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The shadow continuum : testing the records continuum model through the Djogdja Documenten and the migrated archives

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Chapter IV:

After the Transfer of Sovereignty and the Use of the Continuum

Introduction

The preceding chapter looked at the *Djogdja Documenten* during the Indonesian struggle for independence. This was the period after declaring independence but prior to the Dutch recognition of an independent Indonesia. With the *Djogdja Documenten* now, chronologically, in The Hague, it is time to look at the process which saw their return to Indonesia. This includes looking at the archival cooperation between the two countries in general, as well as that which specifically relates to the *Djogdja Documenten*.

This chapter begins with a discussion on the evolving archival cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the course of the early independence period through Suharto's New Order regime. With the rise of Suharto and his pro-West mentality in place, I will explore the bilateral diplomacy that led to their eventual return to Indonesia. The chapter ends by viewing the *Djogdja Documenten* through the lens of the records continuum model, including a review of the *Djogdja Documenten* and the shadow continuum. This will be performed using Bastian's notion of archival traces, combined with the records continuum model. The records continuum model should pose no problems relating to the *Djogdja Documenten* if traces of their existence at various points are found.

After describing this period where the *Djogdja Documenten* were in the Netherlands, and then their return to Indonesia, there are two major questions that this chapter will answer. The first is how the *Djogdja Documenten* can be interpreted using the continuum model, including the period in the Netherlands. The second question ties the *Djogdja Documenten* into the shadow continuum and will look at whether the shadow continuum is a necessity in fitting the *Djogdja Documenten* into the continuum model.

The period prior to the return of the *Djogdja Documenten* was marked by a deterioration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, due in part to Sukarno's general disposition towards the former colonial power.

Nationalizing foreign-owned businesses and the West Irian dispute further separated the countries, which added to the absence of any movement on archives and the *Djogdja Documenten* in particular. What little cooperation did occur between the two national archives was short-lived and lacked results. This failed cooperation can be seen in aborted archival programs in the 1950s and early 1960s.¹

The early years of independence, however, did include some sporadic conversations between the two archives. However, overall it is marked by its silences. The *Djogdja Documenten* would not become a point of discussion until after a 1968 Cultural Agreement between the two countries. Conversations that took place prior to the agreement were slow-moving and failed to result in any substantial cooperation, coming so soon after the end of combat operations.

A. Initial Attempts at Cooperation

In 1954, less than five years after the Netherlands recognized Indonesian independence, archival cooperation was first addressed, though it is eventually aborted. This ill-fated attempt began before Sukarno initiated his period of Guided Democracy, which followed his removal of the 1950 constitution and the reversion to the 1945 constitution which included a strong, central executive.² In the early years of independence the economic relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia continued, and Dutch companies were still heavily invested in Indonesia. Before Guided Democracy, which also included strong anti-colonial—and therefore anti-Dutch—discourse, cooperation was still taking place between the governments of the two countries.

The first archival project was a Dutch-initiated microfilming project. It was not an exchange of records or films, but only the filming of archives from the early years of the Dutch colonial period to be sent to the Netherlands. It concerned the

¹ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Code-archief 1955-1964, nummer toegang 2.05.118, inventarisnummer 13156.

² Benedict Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture', *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006, 49.

Dagregister (Day Registry) of Batavia Castle, the home of the Dutch East India Company during the 17th century. This large-scale project—23,000 pages onto film—was hoped to be approved and finished as soon as possible due to the ‘uncertain’ political situation in Indonesia. The project came to an abrupt stop in 1957 when an Indonesian archivist ‘bluntly’ put an end to the project and declared the Dutch team no longer welcome in his institution. The Dutch feared this instruction must have come from above. Such a response is an indication of the future of Dutch-Indonesian relations.³ The deteriorating relationship worsened as the West Irian dispute between the two countries continued. The microfilming project of the *Dagregister* became a casualty of the dispute, and is currently still incomplete.⁴

Though it may seem unusual that there would be enough cooperation to even begin the project only five years after the end of military engagements between the two countries that ruptured their political connection, it fits with the state of the relationship in the early 1950s. In 1948 STICUSA (*Stichting voor Culturele Samenwerking*, Foundation for Cultural Cooperation), a Dutch government-financed organization supporting cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and its colonies, was founded. Until 1955 its work included, and often focused on, Indonesia. After political disputes its mission shrank to only support cooperation between the Netherlands and Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles.⁵ In the early 1950s Dutch businesses continued to operate in Indonesia before tensions surrounding the West Irian dispute increased in intensity in 1957.⁶

When the Netherlands recognized Indonesia independence in 1949 part of the terms of the agreement was the continuation of Dutch control over the western portion of New Guinea. The Dutch were interested in keeping part of their former

³ NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 13156.

⁴ The incomplete *Dagregister* films are located in het Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Microfiches *Dagregisters* Batavia, 1683-1807, nummer toegang 1.11.06.01.

⁵ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Stichting Culturele Samenwerking (STICUSA), nummer toegang 2.19.114.

⁶ John Saltford, *United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua*, 1962-1969, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 6.

lucrative colony, and made control over the territory part to the negotiations.⁷ After the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch administration worked to prepare a new, independent rival to the Republic of Indonesia in the region with stronger ties to the Netherlands. After centralizing his power and installing his system known as 'Guided Democracy', Sukarno made integrating West Irian into Indonesia his new anti-colonial cause.⁸ This led to military engagements and the end of any semblance of a cooperative relationship for the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Netherlands would hand over control of West Irian in 1962 to the United Nations, which eventually gave control to Indonesia.

The relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands was still in shambles from the fallout over the dispute when, in 1964, Director of the *Eerste Afdeling* (First Section of the ARA—documents created before 1795) Marie Antoinette Petronella Meilink-Roelofs visited the Arsip Nasional as part of a trip visiting Asian archives. She wrote of the Indonesian leg of her journey that by viewing 'the manner in which Djakarta makes free with one of the most valuable holdings of archives in Asia then it is clear that Indonesia is failing miserably in its duty'. As a contrast, her review of the National Archives of Malaysia calls them 'expertly managed' despite their 'not so very important material'.⁹ Twice in her report she refers to the 'strong British influence' in the Malaysian archives, which may be an allusion to the archival distance that existed between the Netherlands and Indonesia.¹⁰ Meilink-Roelofs was only given limited access to the archives and was treated with distrust upon arrival, which also might have coloured her impression of ANRI.¹¹

⁷ Jan Pouwer, 'The colonisation, decolonisation and recolonisation of West New Guinea', *The Journal of Pacific History*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1999), 166-67.

⁸ Benedict Anderson, 'Old State, New Society', *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006, 105-106.

⁹ The UNESCO-appointed overseer of the Malaysian National Archive at this time was former *Landsarchivaris* of the Dutch East Indies, F.J.R. Verhoeven.

¹⁰ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Collectie 441 F.R.J. Verhoeven, 1921-1987, nummer toegang 2.21.281.04, inventarisnummer 30. Manuscript for her article 'Een archiefreis door Oost-Azie' (An Archival Journey Through East Asia).

¹¹ Frank Lequin, In Memoriam M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, vol. 146, no.1 (1990), 127-146.

Sukarno confiscated Dutch property and nationalized Dutch-owned businesses in late 1957.¹² The aborted cultural cooperation was a side effect of this destruction of the relationship. The regrowth of cooperation is directly tied to the rise to power of Suharto and his accession to President of Indonesia in 1968.¹³ The vast political changes in Indonesia that stemmed from Suharto's re-imagining of Indonesia's relationship with the West and the Netherlands would eventually effect change at ANRI as well.

Suharto not only changed internal politics of Indonesia, but oversaw a major overhaul of Indonesian foreign policy. This included both the signing of a Cultural Agreement with the Netherlands in 1968 and the return of previously nationalized foreign-owned businesses. This goes hand-in-hand with the internal changes made, as a renewed relationship with the Netherlands would make the Dutch more susceptible to any number of new programs, including archival transfers.

B. Sukarno's Indonesia through Two Archivists

The Sukarno-era lacked any such cooperation. By looking at a series of correspondence from 1963 the general feeling of Sukarno-era Indonesia towards the Netherlands can be seen. The resentment towards the Dutch manifested itself in the *Arsip Nasional* by both its treatment of the Dutch and in its sense of self. The correspondence comes from the personal papers of Frans Rijndert Johan Verhoeven, former director of the *Landsarchief* prior to the Japanese occupation, held in the Nationaal Archief.¹⁴ The *Landsarchief* was the national archive of the Netherlands East Indies, founded by the Dutch administration in 1892. After independence the *Landsarchief* became the *Arsip Nasional*—both administratively and the actual building that housed the records.

By 1963 Verhoeven had become Keeper of Public Records in recently independent Malaya working as part of an UNESCO project.¹⁵ His official title was

¹² Saltford, *United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua*, 6.

¹³ From 1965 he had held the role under the title of Acting President.

¹⁴ NL-HaNA, Verhoeven, 2.21.281.04, inv.nr 30.

¹⁵ Verhoeven's project would last from 1962 until 1966. Originally intended to work in

'Unesco expert on archives and documentation, attached to the National Archives of Malaysia' though he was made *de facto* director of the National Archives because there was 'no one available but the Unesco expert'.¹⁶ Part of his project involved writing an article on the Dutch Malacca archives from the 17th to 19th centuries that he believed became lost sometime during the Second World War. The Dutch attacked Malacca, which was under Portuguese rule, in 1640/1641 and stayed in control of the city for almost 200 years. Knowing that some records from Dutch Malacca were in the former Landsarchief, Verhoeven wrote to the director of the Arsip Nasional, Mr. R. Mohamed Ali for more information.

Their conversation starts off simply enough, with Verhoeven asking his question to Ali about archives in the Arsip Nasional from Dutch Malacca. An inventory by first *landsarchivaris* Jacobus Anne van der Chijs from the 19th century mentioned some, but Verhoeven was under the belief that there were more based on recent findings. Ali informed him that there are indeed more than mentioned by van der Chijs but no catalogue or inventory on them is available. Verhoeven offered the assistance of '[p]erhaps some day one of our staff should come to Djakarta and do some research (...) making a catalogue and having them copied for the National Archives in Kuala Lumpur'.

It is in response to this letter where the direction of the correspondence begins to change and where the mindset of Sukarno's Guided Democracy and how it infiltrated all aspects of government, including ANRI, is exposed. Ali first rejected the notion of someone from Malaysia doing work in the Arsip Nasional based on Dutch-caused time restraints. His statement of 'I have to inform you that we are still checking piles of archives neglected by the Dutch Government' placed the blame for the backlog of work to be done by staff on the Dutch and perhaps even Verhoeven

the National Archives of Malaya, his project soon turned to the archives of all of Malaysia when Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore would join in 1963. After Singapore left Malaysia and became independent in 1965 the Singaporean government would request his services to do a similar project for them. He completed his Malaysia report in 1966 and wrote a similar report on his findings for Singapore in 1967. His reports can be seen both in the Nationaal Archief and at the National Library of Singapore.

16 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemeen Rijksarchief, nummer toegang 2.14.03, inventarisnummer 1320.

himself. Ali then reminded Verhoeven of the ‘rigid’ regulations for using Landsarchief facilities by ‘*inlanders*’. This Dutch term, strongly disliked by Indonesians, is described by Benedict Anderson as ‘like the English “natives” and the French “*indigenes*”, [it] always carried an unintentionally paradoxical semantic load’.¹⁷ Ali also told Verhoeven that any visit would have to be approved by the Ministry of Information—a process which he believes all national archives must adhere to.¹⁸

Verhoeven's reply mentioned four main points: that the documents in question ‘have always been open to anyone who wanted to do research in them’, that he could not recall the regulations being so rigid, that international archival standards warrant national archives being open to foreigners without special permission under the archival ‘bill of rights’, and, most importantly, that under the last archives regulation, the *Archiefordonnatie* 1941 (Archive Ordinance 1941) all archives in the Landsarchief older than forty years should have been open to the public. Verhoeven lamented the fact that so soon after the passage of the ordinance that the Japanese invaded, but he stated his hope that the Indonesian government would have endorsed the ordinance by now.

At this point Verhoeven was no longer an official representative of the Netherlands colonial government. His new capacity had him working for Malaya and the United Nations. To Ali, however, he cannot be shaken of his past, as the reference to rigid rules regarding *inlanders* attests. Ali's responses were in keeping with the public persona set forth by Sukarno, and are not uncommon in newly independent states. Roy Jones and Brian Shaw describe how ‘many historic icons of the built environment were inevitably viewed as imprints of an exogenous authority, a factor that heavily discounted their preservation value’.¹⁹ In these letters between Verhoeven and Ali it is seen how the ‘historic icons’ can be not only

¹⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 2006, 122.

¹⁸ ‘Those regulations were very “rigid” for foreigners and “inlanders”, and I suppose every National Archive is scrupulously closed for foreign eyes if not with special permission based on international friendship and mutual help.’

¹⁹ Roy Jones and Brian J. Shaw, ‘Palimpsests of Progress: Erasing the Past and Rewriting the Future in Developing Societies—Case Studies of Singapore and Jakarta’, *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2006), 123.

the physical *space* of the archive, but the concept in general, and their preservation value is not about preserving the structure of the building but rather discounting the preservation of the links between the Dutch and the Arsip Nasional (Fig. 3).

Ali responds to Verhoeven's lack of recollection and landsarchief history in a way that represents the standard post-independence break with the past. He states that the *Archiefordonnantie* 1941 was never implemented by Indonesia, and that on account of numerous presidential decrees and government regulations 'the Arsip Nasional is by no means the same as the formerly [sic] Landsarchief'.²⁰ Verhoeven replies by asking for this documentation related to the regulation of the Arsip Nasional, as well as a list of maps of Malacca held in Jakarta—trying to get the conversation back to its original purpose. However, the correspondence ends there, and Verhoeven's finished published paper makes it appear that nothing more came from their conversation. The paper on the Malacca archives contains only one mention of his communication with Ali: a reference to '20 big volumes' of uncatalogued documents not mentioned in van der Chijs' initial inventory, meaning his initial request of receiving any sort of list or anything specific was never met and nothing beyond what survived in Verhoeven's personal papers came from their letters.

²⁰ Ali lists the following regulations: Peraturan Presiden No. 19/1961 Tentang Pokok2 Kearsipan Nasional and the Keputusan Menteri Pertama No. 406/M.P./1961 Tentang Arsip Nasional.



Fig. 3. The interior courtyard of the former Landsarchief/Arsip Nasional. The building was originally the mansion of eighteenth century Governor-General Reynier de Klerck. Despite Ali's claims that 'the Arsip Nasional is by no means the same as the (...) Landsarchief', the house continued as the Arsip Nasional through the 1970s. It currently serves as a museum run by ANRI. Photo by Ding Ren.

C. Guided Democracy and *Konfrontasi*

Sukarno, and therefore the government of Indonesia under his watch, was a proponent of what Anthony Reid refers to as anti-imperial nationalism. This was the type of nationalism which would use 'the boundaries and unities created by the imperial power as the sacred space of the new national identity, within which all "indigenous" people should bury their differences'.²¹ Anti-imperial nationalism continued after independence as the 'official' form of state nationalism used by the government. The fight against the West and the Dutch was therefore key to feeling united as 'Indonesian'. It manifested itself throughout the government during the 'Guided Democracy' period of 1957-1966, when he consolidated his central powers,

21 Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 9.

including at ANRI, as can be seen in the rhetoric of Ali.²²

The collections of ANRI were from all of Indonesia, a country that Sukarno saw as united in its struggle. Sukarno's labeling of early anti-colonial fighters from various ethnic groups as 'national heroes' united the various groups as Indonesian. It brought them together into a shared history of resistance.²³ This is what Edward Said refers to as "'returns" to culture and tradition', where newly formed states have looked to their past culture as a means to unite their people under a single identity.²⁴ It is a 'search for authenticity, for a more congenial national origin than that provided by colonial history'.²⁵ While sometimes the search results in only an idea 'of what they supposed themselves to have been prior to...colonization', that simply shows the power between the past and cultural identity.²⁶ Ali's confrontation with Verhoeven in their letters shows how Guided Democracy and a unifying nationalist cause manifested itself at ANRI.

The conversation between Verhoeven and Ali took place within the context of the *Konfrontasi* (confrontation) between Indonesia and Malaya and Britain over the formation of Malaysia. Verhoeven's past as a member of the Dutch colonial administration certainly added to Ali's reaction, as evidenced by the allusion to the treatment of *inlanders*. Ali remembered what the archive was like when it was the Landsarchief under the direction of Verhoeven and used this knowledge to make specific claims against Verhoeven in his reply. It was also only one year after armed conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the West Irian dispute. Overall, this period was marked by the movement of Indonesia's foreign policy away from the United States and the West and more towards the Soviet Union.²⁷

After his success against the Netherlands in securing West Irian, Sukarno continued with this policy when what he saw as a British neo-colony was being established on his borders. Though the Indonesian official response ranged from

22 Reid, *Imperial Alchemy*, 147.

23 Ibid., 147.

24 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Vintage, 1994, xiii.

25 Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 226.

26 Ibid., 16.

²⁷ J. Soedjati Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno*, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996.

indifferent to supportive of the idea of Malaysia from 1961 through 1962, the months from the summer to autumn of 1963 were some of the most tense of the *Konfrontasi* period, as Malaysia was created from the unification of Malaya, Singapore and the British North Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah.²⁸ This action was concurrent with the correspondence between Verhoeven and Ali. Malaysia was therefore not only just across the Strait of Malacca from Sumatra, it would also have a land border with Indonesia on Borneo.

The fight against Dutch and Western cultural encroachment on Indonesia was a consistent theme in Sukarno's world outlook and thus also in Indonesia's early independent history. Too much appropriation of Western culture was seen as moving against the revolution, which was fought to oust the Western imperialists and ensure that Indonesia could control its future and its culture. The more open to the West policy that Suharto would promote was seen to Sukarno as backward movement and against a modern and free Indonesia.

Indonesia and Sukarno's relationship with the West was, as already shown, not necessarily confrontational from the beginning, as American influence and continued Dutch business interests were very important in the first years of independence. Further into Sukarno's presidency, however, this began to change. Strains in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia led to a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, who supported Indonesia during the West Irian dispute. Eventually Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations in 1965. By this time Sukarno was clearly on an independent path of foreign affairs.²⁹

Sukarno's interest in national history and heritage has been highlighted in the past. There is no change in that between Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno wanted to highlight the independent nature of the history. The link between colonialism and archives is so strong that finding the independent nature was far more difficult than in the archaeological sites described by Bloembergen and Eickhoff.³⁰ While the field

28 Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation of Malaysia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

29 Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited*.

30 Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff, 'Conserving the past, mobilizing the

of archaeology is also colonial in nature, most of what would be found and conserved would be from the pre-Dutch period and could be used to promote an Indonesian identity—despite the initial decisions of what and how to preserve and conserve being made by the Dutch administration. The majority of what was held in the Arsip Nasional, on the other hand, was either from the VOC period of the Netherlands East Indies colonial government and could not as easily be used to show off an Indonesian unifying culture. So while archaeological sites that were re-discovered during the colonial period—such as Borobudur and Prambanan—could easily have their colonial attachment removed, this required more effort at the Arsip Nasional.³¹

D. The New Order and Increase in Cooperation

Directly following the transition to Suharto's presidency not much had changed regarding the state of the Arsip Nasional. A Dutch newspaper article from 1968 on the history of the building that had housed the Landsarchief/Arsip Nasional since 1925 declared that it would be 'in vain' to search at the archive for such important documents as the 1945 proclamation of independence or other records relating to independence including those from the many negotiations with the Dutch.³²

Immediate changes in the physical and theoretical infrastructure of the Arsip Nasional had to take place.

The return of the *Djogdja Documenten* to Indonesia had its roots in a tumultuous time for the country. Suharto's rise to power led to the persecution of communists and other leftists in Indonesia, with estimates ranging from 500,000 to one million people being killed for their political beliefs. This period is marked with a renewed relationship with the West and the Netherlands, but it came at a human cost for those on the other side of the political spectrum. The archival changes to be

Indonesian future: Archaeological sites, regime change and heritage politics in Indonesia in the 1950s', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, vol. 167, no. 4 (2011), 405-436.

³¹ Bloembergen and Eickhoff, 'Conserving the past', 431.

³² KITLV Archive Number H1710 Folder 28, 6 Dec 1968, *Haagsche Courant*.

discussed further below should come with knowledge of what else was included in the rise of Suharto.³³

After the reinstatement of diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia and the removal of Sukarno from power, delegates from both sides signed an agreement for cultural cooperation in 1968.³⁴ Though often little more than formalities, the cultural agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia has played a large role in the history of the relationship between the two countries. It marked the cultural cooperation of two countries that twenty years earlier had been engaged in war and led the way for, among other things, cooperation between the two national archives.

The return of the *Djogdja Documenten* and archival cooperation is only a small part of a much larger cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia in the 1960s and 70s. In Jakarta, Dutch-era buildings and the last remaining typical Dutch-style bridge were restored or preserved.³⁵ These policy changes also involved economic changes, and occurred in different phases. Hal Hill identifies the first five Suharto years (1966-1970) as 'the rehabilitation and recovery' period, where the government was 'concerned above all else to control inflation, to re-establish ties with the international donor community, and to rehabilitate physical infrastructure'. The period from 1971-1981 Hill calls 'rapid growth'.³⁶ We can see these stages even in the archive, as the policy of the New Order influenced every sector of the State, including fiscal, manufacturing and agricultural policy.

It seems nearly impossible to imagine the acceptance of the colonial nature of

³³ This dissertation cannot be a complete history of the transitional period from Sukarno to Suharto. Histories describing the effects of the New Order socially and politically can be found in many sources. Nor is the discussion on the renewed cooperation with the Netherlands and therefore cooperation between the two national archives meant to showcase a period where up to one million people were killed by state forces as a completely positive case and that what happened outside of the archive was somehow 'worth it' due to the changes in the Arsip Nasional.

³⁴ For a more in depth look at the cultural agreement see chapter 5 of Mei Li Vos' *International Cooperation Between Politics and Practice: How Dutch Indonesian Cooperation changed Remarkably Little after a Diplomatic Rupture*.

³⁵ Jones and Shaw, 'Palimpsests of Progress', 122-138.

³⁶ Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 15-16.

archives during the Guided Democracy period. While the unrest and death that came with Suharto's rise to power was not necessary for the new view toward archives, the change in leadership was. Where Sukarno saw the fight against Western imperialism as ongoing, Suharto and the New Order attempted to move beyond struggling against the colonial legacy.³⁷ Once Suharto was in power he was very receptive of international monetary aid. Indonesia under Guided Democracy suffered from hyperinflation, and little work could be done by the new regime before the economic situation was remedied.³⁸ This international aid, which included aid from the Netherlands, evolved into cultural aid as well. From the late 1960s onward the Netherlands played a role in monetarily supporting the preservation of the history that they shared with Indonesia—something that previously would have been seen as neo-colonial by Sukarno. The Arsip Nasional was able to use the Dutch role in order to build its collection and infrastructure.

E. The Work of Soemartini

Archival cooperation was a result of greater cooperation in all fields between the Netherlands and Indonesia, but it also was the work of specific people on both sides. While the decision of what was seized and kept in 1948 was done not by archivists but by military officials, the cooperation after 1968 to return the *Djogdja Documenten* was the work of two archivists. In Indonesia the initiator of much of the cooperation was Raden Adjeng Soemartini, director of the Arsip Nasional.³⁹ Her Dutch equivalent, Ton Ribberink, would be just as important later in the process in being a mediator between Dutch ministries in securing further returns of original documents.

The first real action after the cultural agreement to involve archives originated from a letter sent in 1970 from Soemartini to the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta.⁴⁰

³⁷ Michael Wood, *Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counterviews*, Leiden: Brill, 2005, 77-78.

³⁸ Benedict Anderson, 'Old State, New Society', 111-112.

³⁹ As is common for some Javanese names she is most often referred to simply as Soemartini.

⁴⁰ For further study of this letter see: Michael Karabinos, 'Returning to the Metropole:

Soemartini, while director of the Arsip Nasional, was still a public servant, and writing directly to the ambassador and not an equal-level civil servant shows a certain amount of bravado. It also is a testament to Soemartini showing independence on behalf of the archive, though the true essence of the letter is quickly revealed—help was needed.⁴¹

Contextualizing the cooperation as part of ‘our countries’ mutual interest’, Soemartini clearly intended for this to be seen by the Dutch representatives as something worth participating in. Her initial offer was that ‘the Netherlands would acquire microfilms of all documents containing information of interest to the Netherlands from Indonesia, and vice versa’.

Attached to the letter was Soemartini's draft ‘Proposal for an Agreement’:

‘The “Algemeen Rijksarchief” of the Netherlands and the “Arsip Nasional” of Indonesia, being profoundly aware of the necessity to cooperate together in endeavours to promote the development of their respective national archives in the interests of both the Netherlands and Indonesia, and being aware that such a needed cooperation can and should be undertaken within the general framework provided by the Agreement on Cultural Co-operation Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands’

Putting the cooperation in terms of the cultural agreement was necessary—it set the precedence for such work. It can also be seen as redundant, as there is no way such large scale cooperation could have existed before the agreement. We have seen that earlier in the 1960s Meilink-Roelofs may have been seen as ‘an official representative of the old colonial regime’ and that previous cooperative attempts

The Indonesian National Archives and its changing role at the start of the New Order’, *Archives and Manuscripts*, vol. 39, no. 2 (November 2011).

⁴¹ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Ambassade in Indonesië [standplaats Jakarta], nummer toegang 2.05.188, inventarisnummer 590. The entire discussion regarding this letter can be found in this archive. All following quotes are found here.

had stalled. Soemartini, however, became a lifelong friend of Meilink-Roelofs.⁴² The cultural agreement gave the state's blessing to cooperating with the Netherlands. It must also be said that Soemartini's actions showed a more cooperation-inclined disposition compared with the past, as showcased in the Ali/Verhoeven letters.

When an agreement was finally signed in 1970, negotiations in the preceding two years had reduced it down to only part of Soemartini's original proposal: there will be a microfilm exchange. Through Soemartini's leadership, by the time of her retirement in 1990 nearly every one of her original proposals would be implemented. The majority of all cooperation, therefore, was not stipulated in the first agreement, but rather came through other means and future correspondence. This agreement can be seen as but a small part of the results of the 1968 cultural accord, as can the continued cooperation.

All the while, as cooperation was taking place between the two sides, an internal change is reversing the line of thinking seen in the Verhoeven/Ali letters. In 1971 a law was passed that named one of the proclamations mentioned by Ali as 'no longer suited to the growth of the demands of advanced administration', and three years later the second proclamation is revoked by Suharto in a law stating that, 'in the context of the growth of duties and of their intensification, it is considered necessary to re-determine the position, basic tasks, functions and organisation of the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia which were regulated by Decision of the First Minister'.⁴³ The Arsip Nasional would no longer be part of a government ministry, but became a separate agency, with its director having more direct access to the President and other leaders.

In the cultural agreement of 1968 and the archival agreement of 1970 the *Djogdja Documenten* were not specifically mentioned by name.⁴⁴ By 1973, however,

⁴² Lequin, 'In Memoriam', 136.

⁴³ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 190.

⁴⁴ In Soemartini's letter initiating cooperation she mentions the Arsip Nasional being interested in 'public documents and other materials from the period 1945-1950' held in the Netherlands. 'Public documents' could be referring to the archives of the *Algemeen Secretarie* that are mentioned throughout the repatriation process, and 'other materials' is vague enough to mean anything, including the Djogdja

Indonesian historians were beginning to travel to The Hague to make inventories of collections at the Algemeen Rijksarchief (General State Archive, today's Nationaal Archief) relating to Indonesia.⁴⁵ In April of that year the Indonesian news agency Antara reported the commencement of 'the proposal put forward by Former Vice President Hatta for the return in the form of microfilms of archives on Indonesia's independence struggle from Holland'.⁴⁶ This would have the benefit that, in the words of Ambassador Scheltema, future Indonesian researchers would no longer have to 'make such long trip anymore to be able to write about the history of Indonesia's independence'.⁴⁷

From the earliest days of cooperation archival and language training were two of the most important aspects. Soemartini's 1974 letter included a request for an archivist to travel to the Netherlands for training and was also discussed between Soemartini and Dutch archivist M.G.H.A. de Graff on his 1973 trip to Jakarta.⁴⁸ As the Dutch language was no longer being taught in Indonesia and people's ability to read it was diminishing at the end of the Sukarno administration, the Cultural Agreement contained Dutch-language training for Indonesian archivist to be able to read the colonial Dutch documents.⁴⁹ Soemartini herself knew the benefits this training could produce, as she was one of the first Indonesian archivists to travel to the Netherlands and graduate from the *Archiefschool* in 1969.⁵⁰ Training still exists to this day in the form of the Cosmopolis programme at Leiden University which brings students from Asia, and especially Indonesia, to receive a Master's degree in archival studies.⁵¹

With cooperation between the two countries (and their archives) at a high point, talk began to circulate of the exchange of archives seized by the Dutch military. In a letter from the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to the ambassador in

Documenten as they fit the period.

⁴⁵ NL-HaNA, Ambassade Indonesië 1962-1974, 2.05.188, inv.nr., 590.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ 2.05.188 590

⁴⁹ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 174.

⁵⁰ 'Archief examen IIde klasse', *Nederlandsch Archievenblad*, (January 1969), 274.

⁵¹ Cosmopolis, <http://hum.leiden.edu/history/cosmopolis>, accessed 26 February 2015.

Jakarta, while giving a background on the cooperation between ARA and ANRI there was mention of the *Djogdja Documenten* in regards to sending microfilm to Indonesia. Discussion of the archives was now circulating through government offices. By the end of 1974 the Minister of Foreign Affairs acknowledged the political sensitivity of the transfer of these archives and asked for special care to be given to the file transfer project including that any potential sensitive records be approved by him first before being sent to the Arsip Nasional.⁵²

At the end of 1974 Soemartini wrote to the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta asking for financial assistance in sending an Indonesian historian to The Hague specifically to inventory the *Djogdja Documenten* (though she uses the phrase *Buitgemaakte Archieven*). This letter lacked the symbolism of her 1970 letter initiating cooperation—there is no mention of how her new plan would be beneficial to the Netherlands. It was a straightforward ‘request for assistance within the framework of our endeavour to improve and develop archival activities in Indonesia’. It did, however, pay respect to the Dutch and their role in the project, as she referred to the assistance as ‘another Dutch contribution to our endeavour to improve and develop the much needed infrastructure for the development of our country’.⁵³

From the beginning Soemartini was content with record exchanges between Indonesia and the Netherlands involving microfilm rather than originals, but the *Djogdja Documenten* represented the one departure from this agreement. That the records were already being returned to Indonesia less than thirty years after their seizure is quite remarkable and shows the rapid change in the relationship following the rise of Suharto. A counterexample would be the records still in the United States National Archives seized from Germany in the First World War. This is worth noting, as the Dutch reaction could have been to say that the *Djogdja Documenten* were intelligence records seized during wartime and that they had become the property of the government of the Netherlands. Instead, the Dutch government agreed with the idea that the records legally belonged to Indonesia.

After this request the turnaround was remarkably quick. The Dutch Embassy in

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

Jakarta wrote to The Hague that for the sake of 'our good relations we should make a positive offer quickly'.⁵⁴ In January 1975 the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work declared that 'the Netherlands government is prepared to hand over documents of Indonesian Republic origin which came into Dutch possession in the period 1945-1959 [sic], after an inventory has been made by the Government Archives Department'.⁵⁵

F. Search for More Documents

Less than one year later, in November 1975, Ambassador Jalink was in Jakarta presiding over the return of part of the collection. In his speech he mentioned 'why this transfer does not cover [the complete collection]. The answer is that after 1948 the Jogja files were split up and got mixed up with Dutch dossiers. To recollect and reorder them is a rather time consuming operation'. Jalink concluded his remarks stating 'that there is more to come'.⁵⁶ This last line proved important for over ten years as Indonesia waited for the return of the complete archive. Jalink appeared to know that more of the *Djogdja Documenten* exists than what is being returned in 1975, but was not yet aware of the difficulty that would be required in completing the return. It is a reference to his promise that more will be returned that Soemartini used almost ten years later to reignite the conversation regarding the repatriation of the *Djogdja Documenten*.

The cultural agreement also led to the formation of an Indonesian studies program in 1975, which in turn created the Netherlands-Indonesian Steering Committee on Museums, Monuments, and Archives. At the 1983 meeting of the committee, with Soemartini as part of the Indonesian delegation, the *Djogdja Documenten* and Jalink's assurance of more archives made a return to the

⁵⁴ The two countries now have a good enough relationship that such an offer is not received with surprise and is quickly agreed to. NL-HaNA, Ambassade Indonesië 1962-1974, 2.05.188, inv.nr., 590. My translation.

⁵⁵ 1959 is most likely a typo for 1949. NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 201.

⁵⁶ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 266.

discussion. The official report of the meeting tells the following:

'Ms. Soemartini also stated that the Indonesia side would like to be informed when the rest of the so-called 'Yogya archives' will be handed over. The Netherlands will make investigations about this subject mentioned in the speech of the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. P.W. Jalink, on the occasion of the transfer of parts of these archives on November 7, 1975. The Head of the Netherlands Delegations [Mr. R. Hotke, Director General of Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture, WVC, the successor to the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work] stated that if there still is a rest of these 'Yogya archives' in the Netherlands, it will be handed over'.⁵⁷

Hotke wrote to Ton Ribberink, director of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, that at the meeting Ms. Soemartini made reference to the speech by Jalink, which was new to him and he thought the *Djogdja Documenten* case was closed and that he is waiting for Ribberink's comments on the situation.

Hearing this, Ribberink replied that he does not know why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not have returned all of the *Djogdja Documenten* in 1975, and that their failure to do so was 'contrary to the international rules for archives'. He believed the records to still be in the NEFIS archives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus referred Hotke to the relevant person to contact. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to resent the accusation and wrote to the ARA that their current attitude regarding the *Djogdja Documenten* was undesirable and that though the Indonesian side is doubtful, they maintained their claim that all records were returned in the mid-1970s.⁵⁸

After years of little results, Ribberink tried to locate the collection in 1987. Just as in 1983, the parties involved were Ribberink, the ministry of WVC and Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs reiterated its belief that between 1975 and 1976 all of the

⁵⁷ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 266.

⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 266.

Djogdja Documenten were returned. Failing to believe them, Ribberink wrote to different officials of WVC looking for the green light to microfilm the last of the missing pieces and send them to Jakarta, as he still believed them to be in the collection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁹

Contributing to the problem, the definition of the *Djogdja Documenten* was not agreed upon by both sides. In 1975 'very strict criteria' were put in place regarding what would be returned to ANRI as the *Djogdja Documenten*.⁶⁰ The Indonesian side had consistently noted that they did not believe the transfer of seized archives to be completed. This is noted by Ribberink in a July 1987 letter to WVC, 'In Indonesia there is a greater interpretation of the Djokja [sic] documents (...) these documents are not only those found in the Foreign Affairs held Nefis archives, but also under my administration in the archives of the General Secretary and Attorney General of Batavia'. At that time the complete NEFIS archive, which are now held at the Nationaal Archief, had yet to be transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What the Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined to be the *Djogdja Documenten* were removed from the NEFIS archive and transferred to ANRI in 1975 and 1976. Ribberink is explaining that Indonesian archivists believed more seized archives exist within the ARA (his administration) in the archives of the *Algemene Secretarie* (General Secretary) and the *Procureur-General* (Attorney General). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs disagreed with this expanded view of the *Djogdja Documenten* and declared that everything that needed to be returned was returned in the 1970s.⁶¹

Despite having been seized and then translated by NEFIS, in the intervening period the remaining *Djogdja Documenten* were no longer with the rest of the NEFIS archive. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' insistence that everything—or at least everything they had and knew of—had been returned in 1976 gives credence to this fact. After the first batch had been returned, other seized documents from

⁵⁹ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 266.

⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 201. Letter dated 2 April 1987 from Director Cultural Services to Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that there may be more seized archives that must be returned due to the 'strict criteria' in place in 1975.

⁶¹ NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 201, letter dated 23 April 1987, Foreign Affairs to Ministry WVC.

Yogyakarta were found in the archives of the *Procureur-Generaal* and the *Algemene Secretarie*. This explains Ribberink's work throughout the 1980s searching for last remnants of the collection in multiple locations.

When M.G.H.A. de Graaff and A.M. Tempelaars of the ARA made an inventory of the *Algemene Secretarie* 1942-1950 collection in 1990 they declared certain records, including 'captured archives of the Republic', as 'not-belonging' to the ARA and included these in a shipment to the Arsip Nasional. Among these were papers of Sukarno, A.K. Pringgodigdo, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republican national secretary. A letter from the director of the *Tweede Afdeling* (Second Section of the ARA—records created after 1795), Evert van Laar to Soemartini's successor, Noerhadi Magetsari, in 1991 stated that these records would be returned to Indonesia, and that some of them had already been transferred between 1986 and 1991, thus ending the transfer process of the *Djogdja Documenten*.⁶²

While it appears conversations on the *Djogdja Documenten* have ended, the search for more original material in the Nationaal Archief still continues. Whether any other records are part of the *Djogdja Documenten* depends on what criteria one uses to define the collection. That Republican government records are still held in The Hague—including in the NEFIS archive—however, cannot be denied.

G. The *Djogdja Documenten* through the Records Continuum Model

The *Djogdja Documenten* show that it is not always archivists making the decision as to what records are held for historical use. Terry Cook claims that appraising and selecting the contents of archival collection is fundamental to our interpretation of history. If this is true, then in this case it is clear that the Dutch military played the most important role.⁶³ Perhaps these records never would have been selected for

⁶² NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 318. See also F.J.M. Otten, 'Bespreking van Inventarissen', *Nederlandsch Archievenblad*, (September 1991), 259-261.

⁶³ Terry Cook, 'Remembering the Future: Appraisal of Records and the Role of Archives in Constructing Social Memory', in Francis X. Blouin Jr. and William G. Rosenberg

inclusion in publicly accessible archives later, or they could have been destroyed by the Indonesian government for their sensitive contents. Either way, by taking these records, the Dutch military highlighted these records and made them significant

To put the *Djogdja Documenten* into continuum model terms, we can say that the individual records were created by the Indonesian ministries (1D), and captured (2D) within separate ministerial recordkeeping systems. They were then re-created by the division of NEFIS tasked with finding and seizing records (1D). They were then sent to another division within NEFIS charged with creating their routing slips and organizing them within the NEFIS system (capture, 2D). The individual records were put together in an archive—both the larger NEFIS archive and their subset of the *Djogdja Documenten* (3D). They were re-created once more upon being sent to The Hague (1D), and captured and organized within the Dutch government systems (2D and 3D). In the mid-1970s they are sent back to Indonesia, where they were re-created as a separate collection in ANRI (1D), re-captured (2D), re-organized (3D) and pluralized (4D).

The seizure of the *Djogdja Documenten* was also the catalyst for the creation of many other records. The reports written by NEFIS that used records of the *Djogdja Documenten* were created, captured, organized and pluralized. Using the *Djogdja Documenten* to write these reports re-contextualized them and thus was another form of creation (1D). Furthermore, sending the information within the records to the recipients of the reports is another example of pluralization (4D).

From the literature review it is possible to compare the *Djogdja Documenten* to the Baath Party archives of Iraq. In both cases the archive was created by a national government and seized during an invasion and occupation—though the Baath archives are in a private rather than public facility. The act of seizure is an excellent example of the re-creation from the continuum model. Records in such cases take on completely new contexts under their new stewardship and can possibly go through each dimension again. Like the Baath Party archive, and the records of the

(eds.), *Archives, Documentation, and Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007, 169.

US Virgin Islands, the *Djogdja Documenten*, from 1948 until the 1970s, were a problem of localized access and it is simple to interpret their history using the continuum model.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were seized from various sources and records creators. It was never the case that these records should end up organized together had it not been for their seizure. It is also uncertain whether all records in question would have made it from the record creator to ANRI. In fact, knowing that some of the records the Dutch seized were particularly damning and guilt-inducing, it seems unlikely that without the symbolic nature of being representative of the revolution that some records would have been made public. The *Djogdja Documenten* were actively used by the Republican government, but were later removed from that context.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were known in Indonesia after they were seized by the Dutch military. As the individual records were created by Indonesian ministries, they certainly were aware of the existence of certain records, and letters from Hatta to the Netherlands delegation during the negotiations in 1949 prove he had an idea of what was seized.⁶⁴ Later correspondence from Soemartini also allows us to see that throughout the period 1948-1970 knowledge of the *Djogdja Documenten* existed in Indonesia. Their transformation from ministerial records in Indonesia to intelligence records held by the Dutch is an example of non-linear re-creation. The continuum model allows records to be created more than once. In this case they were created by Indonesian ministries and then re-created by NEFIS. The entire collection, previously housed by various organizations, became re-created after its seizure. The *Djogdja Documenten* as we know them did not exist before NEFIS intervention. Therefore the continuum model's nonlinear explanation of records can be applied to the *Djogdja Documenten*.

The fact that the *Djogdja Documenten* was created by compiling records from across various institutions into one archive perfectly illustrates the continuum model's claim that creation can occur at any time after initial creation. The

⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 2936.

continuum model relates to the individual records, not archival groups. Having an individual record morph from a ministerial document organized by that institution to a source of intelligence in a newly created archive by another institution tests and proves the non-linear time aspect of the continuum model. The universality of the continuum model is still not proven after this case. It is similar to other examples of localized access problems from Chapter II that were easily interpreted using the continuum model. The universality aspect of the continuum model will continue to be tested in the next case study.

The *Djogdja Documenten* are not a situation where the applicability of the continuum model is compromised. My initial thought that seizure of records is not a phenomenon described by the continuum model was incorrect, as seizure is an example of re-creation. Using the *Djogdja Documenten* to test the continuum model finds that, at least in this case, the model is applicable.

H. The *Djogdja Documenten* and the Shadow Continuum

In terms of the shadow continuum, the most important piece of documentation is the NEFIS routing slip (*geleidebrief*). These slips are the ultimate traces of their existence. The routing slips are just one trace of the *Djogdja Documenten*. Throughout the NEFIS archive there are enough references to the seizure of documents, that even without knowing the location of the *Djogdja Documenten* we would know of their existence. The shadow continuum would therefore never come into play in such an example. Had the *Djogdja Documenten* been destroyed and never returned to Indonesia, the routing slips would have provided information on what was originally held in the collection. The routing slips would have therefore still been an example of creation (1D) coming from destruction.

There was no period in the history of the *Djogdja Documenten* where they would have existed in the shadow continuum. Even while held in the Netherlands traces would have allowed them to be interpreted through the continuum model. Pluralization and openness—or knowledge of their existence and contents—was kept intact the entire time from seizure through being sent back to Indonesia.

Conclusion

Sukarno's centralization of power under Guided Democracy further eroded Indonesian-Dutch relations, and ended most conversations regarding cooperation, archives and the *Djogdja Documenten*. The violent rise to power of Suharto in the 1960s coincided with a turn to the West and the Netherlands. Suharto's extreme anti-communist stance, which led to the death of hundreds of thousands of suspected left-leaning individuals, resulted in a renewed friendship with the Western powers at the height of the Cold War and anti-communist wars in Southeast Asia.

When the records continuum model is applied to the *Djogdja Documenten* it is a clear example of the concept of re-creation. The way the *Djogdja Documenten* include records from multiple ministries joined as one archive after seizure illustrate how the creation dimension can occur at any point after initial creation of an individual record.

Each re-creation was known, at least in some form, by government officials and archivists in both Indonesia and the Netherlands. Traces can be found in the case of the *Djogdja Documenten* as both the records themselves and the NEFIS routing slips are accessible. It was therefore concluded that the shadow continuum is irrelevant to the relationship of the *Djogdja Documenten* and the continuum model.

What will be presented next in Malaysia and Singapore is vastly different from the *Djogdja Documenten*. Though both groups of records would undergo transformation from various departments to becoming one archive and were created in the greater context of 'decolonization,' the context and content were much different.