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## **The shadow continuum : testing the records continuum model through the Djogdja Documenten and the migrated archives**

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### Chapter III:

#### The Creation of the *Djogdja Documenten*

##### Introduction

The *Djogdja Documenten* will be covered first both because I discovered prior to the Migrated Archives and because it is more of a completed story than the second case. Records were moved from one place to another. Work was done by the governments of both Indonesia and the Netherlands, and now the records are held in Jakarta. During a period of cooperation from the 1970s-90s, copies of the *Djogdja Documenten* were made and kept in The Hague while the originals were sent to Jakarta. I will begin the case study of the *Djogdja Documenten* with a brief background and introduction to how I learned about the collection, followed by a review of how these documents have been used and discussed in literature. After that I will examine their contents and why they would have been so sought after by the Dutch military. This section includes some history on the Indonesian Revolution to provide context surrounding the creation of the *Djogdja Documenten* and the individual documents as they were used by the Republican government.

There are many different aspects to explore in a case such as the *Djogdja Documenten*, but my review is a specific one, formulated in a particular way. It is meant to provide certain information on the *Djogdja Documenten* that will be useful in the next chapter, which will focus on the documents after the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence. Chapter IV will also deal with the long term aspects of the *Djogdja Documenten* as it relates to the continuum model. This chapter lays the groundwork for the following chapter by outlining the *Djogdja Documenten* in a way that will make it easier to understand them via the continuum model.

My personal 'discovery' of the *Djogdja Documenten* came at the Nationaal Archief while reading correspondence between archivists in Indonesia and the Netherlands in the midst of research on the post-independence relationship between the two national archives. Reading letters from the director of ANRI to Dutch archivists and diplomats regarding these seized documents created by the

government of the Republic of Indonesia during the revolutionary period sent me deeper into the collection at the Nationaal Archief, searching for more references to their seizure.

This eventually brought me to metadata of the *Djogdja Documenten*—detailing the documents seized, their contents, creating organization, seizure location, date of seizure, etc. This metadata is in the form of routing slips, or *geleidebrieven* (Fig. 2), created by the Dutch intelligence service (NEFIS, the Netherlands East Indies Forces Intelligence Service; known in Dutch as CMI, or *Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst*, Central Military Intelligence Service) after the seizure of the *Djogdja Documenten*. They were given the name routing slips as they were used to track the records' movements across the various divisions of NEFIS, but they offer much more. These forms, filled out by members of the intelligence service, communicate to the reader not only about the document as a record of Indonesian government actions, but of the Dutch activities involved in their seizure. From this it is possible to determine what the Dutch military was interested in discovering about the anti-colonial movements when seizing documents. With little in the way of secondary sources written on the *Djogdja Documenten*, it took significant archival research to fully comprehend the collection and its creation.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were not the only records seized by the Dutch military during the Indonesian Revolution. Other original records from the period still exist in the NEFIS archive at the Nationaal Archief. There are over 4100 files (*bestanddelen*) in the NEFIS archive that are labelled 'found, seized and captured'.<sup>1</sup> Among this group are the *Djogdja Documenten*, which exist in copied form at the Nationaal Archief. At the Arsip Nasional the collection labeled 'Djogdja Documenten' contains only 356 files, fitting into only 14 boxes (see Appendix A). The *Djogdja Documenten* are therefore defined as the NEFIS documents that were claimed by Indonesia to be the property of their government.

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1 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service [NEFIS] en Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst [CMI] in Nederlands-Indië, nummer toegang 2.10.62, inventarisnummer 3013-7112, Bijlage 3: Beschrijving van Gevonden en Buitgemaakte Documenten.

Most of the seized records were written in Indonesian, with a small number between Indonesian and foreign officials written in English. Translations were made into Dutch by NEFIS employees and the record was given a number. NEFIS document numbers begin before the *Djogdja Documenten* and continue after, with the 356 records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten* falling between numbers 5223 and 5808.<sup>2</sup>

Some organizations in the Republican government saw more seizures than others. Ninety-five out of 356 documents were seized from the Ministry of Defense, which at the time had Vice-President Mohammad Hatta also acting as Defense Minister.<sup>3</sup> The archive of Hatta is also listed 76 times, though it is not clear if this was his personal archive or the archive of his government office.<sup>4</sup>

[illegible]

Fig. 2. A handwritten and typed version of a NEFIS routing slip (geleidebrief) at the Nationaal Archief in The Hague. Photo by Ding Ren.

<sup>2</sup> Arsip Nasional, 'Daftar Arsip Djogdja Documenten 1945-1949'.

<sup>3</sup> Indonesian Embassy in London, 'Indonesian Cabinet 1945-2001', [http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/indonesia\\_cabinet\\_1945-2001.html#hatta1](http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/indonesia_cabinet_1945-2001.html#hatta1) (accessed 15 September 2014).

<sup>4</sup> NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr 3013-7112.

## A. Background on NEFIS

NEFIS, the intelligence wing of the Dutch military, was founded during the Second World War by the Dutch colonial government-in-exile in Australia to gather information on Indonesia during the Japanese occupation. However, the majority of their information came from those who managed to escape Indonesia, leaving the Dutch government with out-of-date intelligence. This factored into the Dutch surprise at how strong the independence movement had become. Following the Japanese capitulation and their return to the Indies, the focus of NEFIS shifted to Indonesian nationalist groups. Part of that focus was the accumulation and analysis of records created by such groups.

NEFIS routing slips are available for nearly all outside records discovered by the agency, and not only the *Djogdja Documenten*. Within NEFIS there was a particular division involved in the translation of records and their organization. Records were seized or found, telegraphs were intercepted, spies and informants were used—all for the accumulation of information by NEFIS. Records used by NEFIS were given a number and a routing slip. This work all occurred at NEFIS headquarters in Bandung, south of Jakarta. It was here that their archive of documents and routing slips was held. The headquarters was also where records that were seized were processed, rather than appraisal at the site of seizure.<sup>5</sup>

The records gathered by NEFIS provided the Dutch government with valuable information on the Indonesian side during peace negotiations. This is in line with Linda Barnickel's concept of the 'intelligence value' of records, which 'in a military or political sense [...] is the value information has for enemies or opponents of the creating or possessing individual or agency'.<sup>6</sup> The records were used to write reports, which were shared throughout the Dutch government, and kept decision-makers abreast of the situation in the area, including the Prime Minister and

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<sup>5</sup> Okeu Yulianasari, 'Deciphering the NEFIS Archives: Investigating Dutch Information Gathering in Indonesia 1945-1949', MA Thesis, University of Leiden, 2012, 58-63.

<sup>6</sup> Linda Barnickel 'Spoils of War: The Fate of European Records During World War II', *Archival Issues* vol. 24, no. 1 (1999), 8.

Minister for Overseas Territories in The Hague and the Army Commander of the Dutch East Indies.<sup>7</sup>

The Dutch were interested in proving certain transgressions of the Republic of Indonesia government. The information gleaned from the *Djogdja Documenten* by the Dutch can be categorized into three main accusations: illegal opium trading, communist sympathies and clandestine terrorist activities against Dutch troops and civilians. The Dutch military was hoping to implicate the Indonesian side in the aforementioned activities in order to discredit them and slow down the support they were gaining from the rest of the world. By late 1948 support for Indonesia was growing in the international community, and the Netherlands was attempting to bring international support back to its side.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were seized after what the Dutch called a *politieele actie* (police action). In Indonesia the terms ‘military aggression’ or ‘military action’ are used. The difference being that a police action is generally seen as something regarding domestic affairs—as the Netherlands viewed Indonesia at the time as their territory.<sup>8</sup> Not being a recognized nation, Indonesia could not be invaded and was therefore subject only to a police action.<sup>9</sup> Indonesia, however, had declared independence over three years earlier in 1945 after the end of the Japanese occupation, and saw the Dutch invasions as acts of military aggression. This word choice is important for clarifying the mindset of both sides regarding the documents in question. Between 1945 and 1949 the Netherlands still regarded the East Indies as a legitimate colony of theirs. While the return of documents does begin within 30 years of their capture, it is worth noting that it was not until a 2005 speech by Foreign Minister Ben Bot that the Netherlands recognized Indonesian independence to have begun in 1945 rather than 1949.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Okeu Yulianasari, ‘Deciphering the NEFIS Archives’, 73.

<sup>8</sup> Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism 1920-1949*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002, 216, mentions the Dutch attempts to treat the problem in Indonesia as a ‘family affair’.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Cribb, ‘Avoiding Clemency: The Trial and Transfer of Japanese War Criminals in Indonesia, 1946-1949’, *Japanese Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2011), 64.

<sup>10</sup> Government of the Netherlands, ‘Relations The Netherlands – Indonesia’,

After the fighting ceased and the Netherlands withdrew from Indonesia, the records of NEFIS, including the seized documents and the reports they created using them, were sent from the NEFIS headquarters in Bandung to The Hague where they were re-organized under Dutch governmental recordkeeping systems.<sup>11</sup> While being the impetus for most of what will be described below, this period in The Hague is also the hardest to document. The delay in the return of the *Djogdja Documenten* is blamed on documents being misfiled and being in unknown locations, with letters between the Ministries of *Buitenlandse Zaken* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and *Binnenlandse Zaken* (Ministry of the Interior) trying to determine who has what. It was, however, a nearly thirty year period in The Hague before the first of these documents began their return to Indonesia, and another ten years before the second group.<sup>12</sup>

There is no doubt that the *Djogdja Documenten* come from different original sources. The various locations are listed in documents in The Hague and in each file in Jakarta (see appendix B). Numerous government buildings in Yogyakarta were taken over and their contents searched for useful records. Correspondence between Dutch officials after the capture make note of this fact.<sup>13</sup> It is quite possible, in fact very likely, that one part of the documents would have been created completely separate from, and without the knowledge of, another part being created.

From this it is reasonable to say that NEFIS was the creator of the *Djogdja Documenten* as a collection. What makes the documents that are referred to as the

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<http://www.government.nl/issues/international-relations/indonesia> (accessed 29 May 2014).

<sup>11</sup> P.J. Drooglever, et al., *Guide to the Archives on Relations Between the Netherlands and Indonesia 1945-1963*, The Hague: Institute of Netherlands History, 1999, 103.

<sup>12</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Twede Afdeling, nummer toegang 2.14.04, inventarisnummer 201.

<sup>13</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 1945-1950, nummer toegang 2.10.17, inventarisnummer 798. A NEFIS official writes to the *Procureur Generaal*, 'Ik heb de eer UhoogEdelGestrenge bijgaand foto's aan te bieden, welke in het tijdvak van 19 December 1948 tot heden werden aangetroffen in diverse gebouwen h.t.s.' (I have the honor to show you photos, which from 19 December 1948 to the present were found in various buildings).

*Djogdja Documenten* one archive was their seizure by the Dutch military, and nothing else. Without the action of the Dutch they are not one entity, or one archive. On their own, taken outside the context of their capture and removal from Yogyakarta, two documents within the *Djogdja Documenten* from different creators are no more linked than two documents that *were not* seized from the same creators. The *Djogdja Documenten* was therefore—as a unit—a Dutch creation.

Individual records from various organizations became one new archive as a result of decisions made by NEFIS. This is what the records continuum model would refer to as re-creation (1D). The Dutch went through a process of picking and choosing what to take, linking these records in history. Without Dutch intervention they would never have been part of one archive group. The Dutch troops then, in the sense that Tom Nesmith illustrates by arguing that ‘any work of archives-making is a type of authoring or creating of the archival records’, are co-authors of the *Djogdja Documenten*.<sup>14</sup>

## **B. Situation in the Dutch East Indies after the Second World War**

NEFIS was created in the wake of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies. While the Dutch government and military went into exile in Australia, citizens of European origin not lucky enough to escape were put into internment camps. Japan supported the anti-colonial activities of the Dutch-educated nationalist Indonesian leaders and in the closing months of the war promised to work towards the creation of an independent state for Indonesia.<sup>15</sup> Pressured in part by a growing youth movement, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta broadcasted a proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945—after the surrender of Japan but before any attempt at re-conquest by the Allies.

Indonesia had expected American forces to be used in the invasion of the Indies,

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<sup>14</sup> Tom Nesmith, ‘Seeing Archives: Postmodernism and the Changing Intellectual Place of Archives’, *The American Archivist*, vol. 65, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002), 32.

<sup>15</sup> R.E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 110-111.

as was the case in other Japanese-held islands.<sup>16</sup> Instead, the supreme command of the Indies was handed to the British as part of the South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Admiral Mountbatten. This was agreed to at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 so that American troops could be diverted to Japan after the war. Mountbatten, in his official capacity, supported the Dutch right to regain control of the colony when they were once again ready to govern.<sup>17</sup> British troops, mostly from India, were therefore the first group to engage the Indonesian independence movement in combat.<sup>18</sup> In November 1946 the first agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Linggajati Agreement, was signed, but did little to change the situation in the Indies.<sup>19</sup>

### C. The *Djogdja Documenten* in Literature

There are no actual academic studies of the *Djogdja Documenten* as a subject in and of itself. Rather, a literature review will have to consist of brief mentions—which rarely refer to the *Djogdja Documenten* as an entity—as well as examples of historians using the records in their research. The story of the *Djogdja Documenten* is only told in a piecemeal fashion between these various studies. These studies all come from historians, as no archival scholars have previously studied the collection in the way that will be completed here.

One of the earliest mentions of the *Djogdja Documenten* was an article by Robert Cribb on opium in the Indonesian Revolution.<sup>20</sup> He details the role of opium used to financially support the revolution, one of the three accusations against the Republic that the Dutch were trying to prove. He therefore makes mention of ‘captured Republican documents’, which gave the Dutch ‘possession of documents of indisputable authenticity which proved not only the Republic's involvement in

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<sup>16</sup> Paul F. Gardner, *Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian Relations*, Boulder, USA: Westview Press, 1997, 1.

<sup>17</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 54.

<sup>18</sup> Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 102.

<sup>19</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 200.

<sup>20</sup> Robert Cribb, ‘Opium and the Indonesian Revolution’, *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 22, no. 4 (1988), 701-722.

opium trading but indicated that knowledge of the trade went up at least as far as the prime minister and vice-president, Mohammad Hatta'.<sup>21</sup> Cribb also makes use of many of the documents seized by NEFIS as the basis for his knowledge of the opium trade in Indonesia.

Yong Mun Cheong, in *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection*, refers to captured documents three times and how they connected Singapore and Indonesia.<sup>22</sup> All, however, happen in passing. Describing the opium trade and Indoff's (the Indonesian Office) role he states, 'Indoff's complicity became more entangled when Yogyakarta fell into Dutch hands in December 1948 and the Dutch captured documents allegedly implicating Indoff in smuggling eight tons of opium into Singapore'.<sup>23</sup> Cheong also mentions one Indoff leader, Daroesman, as 'the immediate victim of the 1948 military action' because '[d]ocuments seized in the Yogyakarta archives implicated Daroesman in clandestine activities and it was time for him to be reassigned before an arrest warrant could be served on him'.<sup>24</sup>

George Kahin was an American graduate student who befriended the leaders of the Republic and lived in Indonesia researching and writing at the time of the revolution. His *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* has been a lasting study of the topic due to his access into the Republican government. In his memoirs published after his death he describes living in Yogyakarta during the invasion and mentions 'that on the 22<sup>nd</sup> [of December] the staff of the Indonesian delegation was taken to Yogyakarta by truck, all of its archives being seized by the Dutch'. The delegation was previously nearby in Kaliurang with the American, Belgian and Australian delegations to the peace negotiations.<sup>25</sup> The archives of the Indonesian delegation to the peace talks is one major source of records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten*.

In his description of how to study the Indonesian revolution in European

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<sup>21</sup> Cribb, 'Opium and the Indonesian Revolution', 720.

<sup>22</sup> Yong Mun Cheong, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Cheong, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection*, 135.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>25</sup> George McT. Kahin, *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, London: Routledge, 2003, 94.

archives for those who cannot travel to Jakarta, Oey Hong Lee notes that 'in the Dutch Royal Archives [*sic*] there is an impressive number of Indonesian secret papers which have been captured by the Dutch during their occupation of Yogyakarta in December 1948'.<sup>26</sup> Lee did the archival research for his book *War and Diplomacy in Indonesia 1945-1950* in 1977 before all the documents had been returned.

Frances Gouda's book, written with Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, on the role of the United States in the negotiations leading to Indonesia's independence, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia*, uses the *Djogdja Documenten* on a number of occasions. Unlike other uses of the *Djogdja Documenten*, however, Gouda makes no reference in the book to the history of these records and the fact they were seized by the Dutch military. They only act as an archival source that was used at ANRI, and not at all for their story and their role in Indonesia's nationalist movement.<sup>27</sup>

One of the more recent studies mentioning the collection comes from Robert Elson and A.B. Kusuma on the documentation surrounding the writing of the 1945 Indonesian constitution.<sup>28</sup> Included in these sources is the 'Pringgogidgo Archive', which was unknown to previous researchers of the constitution as the archive's location in The Hague was not known.<sup>29</sup> Elson and Kusuma claim that how the archive arrived in The Hague 'remains something of a mystery'.<sup>30</sup> The most plausible reason, they believe, is that the documents were seized during the second Dutch military campaign in the Indies, launched in December 1948, when the Dutch army invaded the Republic of Indonesia capital of Yogyakarta.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Oey Hong Lee, *War and Diplomacy in Indonesia 1945-1950*, Townsville City: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981, 3. Lee translates *Algemeen Rijksarchief* incorrectly as 'Royal Archives' rather than General State Archive.

<sup>27</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*.

<sup>28</sup> A.B. Kusuma and R.E. Elson, 'A Note on the Sources for the 1945 Constitutional Debates in Indonesia', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, vol. 167, nos. 2-3 (2011), 196-209.

<sup>29</sup> Named after A.K. Pringgogidgo, a senior diplomat in the Republican government.

<sup>30</sup> Kusuma and Elson, 'A Note on the Sources', 198.

<sup>31</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Tweede Afdeling, nummer toegang 2.14.04, inventarisnummer 318. For more information see: Michael

The most comprehensive use of the *Djogdja Documenten* as a source is from Chiara Formichi's book *Islam and the Making of the Nation*. This book follows Kartosuwiryo and his founding of the *Darul Islam*, which originally fought against the Dutch in order to form an Islamist Indonesia, and later acted in rebellion against the Republic. She uses many records from the *Djogdja Documenten* to research the early years of *Darul Islam*, when the Dutch military would have been very interested in this anti-colonial organization fighting against them.<sup>32</sup> The remaining studies on the Indonesian Revolution, including those covering the capture of Yogyakarta, fail to mention the *Djogdja Documenten*, including many written after their return to Indonesia.

#### **D. Background on Seizure and Military Actions**

Though not often mentioned in literature on the period, the *Djogdja Documenten* were seized for a reason and were seen as important by the Dutch military at the time. By late 1948 the Indonesia independence struggle had lasted more than three years and pressure was on to create a lasting peace agreement after multiple failures. In August 1947 the United Nations created a Committee of Good Offices (CGO) to oversee the peace process, with one delegation chosen by the Netherlands, one by the Republic of Indonesia, and one agreed upon by both.<sup>33</sup> These choices were Belgium, Australia and the United States, respectively. Australia was seen as highly sympathetic to the Indonesian cause, while Belgium both shared the Dutch language and had its own colonial empire. By this time international opinion was not so clearly on the Dutch side. Growing sympathy for the right to self-determination for Indonesia meant that any new actions on the part of either side had to be carefully thought out and managed.

On December 19, 1948, the Dutch army launched its second military campaign

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Karabinos, 'Displaced Archives, Displaced History: Recovering the Seized Archives of Indonesia', *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde*, vol. 169, nos. 2-3, (2013).

<sup>32</sup> Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20<sup>th</sup> Century Indonesia*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012.

<sup>33</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 214.

against the nationalist elements of Indonesia. Among the cities taken by the Dutch was the capital, Yogyakarta.<sup>34</sup> While in the midst of peace negotiations the Dutch had issued an ultimatum one week prior to the attack and deemed Indonesian concessions as lacking, and quickly launched their invasion.<sup>35</sup> The impetus for this invasion, of course, goes back further.

The first Dutch military campaign (*Operatie Product*: Operation Product) was launched on July 21, 1947, after the failure of the Linggajati Agreement, the first peace agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands. The campaign lasted two weeks and saw the Netherlands retake control of important regions of Sumatra and two-thirds of Java, leaving Yogyakarta in the control of the Republic.<sup>36</sup>

The second attempt at a peace treaty, the Renville Agreement, which included a status quo line and a plan for the creation of a United States of Indonesia with the Republic of Indonesia as one member state, also failed to last. The second Dutch military campaign (*Operatie Kraai*: Operation Crow) was a more large-scale operation that would shape Dutch-Indonesian relations until the transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch not only captured Yogyakarta, but also arrested President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta, along with over twenty other government officials who were moved to a prison on the island of Bangka.<sup>37</sup>

In negotiations with the Committee of Good Offices, both countries attempted to place the blame on the other. Mohamed Roem, the Indonesian delegate, wrote in October 1948 to American delegate Merle Cochran that Indonesia was trying to uphold the truce agreement and claims that the Netherlands was the reason for the

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<sup>34</sup> The status of capital had temporarily been allocated to Yogyakarta by the Sultan after the Dutch had returned to power in Batavia (modern day Jakarta).

<sup>35</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 292-293.

<sup>36</sup> Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 103.

<sup>37</sup> The list of captured officials can be found in Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven, nummer toegang 2.10.14, inventarisnummer 2888. *The Times*, on 17 January 1949 ('Republican Leaders' Conditions', 4), describes how Hatta and five other ministers were held, 'confined to one bedroom, six metres square, containing six beds, and one other room, 19 by 16 metres, all windows being enclosed by wire netting'.

breakdown of negotiations.<sup>38</sup> In the week leading up to the start of *Operatie Kraai* negotiations were particularly heated. On 11 December, 1948 the Dutch delegate told Cochran that Indonesia was the first to break the truce. On 13 December Hatta himself wrote to Cochran outlining the misconceptions the Dutch had towards Republican positions and actions. He claimed the Republic agreed to the Renville Agreement and would make concessions including moving back the date of sovereignty transfer. When told of this letter, the Dutch delegate told Cochran that Hatta's letter was his personal feelings and not that of the Republican government and therefore would not change their position.<sup>39</sup> On 17 December he gave an ultimatum that a response must be made within eighteen hours.<sup>40</sup> Cochran's reply gives a hint at the negative response the United States will have to the military action and the invasion of Yogyakarta:

'I feel constrained to express my regrets that it was thought necessary to impose a time limit which allows, if taken literally, a total of less than eighteen hours, including the hours of night, for the making of copies; the delivery of the note to Dr. Hatta by the United States Representative; consideration by Dr. Hatta; the necessary consultations with members of his government; the preparation of a considered reply; the trip from Kaliurang to Jogja and then the flight to Batavia. I cannot help but recall, by way of comparison, that I gave Dr. Hatta's letter to you at 5:30 pm on Monday, 13 December. That letter was answered only today, five days later, despite the fact that it asked only for a decision to resume negotiations. Your telegram was delivered to Dr. Hatta, after the making of copies, at 4:30pm today. You will agree, I am sure, that in such circumstances, I cannot in justice press Dr. Hatta for an immediate reply to a letter which calls not for a mere expression of willingness to resume negotiations but rather for a surrender to the position of your government on every material point'.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 1945-1950, nummer toegang 2.10.17, inventarisnummer 783.

<sup>39</sup> NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 2091.

<sup>40</sup> Theodore Friend, *Indonesian Destinies*, Cambridge, USA: Belknap Press, 2003, 43.

<sup>41</sup> NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 2091.

The next day, T. Elink Schuurman, Dutch delegate, wrote to the Committee of Good Offices, referencing previous letters regarding Republican violations of the Renville Agreement, that the Netherlands would no longer consider the agreement binding at 00.00 19 December.<sup>42</sup> Though already planned, with this letter the Netherlands announced its intention to launch a second military campaign. Not everyone heard this announcement, however. Telegraphic communications were cut off between Batavia and Kaliurang, where the Committee was headquartered, by the Dutch. Cochran and the deputy Australian delegate were in Batavia being handed the letter and were unable to communicate back to Committee. Cochran was also concerned that no notice was sent to the Republican government in Yogyakarta. Though a letter was given to the Secretary-General of the Republican delegation, it was not until nearly 11:45pm on 18 December. The cutoff in communications, however, made it impossible for him to alert Yogyakarta.<sup>43</sup>

With the military successfully having taken control of the city, and the Indonesian leaders under arrest, NEFIS personnel could begin their work. In the days, weeks and months following the invasion, Republican offices were searched and records seized. The routing slips that were created contain the date that the record in question came under NEFIS control, and where they were found, giving an indication into the role the records played while they were held by the Republican government.<sup>44</sup>

## **E. Prior to Seizure**

I have stated that the *Djogdja Documenten* as a collection were created by NEFIS, after the act of seizing particular documents and framing them under a single context. This is a type of re-creation (1D) as described by the continuum model. The individual records, however, were created by various departments and members of

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<sup>42</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Collectie 249 P.J. Koets, nummer toegang 2.21.100, inventarisnummer 432.

<sup>43</sup> NL-HaNA, Koets, 2.21.100, inv.nr. 434.

<sup>44</sup> NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 3013-7112.

the Republic of Indonesia government. While not much is available on the recordkeeping strategies of the Republic during the military engagement with the Netherlands, in this section I will give as much background on the pre-seizure history of the records as possible.

The inventory of NEFIS documents available on the website of the Nationaal Archief includes metadata that lists the original archive where the individual records were found.<sup>45</sup> From this it is possible to see exactly where the records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten* were before being seized by the Dutch military. Original creators include the Ministry of Defense, Internal Affairs, Social Affairs, the State Secretariat, Sukarno, Hatta, the Republican delegation to the peace talks, and others.

In previous research, Okeu Yulianasari has written that entries in the inventory 'give the impression that the archivist did not use the routing slip but instead, described the document based on the information that they found on the first page of a *bestanddeel* [file]'.<sup>46</sup> This would explain the discrepancies in terms of standardization in the descriptions of where the records were found. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 46 documents seized, and the archive of Agus Salim, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, is also listed as a site of seizure. Further confusing matters, these are split between '*Archief Agoes Salim*', '*Archief H.A. Salim*', '*Archief Hadji Agoes Sali*', '*Huiszoeking* [House search] H.A. Salim', and '*Woning* [Dwelling] H.A. Salim *te Djocja*'.

While this information does not offer much, it is the greatest source for understanding the story of these documents prior to their seizure. It allows us to see some of the structure the Republican government had in regards to its recordkeeping. The other place to look is at ANRI, where, kept separately from the *Djogdja Documenten*, are the records of the Republican government that were not seized. ANRI has in its collection the archives of the Sekretariat Negara, the

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<sup>45</sup> The inclusion of this information on the online inventory is relatively new, and occurred in the course of the writing of this dissertation. Prior to 2012 it was only possible to see the metadata in a special paper inventory available at the reference desk of the Nationaal Archief. The online inventory simply numbered the documents and gave no hint as to what each document was. The new online inventory includes original location, seizure date and NEFIS number.

<sup>46</sup> Yulianasari, 'Deciphering the NEFIS Archives', 3.

Republican Delegation, and the Ministries of Social Labour and Internal Affairs, all of which had some records taken out that became part of the *Djogdja Documenten*.

More information is available for NEFIS and their work done once records were seized than for how the Republican government created, organized and stored its records. The most we can know about the records pre-seizure is where in the Republican government they were created. What the Republican government created but did not keep cannot be known. Furthermore, what was seized by NEFIS but seen as unnecessary for the fulfillment of their goals and therefore destroyed is also unknown. One of these goals was to gain information on specific areas of Republican actions which could strengthen their case against the Republic in the international debate on Indonesian independence. This is the reason the *Djogdja Documenten* look the way they do and why there are certain themes seen in the individual records.

## **F. The Dutch Claims**

With the *Djogdja Documenten* the Dutch were trying to prove three main claims against the Republican government. These are using the international opium trade to finance the revolution, having links to communist groups and violating the Renville Truce Agreement by implementing subversive activities in Dutch-controlled territory, including launching an insurgency campaign and feigning cooperation in peace negotiations. It was therefore seen by the Dutch that this act of archival looting was justified by what they found among the documents.<sup>47</sup> NEFIS reports written after the invasion noted that '[a]part from evidence already published, these conclusions are borne out completely by the examination of the Republican archives which have been found after the occupation in Djokja and elsewhere in Republican territory'.<sup>48</sup> In an unpublished February 1949 report, 'The Consequences of a Restoration of Republican Authority in Djocjakarta and Vicinity' each claim was specifically linked to individual records that were seized in December.

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<sup>47</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Collectie 216 S.H. Spoor, 1946-1949, nummer toegang 2.21.036.01, inventarisnummer 39.

<sup>48</sup> NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.

The Netherlands tried to press their claims against the leaders of the revolution using records taken directly from the Republican government. The three accusations made by the Dutch that helped shape the contents of the *Djogdja Documenten* were well known by the end of 1948. Dutch officials had been pleading their case to members of the CGO since it was formed.<sup>49</sup> However, despite these attempts, the international community was slowly moving towards support of Indonesian independence. While the US was initially supportive of the Netherlands, it went through three different delegates, all of who would leave their position supporting the Republican cause in the face of the Dutch accusations.<sup>50</sup>

While both sides in the negotiations tended to blame each other, the pressure from the international delegates was more focused on the Netherlands. The Dutch side was seen as less willing to compromise and work with the Republic — often making demands that would essentially leave the Republic powerless.<sup>51</sup> The Republic, on the other hand, was quick to agree to recommendations made by American delegate Coert Du Bois in 1948, which further made the Netherlands look like the party blocking a settlement.<sup>52</sup> A similar occurrence happened three months before the invasion of Yogyakarta, after new American delegate Merle Cochran made another proposal for an agreement.<sup>53</sup> In an attempt to influence outside opinion, the Dutch began their search for evidence related to their three claims in the *Djogdja Documenten*.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 229.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 269.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 220.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 249.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 284.

<sup>54</sup> Numerous telegrams can be found in Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Indisch Archief, Serie V, 1945-1950, nummer toegang 2.10.36.15, inventarisnummer 13 (7-IIIc). These telegrams reference the search for and discovery of evidence in Republican records of opium trading, military excursions into Dutch-held territory, and *ultra-links* (extreme leftwing) members of the Republican government.

## G. Opium Trade

Robert Cribb's previously mentioned study of the use of the opium trade to fund the revolution goes into detail of the background of opium sales in the Dutch East Indies, through the Japanese occupation, and up to the revolution. Initially the Republican opium agency was simply occupying the same role the previous governments had. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the Dutch Indies government had banned the growing of opium. The state's imported supply was now predominately consumed by the Chinese population. Needing the money to finance their fight against the Netherlands, Republican officials attempted exporting the existing stockpile of opium—particularly to Singapore.<sup>55</sup>

The Dutch Indies government heavily controlled the opium trade during the colonial period. After the Japanese occupation ended the stockpile of opium was able to be controlled by the Republicans. The opium in question therefore existed solely from Dutch procurement during the pre-war period.<sup>56</sup> In order to take any sort of moral high-ground it was necessary to prove that the trade went beyond the Dutch regulation of consumption by addicts and into the international distribution of opium in the colonies of other countries. Included in the Dutch accusation was the fact that:

'None of the documents contains any evidence of opium ever having been sold for the purpose of reconstruction of the Republican areas; all transactions and the whole illicit traffic in opium have exclusively served the financing of the republican struggle for power and benefited individual republican leaders. As will appear from the following documents, the Republic regarded the maintenance of foreign relations including the financing of its foreign missions exclusively as weapons against the Dutch'.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Cribb, 'Opium and the Indonesian Revolution', 701-722.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 704.

<sup>57</sup> NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.

## H. Communist Links

Dutch intelligence officials were also interested in any information that could link the Republic of Indonesia to communism, though this was a harder claim to make stick. Claiming that the Republican government had communist tendencies stemmed mainly from intermittent contact with the Malayan Communist Party.<sup>58</sup> The Indonesian independence struggle existed against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War. The United States in particular was interested in ensuring that an independent Indonesia would not lead to a power vacuum that could result in a communist regime.

Following the suppression of the Madiun Affair—a Communist Party coup attempt that led to the execution of many communist leaders—the Republican government gained a certain amount of stature in the anti-communist West. Though Kahin and Kahin claim that with the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) subdued, ‘it was no longer possible for the Dutch to continue their propaganda that the republic was but a bridge to communism’, it would still be attempted through the seizure of records.<sup>59</sup> The attempt was to show that communism existed in the Republic outside the PKI. This would also be of major interest to the British, who by June of 1948 were engaged in the ‘Malayan Emergency’ battle against communist insurgents in close proximity to Indonesia.<sup>60</sup> The British Foreign Office report on communism, however, made note that Tan Malaka, considered one of the most powerful communists not involved in Madiun, was a Trotskyist who ‘probably has now no Russian connections’.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, Hatta had promised Cochran that should followers of Tan Malaka attempt a Madiun-like coup, the Republic would similarly deal with them.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.

<sup>59</sup> Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995, 31.

<sup>60</sup> Karl Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1968*, Richmond (UK): Curzon Press, 2001.

<sup>61</sup> The National Archives (TNA): CAB 129/29: Records of the Cabinet Office, Communism in Countries Outside the Soviet Orbit.

<sup>62</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 288.

A successful Communist coup, such as the one attempted at Madiun in September of 1948, could have changed the views of the Americans and British. Communism in Indonesia has a long history for the region, with the precursor to the PKI being founded in 1914 as the first Communist party in Asia outside the Russian sphere, albeit with an initial Dutch majority.<sup>63</sup> After the First World War the party's Indonesian membership began to grow, official becoming the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) in 1920.<sup>64</sup> The PKI was one of the first groups to actively seek freedom from Dutch rule in order to establish their Marxist state. While fluctuating between states of varying relevance, the party continued to exist through the rest of the colonial period.

In 1948 the PKI was gaining support, as many Indonesians viewed the United States as supporting the Dutch and therefore sought the favor of the world's other super power. With the official word from Moscow that full independence could never exist without Soviet control over the West, it is understandable why this would be a realistic turn of events.<sup>65</sup>

When Moeso, who had been a communist leader in Indonesia in the 1920s and 30s and then spent more than a decade living in Moscow, returned in August of 1948 he was voted secretary of the PKI. His time in the USSR was seen as 'tangible evidence of Moscow's immediate interest in Indonesia', and pushed even more communists and socialists towards the Soviet Union for assistance in advancing independence.<sup>66</sup> Part of Moeso's initial plan was the enlargement of the PKI by absorbing the Labor and Socialist Parties. Leaders of these parties came out and declared they had been secret communists the whole time and thus happy to merge with the PKI.

In September of 1948 communist military groups attempted to seize power in Madiun, though before Moeso had wanted to. He had arrived in Madiun to discover

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<sup>63</sup> Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965, xi. This book provides a complete history of the Communist movement in the Indies from its beginnings through the 1920s.

<sup>64</sup> McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 45-47.

<sup>65</sup> Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 257.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 272.

that the communist coup had begun and he was now in a position where he was forced to act and continue the rebellion.<sup>67</sup> Within a month the uprising was put down, the communists not receiving support they had expected among the peasant and working classes.<sup>68</sup> Sukarno, Moeso's rival, had begun to personify an independent Indonesia to many Indonesians, and any action against him meant fighting the Republic.<sup>69</sup> Their support amongst troops was also over exaggerated, and after defections the PKI was left with little other than two weary militia battalions.<sup>70</sup>

In the end the leaders of the Madiun Affair, including Moeso, were captured and executed by the Republic, and Hatta's image as anti-Communist strengthened, especially in the eyes of the West.<sup>71</sup> The Sukarno/Hatta government further derided the Madiun uprising on the premise that a national revolution must take place before a Marxist one.<sup>72</sup> As Sukarno put it, a social revolution such as Madiun cannot proceed without "a solid steppingstone", one which proceeds after the National phase has been completed.<sup>73</sup>

Prior to the Madiun Affair it was unknown how the Republic would handle a communist uprising, especially with the fear of Soviet assistance.<sup>74</sup> The response of the Republican government strengthened their standing inside the American government, and made the Netherlands the biggest hurdle in creating a lasting settlement.<sup>75</sup>

Dutch attempts to paint the Republic as communist were therefore seen with a fair amount of skepticism amongst their Western allies, a fact that can be gathered

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 286.

<sup>68</sup> Alan Levine, *The United States and the Struggle for Southeast Asia 1945-1975*, London: Praeger, 1995, 45.

<sup>69</sup> Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 301.

<sup>70</sup> Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1989, 77.

<sup>71</sup> Swift, *The Road to Madiun*, 86.

<sup>72</sup> Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammed Hatta*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1987, 148.

<sup>73</sup> Sukarno, 'The Madiun Affair', in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), *Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945-1965*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 363.

<sup>74</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 279.

<sup>75</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 282.

from British archives. Britain had its own intelligence, which led them to view these reports as 'alarmist' and determined that Hatta was 'not, now, a Communist'.<sup>76</sup> A memorandum on communist activities in the Indies using documents from NEFIS as its sources was published by the Dutch earlier in 1948. The British official charged with responding to the memorandum within the government states that in his opinion it 'should be ignored entirely'. He calls it 'an even more blatant than usual case of the Dutch habit of producing a certain number of facts in circumstances of their own choosing in order to "make their point"' and 'the worst of its kind I have ever seen in this respect'.<sup>77</sup> Even in the midst of the Malayan Emergency, when the British were fighting what they referred to as 'Communist Terrorists' in the jungles of Malaya, the British government still did not trust Dutch intelligence reports and saw them as misinterpreting the facts. The United States would also eventually put its support behind Sukarno and Hatta, showing the widespread disregard for Dutch claims of communism within the Republic. This shift in US policy would turn the revolution in Indonesia's favour, but came with the understanding that American companies would gain a foothold in the new independent country.<sup>78</sup>

Describing Republican members as communist to the American government was part of the NEFIS operation well before the second military campaign and the seizure of the *Djogdja Documenten*. Frances Gouda notes that by 1946 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff already had a file filled with NEFIS reports, many depicting the Republic as controlled from Moscow.<sup>79</sup> The post-war expansion of communism was a great concern of American President Harry Truman's administration. Early meetings between Dutch and American representatives also played into such fears and focused heavily on communism.<sup>80</sup>

By late 1948, however, prior to the recovery of the *Djogdja Documenten*, the CGO already had reservations about the accusation of communist influences in the

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<sup>76</sup> The National Archives (TNA): CAB 129/29: Cabinet Office, Communism in Countries Outside the Soviet Orbit.

<sup>77</sup> The National Archives (TNA): FO 810/23: Communistic Activities in South East Asia.

<sup>78</sup> Dan La Botz, *Made in Indonesia: Indonesian Workers Since Suharto*, Cambridge, USA: South End Press, 2001, 93.

<sup>79</sup> Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions*, 259.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 204.

Republican government. The Truman administration saw working with 'moderates' like Hatta as the only way to stop further communist infiltration in Indonesia, and the Dutch position began to look weaker.<sup>81</sup>

## I. Insurgency

The third accusation the Dutch were hoping to prove through the *Djogdja Documenten* was that the Republic was planning and carrying out insurgent activities that violated the standing ceasefire treaty, including attacks against Dutch civilians and supporters.<sup>82</sup> Hatta's response, while in custody, to these claims was that any plans the Indonesian government had relating to attacks on the Dutch were preparations for a response to any possible Dutch invasion of Republican territory.<sup>83</sup> Mohammad Roem, writing an update on the Republican government in January of 1949 continued this line of reasoning, stating:

'After the Dutch had launched their second military action, they declared that they have confiscated a number of documents containing evidence that the TNI [Indonesia National Army] was planning to attack West Java and that the Government of the Republic had made preparations to that end. The true fact is that any Army Staff is in possession of several plans dealing with problems of offensive and counter offensive. The TNI staff, too, had made preparations for various actions which might have to be carried out should the Republic be attacked by the Dutch, and that is the only kind of plan which the Dutch could possibly have found'.<sup>84</sup>

Hatta had sensed the Dutch plan for an invasion as early as October of 1948 when he wrote to the American representative in the negotiation process that it was his impression that 'the Dutch are advancing charges of subversive activities of the Republic only to find a justification for another military action (...) [t]he Republican

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 300.

<sup>82</sup> NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.

<sup>83</sup> NL-HaNA, Koets, 2.21.100, inv.nr. 56.

<sup>84</sup> NL-HaNA, Koets, 2.21.100, inv.nr. 434

Government has submitted evidence to prove that these accusations are false'.<sup>85</sup>

## J. Response to Claims

The seized archives not only served the claims intended for the international community, but also played a role in determining Dutch policies, both military and diplomatic. NEFIS reports were sent to the Netherlands, Dutch diplomats in countries involved in the process (such as the United States and United Kingdom), and high-ranking government and military officials. Reports written after the invasion of Yogyakarta made specific reference to the *Djogdja Documenten*, such as one from 17 February 1949. The first sentence begins, 'From the archive of MOH. HATTA' followed by a description of the opium trade.<sup>86</sup>

However, if the Dutch government had hoped that the contents of the *Djogdja Documenten* would help turn international support back in their favor, they would find this not to be the case.<sup>87</sup> While the Republican detainees may have had 'a feeling of lonely abandonment' at the hands of the United Nations and the international community during the end of 1948 into the early months of 1949, by the end of the year the pressure on the Netherlands would be too strong and they would be forced to recognize Indonesian independence.<sup>88</sup> Further military action had the opposite effect of what the Netherlands had hoped. Rather than listen to the accusations made, even if they came with record evidence, the United States and its allies were now fully prepared to work with Hatta and the Republican government.

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<sup>85</sup> Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie: Strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Indië, nummer toegang 2.13.132, inventarisnummer 423.

<sup>86</sup> NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 629.

<sup>87</sup> Cheong, relating the story of finding communist material states, '[t]he documentation available suggests that Dutch authorities were on the alert for any evidence to prove that Republican sympathizers were allied with pro-communist organizations (...) It is most likely that these messages were shared with British authorities in Singapore (...) The Dutch benefited from this cooperation with the British because it enabled them to show how organizations like Indoff were taking actions that were dangerously close to illegal transactions' (190). Similarly, Cribb describes the captured documents as appearing 'to be a propaganda windfall for the Dutch' before being pressured to shelve their findings (720).

<sup>88</sup> Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 343.

So great was the pressure to come to an agreement that the Netherlands, without fanfare, refrained from publishing a report they had written using the *Djogdja Documenten* so as to not completely damage their ability to work diplomatically with Hatta and those aligned with him.<sup>89</sup> Withdrawing forces meant returning to the Netherlands with the *Djogdja Documenten* in tow.

The *Djogdja Documenten*, along with the rest of the NEFIS collection, were shipped to the Netherlands prior to the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, in 130 cases of records. At first sent to the Ministry of Overseas Territories, records were later transferred to different agencies in the government, as after independence they no longer were related to a territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The inventory taken of the NEFIS archive by archivists at the Nationaal Archief when they were transferred there found the collection to contain much less than was originally written, with some documents from NEFIS most likely destroyed.<sup>90</sup>

The next aspect of the story that needs explanation is what happened after their arrival in the Netherlands and how they would eventually be sent to ANRI, which must be prefaced by a short description on the post-independence relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia and their cooperation.

## Conclusion

The records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten* were seized as military intelligence during wartime. The Dutch government were attempting to prove misdoings by the Republic of Indonesia through evidence in the Republic's archives. NEFIS, the Dutch military intelligence agency, was tasked with recovering and processing the records into reports disseminated throughout the Dutch and Dutch East Indies governments. As the Netherlands still considered Indonesia as part of their territory it is understandable how the records would have been in the possession of NEFIS at the end of the military engagement and then sent back to The

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<sup>89</sup> Cribb, 'Opium and the Indonesian Revolution', 720.

<sup>90</sup> NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 3013-7112.

Hague following the transfer of sovereignty.

For the *Djogdja Documenten* to be analyzed using the records continuum model certain aspects of their history have to be known. This includes the moments of the various dimensions, which will be discussed further in Chapter IV. The actions that I described in this chapter will be framed in continuum model concepts in the next chapter.

Just as Bastian's research introduced the records of the Virgin Islands, or Grimsted's introduced the records of the Soviet secret archive, this chapter introduced key concepts and phrases related to the *Djogdja Documenten*. Such a detailed history of the *Djogdja Documenten* did not previously exist. This background will be useful in the next chapter as I look at the archival cooperation between the two countries and analyze the records through the continuum model.