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Power analysis: a study of participation at the local level in Tanzania
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Citation

Kamanzi, A. (2012). Power analysis: a study of participation at the local level in Tanzania. *Asc Working Paper Series*, (105). Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/19551>

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African Studies Centre
Leiden, The Netherlands

**Power analysis:
A study of participation at the local
level in Tanzania**

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ASC Working Paper 105 / 2012

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Power Analysis: A Study of Participation at the Local Level in Tanzania



*Cover page photograph: Traditional well at Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region
(Photo: Deodatus Buberwa and Sarah Mamboya, November 2010)*

By Paul Rabé & Kamanzi Adalbertus

2012

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) in Tanzania and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in Tanzania for whom this study was done. We appreciate the support from both institutions during the course of the study and the presentation of the findings.

We would also like to acknowledge the research team which did the data collection in this study (Bonamax Mbasia; Deodatus Buberwa; Faustin Kashumba; Judith Namabira; Khalila Ahmed; Sara Mamboya, and; Yusufu Ramadhan. We appreciate their tireless efforts and endurance in the field.

We also acknowledge the technical support which was given to this study by Alberto Gianolli and Anirban Pal from the Institute of Housing and Urban Development Studies (HIS).

In a special way, we acknowledge a thorough review by Professor Jethro Pettit of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). His critical comments led to the scientific improvement of this study.

Foreword

This is a fascinating and well-implemented study of power and participation at the local level in Tanzania, making use of the power cube as an analytical framework. From a methodological perspective, the study shows that the power cube can provide a range of useful angles (power, spaces and levels) from which to view and illuminate the same dynamics, and with which to identify the connections between these dimensions.

The study also reaches beyond the power cube framework in useful ways, drawing on concepts of resistance, power as pervasive and embedded in discourses, the analysis of actors and different forms of citizen action (e.g. individual and collective), and the role of economic action and empowerment as an enabler of citizen participation.

The detailed account of the methodology used and questions posed in interviews and focus groups, together with applications of the power cube concepts and the other concepts and dimensions of power analysis noted above, provide a useful set of tools and guidelines that could be adapted for other studies.

The report also points to ways in which the power cube analysis can be enhanced with other lenses, and to the need to synthesis and analyse findings *across* the dimensions of the cube as well as *within* them. As noted in many of the observations below, there are many lessons about the forms of power to be found under the findings on spaces and levels; lessons about spaces in the sections on power and levels; etc.

This leads me to wonder whether the cube's dimensions serve well as a reporting format, or whether there is a need for more cross-cutting analysis, such as that presented in the conclusion; and more use of related concepts and dimensions to illuminate the dynamics (e.g. resistance, discourse, actor and network analysis, and concepts of agency such as 'power to', 'power with' and 'power within'). At the very least, this challenge of reporting signals the need to address the role of the other dimensions of the cube within each heading, and other dimensions of analysis.

Congratulations to the researchers for an excellent and insightful study, which I hope will inspire others to take up and adapt this approach in other contexts. I would be very interested to hear the reflections of the researchers on the use of the power cube framework, and where they found it helpful, limiting, or in need of adjustment to the issues and context of local power and participation in Tanzania.

By Prof. Jethro Pettit, IDS
10 Feb 2011

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Note on Currency Exchange Rate

The exchange rate applied by this report is: US\$ 1 = Tanzanian shillings (Tsh.) 1,513.00
Source: OANDA.com (March 2011)

Abbreviations

CC	:	City Council
CBO	:	Community-Based Organization
CCM	:	<i>Chama cha Mapinduzi</i> (ruling political party)
CHADEMA	:	<i>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</i> (opposition political party)
CLGF	:	Commonwealth Local Government Forum
CUF	:	Civic United Front (opposition political party)
D-by-D	:	Decentralization by devolution
DC	:	District Council
ED	:	Executive Director (of District or City Council)
FGD	:	Focus group discussion
IDS		Institute for Development Studies, UK
IHS	:	Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, the Netherlands
IRDP	:	Institute of Rural Development Planning, Dodoma
LGA	:	Local Government Authority
LGD	:	Large group discussion
LGRP	:	Local Government Reform Program
MEO	:	Municipal Executive Officer
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organization
O&OD	:	Opportunities and Obstacles for Development
PMO-RALG	:	Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government
REPOA	:	Research on Poverty Alleviation (NGO in Dar es Salaam)
SIDA	:	Swedish International Development Agency
TASAF	:	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TLP	:	Tanzania Labor Party
UDOM	:	University of Dodoma
VEO	:	Village Executive Officer
WDC	:	Ward Development Committee

WEO : Ward Executive Officer

Executive Summary

Introduction

The objective of the present Study was to help uncover the “character of power” in villages and *mitaa* [streets] in Tanzania, specifically as related to decision-making about local development. It examined how power is exercised at the local level, and by whom. In addition, it sought to identify which opportunities are available for people living in poverty to influence decision making, and which obstacles block real participation as well as demands for accountability.

The Study was carried out in a random sample of 15 villages, *mitaa* and “*vitongoji*” (hamlets) across Tanzania, using the “power cube” model of power. This model is a framework for analyzing the levels, spaces and forms of power, as well as the interrelationship between these three dimensions. Respondents included village leaders and local business people (two traditionally influential groups), as well as women, youth, small farmers and casual laborers (representing traditionally less influential groups).

Spaces of Participation

Village meetings are the most common type of forum where citizens meet with local officials. However, ordinary respondents (i.e. those who are not leaders) appear to be skeptical about the participatory nature of these meetings. Most decisions about local development tend to be made by councilors and Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), Village Executive Officers (VEOs) and Village Chairpersons.

In all villages and *mitaa* surveyed, there is a large gap between leaders and other respondents when it comes to interpretations of successful “participation”. Leaders conceive of successful participation as getting people to attend meetings (and, implicitly, getting them to accept the decisions they have made). Other respondents, on the whole, question their ability to genuinely influence local plans.

Most respondents tend to participate primarily in non-interactive ways. The way in which decisions are made about local development has not changed over the past five years, though there seems to be more awareness among local populations of development projects.

Forms of Power

Official forums, and in particular village meetings (as the primary locus of visible power), are generally perceived by ordinary respondents as the channel through which leaders *inform* them of the decisions they (i.e. leaders) have taken; they do not consider them so much as forums where they can actually *influence* decisions.

Ordinary villagers claim to have relatively few alternative, informal or “hidden” forms of power of their own to counter the visible and hidden instruments of power of local leaders and officials. The most important—and common—acknowledged hidden power forms wielded by

ordinary villagers is petty corruption, which seems to grease the wheels of many local transactions.

Most respondents do not demand to participate as they do not see opportunities to get involved, and as they expect their leaders to take the initiative. Another reason people do not demand to participate is out of fear for the repercussions of “demanding too much”.

There appears to be little evidence of “false consciousness” among non-leader respondents, i.e. most ordinary villagers do not believe local leaders have a natural right to their positions. Therefore, the ability of leaders’ to “shock and awe” villagers with invisible power would seem to be limited. However, most respondents do feel that leaders are “advantaged” relative to themselves because in their positions they can capture small bribes and have access to other small benefits. Economic hardships are the main reason why ordinary villagers feel disadvantaged, in general, and when compared to their leaders.

Levels of Decision Making

Most respondents (both leaders and non-leaders) feel that development in their villages is most strongly influenced by leaders at the local (village and district) level. The influence of the local level on people’s lives seems to have increased during the past five years.

There is evidence to suggest that many villagers are taking matters into their own hands, rather than (solely) organizing through collective action, when they really need to obtain services or resources. This form of “self-development” adds another layer to the concept of the “local level” in the third dimension of the power cube, as (informal) self-development needs to be distinguished from the “formal” local level, as represented by local leaders and officialdom. Self-development might also be construed as a form of “hidden power” possessed by ordinary villagers, even though it arises from these villagers’ frustrations with their lack of access to alternative mechanisms to wield influence and participate in local decision-making.

Conclusion

The results of the Study confirm some of the familiar conclusions about participation in the existing literature on development and participation in Tanzania. Other findings are newer and perhaps more surprising. Among the familiar findings is the fact that, first, there is a long tradition of centralized planning in Tanzania; this tradition is still reflected—to varying degrees—in the current practice of local development planning, which is still quite “top down” in orientation. Second, the current practice of participation at local level is of a different kind than the one promoted by many development organizations. It emphasizes citizens’ obligation to contribute to their country’s development but not in actual decision-making. And third, participation—when it does occur in local development—is often accompanied by patronage and lack of transparency.

The Study exposed six “new” findings. First, no significant relationship could be found between council performance (as determined by overall council performance and per capita budget allocations for health and primary education) and the level and quality of public participation in the villages and *mitaa* surveyed. Second, there is a large gap in perceptions of participation between leaders and ordinary respondents: leaders are much more convinced than their constituents that village meetings are open, decision-making forums where ordinary villagers can have their say. Other respondents are much more skeptical.

Third, for many respondents economic activities, such as self-help groups centered around income generation activities, are often a stepping stone for social and political empowerment. Fourth, most villagers acknowledge that they need to engage in bribery or “gift giving” to local leaders and officials in order to get almost anything done, from demanding small favors to circumventing the local bureaucracy and “solving problems”. Fifth, the Study uncovered both formal and informal accountability structures at village level. The success of both types of mechanisms to ensure accountability depends on local leadership and the degree to which citizens, civil society and opposition party members are willing to put pressure on local leaders. Finally, despite the many difficulties associated with genuine participation, there are examples of “success stories” in several of the villages included in the Study, where the most historically vulnerable villagers (women, youth and small farmers) are feeling more empowered, mainly as a result of good individual leadership and collective organization (whether in formal or “informal” structures).

Recommendations

The Study includes three sets of recommendations. First, it cites respondents’ own priorities for promoting greater participation in their villages and *mitaa*, which include the need to achieve greater transparency in decision-making regarding local development and the need for citizens to achieve better access to information. Second, the Study Team’s own proposals to improve transparency and strengthen participation include recommendations on increasing citizen access to local budget information; reducing opportunities for corruption and patronage based politics; reducing the scope for partisan politics; helping women to break down the cultural barriers to greater participation; and increasing options for participation in local forums through anonymous channels. And third, the Study Team proposes modifications and additions to the power cube model of analyzing power, in order to improve the effectiveness of this model as a framework for the study of power relations at local level in Tanzania.

1 Introduction

This document represents the final report of the “Study of Participation at Local Level in Tanzania”, as commissioned jointly by PMO-RALG and the Swedish Embassy in Tanzania, and as carried out by a team contracted by the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS).

The study aims to contribute to the development of the Local Government Reform Program in Tanzania, which is led by PMO-RALG, in two ways:

1. By analyzing the ability of people living in poverty in Tanzania to participate in decision-making processes, influence decisions and demand accountability at the local level;
2. By helping to uncover the character of power relations at local level, through the application of the “power cube” model of power, and in so doing, identifying opportunities available to people living in poverty to influence decision making, and identifying those obstacles that block real participation.

1.1 Understanding the “Character” of Local Power Relations

The purpose of the assignment was to create a better understanding of how power is exercised at the local level and which opportunities are available for people living in poverty to influence decision making, and which obstacles block real participation as well as demands for accountability from decision-making. The analysis is linked to the objectives and implementation of the Local Government Reform Program, which evidence suggests has contributed to increased participation at a quantitative but perhaps not qualitative level.

The underlying assumption of the Study is that power relations at local level in Tanzania (as well as possibly at national level and at supra-national level) have a profound effect on the ability of the poor to engage in successful participation and make their voices heard. For this reason, a thorough understanding of the power dynamics affecting the target group is necessary to underpin further development and policy reform.

The Study provides a deeper understanding of the social, economic and political power structures and power relations in Tanzania, through the application of the “power cube” model of power to the study of participation in a sample of 12 villages and 3 mitaa nationwide in Tanzania, using participatory methods of research. The “power cube” is a framework for analyzing the levels, spaces and forms of power, and their interrelationship. It provides a useful approach to explore various aspects of power and how they interact with each other by focusing on actors, relationships, forces, arena and possibilities for change.

1.2 Outline of the Report

The Report is divided into the following main sections:

- Section 2 describes the methodology of the Study, including the survey instruments, target respondents, assumptions, circumstances and limitations.

- Section 3 provides an overview of the sampling and random selection criteria applied to obtain the councils and villages and mitaa included in the Study.
- Section 4 describes the “power cube” approach to power, which is the theoretical framework for the Study, and identifies how the power cube dimensions have been conceptualized through the survey instruments.
- Sections 5, 6 and 7 summarize the findings of the Study using the conceptualizations of power described in section 4. Results of individual interviews are described first to present an overview of findings about the character of power at local level. These findings are then triangulated with the results of the focus group discussions (FGDs) and large group discussions (LGDs).
- The conclusion of the report (section 8) identifies the main results of the Study that are echoed in the development literature on participation in Tanzania. In addition, it presents results that can be characterized as “new” findings, i.e. outcomes that are less widely known and (thus far) not adequately covered in the literature.
- Section 9 provides the main recommendations of the report. These include respondents’ own recommendations for improving participation and accountability in their villages and mitaa, as well as the Study Team’s own recommendations on the same themes. Finally, the report assesses the merits and effectiveness of the power cube as a framework for an analysis of power relations.
- Appendices 1 through 4 contain the questionnaires and survey instruments used to guide the individual interviews, focus group discussions and large group discussions in Phases 1 and 2 of the Study (overview phase and in-depth phase). Appendix 5 provides an illustration of local-level decision making structures.

2 Methodological Approach

2.1 Study Phases and Total Respondents

The Study was carried out in two phases: an overview phase (Phase 1) took place from 4 October to 19 November 2010, and an in-depth phase (Phase 2) was undertaken from 22 to 26 November 2010.

- Phase 1 aimed to collect information on a wide range of topics related to power and participation at local level, according to each of the power cube dimensions. This phase was undertaken in all 15 survey areas covered by the Study and targeted a total of 720 respondents¹.
- Phase 2 was designed to address some of the perceived gaps remaining from data collected in Phase 1. Four sub-topics were addressed: collective attempts to make demands and influence decision-making; individual strategies (“self-development”); policy recommendations related to villagers’ capacity (or lack thereof) to organize; and policy recommendations related to participation in official structures. Phase 2 was

¹ See Table 1, section 2.3, for more detail on target number of respondents.

undertaken in 3 selected survey areas covered by the Study, which were selected at random. During this phase, the research teams approached 180 of the same respondents already targeted in Phase 1 in an effort to seek more detailed follow-on information related to each of the four sub-topics.

2.2 Study Approach

The methodology of the Study was characterized by two main aspects. First, the research was qualitative in nature. Qualitative tools (individual interviews, focus group discussions, and large group discussions) were used to collect data, and data were primarily qualitative in nature. And second, the research was based on in-depth “portraits” of 15 case study villages/mitaa throughout Tanzania.

Each team of researchers stayed in a data collecting area for a period of no less than six days. This was geared not only towards collecting the necessary qualitative data but also towards gaining a better understanding of local dynamics and the way in which people in each area lived, and in so doing gaining a more nuanced understanding of the data collected.

For the analysis of findings in the present final report (sections 5, 6 and 7), data from individual interviews were compiled in SPSS and complemented with qualitative data from the focus group discussions and large group discussions. Thus, patterns were first identified in the results from individual interviews and subsequently examined further with the qualitative data from the FGDs and LGDs. To illustrate major points in the analysis, the report uses—as much as possible—respondents’ own words. Citations have been edited only in those cases where grammatical corrections were necessary to facilitate comprehension; content of citations has not been modified.

2.3 Survey Instruments

The Research Team utilized three types of survey instruments to gather data in each village or mtaa in Phases 1 and 2: individual interviews, focus group discussions, and large group discussions (see Appendices for the survey questionnaires).

Table 1 shows the total number of respondents per village or mtaa in both phases of the Study, along with the target number of respondents for each instrument².

² Notes regarding total number of respondents: 1) The total is an estimate based on the target number of respondents for FGDs and LGDs; the actual figure might be slightly higher or lower than this total, depending on attendance of FGDs and LGDs; 2) Phase 2 respondents were the same individuals approached in Phase 1, therefore the Phase 2 total does not represent *additional* respondents.

Survey instrument	Target no. of respondents (per village/mtaa)	Target no. of respondents (all villages/mitaa)
Individual interviews	Phase 1: 8	Phase 1: 120
	Phase 2: 10	Phase 2: 30
Focus group discussion	Phase 1: 40 (4 FGDs gathering 10 respondents each)	Phase 1: 600
	Phase 2: 50 (5 FGDs gathering 10 respondents each)	Phase 2: 150
Large group discussion	Phase 1: 48 (all respondents from the FGDs and interviews)	Phase 1: 720
	Phase 2: 58 (all respondents from the FGDs and interviews)	Phase 2: 180
Total	Phase 1: 48	Phase 1: 720
	Phase 2: 58	Phase 2: 180

Table 1: Number of respondents per survey instrument

2.3.1 Individual Interviews

In each village or mtaa, the researchers started by spending one day interviewing respondents individually. The total number of individual interviews per village was 8 (two researchers conducting 4 interviews each). The individual interviews enabled the Research Team to obtain an overview of issues of decision-making, participation, and “power” in each study area.

Each individual interview lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours, depending on the propensity of the respondents to talk. There were five target groups for the individual interviewees: local leaders, women, youth, small farmers (in rural areas) and casual laborers, in urban areas (see next section on target respondents for more detail). In Phase 2 an additional target group included local business people. Two respondents from each category were approached for the individual interviews. In each village/mtaa, the two local leaders were the VEO and the Village Chairman. The researchers located the other interviewees through “snowball sampling”³, by using the village population (and not the VEO) as reference persons. The individual interviewees were people considered to be “key informants” in their communities, i.e. knowledgeable people who know their village or mtaa well, and who are not shy or afraid to talk.

A total of 120 individuals were interviewed in Phase 1, and another 30 interviewees were covered in Phase 2. Figure 1 identifies the total number of individual interviewees per respondent category in Phases 1 and 2. Village leaders made up the single largest response category (at 25 percent). Thirty percent of all interviewees were from “more influential” categories (village leaders and local business people). The remainder were from “less influential” categories, comprising women, youth, casual laborers (in urban areas and hamlets or “vitongoji”), and small farmers (in the villages).

³ Snowball sampling is a technique for identifying respondents whereby researchers locate one person (known as the “reference person”) and then ask that person for the names of other (similar) people that he or she knows who possess the characteristics of the sub-group required.

Women comprised 50 percent of all respondents in each of the sub-categories, including leaders, business people, youth, small farmers and casual laborers, except for the sub-category of “women” (where women comprised 100 percent of respondents).




Figure 1: Number of individual interviewees per category, Phases 1 and 2
(Figure shows N and %; N = 126: 120 respondents + 6 business people in Phase 2 only)

Figure 2 provides an overview of the total number of individual interviewees in rural areas (villages) and urban areas (mitaa and hamlets or “vitongoji”)⁴. Seventy percent of interviewees were from rural areas and 30 percent from urban areas or hamlets.




Figure 2: Overview of rural/urban status of individual interviewees, Phases 1 and 2
(Figure shows N and %; N = 126: 120 respondents + 6 business people in Phase 2 only)

2.3.2 Focus Group Discussions

⁴ The number of interviewees from “urban” areas includes respondents from the newly classified hamlet of Kichangare (Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

The objective of the focus group discussions was to provide an opportunity to a select group of respondents with shared characteristics to discuss in depth their perceptions of decision-making, participation, and their influence at local level. Each FGD lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours, and brought together a small group of people (no more than 10 individuals in each group), in order to ensure that all respondents had a chance to speak. The FGDs served to “triangulate” (verify) selected data obtained during the individual interviews; the purpose of this was to assess whether data results differed according to the format of questioning. The questionnaires for the FGDs contained a number of identical questions from the individual interviews—to enable triangulation—as well as additional, more detailed follow-up questions.

The categories of respondents for the FGDs were the same as for the interviews (village leaders, women, youth, small farmers, casual laborers and business people), although the actual respondents were different individuals. The VEOs mobilized respondents for each discussion, according to the criteria communicated to them by the researchers. Two researchers assisted with each FGD: one researcher was the facilitator while the other was the note taker. As best as possible, the FGDs were held in an enclosed space away from the general public, so as to prevent curious passers-by from listening to—and joining in—the discussion. This was to provide respondents with a feeling of privacy (at least within their own group) and to encourage them to express their opinions.

A total of 600 respondents participated in FGDs in Phase 1 and another 150 respondents took part in FGDs during the in-depth phase (Phase 2) of the Study. The Survey Team ensured that half of all participants of FGDs were women, except for the “women’s” FGDs (where all respondents were women).

2.3.3 Large Group Discussions

Large group discussions were held on the final (fourth) day of the Survey in each village or mtaa. The researchers invited all respondents from the individual interviews and FGDs to gather in a public place; there, the researchers summarized the main findings of the interviews and the FGDs (without linking the identities of any individuals to opinions expressed) and sought their comment and clarification on the results.

The LGDs served at least two purposes. First, they had a ceremonial function: refreshments, were served (as an added incentive to ensure that most respondents attend the meeting), and researchers provided feedback to the village or mtaa, as a courtesy to the local population and leadership after spending four days in their midst⁵. At the same time, the LGDs were an occasion for a farewell gesture before the researchers left the area. The second purpose of the LGD was as another way to triangulate and verify the research findings from the individual interviews and FGDs, and to clarify any outstanding issues. In practice, the “group dynamic” inherent in the LGDs helped to spur on discussion and produce unexpected results: a value-added of the LGDs was to bring together groups of people (from the five categories of respondents) who might otherwise have little occasion to meet together and discuss issues related to local development.

The researchers used a shortened version of the list of questions for the FGDs as a basis for the large group discussions. Only core questions and findings were raised, unless

⁵ The courtesy gesture was a response to a commonly heard complaint about survey exercises: local populations frequently mention that they resent the fact that survey teams rarely “report back” to them about the results of local data collection exercises.

respondents wanted to go over the results of some of the additional questions discussed. The researchers presented the findings of the core questions on flip chart paper, which they read out aloud to the assembled audience.

All respondents (individual interviewees and participants from the FGDs) were invited to attend the LGD in each village/mtaa.

2.4 Target Respondents

In both Phases 1 and 2, the Study targeted five main categories of respondents: leaders, women, youths, small farmers and casual laborers. In Phase 2 the Study also targeted an additional group, i.e., local business people.

The rationale for the selection of these groups was to achieve a balance of “advantaged” and “less advantaged” respondents. Local leaders and business people are assumed to have a certain degree of influence and status in a community. The four remaining categories (women, youth, small farmers and casual laborers) represent those groups traditionally assumed to have less status and influence, and are assumed to be socially and economically more vulnerable.

The different categories of respondents were defined as follows:

- In the context of the Study, the category of **local leaders** comprised the “local elites” of the villages surveyed, including local officials such as village chairpersons, ten cell leaders and/or vitongoji (sub-village) leaders, VEOs, mtaa chairpersons and councilors. While the VEO and village chairperson participated in the interviews and Large Group Discussions (LGDs), the other types of leaders participated in the FGD for leaders and the LGDs. In addition to officials, the category of “local leaders” also included some local religious and civil society leaders.
- The category of **local business people** includes those who enjoy esteem in the community as a result of their owning a prominent local business (of whatever kind) and earning more money than the average citizen.
- **Women respondents** included ordinary village women from a mix of social classes, age groups, employment status, and religions, reflecting the diversity of female citizens present in each surveyed village or mtaa. Women in this category could not be classified as “local leaders” or as “youth” (i.e. they were above the age of 25).
- **Youth** comprised unmarried young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25. The lower age limit of 18 was established so as to include only young people who are eligible to officially participate in civic life, as indicated by the ability to vote (the minimum voting age in Tanzania is 18). The unmarried status represents a concession to local social conventions: traditionally, young people are considered “youths” in Tanzanian culture if they are not yet married. Conversely, they are considered as adults (and thus become socially more important and less marginalized) when they become married.
- **Small farmers** were defined as smallholders, engaging in subsistence farming or small-scale market trading for their agricultural products. The emphasis on *smallholders* was to ensure that respondents included those considered poor and

traditionally without influence, as opposed to larger (wealthier and more influential) farmers.

- **Casual laborers** comprise those workers doing odd jobs in the urban informal economy. As in the case of small farmers, the emphasis on *casual* laborers is to ensure that respondents include those considered poor and traditionally without influence, as opposed to more established (wealthier and more influential) laborers in the informal or formal economies.

2.5 Assumptions, Circumstances and Limitations

The Study was guided and shaped by several assumptions and limitations, summarized below. These need to be considered when interpreting the findings described in this report.

- **Focus on the village/mtaa level:** The principal focus of the Study was at the level of the village (in rural areas) and mtaa (in urban areas), as these represent the lowest units of government in Tanzania. The village/mtaa level is considered to be the layer of government closest to the people. The Study paid special attention to the workings of the village meeting, which is a consultation and information forum that is, in principle, the main officially sanctioned venue for citizen participation in decision-making related to local development. The text boxes below explain, in brief, the system of local governance in Tanzania as it applies to this Study, as well as the purpose of village meetings.

Local Government in Tanzania

Source: Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Tanzania Country Profile

Local government in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar is divided into rural and urban authorities. On the mainland, urban authorities comprise city, municipal and town councils. In rural areas there are two levels of authority: district councils and village council and township authorities. In urban areas the mtaa is the smallest unit within the ward of an urban authority⁶. In rural areas, the smallest units of a village are known as vitongoji (also known as sub-villages or hamlets). In mainland Tanzania there are 22 urban councils and 106 district councils, four cities, 10,364 registered villages, 1,795 mitaa, and 51,000 vitongoji.

District and urban councils coordinate the activities of village council and township authorities, which are accountable to the district for all revenues received for day-to-day administration. The village and township councils have responsibility for formulating plans for their areas, and in most cases securing district approval. Village councils have between 15 and 25 members, made up of a Chairperson elected by the village assembly, all chairpersons of the vitongoji within its area, and other members elected by the village assembly. The term of office for councilors is five years. The secretary to the village council is the village/mtaa executive officer (VEO). Women must comprise at least 25 percent of council members.

Below the level of the local authorities there are a number of democratic bodies to debate local development needs. In the rural system the vitongoji are composed of elected chairpersons who appoint a secretary and three further members, all of whom serve on an advisory committee. In urban areas the recently established mtaa committees, unlike those of the vitongoji, have a fully elected membership comprising a chairperson, six members and an executive officer. These committees provide a grassroots link to the ward structure, and mobilize participation in local development.

The Role of Village Meetings

⁶ The plural form of "mtaa" is "mitaa".

Local authorities are now required to promote and ensure democratic participation. In principle, one of the main ways in which this occurs is through village meetings, which fulfill a critical role as consultation and information forums for citizens. The process begins at the level of the vitongoji or sub-villages, where people present their needs and priorities. At the village level the sub-village needs are presented in the village development committee and development projects are identified, to be presented at the village meeting. Village development proposals and priorities take the form of suggestions, which are then presented at the Ward Development Committee (WDC).

District councils have the formal powers to decide which projects are funded by public funds in a village. The assumption is that as the councilors—who are the major stakeholders at the council—are the representatives of the people, then it means that the “people” have participated. District councils have the capacity to look at the proposed development projects comprehensively, within the framework of available funds and the general policy and priorities of the state, available human resource capacities, their access to the donors, and development-oriented civil society organizations. Once funds are allocated to a village project, the sub-village and the village/mtaa chairpersons, in conjunction with the VEO, see to it that the funds allocated to the projects are dispersed according to plan.

- **Local development as a reference point:** The activity of planning for local development projects at the level of the village and mtaa—both through formal channels as well as informal structures—was used as the focal point and reference for the study of decentralization and participation. It can be argued that the activity of planning for development at local level lies at the very heart of good governance for villagers anywhere. It is arguably also one of the most essential and universal outputs of civic participation. The Study has sought to identify and analyze planning initiatives for development projects at the local level that encompass a range of both *formal* (officially sanctioned) as well as *informal* (villagers’ own initiative) activities aimed at making available concrete improvements in the lives of citizens, such as water supply projects, roads, and health interventions. These activities take place in both formal as well as informal committees and forums, in forums organized by official village structures as well as forums initiated by villagers themselves. Furthermore, as a result of the campaign for national elections in Tanzania (see next point), the process of planning for local development projects offered a more neutral activity to base questions around than the concept of political participation, which could have been another potential reference point for any study of participation and good governance.
- **National elections:** The research period for the present study coincided with the political campaign for the 2010 Tanzanian national elections, which took place on 31 October 2010. The campaign impacted on the research in several ways. Firstly, it resulted in a general politicization of discussions about development and participation, and thus limited the ability of the study to investigate the concept of *political* participation and empowerment in a neutral and effective manner. For this reason, as explained in the point above, it was decided to limit the focus of the research to the more neutral and technical sounding concept of *development planning* (both through formal and informal channels). Second, the electoral campaign limited the ability of the study to include and deal with political issues (such as the selection of regions dominated by the dominant or opposition political parties) as part of its sampling criteria.
- **Acknowledging limited representativeness:** Tanzania has a total population of approximately 40 million and is comprised of more than 12,000 villages, over 3,000 mitaa, and over 340 wards. The present study is limited in scope: it has been set up to target approximately 900 respondents in 12 villages and 3 mitaa nationwide. As a

result, the study does not seek to achieve “representativeness” at the national level for its findings. Rather, it aims to provide a broad qualitative assessment of the nature of power relations at local level in a range of different villages/mitaa nationwide. It is hoped that the results may be a basis for further exploration in larger surveys in the future. Within these limitations, however, the study aims to capture as much of the diverse conditions characterizing the populations of villages and mitaa in Tanzania as possible.

- **Snapshot of power relations:** The findings described in this report represent only a snapshot in time of the character of power relations in the Tanzanian villages and mitaa covered by the Study. No previous baseline study of local power dynamics could be used as a historical reference point, therefore, the Study cannot claim to accurately measure any changes *over time* in power and participation at local level. In addition, several of the items in the questionnaires (see Appendices) asked respondents to compare their current situation with that of five years ago⁷. The purpose of these comparative questions was to understand citizens’ perceptions of the *direction* of change in their villages and mitaa.
- **Over-sampling and under-sampling:** The categories of respondents selected may not accurately represent the populations of villages and mitaa sampled. Moreover, certain categories of respondents (particularly local leaders) have been oversampled relative to their proportion of the local population, in order to achieve a balance between presumed “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” groups. Conversely, other respondent categories (i.e. casual laborers) have been under-sampled. In the case of casual laborers, this category was only interviewed in mitaa (not in rural areas); as urban areas represented only one-fifth of the total sample, therefore casual laborers were necessarily a small respondent category.

3 Overview of Councils Included in the Study

The Study was conducted in 11 (rural) villages and 4 “urban” areas (either mitaa or hamlets) throughout Tanzania⁸.

Sampling of villages followed the criterion of central government budget allocations to councils, which in Tanzania is based on the performance of councils in relation to several different aspects of service delivery and human resource capacity. One of the main premises behind the sampling approach was to examine whether there was a relationship between central government budget allocations to councils and the levels and quality of participation in villages and mitaa in these councils. The local government performance criterion was considered important for the selection of the villages because it was assumed that access to

⁷ Five years was determined to be a suitable period in which to assess the direction of change: long enough to be able to assess relevant changes, but not too long so that respondents can still accurately recollect events.

⁸ The Terms of Reference mandated that the Study was to be carried out in 12 (rural) villages and 3 (urban) mitaa throughout Tanzania. But after the random selection of villages and mitaa had taken place, the Study Team discovered—on the ground—that one of the “villages” selected (Kichangare, in Mwanza district council, Kilimanjaro region) was officially no longer declared a village but a hamlet. All “villages” in Mwanza township authority are in the process of transferring from rural to urban status, though this information had not yet been updated at national level at the time of the survey exercise.

better services has an influence on participation: the better the access to services (and the better the quality of services), the higher the participation levels and, conversely, the lower the access to services, the weaker the participation.

To test the relationship between council performance and participation, the councils included in this Study were selected so as to achieve a balanced sample between highly performing, medium-high and weakly performing councils. The relationship between council performance and participation is evaluated in the concluding section of this report (see section 8.2.1).

Region	Rural council	Urban council	Ward	Village	Mtaa Hamlet or	Score ⁹
Kilimanjaro	Mwanga		Mwanga		Kichangare	High
	Moshi		East Old Moshi	Kidia		Medium
Coastal	Mkuranga		Mbezi	Msorwa		Low
Morogoro	Mvomero		Mvomero	Wami Dakawa		Low
Mwanza	Ukerewe		Kagera	Kagera		Low
		Mwanza	Buhongwa		Ng'washi	Low
Mara	Rorya		Bukura	Bubombi		n/a
Singida	Manyoni		Idodyadole	Mbugani		Medium
Tabora	Igunga		Ziba	Iborogero		Low
Mbeya	Kyela		Ikama	Ilopa		High
Iringa	Iringa		Ifunda	Mbitimikali		High
		Njombe	Mjimwema		Mjimwema	Medium
Mtwara	Mtwara		Ziwani	Ding'wida		Medium
		Mtwara-Mikindani	Jangwani		Mchangani	High
Tanga	Pangani		Pangani Mashariki	Pangani Mashariki		High

Table 2: Overview of villages and mitaa in the Study sample for Phase 1

Villages and mitaa in the Study sample for Phase 1 are listed in Table 2 (in the shaded columns), along with the names of their regions and councils. The villages and mitaa selected for the in-depth research period in Phase 2 are listed in Table 3.

Region	Rural council	Urban council	Ward	Village	Mtaa Hamlet or	Score
Kilimanjaro	Mwanga		Mwanga		Kichangare	High
Mwanza	Ukerewe		Kagera	Kagera		Low
Mbeya	Kyela		Ikama	Ilopa		High

Table 3: Overview of villages and mitaa in the Study sample for Phase 2

⁹ "Score" refers to the average of three indicators in the LOGIN Tanzania database: overall council performance, and per capita budget allocations for health and primary education. See Table 4.

For Phase 1 of the Study, councils were selected on the basis of performance data as published in an annual assessment of local government authorities produced by PMO-RALG¹⁰. Subsequently, the sample was also cross-checked with the database of Local Government Information (LOGIN) Tanzania, to ensure that the list of selected councils reflected a range of different performances in three key service areas reported by LOGIN Tanzania, namely: per capita budgets for health and primary education, and overall local government performance. Both data sources indicate that the Study sample of councils selected is diverse, i.e. that the sample comprises a balanced range of council performances in access to services, from weak to strong. For Phase 2 of the Study (the in-depth phase), three councils were chosen that represented a cross-section of councils in the sample, both in terms of rural/urban status as well as local government performance results across three indicators contained in the LOGIN Tanzania database (see Table 4). The three areas were the hamlet of Kichangare (Mwanga council) and the villages of Kagera (Ukerewe council) and Ilopa (Kyela council).

Table 4 illustrates the performance of councils included in the sample with regard to three selected indicators from LOGIN Tanzania pertaining to internal capacities and service delivery (overall performance, per capita budget allocation for health, and per capita budget allocation for primary education).

Council name	Total score ¹¹	Overall performance ¹²	Budget for primary education (Tsh.)	Budget for health (Tsh.)
Pangani	12	81.3%	29,968	18,570
Iringa	12	80.0%	21,019	8,283
Mtwara-Mikindani	9	83.9%	14,579	6,702
Mwanga	9	67.1%	25,000	13,203
Kyela	9	48.4%	22,291	8,211
Mtwara	7	81.9%	11,267	3,308
Moshi	7	76.1%	22,266	3,601
Njombe	6	86.5%	15,696	2,695
Manyoni	6	70.3%	11,617	6,252
Mvomero	5	54.8%	11,751	4,408
Ukerewe	5	61.3%	13,951	4,416
Mwanza	5	70.1%	14,394	5,985
Igunga	4	69.7%	14,423	4,361

¹⁰ See United Republic of Tanzania (2009), Annual Assessment of LGAs for Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures under Local the Government Development Grant System for FY 2009/10 – United Republic of Tanzania, National Synthesis Report, PMO-RALG.

¹¹ “Total score” reflects an average performance across all three indicators. This is calculated by assigning 4 points to the councils in the top range, 2 points to the councils in the middle range, and 1 point to the councils in the bottom range. The points for each council were added up, resulting in 3 categories of councils: above average councils (9 to 12 points), average councils (6 to 7 points), and below average councils (4 to 5 points).

¹² “Overall performance”, as defined by LOGIN Tanzania, reflects the outcome of a performance assessment evaluating council performance based on nine categories: financial management; fiscal capacity; planning and budgeting; transparency and accountability; interaction between higher local governments and lower local governments; human resource development; procurement; project implementation, and council functional process.

Council name	Total score ¹¹	Overall performance ¹²	Budget for primary education (Tsh.)	Budget for health (Tsh.)
Mkuranga	4	65.8%	17,352	6,016
Rorya	n/a	n/a	13,061	2,155

Table 4: Performance levels of councils included in the Study

Source: Local Government Information (LOGIN) Tanzania; www.logintanzania.net

Color codes: Green=high score; Orange=medium score; Red=weak score

Budgets for primary education and health are given in Tanzanian shillings per capita, 2007-8

Color coding of performance results reflects LOGIN Tanzania's assessment, whereby councils are rated either as "clean" (indicated by the green color), "qualified" (in orange color), or "adverse" (in red color), in diminishing order of satisfactory performance. As most councils in the sample scored differently according to the three indicators selected, the Study Team calculated a "total score" to obtain an idea of average total performance per council (for more detail about the calculation employed, see footnote 11).

Figure 3 illustrates the location of the 15 councils included in the Study. Councils selected for Phase 1 only are indicated in red. Councils selected for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 are indicated in green.




Figure 3: Map of Tanzania showing villages and mitaa included in the Study
(Source: UN Cartographic Section, 2005)

4 Measuring Power Using the Power Cube

The Study measured the character of power at local level in Tanzania using the “power cube” approach to analyzing power. This approach considers three dimensions of power: spaces of participation; forms of power; and levels of decision-making. This section describes the three dimensions of power in greater detail and illustrates how they have been conceptualized in the present Study.

4.1 Conceptualizing Spaces of Participation

Spaces of participation represent three potential arenas for participation and action, including closed, invited and claimed spaces; these spaces are not necessarily separate from one another; they are inter-related, and power can move from one to the other and back again.

- Invited spaces are those spaces where there are opportunities for involvement and consultation, usually through “invitation” by various authorities, including governments, supra-national agencies or non-governmental organizations. Invited spaces may be regularized, that is they are institutionalized and ongoing, such as those found in various legally constituted participatory forums, or more transient, through one-off consultations. Increasingly, with the growth of new forms of “participatory governance”, these spaces are seen at every level, from local, to national policy and even to global forums, and often within organizations and workplaces as well (IDS, Power Pack, 17).
- Closed spaces are institutions, customs, laws and places, etc. that have an impact on peoples’ lives but which are considered off-limits for public participation. Decisions are made by a set of actors behind closed doors, without any pretence of broadening the boundaries for inclusion. John Gaventa refers to these spaces as “provided” spaces, in the sense that “elites (be they bureaucrats, experts or elected representatives) make decisions and provide services to “the people”, without the need for broader consultation or involvement” (Gaventa, 26).
- Claimed spaces for participation are those which relatively powerless or excluded groups create for themselves – they are not creations of the “goodwill” of others. Claimed spaces range from ones created by social movements and community associations, to those simply involving natural places where people gather to debate, discuss and resist, outside of the institutionalized policy arenas. These spaces may emerge “out of sets of common concerns or identifications” and “may come into being as a result of popular mobilization, such as around identity or issue-based concerns, or may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuits” (IDS, Power Pack, 17).

Table 5 summarizes the questions by which the Study asked respondents about the spaces of participation in their villages/mitaa, and lists the survey instruments (individual interviews and/or focus group discussions) in which the questions were included.

Area of investigation	Question	Inclusion in survey instrument
All spaces	Who makes decisions related to local development in your village/mtaa?	FGDs; Individual interviews
Invited spaces	Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your village or mtaa during the past 5 years related to development?	Individual interviews
	If Yes, what kind of forums were these? If No, why not?	Individual interviews
	If Yes, how did you participate? Select from: attendance only; information giving; consultation only; providing resources; by forming groups to meet objectives; interactive participation (joint analysis); self-mobilization (taking own initiative) ¹³ .	Individual interviews
	Do you feel that you were able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa through these forums?	Individual interviews
	Has the way in which decisions related to development are made in your village/mtaa changed during the past 5 years?	FGDs; Individual interviews
	Do you feel that you have become more or less successful at influencing decisions in your village/mtaa related to development planning during the past 5 years—or has it stayed the same?	FGDs
	If you have become more successful, then why is this the case? If you have been less successful—or there has been no change—what have been the obstacles?	FGDs
Closed spaces	Do you feel that there are any forums in your village or mtaa where you are not invited to attend or participate?	Individual interviews
	If Yes, what kind of forums are these?	Individual interviews
Claimed spaces	Are there any development planning forums being organized by villagers without waiting for the government?	Individual interviews
	Have people in your village/mtaa ever demanded to participate in development?	FGDs; Individual interviews
	If Yes, what was the response?	Individual interviews

Table 5: Conceptualizing spaces of participation in the survey instruments

4.2 Conceptualizing Forms of Power

Power manifests itself in three different forms in the power cube—visible, hidden and invisible.

- Visible forms of power are defined as “contests over interests that are visible in public spaces or formal decision making bodies”. Often these refer to political bodies, such as legislatures, local government bodies, local assemblies, or consultative forums.

¹³ The selected participation modes are based on Pretty et al. (1995).

However, they can equally apply to the decision-making arenas of organizations and even of social movements or other spaces for collective action (IDS, Power Pack, 10).

- Hidden forms of power are those where vested interests (persons or institutions) create barriers to participation and “maintain their influence by controlling who gets to the decision-making table and what gets on the agenda. These dynamics operate on many levels to exclude and devalue the concerns and representation of other less powerful groups” (Gaventa 2005, 15). As the name suggests, these forms of power most often occur “backstage”, away from the spotlight and outside of visible forums of decision-making. Hidden power does not only belong to dominant actors, however: those traditionally considered to be less “influential” typically deploy a multitude of hidden power strategies to obtain what they need. Indeed, for less influential actors, hidden power strategies are often the power instrument of choice, given that they often have no access to open power strategies in traditional, public forums¹⁴.
- The concept of invisible power describes the ways in which power is internalized, i.e. the “psychological and ideological boundaries of participation”, including the adoption (by dominant groups) of ideologies, values and forms of behavior, as well as different forms of behavior by relatively powerless groups themselves, including “false consciousness” (in the Marxist sense) or the internalization of powerlessness” (Gaventa 2006, 29) or “what is acceptable” (Gaventa 2005, 15).

Table 6 summarizes the questions by which the Study asked respondents about the forms of power in their villages and mitaa, and lists the survey instruments (individual interviews and/or focus group discussions) in which these questions were included.

Area of investigation	Question	Inclusion in survey instrument
Visible forms of power	What are the main obstacles that ordinary villagers (i.e., women, youth, small farmers, casual laborers, the poor, etc.) face in official forums when they try to influence decision-making, raise questions and demand accountability and transparency?	Individual interviews
	Have these obstacles become more or less during the past 5 years? Please explain.	Individual interviews
	Which official forums are the most important for ordinary villagers to be heard, to influence decision-making, to raise questions and to demand accountability and transparency?	Individual interviews
	Why are these forums the most important?	Individual interviews
	Which groups of people dominate discussions in these official forums?	
	How do they dominate?	Individual interviews
	How successful are ordinary villagers in influencing decision-making in official forums?	Individual interviews

¹⁴ There is a rich body of literature documenting “hidden forms of power” by poor and less influential population groups. Among the more prominent theorists who describe forms of hidden power, James C. Scott (1990) refers to “disguised, low-profile, undeclared” forms of resistance, and Michel Foucault (1980) refers to the “local and intimate operations of power” or “micro-powers” that are exercised at the level of daily life.

Area of investigation	Question	Inclusion in survey instrument
	Do you think that women have gained more influence in development planning during the past 5 years?	Individual interviews
	Do you think that men have lost influence in development planning during the past 5 years?	Individual interviews
	Are plans for development projects followed up?	Individual interviews
	Which information do people receive that enables them to participate and follow up?	Individual interviews
	How many political parties are present in this village/mtaa?	Individual interviews
	Do you think you have the ability to influence development planning through official forums? Please explain.	FGDs
	Has your ability to influence development planning through official forums increased or decreased during the past 5 years, or has it stayed the same?	FGDs
	If it has increased, why do you think this is the case? If it has decreased, why do you think this is the case?	FGDs
Hidden forms of power	What are the main unofficial/informal ways, outside of official forums, which you have available to make your views heard?	FGDs; Individual interviews
	What are the reasons why you need these informal forums?	FGDs; Individual interviews
	Who do you turn to first when you need help in any matter?	Individual interviews
Invisible forms of power	Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general)?	Individual interviews
	Under what circumstances Yes/No?	Individual interviews
	What is the reason for your answer?	Individual interviews
	Are traditional leaders and religious leaders influential? If Yes, how so? If No, why not?	Individual interviews
	Which factor gives a person more influence: money or land?	Individual interviews
	Are leaders more advantaged in society compared to other people? If yes, why? How do you explain their/your advantaged position?	FGDs
	Are [women/youth/casual laborers/small farmers] more disadvantaged in society? If yes, why? How do you explain their/your disadvantaged position?	FGDs

Table 6: Conceptualizing forms of power in the survey instruments

4.3 Conceptualizing Levels of Decision-Making

The power cube theory holds that different levels (or layers) of decision making and authority exist on a vertical scale, including at the global (supra-national), national and local levels.

- At the supra-national level, there are many new forms of global institutions that offer venues for participation and influence at levels beyond the nation-state. These may include formal and informal, state and non-state spaces. They include UN institutions, civil society networks, trade regimes, and private conglomerates.
- For many observers, the national government level is still the critical entry point for change. It is national governments that often officially represent citizens in global governmental arenas, or who can decide whether or not to implement international treaties (IDS, Power Pack, 22).
- The sub-national level comprises many decision-making arenas that are “critical points of leverage for holding and challenging power” (IDS, Power Pack, 23). Decentralization processes in many countries aim to make this level ever more relevant in citizens’ lives, as citizens will increasingly turn to local governments for access to services and political representation. Strategies for participation in local governance, such as those supported under the Local Government Reform Program in Tanzania, are very important for planning, allocating and monitoring budgets, and holding local institutions to account.

Table 7 summarizes the questions by which the Study asked respondents about the relevant levels of decision-making in their villages and mitaa, and lists the survey instruments (individual interviews and/or focus group discussions) in which these questions were included.

Area of investigation	Question	Inclusion in survey instrument
All three levels of decision-making	Which of these structures has the most influence on development planning in your village? Choose from: IMF/World Bank; other international organizations; other countries; national government; political parties; NGOs/CBOs; religious leaders; village leadership; private sector; or other.	Individual interviews
	What is the reason for your answer?	Individual interviews
	In case of the structures mentioned, whose influence is increasing the most within the past 5 years?	Individual interviews
	What is the reason for your answer?	Individual interviews
	Have you heard of the Government’s “Decentralization by Devolution” policy?	Individual interviews
	If Yes, has the “Decentralization by Devolution” policy in Tanzania resulted in an increase in participation by villagers?	Individual interviews
	How do intra-household relations influence participation? Can several persons of a family attend a meeting and can they express differing views?	Individual interviews
	Development in my village/mtaa is most influenced by decisions at what level? Supra-national, national, or local level?	FGDs
	The most important influence (on local development) comes specifically from who or what (level)? Explain your answer.	FGDs

Table 7: Conceptualizing levels of decision-making in the survey instruments

5 Findings for Spaces of Participation

5.1 *Invited Spaces*

By law the village meeting constitutes the most important “invited space” for citizens to discuss local development issues. A large proportion of individual interviewees (28 percent) felt that decision-making related to development in their villages and mitaa takes place primarily at village meetings (see Figure 4). But at the same time, almost 62 percent of interviewees said they felt that “local leaders” (a category including village chairpersons, ten cell leaders and/or sub-village leaders, mtaa chairpersons, VEOs and councilors) were the ones actually making decisions related to development in their villages or mitaa.

Breaking down the results by respondent categories helps to explain the apparently contradictory perceptions about decision-making authority. Of all individual interviewees, local leaders were most convinced that village meetings were decision-making forums: over 40 percent of leaders indicated that decisions about local development were made here. But other respondents were more skeptical: a majority of youth and women respondents felt that village chairpersons, ten cell leaders and sub-village leaders were the *most* important decision-makers; only 23 percent and 21 percent of respondents in these categories, respectively, believed that village meetings were the most important decision-making forums.

The perception of most respondents that local leaders are the real decision-makers is not a completely accurate reflection of the law, in the sense that—by law—local leaders are mandated to formulate plans for their sub-villages and villages with the input of local citizens, as obtained at village meetings. Thus, local leaders are supposed to act somewhat as “midwives” of local plans and development initiatives, while the district level technically approves the local plans (see text boxes, section 2.5). But villagers’ perceptions are significant for illustrating the relatively low importance they attach to the village meeting as a democratic decision-making forum, and the relatively high importance they attach to the role played by their local leaders (whether justified or not). The results could also indicate that, in actual fact, local leaders are superseding their role as “midwives” of local development plans and are dominating proceedings rather than merely facilitating them. This latter interpretation of the results would seem to have some credence in the light of evidence of skepticism of respondents about the democratic, “bottom-up” nature of village meetings (see sections 5.4.1 and 6.2).

Some local leaders take the concept of the village meeting as an “invited space” quite literally, as they feel that it is the “duty” of citizens to participate in the development of their village or mtaa:

“Most people are aware of their duties [of] participating in their own development...The government is trying to make sure that local people are participating in planning their own development” (FGD for leaders, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).

“Nowadays most people are more becoming aware of their responsibility towards participating in their own development” (FGD for leaders, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).




Figure 4: Who makes decisions related to development in your village/mtaa? (% of respondents; N = 120 individual interviewees; Phase 1)

A majority of interviewees (57 percent) indicated that they had participated in decision-making activities related to development in their village or mtaa during the past 5 years; Among those who had participated, a third had attended village meetings and 14 percent had attended “project committee meetings”. Forty-two percent of interviewees indicated that they had not participated in any decision-making activities during the past 5 years.




Figure 5: Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your village or mtaa during the past 5 years? (% of respondents; N = 120 individual interviewees; Phase 1)

However, the responses to this question varied significantly depending on the category of interviewees. As Figure 5 illustrates, among casual laborers, small farmers and women (non-leaders), a majority of respondents indicated that they had *not* participated in any decision-making forums. Among youths, the number of respondents who had not participated was equal to the number of respondents who had participated (with two respondents not giving any answer). Only among leaders was there a clear majority of respondents who indicated that they had participated in decision-making activities related to development in their villages or mitaa during the past 5 years.

5.2 Forms of Participation

For those interviewees who indicated that they *had* participated in decision-making activities during the past 5 years, a majority (35 out of 66 interviewees, across all categories of respondents as well as regions of the country) participated primarily in passive ways, through attendance, information giving, consultation, or providing financial “contributions” only. Thirty respondents indicated that they had played at least some active role in the decision-making forums, through interactive participation and joint analysis, forming groups to meet objectives, or some combination of the above along with providing “resources”.

Forms of participation		N	%
Passive participation	Attendance only	11	17%
	Information giving only	10	15%
	Consultation only	8	12%
	Providing contributions only	6	9%
Mixed forms of participation	Combination of providing contributions, forming groups and interactive participation	10	15%
	Forming groups to meet objectives	9	14%
Interactive participation	Interactive participation and joint analysis	11	17%
Other		1	2%
Total N of respondents who participated in decision-making forums		66	100%
“No answer” = 54 respondents			

Table 8: How did you participate in decision-making forums?
 (% of respondents; N = 120; Phase 1; “No answer” category represents respondents who did not participate in decision-making forums, as well as missing cases)

Most interviewees (44 percent) indicated that they were able to influence decisions about development in their villages/mitaa through the forums they attended: 30 percent of interviewees felt they were not able to do so, 9 percent felt they were only “partially” successful, and 2 percent said they were not sure (see Figure 6).

The confidence of respondents in this regard is perhaps surprising given the overall level of pessimism about the quality of participation at village meetings. But the results must be interpreted with some caution. First, there is a relatively large proportion of “no answer”

responses; it is possible that for many respondents, “no answer” represents a form of qualified “no”. Second, the apparent contradiction might be explained in part by respondents’ different interpretation of the question. There is evidence that the question, “Do you think you have the ability to influence development planning through official forums?” was interpreted by some respondents as a comment on their own *capacities* rather than as a question about their degree of *success* at influencing decision-making. The following example of responses to this question would appear to bear this out:

“We are capable of running our own businesses, so we can also influence and initiate development plans and projects in our village” (FGD for women, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region).




Figure 6: Do you feel that you are able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa through official forums?
(% of respondents; Total N = 113; Missing values N = 7; Phase 1)

For those interviewees who felt they were *not* able to influence decisions, the main obstacles mentioned were “demands not being considered” (32 interviewees, or 42 percent of the sub-sample) and “self-segregation” (11 interviewees, or 14 percent of the sub-sample).

Just over half of interviewees (51 percent) said that the way in which decisions related to development were made in their villages/mitaa had not changed at all during the past 5 years, versus 42 percent who thought decision-making had changed, while 5 percent replied that it had “partially” changed, or else they did not know. Figure 7 illustrates that leaders were more convinced than other respondents that decision-making had changed: whereas almost 60 percent of leaders felt that there *had* been changes during the past five years, only about 40 percent of youth, 38 percent of women (non-leaders), 27 percent of small farmers and 25 percent of casual laborers thought this was the case. Among ordinary citizens (non-leaders), without exception, more interviewees felt that decision-making had *not* changed than thought that it had changed.




Figure 7: Has the way in which decisions related to development are made in your village/mtaa changed during the past 5 years?
 (% of respondents; N = 120 individual interviewees; Phase 1)

In general, respondents in the FGDs were less optimistic than interviewees about their ability to influence decision-makers through village meetings. For example, youths in many areas pointed out that their economic handicaps and their lack of access to resources impaired their ability to participate meaningfully in civic life in their villages:

“Youth have no power to influence village development: if you don’t have money or land or education, how do you influence those people? For instance, regulations for getting agro-input vouchers are unfriendly to youth...There is no way [we] can get vouchers because one of the regulations to get [them] is that [we are] supposed to own [a plot] of land and [we] don’t own any, automatically, [so we] are out. Then why do [we] go to community meetings if decisions they make are not friendly to youth?” (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa region).

“Youth do not have resources like employment, working capital and land that are most influential in development planning” (FGD for youth, Mjimwema village, Njombe council, Iringa region).

The correlation between money and influence in participation applies also to other groups in the villages studied. Poor villagers, generally, complained that their poverty means they are taken less seriously in invited spaces than their richer fellow villagers.

“Those who have big capital are listened [to] in the community, but most of us with small capital, we are not even considered to have any good ideas for community development” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

5.3 Closed Spaces

In the case of the 42 percent of interviewees who indicated that they had *not* participated in local forums on development during the past five years (see section 5.1), most respondents (44 percent) said they did not feel invited to attend decision-making forums. Another 26 percent said there was no particular reason why they did not participate in such forums.

A majority of interviewees (56 percent) felt that there are forums in their villages or mitaa (i.e. forums not only restricted to village meetings) where they are *not* invited to participate in decisions related to development; 37 percent disagreed that there are such forums. As Figure 8 illustrates, as in other areas, there is a discrepancy between leaders and other respondents. A majority of leaders (almost 60 percent) felt that village forums were open to all citizens. In the case of all other respondents, however, the views were the reverse: a majority of ordinary citizens felt that village forums were closed off to them. Youth were the most skeptical: 73 percent of youth respondents felt that they were not invited to village forums. Fifty-seven percent of small farmers, and 55 percent of women interviewees thought the same. The perception of closed spaces might also be interpreted as a form of hidden power possessed by leaders (see section 6.4.1).




Figure 8: Do you feel that there are any forums in your village or mitaa where you are not invited to attend or participate?

(% of respondents; Total N = 119; Missing value N = 1; Phase 1)

For the respondents who do not feel invited, the most commonly mentioned “closed” forums were project groups (31 percent) and leaders’ committees (25 percent). Just under a quarter (22 percent) of these interviewees felt that village meetings and sub-village meetings were closed to them; 7 percent of interviewees felt that “all forums” were closed off to them.

“We have never been invited to any developmental discussion meetings”
(FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“[People] are not invited to attend meetings. Local development planning is meant for the few, not the whole community. There are meetings only when there are new development projects to be introduced. Few people are invited to attend. [People in our village] have no information on what is going on related to development planning of the village” (FGD for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

5.4 The Quality of Participation in Invited Spaces

Underlying the issue of frequency of participation is perhaps an even more important question: how do respondents evaluate the *quality* of their participation in open forums? One striking finding is that there is a wide gap between local leaders and other respondents with regard to what constitutes “participation”.

For leaders, participation is equated primarily with the simple attendance of village meetings. Typically, village leaders argue that there is participation occurring in village meetings because development issues are discussed there, and they claim that villagers have a say in decisions.

“Together with villagers we discuss about development projects...Villagers decide whether to accept or reject development projects” (FGD for leaders, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Official forums is where we [make] our plans and decisions” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“Many issues about development have been fulfilled as they were discussed at official forums. People trust leaders and what [leaders] tell them at official forums” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“Community members are the ones who are involved in meetings and decide about developmental projects of our street...they own these projects” (FGD for leaders, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

But in most cases, ordinary respondents in the same villages/mitaa contradicted leaders' claims that there is sufficient participation at village meetings.

“The Village Chairman and VEO are still making decisions for us without our consult...The Village Chairman and the Village Council are the ones who are making decisions about our development” (FGD for small farmers, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Leaders don't care about our ideas. This is because our leaders are still having gender biases that a woman cannot perform anything for development” (FGD for small farmers, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region).

“We are not capable of influencing anything [any decisions]. We are afraid of the leaders. No one can dare to speak out. ...There are no specified programs and villagers are not well informed of development projects. In most cases, the projects are overheard in community gathering and not in official meetings. In fact, there are no proper plans for one to make follow ups. The projects are ad-hoc, only leaders have opportunity to sit in their offices and plan for us.

...All plans are being set by the leaders. Villagers are mere implementers” (FGD for small farmers, Iborogero village, Igunga council, Tabora region.).

“Decisions [related to development in the village] originate from the central government and villagers are supposed to accept... Village meetings [are] in the form of commanding people what to do. We are used to [it], that information or ideas given by leaders should always be accepted without challenge” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“We are not involved in some of the important decisions in the mtaa. For instance, the establishment of a water project in our place: leaders have taken a lot of money in that project and nothing is continuing” (FGD for youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwangi council, Kilimanjaro region).

5.4.1 The Nature of Participation

Leaders are more convinced than ordinary villagers that village meetings are true decision-making forums. Results from the individual interviews illustrate that 41 percent of leaders believe that decisions about local development are made at village meetings, by participants of these meetings, rather than (solely) by local officials. Other respondents, however, believe that this figure is much lower: only a third of small farmers believe that decisions are made at village meetings, while only 23 percent of youth respondents, only 21 percent of women, and only 14 percent of casual laborers believe this to be the case.

Respondent category	Decisions are made by officials	Decisions are made by village meetings (all participants)	Total (N)
Leaders	59%	41%	32
Women	79%	21%	29
Youth	77%	23%	30
Small farmers	67%	33%	21
Casual laborers	88%	13%	8

Table 9: Who makes decisions at village meetings?
(% of respondents; N = 120; Phase 1)

The apparent contradiction in leaders’ attitudes—with on the one hand their idea that village meetings are forums where villagers are informed of developments rather than actively consulted, and on the other hand their conviction that these meetings are participatory nevertheless—is captured by the following quote from a focus group discussion:

“Decisions are made by Councilors and the WEO, VEO and Village Chairpersons and the Village Meeting”... “We have influence because [we] respond to the needs of the people” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero Village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

The disconnect between leaders and most other respondents becomes clear when views are analyzed concerning the purpose of village meetings: most leaders believe that the main purpose of the village meetings is to *pass on* information to villagers rather than to consult with villagers on development plans, and to seek their views. In this context, leaders

considered "participation" by people not so much as a say in public decision-making, but as people's financial *contribution* to the implementation of decisions made by the leaders at village or district level:

"The people get information on new projects approved by the district and their role—if it is cash contribution, labor or if they are the beneficiaries and how each one will benefit" (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

It is not surprising, therefore, that many ordinary villagers associate "participation" with mandatory "contributions" of money and, in some cases, labor. These contributions, moreover, are often for projects that many feel do not even reflect their own interests:

"Development projects are not transparent. We are not even aware of those development projects. All plans are with our leaders. People are not well informed about the projects. The development projects become known to the villagers when the leaders need financial contribution...In most cases, the projects are not peoples' development priorities. For instance, we demand a market as a priority, but it has not been well considered by the leaders". "Leaders do not provide information: we would like to participate but it is not so easy in this particular village" (FGD for women, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

"All leaders at mtaa to district level are corrupt, they always decide for their benefits, they don't involve local community in any developmental decision making processes; local community are involved at the end if they need cheap labor or by contributing some amount of money" (FGD for local business people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanza council, Kilimanjaro region).

"Fishermen's problems are not considered during community meetings except when it comes to paying tax" (FGD for small scale fishermen, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

"The only transparent things here are contributions needed, not those collected" (FGD for women, Ng'washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

5.4.2 The Outcomes of Participation

In just a few areas, the Study found that a majority of respondents appeared to be satisfied with the outcome of their participation in invited spaces.

For example, in the one-party (CCM) dominated village of Msorwa, 30 km from Dar es Salaam, almost all respondents in their FGDs (except for the women) claimed that villagers participated in village meetings and were successful in influencing development outcomes, as the following excerpts from the FGDs for small farmers and youth make clear.

"People are ready to participate in development...They know what development is, and they know that it is their right to participate in development planning... [In the past 5 years, people have become more successful in influencing decisions in the village]: when they need something they are ready to make sure it is done. [People] were able to build a

secondary school and make sure the village demarcations are put clear” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).

“The contribution of youth participation in development planning has increased over the past five years...We are becoming more successful at influencing decisions in village development planning. We have realized that change is possible and have decided to [become] involved in political leadership. About 80% of village leadership are youths, including the village chairperson...For example, we influenced the construction of a cashew nut godown because most youths are involved in the cashew nut business. Later on, when the ward secondary school was established, there was a need [for] a temporary dormitory. It was suggested by the VDC that the cashew nut godown be used as a temporary dormitory. When [the proposal came] to the community meeting, youths rejected strongly the idea” (FGD for youth, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).

Moreover, in the village of Wami Dakawa, 30 km from Morogoro town, women and youth respondents were quite positive about the follow-up by local leaders to requests for development projects by villagers. As in Msorwa village, it is noteworthy that youths have assumed (certain) local leadership positions:

“People demanded to construct a police station; after completion of the police station the government provided policemen. People [also] requested water project from the government and it was provided” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

“Villagers do make decisions...We have become more successful [at influencing development] as many youths have got positions in village leaderships since 2009” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

But even in Wami Dakawa village, where villagers were somewhat optimistic about influencing development outcomes, respondents mentioned that it is difficult to motivate people to participate in development:

“Few meetings are held and only few people are willing to attend” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

The quote from the youth discussion above reflects a broad finding across most of the villages included in the Study, where overall satisfaction with the outcomes of participation was the *exception*, not the rule. In most villages surveyed, the Study found that low levels of participation in invited spaces are directly related to a perception by villagers that it is useless to engage in participation because their demands will not be met, whether or not they participate in village meetings.

There are several underlying reasons for villagers’ sense of “indifference” with regard to participation in invited spaces such as village meetings (as the principal decision-making forum at local level). The first reason is disappointment with past efforts at participation and disappointment with past development outcomes.

“Our leaders are very selfish and corrupt; someone cannot be involved in any development project without giving something... Our leaders are not careful

and responsible, i.e. the market was constructed using a lot of money but it is now more than two years after construction that market is not in use” (FGD for youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwangi council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Leaders prefer to spend money acquired from development projects without consulting other villagers; this makes people see no significance of official forums....Members of village development committees do not have cooperation with village leaders. So ideas given by the villagers are not well conveyed to village leaders” (FGD for small farmers, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

“There are meetings only when there are new development projects to be introduced...When new development projects are initiated, only relatives of leaders do benefit.... Leaders have just ignored them and they [youth] have left everything to God. They have decided to set themselves apart and do their own business like fishing” (FGD for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

“We are not capable of influencing local development. [Our village leaders] are not confident at all, we agree at the meeting but when they go up at the Ward Development Committee (WODC) they say nothing except betraying our trust” (FGD for small farmers, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).

A second reason for the apparent indifference of villagers regarding participation in invited spaces is the perception that local leaders equate demands for development as a challenge to their own authority.

“Even if you demand, nothing will be done and you will be regarded as an enemy so it is better for us to remain the way we are” (FGD for women, Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

“[We] are not free to give ideas different from those of leaders since leaders do not accept challenges” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

Villagers’ disappointment with local leaders and development outcomes is acknowledged and understood by some leaders themselves:

“We have not implemented any plan and project as suggested by community members due to lack of implementation fund. As a result most villagers do not trust us and even if you call a village meeting very few will attend” (FGD for leaders, Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

“Sometimes there are complaints from the villagers when development projects do not help them as they expected. This reduces their ability to influence development planning through official forums” (FGD for leaders, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

“[People] are not motivated due to lack of coordination and failure of the district to help the [leaders] to motivate them by accepting and working on their projects which villagers need” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

Ironically, village leaders hinted that they resented the distance and arrogance of district leaders, just as their own constituents leveled the same accusations against them (see also section 7.2 for more information about relations between village and high-level leaders):

“The problem with our [district] leaders is that they don’t like to know problems of people they are ruling, they are not ready to listen our problems they pretend to be busy all of their time” (FGD with leaders, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

5.4.3 The Struggle to Meet Basic Needs

Another important reason for villagers’ indifference to participation has less to do with local governance, and more to do with basic economic survival: the opportunity cost of attending village meetings and making efforts to influence decision-making is simply too high for many villagers, particularly the very poorest.

“[I am] not participating in development activities in our mtaa. And I don’t mind because I am struggling to feed my family” (Comment expressed at LGD, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Our weakness is the result of not being educated and our poverty. Everybody here is poor and over-burdened by taking care of our lives” (FGD for leaders, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

The burden of ordinary villagers’ struggle to meet basic needs is an important factor standing in the way of their empowerment. This insight is incorporated also in other frameworks of power, such as that of Naila Kabeer (1999), for whom power is the “ability to make choices”. For Kabeer, the ability to exercise choice is composed of three interrelated dimensions, i.e. resources, agency and achievements. “Resources” refers to material as well as social and human resources: changes in people’s resources translate into changes in the choices they are able to make—and hence changes in their level of empowerment (Kabeer, 436-7; 443).

During the in-depth research phase, individual interviewees in the three target areas for Phase 2 (Kagera mtaa, Kichangare hamlet and Ilopa village) were asked what they felt the main obstacles were to collective action and organization by villagers (see Figure 9). Most interviewees emphasized indirect, pragmatic considerations before all other factors. The most frequent responses were illiteracy (33 percent of responses) and poverty (20 percent), followed by “inadequate access to affordable agricultural inputs and micro credit” (13 percent). Fewer respondents mentioned direct factors affecting participation, such as “lack of personal interest and friendships in forming committees”, “most decisions made at ward and district levels”, and “inferiority complex” of villagers (10 percent of responses each).




Figure 9: What are the main obstacles to better organization by villagers?
(% of respondents; N = 30; Phase 2)

In the FGDs, respondents elaborated on the linkages between participation and organization, on the one hand, and economic empowerment, on the other:

“Lack of basic needs is one of the obstacles [to better organization among villagers] because people...use most of their time fending for their lives rather than participating in development planning” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“The main obstacle here [to better organization by villagers] is lack of necessary information, inadequate entrepreneurial skills and lack of working capital, including technology” (FGD for local business people, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

Moreover, women typically cited a combination of social and economic factors as the main obstacles to greater participation by women in village development, including “retrogressive cultural beliefs that continue regarding women as inferior figures” (even within their own families); “empty promises by political leaders”; and the “lack of working capital”, especially agro-inputs and micro schemes” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region). See also section 6.2.1 on the socio-cultural hurdles that women face within their own families.

In almost all villages and mitaa, women emphasized the need for economic empowerment as a prerequisite for boosting their levels of participation:

“Most women use most of time sorting out family chores and have no time for village development projects. Unless women are empowered economically it is difficult for us to influence development planning in our village” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

In the same context, many respondents called for investment in basic services as a priority intervention:

“The current emphasis [of] the government has been construction of classrooms for ward secondary and primary schools. Other village priorities have been forgotten, like water. Our village has a water problem, and the government intervention is not enough” (FGD for local business people, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

For many youth respondents, “civic education” priorities included basic elements such as learning to work together:

“There is no togetherness among youths when it comes to raising their issues...Youths have not been educated on the significance of working together” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

5.5 Claimed Spaces

A majority of interviewees (52 percent) agreed with the statement that villagers sometimes organize their own forums related to development in their villages/mitaa without waiting for the government; 43 percent disagreed with this statement, and 3 percent of interviewees said they did not know whether this was the case or not.

Most “claimed spaces” (i.e., forums or institutions which relatively powerless or excluded groups create for themselves, without waiting for approval from official structures) identified by the Study took the form of self-help groups centered around income generation activities or emergencies. These were found especially in the case of women and small farmers:

“People organize themselves informally to get social services they need, especially [regarding] issues concerning with emergencies, self-help activities and income generating activities” (LGD and FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

Some villagers mentioned that some of these kinds of self-help groups cannot be considered as spaces where they make their views heard:

“We do have informal structures; these are good for community socialization...However, we cannot use them to complain or demand anything from the government. For instance, we have VIKOBA, where members are supposed to contribute Tsh.1,500 every Friday. Then, a member can borrow some money and conduct any business he/she wants. We also have an association of “*kufa na kuzikana*” [a special fund for emergencies]. Members also contribute some money. The accountant is responsible to keep the money. The fund is only used when somebody passes away, or in case of a tragedy” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

The existence of more traditional claimed spaces centered around self-governance models were hard to find, particularly in the form of *organized* alternative forums, involving a group of villagers. This has to do with the difficulties involved in collective action at village level (see sub-section 7.4), but it also has to do with the apprehension most villagers feel when

undertaking activities that are seen to be counter to what village leaders or the “government” is doing.

Noteworthy exceptions to the finding of claimed spaces being primarily for livelihood-centered activities were found in the mtaa of Ng’washi and the village of Bubombi. In both cases, respondents mentioned that they had no choice but to form self-groups, as formal (government) structures and leadership channels were not serving them. Ng’washi, where local village leaders are completely overruled by municipal officials in Mwanza and all mtaa residents (including leaders) feel they have no influence on decision-making at all, residents were unanimous in saying that informal self-help groups were the only structures they have left to make their views heard (at least to themselves):

“Local development in Ng’washi is influenced by the municipality and killed by it because they are here to siphon [off] everything, [including] land, animals...There is no alternative here [for making our views heard]...All we do is to ensure that we survive on our own through small groups of self-help [rather] than [depend] on the village leadership” (LGD, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

The village of Bubombi has been led by opposition parties for a long time, and even the leaders there claimed that they were being sidelined by the district level for political reasons (see sub-section 7.3.1 on the influence of political parties). As a consequence, the leaders and other villagers there have created their own political space to discuss issues, outside of the formal forums dominated by government:

“Formal forums are places to gather and hear lies and political jokes. But in our traditional gatherings and social groups we seriously discuss issues and [our own] issues, hence we cannot fail” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).

Many villagers in other areas mentioned that they preferred not to organize their own (self-governance) initiatives or forums for fear of alienating their local leaders: according to many respondents, it is dangerous to claim spaces separate from what local leaders (and the “government”) are doing. See also sub-section 6.2 on why many villagers prefer not to “make demands”:

“We do not need any informal forum because it causes conflict with the leaders. [We] are trying to avoid conflict with leaders by keeping silent” (FGD for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

6 Findings for Forms of Power

6.1 Visible Forms of Power

A large majority of interviewees (78 percent) indicated that village meetings are the most important *official* forums for villagers to be heard, to influence decision-making, to raise questions and to demand accountability and transparency. Other, less important official forums were thought to be political meetings and NGO meetings (9 percent of responses each). The main reasons cited for the importance of village meetings is that “all villagers and

their leaders attend” (43 percent of responses), they are “easy to attend” (12 percent), and that they enable villagers to hear about development policy (12 percent).

When they were asked who dominated these official forums, and how they dominated, interviewees mentioned, in order of importance, village chairpersons (32.5 percent), “all local leaders” (12 percent), “wealthy people” within the village (12 percent), and VEOs (11 percent). Fourteen percent of interviewees felt that “all members” dominated official proceedings, while 8 percent mentioned that men dominated official forums. These people were found to dominate as “main speakers” (26 percent), through their monitoring and evaluation responsibilities (23 percent) and through final decision-making (22 percent).

6.2 Official Forums: a Mostly Top-Down Process

On the whole, individual interviewees were not very confident about their ability to influence decision-making in official village forums. Almost half of interviewees (48 percent) felt that they were “not successful at all” or “somewhat unsuccessful” in influencing decisions in these forums. Thirty-two percent felt that they were “somewhat successful” or “very successful”; 7.5 percent of respondents were not sure.

A breakdown of the results shows, once again, that there is a discrepancy between leaders and the rest, with leaders somewhat more optimistic than other respondents that they are able to influence decision-making (see Figure 10). A majority of casual laborers, small farmers, women and youth feel that they are “not successful at all” in influencing decision-making in official village forums, whereas a majority (almost 50 percent) of leaders feel that they are either “very successful” or “somewhat successful”.




Figure 10: How successful are you in influencing decision-making in official forums?
 (% of respondents; Total N = 105; Missing values N = 15, Phase 1)

In many areas surveyed, the process of submitting and following up development plans seems to be a top-down exercise, where people are simply told what to do by their leaders.

Conversely, most villagers do not demand to participate and do not see opportunities to get involved, as they expect the leaders to take the initiative.

Of all the focus group categories, women respondents—in villages as well as mitaa, and across the country—were most often pessimistic about their ability to influence development in their villages. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 11 and presented in Table 10; the contrast between women and other respondent categories (particularly leaders) is noteworthy.

6.2.1 Traditional Views about Women

Many women feel that they are at a disadvantage in official forums, for both social and economic reasons. At the root of the problem, for many women, are “traditional views” about women and their place in society. These traditional views persist, first of all, within the home.

“Not all our husbands are happy seeing their wives involved in income generating activities” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“Women are not free to speak. We are busy with family issues...Men are leaders in our culture... In meetings women are considered like children” (FGD for women, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

Traditional views underpin a vicious circle that keeps women outside of the mainstream of civic life in their villages and mitaa. For the domestic burdens of women, which are reinforced by these traditional views, stymie their ability to participate properly in socio-economic life of their villages and mitaa (see also section 5.4.3 on the struggle to meet basic needs, and how this affects women, in particular).

“Women suffer more. We have to wake up early [*around 4:00 in the morning*]. We have to queue. Sometimes, it reaches up to 11:00 in the morning to get one bucket of water. Normally, the wind mill does not work during mid-day, when there is no wind, and we can no longer get the water. Then we have to go a mile from Mbugani to search for water. We have contributed Tsh.5000 [for the rehabilitation of the wind mill]. We have also contributed Tsh.1000 per household for water dam construction, and Tsh.20,000 for those who have livestock, but we do not know when the construction will take off” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

““[Women’s] problems are hardly heard during community meetings...We have been less successful because women’s influence in the village is not recognized. This is because our income is low and most women in the village lack civic education [and] hence do not know their rights. We have remained implementers of what is decided in community meetings” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

Women’s less-than-full participation in socio-economic life, in turn, reinforces their sense of isolation and lack of self-confidence when it comes to influencing development in their villages and mitaa.

“As a female, [village officers] think I do not know anything about decision making... Normally men [in the village] want to organize themselves without

involving females” (Female interviewee number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“Women’s position in the community is still low... Most women are poor and this makes us less able to influence development planning in our village. There are very few activities organized by government concerning empowering women in this village” (FGD for women, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).




Figure 11: Do you feel that you are able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa through official forums?

(% of respondents; Total N = 113; Missing values N = 7, Phase 1)

Respondent category	Yes	Partially	No	I don't know	No answer
Leaders	75%	9%	13%	0%	3%
Women	30%	7%	44%	0%	19%
Youth	36%	14%	29%	7%	14%
Small farmers	33%	0%	39%	0%	28%
Casual laborers	25%	13%	38%	0%	25%

Table 10: Do you feel that you are able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa through official forums?

(% of respondents; Total N = 113; Missing values N = 7, Phase 1)

6.3 Making Demands

Few respondents said they had demanded to participate in development at local level and succeeded in obtaining what they demanded. There were exceptions, such as in Msorwa village near Dar es Salaam and Wami Dakawa village near Morogoro:

“[People] have demanded to participate in meetings with investors in land and they were accepted” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).

“Village elders (*wazee*) did ask to make a committee for constructing village roads. They were given that chance and roads were constructed under their leadership” (FGD for small farmers, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

In most cases, however, respondents indicated that making demands translates into making oneself unpopular with local leaders. Many villagers expressed intimidation by leaders:

“Villagers are mostly afraid of leaders....Villagers are not free to air their views. When you dare to do so, you are being warned by the leaders, not to talk much “*usichonge mdomo*”. Otherwise, [your] life will become terrible, as you will be watched and followed every movement” (FGD for women, Iborogero Village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“It is not worthwhile to make follow up of any development...If you do so, the leaders can put you in a very terrible situation. You can even be declared as ‘non-citizen’” (FGD for small farmers, Iborogero Village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

Moreover, citizens’ demands are often perceived to be an infringement of leaders’ time. This reality is reflected even in the language used by leaders and villagers alike. For example, in Wami Dakawa village, when villagers write a letter to the Village Executive Secretary demanding that their grievances be heard, this form of demand is commonly referred to (by both villagers and leaders) as “disturbing him” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

In other cases, villagers’ fear of leaders resembles a form of deference to hierarchy, in which they prefer their leaders to take initiatives:

“[People here] have never demanded...they believe that anything good must be initiated by leaders themselves. [Local leaders] say that everything should pass through the leaders who should tell them what to do otherwise it is rumors. They say that true development should be brought up by the government” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“Plans come from the top (district level). No one dares to challenge the plans. Whatever comes from the district, it is an order or directives for implementation and not for discussion... People do not know if they have the right to make such influence. We are used to be implementers and not planners. The leaders are selfish and they make themselves fearful to the villagers. They do this deliberately so that people can keep quiet and they can continue to do what they want” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

“People in the village normally do not know how, and where to follow [...] development projects. They always wait for TASAF people to give them

direction on how to implement these projects and how much to contribute” (FGD for small farmers, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

Respondents—particularly women—regularly displayed a lack of confidence to demand anything from their leadership in open meetings:

“How can [we] demand? We do not know the procedures. We see things happen by the government hand” (FGD for women, Ng'washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

“Women are not confident to speak out. Some women leaders (like the hamlet chairperson or those involved in the village council) talk during village meeting. You know it is not easy to speak in public, where everyone is looking at you. This needs people like you [*referring to researchers*] who have gone to school and seminars” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

Leaders themselves confirmed their tendency to dominate official forums and, in some cases, to monopolize power:

“Leaders are the same for the past 15 years; how could we change if there is no problem? Leaders here are strong and can implement anything they want. All the current projects are the results of our influence. Opposition parties fear to come and work here” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga council, Tabora region).

Moreover, leaders often justified their dominance based on their superior knowledge, and on the relative ignorance and lack of education of ordinary citizens:

“People have little understanding. They depend much on being told what to do by their leaders” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa Village, Kyela Council, Mbeya region).

The top-down nature of decision-making often extends beyond the relationship between village leaders and citizens to the way in which higher level government officials (at district or municipal level) deal with village leaders. See section 7.2 for more detail on the complicated relationship between village leaders and higher-up officials.

6.4 Hidden Power

Hidden forms of (“backstage”) power are available to leaders and ordinary villagers alike, although they take different forms. Hidden power is also exercised in many different kinds of spaces, from invited spaces (official forums, such as village meetings) to closed spaces, where villagers congregate away from their leaders.

6.4.1 Hidden Power of Leaders

Leaders themselves identified their greatest source of hidden power to be their ability to go house to house to persuade villagers of certain development causes.

“We influence development planning by lobbying individual local people from house to house. For instance, [for the] “Malaria Haikubaliki Campaign”, official

forums were not enough, we had to go house to house lobbying people to use mosquito nets” (FGD for leaders, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

“We have several strategies to try and get people to accept projects, including going around talking to people” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

But perhaps the most important (unspoken) source of informal power of local leaders is their ability to capture petty bribes in order to perform small services for fellow villagers. Leaders’ access to bribes forms a source of constant friction in their relationship with other villagers. It is also the main reason why most villagers believe that leaders are more “advantaged” than they are themselves (see also the links to invisible power, in sub-section 6.5).

“Leaders are more advantaged. They benefit with the financial contribution intended for village projects...There is a CCM project in auction market every Monday. This project is bicycle parking in the market, and anyone who enters the market with a bicycle has to park and pay Tshs.200....Leaders benefit from this project as they do not account for the revenue collected” (FGD for women, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“Leaders are still asking for “*kitu kidogo*” (bribes) to help you effectively... For instance, at the beginning of this year, we were requested to bring introductory letters for us to get a loan from the bank, but what happened [was that] for each introductory letter we were supposed to give Tshs.20,000 for mtaa leaders to write that letter which actually is a bribe” (FGD for local business people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanza council, Kilimanjaro region).

But the cycle of petty corruption does not end there. Leaders, too, admit to “giving some amount of money to district leaders” and to “calling and negotiating with top leaders” in order to get things done (FGD with leaders, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

A related aspect of leaders’ hidden (informal) power is their ability and willingness to perform special favors for villagers. This mechanism of power may be regarded as the “flip-side” of the hidden power mechanism of petty corruption wielded by villagers (see next sub-section). In this case, both leaders and villagers may be said to have a form of “symbiotic” hidden power relationship, where an individual villager’s hidden power to bribe is nurtured by a leader’s hidden power to resolve issues informally for an individual villager.

The following examples demonstrate how this form of hidden power resembles a kind of “patronage” available for local leaders to dispense when they please:

“People come to [an] individual leader to get support, [for example] when they face problems of land, we can resolve the differences unofficially. This is done at one leader’s home” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“Women and youths demanded to contribute their labor power on building a secondary school. They do this expecting that in case there is a new project they may be among the beneficiaries. They were accepted” (FGD for leaders, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

Another instrument of leaders' hidden power is their access to information, and—as this is related—their power to keep information from their constituents. Villagers are near unanimous in insisting that local leaders keep them in the dark about taxes collected, income generation schemes, development plans and financial reports. Many villagers feel that this lack of transparency inhibits their ability to participate fully in development planning.

“[Leaders] are the ones who are collecting some of [our] taxes and they don't give back [a] financial report” (FGD for women, Ding'wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

“For the past 20 years we haven't heard any financial report in any meeting within our township council” (LGD, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Information provided by local leaders concerning village development cannot be trusted because we feel that they lack transparency and accountability. Most of the time there is no connection between resources contributed, expenditure and value for money. The village water project is one of the examples of inadequate follow-up of development planning: the whole project cost Tsh.54 million and just imagine only one water well is functioning. This is a completely robbery (*“huu ni ufisadi, wizi mtupu”*) (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa region).

Just as local leaders are able to regulate the information flow to their constituents (at least as far as official information is concerned), they are also able to make ostensibly open meetings feel like closed spaces for many ordinary villagers (see section 5.3 on citizens' comments on closed spaces in their villages). Though many village forums—including village meetings, sub-village meetings and project groups—are officially open to villagers, barriers to access and subtle forms of exclusion make many citizens feel unwelcome.

But just as some of the village leaders wield “hidden power” in their relations with constituents when it comes to creating exclusive spaces and controlling information, so do district leaders wield instruments of hidden power vis-à-vis village leaders. Examples of such behavior by district leaders include sidelining of local (village) leaders, setting agendas behind the scene, and excluding certain players (see also section 7.2 on relations between village leaders and higher level officials).

6.4.2 Hidden Power of Ordinary Villagers

The most common instrument of hidden power for ordinary villagers is petty corruption, just as accepting bribes is an important source of informal power for local leaders. In all villages surveyed, ordinary respondents mentioned bribes as a way to circumvent official bureaucracy and to “get things done”.

“Bribes are the most effective strategy to success because our leaders are corrupt. Without a bribe of at least Tshs.10,000 to 50,000 you cannot be considered by our mtaa leaders...For example, people have to give money as corruption to leaders in order to get birth certificate of their children” (FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“If you give some amount of money your problem will be solved very quickly without any disturbances, in every sector here at Mwanga...if you need service [quickly] just give something” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“The best way [to get the services and resources that we need] is through individual efforts whereby you [are] able to influence the leaders by giving them gifts/ bribes or by mentioning some of our relatives in top position at regional level” (FGD for youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

Not all bribes are in the form of cash:

“We sometimes offer our body to leaders for us to succeed some of our desire” (FGD for women, Mchangani village, Mtwara-Mikindani council, Mtwara region).

Often, those villagers without the money to spend on petty corruption complained that they had no forms of hidden power. Typically, these villagers were youths, women and the poorest members of the community.

“We don’t have sources of income so we [cannot] get some amount of money to give as corruption” (FGD for youth, Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

“Women are the most disadvantaged ones...for instance, all sources of household income are owned by men, we use most of the time working but we get less. There are few opportunities for women to access agro-inputs and micro credit schemes” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

Other forms of informal power and organization deployed by ordinary villagers involve time-honored and classic mechanisms such as using “contacts”, petitioning of local leaders, and forming small self-help groups to provide socio-economic support, as the examples below illustrate.

“The most [common] strategies...are lobbying and networking with people you think can assist you [to] get what you want” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“The best strategy to use when I’am in need to get what I want is through contacts. Though other strategies can be used like petitions, bribes and so on, but contacts simplifies because I can use my fellow/ friends of mine who is close to the person or institution that I need to get an aid from” (Woman interviewee, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“A group of people is [formed] and sent to the leaders to explain their grievances on behalf of others” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa Village, Mukaranga Council, Coastal region).

“Women have been meeting in self-help forums where they assist each other in self-help activities like establishing micro credit schemes and working

together in farms” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).

Respondents also mentioned subversion tactics as informal mechanisms of power available to ordinary villagers, such as illegal fishing necessitated by “inadequate working capital and corrupt coastal zone officials” (FGD for leaders, Pangani Mashariki Village, Pangani Council, Coastal region) and “escaping payment of contributions” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

As a last resort, youth in particular also mentioned “voting with their feet” when they are left with no hope. Migration and exit can be considered as forms of hidden power in the sense that they offer individuals the prospect of a better alternative to unsatisfactory present circumstances¹⁵. For example, in remote Mbitimikali village in Iringa region (13 kilometers from the Iringa-Mbeya highway), where access to land for youths is increasingly difficult (see sub-section 5.2), youths mentioned that their only alternative for a better economic future is to migrate to urban areas:

“Rural areas [are] not providing hope for youth... it is very difficult to get land here either from the family or community. The village leaders have sold all good land; nothing is left for future generations. How can you practice agriculture without land and agro-inputs? We have lost hope in participating in community meetings and about half of youth in this village have migrated into urban areas. We have remained few and [we] don't think we can bring changes here” (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa region).

In Mjimwema village, which is more accessible to urban areas (7 kilometers from Njombe Township Council headquarters, situated along the Iringa-Songea highway), migration to town is an option for those who wish to escape the wrath of local leaders:

“Youth are still poor and do not have resources needed to influence development planning in the [village]... Youth also have lost hope [to be] involved in community development, and some are going to town because the rural area is becoming unfriendly to youth... If things are becoming tough in the village, some of us [go] to town” (FGD for youth, Mjimwema village, Njombe council, Iringa region).

6.4.3 Informal Forums and Sources of Information

In all villages studied, as was seen in sub-section 6.4.1, respondents complained that they received insufficient information about local development plans and projects from their leaders and officials, even when they attended village meetings. As a consequence, ordinary villagers try to make up for some of the information “gaps” by getting their information from informal sources, in addition to formal sources.

¹⁵ There is a sizeable literature on “exit” as a form of power for individuals, inspired by the original typology of “exit, voice and loyalty” of Albert O. Hirschman (1970 et al.), adapted by William Lyons and David Lowery (1986 and 1989), and described by Paul Rabé (2009), among others, as a strategy of (urban) poor individuals who perceive themselves to have better alternatives elsewhere.

For example, youth in Wami Dakawa village mentioned that through informal forums they “get time to discuss among themselves and [that] this is a chance for getting new ideas. The discussions are also chances for getting information on new [temporary] jobs in the village” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region). Women in Msorwa village felt that they needed informal gatherings “to learn if there is anybody with [a] clear explanation of what is going on” (FGD for women, Msorwa village, Mkuranga council, Coastal region).

The importance of informal gatherings and informal sources of information appears to increase the more that villagers feel barred from participating in officially sanctioned forums. Thus, women in Wami Dakawa village mentioned that they needed informal forums because they feel that their problems are “hardly heard during community meetings” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region). The same is true for women in Iborogero village and small farmers in Bubombi village:

“Leaders do not encourage us to participate in village development. They do not show us the way. In fact, they do not represent us or work for the people. Hence, informal forums can be one way of meeting and exchanging views, experiences and suggestions for better life in the village” (FGD for women, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“The failure of the government to help us cannot be the end of [our] life, so we meet to discuss politics, the government behavior, ways to sell our products, fish and care for our animals from thieves” (FGD for small farmers in Bubombi village, Rorya council, Mara region).

But even in areas where respondents felt that they had access to formal decision-making structures, some still perceived the need for informal gatherings, as the latter have added functions that official forums cannot fulfill:

“Not all women’s problems can be solved by official forums. We also need some self-help activities for different groups of women to sort out some problems like assisting each other during ‘gladness’ and ‘sadness’ situations (FGD for women, Mjimwema mtaa, Njombe council, Iringa region).

“[Informal] self-help forums are needed to solve problems that cannot be solved during official meetings, for instance, the establishment of [a] cashew nut farmers association was done through unofficial forums” (FGD for youth, Msorwa village, Mkuranga council, Coastal region).

Village leaders do not always appreciate it when villagers gather among themselves and organize forums outside of official structures, as is clear from the following comments:

“We do not want [informal forums] because they are poorly organised and in most cases they lead to conflict because they are unlawful” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“Informal forums are good for community planning if people could know and if they were rich to implement what we plan. But it is a wastage of time” (FGD for leaders, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

Figure 12 lists some of the most important formal and informal sources of information identified by individual interviews in the three focal areas covered in Phase 2¹⁶. Additional formal sources of information mentioned in the FGDs include the radio and newspapers. In the FGDs, the most commonly cited informal sources of information for villagers included “women’s groups in market places” and “women’s social forums”, “kijiweni” (local pubs) and “vijiweni” (places around shops or markets); and “evening informal meetings at our shops or around the market”.

The “vijiweni”, in particular, are mentioned as informal locales where “business people and small scale farmers meet daily” to discuss ongoing matters (FGD for small farmers, Ng’washu mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region) or to discuss “development proposals before they are proposed at community meetings” (LGD, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).




Figure 12: What are the most important sources of information about development in your area? (% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)

The informal gatherings described above (particularly the “vijiweni”, “kijiweni”, women’s groups, women’s social forums, and “evening informal meetings”) provide villagers with outlets for hidden power, but they may also be characterized as claimed spaces according to the power cube. They constitute important “spaces”—in the physical or social sense, and often both at the same time—that are the creations of sub-groups of citizens (i.e. women or youth) outside of institutionalized policy arenas, where information and hence a kind of power or resistance are occurring.

Respondents in several villages cited examples where informal gatherings and initiatives have led to demands of leaders or to other kinds of actions in the formal sphere:

“Discussing in groups acts as a catalyst for leaders to hold meetings for discussing about peoples grievances” (FGD for small farmers, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa region).

¹⁶ In Figure 12 “colleagues” refers to fellow leaders (in the case of leaders) as well as “friends” with whom interviewees sometimes have (informal and formal) working relations.

“A group of people is made and sent to the leaders to explain their grievances on behalf of others. [This] helps to make leaders call for meetings where decisions of the majority do take place” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa village, Mkuranga council, Coastal region).

But while in some areas villagers’ informal forums may lead to action to make demands, in other areas villagers mentioned that there are risks involved in informal organization, as informal gatherings may antagonize the local leadership (this is also discussed in section 6.3). This perception of risk is an obvious disincentive to informal organization.

“[We] do not need any informal forum because it causes conflict with [our] leaders. [We] are trying to avoid conflict with leaders by keeping silent (FGD for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

“We do not need [informal forums]. The VEO will make sure you are in trouble if you keep on voicing; ask the former chairperson of the village who resigned because he entertained discussions” (FGD for youth, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

“We usually meet during our business or other community gatherings. However, we normally discuss our family issues, not development issues. In fact, we are fearful to make our views heard. If you want your life to be safe and stable in this village, you better stay calm and engage [in] your affairs” (FGD for small farmers, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

6.5 *Invisible Power*

This Study identified at least three different manifestations of invisible power: internalized power/disempowerment and widespread fatalism expressed by ordinary villagers, and a cultural form of power attributed to leaders as a result of their access to certain economic advantages.

6.5.1 **Internalization of Power Norms**

Much of the frustration expressed by ordinary villagers with regard to the unsatisfactory processes of participation, as captured in the sections above, reflect their underlying feelings of internalized powerlessness. These feelings are psychological, and can be defined as invisible forms of disempowerment according to the power cube.

Two different forms of “lack of agency” might be distinguished here. The first is directly related to internalized disempowerment embedded in *norms and beliefs*. Into this category belong women’s lack of self-confidence and pessimism about their right to influence as a result of “retrogressive cultural beliefs that continue regarding women as inferior figures”, both within the home and within society at large, as well as women’s lack civil education and lack of awareness of their rights. Into this category also belong the feelings of youth that they are too young for their opinions to matter and for their input to be taken seriously by village elders and leaders. Another example of norms and beliefs at work is villagers’ lack of confidence that they will be taken seriously because they are illiterate, uneducated and “peasants”.

A second form of lack of agency is related less to cultural beliefs and patterns (i.e. social norms) and more to poor leadership or limitations in the formal participation process. This category includes villagers' fear of leaders ("we are afraid of the leaders; no one can speak out"); villagers' refusal to demand to participate, as they do not see opportunities to get involved, and as they expect their leaders to take the initiative; people believing what they are told (or not told), related to the withholding of information; people's belief in hierarchy and the power of leaders ("people do not know if they have a right"); and villagers' widespread feelings of indifference (as a result of past disappointments with the participation process). There seems to be a relationship between these types of fear and self-doubt (what Veneklasen and Miller would characterize as a lack of "power within") and the lack of claimed spaces and poor or absent collective action (lack of "power with")(see section 9.3).

At the other end of the spectrum of internalized power, local leaders' accepted notions and discourses of participation can be regarded as examples of internalized (invisible) power. These include leaders' use of one-way communication at village meetings ("informing people, rather than seeking their views and inputs"), and their power to obtain villagers' contributions for development initiatives, to name but a few.

6.5.2 Fatalism among Ordinary Villagers

As a measure of the "psychological and ideological" dimensions of invisible power, the Study sought to gauge whether villagers were optimistic or pessimistic about their ability to influence circumstances in their lives in general. The assumption was that a large degree of fatalism would indicate a negative predisposition to change, including the ability to shape one's own destiny. Conversely, a low level of fatalism might indicate openness to the idea that circumstances can change—including those affecting one's own life.

Responses to the question, "Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general)?" demonstrated that villagers are fairly evenly divided about their ability to actively influence events in their own lives. A slight majority of respondents (54 percent) indicated that they feel confident about their ability to influence events, while 37.5 percent disagreed and another 8 percent of respondents were uncertain. But the responses varied by respondent category, with a large gap between leaders and other groups. It is striking that (once again) women are more fatalistic than any other respondent category: a majority of women interviewees (55 percent) believed that they were *not* able to influence what happens to them in their lives. Youths and small farmers were less pessimistic than women, but not as optimistic about their ability to influence their lives as leaders.

At the very least, there is no evidence that most villagers in the survey areas suffer from "false consciousness" (in the Marxist sense) in their relationship with those they consider to be powerful. There appears to be no sense of awe—in the sense of a fundamental humility—on the part of those who consider themselves to be "disadvantaged" vis-à-vis those they consider to be "advantaged". To the contrary, ordinary villagers display a healthy dose of skepticism and irony towards their leaders, which appears to indicate that they are well aware of their leaders' failings even if they realize they can do little (in the short term, at least) about their leaders' dominance.




Figure 13: Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general)? (% of respondents; Total N = 120; Phase 1)

6.5.3 Economic Privileges as Cultural Forms of Power

A third source of invisible power and (its flip side) disempowerment relates to access to economic assets. Key economic resources such as material benefits, money or land provide a high degree of unspoken, invisible power to their possessors. This process has been described by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in his views on cultural capital as “embodied capital”, which holds that economic assets are symbolically translated into cultural forms of power¹⁷.

A majority of respondents were convinced that leaders were more “advantaged” than ordinary villagers, mainly because as a result of their positions they could capture small benefits, both from villagers as well as occasionally from higher level officials. The acceptance of small bribes by leaders is therefore a critical source of their invisible power, as is the sense of impunity (officials getting away with taking bribes) that accompanies this. Conversely, villagers’ inability to complain about leaders’ need for bribes (and their feeling that it is no use to complain because nothing will change) are critical examples of villagers’ disempowerment in this context.

The existence of this form of invisible power was usually denied by many leaders, who claimed that their tasks are performed on a purely “voluntary basis”. Evidence shows that leaders’ economic privileges (however small) do indeed give them the symbolic, cultural forms of power inherent in Bourdieu’s form of embodied capital: some leaders openly admitted that their functions enabled them to access both material as well as intangible benefits, which put them in an advantaged position relative to other villagers:

¹⁷ According to Bourdieu, “cultural capital” exists in three forms (embodied, objectified and institutionalized). In the “embodied” state, which is the most relevant for the process of internalization of power akin to invisible power in the power cube, embodied cultural capital is defined as “external wealth converted into an integral part of the person” (Bourdieu, 18).

“We benefit say from gifts like mobile phones from the MP for Igunga, some drinks, support when you have problems, respect, and some training on many issues like HIV/AIDS, animal keeping etc.” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga council, Tabora region).

Respondents were unanimous in mentioning that money is a much more important resource of invisible power than land at local level. The following responses to the question of whether money or land provided more influence were typical of responses by villagers in all areas:

“Money can help us do any business”; “money can facilitate development in our village”; “with money, you can do everything you want in this world” (LGD and FGDs for women and youth, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Money [gives a person more influence] (*“usishindane na mwenye hela”*). Money can buy anything, even the leadership” (FGD for women, Iborogero village, Igunga council, Tabora region).

But some respondents added that, while money is more important than land, informal networks might be an even more important source of invisible (perceived) power than money:

“The influence to a person may come from your political party or money but more important is the way you are familiar with neighbors” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).

Other respondents also mentioned that education is just as important as money:

“Those with education like you [*the researchers*] can talk freely” (FGD for women, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

7 Findings for Levels of Decision-Making

7.1 The Importance of the Local Level

According to most villagers it is the village leadership that has the biggest influence on development in their villages or mitaa (at 36 percent of responses), followed by NGOs and CBOs (17 percent), political parties and religious leaders (10 percent of responses each) (see Figure 14). The influence of the village leadership far outweighs that of other levels of decision-making, such as the private sector (7.5 percent), higher-level government institutions (5 percent), international organizations, the World Bank/IMF (6 percent) and other international organizations (2 percent).




Figure 14: Which of these structures have the most influence on development in your village?
 (% of respondents; Total N = 120; Phase 1)

Views on the importance of the village leadership did not differ significantly by category of respondent. All categories of interviewees felt that the village leadership was the most influential in their lives: over 41 percent of women respondents felt this to be the case, followed by 40 percent of leaders themselves, 38 percent of small farmers and casual laborers, and over 23 percent of youth. Youth respondents felt that political parties were equally important as village leaders, while casual laborers felt that NGOs/CBOs were equally important. Central government institutions (“government institutions”) were uniformly considered by all categories to be the least influential in citizens’ lives.

Most villagers also think that the village leadership is the level of decision-making whose influence has increased the most during the past 5 years (44 percent of responses); this is far higher than the increase of influence of NGOs and CBOs (17 percent), political parties (9 percent), religious leaders (8 percent), and the private sector (7.5 percent).

The most important criteria used by villagers to assess the influence of different levels of decision-making in their lives is, in order of importance, that institutions “treat all people equally” (28 percent), that they are “supportive” (27.5 percent), and that they are “close to the people” (20 percent).

Moreover, in another sign that the village level is the closest administrative level to ordinary citizens—despite citizens’ difficulties to influence decision-making at village level—most interviewees indicated that they turn to local officials first when they need help in any matters. Over 60 percent of interviewees said they sought assistance from local officials, including in order of importance, village chairpersons (30 percent), VEOs (23 percent) and sub-village chairpersons (7.5 percent). Less than 40 percent of respondents said they first turn to neighbors/best friends (20 percent), parents or family (11 percent) or other villagers (7 percent) in case of need.

In the group discussions, some villagers admitted to not knowing exactly where decision-making authority is located, but they nevertheless felt that decisions were made *through* their local leaders:

“We don’t know who influences decisions, though our leaders at [mtaa] level are always deciding for us” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

The importance of the local level to ordinary citizens was obvious in most areas surveyed, but not all. For example, in the case of Msorwa, a village 30 km from Dar es Salaam, respondents attached relatively less importance to the local level: perhaps as a result of the proximity of the village to the national capital, the national and supra-national levels (mostly in the form of international NGOs) seemed to be perceived as more important levels of decision-making that affect this village.

7.2 Village Leaders versus Higher Level Officials

The importance most citizens attach to decision-making at the local (village) level is not always reflected by the *actual* power that village leaders enjoy. In fact, the relationship between the district and/or municipal level and village leaders is often just as tense and top-down in nature as the relationship between village leaders and their own constituents.

Most village leaders—and some other respondents as well—acknowledged that it is at the district level where development projects are actually approved and decided:

“All development plans are discussed and decided at the district level and we village and ward leaders are informed. We leaders facilitate development plan here but we inform the district for approval and then call the public meeting to tell the villagers on the progress and their role to the project in question. Sometimes we plan here but without telling the district: that must be a very small thing because we fear the district may change the plan and get ashamed. For example we planned to have people with their temporary shops but they were pulled down by force that they are in the road reserve” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“[The district] is the one with the mandate to plan for the village and provide the budget to implement the plans and projects” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

In urban areas, the municipal level is the dominant actor. In an example of the hidden power available to higher-level officials vis-à-vis lower level leaders, village leaders in Ng’washi mtaa (Mwanza council) complained that they are being bypassed and overruled by higher level officials at the municipality who enjoy better education and other resources.

“[It is] hard...to work with educated people from the Municipality. Shamelessly they do things and become tough on us if they sense we are against certain ideas...It is as if there is no line between our mtaa and the Ward. They claimed this land in our mtaa is for the Ward, and without our authority they built this market. Nobody among us [leaders] can tell you who paid for this construction, how much it cost, and who wanted it” (FGD for leaders, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

The sidelining of local leaders in Ng'washi mtaa by municipal officials, as well as by the local VEO, has resulted in a further lack of transparency and accountability downward to citizens:

“We just see VEO and Municipal officials coming and things happening in our mtaa but we are no longer calling meetings regularly. We used to call meetings and tell people [...] things to implement but not in the past three years... We are frustrated and we are no longer trusted hence we need people to at least know that it is not our intention to let them down but circumstances are forcing us to do so” (FGD for leaders, Ng'washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).

This complaint was echoed by other leaders at village level:

“Plans come from the top (district level, TASAF)... Local development in the village is mostly influenced by decisions at district level. We have not been able to convince the district to have reliable water, dispensary or bridges to this road. We have become less successful at influencing decisions... The district [does] what [it] wants. People are complaining” (FGD for leaders, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

7.3 Influence of Non-State Actors

The non-state actors with the most influence at local level appear to be political parties and civil society actors, and to a lesser extent also religious leaders, although the influence of each of these actors varies from area to area, and is disputed by some respondents.

7.3.1 Political Parties

In most of the villages that were part of this Study respondents indicated that the ruling party (CCM) as well as other political parties were active in local politics.

On the whole, the impact and influence of political parties on local participation appear to be mixed. Figure 15 illustrates the influence of political parties in the three areas selected for in-depth focus in Phase 2, based on the results of individual interviews. A majority of interviewees in Kichangare mtaa and Ilopa village (70 percent in each case) indicated that parties there were influential because they “influenced development projects” and “revealed what needed to be done”. By contrast, a slim majority (50 percent versus 40 percent) of interviewees in Kagera hamlet on Ukerewe island mentioned that they felt political parties were not influential because they “only fulfill their own interest”.

In some areas, respondents reported that they felt that the multiple parties were having a beneficial impact on local governance:

“We have CCM and TLP in this village. The influence of political parties on people’s development is that opposition parties are putting pressure on the ruling party to improve its performance” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).




Figure 15: How influential are political parties in your village/mtaa?
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)

But in some other areas respondents reported that opposition parties are not able to offer enough political counterweight to the ruling party. The perceived dominance of the CCM party within the local administration sometimes makes it difficult for some to differentiate between village administrative positions (e.g. VEOs) and CCM party positions, and it results in a perception of censorship in village forums.

“There is nothing you can do with CCM leaders here...Meetings are not held here, it is always like a classroom where there is no noise accepted. No question, a leader selects who to ask a question hence its themselves who asks obvious question. That is why we , people decided not to attend the meetings any more” (LGD in Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“There is absolutely no change [in the way that decisions are made]. People are not involved in decision making. Everything is planned and decided by leaders, specifically [CCM] party leaders” (FGD for women, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).

“The most influential party is CCM because it influences all village development planning like health center and ward secondary school” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

In Bubombi village, which is ruled by an opposition party, the leaders complained that they were being sidelined and intimidated because of their political affiliation:

“Leaders here are not listened [to]; we are thought [of] as people from the opposition party... We are isolated because they label us as opposition and tough people...Our powers are being sidelined by the [District] ED, who threatened our very existence; the [District] ED has money and police to

intimidate us all” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).

Several respondents felt that, in their areas, political parties were “very influential” but that their impact was beneficial:

“[Political parties] are very influential since they educate local communities about human rights, character of a good leader and reveal some critical issues like corruption within the community” (FGD with leaders, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Political parties have much influence on the decision making at village level because all development projects in this village have been influenced by the ruling party” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

On the other hand, according to some other respondents the importance of the political party factor was minimal in their areas as political leaders are “all the same”.

“Political parties in this mtaa are not influential here. We see leaders crossing from one political party to another but they are the same. May be this year we can see some differences as Chadema has come into the district seat but, as a leader from CCM, I can assure you, wait and see if anything will [change]” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

While there was little consensus among respondents regarding the level of influence of political parties, it is noteworthy that the majority of respondents thought that there is little tolerance of opposing political views by local leaders in their villages.




Figure 16: Are opposing views on issues accepted by the leadership at local level?
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)

Most respondents signaled that opposing political views are regarded with suspicion, even in those areas with a presence of multiple political parties. Among individual interviewees in the Phase 2 focus areas of Kichangare mtaa, Kagera hamlet and Ilopa village, 44 percent indicated that opposing political views cannot be accepted, while only 13 percent said that opposing views are usually accepted. Forty-three percent said that such views might be

accepted, but that it depended on what the views are that are expressed (see Figure 16). Local leaders in some of the villages studied during Phase 2 (i.e. Ilopa village) even openly acknowledged that there was no space at all for opposing views.

However, respondents also hint that differences between parties might not always be political or ideological in nature; rather, they might (also) reflect the competition of rival personal fiefdoms.

“[In this village] there are no opposing views noted already” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

[Opposing political perspectives] are viewed as a “destroyer of peace and security within our community” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Some local leaders are turning local leadership into a personal business...Corruption [exists] among local leaders. They have sold all community lands and the money is not seen” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

7.3.2 Civil Society Organizations

Civil society organizations (comprising local community based organizations as well as local and international “NGOs”, with the latter being the civic organizations most familiar to respondents) have a presence in most of the villages and mitaa studied. Their presence at local level, in terms of size and impact, varies from small operations by a single CBO or NGO (with minimal impact) to multiple development projects operated by numerous organizations (with a larger impact on the village).

Opinion is mixed as regards to the relevance and impact of civil society organizations. In areas where these organizations are most active their contribution is deemed to be positive and influential—and even a substitute for (absent) government efforts—as these groups provide much-needed community education, including in community participation, which is welcomed by almost all respondents. Conversely, in areas where civil society organizations are absent or few in number, respondents assess their impact to be negligible.

“[NGOs] always provide seminars to educate local community on the importance [of] participating in development initiatives and plans within the community...They are active in promoting the use of condoms, to be faithful to our partners, they are educating people to participate in local community development initiatives and on environmental conservation” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“[The biggest influence comes from] street leaders and non-governmental organizations. For instance KIMWAMU Is a non-governmental organization which provides help to vulnerable children in our district...Local leaders are the one who are aware of our problem though they don't have funds to implement our suggested projects [*in contrast to NGOs*]” (FGD for casual laborers, Mchangani mtaa, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

7.3.3 Religious Leaders

Religious leaders are considered to have comparatively less power than village leaders and local officials, although they have more power than traditional leaders. As with civil society organizations, the influence of religious organizations and leaders varies in each area according to local leadership and activities deployed. In many areas, religious leaders are credited with assisting villagers with small development initiatives and with providing civic education, although their influence is felt primarily within their own congregations.

“The religious leaders are very influential. They sensitize people to participate in development projects...They have constructed a building with small rooms around the mosque and [they] encourage community members to initiate small businesses for their development” (FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwangi council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Religious leaders, especially Roman Catholics, are influential in village development planning. For example, they have invested lots of money in the project of people affected by HIV/AIDS” (FGD for women, Mjimwema mtaa, Njombe council, Iringa region).

“Religious leaders are influential to their church members only, not to the whole community” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

In some areas, however, there was just as much criticism of religious leaders as of government officials:

“Religious leaders too have become more of business people with no attraction at all. Can anyone here say we have any Pastor who is reliable?” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya council, Mara region).

“We have never heard religious leaders encouraging development issues” (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa region).

7.4 *Collective Action versus Self-Development*

As a result of widespread frustration with the process and outcome of participation in official structures, many villagers in several of the areas studied say they have abandoned their faith in the merits of participation and collective action. Instead, they are relying mainly on individual initiative—which some respondents term “self-development”—to meet their needs. This phenomenon was investigated in more depth during the second phase of the Study, in three villages selected randomly: the hamlet of Kagera on the island of Ukerewe (Lake Victoria), Mwanza region; Kichangare mtaa, Mwangi township authority, Kilimanjaro region; and Ilopa village, Kyela council, in Mbeya region.

In the three areas selected for in-depth study (Phase 2), “self-development” took the forms of petty bribery of leaders and officials (the number one strategy in Kagera hamlet and Kichangare mtaa), involvement in social networks (the number one strategy in Ilopa village), and to a lesser extent in all three areas, using networks of relatives. An illustration of the relative popularity of various self-help strategies, as indicated by individual interviews, is presented in Figure 17.




Figure 17: When you use your individual efforts to get what you need, which strategies are the most effective?
 (% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)

In some cases, the resort to self-development appeared to be primarily a coping strategy necessitated by the absence of any alternatives. For example, in the village of Ding'wida—a poor village lacking many services, with a newly created administrative structure—many respondents are forced to rely on their own initiative simply because so few collective structures are operational at village level. This situation applies also to other villages selected for this Study.

“Our leaders are not willing to call a meeting to discuss development projects and plans for our village... We don't have development projects and plans. [There is] misunderstanding among villagers themselves. ... We are solving our problems [by] ourselves in the village” (LGD and FGD with small farmers, Ding'wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

“The village is very young and we have not done any developmental project in our village. We are capable of organizing development projects though we don't have funds for implementation. Villagers are disappointed with government and they do not believe any promise from our top leaders” (FGD with leaders, Ding'wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).

“We are denied the opportunity to give out our views, ask questions or provide suggestions, for the betterment of our village. Now, villagers are more apt to self development than village development” (FGD for small farmers, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).

In the three areas randomly selected for in-depth investigation, most attempts at collective organization by villagers have failed. Self-development by villagers in lieu of participation arises for different reasons. In the hamlet of Kagera—as in Ding'wida village—villagers seem to go their own way as a result of poor and/or absent leadership at village level.

“Villagers have tried several times but the way the leaders treat them ...they have come to an end now. They have decided to do development individually. Participation is here, but at the family level, so we can always encourage each other to participate fully but more must be expected from [us], the leaders” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

In Kichangare mtaa, respondents signaled fear of their leaders, and frustration with their leaders’ seeming lack of interest in the mtaa’s development. The fear and frustration appears to stymie any motivation for collective action and results in a kind of tyranny of low expectations:

“We are satisfied with conditions we are living with, though, even if we attempt as a group to demand or influence decision making, nothing will be considered because our leaders are always ignoring our contribution because of our duties” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Participation from local community is not that effective since some of us are still scared to demand [our] right, [while] others are discouraged that even if you struggle to get something it will not happen to have what you have struggled for” (FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“We are not involved and [not] even invited to participate by giving ideas, though [leaders] always need us to contribute some amount of money for some project to be fulfilled” (LGD in Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

In Ilopa village, the local and district leaderships have shown themselves to be more supportive of collective demands by villagers. Women’s (informal) self-help groups, in particular, have been active and quite successful with regard to income-generation activities. The main problem here is that villagers’ attempts to organize have so far suffered from (what respondents describe as) “lack of unity”.

“[Small farmers organized to make a] collective demand to influence [local decision-makers] to access agro inputs and markets for farmers, but this has remained at an individual level because we don’t yet have an organization that can officially represent us...The local authority was supportive [as they] tried to register our village in the government agro-voucher payment to assist farmers in this village, but so far the process is unrewarding...The lesson learned from this attempt is that if we want to succeed in influencing local development in this village we should organize ourselves and work as one group” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“Collective demands [such as women’s self-help groups’ proposal for a palm oil extractor through TASAF] are more effective through informal structures like our women groups...but when we put collective demands on formal forums then it becomes a problem [as the proposal was not selected as a priority at the village meeting]. Sometimes we think that men do not understand us because those two projects could also assist them” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“Most informal collective demands are successful here in the village because we organize ourselves without the influence of local leaders, but there are very few formal collective attempts that have brought up fruitful results... There is very little follow up of village development planning” (LGD, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

In all three areas, a common theme was that most respondents seemed to believe that the reason for the rise in own initiative lies also with the failure of villagers' own capacity for collective organization and even with the “character” of their fellow villagers:

“Nowadays everyone fights for [him or herself], [unless they require help from officials]. The main obstacle [to better organization by villagers] is selfishness...80 percent of villagers of this mtaa have got this character... These people fail even to form a clan organization” (Interview with local business person no. 1, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“In [this] mtaa we have still have a problem of poor organization: no clear organization has been formed by the people in this mtaa. This is [because of] lack of education [for] the people about the importance of village organization...lack of ideology, financial poverty and selfishness” (Interview with local business person number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“Obstacles [to better organization] in my mtaa include poverty within the member group, carelessness which is caused by being not educated, lack of unity and having no clear decision” (Female interviewee no. 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“Individual effort [is easier than collective effort]. This is because it's simple to express yourself, to avoid some group conflict that may arise, and [it is easier] to give a bribe to respective leaders [as an individual] than as a group” (LGD and FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“People fail to participate in village development planning because they fear contributions that will accompany [such] planning. Illiteracy and inadequate information and [lack of] civic education [are some] of the obstacles that we have in this village that [characterize] people's participation in development planning” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

Past efforts at collective action by villagers in all three areas have been limited, or else have foundered, because of a variety of internal problems.

“Villagers do organize, but the problem is that only people of the same interest, class or status organize together. For example, educated people have established a certain training center over there with no any other” (Youth interviewee number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“The main obstacle as I experienced from before is difference in priorities. I believe that everyone has his/her own priorities so it is difficult to organize people with different views and priorities. And I know even myself I cannot

accept this organization because it is just a wastage of time” (Youth interviewee number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“We have puppet community members who always report some of our plans to leaders, as a result it leads to failure of [our] plans” (FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“A group has power compared to an individual, though it is difficult to organize community members in a group given that people are afraid to be watched as enemy by our leaders with in the mtaa” (FGD for local business people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“[Youth in this village] are not ready to organize ourselves as a group and do something. The problem with us [is] everyone wants to go his/her [own] way, which [has] proved to bear unfruitful results” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

8 Conclusion

Many of the reforms that are part of the Local Government Reform Program have been successful in encouraging greater local-level participation in development projects. The positive impact of the LGRP so far includes an increase in political competition, at least in parts of Tanzania, greater participation of citizens in local decision-making, and an increased role for village governments (relative to district and higher levels of government) in the affairs of villages.

But some of the broader changes required to cement the LGRP, including the deepening of democracy, increasing the demand for transparency and accountability, and addressing issues of elite capture, etc., will require much more time to take hold. In an illustration of this, the Study has presented a somewhat somber picture of the character of power and the avenues of participation available to ordinary citizens in villages and mitaa of Tanzania.

Some of the main findings of this Study have been previously confirmed in the existing literature on development and participation in Tanzania. Other findings are newer and perhaps more surprising. The conclusion of this Study summarizes both sets of results (familiar as well as “new”).

8.1 Familiar Themes in the Development Literature

In the literature on decentralization and participation in Tanzania, three themes in particular have echoes in the findings as presented in this Study. The first is that there is a long tradition of centralized planning in Tanzania, and that this tradition is reflected—to varying degrees—in the current practice of local development planning. The second is that the current practice of “participation” at local level is of a different kind than the one espoused by many (Western) development organizations. And the third theme is that participation—such as it does occur in local development planning—is often accompanied by patronage and lack of transparency. These three themes are briefly touched on in sub-sections 8.1.1 through 8.1.3 below.

8.1.1 A Legacy of Top-Down Development

The present Study recorded widespread frustration among ordinary villagers with the lack of opportunities for true (bottom up) participation and inputs in local development. To a certain extent, the prevalence of top-down decision-making is part of a long legacy of central planning in Tanzania. Already in the 1970s, it was noted (for example by J. Samoff, 1974) that Tanzania's system of development planning was top-down (from the central to district and then to village level) and that local councils failed to translate national policies in local terms: Samoff pointed out that local leaders merely acted as facilitators and counselors, and not as agents of mobilization and change.

More recently, A.S. Norman and L. Massoi (2010) investigated community involvement in local planning processes in Tanzania within the context of the decentralization reforms. They concluded that the contribution of the "grassroots" level to decision making is minimal and ineffective. In principle, the village meeting—the most common "invited space" at local level—can serve as a mechanism of social accountability. But in practice its role seems constricted: there are no documented examples of the village meeting overruling decisions by village leaders (REPOA, 2007). The village meeting's power to remove any village council member is infeasible as no mechanisms exist for the adoption of the procedure before the end of the tenure of councilors (REPOA, 2007). Thus the meeting has no tool to keep councilors' actions in check. Further, the law directs the village meeting to be called every three months. This means that in one year only four meetings can be convened, which may not be enough for ensuring participation and information sharing. Finally, when the village meeting actually meets, its role is considered ineffective and citizens feel they have no influence in setting the village plans (Chaligha, 2008).

In urban areas, there is no exact equivalent of the village meeting. Though the law directs mitaa to meet every two months and to submit meeting minutes to the WDC, the mitaa's role appears to be to implement decisions already made by the higher authorities. This practice has turned out to be a source of frustration for the leaders in the mitaa selected for the present Study, especially in Kichangare hamlet. As Amon Chaligha also found, mitaa citizens do not seem to have decision-making powers over matters affecting their lives: mitaa residents surveyed reported only being involved in the implementation of centrally made plans that did not include their priorities. Chaligha's respondents argued that instituting community involvement in planning process would lead to an increased ownership of projects, accountability, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency of the process.

8.1.2 Different Interpretations of "Participation"

Participation as "duty" is a rallying cry of many of the local leaders interviewed in this Study; at another level, ordinary villagers have shown themselves to be increasingly frustrated with the notion of "participation as contribution" without the quid pro quo of actual decision-making that would be expected to be its natural corollary. According to R. Marsland (2006) at least two contradictory meanings of participation are commonly used in Tanzania. The first, concerning "empowerment" and citizens' involvement in local decision-making, is associated with international development discourse. The second, concerning the obligation of Tanzanian citizens to contribute to the development of the nation (*kujenga taifa*), can be traced back to African socialism and Julius Nyerere's concept of self-reliance (*kujitegemea*).

Marsland concludes that the notion of participation is not adopted at the local level in Tanzania in a pure form according to international development organizations. Rather, the existing historical and cultural context influences the accepted meanings of participation. In

particular, participation is necessary because of the lack of government resources, but citizens are not expected to become too independent of the government, nor are they to be trusted to make decisions for themselves. As a result, the power struggles between the government and local actors cannot be understood within a framework that analyzes international discourses of development and participation alone. Insight can be gained only by recognizing that alternative discourses also exist and have long histories both in nation states and at a local level. Marsland argued that the official understanding of citizen “participation”—at least at the lower level—is one that literally orders citizens to *contribute to their country’s development* but *not in actual decision-making*.

8.1.3 Patronage and Lack of Transparency

In the study “*Local Autonomy and Citizen Participation in Tanzania: From a Local Government Reform Perspective*” Amon Chaligha (2008) argued that the key objective of the decentralization process in Tanzania—that is, to increase citizen participation in the planning and implementation of development activities at the local level—has (thus far) not been accomplished. Chaligha’s study investigated six cases across the country and found that participation was mostly exercised through community meetings and citizen contributions of their labor and financial resources. The cases also highlighted the risk of citizens being sidelined by council authorities during public meetings.

Chaligha found that, in the six councils he investigated—particularly in those with a “big opposition showing” (Chaligha 2008, 21)—political patronage was seen as a constraint to citizen participation in the formulation and implementation of council programs. In some cases, council officers’ political loyalty takes precedence over support for local development priorities. This very same observation was also made by respondents in some of the areas surveyed by the present Study:

“Political differences are the main obstacle. [Some] people are against good ideas simply because they are from an opposition party” (FGD for leaders, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).

Patronage and lack of transparency may be regarded as forms of hidden power possessed by higher level officials. Many citizens whom Chaligha interviewed said that they did not have ways to hold their representatives accountable for their actions, and councilors held limited powers to remove non-performing or corrupt council officers. There are no effective instruments and procedures in place for ordinary people to use when they want to hold council officials accountable. The lack of citizen involvement undermines the ability of the councils to improve the welfare of the local population as envisioned under the Local Government Reform Program. The village assembly, mitaa, and vitongoji are yet to be strengthened to play a strong role in local governance.

8.2 New Findings Presented by the Study

Some of the most striking findings of the Study comprise issues not widely covered in much of the literature on decentralization and participation in Tanzania. Six of these arguably “new” findings are summarized below. First, the Study could find no significant relationship between the quality and levels of participation and the “performance” of councils, as measured by central budget allocations to these councils. Second, there is a large gap between leaders and ordinary villagers when it comes to perceptions of participation. Third, economic empowerment appears as an important building block in the political empowerment and self-confidence of villagers. Fourth, petty corruption and bribery is

widespread in village life, and affects local power dynamics in manifold ways. Fifth, there are two types of accountability structures at local level—formal and informal. The success of either type of structure is mixed, and depends on local circumstances. And sixth, on a more positive note, the Study has uncovered the existence of some notable “success stories” of empowerment involving some of the most vulnerable groups surveyed (women, youth and small farmers).

8.2.1 Local Government Performance Levels and Participation

As indicated in section 3, one of the main premises behind the sampling approach of the Study was to examine whether there was any relationship between central government budget allocations to councils—which are based on councils’ “performance”—and the levels and quality of participation in villages/mitaa in these councils.

In order to test the relationship, the Study Team selected the top two councils (Pangani-Mashariki and Iringa) and the bottom two councils (Igunga and Mkuranga) in terms of their “total score” (average performance score), as indicated in Table 4, section 3. A statistical analysis using the chi-square test was carried out, aimed at identifying statistically significant differences in the level and quality of public participation between responses in the two pairs of extreme cases.

The level and quality of participation was assessed based on responses of individual interviewees to five questions contained in the questionnaire for Phase 1¹⁸. In all cases, no significant differences were found between responses from the top two and bottom two councils¹⁹.

1. *Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your village or mtaa during the past five years related to development planning [Q.3]?* There are no statistically significant differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of the level of public participation in decision-making activities over the past five years.
2. *Do you feel that you were able to influence decisions about development planning in your village/mtaa through these forums [Q.6]?* There are no statistically significant differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of citizens’ perceived ability to influence decisions related to development planning.
3. *Are there any development planning forums being organized by villagers without waiting for the government [Q.10]?* There are no statistically significant differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of forums independently organized by citizens.
4. *How successful are people such as yourselves in influencing decision-making in official forums [Q.17]?* There are no statistically significant differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of citizens’ perceived ability to influence decisions in official forums.

¹⁸ Question numbers [Q] refer to questionnaire for individual interviewees, Phase 1 (see Appendix 2).

¹⁹ Chi-square (χ^2) statistics for responses of interviewees from the top two and bottom two councils are summarized here for each of the five questions above, whereby “df” refers to “degrees of freedom” and “p” refers to the significance level (with 0.00 being most significant and anything higher than 0.05 being less than statistically significant): 1) $\chi^2 = 2,133$, df = 1, p = 0.144; 2) $\chi^2 = 4,725$, df = 3, p = 0.193; 3) $\chi^2 = 0,784$, df = 1, p = 0.376; 4) $\chi^2 = 3,685$, df = 5, p = 0.596; 5) $\chi^2 = 2,026$, df = 2, p = 0.363.

5. *Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general) [Q.23]?* There are no statistically significant differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of citizens' perceived ability to have an influence over their lives.

Based on the statistical analysis carried out on the top two and bottom two councils, it can be concluded that—at least as far as participation was measured in the five questions mentioned above—council performance in the three areas selected (overall council performance and per capita budget allocations for health and primary education) has no significant relationship with the level and quality of public participation in the villages and mitaa surveyed.

8.2.2 A Gap in Perceptions between Leaders and “Ordinary” Citizens

One of the most notable results of the Study is that—while overall findings do not vary significantly between different areas of the country, nor between rural villages and urban mitaa and hamlets—there is, however, a remarkable difference in attitudes towards participation between local leaders and other respondents.

The discrepancy starts with the very notion of what constitutes participation. For many leaders, participation is equated primarily with the simple fact of villagers attending village meetings; this is in line with the traditional view of participation as an “obligation of Tanzanian citizens to contribute to the development of the nation”, as described in section 8.1.2. The expectations of other villagers, however, were generally higher and more closely resemble the idea of participation as “citizens' involvement in local decision-making”.

In most cases, ordinary respondents felt that they have insufficient real inputs into decision-making in official, invited spaces (primarily village meetings). Most villagers feel that important decisions are made principally by local leaders, whereas leaders claimed that village meetings function as real decision-making forums. Leaders also claim that village meetings are “open to all citizens”, while most other villagers dispute this. The perception of official meetings as closed spaces can be interpreted as a form of hidden power possessed by leaders.

A majority of casual laborers, small farmers and women indicated that they had *not* participated in any decision-making forums related to development in their villages or mitaa during the past five years. These same groups (and youth) also feel that they are “not successful at all” in influencing decision-making in official village forums. Only among leaders was there a clear majority of respondents who indicated that they *had* participated in such forums. Leaders also are more confident than others that they are able to influence decision-making. Low levels of participation in invited spaces by ordinary villagers are directly related to a perception by these villagers that it is useless to engage in participation because their demands will not be met, whether or not they participate in village meetings. In addition, some respondents indicated feeling intimidated by village leaders and government officials for speaking out about their concerns during public meetings.

Women (in both the individual interviews as well as the FGDs) were generally more pessimistic than other respondents about their ability to influence decision-making, owing to what they perceive as their lower social and economic status.

Most leaders believe that the main purpose of village meetings is (simply) to pass on information to villagers and to seek their contributions for development projects. But many ordinary respondents complain that their leaders do not share enough information. For this reason, most respondents feel that they need their own sources of information, as they do not get sufficient information through official (village) meetings and because they feel that they are “hardly heard during community meetings”. The cycle of “disinformation” extends upwards, as village leaders, in turn, feel that they are regularly kept out of the loop by higher level officials.

8.2.3 The Importance of Economic Empowerment

Most respondents indicate that their economic empowerment, through better access to livelihood opportunities and their involvement in collective groups involved in such activities, acts as an important stepping stone for social and political empowerment. The connection to economic empowerment is often under-emphasized in rights-based approaches and efforts to deepen democratic participation, and suggests that support for strategies of economic empowerment is vital. Economic empowerment is also the central organizing theme in the case of villagers forming “claimed spaces”, in which they join together to develop common pursuits. Most claimed spaces identified by the Study took the form of self-help groups centered on income generation activities or emergencies. These were found especially in the case of women, youth and small farmers. Evidence of this, as uncovered by the Study, was found in small “success stories”, which are described as examples in section 8.2.6.

The corollary of the importance of economic empowerment is that the burden of ordinary villagers’ struggle to meet basic needs is an important factor standing in the way of their broader empowerment. This is especially true for women, who cite “retrogressive cultural beliefs that continue regarding women as inferior figures” (even within their own families) as one of the main reasons why they are unable to participate actively in village development. These traditional (social) views have a direct economic consequence for women: the domestic burdens of women, which are reinforced by these traditional views, limit their ability to participate properly in the socio-economic life of their villages and mitaa, either because of a lack of time (due to fulfilling household chores) and/or due to social prohibitions. Women’s less-than-full participation in socio-economic life, in turn, reinforces their sense of isolation and lack of self-confidence when it comes to influencing development in their villages and mitaa.

In the in-depth research phase, interviewees indicated that economic obstacles were among the most important factors in their difficulties to organize collectively. These included pragmatic considerations, such as poverty and “inadequate access to affordable agricultural inputs and micro credit”.

8.2.4 The Omnipresence of Petty Corruption and Bribery

Recent studies on petty and “grand” corruption have highlighted the problem of its prevalence, and of its social, economic and political roots. Thus, a study by Sikika (2010) on petty corruption in health services in Tanzania noted that corruption is “rampant” and “difficult to solve”, but that people’s perceptions of the extent of corruption does “not correlate with their own experiences of being asked for and giving bribes” in that “only a relatively small proportion of patients (18 percent) reported having been asked to pay a bribe” (Sikika, 12, 81). This finding differs from that of the present Study, which indicated that—in all villages and mitaa surveyed—most villagers readily admitted to needing to engage in petty corruption and “gift giving” to local leaders and officials in order to get almost anything done,

from demanding small favors to circumventing the local bureaucracy and “solving problems”. In fact, the incidence and necessity of bribery in village life is so prevalent that respondents did not know where to begin (and whom to approach) to complain about it.

The omnipresence of petty corruption points to the complex power dimensions of the problem, and the inherent duality of the nature of this power. The acceptance of small bribes represents a form of hidden power for village leaders (who extract bribes from their constituents) and district officials (who in turn extract them from village leaders). The inability of ordinary people to complain about petty corruption also represents another form of hidden power of leaders, in the shape of their impunity and unaccountability. Moreover, leaders’ access to bribes and material benefits also gives them symbolic and cultural forms of power that, according to the theory of cultural capital of Pierre Bourdieu, resemble “embodied capital” and a form of invisible power.

But this Study has noted that the act of being *able* to give small bribes and gifts also represents a form of hidden power possessed by ordinary villagers. Those villagers with more money can afford to bribe more and “get more things done”, while poorer villagers (often youth and women) complained that they were disadvantaged and “could not be successful” because they could not afford to bribe leaders.

8.2.5 Formal and Informal Accountability Structures

The present Study distinguishes between two kinds of accountability mechanisms at the village level: formal and informal. Formal accountability mechanisms revolve primarily around the village meeting. In principle, at village meetings, village committees present reports to the citizenry regarding leaders’ performance and achievements in the area of local development. Ordinary citizens, members of the political opposition, and representatives of civil society are all supposed to be able to make use of the village meeting forum to seek information and demand accountability. Outside of the village meeting structure, another formal accountability mechanism is provided by the village notice board. Leaders are expected to communicate to citizens on these notice boards what is being planned at local level and how funds have been spent on development programs. This Study demonstrates that the degree to which village meetings and notice boards fulfill their intended role as accountability mechanisms *in practice* varies to a large extent, depending on local leadership, pressure from citizens and opposition party members, and other factors.

Informal accountability structures take two main forms. On the one hand, some local leaders have indicated in the present Study that they take the time—outside of the village meeting forum, and outside of any other official structures—to assist their constituents, provide them with information, listen to their complaints, and persuade them where necessary, regarding local development issues and personal matters. Here again, the degree to which village leaders *actually* fulfill their role as informal accountability structures varies to a large extent, depending on local leadership and the determination of citizens to seek them out on an informal basis. On another level, in most of the villages included in this Study, ordinary villagers among themselves tend to initiate informal mechanisms to promote and inform each other about local development. These may take the form of small associations (such as women's groups, self-help groups, and income generation schemes, etc.), informal gatherings at “kijiweni” and “vijiweni”, and informal meetings of members of opposition parties. In the case of these kinds of informal gatherings, accountability is towards members of the group.

8.2.6 Some Success Stories

Success stories of inclusive participation and empowerment are still the exception rather than the rule in the villages and mitaa covered by the Study. Nevertheless, there is evidence that—in some areas at least, and among some groups of respondents—progress in the linked areas of empowerment and decision-making is being made. The main distinguishing factors in these “success stories” appear to be good individual leadership and collective organization (whether in formal or “informal” structures), mainly centered around income generation activities, as explained also in the finding in section 8.2.3.

The following examples from Msorwa, Ilopa and Mjimwema villages appear to demonstrate this in the case of traditionally least influential groups at local level, i.e. women, youth and small farmers. In these cases, growing confidence emanates from economic and social empowerment, which in turn has led youth and women in these villages to make more demands for participation and inclusion in local governance, resulting in positions of leadership. Moreover, the success stories indicate that progress towards participation and empowerment transcends the urban-rural divide as well as the issue of local government performance, as the cases hail from a range of different areas. Ilopa and Mjimwema are both remote rural areas, whereas Msorwa is a suburban village outside Dar es Salaam. And while Ilopa village is in the top level of councils in the sample (Kyela council), Mjimwema village is located in a medium-performing council (Njombe) and Msorwa is in a poorly performing council (Mkuranga).

“Our ability to influence development planning through official forums has increased...In the past most of leadership positions were under old people, but nowadays the youths are leaders and most youths feel free to give their views. There is improvement in youth involvement in village development planning...We have the ability to influence development planning...It has increased because youth are coming up with new ideas that [are] challenging ways of community life, including coming up with new economic activities like the fast food business [*processing and marketing of cashew nuts*]” (FGDs for youth and small farmers, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).

“We are becoming a little bit [more] successful at influencing decisions in village development planning, and this is because women nowadays are empowered to know their rights and are much more involved in income generating projects”....We [also] have the ability to influence development planning because the community is becoming more and more aware of the contribution of women in development” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

“Nowadays women are empowered and participating fully in development planning and income generating self-help groups. We have microfinance [programs] like FINCA and PRIDE, which are very much assisting women in income generating projects in this mtaa...Women have become more successful at influencing decisions in this village [as] they are empowered with civic education and income generating projects. They are also participating in political leadership, for instance Honorable Anna Makinda is our Member of Parliament and she is a woman” (FGD for women, Mjimwema village, Njombe council, Iringa region).

9 Recommendations

The Study proposes three sets of recommendations. The first is a summary of priorities advanced by respondents to achieve greater participation in their villages and mitaa. The second are the Study Team's own recommendations on how the LGRP could encourage more participation and strengthen mechanisms to demand greater transparency and accountability at the local level. Finally, the Study Team assesses the merits and effectiveness of the power cube as a framework for an analysis of power relations, and suggests three modifications to the model.

9.1 Respondents' Priorities for Reform

When the Study Team asked respondents what they thought would be the most important changes that would help to promote greater participation in their villages and mitaa, the two most important factors that were cited were 1) greater transparency in decision-making regarding local development (which reflects a demand for democratization) and 2) the need for citizens to achieve a better understanding of local development and procedures (which can be identified as a form of self-empowerment through better information). What these two types of responses arguably demonstrate is that many citizens are yearning for greater involvement in local development and governance and an end to isolation and marginalization.

9.1.1 "Less Politics" and Greater Accountability to the People

Those who have conducted longitudinal studies point to a gradual change as a result of democratization and decentralization policies associated with the LGRP. K.A. Snyder (2008), who conducted research on power and politics in Tanzania in 1990 and again in 2001/2002, claims to have observed a markedly different tenor between these two periods of time, as villagers began using the "rhetoric of *demokrasia*" to challenge government officials openly.

In the present Study, the rhetoric of democracy permeates respondents' recommendations for how to improve participation in their villages and mitaa. Respondents are increasingly using the *rhetoric* of democracy in their analysis and critiques of local-level participation. Thus, while many experiences of poor or absent local participation still abound, at least many respondents appear to be holding their leaders—and the open forums of participation in their villages—up to a higher standard, i.e. one that is characterized by the need for transparency, accountability and space for genuine civic inputs in decision-making. In general, respondents (including village leaders) demand "less politics" and more accountability from government officials, particularly at district level.

"We need to reduce politics in formal collective demands, and leaders should make sure that they are accountable to people, especially implementing what was decided by village general meeting" (LGD, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).

Leaders at district level should have a culture of visiting local communities at least once per month to know problems which are facing us" (FGD for local business people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).

“Participation can only be effective if elected leaders can be given [an] opportunity to implement people’s wishes and not directives from above... It is the District that controls our life here. They have not learned that the country wants people to run their [own] life. Or they might be advised wrongly, you know Tarime and Rorya are always thought to be bad places, but those are lies” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).

“The district must change and make sure they work for people, not for themselves. They must make sure they listen to village and mtaa leaders, otherwise more people will hate us leading to what will come as you saw Chadema coming to power due to what people see as a sleeping District Council” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).

“[The] district level needs to be close to the village level and bridge the gap between village and district level, and take appropriate action in case of poor village leadership” (FGD for youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanza council, Kilimanjaro region).

For village and district leaders, the most pressing priority was considered to be “involving local people more in village development planning” (60 percent of responses; 18 out of 30 responses). A particular priority for village leaders was considered to be improving their “commitment to transparency and accountability” (23 percent; 7 out of 30 responses).




Figure 18: What can village leaders do to make participation by villagers more effective? (% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)




Figure 19: What can the district level do to make participation by villagers more effective? (% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)

9.1.2 Better Information and More Transparency in Local Government

The most popular factors that respondents identified as contributing to greater participation was more “project education” (22 percent of responses), followed by “transparency and accountability” (14 percent of responses), more “loans to develop projects” (12.5 percent), and “participatory planning education” (11 percent of responses).




Figure 20: What is the most important factor that would help to promote greater participation in your village/mtaa?

(% of respondents; Total N = 120; Phase 1)

These results were common to all the respondent categories, albeit with slightly different priorities. The two factors most cited by local leaders were “transparency and accountability” (25 percent of leaders’ responses), followed by providing “participatory planning education” (22 percent of leaders’ responses).

For women interviewees, the two priority factors were “project education” and “good leadership” (each 20 percent of women interviewees’ responses). These were followed by “loans to develop projects” and “transparency and accountability” (each at 17 percent of responses). “Project education” was the overwhelming priority for youth respondents (43 percent of youth responses) as well as for casual laborers (3 out of 8 respondents). The main priorities for small farmers were “participatory planning education” and “providing estates for youth agriculture” (each at 19 percent of this sub-group’s responses).

Respondents also pointed to a role for themselves in improving the information flow at local level. In the in-depth research phase, respondents from the three focal areas of Ilopa village, Kichangare hamlet and Kagera mtaa were asked about the role of different levels of development (villagers, leaders and district level) in improving participation at local level (see next three Figures). At village level, most individual interviewees felt that their participation in official forums (invited spaces) could be made more effective if they identified their priorities better (10 out of 30 responses).




Figure 21: How can participation by villagers in collective (official) mechanisms be made more effective in your village?

(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2)

9.2 Study Team Recommendations

The Study's own recommendations address the twin challenges raised in the conclusion of the Study (both the familiar conclusions from the literature as well as the "new" findings): how can the LGRP encourage more participation and strengthen mechanisms to demand greater transparency and accountability at the local level in Tanzania?

The Study Team recommendations complement the proposals of respondents. They are indicative only and deliberately vague about the identity of the actors required to fulfill these tasks; more detail about precise modalities and institutional roles and responsibilities should be worked out more accurately later, within the context of the LGRP.

9.2.1 Improving Transparency

- **Reduce opportunities for corruption and patronage-based politics:** The LGRP has had a positive impact in allocating greater powers to village-level governments. At the same time, this has given greater opportunities for some local elites to capture power and abuse it for personal gain. In order to limit the scope for corruption and patronage-based politics, the Study Team recommends greater transparency in the managing of grants and transfers from higher levels of government to the district and village levels. For instance, transfers from national government to district and village levels can be made contingent on publication of detailed village finances on a notice board outside the VEO's office in a format that is easy to understand for the villagers and identify discrepancies, if any. This should be used in conjunction with national legislation on *right to information* that is enforceable through an independent agency. Another recommendation is to create more than one channel through which transfers and development aid flows into the village (e.g. through community based organizations that can apply for grants) and creating competition among these various agents of development. In such a situation the village leaders are only one set of actors, but they are not the only ones making decisions. It is also suggested to allow for anonymous complaints to be registered either by mail or by phone to a regional or national vigilance committee regarding local abuse of power.
- **Reduce the scope for partisan politics:** Some of the reasons for lack of citizen participation at the village or mtaa level have to do with political apathy of the people, which results from dominant political parties monopolizing the entire political space, with little opposition. And since political parties are organized hierarchically, they are not necessarily the best vehicles to organize bottom-up decision making structures from village to district level. Measures can be put in place so that local politics no longer remains partisan in nature but is mainly issue-based, where independent candidates contest the elections and where elections then become an instrument in constructing the local public agenda from the viewpoint of competing *local* interests. (Note that political parties usually sacrifice *local* development issues and focus primarily on representing one or the other competing *national* interests.) This form of representative democracy, together with the use of referenda (which can be seen as a form of participatory democracy) would address the current lack of political competition. Other ideas can be explored in consultation with national governments, for example: giving the opposition candidate a formal role in the village affairs even if she/he lost in the election would create some checks and balance on the power of the

village leader. But such a change would then have to be institutionalized in the form of national legislation and not be left to the discretion of the village leader.

9.2.2 Strengthening Participation

- **Address the cultural barriers to women’s participation:** Women’s voices were the weakest in most villages that were part of the Study. Affirmative action measures for women in local government councils implemented in other countries should be examined—i.e. India, where 50 percent of *panchayat* (village council) seats are reserved for women—to see what can be learned from these experiences. In the short run, affirmative action measures run the risk of attracting women from households that constitute the local elites. It is therefore important that these affirmative action regulations be kept in place for a sufficiently long duration of time so as to change the cultural perceptions about women in leadership positions.
- **Invite people to participate through anonymous channels:** The Study indicates that, in several villages and mitaa surveyed, ordinary citizens are scared to exercise their right to participate meaningfully in public decision-making. Quite a few respondents feel intimidated by village leaders and government officials for speaking out about their concerns during public meetings. In order to bridge the gap identified by the Study between citizens and invited (official) spaces at village level, anonymous instruments should be made available, such as secret ballots for village referendums, anonymous suggestion boxes, etc. These anonymous instruments, while not ideal in the long term to promote an open local democracy, would aim to give citizens—in the short to medium term—an outlet for their concerns and complaints, while also giving them the feeling that their priorities are being addressed. At the same time, these instruments might help overcome the barrier of fear of “intimidation” by local leaders that many respondents indicated exists.
- **Increase support for participatory budgeting techniques:** In some villages, participation was perceived to be more of an obligation than a right, related as it is to cash or labor contributions and less as a right to have a voice in public decision-making. Mechanisms should be increased for participation, without making too many demands on people (either in the form of mandatory participation or project contributions). This can be done by making available a substantial portion of grants and transfers for capital expenses a village receives and mandating it to be spent using participatory budgeting techniques. This will help change the perception of villagers as well as the village leaders that participation is not merely about *obligations* of villagers towards the state, but also about the *rights* of villagers to have a voice in state spending. In the medium to longer term, local governments should be granted powers to levy taxes/user fees that can pay for public works projects implemented by the village councils.

9.3 Strengthening the Power Cube as Framework of Power

This Study has applied the “power cube” as its theoretical framework to analyze the character of power in selected villages and mitaa across Tanzania. The power cube provides a very useful conceptual model to assess the level and quality of participation, yielding insights across three critical dimensions of power (spaces, forms of power, and levels of decision-making). There is still much work to do to further uncover the dynamics inherent in relations of power and decision-making across these three dimensions. However,

further research on power in Tanzania might benefit from continued adaptation of the model. Modifications are suggested in three areas.

- *Addressing linkages across power cube dimensions at multiple levels:* Findings of the present Study were organized carefully according to the three dimensions of the power cube, to adhere closely to the model. However, in practice, the three dimensions are inter-linked: visible, hidden and invisible forms of power traverse all three spaces of participation, across multiple levels of decision-making. The various inter-dimensional linkages are multiple, and complex. Further research on power in Tanzania might usefully illustrate these linkages across multiple levels of decision-making (not just at village level) and for different sets of actors.
- *Adding new dimensions of power and participation:* Two of the main findings of the Study (on the one hand, the omnipresence of bribery and corruption at local level, and on the other hand, the importance of economic empowerment as a pre-requisite for social and political empowerment (or at least, as a simultaneous development alongside social and political empowerment) fit uneasily within the existing dimensions of the power cube. These findings are multi-dimensional, but in addition, they point to the need to consider new categories of power, possibly related to “shadow power” (related to the way things “actually work”) and to livelihoods and resources, both of which are not yet provided for explicitly in the power cube framework. In the context of the latter, the focus of Naila Kabeer (1999) on “resources” as one of the three main dimensions of people’s ability to make choices (and thus achieve power) might be a useful model for the power cube (see also section 5.4.3).
- *Juxtaposition of other models of power:* The power cube is an excellent tool to “assess the ways in which power works” (Gaventa 2005, 10). Alongside this tool, it might be useful for further research on power in Tanzania to address also the question of what power looks like once it is produced (in any form: visible, hidden or invisible). In this context, the power cube could be usefully combined with other models of power that expose “hierarchies” (levels of intensity) of different types of power achieved. Two such models (among others) include those of Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim (2003) and Lisa Veneklasen and Valerie Miller (2002).
 - Goetz and Hassim make a distinction between “access”, “presence” and “influence” in participation, which represent steps of participation. The first step, “access”, involves opening arenas for socially excluded groups for dialogue and information sharing. The second step, “presence”, involves institutionalizing participation in decision-making, while the third step, “influence”, brings excluded groups’ engagement with politics, civil society and the state to a higher level, where these groups can “translate access and presence into a tangible impact on policy making, the operation of the legal system, and the organization of service delivery” (Goetz and Hassim, 39-40). The framework of Goetz and Hassim has at least two important lessons in the case of the present Study. First, opportunities for excluded groups to be consulted (through “access” and “presence”, for example in village meetings) do not lead, on their own, to policy *influence*. And second, opportunities to be represented in political forums or in the local administration (for example, in the case of village leaders or women councilors) do not automatically translate into *actual* influence and power.

- Veneklasen and Miller, as well as Rosalind Eyben (2004) and others, make a distinction between several kinds of expressions of power, including notably “power to”, “power with” and “power within”. “Power to” is defined as “the capacity to have an effect” or simply also as “agency” (defined as intention or consciousness of action). “Power with” is related to collective action, or “common ground among different interests and building collective strength through organization and the development of shared values and strategies”. “Power within” is the power of self-worth and sense of dignity that results from the power to organize with others (Eyben, 2-8). In their self-development initiatives, respondents in the present Study displayed a sense of “power to” (in individual actions) and “power within” (in informal group activities). However, the achievement of collective strength in the form of “power with” is (in most cases) elusive.

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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Focus Group Discussions, Phase 1

QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (PHASE 1)

Revised 29-Sep-2010

Background information:

Date and time:			
Name of note taker:			
Name of facilitator:			
Team number:	Team 1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 3 <input type="checkbox"/>

Select that which applies:	Village <input type="checkbox"/>	Mtaa <input type="checkbox"/>	
Name of Village/Mtaa:			
Name of Council:	District <input type="checkbox"/>	Municipality <input type="checkbox"/>	City <input type="checkbox"/>
Name of Region:			

Select that which applies:	FGD for Leaders <input type="checkbox"/> FGD for Women <input type="checkbox"/> FGD for Youth <input type="checkbox"/> FGD for Small Farmers <input type="checkbox"/> FGD for Casual Laborers <input type="checkbox"/>		
Number of respondents:	Total	Male	Female

Note on question numbering: Questions added by SIDA during comments on initial inception report have been numbered as "Extra" questions 1, 2, 3 etc., in order to enable continuation of data analysis of the original questions using the original question numbers, and to prevent confusion.

Introduction		
1	<p>Mnadhani ni miradi gani ya maendeleo kama miwili au mitatu ambayo ni ya muhimu sana katika kipindi cha miaka mitano iliyopita kwenye kijiji/mtaa wenu?</p> <p>What do you consider to be the 2 or 3 most important development projects in your village during the past 5 years? List here.</p> <p>Maelekezo kwa wadodoswaji: Katika majadiliano yetu tutatawauliza maswali ambayo yanahusu kushiriki kwenu katika kupanga mipango ya maendeleo. Wakati mkitoa majibu, tafadhali tumia mifano kutoka katika miradi hiyo miwili au mitatu ya kijijini/mtaani kwenu.</p> <p><i>Instructions for Respondents:</i> In this discussion, we will ask you a number of questions about your participation in development planning in your village/mtaa. Please refer your answers to the 2 or 3 projects that you mention here.</p>	<p>Taja:</p> <p>1. Project 1:</p> <p>2. Project 2:</p> <p>3. Project 3:</p>
Category 1.1: Spaces of Participation		
2	<p>Nani anatoa maamuzi ya mipango ya maendeleo katika kijiji/mtaa wenu?</p> <p>Who makes decisions related to development planning in your village/mtaa?</p>	
3	<p>Katika kipindi cha miaka 5 iliyopita, kuna mabadiliko yoyote kuhusu njia zinazotumika kutoa maamuzi ya mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji chako/mtaa?</p> <p>Has the way in which decisions related to development planning are made in your village/mtaa changed during the past 5 years? Please explain.</p> <p><i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question asks about <u>all kinds of decision-making forums</u>—informal and formal]</i></p>	
4	<p>Unadhani ushawishi wako/wenu katika utoaji wa maamuzi umeongezeka au umepungua katika miaka 5 iliyopita, au hakuna mabadiliko? Tafadhali elezea.</p> <p>Do you feel that you have become <u>more</u> or <u>less</u> successful at influencing decisions in your village/mtaa related to development planning during the past 5 years—or has it stayed the same?</p>	
5	<p>Kama ushawishi wako umekuwa na mafanikio kidogo au umebaki hivyo, nini hasa kinachokwamisha?</p> <p>If you have become <u>more successful</u>, then why is this the case? If you have been <u>less successful</u>—or there has been <u>no change</u>—what have been the obstacles?</p>	
Category 2.1: Visible Forms of Power		
6	<p>Jee unafikiri una uwezo wa kushawishi mipango ya Maendeleo kwa kupitia vikao rasmi?</p> <p>Do you think you have the ability to influence development planning through <u>official forums</u>? Please explain.</p>	

7	<p>Katika miaka 5 iliyopita, uwezo wako wa kushawishi mipango ya maendeleo, kupitia vikao rasmi, umezidi au umepungua, au hakuna mabadiliko? Umeongezeka; Umepungua; umebaki kama ulivyo; Sijui.</p> <p>Has your ability to influence development planning through <u>official forums</u> increased or decreased during the past 5 years, or has it stayed the same? Please explain.</p> <p><i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question asks about <u>only official decision-making forums</u>, such as village meetings]</i></p>	
8	<p>Kama umeongezeka ni kwasababu gani? Kama umepungua, ni kwasababu gani?</p> <p>If it has <u>increased</u>, why do you think this is the case? If it has <u>decreased</u>, why do you think this is the case?</p>	
Extra 1	<p>Je, mipango ya maendeleo kwenye kijiji/mtaa wenu inafuatwa? Kuna wanaofuatilia?</p> <p>Are plans for development projects followed? Are they followed up?</p>	
Extra 2	<p>Ni habari gani ambazo watu wa kijijini/mtaani hapa wanazipata ili kuweza kushiriki na kufuatilia mipango ya maendeleo?</p> <p>Which information do people receive that enables them to participate and follow up?</p>	
Extra 3	<p>Ni vyama vingapi vya kisiasa vilivyo katika kijiji hiki?</p> <p>How many political parties are present in this village/mtaa?</p> <p><i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question can be <u>observed</u> if too sensitive to ask]</i></p>	
Extra 4	<p>Je, watu katika kijiji/mtaa wako wamewahi kuomba kushiriki katika maendeleo? Kama ndiyo, walijibiwa?</p> <p>Have people in your village/mtaa ever demanded to participate in development? If Yes, what was the response? Select: Yes, no, I do not know. Explain.</p>	
Category 2.2: Hidden Forms of Power		
9	<p>Ili matakwa/maoni yenu yasikilizwe, ni njia gani mbadala, ambazo si rasmi, unazotumia/mnazotumia nje ya vikao rasmi? Toa mifano.</p> <p>What are the main <u>unofficial/informal</u> ways, outside of official forums, which you have available to make your views heard? Give examples.</p>	
10	<p>Kwanini mnahitaji vikao ambavyo si rasmi?</p> <p>What are the reasons why you need these informal forums?</p>	
Category 2.3: Invisible Forms of Power		
11	<p>Jee viongozi wanafaidika zaidi katika jamii ukilinganisha na watu wengine? Kama ndio, ni kwasababu gani? Elezea jinsi wanavyofaidika/mnavyofaidika.</p> <p>Are leaders more advantaged in society compared to other people? If yes, why? How do you explain their/your advantaged position?</p>	

12	<p>Jee wanawake, vijana, vibarua, wakulima wadogo wamesahaulika/hawafaidiki sana katika jamii? Kama ndio, ni kwanini? Elezea jinsi wasivyofaidika</p> <p>Are [women/youth/casual laborers/small farmers] more disadvantaged in society? If yes, why? How do you explain their/your disadvantaged position?</p>	
Extra 5	<p>Je, waganga wa kienyeji na viongozo wa kidni wana ushawishi katika kijiji/mtaa huu? Kama ndiyo, kiviipi? Kama hapana, kwa nini?</p> <p>Are traditional leaders and religious leaders influential? If Yes, how so? If No, why not?</p>	
Extra 6	<p>Ni kitu gani kinachompa mtu ushawishi zaidi: pesa au ardhi?</p> <p>Which factor gives a person more influence: money or land?</p>	
Category 3.1: Levels of Decision-Making		
13	<p>Mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji changu/mtaa inashawishiwa zaidi na maamuzi kutoka katika ngazi zifuatazo: Kimataifa, taifa, au ngazi za chini (Chagua ngazi moja)</p> <p>Development planning in my village/mtaa is most influenced by decisions at <u>what level</u>? Supra-national, national, or local level? (Select only one level)</p>	
14	<p>Ushawishi kutoka kwa nani hasa? Tafadhali elezea.</p> <p>The biggest influence comes specifically from who or what? Explain the reasons for your answer.</p>	
Conclusion		
15	<p>Kwa watu kama nyie, mnadhani ni mambo gani muhimu ambayo yataweza kusaidia kuongeza ushiriki mkubwa zaidi katika kijiji/mtaa wenu?</p> <p>What is the most important factor that you think would help to promote greater participation in development planning among people such as yourselves in your village? Mention only one factor.</p>	
16	<p>Kwa watu kama nyies, mnafikiri ni vikwazo gani vinavyokwamisha ushiriki wenu mkubwa katika kijiji/mtaa wenu? Revise translation.</p> <p>What do you think is the most important obstacle to greater participation in development planning among people such as yourselves in your village? Mention only one obstacle.</p>	

Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Individual Interviews, Phase 1

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS (PHASE 1)

Revised 29-Sep-2010

Background information:

Date and time:			
Name of interviewer:			
Team number:	Team 1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 3 <input type="checkbox"/>

Select that which applies:	Village <input type="checkbox"/>	Mtaa <input type="checkbox"/>	
Name of Village/Mtaa:			
Name of Council:	District <input type="checkbox"/>	Municipality <input type="checkbox"/>	City <input type="checkbox"/>
Name of Region:			

Select that which applies:	Interview category of respondent:
	Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Type of Leader: Village <input type="checkbox"/> Religious <input type="checkbox"/> Civil society <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Mention: _____ Woman <input type="checkbox"/> Youth <input type="checkbox"/> Small Farmer <input type="checkbox"/> Casual Laborer <input type="checkbox"/>

Note on question numbering: Questions added by SIDA during comments on initial inception report have been numbered as "Extra" questions A, B, C etc., in order to enable continuation of data analysis of the original questions using the original question numbers, and to prevent confusion.

Introduction									
1	<p>Unadhani ni miradi gani ya maendeleo kama miwili au mitatu ambayo ni ya muhimu sana katika kipindi cha miaka mitano iliyopita kwenye kijiji/mtaa wenu?</p> <p>What do you consider to be the 2 or 3 most important development projects in your village during the past 5 years? List here.</p> <p>Maelekezo kwa mdodoswaji: Katika majadiliano yetu tutatakuuliza maswali ambayo yanahusu kushiriki kwako katika kupanga mipango ya maendeleo. Wakati ukitoa majibu, tafadhali tumia mifano kutoka katika miradi hiyo miwili au mitatu ya kijijini/mtaani kwanu.</p> <p><u>Instructions for Respondents:</u> In this interview, we will ask you a number of questions about your participation in development planning in your village/mtaa. Please refer your answers to the 2 or 3 projects that you mention here.</p>								
<p align="center">Category 1.1: Spaces of Participation</p>									
2 (same as FGD Q1)	<p>Nani anatoa maamuzi ya mipango ya maendeleo katika kijiji/mtaa wenu?</p> <p>Who makes decisions related to development planning in your village/mtaa?</p>								
3	<p>Kwa miaka 5 iliyopita, umewahi kushiriki katika vikao vyovyote vya kutoa maamuzi kuhusu mipango ya Maendeleo?</p> <p>Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your village or mtaa during the past 5 years related to development planning? MC: Select: Yes; No; Don't know; No answer.</p>								
	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Ndio</td> <td align="center"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hapana</td> <td align="center"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sijui</td> <td align="center"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hakuna jibu</td> <td align="center"><input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>	Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>	Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>								
Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>								
4	<p>Kama ndio, ni vikao gani? Kama hapana, ni kwasababu gani?</p> <p>If Yes, what kind of forums were these? If No, why not?</p>								

5	<p>Kama ndio, ulishiriki vipi? (ushiriki wako ulikuwaje?).</p> <p>If Yes, how did you participate? Multiple responses, from passive to active; Select from: attendance only; information giving; consultation only; providing resources; by forming groups to meet objectives; interactive participation (joint analysis); self-mobilization (taking own initiative) (Pretty, 1996).</p>	Unaweza kuchagua zaidi ya jibu moja	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kuhudhuria tu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kutoa taarifa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kutoa mapendekezo	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kuchangia vitu/fedha	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kuunda makundi kufikia lengo	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kushiriki kwa kujumuika na wengine (kutoa uchambuzi yakinifu wa pamoja)	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
6	<p>Jee katika vikao hivi, unahisi umeweza kushawishi maamuzi kuhusu mipango ya Maendeleo?</p> <p>Do you feel that you were able to influence decisions about development planning in your village/mtaa through these forums? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don't Know; No answer</p>	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
7 (same as FGD Q2)	<p>Katika kipindi cha miaka 5 iliyopita, kuna mabadiliko yoyote kuhusu njia zinazotumika kutoa maamuzi ya mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji chako/mtaa?</p> <p>Has the way in which decisions related to development planning are made in your village/mtaa changed during the past 5 years? Please explain.</p>	Elezea:	
8	<p>Unahisi kuna vikao vyovyote katika kijiji chako/mtaa ambavyo hualikwi kuhudhuria au kushiriki? Ndio; Hapana; Hakuna jibu.</p> <p>Do you feel that there are any forums in your village or mtaa where you are not invited to attend or participate? Select: Yes; No; Don't know; No answer.</p>	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	<p>Kama ndio, ni vikao gani?</p> <p>If Yes, what kind of forums?</p>	Taja:	

10	Kuna vikao vyovyote vya mipango ya maendeleo, ambavyo hupangwa na wanavijiji bila kusubiri serikali? Are there any development planning forums being organized by villagers without waiting for the government? Select: Yes, no, I do not know. Explain.	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
Extra A (same as FGD Extra 4)	Je, watu katika kijiji/mtaa wako wamewahi kuomba kushiriki katika maendeleo? Kama ndiyo, walijibiwaaje? Have people in your village/mtaa ever demanded to participate in development? If Yes, what was the response? Select: Yes, no, I do not know. Explain.	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
Category 2.1: Visible Forms of Power			
11	Katika vikao rasmi, watu wa pembezoni, kama nyie (yaani kwa mfano, wazee, watoto, walemavu, nk.) mnakabiliwa na vikwazo gani, pale mnapotaka kushawishi utoaji wa maamuzi, kuuliza maswali, na mnapohoji uwazi na uwajibikaji? What are the main obstacles that people such as yourselves (i.e., women, youth, small farmers, casual laborers, the poor, etc.) face in official forums when they try to influence decision-making, raise questions and demand accountability and transparency?	Taja:	
12	Je, vikwazo hivi vimezidi au vimepungua katika miaka 5 iliyopita? Tafadhali elezea. Have these obstacles become more or less during the past 5 years? Please explain.	Zaidi	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Pungufu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hamna mabadiliko	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):			
13	Ni vikao gani rasmi ambavyo ni muhimu kwa watu walio pembezoni kama nyie ili kuweza kusikilizwa, kushawishi maamuzi, kuuliza maswali, na kuhoji uwazi na uwajibikaji?	Mkutano wa kijiji	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Mkutano wa kisiasa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Mkutano wa NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Mingineo	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Which official forums are the most important for people such as yourselves to be heard, to influence decision-making, to raise questions and to demand accountability and transparency? Select from: village meetings; meetings with politicians; meetings with NGOs; Other.	Toa jibu moja:	
14	Kwanini vikao hivi ni muhimu? Why are these forums the most important?	Elezea:	
15	Ni makundi gani ya watu ambao huhodhi hivi vikao rasmi? Tafadhali ainisha Which groups of people dominate discussions in these official forums?	Taja:	
16	Wanahodhi kwa namna gani? Tafadhali eleza How do they dominate?	Elezea:	
17	Kwa kiasi gani watu walio pembezoni kama nyie mmefanikiwa kushawishi utoaji wa maamuzi katika vikao rasmi? Tafadhali eleza (Kiasi kidogo, kiasi kikubwa, hawajafanikiwa kabisa). Revise translation. How successful are people such as yourselves in influencing decision-making in official forums? Select: Very successful; somewhat successful; somewhat unsuccessful; not successful at all; Don't know; No answer.	Umefanikiwa sana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Umefanikiwa kiasi	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sikufanikiwa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sikufanikiwa kabisa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
18	Kwa miaka mitano iliyopita, unadhani wanawake wamepata ushawishi mkubwa zaidi katika masuala ya mipango ya maendeleo? Do you think that women have gained more influence in development planning during the past 5 years? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don't Know; No answer.	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
19	Unafikiri wanaume wamepoteza nguvu za ushawishi juu ya mipango ya maendeleo kwa miaka 5 iliyopita? Ndio; Hapana, Sijui. Do you think that men have lost influence in	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>

	development planning during the past 5 years? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don't Know; No answer.	Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):
Extra B (same as FGD Extra 1)	Je, mipango ya maendeleo kwenye kijiji/mtaa wenu inafuatwa? Kuna wanaofuatilia? Are plans for development projects followed? Are they followed up? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don't Know; No answer.	Ndio <input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani <input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana <input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui <input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu <input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):
Extra C (same as FGD Extra 2)	Ni habari gani ambazo watu wa kijijini/mtaani hapa wanazipata ili kuweza kushiriki na kufuatilia mipango ya maendeleo? Which information do people receive that enables them to participate and follow up?	Elezea:
Extra D (same as FGD Extra 3)	Ni vyama vingapi vya kisiasa vilivyo katika kijiji hiki? How many political parties are present in this village/mtaa? <i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question can be observed if too sensitive to ask]</i>	Taja:
Category 2.2: Hidden Forms of Power/Disempowerment		
20 (same as FGD Q8)	Ili matakwa/maoni yako yasikilizwe, ni njia gani mbadala, ambayo si rasmi, unayotumia nje ya vikao rasmi? Toa mifano. What are the main <u>unofficial/informal</u> ways, outside of official forums, which you have available to make your views heard? Give examples.	Taja:
21 (same as FGD Q9)	Kwa nini unahitaji vikao ambavyo si rasmi? What are the reasons why you need these informal forums?	Elezea:

22	<p>Ni nani unayemfikia kwa urahisi pale mnapohitaji msaada katika jambo lolote? Tafadhali ainisha.</p> <p>Who do you turn to first when you need help in any matter? List options.</p>	Taja:
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Category 2.3: Invisible Forms of Power/Disempowerment			
23	Kwa mtazamo wako, unadhani una mamlaka ya kuendesha maisha yako (kwa ujumla)? Ndio; Hapana; Inategemea; Sina uhakika Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general)? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don't Know; No answer.	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
24	Katika mazingira ya pi? Under what circumstances Yes/No?	Elezea:	
25	Tafadhali eleza ni kwasababu gani? What is the reason for your answer? Open question.	Elezea:	
Extra E (same as FGD Extra 5)	Je, waganga wa kienyeji na viongozi wa kidni wana ushawishi katika kijiji/mtaa huu? Kama ndiyo, kivipi? Kama hapana, kwa nini? Are traditional leaders and religious leaders influential? If Yes, how so? If No, why not?	Elezea:	
Extra F (same as FGD Extra 6)	Ni kitu gani kinachompa mtu ushawishi zaidi: pesa au ardhi? Which factor gives a person more influence: money or land? Select: Money; Land; Don't Know; No answer.	Pesa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Ardhi	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
Category 3.1: Levels of Decision-Making			
26	Ni miundo ipi ambayo ina ushawishi mkubwa katika mipango ya maendeleo katika kijiji chako? Chagua kati ya miundo/taasisi: Which of these structures has the most influence on development planning in your village? Choose from: IMF/World Bank; other international organizations; other countries; national government; political parties; NGOs/CBOs; religious leaders; village leadership; private sector; or other (mention specific structure).	Benki ya Dunia	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Taasisi za kimataifa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Nchi nyengine	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Vyama vya siasa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Asasi zisizokuwa za Serikali	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Viongozi wa dini	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Uongozi wa vijiji	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sekta binafsi	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Yenginezo	<input type="checkbox"/>

		Tafadhali ainisha muundo maalum:	
27	Toa sababu ya majibu yako What is the reason for your answer?	Elezea:	
28	Kwa miundo/taasisi ambayo imeainishwa, ni upi ambao una ushawishi mkubwa zaidi katika utoaji wa maamuzi, katika kipindi cha miaka 5 iliyopita? Tafadhali taja muundo husika. In case of the structures mentioned, whose influence is increasing the most within the past 5 years? Mention specific structure.	Benki ya Dunia	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Taasisi za kimataifa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Nchi nyengine	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Vyama vya siasa	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Asasi zisizokuwa za Serikali	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Viongozi wa dini	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Uongozi wa vijiji	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sekta binafsi	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Yenginezo	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Tafadhali ainisha muundo maalum:	
29	Ni kwasababu gani? What is the reason for your answer?	Elezea:	
30	Je, umewahi kusikia sera ya serikali ya “madaraka mikoani” au D by D? Have you heard of the Government’s “Decentralization by Devolution” policy? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don’t Know; No answer.	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	
31	Kama ndio, unafikiri sera hii imeweza kuongeza ushiriki wa wanavijiji Tanzania? If Yes, has the “Decentralization by Devolution” policy in Tanzania resulted in an increase in participation by villagers? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don’t Know; No answer.	Ndio	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Kwa kiasi fulani	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hapana	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Sijui	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Hakuna jibu	<input type="checkbox"/>
		Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika):	

32	<p>Kama hapana, ni kwasababu gani?</p> <p>If No, what is the reason for your answer?</p>	Elezea:
	<p>Ni kwa vipi mahusiano ya kaya yanaathiri ushiriki katika maendeleo? Je, inawezekana kwamba watu mbalimbali wa kwenye kaya moja wahudurie mkutano na watoe maoni tofauti?</p> <p>How do intra-household relations influence participation? Can several persons of a family attend a meeting and can they express differing views?</p>	Elezea:
Conclusion		
33 (same as FGD Q14)	<p>Ni mambo gani muhimu ambayo unadhani yataweza kusaidia kuongeza ushiriki mkubwa zaidi katika kijiji chako kwa watu kama nyie?</p> <p>What is the most important factor that you think would help to promote greater participation in development planning among people such as yourselves in your village? Mention only one factor.</p>	Elezea:
34 (same as FGD Q15)	<p>Unafikiri ni vikwazo gani vinavyokwamisha ushiriki mkubwa katika kijiji/mtaa wako kwa watu kama nyie? Revise translation.</p> <p>What do you think is the most important obstacle to greater participation in development planning among people such as yourselves in your village? Mention only one obstacle.</p>	Elezea:

Appendix 3: Questions for Large Group Discussions, Phase 1

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LARGE GROUP DISCUSSION (PHASE 1) Revised 29-Sep-2010

Background information:

Date and time:			
Name of interviewer:			
Team number:	Team 1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Select that which applies:	Village <input type="checkbox"/>	Mtaa <input type="checkbox"/>	
Name of Village/Mtaa:			
Name of Council:	District <input type="checkbox"/>	Municipality <input type="checkbox"/>	City <input type="checkbox"/>
Name of Region:			
Number of respondents:	Total	Male	Female

Introduction

1	<p>Katika kijiji/mtaa huu, watu wengi walidhani kwamba miradi muhimu katika miaka mitano iliyopita ilikuwa ifuatayo (<i>Wawezeshaji: jaza kulingana na FGDs na individual interviews</i>)</p> <p>In this village, the majority of respondents thought that the most important development projects during the past 5 years were the following [<i>Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews</i>].</p> <p>Maelekezo kwa wadodoswaji: Katika majadiliano haya, tutafanya ufupisho wa mawazo yenu kuhusu kushiriki kwenu katika mipango ya maendeleo kwenye kijiji/mtaa wenu. Majibu yenu yanahusiana na mipango yenu ya maendeleo ambayo mmeitaja hapa.</p> <p><u>Instructions for Respondents:</u> In this discussion, we will summarize your views about your participation in development planning in this village/mtaa. Your answers were related to the 2 or 3 projects that you mention here.</p>	<p>Taja:</p> <p>7. Project 1:</p> <p>8. Project 2:</p> <p>9. Project 3:</p>
Category 1.1: Spaces of Participation		
1	<p>Malisema kwamba katika kijiji/mtaa huu maamuzi kuhusu mipango ya maendeleo kimsimbi yanafanywa na (<i>wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi hiyo kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual interviews</i>).</p> <p>You mentioned that in this village/mtaa the decisions about development plans are made primarily by... [<i>Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews</i>]. To what extent is this true?</p>	<p>Elezea</p>
Category 2.1: Visible Forms of Power		
	<p>Uwezo wenu wa kushawishi mipango ya maendeleo kupitia vikao rasmi (<i>wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati ya “umeongezeka/kupungua” kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual interviews</i>). Je, ni kweli ?</p> <p>Is it true that your ability to influence development planning through official forums has increased/decreased? [<i>Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews</i>].</p>	<p>Elezea</p>
Category 2.2: Hidden Forms of Power		

	<p>Ili matakwa/maoni yenu yasikilizwe, mlisema kwamba kijiji hiki/mtaa huu unatumia ... (taja njia) kama njia mbadala nje ya vikao rasmi ili kushiriki katika mipango ya maendeleo. Je, ni kweli? <i>(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual interviews).</i></p> <p>In order to make your views heard, you mentioned that you use the following kinds of strategies... [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. To what extent is this true?</p>	<p>Elezea</p>
Category 2.3: Invisible Forms of Power		
	<p>Katika kijiji hiki/mtaa huu, viongozi <i>(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati ya “wanafaidika zaidi/hawafaidiki katika jamii ukilinganisha na watu wengine” kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual interviews).</i> Je, ni kweli?</p> <p>In this village/mtaa, you mentioned that leaders are more advantaged/not advantaged in society compared to other people [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. To what extent is this true?</p>	<p>Elezea:</p>
	<p>Watu wa pembezoni kama wanawake, vijana, vibarua, wakulima wadogo <i>(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati ya “hawajasahaulika/wamsahaulika katika jamii” kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual interviews).</i> Je, ni kweli?</p> <p>In this village/mtaa, you mentioned that people such as women, youths, casual laborers, small farmers are more disadvantaged/not disadvantaged in society [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. To what extent is this true?</p>	<p>Elezea:</p>
Category 3.1: Levels of Decision-Making		
	<p>Mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji chenu/mtaa wenu inashawishiwa zaidi na maamuzi kutoka katika ngazi za <i>(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati ya ngazi za “kimataifa/kitaifa/ngazi za chini. “umeongezeka/kupungua” kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual interviews).</i> Je, ni kweli?.</p> <p>Development planning in this village/mtaa is most influenced by decisions at the supra-national/ national/local level [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. To what extent is this true?</p>	<p>Elezea:</p>
Conclusion		

15	<p>Mlitaja kwamba suala ambalo lingesaidia ushiriki mkubwa katika mipango ya maendeleo kwa watu kama nyie katika kijiji/mtaa wenu ni (Wawezeshaji, jaza nafasi hiyo kulingana na mawazo ya FGDs na individual interviews). Je, ni kweli?</p> <p>You mentioned that the most important factor that would promote greater participation in development planning among people such as yourselves in your village is the following... [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]? To what extent is this true?</p>	
16	<p>Mlitaja kwamba kikwazo kikubwa katika kushiriki katika mipango ya maendeleo katika kijiji/mtaa huu ni (Wawezeshaji, jaza nafasi hiyo kulingana na mawazo ya FGDs na individual interviews). Je, ni kweli?</p> <p>You mentioned that the most important obstacle to greater participation in development planning among people such as yourselves in your village is the following... [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]? To what extent is this true?</p>	

Note: Responses to “extra” questions added by SIDA during review of the original inception report (see questionnaires for FGDs and individual interviews) will also be reviewed and discussed in the LGDs. These responses will be added to the questions listed here.

Appendix 4: Questionnaire for All Survey Instruments, Phase 2

PHASE 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ALL SURVEY INSTRUMENTS (FGDs/ INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS/LGDs)

12-Nov-2010

Background information:

Date and time:			
Name of note taker:			
Name of facilitator:			
Team number:	Team 1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Team 3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Select that which applies:	Village <input type="checkbox"/>	Mtaa <input type="checkbox"/>	

Name of Village/Mtaa:			
Name of Council:	District <input type="checkbox"/>	Municipality <input type="checkbox"/>	City <input type="checkbox"/>
Name of Region:			
Survey technique:	FGD <input type="checkbox"/>	Indiv. Interview <input type="checkbox"/>	LGD <input type="checkbox"/>
In case of FGD and INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW: Select the category of respondent(s):	Leader(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Local Business People/Person <input type="checkbox"/> Women/Woman <input type="checkbox"/> Youth <input type="checkbox"/> Small Farmer(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Casual Laborer(s) <input type="checkbox"/>		
In case of FGD and LGD: Number of respondents:	Total	Male	Female

QUESTIONNAIRE PART 1: ANECDOTAL INFORMATION

Part 1 of the Phase 2 questionnaire asks respondents to provide anecdotal information to further detail their experiences with participation and power relations at the local level as recorded in Phase 1 of the research.

COLLECTIVE ATTEMPTS TO DEMAND & INFLUENCE DECISION-MAKING		
1-1	What are the most important development priorities in your village? <i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: Refer to the priorities mentioned in 1-1 when asking the questions below].</i>	
<p>We would like to ask you to describe in detail any attempt (whether success or failure) you have made within the last 5 years to <u>collectively (i.e., as a group, with other villagers)</u> make a demand or influence decision-making through the <u>official channels</u> in your village/mtaa.</p> <p><i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: In case respondents have made a demand or participated in decision-making within the past 5 years, then ask questions 1-3 TO 1-9 below].</i></p> <p><i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: In case respondents <u>have not</u> made a demand or participated in decision-making within the past 5 years, then ask only question 1-2 below].</i></p>		
1-2	If you <u>have not</u> made any collective demand or any attempt to influence local decision making within the past 5 years, then why not?	
<p>Answer the following questions if you <u>have</u> made any attempt(s) to collectively demand or participate in decision making within the past 5 years using <u>official channels</u>.</p> <p><i>[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: Ask the following questions separately for each attempt, i.e. Attempt # 1, Attempt # 2, etc.]</i></p>		
1-3	What was the objective of your collective attempt to demand or influence decision making at local level? What were you trying to achieve?	
1-4	Who initiated the attempt? And who joined the attempt?	
1-5	What was the official channel or mechanism that you used in your attempt to demand or influence decision making at local level?	
1-6	Which local authorities did you approach (i.e. village, district authorities and/or other local institutions)?	
1-7	What was the response from local authorities?	
1-8	Do you think that your collective demand or participation was successful? Why or why not?	
1-9	What do you consider to be the lessons from these collective attempts?	
1-10	Do villagers in this village/mtaa currently organize themselves collectively in <u>informal (i.e., unofficial) structures</u> to get the services and resources that they need? If yes, which structures do they use?	

INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES (“SELF-DEVELOPMENT”)		
1-11	What do you think is the best way to get the services and resources that you need in your village/mtaa: through your <u>individual efforts (i.e. on your own or as a household)</u> or through <u>collective demands, together with other villagers</u> ? Or does it depend on the situation? Please explain.	
1-12	When you use your <u>individual efforts</u> to get what you need, which strategies do you currently use? <i>List a number of formal and informal options (petitions, bribes, contacts, etc.).</i>	
1-13	When you use your individual efforts to get what you need, which strategies are the most effective? Explain why.	
1-14	Have your strategies for individual efforts changed at all during the past 5 years? Why or why not?	

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS—ORGANIZATION		
1-15	If villagers got together and organized themselves better (whether in formal or informal structures), would they be better able to get the services and resources that they need? Why or why not?	
1-16	What are the main obstacles to better organization by villagers (whether in formal or informal structures) in your village?	
1-17	Are these obstacles the same as before, or have you seen a change during the past 5 years?	

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS—PARTICIPATION IN OFFICIAL STRUCTURES		
1-18	How can participation by villagers in collective (official) mechanisms to solve development priorities be made more effective in your village?	
1-19	What can village leaders do to make participation by villagers more effective?	
1-20	What can the district level do to make participation by villagers more effective?	
1-21	Which other institutions should be involved, and what should they do? (For example: political parties, civil society, businesses, etc.)	
1-22	What can villagers do as a group (together) to make participation by villagers more effective?	

1-23	What can you do (individually or as a household) to make participation by villagers more effective?	
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QUESTIONNAIRE PART 2: RAPID ASSESSMENT

Part 2 of the Phase 2 questionnaire asks respondents additional questions about institutions at local level not (adequately) covered in Phase 1.

PLANNING PROCESSES AND INFORMATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL		
2-1	Have you heard about the O & OD planning methodology?	
2-2	Is the O & OD planning methodology effective in representing villagers' development priorities?	
2-3	What are your most important sources of information about development in your area?	

DEMOCRATIC CULTURE		
2-4	How influential are political parties are in this village/mtaa?	
2-5	How knowledgeable are you about the election process, including registration and voting?	
2-6	Do you think election processes at the ward level were free and fair?	
2-7	Do you think election processes at the national level were free and fair?	
2-8	Do you have confidence in political leaders at the ward level?	
2-9	Do you have confidence in political leaders at national level?	
2-10	Are opposing views on issues accepted by the leadership at local level?	
2-11	Are opposing views on issues accepted at national level?	

ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR		
2-12	Are there private entrepreneurs in your village/mtaa?	
2-13	If yes, how do you judge their influence in decision-making regarding local development projects?	
2-14	If yes, how do you judge their influence in decision-making regarding local politics?	

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY		
2-15	Are there any NGOs and/or community based organizations active in this village/mtaa?	
2-16	If yes, which ones are they?	
2-17	Are NGOs and/or community based organizations successful in promoting participation for development in your village?	

Appendix 5: Illustration of Local Level Decision-making Structures

