re que non est signum. Et isto modo etiam conceditur conclusio. Accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro diffinitione negatur maior.

15 (AD 2.) Ad secundum patet per idem, quia nihil probat aliud nisi hec differentia specifica *animatum sensibile* non constituit substantiam animalis accipiendo ‘substantiam’ non pro signo. Et cum hoc stat quod constituit substantiam animalis accipiendo ‘substantiam’ pro diffinitione.

20 (AD 3.) Ad tertium dicitur negando antecedens. Et ad probationem conceditur quod nullum genus sit differentia specifica, quamvis aliquod genus sit differentia accidentalis, sicut hoc genus *coloratum*. Et ulterius dicitur negando quod hoc predicabile *animatum sensibile* predicatur in quid. Et ad probationem dicitur quod, quando queritur ‘quid est animal?’, quamvis posset convenienter responderi quod sit substantia animata sensibilis ratione istius partis que est substantia, tamen nullo modo
25 potest dici quod convenienter responderetur si dicatur quod animal sit animatum sensibile; sed potius, si queratur ‘quale est animal substantialiter?’ convenienter responderetur quod sit animatum sensibile. Unde, quamvis ista diffinitio ‘substantia animata | sensibilis’ predicatur in quid non primo quia ratione sue partis, non tamen propter hoc differentia
30 completa talis diffinitionis predicatur in quid. Unde differentia non est de proprietate responsionis, quando responderetur ad questionem factam per quid de aliquo per eius diffinitionem, sed genus tantum. Sed si queratur, quid et quale substantialiter sit animal, tunc differentia esset de proprietate talis responsionis, quia tunc convenientissime responderetur
35 quod esset substantia animata sensibilis.

34^{va}

(AD 4.) Ad quartum dicitur negando maiorem, quia aliquod animal
 est pars integralis animalis, sicut totus homo preter digitum est animal,
 et tamen est pars integralis animalis compositi ex digito et tali residuo.
 Et ulterius dicitur negando istam de virtute sermonis 'omne animatum
 sensibile est animal', et concedendo istam quod omne animatum primo
 sensibile est animal. Et isto modo voco 'animatum' primo istud ad cuius
 animationem non requiritur aliquod extrinsecum, ut sua anima in ipso
 permanet sine tali extrinseco. Unde manus vel digitus, quamvis sit ani-
 matus, non tamen primo, quia sine corde vel cerebro non durat anima in
 digito, sicut patet per abscisionem.

(AD 5.) Ad quintum patet per idem.

(AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM) Ad argumentum in oppositum, qua-
 liter scilicet Porphyrius sic intelligendus, diffusius patet per supra dicta,
 quia Porphyrius accipit 'substantiam' pro diffinitione, vel si cui placeat
 dicere probabiliter potest dici quod per istam propositionem 'animatum
 sensibile est constitutum substantie animalis', vult Porphyrius intelli-
 gere quod istud a quo accipitur hec differentia *animatum sensibile*, est
 constitutum substantie animalis.

⟨QUESTIO 35⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum hec
differentia *immortale* sit constitutiva Dei.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Deus est primum principium omnium aliorum a se, sicut patet per
Aristotelem, secundo *Physicorum*¹ et undecimo *Metaphysice*;² ergo Deus
non constituitur ab aliquo; igitur hec differentia non est constitutiva Dei.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Omnis differentia constitutiva alicuius est convertibilis cum
eo; sed ista differentia non est convertibilis cum Deo; igitur hec differen-
10 tia non est constitutiva Dei. Maior satis patet ex textu Porphyrii. Minor
declaratur, quia multa alia a Deo sunt rationalia et immortalia, sicut
angeli et anime, et secundum aliquos corpora celestia.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Deus est mortalis, quia potest mori, quia potest assumere
aliquam naturam mortalem ratione cuius poterit denominari ‘mortalis’;
15 igitur immortalitas non est differentia Dei, et per consequens non est
differentia constitutiva Dei.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Si esset differentia constitutiva Dei, hoc esset quia Deus
haberet diffinitionem, cuius diffinitionis ista differentia esset pars com-
pletiva; sed consequens falsum; igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas con-
20 sequentis declaratur: nullum simplex habet diffinitionem proprie dic-
tam; sed Deus est simplex, quia omnino indivisibilis; | igitur Deus non
habet diffinitionem proprie dictam. Maior elicitur ab Aristotele, septimo
Metaphysice,³ ubi vult quod accidens proprie non diffinitur quia non
habet partes diversarum rationum; igitur a multo fortiori istud non dif-
25 finitur proprie quod penitus nullas partes habet; igitur hec differentia
specifica et constitutiva Dei.

6 secundo] secundum E 10 Porphyrii] igitur add. E 11 alia] rationalia add. necnon
del. E 12 corpora] sunt add. E 17 Dei] quia add. necnon del. E 18 ista] pars add.
necnon del. E 23 diffinitur] diffinire E 25 quod] quid E

1 Aristoteles, *Physica* II, locus non inventus.

2 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* XI, 7, 1072b13–14: ‘Ex tali igitur principio dependet celum
et natura’ – rec. Guillelmi. *Auctoritates* 137 (266): ‘A primo principio dependet
caelum et tota natura.’ (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Λ7, 1072b13–14).

3 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 5, 1030b15–1031a14. Sed non ad verbum.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius in textu,⁴ quo dicitur: ‘Sed ea que est rationalis differentia et mortalis, constitutive sunt hominis, rationalis vero et immortalis dei.’

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Distinctio premittenda in ista questione est ista quod ‘aliquam differentiam aliquid constituere’ potest intelligi tripliciter: 5
 uno modo existenter sive realiter, sicut materia et forma que constituunt compositum; alio modo diffinitive, sicut differentia constituit hominem, quia constituit istam diffinitionem, et ideo differentia est primum diffinitivum hominis; tertio modo convertibiliter, scilicet quia differentia addita alicui non convertibili cum eo cuius est differentia constitutiva, 10
 contrahit ipsum, ut totum resultans ex ipso et tota differentia convertibiliter cum eo cuius est differentia, contrahit ipsum cui additur ad standum tantummodo pro significato vel significatis illius cuius est differentia, sicut hec differentia *rationale mortale* addita subiecto vel corpori vel animali contrahit ipsum ad standum tantummodo pro significato vel 15
 significatis.

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod iste terminus ‘Deus’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie, et communiter. Proprie accipitur pro prima causa, sed communiter accipitur pro quocumque habente aliquam similitudinem specialem cum prima causa, scilicet vel 20
 quia est per(p)etuum sicut prima causa, vel quia habet intellectum sicut prima causa, vel quia precise diligitur sicut prima causa deberet diligi. Unde Psalmista⁵ ‘dixi: dii estis, et filii excelsi omnes’, et Apostolus⁶ etiam loqui de gulosis dicit ‘quorum deus venter est’, et alibi est Psalmista⁷ ‘omnes dii gentium demonia.’ 25

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod Deus proprie non habet aliquam differentiam specificam cum eo convertibilem, et hoc accipiendo proprie ‘Deum’ pro primo principio indivisibili. Ista statim patet per superius dicta,⁸ quia ‘Deus’ sic acceptus nullam habet diversi-

5 intelligi] d *add. necnon del. E* 6 que] quod *E* 12 contrahit] h *add. necnon del. E* | ipsum] tantummodo *add. necnon del. E* 22 vel] primo(?) *add. necnon del. E* 28 indivisibili] indivisibili *corr. E ex ... (?)*

4 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 12–14): ‘Sed ea quae est rationalis differentia et mortalis, constitutivae fiunt hominis, rationalis vero et immortalis dei (...)’

5 Ps. 81–86: ‘Ego dixi: Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes.’

6 Filipp. 3: 19: ‘Quorum finis interitio, quorum Deus venter est.’

7 Ps. 95: 5: ‘Quoniam omnes dii gentium demonia.’

8 Videas supra, DIST. 2.

tatem aliquarum partium a qua posset talis differentia accipi, sicut patet per Aristotelem, septimo *Metaphysice*,⁹ ubi dicit quod accidens non habet talem differentiam, quia non componitur ex partibus diversarum rationum.

5 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio que correlarie sequitur, est ista quod Deus proprie non habet diffinitionem, quia omnis diffinitio proprie dicta componitur ex genere et differentia specifica; sed Deus non habet differentiam specificam; igitur Deus non habet proprie diffinitionem. ⟨Maior patet per⟩ Aristotelem, sexto *Topicorum*,¹⁰ et septimo
10 *Metaphysice*,¹¹ et per Porphyrium, capitulo de *differentia*,¹² ubi dicit sic: ‘et hiis opus est maxime ad divisiones generum et diffinitionem specierum, et non est necesse hiis que secundum accidentes inseparabiles sunt’. Et loquitur ibi Porphyrius de specificis differentiis, sicut patet ex textu immediate precedenti.¹³

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod hoc predicatum *rationale* secundum quod est differentia specifica, non verificatur de Deo, accipiendo ‘Deum’ proprie. Ista | conclusio declaratur sic: ista differentia *rationale* secundum quod est differentia specifica, connotat partem
20 essentialem; sed Deus nullam partem essentialem habet; igitur ista differentia secundum quod est differentia specifica, non competit Deo. Apparet ex precedentibus, nam ista est diffinitio ‘rationalis’ secundum quod est differentia specifica, scilicet *rationale* est substantia habens animam intellectivam tamquam partem suam essentialem. Et minor est de se nota.

25 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod hic terminus ‘rationalis’ equivoce verificatur de materia hominis, et de homine, et

35^{ra}

1 aliquarum] partium *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 7 differentia] et *add. E* 15 quod] p *add. necnon del. E* | predicatum] predicabile *E* 19 partem] habet *add. necnon del. E*
25 hic] omne *E*

9 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 5? Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, Z5, 1031a2: ‘soliue substantie est diffinitio’ – recensio Guillelmi.

10 Aristoteles, *Topica* VI, 4, 141b25–28; *Auctoritates* 328 (93): ‘Omnis bona definitio debet constare ex genere et differentiis, quia ista sunt priora et notiora quam species quae definitur’ (Aristoteles, *Topica*, Z4, 141b25–28).

11 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, 12, 1037b29–30; *Auctoritates* 130 (184): ‘Nihil aliud debet esse in definitione nisi genus et differentia.’ (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Z12, 1037b29–30).

12 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 19–21): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et definitiones, sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles sunt, nec magis his quae sunt separabiles.’

13 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 18): ‘(...) specificae omnes vocantur’

de Deo, quia secundum diversas rationes. Nam de materia verificatur tamquam de subiecto anime rationalis, et est terminus communis accidentalis, sicut superius dictum est;¹⁴ et de homine verificatur tamquam connotans partem eius essentialem; et de Deo verificatur tamquam de utente ratione, vel tamquam de isto quod ratiocinatur; et de anima verificatur tamquam connotans eius operationem. 5

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod, si corpus celeste non componatur ex corpore et anima intellectiva, tunc diffinitio istius differentie ‘rationalis’ secundum quod est differentia specifica et diffinitio hominis, est una et eadem diffinitio saltem aliquando diffinitio hominis, utpote ista ‘aliquis habens animam intellectivam tamquam partem sui essentialem’, et potest dici diffinitio naturalis hominis. 10

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem, quia hec differentia non est constitutiva realiter Dei, nec etiam logicaliter, quia non constituit eius diffinitionem proprie dictam, et hoc accipiendo ‘Deum’ proprie, sed accipiendo ‘Deum’ transsumptive, scilicet pro corpore celesti, tunc, si tale corpus sit compositum ex materia et animam intellectiva, ista differentia *rationale et ⟨im⟩mortale* est constitutiva logicaliter Dei, quia est constitutiva diffinitionis ipsius, et est constitutiva alicuius termini convertibilis cum eo, quia tunc corpus celeste est animal rationale immortale, et hoc convertibiliter et diffinitive, semper accipiendo ‘rationale’ secundum quod est differentia specifica. Et sic forte intelligit Porphyrius, quia secundum principia Aristotelis septimo *Metaphysice*¹⁵ tradita nullum potest communem differentiam specificam. 15 20

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod convertitur cum Deo et cum corpore celesti, et ulterius quod nulli alteri competit sub ista ratione, quia nec angelus, nec anima intellectiva est rationalis et immortalis habens animam intellectivam tamquam partem sui essentialem. 25

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod potest assumere sibi naturam mortalem, et taliter denominari extrinsece ‘mortalis’, sed non ⟨secundum naturam⟩ sui propriam, sed sicut in proposito loquor. Et ulterius dicitur quod Deus, cuius *rationale immortale* est differentia specifica, non potest sibi assumere tamquam naturam talem, quia sic accipitur pro corpore celesti. 30

11 habens] hominis E 19 ipsius] seq. lac. 2 litt. E 21 immortale] 2 litt. (?) add. necnon del. et exp. E 24 nullum] seq. lac. 2 litt. E 31 naturam] seq. lac. 7 litt. E

14 Videas supra, DIST. 1.

15 Locus non inventus.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum patet per iam dicta, quia conceditur quod 'Deus' proprie acceptus nullam differentiam specificam habet.

5 ⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum dicitur quod Porphyrius vel accipit ibi 'Deum' improprie sive transsumptive pro corpore celesti, vel loquebatur ponendo exempla introductoria puerorum, | non ut ita sint sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt, vel secundum aliquam opinionem antiquam que posuit Deum componi ex materia et anima intellectiva. 35^{rb}

⟨QUESTIO 36⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum eadem differentia
sit discretiva generis et constitutiva speciei.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Nulle actiones opposite competunt eidem precise; sed dividere et
constituere sunt actiones opposite; igitur dividere et constituere non
competunt eidem precise; igitur una et eadem differentia non est divisiva
et constitutiva. Maior elicitur ex ista propositione Aristotelis, primo *De
generatione*:¹ ‘idem in quantum idem, facit idem,’ et minor est nota de se.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Nulle species ex opposito aliquid dividentes sunt eadem; sed
differentia divisiva et differentia constitutiva sunt species ex opposito
aliquid dividentes; igitur differentia divisiva et constitutiva non sunt
eadem, igitur una et eadem differentia non est divisiva et constitutiva.
Maior est de se nota. Et minor patet per istum textum Porphyrii,² quo
dicitur: ‘rursus eorum que sunt per se differentiarum, alie quidem sunt
secundum quas dividimus genera in species, alie secundum quas ea que
divisa sunt, specificantur.’

⟨AD OPPOSITUM, I⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur: omnis differentia divisiva
alicuius generis constituit aliquam speciem; igitur omnis differentia divi-
siva generis est constitutiva speciei. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens
patet inductive, nam ista differentia *corporea* divisiva istius generis quod
est substantia, constituit istam speciem que est corpus. Et ista differen-
tia *animatum* divisiva corporis constituit istam speciem *vivum*, et sic de
quibuscumque aliis poterit fieri inductio.

5 eidem] eodem E 6 actiones] compo *add. necnon del. E*

1 Vel potius Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione* II, 10, 336a27–28: ‘idem enim et similiter habens semper idem innatum est facere’ – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 170 (43): ‘Idem manens idem semper aptum natum est facere idem.’ (Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione*, B10, 336a27–28).

2 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 2–4): ‘(...) rursus earumque sunt per se differentiarum alie quidem sunt secundum quas dividimus genera in species, alie vero secundum quas haec quae divisa sunt specificantur (...)’

Item, confirmatur per istum textum, quo dicitur, capitulo de *differentia*:³ ‘he quidem que sunt differentie divisive generum, completive sunt et constitutive specierum’.

5 (AD OPPOSITUM, II) Item, hoc patet per textum sequentem,⁴ quo dicitur: ‘quoniam (ergo) eedem, alio modo quidem concepte, sunt constitutive, alio modo autem divisive, omnes specificice vocantur’.

(CONCLUSIO PRIMA) In ista questione presuppositis premissis distinctionibus, prima conclusio est ista quod omnis differentia divisiva generis per se est constitutiva alicuius speciei per se, idest: apta nata constituere
10 aliquam speciem si non penuria nominum impediat. Ista patet sufficienter per predicta,⁵ quia potest probari inductive, sicut predictum est.

(CONCLUSIO SECUNDA) Secunda conclusio est ista quod aliqua differentia divisiva generis dividens aliquod genus non constituit aliquam speciem. Sic ista differentia *animatum* que dividit hoc genus *corpus* non
15 constituit aliquam speciem saltem substantialem, quia non constituit aliquam speciem nisi esset hoc quod dico ‘vivum’, vel hoc quod dico ‘corpus animatum’; sed neutrum istorum est species, nam primum non est species, quia non predicatur in quid, sed in quale, ut si queratur qualis est planta, vel quale est hoc corpus, | convenienter respondetur quod sit
20 vivum. Nec secundum est species, quia non predicatur primo in quid, quia non nisi ratione alterius partis. Igitur videtur quod non sit aliqua species quam constituit ista differentia *animatum* quamvis sit constitutiva, idest: apta nata ad constituendum si talis species esset. Et loquor de constistutione logicali, sicut prescriptum est in precedentibus questionibus.
25

Et si *instetur* contra istam conclusionem per istum textum quo dicitur ‘ea quidem que est animati et sensibilis differentia constitutiva est substantie animalis’, dico breviter quod, quamvis ista differentia composita *animatum sensibile* constituat istam speciem *animal*, propter hoc tamen
30 non oportet quod ista differentia *animatum* constituat aliquam speciem.

2 he] hee E 5 ergo] consequens E | eedem] heedem E 9 constitutiva] speciei *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

3 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 8): ‘Sed hae quidem quae divisae sunt differentiae generum, completivae fiunt et constitutivae specierum (...)’

4 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 13–14): ‘Quoniam ergo eaedem aliquo modo quidem acceptae fiunt constitutivae, aliquo modo autem divisivae, specificae omnes vocantur.’

5 Videas supra, AD OPP., I.

Et si dicatur quod ista differentia *sensibile* sufficienter constituit istam speciem *animal*, quia cum ea convertitur, quia omne sensibile est animal, et omne animal est sensibile, ⟨ergo⟩ frustra additur ista differentia specifica *animatum*, *ad hoc breviter dicitur* quod, quamvis hec differentia *sensibile* accepta active secundum quod convertitur cum isto quod est potens formare, vel cum isto ⟨quod est⟩ habens animam formativam, convertitur cum ista specie *animal*, et ut sufficienter constitueret istam speciem *animal*, tamen ad removendum ⟨equivocationem⟩ huius differentie *sensibile* et expressius et manifestius exprimendum substantiam animalis, convenienter additur ista differentia *animatum*, sicut infra diffusius patebit suo loco.⁶

Pro iam dictis est sciendum quod non omnia exempla auctoris possint accipi ut ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt.

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo maiorem, scilicet quod nulle actiones opposite realiter competunt eidem agenti naturaliter, distinguendo agens naturale contra agens ex opposito. Et ulterius dicitur quod non semper dividere et constituere sint actiones opposite, nam una et eadem actio que est divisio ⟨respectu⟩ unius, est constitutio ⟨respectu⟩ alterius. Et ita est in proposito.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod Porphyrius per istum textum non vult intelligere aliud nisi quod quedam differentie sunt divisive, et quedam sunt constitutive, ita quod iste due proprietates que sunt dividere et constituere, competunt differentiis, et utrum eisdem vel diversis, postea declarat.⁷ Unde accipit istum terminum ‘alie’ loco istius termini ‘alique’, vel si volumus accipere textum de virtute sermonis, tunc ad hoc nullum sequitur inconveniens, quia clarum est quod alie differentie sunt divisive, quia omnes alique sunt alie, et omnes alie sunt alique.

⟨AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM, I⟩ Ad primum igitur in oppositum dicitur concedendo textum sicut patet per primam conclusionem; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod omnis differentia divisiva generis constituat

3 ergo] genus *E* 8 equivocationem] eius vocationem *E* 18 respectu] idem *E*
19 respectu] idem *E* 28 igitur] primum *add. necnon del. E*

6 Videas infra, Q. 38 AD 2., Q. 39 CONCL. 3.

7 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 8): ‘Sed hae quidem quae divisivae sunt differentiae generum, completivae fiunt et constitutivae specierum.’

speciem, quia non est idem *esse constitutivum* et *constituere*, sicut non est idem *esse calefactivum* et *calefacere*. Unde ignis dicitur ‘calefactivus’ quia aptus natus est | calefacere, si calefactibili assit. Et similiter differentia dicitur ‘constitutiva’, quia apta nata est constituere speciem, si species
 5 assit.

〈AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM, II〉 Et per hoc patet ad secundum.

⟨QUESTIO 37⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum differentia
specifica sit necessaria ad divisionem generis.

⟨1.⟩ Et primo ⟨arguitur⟩ quod non:

nihil est necessarium ad aliquam divisionem faciendam sine qua divi- 5
sio potest fieri; sed divisio generis potest fieri sine differentia speci-
fica; igitur differentia specifica non est necessaria ad divisionem generis.
Maior est de se nota. Et minor probatur, quia genus potest dividi per
sua accidentia, cuiusmodi est divisio ista: animalium aliud album, aliud
nigrum, aliud medium in qua divisione nulla est differentia specifica. 10

⟨2.⟩ Item. Potest fieri per propria, cuiusmodi est talis divisio: anima-
lium aliud risibile, ⟨aliud⟩ hinnibile, ⟨aliud⟩ rudibile. Et in nulla tali divi-
sione habetur differentia specifica. Ergo conveniens divisio generis potest
fieri sine aliqua divisione specifica.

Et *si dicatur* quod, quamvis genus potest dividi sine differentia speci- 15
fica accidentaliter, non tamen per se, *contra hoc arguitur*: omnis divisio
qua genus dividitur in suas species, est divisio per se; sed sine differen-
tia specifica genus potest dividi in suas species; igitur sine differentia
specifica genus potest dividi per se. Maior videtur nota. Et minor decla-
ratur, quia, si genus dividatur per proprias passiones suarum specierum, 20
dividitur in suas species, ut si talis fiat divisio animalium: aliud risibile,
aliud hinnibile, nam *risibile* constituit speciem humanam, quia convertitur
cum *homine*, et *hinnibile* speciem equinam. Igitur genus dividitur in
suas species sine differentia specifica.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si genus divideretur convenienter per differentiam speci- 25
ficam, sequeretur quod talis divisio esset conveniens: animalium aliud
rationale, aliud irrationale. Consequentia est de se nota. Et consequens
est falsum; igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia per
omnem divisionem convenientem generis vel genus dividitur acciden-
taliter, vel substantialiter; sed per predictam divisionem non dividitur 30

2 queritur] queritur *corr. ex sequitur E* 10 medium] vatium (?) *E* 12 aliud] inter
E | aliud] alio *E* | tali] differentia *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 15 quod] querens *add.*
necnon del. E 26 sequeretur] sequitur *E* | quod] quod *iter. E*

genus accidentaliter, sicut per se notum est; nec etiam substantialiter, quia sic sequeretur quod divideret suas species. Sed consequens est falsum, quia irrationale non constituit aliquam speciem animalis. Et si constituat, detur ista.

5 ⟨4.⟩ Item. Si sic, tunc ista esset divisio conveniens: animalium aliud rationale corruptibile sive mortale, aliud immortale, et sic de differentiis specificis animalis. Sed consequens est falsum, secundum patet per Boethium, suo libro *Divisionum*,¹ qui dicit quod omnis bona divisio bene
10 esse trimembris.

Item, per eundem Boethium *ibidem*² dicitur quod omnis divisio bona debet fieri per negationem; sed in predicta divisione non est negatio; igitur non est conveniens.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius in isto textu³ quo dicit
15 loquens de differentiis specificis: ‘et | hiis opus est maxime ad divisionem generis.’ 36^{ra}

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio in ista questione premittenda est ista, quod duplex est divisio: quedam est realis et quedam logicalis. Realis dicitur ista, qua partes alicuius essentielles, vel integrales, ⟨sed de tali nihil ad⟩
20 presens est dicendum. Divisio vero logicalis est multiplex: nam quedam est que fit per negationem, et quedam que fit ⟨per⟩ contradictionem disiunctivam, et quedam que fit per utrumque, et quedam per alietatis negationem.

Per negationem, sicut in propositione negativa predicatum dividitur
25 a subiecto, idest: negatur a subiecto. Per disiunctivam contradictionem, sicut quando aliquid alicui attribuitur disiunctive vel disiunctim, ut ‘Sortes tacet vel loquitur’, ‘uterque istorum est Sortes vel Plato’ determinatis Sorte et Platone. Per utrumque, ut ‘Sortes est asinus, vel Sortes non est asinus.’ Et hoc semper fit quando una pars divisionis disiunctive est

6 mortale] immortale E 17 in] est E 20 logicalis] logicaliter E

1 Cf. Boethius, *De divisione*: ‘constat quaecumque a se aliqua oppositione differunt eas solas differentias sub genere positas genus ipsum posse disiungere.’ (PL 64, 881D).

2 Boethius, *De divisione*: ‘oppositio est quae est secundum affirmationem et negationem.’ (PL 64, 881D).

3 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 19): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum (...)’

negativa vel de negato extremo. Per alietatis negationem, sicut quando dividitur in sua contenta. Et hoc dicitur scilicet per accidens vel per se. Per accidens, ut animalium aliud album, aliud nigrum. Per se adhuc dividitur, quia vel primo modo dividitur per se, vel secundo modo. Primo modo sicut quando aliquid dividitur in sua contenta per se per aliquid quod eis competat. Primo modo dividitur per se utpote per differentiam specificam, ut animalium ⟨aliud rationale, aliud irrationale. Secundo modo sicut quando aliquid dividitur⟩ in sua per se contenta per proprietates contentorum sive per aliqua propria, ut animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod nulla differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis, quia sine differentia potest genus dividi; igitur nulla differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis. Consequentia est nota. Et maior patet per predicta.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod nulla differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species, quia genus potest dividi sine differentia a suis speciebus; igitur nulla differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species. Consequentia patet. Et antecedens declaratur, quia genus potest dividi in suas species per suas species, utpote tali divisione: animalium aliud homo, aliud asinus, in qua divisione nulla ponitur differentia.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod omnis differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species per se primo modo. Et patet ista conclusio per secundam conclusionem, quia genus potest dividi per suas ⟨species⟩ in suas species per se primo modo, quia de talibus speciebus tale genus predicatur per se primo modo, et etiam una species de seipsa.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species secundo modo per se, quia talis divisio potest fieri per proprium quod competit tali speciei per se secundo modo, ut si fiat talis divisio: animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile, in qua divisione nulla ponitur differentia specifica, et tamen genus dividitur in suas species, idest: per aliqua que contrahunt genus ad standum pecise pro suppositis talium specierum,

1 de] de *add. sup. lin. E* 20 asinus] alius *E* 32 divisione] ni(?) *add. necnon del. E* 34–355.2 pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium risibile contrahit hoc genus animal ad standum precise] pro suppositis talium specierum, sicut hoc proprium ‘risibile’ contrahit hoc genus ‘animal’ ad standum precise *corr. mg. E*

sicut hoc proprium *risibile* contrahit hoc genus *animal* ad standum precise proprie pro suppositis 'hominis'.

5 (CONCLUSIO QUINTA) Quinta conclusio est ista quod ad divisio(nem) generis in suas species per se primo modo formaliter, est | aliqua differentia specifica necessaria necessitate conditionata. Et hoc est dictum quod talis conditionalis est necessaria. Si genus dividitur in suas species per se primo modo formaliter, dividitur per aliquam differentiam specificam. Ista conclusio declaratur, quia omne quod dividit genus, vel est species, vel individuum, vel est proprium, vel accidens, vel differentia specifica. 10 Sed species non dividit genus per se primo modo formaliter, tum quia non accipitur a forma, tum quia non complet formaliter diffinitionem speciei. Et per idem etiam patet quod individuum non dividit genus formaliter, nec etiam genus dividit in suas species. Et manifestum est quod nec proprium, nec accidens dividit genus proprie primo modo in suas species. Relinquitur ergo quod sola differentia specifica dividit genus per se primo modo formaliter in suas species, vel saltem differentie specificæ, quia proprie loquendo nulla divisio potest fieri sine pluribus dividendis. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphyrius,⁴ quando dicit quod hiis opus est maxime ad divisionem generum in suas species.

20 (AD 1.) Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem, scilicet differentia specifica non est necessaria ad divisionem generis. Est tamen necessaria necessitate conditionata ad divisionem generis per se primo modo formaliter in suas species, et hoc ad intellectum predeterminedatum.

25 (AD 2.) Ad secundum patet per idem, quia conceditur quod genus potest dividi per sua propria in suas species per se, tamen non primo modo formaliter.

30 (AD 3.) Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod per talem divisionem genus dividitur substantialiter. Et ulterius dicitur quod *irrationale* est differentia specifica que dividit genus in suam speciem saltem mentalem, quamvis nulla species sit imposita ad significandum. Et vocetur ad presens ista species *A*, que quidem species alienando significet omnis animal irrationale.

2 precise] pro *add. necnon del. E* | suppositis] supponitur *E* 23 formaliter] formalem *E* | species] per se non tamen primo modo formaliter *add. necnon del. et exp. E*
 26 dividi] substantialiter. Et ulterius dicitur *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 32 alienando] alida *E*

4 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 19): 'Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum (...)'

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur quod Boethius loquitur *ibidem*⁵ de divisione data per negationem ad conclusionem ⟨disiunctivam⟩ que fit communiter in predicata contradicentia, vel que petit alteram partem contradictionis, vel que petit, vel que dat, alteram partem contradictionis, cuiusmodi est ista: ‘Sortes currit vel Sortes non currit’, ‘Sortes est homo 5 vel Sortes non est homo’. Et talis semper debet dari per negationem, et est precise bimembris, et sic intelligit Boethius. Vel potest dici quod ipse loquitur de differentia compendiosiori que est magis distributiva, et talis semper est bimembris, et, ut communiter, fit per negationem.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum satis 10 patet per predicta, quia Porphyrius loquitur *ibidem* de divisione generis per se primo modo formaliter.

2 conclusionem] *seq. lac. 5 litt. + veram E* 3–4 contradictionis] contradictionem *E*

4 contradictionis] contradictionem *E* 7 sic] tunc *E* 12 formaliter] formali *E*

5 Boethius, *De divisione*. (PL 64, 881D).

⟨QUESTIO 38⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum differentia specifica
sit necessaria ad diffinitionem faciendam.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

5 Nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad diffinitionem faciendam
sicut ad diffinitionem datam per additamentum, quia talis diffinitio
potest fieri per proprium, sicut patet per Aristotelem, septimo *Metaphy-*
sice.¹ Nec etiam est necessaria ad diffinitionem | differentia specifica. Et 36^{va}
quod non sit necessaria ad diffinitionem propriissime dictam, declaratur:
10 nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad diffinitionem manifeste
exprimende⟨m⟩ essentiam diffiniti; igitur nulla differentia specifica est
necessaria ad diffinitionem propriissime datam. Ista consequentia patet,
quia omnis diffinitio manifeste exprimens essentiam diffiniti est diffinitio
15 propriissime dicta. Et antecedens declaratur, quia in ista diffinitione
'homo est corpus et anima intellectiva essentialiter unita' non ponitur
aliqua differentia specifica, et tamen ista diffinitio manifeste exprimit
essentiam diffiniti, quia exprimit utramque partem essentialem, scilicet
tam materiam quam formam hominis; igitur nulla differentia specifica
est necessaria ad diffinitionem que manifestissime exprimit essentiam
20 diffiniti.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad diffinitionem
propriissime dictam que connotat aliquod extrinsecum; sed omnis differ-
entia specifica connotat aliquod extrinsecum; igitur nulla differen-
tia specifica est necessaria ad diffinitionem propriissime dictam. Maior
25 elicitur ab Aristotele, septimo *Metaphysice*,² ubi vult quod diffinitio

8 specifica] est necessaria *add. E* 11 exprimendem] esses *add. necnon del. E* 19 est]
ex *E* 24 specifica] *seq. lac. 5 litt. E add. 1 litt(?) E*

1 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, VII, 1031a1–3: 'Palam itaque quia solius substantie est dif-
finitio. Nam et si aliarum categoriarum, necesse est ex additione esse.' Cf. *Aucto-*
ritates 129 (164): 'Definitio accidentium fit per additamentum, scilicet substantie.'
(Cf. S. Thomas, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 4, n. 1345. Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Z5,
1031a1–3).

2 *Auctoritates* 129 (163): 'Definitio est sermo indicans quid est esse rei per essentialia.'
(Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Z5, 1031a12–13).

propriissime dicta debet dari per essentialia et non per aliquod extrinsecum connotativum. Diffinitionem factam per proprium vocat Aristoteles ibidem ‘diffinitionem datam per additamentum’, eo quod ‘proprium’ connotat aliquod extrinsecum quasi superadditum essentiae diffiniti. Et minor declaratur, scilicet quod omnis differentia specifica connotat aliquod extrinsecum, quia omnis differentia specifica connotat actum nobiliorem diffiniti, sicut hec differentia specifica *animatum sensibile* connotat actum sciendi, et hec differentia specifica *rationale mortale* connotat actum ratiocinandi, sed hoc proprium *risibile* connotat actum ridendi, et hoc proprium *hinnibile* actum hinniendi. Igitur pari ratione qua nulla diffinitio propriissime dicta potest dari per proprium quia connotat aliquod extrinsecum, igitur nulla diffinitio propriissime dicta potest dari per differentiam specificam, que connotat aliquod extrinsecum.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius in textu superius alligator,³ quo dicit: ‘et hiis opus est maxime ad divisiones generum et diffinitionem specierum’. Sed non est necesse hiis que sunt secundum accidens inseparabiles, ex quo plane patet quod Porphyrius vult dicere quod differentia specifica sit necessaria ad diffinitionem propriissime dictam. Sed proprium non est necessarium ad talem diffinitionem.

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio est ista quod triplex est diffinitio, nam quedam est diffinitio quid nominis, et quedam est oratio descriptiva sive descriptio, et quedam est diffinitio propriissime dicta.

Diffinitio vero quid nominis est oratio compendiosa indicans quid nomen significat. Et accipitur hic ‘nomen’ largissime secundum quod convertitur cum ‘dictione’, sive talis dictio sit verbum, sive nomen acceptum stricte, sive composita sive simplex. Talis diffinitio quid nominis adhuc accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et communiter. Proprie scilicet, quando convertitur cum diffinito. Communiter, quando extendit se ad orationem indicantem quid nomen | significat, quamvis talis oratio non convertitur cum diffinito.

2 connotativum] connotantia E | per] per *sup. lin. E* 4 superadditum] subadditum E 9 ratiocinandi] -cinandi *sup. lin. E*; cui additur *add. necnon del. E* 14 superius] superius *iter. E* 21 quid] quid *sup. lin. E*^f 23 nominis] adhuc accipitur dupliciter *add. necnon del. E* 30 convertitur] de *add. necnon del. et exp. E*

3 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 19): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum (...)’

Descriptiva vero diffinitio est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam diffiniti per genus (et) per proprium sive per propria talis diffiniti. Et ista vocatur ab Aristotele, septimo *Metaphysice*,⁴ ‘diffinitio data per additamentum’, quia datur per aliquid quod connotat aliquod extrinsecum, de
5 qua connotatione inferius in ista questione plus patebit.

Diffinitio vero propriissime dicta est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam diffiniti per essentialia sive per substantialia, idest: per terminos non connotantes aliquid extrinsecum essentie rei diffinite. Et talis diffinitio subdividitur secundum quod elicitur ab Aristotele, primo *De anima*,⁵ nam: quedam est naturalis, et quedam est dialectica.
10

Diffinitio vero naturalis est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam diffiniti per substantialia, secundum substantialium aliquid significat specialiter materiam rei diffinite, ut si diffiniatur domus sic: ‘domus est substantia composita ex fundamento, lapide et parietibus, lignis et tecto,
15 stramento’, vel aliquid consimile, quod specialiter significat vel connotat materiam rei distincte, vel formam talis rei existere in tali materia.

Diffinitio vero dialectica est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam rei distincte per substantialia, quorum substantialium aliquid significat, vel connotat formam rei diffinite, et utrum(que) significat specialiter,
20 vel connotat materiam vel formam, ut si ‘domus’ sic diffiniatur: ‘domus est quod dicitur protectivum a pluviis et ventis, scilicet caloribus et frigiditibus’, vel: ‘domus est quod dicitur protectivum a passionibus aeris’.

Et dicitur prima diffinitio ‘naturalis’ propter hoc quod naturalis philosophus specialiter inquirens naturam rei, et eius principia essentialia exprimit per diffinitionem suam principia naturalia rei diffinite. Secunda vero diffinitio dicitur ‘dialectica’, quia dialecticus non ita profunde
25

3 diffinitio] diffinito E 4 extrinsecum] quod add. E 7 essentialia] -lem add. necnon del. E 11 vero] vero sup. lin. E 13 domus] domum E 19 rei] dis add. necnon exp. E 21 dicitur] contentivum add. E

4 Cf. *Auctoritates* 129 (164): ‘Definitio accidentium fit per additamentum, scilicet substantiae.’ (Cf. S. Thomas, *In Metaphys.*, VII, lect. 4, n. 1345. Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Z5, 1031a1–3).

5 Aristoteles, *De anima* I, 1, 403a28–30. Cf. *Auctoritates* 175 (12): ‘Triplex est definitio: una quae datur ad materiam tantum, ut cum dicitur domus est quid constans ex lapidibus et lignis; alia est quae datur per formam tantum, ut cum dicitur domus est quoddam cooperimentum defendens nos a caumatibus et imbribus; tertia quae datur per utrumque, scilicet cum dicitur domus est cooperimentum quoddam defendens nos a caumatibus et imbribus constans ex lapidibus et lignis.’ (Aristoteles, *De anima*, A1, 403b3–7).

speculatur, nec ita exquisite inquit de principiis naturalibus rei, sed sufficit sibi per aliquam opinionem devenire ad formam rei, et ipsam quoddammodo in diffinitione exprimere.

Unde diffinitio naturalis est duplex, nam quedam distincte exprimit materiam tantum, et quedam tam materiam quam formam, sive finem, 5 quia forma et finis intrinsecus coincidunt. Et ista est diffinitio propriissime naturalis, ut si ‘domus’ sic diffiniatur: ‘domus est quoddam compositum ex lignis et lapidibus protectivum a passionibus aeris,’ vel si ‘homo’ sic diffiniatur: ‘homo est animal compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva.’ 10

Diffinitio vero dialectica vocatur sicut predictum est, que fit cum expressione forme vel finis in diffinito, ut si ‘homo’ sic diffiniatur: ‘homo est rationale mortale.’

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod aliquid dicitur ‘extrinsecum’ dupliciter: uno modo quia non est ipsummet, nec aliqua 15 eius pars essentialis vel integralis, sed visus nec est albedo nec aliqua pars albedinis. Et ideo ista diffinitio ‘albedo est color disgregativus visus’ datur per extrinsecum. Alio modo accipitur ‘extrinsecum’ largius pro illo *B* quod nec est ipsamet res cui dicitur extrinsecum, nec est aliqua 20 pars istius rei, nec principalis actus vel operatio talis rei. Et isto modo 37^{ra} actus intelligendi sive ratiocinandi non est aliquod extrinsecum | homini, quamvis secundum communem opinionem sit accidens superadditum, nec etiam actus sentiendi est extrinsecus animali, vel actus vegetandi ipsi plante.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista, quod omnis diffinitio est 25 oratio compendiosa, sicut satis ex predictis elici potest. Patet etiam per Aristotelem, sexto *Topicorum*.⁶ Unde, quamvis ista alia oratio indicet essentiam rei, vel quid nominis et non compendiose, non est diffinitio eius, ut si ‘homo’ sic indicetur: ‘homo est substantia habens duas manus

1 de] primis *add. necnon del. E* 2 opinionem] operationem *E* | et] propter *add. necnon del. E* 5 finem] formam *E* 7 diffiniatur] et *add. E* 17 diffinitio] ad *add. necnon del. E* 21 extrinsecum] homini, quamvis secundum communem opinionem *add. mg. E. Idem textus invenitur initio f. 37^{ra}. Sub columna f. 36^{ra} hec littera ‘P’ scripta est.* 22 accidens superadditum] sive additum *E* 26 Patet] per *add. E*

6 Aristoteles, *Topica*, VI, 1, 139b13–17: ‘omne quod appositum est in diffinitione superfluum’ – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 328 (83): ‘Oportet definientem planissima interpretatione uti eo quod causa cognoscendi traditur definitio, unde definitio non debet esse obscura, nec aliquid superfluum continere.’ (Aristoteles, *Topica*, Z1, 139b13–17).

et decem digitos et duos pedes, potens sentire et potens intelligere et potens ridere. Ista oratio, quamvis indicet essentiam rei, non tamen est diffinitio eius, quia non est compendiosa.

5 (CONCLUSIO SECUNDA) Secunda conclusio est ista, quod omnis diffinitio est eque nota vel notior diffinito; aliter non indicaret diffinitum.

Unde, quamvis circa istam materiam multe conclusiones possent poni, cum differentie non essent ad propositum, de quibus supersedeo aliquas. Tamen ut principale propositum melius intelligatur, quodammodo declarabo.

10 (CONCLUSIO TERTIA) Tertia conclusio est ista quod omnis diffinitio est diffinitio quid nominis, quia omnis diffinitio indicat quid nomen significat, et per consequens diffinitio propriissime dicta est diffinitio quid nominis, nisi vocetur 'diffinitio quid nominis': 'oratio compendiosa per terminos predicantes primo modo per se, vel per terminos non
15 connotantes aliquid extrinsecum'.

(CONCLUSIO QUARTA) Quarta conclusio est ista quod aliqua diffinitio proprie dicta non datur per differentiam (acceptam) a specie, vel a formalitate. Statim patet, quia aliqua talis diffinitio potest dari per differentiam acceptam a materia, cuius(modi) est hec diffinitio: 'corpus est
20 substantia materialis'. Nec credo quod facile sit aliter corpus diffinire. Et ideo proprie loquendo corpus non habet diffinitionem dialecticam, sed tantummodo naturalem, sicut sequitur ex predictis.⁷

(CONCLUSIO QUINTA) Quinta conclusio est ista quod omnis diffinitio dialectica propriissime dicta datur per differentiam specificam, quia per
25 differentiam acceptam a specie, sive a forma. Et patet per correlarium ex predictis.

(CONCLUSIO SEXTA) Sexta conclusio est ista quod aliqua diffinitio proprie dicta datur per differentiam specificam connotantem aliquod extrinsecum quod non est de essentia rei cui dicitur extrinsecum. Ista
30 patet, quia ista differentia *mortale* connotat actum moriendi. Qui quidem actus sunt accidentia sibi addita; non tamen sunt tales actus extrinseci large accipiendo 'extrinsecum'.

5 aliter] personaliter E 6 istam] 2 litt.(?) add. necnon del. E 7 propositum] ideo ad primo(?) add. E; seq. lac. 2 litt. E 12 diffinitio] est add. E 14 per] dicendi add. E 17 datur] datens(?) E 21 loquendo] loco E | dialecticam] dialecticum E
29 extrinsecum] idem add. E 31 accidentia] sunt large accipiendo sub add. necnon del. E | sunt tales] sunt tales iter. E 32 accipiendo] predictum add. necnon del. E

7 Videas supra, DIST. 1.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod inter diffinitiones proprie dictas una est rationabilior alia, sicut ista expressius, compendiosius et essentialius indicat essentiam diffiniti. Et talis est diffinitio naturalis exprimens tam materiam quam formam, ut si ‘homo’ sic diffiniatur: ‘homo est substantia composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva.’ 5

37th ⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod differentie formarum non – saltem non omnes – debent poni in diffinitione, quia tunc non esset oratio compendiosa propter hoc quod homo esset sic diffiniendus: ‘homo est substantia | corporea animata sensibilis rationalis mortalis’. Et ideo *multi* volunt dicere quod ista non est diffinitio ‘animalis’ proprie dicta: ‘animal est substantia animata sensibilis’, sed ista ‘animal est substantia animalis sensibilis’, accipiendo li ‘sensibile’ active prout stet loco istius quod est ‘potens sentire’. Sed *alii* dicunt (quod), quamvis apponantur univoce differentia superiorum ad maiorem expressionem – que quidem appositio non multum impedit compendiositatem orationis – 15 non propter hoc impeditur quin talis oratio probabiliter posset dici ‘diffinitio’. Unde stricte et proprie loquendo primum dictum plus valet. 15

⟨CONCLUSIO NONA⟩ Nona conclusio est ista: voco ‘differentiam specificam’ differentiam que (est) apta nata esse medium concludendi alia specificie differentie, et que non connotat aliquid extrinsecum large accipiendo ‘extrinsecum’; tunc omnis diffinitio proprie dicta sive naturalis, sive dialectica, datur per differentiam specificam. Et potest ista conclusio satis faciliter intelligi ex predictis. 20

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod vocando ‘differentiam specificam’ (ista que est) accepta a forma, tunc aliqua diffinitio proprie dicta potest dari sine differentia specifica, sicut patet de 25 ista diffinitione: ‘corpus est substantia materialis’. Sed vocando ‘differentiam specificam’ ista que est apta nata esse medium concludendi alia specificie differentie, tunc nulla diffinitio proprie dicta potest dari sine differentia specifica. Et ulterius dicitur pro forma argumenti negando 30 istam consequentiam ‘aliqua diffinitio propriissime accepta potest dari sine differentia specifica; igitur nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad diffinitionem proprie dictam’, quia ad omnem diffinitionem dialecticam est aliqua differentia specifica necessaria necessitate conditionata et non absolute, unde nulla differentia est necessaria. Et ulterius dicitur 35

8 esset] est E 9 substantia] compositum *add. necnon del. E* | substantia] quamvis *sub columnna E* | sensibilis] accipiendo li s *add. necnon del. E* 19 differentiam] esse *add. E*
22 potest] patet E

quod ista diffinitio: ‘homo est corpus et anima intellectiva essentialiter unita’ non fit sine differentia specifica, quia anima intellectiva est ibi differentia specifica.

5 Et si dicatur quod oportet differentiam specificam predicari per se et diffinito, et etiam quamlibet partem diffinitionis, *ad hoc dicitur breviter* quod hoc non oportet in diffinitione naturali, sed in diffinitione dialectica.

10 (AD 2.) Ad secundum dicitur negando omnem differentiam specificam connotare aliquod extrinsecum large accipiendo ‘extrinsecum’, scilicet pro isto quod non est de essentia rei ut eius actus principalis. Sed bene conceditur omnem differentiam specificam accepta a forma, vel saltem multas differentias specificas acceptas a forma, connotare aliquod extrinsecum, stricte accipiendo ‘extrinsecum’ secundum quod se extendit ad actum principalem rei, qui quidem actus non vocatur aliquod
15 extrinsecum in proposito, scilicet quando dicitur: diffinitio proprie dicta debet dari per substantialia et per terminos non connotantes aliquod extrinsecum. Unde, quamvis connotent actum principalem istius forme a qua tales termini concipiuntur, non dicuntur tamen connotare aliquod
20 extrinsecum et differentia superius, vel saltem multas differentias specificas propter istam differentiam specificam *animatum* que non videtur connotare aliquod actum, secundum *aliquos*. Et hoc puto fore verum.

(AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM) Ad argumentum in oppositum, patet qualiter scilicet Porphyrius sit intelligendus, quia ipse loquitur de differentia specifica, vocando differentiam specificam ista(m) que apta nata
25 est concludendi alia specificice | differre. Et patet totum per predicta. 37^{va}

8 secundum] primum *add. necnon del. et exp. E* 10 est] extrinsecum *add. necnon del. E* 18 termini] termini *corr. sup. lin. E* 21 hoc] ad *add. E* 25 predicta] in omnem *add. E^c*

⟨QUESTIO 39⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum ista diffinitio differentie sit bene data: 'differentia est qua abundat species a genere'.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

Alicui competit diffinitio cui non competit diffinitum; igitur diffinitio non est bona. Consequentia nota. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, sicut species abundat a genere differentia, ita a proprio, et etiam diversis accidentibus que universaliter competunt speciei et non generi; sicut omnis homo est animal (rationale), omnis homo est rectus, omnis homo (est) superciliosus, et non omne animal est huiusmodi, ut patet. 5 10

⟨2.⟩ Item. Hec est falsa: differentia (est) in qua abundat species a genere; igitur diffinitio non est bona. Consequentia nota, quia omnis bona diffinitio verificatur de diffinito. Et antecedens probatur, quia: omnis differentia que competit speciei, competit generi talis speciei; igitur nulla differentia abundat species a genere. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens probatur, quia: quidquid competit speciei personaliter sumpto, hoc competit generi personaliter sumpto. Nam, sicut iste sunt vere: 'homo est rationalis', 'homo est mortalis', 'homo est risibilis', 'homo est rectus', consimiliter iste sunt vere: 'animal est rationale', 'animal est risibile', etcetera, quia, si non, tunc arguatur sic ex opposito: 'nullum animal est rationale; omnis homo est animal; igitur nullus homo est rationalis'. Conclusio falsa; et non minor; igitur maior. 15 20

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si species abundaret differentia a genere, hoc esset quia differentia competeret actu speciei et non generi, sed potentia tantum, sicut dicitur in littera.¹ Sed hoc est falsum, quia sicut hec actu est vera 'homo est rationalis', ita hec actu est vera 'animal est rationale', et non tantum ista 'animal potest esse rationale'; igitur videtur quod differentia non potius competat generi potestate et non actu quam speciei, nec e converso. 25

3 abundat] habundat sic E 25 hec] habet E

1 *Isagoge*, III, 9 (11, 3-4): 'potestate quidem omnes habent sub se differentias, actu vero nullam.'

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius² ubi loquens de differentiis specificis distinguendo eas contra actus separabilia et inseparabilia que sunt differentie communiter et non proprie dicte, dicit sic: ‘Quas etiam determinantes dicunt: differentia est qua abundat species a genere.’

5 ⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Distinctio istius questionis est ista quod ‘actus et potentia’ accipiuntur dupliciter, scilicet realiter et logicaliter. Realiter secundum quod ‘materia prima’ dicitur potentia respectu forme, et ‘forma’ dicitur actus respectu materie, et etiam secundum quod ‘potentia intellectiva’ et ‘potentia visiva’ et ‘potentia auditiva’ et ⟨sic de⟩ aliis dicuntur potentie
10 respectu actus.

Logicaliter, ut si aliquod predicatum competat alicui subiecto particulariter et non universaliter, eo quod subiectum sit in plus quam predicatum, hoc est quod subiectum sit communius quam predicatum, tunc dicitur breviter loquendo quod tale predicatum competit tali subiecto
15 tantum potentia et non actu. Et si aliquod predicatum competat alicui subiecto universaliter, tunc dicitur quod sibi competit actu quia actualitate universaliter.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod predicta diffinitio ‘differentie’ de virtute sermonis non convertitur cum diffinito. Ista conclusio patet per primum argumentum ad principale quod probat quod,
20 sicut species abundat a genere differentia, et proprio et aliquibus accidentibus. Et *si dicatur* quod Porphirius diffinit ibidem differentiam in sua maxima communitate, scilicet secundum quod se extendit ad differentiam communiter dictam et ad differentiam magis proprie dictam,
25 hoc non potest esse, sicut patet ex processu littere prius allegate, quia Porphirius dicit ibidem³ quod differentiis specificis maxime opus est ad divisiones et diffinitiones, et non accidentibus inseparabilibus, ea, multo fortiori, nec accidentibus separabilibus. Et tunc sequitur:⁴ ‘Quas etiam

1 loquens] Porphirius *add. E* 11 Logicaliter] universaliter *E* 21 differentia] respectu *add. E* 27 accidentibus] non *add. necnon del. E*

2 *Isagoge*, III, 9 (10, 22–11, 1): ‘Quas etiam determinantes dicunt: differentia est qua abundat species a genere.’

3 *Isagoge*, III, 8 (10, 19–21): ‘Et his maxime opus est ad divisiones generum et definitiones, sed non his quae secundum accidens inseparabiles sunt, nec magis his quae sunt separabiles.’

4 *Isagoge*, III, 9 (10, 22–11, 1): ‘Quas etiam determinantes dicunt (...)’. Videas supra, AD OPP.

determinantes etcetera,⁸ idest quas differentias specificas; ergo Porphirius
37^{vb} intendit ibi specialiter diffinire differentiam | specificam.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod predicta diffinitio est bona secundum intellectum auctoris, scilicet si suppleatur istud quod auctor intelligit, et tunc debet sic suppleri: differentia est qua abundat actu et per se primo modo species a genere. Ista patet, quia tunc ista diffinitio competit differentie specificae et non aliis; igitur diffinitio est conveniens. Consequentia videtur evidens, quia nihil aliud a differentia specifica competit speciei universaliter per se primo modo quod non competit generi talis speciei universaliter, sicut patet discurrendo per singula. 5 10

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod aliqua differentia specifica competit generi actu. Ista patet, quia aliqua differentia specifica competit generi universaliter, sicut ista differentia specifica *sensibile* sive *animatum sensibile* competit isti generi *animal* universaliter, quia omne animal est animatum sensibile. 15

⟨CONTRA I⟩ Sed *contra istam conclusionem* instatur per textum,⁵ qui dicit quod differentia competit generi potestate, actu vero non.

⟨CONTRA II⟩ *Item*. Si sic, tunc species non abundaret differentia a genere. 20

⟨AD CONTRA I⟩ Ad primum dicitur quod textus intelligit quod differentia divisiva alicuius generis in suam speciem non competit generi actu, idest, universaliter.

⟨AD CONTRA II⟩ Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia, quamvis actu differentia specifica competat generi universaliter quod competit speciei talis generis. 25

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Et ideo quarta conclusio est ista quod nulla differentia specifica alicuius speciei competit actu generi talis speciei. Ista statim patet, quia nihil convertibile cum specie competit universaliter generi talis speciei; sed omnis differentia specifica alicuius speciei est convertibilis cum ista specie cuius dicitur differentia specifica; igitur nulla differentia specifica alicuius speciei competit actu generi talis speciei. 30

8 quia] quod E 15 competit] h add. necnon del. E 18 vero] vel E 21–22 differentia] dist add. necnon del. E

5 *Isagoge*, III, 9 (11, 3–4): '(...) potestate quidem omnes habent sub se differentias, actu vero nullam.' Videas supra, 3.

Et si dicatur quod ista differentia specifica *rationale mortale* competit universaliter isti generi *animal*, quia hec est vera demonstratis Sorte et Platone ‘uterque animal de numero animalium est rationale mortale’, et ista est universalis, igitur predicatum competit subiecto universaliter, *ad*
 5 *istud dicitur* quod conclusio intelligitur universalitate generali per quam fit distributio pro omni supposito personaliter, et non de universalitate speciali sive restrictiva in qua restringitur subiectum ad standum pro aliquibus suis suppositis et non pro omnibus. Unde, quando dicit textus quod differentia specifica non competit generi actu, idest universaliter,
 10 loquitur de universalitate generali sive absoluta et non speciali et restrictiva, quia cuicumque communi aliquod predicatum competit potentia, idest particulariter, eidem competit actu actualitate restrictiva.

⟨AD 1⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo consequentiam, et negando antecedens, ad intellectum auctoris superius expressum.⁶ Et
 15 ad probationem: quod, quamvis species abundaret proprio et aliquibus accidentibus a genere, non tamen primo modo dicendi per se quod subintelligitur in predicta diffinitione.

⟨AD 2⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod sit falsum. Et ad probationem dicitur negando consequentiam istam: ‘quidquid competit speciei, competit
 20 generi talis speciei; igitur species non abundat differentia a genere’, quia species non dicitur abundare differentia a genere quia aliqua differentia competit speciei que non competit generi, sed quia aliqua differentia competit speciei universaliter absolute que non competit generi talis speciei. Sed exponitur satis in supplemento predictae diffinitionis.

⟨AD 3⟩ Ad tertium patet per predicta, quia non dicit quod differentia competit alicui actu ideo quia propositio in qua de ipso subiecto talis
 25 differentia verificatur, est actu vera, sed ideo quia | sibi competit universaliter absolute, et tali actualitate non competit differentie specificae generis eius speciei cuius est differentia specifica. 38^{ra}

30 ⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum sufficienter patet per predicta.

6 Videas supra, CONCL. 1.

⟨QUESTIO 40⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliqua alia
diffinitio differentie convertitur cum differentia.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non:

quia non ista diffinitio differentie qua dicitur ‘differentia est que predi- 5
catur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale’,¹ quia ista tantum-
modo competit differentibus subalternis, quia differentia specialissima
non predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Ista diffinitio competit pluribus accidentibus, sicut de se
notum est. 10

⟨3.⟩ Nec etiam diffinitio ‘differentia est istud quod est aptum natum
dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere’,² quia hoc etiam competit pro-
prio, sicut patet per Porphyrium in textu ubi exemplificat de isto proprio
aptum natum navigare,³ quod quidem proprium est aptum natum divi-
dere hominem ab aliis animalibus. 15

⟨4.⟩ ⟨Nec etiam ista diffinitio ‘differentia est qua differunt a se singula’,⁴
quia ista tantummodo competit differentie specialissime.⟩

⟨5.⟩ Nec etiam ista diffinitio ‘differentia est istud quod ad esse rei
conducit et eius quod est esse rei pars est’,⁵ quia hoc competit tam materie
quam forme quarum nulla est differentia, quia nulla est universale. Igitur, 20
ut videtur, nulla alia diffinitio differentie ab ista dicta ‘est qua abundat
species a genere’ est convertibilis cum diffinito, et per consequens nulla
alia est conveniens diffinitio differentie.

8 specie] specie *mg. E*^c

1 *Isagoge*, III, 10 (11, 7–8): ‘Definiunt autem eam et hoc modo: differentia est quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quale sit praedicatur (...)’

2 *Isagoge*, III, 11 (11, 18–19): ‘Describunt autem huiusmodi differentias et hoc modo: differentia est quod aptum natum est dividere quae sub eodem sunt genere (...)’

3 *Isagoge*, III, 13 (12, 4–5): ‘(...) neque enim quod aptum natum est navigare erit hominis differentia, etsi proprium sit hominis.’

4 *Isagoge*, III, 12 (11, 21): ‘Assignant autem etiam hoc modo: differentia est qua differunt a se singula (...)’

5 *Isagoge*, III, 13 (12, 1–4): ‘Interius autem perscrutantes de differentia, dicunt (...) esse differentiam, (...) quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est (...)’

5 <AD OPPOSITUM> Ad oppositum arguitur per Porphyrium qui quasi omnes alias diffinitiones corrigens ponit istam diffinitionem ipsam, ut videtur, ultra omnes alias commendans dicens: ‘interius perscrutantes et speculantes dicunt non quodlibet eorum que sunt eodem genere sunt dividendum esse differentiam, sed quod ad esse rei convenit et eius quod est esse rei pars est.’⁶

10 <DISTINCTIO PRIMA> Prima distinctio istius questionis est ista quod duplex est ‘quale’, scilicet substantiale et accidentale. Quale substantiale querit de forma substantiali; quale vero accidentale querit de forma accidentali sive de alia proprietate accidentali.

15 <DISTINCTIO SECUNDA> Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘esse’ accipitur multipliciter: uno modo pro ipsa re existente, secundo modo pro forma rei; et istis duobus modis est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio modo accipitur pro diffinitione sive descriptione; et sic est nomen secunde intentionis.

<CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio ‘differentia est que predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale’ non convertitur <cum> differentia, sicut probat primum argumentum, quia non competit differentie specialissime.

20 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio convertitur cum diffinito secundum intellectum auctoris, quia auctor intendit ibi diffinire differentiam specificam subalternam. Et tunc debet sic exprimi: ‘differentia specifica subalterna est istud quod predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale substantiali.’ Et quod auctor intendat loqui de differentia specifica, patet per hoc quod sequitur in littera de isto exemplo metaphysice,⁷ quo dicit auctor quod, sicut statua constat ex aere et figura tamquam ex materia et forma, ita homo communis et specialis ex genere tamquam ex materia et ex differentia tamquam ex forma. Et ideo differentia predicatur in quale substantiale quod

7 distinctio] est ista *add. necnon del. E*

6 *Isagoge*, III, 13 (12, 1–4): ‘Interius autem perscrutantes de differentia, dicunt non quodlibet eorum quae sub eodem sunt genere esse differentiam, sed quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est (...)’

7 *Isagoge*, III, 10 (11, 12–16): ‘Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus vel ad similitudinem materiae specieique constitutionem hebetibus, quemadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura, sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia (...)’

38^b querit de forma substantiali a qua accipitur differentia specifica, nam, sicut in compositione et generatione rei naturalis pre-|supponitur materia et postea inducitur forma, ut sic habeat esse completum rei, igitur in compositione diffinitionis prima ponitur genus, et postea apponitur differentia specifica, et sic habetur diffinitio completa. 5

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio: ‘differentia est istud quod est aptum natum dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere’ non est convertibilis cum differentia specifica. Ista conclusio patet per textum prius allegatum,⁸ quia competit proprio, nam proprium est aptum natum dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere, quia dividit hominem ab equo, sicut patet de ista proprietate *risibile*, et similiter etiam de ista quam tangit auctor in littera ‘aptum natum navigare’. 10

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio convertitur cum diffinito ad intentionem auctoris, quia auctor intendit ibi tantummodo diffinire ‘differentiam’ secundum quod se extendit ad differentiam proprie dictam et magis proprie dictam, et hoc est ad proprium et ad differentiam specificam, ut sic exprimatur: ‘differentia specifica vel proprium est istud quod est aptum natum dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere specificè’, quia licet accidens aliquali divisione dividat ista que sunt sub eodem genere, non tamen oportet quod dividat ista specificè. 15 20

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod ista propositio ⟨‘differentia est qua different a se singula’⟩ secundum intellectum auctoris est vera, quia auctor intelligit:⁹ ‘singula qua a se differunt, et est differentia’. 25

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Ex quo sequitur correlarie ista conclusio quod aliqua diffinitio non est predicabilis de suo diffinito, quia si hoc diffinitum ‘differentia’ ponatur a parte subiecti, tunc propositio est falsa, sicut iam dictum est.¹⁰

Secundum correlarium est istud quod aliquod diffinitum est verificabile de sua diffinitione, quequidem diffinitio de ipso diffinito non est verificabilis, quia: de ista diffinitione ‘singula qua a se differunt’ est hoc diffinitum ‘differentia’ verificabile, quia hec est vera: ‘singula qua a se dif- 30

7 quod] habet *add. necnon del. E* 24 qua] *con-li E* 24–25 differentia] *dicta E*
27 diffinitio] *-to add. necnon del. E*

8 Videas supra, 3.

9 *Isagoge*, III, 12 (11, 21): ‘Assignant autem etiam hoc modo: differentia est qua differunt a se singula (...)’

10 Videas supra, 4.

ferunt est differentia, ut patet inductive, quia ista 'qua a se differunt' est differentia, et ista 'qua a se differunt' est differentia talis, et tamen hec diffinitio non est verificabilis de isto diffinito, sic quod de ipso vere predicetur, quia hec est falsa: 'differentia est qua differunt', vel 'differentia est
5 singula qua differunt'.

Verumtamen ad vitandum tales conclusiones mirabiles volunt *aliqui* dicere quod aliquando istud quod sequitur verbum, est subiectum et quid precedit, est predicatum. *Sed* hoc est contra communem consuetudinem loquendi. Ideo plus placet tenere predictas conclusiones, que
10 non sunt multum mirabiles in proposito, quamvis non intelligentibus appareant esse mirabiles, quia tota causa quare hoc diffinitum est predicabile de diffinitione et non e contra, est signum distributivum in diffinitione positum. Quod quidem signum est pars propositionis, et ideo non potest poni a parte predicati, secundum istam propositionem Aristotelis,
15 primo *Perihermeneias*¹¹ 'nulla est affirmatio in qua universale universaliter sumptum predicatur'.

Tertium correlarium est istud quod non semper diffinitio et diffinitum convertuntur, quia non semper verificantur de se mutuo universaliter et affirmative.

Et *si dicatur* quod Porphirius¹² non intendit differentiam diffinire quando dicit 'differentia est qua differunt a se singula', hoc *videtur* esse contra illum textum precedentem,¹³ quo dicitur 'assignant ergo et hoc modo'. Per quem textum videtur quod Porphirius vult dicere quod *antiqui* diffiniunt differentiam hoc modo, et sic communiter exponitur ab
25 expositoribus. Et hec dicta non sunt simpliciter affirmative | sed tamquam probabilia et possibilis sustineri. 38^{va}

Verumtamen *aliter potest dicere* quod forte melius distinguendo predictam propositionem secundum ampliationem sensus proprius est falsus, sicut predictum est; sensus vero transsumptivus in quo dicit eam
30 auctor, est verus, et tunc stat loco istius propositionis 'differentia est qua possunt proliari cui specificice differentie tamquam pars', quod accipitur a

4 vel] vel E^c 10 quamvis] quamvis iter. E 11 tota] quod add. necnon del. E
13 quidem] po(?) est add. necnon del. E 21 esse] esse E^c 29 transsumptivus] transsumptiva E

11 Cf. *Auctoritates* 305 (11): 'Hoc signum "omnis" non est "universale" sed significat "universaliter", id est designat quod unusquisque terminus teneatur universaliter.' (Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, 7, 17b11-12).

12 *Isagoge*, III, 12 (11, 21): '(...) differentia est qua differunt a se singula (...)'

13 *Isagoge*, III, 12 (11, 21): 'Assignant autem etiam hoc modo (...)'

parte essentiali et rei. Et sic diffinitio convertitur cum diffinito, scilicet cum differentia specifica.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista ‘quod ad esse rei conducit, et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est’,¹⁴ igitur non est diffinitio convertibilis cum differentia specifica, si accipiatur de virtute sermonis. 5
Ista statim patet, quia genus adducit ad esse rei, idest ad diffinitionem, quia est pars essentialis diffinitionis.

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod ista diffinitio convertitur cum differentia specifica ad intellectum auctoris, quia auctor intelligit quod differentia specifica est istud quod diffinitionem proprie 10
dictam complet, et quod est pars formalis diffinitionis proprie dicte; igitur quod ista coniunctio ‘et’ stet ibi expositive, et non copulative, quia tunc ista particula addita pars superflueret, nam omne istud quod complet diffinitionem est pars formalis diffinitionis. Debet ergo sic intelligi: 15
‘differentia est istud quod complet diffinitionem rei proprie dictam, idest, quod est pars formalis diffinitionis proprie dicte’.

Et sic patet quod ‘differentia’ habet plures descriptiones. Et *si dicatur* quod unius rei una est diffinitio, *dicitur* quod unitas ista intelligitur de unitate convertibilitatis, quia omnes diffinitiones unius rei convertuntur, nam aliter non esset quod ista diffinitio sit vera, nam unius rei possunt 20
esse plures diffinitiones proprie dicte, utpote diffinitio naturalis et diffinitio dialetica. Iterum unius rei possunt esse plures descriptiones, secundum quod unius rei possunt esse plures proprietates complentes tales descriptiones, sicut ista est una descriptio hominis: ‘homo est animal risibile’, completa per istam proprietatem *risibile*; et ista est alia descriptio 25
hominis: ‘homo est animal susceptibile discipline’, et consimiliter secundum diversas proprietates differentie ponuntur diverse descriptiones eiusdem.

⟨AD 1⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod diffinitio ‘differentia est que predicatur de pluribus etcetera’ non convertitur cum 30

1 scilicet] scilicet *sup. lin. E^c* 4 igitur] igitur *sup. lin. E^c* 5 convertibilis] convertitur
E 9 intellectum] intellectui E 14 ergo] ergo *sup. lin. E^c* 19 unitate] convertibiliter
add. necnon del. et exp. E 30 est que] est que *sup. lin. E^c*

14 *Isagoge*, III, 13 (12, 1–4): ‘Interius autem perscrutantes de differentia, dicunt non quodlibet eorum quae sub eodem sunt genere esse differentiam, sed quod ad esse conducit et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est (...)’

differentia specifica subalterna sub intellectu quo superius dictum est,¹⁵ scilicet quod li 'quale' accipiatur pro quali substantiali.

5 ⟨AD 2⟩ Et per hoc patet ad secundum, quia ista diffinitio non competit pluribus accidentibus, quia, quamvis accidentia predicentur in quale, non tamen in quale substantiale.

10 ⟨AD 3⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod ista diffinitio 'differentia est istud quod aptum natum est dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere' non convertitur cum differentia specifica, ⟨sed⟩ convertitur cum differentia secundum quod se extendit ad differentiam specificam, et ad proprium.

 ⟨AD 4⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo etiam quod ista sit falsa, quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula, et hoc si accipiatur in sensu proprio, sed in sensu transsumptivo est vera, intelligendo sicut predictum est.¹⁶

15 ⟨AD 5⟩ Ad quintum dicitur quod ista diffinitio 'differentia est quod ad esse rei conducit' convertitur cum differentia specifica secundum intellectum auctoris, quia ibi 'esse' accipitur pro diffinitione proprie dicta. Et sic accipiendo 'esse' materia et forma non conducunt ad esse rei, quia non intrans diffinitionem, quia non sunt signa. Et patet totum per
20 predicta.

Et sic est finis questionis.

1 intellectu] intellectum *E*

15 Videas supra, DIST. 1.

16 Videas supra, CONCL. 6.

⟨QUESTIO 41⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum proprium dicatur quadrupliciter.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non.

38^{vb} Quia nullum proprium dicitur quadrupliciter; igitur nec proprium. |
Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens patet inductive, quia: non 5
proprium quod convenit omni etsi non soli, dicitur quadrupliciter, nec
proprium quod convenit soli sed non omni, nec proprium quod convenit
omni et soli, sed non semper, nec proprium quod convenit omni et soli et
semper; et omne proprium est aliquod istorum; igitur nullum proprium
dicitur quadrupliciter. 10

⟨2.⟩ Item. Nullum est proprium quod convenit omni et non soli; igitur
proprium non dicitur quadrupliciter. Consequentia videtur de se nota.
Et antecedens declaratur, quia: capiantur omnia ista quibus competit tale
proprium, tunc vel omnia illa continentur sub aliqua specie, vel sub ali-
quo genere, vel sub aliquo transcendente. Si sub aliqua specie, tunc istud 15
proprium competit illi soli speciei; si sub aliquo genere, tunc competit illi
soli ⟨generi; si sub aliquo transcendente, tunc competit illi soli⟩ transcen-
denti. Igitur omne proprium quod competit omni, competit soli; igitur
nullum est proprium quod competit omni et non soli.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Nullum est proprium quod competit soli et non omni; igitur 20
proprium non dicitur quadrupliciter. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et
antecedens probatur, quia, si aliquod proprium competit soli, tunc istud
solum vel est species vel est genus vel est transcendens, et per consequens,
si competit tali soli, competit alicui contento sub illo; igitur competit
alicui alteri ab illo; igitur non illi soli, ut si hoc proprium *esse medicum* 25
competit soli homini ita quod non competat alicui alteri ab ista specie
homo; igitur non competit alicui contento sub ista specie, vel si competit
alicui contento sub ista specie *homo*, igitur non competit isti soli speciei
homo.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Nulli soli homini competit; igitur non soli homini competit. 30
Consequentia nota. Et antecedens patet inductive.

11 est] est *sup. lin. E^c* 14 sub] se *E* 15 sub] sub *sup. lin. E^c* 16 proprium]
compedit *add. necnon del. E* | sub] sequitur *E* 26 soli] vel *add. E*

5 ⟨5.⟩ Item. Nullum est proprium quod competit omni et soli sed non semper; igitur proprium non dicitur quadrupliciter. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, si esset aliquod tale proprium, esset hoc proprium tale *canescere in senectute*, sicut patet in textu.¹ Sed hoc non competit omni et soli sed non semper, quia hec est falsa: ‘omnis homo canescit in senectute’, sicut de se notum est.

10 ⟨6.⟩ Item. Nullum ⟨est⟩ proprium quod competit omni et soli et semper, quia, si aliquod esset tale, tunc hoc proprium *risibile* esset tale. Consequens est falsum, quia nullus homo est semper risibilis, quia nullus homo est semper.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porpyrius in littera,² qui dicit ‘proprium vero quadrifariam dividunt, etcetera.’

15 ⟨SOLUTIO QUESTIONIS⟩ In ista questione primo recitanda est una opinio reprobanda; secundo ponende sunt aliquae conclusiones; tertio solvende sunt rationes principales.

20 ⟨OPINIO COMMUNIS⟩ Circa primum est sciendum quod quondam fuit *communis opinio* quod omne proprium esset res que non est signum, sicut hoc proprium | *risibile*; *quidam* posuerunt ex parte rei unam aptitudinem ridendi existentem in homine subiective, et ad hoc ponendum talibus movebantur motivis: 39^{ra}

⟨I⟩ Primo, quia proprium sequitur formam specificam; et nullus terminus sequitur formam specificam.

⟨II⟩ Secundo, quia proprium est inseparabile ab eo cuius est proprium; sed nullus terminus est inseparabilis.

25 ⟨III⟩ Tertio, quia proprium est demonstrabile de eo cuius est proprium; sed nullus terminus est demonstrabilis de aliquo.

⟨IV⟩ Quarto, quia proprium per se competit illi cuius est proprium; sed nullus ⟨terminus⟩ per se competit alicui.

3 proprium] tale *add. E* 5 non] non *sup. lin. E^c* 14 ponende] posite *E* 20 motivis] mor-vus *E* 21 sequitur] prime *add. necnon del. E* 23 inseparabile] quia proprium est demonstra *add. necnon del. E*

1 *Isagoge*, IV (12, 14–15): ‘Et quod soli et omni et aliquando, ut homini in senectute canescere (...)’

2 *Isagoge*, IV (12, 12): ‘Proprium vero quadrifariam dividunt.’

⟨v⟩ Quinto, quia proprium non potest negari ab eo cuius est proprium, sicut risibile non potest vere negari ab homine; sed hic terminus potest vere negari ab homine, quia nullus homo est terminus.

⟨CONTRA ISTAM OPINIONEM⟩ Sed ista opinio per *modernos* studiosos perscrutantes ex toto quasi reprobatur, quia iam quasi ab omnibus ponitur, quia 'proprium' nihil aliud est quam terminus competens alicui per se secundo modo, et hoc precipue 'proprie proprium'. 5

Primo, quia nihil predicatur de subiecto nisi terminus; omne proprium predicatur de suo subiecto.

Secundo, quia nihil convertitur cum suo subiecto nisi terminus; convertibilitas est proprietas terminorum sive propositionum; sed proprium convertitur cum suo subiecto. 10

Tertio, quia omne demonstrabile de suo subiecto est terminus, quia omne tale est predicabile; sed proprium est demonstrabile de suo subiecto; igitur etcetera. 15

Ad istam partem multe rationes adducuntur. Que causa brevitatis obmittantur, et etiam: quasi nullus predictam opinionem tenet, et iterum quia ipsamet opinio sua evidenti irrationabilitate destruit seipsam.

⟨AD I⟩ Ad primum igitur eorum motivum dicitur concedendo maiorem ad bonum intellectum, istam, scilicet, 'omne proprium sequitur formam specificam', idest, omne proprium verificatur de suo subiecto ratione forme specificæ, vel nature specificæ, et precipue proprie proprium. Et ad eundem intellectum negatur minor, ista, scilicet, 'nullus terminus sequitur formam specificam', quia nihil aliud quam terminus verificatur de aliquo ratione nature specificæ. 20 25

⟨AD II⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo maiorem, et hoc loquendo de inseparabilitate logicali et de proprie proprio. Et uniformiter loquendo negatur minor, ista, scilicet, 'nullus terminus est inseparabilis', quia nihil aliud est inseparabile nisi terminus, quia, si proprium esset talis res que non esset signum, tunc posset separari, saltem per potentiam prime cause; sed tentis significatis vocabulorum proprium non potest separari a suo subiecto, sicut hoc proprium *risibile* non potest vere negari ab homine per aliquam potentiam. 30

⟨AD III⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo maiorem et negando minorem, quia nihil aliud quam terminus est demonstrabile. 35

1 quia proprium] quia proprium *iter. E* 5 toto] compositionibus *E* 17 nullus] hiis corporibus *add. E* 21 specificam] quia nihil aliud quam terminus *add. necnon del. E* 24 terminus] est inseparabile *add. E*; quia nihil aliud est inseparabile *add. necnon del. E*

⟨AD IV⟩ Ad quartum dicitur similiter negando minorem quod nihil competit alicui secundo modo dicendi per se nisi terminus.

⟨AD V⟩ Ad quintum dicitur negando minorem, istam, scilicet, ‘omnis terminus potest vere negari ab homine’, quia iste terminus ‘homo’ non potest vere negari ab ‘homine’, nec iste terminus ‘risibilis’.

Et ad probationem dicitur, quod, quamvis hec sit vera: ‘nullus homo est terminus’, propter hoc tamen non sequitur quod omnis terminus posset vere negari ab homine. Unde omnia ista motiva pure oriuntur ex ignorantia logice.

10 Et *si dicatur* quod ex predictis sequeretur | quod hoc proprium *risibile* 39th esset proprium alicuius quod impossibile esset ridere, et quod non posset esse risibile, quia esset proprium istius termini ‘homo’, et impossibile est hunc terminum ‘homo’ ridere, igitur esse risibile, *ad istud dicitur* totum concedendo, de quo plus patebit statim in conclusionibus.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Est igitur prima conclusio quod ‘proprium’ dicitur quadrupliciter, quia iste terminus ‘proprium’ accipitur quadrupliciter, sicut patet ex textu.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec propositio est impossibilis: ‘proprium competit soli speciei’. Demonstratur sic, quia 20 si competat alicui speciei, competit alicui contento sub tali specie, quod contentum non est talis species; igitur non competit soli speciei.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod ista propositio: ‘aliquid est proprium quod ⟨competit⟩ omni et non soli’ ad intellectum auctoris est vera, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquid est proprium quod competit 25 omni homini vel omni individuo istius speciei *homo*’, et non verificatur de ista specie sumpta cum dictione exclusiva, sicut hoc proprium *esse bipedem* vel *aptum natum* ⟨*esse*⟩ *bipedem*.

Et *si dicatur* quod non potius stat loco istius propositionis quam loco istius ‘aliquid proprium competit omni individuo istius speciei *asinus*’, 30 et non verificatur de ista specie *asinus* sumpta cum dictione exclusiva, *ad istud dicitur* concedendo quod non stat potius loco unius quam alterius, quia stat loco cuiuscumque talis.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod hec propositio est falsa: ‘aliquid proprium alicuius speciei competit omni individuo

14 conclusionibus] clusionibus E
30 dictione] ex dictione add. E

20 alicui] speciei comp add. necnon del. E

alicuius speciei, quia omne individuum est individuum alicuius speciei et nullum proprium alicuius speciei competit omni individuo.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod ad intellectum auctoris hec est vera: 'aliquod est proprium quod competit soli sed non omni', quia stat loco istius 'aliquod est proprium quod verificatur (de 5
individuo istius solius speciei, et non) de omni individuo istius speciei'. Et sic ponitur actus significatus qui debet sic exerceri: 'solus homo est medicus, et non omnis homo est medicus', et non tantum potest per istum actum exerceri, verum etiam per quemque alium consimilem, sicut per istum: 'solus homo est geometer, et non omnis homo est 10
geometer'.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod istud proprium *canescere in senectute* non est tale proprium quod competit ⟨omni⟩ et soli sed non semper, quia non omnis homo canescit in senectute, quia 15
puer non canescit in senectute.

Et si queratur quid sit dicendum ad textum auctoris, *ad hoc breviter respondetur* quod auctor ponit exemplum non ut ita est, sed ut sentiunt, qui addiscunt, sicut frequentissime auctores faciunt.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod aliquod est proprium quod competit omni et soli sed non semper, ad intentionem 20
auctoris, quia stat loco istius 'aliquod est proprium quod verificatur de aliqua specie' sumpta cum isto 'solus' sive dictione exclusiva. Et quod competit omni individuo istius speciei sed non semper, competit tali speciei vel talibus individuis, sicut hoc proprium *esse risibile* dummodo Sortes ridet vel *esse risibile* dummodo sol est in oriente ut esse risibile in 25
hoc instanti, demonstrato instanti presenti quia solus homo est risibilis in hoc instanti, et omnis homo est risibilis in hoc instanti, et hoc proprium non competit isti speciei semper, demonstrando | idem instans quod 39^{va}
prius, vel 'omnis homo est risibilis in A instanti' vocando istud instans proprie A prius demonstratum. 30

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod aliquod est proprium quod competit omni et soli et semper, ad istum intellectum quod aliquod proprium verificatur de aliquo specie sumpta cum dictione 35
exclusiva, et verificatur de ista specie universaliter et numquam vere negatur ab ista specie, et hoc utrisque, scilicet tam specie quam proprio, sumptis personaliter, sicut hoc proprium *risibile* verificatur de ista specie *homo* universaliter, et verificatur de ea cum dictione exclusiva.

2 alicuius] alicuius *sup. lin. E^f* 8 potest] possunt *E* 8–9 per istum] per istum *iter. E*
17 est] sunt *E* 22 quod] quid *E*

Ex isto sequitur aliqua <CORRELARIA quorum> primum est hoc quod proprium *risibile* competit alicui tamquam proprie proprium quod impossibile est ridere, sicut isti speciei *homo* que non potest ridere.

5 Secundum est quod hoc proprium *risibile* competit alicui tamquam proprie proprium quod impossibile est esse risibile. Istud correlarium iam patet de ista specie *homo*, quem impossibile est esse risibilem.

Tertium correlarium est quod hoc proprium *risibile* non est proprium alicuius quod potest ridere, quia non est proprium nisi alicuius termini vel signi, et nullum tale potest ridere.

10 <CONCLUSIO NONA> Ultima conclusio est ista quod istud proprium quod competit omni et soli et semper est unum universale de quo principaliter intendit Porphyrius, quia alia sunt accidentia.

<AD 1> Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando consequentiam, si subiectum antecedentis supponit personaliter et subiectum consequentis 15 materialiter, et negando antecedens, si subiectum supponat materialiter, et concedendo utramque istarum ‘nullum proprium dicitur quadrupliciter’, et ‘proprium dicitur quadrupliciter’ quia in prima subiectum supponit personaliter et in secunda materialiter. Et sic non est con<sequentia> propter equivocationem.

20 <AD 2> Ad secundum dicitur negando antecedens secundum intellectum auctorum. Et ad probationem dicitur quod omnia ista quibus competit tale proprium, continentur sub aliqua specie. Et ulterius dicitur concedendo quod istud proprium competat omni speciei sumpte cum dictione exclusiva, sed non competit omnibus contentis sub ista specie, 25 sicut ‘tantum animal est bipes’ et ‘non omne animal est bipes’. Iterum dicitur quod sic istud competit aliquibus contentis sub aliqua specie vel genere vel transcendente, de qua vel de quo istud proprium verificatur exclusive, sicut hoc proprium *esse bipedem* competit aliquibus que continentur sub aliquo quod est species, genus vel transcendens de quo istud 30 proprium exclusive verificatur. Et ideo non competit omni et soli.

<AD 3> Ad tertium dicitur quod ista propositio ‘proprium competit soli speciei’ stat loco istius ‘competit alicui speciei exclusive, vel sumpte cum ista dictione “solus”’ et sic intendit Porphyrius, et cum hoc stat quod competat contentis sub specie.

1 quorum] *seq. lac. 6 litt. E* | primum] proprium *E* 12 principaliter] predicamentis *E*
 | alia] talia *E* 16 concedendo] ista *add. necnon del. E* 18 consequentia] *seq. lac. 2*
litt. E; nionem(?) *add. E* 21 omnia] ia(?) *sup. lin. add. E* 22 proprium] tale *p add.*
necnon del. E 34 competat] competatat *E*

⟨AD 4⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo consequentiam et consequens, acci-
piendo ‘consequens’ proprie et predicatum personaliter. Sed acci-
piendo ‘consequens’ transsumptive in sensu composito dictum, tunc
negatur consequentia, vel si predicatum consequentis supponat materia-
liter, quia competit soli homini, scilicet isti termino ‘solus homo’. 5

⟨AD 5⟩ Ad quintum patet per predicta, quia hoc proprium quod dico
‘canescere in senectute’ non est tale proprium, quamvis gratia exempli
ponatur.

⟨AD 6⟩ Ad sextum dicitur negando antecedens, quia hoc proprium
risibile competit omni et soli homini universaliter et exclusive non tamen 10
semper, quia hec est falsa: tantum omnis homo est risibilis, sed divisive.
Sed hoc copulativa est vera: omnis homo est risibilis et tantum homo est
risibilis. Et competit sibi semper. Hoc est si ista universalis ‘omnis homo
est risibilis’ semper esset, esset semper vera.

Et ulterius dicitur negando istam consequentiam: ‘nullus homo est risi- 15
bilis semper, igitur hoc proprium non competit homini semper’, quia isto
homini actu significato hoc proprium *risibile* competit homini semper,
non debet sic exerceri: omnis homo est semper risibilis, sed sic: quan-
39^{vb} documque hec propositio ‘omnis homo est | risibilis’ est vel erit, ipsa est
vel erit vera, et hoc dico reddendo singula singulis videlicet quandocum- 20
que fuit, fuit vera; et quandocumque est, est vera; et quandocumque erit,
erit vera. Et impossibile est ipsam esse falsam sine nova impositione. Et
sic debet intelligi quando dicitur ab *aliquibus* quod proprium non potest
separari ab eo cuius est proprium: hoc non potest ab eo vere negari,
sumptis personaliter. 25

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum in oppositum patet
per predicta quid sit dicendum.

Et sic est finis questionis.

2 Sed] ad *add. necnon del.* 3 dictum] est *add. E* | tunc] tunc *iter. E* 9 sextum]
tertium *E* 11 semper] simul *E* 16–17 isto homini] iste homo *E* 17 actu] actus *E*
| semper] quia iste actus *add. necnon del. E* 19 est] est *iter. E* 20 videlicet] oportet
E 22 esse] falsus *add. necnon del. E*

⟨QUESTIO 42⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod accidens
absit et assit preter subiecti corruptionem.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non:

5 quia sic ista accidentia *sedere, stare* essent huiusmodi quae aderunt et
aberunt preter subiecti corruptionem. Ista consequentia videtur evidens
ex textu.¹ Et falsitas consequentis declaratur, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod
aliquid posset sedere et stare preter subiecti corruptionem, igitur preter
sui debilitationem, et per consequens posset adhuc per tantum tempus
10 stare preter subiecti debilitationem, et pari ratione adhuc per tantum
tempus, et sic in infinitum; igitur aliquis posset stare per infinitum tem-
pus preter subiecti debilitationem. Sed hoc est falsum, sicut de se patet;
igitur istud ex quo sequitur, scilicet, quod *stare* sit accidens quod potest
adesse preter subiecti corruptionem. Et quod ista consequentia ‘aliquis
15 posset stare sine subiecti corruptione et sine subiecti debilitatione’, sit
vera, declaratur, quia debilitatio nihil aliud videtur esse ⟨quam⟩ corruptio
virtutis, nec virtus videtur aliud esse quam ipsa res virtuosa, ergo debi-
lilitatio rei non est aliud quam corruptio rei. Et consimiliter arguitur de
sedere et de quocumque alio accidente quo subiectum posset fatigari.

20 ⟨2.⟩ Item. Si sic, tunc sequeretur quod accidens posset separari a
subiecto. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et falsitas consequentis decla-
ratur, quia, si sic: ponatur igitur in esse quod aliquod accidens separatur
a subiecto: vel igitur accidens quod est, separatur a subiecto, vel acci-
dens quod non est; non accidens quod est, quia omne tale inheret suo
25 subiecto; igitur nullum tale separatur a subiecto. Ista consequentia patet,
quia: capiatur aliquod accidens quod non separatur a suo subiecto, et
vocetur *A*, et aliud accidens quod dicitur separari a subiecto, et voce-
tur *B*. Tunc quero, utrum *B* sit in subiecto vel non; si sic, tunc non
potius separatur a subiecto quam *A*; si non, tunc accidens subsisteret sine
30 subiecto, quod est contra Aristotelem,² primo *Physicorum*, ubi vult quod

6 videtur] declaratur(?) *E* 19 quo] quod *E* 24 quod] accidens *add. necnon del. et*
exp. E

¹ *Isagoge*, v, 1–2 (12, 23–13, 1).

² Aristoteles, *Physica* I, 2, 185a28–32.

passiones non possunt existere sine subiecto. Item, tunc non esset accidens, quia accidens dicitur esse eo, quia alicui accidit, et alteri inhereat. Et sic potest dicere quod accidens quod non est, potest separari a subiecto, quia non entis non est separatio sine alio.

⟨3.⟩ Item. Si sic, tunc calor ignis posset separari ab igne, sine corruptione (ignis, et animal posset) esse sine calore naturali, et sic de singulis. Sed ad istud dicitur quod ista sunt accidentia inseparabilia, de quibus predicta diffinitio intelligitur.

Sed contra: calor ignis et calor naturalis animalis possint remitti; igitur ab eorum subiecto possint separari. Consequentia patet, quia remissio accidentis non videtur aliud quam corruptio eiusdem. Et antecedens patet de se.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Nullum accidens adest et abest alicui subiecto, igitur nec accidens. Antecedens patet inductive, quia aliter sequeretur quod aliquod accidens competeret alicui subiecto solo, quod includit contra dictionem.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius.³

40^{ra} ⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio est ista quod ‘accidens’ accipitur dupliciter.

Uno modo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, hoc est, non per se primo modo vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Et sic accidens est quantum universale. Et isto modo iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen secunde intentionis.

Alio modo accipitur ‘accidens’ pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto cum quo non facit per se unum, sive talis res sit signum, sive non. Et sic iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen prime intentionis.

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est ista quod ‘adesse et abesse’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet, logicaliter et realiter. Logicaliter ali-

15 includit] concludit *E* 21 accidens] et *add. necnon del. E* 23 intentionis] Prima distinctio est ista, quod ‘accidens’ accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro aliquo qui accidentaliter predicatur, hoc est, non per se primo modo vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Tunc accidens est quantum universale, et isto modo iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur ‘accidens’ pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto, cum (quo non) facit per se unum, sive talis res sit signum sive non, et sic iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen prime intentionis, *add. E. Textus prime distinctionis iteratur cum differentiis paululis que inveniuntur initio f. 40^{ra}.*

3 *Isagoge*, v, 1 (12, 23–25): ‘Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem.’

quid dicitur 'adesse et abesse' per divisionem affirmativam vel negativam, realiter per realem inherentiam vel per realem separationem.

5 (DISTINCTIO TERTIA) Tertia distinctio est ista quod 'subiectum accidentis' accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro isto de quo accidens accidentaliter predicatur; alio modo pro isto cui accidens realiter inheret.

(CONCLUSIO PRIMA) Prima conclusio est ista quod nullum accidens adest et abest preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc qualitercumque accipitur 'accidens' sive 'adesse et abesse', quia ex hoc sequeretur quod aliquid competeret alicui et istud non competeret eidem, quod est manifesta
10 contradictio, sicut pretangebatur (in) argumento principali.

(CONCLUSIO SECUNDA) Secunda conclusio est ista quod hec propositio: 'accidens adest et abest etcetera' est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius 'accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem'.

15 (CONCLUSIO TERTIA) Tertia conclusio est ista quod omne accidens quod est universale, potest adesse et potest abesse preter subiecti corruptionem. Ista conclusio patet inductive, quia, si aliquod non posset, sit gratia exempli hoc accidens *nigrum*, quod non potest abesse Ethiopi vel corvo. Sed clarum est quod hoc potest adesse et potest abesse, quia,
20 quamvis non posset abesse Ethiopi vel corvo, potest tamen adesse et potest abesse alicui alteri subiecto.

Et si dicatur quod hoc accidens compositum *Ethiops niger* non potest adesse et abesse etcetera, *ad istud dicitur* negando assumptum, quia non sequitur naturam specificam, sed accidentalem complexionem individui,
25 que posset, quamvis de difficili, mutari. Et hoc est quod Porphyrius forte intendit per hoc quod dicit: 'Potest autem subintelligi corvus albus et Ethiops nitens candore'.⁴

(CONCLUSIO QUARTA) Quarta conclusio est ista quod omne accidens reale potest a subiecto separari preter corruptionem subiecti. Ista declaratur quia: si aliquod non posset, hoc maxime videtur verum de caliditate
30 ignis et de calore naturali animalis, sine quibus ista subiecta videntur non posse subsistere. Quia, si non, tunc sequeretur quod omne istud quod posset talem calorem remittere in aliquo, posset eius subiectum

8 adesse] sive *add. necnon del. E*

10 pretangebatur] pretangebatur *commixtur E*

12 intellectum] au *add. necnon del. E*

23 adesse] ve *add. necnon del. E*

4 *Isagoge*, v, 3 (13, 1-3): 'Potest autem subintelligi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem.'

40^{nb} corrumpere. Quod non apparet verum, quia sic sequeretur quod gutta
 aque posset corrumpere spheram ignis, | quod non videtur verisimile.
 Patet igitur quod sine omni caliditate potest ignis existere, et per conse-
 quens omnis caliditas est separabilis ab igne, et consimiliter sine omni
 calore naturali potest hoc animal existere, quia, si non: capiatur aliquis 5
 calor naturalis sine quo hoc animal non potest existere. Qui calor vocetur
A, et incipiat aliquod agens in hoc instanti remittere *A*; tunc sic *A* post
 instans non erit, quia immediate post hoc instans corrumpetur secun-
 dum aliquid sui. Et hoc animal non potest existere sine *A*; igitur hoc
 animal post hoc instans non erit, et per consequens, hoc est ultimum 10
 instans esse istius animalis. Quod est contra Aristotelem, sexto *Physico-*
rum,⁵ ubi vult quod non est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse;
 igitur sine *A* potest hoc animal esse. Et sic arguitur de quocumque alio
 calore naturali.

Et *si instetur* quod sic sequitur quod aliquod elementum posset exi- 15
 stere sine sua propria qualitate, et aliquod animal sine suo propria calore
 naturali, quorum primum est contra Aristotelem in *De proprietatibus*
*elementorum*⁶ et secundo *De generatione*,⁷ et contra Commentatorem,
 tertio *De anima*, capitulo de *tactu*,⁸ et secundum est contra Aristotelem,
 secundo *De anima*,⁹ ubi vult quod omnis operatio vite procedit ex calore 20
 naturali, vel mediante calore naturali, *ad istud breviter dicitur* negando
 istam consequentiam 'sine calore naturali potest hoc animal esse; igitur
 animal potest esse sine calore naturali,' quia antecedens (est) verum et
 consequens est impossibile, nam sua de inesse est impossibilis, ista, sci-
 licet, 'hoc animal est sine calore naturali.' 25

Et *si dicatur* quod consimiliter ista de inesse que correspondet huic:
 'sine calore naturali hoc animal potest esse' est impossibilis, ista scilicet

2 ignis] ignis *mg. E* 11 instans] stans *E* 11–12 Physicorum] uib *add. necnon del. E*
 12 instans] stans *E* 17 naturali] quod *add. necnon del. E*

5 Vel potius Aristoteles, *Physica* VIII, 8, 263b20–264a6?

6 Ps.-Aristoteles, *De proprietatibus elementorum*. Locus non inventus.

7 Aristoteles, *De generatione* II, 2, 329b22–24: 'Non enim in faciendo aliquid aliud
 neque in patiendo ab alio dicuntur, oportet autem activa ad invicem et passiva esse
 elementa: miscentur enim et transmutant in invicem' – tr. vetus. *Auctoritates* 169
 (24): 'Elementa activa et passiva sunt ad invicem cum subjecto.' (Aristoteles, *De*
generatione II, 2, 329b22–24).

8 Averroes, *In De anima* III, com. 4, p. 386, l. 85–86: 'forme enim materiales non
 sunt separabiles'. *Auctoritates* 192 (214): 'Formae naturales non sunt separabiles'
 (Averroes, *In De anima* III, com. 4, p. 386, l. 85–86).

9 Aristoteles, *De anima* II, 4, 416b28–30.

‘sine calore naturali hoc animal est’, *ad istud dicitur* quod ista non est sua de inesse, quia non oportet propositionem de impossibili poni in esse cum nota universalitatis a parte subiecti, sed sufficit ad veritatem talis de possibili, quod nulli eius singulari repugnat poni in esse, sicut manifeste
 5 patet de ista propositione de possibili ‘utrum⟨que⟩ istorum potest esse verum’ demonstratis duobus contradictoriis que non possunt sic poni in esse ⟨quod⟩ utrum⟨que⟩ istorum est verum, sed sufficit quod quilibet eius singularis poterit poni in esse. Sed quando in aliqua propositione de
 10 possibili signum universale ponitur a parte predicati, ad eius veritatem requiritur ipsam poni in esse cum eodem predicato, quia predicatum appellat suam propriam formam.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod aliquod accidens quod est universale, dicitur inseparabile respectu alicuius subiecti determinati et non absolute, sicut hoc accidens quod est *moveri*, non
 15 potest separari a primo mobili saltem naturaliter loquendo, quia physice loquendo hec est impossibilis ‘primum mobile non movetur’, quamvis forte secundum rei veritatem et precise secundum theologos est possibilis.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod hec est possibilis:
 20 | ‘accidens separatur a subiecto’, nam sequitur: ‘accidens quod nunc est in subiecto, immediate post hoc non erit in subiecto, igitur accidens separatur a subiecto’. Et antecedens est possibile, igitur et consequens. Et consequentia patet, quia consequens est expositio antecedentis. 40^{va}

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod ista est possibilis: ‘accidens est quod separatur a subiecto’. Et probatur sicut immediate precedens. Et *si dicitur* quod nihil inherens subiecto separatur a subiecto, *dicitur* negando istam, quia nihil aliud est *accidens separari a subiecto* quam *nunc esse in subiecto et immediate post hoc non esse in subiecto*.

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod hec est impossibilis: ‘accidens quod non est, separatur a subiecto’. Quia, si hec in aliquo sensu posset verificari, hoc esset in isto sensu: *aliquod accidens non est in subiecto quod immediate ante hoc fuit in subiecto*, et hoc est falsum, quia nullum accidens immediate ante hoc fuit in subiecto quod nunc non est
 30 in subiecto, et precipue nullum accidens quod successive acquirebatur
 35

1 est] est *E* 4 eius] singulis (?) *add. necnon del. E* 16 primum] primo *E*
 17 est] excipit *E* 23 consequens est expositio antecedentis] antecedens est expositio
 consequentis *E* 28 immediate] mediate *E* 33 quod] ex quam (?) *E*

vel deperdebatur, quia sic sequitur quod istud accidens non successive corrumpebatur.

⟨CONCLUSIO NONA⟩ Nona conclusio est ista quod hec est impossibilis: ‘aliquod accidens separatur totaliter a subiecto’, et hoc ad istum intellectum: *aliquod accidens nunc est in subiecto quod immediate post hoc* 5 *secundum nullam eius partem erit in subiecto*, quia sic esset dare ultimum instans rei permanentis in esse. Et consimiliter aliquod accidens corrumperetur subito et non successive, quod non videtur verum.

Et multa istorum dicta sunt gratia exercitii et probabiliter potius quam exercitive determinationis. 10

⟨AD 1⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur concedendo quod *sedere et stare et moveri* sunt huiusmodi accidentia que possunt adesse et possunt abesse preter subiecti corruptionem, et etiam preter debilitationem. Quia experimur aliquando subiectum per motum conformari et sanari, utpote quando per motum convenientis exercitii vel sudorum vel 15 *evacuationis vel alicuius consimilis, mala materia infirmitatis impediens operationem naturalem* removetur.

Et ulterius dicitur negando consequentiam: ‘si per tantum tempus aliquid potest stare preter sui debilitationem, igitur pari ratione adhuc per tantum tempus potest stare sine sui debilitatione’, et hoc, quia cetera non 20 sunt paria, quia possibile est quod prima statio induxit bonam complexionem, et secunda dissolvebat bonam complexionem ceteris existentibus paribus. Tunc est consequentia bona, et tunc negatur antecedens, scilicet quod aliquod fatigabile per stationem vel per motum per aliquod tempus in isto fatigetur. Et ulterius dicitur quod talis debilitatio vel fatiga- 25 ^{40^{vb}} tio | est corruptio virtutis. Et ulterius negatur quod talis virtus sit ipsa res virtuosa, hoc est: ipsum principale subiectum; sed aliqua re superaddita, utpote calor naturalis, vel bona complexio naturalis, vel spiritus vitalis, vel omnia ista que, vel quorum, aliquid dissolvitur vel remittitur sensibiler vel insensibiliter per talem stationem vel per talem motum. Et ista 30 patet, quia non omnis debilitatio alicuius subiecti est corruptio eiusdem subiecti.

⟨AD 2⟩ ⟨Ad⟩ secundum patet per predicta, quia conceditur quod accidens quod est, separatur a subiecto, et non accidens quod non est. Et ulterius dicitur quod potius *B* separatur a subiecto quam *A*, quia *B* nunc 35

7 instans] in *sup. lin. E^c* 17 removetur] removetur *E^c*; vacat *add. necnon del. E*
 22 complexionem] secundum *add. necnon del. E* 25 dicitur] concedendo *sup. lin. E^c*

est in subiecto et immediate post hoc non erit in subiecto, et hoc est: *separari a subiecto*. Sed sic non est de *A*, per casum, quia *A* est in subiecto et immediate post hoc erit in subiecto.

5 ⟨AD 3⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod calor potest separari ab igne, et qualitas naturalis suo proprio elemento, et calor naturalis ab animali. Et ulterius negatur ista consequentia, igitur ignis potest esse sine calore, et animal sine calore naturali, et patet totum per predicta.¹⁰

10 ⟨AD 4⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod nullum accidens adest et abest etcetera, sed qualiter hec debeat intelligi, sufficienter ⟨patet⟩ in precedentibus.

⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Et per hoc patet ad argumentum in oppositum quid sit dicendum.

3 immediate] mediate *E*

10 Videas supra, CONCL. 4.

⟨QUESTIO 43⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum ex subiecto et
accidente componatur aliquod per se unum.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic:

ex subiecto et forma substantiali componitur aliquod per se unum; et 5
omnis forma substantialis est accidens; igitur ex subiecto et accidente
componitur aliquod per se unum. Consequentia videtur evidens. Et
prima particula antecedentis patet; et secunda, videlicet quod omnis
forma substantialis sit accidens, declaratur, quia potest adesse et potest
abesse preter subiecti corruptionem, idest: preter materie corruptionem, 10
nam quedam materia est proprie subiectum forme substantialis, et istud
subiectum secundum Aristotelem, primo¹ et secundo² *Physicorum*, est
ingenerabile et incorruptibile.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Sicut forma substantialis extenditur intrinsece ipse mate-
rie, sic videlicet quod, ubicumque est aliqua pars materie, ibi est aliqua 15
pars forme, et e converso, ita quod materia et forma sunt precise in
eodem loco, nec per adventum forme augmentatur quantitas materie,
nec e converso; nec etiam quantitas alicuius tertii, sic, ut videtur, accidens
intrinsece extenditur suo subiecto secundum omnes conclusiones iam
dictas. Igitur, pari ratione qua ex materia et forma substantiali componi- 20
tur aliquod per se unum, consimili ratione ex accidente et suo subiecto
componitur aliquod per se unum.

41^{ra} ⟨3.⟩ Item. Sicut materia et forma sunt partes essentielles substantie
composite, ita subiectum | et accidens sunt partes essentielles aggregati
sive compositi ex substantia et accidente, igitur, ut videtur, sicut ex 25
materia et forma componitur per se unum, ita ex subiecto et accidente
componitur per se unum.

6 accidente] excidente E 11 quedam] est *add. necnon del. E* 16 precise] et *add.*
necnon del. E 17 augmentatur] acmentatur E 26 et] et *iter. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Physica* 1, 9, 192a27–29: ‘in quantum autem est secundum potentiam, non per se, sed incorruptibilem et ingenitum necesse est ipsum esse’ – tr. vetus. Cf. *Auctoritates* 141 (21): ‘Principia semper oportet manere.’ (Aristoteles *Physica*, A6, 189a19–20).

2 Cf. *Auctoritates* 145 (56): ‘Subiectum et ejus propria passio sunt ejusdem considerationis.’ (Cf. Aristoteles *Physica*, B2, 193b26–28).

⟨4.⟩ Item. Sicut forma substantialis non potest recedere sine corruptione compositi ex materia et tali forma, ita accidens non potest recedere sine corruptione compositi ex subiecto et isto accidente. Et sicut accidens potest recedere sine corruptione sui subiecti, ita forma substantialis
 5 potest recedere sine corruptione sui subiecti vel materie, igitur, sicut ex materia et forma substantiali componitur aliquod per se unum, ita ex subiecto et accidente componitur aliquod per se unum, quia ex utraque parte omnes proprietates sunt similes.

Et *si dicatur* quod differentia est, quia accidens facilius recedit a suo
 10 subiecto quam forma substantialis a materia, *hoc non videtur verum*, primo, quia in perfecte compositis corporibus sicut in hominibus, anima facillime recedit a materia, quia per agens valde debile et in brevi tempore, sicut per vermem, vel per araneam vel aliquid consimile quod est agens debile, quod tamen statim interficit hominem sicut experimur.
 15 Tunc sic: omne quod fit ab agente debili et in brevi tempore, istud faciliter fit, sed sepe numero forma substantialis a materia fit de brevi tempore, et ab agente debili; igitur faciliter fit.

⟨5.⟩ Item. Multa accidentia sunt de difficili mutabilia a subiecto, utpote omnis habitus, sicut patet per Aristotelem in *Predicamentis*, capitulo de
 20 *qualitate*.³

⟨6.⟩ Item. Alique forme substantiales consimiliter separantur et corumpuntur sicut earum accidentia, utpote forma substantialis ipsius ignis, que faciliter intenditur et remittitur, sicut caliditas ignis secundum quod vult Commentator, tertio *Celi* commento 87,⁴ et per consequens in
 25 igne non facilius separatur accidens a suo subiecto quam forma substantialis a materia.

⟨7.⟩ Item. Secundum Aristotelem⁵ et Commentatorem,⁶ tertio *Celi*, unumquodque tantum acquirit de loco quantum acquirit de forma, et pari ratione, quantum perdit de loco, tantum perdit de forma; igitur
 30 forma substantialis ita de facili separatur a materia, sicut accidens a subiecto.

2 potest] ne(?) add. necnon del. E 11 perfecte] perfectionis(?)E 12 facillime] facillima E 17 et] ag add. necnon del. E 29 forma] materia E

3 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 8, 8b27–28: ‘Et una quidem species qualitatis habitus affectioque dicantur. Differt autem habitus affectione quod permanentior et diuturnior est’ – tr. Boethii.

4 Averroes, *In De celo*. Locus non inventus.

5 Aristoteles, *De celo et mundo* III. Locus non inventus.

6 Averroes, *In De celo*. Locus non inventus.

Ex quibus omnibus, ut videtur, apparet, quod ex subiecto et accidente componatur aliquod per se unum.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM I⟩ Ad oppositum arguitur primo: si sic, sequeretur quod non maiori ratione dicitur forma accidentalis accidens vel accidens forma accidentalis quam substantialis, quia, sicut accidens potest adesse et potest abesse, ita forma substantialis. Igitur, si ex accidente et subiecto sicut ex caliditate et subiecto fieret per se unum, non esset aliqua ratio
41^{rb} quare caliditas non esset forma substantialis, | vel quare forma substantialis ignis non esset forma accidentalis.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM II⟩ Secundo sequeretur quod aggregatum esset per se in aliqua genere, quia omne per se unum est per se in aliquo predicamento, quia omne tale est individuum per se alicuius speciei, et per consequens aliquod aggregatum esset per se in predicamento substantie vel per se in predicamento accidentis. Quod videtur falsum, quia non maiori ratione in uno predicamento quam in alio, igitur, in omni vel in nullo, sed non in omni, quia secundum Simplicium⁷ predicamenta sunt impermixta; igitur in nullo.

⟨AD OPPOSITUM III⟩ Tertio sequeretur quod nihil esset unum per accidens, quod est contra Aristotelem, quinto *Metaphysice*.⁸

⟨DISTINCTIO PRIMA⟩ Prima distinctio est ista que ad presens presupponitur de accidente, quia in precedenti questione pona⟨ba⟩tur.

⟨DISTINCTIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda distinctio est de uno, nam ‘unum’ accipitur multipliciter:

⟨I: UNUM ESSENTIALITER⟩ scilicet pro ‘uno essentialiter’; quod quidem unum componitur ex partibus diversarum rationum, quarum una est potentia respectu alterius, et ⟨que⟩ sunt precise in eodem situ, sicut materia et forma.

⟨II: UNUM SECUNDUM GRADUS ACCIDENTALES⟩ Alio modo dicitur ‘unum’ secundum gradus accidentales; quod quidem unum componitur

10 esset] pers *add. necnon del. E* 14 predicamento] predicatis *add. necnon del. E*
16 sed] in *add. E*

7 Simplicius, *In Predicamenta* (?) vel *In De celo* (?). Locus non inventus.

8 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, v, 7, 1017a7–10: ‘Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundum accidens illud vero secundum se. Secundum accidens quidem, ut iustum musicum esse dicimus et hominem musicum et musicum hominem’ – rec. Guillelmi. *Auctoritates* 125 (132): ‘Ens per accidens est quando unum accidens dicitur de alio, ut album est musicum, vel accidens de subiecto, ut homo est albus, vel subiectum de accidente, ut album est homo, vel musicum est homo.’ (Aristoteles, *Metaphys.*, Δ7, 1017a7–10).

ex partibus eiusdem rationis, que quidem partes sunt precise simul, sive sibi invicem inexistentes, et hoc sive tale unum sit extensum sive non.

Exemplum primi sicut albedo, que componitur ex partibus gradualibus eiusdem rationis. Que quidem partes graduales secundum intensio-
nem et secundum extensionem sunt sibi invicem inexistentes et precise
5 in eodem situ subiective.

Exemplum secundi ut aliquod accidens mentale, sicut gaudium vel dilectio, quia talia accidentia mentalia intensionalia et remissibilia componuntur ex partibus gradialibus eiusdem rationis. Que quidem partes,
10 quamvis proprie loquendo non sunt in eodem situ, tamen sunt sibi invicem *(in)*existentes, quia sunt in subiecto individuali utpote in anima intellectiva.

Et isti duo modi unitatis propriissime dicuntur unitates per se, quia sunt maxime unitates que fiunt ex distinctis rebus excepta sola unitate
15 filii Dei et nature assumpte, de qua nihil ad presens quia alterius existit speculationis.

⟨III: UNUM INDIVISIBILITATE⟩ Tertio modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum indivisibilitate’, sicut Deus est unus, et angelus, et anima intellectiva. Et hoc est similiter maxime unum.

20 ⟨IV: UNUM CONTINUATIONE⟩ Quarto modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum continuatione’, sive corporali sive incorporali. Corporale sicut unum lignum continuum, cuius partes secundum extensionem continuantur sibi invicem; incorporale sicut partes solis integrales sibi invicem continuantur. Et isto modo aliquod dicitur unum per se.

25 ⟨V: UNUM SITU VEL SUBIECTO⟩ Quinto modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum situ vel subiecto’, ista, scilicet, que precise sunt in eodem situ sive in eodem subiecto, sicut albedo et dulcedo sunt precise in eodem situ et in eodem subiecto sicut in lacte, et sicut grammatica et musica sunt precise in eodem subiecto, scilicet in anima.

30 ⟨VI: UNUM PER ACCIDENS PROPRIE LOQUENDO⟩ Sexto modo dicitur aliquod ‘unum per accidens’ proprie loquendo, sicut aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente, quamvis etiam quintus modus sit unitas accidentalis.

35 ⟨ALII MODI UNITATIS⟩ Alii vero sunt modi | unitatis, utpote unum 41^{va}
numero, unum specie, unum genere, unum diffinitione etcetera, de quibus non oportet ad presens tractare, sed alibi erit locus eorum.⁹

7 gaudium] nec(?) add. necnon del. E 15 quia] quod E | existit] existat E 23 incorporeale] incorporalem E 32 unitas] unita E

9 Locum invenire non potui.

⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima igitur conclusio est ista quod ex subiecto et accidente illius subiecti accipiendo ‘accidens’ secundum quod est nomen secunde intentionis, non componitur unum per se, quia sunt diverse res quarum una est subiectum propositionis, et reliqua predicatum, et quarum una non est materia sive potentia respectu alterius, quamvis subiectum se habeat ad modum materie et predicatum ad modum forme. Nec etiam sunt diversi gradus eiusdem rationis existentes precise in eodem situ, vel sibi invicem inexistentes, nec etiam sunt unum indivisibilitate, vel continuatione. Et patet totum de se.

⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista quod isto modo accipiendo ‘subiectum’ et ‘accidens’ ex subiecto (et) accidente componitur unum unitate subiecti, quia tam subiectum quam accidens possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sicut patet de ista propositione mentali ‘homo est albus’.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod accidente isto modo accepto, scilicet, pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens, quia: capiatur ista propositio ‘Sortes sedet’, que tantum sit vera per unam horam, et vocetur *A*, tunc hoc accidens *sciens A* competit Deo, quia hec est vera: ‘Deus est sciens *A*’, et hoc accidens potest adesse Deo et potest abesse, sicut de se notum est.

⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod ex subiecto et accidente secundo modo accipiendo ‘accidens’, videlicet ut accidens est nomen prime intentionis, non fit unum per se, quia non essentialiter, vel gradualiter, nec indivisibilitate, nec continuatione. Et patet totum per predicta.¹⁰

⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primum igitur principale dicitur negando istam ‘omnis forma substantialis est accidens’. Et ad probationem dicitur quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit accidens, non sufficit quod poterit adesse vel quod poterit abesse preter subiecti corruptionem, sed requiritur quod ipsum vel aliquid eiusdem speciei specialissime poterit adesse alicui subiecto substantiali post eius esse substantiale perfectum. Et hoc est precisa causa quare aliquid dicitur accidens, scilicet quia accidit rei et advenit post ultimum esse talis rei, vel saltem quia aliquid eiusdem speciei potest alicui tali advenire. Et sic intelligenda est predicta diffinitio accidentis. Sed hoc

15 accidente] accidens *E* 16 accepto] acceptum *E* 23 prime] secunde *E*
 27 quod] quod *sup. lin. E^c* 30–31 substantiali] quod *add. necnon del. E*

10 Videas supra, DIST. 2, Q. 42 DIST. 1.

non competit forme substantiali, quia nulla forma substantialis potest advenire alicui subiecto substantiali post eius ultimatam perfectionem, saltem secundum quamlibet eius partem integram. Quod dico propter formam generatam in nutritione, de qua alias plus patebit.

5 <AD 2.> Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam quia iste conclusiones non sunt cause quare ex materia et forma substantiali componitur per se unum, sed quia materia est potentia, et forma actus, sicut elicitur ab Aristotele, secundo *De anima*.¹¹ Unde breviter: materia et forma sunt talis nature quod ex eis constituitur per se unum, et subiectum et
10 accidens non sunt talis nature.

 <AD 3.> Ad tertium dicitur consimiliter negando consequentiam. Et causa iam dicta est.¹²

 <AD 4.> Ad quartum consimiliter etiam dicitur negando consequentiam, | quia iste similitudines non sunt sufficientes ad hoc quod ex
15 subiecto et accidente fiat per se unum, et hoc quia accidens potest advenire rei post eius esse completum. 41^{vb}

 <AD 5.> Ad quintum dicitur quod, quamvis multa accidentia sint de difficili mobilia, propter hoc tamen non sequitur quod ex eis et eorum subiectis fiat per se unum.

20 <AD 6.> Ad sextum dicitur quod Commentator ibidem communiter non tenetur.

 <AD 7.> Ad septimum dicitur quod Aristoteles intelligit quod unumquodque, quantum acquirit de loco naturaliter et per principium intrinsecum, tantum habet de forma inclinante ad talem locum. Et ulterius
25 dicitur concedendo quod in multis casibus ita faciliter separetur forma substantialis a materia sicut accidens (a subiecto). Nec ista est causa quare ex subiecto et accidente deberet fieri per se unum, sed causa est, sicut superius dictum est, quia accidens potest advenire rei post eius esse completum. Et per consequens accidens in natura sua habet tantam
30 extraneitatem cum suo subiecto, et tantam disimilitudinem, quod ex ipso et suo subiecto non potest fieri per se unum.

Et ista sunt dicta secundum communem locutionem †pl-m† verumtamen sicut placeat. Non mihi apparet ratio cogens quin poterit probabiliter teneri quod ex accidente et subiecto fiat ita bene per se unum sicut

14 ex] materia *add. necnon del. E*

11 Aristoteles, *De anima*, II, 1, 412a9–10. *Auctoritates* 177 (38): ‘Materia est potentia, forma vero actus.’ (Aristoteles, *De anima*, B1, 412a9–10).

12 Videas supra, CONCL. 4.

ex materia et forma substantiali. Et hoc diffusius pertractabitur *Supra Praedicamenta*.¹³

⟨AD PRIMUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad primum in oppositum dicitur quod, quamvis ex subiecto et accidente fieret per se unum, tamen quia adhuc forma accidentalis advenit rei post eius esse completum, ideo potius
5 poterit dici accidens quam forma substantialis.

⟨AD SECUNDUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Qualiter vero compositum ex subiecto et accidente fit in predicamento, et qualiter non, patebit *Super Praedicamenta*,¹⁴ quia ibi potius habet locum.

⟨AD TERTIUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad ultimum potest dici quod non oportet istam consequentiam valere, quia, quamvis ex subiecto et accidente
10 fieret per se unum, tamen ex accidentibus existentibus in eodem subiecto fieret unum per accidens, sicut ex grammatica et musica in anima, et albedine et dulcedine in lacte.

8 et] ex E 11 et] et sup. lin. E^c; ex add. necnon del. E

13 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, QQ. 9-13?

14 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones super Praedicamenta*, Erfurt SB Ampl. Q 288 (XIV) ff.43^{rb}-145^{vb}, QQ. 9-13?

⟨QUESTIO 44⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum corvus possit subintelligi albus.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod non:

quia si sic: ponatur etiam in esse, scilicet quod corvus subintelligitur
5 albus, igitur corvus albus intelligitur, igitur corvus albus est. Sed conse-
quens est impossibile, ut suppono ad presens, igitur istud ex quo sequitur.
Et quod ista consequentia ‘corvus albus intelligitur; igitur corvus albus
est’ sit vera, patet per Aristotelem, capitulo de *relatione*,¹ ubi vult quod
ista consequentia sit vera: ‘scientia est, igitur scitum est, et igitur scibile
10 est’, et pari ratione sequitur ‘intellectio est, igitur intellectum est | et intel- 42^{ra}
ligibile est’, et similiter quod ista consequentia sit vera: ‘corvus intelligitur
albus, igitur corvus albus intelligitur’. Patet quia sequitur ‘corvus intelli-
gitur albus, igitur corvus est intellectus albus, igitur quoddam intellectum
album est corvus, et nullum aliud intellectum album a corvo est corvus,
15 igitur aliquid intellectum album quod est corvus est corvus, igitur cor-
vus qui est quoddam intellectum album, intelligitur, igitur corvus albus
intelligitur’.

⟨2.⟩ Item. Si corvus potest subintelligi albus, vel igitur vere vel false.
Non vere, quia sic intelligendo non esset accidens inseparabile corvo,
20 quod est contra textum. Et si false, consimiliter quodcumque predica-
tum potest subintelligi inesse corvo, quia false corvus potest subintelligi
asinus, vel Deus, vel quidquid aliud quod est in rerum natura. Et sic
sequitur quod ista propositio ponetur preter propositum et sine causa,
scilicet quod corvus potest subintelligi albus.

25 ⟨3.⟩ Item. Si corvus posset subintelligi albus, igitur talis intellectio
posset ab aliquo obiecto causari. Consequentia est de se nota, quia omne
quod potest esse et non est, potest ab aliquo causari. Falsitas consequentis
declaratur, quia talis intellectio, si poterit causari ab aliquo obiecto, hoc
esset a corvo vel albedine; sed non a corvo, quia corvus non naturaliter

7 corvus] est *add. necnon del. E* 26 aliquo] subiecto causari *add. necnon del. E*
28 quia] 3 *litt. (?) add. necnon del. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 7b23–27: ‘scibile enim scientia prius esse videbitur; namque in pluribus subsistentibus iam rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim vel in nullis hoc quisque perspiciet, simul cum scibili scientiam factam.’ – tr. Boethii.

causat (conceptum albedinis), sicut de se patet; nec etiam ab albedine, quia albedo non naturaliter causat conceptum corvi, igitur a nullo potest talis intellectus sive conceptus causari.

⟨4.⟩ Item. Si corvus potest subintelligi albus, igitur corvus potest subintelligi esse quoddam album, igitur potest subintelligi esse hoc album vel hoc album et sic de singulis; sed quocumque albo demonstrato erit talis propositio impossibilis; igitur corvus non potest fieri albus. Ista ultima consequentia patet ex hoc quia intellectus non potest assentire alicui propositioni quam scit esse impossibilem, quia omnis impossibilitas est ratione alicuius contradictionis; et nulli contradictioni potest intellectus assentire quam scit esse contradictionem, sicut patet (per) Aristotelem, quarto *Metaphysice*.²

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphyrius,³ qui dicit expresse in textu: ‘potest autem subintelligi corvus albus et Ethiops nitens candore’.

⟨SOLUTIO QUESTIONIS⟩ In ista questione premitte sunt quedam suppositiones; secundo subiungende sunt quedam conclusiones; et tertio solvende sunt principales rationes.

⟨SUPPOSITIO PRIMA⟩ Prima igitur suppositio est ista quod omnes tales dictiones ‘intellectio’, ‘desideratio’, ‘credulitas’ sive ‘credito’, ‘conceptus’ sive ‘conceptio’, ‘voluntas’ sive ‘volitio’ sint relativa. Et capit ista suppositio evidentiam ab Aristotele, capitulo de *relatione*,⁴ ubi vult quod scientia et sensatio sunt relativa, quia pari ratione qua scientia est alicuius scibilis, et alicuius sciti, et sensatio alicuius sensibilis et sensati. Intellectio est alicuius | intelligibilis et intellecti, et desideratio alicuius desiderabilis et desiderati, et credito alicuius credibilis et crediti, et volitio alicuius volibilis et voliti, et sic de consimilibus.

1 causat] *seq. lac. 9 litt. E* 18 tales] *sup add. necnon del. E* 20 conceptio] *volup add. necnon del. E* 22 quia] *quia corr. ex quam E* | *ratione] p add. E*

2 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* IV, 7, 1011b23–24: ‘At vero nec medium contradictionis nichil esse contingit, sed necessarium aut dicere aut negare unum de uno quodcumque’ – rec. Guillelmi.

3 *Isagoge*, v, 3 (13, 1–3): ‘Potest autem subintelligi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem.’

4 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 6b34–37, tr. Boethii: ‘scientia alicuius scientia; ut scientia scibilis rei dicitur scientia et scibile scientia scibile, (et sensus sensibilis sensus et sensibile sensu sensibile).’

5 ⟨SUPPOSITIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda suppositio est ista que similiter ibidem⁵ ab Aristotele elici potest, quod relativa sibi invicem non includentia ampliationem – utpote aliquod verbum possibilitatis vel de preterito vel de futuro – sint simul natura, ita quod consequentia existendi ab uno ad
 10 reliquum et e converso, utrisque acceptis personaliter, est bona, sicut ista consequentia est bona: ‘scientia, igitur scitum est, et e converso’, ‘sensatio est, ergo sensatum est, et e converso’, et simili ratione sequitur ‘intellectio est, ergo intellectum est, et e converso’, ‘creditio est, ergo creditum est, et e converso’, ‘volitio est, ergo volutum est, et e converso’. Videtur satis
 15 evidens quod ista fuerat intentio Aristotelis, sicut legenti capitulum de *relatione* satis patet.

15 ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima conclusio est ista quod istud quod non potest esse, non potest intelligi. Que statim patet ex iam dictis, quia, si aliquid posset intelligi quod non posset esse: ponatur in esse, scilicet quod intellectio sit non existentis, tunc sic intellectio non existentis est, igitur non
 20 existens est intellectum, et ultra, igitur tale intellectum est. Ista consequentia patet per secundam suppositionem. Et quod omnis intellectio sit alicuius intellecti, patet per primam suppositionem. Sed hoc consequens ‘non-existent est intellectum’ terminis sumptis non materialiter ut
 25 suppono ad presens, est impossibile, igitur istud ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod intellectio possit esse non existentis.

 ⟨CONCLUSIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda conclusio est ista que satis evidenter sequitur ex conclusione iam posita, scilicet: quod non est, non intelligitur. Et ista sine ulteriori declaratione patet ex iam dicta.

25 ⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista quod hominem esse est homo. Que probatur sic: hominem esse est aliquid et non aliud ab homine, igitur est homo. Consequentia plana. Et secunda particula antecedentis patet. Et prima declaratur, scilicet quod hominem esse sit aliquid, quia hominem esse est scitum et volutum et desideratum;
 30 igitur, hominem esse est aliquid. Et potest totum probari per predictas suppositiones.

 ⟨CONCLUSIO QUARTA⟩ Quarta conclusio est ista quod hominem esse animal est aliquid, quia hominem esse animal est homo et animal, et

9 converso] 3 litt. (?) sup. lin. add. necnon del. E 15 non] entis add. necnon del. E
 | existentis] etiam add. necnon del. E

5 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 7b15, 19–20: ‘Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura’ – tr. Boethii. *Auctoritates* 303 (27): ‘Relativa sic se habent quod posita se ponunt et perempta se perimunt.’ (Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 7b15, 19–20).

identitas hominis et animalis, et totum est homo. Et probatur sicut predicta conclusio immediate, et confirmatur per Commentatorem, quarto *Metaphysice*,⁶ ubi vult quod ens homo et unus homo non est aliud quam homo.

42^{va} ⟨CONCLUSIO QUINTA⟩ Quinta conclusio est ista quod hominem esse 5
asinum non est aliquid vel aliqua quia: quod non sit aliquid, videtur
evidens, et quod non sit aliqua, declaratur, quia si | esset aliqua, tunc
oportet quod esset homo et asinus et identitas hominis et asini, quod
patet esse falsum, quia identitas hominis et asini non est. Et loquor de
identitate numerali ratione cuius vere dicitur quod hoc est hoc. 10

⟨CONCLUSIO SEXTA⟩ Sexta conclusio est ista quod Platonem esse non
potest intelligi, posito quod Plato non sit nec poterit esse. Et sequitur ex
prima conclusione.

⟨CONCLUSIO SEPTIMA⟩ Septima conclusio est ista quod Platonem esse
non potest credi, posito quod Plato non sit, nec poterit esse. Et patet sicut 15
predicta precedens.

⟨CONCLUSIO OCTAVA⟩ Octava conclusio est ista quod posito quod Plato
non sit, et quod Sortes habeat actum complexum in mente sua, vel
saltem aliquem actum quo crederet Platonem esse, si Plato esset, et lateat
Sortem Platonem non esse, tunc Sortes non crederet Platonem esse. Ista 20
statim patet, quia Platonem esse nihil est; igitur non est creditum; igitur
Sortes hoc non credit, et hoc supposito quod nulli termini supponant
materialiter vel simpliciter.

⟨CONCLUSIO NONA⟩ Nona conclusio est ista quod tento eodem casu
Sortes non credit se credere Platonem esse, quia Sortem credere Platonem 25
esse nihil est, igitur non est creditum. Consequentia patet per
secundam suppositionem. Et antecedens declaratur, quia, si Sortem cre-
dere Platonem esse esset aliquid, hoc esset Sortes et credens Platonem
esse et identitas Sortis et credentis Platonem esse, sicut patet ex prece-
denti conclusione. Igitur Sortem esse credentem Platonem esse nihil est, 30
igitur non est creditum, igitur Sortes non credit se credere Platonem esse.

Et *si instetur* sic: Sortes decipitur, et omnis deceptio est respectu
actus credulitatis, igitur Sortes habet actum credulitatis et non alium,
ut suppono, nisi istum quo credit Platonem esse, igitur Sortes credit
Platonem esse, vel Sortes credit Sortem credere Platonem esse, *ad istud* 35

2 immediate] immediata E 8 identitas] idemptitas E 19 quod] quod E 34 istum]
quo add. necnon del. E

6 Averroes, *In Metaphys.* Locus non inventus.

breviter dicitur concedendo quod Sortes decipitur tali casu posito. Et ulterius negatur quod omnis deceptio est ratione alicuius credulitatis, quia deceptio potest esse ratione actus qui esset credulitas si habet subiectum. Et sic est in proposito. Unde quia Sortes habet unum actum
 5 in mente quo crederet Platonem esse, si Plato esset, et Plato ⟨non⟩ est, igitur Sortes decipitur, et consimiliter potest dici quod Sortes decipitur, quia credit istam propositionem ‘Plato est’. Sed tunc non omnes termini sic se habent quod non supponunt materialiter vel simpliciter, sicut presupponitur.

10 ⟨CONCLUSIO DECIMA⟩ Decima conclusio est ista quod supposito quod corvus albus non sit, tunc corvus albus non subintelligitur. Et si non poterit esse, non potest subintelligi. Et patet totum per primam et secundam conclusionem. Et ad Porphyrium dicitur in solvendo rationes principales.

15 ⟨AD 1.⟩ Ad primam rationem dicitur concedendo quod, si corvus albus intelligitur, corvus albus est, et si impossibile sit quod corvus sit albus, impossibile est corvum album intelligi, sicut sufficienter patet per predicta.

Et ulterius dicitur quod istud quod supponitur non est verum, scilicet | quod hec sit impossibilis: ‘corvus est albus, vel corvus albus est’, quia, 42^{vb}
 20 quamvis forte per communem cursum nature corvus non potest esse albus, potest tamen per potentiam prime cause, quia albedo non repugnat principiis essentialibus corvi, sed forte repugnat alicui complexionem accidentali. Et ideo intellectis significatis terminorum potest intellectus assentire huic propositioni ‘corvus est albus’, quia nullam contradictionem includit.
 25

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur quod corvus non potest subintelligi albus vere nec false, nisi corvus albus posset esse. Et hoc dico tentis significatis vocabulorum.

Et ulterius dicitur negando quod corvus potest subintelligi esse asinus, 30 quia corvum esse asinum nihil est. Et hoc dico nullo termino accepto materialiter vel simpliciter.

Et ulterius dicitur, quando queritur quare Porphyrius dicit hoc, hoc infra patebit.⁷

3 qui] quid *E* 4 in] de *add. necnon del. E*; in *sup. lin. E^c* 11 subintelligitur] supintelligitur *E* 22 essentialibus] essentialis *E* 29 potest] potestus (*sic*) *E*

7 Videas infra, AD OPP.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur quod talis conceptus potest causari a corvo et ab albedine et ab inherentia albedinis in corvo, si talis inherentia potest esse, et si non potest esse, non potest ab ea causari.

Et ulterius dicitur quod corvus causat conceptum simplicem corvi, et album causat conceptum simplicem albi, vel saltem *albedo existens* 5 *in albo*. Et tunc habitis istis duobus conceptibus simplicibus intellectus de se est potens tales conceptus componere vel dividere, secundum affirmationem vel negationem mediante conceptu substantivo verbali.

Et si dicatur quod tunc sequeretur quod intellectus esset potentia 10 activa et non tantum passiva, *ad hoc dicitur* concedendo quod intellectus est ipsa anima intellectiva, et omnis anima intellectiva, dummodo est in corpore, est actus corporis, et est formale principium agendi multas operationes corporales. Sed quod Aristoteles⁸ et Commentator,⁹ tertio *De anima*, dicunt intellectum esse potentiam passivam, intelligunt respectu 15 primorum actuum, vel specierum rerum intelligibilium respectu quarum intellectus se habet pure passive, quia intellectus non causat aliquam speciem alicuius rei intelligibilis que non est ipse intellectus, sed res ipsa causat in intellectum suam speciem, saltem vel mediate, vel immediate. Et hoc vult Aristoteles intelligere quando dicit quod intelligere est 20 quoddam pati. Cum hoc tamen stat quod habitis talibus speciebus sive conceptibus simplicibus potest intellectus virtute sua propria se habere active respectu compositionis affirmative vel divisionis negative talium conceptuum.

Et ulterius dicitur quod tunc talis compositio vel talis propositio 25 non habet aliquod obiectum totale sibi correspondens, et ideo non est intellectio simplex vel composita, quamvis poterit concedi quod habeat 43^{ra} obiectum sive obiecta partialia, scilicet albedinem | et corvum, quia corvus est obiectum subiecti, et albedo vel album est obiectum predicati. Et consimiliter dicitur de ista propositione mentali ‘homo est asinus,’ quia 30 ex parte rei nihil correspondet sibi obiective adequate.

8 Aristoteles, *De anima*, *Γ4*, 429a10–11, 13–14. *Auctoritates* 185 (136): ‘Intellectus est pars animae. Intelligere est pati.’ (Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, *Γ4*, 429a10–11, 13–14.); *Auctoritates* 187 (155): ‘Intellectus noster est ens in potentia.’ (Cf. S. Thomas, *In De anima*, III, lect. 11, n. 759; Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, *Γ6*, 430b23–24).

9 Averroes, *In De anima*, III, com. 12, p. 427, l. 22–23: ‘(...) intelligere est passio, non actio.’ *Auctoritates* 194 (244): ‘Intelligere est passio et non actio.’ (Averroes, *In De anima*, III, com. 12, p. 427, l. 22–23).

5 ⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo quod, si corvus albus non potest esse, corvus albus non potest subintelligi, sicut predictum est. Et ulterius conceditur quod intellectus non potest assentire alicui propositioni quam scit impossibilem, saltem respectu illius sensus ratione cuius est impossibilis. Et ulterius quod ista non est impossibilis: ‘corvus est albus’, sicut predictum est.

10 ⟨AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad argumentum vero in oppositum dicitur quod Porphyrius volens ostendere qualiter intellexit nigredinem esse inseparabilem a corvo et ab Ethiope, videlicet non sic sicut proprie proprium est inseparabile ab eo cuius est proprium, dicit quod potest subintelligi corvus albus, hoc est, intellectus potest assentire huic propositioni ‘corvus est albus’ et huic ‘Ethiops est albus’, et hoc intellectis significatis vocabulorum, quia corvus et nigredo sunt res totaliter distincte, et nigredo non sequitur corvum nec Ethiopem ratione suorum
15 principiorum essentialium, sed ratione alicuius complexionis accidentalis. Que quidem complexio posset artificialiter vel per potentiam prime cause taliter mutari quod in corvo resultaret albedo, quamvis hoc non posset fieri secundum communem cursum nature. Non igitur includit contradictionem quod corvus sit et non sit niger, sed albus, et ideo poterit intellectus assentire huic propositioni ‘corvus est albus’. Vult igitur Porphyrius dicere quod nigredo est accidens inseparabile corvo, non sic quod nullo modo posset separari, sed sic quod secundum cursum nature non potest separari. Sed sic non est de proprio, quia intellectis significatis terminorum intellectus non potest assentire huic propositioni ‘homo est, et non est risibilis’, quia secundum Lincolniensem, primo *Posteriorum* capitulo de *per se*,¹⁰ homo est risibilis ratione suorum principiorum essentialium, ita quod talibus principiis simul unitis sic videlicet quod homo existat, Deus non posset facere quin homo esset risibilis. Et ideo proprium per nullam potentiam est separabile ab eo cuius est proprium,
20 hoc est, tentis significatis vocabulorum. Proprium significative sumptum nullo modo potest vere negari ab eo cuius est proprium significative sumpto, idest personaliter sumpto. Ad ostendendum igitur differentiam inter ⟨in⟩separabilitatem proprii a suo subiecto et inseparabilitatem
30

18 communem] nature *add. necnon del. E* 21 dicere] dicere *corr. ex dicitur E* | non] non *sup. lin. E^c*

10 Robert Lincolniensis (= Grosseteste), *In Posteriorum analyticorum*. Ed. P. Rossi, *In A.Po.* 1, 4, p. 111, l. 51–p. 112, l. 78

accidentis inseparabilis a suo subiecto, dicit Porphirius:¹¹ ‘potest autem
43^{rb} subintelligi corvus albus | et Ethiops nitens candore.’

Et sic patet istius questionis intellectus.

11 *Isagoge*, v, 3 (13, 1–3): ‘Potest autem subintelligi et corvus albus et Aethiops amittens colorem praeter subiecti corruptionem.’

(QUESTIO 45)

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquod
accidens sit genus substantiale.

(1.) Et arguitur primo quod sic:

5 iste terminus vocalis 'animal' est genus substantiale; iste terminus
vocalis 'animal' est accidens; igitur, accidens est genus substantiale. Maior
patet de se, et minor similiter.

(2.) Item. Omne istud quod facit aliquam propositionem esse per acci-
dens est accidens; aliquod genus substantiale facit propositionem esse
10 per accidens; igitur, aliquod genus substantiale est accidens. Maior videretur
evidens per istam regulam Aristotelis, primo *Posteriorum*,¹ 'propter
quod unumquodque tale et istud magis'. Si igitur aliqua propositio dica-
tur per accidens ratione alicuius termini, iste terminus erit accidens.
Et minor declaratur, quia hec est per accidens: 'dominus est homo', vel
15 'dominus est animal', et hoc ratione istius termini 'animal', quia ista est per
se: 'dominus est dominus'. Igitur, si isto predicato remoto et alio appposito
resultet propositio per accidens, hoc erit ratione illius predicati apppositi,
igitur ista propositio 'dominus est animal' est per accidens ratione istius
predicati apppositi *animal*; igitur hoc predicatum *animal* est accidens.

20 (3.) Item. Omne istud quod est alicui accidens, est accidens; sed ali-
quod genus substantiale est alicui accidens; igitur aliquod genus substan-
tiale est accidens, et ultra: igitur accidens est genus substantiale. Maior
est evidens. Et minor patet per Aristotelem, capitulo de *relatione*,² qui
dicit sic: 'si servus ad dominum dicatur circumscriptis omnibus que sunt

7 minor] declaratur *add. necnon exp. E* 21 est] alica(?) *add. necnon del. E*

1 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, A2, 72a27–32: 'semper enim propter quod est unumquodque, illud magis est' – tr. Iacobi. *Auctoritates* 313 (29): 'Non solum necesse est praecognoscere prima principia, aut omnia, aut quaedam, aut conclusionem, sed et magis; propter unumquodque tale et ipsum magis, ut propter quod amamus rem, illud est magis amatum et omnia posteriora scimus et credimus. Per primo ergo, illa magis scimus.' (Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, A2, 72a27–32).

2 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta*, 7, 7a35–39: 'ut si servus ad dominum dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel scientiae susceptibilem vel hominem, relicto vero solo domino esse, semper servus ad illud dicitur; servus enim domini servus dicitur' – tr. Boethii.

accidentia domino, ut esse bipedem vel esse scientie susceptibilem vel hominem, ex isto textu manifeste apparet quod ista predicata *(esse) bipes, esse scientie susceptibile et homo* sunt accidentia domino. Et pari ratione iste terminus ‘animal’. Igitur aliquod genus substantiale est accidens domino, et per consequens alicui est accidens.

5

⟨AD OPPOSITUM⟩ Ad oppositum est Porphirius,³ qui dicit quod accidens est quod contingit eidem inesse et non inesse, vel quod neque est genus, neque species, neque differentia, neque proprium etcetera. Ex quo patet quod secundum ipsum nullum accidens est genus substantiale, quia de tali genere, ut videtur ibidem, loquitur in ista conclusione presuppositis diffinitionibus de accidente suprapositis.

10

⟨DISTINCTIO⟩ Addo istam distinctionem quod aliquid dicitur ‘accidens’ tripliciter.

⟨I⟩ Uno modo quia de aliquo per accidens verificatur, sicut iste terminus ‘homo’ verificatur per accidens de ‘domino’.

15

⟨II⟩ Alio modo quia potest alicui adesse et eidem abesse preter subiecti corruptionem – idest preter hoc quod ‘esse’ vere negatur a tali subiecto significative sumpto – sicut iste terminus ‘sedens’ est accidens ‘homini’.

⟨III⟩ Tertio modo quia connotat aliquod extrinsecum quod est accidens realiter inherens subiecto, sicut iste terminus ‘nigrum’ vel ‘niger’ connotat aliquod extrinsecum corvo quod est realiter in corvo sicut accidens in subiecto.

20

43^{va} ⟨CONCLUSIO PRIMA⟩ Prima igitur conclusio est ista | quod omnis terminus, sive substantialis, sive accidentalis primo modo, est accidens, quia omnis terminus competit alicui per accidens, igitur omnis terminus est accidens. Consequentia patet per primum membrum distinctionis. Et antecedens satis manifeste elicitur ab Aristotele in textu allegato, in capitulo de *relatione*, nam, sicut ‘homo’ est accidens domino, ita ‘Deus’ est accidens scienti A propositionem, et sic de quibuscumque aliis terminis, communibus (vel) substantialibus vel accidentalibus.

30

2 predicata] scilicet(?) *add. necnon del. E*

3 *Isagoge*, v, 4 (13, 3–5): ‘Definitur autem sic quoque: accidens est quod contingit eidem esse et non esse, vel quod neque genus, neque species, neque differentia, neque proprium (...)’

Ex quo sequitur correlarie quod omne genus substantiale est accidens, et omnis species substantialis, et omnis differentia, et omne proprium, quia quodlibet istorum est terminus, et ultra: igitur aliquod accidens est genus substantiale, et aliquod accidens est species, etcetera.

5 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio est ista quod nullum accidens secundo modo acceptum secundum quod potest adesse vere per predicationem affirmativam alicui subiecto et potest abesse vere per predicationem negativam ab eodem subiecto sine corruptione subiecti, est
10 genus substantiale. Ista statim patet, quia de quocumque verificatur iste terminus ‘animal’, ab eodem non potest vere negari ipso existente in
 rerum natura, et pari ratione nec aliquod aliud genus substantiale, igitur nullum genus substantiale est tale accidens. Et per consequens nullum tale accidens est genus substantiale.

<AD 1.> Ad primum principale dicitur concedendo conclusionem quantum
15 (est) de virtute conclusionis, quia suppono ad presens quod omnis terminus mentalis sit accidens realiter alicui inherens, et similiter omnis terminus vocalis. Non est tamen accidens secundo modo acceptum, quomodo accipit Porphyrius accidens.

<AD 2.> Ad secundum dicitur concedendo conclusionem in sensu quo
20 ponitur prima conclusio. Nec plus probat argumentum.

<AD 3.> Ad tertium patet per idem, quia non aliud concludit nisi quod aliquod genus substantiale competit alicui per accidens. Et hoc conceditur, sicut predictum est.⁴

<AD ARGUMENTUM IN OPPOSITUM> Ad argumentum in oppositum dicitur
25 quod Porphyrius accipit ‘accidens’ secundo modo, et de tali accidente verum est dicere quod non est genus substantiale, nec species, nec differentia, nec proprium.

Vel potest dici quod accipit ibi ‘accidens’ tertio modo propter istud quod sequitur, quo dicit:⁵ ‘semper autem est in subiecto subsistens’ idest
30 de tali accidente personaliter sumpto potest semper verificari ‘esse in subiecto’, et hoc sine aliqua nova impositione terminorum.

14 primum] primum iter. necnon del. E 26 nec] sub add. necnon del. E 31 terminorum] Explicit expliciat qui plus vult scribat. Expliciunt questiones libri Porphyrii. add. E^m

4 Videas supra, CONCL. 1.

5 Isagoge, v, 4 (13, 5): ‘(...) semper autem est in subiecto subsistens.’

Index nominum

Aristoteles, passim

Averroes, 187, 234, 278, 333, 335,
384, 389, 393, 398, 400

Avicenna, 229

Boethius, 177, 216, 353, 356

Donatus, 222

Peter of Spain, 233

Porphyrius, passim

Robert Grosseteste, 401

Thomas Aquinas, 235, 237

Index verborum notabilium

Accidens: *accidens logicale* accipitur tantummodo pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur, et *reale* pro re que accidentaliter inheret alicui subiecto. Q. 30, DIST. 1 (29^{vb}).

– ‘accidens’ accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo *pro termino qui accidentaliter predicatur*, hoc est, non per se primo modo vel secundo modo dicendi per se. Et sic accidens est quintum universale. Et isto modo iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur ‘accidens’ *pro aliqua re inherente alicui subiecto cum quo non facit per se unum*, sive talis res sit signum, sive non. Et sic iste terminus ‘accidens’ est nomen prime intentionis. Q. 42, DIST. 1 (40^{ra}).

– aliquid dicitur ‘accidens’ tripliciter. *I*: Uno modo *quia de aliquo per accidens verificatur*, sicut iste terminus ‘homo’ verificatur per accidens de ‘domino’. *II*: Alio modo *quia potest alicui adesse et eidem abesse preter subiecti corruptionem* – idest preter hoc quod ‘esse’ vere negatur a tali subiecto significative sumpto – sicut iste terminus ‘sedens’ est accidens ‘homini’. *III*: Tertio modo *quia connotat aliquod extrinsecum quod est accidens realiter inherens subiecto*, sicut iste terminus ‘nigrum’ vel ‘niger’ connotat aliquod extrinsecum corvo quod est realiter in corvo sicut accidens in subiecto. Q. 45, DIST. UN. (43^{rb}).

– iste terminus ‘accidens’ non est per se superius ad qualitatem, sed e

converso. Q. 22, CONCL. 4 (21^{va}) – nullum accidens adest et abest preter subiecti corruptionem, et hoc qualitercumque accipitur ‘accidens’ sive ‘adesse et abesse’. Q. 42, CONCL. 1 (40^{ra}) – hec propositio: ‘accidens adest et abest etcetera’ est vera secundum intellectum auctoris, quia stat loco istius ‘accidens potest adesse et abesse preter subiecti corruptionem’. Q. 42, CONCL. 2 (40^{ra}) – omne accidens quod est universale, potest adesse et potest abesse preter subiecti corruptionem. Q. 42, CONCL. 3 (40^{ra}) – omne accidens reale potest a subiecto separari preter corruptionem subiecti. Q. 42, CONCL. 4 (40^{ra}) – hec est possibilis: ‘accidens separatur a subiecto’. Q. 42, CONCL. 6 (40^{rb-va}) – ista est possibilis: ‘accidens est quod separatur a subiecto’. Q. 42, CONCL. 7 (40^{va}) – hec est impossibilis: ‘accidens quod non est, separatur a subiecto’. Q. 42, CONCL. 8 (40^{va}) – hec est impossibilis: ‘aliquod accidens separatur totaliter a subiecto’. Q. 42, CONCL. 8 (40^{va}) – aliquod accidens est genus substantiale, et aliquod accidens est species, etcetera. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}) – nullum accidens secundo modo acceptum secundum quod potest adesse vere per predicationem affirmativam alicui subiecto et potest abesse vere per predicationem negativam ab eodem subiecto sine corruptione subiecti, est genus substantiale. Q. 45, CONCL. 2 (43^{va}).

Videas Inseparabile accidens;
Separabile accidens; Subiectum
accidentis.

Actus et potentia: ‘actus et potentia’ accipiuntur dupliciter, scilicet realiter et logicaliter. – *Actus et potentia si accipiantur realiter:* Realiter secundum quod ‘materia prima’ dicitur potentia respectu forme, et ‘forma’ dicitur actus respectu materie, et etiam secundum quod ‘potentia intellectiva’ et ‘potentia visiva’ et ‘potentia auditiva’ et (sic de) aliis dicuntur potentie respectu actus. – *Actus et potentia si accipiantur logicaliter:* Logicaliter, ut si aliquod predicatum competat alicui subiecto particulariter et non universaliter, eo quod subiectum sit in plus quam predicatum, hoc est quod subiectum sit communius quam predicatum, tunc dicitur breviter loquendo quod tale predicatum competit tali subiecto tantum potentia et non actu. Et si aliquod predicatum competat alicui subiecto universaliter, tunc dicitur quod sibi competit actu quia actualitate universaliter. Q. 39, DIST. UN. (37^{va}).

Actus exercitus/actus significatus: duplex est ‘actus logicalis’, scilicet actus exercitus et actus significatus. *Actus exercitus* est propositio, cuius copula sive verbum principale est hoc verbum ‘est’, sicut patet (in) talibus propositionibus ‘homo est animal’, ‘Sortes est homo’, ‘albedo est color’, et sic de aliis. *Actus significatus* est propositio cuius copula sive verbum principale est hoc verbum ‘predicatur’ vel aliquid sibi equivalens, cuiusmodi sunt talia: ‘competit’, ‘inest’, ‘dicitur’, ‘verificatur’, et similia. Et tales propositiones

sunt huiusmodi: ‘animal predicatur de homine’, ‘animal dicitur de homine’, ‘animal competit homini’, ‘predicatum inest subiecto’, ‘animal verificatur de homine’, et consimiles. Et vocatur primus actus ‘exercitus’ et secundus ‘significatus’, quia per primum exercitur predicatio que per secundum significatur, sicut patet per istam: ‘animal predicatur de homine’, significatur ista prima que exercetur in ista propositione: ‘homo est animal’. Q. 25, DIST. 1 (24^{vb}–25^{ra}).

Adesse et abesse: ‘adesse et abesse’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet, logicaliter et realiter. *Logicaliter* aliquid dicitur ‘adesse et abesse’ per divisionem affirmativam vel negativam, *realiter* per realem inherentiam vel per realem separationem. Q. 42, DIST. 2 (40^{ra}).

Anterioritas: premittitur distinctio de anterioritate *reali* et *logicali*, et quod ‘anterioritas’ in proposito accipitur brevitatis gratia pro ‘superioritate per se’. Q. 19, DIST. UN. (17^{vb}).

Cognitio predicamentorum: – nullum necesse est habere cognitionem generis ad (cognitionem) predicamentorum habendam. Q. 1, CONCL. 3 (1^{rb}) – ad perfectam cognitionem predicamentorum habendam necesse est necessitate conditionata cognitionem generis et aliorum universalium haberi. Q. 1, CONCL. 5 (1^{rb}–^{va}) – ad perfectam cognitionem predicamentorum habendam non est necesse necessitate absoluta cognitio universalium haberi. Q. 1, CONCL. 6 (1^{va}).

Videas Scientia.

Cognitio relativorum: non cuiuslibet relativi prima notitia qua cognoscitur quid tale relativum significat, est eius notitia diffinitiva per suam correlarium. Q. 17, CONCL. 1 (16^{va}) – prima notitia alicuius relativi qua scitur ⟨quid⟩ tale relativum significat, causatur per aliquam informationem non diffinitivam sed potius narrativam. Q. 17, CONCL. 2 (16^{va}) – possibile est primam notitiam ⟨esse⟩ diffinitivam. Q. 17, CONCL. 3 (16^{va}) – possibile est aliquem scire quid relativum significat principale sine hoc quod sciat quid significat suum correlarium. Q. 17, CONCL. 5 (16^{vb}) – impossibile est aliquem scire diffinitive quid relativum significat principaliter et connotat nisi sciat quid significetur per suum correlarium. Q. 17, CONCL. 6 (16^{vb}).

Commune: ‘commune’ est duplex, scilicet, commune univocum et commune equivocum. – *Commune univocum:* ‘Commune univocum’ dicitur istud quod competit pluribus mediante eodem conceptu, sive simplici sive composito eque primo, ita quod, si sit conceptus compositus, non competit uni ratione unius partis talis conceptus et alteri ratione alterius partis, sed utricumque competit ratione cuiuslibet partis talis conceptus compositi; et talis conceptus compositus est diffinitivus quia competit cuilibet supposito sub diffinito ratione cuiuslibet sue partis, sicut ista diffinitio ‘animal rationale mortale’ non tantum competit Sorti ratione ‘animalis’, sed etiam ratione ‘rationalis’ et ‘mortalis’. – *Commune univocum:* ‘Commune equivocum’

dicitur istud quod competit pluribus ratione diversorum conceptuum, sive isti conceptus sint simplices, sive compositi, ita videlicet quod istud commune competit uni mediante uno conceptu simplici, et alteri mediante alio, et tertio mediante tertio, quamvis ex istis conceptibus unus conceptus componatur. Q. 12, DIST. 1 (10^{vb}).

Consequentia: a propositione ad suas exponents Q. 31, CONCL. 2 (30^{vb}).

Credere: Platonem esse non potest credi, posito quod Plato non sit, nec poterit esse. Q. 44, CONCL. 7 (42^{va}) – posito quod Plato non sit, et quod Sortes habeat actum complexum in mente sua, vel saltem aliquem actum quo crederet Platonem esse, si Plato esset, et lateat Sortem Platonem non esse, tunc Sortes non crederet Platonem esse. Q. 44, CONCL. 8 (42^{va}) – tento eodem casu Sortes non credit se credere Platonem esse. Q. 44, CONCL. 9 (42^{va}).

Credulitas: omnis notitia informativa ab homine vel a libero presupponit credulitatem addiscentis. Q. 17, CONCL. 4 (16^{vb}).

De virtute sermonis: Q. 4, AD 4. ⟨ad probationem prime propositionis, ad probationem secunde propositionis⟩ (4^{rb}, 4^{va}); Q. 6, AD 2. (6^{ra}); Q. 9, AD OPP. (8^{rb}); Q. 15, AD 5. (5^{rb}); Q. 17, AD 4. (17^{ra}); Q. 25, DIST. 2 (25^{ra}); Q. 29, AD 2. (29^{rb}); Q. 31, CONCL. 9 (31^{ra}); Q. 34, AD 4. (34^{va}); Q. 36, AD 2. (35^{va}); Q. 39, CONCL. 1 (37^{va}); Q. 40, CONCL. 7 (38^{va}).

Descriptio: Q. 3, DIST. UN. (2^{vb}).

Descriptiva oratio: Q. 3, DIST. UN. (2^{vb}).

Deus: iste terminus 'Deus' accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie, et communiter. – *Deus proprie acceptus:* Proprie accipitur pro prima causa, – *Deus communiter acceptus:* sed communiter accipitur pro quocumque habente aliquam similitudinem specialem cum prima causa, scilicet vel quia est per(p)etuum sicut prima causa, vel quia habet intellectum sicut prima causa, vel quia precise diligitur sicut prima causa deberet diligi. Unde Psalmista 'dixi: dii estis, et filii excelsi omnes', et Apostolus etiam loqui de gulosis dicit 'quorum deus venter est', et alibi est Psalmista 'omnes dii gentium demonia.' Q. 35, DIST. 2 (34^{vb}).

– Deus proprie non habet aliquam differentiam specificam cum eo convertibilem, et hoc accipiendo proprie 'Deum' pro primo principio indivisibili. Q. 35, CONCL. 1 (34^{vb}) – Deus proprie non habet diffinitionem. Q. 35, CONCL. 2 (34^{vb}) – hoc predicatum 'rationale' secundum quod est differentia specifica, non verificatur de Deo, accipiendo 'Deum' proprie. Q. 35, CONCL. 3 (34^{vb}) – hic terminus 'rationalis' equivoce verificatur de materia hominis, et de homine, et de Deo. Q. 35, CONCL. 4 (35^{ra}) – accidente accepto pro uno predicabili accidentaliter, Deo potest competere aliquod accidens. Q. 43, CONCL. 3 (41^{va}).

Differentia: 'aliquam differentiam aliquid constituere' potest intelligi tripliciter: uno modo *existeriter sive realiter*, sicut materia et forma que constituunt compositum; alio modo

diffinitive, sicut differentia constituit hominem, quia constituit istam diffinitionem, et ideo differentia est primum diffinitivum hominis; tertio modo *convertibiliter*, scilicet quia differentia addita alicui non convertibili cum eo cuius est differentia constitutiva, contrahit ipsum, ut totum resultans ex ipso et tota differentia convertibiliter cum eo cuius est differentia, contrahit ipsum cui additur ad standum tantummodo pro significato vel significatis illius cuius est differentia, sicut hec differentia 'rationale mortale' addita subiecto vel corpori vel animali contrahit ipsum ad standum tantummodo pro significato vel significatis. Q. 35, DIST. 1 (34^{vb}).

– *Perceptio differentium:* omnis perceptio aliquorum differentium primo fit per sensum vel presupponit sensationem qua percipiuntur alique differentie. Q. 32, DECL. (31^{vb}).
Videas Suscipere magis et minus.

Differentia per se: 'differentia per se' accipitur multipliciter. – *Differentia per se large accepta:* Uno modo, scilicet large pro omni eo quod predicatur per se de aliquo, et potest esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum significatum illius de quo verificatur ab alio specificiter differre, et connotat specialiter aliquem partem essentialem vel aliquod accidens, formaliter procedens sive materialiter ab aliqua tali parte vel a toto composito ex talibus partibus. Et isto modo omne proprium est differentia per se et precise omne proprium substantiale. (...) – *Differentia per se stricte accepta:* Differentia vero per se stricte vocatur aliquis terminus discrete significans

vel connotans aliquam partem essentialem compositi ex materia et forma nihil extrinsecum discrete connotans sive significans, potens esse medium syllogisticum ad concludendum aliqua specificè differre. (...) Et ista est differentia completiva diffinitionis proprie dicte. Q. 32, DIST. UN. (32^{rab}).

– nulla differentia proprie dicta predicatur in quid primo modo. Q. 34, CONCL. 3 (34^{rb}) – omnis differentia divisiva generis per se est constitutiva alicuius speciei per se. Q. 36, CONCL. 1 (35^{rb}) – aliqua differentia divisiva generis dividens aliquod genus non constituit aliquam speciem. Q. 36, CONCL. 2 (35^{rb}) – nulla differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis. Q. 37, CONCL. 1 (36^{ra}) – nulla differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species. Q. 37, CONCL. 2 (36^{ra}) – omnis differentia est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species per se primo modo. Q. 37, CONCL. 3 (36^{ra}) – omnis differentia est accidens. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}).

Differentia specifica: duplex est differentia specifica, scilicet formalis et materialis. – *Differentia specifica formalis:* Formalis que fit gratia alicuius forme; – *Differentia specifica materialis:* materialis que fit gratia alicuius materie. – *Differentia specifica formalissubstantialis:* Formalis adhuc est duplex, nam quedam est substantialis, scilicet illa que est gratia alicuius forme substantialis, et quedam accidentalis, – *Differentia specifica accidentalis:* scilicet ista que fit gratia alicuius forme accidentalis. Accidentalisis adhuc est duplex. Quia quedam fit per se, et quedam per accidens. *Differentia specifica acci-*

dentalis per se: Per se, sicut albedo, que est forma accidentalis, per se differt a nigredine; *Differentia specifica accidentalis per accidens:* per accidens, sicut Sortes secundum suam albedinem a Platone nigro specie per accidens differt. Q. 31, DIST. 1 (30^{va}). – differentia specifica substantialis de qua loquitur Porphyrius, semper facit aliud, et hoc transsumptive loquendo ad istum intellectum quod talis differentia est medium concludendi aliqua duo esse differentium formarum substantialium, et per consequens quod talia duo habent dissimiles formas substantiales. Q. 31, CONCL. 12 (31^{rb}) – aliquid facit per se differre quod non est differentia specifica. Q. 32, CONCL. 1 (32^{rb}) – accipiendo transsumptive ‘facere differre’, aliquid facit per se differre quod non est differentia specifica. Q. 32, CONCL. 2 (32^{rb}) – accipiendo transsumptive ‘facere differre’, aliquid connotans aliquam formam facit per se differre quod non est differentia specifica. Q. 32, CONCL. 3 (32^{rb}) – omne connotans formam intrinsecam et non extrinsecam, quod predicatur primo modo dicendi per se de aliquo subiecto, et potest esse medium syllogisticum concludendi significatum talis subiecti a quocumque alio specificè differre, est differentia specifica. Q. 32, CONCL. 4 (32^{va}) – aliquid est differentia specifica quod non discrete connotat aliquam formam. Q. 32, CONCL. 5 (32^{va}) – nulla differentia specifica accipiendo ‘differentiam’ sicut logici accipiunt et sicut Porphyrius accipit, quando dicit: ‘differentia predicatur in quale’, est constitutiva alicuius substantie. Q. 34, CONCL. 1 (34^{rb}) – omnis differentia specifica est constitutiva substantie

accipiendo 'substantiam' pro diffinitione. Q. 34, CONCL. 2 (34^{rb}) – omne istud a quo accipitur differentia specifica 'animalis', constituit substantiam animalis accipiendo 'substantiam' pro re que non est signum, scilicet pro essentia. Q. 34, CONCL. 5 (34^{rb}) – nulla differentia specifica est necessaria ad divisionem generis in suas species secundo modo per se. Q. 37, CONCL. 4 (36^{ra}) – ad divisio(nem) generis in suas species per se primo modo formaliter, est aliqua differentia specifica necessaria necessitate conditionata. Q. 37, CONCL. 5 (36^{rab}) – aliqua differentia specifica competit generi actu. Q. 39, CONCL. 3 (37^{vb}) – nulla differentia specifica alicuius speciei competit actu generi talis speciei. Q. 39, CONCL. 4 (37^{vb}).

Differre: 'aliquid differre ab alio' potest intelligi dupliciter, scilicet primo, vel non primo sed secundum partem. – *Aliquid primo differre ab alio:* Primo quando aliquid totum differt ab isto a quo differt secundum se et secundum quodlibet sui partem, sicut Sortes differt a Platone. – *Aliquid non primo sed secundum partem differre ab alio:* Non primo sed secundum partem quando aliquid differt ab aliquo a quo differt secundum aliquam sui partem, et secundum quamlibet sui partem ab isto non differt, sicut Sortes differt a sua manu dextera secundum suam manum sinistram, vel pedem, et non differt a sua manu dextera secundum suam manum dexteram. Q. 28, DIST. UN. (28^{rb}).

– aliquid ab alio potest differre tripliciter: uno modo *primo et per se*, quando scilicet aliquid ab alio differt secundum se et

secundum quamlibet sui partem; alio modo *non primo sed per se*, scilicet quando aliquid ab alio differt secundum aliquam sui partem et non secundum quamlibet; tertio aliquid ab alio differt *nec primo nec per se, sed tantum secundum accidens*, quia tali (modo) ab eo differt secundum suum accidens. Q. 30, DIST. 4 (29^{vb}).

– aliquid ab alio potest differre dupliciter: uno modo *proprie et stricte*, sicut Sortes differt a Platone per semetipsum et per eius partem; alio modo *transsumptive*, sicut dicimus quod Sortes si sit sedens differt a Platone stante per hoc separabile accidens, scilicet 'sedens', quod stat loco istius propositionis Sortes concluditur differre ab Platone syllogistice per hoc medium 'sedens', igitur Sortes differt a Platone ita quod ista propositio Sortes per hoc separabile accidens sedens differt a Platone. Et est distinguende penes amphiboliam: in sensu proprio falsa est; in sensu transsumptive secundum quod iam expositum est, est vera. Et ista distinctio in ista materia maxime est necessaria, quia Porphyrius et alii doctores in ista materia loquitur transsumptive potius quam proprie. Q. 29, DIST. 1 (29^{ra}).

– nihil differt ab aliquo. Q. 28, CONCL. 1 (28^{rb}) – nihil differt ab alio. Q. 28, CONCL. 2 (28^{rb}) – nihil quod est, differt ab aliquo, et omne quod est, ab alio differt. Q. 28, CONCL. 3 (28^{va}) – nihil differt a se. Q. 28, CONCL. 4 (28^{va}) – omne quod est, differt a se quod non est. Q. 28, CONCL. 5 (28^{va}) – omne quiescens differt a se currente. Q. 28, CONCL. 5 (28^{va}) – omnis stans differt a se sedente. Q. 28, CONCL. 5 (28^{va}) – omnis puer differt a se sene. Q. 28,

CONCL. 5 (28^{va}) – omne senex differt a se puero. Q. 28, CONCL. 5 (28^{va}) – accipiendo ‘differentiam’ (...) pro termino qui predicatur in quale, per quid tamquam per medium syllogisticum potest vere syllogisari aliquid ab alio differre, nihil aliud a termino ab alio differt per aliquam differentiam proprie accipiendo ‘differre’. Q. 29, CONCL. 1 (29^{rb}) – omne quod ab aliquo differt, ab eodem differt per accidens separabile logicale accipiendo ‘differre’ transsumptive. Q. 29, CONCL. 2 (29^{rb}) – omnis differentia ab alio differt per differentiam proprie accipiendo ‘per aliquid differre’. Q. 29, CONCL. 3 (29^{rb}) – aliquid ab alio differt proprie, primo et per se inseparabili accidente. Q. 30, CONCL. 1 (29^{vb}) – aliquid ab alio differt transsumptive inseparabili accidente. Q. 30, CONCL. 3 (29^{vb}).

Videas Differentia specifica.

Diffinitio: ‘diffinitio’ accipitur tripliciter, scilicet, large, stricte et strictissime, hoc dictu est: communiter, proprie et propriissime. – *Diffinitio large accepta:* Diffinitio large accepta extendit se ad quemcumque connotationem, sive convertibilem, sive non convertibilem cum diffinito. – *Diffinitio stricte accepta:* Diffinitio stricte accepta non extendit se ad connotationem, sed ad descriptionem sive diffinitionem datam per additamentum, et talis diffinitio datur per genus et per proprium et aliquando per plura accidentia, sive per plures terminos accidentales qui simul compositi faciunt unum accidens convertibile cum diffinito, sicut patet in ista diffinitione ‘homo est animal et bipes, recte intendens’. – *Diffinitio stricismente*

accepta: Diffinitio vero strictissime accepta vocatur illa que componitur ex genere diffiniti et differentia specifica cum diffinito convertibili, sicut patet de ipsa diffinitione ‘substantia animata sensibilis’. Q. 17, DIST. 1 (16^{rb}).

– triplex est diffinitio, nam quedam est diffinitio quid nominis, et quedam est oratio descriptiva sive descriptio, et quedam est diffinitio propriissime dicta. – *Diffinitio quid nominis:* Diffinitio vero quid nominis est oratio compendiosa indicans quid nomen significat. Et accipitur hic ‘nomen’ largissime secundum quod convertitur cum ‘dictione’, sive talis dictio sit verbum, sive nomen acceptum stricte, sive composita sive simplex. Talis diffinitio quid nominis adhuc accipitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et communiter. – *Diffinitio quid nominis proprie accepta:* Proprie scilicet, quando convertitur cum diffinito. – *Diffinitio quid nominis communiter accepta:* Communiter, quando extendit se ad orationem indicantem quid nomen significat, quamvis talis oratio non convertitur cum diffinito. – *Diffinitio descriptiva:* Descriptiva vero diffinitio est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam diffiniti per genus (et) per proprium sive per propria talis diffiniti. Et ista vocatur ab Aristotele, septimo *Metaphysice*, ‘diffinitio data per additamentum’, quia datur per aliquid quod connotat aliquod extrinsecum (...). – *Diffinitio propriissime dicta:* Diffinitio vero propriissime dicta est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam diffiniti per essentialia sive per substantialia, idest: per terminos non connotantes aliquid extrinsecum essentie

rei diffinite. Et talis diffinitio subdividitur secundum quod elicitur ab Aristotele, primo *De anima*, nam: quedam est naturalis, et quedam est dialectica. – *Diffinitio propriissime dicta naturalis*: Diffinitio vero naturalis est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam diffiniti per substantialia, secundum substantialium aliquid significat specialiter materiam rei diffinite, ut si diffiniatur domus sic: ‘domus est substantia composita ex fundamento, lapide et parietibus, lignis et tecto, stramento’, vel aliquid consimile, quod specialiter significat vel connotat materiam rei distincte, vel formam talis rei existere in tali materia. (...) Et dicitur (ista) diffinitio ‘naturalis’ propter hoc quod naturalis philosophus specialiter inquirens naturam rei, et eius principia essentialia exprimit per diffinitionem suam principia naturalia rei diffinite. (...) Unde *diffinitio naturalis est duplex*, nam quedam distincte exprimit materiam tantum, et quedam tam materiam quam formam, sive finem, quia forma et finis intrinsecus coincidunt. Et ista est diffinitio propriissime naturalis, ut si ‘domus’ sic diffiniatur: ‘domus est quoddam compositum ex lignis et lapidibus protectivum a passionibus aeris’, vel si ‘homo’ sic diffiniatur: ‘homo est animal compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva’. – *Diffinitio propriissime dicta dialectica*: Diffinitio vero dialectica est oratio compendiosa indicans essentiam rei distincte per substantialia, quorum substantialium aliquid significat, vel connotat formam rei diffinite, et utrum(que) significat specialiter, vel connotat materiam vel formam, ut si ‘domus’ sic diffiniatur: ‘domus

est quod dicitur protectivum a pluviis et ventis, scilicet caloribus et frigiditatibus’, vel: ‘domus est quod dicitur protectivum a passionibus aeris’. (...) (Ista) diffinitio dicitur ‘dialectica’, quia dialecticus non ita profunde speculatur, nec ita exquisitè inquirat de principiis naturalibus rei, sed sufficit sibi per aliquam opinionem devenire ad formam rei, et ipsam quoddammodo in diffinitione exprimere. (...) Diffinitio vero dialectica vocatur sicut predictum est, que fit cum expressione forme vel finis in diffinito, ut si ‘homo’ sic diffiniatur: ‘homo est rationale mortale’. Q. 38, DIST. 1 (36^{vab}).

si sit notitia generis, omnis diffinitio potest assignari. Q. 3, CONCL. 3 (2^{vb}) – possibile est aliquem scire aliquam diffinitionem dari per genus sine hoc quod talis sciat quid sit genus diffinitive. Q. 3, CONCL. 7 (3^{ra}) – necesse est necessitate conditionata genus poni in diffinitione speciei ad istum intellectum quod hec sit vera: si species bene diffinitur, genus poni(tur) in eius diffinitione. Q. 17, CONCL. 7 (16^{vb}) – nulla diffinitio proprie dicta predicatur in quid primo modo. Q. 34, CONCL. 3 (34^{rb}) – omnis diffinitio proprie dicta predicatur in quid non primo, quia rationis sue partis. Q. 34, CONCL. 4 (34^{rb}) – diffinitio est oratio compendiosa. Q. 38, CONCL. 1 (37^{ra}) – omnis diffinitio est eque nota vel notior diffinito. Q. 38, CONCL. 2 (37^{ra}) – omnis diffinitio est diffinitio quid nominis. Q. 38, CONCL. 3 (37^{ra}) – aliqua diffinitio proprie dicta non datur per differentiam (acceptam) a specie, vel a formalitate. Q. 38, CONCL. 4 (37^{ra}) – omnis diffinitio

dialectica propriissime dicta datur per differentiam specificam. Q. 38, CONCL. 5 (37^{ra}) – aliqua diffinitio proprie dicta datur per differentiam specificam connotantem aliquod extrinsecum quod non est de essentia rei cui dicitur extrinsecum. Q. 38, CONCL. 6 (37^{ra}) – inter diffinitiones proprie dictas una est rationabilior alia. Q. 38, CONCL. 7 (37^{ra}) – differentie formarum non – saltem non omnes – debent poni in diffinitione. Q. 38, CONCL. 8 (37^{ra}) – omnis diffinitio proprie dicta sive naturalis, sive dialectica, datur per differentiam specificam. Q. 38, CONCL. 9 (37^{rb}).

Diffinitio data per additamentum:
Q. 3, DIST. UN. (2^{vb}).

Diffinitio differentie ‘differentia est qua abundant species a genere’: predicta diffinitio ‘differentie’ de virtute sermonis non convertitur cum diffinito. Q. 39, CONCL. 1 (37^{va}) – predicta diffinitio est bona secundum intellectum auctoris, scilicet si suppleatur istud quod auctor intelligit, et tunc debet sic suppleri: differentia est qua abundat actu et per se primo modo species a genere. Q. 39, CONCL. 2 (37^{vb}).

Diffinitio differentie ‘differentia est que predicator de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale’: ista diffinitio non convertitur (cum) differentia. Q. 40, CONCL. 1 (38^{ra}) – ista diffinitio convertitur cum diffinito secundum intellectum auctoris, quia auctor intendit ibi diffinire differentiam specificam subalternam. Q. 40, CONCL. 2 (38^{ra}).

Diffinitio differentie ‘differentia est istud quod est aptum natum dividere ista que sunt sub eodem genere’: ista diffinitio non est convertibilis cum differentia specifica. Q. 40, CONCL. 3 (38^{rb}) – ista diffinitio convertitur cum diffinito ad intentionem auctoris, quia auctor intendit ibi tantummodo diffinire ‘differentiam’ secundum quod se extendit ad differentiam proprie dictam et magis proprie dictam, et hoc est ad proprium et ad differentiam specificam. Q. 40, CONCL. 4 (38^{rb}).

Diffinitio differentie ‘differentia est qua different a se singula’: ista propositio secundum intellectum auctoris est vera, quia auctor intelligit: ‘singula qua a se differunt, et est differentia’. Q. 40, CONCL. 5 (38^{rb}) – aliqua diffinitio non est predicabilis de suo diffinito, quia si hoc diffinitum ‘differentia’ ponatur a parte subiecti, tunc propositio est falsa. Q. 40, CONCL. 6 (38^{rb}) – aliquod diffinitum est verificabile de sua diffinitione, quequidem diffinitio de ipso diffinito non est verificabilis, quia: de ista diffinitione ‘singula qua a se differunt’ est hoc diffinitum ‘differentia’ verificabile. Q. 40, CONCL. 6 (38^{rb}) – non semper diffinitio et diffinitum convertuntur, quia non semper verificantur de se mutuo universaliter et affirmative. Q. 40, CONCL. 6 (38^{rb}).

Diffinitio differentie ‘differentia est istud quod ad esse rei conducit, et quod eius quod est esse rei pars est’: non est diffinitio convertibilis cum differentia specifica, si accipiatur de virtute sermonis. Q. 40, CONCL. 7 (38^{va}) – ista diffinitio convertitur cum differentia specifica ad

intellectum auctoris, quia auctor intelligit quod differentia specifica est istud quod diffinitionem proprie dictam complet, et quod est pars formalis diffinitionis proprie dicte. Debet ergo sic intelligi: 'differentia est istud quod complet diffinitionem rei proprie dictam, idest, quod est pars formalis diffinitionis proprie dicte'. Q. 40, CONCL. 8 (38^{va}).

Diffinitio quid nominis: Diffinitio vero quid nominis vocatur oratio indicans quid nomen significat, convertibilis cum tali nomine, quam non oportet aliquod genus intrare. Q. 3, DIST. UN. (2^{vb}).

– sine genere potest diffinitio quid nominis assignari. Q. 3, CONCL. 1 (2^{vb}).

Diffinitio quid rei: Diffinitio vero quid rei accipitur dupliciter, quia quedam est *que datur per essentialia*, idest: per terminos essentialia nihil extrinsecus connotantes cuiusmodi sunt genus diffiniti, et differentia specifica, et vocatur diffinitio propriissime dicta. Alia est diffinitio quid rei *que datur per propria sive accidentalia et per genus diffiniti*, ut si homo diffiniretur: 'homo est animal risibile' vel 'homo est animal recte sedens', et vocatur per Aristotelem 'diffinitio data per additamentum', et a Boethio vocatur 'descriptio' sive 'descriptiva oratio'. Q. 3, DIST. UN. (2^{vb}). – nulla diffinitio quid rei potest assignari sine omni genere vel sine genere istius. Q. 3, CONCL. 2 (2^{vb}) – diffinitio quid rei potest assignari ab aliquo sine hoc quod sciatur quid sit genus diffinitive ab eodem. Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (2^{vb}) – necesse est necessitate conditionata scientem se diffinire

diffinitione quid rei scire quid sit genus etcetera. Q. 3, CONCL. 6 (3^{ra}).

Diffinitio specie 'species est que predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid sit': ista diffinitio speciei: 'species est quod predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus in esse quod quid' non est bona. Q. 17, CONCL. 8 (16^{vb}) – potest teneri quod predicta diffinitio, etiam cum suppletione ('species est que predicatur de pluribus numero differentibus, et non specie, in eo quod quid'), non est bona. Q. 18, CONCL. 1 (17^{rb}) – ista diffinitio 'species est que immediate ponitur sub genere' est bona diffinitio. Q. 18, CONCL. 2 (17^{rb}) – diffinitio speciei specialissime debet sic suppleri: 'species specialissima est que ponitur immediate sub genere et que de pluribus numero differentibus et non specie univoce predicatur in eo quod quid'. Q. 18, CONCL. 3 (17^{rb}) – probabiliter potest teneri predictam diffinitionem sine ista particula 'que immediate ponitur sub genere' esse bonam. Q. 18, CONCL. 4 (17^{va}).

Divisio: quedam est divisio realis et quedam logicalis. – *Divisio realis:* Realis divisio vocatur ista qua partes essentialia vel integrales cuius rei ab invicem separantur. – *Divisio logicalis:* Divisio vero logicalis vocatur ista qua aliquod signum commune contrahitur pro aliquibus significatis per aliquam differentiam vel per aliquam suam speciem, sicut hoc signum commune 'animal', quando additur sibi hec differentia 'irrationale', contrahitur ad standum pro aliis suis significatis. Et ista divisio subdividitur, quia quedam est essentialis et quedam acciden-

talis. – *Divisio logicalis essentialis*: Essentialis dicitur ista qua aliquod commune dividitur vel per suas differentias specificas sive essentielles, vel per sua inferiora per se. Prima divisio⟨ne⟩ potest ⟨genus⟩ dividi in suas species per suas differentias specificas. Secunda divisione, scilicet, per sua per se inferiora, potest species specialissima de se dividi per sua supposita, sed non per differentiam specificam, quia species specialissima non habet divisiones specificas divisivas, sed tantummodo constitutivas. Exemplum primi, ut ‘animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale’; exemplum secundi, ut ‘hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato’. – *Divisio logicalis accidentalis*: Divisio vera accidentalis est ista qua aliquis terminus substantialis sive accidentalis dividitur per aliquos terminos accidentales, ut ‘hominum alius longus, alius brevis’, ‘alborum aliud dulce, aliud amarum’. Et ex isto infertur unum correlarium, videlicet quod divisione accidentali minus commune dividitur per communiora, quia clarum est quod quilibet istorum terminorum ‘breve’ et ‘longum’ communior est quam iste terminus ‘homo’. Q. 2, DIST. UN. (2^{ra}).

– duplex est divisio: quedam est realis et quedam logicalis. – *Divisio realis*: Realis dicitur ista, qua partes alicuius essentielles, vel integrales (...). – *Divisio logicalis*: Divisio vero logicalis est multiplex: nam quedam est que fit per negationem, et quedam que fit ⟨per⟩ contradictionem disiunctivam, et quedam que fit per utrumque, et quedam per alietatis negationem. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per negationem*: Per negationem, sicut in propositione negativa

predicatum dividitur a subiecto, idest: negatur a subiecto. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per contradictionem disiunctivam*: Per disiunctivam contradictionem, sicut quando aliquid alicui attribuitur disiunctive vel disiunctim, ut ‘Sortes tacet vel loquitur’, ‘uterque istorum est Sortes vel Plato’ determinatis Sorte et Platone. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per negationem et contradictionem disiunctivam*: Per utrumque, ut ‘Sortes est asinus, vel Sortes non est asinus’. Et hoc semper fit quando una pars divisionis disiunctive est negativa vel de negato extremo. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per alietatis negationem*: Per alietatis negationem, sicut quando dividitur in sua contenta. Et hoc dicitur scilicet per accidens vel per se. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per alietatis negationem per accidens*: Per accidens, ut animalium aliud album, aliud nigrum. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per alietatis negationem per se*: Per se adhuc dividitur, quia vel primo modo dividitur per se, vel secundo modo. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per alietatis negationem per se primo modo*: Primo modo sicut quando aliquid dividitur in sua contenta per se per aliquid quod eis competat. Primo modo dividitur per se utpote per differentiam specificam, ut animalium in ⟨aliud rationale, aliud non rationale. – *Divisio logicalis que fit per alietatis negationem per se secundo modo*: Secundo modo sicut quando aliquid dividitur in) sua per se contenta per proprietates contentorum sive per aliqua propria, ut animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile. Q. 37, DIST. UN. (36^{ra}).

ad nullam divisionem realem faciendam est necesse scire quid sit genus. Q. 2, CONCL. 1 (2^{ra}) –

ad nullam divisionem logicalem faciendam est necesse scire quid sit genus. Q. 2, CONCL. 2 (2^{ra}) – necesse est scire quid sit genus (necessitate) conditionata ad faciendam aliquam divisionem qua scit (talem) esse generis in suas species vel speciei in sua per se inferiora. Q. 2, CONCL. 3 (2^{rb}).

Ens: ens predicatur univoce de subiecto et accidente. Q. 21, OPINIO 1 (19^{vb}) – unus est conceptus entis distinctus a conceptu substantie et conceptu accidentis. Q. 21, OPINIO 2 (20^{ra}) – ens non est universale. Q. 21, CONCL. 1 (20^{rb}) – ‘ens’ est pars alicuius predicati quod predicatur in quid, quia istius predicati ‘ens per se subsistens’. Q. 21, CONCL. 3 (20^{rb}) – ens est pars generis, quia pars istius predicati quod est ‘ens per se subsistens’. Q. 21, c.43 (20^{rb}) – omne ens differt a non ente. Q. 28, CONCL. 5 (28^{va}).

Equivocum: iste terminus ‘equivocum’ accipitur multipliciter. Uno modo pro equivoco a casu, alio modo pro equivoco a consilio. Et uterque istorum modorum accipitur dupliciter, scilicet, uno modo pro equivoco equivocante, et alio modo pro (equivoco) equivocato (...). – *Equivocum equivocans:* equivocum equivocans, idest, terminus equivoce significans, accipitur multipliciter: (I) uno modo strictissime prout distinguitur contra univocum strictissime acceptum. (...) (II) Secundo modo accipitur ‘equivocum’ pro illo quod predicatur de pluribus in quid diffinitive, quamvis non predicetur de eisdem pluribus unica impositione, (et) non unico conceptu. (III) Tertio modo accipitur ‘equivocum’ pro aliquo quod

predicatur de pluribus mediantibus diversis conceptibus specificis. Q. 5, d.2 (5^{ra}).

– (Equivocorum) quoddam est complexum et quoddam incomplexum. (...) Complexum sicut hoc disiunctum: ‘Sortes vel Plato’, incomplexum sicut iste terminus ‘Sortes’ diversa significans proprie et non appellative. Q. 12, DIST. 2 (10^{vb}).

Esse: ‘esse’ accipitur multipliciter: uno modo *pro ipsa re existente*, secundo modo *pro forma rei*; et istis duobus modis est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio modo accipitur *pro diffinitione sive descriptione*; et sic est nomen secunde intentionis. Q. 40, DIST. 2 (38^{ra}).

Extrinsecum: aliquid dicitur ‘extrinsecum’ dupliciter: – *Extrinsecum stricte acceptum:* uno modo quia non est ipsummet, nec aliqua eius pars essentialis vel integralis, sed visus nec est albedo nec aliqua pars albedinis. Et ideo ista diffinitio ‘albedo est color disgregativus visus’ datur per extrinsecum. – *Extrinsecum largius acceptum:* Alio modo accipitur ‘extrinsecum’ largius pro illo B quod nec est ipsamet res cui dicitur extrinsecum, nec est aliqua pars istius rei, nec principalis actus vel operatio talis rei. Et isto modo actus intelligendi sive ratiocinandi non est aliquod extrinsecum homini, quamvis secundum communem opinionem sit accidens superadditum, nec etiam actus sentiendi est extrinsecus animali, vel actus vegetandi ipsi plante. Q. 38, DIST. 2 (36^{vb}–37^{ra}).

Fallacia: fallacia compositionis et divisionis. Q. 1, AD 3. (1^{vb}). – fallacia equivocationis. Q. 28, AD 2. (28^{va}).

Fantasia: *fantasia indeterminata.*

Q. 14, AD ARG. CONTRA CONCL. 10 (14^{rb}).

Genus: iste terminus ‘genus’ multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro principio, alio modo pro predicamento. – *Genus pro principio acceptum:* Pro principio accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro principio productivo sive generativo, alio modo pro principio contentivo. – *Genus pro principio productivo acceptum:* Pro principio productivo, sicut ‘Romulus fuit genus Romanorum’, ‘pater genus filiorum’, et sic de similibus. – *Genus pro principio contentivo acceptum:* Pro principio contentivo adhuc dicitur uno modo pro principio contentivo *circumscriptive*, alio modo pro principio contentivo *predicative* vel *significative* vel *communicative*, quod totum reducitur ad idem. Exemplum primi, sicut ‘locus in quo quis generatur vel producitur’ dicitur genus talis producti, quia est eius principium contentivum *circumscriptive*. Exemplum secundi sicut iste terminus ‘animal’ dicitur genus hominis quia est eius principium *predicative* vel *significative*, quia predicatur de homine in quid et de aliis ab homine differentibus, et significat quiddam ‘homo’ significat, et aliquid plus, et est communior quam iste terminus ‘homo’, et diffinitur proprie, et ideo dicitur eius principium diffinitivum contentivum *predicativum*. Q. 5, DIST. 1 (4^{vb}–5^{ra}).

– genus accipitur *pro principio contentivo predicative* cui supponitur (species). Q. 6, DIST. UN. (5^{vb}).

– tota multitudo hominum est genus. Q. 5, CONCL. 1 (5^{ra}) – tota

multitudo entium non est genus.

Q. 5, CONCL. 2 (5^{rb}) – omne principium productivum, vel contentivum *circumscriptive*, vel *predicative* sive *significative*, a quo vel ratione cuius aliquod principiatum habet denominationem distinctivam ab alio predicamento, est genus. Q. 5, CONCL. 3 (5^{rb}) – alius terminus est genus tamquam principium contentivum *predicative* sive *significative*. Q. 5, CONCL. 4 (5^{va}) – genus est equivocum, et hoc sive accipiat materialiter, sive *significative*. Q. 5, CONCL. 5 (5^{va}) – non omne istud est genus cui supponitur species. Q. 6, CONCL. 1 (5^{vb}) – non est genus nisi habuerit sub se plures species actu. Q. 6, CONCL. 2 (5^{vb}) – quodlibet genus potest non esse genus, ipso existente in rerum natura.

Q. 6, CONCL. 4 (5^{vb}) – iste terminus ‘genus’ de nullo predicatur per se. Q. 6, CONCL. 5 (5^{vb}) – omne illud est genus cui immediate supponitur sua species. Q. 6, CONCL. 6 (6^{ra}) – aliquid est per se superius ad aliud quod non est suum genus. Q. 6, CONCL. 7 (6^{ra}) – genus est principium contentivum suarum specierum *predicative*. Q. 7, CONCL. 1 (6^{rb}) – genus est principium compositivum suarum specierum. Q. 7, CONCL. 2 (6^{rb}) – genus predicatur de pluribus pro se vel pro suo simili vel equivalenti. Q. 8, CONCL. 1 (7^{ra}) – omne genus materialiter acceptum predicatur de pluribus stantibus materialiter in tali propositione. Q. 8, CONCL. 2 (7^{rb}) – omne genus predicatur de pluribus stans *significative* in tali propositione. Q. 8, CONCL. 3 (7^{rb}) – nullum genus predicatur de pluribus pro se. Q. 8, CONCL. 4 (7^{rb}) – nullum genus predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo significato. Q. 8, CONCL. 5 (7^{rb}) – omne genus

predicatur de pluribus pro aliquo suo significato. Q. 8, CONCL. 6 (7^{rb}) – si naturalis potentia vel impotentia sit una species in predicamento qualitatis, tunc nullum genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie. Q. 8, CONCL. 7 (7^{rb}) – omne genus predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus. Q. 8, CONCL. 8 (7^{rb}) – omne genus predicatur in quid de aliquo. Q. 9, CONCL. 1 (7^{vb}) – aliquod genus predicatur in quale primo. Q. 9, CONCL. 2 (7^{vb}) – non omne genus predicatur in quid primo de quacumque sua specie predicatione dubii remotiva. Q. 9, CONCL. 3 (7^{vb}) – omne genus simplex substantie predicatur in quid de se ipso accipiendo ‘predicationem in quid’ pro predicatione absoluta. Q. 9, CONCL. 4 (7^{vb}) – nullum genus predicatur in quid de quocumque suo individuo predicatione dubii remotiva. Q. 9, CONCL. 5 (7^{vb}) – aliquod genus predicatur in quale de sua specie quamvis non primo. Q. 9, ALIE CONCL. (8^{ra}) – (si) aliquod genus predicatur in quid de sua specie, de eadem predicatur in quale. Q. 9, ALIE CONCL. (8^{ra}) – genus non differt ab individuo large accipiendo individuum. Q. 10, CONCL. 1 (8^{va}) – omne genus continetur ab aliqua specie tamquam significatum alicuius speciei, non tamen tamquam inferius ad illam speciem. Q. 10, CONCL. 2 (8^{va}) – non omne genus, accipiendo ‘genus’ materialiter, est alicuius speciei genus. Q. 16, CONCL. 1 (15^{vb}) – aliquod genus est species specialissima. Q. 16, CONCL. 2 (15^{vb}) – aliqua coordinatio generalissimi et specialissimi (est) sine speciebus subalternis mediis. Q. 16, CONCL. 3 (15^{vb}) – omne genus est alicuius speciei genus,

si ly ‘genus’ supponat personaliter. Q. 16, CONCL. 5 (15^{vb}) – omne genus est principium contentivum. Q. 23, CONCL. 1 (22^{va}) – aliquod genus est pars integralis speciei specialissime. Q. 27, CONCL. 2 (26^{rb}) – nullum genus absolutum componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus absolutis precipue eque communibus. Q. 27, CONCL. 3 (26^{rb}–27^{va}) – omne genus substantiale est accidens. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}).

Videas Relativa – genus et species; Species.

Genus generalissimum: aliquod genus generalissimum est pars individui stricte accipiendo ‘individuum’. Q. 10, CONCL. 3 (8^{va}) – aliquod genus generalissimum est per se inferius ad aliud genus generalissimum. Q. 10, CONCL. 4 (8^{va}) – aliquod genus est superius per se ad aliquod genus generalissimum. Q. 22, CONCL. 3 (21^{rb}) – omne genus generalissimum est primum principium. Q. 23, CONCL. 2 (22^{va}) – genus generalissimum est primum principium compositivum. Q. 23, CONCL. 3 (22^{vb}) – genus generalissimum est aliquando principium effectivum. Q. 23, CONCL. 4 (23^{ra}) – genus generalissimum (est) primum principium initiativum sive terminativum. Q. 23, CONCL. 5 (23^{ra}).

Homo: ista propositio ‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est vera in sensu proprio precipue tenendo quod partes nihil aliud sint quam suum totum. Q. 25, CONCL. 1 (25^{ra}) – plures homines totaliter distincti non sunt unus homo. Q. 25, CONCL. 2 (25^{ra}) – ista propositio ‘plures homines sunt unus homo’ est vera in sensu transumptivo.

Q. 25, CONCL. 3 (25^{rab}) – uterque istorum – demonstrando Sortem et Platonem – est unus homo singularis, et per consequens est unus homo sensibilis, et unus homo non-universalis, et unus homo capiendus et sic de quibuscumque aliis conditionibus individuantiis. Q. 25, CONCL. 4 (25^{rb}) – si corpus celeste non componatur ex corpore et anima intellectiva, tunc diffinitio istius differentie ‘rationalis’ secundum quod est differentia specifica et diffinitio hominis, est una et eadem diffinitio saltem aliquando diffinitio hominis, utpote ista ‘aliquis habens animam intellectivam tamquam partem sui essentialem’, et potest dici diffinitio naturalis hominis. Q. 35, CONCL. 5 (35^{ra}) – hominem esse est homo. Q. 44, CONCL. 3 (42^{rb}) – hominem esse animal est aliquid, quia hominem esse animal est homo et animal, et identitas hominis et animalis, et totum est homo. Q. 44, CONCL. 4 (42^{rb}) – hominem esse asinum non est aliquid vel aliqua. Q. 44, CONCL. 5 (42^{rb}).

Idem: aliqua possunt dici ‘eadem’ vel ‘plura’ multipliciter, scilicet *numero* vel *specie* vel *genere*, vel *secundum equivalentiam*. Unde aliqua sunt eadem secundum equivalentiam que differunt genere, sicut signum vocale et signum scriptum. Q. 22, DIST. 2 (21^{rb}).

Individuum: iste terminus individuum potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet, large vel stricte. – *Individuum large acceptum:* Large secundum quod est nomen prime intentionis, significans re(m) materialiter existentem sive istud sit signum sive res que non est signum. – *Individuum*

stricte acceptum: Stricte secundum quod est nomen secunde intentionis, significans signum quod significative sumptum non predicatur de pluribus saltem univoce. Q. 10, DIST. UN. (8^{va}).

– quoddam dicitur individuum ut nunc, et quoddam simpliciter. – *Individuum ut nunc:* Individuum ut nunc potest istud dici quod pronunc non competit alicui nisi uni soli, ita quod non competat pluribus, quamvis sine nova impositione posset pluribus competere, et talia individua sunt omnes termini habentes tantum unum suppositum. Et ad istum intellectum loquitur Porphyrius quando dicit quod filius Sophronisci sit individuum, idest, iste terminus ‘filius Sophronisci’, si solus sit ei Socrates filius. – *Individuum simpliciter:* Individuum vero simpliciter dicitur istud quod non potest univoce pluribus competere sine nova impositione, sicut ‘Socrates’ et ‘hoc album’ et ‘hoc veniens’, etcetera. Q. 13, DIST. UN. (12^{ra}).

– In ista questione presupponitur (...) quod ‘individuum’ semper accipitur pro individuo individualitate *predicationis* et non *existentie*. Q. 20, DIST. 1 (18^{vb}).

– individuum non est individuum. Q. 11, CONCL. 2 (9^{va}) – nullum individuum est nomen appellativum. Q. 20, CONCL. 1 (18^{vb}) – nullum individuum correspondet conceptui appellativo absolute, primo et principaliter. Q. 20, CONCL. 2 (18^{vb}) – aliquid individuum quod est nomen proprium, correspondet conceptui appellativo connotative sive accidentaliter, secundario et ex consequenti. Q. 20, CONCL. 3 (19^{ra}) – aliquid individuum sive nomen proprium

convertitur cum termino appellativo Q. 20, CONCL. 6 (19^{rb}) – aliquod individuum alicuius speciei ab alio individuo eiusdem speciei differt per accidens. Q. 30, CONCL. 2 (29^{vb}) – quaecumque duo individua alicuius speciei specie differunt, differunt qualitercumque accipitur ‘species’. Q. 31, CONCL. 1 (30^{vab}) – nulla duo individua alicuius speciei substantialis differunt specie substantiali. Q. 31, CONCL. 2 (30^{vb}) – omne individuum specie ab alio differt. Q. 31, CONCL. 3 (30^{vb}) – nullum individuum ab alio differt specie. Q. 31, CONCL. 4 (30^{vb}) – aliquod individuum ab alio individuo differt specie substantiali. Q. 31, CONCL. 5 (30^{vb}) – nullo termino existente nulla sunt eiusdem speciei accipiendo speciem pro termino. Q. 31, CONCL. 6 (31^{ra}) – accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma reali et non pro termino, aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei nullo termino existente. Q. 31, CONCL. 7 (31^{ra}) – accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma reali et non pro termino, nulla duo individua suppositionaliter discreta ita quod non sint partes alicuius alterius per se unius, sunt eiusdem speciei. Q. 31, CONCL. 8 (31^{ra}) – aliqua individua suppositionaliter discreta sunt earundem specierum, idest: consimilium specierum ultimatarum, similitudine substantiali. aliqua duo individua que sunt eius(dem) speciei specialissime, sunt diversarum specierum. Q. 31, CONCL. 10 (31^{ra}) – Sortes et Plato et quaecumque alia individua substantialia composita ex materia et forma sunt per se alterius speciei substantialis non tamen primo. Q. 31, CONCL. 11 (31^{ra}).

Individuum large acceptum: ‘individuum’ large acceptum est transcendens. Q. 11, CONCL. 3 (9^{va}) –

‘individuum’ large acceptum est superius ad genus generalissimum. Q. 11, CONCL. 4 (9^{va}).

Individuum stricte acceptum: omne individuum predicatur univoce de pluribus. Q. 11, CONCL. 1 (9^{va}) – ‘individuum’ strictissime et propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter sumptis. Q. 11, CONCL. 5 (9^{va}) – ‘individuum’ propriissime acceptum predicatur de pluribus univoce personaliter acceptis mediante conceptu composito. Q. 11, CONCL. 6 (10^{ra}) – ‘individuum’ proprie acceptum non predicatur de pluribus totaliter distinctis personaliter acceptis mediante unico conceptu simplici precise. Q. 11, CONCL. 7 (10^{ra}).

Infinitum: quod iste terminus ‘infinitum’ accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo sincategorematicae, alio modo categorematicae. – *Infinitum sincategorematicae acceptum:* Sincategorematicae accipitur quando tenetur distributive sive divisive, et tunc reddit propositionem universalem, ut patet in talibus ‘infinite dies precesserunt diem istam’, ‘infiniti homines fuerent ante istum hominem’, ‘in infinitum continuum est divisibile’. Et tunc debent tales propositiones sic exponi: ‘plures homines precesserunt hunc hominem’, vel ‘plures dies precesserunt istum diem’, et non tot quin plures; et tunc tales sunt singulares: ‘isti duo homines precesserunt hunc hominem’, et iste terminus ‘et sic in infinitum’ semper demonstrando homines in tali minori qui precesserunt hunc hominem. Cum hoc tamen stat quod omnis multitudo hominum

que precessit hunc hominem sic accepta, sit finita. Et consimiliter est de ista propositione cuius universales iste sunt singulares: 'in istas duas partes continuum est divisibile', et 'in istas tres partes continuum est divisibile', et sic in infinitum. Cum hoc tamen stat quod omnes partes in quas continuum est divisibile, sunt finite, quia due sunt finite et tres sunt finite et quattuor sunt finite, et sic in infinitum. Et ideo multi logici non negant istam 'continuum est divisibile in infinitum' ponendo ly 'in infinitum' a parte predicati. Et tunc, ut dicunt, stat categorematice sive collective, quod idem est. Et tunc ad veritatem talis requiritur quod continuum posset esse actu divisum in aliquam multitudinem infinitam discrete, quod Aristoteles, (primo) *Physicorum*, dicit esse impossibile, quamvis aliqui theologi hoc concedunt, quod non est presentis speculationis. – *Infinitum categorematice acceptum*: Infinitum vero categorematice acceptum accipitur multipliciter. (1) Uno modo privative tantum, et sic tantummodo significat privationem finis, et isto modo omne istud quod non habet finem vel terminum, est infinitum. Et sic omne indivisibile est infinitum, quodcumque fuerit. (2) Alio modo accipitur non tantum privative, sed etiam includit affirmationem alicuius magnitudinis vel molis vel corporis vel virtutis. Et sic adhuc accipitur multipliciter secundum quod innuit Aristoteles, tertio *Physicorum*: (2.1) Quia quod est 'infinitum intensive' utpote virtualiter, sicut prima causa dicitur infinita in sua virtute et potentialitate, quia non est dare

(aliquid) quod non potest. (2.2) Alio modo dicitur aliquid 'infinitum durative', quia durabit et non erit finis sue durationis. (2.3.) Tertio modo dicitur aliquid 'infinitum extensive', si aliquid tale esset, scilicet quod extendetur et non habebit finem sue extensionis. Et istud adhuc subdividitur. (2.3.1) Quia aliquid potest dici 'infinitum extensive', quia extenditur et non habet finem extrinsecum sue extensionis, et isto modo longitudo gyrativa alicuius continui est infinita extensive. (2.3.2) Alio modo quod extenditur et non habet finem sue extensionis intrinsecum, et isto modo nihil est infinitum, nec potest esse, secundum aliquos. (2.4) Quarto modo adhuc capitur 'infinitum successive', quali infinitate tempus et motus celi dicuntur infiniti, de quibus est tractatum, sed ista ad presens hic ponuntur ne juvenes dampnum incurrant ignorantia terminorum. Q. 24, DIST. 1 (23^{va}–24^{ra}).
– de quolibet infinito qualitercumque accipitur et de qualibet parte infiniti est diffinitiva et notificativa scientia sive notitia et certissima. Q. 24, CONCL. 1 (24^{ra}) – de infinitis sive de infinito intensive est scientia humana. Q. 24, CONCL. 2 (24^{ra}) – de infinitis continuatione sive extensione est ars et scientia humana. Q. 24, CONCL. 3 (24^{ra}) – de infinitis duratione est ars et scientia humana. Q. 24, CONCL. 4 (24^{ra}) – de infinito non est ars et scientia humana, sic videlicet quod ipsum infinitum secundum se et secundum quamlibet sui proportionalitatem et secundum quamlibet sui partem distincte ab homine qui non est Deus, cognoscitur. Q. 24, CONCL. 5 (24^{ra}).

Inseparabile accidens: aliquid accidens quod est universale, dicitur inseparabile respectu alicuius subiecti determinati et non absolute. Q. 42, CONCL. 5 (40^{rb}).
Videas Differre.

Inseparabilitas: presupponitur distinctio de inseparabilitate logicali et reali – *Inseparabilitas logicalis:* logicalis est ista qua non potest verificari per aliquam negationem, sicut dicimus quod propria passio est inseparabilis a suo subiecto, hoc est, non potest vere negari a suo subiecto primo; – *Inseparabilitas realis:* realis est quae fit realiter sine aliqua propositione, scilicet quando due res non possunt a se invicem dividi sive separari. Q. 30, DIST. 2 (29^{vb}).

Instinctus: *instinctus nature.* Q. 14, AD ARG. CONTRA CONCL. 10, III (14^{rb}).

Intelligere: istud quod non potest esse, non potest intelligi. Q. 44, CONCL. 1 (42^{rb}) – quod non est, non intelligitur. Q. 44, CONCL. 2 (42^{rb}) – Platonem esse non potest intelligi, posito quod Plato non sit nec poterit esse. Q. 44, CONCL. 6 (42^{va}) – supposito quod corvus albus non sit, tunc corvus albus non subintelligitur. Q. 44, CONCL. 10 (42^{va}).

Motus: iste terminus ‘motus’ non est per ⟨se⟩ superior ad actionem, sed e converse. Q. 22, CONCL. 5 (21^{va}) – omnis motus est passio, et per consequens motus non est per se superior ad passionem. Q. 22, CONCL. 6 (21^{va}).

Necessitas: necessitas est duplex, scilicet complexa et incomplexa. –

Necessitas incomplexa: Necessitas incomplexa est res que non potest non esse. – *Necessitas complexa:* Complexa adhuc subdividitur, quia quedam est absoluta sive categorica, et quedam conditionata sive hypothetica. Q. 1, DIST. 2 (1^{rb}).

Notificatio: quedam est notificatio remissa et quedam perfecta et quedam perfectior et quedam perfectissima. – *Notificatio remissa:* Remissa vero generat aliqualem notificationem utrum quid significatur per terminum vel per notitiam confusam. Que quidem notificatio habet multos sensus. – *Notificatio perfecta:* Notificatio perfecta est illa qua scitur de aliqua re aliquas suas proprietates accidentales sibi inesse. – *Notificatio perfectior:* Notificatio perfectior est illa qua scitur proprietates propriissimas alicuius rei secundum aliquid inesse. – *Notificatio perfectissima:* Notificatio perfectissima est illa qua scitur res diffinire propriissime et proprie et communiter, hoc est qua cognoscitur differentia specifica convertibilis rei inesse, et qua cognoscuntur proprietates rei inesse, et etiam qua cognoscitur accidens talis rei sibi inesse, et per consequens ista notitia est composita ex pluribus notitiis vel saltem est plures notitias supponens. Q. 17, DIST. 2 (16^{rb-va}).

Predicamentum: duplex est ‘predicamentum’: quoddam est predicamentum prime intentionis, et quoddam secunde intentionis. – *Predicamentum prime intentionis:* ‘⟨Predicamentum⟩ prime intentionis’ vocatur istud quod componitur ex coordinationibus primarum intentionum, cuiusmodi sunt ista decem de quibus pertractat Aristoteles in

Predicamentis. – *Predicamentum secunde intentionis:* ‘Predicamentum secunde intentionis’ vocatur coordinatio secundum sub et supra composita ex terminis secunde intentionis, cuiusmodi e(s)t talis coordinatio: ‘hoc genus’, ‘genus universale’, et sic de consimilibus coordinationibus. Q. 22, DIST. 1 (21^{rb}).

– ista exclusiva ‘tantum sunt decem predicamenta’ in omni suo sensu est falsa. Q. 22, CONCL. 1 (21^{rb}) – plura sunt predicamenta prime intentionis quam decem. Q. 22, CONCL. 2 (21^{rb}).

Predicare: ‘predicare’ accipitur dupliciter, scilicet large et stricte. – *Predicare large acceptum:* Large extendit se ad omnem predicationem, sive negativam, sive veram, sive falsam, sive universalem, sive particularem, sive indefinitam, sive singularem. – *Predicare stricte acceptum:* Stricte accipitur tantummodo pro predicatione affirmativa vera, ita quod convertitur cum isto termino ‘verificare de aliquo’. Q. 26, DIST. UN. (26^{rab}).

– *Aliquid predicari de pluribus:* ‘aliquid predicari de pluribus’ intelligitur dupliciter, scilicet *secundum actualitatem* vel *secundum aptitudinem*, id est, actualiter vel aptitudinaliter. Q. 8, DIST. UN. (7^{ra}).

– large accipiendo ‘predicari’ quilibet terminus de quolibet termino predicatur vel saltem est predicabilis. Q. 26, CONCL. 1 (26^{rb}) – inferius predicatur de suo superiori; quod quidem superius stat confuse et distributive. Q. 26, CONCL. 2 (26^{rb}) – accipiendo ‘predicari’ pro ‘affirmative de aliquo verificari’, sicut accipit communiter Porphyrius predicari, ⟨inferius predicatur de

suo suoeriori). Q. 26, CONCL. 3 (26^{rb}) – nullum inferius predicatur de suo superiori universaliter, hoc est: nullum inferius predicatur de suo superiori stante confuse et distributive respectu talis inferioris. Q. 26, CONCL. 4 (26^{rb}).

Predicari in quid: ‘predicari in quid’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo *pro predicatione absoluta*, alio modo *pro predicatione dubii remotiva* ad questionem factam per ‘quid?’. Q. 9, DIST. 1 (7^{vb}).

– *Predicari in quid; predicari in quale:* ‘predicari in quid’ vel ‘predicari in quale’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo *primo*, id est, non ratione alicuius partis, alio modo *non primo*, quia ratione alicuius partis. Q. 9, DIST. 2 (7^{vb}).

– *Predicari in quid:* aliquid predicatur in quid dupliciter, scilicet *primo* et *non primo*. – *Predicari in quid primo:* Primo, quando aliquid predicatur in quid ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione alicuius sue partis. – *Predicari in quid non primo:* Non primo, quando aliquid predicatur in quid ratione alicuius sue partis, videlicet quia aliqua sua pars predicatur in quid. Q. 34, DIST. 2 (34^{rab}).

Principium: ‘principium’ accipitur multipliciter, (...): uno modo accipitur *pro principio productivo*, ⟨sicut⟩ *pro causa efficiente*, universali vel particulari; alio modo accipitur *pro principio compositivo* sicut *pro materia* vel *forma*, ex quibus equales res componuntur tamquam ex principiis; tertio modo accipitur *pro principio terminativo*, sicut *pro causa formali*; quarto modo accipitur *pro principio contentivo*, et hoc dicitur uno modo

circumscriptive, sicut locus est principium vel patria (...); alio modo *predicative vel significative* sicut pro predicabili in quid de pluribus specie differentibus, quod quidem continet unam predicationem vel significationem (sicud) sua per se inferiora. Q. 7, DIST. UN. (6^{rb}).

– ‘principium’ accipitur multipliciter, scilicet pro principio contentivo, et principio effectivo, sive pro principio compositivo. – *Principium contentivum*: Principium contentivum vocatur principium logicale, quod propter suam communitatem tamquam superius continet sub se sua inferiora. Et de tali prioritare sive principalitate loquitur Aristoteles, quod tale principium dicitur principium in *Postpredicamentis*, capitulo de prius, ubi dicitur quod ‘prius’ dicitur istud a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. – *Principium compositivum*: Principium vero compositivum dicitur ex quo res componitur, quod quidem principium est pars rei et manet in rei, sicut vult Aristoteles, primo *Physicorum*, et tale est principium naturale intrinsecum, sicut materia et forma. – *Principium effectivum*: Principium vero effectivum dicitur causa efficiens, quod quidem dicitur principium extrinsecum, et est similiter principium naturale sive reale. Finis vero propinquus rei, quia coincidit cum forma, sicut vult Aristoteles, secundo *Physicorum*, ideo est principium intrinsecum, sicud forma. Q. 23, DIST. 1 (22^{rb-va}).

– *Principium terminativum*: Verumtamen potest addi quartum membrum divisionis, scilicet principium terminativum, et istud subdividitur in principium terminativum intrin-

secum et extrinsecum. – *Principium terminativum intrinsecum*: ‘Intrinsecum’ dicitur pars rei vel essentialis, ut forma, que est pars generatio- nis, vel pars quantitativa, que est pars magnitudinis vel terminans magnitudinem, sive initians continuationem et successionem, quod dico pro principio initiativo vel successivo, de quo alibi diffusius patet, utpote in *Questione de tempore sive quarto Physicorum*. – *Principium terminativum extrinsecum*: Principium vero terminativum sive initiativum ‘extrinsecum’ est causa efficiens, vel finis remotus rei et hoc *essentialiter loquendo*; sed *quantitative loquendo*, tunc istud a quo res incipit exclusive vel ad quod terminatur, dicitur principium vel terminus, sicut si aliquod longum extendatur ab isto pariete ad ostium, tunc iste paries est principium extrinsecum illius extensionis, et ostium est terminus extrinsecus, vel e converso, secundum diversam considerationem diversorum. Q. 23, DIST. 2 (22^{va}).

Propositio: (Boecius) vult quod omnis propositio sit vocalis, mentalis vel scripta Q. 14, AD. OPP. (12^{vb}). – sicut tota propositio vocalis correspondet toti mentali, sic pars principalis parti principali, utpote subiectum subiecto, et predicatum predicato. Q. 20, CONCL. 3 (19^{ra}) – non semper eodem modo partes vel equivalentes constituunt propositionem equivalentem Q. 4, AD 4., AD PROB. 2. PROP. (4^{va}) – quancumque alique tres propositiones sic se habent quod in dubio sunt due, et tertia certa sive (s)cita, et quod habent idem subiectum, tunc aliud est predicatum propositionis scite a predicato propositionis dubie

Q. 21, OPINIO 2 (19^{vb}) – aliquae due propositiones possunt sic se habere quod subiecta earum precise supponunt pro eisdem, et predicata similiter, quarum tamen una esset vera et reliqua esset falsa. Q. 26, CONCL. 5 (26^{va}).

Propositio mentalis: nulla propositio mentalis eque simplex correspondet convertibiliter isti vocali ‘Sortes est homo’. Q. 12, CONCL. 7 (11^{va}) – aliqua mentalis sibi correspondet convertibiliter, quamvis non sit eque simplex, sicut ista res que vocatur Sortes. Q. 12, CONCL. 8 (11^{va}).

Propositio singularis: aliqua propositio est singularis in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo. Q. 12, CONCL. 5 (11^{rb}) – nulla propositio est singularis cuius subiectum est terminus communis univocus primo sine signo et sine pronomine demonstrative. Q. 12, CONCL. 6 (11^{rb}) – aliqua est propositio singularis cui nulla mentalis eque simplex correspondet convertibiliter. Q. 12, CONCL. 7 (11^{rb}).

Proprium: ‘proprium’ nihil aliud est quam terminus competens alicui per se secundo modo, et hoc precipue ‘proprie proprium’. Primo, quia nihil predicatur de subiecto nisi terminus; omne proprium predicatur de suo subiecto. Secundo, quia nihil convertitur cum suo subiecto nisi terminus; convertibilitas est proprietas terminorum sive propositionum; sed proprium convertitur cum suo subiecto. Tertio, quia omne demonstrabile de suo subiecto est terminus, quia omne tale est predicabile; sed proprium

est demonstrabile de suo subiecto; igitur etcetera. Q. 41, CONTRA OP. COMM. (39 ra).

– proprietas individualis, accipiendo ‘proprietatem’ sive ‘proprium’ primo vel secundo vel tertio modo quo accipit Porphyrius ‘proprium’, potest competere pluribus individuis. Q. 13, CONCL. 1 (12^{ra}). – proprietas individualis accipiendo quarto modo ‘proprium’, scilicet, secundum quod convertitur cum isto cum quo est proprietas unius individui, numquam potest univoce alteri individuo competere. Q. 13, CONCL. 2 (12^{rb}) – ‘proprium’ dicitur quadrupliciter, quia iste terminus ‘proprium’ accipitur quadrupliciter. Q. 41, CONCL. 1 (39^{rb}) – hec propositio est impossibilis: ‘proprium competit soli speciei’. Q. 41, CONCL. 2 (39^{rb}) – ista propositio: ‘aliquid est proprium quod <competit> omni et non soli’ ad intellectum auctoris est vera, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquid est proprium quod competit omni homini vel omni individuo istius speciei homo’, et non verificatur de ista specie sumpta cum dictione exclusive. Q. 41, CONCL. 3 (39^{rb}) – hec propositio est falsa: ‘aliquid proprium alicuius speciei competit omni individuo alicuius speciei’. Q. 41, CONCL. 4 (39^{rb}) – ad intellectum auctoris hec est vera: ‘aliquid est proprium quod competit soli sed non omni’, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquid est proprium quod verificatur <de individuo istius solius speciei, et non> de omni individuo istius speciei’. Q. 41, CONCL. 5 (39^{rb}) – istud proprium canescere in senectute non est tale proprium quod competit <omni> et soli sed non semper. Q. 41, CONCL. 6 (39^{rb}) – aliquid est proprium quod competit omni et soli sed non semper, ad intentionem

auctoris, quia stat loco istius ‘aliquid est proprium quod verificatur de aliqua specie’ sumpta cum isto ‘solus’ sive dictione exclusiva. Q. 41, CONCL. 7 (39^{rb}) – aliquid est proprium quod competit omni et soli et semper, ad istum intellectum quod aliquid proprium verificatur de aliquo specie sumpta cum dictione exclusiva, et verificatur de ista specie universaliter et numquam vere negatur ab ista specie, et hoc utrisque, scilicet tam specie quam proprio, sumptis personaliter. Q. 41, CONCL. 8 (39^{va}) – proprium ‘risibile’ competit alicui tamquam proprie proprium quod impossibile est ridere. Q. 41, CONCL. 8 (39^{va}) – hoc proprium ‘risibile’ competit alicui tamquam proprie proprium quod impossibile est esse risibile. Q. 41, CONCL. 8 (39^{va}) – hoc proprium ‘risibile’ non est proprium alicuius quod potest ridere. Q. 41, CONCL. 8 (39^{va}) – istud proprium quod competit omni et soli et semper est unum universale de quo principaliter intendit Porphyrius, quia alia sunt accidentia. Q. 41, CONCL. 9 (39^{va}) – omne proprium est accidens. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}).

Quale: duplex est ‘quale’, scilicet substantiale et accidentale. – *Quale substantiale:* Quale substantiale querit de forma substantiali; – *Quale accidentale:* quale vero accidentale querit de forma accidentali sive de alia proprietate accidentali. Q. 40, DIST. 1 (38^{ra}).

Relatio: *Suppositio prima:* Prima igitur suppositio est ista *quod omnes tales dictiones ‘intellectio’, ‘desideratio’, ‘credulitas’ sive ‘credidio’, ‘conceptus’ sive ‘conceptio’, ‘voluntas’ sive ‘volitio’ sint relativa.* Et capit ista

suppositio evidentiam ab Aristotele, capitulo de *relatione*, ubi vult quod scientia et sensatio sunt relativa, quia pari ratione qua scientia est alicuius scibilis, et alicuius sciti, et sensatio alicuius sensibilis et sensati. Intellectio est alicuius intelligibilis et intellecti, et desideratio alicuius desiderabilis et desiderati, et creditio alicuius credibilis et crediti, et volitio alicuius volibilis et voliti, et sic de consimilibus. *Suppositio secunda:* Secunda suppositio est ista que similiter ibidem ab Aristotele elici potest, *quod relativa sibi invicem non includentia ampliationem – utpote aliquid verbum possibilitatis vel de preterito vel de futuro – sint simul natura, ita quod consequentia existendi ab uno ad reliquum et e converso, utrisque acceptis personaliter, est bona,* sicut ista consequentia est bona: ‘scientia, igitur scitum est, et e converso’, ‘sensatio est, ergo sensatum est, et e converso’, et simili ratione sequitur ‘intellectio est, ergo intellectum est, et e converso’, ‘credidio est, ergo creditum est, et e converso’, ‘volitio est, ergo volutum est, et e converso’. Videtur satis evidens quod ista fuerat intentio Aristotelis, sicut legenti capitulum de *relatione* satis patet. Q. 44, SUPPOSITIONES (42^{rab}).

Relativa – genus et species: nulla species que est homo, nec aliquid genus quod est animal dicuntur relative ad invicem. Q. 15, CONCL. 4 (15^{ra}) – species et genus que verificentur de homine et animali, dicuntur relativa ad invicem, quia isti duo termini ‘species’ et ‘genus’. Q. 15, CONCL. 5 (15^{ra}) – non omne genus et species sunt sibi invicem relativa. Q. 16, CONCL. 4 (15^{vb}).

‘Res que vocatur Sortes’: iste terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est terminus accidentalis, non substantialis. Q. 20, c.4 (19^{ra}) – iste terminus ‘res que vocatur Sortes’ est in predicamento qualitatis. Q. 20, c.5 (19^{rab}).

Scientia: ‘scientia’ accipitur tripliciter: uno modo *propriissime*, scilicet pro notitia causata demonstratione; alio modo accipitur *largius*, scilicet pro notitia evidenti veri necessarii; tertio modo accipitur *largissime*, scilicet pro notitia evidenti et probabili alicuius veri. Q. 1, DIST. 1 (1^{ra}). – aliqua scientia est necessaria ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam Q. 1, CONCL. 1 (1^{ra}) – nulla scientia que (non) est prima causa, est necessaria aliqua necessitate ad cognitionem predicamentorum habendam Q. 1, CONCL. 2 (1^{rb}) – possibile est aliquem habere scientiam predicamentorum sine scientia generis. Q. 1, CONCL. 4 (1^{rb}) – scientia universalium presupponit scientiam singulorum. Q. 24, AD 6. (24^{va}).

Videas Cognitio.

Sensus transsumptivus: Q. 13, AD 3. (12^{rb}); Q. 14, CONCL. 10 (13^{rb}), AD 3. (14^{va}); Q. 25, DIST. 2, CONCL. 3 (25^{ra}); Q. 29, DIST. 1 (29^{ra}), CONCL. 2 (29^{rb}), AD 1., AD 3. (29^{rb}), AD OPP. (29^{va}); Q. 30, DIST. 3, (29^{vb}), CONCL. 3 (29^{vb}–30^{ra}), AD 1. (30^{ra}); Q. 31, CONCL. 9, CONCL. 10, CONCL. 11 (31^{ra}), CONCL. 12, AD 2. (31^{rb}); Q. 32, 2. (31^{va}), CONCL. 2 (32^{rb}); Q. 35, AD 1. (35^{ra}), AD OPP. (35^{ra}); Q. 40, CONCL. 6, AD 4. (38^{va}); Q. 41, AD 4. (39^{va}).

Separabile: duplex est ‘separabile’, (...) scilicet reale et logicale. –

Separabile reale: Reale, quod realiter inheret alicui subiecto et potest non inherere manente subiecto. – *Separabile logicale*: Reale Logicale, quod affirmatur de aliquo subiecto et potest negari ab eodem subiecto significative sumpto. Q. 29, DIST. 2 (29^{rb}).

Separabile accidens: duplex est ‘separabile accidens’, scilicet realis et logicalis. – *Separabile accidens realis*: Realis est que fit ex parte rei alicuius accidentis in subiecto cui realiter inheret, sicut quando caliditas separatur a ligno, vel ab aliquo. – *Separabile accidens logicalis*: Logicalis est ista quando aliquis terminus accidentalis vere negatur a subiecto, sicut patet in ista propositione: ‘Sortes non est sedens’, posito quod Sortes prius fuit sedens et nunc non sit sedens. Q. 29, DIST. 2 (29^{rab}).

Species: ‘species’ accipitur multipliciter: uno modo *pro pulchritudine*; secundo modo *pro forma*; tertio modo *pro diffinitione*; quarto modo *pro similitudine representativa*; quinto modo *pro quoddam universalis*. Q. 14, DIST. UN. (12^{vb}).

– ‘species’ accipitur dupliciter quantum est ad presens: uno modo *pro forma reali substantiali vel accidentali*, alio modo *pro termino mentali, vocali vel scripto*, qui quidem terminus est de pluribus predicabilis numero differentibus in eo quod quid. Q. 31, DIST. 2 (30^{va}). – sive species accipiatur pro re que non est signum, sive pro signo, Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei. Q. 14, CONCL. 11 (14^{rb}) – homo est species animalis. Q. 15, CONCL. 1 (14^{vb}) – homo est species ‘animal’. Q. 15, CONCL. 2

(15^{ra}) – hec est concedenda: ‘omne “homo” est species animalis.’ Q. 15, CONCL. 3 (15^{ra}) – omnis species est alicuius generis species, si ly ‘species’ supponat personaliter. Q. 16, CONCL. 5 (15^{vb}) – aliqua species est pars integralis generis. Q. 27, CONCL. 1 (27^{rb}) – species est pars subiectiva generis et individuum speciei, quia sunt per se inferiora ad genus et ad speciem. Q. 27, CONCL. 6 (27^{va}) – aliqua species est pars essentialis generis. Q. 27, CONCL. 7 (27^{va}) – omnis species substantialis est accidens. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}). *Videas* Genus: Relativa – genus et species.

Species pro pulchritudine accepta: aliquod signum est species primo modo accepta. Q. 14, CONCL. 1 (12^{vb}) – non omnis species isto modo accipiendo ‘speciem’ est signum vel terminus. Q. 14, CONCL. 2 (13^{ra}).

Species pro forma accepta: aliqua ‘species’ secundo modo accepta est terminus vel signum. Q. 14, CONCL. 3 (13^{ra}) – non omnis ‘species’ taliter accepta est signum. Q. 14, CONCL. 4 (13^{ra}) – proprie loquendo nullo signo existente aliqua sunt eiusdem speciei accipiendo ‘speciem’ pro forma. Q. 14, CONCL. 8 (13^{ra}) – nullo signo existente Sortes et Plato proprie loquendo secundum communem opinionem non sunt eiusdem speciei, quamvis forte secundum opinionem Commentatoris qui posuit unum intellectum esse in omnibus, possent dici in aliquo sensu ‘eiusdem speciei’, quia eiusdem intellectus. Q. 14, CONCL. 9 (13^{rb}) – transumptive loquendo nullo signo existente Sortes et

Plato sunt eiusdem speciei, idest: Sortes et Plato habent consimiles formas ultimas. Q. 14, CONCL. 10 (13^{rb}).

Species pro diffinitione accepta: omnis ‘species’ tertio modo accepta est signum vel signa. Q. 14, CONCL. 5 (13^{ra}).

Species pro similitudine representativa accepta: aliqua ‘species’ quarto modo accepta est signum vel terminus. Q. 14, CONCL. 6 (13^{ra}).

Species pro quoddamuniversalis accepta: omnis ‘species’ quinto modo accepta est signum simplex vel compositum. Q. 14, CONCL. 7 (13^{ra}).

Species specialissima: omne quod est proxime et univoce ante individua, est (species) specialissima, si illud immediate et per se supponitur generi. Q. 19, CONCL. 1 (17^{vb}) – sub specie specialissima nihil continetur nisi individuum. Q. 19, CONCL. 2 (17^{vb}) – aliquid est per se ante individua proxime quod non est species specialissima, nec genus, sed individuum. Q. 19, CONCL. 3 (18^{ra}) – nulla species specialissima componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus specialissimis absolutis. Q. 27, CONCL. 4 (27^{va}) – aliquod species specialissima componitur, tamquam ex partibus integralibus, ex pluribus speciebus (specialissimis) non-absolutis. Q. 27, CONCL. 5 (27^{va}).

Subiectum accidentis: ‘subiectum accidentis’ accipitur dupliciter: uno modo *pro isto de quo accidens*

accidentaliter predicatur; alio modo pro isto cui accidens realiter inheret. Q. 42, DIST. 3 (40^{ra}).

Substantia: iste terminus 'substantia' accipitur multipliciter: uno modo *pro termino absolute significante substantiam*, sicut accipit Aristoteles in *Predicamentis*, quando loquitur de substantia prima et secunda, et sic est nomen secunde intentionis. Alio modo accipitur 'substantia' *pro essentia alicuius rei*, sive ista res sit per se subsistens, sive alteri inherens. Et sic accipit Aristoteles in principio *Predicamentorum*, quando dicit: 'equivoca sunt, quorum nomen est communis et ratio substantie secundum istud nomen est diversa', idest: essentie, quia non tantum loquitur Aristoteles de equivocacione que fit in terminis substantialibus, sed etiam de ista que fit in terminis accidentalibus, quia diffinit equivoca quecumque sint ista sive substantialia sive accidentalia. Et isto modo substantia est nomen prime intentionis. Tertio modo accipitur 'substantia' *pro diffinitione*. Et isto modo accipitur a Porphyrio, quando dicit quod differentia est constitutiva substantie animalis vel hominis. Et isto modo adhuc substantia est nomen secunde intentionis. Q. 34, DIST. 1 (34^{ra}).

Superpositio, suppositio: 'superpositio' et 'suppositio' (...) accipi(un) tur dupliciter: uno modo logicaliter, alio modo localiter. *Localiter* sicut paries superponitur fundamento et fundamentum supponitur parieti. *Logicaliter*, sicut magis commune superponitur minus communi et <minus> commune supponitur magis communi. Q. 6, DIST. UN. (5^{vb}).

Supponere: supponere *naturaliter* Q. 26, AD 2. (26^{va}) – supponere *materialiter* Q. 15, AD 1. (15^{rab}); Q. 41, AD 1. (39^{va}); Q. 41, AD 4. (39^{va}); Q. 44, CONCL. 8, CONCL. 9 (42^{va}) – supponere *simpliciter* Q. 44, CONCL. 8, CONCL. 9 (42^{va}) – supponere *personaliter*. Q. 1, AD 1. (1^{va}), Q. 6, CONCL. 5 (10^{ra}); Q. 41, AD 1. (39^{va}) – supponere *confuse et distributive* Q. 4, 1. AD 1. PROP. (3^{va}), Q. 4, AD PROB. 2. PROP. (4^{va}); Q. 26, CONCL. 2 (26^{rb}); Q. 26, CONCL. 4 (26^{rb-va}) – supponere *confuse tantum* Q. 4, 1. AD 1. PROP. (3^{va}), Q. 4, AD PROB. 2. PROP. (4^{va}); Q. 25, CONCL. 4, ad I (25^{rb}); Q. 25, AD 3. (25^{va}).

Suppositio: presupponitur *distinctio de suppositione materiali et personali et simplici*. Q. 15, DIST. UN. (14^{vb}); *distinctio inter suppositionem significativam et personalem* tamquam superius et inferius Q. 11, AD 2. (10^{rab}).

Species pro universali accepta: ista consequentia est bona: 'una species est, igitur alia species est'. Q. 6, CONCL. 3 (5^{vb}).

Suscipere magis et minus: 'suscipere magis et minus' potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet realiter et logicaliter. – *Suscipere magis et minus realiter:* Realiter quando aliquid in essentia sua intenditur vel remittitur per aliquid simile sibi adveniens, vel ab eo recedens, sicut dicimus calorem intendi per appositionem caloris, et lumen per appositionem luminis. – *Suscipere magis et minus logicaliter:* Logicaliter sive predicative, quando aliquis terminus de aliquo verificatur

aliquando cum hoc adverbio 'magis', et aliquando cum hoc adverbio 'minus', sicut dicimus album intendi vel suscipere magis et minus, quia aliquando album verificatur de suo subiecto cum adverbio 'magis', et aliquando cum hoc adverbio 'minus'. Q. 33, DIST. UN. (33^{rb}).

– omnis differentia sive per se sive per accidens mentalis potest intendi vel potest remitti realiter Q. 33, CONCL. 1 (33^{rb}) – nihil suscipit magis et minus secundum idem realiter. Q. 33, CONCL. 2 (33^{rb}) – nihil suscipit magis et minus logicaliter secundum idem, respectu eiusdem. Q. 33, CONCL. 3 (33^{rb}) – aliquid suscipit magis et minus secundum idem respectu diversorum, Q. 33, CONCL. 4 (33^{rb}) – probabiliter potest teneri quod aliqua differentia per se potest suscipere magis et minus tam logicaliter quam realiter. Q. 33, CONCL. 5 (33^{va}) – nulla differentia per se primo modo potest suscipere magis et potest suscipere minus logicaliter secundum communem opinionem. Q. 33, CONCL. 6 (33^{va}).

Terminus: omnis terminus cum alio termino a quo vere negatur, vere predicatur de seipso mediante hoc verbo 'differt'. Q. 28, CONCL. 5 (28^{va}) – omnis terminus, sive substantialis, sive accidentalis primo modo, est accidens. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}).

Terminus appellativus: presuppono quod omnis terminus appellativus sit universale. Q. 20, DIST. 2 (18^{vb}).

Terminus communis: *Videas* Propositio singularis; Terminus proprius.

Terminus equivocus: *Videas* Terminus proprius; Terminus univocus.

Terminus mentalis: est conceptus simplex vel composites Q. 4, CONCL. 1 (3^{vb}) – est in intellectu subiective Q. 4, CONCL. 1 (3^{vb}) – aliqua mentalis sibi correspondet convertibiliter, quamvis non sit eque simplex Q. 12, CONCL. 8 (11^{va}).

Terminus proprius: aliquis terminus proprius convertitur cum aliquo termino communi. Q. 12, CONCL. 2 (11^{ra}) – aliquis terminus proprius est commune equivocum. Q. 12, CONCL. 3 (11^{rb}) – aliquis terminus proprius habet inferius. Q. 12, CONCL. 4 (11^{rb}).

Terminus scriptus: *Vide* Universale.

Terminus univocus: duo termini absolute convertuntur, quorum unus est univocus et alius equivocus. Q. 12, CONCL. 1 (11^{ra}).

Terminus vocalis/prolatus: *Vide* Universale.

Totum, pars: 'totum' et 'pars' dicuntur multipliciter, nam quoddam est (totum) integrale, et (quoddam) est totum universale (vel subiectivum, et quoddam est totum essentiale), et similiter quedam est pars integralis, et quedam pars universalis vel subiectiva, et quedam est pars essentialis. – *Pars essentialis:* 'Pars vero essentialis' dicitur ista, que cum aliquo componit aliquod totum essentiale, quod non excedit in quantitate talem partem essentialem. Unde pars essentialis addita parti essentiali non facit totum maius quantitative, vel remota

non facit totum minus, sicut patet de forma niville, que separata ab nivilla non diminuit quantitatem niville. Consimiliter forma adveniens materie non facit totam magis extensum quam sit ipsa materia vel ipsa forma. – *Pars integralis*: ‘Pars vero integralis’ vocatur ista ex qua cum aliis partibus integralibus integratur totum componens. Que quidem pars addita maius facit unum totum integrale maius quantitative aliqua sua parte, sicut pes vel manus facit ipsum totum cui additur maius quantitate. Et talis pars integralis adhuc subdividitur, quia: quedam est pars continuativa, et quedam aggregativa, et quedam multiplicativa, et quedam ordinativa, et sic de aliis. – *Pars subiectiva*: ‘Pars vero subiectiva’ accipitur potius in logica, et dicitur semper ‘inferius respectu sui superioris’, quia subicitur in propositione in qua fit predicatio directa, et quia significat partem sui totius significati per suum superius, sicut ‘homo’ significat aliquid quod animal significat, et non significat istud quod animal significat, et ideo dicitur ‘pars subiectiva’ respectu animalis et ‘totum universale’ respectu Sortis et Platonis et de aliis individuis. Q. 27, DIST. UN. (27^{rab}).

Universale: duplex est universale, quod quoddam est universale naturale sive per se, et quoddam est universale ad placitum sive per accidens. Et quodlibet istorum membrorum subdividitur. – *Universale naturale*: universale naturale est duplex quia: quoddam est universale naturale predicatione, quoddam reale; primo modo predicatum vocatur universale logicale; secundo modo vocatur

universale physecum. – *Universale naturale predicatione sive logicale*: conceptus predicabilis de pluribus si plura habeat supposita vel posset habere plura supposita. Quod dico propter conceptum mundi et solis et lune et sic de consimilibus. Unde universaliter: omnis conceptus appellativus posset dici isto modo universale, quia omne tale universale est quoddam signum simplex vel compositum. – *Universale naturale reale sive physicum*: res sine qua pauci vel nulli effectus naturales in spera activorum et passivorum possunt effici, et talia universalis sunt Deus et omnia corpora supercelestia. – *Universale ad placitum*: Universale ad placitum sive per accidens est duplex: quoddam est ex communi usu, scilicet, vocale et scriptum. *Vocale* est terminus appellativus vocalis simplex vel compositus; *scriptum* est terminus scriptus appellativus simplex vel compositus. Q. 4, DIST. UN. (3^{vab}).

– aliquid predicatur de pluribus univoce quod non est universale. Q. 21, CONCL. 2 (20^{rb}) – hoc genus ‘universale’ est per se superius ad genus generalissimum. Q. 22, CONCL. 3 (21^{rb}) – omne genus substantiale est accidens, et omnis species substantialis, et omnis differentia, et omne proprium. Q. 45, CONCL. 1 (43^{va}).

Universale mentale: est in intellectu subiective Q. 4, CONCL. 1 (3^{vb}). – duo universalis mentalia possunt simul esse in eodem intellectu. Q. 4, CONCL. 2 (3^{vb}) – aliqua duo universalis eiusdem speciei specialissime possunt simul esse (in) intellectu. Q. 4, CONCL. 3 (3^{vb}). – universale intensum et

universale remissum possunt simul esse intellectu. Q. 4, CONCL. 4 (3^{vb}) – duo universalialia intensa non possunt simul esse in intellectu. Q. 4, CONCL. 5 (3^{vb}).

Universale scriptum: non est in aliqua substantia tamquam accidens in subiecto, quia est substantia vel substantie Q. 4, CONCL. 5 (4^{ra}).

Universale vocale: est in aere tamquam in subiecto Q. 4, CONCL. 5 (4^{ra}).

Univocum: univocum strictissime acceptum (...) accipitur pro terminis qui mediante unica impositione sive unico conceptu sive unica ratione diffinitiva predicantur de pluribus in quid, et non perfectius neque prius de uno quam de alio, idest, non cum ista additione ‘perfectius’ predicatur de aliquo illorum respectu alterius illorum, sicut homo predicatur de suis suppositis, quia Sortes non est perfectius homo quam Plato, nec quam Cicero. Q. 5, DIST. 2 (5^{ra}).

– univocorum quoddam est complexum et quoddam incomplexum (...). Q. 12, DIST. 2 (10^{vb}).

– univocorum quoddam est primo univocum, idest non ratione alicuius sue partis precise, sed ratione totius; et quoddam est univocum non primo, quia est univocum ratione alicuius sue partis, et non totius vel cuiuslibet partis. – *Univocum primo:* Exemplum primi: iste terminus ‘homo’ est univocus primo modo, quia non ratione alicuius sue partis precise, et similiter iste terminus complexus ‘animal rationale mortale’. – *Univocum non primo:* Exemplum secundi sicut iste terminus complexus ‘res exi-

stens Sortes’ est terminus univocus ratione istius partis ‘res existens’ et ⟨non⟩ ratione istius termini ‘Sortes’, et similiter iste terminus ‘substantia existens Sortes’ sive ‘substantia que vocatur Sortes’. Q. 12, DIST. 3 (11^{ra}).

– omne istud predicatur univoce de aliquibus de quibus aliquid predicatur secundum nomen et secundum eandem rationem. Q. 21, OPINIO 1 (19^{vb}).

Unum: ‘unum’ accipitur multipliciter: *I: Unum essentialiter:* scilicet pro ‘uno essentialiter’; quod quidem unum componitur ex partibus diversarum rationum, quarum una est potentia respectu alterius, et ⟨que⟩ sunt precise in eodem situ, sicut materia et forma. *II: Unum secundum gradus accidentales:* Alio modo dicitur ‘unum’ secundum gradus accidentales; quod quidem unum componitur ex partibus eiusdem rationis, que quidem partes sunt precise simul, sive sibi invicem inexistentes, et hoc sive tale unum sit extensum sive non. Exemplum primi sicut albedo, que componitur ex partibus gradualibus eiusdem rationis. Que quidem partes graduales secundum intensionem et secundum extensionem sunt sibi invicem inexistentes et precise in eodem situ subiective. Exemplum secundi ut aliquid accidens mentale, sicut gaudium vel dilectio, quia talia accidentia mentalia intensionalia et remissibilia componuntur ex partibus gradialibus eiusdem rationis. Que quidem partes, quamvis proprie loquendo non sunt in eodem situ, tamen sunt sibi invicem ⟨in⟩existentes, quia sunt in subiecto individuali utpote in anima intellectiva. Et isti duo modi unitatis propriissime dicuntur unitates per

se, quia sunt maxime unitates que fiunt ex distinctis rebus excepta sola unitate filii Dei et nature assumpte, de qua nihil ad presens quia alterius existit speculationis. *III: Unum indivisibilitate*; Tertio modo dicitur aliquod 'unum indivisibilitate', sicut Deus est unus, et angelus, et anima intellectiva. Et hoc est similiter maxime unum. *IV: Unum continuatione*: Quarto modo dicitur aliquod 'unum continuatione', sive corporali sive incorporali. Corporale sicut unum lignum continuum, cuius partes secundum extensionem continuantur sibi invicem; incorporale sicut partes solis integrales sibi invicem continuantur. Et isto modo aliquod dicitur unum per se. *V: Unum situ vel subiecto*: Quinto modo dicitur aliquod 'unum situ vel subiecto', ista, scilicet, que precise sunt in eodem situ sive in eodem subiecto, sicut albedo et dulcedo sunt precise in eodem situ et in eodem subiecto sicut in lacte, et

sicut grammatica et musica sunt precise in eodem subiecto, scilicet in anima. *VI: Unum per accidens proprie loquendo*: Sexto modo dicitur aliquod 'unum per accidens' proprie loquendo, sicut aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente, quamvis etiam quintus modus sit unitas accidentalis. *Alii modi unitatis*: Alii vero sunt modi unitatis, utpote unum numero, unum specie, unum genere, unum diffinitione etcetera (...). Q. 43, DIST. 2 (41^{rb-va}).

– ex subiecto et accidente illius subiecti accipiendo 'accidens' secundum quod est nomen secunde intentionis, non componitur unum per se. Q. 43, CONCL. 1 (41^{va}) – isto modo accipiendo 'subiectum' et 'accidens' ex subiecto (et) accidente componitur unum unitate subiecti. Q. 43, CONCL. 2 (41^{va}) – ex subiecto et accidente accipiendo 'accidens' ut accidens est nomen prime intentionis, non fit unum per se. Q. 43, CONCL. 4 (41^{va}).

Index exemplorum

A: omnis A est littera Q. 11, AD 2. (10^{rb}).

Adam: Adam non est Q. 27, 3. (27^{ra}) – Adam non est, igitur homo non est Q. 27, 3. (27^{ra}).

Albedo: albedo est color Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}).

Album: alborum aliud dulce, aliud amarum Q. 2, DIST. UN. (2^{ra}).

Animal: animal est animal Q. 4, CONCL. 3 (3^{vb}); Q. 9, CONCL. 4 (7^{vb}) – animal est homo Q. 26, 1., 2., 3. (25^{vb}–26^{ra}); Q. 26, CONCL. 2, CONCL. 3, CONCL. 4, CONCL. 5 (26^{rb}–va); Q. 26, AD 1. (26^{va}) – animal est rationale Q. 39, 2., 3. (37^{va}) – animal potest esse rationale Q. 39, 3. (37^{va}) – animal est risibile Q. 39, 2. (37^{va}) – animal est genus Q. 2, CONCL. 2 (2^{rb}) – animal est substantia animata sensibilis Q. 38, CONCL. 8 (37^{rb}) – animal est substantia animalis sensibilis Q. 38, CONCL. 8 (37^{rb}) – omne animal est homo Q. 26, CONCL. 5 (26^{va}); Q. 26, AD 1. (26^{va}) – animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale Q. 2, DIST. UN., CONCL. 2 (2^{ra}); Q. 37, DIST. UN. (36^{ra}) – animalium aliud risibile, aliud hinnibile Q. 37, DIST. UN., CONCL. 4 (36^{ra}) – animalium aliud album, aliud nigrum Q. 37, DIST. UN. (36^{ra}) – hoc animal est animal Q. 9, CONCL. 4, c.5 (7^{vb}) – hoc animal est sine calore naturali Q. 42, CONCL. 4 (40^{rb}) – aliquod animal est homo

Q. 26, AD OPP. 1–2 (26^{ra}) – nullum animal est homo Q. 26, AD OPP. 2 (26^{ra}) – nullum animal irrational est homo Q. 26, AD OPP. 3 (26^{ra}) – omne animal est Q. 27, 3. (27^{ra}) – omne animal est animal Q. 4, 1. AD 1. PROP. (3^{rb}); Q. 4, AD 4. (Ad probationem prime propositionis) (4^{ra}) – omne animal (est) substantia Q. 4, 1. AD 2. PROP. (3^{va}) – omne animal est ens Q. 4, 1. AD 2. PROP. (3^{va}) – omne animal est homo Q. 26, 1., 2., AD OPP. 1 (25^{vb}–26^{ra}); Q. 26, CONCL. 1 (26^{rb}) – omne animal preter animal irrationale est homo Q. 25, AD OPP. 3 (26^{ra}) – non omne animal est bipes Q. 41, AD 2. (39^{va}) – animal est omnis homo Q. 4, AD 4. AD PROB. 1. PROP. (4^{rb}) – animal rationale est animal Q. 7, AD 1. (6^{va}) – tantum animal est bipes Q. 41, AD 2. (39^{va}) – utrumque animal istorum animalium est homo Q. 26, CONCL. 4 (26^{va}) – uterque animal de numero animalium est rationale mortale (demonstratis Sorte et Platone) Q. 39, CONCL. 4 (37^{vb}) – animal predicatur de homine Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}) – animal dicitur de homine Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}) – animal competit homini Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}) – animal verificatur de homine Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}).

Animalis: animalis est genus hominis Q. 15, AD 3. (15^{rb}).

Calor naturalis: sine calore naturali potest hoc animal esse; igitur animal potest esse sine calore naturali

Q. 42, CONCL. 4 (40^{rb}) – sine calore naturali hoc animal potest esse
 Q. 42, CONCL. 4 (40^{rb}) – sine calore naturali hoc animal est Q. 42, CONCL. 4 (40^{rb}).

Coloratum: hoc coloratum est coloratum Q. 9, CONCL. 4 (7^{vb}).

Corpus: hoc corpus est corpus Q. 9, CONCL. 4 (7^{vb}) – ‘corpus est substantia’ Q. 23, CONCL. 5 (23^{ra}) – ‘corpus est substantia composita ex materia et forma’ Q. 23, CONCL. 3 (23^{ra}).

Deus: Deus est Q. 1, CONCL. 6 (1^{va}); Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (3^{ra}) – Deus est sciens A Q. 43, CONCL. 3 (41^{va}).

Dominus: dominus est animal Q. 45, 2. (43^{rb}) – dominus est dominus Q. 45, 2. (43^{rb}) – dominus est homo Q. 45, 2. (43^{rb}).

Fundamentum: fundamentum non est, igitur domus non est Q. 27, 3. (27^{ra}).

Genus: aliquod est genus Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (3^{ra}) – genus est quod predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (3^{ra}).

Homo: homo est homo Q. 4, CONCL. 3 (3^{vb}) – hominum alius Sortes, alius Plato Q. 2, DIST. UN. (2^{ra}) – hominum alius longus, alius brevis – homo est species Q. 2, DIST. UN., CONCL. 2 (2^{rb}) – homo est species animalis Q. 15, AD 3. (15^{rb}) – homo est animal Q. 4, CONCL. 2 (3^{vb}); Q. 4, CONCL. 5 (4^{ra}); Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}) – homo est animal rationale mortale Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (3^{ra}) – homo est rationale mortale Q. 38, DIST. 1 (36^{vb}) – homo est rationalis Q. 39, 2.,

3. (37^{va}) – homo est mortalis Q. 39, 2. (37^{va}) – homo est risibilis Q. 39, 2. (37^{va}) – homo est, et non est risibilis Q. 44, AD 3. (43^{ra}) – homo est animal compositum ex corpore et anima intellective Q. 38, d.1 (36^{vb}) – homo est animal risibile Q. 3, DIST. 1 (2^{vb}); Q. 40, CONCL. 8 (38^{va}) – homo est animal recte sedens Q. 3, DIST. 1 (2^{vb}) – homo est animal et bipes, recte intendens Q. 17, DIST. 1 (16^{rb}) – homo est rectus Q. 39, 1. (37^{va}) – homo est animal susceptibile discipline Q. 40, CONCL. 8 (38^{va}) – homo est asinus Q. 44, AD 3. (43^{ra}) – homo est substantia composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva Q. 38, CONCL. 7 (37^{ra}) – homo est substantia corporea animata sensibilis rationalis mortalis Q. 38, CONCL. 8 (37^{rab}) – homo est substantia habens duas manus et decem digitos et duos pedes, potens sentire et potens intelligere et potens ridere Q. 38, CONCL. 1 (37^{ra}) – nullus homo est Q. 27, 3. (27^{ra}) – nullus homo est asinus Q. 26, CONCL. 1 (26^{rb}) – omnis homo est Q. 27, 3. (27^{ra}) – omnis homo est animal Q. 4, AD 4. (Ad probationem secunde propositionis) (4^{va}) – omnis homo est homo Q. 4, 1. AD 1. PROP. (3^{rb}); Q. 4, AD 4., AD PROB. 1. PROP. (4^{ra}) – omnis homo est risibilis Q. 41, AD 6. (39^{vab}) – omnis homo est substantia Q. 4, 4. (secundum quantum ad secundam propositionem), AD 4., AD PROB. 2. PROP. (3^{va}, 4^{va}) – omnem hominem videt homo Q. 4, AD 4., AD PROB. 1 PROP. (4^{rb}) – est homo animal omnis Q. 4, AD 4., AD PROB. 2. PROP. (4^{va}) – homo non est, igitur animal non est Q. 27, 3., AD 3. (27^{ra}, 27^{vb}).

Plato: Plato est Q. 44, CONCL. 9 (42^{va}) – Plato est animal Q. 8, CONCL. 3 (7^{rb}) – Plato est homo

Q. 2, CONCL. 2 (2^{rb}) – Plato est individuum Q. 11, 3. (9^{rb}) – Plato est iste Q. 11, AD 5. (10^{rb}).

Predicatum: predicatum inest subiecto Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}).

Sortes: Sortes est animal Q. 8, CONCL. 3 (7^{rb}) – Sortes est homo Q. 2, CONCL. 2 (2^{rb}); Q. 25, DIST. 1 (25^{ra}) – Sortes est individuum Q. 11, 3. (9^{rb}) – Sortes est iste Q. 11, AD 5. (10^{rb}) – Sortes currit Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (3^{ra}); Q. 19, CONCL. 3 (18^{ra}) – Sortes scribit Q. 20, 3. (18^{vb}) – Sortes sedet Q. 43, CONCL. 3 (41^{va}) – Sortes tacet vel loquitur Q. 37, DIST. UN. (36^{ra}) – Sortes est asinus, vel Sortes non est asinus Q. 37, DIST. UN. (36^{ra}) – Sortes est, ergo Sortes vel Plato est Q. 19, 3. (17^{vb}) – Sortes potest portare duas tales lapides, ergo potest portare tres Q. 4, AD 4. (4^{rb}).

Sortes et Plato: Sortes et Plato habent formas similes ultimata similitudine Q. 31, CONCL. 9 (31^{ra}) –

Sortes et Plato sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime nullo termino existente Q. 31, CONCL. 9 (31^{ra}) – Sortes et Plato sunt plures homines Q. 25, 1., AD 1. (24^{va}, 25^{rbva}) – Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo Q. 25, 1., AD 1. (24^{va}, 25^{rbva}) – Sortes et Plato sunt unus homo in communi Q. 25, 3., AD 3. (24^{va}, 25^{vb}) – uterque istorum est Sortes vel Plato (determinatis Sorte et Platone) Q. 37, DIST. UN. (36^{ra}).

Substantia: omnis substantia est homo Q. 4, 4., 2. AD 2. PROP., AD 4., AD PROB. 2. PROP. (3^{va}, 4^{va}). – ‘substantia est ens’ Q. 23, CONCL. 5 (23^{ra}).

Terminus: aliquis terminus est genus Q. 3, CONCL. 5 (3^{ra}) – iste terminus scriptus ‘animal’ est animal Q. 8, CONCL. 2 (7^{rb}) – iste terminus prolatus ‘animal’ est animal Q. 8, CONCL. 2 (7^{rb}) – iste terminus ‘genus’ est genus Q. 8, CONCL. 2 (7^{rb}).

APPENDIX

QUESTIONES SUPER PREDICAMENTA

⟨QUESTIO 2⟩

Consequenter queritur utrum aliquis conceptus sit equivocus.

⟨1.⟩ Et arguitur primo quod sic.

5 Omnis proprietas conveniens alicui termino vocali vel scripto ratione alicuius conceptus convenit isti conceptui; sed equivocatio convenit termino vocali vel scripto ratione alicuius conceptus, igitur equivocatio similiter convenit conceptui; igitur aliquis conceptus est equivocus. Maior videtur evidens per istam propositionem primo *Posteriorum*,¹ ‘unumquodque propter quid est et illud magis.’

10 Item, hoc idem patet discurrendo per singulas proprietates terminorum vocalium vel scriptorum; nam nullus terminus vocalis vel scriptus est nomen vel verbum, vel singularis numeri, vel nominativi casus, vel tertie persone et sic de aliis nisi quia talis terminus correspondet alicui conceptui nominali vel verbali, vel singularis numeri, vel nominativi casus, vel tertie persone etcetera, sicut satis potest elici ab Aristotele primo *Perihermenias*,² et precipue a suo commentatore Boethio ibidem,³ supra istum textum ‘Voces sunt note earum que sunt in anima passionum’; igitur pari ratione nullus terminus vocalis est equivocus nisi quia correspondet conceptui equivoco.

20 Et si dicatur quod non est simile de ista proprietate que est equivocatio et de aliis proprietatibus, *tunc assignetur*, dissimilitudo scilicet quare ista proprietas potius competit termino vocali vel scripto preter hoc quod

3 Et] 1 mg. E¹ 10 Item] 2 mg. E¹ 15 tertie] pers add. necnon del. E 22 termino] terminus E

1 Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora* 1, 2, 72a27–32; *Auctoritates* 313 (29): ‘Non solum necesse est precognoscere prima principia, aut omnia, aut quedam, aut conclusionem, sed et magis; propter unumquodque tale et ipsum magis, ut propter quod amamus rem, illud est magis amatum et omnia posteriora scimus et credimus. Per prima ergo, illa magis scimus.’

2 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione* 1, 16a3–4: ‘Sunt ergo ea que sunt in voce earum que sunt in anima passionum note.’

3 Boethius, *In librum De Interpretatione Editio prima* (PL 64, 298A): ‘Sunt ergo ea que sunt in voce, earum que sunt in anima passionum note, id est, ipse, inquit, voces intellectus qui sunt anime passionem significant, eorumque sunt significative.’ *In librum De Interpretatione Editio secunda* (PL 64, 405A).

competat alicui conceptui, quam aliqua alia sua proprietates grammaticalis vel logicalis.

⟨2.⟩ Item, posito quod Sortes audiat vel videat istum terminum ‘canis’, et quod sit omnino indifferens ad cogitandum de animali latrabili et de celesti sidere et pisce marino, ita quod non plus inclinetur ad cogitandum supra unum quam supra reliquum, tunc per talem auditionem generatur unus conceptus in mente Sortis cui correspondet iste terminus ‘canis’, et non conceptus univocus, quia tunc iste terminus ‘canis’ esset univocus ad ista tria significata; igitur conceptus equivocus.

Et *si dicatur* quod in tali auditore generabuntur tres conceptus, tali casu posito, scilicet conceptus animalis latrabilis et conceptus piscis marini et conceptus sideris celestis; quia non maiori ratione unus quam alius; igitur omnis vel nullus. Et non nullus, sicut experimento patet; igitur omnis. Et ita non generatur aliquis unus conceptus precise cui correspondet iste terminus ‘canis’ convertibiliter.

Sed contra: si sic, ponatur tunc quod iste terminus ‘canis’ sit equivocus ad mille significata – sicut de facto iste terminus ‘Ioannes’ est equivocus ad mille significata, vel potius ad centum milia, – et quod Sortes sit indifferens omnino ad cogitandum supra aliquod istorum significatorum; quo posito, ex predicta ratione sequitur quod quando Sortes audiret talem terminum ‘Ioannes’, generaretur in mente eius centum milia conceptus, quibus correspondet ratione diversorum significatorum iste terminus ‘Ioannes’ eque primo; cuius oppositum experimur. Relinquitur | igitur quod tali termino equivoco correspondeat unus conceptus equivocus.

⟨3.⟩ Item, omne signum quod competit pluribus diversa ratione est equivocum; sed aliquis conceptus competit pluribus diversa ratione; igitur aliquis conceptus est equivocus. Maior elicitur ex textu Aristotelis⁴ quo dicit quod equivocum est cuius nomen est commune, et ratio diversa. Minor declaratur, nam conceptus discretus et proprius ipsius Sortis competit ipsi Platoni, posito casu possibili, scilicet quod Sortes et Plato sint in tantum similes, quod in absentia unius et in presentia

5 celesti] scelesti E | marino] iste *add. necnon del. E* | plus] plus *superscr. E* | ad] con
add. necnon del. E 6 supra] sequitur E 11 casu] q *add. necnon del. E*
 11–12 piscis marini] piscus marinus E 12 sideris] scideris E 18 milia] ooooo
 E 19–20 significatorum] q *add. necnon del. E* 20 predicta] ratione *add. necnon del.*
 E 24 igitur] quod *add. necnon del. E*

4 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 1, 1a1–2: ‘Equivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantie ratio diversa.’

alterius non poterit discerni utrum presens sit Sortes vel Plato. Tunc clarum est quod Sortes presens alicui causabit suum conceptum proprium et discretum in mente istius cui est presens; quo conceptu causato, remouetur Sortes et presens detur Plato sine scitu concipientis, et continuet
 5 conceptum sui. Tunc iste concipiens experitur se – eodem conceptu quo concepit Sortem – concipere hanc rem sibi presentem, que quidem res est Plato; igitur conceptus Sortis discretus competit Platoni, et non eadem ratione, quia non videtur possibile quod conceptus discretus et proprius alicuius eadem ratione competeret alteri, quia tunc non esset discretus et
 10 proprius, sed communis.

⟨4.⟩ Item, nullus conceptus specialissime specificus potest competere alicui individuo alterius speciei nisi diversa ratione et equivoce; sed aliquis conceptus specialissime specificus competit alicui individuo alterius speciei; igitur aliquis conceptus specialissime specificus est equi-
 15 vocus. Maior videtur de se nota, quia sicut iste terminus ‘homo’ qui est species specialissima non potest competere alicui individuo alterius speciei, utpote asino, nisi equivoce, ita etiam iste conceptus specialissimus ‘homo’ non potest competere alicui individuo alterius speciei nisi equivoce. Minor declaratur, posito quod Sortes videat aliquam rem a
 20 remotis, que quidem res in rei veritate sit asinus, et quod appareat Sorti quod ista res sit homo; tunc Sortes concipit istam rem conceptu specifico hominis; igitur conceptus specificus hominis competit asino, et per consequens conceptus specialissime specificus competit alicui individuo alicuius speciei. Igitur aliquis conceptus specialissime specificus est equi-
 25 vocus.

⟨5.⟩ Item, aliquis conceptus competit sibi ipsi et rei extra, que quidem res differt a tali conceptu genere; et non competit sibi ipsi et tali rei extra univoce; igitur equivoce.

Prima particula antecedentis declaratur, posito quod Sortes intelligat
 30 lapidem; tunc quero utrum Sortes experiatur se concipi lapidem, vel non. Si non, tunc pari ratione periret omnis experientia, quod est absurdum. Hoc etiam est contra Aristotelem, ut videtur, secundo *De anima*,⁵ ubi vult quod sentiens sentit se sentire, et videns videt se videre, et sic de

33 sentiens] centiens *E* | videns] *d add. necnon del. E*

5 Aristoteles, *De anima* II, 425b12–17: ‘Quoniam autem sentimus nos audire et videre, necesse est quod sentire quod nos videmus aut est per hunc visum, aut per aliud; sed illud erit visus, et coloris subiecti. Aut duo unius, aut idem sui. Et etiam, si sensus quo sensimus nos videre sit alius, aut erit hoc in infinitum, aut erit idem sui. Oportet igitur ut hoc faciat primo.’

aliis. Igitur pari ratione intelligens intelligit se intelligere; vel igitur eadem
 intellectione vel alia. Non potest dici quod alia, quia pari ratione sentiens
 45^a aliquid sentiret se sentire alia sensatione ab ista sensatione, qua sentit |
 istud ad extra, et sic esset processus in infinitum, quod videtur esse
 vitandum; igitur standum est in primo, scilicet quod eodem conceptu 5
 quo Sortes concipit lapidem concipit istum eundem conceptum lapidis.
 Igitur conceptus specialissime specificus lapidis competit sibi ipsi et
 lapidi extra.

Secunda particula antecedentis, videlicet quod talis conceptus non
 competit sibi ipsi et lapidi univoce, patet quia sic sequeretur quod lapis 10
 et talis conceptus essent eiusdem speciei specialissime. Quod de se patet
 esse falsum, quia genere differunt, sicut dictum est. Et confirmatur:
 capiendo istam propositionem mentalem ‘homo est species’, tunc quero
 utrum subiectum supponat pro se vel non. Si sic, habetur propositum,
 scilicet quod conceptus specialissime specificus hominis potest compe- 15
 tere sibi ipsi et homini extra. Si non, tunc sequeretur quod nullus ter-
 minus mentalis posset supponere materialiter, quod videtur esse falsum,
 quia omnis res potest se ipsam representare; igitur talis conceptus potest
 se ipsum representare, et per consequens pro se ipso supponere, igitur
 sibi ipsi competere et rei extra. 20

⟨SUPPOSITIO PRIMA⟩ In ista questione primo ponende sunt aliquae suppo-
 sitiones, quarum prima est ista, quod omnis res naturaliter representat se
 ipsam. Et hec suppositio videtur rationalis, quia omnis representatio est
 ratione alicuius convenientie vel identitatis; igitur, cum nulla res tantum
 conveniat alicui ut ita loquar, vel sit eadem alicui sicut sibi ipsi, videtur 25
 quod omnis res sit sui ipsius representatio.

⟨SUPPOSITIO SECUNDA⟩ Secunda suppositio est ista, quod omne istud
 quod representat diversa diversis rationibus sit equivocum equivocans,
 saltem a casu vel consilio. Et ista suppositio satis elicitur ex textu Aristo-
 telis⁶ et sui commentatoris Boethii in principio istius Boethii.⁷ 30

3 sentit] istud ad extra, et sic esset processus in infinitum *add. sub columna, eadem
 manu E*; pi *add. sub columna, eadem manu E* 27 Secunda] pro *add. necnon del. E*
 28 representat] repugnat *E*

6 Aristoteles, *Predicamenta* 1, 1a1–2: ‘Equivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum com-
 mune est, secundum nomen vero substantie ratio diversa.’

7 Boethius, *In Cat.*: ‘Equivocorum alia sunt casu, alia consilio.’ (PL 64, 166B).

5 <CONCLUSIO PRIMA> Prima conclusio est ista, quod aliquid ex sua natura
 est equivocum equivocans. Ista declaratur sic: aliquid ex sua natura est
 representativum diversorum diversis rationibus; igitur aliquid ex sua
 natura est equivocum equivocans. Ista consequentia patet per secundam
 10 suppositionem. Et antecedens declaratur, nam latratus canis represen-
 tat semetipsum naturaliter, per primam suppositionem; et etiam experi-
 mento patet quod precise representat semetipsum auditui, quia auditor
 et non representat se ipsam ex impositione ad placitum, nec per acci-
 dens nec per se nec primo nec secundo; igitur representat se ipsum
 15 auditui ex sua natura. Et hoc dico, habitis omnibus circumstantiis requi-
 rendis, utpote quod debita sit distantia inter talem sonum et auditum,
 et quod sensus sit dispositus, et quod medium sit aptum, et sic de aliis.
 Et talis latratus representat canem, sicut patet experimento; quia audito
 tali latratu, concipitur canis, et non representat canem ex impositione
 20 ad placitum, | saltem ex humana impositione; igitur naturaliter. Clarum 45^{rb}
 <est> quod non eadem impositione representat semetipsum et canem;
 igitur diversa ratione. Igitur est naturaliter representativum diversorum
 diversa ratione.

20 <CONCLUSIO SECUNDA> Secunda conclusio, que consimili ratione se-
 quitur, est ista, quod aliquis conceptus est equivocus equivocans; quia
 aliquis conceptus est representivus diversorum diversa ratione; igitur ali-
 quis conceptus est equivocus equivocans. Ista consequentia patet sicut
 prius. Et antecedens similiter declaratur, quia aliquis conceptus represen-
 25 tat seipsum intellectui, quia est presens intellectui; et non impeditur, ut
 suppono, quin representat seipsum intellectui. Quia per aliquem nimiam
 sollicitudinem ipsius intellectus vel discretionem alicuius rei represen-
 tat semetipsum intellectui. Et representat rem extra cuius est conceptus
 et ipsi intellectui, et non eadem ratione; quia talis conceptus et talis res
 30 extra cuius est conceptus genere generalissimo differunt; igitur aliquis
 conceptus est representivus diversorum diversa ratione.

Item, sensus potest diversa sentire mediante <eodem> sono; igitur
 a simili vel a fortiori intellectus potest diversa concipere et intelligere
 mediante eodem conceptu; quia non videtur ratio quin pari ratione

1 Prima conclusio] Conclusio prima *mg. E¹* 7 quod] quam *E* | representat] repugnat
E | auditui] auditui *mg. E* 9 representat] repugnat *E* 13 audito] similiter *add.*
necnon del. E 14 latratu] con *add. E* | non] repugnat *add. necnon del. E* 19 Secunda
 conclusio] Conclusio secunda *mg. E¹* | consimili] consimiliter *E* 20 est¹] est *corr. ex*
ex E 21–22 aliquis] est *add. necnon del. E* 28 et] representat *add. necnon del. E*
 30 representivus] representans *E* 31 potest] diversa *add. E*; concipere *add. necnon*
del. E; vel *superscr. E* 33 mediante] in *add. necnon del. E*

qua sensus mediante eadem specie potest diversa diversis rationibus sentire, ipse intellectus mediante eodem conceptu potest diversa diversis rationibus intelligere, scilicet ipsum conceptum et rem extra cuius est conceptus.

⟨CONCLUSIO TERTIA⟩ Tertia conclusio est ista, quod unus et idem conceptus proprius et discretus unius rei potest esse conceptus proprius alterius rei. Ista declaratur sic: ponatur quod Sortes et Plato sint in tantum similes, quod in absentia unius non discernitur quis istorum sit presens, scilicet utrum Sortes sit presens vel Plato; quo posito, ponatur Plato alicui concipienti ipsum Platonem conceptu proprio et discreto; et removetur Plato sine scitu concipientis et presentetur Sortem, et continuet concipiens conceptum suum – qui quidem conceptus vocetur *A* – tunc sic: *A* prius fuit conceptus proprius ipsius Platonis, et iam *A* est conceptus proprius ipsius Sortis; igitur proprius conceptus unius potest esse proprius conceptus alterius, et hoc ratione maxime similitudinis. Et quod unus et idem conceptus qui fuit Platonis sit postea Sortis, et non alius, patet: quia concipiens experitur se concipere eundem conceptum.

Et a simili potest etiam declarari, posito quod *B* ignis causet calorem in aliquo subiecto, et quod *C* ignis precise eque intentius cum *B* igne succedat *B* ignem, in qua successione conservetur *F* calor per potentiam prime cause sine sui diminutione; tunc clarum est quod *F* calor non corrumpetur, sed ulterius conservabitur per *C* ignem. Quia non potest assignari ratio corruptionis, quia *C* ignis non corrumpet *F* calorem, nec aliquid aliud, ut suppono; igitur nihil corrumpit ipsum. Et pari ratione conceptus *A*, qui fuit causatus a Platone, postea causabitur et continuabitur a Sorte.

45^{va} ⟨OBIECTIO⟩ Et si instetur | quod ista conclusio includat contradictionem, scilicet quod idem conceptus sit communis et non communis, quia si sit proprius Platoni, tunc non est communis; et si conveniat Sorti et Platoni, videtur quod tunc sit communis.

Ad istud dicitur quod conceptus non dicitur communis quia potest competere pluribus successive, sed quia potest pluribus competere simul; quod non potest *A* conceptus. Quia si intellectui primo Sortes presentaretur, Plato alio conceptu conciperetur; vel, si eodem – quod forte verius

2 sentire] vacat *mg. E. Sequitur textus vacuus 2¾ lineae*: Oscitat ille diu qui furnum vincit hiando. Qui mihi dat villum, mala passio (torqueat) illum. Vivat in eternum qui dat mihi tale Falernum. *E* 5 Tertia conclusio] Conclusio tertia *mg. E¹* 11 scitu] scitum(?) *E* 19 precise] presise *E* 22 C] *C superscr. E corr. ex se* 31 communis] vacat vacat *add. necnon del. E*

est – hoc esset equivoce et non univoce. Unde quod aliquid idem quod est proprium uni secundum unam rationem individualem sit commune alteri secundum aliam rationem individualem, hoc non includit contradictionem; quia non secundum idem est proprium et commune.

5 Et ista conclusio ponenda est non omnino assertive, sed tamquam probabilis. Quia, si cui placeat, posset dicere quod, posito casu priori de Sorte et Platone maxime similibus, *A* conceptus non esset ipsius Sortis, sed semper ipsius Platonis. Et in presens Sortis generaretur conceptus
10 Sortis, quod tamen lateret concipientem propter maiorem similitudinem, tam conceptum generationis Sortis et Platonis quam etiam corruptionis generantium tales conceptus. Et tunc consequenter potest dici quod talis conceptus non est equivocus.

15 <CONCLUSIO QUARTA> Quarta conclusio est ista, quod aliquod definitum mentale competat alicui cui non competit eius definitio. Ista statim patet per predicta, quia capiatur conceptus specialissime specificus hominis; tunc iste conceptus representat hominem, ratione cuius representationis competit sibi ista definitio ‘animal rationale mortale’; et representat seipsum, sicut patet per primam suppositionem et secundam conclusionem; et ipsemet conceptus non est animal rationale mortale;
20 igitur talis conceptus competit alicui cui non competit aliqua sua definitio.

<AD 1.> Ad primum igitur principale dicitur quod, quamvis conclusio sit concedenda, scilicet quod aliquis conceptus sit equivocus, sicut patet per predictas conclusiones, non tamen cogit hoc istud argumentum. Et ideo
25 ad propositiones ordinarie respondetur.

Primo concedendo maiorem, videlicet quod quandocumque aliqua proprietas competit alicui ratione alicuius conceptus precise etc.

Et ulterius dicitur negando minorem, scilicet quod equivocatio competit alicui termino vocali vel scripto precise ratione alicuius conceptus,
30 quia equivocatio competit termino vocali vel scripto ratione diversorum conceptuum; quia scilicet talis terminus correspondet diversis conceptibus et diversis impositionibus diversarum rationum.

Et ulterius dicitur quod non est simile de proprietate equivocacionis et de aliis proprietatibus. Et potest ratio dissimilitudinis taliter assignari,
35 videlicet quod alie proprietates possunt haberi ratione unius conceptus

1 non] non *superscr.* E 13 Quarta conclusio] Quarta conclusio *mg.* E¹ 15 specialissime] con *add. necnon del.* E 16 ratione] con *add. necnon del.* E

tantum, sed equivocatio non, nisi ratione plurium conceptuum diversarum rationum.

⟨AD 2.⟩ Ad secundum dicitur concedendo, tali casu posito, quod in mente Sortis generabitur unus conceptus correspondens isto termino ‘canis’, non simplex sed compositus; non equivocus simpliciter sed univocus, scilicet iste conceptus ‘aliquid quod vocatur “canis”’, vel aliquis conceptus consimilis. Unde non est inconveniens quod termino puro equivoco correspondeat adequate conceptus univocus compositus. Sed
 45^{vb} esset inconveniens dicere quod tali termino correspondet adequate | conceptus simplex univocus. Et dixi quod talis conceptus compositus non
 10 esset equivocus; et hoc intellexi ratione diversorum significatorum aliorum a seipso, scilicet quod talibus significatis non esset equivocatio.

⟨AD 3.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur dupliciter. Primo secundum conclusionem superius positam, concedendo quod talis conceptus est equivocus, quia una ratione individuali competit Sorti, et alia ratione individuali competit Platoni.
 15

Secundo potest dici, si cui placeat, quod non eodem conceptu concepit Sortem et Platonem, quamvis hoc lateat concipientem, sicut predictum est;⁸ sed alio et alio.

⟨AD 4.⟩ Ad quartum dicitur concedendo maiorem, et negando minorem. Et ad probationem dicitur quod in tali apparentia concipiens non concipit asinum conceptu specifico hominis, quamvis ipse deceptus assereret quod ipse conceptu hominis conciperet talem rem. Si concipiat istam rem, concipit aliquo alio conceptu, utpote hoc conceptu ‘ista res’; et conceptu hominis quem habet in mente concipit hominem. Si sit in
 20 rerum natura vel nihil, concipit isto conceptu. Si homo non sit in rerum natura – sicut si quis videt aliquem hominem de quo simplissime crederet, propter magnam similitudinem, quod esset personaliter suus amicus, qui in rei veritate non esset suus amicus sed inimicus, quem summe odiret – tunc talis videns crederet quod summe diligeret istum hominem visum, et tamen decipitur per hoc quod summe diligit amicum suum quem credit esse istum hominem. Et ideo, sicut quis potest taliter decipi in actibus ipsius voluntatis, ita potest decipi in actibus intellectus. Verumtamen posset probabiliter susteneri quod talis conceptus hominis competeret in tali casu asino equivoce. Sed quidquid sit de hoc,
 25
 30
 35

9 termino] or *add. necnon del. E* 20 et] *ned add. necnon del. E* 27 videt] v *add. necnon del. E* 34 Verumtamen] *Verumptamen E* 35 tali] *con add. necnon del. E*

8 Videas supra, CONCL. 3.

saltem oportet necessario concedere quod asinus vel accidentia asini in tali distantia cum talibus circumstantiis saltem personaliter causant conceptum specificum hominis.

5 (AD 5.) Ad quintum dicitur concedendo, sicut patet per conclusiones positas, quod talis conceptus est equivocus, quia competit sibi ipsi ratione identitatis, et competit rei extra ratione representative similitudinis, sicut expresse patet in exemplo posito de latratu canis, qui representat semetipsum et canem.

10 (OBJECTIO) Et *si dicatur* quod non representat canem nisi arguitive vel propter aliquem sensationem precedentem intuitivam ipsius canis latrantis, *ad hoc dicitur* concedendo; sed tamen hoc non obstante, talis latratus post talem experientiam representat canem; et hoc sufficit ad propositum.

15 Et per hoc patet ad confirmationem, quia conceditur quod talis conceptus semetipsum representat, et se ipso considerato concipitur; et pro se ipso supponere potest, sicut patet in ista propositione mentali ‘homo est species’, supposito quod idem sit subiectum in tali propositione mentali quod est subiectum in ista propositione mentali ‘homo est animal risibile’. Verumtamen cum hoc stat quod in ista propositione mentali ‘homo est species’ supponit personaliter, si conceptus ipsius conceptus hominis subiciatur; quia ego pono ad presens quod omnis conceptus potest se ipso concipi, et alio conceptu.

25 (1.) Ad oppositum arguitur sic: quandocumque aliqua proprietas alicui rei (competit) naturaliter et nullo modo ad placitum vel ex positione voluntaria, tunc talis proprietas competit isti rei uniformiter, dummodo talis res est in rerum natura; sed hec proprietas que est representare rem extra intellectui competit naturaliter ipsi concipienti et non ad placitum; igitur uniformiter competit sibi et semper, dummodo talis conceptus existeret, et per consequens talis conceptus non representabit aliquid 30 aliud a tali re extra; igitur, ut videtur, nullus conceptus representabit diversa diversis | rationibus. Maior patet ex simili: nam et proprietas, 46^{ra} (que) est califacere, competit naturaliter igni, vel esse califactivum, et non competit sibi; igitur nec potest sibi competere ipso manente, nec aliud potest proprie et per se, quamvis accidens, califacere. Et similiter

11 tamen] tamen *superscr. E* | obstante] opstante *E*

dicendum est de conceptu. Et confirmatur per Aristotelem secundo *De generatione*,⁹ ubi vult quod idem in quantum idem semper fiat idem. Et minor patet per experientias.

⟨II.⟩ Item, si aliquis conceptus esset equivocus sicut terminus vocalis vel scriptus, tunc sequitur quod sicut terminus vocalis vel scriptus potest equivocare indifferenter ad quamcumque rem sive ad quodcumque signum, similiter et conceptus. Sed consequens falsum, igitur istud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis patet de se, quia conceptus lapidis non potest representare deum, vel proprius conceptus albi vel albedinis non potest representare nigredinem. Et consequentia patet, quia non videtur esse maior ratio de uno quam de alio. Et si sit, tunc assignetur.

⟨III.⟩ Item, si aliquis conceptus posset presentare plura diversis rationibus, hoc maxime videtur verum quod conceptus alicuius rei extra representat istam rem extra et semetipsum diversis rationibus, sicut superius arguebatur.¹⁰ Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia tunc talis conceptus seipso conciperetur, cuius oppositum videtur apparere per experientiam. Quia multi laici rudes habent multos conceptos quos nesciunt se habere, et per consequens quos non intelligunt. Quia si intelligerent, experirentur se intelligere.

⟨IV.⟩ Item, si sic, tunc possemus manifeste scire quod talis conceptus distinguitur ab ipso intellectu, quod tamen non videtur verum, quia multi valentes opinantur oppositum.

⟨V.⟩ Item, nos experimur nos ex consequenti intelligere conceptus nostros; et hoc facta diligenti inquisitione prius ⟨ali⟩quomodo intelligimus rem extra; igitur non videtur quod intelligimus equivoce conceptum ipsius rei extra et ipsam rem extra; ergo conceptus non representat seipsum intellectui.

⟨VI.⟩ Item, si representaret seipsum intellectui, pari ratione quidquid ⟨esset⟩ in intellectu, representaret seipsum intellectui; et per consequens omnes habitus scientifici vel dubitativi vel opinativi vel creditivi existentes in intellectu alicuius representarent se intellectui, et per consequens quilibet homo actu intelligeret omnes tales habitus, et hoc distinctis et

2 in quantum] in quam E 5 vel] ut E 11 ratio] ratione E 14 sicut] sicut E
 16 conciperetur] q *add. necnon del. E* 17 laici] layci E 24 aliquomodo] re
add. necnon del. E 31 intellectu] *corr. ex tellectus E* 32 habitus] et habitus *add. E*
 | distinctis] dis E; *lac. duo litt. E*

9 Aristoteles, *De generatione et corruptione* II, 10 336a27–28; *Auctoritates* 170 (43):
 ‘Idem manens idem semper aptum natum est facere idem.’

10 Videas supra, CONCL. 4.

propriis conceptibus. Et sic non posset esse oblivio alicuius existentis in intellectu; cuius oppositum experimur, quia factis cum magno labore aliqua quorum cognitiones habituales iste habemus in mente, ad memoriam nostram reducimus, sicut manifestiva apparentia docet.

5 <AD I.> Ad primum igitur in oppositum, dicitur concedendo quod talis
 10 proprietates mentalis inest uniformiter isti cuius est proprietates et semper
 ipso manente, nisi impediatur. Et consimiliter conceditur quod repre-
 sentare rem extra inest conceptui uniformiter quantum est ex parte sui
 et semper ipso manente, nisi impediatur, vel per corruptionem rei extra,
 15 que quando non est non representatur; vel per diversionem ipsius intel-
 lectus. Quia quamvis intellectus se habeat passive respectu receptionis
 specierum intelligibilium, sicut vult Aristoteles tertio *De anima*,¹¹ tamen
 post talem receptionem se habet active | in advertendo se intelligere 46^{rb}
 20 actus, et continendo vel divertendo se a talibus actibus ad alios actus, vel
 simpliciter ad non intelligendum, sed suspendendo omnem sui actum.
 Conceditur igitur ad intellectum iam dictum quod in talibus uniformiter
 representat intellectui rem extra.

Et ulterius negatur ista consequentia ‘igitur non representat intellectui
 aliquid aliud a tali rei extra’, quia ita naturaliter et ita uniformiter talis
 25 conceptus representat semetipsum intellectui ratione identitatis, sicut
 representat rem extra ratione representative similitudinis. Et de ista
 materia haberetur quodammodo diffusius in questionibus secundi *De
 anima*,¹² ubi tractaretur de speciebus representationis.

Et ad auctoritatem Aristotelis, dicitur ipsam similiter concedendo. Ad
 30 intellectum dicentis, quia idem agens naturale, quantum est ex parte sui,
 semper facit idem dummodo est, nisi impediatur. Et hoc non est aliud
 dicere nisi quod agens naturale et non voluntarium, ceteris paribus, non
 valet ad opposita, quia non agit per voluntatem, saltem suam, quamvis
 per voluntatem divinam.

30 <AD II.> Ad secundum dicitur negando consequentiam. Quia terminus
 vocalis vel scriptus, quantum est de se, est indifferens simpliciter ut
 ponatur ad significandum quamcumque rem. Et sic non est de conceptu,

13 active] in *add. necnon del. E* 15 sui] *corr. ex suum(?) E* 21 ista] a *add. necnon del. E*

11 Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 4, 429a10–11, 13–14. *Auctoritates* 185 (136) ‘Intelligere est pati’. Cf. Aristoteles Γ4, 429a10–11, 13–14.

12 Thomas Manlevelt, *Questiones in De anima*. Textum invenire non potui.

qui est determinatus per sui naturam ad representandum certas res; nec est alia ratio assignanda nisi quia est talis nature.

Et si queratur pueriliter quare est talis nature, dicitur quod quia prima causa fecit eum talis nature. Et ibi est standum.

⟨AD III.⟩ Ad tertium dicitur concedendo quod conceptus representat 5
rem extra et semetipsum. Et ulterius conceditur quod conceptus se ipso
concipitur confuse tantum et remisse. Propter quam confusionem et
remissionem laici non percipiunt se intelligere tales conceptus, nec etiam
clerici, nisi ex consequenti et argumentative, facta diligenti inquisitione
qualiter intellectus se habet in concipiendo rem extra; sicut quando 10
aliqua imago tota videtur, multe videntur eius partes visione totius, quas
partes videns non experitur se vidisse. Quia si queratur ab eo, utrum
talis imago habeat longos digitos vel breves, vel utrum habeat quinque
digitos vel non, satis possibile est quod ipse nesciat; et tamen videt
omnes digitos et omnes partes. Sed quando talis in visione postea advertit 15
suam visionem distincte ad manum, tunc distincte videt manum, et forte
eadem specie qua prius, mediante qua distincta visione, vel mediante qua
advertentia vel adversione scit respondere ad plures questiones de tali
manu factas. Et consimiliter quodammodo potest dici de conceptu, quod
46^{va} conceptu concipitur distincte res extra | aliquando, et ipsemet conceptus 20
confuse et remisse. Et ideo si queratur de aliquo concipiente utrum
concepit talem conceptum, dubitabit; sed postea si intellectus advertat
se diligenter ad talem conceptum, tunc experitur se concipere talem
conceptum. Et ex istis patet quod non sequitur, si tali conceptu ipsemet
conceptus concipiatur, quod concipiens hoc experitur. 25

⟨AD IV.⟩ Ad aliud dicitur negando consequentiam. Quia quamvis talis
conceptus distincte concipiatur, per hoc tamen non potest sciri utrum sit
ipse intellectus vel aliqua res alia ab ipso intellectu.

⟨AD V.⟩ Ad aliud dicitur concedendo quod nos experimur nos intel-
ligere conceptus nostros distincte et intense, facta tali inquisitione; sed 30
cum hoc stat quod prius intelligimus eosdem conceptus remisse.

⟨AD VI.⟩ Ad ultimum negatur consequentia: 'si actus intellectus vel
conceptus intellectualis ipsius intellectus representaret se intellectui, ita
quod intellectu concipiatur, pari ratione omnis habitus scientificus vel
dubitativus vel opinativus etc. representat se intellectui, ita ut actu 35

9 diligenti] diligenti *superscr. E*; ex consequenti *add. necnon del. E* 11 imago] ymago
E 15 talis in] in talis E 16 suam] divisio *add. necnon del. E* | videt] s *add. necnon*
del. E 21 aliquo] a^l(?) E 30 tali] *corr. ex talis E* 35-457.1 actu intelligatur] actus
intelligitur E

intelligatur'; quia alia ratio est de actu et de habitu. Nam actus est istud quo intellectus actu operatur, et ideo actu se representat intellectui ut actu intelligatur; et sic non est de habitu.

5 Verumptamen potest, si alicui placeat, distinguere de representatione actuali et habituali. Representatio actualis est qua res actu intelligitur; habitualis est non qua actu fit intellectio, sed qua poterit fieri sive innotescere alicuius rei extra. Et sic bene conceditur quod omnis habitus existens in intellectu habitualiter representat semetipsum intellectui, et cum tali representatione oblivio bene potest stare.

Samenvatting

De *Questiones libri Porpirii*, toegeschreven aan Thomas Manlevelt, voeren het Ockhamisme tot zijn uiterste grenzen.

De logische traktaten van Thomas Manlevelt, van wie wij weinig meer weten dan dat hij rond 1330 vermoedelijk in Parijs werkzaam was, vonden gretig aftrek in de veertiende- en vijftiende-eeuwse academische wereld. Handschriften daarvan zijn er dan ook nog in groten getale. Van het hier uitgegeven commentaar in de vorm van *questiones* op de *Isagoge* van Porphyrius is echter maar één handschrift bekend.

Voor deze editie betekent dit dat ik alle tekstuele onduidelijkheden, verschrijvingen, herhalingen en omissies moest oplossen zonder andere handschriften er op na te kunnen slaan.

Een later bovenaan het handschrift toegevoegde opmerking schrijft dit commentaar aan Thomas Manlevelt toe. De tekst zelf geeft geen enkele aanleiding om deze toeschrijving in twijfel te trekken. Integendeel: de onalledaagse verwijzing naar het hertogdom Brabant in een van de *questiones* strookt wonderwel met de weinige biografische gegevens die over Manlevelt bekend zijn. Volgens de provisorische biografie die Lorenz van hem heeft opgesteld, moet Manlevelt eind jaren dertig van de veertiende eeuw vanuit Parijs naar pre-universitair Leuven zijn getrokken. Ook gaat de tekst bijvoorbeeld uit van de suppositieleer die uit de traktaten van Manlevelt bekend is. Zonder veel voorbehoud durf ik deze tekst daarom aan Thomas Manlevelt toe te schrijven. Daarbij dateer ik de tekst rond de jaren dertig tot veertig van de veertiende eeuw, en beschouw hem als afkomstig uit Leuven, waar Manlevelt enigszins in de periferie van de academische wereld werkte, wat weer de beperkte verbreiding van dit geschrift zou verklaren.

De inleiding tot deze editie plaatst dit commentaar op de *Isagoge* in een historisch, filosofisch en geografisch kader. Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een eerste kennismaking met de filosoof Thomas Manlevelt, aan de hand van een eerder door Andrews onder de aandacht gebracht staaltje extreem Ockhamisme. Manlevelt ontkent namelijk niet alleen, in het voetspoor van Ockham, het bestaan van alle Aristotelische categorieën op substantie en kwaliteit na. Ook het bestaan van substantie ontkent hij, zodat in de werkelijkheid alleen nog individuele instanties van de

categorie kwaliteit overblijven. Op deze zelfde radicaal-Ockhamistische wijze gaat Manlevelt in het hier uitgegeven commentaar op de *Isagoge* ons denken te lijf. Ook van ons denken lijkt uiteindelijk niets anders te resteren dan een stoet van individueel elkaar opeenvolgende instanties van de vijf Porphyriaanse universalia, elk voor zich niets meer dan een accidentje van de menselijke geest. Helaas is Manlevelts commentaar op Aristoteles' *De anima*, waarnaar hij regelmatig verwijst, tot nu toe niet teruggevonden.

Hoofdstuk 2 gaat nader in op leven en werk van Thomas Manlevelt. Deze editie zou het voorbehoud moeten wegnemen waarmee de toeschrijving aan Manlevelt van het hier uitgegeven commentaar op de *Isagoge*, alsook het in handschrift daarop naadloos aansluitende commentaar op de *Categorieën* tot nu toe gepaard ging. Zelfs dient Manlevelts bibliografie nog uitgebreid met twee nog onbekende werken van zijn hand: commentaren op Aristoteles' *De anima* en *Physica*. Zoals gezegd past de hier uitgegeven tekst keurig binnen het biografische raamwerk dat Lorenz van Manlevelt heeft opgesteld. Ik ga ervan uit dat Thomas Manlevelt inderdaad rond 1330 zijn academische hoogtijdagen in Parijs heeft beleefd, waarna hij zijn carrière in Leuven heeft voortgezet. Dit commentaar op de *Isagoge* stamt dan uit zijn Leuvense periode. Hoewel zijn bijnaam 'Anglicus' luidt, meen ik uit de beschikbare gegevens te mogen opmaken dat hij wel Engels van filosofische overtuiging, maar niet van geboorte was.

Hoofdstuk 3 biedt verdere argumenten voor de toeschrijving van deze tekst aan Thomas Manlevelt, onder meer op grond van intertekstuele verwijzingen in de tekst zelf. Ook ga ik in op de Franciscaanse context waarbinnen dit werk past, zonder overigens daarmee te willen impliceren dat Manlevelt zelf een theoloog was.

In hoofdstuk 4 schets ik de historische achtergrond van deze *Questiones libri Porhirii*. De tekst zelf plaats ik in de lange traditie van commentaren op de *Isagoge*. De auteur geef ik een plaats binnen de Ockhamistische beweging in de vroege veertiende eeuw, en ik zie in hoeverre hij in verband kan worden gebracht met de Ockhamistische ontwikkelingen op de universiteiten van Oxford en Parijs.

Hoofdstuk 5 is gewijd aan vorm en inhoud van de hier uitgegeven tekst. De uiterst gestructureerde vorm van het traditionele commentaar in de vorm van *questiones* geeft de auteur alle ruimte om zijn hoogst originele ideeën te berde te brengen. Daarbij gaat hij zonder meer uit van de juistheid van de nominalistische, of preciezer Ockhamistische opvatting omtrent de status van de universalia (*genus, species, differentia, proprium,*

accidens): in de echte wereld bestaan geen algemeenheden maar alleen individuele dingen, algemeenheid is voorbehouden aan de begrippen waarmee wij in ons denken aan deze dingen in de buitenwereld refereren. In zijn commentaar staat Manlevelt stil bij de individualiteit die niet alleen bestaat in de buitenwereld, maar ook in onze eigen denkwereld. Het individuele en het accidentele: dat is wat Manlevelt steeds weer benadrukt. Want daaruit bestaat ons hele denken: individuele gedachten, die – hoe algemeen ook van strekking – als accidenten aan onze geest toekomen. Zelfs het meest algemene van de vijf universalia, het genus, is niet meer dan een accident van onze geest. En deze accidenten wisselen elkaar in een voortdurende opeenvolging af. Als ik denk: eens mens is een levend wezen, dan heb ik eerst het idee van mens in mijn hoofd en vervolgens het idee van levend wezen. En zelfs deze twee brokjes kennis kan ik niet beide tegelijk even intensief ter beschikking hebben. Het hoeft geen betoog dat deze rücksichtsloze doorvoering van het Ockhamistische programma uiteindelijk zal tornen aan de mogelijkheid van de totstandkoming van de menselijke kennis.

Een beschrijving van het handschrift waarop deze editie is gebaseerd biedt hoofdstuk 6 van de inleiding. Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een korte verantwoording van de wijze van uitgeven.

De teksteditie beoogt allereerst een bijdrage te leveren aan de kennis van de filosofische ontwikkelingen vanuit logisch-semantische invalshoek, eerste helft van de veertiende eeuw. Daarbij verrijken deze *Questiones libri Porphirii* ons beeld van het continentale Ockhamisme. Velen biedt deze uitgave bovendien een eerste uitgebreide kennismaking met een denker, wiens ideeën van meer dan alleen historisch belang zijn.

Curriculum Vitae

Alfred van der Helm was born on January 21st 1958 in the Hague, the Netherlands. After finishing Gymnasium in 1976, he obtained the title of doctorandus in Philosophy at Leiden University in 1983. In 1988 he also obtained the title of doctorandus in Indonesian and the title of doctorandus in Literature, both again at Leiden University. From 1988 until 1993 he did literary translations from Indonesian into Dutch, mostly in collaboration with Angela Rookmaaker. Among these translations are several books by Pramoedya Ananta Toer and the autobiography of President Soeharto. From 1993 until 1996 he was a teacher in Medieval, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy and Metaphysics in the Faculty of Philosophy at Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, Indonesia. After returning to the Netherlands he had several jobs, none of them in the academic field. Since 2000 he works for the Dutch Immigration Office. He is married and has two daughters.