"This is Roosevelt's World" - FDR as a Cultural Icon in American Memory

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Chapter 2: Agency in Cultural Memory and Remembrance

Introduction

Franklin Roosevelt, like most statesmen, realized he did not only need to autofabricate his public image to enable him politically to wield the power invested in him for the then-present, but also for the then-future. Not a historian and writer like Winston Churchill, FDR nonetheless understood he would become a historical icon, and dedicated the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, with the now famous words:

> To bring together the records of the past and to house them in buildings where they will be preserved for the use of men and women in the future, a Nation must believe in three things. It must believe in the past. It must believe in the future. It must, above all, believe in the capacity of its own people so to learn from the past that they can gain in judgment in creating their own future. (Library Dedication Speech, June 30, 1941)

Roosevelt here suggests it is the Nation that "bring[s] together the records of the past ….", tellingly, because in this particular instance, it was FDR personally who initiated anything, rather than the Nation. This is important because it is an example of FDR presenting himself as embodying the Nation in a situation in which he served his personal interest, but which accrued momentum as a national event. It has since become standard practice for presidents to create individual presidential libraries, regulated by federal law (Clark 50), and this quotation by Roosevelt is cited time and again in justification.[1] FDR said this in the context of his own presidential library's dedication, but the three beliefs articulated are general ones Roosevelt held and clearly acted on in his autofabrication for the future. He believed that "the past", his present, contained lessons for the future, and that the future would be able to discern those. In his asserted belief in the capacity of the people "so to learn from the past that they can gain in judgment in creating their own future", he juggles two notions of using the past: on the one hand the idea that academic history contains "lessons" or good examples to follow, and on the other the idea that the past can be made applicable to present needs. Roosevelt thus explicitly expressed his trust in future generations' ability to learn from his papers, and continue to draw lessons from his work, however different they might become. By dedicating this library, he added his papers to the archive of cultural memory – the repository of traces from the past upon which everyone in every newly evolving present can draw.

What form that future learning might take remained an open question. Barry Schwartz in *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory* (2000) considers this same question when he writes:

1 E.g. by Koch and Bassanese, Clark , Hufbauer.

> How, then, are we to regard Lincoln? Is he a model *of* society or a model *for* society (Geertz 1973c 93-94)? A mirror or a lamp for the present? A reflection of the concerns of the day or a pattern for understanding and dealing with them? (…) These questions admit of no realistic answers. To conceive of collective memory as a mirror of reality is to conceive a fiction, for if, independently of historical evidence, our changing understanding of the past uniquely parallels changes in our society, then the only relevant reality would be the present, and the very concept of collective memory would be meaningless. To conceive the meaning of the past as fixed and steady is likewise meaningless, since any event must appear differently as perceptual circumstances change. (7)

Schwartz here essentially draws apart two functions of collective memory: to be enlightened by the past, and to employ the past as a reflection of the desires and needs of the present. The latter of these is Halbwachs's seminal definition, the former seems to be the one Roosevelt is leaning towards in his dedication speech (Erll and Rigney 1). This is no surprise, because that is the use of the past in which he has most of a stake as a historical statesman. The speech suggests FDR believed others would be able to learn from his example. But at the same time his plea for faith in the future, his stress on the Nation's future "people *so* to learn from the past" suggests that it is not yet clear *how* that learning will take shape. Roosevelt did not leave a text outlining what he thought the future should admire and emulate in him, but rather a massive archive of documents that might inform such interpretations. Although setting up a library and museum at the site of his home proposes particular remembrance practices, Roosevelt was more invested in making himself available to cultural memory in a broader and more serendipitous sense.

I have argued that Roosevelt succeeded in using social, cultural and technological transitions to assume some control over factors that could have fashioned him in unwelcome directions, and to turn them into vehicles of active autofabrication. This chapter theorizes the possibility to additionally shape one's own remembrance, beginning by outlining the difference between cultural memory and remembrance, and the role of representations and agents representing Roosevelt. It elucidates how Roosevelt in a sense rode the waves of key twentieth-century American developments so prolifically, that most central themes of Roosevelt's autofabrication overlap with crucial developments in twentieth century America, and therefore with the principal topics and issues in the process of memory-making that has gone on since his death. This chapter shows what mechanisms in the creation of cultural memory and remembrance underlie the dynamics of remembering and representing FDR since 1945.

The previous chapter focused on how self-fashioning and autofabrication conceptually work, and how they complement each other in a modern democratic mass-media context. As discussed, Greenblatt argues in the wake of Foucault that any self is a product of what its culture and context demand, and of the individual's own character and active positioning. But a politician in a position of power can also make his own history in a broader sense – by managing his public

image positively and through obscuring negative aspects – for the sake of future remembrance. Autofabrication is thus also crucial to understanding Roosevelt's remembrance. Autofabrication is done in the first place for the present and the very near future – in many politicians' case to be re-elected – but it is also actively involved in the production and management of future remembrance.

FDR was involved in his autofabrication, by constructing a particular public image, and by keeping that public image textually as separate as possible from his practices as power-brokering president. However, during his presidency as well as after his death, he has also been portrayed and represented by a host of other agents with varying agendas. The interaction of his own textual making of himself and the texts others made of and about him later elucidates both the processes of autofabrication and memory-making. I argue that because his autofabrication was so porous in its ability to allow other narratives to absorb elements of FDR's public image, the FDR icon assumed a degree of agency of its own, determining the meaning of later representations of him. The power of FDR's discourse and rhetoric, textual and otherwise, lies in the fact that they continue to seem relevant to situations different from the ones in which they were first uttered. FDR fabricated himself so that he was extremely available for future imagined communities or collectives to be part of narratives employed to read the ideologies and needs of the present into the past. To put it differently, the FDR icon produces and propels a kind of discourse that has survived since Roosevelt's death, and continues to give him and his self-defined beneficiaries a degree of actual power in the present.

To substantiate these claims, I first extrapolate the autofabrication and self-fashioning dialectic into the realm of remembering the past, suggesting that cultural memory is the 'memory equivalent' of self-fashioning, and remembrance the equivalent of (auto)fabrication-in-the-future. Remembrance is a practice, a ritual that was created by particular individuals or institutions with specific aims and political agendas, whereas cultural memory, while also shaped by social interests and political ideologies, is vaguer, harder to grasp, and yet more omnipresent. One way of putting it is that cultural memory can be seen as the archive of the past, and remembrance the choice of documents, narratives and experiences an agent selects to represent the past. What is attractive about that metaphor is that, like archives, cultural memory seems a neutral, passive repository, when in reality through privileging some stories and marginalizing others, cultural memory too has a measure of control over the past, even if the agents in cultural memory – in a physical archive, these would be the archivists – are hard to pinpoint (Schwartz and Cook 1). A problem with the metaphor, however, is that remembrance is not simply the selection of stories from cultural memory to create a certain practice, but also includes that practice itself, that is, what people do with narratives and representations of particular elements of the past.

Following my conceptualization of these terms, I will discuss the serendipitous yet important nature of agency within cultural memory, and then the potential for autofabrication for future

remembrance. Following that, I discuss – in conversation with and departure from Pierre Nora – how remembrance and cultural memory meet in particular physical or metaphorical *lieux de mémoire*, and how representation by other agents influences what elements are hidden and which ones are made surreptitiously present. Throughout I will give examples drawn from the case study started in the previous chapter: Roosevelt's Four Freedoms in remembrance and cultural memory.

From Self-fashioning and Autofabrication to Cultural Memory and Remembrance

The interpretation of cultural memory as the archive of possible culturally acceptable narratives is close to, yet different from Jan Assmann's celebrated definition in "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity." Cultural memory, as Assmann understands it, concerns events that are no longer part of 'lived' memory in society, but are culturally inherited, becoming fixed legends or myths, functioning as cultural touchstones. At the other end of the spectrum he posits the concept of communicative memory, which comes into existence in everyday interaction between people. Communicative memory is evanescent, and allows for diversity and contradiction; it is made up of the informal, loosely shaped memories people share and does not involve high political stakes. The life of communicative memory is about eight decades, as long as there are people alive to recount what they lived through. In between cultural and communicative memory there is, to borrow Jan Vansina's expression a "floating gap" (23-24). However, rather than thinking of cultural and communicative memory as temporally following each other, separated by a gap, I propose a more spatial dynamic, which allows me to refine Pierre Nora's opposition between *lieux* and *milieux de mémoire*, an opposition which disregards precisely the crucial negotiation carried out in the "floating gap." Doing so is important, because, as within autofabrication, disguising the fact that there is a negotiation artificially increases the authority of the remembrance practices that emerge as dominant.

My use of cultural memory shares with Assmann's the idea that cultural memory is something that can be drawn from, but, like FDR, I think of the repository of traces, including documents and lived memories ("communicative memory"), as part of cultural memory. This is not to say that Assmann's opposition between cultural and communicative memory is not useful. Indeed, in between these poles Aleida Assmann has, in *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit* developed an elaborate hierarchy. However, she focuses less on the fact that the existence of a floating gap provides space for invisible power play. What the Assmanns refer to as "figures of memory", I call remembrance. While I recognize the elegance of their term, suggesting the configuration that happens in remembering, as well as the ritualized choreography within that process, I also find "memory" a term too intangible to use for situations in which pinpointing who is directing the process of re-membering is of the essence. As Adrian Parr has it "memory, unlike remembrance itself, is not *in* space and time" (10), whereas negotiating remembrance practices is. So to stress

the active agency involved, I follow Jay Winter's suggestion to use remembrance as to denote ideologically charged acts of reconfiguring elements of memory (*Performing* 15). Remembrance is thus the configuration of narrative elements agents draw from the archive of cultural memory to produce, and have others invest in a particular version of a particular story.

The archive as a metaphor for memory is well-known,[2] but links between image-making in the present and later remembrance are little theorized. Image management of leaders is treated independently from memory studies. However, if the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library shows one thing, it is that image- and memory-making are not separate. FDR created the library as an act of autofabrication, not primarily to represent himself to his own present but to the future, as his dedication makes explicit. In the years since his death the library has changed dramatically, sometimes in ways FDR envisaged and sometimes differently. But in any case he, as the remembered object, is also a key player in negotiating the remembrance itself. His autofabrication concerns more than his image in the eyes of his contemporaries; it projects itself forward into the realm of remembrance. Roosevelt steered his future remembrance among other things by appointing friends and relatives as representers. By giving his documents to the National Archives and Records Administration he added them to the repository of cultural memory. However, by housing them in a separate building on his own estate, and having the National Park Service manage his home on the same estate, he contributed to creating a particular remembrance of himself and his presidency (Hufbauer 41).

(Auto)remembrance is thus an extension into the future of autofabrication, while cultural memory is broader, more the collective product of a culture, in short more like self-fashioning. Like self-fashioning, cultural memory is concerned also with the internal and the personal, as well as a cultural resultant of forces that exist, but are hard to pinpoint. Like autofabrication, remembrance is a practice that independently and often consciously constructs an iconic image, making ideological choices in the process, to offer particular narratives and to suppress other elements. I find it useful to think of memory as "the past made present", as Richard Terdiman formulates it, but more specifically remembrance is the practice, by a society, or agents or groups within society, of making particular parts of cultural memory present. Cultural memory, like remembrance, is ideologically charged but it simultaneously seems the collective and implicit product of a porous group. Remembrance, conversely, is consciously designed and fabricated by agents who can be identified. Remembrance practices can be the product of autofabrication. As with autofabrication and self-fashioning, it is important in creating remembrance to suggest that it coincides with cultural memory as produced by society at large, and for a narrative to be embedded into cultural memory, it must possess a degree of adaptability to the needs of pre-existing cultural memory.

2 E.g. Joan Schwartz & Terry Cook, "Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory" *Archival Science* 2, 2002. 1-19.

Both mechanisms, self-fashioning and cultural memory on the one hand, and autofabrication and remembrance on the other, are particularly pertinent to the analysis of the creation of iconic statesmen in memory. What is at stake here is the interplay in which Roosevelt's iconic status in American memory – which Roosevelt narratives are being remembered and forgotten – is determined by the historical role Roosevelt played and by what memory communities need and want in terms of iconic figures and narratives at the time of remembering, which is obviously always in flux. Most studies in the field of cultural memory focus on the second of these – what cultural needs are met by remembering particular narratives in the present. Remembrance is often used to refer to the more performative or ritualized aspects and forms of cultural memory.[3] I do so too, but view remembrance in a more political context, consciously designed and produced by particular agents, and which can be – an in FDR's case often are – products of successful management by the remembered person.

Although conflicts about which historical narratives need to be told and remembered are illuminating when analyzing who has agency over cultural memory, most cultural memory is not especially contested. Not because everyone agrees, but because there is no need to agree. Different memory communities have and create different historical narratives, which function as social memories within their own groups' collective consciousness, often without needing to impose that narrative on others. Such social memories of specific groups, can, however, become politically active, for instance when a national memorial with a particular representation of history is at stake. It is useful here to introduce Aleida Assmann's four types of memory: individual, social, cultural and political/national memory. These types of memory differ in that they are increasingly coercive and collective. Whereas individual memory is very free-ranging and often unmediated, or mediated only in very informal and limited contexts, political memory is limited to one interpretation that is well-preserved in a clearly established, often national, place.

Individual memory is a single person's 'lived' memory of an event, which nonetheless does exist in a social context; social memory concerns memories that exist within a particular collective; cultural memory has taken a more definite shape through being mediated in a particular form. Political memory is the most limited and coercive form of memory: it presupposes a consensus about the interpretation of the remembered event and implements that interpretation as 'the' collective memory (Jonker 21; Assmann 21-60). Most "memory wars" or "history wars" are sparked in the process of creating political memory. I find this classification useful to understand why some narratives of the past-made-present are more visible or more contested than others, but Assmann stresses the classification rather than the fluidity of the classes. Because these types of memory are defined by the places of their occurrence – the brain, social communities, cultural narratives, national commemorations – the focus is less on the ways in which memories can shift from one category to another.

3 Rigney 18; Winter "Historical Remembrance in the Twenty-First Century" 9.

Agency in Cultural Memory

Autofabrication for the sake of one's future image can involve either attempts to shape, manage or contribute to future remembrance practices, as FDR did for instance when he created the museum on the first floor of his presidential library, and chose agents to manage its permanent and temporary exhibitions. It can also shape and inform future cultural memory, as he did through his literal and figurative contribution to the national archive on the museum's second floor. As noted, because cultural memory and its movements are harder to pinpoint, it is also more difficult to identify agents exerting power over it, but cultural memory nonetheless reflects needs and interests of society or dominant groups or institutions within society.

One important monograph, both in its treatment of memory and because it is close to it in terms of subject matter, to analyze the seemingly serendipitous dynamic of cultural memory, is Emily Rosenberg's *A Date Which Will Live, Pearl Harbor in American Memory* (2003). Although its case study, the attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7th, 1941, is not an active agent in determining its own remembrance, it does investigate how "Pearl Harbor" in cultural memory has historically developed since 1941 into the twenty-first century. The first part of Rosenberg's book describes its immediate "reception", close-reading Roosevelt's official reaction and the impact that had in public debates and discourse surrounding Pearl Harbor in the first fifty years after the event. The second part looks in more detail into the development since 1991, when Pearl Harbor was invested with new academic and public interest, and ends ten years later, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, with the omnipresent comparisons of the attacks on the Twin Towers with Pearl Harbor.

Although Rosenberg does not really address it explicitly, she does seem to acknowledge the difference between cultural memory and remembrance, and she particularly also pays attention to the historical development of fabricated elements in cultural remembrance, which may not seem fabricated. She for instance draws attention to the fact that Pearl Harbor was immediately received in the tradition of great tragic American losses such as the Battle of the Alamo and Custer's Last Stand. The old phrase "Remember the Alamo" was immediately appropriated to Pearl Harbor both in newspaper headlines and in governmental war propaganda, which "reiterated the 'remember' theme" (16). This theme was introduced by Roosevelt in his Pearl Harbor speech: "[A]lways will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us." Rosenberg shows how that theme has survived in iconic textual and visual cultural artefacts through the Cold War – then changed into the call for vigilance: "Remember Pearl Harbor, Keep America Alert", 1964 – into the twenty-first century (31). Although Rosenberg does not explicitly point this out, it is a good example of a case in which FDR adopted an older topos and in doing so propelled it into cultural memory by buying into the "Remember" appeal.

One of the key elements Rosenberg cites as reasons for the revived interest in Pearl Harbor, is the so-called memory boom in the USA. "Memory boom" is a coinage of Jay Winter, used to

describe a development that started in the 1970s, and was first analyzed by French historian and philosopher Pierre Nora (Winter, "Memory Boom"). Partly in search for ways to remember and cope with the trauma of the Holocaust, popular interest in history and academic interest in memory both grew immensely in the 1960s and 1970s. This happened more than twenty years after the end of the Holocaust, partly sparked by the decolonization wars, as Michael Rothberg argues in *Multidirectional Memory* (6). Initiatives to commemorate World War Two ingnited huge debates about what elements of communicative memory were to be part of cultural memory, and how to select from that repository the most suitable "official" remembrance practices.

In the 1970s, for instance, oral history gained ground within social history. The testimonies of eyewitnesses of historical events were taken, initially in an effort to create more sources. This new source material was soon problematized by historians. Accounts from memory are of course flawed, often demonstrably so, the narrator has little distance from the recounted events, and many memories seem influenced to a large extent by later experiences, to name only some of the problems (Vansina 3-11). This is not to say that other sources do not have any of these problems – even the most cold and administrative archival sources were created by people and institutions with interests and power over what they kept and left out – but memory studies as an interdisciplinary academic field has grown up around the idea that memory is important, but also very complex and problematic by nature. The kinds of issues identified are different in various subdisciplines; oral historians and psychologists, each for different reasons, might focus on how "historically correct" memories are., are foregrounded. Rosenberg, as a cultural historian, focuses on how influential remembrance practices are in shaping cultural memory. I similarly ask how American remembrance practices produce and mediate particular elements of the past so as to allow them to enter cultural memory.

Although there are differences between disciplines, on the whole the focus in how to assess cultural memory has shifted towards studying the dynamics underlying its production (Erll and Rigney 5). While The History Workshop in Great Britain in the 1970s, in which groups of professional and amateur historians started telling and collecting oral history, started out with the ambition to create source material for social history which would include the experience of the poor, the uneducated, social minorities and women (Frisch xviii). The discourse that came out of that movement, found, for instance in Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen's *The Presence of The Past: Popular Uses of History in American Life*, has become distinctly refocused towards civic engagement. It particularly aims to "give a voice" to the repressed, and value even contradictory stories as equally true. The original idea, however, that oral history based on individual memory would add more sources, is now generally regarded as flawed, which is not to say that oral history has lost its appeal. Authors like Alessandro Portelli have argued that the importance of oral history lies not in its contribution of new facts, but rather in the insight it provides in how memory and storytelling work. Portelli's famous essay "The Death of Luigi Trastulli: Memory and the Events" illustrates this beautifully. Portelli discovered that interviewees, asked to tell the

story of a mass strike in which a young man died, consistently dated the incident in the wrong year. Rather than discarding the oral reports on that basis, he managed to locate the origin of this collective misplacement. While the oral reports did not yield new details about the event, they did show how events are remembered collectively, and thus shed light on the mechanics of storytelling and memory-making.

The other key current in the study of cultural memory initially centered on "sites of memory." French historian Pierre Nora, introduced the term *lieux de mémoire* in 1984, arguing that this concept was crucial to modern societies, which no longer had *milieux de mémoire* – nostalgically defined as "real environments of memory" (7-8) – but instead had consecrated sites of memory "where memory crystallizes and secretes itself" (7). In Nora's understanding, these sites are essentially ruins, "remains", "the boundary stones of another age, illusions of eternity", "moments of history, torn away from the movement of history" (12). This idea that *lieux de mémoire* are ruins, practically dead to the modern societies they inhabit seems flawed. It fits largely with Nora's own seven-volume series discussing what he has selected as France's most important *lieux de mémoire*, which are mainly sites of dominant canonical history, although it also includes places of contested memory. Nora's choice of sites, while extensive, is basically a 'safe' selection of loci of textbook history, presented to invite remembrance according to protocols whose institutional authors occupy authority positions. The memorially ruinous state of those sites is a result of the fact that prescribed remembrance is too dominant there, at the expense of 'warm', communicative, if perhaps controversial memory. Neither Nora's *Lieux de mémoire*, nor for example, Henk Wesseling's (et al.) Dutch equivalent *Plaatsen van herinnering* (4 volumes, 2005-2006) effectively engage with any cultural debates about how to remember a particular site, but rather tend to confirm the canonicity of the dominant narrative, contributing in the process to their social irrelevance. Although there are exceptions, any new practice that visitors might want to engage in with respect to most of the *lieux de mémoire* Nora addresses is made more difficult and less attractive by the overbearing stock remembrance.

Nora himself seems to have been aware of this to some extent: he briefly suggests a distinction between "dominant" and "dominated" *lieux de mémoire*, reformulated by Hue-Tam Ho Tai as "'winner's history' and anti-hegemonic counter-memory" (920). Ho Tai's rewording of the dominant kind as a form of history and the dominated variety as a form of memory is telling: a more fruitful use of the term *lieux de mémoire* is as denoting places, concrete or abstract, where cultural memory continues to be in flux. Or more precisely, where the public, institutions, scholars, educators other stakeholders continue to negotiate cultural memory and remembrance, by proposing remembrance practices. Thus, I regard *lieux de mémoire* as those places, concrete or abstract, that continue to function as *milieux de mémoire* concentrated in particular places: sites where negotiation takes place, and which are not, as Nora suggests empty ruins, congealed places of no-longer relevant pastness, but active sites of identity politics.

A specific aspect of such sites is that they are at once collective, signposted to the public and recognized on a state or national level, but also leave room for individual memory and interpretation. Ann Rigney defines "sites of memory" as "actual locations or symbolic points of reference that serve as dense repositories of historical meaning (a 'minimum of signs with a maximum amount of meaning', as Nora put it) and hence as communal orientation points in negotiations about collective self-definitions." (18) This concept of *lieux de mémoire* as places which are variously used and interpreted by a multitude of "memory communities" – social groups, each with their own ideas of what is important and thus worth remembering – has more or less come to replace the idea of "collective memory" introduced by historian Maurice Halbwachs in his seminal *La mémoire collective* (1950). Nonetheless, Halbwachs' idea that memory and remembrance are best studied as social processes in the present, rather than as direct representations of the past has become widely accepted. Moreover, Pierre Nora's theory of more or less fixed, canonical sites of memory, providing relatively stable points of reference for individuals and groups to remember a shared past, has been developed towards theories of a more dynamic idea of cultural memory developing over time, "in which individuals and groups continue to reconfigure their relationship to the past and hence reposition themselves in relation to established and emergent memory sites." (Erll 2)

Both these currents – the increased interest in history centered around *lieux de memoire* on the one hand, and on the other the movement towards using 'lived memory' as an instrument for emancipation, giving voice to the masses – have been instrumental in increasing the interest of Americans in history. This increased interest is evidenced by the massively increased sale of historical novels and non-fiction, the massive interest in historical sites and museums, and the emergence and popularity of the History Channel. Michael Kammen has written much about this in *The Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (1991). A paradoxical aspect of the increased interest in the past among the general public is that it both encourages multiple versions of stories to exist alongside each other, calling for "shared authority" between professional historians and community members with personal knowledge and memories of the past, and at the same time leads public historians – museum directors, documentary makers, bibliographers – to make accessible products that give a clear-cut interpretation of historical events (Frisch 183-191). Historical canons, deciding which issues are the most important are more popular than ever, while simultaneously the other current towards a multitude of voices goes against the tendency to create single accepted versions of historical events.

Historical canons obviously lead to conflicts, because they create a hierarchy in which events are most important to remember. Most negotiations of cultural memory are essentially matters of power relations: which stories get most attention? A famous example of conflict between those with first-hand memories and personal involvement on the one hand, and public historians and policymakers trying to provide an academically sound and politically correct

view of events on the other, is the conflict over the Enola Gay exhibition by the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. The exhibition critically surveyed the political and technical processes surrounding the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, showing, among other things, the Enola Gay – the aircraft used for the bombing. The Smithsonian Institution was criticized heavily, and eventually forced to change the exhibition, by World War II Veteran lobby groups, who found the treatment of the incident offensive and unpatriotic (Linenthal and Engelhardt).

Most of the US's official National Historic Sites, *lieux de mémoire* administered to by the National Park Service, however, present a rather bland and general version of the sites' history, exactly in order to avoid divergence (Meringolo 115-116). The political choices underlying those sites is often very implicit, but it is telling that the National Park Service – originally created to preserve and service the US's national natural heritage – also cares for the nation's cultural heritage, the National Historic Sites. This link between natural and historical heritage carries the overly deterministic suggestion that what is deemed national history has that role by a kind of natural inevitability. This policy that the NPS also administers National Historic Sites was in fact created by Roosevelt as part of the New Deal, in part to expand federal preservation efforts into the cultural realm, and also to create work for unemployed historians, archaeologists, and tour guides. Roosevelt's Springwood home, on the same estate as the FDR Library, was among the first historic sites to become an NPS managed historical tourism attraction (Kammen 467). Although Roosevelt presumably also endowed his house to the National Park Service in order to aid it in becoming a federal agency preserving historic as well as natural heritage, there is an inescapable suggestion that his home carries a similar kind of incontestable natural presence as the Grand Canyon. Michael Kammen has interpreted this movement towards invented remembrance as a return to inventing traditions, as Eric Hobsbawm described this in Ranger and Hobsbawm *The Invention of Tradition* (1983). However, it is worth noting that FDR did nothing to influence or shape the content of how his lifelong home would be presented to future audiences. The fact that the transfer of his house to the NPS is an effect of his own arrangements makes it an act of autofabrication, positioning FDR to some extent as a natural phenomenon. Yet the fact that he did not detail how it would be presented to visitors implies that it is a contribution to cultural memory rather than the insertion of a particular remembrance practice.

Although Roosevelt both made his home available as a site of remembrance and provided a context in which this could be presented as a kind of natural heritage, he did not create the remembrance practices installed there, as prompted by the guided tours, the labels, self-guided part of the experience, the choice of narrative available onsite. The choice of material presented there is guided in part by the latest insights of academic history, but also by what seems to work well in interaction with the site. Historical evidence is a powerful instrument in putting forward a version of an event, but so are a well-rounded or sensational narrative, or a catchy phrase used by an authoritative or famous proponent of that version. Emily Rosenberg, in her introduction to

A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory, makes a similar point, by choosing to conflate history and memory entirely, stressing the role of mediation memory:

> In recent American culture, I would contend, historical memory (to which I will refer as 'memory' or 'history/memory') is inseparable from the modern media, in all their forms. Even so-called 'lived memory', which revolves around individual 'experience' and 'testimony' takes shape in interaction with diverse media effects and also must attract and be recorded in some kind of mediated form if it is to last and become part of known 'history' (3-4).

Rosenberg's conclusion about cultural artefacts representing "history/memory" in America is that "in America, there is increasingly no effective memory or history outside of media, broadly defined" (4). This is striking in its seeming assumption that America is special in this respect, unlike other countries where memory or history could exist outside of media. It recalls Baudrillard's claim in *America* that "American life *is* cinema", i.e. that American culture is hyperreal to the extent that there is no point in trying to identify "the real thing" from the collection of simulacra.[4] Although I would not say that American culture or memory is necessarily more profoundly mediated than other cultures, I do argue that Roosevelt was particularly alive to its mediated nature, and in part therefore a successful agent in mediating a specific range of images and narratives. Unlike Baudrillard or Kooijman, Rosenberg does sustain the concept of chronology in mediation. *A Date Which Will Live* essentially writes the history of the cultural memory and remembrance of Pearl Harbor, explaining developments in the context of predating changes in the social and political landscape. This interest in diachronic development is in keeping with the shift of interest within the study of cultural memory from the spatial towards the temporal. Sites of memory remain central but are studied as they develop over time in dialogue with various memory communities, instead of the earlier focus on their spatial dimensions.

Autofabrication for Future Remembrance

Politicians in power – often very consciously – add "raw" material to a kind of intangible repository of future cultural memory, but autofabrication for the future is perhaps more logically associated with setting up future remembrance. Ranger and Hobsbawm in *The Invention of Tradition* discuss the creation of ritualized remembrance practices, which, though not shaped by the remembered, are invented to work in the future as well as in the present. They identify a tendency to invent new traditions starting in the nineteenth century, which they read as part of nation-states creating a sense of national identity, remembering a past as well as setting up practices for the future. Michael Kammen argues that the early invented traditions Ranger and Hobsbawm studied, were overtly nationalistic and hardly critically debated, but

4 Baudrillard 101; Kooijman 71, 11-12.

that Americans even now, use history to "depoliticize" the past. If that is true, it is particularly relevant to this study, because, as I shall argue in chapter 4, Roosevelt himself, despite being a very controversial and partisan figure, tried to depoliticize himself as well. The coincidence of his own depoliticization and that which American cultural memory according to Kammen has tended toward, contributes to depoliticized remembrance practices, which are politically charged precisely for that reason. Cultural memory has come to need personal FDR anecdotes, which he gracefully provides, to the detriment of critical attention to more political aspects of his public role.

Many studies, like Rosenberg's, analyze the workings of cultural memory and remembrance by tracing one exemplary case and reflecting on the relevant underlying theoretical insights. My addition to this debate lies in the fact that I research how a remembered person can exert a degree of agency over his own role in cultural memory beyond the grave, an issue in which the role of representation is central. Ann Rigney's *The Afterlives of Walter Scott* (2012) is important in that respect because Rigney there proposes the idea that Walter Scott influenced his own remembrance. I explore that idea for Roosevelt's case, but also more generally and theoretically slightly differently.

The Afterlives of Walter Scott traces what Rigney calls the "social life" of Scott's cultural presence in the Anglophone world, since the appearance of Scott's first *Waverley* novel in 1814, until the centenary of his death in 1932. The book investigates how Scott and his novels were remembered and continued to have a cultural afterlife in that long century. This tells an important story about the cultural impact of Walter Scott's novels in the English-speaking world, but it particularly also provides a keyhole perspective on the process of cultural memory. Rigney shows how Walter Scott was active in contributing to the development of a memory culture in the nineteeth century. She draws attention to Scott's *procreativity*: the capacity of his work to generate new versions in other texts and media. This meant that his work lent itself easily to appropriation to later generations' ideological, aesthetic and creative needs (12).

Such procreativity is also one of Roosevelt's strengths in steering his own memory, and, as in Scott's case, a risk too: in a sense Roosevelt's utterances and mediagenic forms are at times so adaptable, that they can survive without leaving any conscious indexical link with him in collective memory. Like Roosevelt, Scott was also himself very interested in memory-making. His novels created a kind of fictional collective memory for the English-speaking world, thereby turning the past into a shared narrative commodity, while simultaneously – by turning it into an object of display – providing the conditions for taking leave of it (4, 202). Rigney argues that Scott's aptitude at turning the past into a commodity may have helped to create the conditions for Scott himself to have been so easily forgotten as he has been in the twentieth century. Roosevelt's interest in memory-making was, however, both more self-serving and more typical of a political leader, and, by consequence, also of a more general political nature. It was also, probably at least by his own interested standards, more successful.

Although other iconic American presidents have no doubt also autofabricated their public image for the future, this is strikingly absent from the various monographs about the remembrance of George Washington, and to an even larger extent Abraham Lincoln. Barry Schwartz has considered both Washington's and Lincoln's roles in American memory: Washington in *George Washington, the Making of an American Symbol* (1987), Lincoln in *Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of National Memory* (2000) and *Abraham Lincoln in the Post-Heroic Era* (2008). The first of the Lincoln books discusses the first hundred years after his death, the second is a sequel, treating Lincoln in American history and memory in the late twentieth century. Schwartz is a sociologist, who is more interested in the function of these heroic "great men" in later society, particularly in terms of cultural memory, but also in terms of the power relations that shape remembrance practices. However, Schwartz disregards Lincoln's own autofabrication and impact on his later remembrance, which he certainly did have; instead Schwartz seems to believe that there is a clean break between the living Lincoln who was a controversial politician in the then-present, and the dead Lincoln who was a national focus of American cultural memory: "Only when Lincoln died, only when his own heart stopped beating, did the pulse of the twenty million throb into it" (23). This somewhat dramatic statement assumes on the one hand that the historical Lincoln exerted no agency over the iconic Lincoln that survived him. On the other hand, it suggests that the "twenty million" – Northerners, presumably – throbbed in unison, that is, agreed about the shape his icon should take, which, given the extremely polarized war situation in which Lincoln died, seems unlikely. Even though his violent death will have influenced greatly how Lincoln was perceived, he obviously did not become an uncontroversial national hero immediately at that moment, nor did the Lincoln icon entirely cease to be a product of his own autofabrication.

Another historian writing about Lincoln in American memory is Merrill Peterson, whose *Lincoln in American Memory* (1994) remains important. Its chronological discussion of Lincoln's reputation after his death includes many of the phases that can also be distinguished in Roosevelt's afterlife, including the shift from 'warm' lived memory to 'cold' academic history, and a chapter called "What would Lincoln do?" on his posthumous agency in the Civil Rights Movement. However, as Schwartz points out, it does not address "what ideological issues his image articulated" in different periods, nor does it quite take this agency seriously, much less consider Lincoln's role in trying to manage his agency of his future role as a cultural icon. Thus, neither of these treatments of Lincoln in American memory addresses the historical Lincoln's agency, as Rigney does for Walter Scott. Scott, however, was no politician and did not vie for an illustrious place in history. Indeed, Rigney argues Walter Scott employed his agency over his future remembrance to make himself forgettable:

> Scott's entire *oeuvre* can be seen at one and the same time as a major contributor to the cult of memory in modern societies and as a huge investment in making that past irrelevant as an active force in the present. He showcased the past, but only in order to provide the imaginative conditions for taking leave of it. (4)

Rigney argues that Scott "having thematized cultural transience … had become in part its victim." (217) Although Roosevelt is of course a very different type of case study, there are, I think, important commonalities between Scott and FDR. Firstly, Rigney clearly sees Scott as having influenced his own afterlife, although this worked very differently for him as a literary figure than it would for a politician, and despite the fact that Scott clearly did not have a self-preserving or self-congratulatory agenda. Secondly, it seems that Scott and FDR had in common that they saw and treated the past, in synchrony with the cultural developments of their times, as an active force in the present capable of being "defused" or neutralized by showcasing it. Roosevelt, however, did that in different ways from Scott, and certainly did not become "its victim", but rather the champion of memory that he now is.

Remembering The Four Freedoms

Although there is clearly an ongoing negotiation about the presence of the past – which past, what meaning that past is attributed in the present, how the relevant past is to be selected, how historically correct it is , to what extent remembered agents can themselves influence later cultural memory – it is difficult to pinpoint precisely where this negotiation takes place. Pierre Nora's term *lieux de mémoire* is helpful here, although it has its problems too. One of these is that *lieux de mémoire* can be abstract 'sites' too, so that there is still no tangible locus that can be identified as a space of negotiation. One of Roosevelt's important *lieux de mémoire* – highly flexible because not tied to a specific place – is his formulation of the Four Freedoms. The Four Freedoms remain highly important in projections of Roosevelt as a public icon, but at the same time their formulation precludes a great deal of opposition. Wherever one is on the political spectrum, at least two of the four are likely to be compelling. The two "freedom *of*"s, speech and religion, point to individual liberties, and the two "freedom *from*"s , fear and want, promote collective freedoms, requiring an active role from government. As such the Four Freedoms balance left-wing and right-wing priorities as well as individual and collective needs, effectively offering a set of principles containing something for almost everyone.

The Four Freedoms have been and continue to be echoed endlessly in various political and cultural contexts. They are part of the Atlantic Charter drawn up by Roosevelt and Churchill, and from there found their way into the charter of the United Nations. They were also the basis for a renowned series of war propaganda posters by Norman Rockwell, and the central words are repeated in many FDR memorials, most centrally in the Four Freedoms Park on Roosevelt Island in New York City (Murray 35). Also, the Roosevelt Institute annually awards four Four Freedoms Medals, one for each freedom.[5] In those and other forms the Four Freedoms Speech has continued to resonate and been rekindled time and again in new contexts. The previous chapter discussed the political use the Roosevelt Administrations made of the Four Freedoms

5 http://www.fourfreedomsawards.org/

during his presidency – to frame the American war effort and to autofabricate FDR's public image – this chapter traces how their trajectory continued into FDR's remembrance, to show how they continued to work as a vehicle for him to retain agency over his remembrance, and to nuance how *lieux de mémoire* and representation can function within this dynamic.

The Four Freedoms Park is an intriguing case in point. Located at the southernmost tip of Roosevelt Island (NYC), the memorial is Louis Kahn's last design, built posthumously and opened in 2012.[6] The memorial is a project driven mainly by the Roosevelt Institute, the previously mentioned foundation, especially Ambassador William vanden Heuvel.[7] The Roosevelt Institute is also linked to the Roosevelt family in the sense that both the Board of Directors and the Board of Governors are chaired by Roosevelt grandchildren. The Roosevelt Institute is committed to "carrying forward the legacy and values of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt" and includes a Democratic think tank, the Four Freedoms Center.[8] The Four Freedoms Park has a highly abstract and stylized design, basically triangular, with a walkway on each side leading through a highly schematically constructed park to a square outdoor "room" at the very tip of the island. The room provides space to sit, and a box that contains a bust of Franklin Roosevelt facing away from the room. The outside of the box that can be seen when sitting in the outdoor room is engraved with a section of the Four Freedoms speech. The pointed triangular shape of the memorial indexes the United Nations Headquarters, Roosevelt's distant vision which he did not live to see fulfilled, like a compass needle. The memorial clearly itself is the project of an ideological institution, built with private funds from likeminded philanthropists remembering FDR as a champion of freedom, and visited by a presumably sympathetic public. The FDR Four Freedoms Park Conservancy, the board that has built and now manages the memorial is linked to the Roosevelt Institute and active in proposing remembrance practices at the site, such as an annual wreath-laying ceremony to remember FDR's death, and educational programming, such as the FDR Four Freedoms digital resource, a smartphone application offering spoken and visual explanation and interpretation of FDR and the memorial. At the same time the memorial is Louis Kahn's last design, inviting an audience interested in memorial architecture rather than in Roosevelt, an element that is not so much part of the agenda of the Park Conservancy. Louis Kahn is discussed briefly on the website and on the Park billboards, but primarily in the context of his reverence for FDR, and the fact that Kahn was helped early in his career by Roosevelt's New Deal.[9] Despite the Conservancy's stress on FDR, it is also clearly a site for remembering Louis Kahn, then, and although posthumous building of an architect's design is no doubt always slightly unfaithful to his original intentions, Gina Pollara, the executive director of the building project, cited faithfulness to Kahn's design and a commitment to his architectural intentions as her primary motivation in accepting her commission (interview August 3, 2010).

6 http://www.fdrfourfreedomspark.org/overview
7 Interview with William vanden Heuvel, August 4, 2010.
8 http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/programs/four-freedoms-center
9 http://www.fdrfourfreedomspark.org/overview

Figure 2. Four Freedoms Park, Roosevelt Island NYC

The remembrance of FDR and of Louis Kahn do not conflict at the site – some individuals and institutions are more interested in the one, others in the other, but both groups are essentially contributing to and recalling from different areas of cultural memory through the lens of this site. However, a more territorial contest has to do with the space the site occupies. Roosevelt Island was called Brackwell island after its colonial owner since the late seventeenth century. Located off Manhattan it was a logical place to isolate people, so it housed both various hospitals, most famously the smallpox hospital at the entrance to the memorial, prisons, and a lunatic asylum, in a peculiarly literal illustration of Foucault's phenomenology of the othering of aberrance in *Madness and Civilization*. For this reason, the island was renamed Welfare Island in 1921, and in memory of FDR's commitment to the poor, old and incapacitated, Roosevelt Island in 1971 (Pollak). It is perhaps no surprise then, that the Roosevelt Island Disabled Association vehemently opposed the fact that the Four Freedoms Memorial contains no explicit reference to Roosevelt's own disability. To stick to Kahn's design means to focus on FDR's ideals of freedom and worldwide internationalism, rather than to give undue attention to a handicap that clearly did not obstruct him in carrying his ideals to fruition. On the other hand, not to show the disability can be construed as portraying FDR as merely charitable to the deprived, glossing over the fact that he was one of them, which would emancipate the site from a place of exclusion to a place of redress. The practical outcome, is that the Roosevelt Island Disabled Association is now building The FDR Hope Memorial, in front of, but not as part of, the FDR Four Freedoms Park, with an initial donation from the Roosevelt Institute, portraying FDR in his wheelchair, reaching out to a girl on crutches, in order to "educate future generations about FDR and about Roosevelt Island, a vital community of 'enabled' residents."[10] Thus, the Four Freedoms Memorial functions

10 http://www.fdrhopememorial.org/about-the-memorial/

as a *lieu de mémoire*, used by various groups to implement particular remembrance practices, shoring up particular narratives of the site and the Roosevelt's meaning to it and to the world. It remains a site – not just a *lieu*, a placeholder, but a geographically and socially located *milieu* – alive with debate and memory-making as long as various interpretative remembrance practices continue to vie for the same ground, literally and figuratively, in cultural memory.

Figure 3. FDR Hope Memorial (design by Meredith Bergmann)

Representation: A Dynamic of Elision and Presentation

Autofabrication entails the acts whereby a leader shapes his public image, remembrance produces a representation that is successful if it finds its way into cultural memory. One crucial issue in the production of both autofabrication and remembrance that I have touched on, but not explicitly addressed yet, is that of representation, a key element in any translation of FDR from body natural to icon. I use Roger Chartier's work on representation in *On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices* to flesh out two key aspects of representation in the context of autofabrication and remembrance: first, representation necessarily and meaningfully occludes elements of the original, and it is important to understand who holds power over these elisions; and second, representations by nature also presentify themselves, and thereby the agents to whom the task of representing has been delegated.

As is clear from the discussion of the Four Freedoms Park as contested ground, there is always a power issue at stake in representation. Autofabrication feeds into the archive of cultural memory directly – mediated of course, but not through delegation to representatives. Remembrance on the other hand happens through representation by delegates, and this introduces the presence

of these representative agents, with their own interests and agency. Chartier stresses these three elements in the process of representation:

> …the importance of the notion of *representation* (…), a notion that pertains on three levels of reality: first, on the level of collective representations that embody, within individuals, the divisions of the social world, and organize the schemes of perception by which individuals classify, judge and act; second, on the level of forms of exhibition and stylization of the identity that those individuals or groups hope will be recognized; third, on the level of the delegation to representatives (single individuals, institution, or abstract instances) of the coherence and stability of the identity thus affirmed. (90)

These three levels of representation – 1. representations embodying the divisions of the social world and schemes of perception; 2. Forms of exhibition that those subscribing to 1. hope will be recognized; 3. The delegation to representatives of the identity thus affirmed. – correspond to how I perceive self-fashioning/cultural memory, autofabrication, and remembrance. Self-fashioning and cultural memory are joined together, not because they are the same, but because they both pertain to collective understandings that embody the social world and organize schemes of perception, about the present (self-fashioning) or the past (cultural memory). They are also similar in that, although a power issue is at stake here as elsewhere in representation, it is hard to identify who actually possesses control. The second parallels my notion of autofabrication: representations are forms of exhibition and stylization of the identity that the autofabricator and his assistants hope will be recognized, and the autofabrication is successful if its public projection of itself is indeed recognized. The first two coincide temporally: in autofabrication (self)representations are put forward that organize the social world, and these representations are effective insofar as they are indeed recognized and affirmed within self-fashioning, and later in cultural memory. The third level pertains to the cultural delegation to agents representing the iconic leader. This is actually an outcome of a negotiation between 1 and 2: once a representation is established through the interaction of autofabrication and self-fashioning, "the identity thus affirmed" is relegated to representatives of the leader, who in turn establish practices of remembrance, that seek to find their place in cultural memory. Representations on this level are also matters of the delegation of power. FDR delegated the representation of his public image for the future to various agents as part of his autofabrication, but in "carrying forward his legacy" his delegates also make decisions that implicitly or explicitly use FDR's agency, despite the fact that he has not had an actual say in the concrete matter at hand.

This last step establishes a kind of iteration – the person or institution in charge of the representation itself needs to claim a place in society, and eventually in cultural memory, and doing so often involves not just a representation of the icon legitimizing it, but an act of autofabrication itself. Chartier discusses how representatives "presentify" themselves through what they represent. He says about this: "A double meaning and a double function are thus

assigned to representation: to make an absence present, but also to exhibit its own presence as image, hence to constitute the person who looks at it as the looking subject." (91) Chartier makes this specific to the figure of the king. FDR is of course not a king, but has often been accused of acting as if he were one,[11] because he moved so easily in precisely this kind of material:

> Like the Eucharist, the portrait of the king – in painting or in writing – is simultaneously the representation of an absent historical body, the fiction of a symbolic body (in which the kingdom replaces the church), and the real presence of a sacramental body visible in the species that conceals it. (93)

I think of "the representation of an absent historical body" as the autonomously developed public image, the primary product of autofabrication – even if the king did not make the portrait, he certainly had power over its existence and its kind of portrayal, and "the fiction of a symbolic body" as part of self-fashioning, the place the king is attributed by society, as himself embodying the nation. "[T]he real presence of a sacramental body visible in the species that conceals it" is a religiously invested formulation of the other aspects of an iconic leader, one in the realm of self-fashioning: the species, i.e. the person in a bodily sense and the other in the realm of autofabrication: the real presence of a sacramental body, i.e. the vessel of power. The crossing point negotiating between the two – or actually among the four – which I have called the iconic leader's role as a political leader, Chartier locates in the tangible, regal, body that conceals its ritual function.

The concealment performed in this secondary level of representation of the iconic leader thus mirrors his own autofabrication. The elisions that occur in constituting acts, places and products of remembrance are crucial for the survival of an iconic leader in cultural memory. To give an example, one of the most persistent representations of the four freedoms, and thus indexically of FDR are Norman Rockwell's Four Freedoms posters, created in 1943 and used by the Office of War Information to sell war bonds. Each poster represents one of the four freedoms, but each also represents a Christian, white, middle-class nostalgic view of America, interpreting the four freedoms as concretely referring to American family life, Thanksgiving, workmanship, and Protestantism. The controversial aspects of freedom from want – after all the ideological foundation for the to many Americans highly suspect New Deal – is stifled by the huge Thanksgiving turkey Rockwell uses to represent white middle-class American family life.

Roosevelt commissioned and later praised Rockwell's representations of the Four Freedoms, writing to him: "I think you have done a superb job in bringing home to the plain, everyday

11 E.g. Alfons Lammers, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Koning van Amerika.* [*Franklin Delano Roosevelt: King of America*]

Figure 4. Four Freedoms posters Norman Rockwell (Wikimedia Commons)

citizen the plain, everyday truths behind the Four Freedoms ... I congratulate you not alone on the execution but also for the spirit which impelled you to make this contribution to the common cause of a freer, happier world" and to *The Post* in which they were first published: "This is the first pictorial representation I have seen of the staunchly American values contained in the rights of free speech and free worship and our goals of freedom from fear and want." (Murray 60-61). Thus, FDR sanctioned this representation of the four freedoms as representing the view of "staunchly American values," allowing Rockwell to gloss over FDR's activist social and economic agenda, and the presence in America of people who were non-white, poor, or not Christian, while avoiding doing so himself. As such, through this obviously problematic, yet popular representation, FDR's Four Freedoms became ingrained in American memory in a new way than their original formulation had done: in a new medium as well as with a concrete narrative content that the original formulation does not have. FDR was especially successful in his autofabrication and at surviving in cultural memory through remembrance because he understood this. He autofabricated himself as on some level an empty container, a highly flexible vessel which can contains a host of multiple meanings, and then allowed artists like Rockwell, independent to some extent, but paid by his administration, to fill in his abstract words with visual narratives that resonated in new ways.

The Four Freedoms posters at the same time of course also presentify Norman Rockwell, who before this series was regarded as a somewhat pedestrian and unoriginal artist. The Four Freedoms series made Rockwell's name as an artist who otherwise would probably not have been remembered. The same is true for almost any Roosevelt representation by a delegate person or institution, especially by those who take charge of his remembrance. A perhaps facile case in point is the Dutch Roosevelt Study Center, located in Middelburg, where the Roosevelt family has some of its roots. The Roosevelt Institute, as noted, annually grants four Four Freedoms Awards, and the award ceremony takes place in alternate years in Middelburg and in New York. As such, the award does not only celebrate FDR's international achievement, the point the Roosevelt Institute stresses, and his rootedness in the old world, but it also presentifies the Roosevelt Study Center and Middelburg as a historically important town.

Conclusion

To conclude I return to the Four Freedoms Park, as a key example of how both Roosevelt's own autofabrication and this particular *lieu de memoire,* representing him by delegation to the FDR Four Freedoms Park Conservancy, have incorporated absences and dissimulations in order to allow for a range of interpretations, so that FDR's relevance in the present becomes a sustainable commodity. The memorial is extremely puzzling in a number of ways: first, while it points to the United Nations Headquarters, explicitly indexing it as FDR's vision, coming directly out of the Four Freedoms on a rhetorical, and the Atlantic Charter on a political level, the bust of FDR that is part of the memorial is actually looking away from the UN building. Second, Eleanor Roosevelt, FDR's wife and the first US delegate to the United Nations is a gaping absence in the memorial. She is the grotesquely unmentioned figure who hovers in the air between the island's tip and the UN Headquarters. And third, although the outdoor room is ostensibly made for visitors to sit and debate politics, inspired by FDR's Four Freedoms speech engraved in the wall, one can from that point neither see FDR's iconic representation, the bust, nor the UN Headquarters. Thus, the visitor is positioned amid a positivistic linear and diachronic presentation of history, supposedly as a democratically empowered co-creator of world peace and dialogue, but at the same time part of a disembodied void, from which it is impossible to oversee the implications of abstract discourse.

These three issues are related. The diachronic logic of the memorial, laid out as an arrow pointing from the vantage point of history into the future, across the precipice to the UN building, simultaneously presentifies and occludes FDR as well as Eleanor Roosevelt. Because of the clear abyss, literally the water between the memorial and the UN building, but metaphorically of Franklin Roosevelt's early death, and because of Eleanor's role in carrying out his vision, as well as her well-known modesty, she really is there in a representational sense. Indeed her invisibility suggests complete transparency in her translation of his vision into practice, as if representing him did not presentify her. At the same time, FDR's bust is facing away from the UN and instead

looking back towards the nineteenth-century Smallpox Hospital. This positioning of Roosevelt as backward-looking character is arresting – he is usually represented as a herald of progress, well ahead of the troops. It is significant that it is the bust, the physical body, that is looking back. Although I do not think the Park Conservancy intends visitors to make this connection, it is in keeping with Roosevelt's own plasticity in autofabrication that it gives space to this reading, and it aptly encompasses all the aspects of the production of iconic leadership I have outlined. Roosevelt's physique is turned to the past, facing the smallpox hospital as an emblem of the kind of place that might have truly disabled him socially and politically. Thus the two aspects contained in self-fashioning – Roosevelt as an individual and as the resultant of a self-fashioning culture – are lodged in a past that is *there*, but no longer the pinnacle of what is relevant. The engraved excerpt of the Four Freedoms speech encapsulates the act of autofabrication, the textual space in which Roosevelt shaped his public image. The text works both to feed the discussion of the memorial visitors in the outdoor room, and thus to shape remembrance practices within cultural memory, and secondly, invisibly to wield power over the future.