The shadow continuum: testing the records continuum model through the Djogdja Documenten and the migrated archives
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MJK
Abstract
This dissertation aims to test the universal suitability of the records continuum model. The records continuum model was created in the 1990s by Australian archivist Frank Upward, and is seen by many in the archives community to be a successor to the records life cycle model that appeared in the mid-twentieth century. A major draw of the continuum model is its all-encompassing nature. The continuum model is meant to visualize and describe all cases of records, thanks to its innovative approach to the period after a record is initially created. Rather than seeing time as linear, the continuum sees records as free to move throughout four records ‘dimensions’.

Using two case studies of archives from the decolonization process with non-traditional experiences, this research attempts to ‘map’ these cases onto the continuum model and test the universality of the model as a result. The first case study is known as the Djogdja Documenten and comes from Indonesia. Seizing documents from various Indonesian government ministries during the Indonesian struggle for independence, the Dutch military turned these unrelated records into one archives group. The second case is the so-called Migrated Archives. Unlike the Djogdja Documenten, the records that make up the Migrated Archives were created by the colonial administration—in this case the British. While the Migrated Archives are a worldwide phenomenon, I concentrate on records from Singapore and Malaysia. The Migrated Archives became one archive when records from various colonial governments were sent to London on the eve of independence rather than have them fall into the hands of the successor governments. After nearly fifty years of being hidden in a Foreign Office warehouse, the Migrated Archives were only available to public viewing in 2012.

Following each case study, which includes an extensive history of the archives’ formation, background, context, and content, I will attempt to place the archives on the continuum model, mapping each action on to a corresponding dimension. The Djogdja Documenten poses no problems at doing this, and in fact acts as a prime example for showing how the continuum model’s idea that dimensions can occur is any order is applicable in real world cases. In the case of the Migrated Archives,
however, the glaring omission from the continuum model of places in between dimensions where records can get trapped or lost is seen. I rectify this through the creation of something I call the shadow continuum. In the shadow continuum records proceed through the dimensions of the continuum model, even when they are unknown to exist. The functioning of the shadow continuum is the same as the original continuum model, only its actions are kept intentionally veiled by those who control the record.
Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift heeft als doel de universele geschiktheid van het *records continuum model* te toetsen. Het continuüm model werd ontwikkeld in de jaren 90 door de Australische archivaris Frank Upward, en wordt door velen in de archiefgemeenschap gezien als een opvolger van het *life cycle model*, dat verscheen in het midden van de twintigste eeuw. Een belangrijk deel van het continuüm model is de allesomvattende natuur. Het continuüm model is bedoeld om te visualiseren en te beschrijven alle gevallen van archievering, dankzij haar innovatieve benadering van de periode na die waarin een archief is in eerste instantie gemaakt. In plaats van het zien van de tijd als lineair, ziet het continuüm model archieven als vrij om te bewegen tussen vier 'dimensies'.

Met behulp van twee case studies van niet-traditioneel gemaakt archieven van het dekolonisatieproces, probeert dit onderzoek deze gevallen tot het continuüm model te arrangeren, en als gevolg daarvan de universeelheid van het model te testen van.

De eerste casus is bekend als de "Djogdja Documenten" en komt uit Indonesië. Het nemen van documenten uit verschillende ministeries van de Indonesische regering tijdens de Indonesische onafhankelijkheidsstrijd, de Nederlandse militairen maakten deze records buit en maakte ze tot hun eigen archief groep. De tweede casus is de zogenaamde *Migrated Archives*. In tegenstelling tot de "Djogdja Documenten", zijn de documenten die deel uitmaken van de *Migrated Archives* gemaakt door het koloniale bestuur zelf, in dit geval de Britse koloniale administratie. Hoewel de *Migrated Archives* een wereldwijd fenomeen zijn, concentreer ik me op documenten uit Singapore en Maleisië. De Migrated Archives werd één archief gecreëerd uit documenten van verschillende de koloniale overheden, die aan de vooravond van de onafhankelijkheid naar Londen werden gestuurd, in plaats van ze over te dragen aan de opvolgende bestuurders Na bijna vijftig jaar verborgen in een Foreign Office magazijn, werden de *Migrated Archives* pas openbaar gemaakt in 2012.

Na elke casus, die een uitgebreide geschiedenis van het archief formatie, achtergrond, context, en de inhoud bevat, poog ik de archieven in het continuüm model te plaatsen, elke actie arrangerend bij een overeenkomstige dimensie. De
“Djogdja Documenten” levert hierbij geen problemen, en fungeert als een typisch voorbeeld van de toepasbaarheid in de praktijk van het idee dat in het continuüm model dimensies kunnen gebeuren in elke volgorde. In het geval van de Migrated Archives daarentegen leidt de vijftig jarige verdwijning tot een problem. Dit is gebaseerd op het concept van “traces” (sporen) in het archief en hoe ze invloed hebben op een archief verbinding met het continuüm model. Er is momenteel geen term om te beschrijven wanneer er geen openbaar bewijs van een record, maar continuüm concepten zijn nog steeds van kracht. Ik noem dit fenomeen de shadow continuum en het ontbreken van een spoor is van cruciaal belang voor het bestaan ervan. Het concept van de shadow continuum wordt het hoogtepunt van het onderzoek en wordt ontwikkeld en onderzocht in het laatste deel van het proefschrift.
Propositions

- The indiscriminate claim of the record continuum model's universality makes it inherently difficult to disprove, but must be continually pursued if we are to believe it to be true.

- There is no agreed upon right test of the records continuum model. Instead, there is only the most appropriate for the case at hand.

- Creating the shadow continuum effectively links continuum concepts to unseen, hidden, secret or classified documents that left no other trace.

- The records of the *Djogdja Documenten* and Migrated Archives are a prime example of the idea that the record continuum model's dimensions can take place at any time in any order.

- There is no distinction in Dutch between 'record' and 'archive', which, while being the first hurdle an American writing an archival science dissertation in the Netherlands must conquer, is also a linguistic form of continuum thinking.

- Describing archives using terms such as collective memory or heritage brings us no closer to understanding or defining collective memory, heritage, or archives.

- An unrecognizable first draft of a dissertation is the truest symbol of the PhD journey.

- The so-called *schertsstellingen* can cause more stress than writing one's own dissertation.
List of Principal Abbreviations

ANRI - Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (National Archives of Indonesia)

ARA - Algemeen Rijksarchief (General State Archives; previous name of Nationaal Archief)

CMI - Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst (Central Military Intelligence Service of the Netherlands)

CO - Colonial Office (British government office that would eventually merge and form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office)

FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office (commonly known as Foreign Office)

FO - Foreign Office

MCP - Malayan Communist Party

NA - Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands)

NAS - National Archives of Singapore

NEFIS - Netherlands East Indies Forces Intelligence Service

PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia)

PRO - Public Records Office (British government repository prior to formation of The National Archives)

TNA - The National Archives (UK)
Chapter I:  
Introduction

A: Origins

This project evolved from an interest in the effects of colonialism on recordkeeping. The initial exploration began at the Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands). There I viewed records related to cooperation with the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (National Archives of Indonesia, ANRI). Within these records I came across letters written in the mid-1970s from the director of ANRI to the Dutch government requesting a group of records known as the Djogdja Documenten. These records had been seized by the Dutch military thirty years earlier during the fight for Indonesian independence. Within a year of first reading these letters I learned of administrative records of 37 former colonies that had been found in London after fifty years of being hidden in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) storage facility. Known as the Migrated Archives, they were now being moved to The National Archives of the United Kingdom. These new revelations and discoveries shifted the focus of my research towards ‘missing’ or lost archival collections.

Both of these archives can be considered ‘non-traditional’ in their creation as archival collections. The individual records that form the archives were all created as a result of government business and are therefore similar to numerous other records in archives around the world. However, what makes both cases unique is their custodial history after their initial creation. For the Djogdja Documenten it was the decision of the Dutch military to seize certain records for intelligence purposes while leaving others behind. The Migrated Archives are the result of colonial administrators around the world making the decisions to either destroy, send to London, or leave records behind for the successor state prior to independence. The Migrated Archives are the records that were sent to London, where they became a single archive.

This research coincided, time-wise, with the public disclosure of sensitive records by Wikileaks. Contemporary secret records became a major news story, and my interest in records that exist but are unseen grew. In the age of Wikileaks and
information hidden because it is deemed ‘embarrassing’ or potentially useful to ‘enemies’, I was drawn to historical examples of such thought. Keeping certain records out of public view is not unique to contemporary society. Some of the same rationalization can be seen in the historical case studies of this dissertation as in the contemporary examples of the leaked Iraq and Afghanistan War documents, the leaked American diplomatic cables, as well as the National Security Agency surveillance exposure.

**B. Research Question**

Inaccessible or secret records, however, are not enough on their own to comprise an entire research project. My interest was particularly in those records which were intentionally removed from location to another. I began to think of these records in terms of records models and became interested in how a period of ‘silence’ in the archive could be represented in such models.

In the late twentieth-century Australian archivists created a new way to visualize recordkeeping in the digital world. This model, known as the records continuum model (or simply continuum model), was meant to remove the space-time constraints of a record. In the development of the continuum model no final answer has been given on how universally applicable the model is. Questions such as whether the continuum model is culturally dependent, or if all records can be interpreted using it, are still left open.

I therefore am left with three major research questions that will lead me through my work. Are there situations in which the model is not applicable? If so, what is the source of these situations being outside the continuum model’s applicability? And finally, what can be done to rectify such situations? The two case studies will allow me to deeply analyze the continuum model and its ability to interpret the nature of records.
C. Outline

Before the case studies can be analyzed I will embark upon a survey of literature on other missing or displaced archival collections and interpret them using the continuum model. Chapter II introduces such collections, both contemporary and historical. Starting with Jeanette Bastian’s work on the records of the United States Virgin Islands, through seized and destroyed records of the Second World War, and ending with the recent American invasion of Iraq and the case of the Baath Party records, I will note certain elements in order to differentiate various categories of missing archives. The continuum model will then be used to interpret these examples in the same way it will for each case study in the later chapters.

Chapter II also outlines my concept of the shadow continuum. The shadow continuum was developed for cases where continuum model dimensions are followed but happen in a secretive manner, unknown to those outside the process. I link the need for the shadow continuum to the reliance of the continuum model on an open and accessible society and archive.

Chapter III looks at the *Djogdja Documenten* from before the individual records were created through the seizure by the Dutch military. I will give a background on Dutch military intelligence in Indonesia, as well as the political situation during the Indonesian Revolution. Included is an overview of what information the Dutch were looking for in the records they seized.

Chapter IV continues with the *Djogdja Documenten* but instead focuses on the period after they were sent to the Netherlands. This chapter covers the political climate in post-independence Indonesia under Sukarno, and the shifts in ideology and diplomacy following the rise of Suharto in the mid-1960s. The cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and how it relates to archives and the *Djogdja Documenten* in particular, is covered by this political background. Chapter IV ends with an analysis of the *Djogdja Documenten* through the continuum model, in the same vein as the examples in Chapter II.

Chapter V begins the case study of the Migrated Archives, focusing solely on the records from Singapore and Malaysia. The chapter is a background on the
decolonization process and a literature review of the Migrated Archives. The review consists of each major academic study done thus far on the Migrated Archives, as well as an overview of coverage in the British press.

Chapter VI contextualizes the Migrated Archives in history and archival science. It begins with a look at the contents of the records and follows with the study of two particular events that led to the creation of many records that can be found in the Migrated Archives: the Malayan Emergency and the creation of Malaysia by merging Malaya with Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (now Sabah). Most of the available literature on the Migrated Archives is not from archival scholars, and this chapter puts the Migrated Archives in the context of archival discourse. It covers the archival concepts of appraisal and selection, provenance and finally ends with analyzing the Migrated Archives through the continuum model.

D. Research Methods

The literature review of previous cases of missing or displaced archives in Chapter II was conducted through research in archival journals and major publications. I began with well-known cases, such as those surrounding the Second World War, where numerous records and other cultural artifacts were seized. From there I was able to find other similar cases, especially those discovered during or dating from the early twenty-first century. For each case I looked for similarities that could help me create critical elements of the different categories of missing archives. This would help me determine when, if ever, the universality of the continuum model was not applicable.

The research for my two case studies involved both archival and literature research. Archival research meant going to archives in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Indonesia to not only see the collections in question, but also to view records that make reference to them such as newspaper articles, correspondence between government ministries and intra-departmental notes on their removal. Literature research on the case studies was done for their few mentions in previous research—either research about the cases or those using the collections as primary resources. Further research was done to place the collections
in their historical context of the decolonization of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The majority of research was done at the national archives of the Netherlands, Indonesia, the United Kingdom and Singapore. Further work was done at the International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam), the KITLV archive (Leiden, the Netherlands), the Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Netherlands Royal Library), the British Library and the National Library of Singapore.

E. Geographic Concentration and Definitions

Concentration on Singapore and Malaysia as a pair within the Migrated Archives is due to the related history of the two countries—Singapore was one of the three British colonies joined with Malaya to become Malaysia before it left the federation after two years. Singapore and Malaysia also offer a larger geographic scope that permits the dissertation to study archives and decolonization in the region. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have a long historical relationship, and references to Malaya and Singapore are made in the Djogdja Documenten, while references to Indonesia are made in the Migrated Archives.

The terminology regarding the two case studies also needs clarification. The Djogdja Documenten, starting in the 1960s, when work on their return began, through today, are most often known by some variation of one or two names. The first is Buitgemaakte Archieven, the Dutch phrase meaning ‘seized (or captured) archives’. At times this phrase is used by Indonesian archivists in correspondence with their Dutch counterparts, though it begins to fall out of favor after progress is made in their repatriation. The second most often used phrase is one that alludes to Yogyakarta, the city from which they were seized. Yogyakarta is often shortened to Yogya, Jogja, or Djogja. I have chosen the spelling Djogdja for Djogdja Documenten, for as rare as it may be, it is how the Arsip Nasional refers to them today in their

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1 I will use the contemporary full English and Indonesian spelling of Yogyakarta when referring to the city. The spelling ‘Djogdja’ will only be used in conjunction with ‘Documenten’ as a proper noun. Alternative spelling (Djogjakarta, Djogja, Jogjakarta and Jogja) will be kept in quotations, as will Yogya.
inventory. The phrase Migrated Archives, though not an original or specific phrase for the records in question, has become the preferred name for these archives by The National Archives, UK, and the academic community which have written on them thus far. For that reason I have decided to continue using the phrase, with capital letters, to describe those records which were created during the colonial period by British colonial administrations around the world, sent to the Colonial Office just prior to independence, and subsequently hidden for fifty years until their discovery at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office warehouse facility at Hanslope Park in 2011.²

I use the phrase ‘decolonization process’ to describe when these archives were created as I believe it is the simplest way to label this period. I consider decolonization to be the process of removing and deconstructing the colonial system in a country. Both the former colonizer and colonized play a role, and it continues after independence—as examples in both cases will show. In both cases the archives were created during this process. The Djogdja Documenten were seized after the Republic of Indonesia had declared independence, though the country was not yet recognized by much of the international community. The Migrated Archives were created while the British were orchestrating the independence of Malaya and the creation of Malaysia, thus also placing them within the decolonization process.

I will also need to clarify word choice over the terms ‘archive’ and ‘record’. Most European traditions, unlike that of the United States, do not differentiate between the two linguistically. The Dutch archief (plural archieven) means both records chosen for historical preservation, and those not chosen. To make it clearer, I will use the terms record and records to describe all ‘process-bound information’ managed by some organizational system, regardless of the decision made to preserve them for historical use.³ I will use archives to refer to groups of records as one archival collection. Archive will, of course, also refer to the institution and

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² The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the result of the merger of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office, itself a successor to the Colonial Office.
building that holds records for historical use and access.

F. Records Models

As the dissertation will be a study of the records continuum model, it is necessary to explain the source of the model. Models exist to explain and to simplify. Archivists have developed models because they are ways of visualizing a record—its nature, how it was formed and what can be expected after it is formed. Models take complex ideas and visualize them in a way that is recognizable and appealing. There are currently two major records models: the records continuum model and the records life cycle model. The records continuum model is seen by its proponents as an alternative or replacement for the records life cycle.\(^4\) The life cycle still functions as the main model used for understanding the nature of a record among many, particularly in the United States.

The life cycle model breaks a record down into three distinct stages that distinguish records from archives. The first stage is the active stage, when records are created and actively used by the creating agency. In the second stage, the dormant stage, records are no longer of current use. The third stage is when records become archives, being stored and preserved for future use.\(^5\) Prior to the archival stage is the selection and appraisal process, where records are discarded or 'advanced' to the archival stage.

According to the life cycle model, records are those used by the creating institution, whereas archives are those chosen from the larger group of records to be kept for historical preservation. The inability of the life cycle model to be applied to cases of missing or removed archives is exposed when the only things that can


happen to a record after it is created are its destruction or its placement in an archival institution.\textsuperscript{6}

The work of archivists like Theodore Schellenberg and Margaret Cross Norton led to the development of the life cycle model—with the idea that archivists should be at the decision-making stage that separates records to be destroyed from archives to be preserved. This view of the archivist's job, and the life cycle model that came with it, was developed in part from Norton's observation on the growing problem of creating agencies' inability to preserve all their records and to make determinations on what should be kept.\textsuperscript{7}

This perspective was in direct contrast to the philosophy of early twentieth century British archivist Sir Hilary Jenkinson. Part of the Jenkinsonian approach to archives is that rather than archivists, the records creators perform the appraisal step. Archivists instead should take a passive, custodial role in the protection, conservation, and storage of records.\textsuperscript{8} However, both archivist-as-custodian and archivist-as-appraiser lead to a similar 'cycle' approach, the major difference being who acts as appraiser of records. In both, records are separated between the 'current' and the 'historical'. This approach is seen as the beginning of the division between the management of records and archives into two distinct fields.\textsuperscript{9}

The name life cycle is in some ways a misnomer. In the life cycle records move in one direction towards destruction or preservation, and there is little to suggest any cycling back to the start. Lane and Hill have called it 'a linear [model] in which records progressively work through usefulness until they degrade into uselessness and death which becomes synonymous with the archive. As such it only offers one temporal dimension of existence for the archive'.\textsuperscript{10} This one-directional aspect of the

\textsuperscript{6} For an in-depth look at the creation of both the life cycle and continuum models, see Glenn Dingwall, 'Life Cycle and Continuum : A View of Recordkeeping Models from the Postwar Era', \textit{Currents of Archival Thinking}, Terry Eastwood and Heather MacNeil, eds, Santa Barbara, USA: Libraries Unlimited, 2010, 140.

\textsuperscript{7} Cook, 'What's Past is Prologue', 26.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 22-26.


\textsuperscript{10} Victoria Lane and Jennie Hill, ‘Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going? Situating the archive and archivists', in \textit{The Future of Archives and
life cycle would lead in part to the records continuum.

G. The Records Continuum

The records continuum model (Fig. 1) grew out of the work of Peter Scott, Jay Atherton and, later, Frank Upward. The development of records continuum theory was the result of work over many decades by various archivists, but the model itself is generally attributed to the work of Frank Upward of Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. Upward took the pre-existing concept of the records continuum and created the visual model. His model, and the growth of continuum theory in general, was partly a response to the increase of electronic records through the 1980s and 1990s, which changed the way decisions were made regarding creation and preservation of records. The life cycle, according to continuum theory, no longer served its old purpose.

The records continuum as a theory was conceived as a way of re-connecting the two aspects of a record that were separated in the life cycle model. A distinction between records and archives no longer mattered. The continuum model, according to Upward, takes the idea of the continuum ‘beyond metaphor’ and shifts how information professionals treat records.

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Rather than being linear, the continuum model attempts to show the fluid nature of records.\textsuperscript{14} Upward has stated that part of the reason why he developed the model was to create ‘a way of graphically representing the moving out from an initial communication which occurs in recordkeeping’.\textsuperscript{15} The initial communication is the creation of the record, and the continuum model is meant to visualize creation at the

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{records_continuum_model.png}
\caption{Original Records Continuum model. Copyright Frank Upward (1996).}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{14} The use of both words—‘records’ and ‘archives’—is still seen in records continuum theory, however.
It is important to note the difference between the records continuum and the continuum model. The records continuum relates to recordkeeping and records management. The model, on the other hand, is meant to help understand and describe the nature of records using records continuum theory. I believe that certain misunderstandings of what the model is capable of come from conflating a new style of records management with the explanatory model meant to represent it.

Upward denotes four ‘dimensions’ to the continuum model that he names create, capture, organize and pluralize. These dimensions are not necessarily in temporal order: Creation, for instance, ‘recursively occurs in places of situated action. Historical recordkeeping tasks, for example, create the record anew’. In this dissertation I will use the term ‘initial creation’ to clarify when I mean the first instance of creation of a document. An update to the continuum model which slightly adjusted the names of the four dimensions was developed after Upward. However, I will keep with the four names as initially conceived, as even the most recent literature on the continuum model is fairly standardized in its use of Upward’s original terminology. Defining the four dimensions is fundamental to interpreting the continuum model and, in turn, continuum theory in general:

The first dimension (1D), creation, is present when information is initially recorded. It is the beginning of a process—the action that leads to a record. Reed refers to it as ‘the locus of all action’ and refers to the recorded information at this point as ‘documents’, not yet managed as a record. It can also refer to re-creation, the start of a new process. This definition is extremely important in continuum thinking, as changes in context reflect re-creations.

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16 Barbara Reed, ‘Reading the Records Continuum: Interpretations and Explorations’, *Archives and Manuscripts*, vol. 33, no. 1 (May 25), 18-43.

17 Frank Upward, Sue McKemmish, and Barbara Reed, ‘Archivists and Changing Social and Information Spaces’, 199.


19 Barbara Reed, ‘Reading the Records Continuum: Interpretations and Explorations’, *Archives and Manuscripts*, vol. 33, no. 1 (May 2005), 20.
Capture, the second dimension (2D), occurs when documents are integrated into an institution's records management system. The record is now working in tandem with other records. Metadata is created and the record begins to take on a greater context.

The third dimension (3D), organization, is the process of turning a record into a part of a larger whole. The record is now part of an archive collection. Reed refers to this as ‘the dimension of “the archive” or “the fonds”’.\(^{20}\)

Pluralization, the fourth dimension (4D), refers to the process that makes a record seen and used by those outside the smaller organization of the third dimension.\(^{21}\) It is the dimension of access, and of the historian and other researchers. McKemmish and Upward have both used the phrase ‘collective memory’ to refer to the fourth dimension.\(^{22}\) Using a phrase without an agreed upon definition like ‘collective memory’ may add to confusion, but it is meant to imply that the record is being used by those outside the recordkeeping organization.

Aside from the four dimensions in the continuum model, Upward also names four ‘axial elements’: transactionality, identity, evidentiality and recordkeeping containers. Transactionality is ‘related to records as products of activities’. Identity is ‘related to the authorities by which records are made and kept, including their authorship, establishing particularities of the actors involved in the acts of records creation, the empowerment of the actors and their identity viewed from broader social and cultural perspectives’. Evidentiality is ‘related to the records as evidence with integrity and continuity’, and recordkeeping containers relate ‘to the objects we create in order to store records’.\(^{23}\)

Barbara Reed describes how records ‘transition’ from one dimension to the next.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 20.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 20.


Somewhat contradictorily she also states that a ‘record exists at the same time in all dimensions, but in our day to day working lives we tend to focus on specific views suited to our particular circumstances of employment’. She sees the third dimension as ‘the dimension of the “archive” or the “fonds”, the whole, extant or potential, of all of the records of an organisation cumulating to form organisational or personal memory’. The fourth ‘represents the capacity of a record to exist beyond the boundaries of a single creating entity’ and ensures ‘that records are able to be reviewed, accessed’.

Upward states that the model focuses ‘on the recursivity of the processes involved in the formation of archives’. He also notes the connective nature of the dimensions, that the fourth dimension ‘will become little more than wishful thinking if divorced from the other three dimensions, and without it they in turn are potentially pernicious’, referring to the fact that ‘[p]luralization is needed to provide the kind of archival neutrality that can be achieved through the coexistence of different viewpoints’. Upward acknowledges the explanatory nature of the continuum model, while also noting that its biggest draw is also its simplest: its ability to create a ‘layered and interconnected model for the ongoing management of systems and the formulation of strategies and tactics’.

**H. Limits to the Records Continuum Model**

Within the rich literature on the continuum model, criticism of it is generally difficult to find. But, as one might expect, the best place to find it is in the same country as its invention. In his book *Archives and Societal Provenance: Australian Essays*, Michael Piggott, an Australian archivist and contemporary of Upward, McKemmish, and Reed, sees the confusion surrounding the continuum model to be

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24 Reed, ‘Reading the Records Continuum’, 20.
25 Ibid., 19.
26 Ibid., 19.
27 Frank Upward, Sue McKemmish, and Barbara Reed, ‘Archivists and Changing Social and Information Spaces’, 216.
28 Ibid., 227.
29 Upward, ‘Modelling the continuum as paradigm shift’.
the source of many of its problems. Piggott states, ‘[t]he core texts are not always easy to understand [...] Yet even those well versed in the professional literature sometimes struggle to comprehend the intended meaning of continuum writing’.30 Furthermore, he calls the continuum model an ‘abstraction’, one which must ‘take its chances’ due to its reliance ‘on the viewer to draw a correct inference’.31 By this he means the description of the continuum model can be so confusing and vague that the onus is on the reader to make conclusions on what the model attempts to do. He is specifically referring to the image of the continuum model, the concentric circles and words floating throughout.

Piggott also mentions the model’s inability to describe ‘the role of records and recordkeeping in society; their true context’.32 Piggott makes mention of sweeping broad claims made by archivists—including one in a book he co-edited—such as ‘there is no area of human activity not shaped in the most fundamental ways by the archival storage of information’, but concludes that the continuum model is not a theory that can explain or prove such claims.33

The continuum model is often lauded for its universality, but simply saying something is all-encompassing and actually being all-encompassing are two vastly different things. This criticism is echoed by Piggott, who says that ‘[t]he repeated assertion that the model is a worldview, that it can be read into any era, that it is era independent and relevant across cultures has never been seriously tested, by its supporters or anyone else’.34 This draws attention to the severe lack of critical debate on the continuum model after its initial development. Following the formative years in the mid-1990s when the continuum model was being developed in Australia, its acceptance has become a foregone conclusion, without any substantial tests of the lofty claims put forth by its defenders.

A tendency to include hyperbolic and untested statements is common when

31 Piggott, Archives and Societal Provenance, 183.
32 Ibid., 187.
33 Ibid., 188.
34 Ibid., 185.
discussing the model. For instance, Piggott recalls how various articles have referred to the continuum model as ‘a device, a tool, a paradigm, a theory, a metaphor, a model, a logical model, a space/time model, a space/time construct [...] a method of thinking [...] a concept and a view’.\textsuperscript{35} Hence Piggott’s note on the ‘importance of clear articulation’.\textsuperscript{36}

While calling for tests of the continuum model and its universality, Piggott offers no suggestions of what such a test should look like, only that ‘something more substantial is needed’ than what currently exists.\textsuperscript{37} No consensus exists in continuum literature or its criticism as to what a test of the continuum model would look like. This dissertation represents only one type and may not necessarily be the optimal way to test the universality of the continuum model. I describe the case studies in detail and test their applicability to the continuum model at each dimension. I made the decision to make the dimensions the central focus of my test because the fluid “movement” of records between dimensions is a major feature of the continuum model and is seen as an upgrade over the one-directional aspect of the life cycle model. Focusing on how the records fit into each dimension is also a previously standardized method of describing records using the continuum model.\textsuperscript{38}

Though I only use two case studies from very specific situations, this work is meant to begin the critical evaluation of the continuum model and its worldview assertion. Like Piggott I am not opposed to the concepts behind the records continuum theory or the claim that it successfully unifies records and archives management. The test focuses solely on the universality of the continuum model and its applicability.\textsuperscript{39} I will pay particular attention to the idea that the continuum model is both transepochal and cross-cultural.

\textsuperscript{35} Piggott, Archives and Societal Provenance, 183.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 175.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 185.
\textsuperscript{38} Frank Upward, Sue McKemmish, and Barbara Reed, ‘Archivists and Changing Social and Information Spaces’, 197-237.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 185.
Chapter II:

Missing and Seized Archives and the Shadow Continuum

Introduction

Prior to beginning work on the case studies I will review literature on other examples of archival collections that have a similar contentious nature. The objective of this chapter is to begin testing the universality of the continuum model against these archives. Before I begin the process of testing the applicability of the continuum model to my cases I want to do a cursory test of the model on previously studied cases of missing or displaced archives.

The literature review begins with a shot look at international practices regarding disputed archival claims before moving on to previous cases that have been thoroughly discussed and explained. Following that I will reflect upon the case in relation to the records continuum model. These examples of missing archives have originated from such places as the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Netherlands, France, Iraq, Germany and the former Soviet Union. Perhaps two of the most well-known, and well-published, authors on the subject of missing, inaccessible, or displaced archives are Jeannette Bastian—whose work is focused on the U.S. Virgin Islands—and Patricia Kennedy Grimsted—whose work is on European archives in the former Soviet Union. Along with these I will also mention other cases in other parts of the world that involved some ‘silence’.

While I refer to my cases as displaced, removed, or missing archives, these are all just a specific subset of archival silences. Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes of the four periods that silences can enter historical production: fact creation (registration of information); fact assembly (creation of archives); fact retrieval (creation of narratives); and retrospective significance (writing of history). My two cases involve silences that arrive at fact assembly and fact retrieval—when archives

are created from records and when archives are used.

Trouillot’s silences are used in this dissertation as a means of describing the concepts that link my cases and literature examples and are not central to how I frame the cases in later chapters. Michelle Caswell uses Trouillot’s silences as her entry point into studying the photographic archive of the Tuol Sleng prison in Cambodia. She notes the usefulness of the continuum model for understanding that archive, but it is not her core way of explaining her case. In this dissertation I will essentially be taking the opposite approach. Trouillot’s silences help draw attention to the central question I have towards the continuum model. If something is silenced it can be difficult to visualize it within a model. Therefore, after reviewing the literature I will put forth an idea that I see as a way to visualize silences on the records continuum model.2

When each example is analyzed using the continuum model I will use 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D for each dimension. This system has its problems if we believe that records are in all four dimensions at once, or that different dimensions can happen in tandem and recursively. However, it has precedence and has been used in previous literature.3

A. UNESCO, ICA, and International Practices

In cases of disputed archives all parties involved have competing claims over the ownership of contested archival collections. The international community, in the form of both UNESCO and the International Council on Archives (ICA), have gotten involved in such cases and have published various decisions on how to solve disputes. UNESCO and the ICA have officially condemned the seizure of archives during a military occupation, with UNESCO stating, ‘military and colonial occupation do not confer any special right to retain archives acquired by virtue of

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2 Michelle Caswell, Archiving the Unspeakable: Silence, Memory, and the Photographic Record in Cambodia, Madison, USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014, 13-14

3 See, for instance, Frank Upward, Sue McKemmish, and Barbara Reed, ‘Archivists and Changing Social and Information Spaces’, 199.
that occupation’. 4

A further UNESCO report on the transfer of archives refers to archives as ‘an essential part of the heritage of every national community’ which ‘are indispensable in the development of national awareness and identity, [and] they constitute a basic part of the cultural property of States’. 5

A UNESCO RAMP (Records and Archives Management Programme) study from 1998 based on a questionnaire sent to the national archives of 83 different countries—of which 45 did not respond at all—details the outstanding archival disputes at that time. As it relates to this dissertation, Indonesia did not respond and therefore there is no list of what was still in dispute in 1998. However, the work that took place twenty years earlier between the Netherlands and Indonesia is mentioned in the report as a successful example of bilateral cooperation in the recovery of disputed archives. 6

The decision of where disputed archives should be held is often related to the concept of functional pertinence. Functional pertinence is considered an ‘exception’ to provenance, where the decision to keep records in a certain place is based on the continued administration of an organization. 7 This is relevant for the Djogdja Documenten, as they were Indonesian government records. The decision by the Dutch government to return them therefore took functional pertinence into consideration, as their return facilitated the continuation of their functions in

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Indonesian government organizations. The fact that after independence ANRI held on to many records from the Dutch period is an example of functional pertinence in action. Records from Dutch governmental offices were necessary for the administration of their Indonesian equivalents.

Functional pertinence also pertains to the Migrated Archives. The records sent to London could easily be perceived as being necessary for the successor state to continue the administrative duties of the respective government departments. However, the British government has made no statements that this will ever be a possible outcome of the Migrated Archives. Microfilm copies, however, have recently been made available at the National Archives of Singapore for records that relate to Malaysia and Singapore.

B. Types of Disputed Archival Claims

In work prior to the discovery of the Migrated Archives Nathan Mnjama creates a list of eight categories of ‘migrated archives’ that are meant to frame the desire of ex-colonial states to recover records related to their colonial history. This list is based on the work of American archivist Albert Leisinger, to which Mnjama adds three new categories. Though his particular work is related to Africa, the same categories can be seen in Asia and elsewhere. The categories are as follows:

- **Records originally created and maintained by various government agencies of colonial powers in their home countries.** Mnjama claims these, by definition, are not truly migrated archives and that the colonial government has the right to hold on to them but that the ex-colonial states also ‘have a genuine reason to have access to such records’. An example would be the records of the Colonial Office created in London and still held there.

- **Records of colonial administration created in the colonies but transferred to**

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8 For general archives that were 'migrated' from one place to another the lower case form will be used, and the capital form ‘Migrated Archives’ will refer to the recently discovered Foreign and Commonwealth Office records.

Europe at the dawn of independence. These are in the truest sense ‘migrated archives’, and were ‘illegitimately removed’, according to Mnjama. This category is highly relevant to this project, as the most obvious example would be the Migrated Archives case study.

- Records created in one territory, but which somehow found their way to another territory in the region. Examples of this type can be seen in Jakarta, where records from the Dutch period in Malacca were relocated after Malacca was transferred to the United Kingdom.

- Archives of regional colonial bodies, which collapsed either during the colonial period or soon after independence. Mnjama gives the African example of the records of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which became the countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. The National Archives of Zimbabwe, the direct descendant of the union’s archive, held on to records relating to federal government.\(^\text{10}\)

- Private papers of individuals and organizations that had contact with Africans. Examples of this category would be the records of missionaries or travel accounts, many of which are today in university libraries and private collections in other countries.

- Records created by liberation movements whose members were forced into exile. Many such records are held at the International Institute for Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam where they were sent for safe-keeping away from repressive regimes.

- Records of various non-governmental organizations based in Europe in the colonial period. Examples include the KITLV archive in Leiden, the Netherlands and other such colonial scientific societies.

- Audio-visual materials such as photographs, films and audio-tapes. Such material exists around the world in various forms and in various archives.

To his categories one more can be added, one that includes the Daogda

*Documenten*: records created by governments that declared independence and were seized by the colonial power during a war for independence.

With these various types of archival collections in mind, Jean Allman highlights the limitations of the national archive when she uses the phrase ‘shadow archive’ in reference to ‘the scattered fragments’ of documents relating to Ghana’s history in other countries.\(^{11}\) The shortcomings of national archives in collecting records of interest to local communities is not solely a phenomenon of ex-colonial states, but it certainly manifests itself strongly in the countries of Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Evelyn Wareham points out how much of the private collections regarding Pacific Islanders are held in repositories in New Zealand, Australia and the United States.\(^{12}\)

Such localized inaccessibility is different from the case studies in this dissertation, but still illustrates lack of access to historical records of a community. Many of the categories that Mnjama describes can be seen in Allman’s ‘shadow archive’. They exist not in the country they relate to, but instead in archives in Europe or America. With today’s technology, the question becomes more about access to such records rather than specifically their physical place of custody.

Though Mnjama is only interested in disputed archives from the colonial period, missing archives can be created in many other situations. Mnjama’s list can be expanded beyond African colonial disputed claims in order to create a list of all types of displaced or missing archives. One obvious addition are seized archives through war. ‘Missing’ archives can also include destroyed archives that can never be returned. Adding intelligence secrets, such as the Wikileaks records, we now have a longer and clearer list of the various types of displaced or missing archives.

### C. Bastian’s Research in the US Virgin Islands

The early published work of Jeannette Bastian centers extensively on the archives


of the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) and the attempts of the islands to gain
access to their own historical records. Her work most often concentrates on the
work of Virgin Islanders to have records returned to the islands. She then relates
this to concepts like collective memory and reconstructing historical narratives.

Before becoming a U.S. territory the islands belonged to Denmark. When sold to
the United States in 1917 the Danish were able to take many records to
Copenhagen which were then placed in the Danish National Archives, forming an
eexample of Mnjama’s ‘true’ migrated archives.\textsuperscript{13} Prior to the sale, pre-1848 records
had already been sent to Denmark as they were considered ‘purely historical’.\textsuperscript{14}
Other Danish-era documents stayed behind in disuse until the National Archives of
the United States was founded in the 1930s. An archivist was sent to survey the
records and started a transfer process that lasted two decades and shipped 1,260
linear feet (384 meters) of records to Washington, DC. In 1959 post-1917 records
were also sent the National Archives.\textsuperscript{15}

The lack of records in the USVI makes quick access extremely difficult for Virgin
Islanders. In such instances the needs of the local population are often not
evaluated, and decisions are made based on the needs of the colonial
administration. In the case of these records the decisions were made by the Danish
administrators able to transfer records after the sale of the islands, and later by the
American archivists who recognized their usefulness.\textsuperscript{16}

The work of both the Danish and American administrations created
inaccessibility for Virgin Islanders. As Bastian states, ‘[t]he multiple custody of
records at distant locations, in addition to fragmenting the records, created
powerful physical barriers for researchers, particularly those from the Virgin
Islands’. Given that an idea crucial to Bastian’s argument is that ‘the records created
within a community – even those created by a colonial regime – are central to that

\textsuperscript{13} Jeannette Allis Bastian, ‘A Question of Custody: The Colonial Archives of the United
States Virgin Islands’, \textit{American Archivist}, vol. 64, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), 97.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Jeannette Bastian, ‘Taking Custody, Giving Access: A Postcustodial Role for a New
Century’, \textit{Archivaria}, no. 53 (Spring 2002), 80.
community’s ability to fully understand its past and construct a strong collective memory’ means that these barriers block access to community identification. To Bastian, custody remains important, but not as much as access. She states that ‘the access problems of the United States Virgin Islands are not so much about the physical location of the records as they are about recognizing the custodial obligation to resolve access issues’. A lack of access results in the inability of a community to interpret its past and tell its own history.

Bastian envisions technology as a way of increasing access both on the islands and off. Acknowledging the shared context, finding aids ‘in Copenhagen, Washington, and the Virgin Islands could be embedded with references to each other at many levels, creating the ability for the researcher to seamlessly recreate records series’. Such a quote acknowledges that ‘custody’ and ‘access’ need not refer to the physical documents only. While Bastian’s early work tends to focus extensively on the idea of custody, her more recent publications show greater nuance in their description of records and access to cultural memory.

Bastian’s later work focuses on community archives and ‘alternative archives’. The alternative archives she gives as examples ‘demonstrate the multiple ways in which people and communities conceptualize, create, and keep the records that are meaningful to them’. These include ‘monuments as archives’, such as the Jamaica National Trust monuments ‘memorializing the trauma of slavery as it affected ordinary people’, ‘Memory cloths’, like those in South Africa made by local women and drawing on events of the past; ‘The Gaily News’, a local gay and lesbian magazine in Jamaica from the 1980s; and ‘An archive of place’, and the example of the Noongar group of Western Australia who used ‘white colonial records’ to their advantage to prove their people’s continued existence in one place over the years to
receive a native titles claim to the land. Bastian also gives the example of Carnival traditions in the Caribbean and states that ‘[t]he general nature of these events (...) suggests that they function as records. That is, they operate within a context, they have a structure, and they contain and impart content’. This way of viewing non-traditional archives puts them in the same context as traditional archives in that they are all ‘process-bound information’, or ‘information generated by coherent work processes and structured and recorded by these work processes in such a way that it can be retrieved from the context of those work processes’. To circumvent the lack of access to traditional archives, communities around the world form different ways of passing down cultural and ‘collective’ memory. The archive, the institution, is only one aspect of memory.

Bastian notes that ‘for post-colonial communities such as the Virgin Islands, archives seem to pose special problems that revolve around the contradictions inherent in the voicelessness’ in their archives. Since they have ‘no input into the record-creating process’, Bastian asks, ‘how can these communities reclaim their history? How can the voices of those who were silent be recovered? How can communities that were the victim of records, use these records to build reliable and positive constructs of their past?’ Part of her answer to these questions lies in the fact that ‘[a]rchives can provide the keys (...) if the searcher recognizes that records have both a text and a subtext, that records are both evidence and action, and that behind the record lies the trace’. Her very concept of ‘whispers in the archives’, which ‘relies on discovering the words or actions of the colonized’, is about re-reading archives for what is below the surface. Reading archives in this way can be used to fill gaps that are caused by the removal or destruction of other

22 Bastian, ‘The Records of Memory, the Archives of Identity’, 127-128.
23 Ibid., 2-3.
27 Ibid., 33.
documents.

The archives Bastian studies were not secretly displaced. The residents of the USVI had no say over where the records went, and it is likely that most were not aware when or where they were removed from the islands. It was an intentional removal, and rather than be destroyed the records still exist. For Virgin Islands they were certainly inaccessible for geographic and economic reasons.

To analyze these records with the continuum model would be quite easy. They were created, captured and organized (1D, 2D, 3D) by the Danish administration. Some were re-created, re-captured and re-organized (1D, 2D, 3D) by the American administration, while others were sent to Copenhagen and went through the first three dimensions there. After, they were pluralized (4D), either through the Danish or American national archives—though still difficult for the local community to access. This makes them a localized access problem, something that occurs often in other cases of removed, displaced, or missing archives.

D. Lost Archives of Europe in the Second World War

The Second World War and its aftermath led to many cases of stolen archives that resulted in both temporary and permanent missing records in all theatres of the war. The work of Patricia Kennedy Grimsted is at the forefront of discovering these records. Grimsted particularly concerns herself with the ‘twice-stolen’ archives of war-torn Europe. These documents were first confiscated by Nazis in occupied regions and subsequently taken by the Soviets from the capitulating Nazis. Grimsted’s work goes into incredibly precise detail of what organization initially seized the documents, where they were located, when they were discovered by the Soviets, where they were taken in the Soviet Union, and what has happened to them since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. She has spent decades reviewing the subject of these seized records and has outlined the archival and international communities’ position on the looting of archives during wartime.28

28 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, ‘Captured Archives and Restitution Problems on the Eastern Front: Beyond the Bard Graduate Center Symposium’, in Elizabeth Simpson
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the holdings of the so-called Special Archive in Moscow slowly began to be made public. It contained records not only related to the Netherlands, but also France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and other countries. Many of these were the archives of socialist groups, Freemasons, Jews and other ‘enemies of the Reich’ whose written heritage could be used ‘as raw material for propaganda and for ’operational’ use’. Grimsted has followed many of these collections from their re-discovery to their repatriation.

During the war the Netherlands had many private archives looted by the Nazis. Once they were made known in the 1990s, Russian officials had little interest in returning Dutch and other Western European archives to their country of origin. It took over ten years from the time the story of stolen Nazi archives housed in the former Soviet Union reached Western Europe for much of them to have work done on their return. The new government of Russia had made no signs that it would return the archives, nor any other cultural material taken during the war. In the mid-1990s the Duma was contemplating passing a law that would end the prospect of restitution of any cultural material seized during the Second World War.

The capture and subsequent long-term storage of these archives by the Soviet Union had a strong basis in ‘compensation’ against Nazi Germany for cultural destruction caused in their invasion of the Soviet Union, despite the capture’s further punishment of countries like France and the Netherlands. These countries ‘also suffered wartime losses and destruction, and in many cases [the archives are] the memory of individuals and institutions who were victims of the Nazi regime’. The actions of the Russian government prolonged how long these records would be

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31 Grimsted, et. al., Returned from Russia, See ppg. 84-86 for a breakdown of categories of captured records including reasons for interest by the Soviet Union.
32 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Russia’s ‘Trophy Archives: Still Prisoners of World War II?’, Budapest: Open Society Archive, Central European University, 2002, 2.
inaccessible to all researchers.

A specific case of records taken from the Netherlands concerns the archive of the International Archives for the Women’s Movement (now known as Atria). As Francesca de Haan explains, in 1942 the Nazi police seized a large portion of their collection, which was later pillaged by the Soviets. It was not until 2003 that the archive was returned from Russia to its current repository.33 Eric Ketelaar also gives the examples of Freemason and Jewish archives, as well as archives belonging to the International Institute of Social History, the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, and the Catholic Documentation Center as among those that were discovered in the former Soviet Union. Some made a return to the Netherlands after a 2001 meeting between Queen Beatrix and Vladimir Putin, while others wait for their repatriation.34

The Nazis were not the only group capturing archives during the war. Allied soldiers also confiscated military documents from Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied areas. The Soviets were also not the only Allied military ‘re-seizing’ documents taken by the Nazis, as Grimsted’s work on the Smolensk archive—taken by the U.S. Military from the Nazis who had seized it from the Soviet Union—attests.35 Furthermore, though some were returned in 2003, the United States National Archives still contains thousands of German records from the First World War, including some 3,000 maps.36 Though there has been much written on Allied seizure of German historical records—some dating back to the 19th century—most of the literature concerns the factual information of what documents were seized and, if relevant, the repatriation efforts, and not much else.

34 Grimsted, et. al., Returned from Russia.
So many records were seized by the Soviet Union, with varying degrees of operational use to Soviet intelligence, that the entire collection cannot be considered to have only one history. However, in the most basic of terms, Nazi seizure was one form of re-creation, and Soviet seizure after that a second form (1D). Capture and organization (2D, 3D) happened hidden from public view in the secret Soviet archive, while pluralization (4D) occurred after a third re-creation (1D) and subsequent capture and organization (2D, 3D) once the records were returned to countries such as the Netherlands.

To give one example of how varied the stories of the seized records by the Soviet Union are I will mention Jewish organization archives from Austria. These archives were misidentified and initially sent to the Netherlands amongst archives being returned there. This mix-up adds another creation, capture, organization and pluralization for these records.

What is beginning to been seen through these records is that the continuum model can be used to analyze records after pluralization. Prior to pluralization it was not clear what records still existed or what happened to them after the initial Nazi seizure. In this sense the continuum model is retroactively applied to records after their discovery and pluralization, but cannot analyze them before this point. This idea will be important as I search for situations where the continuum model is not applicable and attempt to rectify the problem.

E. The Second World War in Asia

Japanese archivist Masahito Ando has covered the Pacific theatre of the war and the Japanese occupation of former allied colonies in Asia. His central conclusion is that ‘[t]he Japanese invasion of Asia and the Pacific not only caused great loss of life and property but also contributed to a serious gap in the history of the Asian and Pacific

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countries (...) by destroying the foundation of people's memory of this area.'³⁸ Ando makes further reference to specific archives from Hong Kong as well as Burma that went missing during the Japanese occupation. Elsewhere Ando mentions that ‘at the end of the war, the Japanese authorities destroyed almost all important records relating to wartime administration’ so that Japanese-created records would not get into the hands of the returning Allied powers.³⁹ In Hong Kong, Ando explains that whether records survived or not was ‘more or less a reflection of the administrative policy and methods during the Japanese occupation’.⁴⁰ If the Japanese continued the British system, as was the case for the land and housing administration, records relating to that office survived the occupation and were often used by the Japanese. A new system on population statistics, however, meant a loss of all marriage registry records from before the war.⁴¹ Ando’s tables following his article describing the wartime outcome of records in Malaya offer a wealth of information for seeing what the Japanese occupation did to British documents.

Ando gets most of his research from an April, 1948 questionnaire sent by the Public Record Office (PRO, part of today’s National Archives) to government archives in various colonies to determine how their contents were affected by the war. Looking further at this questionnaire gives more background on this particular destruction of archives caused by the Japanese occupation. The questionnaire was accompanied by a memo written by archivist Sir Hilary Jenkinson. In Southeast Asia, the post-war condition of archives was a concern. Respondents were asked to summarize the collection, the historical relevance of its contents, the number of staff at the archive, the number of professionally trained staff, and were then given space for any other comments not covered by the specific questions. Three British colonies that withstood Japanese occupation make reference to it and the

⁴¹ Ibid., 7-8.
destruction of documents in their questionnaire answers: Brunei, Hong Kong and Malaya.

According to the response from the High Commissioner of Brunei, a position granted to the Governor of Sarawak the same year the questionnaire was sent, ‘[t]he Archives in Brunei are at present few in number’ and that in the British Resident’s Office and Treasury ‘the pre-war archives were destroyed during the Japanese occupation’. The response from Hong Kong was similar, stating that ‘pre-war Archives were either lost or destroyed as a result of the Japanese occupation’.42

Malaya’s response, though arriving in London over three years after the questionnaire was sent, is very detailed, going department by department with listings as to how much of the collection survived occupation. Lists of the state governments are also included. The state government of Negri Sembilan lost a large number of records from its State Secretariat when a Japanese sergeant, ‘in an excess of zeal’, destroyed local pre-war records while burning occupation-era Kempeitai records.43 These examples from the Second World War give an idea of how records can go missing and become inaccessible in the course of war, occupation and regime change, all of which are catalysts for displaced or missing archives.

The records destroyed by the Japanese occupation forces can still be represented using the continuum model, as Upward claims that within the model destroyed archives can still be seen ‘through data about their life history or their connection with events. Even if they cannot be observed, their place in spacetime is always there’.44 That is, of course, contingent on traces of the records being left behind. In many cases the records destroyed by the Japanese do have traces, as their destruction was either documented by the Japanese or later by other connected to the records as was the case in Negri Sembilan. Records that were not destroyed were re-created and re-captured (1D, 2D) by the Japanese, and then once

42 The National Archives (TNA): PRO 1/948: Preservation of Colonial Archives.
43 The Kempeitai was the Japanese secret military police. The National Archives (TNA): PRO 1/1204: Colonial Government Archives: reply from Federation of Malaya to circular despatch of March 1948.
44 Upward, ‘Modelling the continuum as paradigm shift’, 5.
again when the British returned.

**F. Iraq and Other American Military Archival Claims**

A recent example of inaccessible, missing, or removed records caused by war and occupation can be found in post-invasion Iraq through a study by Michelle Caswell. After ending up in the possession of Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi-American with connections to the Bush administration, the papers of the Baath Party made their way to the Hoover Institution, a conservative think-tank and library at Stanford University founded by alumnus and later US President Herbert Hoover.\(^{45}\) The papers were discovered by the US military, who gave permission to Makiya to remove part of the collection that was not kept by the United States.\(^{46}\) Caswell tells of how the Society of American Archivists (SAA) and the Association of Canadian Archivists issued a joint statement condemning Makiya’s group (the Iraqi Memory Foundation) and the Bush administration for its handling of the records and calling for their return to the Iraq National Library and Archives.

Caswell connects the fight for the documents to the fight over ‘who gets the power to determine what will constitute the national archive of Iraq’, for ‘[h]e who gets custody of the archive, has the power; the stakes are not just the fate of the Baath Party Records, but the future of Iraq’.\(^{47}\) The connection and conflation of archives and power is one made by Jacques Derrida, Verne Harris, and Jeanette Bastian, among many. Like Bastian, Caswell takes this further and addresses collective memory as one of the powers archives have when she states, ‘without access to important historical documents, nations cannot develop an accurate collective memory, and, without this collective memory, they cannot function well in the present’.\(^{48}\)

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\(^{47}\) Ibid., 221.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 234.
Beyond the problem of what constitutes collective memory, a distinction must be made between ‘access’ and ‘custody’, which Caswell seems to use interchangeably in reference to the future and present of Iraq. However, as Caswell points out, the issue in her case study is made more difficult as ‘providing access to digital copies of the records will not help Iraqis, many of whom don’t have access to the Internet’. Caswell addresses both the ethical and legal issues at stake in the case of seized records during wartime. They are quite clearly Iraqi ‘cultural property’ as the title of her article suggests. Archival principles and international law then make it a custody issue.

Douglas Cox extends the work of Caswell to other examples of SAA responses to archives and war. One thing Cox points out is that the restitution of archives is not always as simple as it may seem. Government archives hold a vast amount of military and intelligence value and their seizure is therefore relatively common in war. Cox outlines the evolution of archival protection, from the 1874 Brussels Declaration through the 1907 Hague Regulations until the 1954 Hague Convention. He also gives examples of the effect of war on archives from the First World War up to Iraq, including the examples of Grenada (1983) and Haiti (1994) during U.S. invasions.

As was the case with the Baath Party records, after the 1983 invasion of Grenada the SAA passed a resolution condemning the seizure of documents and advocating for their return. The records were returned, but not before copies could be made for research use at the US National Archives, an example of what Cox describes as ‘one of the few ancillary international ‘benefits’ resulting from the evils of war—the emancipation of records of nations that would otherwise be concealed from view’. The same could not be said for the example of Haitian records taken in 1994. When they were returned in 2001 it was discovered that no copies had been made, and the originals were most likely destroyed in the 2004

49 Ibid., 230.
51 Cox, ‘National Archives and International Conflicts’, 477.
coup d’etat’.52 Such a situation, according to Cox, ‘support[s] the argument for balancing national interests in the return of original records with international interests in long-term preservation’.53

The Baath Party records, like the Virgin Island records of Bastian’s study, are localized access problems. They are not held in secret, and access to them is not completely denied, but it is nearly impossible for anyone in Iraq to view them. They were created, captured and organized by the Baath Party (1D, 2D, 3D), then re-created and re-captured by the US military, and finally re-created, re-captured, re-organized and pluralized (1-4D) by the Hoover Institution.

G. The Continuum Model and Access

This preliminary exploration of displaced archives and the universality of the continuum model has shown that both localized questions of access and destroyed records can still be analyzed using the continuum model. These are types of records that I initially thought may not fit within the continuum. A short analysis was able to determine, however, that they most certainly do.

From the relative transparency of twenty-first century democracies the records continuum model appears to have a degree of universality. In democratic states innumerable records are made public, often times with relatively damaging information regarding the creating government. In other contemporary societies and other times, however, this transparency is not a cultural norm. Piggott bemoans the fact that the sparse tests of the continuum model thus far have all been in ‘modern Western settings’.54 This leads directly into what I contend are two major, intertwined problems with the records continuum model that affects its ability to analyze certain displaced records. These critiques are primarily concerned with government records and not private records.

The first is that the universality of the continuum model can only be claimed

52 Ibid., 478.
53 Ibid., 479.
and supported once missing, seized, hidden or otherwise displaced records are discovered or leaked. I see this as a self-fulfilling prophecy of the continuum model. When previously unknown records are discovered, the fourth dimension of pluralization can be attached to that act and the records can now be interpreted retroactively using the continuum model. The second problem is the natural conclusion of the first. That is, that the continuum model is reliant on openness and accessibility in society and its archives.

As it stands I do not see the continuum model as acknowledging its reliance on openness and access to support its applicability. All analyses of records using the continuum model are dependent on pluralization having taken place. They are dependent on societies and situations that make records accessible. Unknown records, or the records of secretive states and organizations, cannot be analyzed during the unknown period by the continuum model. The decision whether or not a record is actually pluralized is a records management decision, which is culturally and societally derived. But if the continuum model is viewed in the context of a paradigm shift for records management, as Upward sees it, then a reliance on pluralization and existing as merely a theoretical construct are not elements that would benefit the model.\(^\text{55}\)

This, I believe, turns the continuum model into a theoretical construction. It ceases being a practical model for the understanding of recordkeeping in these situations. Without pluralization a continuum model analysis could still take place, but it would be theoretical and purely speculative. While models can be created for the unknown—and are often used to explain and visualize the unknown—in those cases it is acknowledged that this is the role of the model. The role of the continuum model is not to be speculative. Furthermore, if the continuum was theoretical, pluralization could not be guaranteed.

These problems are inherent within the continuum model due to confusion in continuum model literature. Piggott complains of confusing and vague depictions of the continuum model, as such confusion leads to the question of whether

\(^{55}\) Upward, 'Modelling the continuum as paradigm shift in recordkeeping and archiving processes, and beyond – a personal reflection'.
pluralization is guaranteed or not. Barbara Reed describes records as existing in all dimensions at once. What does that say about the pluralization dimension of unknown records that may never be made available to the public? This is a case of the continuum model getting lost in its own convoluted theory. I intend to remove the confusion by introducing something I call the shadow continuum. This addition is a way of describing hidden records while still using continuum model concepts.

**H. The Shadow Continuum**

There are records that we have no knowledge of, and, unlike known destroyed records, there is no physical trace of their existence. I contend that in such instances these records have been transplanted to the 'shadow continuum'. In the shadow continuum records proceed through the dimensions of the continuum model, even when they are unknown to exist. The functioning of the shadow continuum is the same as the original continuum model, only its actions are kept intentionally veiled by those who control the record. This can be the creating institution, the archival repository or another organization that seized control of the record in a form of re-creation.

The shadow continuum is based partly on the work of Jean Allman, Jeannette Bastian, Barbara Reed, and others. Allman's concept of the 'shadow archive', and Trond Lundemo's 'archival shadows', certainly helped spark the idea of the shadow metaphor in archives. Allman's 'shadow archive', as already stated, are the records of a country that exist spread out throughout the world as a result of colonization and globalization. Lundemo claims that 'the principles structuring what is accessible and stored, but which remain irretrievable' are archival shadows, partially caused by the 'cultural myth that everything is always accessible'.\(^56\) Bastian speaks of both whispers and traces in the archive, hinting at the existence of unknown records.\(^57\) It was Reed's description of the Wikileaks records as 'non-

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\(^{57}\) Bastian, ‘The Records of Memory, the Archives of Identity’, 121-131.
traditional', and her explanation of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network used by the US Department of Defense ‘for the creation and transmission’ of the diplomatic cable leaks, however, that brought these other ideas together for me to create the shadow continuum.  

I propose that the ability to be interpreted with the continuum model by using the shadow continuum hinges on the existence of archival traces, to borrow the phrase from Bastian. I define traces as publically accessible information that offers enough data to contextualize a missing record, determine its content and existence and to uniquely identify it. Traces are the clues left behind that betray the existence—past or present—of a record that is inaccessible. Even without access to the physical record, a trace declares its existence.

It is difficult to pinpoint a trace, as a trace can be seen from either an insider or an outsider perspective. This will be seen in the Migrated Archives. A small group of people can have access to a record and have knowledge of its existence, but I do not see this as fulfilling the definition of a trace. A trace has to be openly accessible to the public. I make public accessibility a crucial element of trace because Upward declares pluralization as the dimension of collective memory. To me this statement links the continuum model and public access. Interpreting a record through the continuum model hinges on an open archive.

At its core the shadow continuum, like the continuum model itself, is a way of representing the nature of records. While the continuum is meant to represent what is happening in any recordkeeping situation, the shadow continuum has a very specific situation that it relates to. That situation is when no traces exist that can allow the adequate representation of the record using the continuum model alone.

Using the shadow continuum, the examples from the literature review can be re-evaluated. For instance, some of the records described by Grimsted, held at a

58 Frank Upward, Sue McKemmish, and Barbara Reed, ‘Archivists and Changing Social and Information Spaces’, 223.
secret Soviet archive after the Second World War, have clear links to the shadow continuum. Capture and organization (2D, 3D) occurred in the secret archive, a period which can be said to exist on the shadow continuum. While some records were useful in an operational sense by the Soviet intelligence community, other seized records were deemed of no operational value and little to no inventorial work was done. In these cases no trace would have been left behind to sufficiently know what still existed.

In the case of Bastian’s records from the US Virgin Islands, the shadow continuum is not relevant. Traces of the records—and the records themselves—were always known and the records could always have been interpreted using the continuum model. Instead, the premise was centered on accessibility. This is the same for the Baath Party archives. In both cases major traces to the records’ location were left. The shadow continuum is dependent on a lack of archival traces, and can be implemented in those cases where no trace exists.

Further examples can help clarify when the shadow continuum is applicable. A fictional example is when the records of a certain group are captured by force. Some records could be destroyed on site, others destroyed at a different location and still others removed from their repository and kept for intelligence purposes in a closed archive. In this case there would be no traces left that would allow the public to know what of the collection was salvaged. There is no independent observation of the various continuum model dimensions. Knowledge of this would not come until the closed archive is opened, perhaps after a change in regime. Something similar to this example is what happened with many private institutional archives during and after the Second World War.

I also want to further mention Barbara Reed’s reading of Wikileaks using the continuum model for any help it can offer in formulating the shadow continuum. Reed states that Wikileaks re-creates the records in question (1D), and then captures, organizes and pluralizes them as well. All this after Wikileaks ‘hoists (or

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heists) records out of their normative progression to pluralization.' Wikileaks should prompt us to think about those records which continue to be kept from public view. There is nothing guaranteeing that the continuum model can be used to analyze and interpret these records, as we do not know anything about them. When pluralization is of no guarantee it is impossible to speak of the 'normative progression to pluralization'.

The National Security Archive in Washington, DC, is also of relevance to the shadow continuum. This non-profit archival institution exists to make Freedom of Information Act requests to the United States government, and to make the resulting records publically accessible. What it is doing is therefore removing the cloak of the shadow continuum, allowing the public to see the nature of the records—how they can be analyzed and interpreted using continuum model concepts.

The shadow continuum runs into a similar problem as the continuum model, in that it can only be applied retroactively. It can only be known for sure that the shadow continuum was in effect after a record has been pluralized. This was part of the problem with the continuum model, so it may seem that the problem is not adequately addressed. However, the main point is to acknowledge this flaw in the continuum model. By saying that the period prior to pluralization for these specific cases of displaced records is influenced by the shadow continuum I am allowing any future discovered cases to be understood in a standardized form.

I. The Case Studies

The preceding introduction to missing and displaced archives now leads into my two case studies. These two cases were formed as a result of the decolonization process and will be viewed through the continuum model. Two cases from the decolonization process have been chosen because I believe that the large amount of

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61 Frank Upward, Sue McKemmish, and Barbara Reed, ‘Archivists and Changing Social and Information Spaces’, 211.
sensitive nature surrounding the decolonization process makes for a suitable example of when and how records can go missing. Both cases involve secrecy, war, regime change, and also have cultural, historical and geographical connections.

The *Djogdja Documenten* are made up of documents created by the government of the Republic of Indonesia during its revolutionary uprising against the Netherlands from 1945-1949. Following the invasion of Yogyakarta—the temporary capital of the Republic—in December of 1948, the Dutch military seized documents for the purpose of intelligence gathering. These documents were sent to the Netherlands after the Dutch left in 1949. From the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia was in ruins. It was not until the early 1970s that the records would begin to be returned to Indonesia.

The Migrated Archives have a history that is only recently coming to light. Upon receipt in London these documents were kept hidden in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) warehouse and were only made public starting in 2012. These records were first known to the public after a group of Kenyans brought a case against the British government claiming to have been tortured during the Mau Mau Emergency that preceded Kenya’s independence. When the documents were further consulted it was revealed that records from nearly forty other colonies were similarly kept hidden.

While the Migrated Archives may be a historical example of keeping ‘embarrassing’ records, they are still an ongoing process as at the time of writing they were still being transferred to The National Archives. This, to me, also makes them a wonderful companion to the *Djogdja Documenten* for my dissertation. In the *Djogdja Documenten* I had a complete story from seizure, removal, pre-return diplomacy, to the final return. With the Migrated Archives the story was being played out as I worked. This made my research difficult but also fascinating. I could compare the two stories, how they became inaccessible, what cooperation was deployed between countries, and what people were involved.

The major difference between the two cases, of course, is that the *Djogdja Documenten* were created by the colonized while attempting to enact their own independence, while the Migrated Archives were created by the colonizers before
and during the independence process. In using the continuum model, however, the
original creator should not be an issue. Despite the differences in their initial
creation, the two cases are still both examples of a similar concept of displaced or
missing archival collections, and therefore their comparison and use of the
continuum model to interpret them is still appropriate.

As always occurs when researching and writing on an evolving topic such as the
Migrated Archives, new findings can make previous work appear outdated. I first
viewed records of the Migrated Archives within the first month of their accessibility
in 2012, and my research continued through 2014. Even while working on the final
edits of this dissertation new information was becoming available. As such, a cut-off
date is necessary to explain why certain records were not consulted or newspaper
stories referenced. In mid-2014 the writing of this dissertation entered its final
phase, and material after this date may not factor into my findings.

Conclusion

Dissecting the literature on missing or removed archives it is apparent that wars,
colonization, and decolonization led to an increase in both the creation and
displacement of records. Records can go missing—from one point of view—during
and after military engagement, through the process of regime change, and also by a
powerful state apparatus that wants to hide certain information about itself.
Records can go missing during regime change, attempted regime change, invasion,
occupation and war. All such examples can lead to the formation of a shadow
continuum. These examples all contain a threat to the status quo, which is the main
source of displaced or missing archives.

Destroyed records, like those in Japanese-occupied territories from the Second
World War, can still be interpreted using the continuum model. Destruction,
according to the continuum model, can happen in any order. Even destroyed
records can lead to new records being created to explain the destruction. The
action that takes place when records are re-created in new contexts by being
removed from their original location can also be interpreted using the continuum
model. The same can be said of records that are knowingly kept inaccessible.

I have termed archives that are taken from one place to another—for instance Bastian’s example in the Virgin Islands and the Baath Party archives—as localized problems. The continuum model can be referenced when describing these archives, such as in Bastian’s case, where Denmark became the new creator of the records in question. When creation is no longer seen as something that only happens once, the act of removal of archives from one place and their transfer elsewhere becomes mapped onto the continuum model through its view that destruction or movement of records is a form of re-creation. Though local communities may lose access to the records, we are still given an idea as to what is happening in these situations through the existence of archival traces.

For cases when no trace can be found I have created the concept of the shadow continuum. The shadow continuum came from two flaws I saw in the continuum model: that its universality hinged on a record’s pluralization and, therefore, that it was inherently reliant on an open society with open archival access.

For the cases of the *Djogdja Documenten* and Migrated Archives, I will keep these previous examples in mind. It must be determined whether my cases are localized problems, whether they can be interpreted with the continuum model, or whether they are subject to the shadow continuum. In doing so I will divide each study into two chapters.

The first part will be the background and initial research that was not necessary for the examples from this chapter—for instance, Bastian’s work took care of any further research on the specific records from the USVI. The second part will be an exploration of the records through the continuum model, mapping each action to a dimension of the model. This will also be the chapter where I discuss any relation to the shadow continuum. In both of the upcoming cases I will see whether they were acting within the shadow continuum or not.
Chapter III:
TheCreation of the *Djogdja Documenten*

**Introduction**

The *Djogdja Documenten* will be covered first both because I discovered prior to the Migrated Archives and because it is more of a completed story than the second case. Records were moved from one place to another. Work was done by the governments of both Indonesia and the Netherlands, and now the records are held in Jakarta. During a period of cooperation from the 1970s-90s, copies of the *Djogdja Documenten* were made and kept in The Hague while the originals were sent to Jakarta. I will begin the case study of the *Djogdja Documenten* with a brief background and introduction to how I learned about the collection, followed by a review of how these documents have been used and discussed in literature. After that I will examine their contents and why they would have been so sought after by the Dutch military. This section includes some history on the Indonesian Revolution to provide context surrounding the creation of the *Djogdja Documenten* and the individual documents as they were used by the Republican government.

There are many different aspects to explore in a case such as the *Djogdja Documenten*, but my review is a specific one, formulated in a particular way. It is meant to provide certain information on the *Djogdja Documenten* that will be useful in the next chapter, which will focus on the documents after the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence. Chapter IV will also deal with the long term aspects of the *Djogdja Documenten* as it relates to the continuum model. This chapter lays the groundwork for the following chapter by outlining the *Djogdja Documenten* in a way that will make it easier to understand them via the continuum model.

My personal 'discovery' of the *Djogdja Documenten* came at the Nationaal Archief while reading correspondence between archivists in Indonesia and the Netherlands in the midst of research on the post-independence relationship between the two national archives. Reading letters from the director of ANRI to Dutch archivists and diplomats regarding these seized documents created by the
government of the Republic of Indonesia during the revolutionary period sent me
deeper into the collection at the Nationaal Archief, searching for more references to
their seizure.

This eventually brought me to metadata of the *Djogdja Documenten*—detailing
the documents seized, their contents, creating organization, seizure location, date of
seizure, etc. This metadata is in the form of routing slips, or *geleidebrieven* (Fig. 2),
created by the Dutch intelligence service (NEFIS, the Netherlands East Indies Forces
Intelligence Service; known in Dutch as CMI, or *Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst*,
Central Military Intelligence Service) after the seizure of the *Djogdja Documenten*.
They were given the name routing slips as they were used to track the records’
movements across the various divisions of NEFIS, but they offer much more. These
forms, filled out by members of the intelligence service, communicate to the reader
not only about the document as a record of Indonesian government actions, but of
the Dutch activities involved in their seizure. From this it is possible to determine
what the Dutch military was interested in discovering about the anti-colonial
movements when seizing documents. With little in the way of secondary sources
written on the *Djogdja Documenten*, it took significant archival research to fully
comprehend the collection and its creation.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were not the only records seized by the Dutch military
during the Indonesian Revolution. Other original records from the period still exist
in the NEFIS archive at the Nationaal Archief. There are over 4100 files
(*bestanddelen*) in the NEFIS archive that are labelled ‘found, seized and captured’.¹
Among this group are the *Djogdja Documenten*, which exist in copied form at the
Nationaal Archief. At the Arsip Nasional the collection labeled ‘Djogdja Documenten’
contains only 356 files, fitting into only 14 boxes (see Appendix A). The *Djogdja
Documenten* are therefore defined as the NEFIS documents that were claimed by
Indonesia to be the property of their government.

¹ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service [NEFIS] en
Centraal Militaire Inlichtingendienst [CMI] in Nederlands-Indië, nummer toegang
2.10.62, inventarisnummer 3013-7112, Bijlage 3: Beschrijving van Gevonden en
Buitgemaakte Documenten.
Most of the seized records were written in Indonesian, with a small number between Indonesian and foreign officials written in English. Translations were made into Dutch by NEFIS employees and the record was given a number. NEFIS document numbers begin before the *Djogdja Documenten* and continue after, with the 356 records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten* falling between numbers 5223 and 5808.²

Some organizations in the Republican government saw more seizures than others. Ninety-five out of 356 documents were seized from the Ministry of Defense, which at the time had Vice-President Mohammad Hatta also acting as Defense Minister.³ The archive of Hatta is also listed 76 times, though it is not clear if this was his personal archive or the archive of his government office.⁴

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⁴ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr 3013-7112.
A. Background on NEFIS

NEFIS, the intelligence wing of the Dutch military, was founded during the Second World War by the Dutch colonial government-in-exile in Australia to gather information on Indonesia during the Japanese occupation. However, the majority of their information came from those who managed to escape Indonesia, leaving the Dutch government with out-of-date intelligence. This factored into the Dutch surprise at how strong the independence movement had become. Following the Japanese capitulation and their return to the Indies, the focus of NEFIS shifted to Indonesian nationalist groups. Part of that focus was the accumulation and analysis of records created by such groups.

NEFIS routing slips are available for nearly all outside records discovered by the agency, and not only the Djogdja Documenten. Within NEFIS there was a particular division involved in the translation of records and their organization. Records were seized or found, telegraphs were intercepted, spies and informants were used—all for the accumulation of information by NEFIS. Records used by NEFIS were given a number and a routing slip. This work all occurred at NEFIS headquarters in Bandung, south of Jakarta. It was here that their archive of documents and routing slips was held. The headquarters was also where records that were seized were processed, rather than appraisal at the site of seizure.⁵

The records gathered by NEFIS provided the Dutch government with valuable information on the Indonesian side during peace negotiations. This is in line with Linda Barnickel’s concept of the ‘intelligence value’ of records, which ‘in a military or political sense [...] is the value information has for enemies or opponents of the creating or possessing individual or agency’.⁶ The records were used to write reports, which were shared throughout the Dutch government, and kept decision-makers abreast of the situation in the area, including the Prime Minister and

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Minister for Overseas Territories in The Hague and the Army Commander of the Dutch East Indies.\(^7\)

The Dutch were interested in proving certain transgressions of the Republic of Indonesia government. The information gleaned from the *Djogdja Documenten* by the Dutch can be categorized into three main accusations: illegal opium trading, communist sympathies and clandestine terrorist activities against Dutch troops and civilians. The Dutch military was hoping to implicate the Indonesian side in the aforementioned activities in order to discredit them and slow down the support they were gaining from the rest of the world. By late 1948 support for Indonesia was growing in the international community, and the Netherlands was attempting to bring international support back to its side.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were seized after what the Dutch called a *politionele actie* (police action). In Indonesia the terms ‘military aggression’ or ‘military action’ are used. The difference being that a police action is generally seen as something regarding domestic affairs—as the Netherlands viewed Indonesia at the time as their territory.\(^8\) Not being a recognized nation, Indonesia could not be invaded and was therefore subject only to a police action.\(^9\) Indonesia, however, had declared independence over three years earlier in 1945 after the end of the Japanese occupation, and saw the Dutch invasions as acts of military aggression. This word choice is important for clarifying the mindset of both sides regarding the documents in question. Between 1945 and 1949 the Netherlands still regarded the East Indies as a legitimate colony of theirs. While the return of documents does begin within 30 years of their capture, it is worth noting that it was not until a 2005 speech by Foreign Minister Ben Bot that the Netherlands recognized Indonesian independence to have begun in 1945 rather than 1949.\(^10\)

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\(^7\) Okeu Yuliansari, ‘Deciphering the NEFIS Archives’, 73.


\(^10\) Government of the Netherlands, ‘Relations The Netherlands – Indonesia’,
After the fighting ceased and the Netherlands withdrew from Indonesia, the records of NEFIS, including the seized documents and the reports they created using them, were sent from the NEFIS headquarters in Bandung to The Hague where they were re-organized under Dutch governmental recordkeeping systems.\(^\text{11}\) While being the impetus for most of what will be described below, this period in The Hague is also the hardest to document. The delay in the return of the *Djogdja Documenten* is blamed on documents being misfiled and being in unknown locations, with letters between the Ministries of *Buitenlandse Zaken* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and *Binnenlandse Zaken* (Ministry of the Interior) trying to determine who has what. It was, however, a nearly thirty year period in The Hague before the first of these documents began their return to Indonesia, and another ten years before the second group.\(^\text{12}\)

There is no doubt that the *Djogdja Documenten* come from different original sources. The various locations are listed in documents in The Hague and in each file in Jakarta (see appendix B). Numerous government buildings in Yogyakarta were taken over and their contents searched for useful records. Correspondence between Dutch officials after the capture make note of this fact.\(^\text{13}\) It is quite possible, in fact very likely, that one part of the documents would have been created completely separate from, and without the knowledge of, another part being created.

From this it is reasonable to say that NEFIS was the creator of the *Djogdja Documenten* as a collection. What makes the documents that are referred to as the

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\(^{13}\) Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 1945-1950, nummer toegang 2.10.17, inventarisnummer 798. A NEFIS official writes to the *Procureur Generaal*, 'Ik heb de eer UhoogEdelGestrenge bijgaand foto’s aan te bieden, welke in het tijdvak van 19 December 1948 tot heden werden aangetroffen in diverse gebouwen h.t.s.’ (I have the honor to show you photos, which from 19 December 1948 to the present were found in various buildings).
Djogdja Documenten one archive was their seizure by the Dutch military, and nothing else. Without the action of the Dutch they are not one entity, or one archive. On their own, taken outside the context of their capture and removal from Yogyakarta, two documents within the Djogdja Documenten from different creators are no more linked than two documents that were not seized from the same creators. The Djogdja Documenten was therefore—as a unit—a Dutch creation.

Individual records from various organizations became one new archive as a result of decisions made by NEFIS. This is what the records continuum model would refer to as re-creation (1D). The Dutch went through a process of picking and choosing what to take, linking these records in history. Without Dutch intervention they would never have been part of one archive group. The Dutch troops then, in the sense that Tom Nesmith illustrates by arguing that ‘any work of archives-making is a type of authoring or creating of the archival records’, are co-authors of the Djogdja Documenten.14

B. Situation in the Dutch East Indies after the Second World War

NEFIS was created in the wake of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies. While the Dutch government and military went into exile in Australia, citizens of European origin not lucky enough to escape were put into internment camps. Japan supported the anti-colonial activities of the Dutch-educated nationalist Indonesian leaders and in the closing months of the war promised to work towards the creation of an independent state for Indonesia.15 Pressured in part by a growing youth movement, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta broadcasted a proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945—after the surrender of Japan but before any attempt at re-conquest by the Allies.

Indonesia had expected American forces to be used in the invasion of the Indies,

as was the case in other Japanese-held islands.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, the supreme command of the Indies was handed to the British as part of the South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Admiral Mountbatten. This was agreed to at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 so that American troops could be diverted to Japan after the war. Mountbatten, in his official capacity, supported the Dutch right to regain control of the colony when they were once again ready to govern.\textsuperscript{17} British troops, mostly from India, were therefore the first group to engage the Indonesian independence movement in combat.\textsuperscript{18} In November 1946 the first agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Linggajati Agreement, was signed, but did little to change the situation in the Indies.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{C. The \textit{Djogdja Documenten} in Literature}

There are no actual academic studies of the \textit{Djogdja Documenten} as a subject in and of itself. Rather, a literature review will have to consist of brief mentions—which rarely refer to the \textit{Djogdja Documenten} as an entity—as well as examples of historians using the records in their research. The story of the \textit{Djogdja Documenten} is only told in a piecemeal fashion between these various studies. These studies all come from historians, as no archival scholars have previously studied the collection in the way that will be completed here.

One of the earliest mentions of the \textit{Djogdja Documenten} was an article by Robert Cribb on opium in the Indonesian Revolution.\textsuperscript{20} He details the role of opium used to financially support the revolution, one of the three accusations against the Republic that the Dutch were trying to prove. He therefore makes mention of ‘captured Republican documents’, which gave the Dutch ‘possession of documents of indisputable authenticity which proved not only the Republic’s involvement in


\textsuperscript{17} Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, \textit{American Visions}, 54.


\textsuperscript{19} Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, \textit{American Visions}, 200.

opium trading but indicated that knowledge of the trade went up at least as far as the prime minister and vice-president, Mohammad Hatta. Cribb also makes use of many of the documents seized by NEFIS as the basis for his knowledge of the opium trade in Indonesia.

Yong Mun Cheong, in *The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection*, refers to captured documents three times and how they connected Singapore and Indonesia. All, however, happen in passing. Describing the opium trade and Indoff’s (the Indonesian Office) role he states, ‘Indoff’s complicity became more entangled when Yogyakarta fell into Dutch hands in December 1948 and the Dutch captured documents allegedly implicating Indoff in smuggling eight tons of opium into Singapore’. Cheong also mentions one Indoff leader, Daroesman, as ‘the immediate victim of the 1948 military action’ because ‘[d]ocuments seized in the Yogyakarta archives implicated Daroesman in clandestine activities and it was time for him to be reassigned before an arrest warrant could be served on him’.

George Kahin was an American graduate student who befriended the leaders of the Republic and lived in Indonesia researching and writing at the time of the revolution. His *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* has been a lasting study of the topic due to his access into the Republican government. In his memoirs published after his death he describes living in Yogyakarta during the invasion and mentions ‘that on the 22nd [of December] the staff of the Indonesian delegation was taken to Yogyakarta by truck, all of its archives being seized by the Dutch’. The delegation was previously nearby in Kaliurang with the American, Belgian and Australian delegations to the peace negotiations. The archives of the Indonesian delegation to the peace talks is one major source of records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten*.

In his description of how to study the Indonesian revolution in European

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24 Ibid., 190.
archives for those who cannot travel to Jakarta, Oey Hong Lee notes that ‘in the Dutch Royal Archives [sic] there is an impressive number of Indonesian secret papers which have been captured by the Dutch during their occupation of Yogyakarta in December 1948’.26 Lee did the archival research for his book War and Diplomacy in Indonesia 1945-1950 in 1977 before all the documents had been returned.

Frances Gouda’s book, written with Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, on the role of the United States in the negotiations leading to Indonesia’s independence, American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia, uses the Djogdja Documenten on a number of occasions. Unlike other uses of the Djogdja Documenten, however, Gouda makes no reference in the book to the history of these records and the fact they were seized by the Dutch military. They only act as an archival source that was used at ANRI, and not at all for their story and their role in Indonesia’s nationalist movement.27

One of the more recent studies mentioning the collection comes from Robert Elson and A.B. Kusuma on the documentation surrounding the writing of the 1945 Indonesian constitution.28 Included in these sources is the ‘Pringgodigdo Archive’, which was unknown to previous researchers of the constitution as the archive’s location in The Hague was not known.29 Elson and Kusuma claim that how the archive arrived in The Hague ‘remains something of a mystery’.30 The most plausible reason, they believe, is that the documents were seized during the second Dutch military campaign in the Indies, launched in December 1948, when the Dutch army invaded the Republic of Indonesia capital of Yogyakarta.31

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27 Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions.
29 Named after A.K. Pringgodigdo, a senior diplomat in the Republican government.
30 Kusuma and Elson, ‘A Note on the Sources’, 198.
31 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Tweede Afdeling, nummer toegang 2.14.04, inventarisnummer 318. For more information see: Michael
The most comprehensive use of the *Djogdja Documenten* as a source is from Chiara Formichi’s book *Islam and the Making of the Nation*. This book follows Kartosuwiryo and his founding of the *Darul Islam*, which originally fought against the Dutch in order to form an Islamist Indonesia, and later acted in rebellion against the Republic. She uses many records from the *Djogdja Documenten* to research the early years of *Darul Islam*, when the Dutch military would have been very interested in this anti-colonial organization fighting against them.\(^{32}\) The remaining studies on the Indonesian Revolution, including those covering the capture of Yogyakarta, fail to mention the *Djogdja Documenten*, including many written after their return to Indonesia.

**D. Background on Seizure and Military Actions**

Though not often mentioned in literature on the period, the *Djogdja Documenten* were seized for a reason and were seen as important by the Dutch military at the time. By late 1948 the Indonesia independence struggle had lasted more than three years and pressure was on to create a lasting peace agreement after multiple failures. In August 1947 the United Nations created a Committee of Good Offices (CGO) to oversee the peace process, with one delegation chosen by the Netherlands, one by the Republic of Indonesia, and one agreed upon by both.\(^{33}\) These choices were Belgium, Australia and the United States, respectively. Australia was seen as highly sympathetic to the Indonesian cause, while Belgium both shared the Dutch language and had its own colonial empire. By this time international opinion was not so clearly on the Dutch side. Growing sympathy for the right to self-determination for Indonesia meant that any new actions on the part of either side had to be carefully thought out and managed.

On December 19, 1948, the Dutch army launched its second military campaign

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against the nationalist elements of Indonesia. Among the cities taken by the Dutch was the capital, Yogyakarta.\textsuperscript{34} While in the midst of peace negotiations the Dutch had issued an ultimatum one week prior to the attack and deemed Indonesian concessions as lacking, and quickly launched their invasion.\textsuperscript{35} The impetus for this invasion, of course, goes back further.

The first Dutch military campaign (\textit{Operatie Product}: Operation Product) was launched on July 21, 1947, after the failure of the Linggajati Agreement, the first peace agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands. The campaign lasted two weeks and saw the Netherlands retake control of important regions of Sumatra and two-thirds of Java, leaving Yogyakarta in the control of the Republic.\textsuperscript{36}

The second attempt at a peace treaty, the Renville Agreement, which included a status quo line and a plan for the creation of a United States of Indonesia with the Republic of Indonesia as one member state, also failed to last. The second Dutch military campaign (\textit{Operatie Kraai}: Operation Crow) was a more large-scale operation that would shape Dutch-Indonesian relations until the transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch not only captured Yogyakarta, but also arrested President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta, along with over twenty other government officials who were moved to a prison on the island of Bangka.\textsuperscript{37}

In negotiations with the Committee of Good Offices, both countries attempted to place the blame on the other. Mohamed Roem, the Indonesian delegate, wrote in October 1948 to American delegate Merle Cochran that Indonesia was trying to uphold the truce agreement and claims that the Netherlands was the reason for the

\textsuperscript{34} The status of capital had temporarily been allocated to Yogyakarta by the Sultan after the Dutch had returned to power in Batavia (modern day Jakarta).

\textsuperscript{35} Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, \textit{American Visions}, 292-293.

\textsuperscript{36} Vickers, \textit{A History of Modern Indonesia}, 103.

\textsuperscript{37} The list of captured officials can be found in Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Algemene Secretarie van de Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij gedeponeerde Archieven, nummer toegang 2.10.14, inventarisnummer 2888. \textit{The Times}, on 17 January 1949 (‘Republican Leaders’ Conditions’, 4), describes how Hatta and five other ministers were held, ‘confined to one bedroom, six metres square, containing six beds, and one other room, 19 by 16 metres, all windows being enclosed by wire netting’. 
breakdown of negotiations. In the week leading up to the start of *Operatie Kraai* negotiations were particularly heated. On 11 December, 1948 the Dutch delegate told Cochran that Indonesia was the first to break the truce. On 13 December Hatta himself wrote to Cochran outlining the misconceptions the Dutch had towards Republican positions and actions. He claimed the Republic agreed to the Renville Agreement and would make concessions including moving back the date of sovereignty transfer. When told of this letter, the Dutch delegate told Cochran that Hatta’s letter was his personal feelings and not that of the Republican government and therefore would not change their position. On 17 December he gave an ultimatum that a response must be made within eighteen hours. Cochran’s reply gives a hint at the negative response the United States will have to the military action and the invasion of Yogyakarta:

‘I feel constrained to express my regrets that it was thought necessary to impose a time limit which allows, if taken literally, a total of less than eighteen hours, including the hours of night, for the making of copies; the delivery of the note to Dr. Hatta by the United States Representative; consideration by Dr. Hatta; the necessary consultations with members of his government; the preparation of a considered reply; the trip from Kaliurang to Jogja and then the flight to Batavia. I cannot help but recall, by way of comparison, that I gave Dr. Hatta’s letter to you at 5:30 pm on Monday, 13 December. That letter was answered only today, five days later, despite the fact that it asked only for a decision to resume negotiations. Your telegram was delivered to Dr. Hatta, after the making of copies, at 4:30 pm today. You will agree, I am sure, that in such circumstances, I cannot in justice press Dr. Hatta for an immediate reply to a letter which calls not for a mere expression of willingness to resume negotiations but rather for a surrender to the position of your government on every material point’.  

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The next day, T. Elink Schuurman, Dutch delegate, wrote to the Committee of Good Offices, referencing previous letters regarding Republican violations of the Renville Agreement, that the Netherlands would no longer consider the agreement binding at 00.00 19 December. Though already planned, with this letter the Netherlands announced its intention to launch a second military campaign. Not everyone heard this announcement, however. Telegraphic communications were cut off between Batavia and Kaliurang, where the Committee was headquartered, by the Dutch. Cochran and the deputy Australian delegate were in Batavia being handed the letter and were unable to communicate back to Committee. Cochran was also concerned that no notice was sent to the Republican government in Yogyakarta. Though a letter was given to the Secretary-General of the Republican delegation, it was not until nearly 11:45pm on 18 December. The cutoff in communications, however, made it impossible for him to alert Yogyakarta.

With the military successfully having taken control of the city, and the Indonesian leaders under arrest, NEFIS personnel could begin their work. In the days, weeks and months following the invasion, Republican offices were searched and records seized. The routing slips that were created contain the date that the record in question came under NEFIS control, and where they were found, giving an indication into the role the records played while they were held by the Republican government.

E. Prior to Seizure

I have stated that the *Djogdja Documenten* as a collection were created by NEFIS, after the act of seizing particular documents and framing them under a single context. This is a type of re-creation (1D) as described by the continuum model. The individual records, however, were created by various departments and members of

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42 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Collectie 249 P.J. Koets, nummer toegang 2.21.100, inventarisnummer 432.
43 NL-HaNA, Koets, 2.21.100, inv.nr. 434.
44 NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 3013-7112.
the Republic of Indonesia government. While not much is available on the recordkeeping strategies of the Republic during the military engagement with the Netherlands, in this section I will give as much background on the pre-seizure history of the records as possible.

The inventory of NEFIS documents available on the website of the Nationaal Archief includes metadata that lists the original archive where the individual records were found. From this it is possible to see exactly where the records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten* were before being seized by the Dutch military. Original creators include the Ministry of Defense, Internal Affairs, Social Affairs, the State Secretariat, Sukarno, Hatta, the Republican delegation to the peace talks, and others.

In previous research, Okeu Yulianasari has written that entries in the inventory ‘give the impression that the archivist did not use the routing slip but instead, described the document based on the information that they found on the first page of a *bestanddeel* [file].’ This would explain the discrepancies in terms of standardization in the descriptions of where the records were found. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 46 documents seized, and the archive of Agus Salim, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, is also listed as a site of seizure. Further confusing matters, these are split between ‘Archief Agoes Salim’, ‘Archief H.A. Salim’, ‘Archief Hadji Agoes Sali’, ‘Huiszoeking [House search] H.A. Salim’, and ‘Woning [Dwelling] H.A. Salim te Djocja’.

While this information does not offer much, it is the greatest source for understanding the story of these documents prior to their seizure. It allows us to see some of the structure the Republican government had in regards to its recordkeeping. The other place to look is at ANRI, where, kept separately from the *Djogdja Documenten*, are the records of the Republican government that were not seized. ANRI has in its collection the archives of the Sekretariat Negara, the

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45 The inclusion of this information on the online inventory is relatively new, and occurred in the course of the writing of this dissertation. Prior to 2012 it was only possible to see the metadata in a special paper inventory available at the reference desk of the Nationaal Archief. The online inventory simply numbered the documents and gave no hint as to what each document was. The new online inventory includes original location, seizure date and NEFIS number.

46 Yulianasari, ‘Deciphering the NEFIS Archives’, 3.
Republican Delegation, and the Ministries of Social Labour and Internal Affairs, all of which had some records taken out that became part of the *Djogdja Documenten*.

More information is available for NEFIS and their work done once records were seized than for how the Republican government created, organized and stored its records. The most we can know about the records pre-seizure is where in the Republican government they were created. What the Republican government created but did not keep cannot be known. Furthermore, what was seized by NEFIS but seen as unnecessary for the fulfillment of their goals and therefore destroyed is also unknown. One of these goals was to gain information on specific areas of Republican actions which could strengthen their case against the Republic in the international debate on Indonesian independence. This is the reason the *Djogdja Documenten* look the way they do and why there are certain themes seen in the individual records.

**F. The Dutch Claims**

With the *Djogdja Documenten* the Dutch were trying to prove three main claims against the Republican government. These are using the international opium trade to finance the revolution, having links to communist groups and violating the Renville Truce Agreement by implementing subversive activities in Dutch-controlled territory, including launching an insurgency campaign and feigning cooperation in peace negotiations. It was therefore seen by the Dutch that this act of archival looting was justified by what they found among the documents. NEFIS reports written after the invasion noted that ‘[a]part from evidence already published, these conclusions are borne out completely by the examination of the Republican archives which have been found after the occupation in Djokja and elsewhere in Republican territory’. In an unpublished February 1949 report, ‘The Consequences of a Restoration of Republican Authority in Djocjakarta and Vicinity’ each claim was specifically linked to individual records that were seized in December.

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48 NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.
The Netherlands tried to press their claims against the leaders of the revolution using records taken directly from the Republican government. The three accusations made by the Dutch that helped shape the contents of the *Djogdja Documenten* were well known by the end of 1948. Dutch officials had been pleading their case to members of the CGO since it was formed.\(^49\) However, despite these attempts, the international community was slowly moving towards support of Indonesian independence. While the US was initially supportive of the Netherlands, it went through three different delegates, all of who would leave their position supporting the Republican cause in the face of the Dutch accusations.\(^50\)

While both sides in the negotiations tended to blame each other, the pressure from the international delegates was more focused on the Netherlands. The Dutch side was seen as less willing to compromise and work with the Republic — often making demands that would essentially leave the Republic powerless.\(^51\) The Republic, on the other hand, was quick to agree to recommendations made by American delegate Coert Du Bois in 1948, which further made the Netherlands look like the party blocking a settlement.\(^52\) A similar occurrence happened three months before the invasion of Yogyakarta, after new American delegate Merle Cochran made another proposal for an agreement.\(^53\) In an attempt to influence outside opinion, the Dutch began their search for evidence related to their three claims in the *Djogdja Documenten*.\(^54\)

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\(^{50}\) Ibid., 269.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 220.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 249.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 284.

\(^{54}\) Numerous telegrams can be found in Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Indisch Archief, Serie V, 1945-1950, nummer toegang 2.10.36.15, inventarisnummer 13 (7-Illc). These telegrams reference the search for and discovery of evidence in Republican records of opium trading, military excursions into Dutch-held territory, and ultra-links (extreme leftwing) members of the Republican government.
G. Opium Trade

Robert Cribb's previously mentioned study of the use of the opium trade to fund the revolution goes into detail of the background of opium sales in the Dutch East Indies, through the Japanese occupation, and up to the revolution. Initially the Republican opium agency was simply occupying the same role the previous governments had. In the early 20th century the Dutch Indies government had banned the growing of opium. The state's imported supply was now predominately consumed by the Chinese population. Needing the money to finance their fight against the Netherlands, Republican officials attempted exporting the existing stockpile of opium—particularly to Singapore.55

The Dutch Indies government heavily controlled the opium trade during the colonial period. After the Japanese occupation ended the stockpile of opium was able to be controlled by the Republicans. The opium in question therefore existed solely from Dutch procurement during the pre-war period.56 In order to take any sort of moral high-ground it was necessary to prove that the trade went beyond the Dutch regulation of consumption by addicts and into the international distribution of opium in the colonies of other countries. Included in the Dutch accusation was the fact that:

‘None of the documents contains any evidence of opium ever having been sold for the purpose of reconstruction of the Republican areas; all transactions and the whole illicit traffic in opium have exclusively served the financing of the republican struggle for power and benefited individual republican leaders. As will appear from the following documents, the Republic regarded the maintenance of foreign relations including the financing of its foreign missions exclusively as weapons against the Dutch’.57

56 Ibid., 704.
57 NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.
H. Communist Links

Dutch intelligence officials were also interested in any information that could link the Republic of Indonesia to communism, though this was a harder claim to make stick. Claiming that the Republican government had communist tendencies stemmed mainly from intermittent contact with the Malayan Communist Party. The Indonesian independence struggle existed against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War. The United States in particular was interested in ensuring that an independent Indonesia would not lead to a power vacuum that could result in a communist regime.

Following the suppression of the Madiun Affair—a Communist Party coup attempt that led to the execution of many communist leaders—the Republican government gained a certain amount of stature in the anti-communist West. Though Kahin and Kahin claim that with the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) subdued, ‘it was no longer possible for the Dutch to continue their propaganda that the republic was but a bridge to communism’, it would still be attempted through the seizure of records. The attempt was to show that communism existed in the Republic outside the PKI. This would also be of major interest to the British, who by June of 1948 were engaged in the ‘Malayan Emergency’ battle against communist insurgents in close proximity to Indonesia. The British Foreign Office report on communism, however, made note that Tan Malaka, considered one of the most powerful communists not involved in Madiun, was a Trotskyist who ‘probably has now no Russian connections’. Furthermore, Hatta had promised Cochran that should followers of Tan Malaka attempt a Madiun-like coup, the Republic would similarly deal with them.

58 NL-HaNA, Spoor, 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.
62 Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions, 288.
A successful Communist coup, such as the one attempted at Madiun in September of 1948, could have changed the views of the Americans and British. Communism in Indonesia has a long history for the region, with the precursor to the PKI being founded in 1914 as the first Communist party in Asia outside the Russian sphere, albeit with an initial Dutch majority. After the First World War the party’s Indonesian membership began to grow, official becoming the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) in 1920. The PKI was one of the first groups to actively seek freedom from Dutch rule in order to establish their Marxist state. While fluctuating between states of varying relevance, the party continued to exist through the rest of the colonial period.

In 1948 the PKI was gaining support, as many Indonesians viewed the United States as supporting the Dutch and therefore sought the favor of the world’s other super power. With the official word from Moscow that full independence could never exist without Soviet control over the West, it is understandable why this would be a realistic turn of events.

When Moeso, who had been a communist leader in Indonesia in the 1920s and 30s and then spent more than a decade living in Moscow, returned in August of 1948 he was voted secretary of the PKI. His time in the USSR was seen as ‘tangible evidence of Moscow’s immediate interest in Indonesia’, and pushed even more communists and socialists towards the Soviet Union for assistance in advancing independence. Part of Moeso’s initial plan was the enlargement of the PKI by absorbing the Labor and Socialist Parties. Leaders of these parties came out and declared they had been secret communists the whole time and thus happy to merge with the PKI.

In September of 1948 communist military groups attempted to seize power in Madiun, though before Moeso had wanted to. He had arrived in Madiun to discover

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64 McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 45-47.
65 Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 257.
66 Ibid., 272.
that the communist coup had begun and he was now in a position where he was forced to act and continue the rebellion.\textsuperscript{67} Within a month the uprising was put down, the communists not receiving support they had expected among the peasant and working classes.\textsuperscript{68} Sukarno, Moeso's rival, had begun to personify an independent Indonesia to many Indonesians, and any action against him meant fighting the Republic.\textsuperscript{69} Their support amongst troops was also over exaggerated, and after defections the PKI was left with little other than two weary militia battalions.\textsuperscript{70}

In the end the leaders of the Madiun Affair, including Moeso, were captured and executed by the Republic, and Hatta's image as anti-Communist strengthened, especially in the eyes of the West.\textsuperscript{71} The Sukarno/Hatta government further derided the Madiun uprising on the premise that a national revolution must take place before a Marxist one.\textsuperscript{72} As Sukarno put it, a social revolution such as Madiun cannot proceed without "a solid steppingstone", one which proceeds after the National phase has been completed.\textsuperscript{73}

Prior to the Madiun Affair it was unknown how the Republic would handle a communist uprising, especially with the fear of Soviet assistance.\textsuperscript{74} The response of the Republican government strengthened their standing inside the American government, and made the Netherlands the biggest hurdle in creating a lasting settlement.\textsuperscript{75}

Dutch attempts to paint the Republic as communist were therefore seen with a fair amount of skepticism amongst their Western allies, a fact that can be gathered

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 286.
\textsuperscript{69} Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 301.
\textsuperscript{71} Swift, The Road to Madiun, 86.
\textsuperscript{72} Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammed Hatta, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1987, 148.
\textsuperscript{74} Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions, 279.
\textsuperscript{75} Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions, 282.
from British archives. Britain had its own intelligence, which led them to view these reports as ‘alarmist’ and determined that Hatta was ‘not, now, a Communist’.76 A memorandum on communist activities in the Indies using documents from NEFIS as its sources was published by the Dutch earlier in 1948. The British official charged with responding to the memorandum within the government states that in his opinion it ‘should be ignored entirely’. He calls it ‘an even more blatant than usual case of the Dutch habit of producing a certain number of facts in circumstances of their own choosing in order to “make their point” and ‘the worst of its kind I have ever seen in this respect’.77 Even in the midst of the Malayan Emergency, when the British were fighting what they referred to as ‘Communist Terrorists’ in the jungles of Malaya, the British government still did not trust Dutch intelligence reports and saw them as misinterpreting the facts. The United States would also eventually put its support behind Sukarno and Hatta, showing the widespread disregard for Dutch claims of communism within the Republic. This shift in US policy would turn the revolution in Indonesia’s favour, but came with the understanding that American companies would gain a foothold in the new independent country.78

Describing Republican members as communist to the American government was part of the NEFIS operation well before the second military campaign and the seizure of the Djogdja Documenten. Frances Gouda notes that by 1946 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff already had a file filled with NEFIS reports, many depicting the Republic as controlled from Moscow.79 The post-war expansion of communism was a great concern of American President Harry Truman’s administration. Early meetings between Dutch and American representatives also played into such fears and focused heavily on communism.80

By late 1948, however, prior to the recovery of the Djogdja Documenten, the CGO already had reservations about the accusation of communist influences in the

76 The National Archives (TNA): CAB 129/29: Cabinet Office, Communism in Countries Outside the Soviet Orbit.
77 The National Archives (TNA): FO 810/23: Communist Activities in South East Asia.
79 Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions, 259.
80 Ibid., 204.
Republican government. The Truman administration saw working with ‘moderates’ like Hatta as the only way to stop further communist infiltration in Indonesia, and the Dutch position began to look weaker.\(^81\)

I. Insurgency

The third accusation the Dutch were hoping to prove through the *Djogdja Documenten* was that the Republic was planning and carrying out insurgent activities that violated the standing ceasefire treaty, including attacks against Dutch civilians and supporters.\(^82\) Hatta's response, while in custody, to these claims was that any plans the Indonesian government had relating to attacks on the Dutch were preparations for a response to any possible Dutch invasion of Republican territory.\(^83\) Mohammad Roem, writing an update on the Republican government in January of 1949 continued this line of reasoning, stating:

‘After the Dutch had launched their second military action, they declared that they have confiscated a number of documents containing evidence that the TNI [Indonesia National Army] was planning to attack West Java and that the Government of the Republic had made preparations to that end. The true fact is that any Army Staff is in possession of several plans dealing with problems of offensive and counter offensive. The TNI staff, too, had made preparations for various actions which might have to be carried out should the Republic be attacked by the Dutch, and that is the only kind of plan which the Dutch could possibly have found.’\(^84\)

Hatta had sensed the Dutch plan for an invasion as early as October of 1948 when he wrote to the American representative in the negotiation process that it was his impression that ‘the Dutch are advancing charges of subversive activities of the Republic only to find a justification for another military action (...) [t]he Republican

\(^81\) Ibid., 300.
\(^82\) NL-HaNA, Spoor; 2.21.036.01, inv. nr. 39.
\(^83\) NL-HaNA, Koets, 2.21.100, inv.nr. 56.
\(^84\) NL-HaNA, Koets, 2.21.100, inv.nr. 434
Government has submitted evidence to prove that these accusations are false.\(^{85}\)

**J. Response to Claims**

The seized archives not only served the claims intended for the international community, but also played a role in determining Dutch policies, both military and diplomatic. NEFIS reports were sent to the Netherlands, Dutch diplomats in countries involved in the process (such as the United States and United Kingdom), and high-ranking government and military officials. Reports written after the invasion of Yogyakarta made specific reference to the *Djogdja Documenten*, such as one from 17 February 1949. The first sentence begins, ‘From the archive of MOH. HATTA’ followed by a description of the opium trade.\(^{86}\)

However, if the Dutch government had hoped that the contents of the *Djogdja Documenten* would help turn international support back in their favor, they would find this not to be the case.\(^{87}\) While the Republican detainees may have had ‘a feeling of lonely abandonment’ at the hands of the United Nations and the international community during the end of 1948 into the early months of 1949, by the end of the year the pressure on the Netherlands would be too strong and they would be forced to recognize Indonesian independence.\(^{88}\)

Further military action had the opposite effect of what the Netherlands had hoped. Rather than listen to the accusations made, even if they came with record evidence, the United States and its allies were now fully prepared to work with Hatta and the Republican government.

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86 NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 629.
87 Cheong, relating the story of finding communist material states, ‘[t]he documentation available suggests that Dutch authorities were on the alert for any evidence to prove that Republican sympathizers were allied with pro-communist organizations (...) It is most likely that these messages were shared with British authorities in Singapore (...) The Dutch benefited from this cooperation with the British because it enabled them to show how organizations like Indoff were taking actions that were dangerously close to illegal transactions’ (190). Similarly, Cribb describes the captured documents as appearing ‘to be a propaganda windfall for the Dutch’ before being pressured to shelve their findings (720).
88 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 343.
So great was the pressure to come to an agreement that the Netherlands, without fanfare, refrained from publishing a report they had written using the *Djogdja Documenten* so as to not completely damage their ability to work diplomatically with Hatta and those aligned with him.\(^\text{89}\) Withdrawing forces meant returning to the Netherlands with the *Djogdja Documenten* in tow.

The *Djogdja Documenten*, along with the rest of the NEFIS collection, were shipped to the Netherlands prior to the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, in 130 cases of records. At first sent to the Ministry of Overseas Territories, records were later transferred to different agencies in the government, as after independence they no longer were related to a territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The inventory taken of the NEFIS archive by archivists at the Nationaal Archief when they were transferred there found the collection to contain much less than was originally written, with some documents from NEFIS most likely destroyed.\(^\text{90}\)

The next aspect of the story that needs explanation is what happened after their arrival in the Netherlands and how they would eventually be sent to ANRI, which must be prefaced by a short description on the post-independence relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia and their cooperation.

**Conclusion**

The records that make up the *Djogdja Documenten* were seized as military intelligence during wartime. The Dutch government were attempting to prove misdoings by the Republic of Indonesia through evidence in the Republic’s archives. NEFIS, the Dutch military intelligence agency, was tasked with recovering and processing the records into reports disseminated throughout the Dutch and Dutch East Indies governments. As the Netherlands still considered Indonesia as part of their territory it is understandable how the records would have been in the possession of NEFIS at the end of the military engagement and then sent back to The

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\(^{89}\) Cribb, ‘Opium and the Indonesian Revolution’, 720.

\(^{90}\) NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 3013-7112.
Hague following the transfer of sovereignty.

For the *Djogdja Documenten* to be analyzed using the records continuum model certain aspects of their history have to be known. This includes the moments of the various dimensions, which will be discussed further in Chapter IV. The actions that I described in this chapter will be framed in continuum model concepts in the next chapter.

Just as Bastian's research introduced the records of the Virgin Islands, or Grimsted's introduced the records of the Soviet secret archive, this chapter introduced key concepts and phrases related to the *Djogdja Documenten*. Such a detailed history of the *Djogdja Documenten* did not previously exist. This background will be useful in the next chapter as I look at the archival cooperation between the two countries and analyze the records through the continuum model.
Chapter IV:

After the Transfer of Sovereignty and the Use of the Continuum

Introduction

The preceding chapter looked at the *Djogdja Documenten* during the Indonesian struggle for independence. This was the period after declaring independence but prior to the Dutch recognition of an independent Indonesia. With the *Djogdja Documenten* now, chronologically, in The Hague, it is time to look at the process which saw their return to Indonesia. This includes looking at the archival cooperation between the two countries in general, as well as that which specifically relates to the *Djogdja Documenten*.

This chapter begins with a discussion on the evolving archival cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the course of the early independence period through Suharto’s New Order regime. With the rise of Suharto and his pro-West mentality in place, I will explore the bilateral diplomacy that led to their eventual return to Indonesia. The chapter ends by viewing the *Djogdja Documenten* through the lens of the records continuum model, including a review of the *Djogdja Documenten* and the shadow continuum. This will be performed using Bastian’s notion of archival traces, combined with the records continuum model. The records continuum model should pose no problems relating to the *Djogdja Documenten* if traces of their existence that various points are found.

After describing this period where the *Djogdja Documenten* were in the Netherlands, and then their return to Indonesia, there are two major questions that this chapter will answer. The first is how the *Djogdja Documenten* can be interpreted using the continuum model, including the period in the Netherlands. The second question ties the *Djogdja Documenten* into the shadow continuum and will look at whether the shadow continuum is a necessity in fitting the *Djogdja Documenten* into the continuum model.

The period prior to the return of the *Djogdja Documenten* was marked by a deterioration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, due in part to Sukarno’s general disposition towards the former colonial power.
Nationalizing foreign-owned businesses and the West Irian dispute further separated the countries, which added to the absence of any movement on archives and the *Djogdja Documenten* in particular. What little cooperation did occur between the two national archives was short-lived and lacked results. This failed cooperation can be seen in aborted archival programs in the 1950s and early 1960s.¹

The early years of independence, however, did include some sporadic conversations between the two archives. However, overall it is marked by its silences. The *Djogdja Documenten* would not become a point of discussion until after a 1968 Cultural Agreement between the two countries. Conversations that took place prior to the agreement were slow-moving and failed to result in any substantial cooperation, coming so soon after the end of combat operations.

**A. Initial Attempts at Cooperation**

In 1954, less than five years after the Netherlands recognized Indonesian independence, archival cooperation was first addressed, though it is eventually aborted. This ill-fated attempt began before Sukarno initiated his period of Guided Democracy, which followed his removal of the 1950 constitution and the reversion to the 1945 constitution which included a strong, central executive.² In the early years of independence the economic relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia continued, and Dutch companies were still heavily invested in Indonesia. Before Guided Democracy, which also included strong anti-colonial—and therefore anti-Dutch—discourse, cooperation was still taking place between the governments of the two countries.

The first archival project was a Dutch-initiated microfilming project. It was not an exchange of records or films, but only the filming of archives from the early years of the Dutch colonial period to be sent to the Netherlands. It concerned the

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Dagregister (Day Registry) of Batavia Castle, the home of the Dutch East India Company during the 17th century. This large-scale project—23,000 pages onto film—was hoped to be approved and finished as soon as possible due to the ‘uncertain’ political situation in Indonesia. The project came to an abrupt stop in 1957 when an Indonesian archivist ‘bluntly’ put an end to the project and declared the Dutch team no longer welcome in his institution. The Dutch feared this instruction must have come from above. Such a response is an indication of the future of Dutch-Indonesian relations. The deteriorating relationship worsened as the West Irian dispute between the two countries continued. The microfilming project of the Dagregister became a casualty of the dispute, and is currently still incomplete.

Though it may seem unusual that there would be enough cooperation to even begin the project only five years after the end of military engagements between the two countries that ruptured their political connection, it fits with the state of the relationship in the early 1950s. In 1948 STICUSA (Stichting voor Culturele Samenwerking, Foundation for Cultural Cooperation), a Dutch government-financed organization supporting cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and its colonies, was founded. Until 1955 its work included, and often focused on, Indonesia. After political disputes its mission shrank to only support cooperation between the Netherlands and Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. In the early 1950s Dutch businesses continued to operate in Indonesia before tensions surrounding the West Irian dispute increased in intensity in 1957.

When the Netherlands recognized Indonesia independence in 1949 part of the terms of the agreement was the continuation of Dutch control over the western portion of New Guinea. The Dutch were interested in keeping part of their former

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3 NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 13156.
4 The incomplete Dagregister films are located in het Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Microfiches Dagregisters Batavia, 1683-1807, nummer toegang 1.11.06.01.
5 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Stichting Culturele Samenwerking (STICUSA), nummer toegang 2.19.114.
lucrative colony, and made control over the territory part to the negotiations.\(^7\) After the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch administration worked to prepare a new, independent rival to the Republic of Indonesia in the region with stronger ties to the Netherlands. After centralizing his power and installing his system known as ‘Guided Democracy’, Sukarno made integrating West Irian into Indonesia his new anti-colonial cause.\(^8\) This led to military engagements and the end of any semblance of a cooperative relationship for the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Netherlands would hand over control of West Irian in 1962 to the United Nations, which eventually gave control to Indonesia.

The relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands was still in shambles from the fallout over the dispute when, in 1964, Director of the *Eerste Afdeling* (First Section of the ARA—documents created before 1795) Marie Antoinette Petronella Meilink-Roelofsz visited the Arsip Nasional as part of a trip visiting Asian archives. She wrote of the Indonesian leg of her journey that by viewing ‘the manner in which Djakarta makes free with one of the most valuable holdings of archives in Asia then it is clear that Indonesia is failing miserably in its duty’. As a contrast, her review of the National Archives of Malaysia calls them ‘expertly managed’ despite their ‘not so very important material’.\(^9\) Twice in her report she refers to the ‘strong British influence’ in the Malaysian archives, which may be an allusion to the archival distance that existed between the Netherlands and Indonesia.\(^10\) Meilink-Roelofsz was only given limited access to the archives and was treated with distrust upon arrival, which also might have coloured her impression of ANRI.\(^11\)

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\(^9\) The UNESCO-appointed overseer of the Malaysian National Archive at this time was former *Landsarchivaris* of the Dutch East Indies, F.J.R. Verhoeven.


Sukarno confiscated Dutch property and nationalized Dutch-owned businesses in late 1957. The aborted cultural cooperation was a side effect of this destruction of the relationship. The regrowth of cooperation is directly tied to the rise to power of Suharto and his accession to President of Indonesia in 1968. The vast political changes in Indonesia that stemmed from Suharto’s re-imagining of Indonesia’s relationship with the West and the Netherlands would eventually effect change at ANRI as well.

Suharto not only changed internal politics of Indonesia, but oversaw a major overhaul of Indonesian foreign policy. This included both the signing of a Cultural Agreement with the Netherlands in 1968 and the return of previously nationalized foreign-owned businesses. This goes hand-in-hand with the internal changes made, as a renewed relationship with the Netherlands would make the Dutch more susceptible to any number of new programs, including archival transfers.

B. Sukarno’s Indonesia through Two Archivists

The Sukarno-era lacked any such cooperation. By looking at a series of correspondence from 1963 the general feeling of Sukarno-era Indonesia towards the Netherlands can be seen. The resentment towards the Dutch manifested itself in the Arsip Nasional by both its treatment of the Dutch and in its sense of self. The correspondence comes from the personal papers of Frans Rijndert Johan Verhoeven, former director of the Landsarchief prior to the Japanese occupation, held in the Nationaal Archief. The Landsarchief was the national archive of the Netherlands East Indies, founded by the Dutch administration in 1892. After independence the Landsarchief became the Arsip Nasional—both administratively and the actual building that housed the records.

By 1963 Verhoeven had become Keeper of Public Records in recently independent Malaya working as part of an UNESCO project. His official title was

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12 Saltford, United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 6.
13 From 1965 he had held the role under the title of Acting President.
14 NL-HaNA, Verhoeven, 2.21.281.04, inv.nr 30.
15 Verhoeven’s project would last from 1962 until 1966. Originally intended to work in
‘Unesco expert on archives and documentation, attached to the National Archives of Malaysia’ though he was made de facto director of the National Archives because there was ‘no one available but the Unesco expert’. Part of his project involved writing an article on the Dutch Malacca archives from the 17th to 19th centuries that he believed became lost sometime during the Second World War. The Dutch attacked Malacca, which was under Portuguese rule, in 1640/1641 and stayed in control of the city for almost 200 years. Knowing that some records from Dutch Malacca were in the former Landsarchief, Verhoeven wrote to the director of the Arsip Nasional, Mr. R. Mohamed Ali for more information.

Their conversation starts off simply enough, with Verhoeven asking his question to Ali about archives in the Arsip Nasional from Dutch Malacca. An inventory by first landsarchivaris Jacobus Anne van der Chijs from the 19th century mentioned some, but Verhoeven was under the belief that there were more based on recent findings. Ali informed him that there are indeed more than mentioned by van der Chijs but no catalogue or inventory on them is available. Verhoeven offered the assistance of ‘[p]erhaps some day one of our staff should come to Djakarta and do some research (...) making a catalogue and having them copied for the National Archives in Kuala Lumpur’.

It is in response to this letter where the direction of the correspondence begins to change and where the mindset of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and how it infiltrated all aspects of government, including ANRI, is exposed. Ali first rejected the notion of someone from Malaysia doing work in the Arsip Nasional based on Dutch-caused time restraints. His statement of ‘I have to inform you that we are still checking piles of archives neglected by the Dutch Government’ placed the blame for the backlog of work to be done by staff on the Dutch and perhaps even Verhoeven

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the National Archives of Malaya, his project soon turned to the archives of all of Malaysia when Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore would join in 1963. After Singapore left Malaysia and became independent in 1965 the Singaporean government would request his services to do a similar project for them. He completed his Malaysia report in 1966 and wrote a similar report on his findings for Singapore in 1967. His reports can be seen both in the Nationaal Archief and at the National Library of Singapore.

himself. Ali then reminded Verhoeven of the ‘rigid’ regulations for using Landsarchief facilities by ‘inlanders’. This Dutch term, strongly disliked by Indonesians, is described by Benedict Anderson as ‘like the English “natives” and the French “indigenes”, [it] always carried an unintentionally paradoxical semantic load’.17 Ali also told Verhoeven that any visit would have to be approved by the Ministry of Information—a process which he believes all national archives must adhere to.18

Verhoeven’s reply mentioned four main points: that the documents in question ‘have always been open to anyone who wanted to do research in them’, that he could not recall the regulations being so rigid, that international archival standards warrant national archives being open to foreigners without special permission under the archival ‘bill of rights’, and, most importantly, that under the last archives regulation, the Archiefordonnatie 1941 (Archive Ordinance 1941) all archives in the Landsarchief older than forty years should have been open to the public. Verhoeven lamented the fact that so soon after the passage of the ordinance that the Japanese invaded, but he stated his hope that the Indonesian government would have endorsed the ordinance by now.

At this point Verhoeven was no longer an official representative of the Netherlands colonial government. His new capacity had him working for Malaya and the United Nations. To Ali, however, he cannot be shaken of his past, as the reference to rigid rules regarding inlanders attests. Ali’s responses were in keeping with the public persona set forth by Sukarno, and are not uncommon in newly independent states. Roy Jones and Brian Shaw describe how ‘many historic icons of the built environment were inevitably viewed as imprints of an exogenous authority, a factor that heavily discounted their preservation value’.19 In these letters between Verhoeven and Ali it is seen how the ‘historic icons’ can be not only

18 ‘Those regulations were very “rigid” for foreigners and “inlanders”, and I suppose every National Archive is scrupulously closed for foreign eyes if not with special permission based on international friendship and mutual help.’
the physical space of the archive, but the concept in general, and their preservation value is not about preserving the structure of the building but rather discounting the preservation of the links between the Dutch and the Arsip Nasional (Fig. 3).

Ali responds to Verhoeven's lack of recollection and landsarchief history in a way that represents the standard post-independence break with the past. He states that the Archiefordonnantie 1941 was never implemented by Indonesia, and that on account of numerous presidential decrees and government regulations ‘the Arsip Nasional is by no means the same as the formerly [sic] Landsarchief’. Verhoeven replies by asking for this documentation related to the regulation of the Arsip Nasional, as well as a list of maps of Malacca held in Jakarta—trying to get the conversation back to its original purpose. However, the correspondence ends there, and Verhoeven's finished published paper makes it appear that nothing more came from their conversation. The paper on the Malacca archives contains only one mention of his communication with Ali: a reference to ‘20 big volumes’ of uncatalogued documents not mentioned in van der Chijs' initial inventory, meaning his initial request of receiving any sort of list or anything specific was never met and nothing beyond what survived in Verhoeven's personal papers came from their letters.

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C. Guided Democracy and Konfrontasi

Sukarno, and therefore the government of Indonesia under his watch, was a proponent of what Anthony Reid refers to as anti-imperial nationalism. This was the type of nationalism which would use ‘the boundaries and unities created by the imperial power as the sacred space of the new national identity, within which all “indigenous” people should bury their differences’. Anti-imperial nationalism continued after independence as the ‘official’ form of state nationalism used by the government. The fight against the West and the Dutch was therefore key to feeling united as ‘Indonesian’. It manifested itself throughout the government during the ‘Guided Democracy’ period of 1957-1966, when he consolidated his central powers,

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including at ANRI, as can be seen in the rhetoric of Ali.22

The collections of ANRI were from all of Indonesia, a country that Sukarno saw as united in its struggle. Sukarno’s labeling of early anti-colonial fighters from various ethnic groups as ‘national heroes’ united the various groups as Indonesian. It brought them together into a shared history of resistance.23 This is what Edward Said refers to as “returns” to culture and tradition, where newly formed states have looked to their past culture as a means to unite their people under a single identity.24 It is a ‘search for authenticity, for a more congenial national origin than that provided by colonial history’.25 While sometimes the search results in only an idea ‘of what they supposed themselves to have been prior to...colonization’, that simply shows the power between the past and cultural identity.26 Ali’s confrontation with Verhoeven in their letters shows how Guided Democracy and a unifying nationalist cause manifested itself at ANRI.

The conversation between Verhoeven and Ali took place within the context of the Konfrontasi (confrontation) between Indonesia and Malaya and Britain over the formation of Malaysia. Verhoeven’s past as a member of the Dutch colonial administration certainly added to Ali’s reaction, as evidenced by the allusion to the treatment of inlanders. Ali remembered what the archive was like when it was the Landsarchief under the direction of Verhoeven and used this knowledge to make specific claims against Verhoeven in his reply. It was also only one year after armed conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the West Irian dispute. Overall, this period was marked by the movement of Indonesia’s foreign policy away from the United States and the West and more towards the Soviet Union.27

After his success against the Netherlands in securing West Irian, Sukarno continued with this policy when what he saw as a British neo-colony was being established on his borders. Though the Indonesian official response ranged from

22 Reid, Imperial Alchemy, 147.
23 Ibid., 147.
25 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 226.
26 Ibid., 16.
indifferent to supportive of the idea of Malaysia from 1961 through 1962, the
months from the summer to autumn of 1963 were some of the most tense of the
_Konfrontasi_ period, as Malaysia was created from the unification of Malaya,
Singapore and the British North Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah. This
action was concurrent with the correspondence between Verhoeven and Ali.
Malaysia was therefore not only just across the Strait of Malacca from Sumatra, it
would also have a land border with Indonesia on Borneo.

The fight against Dutch and Western cultural encroachment on Indonesia was a
consistent theme in Sukarno’s world outlook and thus also in Indonesia’s early
independent history. Too much appropriation of Western culture was seen as
moving against the revolution, which was fought to oust the Western imperialists
and ensure that Indonesia could control its future and its culture. The more open to
the West policy that Suharto would promote was seen to Sukarno as backward
movement and against a modern and free Indonesia.

Indonesia and Sukarno’s relationship with the West was, as already shown, not
necessarily confrontational from the beginning, as American influence and
continued Dutch business interests were very important in the first years of
independence. Further into Sukarno’s presidency, however, this began to change.
Strains in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia led to a closer
relationship with the Soviet Union, who supported Indonesia during the West Irian
By this time Sukarno was clearly on an independent path of foreign affairs.

Sukarno’s interest in national history and heritage has been highlighted in the
past. There is no change in that between Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno wanted to
highlight the independent nature of the history. The link between colonialism and
archives is so strong that finding the independent nature was far more difficult than
in the archaeological sites described by Bloembergen and Eickhoff. While the field

28 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain,
the United States and the Creation of Malaysia, Cambridge: Cambridge University
29 Djiwandono, Konfrontasi Revisited.
30 Marieke Bloembergen and Martijn Eickhoff, ‘Conserving the past, mobilizing the
of archaeology is also colonial in nature, most of what would be found and conserved would be from the pre-Dutch period and could be used to promote an Indonesian identity—despite the initial decisions of what and how to preserve and conserve being made by the Dutch administration. The majority of what was held in the Arsip Nasional, on the other hand, was either from the VOC period of the Netherlands East Indies colonial government and could not as easily be used to show off an Indonesian unifying culture. So while archaeological sites that were re-discovered during the colonial period—such as Borobudur and Prambanan—could easily have their colonial attachment removed, this required more effort at the Arsip Nasional.\(^{31}\)

**D. The New Order and Increase in Cooperation**

Directly following the transition to Suharto’s presidency not much had changed regarding the state of the Arsip Nasional. A Dutch newspaper article from 1968 on the history of the building that had housed the Landsarchief/Arsip Nasional since 1925 declared that it would be ‘in vain’ to search at the archive for such important documents as the 1945 proclamation of independence or other records relating to independence including those from the many negotiations with the Dutch.\(^{32}\) Immediate changes in the physical and theoretical infrastructure of the Arsip Nasional had to take place.

The return of the *Djogdja Documenten* to Indonesia had its roots in a tumultuous time for the country. Suharto’s rise to power led to the persecution of communists and other leftists in Indonesia, with estimates ranging from 500,000 to one million people being killed for their political beliefs. This period is marked with a renewed relationship with the West and the Netherlands, but it came at a human cost for those on the other side of the political spectrum. The archival changes to be

\(^{31}\) Bloembergen and Eickhoff, ‘Conserving the past’, 431.

\(^{32}\) KITLV Archive Number H1710 Folder 28, 6 Dec 1968, *Haagsche Courant*. 

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discussed further below should come with knowledge of what else was included in
the rise of Suharto.33

After the reinstatement of diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and
Indonesia and the removal of Sukarno from power, delegates from both sides
signed an agreement for cultural cooperation in 1968.34 Though often little more
than formalities, the cultural agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia
has played a large role in the history of the relationship between the two countries.
It marked the cultural cooperation of two countries that twenty years earlier had
been engaged in war and led the way for, among other things, cooperation between
the two national archives.

The return of the Djogdja Documenten and archival cooperation is only a small
part of a much larger cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia
in the 1960s and 70s. In Jakarta, Dutch-era buildings and the last remaining typical
Dutch-style bridge were restored or preserved.35 These policy changes also
involved economic changes, and occurred in different phases. Hal Hill identifies the
first five Suharto years (1966-1970) as ‘the rehabilitation and recovery’ period,
where the government was ‘concerned above all else to control inflation, to re-
establish ties with the international donor community, and to rehabilitate physical
infrastructure’. The period from 1971-1981 Hill calls ‘rapid growth’.36 We can see
these stages even in the archive, as the policy of the New Order influenced every
sector of the State, including fiscal, manufacturing and agricultural policy.

It seems nearly impossible to imagine the acceptance of the colonial nature of

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33 This dissertation cannot be a complete history of the transitional period from
Sukarno to Suharto. Histories describing the effects of the New Order socially and
politically can be found in many sources. Nor is the discussion on the renewed
cooperation with the Netherlands and therefore cooperation between the two
national archives meant to showcase a period where up to one million people were
killed by state forces as a completely positive case and that what happened outside
of the archive was somehow ‘worth it’ due to the changes in the Arsip Nasional.
34 For a more in depth look at the cultural agreement see chapter 5 of Mei Li Vos’
International Cooperation Between Politics and Practice: How Dutch Indonesian
Cooperation changed Remarkably Little after a Diplomatic Rupture.
archives during the Guided Democracy period. While the unrest and death that came with Suharto's rise to power was not necessary for the new view toward archives, the change in leadership was. Where Sukarno saw the fight against Western imperialism as ongoing, Suharto and the New Order attempted to move beyond struggling against the colonial legacy. Once Suharto was in power he was very receptive of international monetary aid. Indonesia under Guided Democracy suffered from hyperinflation, and little work could be done by the new regime before the economic situation was remedied. This international aid, which included aid from the Netherlands, evolved into cultural aid as well. From the late 1960s onward the Netherlands played a role in monetarily supporting the preservation of the history that they shared with Indonesia—something that previously would have been seen as neo-colonial by Sukarno. The Arsip Nasional was able to use the Dutch role in order to build its collection and infrastructure.

E. The Work of Soemartini

Archival cooperation was a result of greater cooperation in all fields between the Netherlands and Indonesia, but it also was the work of specific people on both sides. While the decision of what was seized and kept in 1948 was done not by archivists but by military officials, the cooperation after 1968 to return the *Djogdja Documenten* was the work of two archivists. In Indonesia the initiator of much of the cooperation was Raden Adjeng Soemartini, director of the Arsip Nasional. Her Dutch equivalent, Ton Ribberink, would be just as important later in the process in being a mediator between Dutch ministries in securing further returns of original documents.

The first real action after the cultural agreement to involve archives originated from a letter sent in 1970 from Soemartini to the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta.

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39 As is common for some Javanese names she is most often referred to simply as Soemartini.
40 For further study of this letter see: Michael Karabinos, ‘Returning to the Metropole:
Soemartini, while director of the Arsip Nasional, was still a public servant, and writing directly to the ambassador and not an equal-level civil servant shows a certain amount of bravado. It also is a testament to Soemartini showing independence on behalf of the archive, though the true essence of the letter is quickly revealed—help was needed.41

Contextualizing the cooperation as part of ‘our countries’ mutual interest’, Soemartini clearly intended for this to be seen by the Dutch representatives as something worth participating in. Her initial offer was that ‘the Netherlands would acquire microfilms of all documents containing information of interest to the Netherlands from Indonesia, and vice versa’.

Attached to the letter was Soemartini’s draft ‘Proposal for an Agreement’:

‘The “Algemeen Rijksarchief” of the Netherlands and the “Arsip Nasional” of Indonesia, being profoundly aware of the necessity to cooperate together in endeavours to promote the development of their respective national archives in the interests of both the Netherlands and Indonesia, and being aware that such a needed cooperation can and should be undertaken within the general framework provided by the Agreement on Cultural Co-operation Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands’

Putting the cooperation in terms of the cultural agreement was necessary—it set the precedence for such work. It can also be seen as redundant, as there is no way such large scale cooperation could have existed before the agreement. We have seen that earlier in the 1960s Meilink-Roelofsz may have been seen as ‘an official representative of the old colonial regime’ and that previous cooperative attempts

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The Indonesian National Archives and its changing role at the start of the New Order, Archives and Manuscripts, vol. 39, no. 2 (November 2011).

41 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Ambassade in Indonesië [standplaats Jakarta], nummer toegang 2.05.188, inventarissenummer 590. The entire discussion regarding this letter can be found in this archive. All following quotes are found here.
had stalled. Soemartini, however, became a lifelong friend of Meilink-Roelofsz.\textsuperscript{42} The cultural agreement gave the state’s blessing to cooperating with the Netherlands. It must also be said that Soemartini’s actions showed a more cooperation-inclined disposition compared with the past, as showcased in the Ali/Verhoeven letters.

When an agreement was finally signed in 1970, negotiations in the preceding two years had reduced it down to only part of Soemartini’s original proposal: there will be a microfilm exchange. Through Soemartini’s leadership, by the time of her retirement in 1990 nearly every one of her original proposals would be implemented. The majority of all cooperation, therefore, was not stipulated in the first agreement, but rather came through other means and future correspondence. This agreement can be seen as but a small part of the results of the 1968 cultural accord, as can the continued cooperation.

All the while, as cooperation was taking place between the two sides, an internal change is reversing the line of thinking seen in the Verhoeven/Ali letters. In 1971 a law was passed that named one of the proclamations mentioned by Ali as ‘no longer suited to the growth of the demands of advanced administration’, and three years later the second proclamation is revoked by Suharto in a law stating that, ‘in the context of the growth of duties and of their intensification, it is considered necessary to re-determine the position, basic tasks, functions and organisation of the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia which were regulated by Decision of the First Minister’.\textsuperscript{43} The Arsip Nasional would no longer be part of a government ministry, but became a separate agency, with its director having more direct access to the President and other leaders.

In the cultural agreement of 1968 and the archival agreement of 1970 the \textit{Djogdja Documenten} were not specifically mentioned by name.\textsuperscript{44} By 1973, however,

\textsuperscript{42} Lequin, ‘In Memoriam’, 136.
\textsuperscript{43} NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 190.
\textsuperscript{44} In Soemartini’s letter initiating cooperation she mentions the Arsip Nasional being interested in ‘public documents and other materials from the period 1945-1950’ held in the Netherlands. ‘Public documents’ could be referring to the archives of the \textit{Algemeen Secretarie} that are mentioned throughout the repatriation process, and ‘other materials’ is vague enough to mean anything, including the Djogdja.
Indonesian historians were beginning to travel to The Hague to make inventories of collections at the Algemeen Rijksarchief (General State Archive, today’s Nationaal Archief) relating to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{45} In April of that year the Indonesian news agency Antara reported the commencement of ‘the proposal put forward by Former Vice President Hatta for the return in the form of microfilms of archives on Indonesia’s independence struggle from Holland’.\textsuperscript{46} This would have the benefit that, in the words of Ambassador Scheltema, future Indonesian researchers would no longer have to ‘make such long trip anymore to be able to write about the history of Indonesia’s independence’.\textsuperscript{47}

From the earliest days of cooperation archival and language training were two of the most important aspects. Soemartini’s 1974 letter included a request for an archivist to travel to the Netherlands for training and was also discussed between Soemartini and Dutch archivist M.G.H.A. de Graff on his 1973 trip to Jakarta.\textsuperscript{48} As the Dutch language was no longer being taught in Indonesia and people’s ability to read it was diminishing at the end of the Sukarno administration, the Cultural Agreement contained Dutch-language training for Indonesian archivist to be able to read the colonial Dutch documents.\textsuperscript{49} Soemartini herself knew the benefits this training could produce, as she was one of the first Indonesian archivists to travel to the Netherlands and graduate from the Archiefschool in 1969.\textsuperscript{50} Training still exists to this day in the form of the Cosmopolis programme at Leiden University which brings students from Asia, and especially Indonesia, to receive a Master’s degree in archival studies.\textsuperscript{51}

With cooperation between the two countries (and their archives) at a high point, talk began to circulate of the exchange of archives seized by the Dutch military. In a letter from the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to the ambassador in

\begin{itemize}
\item Documenten as they fit the period.
\item \textsuperscript{45} NL-HaNA, Ambassade Indonesië 1962-1974, 2.05.188, inv.nr., 590.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{48} 2.05.188 590
\item \textsuperscript{49} NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweee Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{50} ‘Archief examen 1de klasse’, Nederlandsch Archievenblad, (January 1969), 274.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Cosmopolis, http://hum.leiden.edu/history/cosmopolis, accessed 26 February 2015.
\end{itemize}
Jakarta, while giving a background on the cooperation between ARA and ANRI there was mention of the *Djogdja Documenten* in regards to sending microfilm to Indonesia. Discussion of the archives was now circulating through government offices. By the end of 1974 the Minister of Foreign Affairs acknowledged the political sensitivity of the transfer of these archives and asked for special care to be given to the file transfer project including that any potential sensitive records be approved by him first before being sent to the Arsip Nasional.\(^{52}\)

At the end of 1974 Soemartini wrote to the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta asking for financial assistance in sending an Indonesian historian to The Hague specifically to inventory the *Djogdja Documenten* (though she uses the phrase *Buitgemaakte Archieven*). This letter lacked the symbolism of her 1970 letter initiating cooperation—there is no mention of how her new plan would be beneficial to the Netherlands. It was a straightforward ‘request for assistance within the framework of our endeavour to improve and develop archival activities in Indonesia’. It did, however, pay respect to the Dutch and their role in the project, as she referred to the assistance as ‘another Dutch contribution to our endeavour to improve and develop the much needed infrastructure for the development of our country’.\(^{53}\)

From the beginning Soemartini was content with record exchanges between Indonesia and the Netherlands involving microfilm rather than originals, but the *Djogdja Documenten* represented the one departure from this agreement. That the records were already being returned to Indonesia less than thirty years after their seizure is quite remarkable and shows the rapid change in the relationship following the rise of Suharto. A counterexample would be the records still in the United States National Archives seized from Germany in the First World War. This is worth noting, as the Dutch reaction could have been to say that the *Djogdja Documenten* were intelligence records seized during wartime and that they had become the property of the government of the Netherlands. Instead, the Dutch government agreed with the idea that the records legally belonged to Indonesia.

After this request the turnaround was remarkably quick. The Dutch Embassy in

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
Jakarta wrote to The Hague that for the sake of ‘our good relations we should make a positive offer quickly’. In January 1975 the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work declared that ‘the Netherlands government is prepared to hand over documents of Indonesian Republic origin which came into Dutch possession in the period 1945-1959 [sic], after an inventory has been made by the Government Archives Department’.

F. Search for More Documents

Less than one year later, in November 1975, Ambassador Jalink was in Jakarta presiding over the return of part of the collection. In his speech he mentioned ‘why this transfer does not cover [the complete collection]. The answer is that after 1948 the Jogya files were split up and got mixed up with Dutch dossiers. To recollect and reorder them is a rather time consuming operation’. Jalink concluded his remarks stating ‘that there is more to come’. This last line proved important for over ten years as Indonesia waited for the return of the complete archive. Jalink appeared to know that more of the Djogdja Documenten exists than what is being returned in 1975, but was not yet aware of the difficulty that would be required in completing the return. It is a reference to his promise that more will be returned that Soemartini used almost ten years later to reignite the conversation regarding the repatriation of the Djogdja Documenten.

The cultural agreement also led to the formation of an Indonesian studies program in 1975, which in turn created the Netherlands-Indonesian Steering Committee on Museums, Monuments, and Archives. At the 1983 meeting of the committee, with Soemartini as part of the Indonesian delegation, the Djogdja Documenten and Jalink’s assurance of more archives made a return to the

54 The two countries now have a good enough relationship that such an offer is not received with surprise and is quickly agreed to. NL-HaNA, Ambassade Indonesië 1962-1974, 2.05.188, inv.nr., 590. My translation.
55 1959 is most likely a typo for 1949. NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 201.
56 NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 266.
discussion. The official report of the meeting tells the following:

‘Ms. Soemartini also stated that the Indonesia side would like to be informed when the rest of the so-called ‘Yogya archives’ will be handed over. The Netherlands will make investigations about this subject mentioned in the speech of the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. P.W. Jalink, on the occasion of the transfer of parts of these archives on November 7, 1975. The Head of the Netherlands Delegations [Mr. R. Hotke, Director General of Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture, WVC, the successor to the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work] stated that if there still is a rest of these ‘Yogya archives’ in the Netherlands, it will be handed over’.57

Hotke wrote to Ton Ribberink, director of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, that at the meeting Ms. Soemartini made reference to the speech by Jalink, which was new to him and he thought the Djogdja Documenten case was closed and that he is waiting for Ribberink’s comments on the situation.

Hearing this, Ribberink replied that he does not know why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not have returned all of the Djogdja Documenten in 1975, and that their failure to do so was ‘contrary to the international rules for archives’. He believed the records to still be in the NEFIS archives at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus referred Hotke to the relevant person to contact. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to resent the accusation and wrote to the ARA that their current attitude regarding the Djogdja Documenten was undesirable and that though the Indonesian side is doubtful, they maintained their claim that all records were returned in the mid-1970s.58

After years of little results, Ribberink tried to locate the collection in 1987. Just as in 1983, the parties involved were Ribberink, the ministry of WVC and Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs reiterated its belief that between 1975 and 1976 all of the

57 NL-HaNA, ARA/Twede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv nr., 266.
58 NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv nr., 266.
Djogdja Documenten were returned. Failing to believe them, Ribberink wrote to different officials of WVC looking for the green light to microfilm the last of the missing pieces and send them to Jakarta, as he still believed them to be in the collection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.59

Contributing to the problem, the definition of the Djogdja Documenten was not agreed upon by both sides. In 1975 ‘very strict criteria’ were put in place regarding what would be returned to ANRI as the Djogdja Documenten.60 The Indonesian side had consistently noted that they did not believe the transfer of seized archives to be completed. This is noted by Ribberink in a July 1987 letter to WVC, ‘In Indonesia there is a greater interpretation of the Djokja [sic] documents (…) these documents are not only those found in the Foreign Affairs held Nefis archives, but also under my administration in the archives of the General Secretary and Attorney General of Batavia’. At that time the complete NEFIS archive, which are now held at the Nationaal Archief, had yet to be transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What the Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined to be the Djogdja Documenten were removed from the NEFIS archive and transferred to ANRI in 1975 and 1976. Ribberink is explaining that Indonesian archivists believed more seized archives exist within the ARA (his administration) in the archives of the Algemene Secretarie (General Secretary) and the Procureur-Generaal (Attorney General). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs disagreed with this expanded view of the Djogdja Documenten and declared that everything that needed to be returned was returned in the 1970s.61

Despite having been seized and then translated by NEFIS, in the intervening period the remaining Djogdja Documenten were no longer with the rest of the NEFIS archive. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ insistence that everything—or at least everything they had and knew of—had been returned in 1976 gives credence to this fact. After the first batch had been returned, other seized documents from

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59 NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 266.
60 NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr. 201. Letter dated 2 April 1987 from Director Cultural Services to Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that there may be more seized archives that must be returned due to the ‘strict criteria’ in place in 1975.
61 NL-HaNA, ARA/Tweede Afdeling, 2.14.04 inv. nr., 201, letter dated 23 April 1987, Foreign Affairs to Ministry WVC.
Yogyakarta were found in the archives of the Procureur-Generaal and the Algemene Secretarie. This explains Ribberink’s work throughout the 1980s searching for last remnants of the collection in multiple locations.

When M.G.H.A. de Graaff and A.M. Tempelaars of the ARA made an inventory of the Algemene Secretarie 1942-1950 collection in 1990 they declared certain records, including ‘captured archives of the Republic’, as ‘not-belonging’ to the ARA and included these in a shipment to the Arsip Nasional. Among these were papers of Sukarno, A.K. Pringgodigdo, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republican national secretary. A letter from the director of the Tweede Afdeling (Second Section of the ARA—records created after 1795), Evert van Laar to Soemartini’s successor, Noerhadi Magetsari, in 1991 stated that these records would be returned to Indonesia, and that some of them had already been transferred between 1986 and 1991, thus ending the transfer process of the Djogdja Documenten.62

While it appears conversations on the Djogdja Documenten have ended, the search for more original material in the Nationaal Archief still continues. Whether any other records are part of the Djogdja Documenten depends on what criteria one uses to define the collection. That Republican government records are still held in The Hague—including in the NEFIS archive—however, cannot be denied.

G. The Djogdja Documenten through the Records Continuum Model

The Djogdja Documenten show that it is not always archivists making the decision as to what records are held for historical use. Terry Cook claims that appraising and selecting the contents of archival collection is fundamental to our interpretation of history. If this is true, then in this case it is clear that the Dutch military played the most important role.63 Perhaps these records never would have been selected for

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inclusion in publicly accessible archives later, or they could have been destroyed by the Indonesian government for their sensitive contents. Either way, by taking these records, the Dutch military highlighted these records and made them significant.

To put the *Djogdja Documenten* into continuum model terms, we can say that the individual records were created by the Indonesian ministries (1D), and captured (2D) within separate ministerial recordkeeping systems. They were then re-created by the division of NEFIS tasked with finding and seizing records (1D). They were then sent to another division within NEFIS charged with creating their routing slips and organizing them within the NEFIS system (capture, 2D). The individual records were put together in an archive—both the larger NEFIS archive and their subset of the *Djogdja Documenten* (3D). They were re-created once more upon being sent to The Hague (1D), and captured and organized within the Dutch government systems (2D and 3D). In the mid-1970s they are sent back to Indonesia, where they were re-created as a separate collection in ANRI (1D), re-captured (2D), re-organized (3D) and pluralized (4D).

The seizure of the *Djogdja Documenten* was also the catalyst for the creation of many other records. The reports written by NEFIS that used records of the *Djogdja Documenten* were created, captured, organized and pluralized. Using the *Djogdja Documenten* to write these reports re-contextualized them and thus was another form of creation (1D). Furthermore, sending the information within the records to the recipients of the reports is another example of pluralization (4D).

From the literature review it is possible to compare the *Djogdja Documenten* to the Baath Party archives of Iraq. In both cases the archive was created by a national government and seized during an invasion and occupation—though the Baath archives are in a private rather than public facility. The act of seizure is an excellent example of the re-creation from the continuum model. Records in such cases take on completely new contexts under their new stewardship and can possibly go through each dimension again. Like the Baath Party archive, and the records of the

US Virgin Islands, the *Djogdja Documenten*, from 1948 until the 1970s, were a problem of localized access and it is simple to interpret their history using the continuum model.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were seized from various sources and records creators. It was never the case that these records should end up organized together had it not been for their seizure. It is also uncertain whether all records in question would have made it from the record creator to ANRI. In fact, knowing that some of the records the Dutch seized were particularly damning and guilt-inducing, it seems unlikely that without the symbolic nature of being representative of the revolution that some records would have been made public. The *Djogdja Documenten* were actively used by the Republican government, but were later removed from that context.

The *Djogdja Documenten* were known in Indonesia after they were seized by the Dutch military. As the individual records were created by Indonesian ministries, they certainly were aware of the existence of certain records, and letters from Hatta to the Netherlands delegation during the negotiations in 1949 prove he had an idea of what was seized. Later correspondence from Soemartini also allows us to see that throughout the period 1948-1970 knowledge of the *Djogdja Documenten* existed in Indonesia. Their transformation from ministerial records in Indonesia to intelligence records held by the Dutch is an example of non-linear re-creation. The continuum model allows records to be created more than once. In this case they were created by Indonesian ministries and then re-created by NEFIS. The entire collection, previously housed by various organizations, became re-created after its seizure. The *Djogdja Documenten* as we know them did not exist before NEFIS intervention. Therefore the continuum model’s nonlinear explanation of records can be applied to the *Djogdja Documenten*.

The fact that the *Djogdja Documenten* was created by compiling records from across various institutions into one archive perfectly illustrates the continuum model’s claim that creation can occur at any time after initial creation. The

64 NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 2936.
continuum model relates to the individual records, not archival groups. Having an individual record morph from a ministerial document organized by that institution to a source of intelligence in a newly created archive by another institution tests and proves the non-linear time aspect of the continuum model. The universality of the continuum model is still not proven after this case. It is similar to other examples of localized access problems from Chapter II that were easily interpreted using the continuum model. The universality aspect of the continuum model will continue to be tested in the next case study.

The *Djogdja Documenten* are not a situation where the applicability of the continuum model is compromised. My initial thought that seizure of records is not a phenomenon described by the continuum model was incorrect, as seizure is an example of re-creation. Using the *Djogdja Documenten* to test the continuum model finds that, at least in this case, the model is applicable.

**H. The *Djogdja Documenten* and the Shadow Continuum**

In terms of the shadow continuum, the most important piece of documentation is the NEFIS routing slip (*geleidebrief*). These slips are the ultimate traces of their existence. The routing slips are just one trace of the *Djogdja Documenten*. Throughout the NEFIS archive there are enough references to the seizure of documents, that even without knowing the location of the *Djogdja Documenten* we would know of their existence. The shadow continuum would therefore never come into play in such an example. Had the *Djogdja Documenten* been destroyed and never returned to Indonesia, the routing slips would have provided information on what was originally held in the collection. The routing slips would have therefore still been an example of creation (1D) coming from destruction.

There was no period in the history of the *Djogdja Documenten* where they would have existed in the shadow continuum. Even while held in the Netherlands traces would have allowed them to be interpreted through the continuum model. Pluralization and openness—or knowledge of their existence and contents—was kept intact the entire time from seizure through being sent back to Indonesia.
Conclusion

Sukarno’s centralization of power under Guided Democracy further eroded Indonesian-Dutch relations, and ended most conversations regarding cooperation, archives and the Djogdja Documenten. The violent rise to power of Suharto in the 1960s coincided with a turn to the West and the Netherlands. Suharto’s extreme anti-communist stance, which led to the death of hundreds of thousands of suspected left-leaning individuals, resulted in a renewed friendship with the Western powers at the height of the Cold War and anti-communist wars in Southeast Asia.

When the records continuum model is applied to the Djogdja Documenten it is a clear example of the concept of re-creation. The way the Djogdja Documenten include records from multiple ministries joined as one archive after seizure illustrate how the creation dimension can occur at any point after initial creation of an individual record.

Each re-creation was known, at least in some form, by government officials and archivists in both Indonesia and the Netherlands. Traces can be found in the case of the Djogdja Documenten as both the records themselves and the NEFIS routing slips are accessible. It was therefore concluded that the shadow continuum is irrelevant to the relationship of the Djogdja Documenten and the continuum model.

What will be presented next in Malaysia and Singapore is vastly different from the Djogdja Documenten. Though both groups of records would undergo transformation from various departments to becoming one archive and were created in the greater context of ‘decolonization,’ the context and content were much different.
Chapter V:

Introduction to the Migrated Archives

Introduction

The second case study of this dissertation stays within Southeast Asia, but moves to Malaysia and Singapore. The first part of what is now Malaysia to gain independence was peninsular Malaya in 1957. It was joined in 1963 by Singapore and two British Borneo territories—though not Brunei—to form Malaysia. In 1965 Singapore left Malaysia and became an independent state. For the purposes of this study, given how intertwined their histories are in the period discussed, both Malaysia and Singapore will be studied.

I was introduced to the Migrated Archives after having begun my research on the Djogdja Documenten. In the spring of 2011 the Migrated Archives were first disclosed to the public, though they were unable to be viewed by researchers while they were sorted through and transferred to The National Archives in London. When, in April of 2012, the first batch was made available at The National Archives I made my initial trip to London to begin combing through what I would be able to see. This gave me a clearer idea of the contents, and what sort of subjects the colonial administration was interested in keeping secret.

The structure of this study on the Migrated Archives will be slightly different to the previous one. Like the Djogdja Documenten study, the Migrated Archives will be discussed over two chapters. However, elements of the Migrated Archives allow the literature to be studied in depth. Being so new, and so historically significant, the Migrated Archives already have a small but detailed body of literature on their background. In this chapter I will give a short history on the independence process of Malaysia before delving into the literature. So much of the literature focuses on the records relating to Kenya, as it was the court case brought by tortured Mau Mau supporters against the British government that led to their discovery. Migrated Archives literature is therefore not enough to tell the entire story, and I will provide a background on the process towards Malaysia’s independence for a complete
understanding of the records that will be the focus of Chapter VI.

A. Decolonizing the Malay States

What is today Malaysia did not exist in a centralized form until after the Second World War. Previously, the British had direct control over the Straits Settlements—Singapore, Penang and Malacca—while leaving the rest of the peninsula as the Federated States of Malaya and the Unfederated States of Malaya. Prior to the Japanese invasion during the Second World War these three entities were governed in completely different ways. The Federated and Unfederated states were ruled by the British through treaties with local leaders, while the Straits Settlements were ‘the wellspring[s] of colonial modernity in Malaya’.¹ British Borneo was split between North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak, and Brunei—the only territory never to join Malaysia. The sultans of the different states kept certain powers, a key point to allowing British influence.

After the war the British attempted to unify the peninsula into the Malayan Union, which left out the predominately Chinese Singapore in order to ‘inflate the size of the Malayan Union’s Malay population’ to gain support for the union among Malays. However, the plan was still opposed amongst the Malay population as leaders felt the British Parliament’s ability ‘to legislate on behalf of Malaya’s affairs (...) amounted to complete annexation of the Malay States, an abrogation of the pre-war 1941 treaties with the Malay Rulers and the abolition of Malay sovereignty’.² Negotiations would eventually lead in 1948 to the Federation of Malaya—still minus Singapore—with special rights given to the Malays. On August 31, 1957 the Federation was granted complete independence, six years before the creation of Malaysia.

This action was complicated by the actions of Sukarno in Indonesia with the implementation of Konfrontasi over the creation of Malaysia. Britain would send

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over 60,000 service personnel, while Malaya 'had under 15,000 in its armed service and Singapore just two battalions', in order ‘to defer Indonesia from using its patrol boats and aircraft against Malaysia’.³ Within two years Singapore would leave and become its own independent state after secret agreements between Singapore and Malaysia.⁴

The independence of Malaya required creating one state in a multicultural place with three ethnic groups. Malays made up slightly less than half of the 5.2 million people in Malaya (2.2 million), with mainly Chinese and Indians making up the other 3 million. Therefore the Malay parties wanted to ensure special political rights of the Malay people in the face of Chinese economic power. Citizenship was seen as very important, and who exactly would belong to a 'Malayan' nation posed many serious questions. Compromises eventually led to citizenship for non-Malays born in Malaya, while the constitution guaranteed Malay as the national language, Islam as the national religion, and secured ‘the special position of the Malays’.⁵

The main Malay party was, and has been since, the UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) led by Dato Onn Jaafar, who would later be succeeded by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya. The UMNO won power under the Tunku in the first council elections in Malaya in 1952 by joining in an alliance with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)—and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)—which helped garner cross-racial support and defeated Dato Onn's new Independence of Malaya Party (IMP).⁶ Their alliance would also win the federal legislature elections of 1955. The creation of the MCA, a more moderate party for the Chinese to join, was done in response to the uprising begun in 1948 by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was predominantly Chinese.⁷

The Federation of Malaya was founded in early 1948. The next nine years were a mix of diplomatic and constitutional discussions involving the rights of the different races and the fighting of the Emergency against the communists. The communists,

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³ Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 280.
⁴ Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 277.
⁵ Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, 4.
⁶ Ibid., 27.
⁷ Ibid., 24.
who were fighting for independence, lost that major attraction to their cause when, after the British were satisfied with the ethnic situation, Malaya was granted independence on August 31, 1957. In Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak, however, the British retained their control and so stayed in near constant diplomatic contact with Malaya once the idea of Malaysia began to circulate. Singapore had internal self-government since the ratification of its 1959 Constitution, though external affairs were still controlled by the British.\(^8\)

Historically, Singapore had always been considered part of 'Malaya', even though after the Second World War the two were politically separated.\(^9\) The independence goal of Singapore, therefore, was unification with the rest of Malaya. This was the dream of Lee Kuan Yew, leader of the People’s Action Party (PAP) and eventual Prime Minister of Singapore, and David Marshall, first Chief Minister and leader of the Labour Front. Lee referred to his dream state of Malaya as a *Malayan* Malaya, one where race did not define the citizenship of a person, but rather devotion to Malaya.\(^10\) However, since it was not part of the post-war Federation of Malaya, it had to take a different route to achieving this goal.

In 1955 elected officials were made the majority of the legislative council in Singapore for the first time.\(^11\) The Emergency measures in place in Malaya were similarly applied in Singapore. In Singapore the communists of the MCP held a large amount of sway that made them important players in the political situation.\(^12\) The first attempt at uniting Singapore with Malaya at the independence of the Federation failed, primarily due to citizenship questions and the status of Singapore within the Federation.\(^13\) While unification failed, Singapore gained self-government and a general election in 1959, with the PAP winning a majority of the seats available.\(^14\) From this position Singapore's leaders began to advance the idea of

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\(^8\) Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 275.
\(^11\) Ibid., 105.
\(^12\) Ibid., 109.
\(^13\) Ibid., 118-119.
\(^14\) Ibid., 154.
merger with Malaya.

The merger of Singapore and the Borneo territories with the peninsula was a two-year process with commissions formed, fact-finding missions established and reports written, all in the attempt to determine how best to deal with integration. The British did not believe in the ability of the Borneo states to self-govern. Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was interested in having the large Malay and indigenous populations of Borneo join his country, but was still less willing to unite with Singapore.\textsuperscript{15} Singapore would eventually be given the offer to join after local elections showed a population growing upset with the inability of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) to bring independence. A leftist, populist mayor was elected, and an internal split within the PAP occurred in 1961. Malaya, therefore, ‘would not tolerate its neighbour drifting both leftwards and to independence’ and therefore circumvented this by bringing Singapore and the PAP into Malaysia.\textsuperscript{16} With the details sorted out, officials from each new territory, Malaya and the United Kingdom had to quickly work to prepare for Malaysia Day.\textsuperscript{17}

Part of that preparation from the British perspective included the destruction and removal of government documents before they could get in the hands of the federal government in Kuala Lumpur:

The political reality of forming Malaysia meant a large role for British administrators in the decision making processes that would affect the archival holdings today of the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore. This explains Dr. Meilink-Roelofsz’s report of the ‘strong British influence’ in Malaysia. British clerks in Southeast Asia were in contact with the Colonial Office in London to transport colonial documents to the London offices to save space for the new diplomatic missions that would have to exist within this newly independent nation. In the lead up to independence the British Colonial Office in London was in contact with administrators in Singapore and Malaysia regarding transfer and disposal of archives. This work, and the decisions of the people involved, would be the

\textsuperscript{15} Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia.
\textsuperscript{16} Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 275.
\textsuperscript{17} Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 94.
determining factor in the creation of the Migrated Archives.

B. Introduction to the Migrated Archives

Some of what colonial officials sent to London would make it into the collection of the PRO. The PRO declared, however, that certain colonial administration records were not belonging to the British public—and therefore they stayed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. These records would become the Migrated Archives. From arriving in London until 1994 they were held at the Hayes repository before being transferred to the Hanslope Park facility.\(^{18}\)

The Migrated Archives were only made known to the public in 2011, and it was not until April 2012 that the first of eight batches of archives were made available in The National Archives in London. With the entire transfer from the FCO warehouse in Hanslope Park to The National Archives taking two years, the full extent of what was contained in the collection was not yet publicized when the first documents were made available to viewers. Their recent discovery was a result of a court case brought against the British government by a group from Kenya charging that during the Mau Mau uprising they underwent torture sanctioned by the colonial administration. When archives detailing the excessive punishments were found at Hanslope Park, thousands of other records related to decolonization from throughout the British Empire were with them. Among them were records from every colony that would become Malaysia—Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak.

The Migrated Archives were subject to mismanagement and a ‘bureaucratic bungle’ according to David Anderson, an expert witness at the Kenyan court case. In the ‘various relocations of department and reorganisations of records management in the 1980s and 1990s’, staff at the FCO ‘lost track’ of the archives for nearly twenty years.\(^{19}\) Already published, and giving us great insight into the years


\(^{19}\) David M. Anderson, ‘Mau Mau in the High Court and the “Lost” British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?’, The Journal of Imperial and
between return to London and public availability, is a report by Anthony Cary, written at the request of the FCO and Henry Bellingham, Minister with responsibility for Africa, who found the disclosure of the Migrated Archives ‘a setback to the credibility of the Foreign Office’.20

The Cary Report, though written in response to the Kenyan court case, can be used to have a general description of the complete Migrated Archives, as they generally followed the same process of being removed, hidden, ignored, forgotten, and retrieved. Initially it was the case that some records were intentionally being hidden by the British government for intelligence reasons or the possibility of embarrassment.21 As time went on and FCO staff changed, people began to forget what was held in the collection and what its relevance was. Staff at both The National Archives and the FCO assumed it included material duplicated and already available to the public, and the collection slowly became known to only a small group of staff who considered it a ‘pet project’ of theirs. It was not until actions taken in the course of the court case that the full scope of the Migrated Archives became apparent.22

An important piece of information to take from the Cary Report is the reason archives would have been shipped to London. The accepted plan when decolonizing a territory was that ‘successor Governments should not be given papers which might embarrass HMG or other Governments; might embarrass members of the police, military forces, public servants or others; (...) might compromise sources of intelligence information; or might be used unethically by (...) the successor Government’.23 Seeing as how vague the phrase ‘might compromise sources of intelligence information’ is, and how much could fit those terms, it is no wonder that so much of the archive of the British Empire is in London, whether in The

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23 Ibid., 1.
National Archives or hidden elsewhere.

According to the Kenyan claimants in the case the torture they suffered was a result of the British government’s decisions in Kenya, and that the contemporary British government could still be held accountable. The response to this by the FCO was that they held no responsibility for the actions of the colonial government, as ‘all such liabilities had [been] transferred to the government of independent Kenya led by Jomo Kenyatta’. The judge in the proceedings struck down this argument and declared that the case could go to trial.

The oversight of the release of documents was given by the Foreign Secretary to Professor Anthony Badger of Clare College at Cambridge. This was, according to Badger, ‘to give reassurance to the academic community’ after the embarrassing acknowledgment that 200 feet of boxes were mismanaged and ‘lost’. Whether this was successful cannot yet be determined, but a review of literature on the Migrated Archives can give an idea of what historians close to the documents think of their relevance and historical importance.

C. Literature Review

Due to the extreme recentness of the case of the Migrated Archives their references in literature are small but growing as more is discovered about them. So far what does exist has mainly been written by actors involved. Unlike the Djogdja Documenten, there are no histories written yet using the Migrated Archives as sources. All published material thus far on the Migrated Archives uses them as source and subject, though in the future it is likely that new histories will be written using these records. The first publications on the Migrated Archives in a historical journal came in the December 2011 issue of The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.

Commonwealth History. David Anderson, Huw Bennett and Caroline Elkins, all expert witnesses in the case, each wrote an article for the journal. A further article was written in the same journal by Mandy Banton that is not about what is in the Migrated Archives themselves, but rather is a search for documents already publically accessible that may reference the disposal and hiding of documents during decolonization. The most recent article is Edward Hampshire’s further look into the actual decision making process involved in the choice of what to destroy, keep and ship to London from Southeast Asia. Anthony Badger, in the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies, writes his own article from his perspective as overseer of the transfer of records to The National Archives. The scarcity of writing due to how recently they were discovered allows an in-depth look at each article in the complete catalog of literature on the Migrated Archives.27

While these articles are those written about the Migrated Archives from within the academic discipline, there have also been news stories published on the topic, particularly in the British press. An online search of major British newspapers shows that The Guardian has covered the topic consistently since the existence of the records was announced in 2011, with Ian Cobain being the lead reporter. From 2011 to 2012 The Times covered the story, but since the first tranche was transferred to The National Archives it has stopped its reporting, as is also true of The Independent. The free-to-view web presence of The Guardian also improves access to information regarding the Migrated Archives, as The Times requires purchasing an online subscription. The Guardian has routinely kept readers abreast on the developing nature of the Migrated Archives story, and has followed up on FCO claims to transfer all records to The National Archives for public access. I will use some articles from The Guardian to complement the academic publications, as these cover issues more recent than the journal articles.

The reason that most academic articles focus on the Kenyan archive is

27 Articles on the Migrated Archives will continue to be published, and some were published while research for this dissertation was coming to a close. These articles include David Phillips, ‘The "migrated archives": the underbelly of colonial rule in Borneo’, Borneo Research Bulletin (2013), 40-66, which uses the Migrated Archives to study the origins of the Indonesia/Malaysia Konfrontasi.
obvious—these are the records that propelled the Migrated Archives into the news and were the first discovered. They are directly connected to a very important court case with repercussions throughout the former British Empire. That the rest of the work has a Malaysia focus, including this dissertation, comes from the fact that the Malaysia records were among the first tranche of files available for viewing at The National Archives in London. The first group released included ‘papers from the four colonies which were likely to provoke most controversy: those from Malaya, the British Indian Ocean Territory (Diego Garcia), Cyprus, and Kenya’. After the first release, the rest would be in alphabetical order of the colony. Records related to the Malayan Emergency and the creation of Malaysia were therefore part of the first batch.

Stephen Howe, an editor of *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, introduces the first three articles in his short essay ‘Flakking the Mau Mau Catchers’. He considers the work of Anderson, Bennett and Elkins as ‘important departures from a long established pattern’ of ‘few instances, in contemporary British, British-imperial, or Commonwealth history, of historians’ work clearly and directly reshaping the course of history itself, or having an obvious major impact on legal or political systems’. While there is some overlapping of information, each article does attempt to perform a specific task.

**D. Anderson’s Question of Conspiracy or Bungle**

David Anderson, of St. Cross College, University of Oxford, attempts two things in his ‘Mau Mau in the High Court and the “Lost” British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?’ The first is to establish the background of the defendants’ allegations. He goes into graphic and specific detail on the type of

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28 Anthony Badger, ‘Historians, a Legacy of Suspicion and the ’Migrated Archives”, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 23, nos. 4-5 (October-December 2012), 802.
30 Howe, ‘Flakking the Mau Mau Catchers’, 695.
torture experienced by the defendants.\textsuperscript{32} The second goal, as the title suggests, is to determine whether the misplacement of the archives was premeditated or a result of mismanagement of records after they were received in London. He first gives a background on the search for evidence on the part of the attorneys for the defendants and their correspondence with the FCO which eventually would lead to the 'disclosure' of the Migrated Archives. Anderson then makes the final conclusion that the Migrated Archives were part of both a conspiracy \textit{and} a bureaucratic bungle. The sending of documents to London 'was a formal part of Britain's process of decolonisation', but the records later became lost in bureaucracy during 'reorganisations of records management practices in the 1980s and 1990s', which is more in line with Cary's conclusion in his report.\textsuperscript{33}

Anderson details the personal story of each claimant. He also gives details on the legal process which unveiled the Migrated Archives after their years of secrecy. In 2009 the court ruled that the FCO must turn over all documents relevant to the case. After working on that task for over a year, FCO official Edward Inglett declared that he had released all records he could find. Anderson himself then wrote a witness statement for the prosecution using a 1967 letter from Kenyan officials to London requesting removed documents as evidence that further records must exist somewhere at the FCO. This led Inglett to request any additional records that may be found at the Hanslope Park depository of the FCO, which yielded no results until he vowed to come and visit the office himself to look for documents. After this the Kenyan Migrated Archives were opened up to Inglett, and after arriving at Hanslope Park he soon discovered the rest of the Migrated Archives.\textsuperscript{34}

Anderson concludes his paper by looking beyond Kenya to the greater impact of the Migrated Archives revelations. He starts with a mention of the disbelief that all who heard the news, and the official story that it was all accidental, must have experienced. While one file lost is understandable, it is a shock that a collection as

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{32} A fifth defendant died before the case made it to court, and one of the four would later drop out of the case leaving only three defendants by the time of the October 2012 decision to allow the suit to continue.
\textsuperscript{33} Anderson, ‘Mau Mau in the High Court’, 713.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 707-708.
\end{flushleft}
large as the Kenyan archives could be lost—and yet Kenya represents only one of 37 former colonies that make up the Migrated Archives. Anderson makes mention of the fact that the PRO had the opportunity in 1995 to review the records but declared them ‘not “public” records to Britain and so [they] could not be accepted’. Because the PRO saw them as public records of British colonial governments that existed separately from the central British government the records were seen as outside their purview. To this he states that it ‘should make historians who regard The National Archives as guardians as well as custodians of our records think more deeply about the effectiveness of the system we have in place for procuring and retaining records’.

The entire story of the Migrated Archives should make historians, and archivists, think deeper about the archival system, if prior to it they felt archival repositories gave them all they needed for research. Missing records can exist anywhere and certainly should cause historians to pause when thinking of archives. They should also cause archivists to question their own current knowledge of the system.

E. Bennett’s View of the Military in Kenya

Huw Bennett, of the Ministry of Defense and King’s College London, includes a short summary of the discovery of the Migrated Archives in his article, much of which is already covered by Anderson and was sourced from the Cary Report.

Given the title of his article, ‘Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army’s Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight’, the archival background is not his main focus. Rather he is concerned with the role of the army in the Kenya Emergency and acted as an expert witness on this subject, which was also the topic of his doctoral research. His conclusion is that it was previously well known that the Kenya Emergency was horrific and violent, and that the Migrated Archives expose the specifics and the effects of the violence. Coupled with the Migrated Archives

\[\text{Ibid., 713.}\]
\[\text{Bennett, 'Soldiers in the Court Room', 717-730.}\]
Archives in making the story of the Kenya Emergency clearer, he adds, is the recently published work by the other two experts in the case, David Anderson and Caroline Elkins.\textsuperscript{37}

While the majority of his paper focuses on the actual colonial army abuses claimed by the defendants, he does a nice job of succinctly summarizing the ‘bungle’ between the FCO and the PRO. Because the PRO rejected the idea that these records were British public records and thus would not accept them, they continued to be stored at the FCO. Eventually ‘the FCO came to believe the files contained little more than mundane administrative records, and that anything substantial in them would be replicated in Colonial Office records already in the National Archives’.\textsuperscript{38} Though some civil servants at the FCO knew of the collection’s existence, without going to the PRO it slowly faded from memory over the next fifteen years before the Kenyan court case.

\textbf{F. Elkins and Restorative Justice}

The article of Caroline Elkins, of Harvard University, on ‘Restorative justice’ for the Mau Mau defendants also concerns a bit of personal justice regarding her 2005 book \textit{Imperial Reckoning}, as well as the work of David Anderson, \textit{Histories of the Hanged}.\textsuperscript{39} The article, ‘Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice’, begins with a comparison between her work and Anderson's. While Anderson's \textit{Histories of the Hanged} focuses on the pre-1954 ‘military war’, \textit{Imperial Reckoning} focuses on the post-1954 ‘civilian war’ where the scope of the British role changed from fighting the guerillas to containing and detaining the civilian population. She then gives an overview of the book reviews of \textit{Imperial Reckoning}, the majority of which she disagrees with and which seem to misunderstand her conclusions and her methodology. She concludes that ‘the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 727.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 726.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Caroline Elkins, ‘Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice’, \textit{The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History}, vol. 39, no. 5 (December 2011), 731-748.
\end{itemize}
Hanslope Disclosure signals a crucial moment in the production of archival evidence. Once released (...) these files will undoubtedly prompt a considerable re-evaluation of British colonial violence at the end of empire'.

However, she cautions us to remember that archival evidence related to systematic torture during the Kenya Emergency existed before the disclosure in the work of Anderson, Bennett, and herself, and that the Migrated Archives merely give researchers even more documentation.\textsuperscript{40} In this she sees some sort of personal restorative justice after the negative reaction from her earlier book that claimed she was too reliant on oral testimonies and lacked written evidence for her new claims. Elkins explains that due to the ‘fragmented nature’ of the official documents she had to engage in many oral testimonies, but that the record was still there if the pieces were put together.\textsuperscript{41}

After her personal background Elkins goes more into the specifics of the court case and the systemic torture unleashed by the colonial administration towards rebel sympathizers. This, she says, was already known prior to the Migrated Archives, but there are five points which the Migrated Archives do make. The first is the further evidence of ‘British colonial brutality’; second is evidence regarding who made the decisions in this process; third is evidence as to who executed these actions; fourth is how much higher ranking British officials knew regarding torture; and finally the response of British officials.\textsuperscript{42} All of this is in line with what I have discovered in the archives surrounding Malaysia as well: that is, nothing substantially new, but rather, more. More documentation, more stories, more information surrounding the decolonization process. In cases such as this, only specific archives are ‘silenced’, while the general content can still be determined from the available records.

The papers of Anderson, Bennett and Elkins are each written by a witness in the Kenyan court case. They therefore each spend considerable time discussing the case, though each has their own separate focus. Bennett, given his military history

\textsuperscript{40} Elkins, ‘Alchemy of Evidence’, 745.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 736.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 744.
background, focuses on the actual torture and historical situation of the Mau Mau Rebellion. Elkins, with her personal academic history involved, focuses on justice—both personal and for the Kenyan claimants. Anderson spends the most time on the story of the Migrated Archives themselves. The other papers written on the subject come from outside the court case, and thus focus on the greater impact of the Migrated Archives, including parts of the empire outside Kenya. Anthony Badger, as the historian overseeing the ‘migration’, is the only author closer to the story than Anderson, Bennett, or Elkins.

G. Banton’s Search for Evidence in Public Archives

Mandy Banton, of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, has a unique article in that it is the first on the Migrated Archives to look beyond Kenya to other former colonies like Tanganyika, Nigeria, the Central African Federation and Malaya. It is also unique in that it does not use any of the Migrated Archives themselves, but rather attempts to discover the culture of disposal, destruction, and hiding of archives by the Colonial Office during decolonization through the use of already public documents in The National Archives. Her work is important in that it goes beyond merely saying what happened, and instead looks at the systemic aspects within the colonial administration that would bring about something like the Migrated Archives. However, systems are made of people, and Banton does provide explanation for the decision making process that was done by individual officials in various colonies. Bureaucratic structures intertwine with personal dispositions, and the results can lead to inaccessible records. This idea is continued in the paper of Edward Hampshire, which focuses solely on Malaysia.

To show the wider disposition towards archives by the colonial officials, Banton moves from Malaysia to southern Africa, before then giving larger international background on colonial archives in the early post-independence period. Regarding Southern Rhodesia, the Central Africa Office in London was adamant in its desire to

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have records shipped to London rather than stay behind and running the ‘risks involved in future change of regime’. Banton then tells the story of a project between UNESCO and the International Council on Archives in 1976 that would search for archives to be repatriated. The response of the PRO is that no claims have been made to them regarding records they hold, despite knowledge of claims by Kenya to the British government for records that would eventually be found in the Migrated Archives.

The Migrated Archives, therefore, are the result of a colonial culture of secrecy and the removal or destruction of archives, as well as the accumulation of choices made by individuals. Jean-Paul Sartre wrote that ‘colonialism is a system’, it is not ‘the statistical result of thousands of individual undertakings’. Though it is true that colonialism is a system that encompassed its human players, a system is nothing without its individual parts, each unique. The personal beliefs of one person could change what became part of the Migrated Archives or not.

**H. Hampshire’s Background on the Decision Making Process**

Of special usefulness to this dissertation, Edward Hampshire has also focused his research on the records of what would become Malaysia. Hampshire’s work is on what he calls ‘the whole story of these records: their selection and then separation from their originating registries by colonial officials, the decisions made as to whether they should be moved elsewhere or destroyed and the actual movement and destruction itself’. This dissertation is meant to tell even more of the story of these records, while tying it into archival theory, but Hampshire provides readers

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44 Quoted in Banton, 330.
45 Ibid., 331.
with the necessary human elements of the Migrated Archives. Systems and processes are nothing without people making decision, and it is in this context that Hampshire's work is most worthwhile.

Hampshire starts this personnel story in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the chronologically first country affected by the Migrated Archives. Entire archive groups were chosen to be either shipped to London or kept in Colombo, rather than on a case-by-case basis. This had the unintended consequence of members in the successor government finding files related to themselves amongst what was left behind. Thereon after the work was done by reviewing every file and making the decision to destroy, retain, or ship. These were decisions that, though made by British officials, were known to Tunku Abdul Rahman in the case of Malaya.

In Malaya the decisions included driving five truckloads of records to Singapore to be ‘destroyed in the Navy’s splendid incinerator there’, as it is described by F. Mills of the British High Commission six years later during the same process for North Borneo and Sarawak. This destruction is also mentioned by Banton, who provides more background on why the decision was made to drive trucks down to Singapore. Banton explains that destruction was difficult due to the number of local staff working as civil servants in Malaya. The largest incinerator in Kuala Lumpur had Malayan employees, as did the port, which would have made movement and disposal by sea difficult. Given these circumstances trucks were chosen and Singapore was the location, with ‘packing and carrying [...] done by expatriate staff and Chinese labourers’. Mills explains in a letter to a colleague that these decisions regarding the secrecy surrounding the destruction were made ‘discreetly’ in part to avoid a similar situation as to that which happened in Delhi in 1947 when the local press ‘greatly enjoyed themselves with the pall of smoke which hung over’ the city while the British destroyed sensitive records. The High Commission’s involvement, as Hampshire points out, shows that the decision making process

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49 Ibid., 336-337.
50 Ibid., 339.
51 Ibid., 340.
took place both within the creating institution and secondly at the High Commission.

In Borneo, just prior to the creation of Malaysia, one official was chosen for each colony to oversee the decisions—Terence O’Brien in North Borneo and Michael MacMullen in Sarawak. The differing opinions of O’Brien and MacMullen would see a difference in what records were destroyed, left for Malaysia, or would eventually become part of the Migrated Archives. O’Brien, a career diplomat who was heavily involved in the negotiations to create Malaysia and held a similar role in regards to records in Ceylon in 1948, was thus more likely to destroy documents rather than re-live the embarrassment of the new government finding personal references. Unlike O’Brien, who recommended burning the majority of the records he reviewed, MacMullen was under the impression more records should be handed over to Malaysia and less should be destroyed. While it is true that MacMullen recommended that a slight majority of the records go either to the federal Malaysian or Sarawak state governments, his desire to destroy less than O’Brien subsequently also meant that more records from Sarawak than North Borneo are included in the Migrated Archives.

The decisions made by O’Brien and MacMullen took future historical use into consideration. O’Brien’s consideration of future use was, for the most part, that there would be none and the records he was removing were unnecessary. This is still consideration of historical value, as he did appraise the records. The British Borneo colonies were much smaller and more recent in creation than the Dutch East Indies, and thus did not have the infrastructure that would lead to the establishment of a central archive like the Dutch had with the *Landsarchief*.

The work of O’Brien and MacMullen was the main source of appraisal and selection for the records of the colonial governments on Borneo. As O’Brien stated,

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56 Ibid., 346-347.
57 Ibid., 335.
'this spring-cleaning of the Registry would have been a good thing, nothing had been cleared out since 1947 or 1948. What's burnt won't be missed!' MacMullen's stance that the successor government should be treated to more records at handover was closer in line to official policy. As Mills wrote during the earlier Malaya process, 'as regards historical material the British could not lay themselves open to the charge of raiding the archives for historical purposes, and that the material should be left for Malayan historians to study.' More immediate factors were still fundamental to making the decisions, such as removing chances of embarrassment, but some historical thought was employed in the process.

Though Hampshire is correct in his assessment that the decision making process was in two parts—the government agency and then by the High Commission—there is a third decision maker in London. This was the decision—or according to the Cary Report, the oversight—that led to the records to sit removed from the public eye. The merger of decisions and processes in Borneo, Kuala Lumpur, and London led to Anderson considered both conspiracy and bungle. The Migrated Archives are thus the result of conscientious decisions made in the former colony by the likes of O'Brien and MacMullen and mismanagement in London by both the FCO and The National Archives.

I. Badger’s Reassurance

Anthony Badger of Clare College, Cambridge, the historian overseeing the return of the documents to The National Archives, wrote a response to historians with regard to the Migrated Archives. It provides a behind-the-scenes look at the transfer of the Migrated Archives to The National Archives. The questions he seeks to respond to are, ‘Can historians be reassured?’; ‘What will historians glean from the migrated archive?’; ‘Will these files rewrite the history of the end of the British Empire?’; and ‘Will the “legacy of suspicion” among historians and journalists be removed?’

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58 Ibid., 344. O’Brien to Mills, 4 July 1963, FCO 141/13039, TNA.
59 Ibid., 341. Mills to MacMullen, para. 8, FCO 141/13039, TNA.
60 Badger, ‘Historians', 799-807.
As far as reassuring historians goes, Badger, in his role, does his best to calm any fears of historians on the openness of the release and the contents of the documents. His final hope ‘is that when the entire archive has been transferred by the end of 2013 the process will have been seen to have been full and transparent and that the academic community will be reassured’. He also promises that material will not be redacted other than personal names. However, he ends on the note that despite everything he can do, ‘even at the end of 2013, I do not believe as the independent reviewer that I will have dispelled that legacy of suspicion’ among historians.

Reports since the transfer began, however, show that Badger’s hopes of transparency and assurance are unlikely to shift feelings away from suspicion. The Guardian has been consistent in reporting on the Migrated Archives since they were announced in April 2011. In April 2013 they ran a story which claimed the transfer of records to The National Archives is not as complete as both Badger and Foreign Secretary William Hague originally had declared. The FCO is using a legal loophole to keep certain records from being publically released along with those that are now available at The National Archives.

Like the larger Migrated Archives, these untransferred records come from across the former empire, including five files ‘concerning a visit that Prince Philip made to Singapore in 1956’. Parts of files that have been transferred to The National Archives are similarly still being kept inaccessible. These include ‘parts of a 1950 file about the “indoctrination of Malay Chinese” travelling to China’ as well as ‘Singapore intelligence reports from the 1950s’. All records are being withheld using Section 3.4 of the 1958 Public Records Act which states that ‘records may be retained after the said period [thirty years] if, in the opinion of the person who is responsible for them, they are required for administrative purposes or ought to be

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61 Badger, ‘Historians’, 805.
retained for any other special reason.’64 Badger’s claim of a lack of a ‘smoking gun’ in the non-Kenyan archives will do little to dissuade historians from being skeptical when the culture of secrecy within the FCO continues to live on.65

As for the records that have been made accessible by being transferred to The National Archives, what historians can glean is what has already been stated: more context, more background information. Or, as Badger says when summing up a talk given by Hampshire, ‘what you get is the local perspective in the colonies of what previously historians have seen from Whitehall [the British government].’66 They cover ‘mundane tasks’ that let us peer deeper inside the colonial system.67 This deeper look, Badger says, even if it does not lead to a rewriting of the history of the British Empire, nevertheless gives ‘fascinating material for many doctoral students for years to come.’68

**J. More Recent Hanslope Park Disclosures**

When the FCO admitted to the existence of the Migrated Archives, it did so while stating that the situation would be rectified and the collection would be transferred to The National Archives for public access. The announcement was also made under the assumption that the FCO was admitting to past mistakes by making accessible all of their secret hidden records.

However, in April of 2013 *The Guardian* already announced that a complete transfer was not taking place and that the FCO was withholding documents that they still felt were in the best interests of national security. Since work began on this dissertation, however, a larger collection of documents that the FCO has kept secret than the initial 37 colonies worth has been disclosed. This stash of over one million records dwarves the Migrated Archives’ 8,800 records. The culture of

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66 Ibid., 803.
67 Ibid., 804.
68 Ibid., 805.
secrecy which led to the creation of the Migrated Archives and their seclusion to Hanslope Park still lingers at the FCO. The FCO still has a bastion of hidden documents that would provide a wealth of information on the British Empire to historians. These newly revealed records date back to the 19th century and thus far have been impenetrable by Freedom of Information Act (FoI) requests. Since their disclosure there has been talk of historians filing legal action against the FCO to ensure their release to the public.

Someone at the FCO is therefore still continuing the decision-making process that was once conducted by O’Brien, MacMullen and others. Questions of what would be ‘embarrassing’ to the British government still overshadow transparency, despite some of the records being over one hundred years old. Banton, formerly of The National Archives herself, felt upset not only at having been lied to by the FCO, but also at her role in furthering that lie by telling her archive patrons that records they were interested in did not exist. The culture of secrecy at the FCO has not been replaced by one of transparency—the disclosure of the Migrated Archives was only a setback forced upon them by the results of the Kenyan court case. Barring another court case, access to these million records will most likely stay restricted, as they have withstood FoI requests.

Just as the Migrated Archives have been claimed to hold no ‘smoking gun’, no one record that completely alters the historical view of the British Empire, this new disclosure is also said to have no ‘truly explosive’ record. Concentrating on such game-changing documents overlooks what is happening and places too much emphasis on finding one thing that changes history, when in fact the existence of such a trove of records is enough to make historians re-evaluate the historical

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record and be skeptical of the official story from the FCO.\textsuperscript{72} New discoveries of records continue to be made, well into the writing of this dissertation. Badger’s attempt at reassurance has failed, as it is difficult not to sense a large-scale concerted effort to keep certain records away from the public.\textsuperscript{73}

These articles, taken together with the Cary Report, constitute what has been published on the Migrated Archives. There is a high probability, of course, that much has been written asking questions that could have been answered by using the Migrated Archives. Unlike the \textit{Djogdja Documenten}, these documents were completely unknown to researchers.

We can see one such example of questions that could have been more fully explored with use of the Migrated Archives from the actions of Indonesia prior to the creation of Malaysia. The Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU – North Borneo Liberation Army, or North Kalimantan National Army) was a small paramilitary group active in North Borneo with support across the border from Indonesia. In his description of the group and their relationship with Indonesia Matthew Jones states ‘[a]lthough we have no access to British intelligence assessments of the Indonesian threat, there were other indications of impending trouble’.\textsuperscript{74} Through records in the Migrated Archives, however, we now do have access to British intelligence from the period related to the TNKU and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{75} The TNKU was partially behind the revolt in Brunei in 1962 that would lead to its refusal to join Malaysia. Monthly intelligence reports written by the Sarawak Local Intelligence Committee directly after the revolt show the TNKU as backed by Indonesian support on both sides of the border and as a serious foe.\textsuperscript{76} However, a

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\item \textsuperscript{72} Cobain, ‘Foreign Office’.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Katie Engelhart, ‘Here’s What the British Government Has Been Hiding’, \textit{Vice}, \url{http://www.vice.com/read/katie-engelhart-britains-secrets-mandy-banton-321} accessed 2 March 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 109.
\item \textsuperscript{75} The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/12602: Sarawak: Indonesian subversive activities in North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei; FCO 141/12613: Sarawak: Intelligence Committee meeting, 28 November 1962, to consider the security situation following arrest in Lawas of ten members of North Kalimantan National Army; FCO 141/13015: North Borneo: North Kalimantan National Army (Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara).
\item \textsuperscript{76} The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/12629: Sarawak: Monthly Intelligence
\end{itemize}
few months later letters between London to the Governor of Sarawak detail Indonesia's role in the cross-border raids while describing the TNKU as 'a mere rabble, its arms in a very poor state and weapon training and shooting proficiency negligible' that has 'built up for itself a grossly exaggerated reputation amongst border longhouses'.

Conclusion

The Migrated Archives were sent to London due to a culture of secrecy within the Colonial Office, which manifested itself in the decisions made on the local level by those given the discretion to appraise and select records. These officials were making their own personal choices in accordance with vague guidelines set by the Colonial Office. The lack of a 'smoking gun' as compared to the archives on Kenya does not lessen their importance regarding the decolonization of all of Malaysia. The Migrated Archives take the stories of Singapore and Malaysia's independence and let researchers peer further into what the British were doing in regards to decolonizing their Southeast Asian holdings. As such their contents will be of great interest to historians of the post-war history of the region.

When Badger writes about the records in the Migrated Archives, he claims they illustrate the 'banality of bureaucracy', and that '[t]hey do convey a sense of how the business of government carried on a day-to-day basis as administrators continued with the mundane tasks of running a country while momentous events went on round about them'. Though their contents might merely record 'mundane tasks', what they represent now is far from mundane, and since coming into the realm of public knowledge they mean much more. The 'momentous events' happening around the initial creation of these records include the independence of Malaya and

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77 The National Archives (TNA): FCO141/12602: Sarawak: Indonesian subversive activities in North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.
78 Badger, 'Historians', 803.
79 Ibid., 804.
the creation of Malaysia through further decolonization. What may seem like ‘mundane’ government business was in fact a clarification of the British role in major events surrounding the organization of Malaysian society. Questions regarding Malay affirmative action and treatment of ethnic and religious minorities—which the Migrated Archives cover extensively—are still highly contentious subjects in Malaysia today. The level of secrecy surrounding the Migrated Archives makes claims of banality appear suspicious, especially given the knowledge that further records have still failed to be made public.
Chapter VI: Contextualizing the Migrated Archives

Introduction

This chapter will build on the introduction to the Migrated Archives as provided by the previous chapter. I will move the discussion of the Migrated Archives first to their contents and context, and then into the realm of archival science, beginning with such important elements of the archival profession as appraisal, selection and original order. I will follow this with a review of the Migrated Archives through the continuum model, as well as the role of the shadow continuum, just as was the case for the Djogdja Documenten. The most important outcomes of the chapter will be whether the Migrated Archives’ unique situation fits in with the idea of universality in the continuum model, and whether the shadow continuum introduced in Chapter II is represented in the Migrated Archives.

Unlike the Djogdja Documenten, the creation (by sending to London), capture and organization dimensions (1D, 2D, 3D) for the Migrated Archives occurred amidst deep secrecy. The Djogdja Documenten were known to exist and therefore had traces. Hatta himself knew certain records were seized and there are records from the time documenting Republican knowledge of what was taken. Later, archivists in Indonesia made numerous contacts with colleagues in the Netherlands regarding their return. There were also traces of their existence in the NEFIS archive due to the routing slips. On the other hand, the specifics of the Migrated Archives—their content and location—were unknown outside of a select few. This chapter will therefore include a reexamination of Banton’s work and a search for traces of the Migrated Archives in publically accessible records.

The Migrated Archives and the ability to analyze them with the continuum model are tied to the flaws in the model surrounding pluralization and openness. Prior to 2011 there was no possibility for analysis by the continuum model. The Migrated Archives, therefore, are a stronger test of the universality of the continuum than the Djogdja Documenten were.
A. The Contents

The Colonial Office was clear as to what types of documents were not to be left for the successor governments, but within their criteria there was room for judgment made by officials in the colonies. The guidelines sent to the various colonies have already been explained.\footnote{The National Archives, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=69697&CATLN=3&Highlight=%2CARCHIVES%2CARCHIVES%2CARCHIVES%2CARCHIVES%2CSINGAPORE&accessmethod=0 (accessed 13 May 2014).} However, specific appraisal of documents and the decision of ‘[h]ow to meet these criteria [set out by the Colonial Office] was largely determined at the local level’.\footnote{Badger, ‘Historians’, 800.} The use of the word ‘might’ in the guidelines, coupled with subjective words like embarrass and compromise can partially explain the sheer magnitude of the Migrated Archives. And, of course, this does not include the documents which were secretly destroyed—either in London or their original location—due to their compromising nature and the potential crimes they may have contained.\footnote{Ian Cobain, Owen Bowcott, and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Britain Destroyed Records of Colonial Crimes’, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes?CMP=twt_gu (accessed 5 May 2012).}

Their ability to be used in telling history, therefore, has been removed permanently.

The Migrated Archives are broken down by colony, and therefore those of interest in this work can be found under four different sections: Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. The Malayan archives come from three original sources: The Governor/High Commissioner's Office, the Chief Secretary and the Ministry for External Defence. A large portion of their contents are in reference to the Malayan Emergency. The extremely politically sensitive nature of the documents, as in the Kenya Emergency, led to many of them being initially suppressed. Aside from the Malayan Emergency, other documents concern the development of the Malayan constitution and the structure of the independent government and finances, Malayan foreign affairs and defense, Chinese in Malaya, citizenship for non-Malays and records relating to various Malay states, many of which date back further than the rest of the documents. Contentious constitutional
matters related to race and Malay privileges are still hotly debated in Malaysia today, which makes their inclusion in the Migrated Archives understandable.\textsuperscript{4}

In the Borneo territories a large share of the records detail their merger into Malaysia. Malaya's Migrated Archive does not cover this period, instead it is related to the period surrounding its own independence. Although the Borneo archives include material from 1946 when Sarawak and North Borneo were made crown colonies following the Japanese surrender, their majority is centered on the lead up to Malaysia.\textsuperscript{5} Prior to the Japanese occupation North Borneo was governed by the British North Borneo Company and not directly by the British government, which explains the lack of any records from before this period. The records of the British North Borneo Company had already been sent to the Public Record Office and are available at The National Archives.\textsuperscript{6} Prior to the Japanese occupation, Sarawak was ruled by the 'White Rajah' Brooke family dynasty, and the majority of documents in the Sarawak collection are from the Governor's Office and come from the same period as those from North Borneo. The Brooke family's personal papers are held in Oxford at the Bodleian Library.\textsuperscript{7}

Monthly and weekly reports, as well as the reports of various intelligence committees make up a major portion of the Malaysia Migrated Archives. The influence of communists, either locally or from Indonesia, was a major concern in both Malaya and Borneo. British reports from only ten years earlier of course made mention of the Dutch propensity for inflating the dangers of communism in Indonesia, though when it directly involves their own decolonization process the


\textsuperscript{5} Jones, \textit{Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia}, gives a good background to the correspondence regarding the creation of Malaysia from both the perspective of Malaya, Britain, and the Borneo territories.


British are much more interested in communist activities.

While the Malaysian archives do not appear to reveal anything as politically damning as the Kenya Emergency records, they nevertheless detail the behind-the-scenes work leading to independence. Records detailing the writing of the Malayan constitution, the Malayan Emergency, and negotiations with different Malay sultans all eventually found the same fate of being sent to London. The records from Singapore date from the period before self-government, which occurred in 1959. While the British still controlled foreign affairs in Singapore, what was sent back to London is from a time before major discussion on Singapore joining Malaysia. Most Singapore records are in the form of intelligence on political activities in Singapore, as well as in Malaya and Indonesia.

The creation of Malaysia led to two different yet connected phenomena relating to documents. The first was the vast amount of records created regarding the unification of the peninsula and the Borneo territories. Officials in Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, Australia and Britain were in correspondence to make Malaysia a reality and to have it exist in a way most beneficial to the various actors involved. The second was the on-the-ground destruction and hiding of records. Malaysia meant decolonization for three further territories, and records that officials did not want passed on to the new state or federal governments in Malaysia were dealt with. This official policy led to the creation of the Malaysia section of the Migrated Archives.

What the Migrated Archives show is the heavy role the British administration played in the two major events covered in the records: the Malayan Emergency and the creation of Malaysia. British involvement in the creation of Malaysia was a major reason Indonesia was against it, and why some people in the Borneo territories were against it as well. Hiding the archives may have been an attempt to hide how involved Britain was so that after independence groups from outside Malaya would not be as capable to call the new federal state a neo-colonial

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Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia*. It should be noted that all of Jones' archival sources come from either Britain (mostly from The National Archives) or the US.
invention. As T.N. Harper states:

‘The dialectic of late colonialism was that the satisfactory conclusion of the business of empire demanded its transfer into trustworthy hands; the need to keep it in those hands made the transfer of power a much swifter process than it was intended to be. Once this dialectic was acknowledged and accepted as unstoppable all the British could do was make the government as pro-western, capitalist and clean as it could’.  

This is exactly what can be seen in the Migrated Archives. They show how ‘the need to keep it in those hands’ and out of the power of the communists of the MCP accelerated the process of Malaysia. Records show the British working with the Tunku on how to approach the idea of an amnesty offer to surrendering communists. When an article in the Singapore Standard reported that the Tunku would legalize the MCP, the British High Commissioner contacted the Tunku to ensure there would be a refutation of this claim. The Tunku promised the High Commissioner that he ‘had spoken entirely in a personal capacity and would make this clear in his correction’. All along, leading to independence, the British administration was making sure their print would be left on Malaysia.

B. Role in Malayan Emergency

The Migrated Archives include records related to a court case involving the 'Semenyih Incident' from early 1956, which would fall under the ‘embarrassing’ heading in the decision making rubric. Chinese rubber tree tappers in the area made claims of mistreatment by British and Malay soldiers. Women reported being kicked by soldiers, having clothing removed while being searched in the jungle, and being forced to walk naked through the jungle to retrieve clothes while soldiers and

10 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/7286: Malaya: Communist offer to negotiate, and offer of amnesty by the Government of the Federation of Malaya.
police—both Malay and British—watched. But this is not a completely secret incident. It was discussed in UK Parliament and is even mentioned by Harper in *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*. Harper mentions that the court inquiry was made to ‘appease Chinese opinion’ and makes little other mention of it in his discussion of the counter-insurgency. However, showing some of the overlap in the Migrated Archives, his citation comes from Colonial Office records previously made public at The National Archives.

The searching of Chinese rubber tappers was only one part of a ‘Food Denial Scheme’, headed by an ‘Emergency Food Denial Organisation’, on which the Migrated Archives gives more information. The hope was the end the distribution of food to Communist insurgents hiding in the jungle, including the area around where the ‘Semenyih Incident’ took place. Communists killed or fleeing due to raids left behind large quantities of rice and other foodstuff, as well as other supplies most likely acquired from local villagers. Communist tracks were found around the perimeter wire of New Villages—‘protected areas’ where rural Chinese rubber-tapping communities were resettled in order to stop the local support of Communist fighters. A major type of food denial came in the form of central cooking of rice in New Villages and Rubber Estates, which was both the most effective way at keeping food from insurgents—or ‘CTs’ (Communist Terrorists) as they were called—and least difficult on the public as the villagers were able to eat all the rice they wanted and had no uncooked rice leftover to give to communists. From October 1956 to March 1957 fifty such central rice cooking schemes were set up in four provinces of Malaya. The schemes were so successful that 113 more were planned by May 1957.

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Records also document British policy-making behind amnesty and surrender plans with the MCP, attempting to influence the Tunku Abdul Rahman and H.S. Lee—of the Malayan Chinese Association—and mould their attitudes. A meeting of the Director of Operations Committee with leaders of Malayan parties and British officials in January 1955 concludes that ‘Abdul Rahman and Lee were not aware of the full implications of an amnesty, or negotiated cessation of armed revolt’ after local press had been giving attention to the possibility of amnesty based on the alliance’s proposals. The matter was discussed in the House of Commons, where it was made clear that ‘no general amnesty should be offered’ and that British officials were looking for a certain line of thinking from the Tunku before sovereignty would be handed over.16 Nonetheless, ‘[e]nding the Emergency, and offering a new amnesty, had been a vital part of the Alliance’s election platform, and one reason for the enthusiasm which swept it to victory’ later in the general elections of 1955.17 Despite the initial British disagreement with amnesty, the Tunku continued to push the idea, and in December of 1955 engaged in talks with the MCP regarding amnesty and surrender. In the end, it was a fear that the Tunku would give too much away to the communists that resulted in the British government promising, before the talks even took place, ‘self-government to Malaya whether or not the Emergency ended’.18 The Tunku would not disappoint at the talks, refusing to succumb to MCP demands, leaving the British more confident in their ability to grant Malaya independence.19

A letter was also written regarding the attitudes of Chinese in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong in the event of war, with a country by country analysis concluding that the Chinese lack a sense of loyalty to the country in which they live. It details the size and distribution of Chinese populations throughout the area, extending beyond only areas of British control, as well as their economic power and political activities, including ‘fifth column activities’.20 The British hoped that the

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16 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/7521: Malaya: possible amnesty offer to Communist terrorist forces.
17 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 222.
18 Edwin Lee, Singapore, 100.
19 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 224.
20 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/7463: Malaya: papers for the Joint
independence of Malaya would act as a ‘psychological weapon’ against the communists.\textsuperscript{21} The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was 95\% Chinese. At the same time, only 5\% of the Malayan Federation Military Forces were Chinese. This fact greatly worried the British as to where the Chinese in Malaya would keep their loyalties.\textsuperscript{22}

The Migrated Archives show the way the British administration used a planned independence and structured decolonization process as an attempt to end fighting with the MCP. While this was a fact that was previously known, the Migrated Archives once again give new information, more specifics, and more anecdotal evidence supporting positions of previous historians and previously held notions on the Emergency. The fight against the communists and the ability to join together a diverse colony into a single state is part of what has made Malaya appear, to the British, as ‘a model of successful decolonisation’.\textsuperscript{23} While the actual events were not as smooth as the British vision of decolonization may have been, to even attempt such a feat would require a massive amount of information and document-creation due to the direct influence the British held in the decolonization process.

This can be seen in the British role in joining the major racial groups of Malaya (Malay, Chinese and Indian) into a unified country. A major Malay grievance was what they saw as ‘half-hearted support given by the Chinese to the prosecution of the Emergency’. The Chinese, for their part, saw ‘few (…) reasons for rejoicing’ at the idea of an independent Malaya, though the British hoped their spirits would be raised when it is discovered that an independent Constitutional Commission was to devise the plan on nationality and citizenship, and that H.S. Lee of the MCA would become Minister of Finance rather than a Malay as some in the press had misleadingly reported. Citizenship was a major concern of the Chinese in Malaya, and it was therefore a major concern of the British in their attempts to keep the

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\textsuperscript{21} TNA: FCO 141/7422: Malaya: Emergency Operations Council.
\textsuperscript{22} TNA: FCO 141/7463: Malaya: papers for the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East): Attitudes of Chinese Populations.
\textsuperscript{23} Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, 2
Chinese communities happy and accepting of an independent Malaya.\textsuperscript{24}

Connected with the Emergency was the writing of the post-independence Malayan Constitution. The constitution helped solidify the compromises and agreements made between the UMNO-MCA-MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) alliance. The Reid Commission, the independent Constitutional Commission chaired by British Judge Lord Reid which included justices from Pakistan, India and Australia, was tasked with writing the new constitution after meetings between the Secretary of State, the political alliance and the Malay Sultans.\textsuperscript{25} In was within the Reid Commission that important constitutional matters such as the special protection of Malay rights, citizenship for non-Malays and state language and religion would be debated. After the Reid Commission was finished with their recommendations, further discussions were held between the Sultans, the political alliance and the British government, which is reflected in the Migrated Archives.

\textbf{C. Role in Creation of Malaysia}

British officials took just as an important role in discussions regarding the creation of Malaysia. It was, after all, three British territories that were to join with Malaya, so their role is perhaps to be expected. However, it could be considered embarrassing in the future if it was known just how much Malaysia was made through British intervention and in a British mould. As the constitution of Malaysia was to be a modified version of the Malayan Constitution, constitutional questions and others like federal education, and the redistribution of representation in a Malaysian parliament are all discussed between various officials in Borneo and London and it is clear they want to make the decisions at the expense of the Tunku in Malaya.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/7459: Malaya: Miscellaneous Political Reports.
\textsuperscript{26} The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/12809: North Borneo: Malaysia; departmental papers and notes: Creation of Malaysia, Planning and Implementation.
Independence led to the politicization of ethnic societies on Borneo, such as the United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) founded by Donald Stephens as a successor to the Society of Kadazans, the pre-political society of which he was president. The term ‘Kadazan’ was used by the group as the name of the indigenous groups to North Borneo, as opposed to the British-used term ‘Dusun’. The UNKO was formed as a way of establishing indigenous power in Malaysia against Chinese and Malay/Muslim economic and political power. Within the Migrated Archives an entire folder is dedicated to the UNKO and its formation. The Commissioner of Labour and Welfare sees problems with the ‘loaded politically’ terms ‘Kadazan’ and ‘Sabah’ as used by Stephens. Also included in the file is a letter from the office of the Commissioner of Police to the Chief Secretary of North Borneo regarding the crest of the UNKO and its meaning.

The creation of Malaysia and the reaction to Konfrontasi are intertwined, as can be gleaned from the Migrated Archives. Sukarno was against the idea of having what he perceived as a British neo-colony on his border, and following the West Irian dispute, ‘Indonesia was [...] freed of one international dispute, but Sukarno was also deprived of a unifying national cause’, which was crucial to this presidency during the Guided Democracy period. Furthermore, as Hack states:

‘Given Britain’s record, Sukarno could hardly fail to be suspicious. Britain had not supported Indonesia’s claim to West New Guinea. Britain had tolerated both rebel sympathizers based in Singapore and large-scale rubber smuggling from Indonesia. It was a major cold war player and SEATO member, while Indonesia sought to organize Afro-Asian diplomacy. There were also fears that the Malays on Sumatra could gravitate towards Malaya. The proposed Malaysian federation seemed to threaten Indonesia with the creation of a large-pro-British and intentionally anti-Indonesian state. In addition, there seemed good reason for Sukarno to suppose he

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27 Reid, Imperial Alchemy, 194.
28 Ibid., 192.
29 Ibid., 195.
31 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, 278.
could frustrate the proposed merger. All he had to do was to threaten to move
closer to communist countries, and to use confrontation tactics—low-level
harassment combined with high-level diplomacy—in order to invoke the sort of
American support which persuaded Holland to compromise in 1962.32

Skirmishes between Indonesian raiders and British and colonial soldiers were
becoming more common after the start of Konfrontasi. This is shown to be a major
concern of the British, who were trying to unite a multi-racial society into one
country and had the added pressure of belligerent opposition groups in Borneo and
across the border in Indonesia.33 Indonesia helped recruit and train groups like the
TNKU (*Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara*, National Army of North Kalimantan),
while the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) and the Sarawak United
People’s Party (SUPP) were predominantly Chinese communists similarly against
the creation of Malaysia.34

Even prior to Konfrontasi the border between Sarawak and Indonesian
Kalimantan on Borneo was a contentious area. In December of 1957 ‘distant
ripples’ based on conversations held between the British Embassy in Indonesia and
the Indonesian government turned into multiple reports in the Indonesian press
regarding a proposed meeting between officials of Sarawak and West Kalimantan,
the Indonesian province it borders. Such a meeting was something the British
government was hoping to delay by using vague responses to any Indonesian
question into the matter. The British government (in both the embassy in Jakarta
and on Borneo) wished to avoid ‘unnecessary contacts with the Indonesians across
the Kalimantan border’, which was made difficult a few months later in February
1958 with the arrest of Mr. B.W. Sandilands of the Colonial Survey Department after
crossing into Indonesia to request permission to travel through Indonesian
territory on official surveying business. R.N. Turner, Chief Secretary of Sarawak, was
against informing the British Embassy in Jakarta of the incident in order to stop it

32 Ibid., 274
33 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/12692: Sarawak: Monthly Intelligence
   Telegrams.
34 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/12629: Monthly Intelligence Reports;
   Attorney General’s Copy.
from re-igniting talks of cross-border discussions, which were 'best left dormant'.

These stories all show a strong British involvement in creating Malaysia. Records revealing just what went on behind the scenes were sent to London where they were intentionally held from public view. If not for the discovery and disclosure of the Migrated Archives it is impossible to know when these records would have ever otherwise been made accessible.

D. Appraisal and Selection

Moving now from the historical context to the archival science context, the following sections will cover the concepts of appraisal and selection and original order, and how they related to the Migrated Archives. The final parts of the chapter will focus on the continuum model. Appraisal and selection determines what records become part of an archive, and in the case of the Migrated Archive it happened twice. Once by officials like O'Brien and MacMullen, and again when they were being released to the public at The National Archives.

The decision of what gets preserved is critical to the way future researchers remember and reconstruct times and events. Ketelaar's claim that '[r]ecords embody the nexus between evidence, accountability, and memory' reminds archivists and historians alike that appraisal and selection are what determine how we see our past, and in turn, our future. The acts of appraisal and selection are sometimes the work of archivists, and at other times of the creating institution, or a combination of the two. For the Migrated Archives, the decision of what to send to London, what to keep in the colonies, and what to destroy was made in the lead-up to independence between those in the colonies and those in the Colonial Office. Given the role of people like O'Brien and MacMullen, Richard Cox's argument that 'the archivist must be involved with the records creator as far up the life cycle of

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35 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 141/13055: North Borneo: Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) - North Borneo / Sarawak contacts and problems; visits and reports by staff of HM Ambassador, Jakarta.
records as possible’ is wishful thinking in such situations, as only colonial officials were making the final decisions.\textsuperscript{37} The work of O’Brien and MacMullen re-created the records they appraised (1D, according to the continuum model), and began the process of unifying them into a separate archival group.

Appraisal and selection also played a role when releasing documents to the public. The stated goal was to release every document of the Migrated Archives by the end of 2013. Part of meeting that goal meant that appraisal would be bypassed and all documents would be made public—after, of course, the standard review for exemptions based on legal reasons. As Badger says regarding this fact, ‘[t]his will have both advantages and disadvantages for the historian, but it inevitably means that there will be duplication not only of materials already held at the Archives but duplications within the collections’;\textsuperscript{38} In Malaysia this can be seen in the monthly intelligence reports on the Chinese in Malaya that are duplicated within the collection, as copies belonging to various officials all became part of the Migrated Archives. Monthly reports from Sarawak during Konfrontasi with Indonesia are duplicated with documents already at The National Archives.

Even if the idea that the extensive period spent hidden was the result of a ‘bureaucratic bungle’ is correct, the role of O’Brien and MacMullen highlights the intentional archival silencing that took place. These two men were literally choosing what could be seen in the future National Archives of Malaysia. In one final statement before the United Kingdom transferred sovereignty, these decisions left a lasting imprint of the colonial past on how history would be remembered in Malaysia.

\textbf{E. Provenance, Original Order and Custodial History}

Upon receipt, the Migrated Archives are being kept in the same order as they are received by The National Archives. This means that ‘records from each individual


\textsuperscript{38} Badger, ‘Historians’, 802.
To put it in the simplest terms possible, the FCO has decided the order the records will be kept should be based on how they sent them to The National Archives. All records are being held as one collection, and are not separated by colony. The National Archives will use this order rather than rearrange records into the pre-existing collections of Foreign and Commonwealth Office records related to those countries. Archivists involved in this decision are therefore taking an active role in determining how researchers will find, read and use these documents. It will be nearly impossible to read these documents and not think about deeper subjects such as why they were hidden and what information lies beneath the surface of the record. The reasoning behind The National Archives’ decision to keep the entire collection as one series was to ‘help readers to search the records, regardless of their level of expertise and ensures that the history of the collection is clear to all’. The ‘history of the collection’ is made clear to researchers in the reading room of The National Archives whenever they do a search of records and request something from the Migrated Archives. On the website of the National Archives any record that is part of the Migrated Archives will be noted in its description under the heading ‘context of this record’. This is similar to the idea put forth by Tom Nesmith that that ‘in place of original order, we should speak of the received order of the records, which would refer to the order the records are in when they are received by an archives’.

Making the decision that they did, The National Archives accurately draws attention to the Migrated Archives’ period when it was unknown to outsiders. It is important to note the phrase ‘the history of the collection’. It does not refer to the history of the documents as it relates to their creation in the colonies and the role they would have played in colonial administration. Rather it refers to what Laura Millar refers to as their custodial history between initial creation and being found.

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40 Ibid.
41 Tom Nesmith, “Reopening Archives: Bringing New Contextualities into Archival Theory and Practice,” Archivaria, 60 (Fall 2005), 264.
at Hanslope Park. The Migrated Archives are being re-read and re-interpreted and its complete story is taken into account. The history of the collection relates to its post-appraisal history. The documents would have been archived in Malaya, but that is not what The National Archives means by its history. It instead refers to the period before being made accessible.

The decision to keep the documents in the order that they were sent to The National Archives, however, is in direct disagreement with the Cary Report, which recommended that the records ‘should be re-attached, physically, to the main FCO archive, together with any other original records’. Instead, every document has been given the new reference number of FCO 141. While it goes against the Cary Report, it must be remembered that the report was not written by an archivist, but by the former British High Commissioner to Canada, Anthony Cary.

Cary’s suggestion betrays a difference in understanding of provenance and original order compared to The National Archives’ final decision. Returning missing records to their ‘original’ location is a concept that was presented in the 1898 ‘Dutch Manual’, the first major published work on provenance and the arrangement of records. The book states that ‘[i]t is desirable to complete the archival collection again with missing documents’ and that ‘[d]ocuments which after having once disappeared from an archival collection are again returned to it by gift or purchase may resume their place in it if it is perfectly clear that they originated in that collection’. Changes in archival theory have led to the context of the records, its complete history, taking the place of original order.

In the post-custodial view of archives, the principle of original order in a physical sense becomes secondary to the idea of properly contextualizing records. Cary’s recommendation to re-fit the Migrated Archives back into a pre-existing

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collection as if that is its ‘home’ is the kind of thinking Nesmith was reacting against when he asked, ‘Can anyone really be in a position to know whether the order of the records on arrival at an archives is the original one, or know whether, even in archives, the order has never been changed?’ Cary’s author-centric view of how to re-integrate newly discovered records into a collection shows how a non-archivist, and non-historian, sees the way in which records should be kept. If The National Archives had followed Cary’s advice, the fact that these were special records specifically chosen to be hidden, for reasons based on their content, could eventually be lost to time as they would be mixed in with records that were made public under the normal thirty year timetable.

As Anne Gilliland-Swetland observes that the concept of provenance has two parts: records of the same provenance should not be mixed with those of a different provenance, and the archivist should maintain the original order in which the records were created and kept. In the cases of both the Djogdja Documenten and the Migrated Archives, ‘history of the collection’ has taken precedence over the original order. The documents of the Migrated Archives have different creating bodies, though the Foreign and Commonwealth Office can be seen as the top of the pyramid, so putting them within the FCO archive is not unusual. Putting them together as record series FCO 141 is purely based on their unique post-creation history and would not otherwise have been done. Like the Djogdja Documenten they form one ‘archive’ because of outside forces affecting them after they were created and even initially ordered by the creating body.

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46 Tom Nesmith, ‘Reopening Archives: Bringing New Contextualities into Archival Theory and Practice’, Archivaria, no. 60 (Fall 2005), 264.
F. The Migrated Archives through the Continuum Model

To understand the Migrated Archives in the continuum model it is imperative to first have a clear picture of two things: the general disposition towards secrecy which permeated the Colonial Office, and—for this case study—the specifics regarding the records from Malaysia and Singapore. Now that this has been presented it is possible to move to looking at these records through the continuum model. Knowing them and the context in which they were initially created we can see whether the actions that took place during their existence coincide with continuum thinking.

I pointed out in Chapter II that a major flaw I see in the continuum model is that it is reliant on pluralization. I use the confusion of whether records are in all dimensions at once or not as a way to point out this problem. To say that the Migrated Archives were always in all dimensions of the continuum model is a difficult statement to prove. When Reed makes the claims that records exist is all dimensions simultaneously she takes the continuum model too far while failing to keep exceptions in mind.48 As it relates to the Migrated Archives, it is nearly impossible to say that there was pluralization during the period they were secretly hidden at Hanslope Park. Analysis of the Migrated Archives using the continuum model was impossible before they were discovered in 2011—their pluralization.

Upward, et al, try to negate this problem in the Wikileaks example by stating that future archivists and historians will look back and only see ‘[r]efracted reflections of the records, seen from differing time periods, differing polities, different roles, all simultaneously co-exist as actual or potential interpretations of records, each valid in its own discrete or overlapping frame of reference’.49 It is true that once hidden archives like the Migrated Archives become known to the public their complete history can be interpreted by the continuum model, but this interpretation overlooks the period while they were hidden. Nevertheless, since pluralization has now occurred, I will offer an analysis of the records.

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48 Reed, ‘Reading the Records Continuum’, 20.
I have previously mentioned the idea of ‘initial creation’ to differentiate it from the continuum model use of the word creation. In this case the records that make up the Migrated Archives were initially created by British colonial government departments (1D). This would be the various government departments creating records, such as intelligence reports, or the report on the Semenyih Incident case prepared by the presiding judge.

These records, and many others, were then captured by colonial recordkeeping systems (2D). They were turned from documents into accessible and useful records of the colonial administration beyond the point of creation. Metadata would have been created and individual records were linked to other records held by the administration. They could now be, as Reed says, ‘accessed and understood by others involved in undertaking business activities’.50

After being evaluated by people like O’Brien and MacMullen they were re-created as a new collection (1D), similar to the Djogdja Documenten being re-created by NEFIS. Prior to the work of these decision makers records from North Borneo and Sarawak would not belong to the same collection. Since some records were also sent to Kuala Lumpur to become part of the National Archives of Malaysia, these too underwent re-creation.

The political situation surrounding these records can also be seen when describing the records in continuum model terms.Records went from being in the possession of a colonial government department to another—for instance from the Colony of North Borneo Office of Police to the Chief Secretary of North Borneo. From here, in North Borneo, O’Brien would determine where records could be moved—either the state government (which would now be Sabah), the federal government in Kuala Lumpur, the Colonial Office in London, or destroyed. Each decision involved a re-creation in the continuum model sense.

The shipment to London can also be considered a further re-creation (1D), as the records changed physical spaces and took on completely new contexts away from their place of origin. It was at Hanslope Park that various collections from

50 Reed, ‘Reading the Records Continuum’, 20.
around the world were joined together into a new group called the Migrated Archives. It was their removal from the initial context that created the Migrated Archives as a separate entity. The discovery of the Migrated Archives during the Mau Mau court case and their movement to The National Archives is one more recreation (1D). Here they were also captured, organized and pluralized by The National Archives (2D, 3D, 4D).

Capture (2D) is the dimension of records management. In this case it took place behind the scenes at The National Archives. This would be the creation of metadata, and bringing the Migrated Archives under the jurisdiction of The National Archives—‘capturing’ them within their system.

The Migrated Archives were organized (3D) by The National Archives in a quite obvious way. Organization is the dimension of the archive; turning records into something larger when they are together. Decisions were made, such as the one that put the entirety of the Migrated Archives into FCO 141. Having them exist as a single archive was an organizational decision made by The National Archives after the records were under their control.

Pluralization (4D) began in April 2012 when the first batch of records was opened to the public. The records could now be used by historians to reevaluate previous histories of the decolonization process. This is why I claim that the continuum model is reliant on pluralization and an open society. The period before pluralization, at Hanslope Park, existed in secrecy. If no trace exists of the records, then this would be an example where the shadow continuum would be applicable.

After pluralization records related to Singapore and Malaysia became of interest to the National Archives of Singapore. Through a project begun in the 1990s, the National Archives of Singapore has been purchasing copies of records related to its colonial past from institutions such as The National Archives in London. When the Migrated Archives were discovered it was decided that these records fit into what the National Archives of Singapore was interested in having. The copies in Singapore were thus re-created, captured, organized and pluralized
(1D, 2D, 3D, 4D) at the National Archives there.\textsuperscript{51}

Furthermore, a new process begins at pluralization (4D). Since the discovery of the Migrated Archives an unknown number of records have been created about them (1D). These include the Cary Report, but also all the records that went in to the creation of the Cary Report that were then captured and organized (2D, 3D). Cary, while writing his report, would have re-created records that helped him in his research (1D). The Cary report has also been pluralized and made accessible (4D). The FCO has also created, captured, organized and pluralized records related to the transfer of the Migrated Archives from the FCO to The National Archives.

Records creation associated with the Migrated Archives therefore pertains to more than just the Migrated Archives alone. The re-creation of the Migrated Archives as a single entity (1D) was a spark that led to the creation of numerous other records that we do not yet know the entire scope of. What was just shown above connects the Migrated Archives to the continuum model. This, however, was only possible since their discovery in 2011. The next section will look for traces before 2011 to see if at any time the shadow continuum may have been at work in the history of the Migrated Archives.

G. The Migrated Archives and the Shadow Continuum

In Chapter II I made it clear that the shadow continuum is only relevant when no trace is left by a record. To see if the shadow continuum is applicable to the Migrated Archives case then we must determine if there were traces of the Migrated Archives available prior to their disclosure. For this the work by Banton is most important. Banton’s work shows that there were records accessible in The National Archives in London prior to the release of the Migrated Archives detailing the extent of colonial-era records that were destroyed. Elkins, meanwhile, commented in her article that evidence of torture during the Kenyan emergency had already existed in The National Archives.

\textsuperscript{51} Kwa Chong Guan and Leong Weng Kee, National Library Board, Singapore (personal communication, 5 March, 2015)
However, it is harder to determine the location of those records that were sent to London in order to not have them land in the hands of the successor governments. We know that they were shipped away from their original location, but specifics after that are harder to gather. The extent of traces of the Migrated Archives in The National Archives is debatable, but it is my belief that what was available prior to 2011 would not be enough to understand the content and context of the Migrated Archives. It was especially unknown just how vast the Migrated Archives would be. Therefore, while at Hanslope Park, the records would be considered under the description of the shadow continuum. No continuum model analysis of these records could have taken place prior to 2011, as there were no sufficient traces to carry out this work. The fact that Banton, an archivist with an expertise in colonial records was unaware of their existence should make this point clear.

For instance, Banton writes of records ‘relating to Kenya [that] are stated as being “on the public record”, but assumed to be either “closed”, “retained” or “missing” until located with the migrated archives’\textsuperscript{52} Until they were known to be part of the Migrated Archives, the references to them in publically accessible archives were not enough to completely contextualize them. Banton’s work illustrates that the idea that records were destroyed or sent to London was known. The extent, and which records met which end, however, was only known within the creating organization and its successor.

Looking at specific mentions makes it clear that, while destruction and hiding were known, traces as defined in Chapter II were inaccessible. In 1958 A.M. Mackintosh, from the Office of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, located in Singapore, wrote to W.I.J. Wallace of the Colonial Office in London about archives that belonged to the Governor-General of the Malayan Union. His letter stated that his office was ‘hard pressed for space in our strong room, the U.K. Commission will have plenty on their hands when they begin to operate, and it would therefore be a great relief to us both, if you would agree to the transfer to London. I am also concerned about the propriety of this Office

\textsuperscript{52} Banton, ‘Destroy? “Migrate”? Conceal?’, 324.
continuing to retain material belonging to the Governor-General’. A later letter from August 1959 informs the Colonial Office that six crates of records have left Singapore bound for London on a Navy boat.\textsuperscript{53}

This letter shows that initially there was a more wide-ranging definition of what documents should be sent back to the Colonial Office. It is not until 1961 that the office writes a memorandum describing which documents should not fall into the hands of successor states. Aside from the aforementioned embarrassment and ethical issues, it also stated ‘there would be little object in handing over documents which would patently be of no value to the successor Government’.\textsuperscript{54}

The records which were sent in August of 1959, are ‘presumably in the migrated archive’ from Hanslope Park according to Banton, though at the time of her writing it could not have been known for sure.\textsuperscript{55} What is known is that further shipments were sent to London of archives relating to Singapore and Malaysia in 1961 and 1964. In 1961 it was decided to send all documents from Government House in Singapore to the Colonial Office in London, but in 1963 David Lee of the Office of the United Kingdom Higher Commissioner writes to the Colonial Office claiming to be pressured into destroying records from 1947-1958 due to space issues. W.E. Musgrove, Chief Register of the Colonial Office responds that he had believed all records should have been sent in 1961 and tells Lee to make arrangements with the Royal Navy to send them by ship to London as soon as possible, which Lee does in January of 1964. All copies of telegrams are ordered to be destroyed ‘by means of shredding (...) packing in suitably weighted crates and dumped at sea at the maximum practicable distance from the coast in current free deep water (...) [or] by fire’.\textsuperscript{56} Men like Musgrove, Lee, Wallace and Mackintosh are similar to O’Brien and MacMullen. They are the people who decided which records will be seen in the future.

The fact that Malaysia and Singapore would experience missing archives was

\textsuperscript{53} The National Archives (TNA): CO 1030/691: Disposal of archives of former Governor-General of the Malayan Union.
\textsuperscript{54} Cary, The Migrated Archives, 1.
\textsuperscript{55} Banton, ‘Destroy? ’Migrate'? Conceal?', 327.
\textsuperscript{56} The National Archives (TNA): CO 1030/1595: Disposal of Singapore Archives.
well known from the time of independence, even if the specifics were not. The work of F.R.J. Verhoeven details the gaps in both countries’ national archives. He makes reference to a clause in Singapore’s National Archives and Records Centre Bill that states that ‘the Director shall demand in writing and take steps for the return of any public records belonging to the Government, that have been illegally removed from official custody, [which] appears to provide a basis for the replevin of historical material abroad’

Actually following through on this proved rather difficult, and Verhoeven notes this and the fact that the more generally accepted way of getting these documents back would be through purchasing, which is the course Singapore took.

The shadow continuum highlights the decisions regarding security and successor state access to information made by officials like O’Brien and MacMullen. It also focuses on the lack of access to the records in the period at Hanslope Park and the culture of secrecy at the FCO. Finally, the Kenyan court case, the Cary Report, and the transfer of records to The National Archives are all made notable as the moments where the records were taken out of the shadows.

In a situation where government openness and the availability of records were not priorities, it is possible to see the flaws in the continuum model that I proposed in Chapter II. The Migrated Archives only became interpretable by the continuum model once they were discovered and pluralization. Without this act no analysis could ever have taken place. The universality of the continuum model hinges on societies and situations where access to information is ensured. In other situations, such as the Migrated Archives prior to 2011, the continuum model is ill-equipped to analyze what is unknown—even when it exists. The model can only be used after the record has become pluralized, thus drawing attention to the fact that existent but unknown records cannot be analyzed through the continuum model.

The shadow continuum is in no way a new model—it is no replacement for the continuum model. It is a descriptive term used to show that the Migrated Archives can be depicted through continuum model dimensions, but that prior to their

57 NL-HaNA, ARA, 2.14.03, inv.nr 1320.
pluralization in 2011 no trace of them was publicly available. The shadow continuum does not, in the end, answer any questions regarding the universal applicability of the continuum model. It does, however, express a unique feature of the record’s history. The shadow continuum contextualizes the unique custodial history of these records.

**Conclusion**

This chapter was meant to put the Migrated Archives in both a historical and archival context. Certain records were chosen to be sent to London and out of public knowledge for a reason. Major historical events covered in the records—the Malayan Emergency and the creation of Malaysia—were discussed. The highly hands-on role of the British in each situation was clear in the records, and could help explain why so many were kept hidden. The decisions made by O’Brien and MacMullen were then re-examined through the concepts of appraisal and selection. The concepts of original order and provenance explored how The National Archives would keep the Migrated Archives as its own collection rather than organize each countries’ documents with others from that country, a decision that succeeds at reflecting the unique history of the records.

This was followed by an attempt to interpret the Migrated Archives using the continuum model. Most actions could still fit into continuum model dimensions, though the period at Hanslope Park left me with a problem that had to be discussed further. While the dimensions of the continuum model were applicable, in that the records were re-created by being sent to Hanslope Park and organized, they did so outside of the public realm. Without evidence of their existence during this period, the shadow continuum needed to be mentioned as a possible supplement.

I postulated that no traces were left behind that would accurately give a clue to the content and context of the Migrated Archives. Allusions to records being destroyed were numerous, and hints that not all was available were there, but nothing could pinpoint the location of the Migrated Archives or what they were. There was no equivalent to the routing slips of NEFIS. Unlike the *Djogdija*
Documenten, in this case, it was unknown that records were removed, since they were created by the British colonial administration. For this reason I found that the shadow continuum would be necessary for a complete interpretation of the Migrated Archives during their period at Hanslope Park. They were still captured and organized (2D, 3D), but sufficient traces of this period were not available.

The Migrated Archives make for a good example of what I already outlined as the major problems with the continuum model. Mainly that it is dependent on pluralization and a culture of openness and access. Without these the continuum model cannot be used in any analysis because it would be impossible to know of these records. By saying that the Migrated Archives, while at Hanslope Park, functioned within the shadow continuum, I am drawing attention to their unique history and allowing for the continuum model to continue to be used to analyze that history.
Chapter VII: 

Conclusion

At the start of this dissertation I set out to do the following: to use a literature review of displaced archival collections in order to set a precedent for my case studies in determining the universality of the continuum model and to discover certain qualities of various categories of displaced records; to introduce my two case studies in a way that would be relevant to understand them in terms of the continuum model; and, finally, to use my cases to test the relevance and universality of the continuum model and the idea of the shadow continuum introduced in Chapter II. This was to be done by analyzing each case using continuum model concepts, particularly the four dimensions. The cases in the literature review, and my two new case studies, were all linked by a period of silences, as per the definition provided by Michel-Rolph Trouillot.

The shadow continuum was created as a way to explain how even in secretly held records, continuum model principles still function. I noticed two major faults in the continuum model that I thought needed investigation. The first is that the universality of the continuum model can only be claimed after the pluralization of formerly displaced records. The second is that the continuum model has a reliance on an open and accessible society and archive. The work of Australian archivist Michael Piggott was part of the development of the objective to test the universality of the continuum model.

I determined that the shadow continuum was contingent on a lack of traces of a record. I defined these traces as ‘publically accessible information that offers enough data to contextualize a missing record, determine its content and existence and to uniquely identify it’. With the shadow continuum and traces identified I moved on to my two case studies.

The Djogdja Documenten is an archive of diverse documents that became one collection as a result of the intervention of the Dutch military. Searching for proof that the Republican government were using the international opium trade to fund their revolution, had communist ties, and were breaking the peace agreement
through insurgency attacks, the Dutch military intelligence service seized records from throughout the Indonesian government. These separate records individually became re-created in the form of the *Djogdja Documenten*. This re-creation was analyzed using the continuum model, as were the capture and organization of the records by the Dutch military intelligence agency, NEFIS.

Detailing the diplomatic processes that occurred while the records were in the Netherlands that led to the shipment of the original *Djogdja Documenten* to the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta helped map further dimensions on the continuum model. Being sent to ANRI was a subsequent re-creation that led to re-capture, re-organization and re-pluralization. All background information was chosen for its usefulness in using the continuum model to analyze the records.

The existence of archival traces is essential to the idea of the shadow continuum. In the case of the *Djogdja Documenten* such traces exist in the form of NEFIS-created routing slips, which inform the reader of what was in the individual record even when the latter cannot be viewed. The routing slips make it unnecessary to implement the concept of the shadow continuum in relation to the *Djogdja Documenten*.

The second case study, the Migrated Archives from Singapore and Malaysia also included an introductory chapter with a literature review and a description of the initial creation and contents of the records. Important in describing the Migrated Archives was the culture of secrecy at both the Colonial Office and its successor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which led to their creation. This was especially relevant regarding the British role in the Malayan Emergency and the creation of Malaysia.

The decisions made by two men, O’Brien and MacMullan, played a key role in describing the Migrated Archives. These two men determined which records would be destroyed, sent to Kuala Lumpur or sent to London from Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah). Other British officials made similar choices in Malaya and Singapore. Their choices directly determined which records would become part of the Migrated Archives, which like the *Djogdja Documenten* were also diverse records that became one collection later.
Understanding the decisions made is beneficial when placing the Migrated Archives in continuum model terms. However, the flaws that I had noticed in the continuum model were glaringly noticeable in the case of the Migrated Archives. Any analysis that I could do of the Migrated Archives through the continuum model was only possible because of the discovery of the records in the midst of writing my dissertation. The United Kingdom, an open and democratic society, still has situations where openness is limited, as the Migrated Archives show. This all strengthened by conclusion that the universality of the continuum model is dependent on pluralization, openness and access. Thus, I determined that in the case of the Migrated Archives the shadow continuum is relevant to its continuum model interpretation.

Relevance

Michael Piggott’s call for testing the universality of the continuum model was one impetus for the direction this dissertation took, and I hope that my work can play a part in increasing reviews of the continuum model. To ensure that theory and practice regarding archives are based on scientific principles that have been critically tested, further work must follow.

The universality of the records continuum model needs further discussion and scientific testing. My research was meant to solve problems within the continuum model through the implementation of the shadow continuum. Ultimately, however, the shadow continuum does not prove nor disprove the universality of the continuum. It only draw attention to, and attempts to fix, the two interconnected flaws in the continuum model I noted. There are still tests to be done, but it could be the case that the universality of the continuum model stands up in any case when it is complemented by something like the shadow continuum or another, as yet unidentified, new way of viewing the model in cases that offer difficulty when attempting to interpret them with the continuum model.

As I noted in the introduction, Piggott gives no criteria for what constitutes a
test of the continuum model—only that they have not yet been done. The outcome of this is that this dissertation may not have been what Piggott envisioned, nor may it be the best test of the continuum model. The fact that it only uses two case studies may seem like a small sample size, but it only takes discovering one example disproving the universality of the continuum model to end the idea that it is time and culture independent.

Tests on the continuum model need to look outside traditional, western-style records management, as suggested by Piggott. Though this dissertation studied Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, it was still concerned with records created under the influence of European colonialism. It says nothing about pre-colonial records, or records created in other circumstances. There are still questions left regarding the way oral records fit into the continuum model, or records created by a state like North Korea. This dissertation is also solely focused on government records, while the continuum model is meant for private and corporate records as well. Records that are created with the pre-existing decision to destroy them are another type of record that could still be tested against the continuum model.

The final outcome, however, may be the same as how Caroline Williams concludes her short entry on the continuum in her book Managing Archives: Foundations, Principles and Practice:

‘It would, I think, be a mistake to try rigidly to relate the theory [of the records continuum] to practice, but much more useful to allow it to insinuate itself into your consciousness and enhance your understanding of records and archives and the actions that are performed around them’.1

If we remove the concept of universality from the continuum model, and instead view it as something relevant to modern recordkeeping, then tests become unnecessary. Perhaps the continuum model would also benefit from archivists and

archival scholars reimagining its role in archival science. This involves determining whether it is a model of a shift in records management, or a tool for understanding records themselves. If the model is seen as merely theoretical, something worth striving to attain, that is different from using it to explore the nature of records. The model has its use in analyzing the moments acted upon a record after its initial creation, but the fact that pluralization is a foregone conclusion needs to be taken into account.

If the current reality stays the same, however, then a common test for determining the usefulness of the continuum model would be useful. My process of going through each pivotal action enacted upon the record and comparing it to the various dimensions was the most useful that I could imagine. The dimensions are such a central element to the continuum model that it made the most sense to focus my test around linking moments and actions to the dimensions.

As for the shadow continuum, I see it as being a worthwhile contribution to archival science. It can seem obvious, the continuum model’s reliance on an open society and pluralization are not often mentioned in continuum theory. The shadow continuum is a reminder of some of the invisible factors at work in records creation and management. The shadow continuum reminds us that records are constantly being re-created. Its purpose is to strengthen the continuum model. Even when we do not see continuum principles at work, or when people intentionally work to limit access to information, the basic four dimensions of the continuum model are still at work. The shadow continuum draws attention to the period prior to pluralization.

What these findings make clear is that the concept of re-creation makes the continuum model an ideal starting point for studying archival cases where the records are removed or “missing” from public knowledge. This ties back to Michelle Caswell’s point that the continuum model would be useful in her work on the Cambodian prison archive, even though she focused on archival silences as her core guiding concept. I see the choice of the continuum model, now with the addition of the shadow continuum, as the best way to see what is happening in these cases.

Each moment—for instance, the seizure by the Dutch military, the repatriation
to ANRI—can be understood through terms and concepts in the continuum model. What started for me as abstract cases without in-depth survey using archival theory, now became embedded in relatable concepts. The continuum model, the shadow continuum, and any future related concepts, can continue to be used as a way to conceptualize and analyze a variety of cases.

**Future Work**

While this dissertation focused on displaced or missing archives through the continuum model, my interest in these archival cases is not limited to this one aspect. I acknowledge multiple potential lenses through which to view missing archives, including through a social and cultural lens. Continued research can still be done on the topic in a variety of ways to help interpret them in archival and non-archival terms. I envision further research being done relating such cases to intelligence and secrecy, oral history, cultural heritage, and collective memory, among other topics.

**Intelligence and Secrecy**

Given the connection to Wikileaks, and that both the *Djogdja Documenten* and Migrated Archives were created as single archives for intelligence and state secret purposes, I would like consider the greater connection of missing archives to what Victor Marchetti and John Marks referred to as ‘the culture of intelligence’. Their work was done in the 1970s, when previously classified information regarding CIA interventions around the world was disclosed, including the level of involvement in rebellions against the central Indonesian state of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy in the late 1950s. Since the disclosure of the recent NSA files, interest in American intelligence—and the roles of its allies—has once again become a topic of discussion in both academic and popular literature. The Migrated Archives fit

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3 Marchetti and Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, 29.
squarely into the same world as hidden CIA records or Wikileaks. Parallels can be drawn on both sides and as we learn more about both Wikileaks and the Migrated Archives further work can be done conceptually linking the two.

The *Djogdja Documenten* still have further research to be done on their post-seizure history. As my case study showed, very little attention has been paid to the *Djogdja Documenten* and its contents, when so much information can still be gleaned from them. There are also still some remaining questions from their period in the Netherlands. For instance, how and why did they get ‘mixed up’ as was claimed by Ambassador Jalink? The Cary Report sheds light on this question as it relates to the Migrated Archives, but for the *Djogdja Documenten* it is still unknown.

There are also still original documents in the NEFIS archive at Nationaal Archief, created in Indonesia. Some of them are non-governmental and thus can be claimed to belong to NEFIS after their seizure, but I believe that in a collection as large as the NEFIS archive there may still be records that could be the property of the Indonesian government—or at the very least are so intertwined with the independence movement in Indonesia that ANRI may be interested in knowing of their existence and having copies. This is a long term project that I wish to pursue in the future.

As far as future work on the Migrated Archives is concerned, at the time of writing the complete archive has not been transferred to The National Archives in London, as highlighted by Ian Cobain of *The Guardian*. I imagine that there will be more work done on that case in the near future. Historians are already reviewing those documents that have been released, and new research will continue. With copies available in Singapore, researchers in Southeast Asia have a location where access can be made closer to home.

**Relation to Archival Theory and the Writing of History**

Having explored these two examples in archival theory terms, there are still questions that linger when I think of their role in society. What are the effects of such archives outside the archival community? How does a lack of access to certain
archives influence history telling and how does that transpose itself into culture, society, and how a group of people identify themselves? These cultural questions are much more theoretical than this scientific study would allow, so I was unable to explore them in this dissertation. However, a further study could include how the history of decolonization is written and re-written by Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean historians.

Missing archives and their relation to the writing of history is another subject that I would like to further research. The existence of the Migrated Archives reminds historians that all research done in the archive is done with a large amount of trust. There is also this trust among the readers of histories written using archival sources. The trust is that ‘we’, as historians, are seeing in an archive that which is important historically. The idea is that the appraisal and selection process would have left those records of continuing value for historical evaluation later. A case like the Migrated Archives erodes this trust. Despite Badger’s attempts to reassure historians, it is the public that must be reassured as well.

Oral History

The field of oral history was not discussed in this dissertation, but missing archives have obvious connections. In sub-Saharan African, where every country felt the effects of colonialism, many national archives had discussions on the amount of missing information. Alistair Tough tells us that ‘[o]ne of the most common outcomes was an oral history programme’.4 This is often seen as a solution of the problem of lost or missing archives and oral history projects have been implemented by the national archives of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

Verhoeven referred to Malaysia in the 1960s as ‘a country which has so many gaps in its archives’, but similarly mentioned the attempt to fill said gaps through ‘tape recordings of interviews with elder persons reminiscing on historical events,

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taken by National Archives personnel. Not only does this mean archivists were learning about oral history, but older Malaysians were being appreciated for their knowledge by performing a task that helps not only the present, but the future. The same is true in Indonesia, where oral history also took an important role as a complement to paper records.

A major oral history program at the Arsip National was undertaken in 1972, shortly after Soemartini was named director, and continued through the 1980s with a goal towards ‘filling in the records and to provide a more complete and more coherent view of the past, grounded in the nation’s sense of itself and its destiny’. A workshop was held at ANRI in 1982 with historians from throughout Indonesia detailing interview projects they were engaging in and the problems that come with oral history. Different projects discussed included Islamic groups and opponents of Sukarno in the 1950s. Most of the workshop, however, centered on documenting the revolution and the National Movement. The interest in oral history is another example of the growing interest in Indonesian identity, with oral history being the place where collective—or national—and individual memories intersect. Oral history, though different from an archive, is another aspect of the vast ‘cultural archive’ from which a community gathers its history. It is also a project that archival institutions generally undertake with the explicit goal of filling in missing information from the archival collection.

Oral history gives a voice to those who might otherwise never have their stories told. The voice then gives power; as now the story is told and retained for future generations. That the Arsip Nasional of the New Order would have been interested in giving a voice to Sukarno’s opponents is no shock. It gives power to them while simultaneously stripping Sukarno of relevance. The emphasis on National Movement was similarly an easy choice. As the defining moment in Indonesian

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5 NL-HaNA, ARA, 2.14.03, inv.nr, 1320
7 IISG, Erkelens archive, 10511.9 Box 2.
history, coupled with the fact that many participants were still alive, made documenting this history a necessity. The oral history project was meant to fill gaps in written sources from the Japanese Occupation to the Revolution era due to chaos, sudden changes, and destroyed sources. The *Arsip Nasional* obviously had archival and historical reasons to be involved in this work, and if taking oral histories from more and more people meant Sukarno’s circle could be less prevalent then the work would also fit into the political atmosphere of the time.

Through these fields of work I would like to continue my research into these cases, and also invite further work by other scholars. Literature on the continuum model will continue, as it is an ongoing work in progress. This dissertation is just one in a long line of work attempting to describe the continuum model and explore its capabilities and limitations. As it evolves and takes on the work of more scholars, the continuum model’s usefulness to archivists, and users, in strengthened.

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Collectie 249 P.J. Koets, nummer toegang 2.21.100, inventarisnummer 56
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Collectie 441 F.R.J. Verhoeven, 1921-1987, nummer toegang 2.21.281.04, inventarisnummer 30
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### Appendix A: Inventory of the Djogdja Documenten

Legend:
- Nationaal Archief inventory number (*inventarisnummer*), Description in Dutch
- NEFIS number; site of seizure
- English description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>NEFIS Document No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
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<td>A Brief van secretaris Indonesische delegatie aan voorzitter van delegatie inzake een rapport; B Rapport inzake de operationele aktiviteiten van het Nederlandse leger; C Rapport inzake de operationele aktiviteiten van het Nederlandse leger.</td>
<td>5223</td>
<td>Archief Roem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6540</td>
<td>Stukken betreffende door de Republiek naar het buitenland gezonden TNI officieren.</td>
<td>5230</td>
<td>Onbekend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6541</td>
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<td>Archief Agoes Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6543</td>
<td>Afschrift brief van dr Leimena aan Merle Cochran inzake consequenties bij afbreken van de onderhandelingen.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6545</td>
<td>Brief van Hamengko Boewono aan Hatta inzake de vorming en samenstelling van het bestuur voor de Daerah Soerakarta.</td>
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</table>
Letter of Hamengko Boewono to Hatta regarding the formation and composition of the board for the Daerah Soerakarta.

6546, Afschrift brief van A.K. Pringgodigdo aan F. Scott, lid CGD.6-12-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5236; vindplaats: Koffer Rep. delegatie te Djocja
Transcript of letter from A.K. Pringgodigdo to F. Scott, member CGO.

6547, Brief van de Democratische Studentenorganisatie “Pericles” aan mr Ali Sastroamidjojo via L.N. Palar.1-3-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5237; vindplaats: Archief Ali Sastroamidjojo
Letter from the Democratic Student Organization "Pericles" to Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo via L.N. Palar.

6548, A Verhandeling over de status van de Republik Indonesia in het internationale recht van Ali Sastroamidjojo en Robert Delson; B Brief van A. Sastroamidjojo aan R. Delson; C Brief van A. Sastroamidjojo aan M. en R. Delson.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5238; vindplaats: Archief Ali Sastroamidjojo
A: Treatise on the status of the Republic of Indonesia in international law by Ali Sastromidjojo and Robert Delson; B: Letter from A. Sastroamidjojo to R. Delson; C: Letter from A. Sastroamidjojo to M. and R. Delson.

6549, Stukken betreffende de Catalina R.I. 006 P.B.Y, met inhoudsopgave.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5239; vindplaats: onbekend
Documents related to the Catalina R.I. 006 P.B.Y, with table of contents.

6550, Brochure van het Ministerie van Welvaart houdende een kort overzicht van de economische ontwikkelingen in de Republik Indonesia.6-9-1947
NEFIS documentnr.: 5240; vindplaats: Huiszoeking Soedjono

6551, Notulen van de ledenvergadering van de Indonesische Delegatie te Terban Taman, met inhoudsopgave.1-8-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5241; vindplaats: Archief Ali Sastroamidjojo
Minutes of the meeting of the Indonesian Delegation at Terban Taman, with table of contents.

6552, Brief van T.K. Critchley, voorzitter CGD aan Mr. Moh. Roem inzake tegenwerking van de TNI met betrekking tot de Status Quo Lijn. 30-8-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5242; vindplaats: Koffer Rep. delegatie te Djocja

6553, Fotokopie van het “Fox contract”, met geparafteerde aanvullingen. 3-1-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5243; vindplaats: Archief Hadji Agoes Salim
Photocopy of the “Fox contract, with initialed additions.

6554, Interview met Hatta in de “Nieuwsgier van 10 december 1948 en brief van Hatta aan Pandit Nehru. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5244; vindplaats: Koffer Rep. delegatie te Djocja
Interview with Hatta in the “Nieuwsgier” of 10 December 1948, and letter from Hatta to Pandit Nehru.

6555, Vriendschapsverdrag tussen de Republik Indonesia en het Koninkrijk Egypte. 1947
NEFIS documentnr.: 5245; vindplaats: Archief Hatta
Friendship treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of Egypt.

6556, Beschouwing van Soegyono te Praag inzake de relatie Indonesia USSR. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5246; vindplaats: Archief Roem
Considerations of Soegyono in Prague concerning the relationship between Indonesia and the USSR.

6557, Aantekeningen van november 1948 met betrekking tot de besprekingen tussen Hatta en D.U. Stikker. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5247; vindplaats: Archief Roem
Notes from November 1948 regarding the talks between Hatta and DU Stitcher.

6558, A Fotokopie van paspoort van Soeripno, Republikeins vertegenwoordiger te
Praag; B Brief van de ambassadeur van de USSR aan Soeripno inzake eventuele consulaire betrekkingen tussen de USSR en de Republik.1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5248; vindplaats: onbekend

A: Photocopy of the passport of Soeripno, Republican representative in Prague; B: Letter from the Ambassador of the USSR to Soeripno on possible consular relations between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia.

6559, Persverklaring van dr Leimena inzake de gevolgen ingeval geen overeenstemming met de Nederlanders wordt bereikt.1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5249; vindplaats: Koffer Rep. delegatie te Djocja

Press Statement by Dr. Leimena on the consequences in the event no agreement is reached with the Dutch.

6560, Authentieke afschriften van aanstellingsbesluiten van Soeripno, Haj Rasjidi en Abdulkadir tot gevolmachtigd minister.1947

NEFIS documentnr.: 5250; vindplaats: Archief Soekarno

Authentic copies of the decisions of Soeripno, Haj Rasjidi and Abdulkadir to Minister Plenipotentiary.

6561, Besluit van Soekarno tot oneervol ontslag van Soeripno als gevolmachtigd minister voor de Oost Europese staten.

NEFIS documentnr.: 5251; vindplaats: Archief Soekarno

Decision by Soekarno to dishonorably discharge Soeripno as Minister Plenipotentiary for the East European states.

6562, Verslag van L.N. Palar inzake zijn besprekingen te Parijs met delegatieleiders van de Veiligheidsraad en een beschrijving van de betrekking van de Republiek met de USA, Engeland en de rol van Goedhart bij zijn bezoek aan de Indonesische delegatie te Parijs.20-10-1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5252; vindplaats: Archief Ali Sastoamidjojo


6563, A Rapport van J. Coast inzake zijn werkzaamheden te Siam betreffende het luchtverkeer met Djocja; B Analyse van de partij politiek te Siam.25-6-1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5253; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
A: Report by J. Coast concerning his work in Siam regarding air connections with Djocja; B: Analysis of the party politics in Siam.

6564, Brief van prof. C.P. Wolff Schoemaker aan Soekarno.9-5-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5254; vindplaats: Paleis Soekarno
Letter from Professor C.P. Wolff Schoemaker to Soekarno.

6565, A Brief van de Minister van Defensie aan de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken; B Bekendmaking van het Ministerie van Defensie inzake de opheffing van de TNI Bag. Masjarakat.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5255; vindplaats: Archief Hatta
A: Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; B:

6566, Bedankbrief van M. Jahja aan Pringgodigdo inzake goede ontvangst van de Goodwill missie van de NIT.6-3-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5256; vindplaats: Archief Soekarno
Thank you letter from M. Jahja to Pringgodigdo concerning the reception of the Goodwill mission from the NIT [State of East Indonesia].

6567, Verzoek aan Moh. Roem tot morele en materiële steun aan de strijdgroepen in West Java.
NEFIS documentnr.: 5257; vindplaats: Archief Moh. Roem
Request to Moh. Roem for morale and material support to the fighters in West Java.

6568, A Brief van FDR Wonosarie aan Hatta; B Resolutie FDR inzake erkenning van de Republik Indonesia door de USSR en Oosteuropese staten; C Verzoek van Ministerie van Voorlichting aan Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken om gegevens over bevriende staten ten behoeve van te vervaardigen artikelen.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5258; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
A: Letter from FDR [People’s Democratic Front] Wonosarie to Hatta; B: Resolution of FDR on the recognition of the Republic of Inonesi by the USSR and Eastern European states; C: Request from the Ministry of Information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for information on friendly states for the benefit of articles to be made.

6569, A Telegrammen van Sumitro aan Hatta inzake bericht dat een “Regering in exil” in India gevormd zou worden; B Paspoort van Soekarno; C Paspoort van Nazir
Datuk Pamontjak. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5259; vindplaats: Archief Hatta
A: Telegrams from Sumitro to Hatta concerning news that a “Government in Exile” would be formed in India; B: Passport of Soekarno; C: Passport of Nazir Datuk Pamontjak.

6570, Stukken betreffende opiumsmokkel in de Republiek. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5260; vindplaats: Archief Hatta
Documents related to opium smuggling in the Republic.

6571, A Correspondentie tussen E.T. Lambert van het Britse consulaat-generaal te Batavia en Hadji Agoes Salim; B Brief van A. Salim aan Ch. Eaton, Consul generaal voor Australië te Batavia inzake de Ecafe conferentie te Lapstone. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5261; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
A: Correspondence between E.T. Lambert of the British consulate-general in Batavia and Hadji Agoes Salim; B: Letter from A. Salim to Ch. Eaton, Consul General of Australia in Batavia concerning the Ecafe conference in Lapstone.

6572, Telegram van Soedarsono aan Hatta inzake wapen en munitietransakties. 26-6-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5262; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
Telegram from Soedarsono to Hatta on weapon and munitions transactions.

6573, Telegram van Soedarsono aan Hatta inzake door Nehru aan Birma gevraagde steun voor de Republiek bij Nederlandse militaire aktie. 1-12-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5263; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
Telegram from Soedarsono to Hatta on the Nehru to Burma requested aid for the Republic in the Dutch military action.

6575, Brief van H.A. Salim aan Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van Pakistan inzake aanstelling van Idham als vertegenwoordiger van de Republiek te Karachi. 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5265; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
Letter from H.A. Salim to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan regarding the appointment of Idham as representative of the Republic to Karachi.

6576, Notulen van een vergadering van de Republikeinse delegatie met het
Republikeinse kabinet op 29 maart 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5266; vindplaats: Archief Soekarno
Minutes of a meeting of the Republican delegation with the Republican cabinet on 29 March 1948.

6577, Stukken betreffende de erkenning van de Republiek Indonesia door de USSR, met inhoudsopgave.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5267; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van Buza
Documents related to the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia by the USSR, with table of contents.

6579, A Brief van Soedirman aan Minister van Defensie inzake het standpunt van het Republikeinse leger met betrekking tot het Nederlandse ontwerp nopens de toekomstige status van het Republikeinse leger; B Afschrift “Summary of Intelligence no. 5” van 21 juni 1947; C Kopie van Nederlands defensie schema voor Indonesia.1947 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5269; vindplaats: Archief Hatta
A: Letter from Soedirman to the Minister of Defense concerning the position of the Republican army with relation to the Dutch draft on the future status of the Republican army; B: Transcript “Summary of Intelligence no. 5” from 21 June 1947; C: Copy of Dutch defense scheme for Indonesia.

6580, Correspondentie tussen Zain en Soedarsono.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5270; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
Correspondence between Zain and Soedarsono

6581, Afschrift brief van de vereniging “Nederland Indonesië van oktober 1948.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5271; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa
Copy of letter of the association “Dutch Indonesia” from October 1948

6582, Stukken betreffende schema van het leger van de “Umat Islam”.1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5272; vindplaats: Archief Moh. Roem
Documents regarding the scheme of the army of the “Umat Islam”.

6583, Fotokopie van brief waarin H.A.M. Hulsker en F.A. Weerensteyn verzoeken
opgenomen te worden in het Republikeinse leger (zie ook doc. nrs. 6929 en 6947). 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5273; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van Defensie

Photocopy of the letter where H.A.M. Hulsker and F.A. Weerensteeyn request to be included in the Republican army.

6584, Stukken betreffende de Interim regering. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5274; vindplaats: Archief Hatta

Documents regarding the interim government.

6585, Brief van jhr H.P. Coertzen de Kock aan Soekarno. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5275; vindplaats: Archief Soekarno

Letter from H.P. Coertzen de Kock to Soekarno.

6586, Telegram van Maramis inzake een goud transaktie t.w.v. $ 61.000. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5276; vindplaats: Archief Hatta

Telegram from Maramis on a gold transaction worth $61,000.

6587, Brief van H.A. Salim inzake benoeming Republikeinse vertegenwoordiger op de Ecafe conferentie. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5277; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa

Letter from H.A. Salim concerning naming a Republican representative to the Ecafe conference.

6588, Brochure van Tan Malakka: “Sang Gerilja dan Gerpolek”. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5278; vindplaats: Paoe Kambar

Brochure of Tan Malakka: “Sang Gerilja dan Gerpolek”.

6589, Brief van H.A. Thahir aan Hatta. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5279; vindplaats: Archief Hatta

Letter from H.A. Thahir to Hatta.

6590, A Telegram van Palar aan Hatta inzake de mogelijkheid van een politionele aktie; B Telegram van Palar inzake advies van de USA aan de Republiek om
infiltraties tegen te gaan; C Telegram van Ubani inzake de activiteit van de Indiase regering in verband met een mogelijke politionele aktie. 1948

NEFIS documentnr.: 5280; vindplaats: Archief Hatta

A: Telegram from Palar to Hatta concerning the possibility of a police action; B: Telegram from Palar concerning advice from the USA to the Republic on preventing infiltrations; C: Telegram from Ubani concerning the activities of the Indian government in connection with a potential police action.

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Singapore. 1948

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NEFIS documentnr.: 5739; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van Defensie
Brochure of Mr. A.M. Tamboenan: “Partai Politik dan Parkindo”.

7044, Brief van Miss Ketoet Tantri (‘Surabaia Sue’) aan Amir Sjarifudin inzake Soetomo.
NEFIS documentnr.: 5740; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van Defensie
Letter of Miss Ketoet Tantri (‘Surabaya Sue’) to Amir Sjarifudin concerning Sutomo.

7045, Order van Chef Staf Republikeinse Weermacht aan Hoofd Intendance ministerie van Defensie inzake financiering verschroeide aarde politiek.10-12-1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5741; vindplaats: Archief PID te Djocja
Order of Republican Military Chief of Staff to the Head Intendance of the Ministry of Defense on financing a scorched earth policy.

7046, Circulaire van de partijraad van de Partai Murba inzake afwijzing van de Van Rooijen Roem overeenkomst.8-6-1949
NEFIS documentnr.: 5742; vindplaats: Nefis/CMI informant
Circular of the Partai Murba council on the rejection of the Van Rooijen-Roem agreement.

7057, Boek: “Constitution of the South East Asia League”.25-7-1947
NEFIS documentnr.: 5753; vindplaats: Woning H.A. Salim te Djocja
Book, “Constitution of the South East Asia League”.

7098, Afschrift van een inlichtingenrapport inzake Kudus.
NEFIS documentnr.: 5795; vindplaats: Archief PID te Djocja
Transcript of an information report concerning Kudus.

7108, Rapport inzake de Tan Malaka beweging te Krawang, met aanbiedingsbrief 1946
NEFIS documentnr.: 5805; vindplaats: Archief Rep. Min. van Defensie
Report concerning the movement of Tan Malaka to Krawang, with offer letter.

7109, Stukken betreffende de KNI Moeda 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5806; vindplaats: Archief PAM te Djocja
Documents related to the KNI Moeda.

7111, Brochure: “The Creation and Growth of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia”, met overzicht van gebeurtenissen van 17 augustus 1945 tot 23 juli 1948 1948
NEFIS documentnr.: 5808; vindplaats: Hotel Merdeka te Djocja
Appendix B: Sites of Seizure of the *Djogdja Documenten*

Locations where the documents of the *Djogdja Documenten* were found, according to the NEFIS archive, and number of documents found at each location, is as follows. When various names were used for one location I have listed each variation:

Antara gebouw te Djocja (Antara news agency building in Yogyakarta): 1 document

Arch. Min. v. BuZa en Defensie (Archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense): 1

Arch. Min. v. BuZa en Hatta (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Hatta): 1

Archief A. Sastroamidjojo: 2; Archief Ali Sastroamidjojo (Archive of Ali Sastroamidjojo, Minister of Education and Culture): 4

Archief Agoes Salim: 1; Archief H.A. Salim: 1; Archief Hadji Agoes Salim: 1; Huiszoeking (house search) H.A. Salim: 1; Woning (home) H.A. Salim te Djocja: 1

Archief Hatta (Archive of Mohammad Hatta, Vice President and Prime Minister of Indonesia): 76

Archief Javasche Bank (Archive of the Bank of Java): 1; Java Bank te Djocja: 1

Archief Kepatihan te Djocja (Governor’s office in Yogyakarta): 3

Archief Laoh (Herling Laoh was Minister of Public Works): 1

Archief Maria Ulfah Santoso (head of Prime Minister’s secretariat): 1

Archief Moh. Roem: 3; Archief Roem (Mohammad Roem, member of Indonesian delegation): 3

Archief mr Icksan: 3

Archief Opium en Zout Regie: 1; Opium en Zoutregie Djocja (Opium and Salt Agency): 1

Archief PAM te Djocja: 7

Archief PID te Djocja (Political Intelligence Service): 11


Archief Rep. Deviezeninstituut (Foreign Exchange Institute): 1

Archief Rep. Hooggerechtshof (Supreme Court): 1

Archief Rep. Min. v. Soc. Zaken (Kusnan was Minister of Social Labor): 1; Archief Rep. Min. van Soc. Zaken (Kusnan was Minister of Social Labor): 1

Archief Rep. Min. van BiZa (Soekiman Wirjosandjojo was Minister of Internal Affairs): 1

Archief Rep. Min. van BuZa (Agus Salim was Minister of Foreign Affairs): 46
Archief Rep. Min. van Defensie (Hatta was Minister of Defense): 95
Archief Rep. Min. van Fiacien (A.A. Maramis was Minister of Finance): 1
Archief Rep. Min. van Onderwijs (Ali Sastroamidjojo was Minister of Education): 1
Archief Rep. Min. van Voorl (Ministry of Information): 4
Archief Rep. Min. van Welvaart (Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was Minister of Welfare): 1
Archief Rep. Proc Generaal: 1; Archief Rep. Procureur Generaal: 2; Archief Djaksa Agoeng (Tirtawinata was Attorney General): 1
Archief Rep. Staatssecretarie: 1; Archief Staatssecretariaat: 1; Archief Secr. Negara Djocja: 1; Archief Secretariaat Negara (State Secretariat): 1
Archief Rep. Staatspolitie (State Police): 2
Archief Roeslam Abdoelgani: 1; Huiszoeking (house search) R. Abulgani, Djocja: 2
Archief Soekarno: 9; Paleis Soekarno (Palace of Soekarno): 1
Archiveven Defensie en O/Z Regie (Archives of Ministry of Defense and Opum and Salt Agency): 1
Archiveven PAM en ALRI te Djocja: 1
Bank Negara Djocja (National Bank in Yogyakarta): 1
Djocja: 1; Djocjacarta: 3; Bezetting Djocjacarta: 1; Archief Djocja: 1
Hotel Merdeka Djocja: 1; Hotel Merdeka te Djocja: 4
Huiszoeking (house search) mr Maramis (Minister of Finance): 1
Huiszoeking (house search) Soedjono: 1
Kap. A. Hamrah te Djocja: 1
Mr. Kartanegara: 1
Nefis/CMI informant: 2; Nefis/CMI informant te Djocja: 1
Onbekend (unknown): 11
Paoe Kambar: 1
Secretariaat Djewatan Umum: 1
Sultanaatskantoor Djocja (Sultanate Office in Yogyakarta): 2
TNI kap. Nusjirevan (Indonesia National Army Captain Nusjirevan): 1
Wonogiri (location outside of Yogyakarta): 1
Curriculum Vitae

Michael Karabinos was born in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, USA in 1983. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (Maryland, USA) in 2005 and a Master of Science in Library Science from the Catholic University of America (Washington, DC, USA) in 2009. He was awarded an Asian Communication Resource Centre Fellowship from the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information of Nanyang Technological University (Singapore) in 2013.

Prior to beginning his PhD he was the Map Librarian at the National Geographic Society in Washington, DC, where he managed the Society’s physical and digital map collections.

He has published his work in Archives and Manuscripts, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde, Information and Culture, as well as in the book Colonial Legacy in South East Asia: The Dutch Archives (Stichting Archiefpublicaties).