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25 Years IOV-IOB: Competence with Consequence?

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COMPETENCE WITH CONSEQUENCE?

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WORKING DOCUMENT

25 Years IOV/IOB: Competence with Consequence?

In the summer of 1977 the *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde* (IOV), Operations Review Unit, was formally established, and its first mission of inspection was carried out shortly thereafter in March of 1978.¹ Twenty-five years and 289 reports later IOV, now known as the *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie* (IOB), Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, can justly celebrate a quarter century of competence in the field of inspection and evaluation.

Starting out as an inspectorate investigating bilateral Dutch development projects, IOB has developed into an institution that seeks to “meet the need for independent evaluation in all fields of Dutch foreign policy”.² During its existence there have been changes in the approach and methodology of IOB. However, that which has remained unchanged in the 25 years of its existence, is its focus on independence and care for the quality of its reports.

The document that you have before you is the pre-publication of a four-chapter book manuscript that is currently being completed for publication in 2003. This document details the background to the book project, before dealing with the central research questions and the approach followed in the historical research. A substantial section dealing with the source material used, and the implications thereof for the findings presented, is followed by a short introductory section detailing the emergence of the IOV/IOB in the context of the 1970s, as well as some introductory ideas as to the position of the IOV/IOB in the context of Dutch politics. Thereafter an outline is presented as to the structure of the book, and a short overview of the contents of each of the four chapters is presented. In the book a number of themes follow through in the history of the IOV/IOB, of which two, institutional independence and periodic synthesis and evaluation, are amongst the most prominent. An overview of these two important themes is presented in this document, and a short section outlines the impact of these two strands on the operations of IOB in the present, whereafter a short conclusion seeks to draw all the strands together.

Background to project

In the summer of 1997, Jan Pronk, the longest serving Dutch minister for development cooperation, commissioned two academic historical projects to give substance to the upcoming commemoration of 50 years of Dutch development cooperation. The first still ongoing project consisted of a series of reprinted source materials relating to Dutch development cooperation.³ The second project consisted of an edited volume of essays dealing with an overview of fifty years of Netherlands development cooperation since 1949.⁴ As the drafts and proofs of the edited volume, *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949 – 1999*, were doing the rounds, an IOB office meeting held on 19 August 1999 decided that:

In het kader van “50 jaar Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking” wordt uitgezocht welk deel van het totale hulpbedrag door IOB-evaluaties is gecoverd.⁵

It was within the parameters of the discussions relating to the effectiveness of Dutch development aid, that the institution tasked with precisely this function, the IOB, began carrying out research which sought to access the extent to which IOB had covered Dutch development assistance. Seven months later, on the last day of March 2000, the assembled staff of IOB gathered to discuss the draft working document entitled *Reikwijdte IOB-onderzoeken* (Scope of IOB research).⁶ Apart from a few general comments, the working document was welcomed and the suggestion was made that in time the document could be combined with further information.⁷ This was to include information on the development of staff, and the activities of the unit with regard to 25 years of IOB/IOV. Furthermore, it was suggested that, “in this context it will be investigated if the history of the IOV can be substantiated”.⁸ It seems that the substantiated history referred to in the minutes of the IOB office meeting in early 2000 were the foreboding of the pre-publication that you now bear in your hands.

The coming of IOV

The 1970's saw a period of unprecedented expansion and interest in development aid in the Netherlands.⁹ This stands in stark contrast to the present, in which, in the interests of a populist rightwing coalition, the minister of development cooperation was scrapped from the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Yet, then as now, there were numerous forces operating within Dutch society, some of which wished for nothing more

than to reduce Dutch government spending on development aid and cooperation. In a series of sensational articles the Dutch rightwing populist press exposed a number of failures in Dutch development aid.¹⁰ The underlying tenor of these articles consistently emphasized, as they continue to do in the present, that the hard earned moneys of Dutch tax payers were being ill-spent or frittered away on nonsensical issues.

In the late 1970s, the then minister of development cooperation, Pronk, resolved to undertake action which would ensure that he would remain one step ahead of the snooping journalists of the rightwing press. The largest newspaper in the Netherlands, *De Telegraaf*, which bore the slogan *De wakkerste krant van Nederland* [The most awake paper of the Netherlands], had consistently sought to expose scandals and the mismanagement of funds within the context of Dutch development aid and cooperation. Pronk no longer wished to be pipped to the post by journalists of *De Telegraaf*, instead inspectors, operating independently of the ministry, were to be sent out into the world of development aid and cooperation to root out and report on possible scandals ahead of the journalists. These new inspectors were to report directly and confidentially to the minister. They were to be the minister's own reporters, answerable to no one else. In this manner the idea for the establishment of the *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde*, later to become the *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie*, came about.

In the course of our work the influence and power of each successive director of the service, in determining policy, corporate behaviour and the like has become apparent. Initially it had been decided to portray the history of IOV/IOB through concentrating on and examining the activities of the Inspection service in a few representative countries on the three continents in which the Inspectors have been consistently involved since the establishment of IOV. However, as our interviews and our work in the archives in The Hague made apparent, the changing history of IOV/IOB could best be explained through following the course of IOV/IOB under its respective directors. The three directors that have served IOV/IOB thus far have determined, to a far greater extent than anything else, the policies pursued by IOV/IOB; this ranges from the banal, such as the changing layout and cover styles of IOV/IOB reports with the changing of the guard, through to the more serious relating to decisions regarding research subjects and the like. This is not to say though, that the impact of changing governments and, until recently, ministers for development aid and cooperation, had no impact on the policies and activities of IOV/IOB. Far

from it, changing governments, ministers, and opposition parties made grateful and abundant use of the materials presented by IOV/IOB, and have consistently sought to influence the policies and directions pursued by the service. In addition increasing international cooperation in the fields of inspection and evaluation, particularly within the OECD,¹¹ have served to influence the policies and direction of the IOB.

Until recently, the policies chosen and the directions chosen within the Dutch department of foreign affairs, with regard to development aid and cooperation, swung through cycles of choices that were largely dependent on which political parties had formed the coalition government of the day. Thus, with regard to development aid and cooperation, governments dominated by the Christian Democrats have tended to display an above average interest in rural development and the NGO sector. Liberal government ministers have tended to emphasise private sector development, whilst governments dominated by the social democrats have sought to emphasise education, health care, and good governance in their contributions to Dutch development aid. Each of these different emphases has had an impact on the manner in which the Minister for Development Cooperation has sought to influence and deal with the research and reports submitted by IOV/IOB. At times, ministers have gratefully made use of the IOV reports that castigated the development initiatives of their predecessors, only to later seek to tone down the comments of IOV reports that were critical of development initiatives undertaken under their own administration.

All the Dutch Ministers for Development, Pronk, De Koning, Van Dijk, Schoo, Bukman, and Herfkens, as well as State Secretary for Development cooperation Van Aardenne, had a high regard for the service and were convinced of the necessity of the service. Though it can be argued that in sum total the reports of the service have had little to no noticeable impact on the activities of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation, all of the ministers used IOV/IOB to legitimate their own activity as Minister for Development Cooperation and ensured that the service did not come in for harsh criticism or lethal budget cuts. As an employee noted, "no parliamentary debate has taken place in which the service has not been presented in a positive light".¹²

Structure of the manuscript

Elsewhere the renowned historian John Iliffe has noted that the essence of history is complexity.¹³ Seeking to write a history of IOV/IOB under extreme time constraints has made Iliffe's dictum all the more apparent. Nevertheless, in seeking to make sense of the complexity that is the history of IOV/IOB there are a number of themes that can be taken up and followed through. Much as guy ropes support and give form to voluminous tents, we will be following and detailing a few themes and aspects of IOV/IOB, which we believe give form and structure to its extensive history. These themes will be pursued through four chapters that have been arranged chronologically. Apart from the first chapter, which details the establishment of IOV, the three subsequent chapters are structured around the directorships of the three directors that have determined IOV/IOB. Each chapter is structured in the same set manner. Each chapter begins by providing an overview of who was employed and involved in IOV/IOB at the time, followed by a narrative chronological history of the service. After these dry bones of structure the chapters concentrate on the controversies and distinguishing features of each directorship. Case studies detailing the operations of IOV/IOB under each of the three directorships are presented in such a manner as to provide the reader with insight into the operations of IOV/IOB at the time. If there is an over arching theme that binds all of the chapters in the book together, then it is the initial preliminary attempt presented here, which seeks to detail and describe the manner in which the reports of IOV/IOB, its prime product, have impacted within the wider world of Dutch politics and Dutch Development aid and cooperation in particular.

Chapter one

Chapter one, "Pronk's Reporters", deals with the establishment of the *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde* (IOV) Operations Review Unit in the context of developments within Dutch development cooperation following the Second World War. It describes the manner in which Dutch development funding increased substantially through the years culminating in the establishment of the left of centre government of Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl in 1973, which promised to invest 1.5% of NNI of the Netherlands in development cooperation. In the early 1970s funding to the *Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers* (SNV) Dutch Volunteer Organisation, which had been established in 1965, increased by no less than 60% and came to fulfil the popular public image of Dutch development cooperation. In

addition the young, and often inexperienced volunteers, came to be the focus point for populist media attention, which lapped up a seemingly never-ending stream of mishaps, scandals, and development disasters, as a means with which to attack, not only the minister for development cooperation, Jan Pronk, but also, and more importantly so, the socialist government of Joop den Uyl. It is an undeniable fact that with the massive expansion in development cooperation, the quality of the aid being provided came under pressure. Anxious to ensure the quality of the aid being provided, as well as to ensure that he received reliable and independent information as to what was actually taking place in the field, Jan Pronk initiated the establishment of the Operations Review Unit. His prime intention was the establishment of a service of independent inspectors, who would investigate whether or not Dutch development aid was being spent in accordance with the intended aims of the minister. Such a service was not to keep itself occupied with evaluation, which would require more intensive research on the basis of far broader sets of questions, neither, was it to be an exercise in financial control, which would be of more limited scope than the Minister's intentions. Furthermore, the envisaged inspectorate was to be an institution that was independent of the departments engaged in policy development and the departments, embassies and so forth, engaged in the execution of policy.¹⁴ In addition, and in contrast to later developments in IOV, the unit was to concentrate solely on bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, development cooperation. Furthermore, once again in contrast to later developments, its reports were to be strictly confidential. Thus, in the eyes of Pronk and those who established the Operations Review Unit in 1977, it was to be a truly independent inspectorate dealing solely with bilateral Dutch development cooperation, answerable to none, except the Minister himself.

Chapter two

Chapter two, "Iovivat: IOV under the directorship of H.J. Kramer", details the history of IOV under its first director Joop Kramer. The chapter indicates how with remarkable energy the new director of IOV initiated the newly established unit. Effectively IOV and its new director hit the ground running and even before the first hand-picked inspectors had been appointed, Kramer had already led and completed the first mission of inspection to Egypt. Under the directorship of Kramer the Operations Review Unit developed as an Inspectorate that travelled far and wide across the planet inspecting projects and activi-

ties funded by Dutch development money. It was a case of learning on the job and seeking to cover as much terrain as possible; indeed in the period of Kramer's directorship no less than 238 reports were completed. To be sure, these reports, some of which were no more than four pages long, were specifically project inspection reports, in which findings regarding one or more specific projects were presented. It was in seeking to gain an overview of the whole of Dutch development cooperation that the unit came to be over-stretched. With a limited number of staff the unit could not hope to gain a full overview of developments, it did however attempt to provide a cross section of activities, and towards the end of Kramer's directorship the review unit found itself moving away from single project reports and beginning with sector reports. At the same time, anxious to improve the quality of its research, the unit submitted itself to repeated self-reviews and evaluations. Chapter two singles out two missions of inspection, to Egypt and Thailand, carried out under the directorship of Kramer. These descriptions provide us with an understanding as to the manner in which IOV functioned at the time. The first mission to Egypt, which was carried out under the personal leadership of Kramer, provides us with insight into the manner in which Kramer believed IOV was meant to function; quick, thorough, and with immediate and clear feedback to the departments responsible for the planning and implementation of development policies. The mission to Thailand, on the other hand, which was also carried out under the personal leadership of Kramer, never resulted in a completed report, and provides an indication as to the over-stretch that was becoming apparent within the activities of the unit towards the end of the directorship of Kramer.

At this stage IOV reports were strictly confidential. In addition, those involved in the projects and activities being inspected, were not granted the right to comment on the findings of the inspectors prior to the completion of the report. Nevertheless IOV had no formal power to ensure that report recommendations would indeed come to be carried out. The appointment of Prince Claus as Inspector General Development Cooperation (IGOS) ensured that henceforth subtle yet direct pressure came to be enforced on the basis of his status as a respected royal. A further development towards the end of Kramer's directorship was that report summaries, and finally with the coming of Minister Schoo, whole reports came to be submitted to parliamentary committees and parliament. Hereby the reports of IOV ceased to be confidential, and became accessible for control and public enforcement by parliament. That is, henceforth parliament had direct and clear insight into the functioning of Dutch development policies.

Chapter three

Chapter three, “Research(ing) development: the directorship of Von Metzsch”, details the directorship of Ms. Hedy von Metzsch. As the second director of IOV, Von Metzsch radically changed the manner in which the unit operated and presented its findings. Under Von Metzsch IOV was transformed from an inspectorate, concerned with the ins and outs of single development projects, into an institution that conducted research of the highest quality concerning broad swathes of Dutch development activities ranging from sector programmes, country studies, and even the internal monitoring and evaluation of Dutch development programmes. With Von Metzsch research reports were made wholly public and stakeholders involved in programmes were invited to comment and reply to draft reports compiled by IOV. Research time and writing intensified substantially and under Von Metzsch the average time for research and reports increased to 36 months. Administrative meetings within IOV, which under Kramer had been weekly affairs, were reduced to a minimum, and replaced, to some extent, by academic meetings in which research and draft reports were subjected to intense and extensive discussion.

Though the number of reports produced by IOV was reduced considerably under the directorship of Von Metzsch, their quality and occasional political impact increased dramatically. Chapter two highlights and discusses the impact of a number of reports written under the directorship of Von Metzsch, in particular the chapter deals with the manner in which Dutch politicians used the reports to further their own political agendas. Thus, when Jan Pronk once again became minister for development cooperation in 1989 he gratefully made use of the IOV report *Aid or Trade?* to lambaste his predecessors, secure in the knowledge that the research carried out by IOV had been commissioned and carried out entirely independent of his term in office. As such Pronk could and did use and present the findings of *Aid or Trade?* to substantiate his own political agenda. However, in the run-up to the elections of 1994 Pronk found himself on the receiving end of an attack initiated by the leader of the Dutch Liberal party Frits Bolkestein. In his attack on Pronk and Dutch development cooperation as a whole, Bolkestein had discovered a political issue that found a certain amount of resonance within Dutch society at the time. Frustrating for Pronk, and to some extent for IOV, was the fact that Bolkestein was remarkably well-informed and appeared to have had access to a draft IOV report on Tanzania. Making use of the published reports on India, Mali, and Tanzania, Bolkestein was able to carry out con-

certed attacks on Pronk and the Labour party and ensure that Dutch development cooperation as a whole came to be reviewed and reorganised. Pronk never forgave IOV/IOB for what he believed was the inopportune publication of IOV reports and sought henceforth to delay their publication to politically more opportune moments. The extreme reaction of the minister, as well as the pressure exerted by the minister on IOV, led to a situation in which the independence of IOV increasingly came under threat. It is true to say that under Von Metzsch IOV reached its zenith in terms of quality and impact. Never before had IOV featured in a coalition agreement, and never before had such detailed histories of Dutch development cooperation been written beyond the realms of academia.

Chapter four

In the autumn of 1999 Rob van den Berg was appointed as director of IOV, and as with the other directors he too sought to change the public face of IOB. The many changes brought about by Van den Berg were grounded upon two documents, *De reikwijdte van IOB studies and Voortrollende programering*. The first document dealt with the range and scope of IOB inspection and evaluation between 1978 – 1999, and together with other material, most notably OECD/DAC findings, *De reikwijdte van IOB studies* provided the material basis for the second document, *Voortrollende programering*, a detailed outline as to the approach that was to be followed by IOB in the future. The changes brought about by Van den Berg became most immediately apparent in the form and later the content of the research reports produced by IOB. Reports were now structured and presented in such a manner that they would be accessible to as broad a public as possible. The other changes introduced by Van den Berg, included amongst others, the publication of working documents, joint evaluations with other evaluation services, international activities, including partnerships with Utstein¹⁵ evaluation services, OED/World Bank¹⁶ and EO/UNDP,¹⁷ as well as, and in contrast to those who had preceded him, Van den Berg sought to continue to include a direct southern input into the business of evaluation.

Chapter four seeks to discuss and describe the functioning of IOB under the directorship of Van den Berg. It does this by referring to the changes in research, reporting, and presentation that were brought about by Van den Berg. In describing these changes, the chapter also discusses two particular cases that reflect on the functioning and effectiveness of IOB under Van den Berg. Following a short discussion on attempts by IOB to

improve the accessibility of its reports and findings, chapter four discusses the extent to which civil servants make use of IOB reports in determining policy the present The chapter indicates that IOB consciously produces material in such a manner as to make it accessible to as broad an audience as possible, including and most importantly so foreign ministry civil servants engaged in developing policy with regard to Africa Unfortunately, a number of these civil servants, in seeking to develop policy with regard to Africa, refuse to take cognisance of, let alone consider, the findings of IOB in their endeavours to disburse their annual budget That is, foreign ministry civil servants are more intent on ensuring that their annual budget allocations are used up, than that they are interested in the quality of the development assistance being provided

The second specific case dealt with in the chapter relates to the follow-up evaluation of Dutch development activities undertaken in Mali following the publication of the initial Mali report in 1994 The research carried out by IOB in this instance was partly carried over from the directorship of Von Metzsch In contrast to the bulk of the research carried out under the second director the follow-up research in Mali was to be a conscious attempt at reducing research and reporting time Following research in Mali and the Netherlands, the first proofs of the core findings of the report were submitted to the Minister in August 2000 Interestingly, at this stage the minister sought to ignore the findings of IOB, an institutional instrument that had been established by her predecessors precisely for the purposes of evaluating and providing recommendations with regard to policy being implemented within the context of Dutch development cooperation Instead, the minister sought direct contact with precisely those institutions and officials that had been criticised by IOB That is the minister consciously ignored the findings and reports of her own inspectorate, in favour of institutions and civil servants that had been criticised in the Mali II report The minister's policy reaction did not tackle the issues raised by Mali II, instead she concentrated on developments in Mali following 1998, that is after the period of time in which IOB had conducted its research It could be argued that the reaction of the Minister was in effect a standard reaction to evaluation reports That is, events in the past have been noted and action has already been undertaken to redress the situation¹⁸

That the parliament of the Netherlands did not take the minister to task for failing to respond adequately to the Mali II report is not a fault of IOB However, it does serve to emphasise that issues relating to development cooperation have ceased to be as popu-

lar as they were in the past within parliament The times in which young politicians sought to make a name for themselves by involving themselves in the intricacies of development cooperation appear to have passed

Independence and Evaluation

Apart from the production of reports of inspection and evaluation, two themes have come to the fore in the book manuscript that have consistently characterised the existence of IOV/IOB since its inception in 1977 These two themes run throughout the book, and are an integral part of every directorship that IOV/IOB has known since its inception These themes are, the continual struggle for the maintenance of the units institutional independence, and the unit's periodic review and evaluation of its working field, in the interests of better fulfilling its mandate

The struggle for independence

In the course of the existence of IOV/IOB there have been two attempts undertaken from within the ministry of foreign affairs to end or curtail the institutional independence of IOV/IOB In both instances the unit successfully defended and retained its independence To be sure, assaults on the independence of IOB also take place on the level of programming, the determination of terms of reference, budgeting, reporting, as well as during research proper Nevertheless, at the time of its inception IOV was placed within the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS) directly under the Director General and thereby independent of the other operational departments and divisions

1) IOV - ISB

In keeping with the recalibration of Netherlands foreign policy following the cabinet-formation of 1994, a decision was taken to remove the barriers that had existed hitherto between, foreign relations, economic relations, and development cooperation, the traditional spheres of activity of foreign policy This recalibration necessitated a complete re-organisation of the department and numerous project-groups spent a large part of 1996 working on this topic One of these project-groups, the "*Deelprojectgroep Ontwikkeling instrument integral management*" (Sub-project group development integrated management instrument) concentrated amongst other things on the evaluation capacities of foreign affairs

In the course of discussions within the project-group a proposal was tabled by the director of Financieel-Economische Zaken (FEZ) suggesting that IOV be combined with the Inspectie Buitenlandse Dienst (ISB). Until then the ISB had kept itself occupied with the inspection of the Foreign Service outside of the Netherlands. Thus the ISB inspected Dutch embassies and consulates on all manner of issues ranging from personal appearance and fire-safety, through to buildings and visa applications.¹⁹ At the time it was argued that IOV and the ISB both required, generally speaking, the same research skills: *beide soorten evaluatie-onderzoek min of meer dezelfde onderzoeksvaardigheden vereisen en vaak ook in elkaars verlengde liggen*²⁰

Interestingly the person, who had tabled the suggestion, declared that in the event of a new research unit being established, he would be prepared to take the unit under his wing as coordinator.

Not surprisingly, for a unit that had not only prided itself on its independence, but also demanded institutional independence in the interests of its work, IOV opposed the proposal. The proposal was rejected and, as a result, IOV remained independent. In the subsequent recalibration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the mandate of IOV was extended to cover all of Netherlands foreign policy. This change in mandate was reflected in the name changed affected by IOV from Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde (Operations Review Unit) to Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department) IOB. Furthermore, in terms of organisational structure, the independence and extension of the fields of competence of IOB was indicated, when it was placed beyond the Directorate General International Cooperation, and placed directly under the Secretary General of the ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹

ii.) IOB – SBO

A more serious and persistent threat to the independence of IOB was an attempt, launched two years later, to have IOB merge with the Policy Planning Division of the Strategic Policy Orientation Unit (SBO/PL) of the ministry of Foreign Affairs.²² The plan being to merge IOB and SBO/PL in one department under the directorship of the then director of SBO. Immediate cause for this attempt was an “efficiency cutback” [efficiencykorting] imposed on the various government departments in keeping with the coalition government policy agreement reached in the late summer of 1998, on account of which Foreign

Affairs had to scrap a number of permanent positions within the ministry. Traditionally reductions in the number of employees have been attained through the discontinuance, cutting down, and or combination of institutional units. With regard to IOB and the SBO/PL the Ministry’s civil service leadership chose for and sought to impose the option of combination.

Interestingly, initially, IOB was totally unaware of the intention to combination, whilst SBO employees were aware of the Ministry’s intentions. Indeed, it was purely by chance that in the course of a ministerial new years reception on 12th January 1999, one of the inspectors happened to hear about the plans. Contact was immediately initiated with the civil service top for whom, however, a decision in principle [*principebesluit*] had already been taken.²³ The main objection of IOB related to the incompatibility between the work of policy reconnaissance and policy advice, tasks being carried out by the SBO/PL, with the work of policy evaluation that was being carried out by IOB. This, according to IOB, would inevitably lead to situations in which the new to be created *Directie Beleidsplanning en Evaluatie* (Division policy planning and evaluation) would be expected to evaluate and report “independently” on policies which the selfsame institutional unit had at an earlier stage advised the ministers to adopt. In this manner the unit would inevitably come to be the judge and jury in its own cases. This would lead to a position, it was argued, which, apart from the internal stress that it would generate, could not be defended to the outside world. As a result the credibility of independent evaluation research would be compromised.²⁴

At the eleventh hour there was an attempt by the Secretary-General, in face-to-face talks with IOB staff, including IGOS, to take away the objections that had been brought forward by IOB. The talks failed, and the then director of IOB, Hedy von Metzsch, turned directly to the minister for development cooperation, Eveline Herfkens, to plead for the continued maintenance of IOB’s independence, an issue for which she had previously consistently expressed her support.²⁵ In the mean time the civil-service top of the ministry did not allow itself to be impressed by the objections of IOB. In communications with the political top, the civil service top expressed its wish to continue with the envisaged merger of IOB and the SBO. The Secretary General did admit that it was possible that the preparations had not proceeded in a completely optimal fashion, and then proceeded to dismiss the intrinsic objections out of hand. In so doing, the Secretary General failed to deal with

one of the chief concerns expressed by IOB, namely the seemingly impossible position into which the single-headed leadership of the new to be established unit would come to be placed. Furthermore, in his memo to the minister, the Secretary General let it be known that he was supported by the Directors-General of the ministry in the periodic *SG/DG Beraad* (Secretary-General/Directors-General consultations) of which he was the chair.²⁶ Fortunately for IOB, the combined intervention of the director IOB, Von Metzsch, and IGOS, prince Claus, with the minister, Herfkens, was successful. The minister let it be known that there were substantial reasons that justified and necessitated the continued organisational independence of IOB.²⁷ Consequently the attempts to subsume IOB within the SBO were dismissed and IOB retained its organisational independence.

Synthesis and evaluation

To be sure, the prime purpose of IOB is to produce reports that detail their evaluation findings with regard to large areas of Dutch foreign policy activities. These reports are then submitted to parliament thereby enabling public control to be exercised. Regularly IOB has been asked to provide an overview of the field and range of its activities in the past. This has resulted in the production of synthesis reports that have also been submitted to parliament. Hardly surprisingly, from its very inception IOV, as an institution that had been expressly established to inspect and evaluate, has also sought to synthesise, reflect, inspect, and evaluate its own activities as well as those of others. This has led, over the years, to a series of publications, some of which were a synthesis of already published material with some additional material, and other documents that do indeed introduce new insights into the functioning of IOV/IOB. These syntheses and evaluations have provided IOB with insights and suggestions as to the way forward in the field of evaluation. After getting off to a flying start, in which IOV and its inspectors did their learning on the job, an ever greater need was felt within IOV for further insight into, not only the activities of IOV, but also for further insight into the practice of inspection and evaluation. Reflecting this need, in the early 1980s different documents were prepared that sought to shed light on IOV's profile and responsibilities.²⁸ It was also within this context that a symposium, with a number of external academics, was organised in January 1983. At that time, about 140 IOV reports had been written, and IOV felt the need for serious consideration of its work. IOV had developed its own methodology, based on an "independent and unilate-

ralist" approach to inspection, and it was felt that the symposium would be a good opportunity to get professional feedback.²⁹ It was expected that the symposium would provide an impulse to the possible improvement and refinement of IOV procedures.

The symposium, provided the methodological basis for, and was followed by, the *Globale evaluatie van de Nederlandse Bilaterale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* (Global evaluation of Dutch bilateral development cooperation) which was drawn up by the then director Kramer in 1984. Published in 1984, the general evaluation was IOV's contribution to the review of development policy initiated by Minister Schoo in the previous year. The general evaluation was largely in the form of an essay, and was almost wholly written by Kramer as chief IOV. The document has previously been analysed by Rob van den Berg, and it will do no harm to refer to the general conclusions reached by Van den Berg. The report focused on bilateral aid and, in particular, on 'country allocations', the budget item for aid to target countries. In his report Kramer rated the effectiveness of activities contained within the category of 'country allocations'. According to the report, of the activities surveyed by IOV

- 15% of activities were 'very satisfactory'
- 35% were 'fairly satisfactory'
- 19% were 'satisfactory to a limited extent'
- 20% were 'fairly unsatisfactory'
- 8% were 'very unsatisfactory'

IOV had no opinion on the remaining 3% of activities.³⁰ In dealing with the report Van den Berg noted the following:

The report claimed that the basis on which countries are selected for aid was not systematic, and pointed to the need for systematic policies tailored to each country (sections 1 and 4). It spoke of a wide gulf between policy aims and implementation in developing countries, and the consequent illusion of policy compatibility between the Netherlands and recipient countries (section 2). The report also warned of the tendency of developing countries not to adhere to their commitments, as a result of which activities were unsuccessful (section 3). Civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not sufficiently knowledgeable about countries (section 5), activities were often unsuccessful because local culture and customs were disregarded (section 6), and often the local population did not participate fully (section 7). Finally, harsh words were spoken about modalities, the level of expertise at diplomatic missions abroad, the lack of coherence among aid instru-

ments, poor preparation, inadequate monitoring and evaluation, and disbursement pressure. An important general conclusion, which the reader must draw for himself on the basis of many specific comments, is that Dutch aid had focused much more heavily on increasing economic autonomy than on reducing poverty, at that time the two main aims of development policy.³¹

In 1986, two years after Kramer had completed his global evaluation, a series of written questions relating to the, “mode of operation and the functioning of the Operations Review Unit”³², were placed before parliament by the permanent parliamentary committee for development cooperation.³³ The questions and answers, which in published form comprise no less than 45 closely typed pages, were placed before parliament in 1986, 1987, and 1988, and built forth on the work which had been completed by Kramer in 1984.³⁴ For example, the permanent parliamentary committee wanted to know:

- How many reports dealing with concrete activities has the inspectorate carried out until now?
- How many reports, about already inspected activities does the inspectorate have in preparation?
- How many combined (samenvattende) reports has the inspectorate brought out or is in the process of preparing?
- On which sectors, themes and countries do these reports have bearing?³⁵

In response to queries from parliament, as well as to demands from within the unit itself for greater insight into the fields covered by IOV, summaries of IOV reports between 1983 and 1994 were drawn up and compiled in an internal document which was completed in November 1994.³⁶ This was complemented in January of 1995 by an internal document entitled, “Synthese van IOV Bevindingen, 1984 – 1994”, which provided a context for the previously completed summaries. In 1995, whilst the government was engaged in an exercise of recalibration, the two afore mentioned internal documents provided an excellent insight into the working field and activities of IOV. As a result the two documents were combined and in October 1995 the report “Bevindingen en aanbevelingen 1984 – 1994” was published.³⁷ The document, which came at a very opportune time, consisted of an overview of the 28 IOV reports, along with summaries, brought out by IOV in the first ten

years of the directorship of Von Metzsch. As such the document provided IOV with information and material with which it could position itself in the ministerial shake up that covered most of 1996. “Bevindingen en aanbevelingen” was translated and republished in 1996 as “Netherlands Aid Reviewed”.³⁸ In 1998, shortly before the departure of Von Metzsch, the “Bevindingen en aanbevelingen” report was updated from 1994 to 1998 so as to include newly published documents and to inform the Minister. In addition the documents provided a basis for a OECD/DAC survey of users of IOB evaluations.³⁹

Shortly after the appointment of Rob van den Berg as director, the report, *De Reikwijdte van IOB Studies: Een Analyse van Evaluatierapporten 1978 – 1999*, was published as an IOB working document in December 2000. The report had two aims, to sketch the activities of IOB since its inception in 1977, and secondly the establishment of an inventory indicating which terrains of policy, policy themes, sectors, and budget categories had been covered by IOB.⁴⁰ The report explicitly states, “The research is ... not aimed at an analysis of the evaluation results”.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the report makes for intriguing reading, covering as it does the “production” history of IOV/IOB. Numerous graphics, tables, lists, and figures provide a detailed overview of the number of reports, geographical spread, the types of evaluation, average research and production times, and so forth. In short a detailed overview of the work of IOV/IOB. As such this document, which as we have seen drew on a long history of self-reflection within IOV/IOB, provided the new director with insights into the direction that the unit would henceforth take.

IOB in the present

The limited number of countries receiving structural support and the emphasis on the sector approach are gradually beginning to place new demands on the design and implementation of evaluations.⁴²

In the present the research field being covered by IOB, as well as the manner in which it is being covered, differs from the past. This change in direction is determined by new modalities and trends in development cooperation and foreign policy, as well as changing ideas as to what inspection and evaluation should entail. In January 2000, in a working document that was explicitly based upon the “Reikwijdte van IOB Studies” report, IOB present-

ted its new working programme entitled “Voortrollende Programmering 2000 – 2001” The new research that was to be adopted would come to cover an even greater scope of foreign ministry funding Amongst others, the new topics would come to include conflict prevention, the strengthening of civil society, and the coherence of separate terrains in international cooperation These new topics all demand a new orientation, and new techniques of evaluation and ways of working This was to be achieved through a number of changes Research forms and research areas were to change, in keeping with suggestions and recommendations that developed out of the numerous overviews and evaluations of the fields of work covered by IOV/IOB in the past

Interestingly, and reflective of the changing sphere of evaluation, in which IOB will of necessity need to cooperate with other evaluation units on account of multilateral funding, the “Voortrollende Programmering” referred directly to, “Review of the DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance”⁴³, a document compiled in 1998 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to substantiate a number of points, of which but a few are listed here

- The need for participation in the evaluation by recipient countries
- IOB needs a mix of internally and externally recruited evaluators
- IOB needs to make more use of non-Dutch consultants and evaluators
- The need for independence within the foreign ministry
- IOB reports in current form only being used by a small group of professionals

In addition, in preparation for the new programme the Director IOB spoke to a number of users from within the ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the following wishes came to the fore

- Shorter reviews, without sacrificing reliability
- Fewer weighty reports, more reporting that is useful in practice
- A more clearly defined role for evaluation in the knowledge cycle, processes of change and areas of implementation about which there is inadequate information in practice
- More interaction with the rest of the ministry (for example by providing expertise)⁴⁴

These comments, based upon self-evaluation and the DAC report, resulted in a change in

approach to the working terrain of IOB Consequently, in 2000 three processes of change were introduced

- i) Diversification of working methods and of the products of evaluation
- ii) Increasing interaction with the ministry’s central organisation and field workers
- iii) Updating of methodology⁴⁵

The processes of change, which were introduced in 2000, are still underway and the move by IOB to a greater role in the evaluation of large areas of Netherlands foreign policy, as opposed to the minister for development cooperation alone, have to be seen in this light⁴⁶

Conclusion

The Operations Review Unit started out in 1977 as an inspectorate hidden from public scrutiny that inspected and judged on a specific and narrow sector of Dutch development cooperation In so doing it inspected on the work and activities of others without the right of appeal or amendment Twenty-five years later this inspectorate has developed into the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, an independent institutional unit which, in full view of public scrutiny, covers broad swathes of Dutch foreign policy, and actively encourages the participation and feedback of those being evaluated

Throughout its history, the reports and findings of IOV/IOB have had consequences, both intended and unintended In its history the unit has consistently sought to provide detailed and useful information, which could then be used to determine and adjust policy implementation However, the consequences of IOV/IOB reports and findings have not always been those anticipated or sought for by the unit researchers, let alone the minister responsible The competence of the unit as an independent “center of excellence”⁴⁷ with regard to the evaluation of issues relating to development cooperation is beyond doubt However, the uses to which the findings of IOV/IOB have been put to are beyond the scope and control of the unit As such the unit, though it can anticipate, cannot determine the consequences of its findings Thus, much as a bread knife can be used to kill or maim, it can also be used for its prime purpose, the slicing of bread, or simply be left lying in a drawer Similarly IOB as an institutional instrument can be –and indeed has been– used

for showdowns well beyond the realms of development cooperation. In addition, as is so often the case, the reports and findings can simply be ignored in the interests of budgetary concerns. Thus, though the competence is beyond reproach, the question remains, what are the consequences of IOB's competence?

Annex

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The central research questions underlying the book manuscript consist of the following parts:

- Which successive understandings of work and findings characterised the work of IOV/IOB?
- Which reports and debates played a crucial role in the observed development of IOV/IOB policy?
- How can this be explained from within the internal developments of IOV/IOB, and in the context of Dutch and international debates regarding the development of the inspection of government services?⁴⁸

It is intended that in the long term a southern perspective will complement the research. In particular, this research would centre on the question as to how the evaluation of development cooperation is to be viewed from a southern perspective.⁴⁹

RESEARCH APPROACH

The research approach to the book was based upon the following:

In order to be able to answer these questions properly it will be necessary ... that research is conducted in the publications and archives of IOV/IOB, the archives and publications of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, as well as in general publications relating to development cooperation. In addition a number of people ... will be consulted in the form of interviews, group interviews, and other forms, particularly where this will be an efficient manner in which to gain quick insight into crucial developments.⁴⁵

SOURCE MATERIAL USED:

As source material for the writing of the manuscript use was made of three types of source material:

- i.) Published primary and secondary source material
- ii.) Catalogued and un-catalogued personal and official written archival material
- iii.) Oral material acquired in both formal and informal settings.

Unfortunately, primarily due to time constraints, we were unable to access and make use of visual materials.

i.) Published primary and secondary source material

Through the years IOB and other institutions have produced numerous reports dealing with the inspection, evaluation, and monitoring of development cooperation in the widest possible sense. Examples of this would include the reports and publications of IOV/IOB, DAC/OECD, World Bank, and so forth.⁵¹ Secondary source material includes the broad swathe of innumerable articles, reports, books, and so forth, which have been written by observers interested in developments in the world of development cooperation as a whole, and inspection, evaluation, and monitoring of development cooperation in particular.⁵² This published material has been used to provide a context within which we could place and seek to understand the functioning and history of IOV/IOB as an institution.

ii.) Catalogued and un-catalogued personal and official written archival material

For the purposes of research use was made of both the catalogued and un-catalogued archives of IOB and the ministry of foreign affairs as a whole. The official catalogued IOB archive consists of approximately 40 metres and no less than 600 files.⁵³ Substantial sections of this archive are in bureaucratic limbo, meaning that they are catalogued, but cannot be found.⁵⁴ In some instances use was made of the catalogued archives of other ministerial departments.⁵⁵ Use was also made of the current IOB archive, which contains contemporary and ongoing records. In addition to the catalogued IOB archives there is a large amount of material that for all manner of reasons has not been catalogued.⁵⁶ Finally, as is so often the case, particularly rich for the researchers have been the records maintained by past and present IOV/IOB employees.

iii) Oral material acquired in both formal and informal settings

Apart from written archives researchers also made use of oral material. For the writing of the manuscript 20 formal interviews and innumerable informal discussions and meetings were held.⁵⁷ The researchers spoke to former student assistants, external consultants, former ministers, current and former IOB employees, civil servants, and a whole host of other parties.⁵⁸

The quality and the sort of source material used in the research has direct implications for the research findings and conclusions. Thus the catalogued official archive is characterised by the absence of incoming and outgoing post dossiers, the argument being that all incoming and outgoing post is to be assigned to specific case dossiers, and not to post dossiers, which in the eyes of archivists would merely be a copy of material to be found in the case dossiers. The absence of incoming and outgoing post dossiers makes it particularly difficult for historians to determine at a glance as to what issues were particularly significant at specific times within the history of an institution. In addition, the bulk of the formal archive of IOV/IOB between 1985 and 1999 is characterised by the well nigh total absence of agendas, let alone the tabled minutes of office meetings and work discussions.⁵⁹ The absence of easy access to, and insight into, the material contained within the archives resulted in a strategy whereby both formal and informal interviews were used to provide the researchers with a framework within which they could then proceed to sketch the history of IOV/IOB. To be sure, the reliance on interviews to gain an insight into the workings of IOV/IOB, and thus an understanding of the archives, has the drawback, common to all oral histories, that that which is remembered and recounted tends to be the dramatic and the controversial.⁶⁰ The research has not sought to duplicate the work of Gerlag, Kliest, and Van den Berg, instead in keeping with the research questions it has consciously sought to complement this work by presenting an insight into internal developments within IOV/IOB.⁶¹

- 1 Beschikking m b t instelling IOV, 1/7/1977, plus instructie inzake de Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde
- 2 <http://www.euforic.org/10b/en/about.htm>
- 3 The Netherlands Institute for History was approached and in 2002 the first copious volume of reprinted source materials, gathered together, sorted, annotated, and introduced by a six man research team, was published *Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking Bronnenuitgave Deel 1 1945 – 1963*, Bewerkt door M L J Dierikx, M Breusers, C P M Klep, E M L Klinkers, en A P G Sens, met medewerking van M E A Weterings, Den Haag Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2002
- 4 P A M Malcontent and J A Nekkens (eds), *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 1949 – 1999*, Den Haag Sdu Uitgevers, 1999
- 5 IOB Bureau Archives (IBA), Actiepunten IOB-Bureauvergadering 19 augustus 1999
- 6 In December 2000 the report was published as, Bibian Gerlag, Ted Kliest en Rob van den Berg, *De reikwijdte van IOB studies Een analyse van evaluatierapporten 1978 – 1999*, Den Haag IOB werkdocument, December 2000
- 7 IBA, Besluitpunten stafvergadering 31 maart 2000
- 8 IBA, Besluitpunten stafvergadering 31 maart 2000 This was a direct reference to the earlier work completed by IOB inspector Dick van der Hoek entitled *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde (IOV) Ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis* which had been completed in late 1995, but had not been published
- 9 Malcontent and Nekkens, *Vijftig Jaar Ontwikkelingssamenwerking*, pp 31 – 41
- 10 In the 1970s there was a systematic series of articles in the *De Telegraaf* which were aimed directly at the Dutch development cooperation. An overview of these articles is presented in the book manuscript, and interested readers are also referred to SNV, *Dag vrijwilliger! Twintig jaar SNV*, Den Haag SNV, 1985, pp 46 – 47
- 11 Organisation for Economic co-operation and Development <http://www.oecd.org>
- 12 Interview conducted with IOB employee, The Hague, IOB, 2/7/02
- 13 John Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika*, Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1979, p XXX
- 14 IBA, Memo 336/76, 20/09/1976 van J P Pronk aan DGIS via S, cc andere diensten Instelling IOV

- 15 The 'Utstein Group' is a group of Ministers responsible for Development Co-operation, working in a concerted way to drive the development agenda forward, focusing on implementing the international consensus. At this point in time, the 'core group' consists of the respective Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom:
<http://www.u4.no/document/utsteinprinciples.cfm>.
- 16 Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank: <http://www.worldbank.org/oe/>.
- 17 Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme: <http://www.undp.org/eo/>.
- 18 Natasja van den Berg et al., *Beleid in ontwikkeling: het Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid, een Pronkstuk?* [Policy in development: Dutch policy on development cooperation – Pronk's showpiece?], student research report, International Relations department, University of Amsterdam, 12 November 1998.
- 19 The ISB is currently known as the *Inspectie en Evaluatie Bedrijfsvoering* (Inspection and Evaluation Unit) which, in addition to its task of inspection is also involved in performance auditing, in which it seeks to determine as to whether or not the organisation of a post enables optimal policy implementation. http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ425714 *Inspectie en Evaluatie Bedrijfsvoering: ISB is belast met de doorlichting van de organisatie, de beleidsuitvoering en de bedrijfsvoering van de posten. Voorts beoordeelt ISB het functioneren van het postennetwerk in zijn geheel en is tevens belast met de begeleiding van de zelfdoorlichting van dienstonderdelen in Den Haag*.
- 20 Memo van Directeur Financieel-Economische Zaken (FEZ) van 2 januari 1996.
- 21 *Secretaris-Generaal* translated as Secretary General in keeping with,
<http://213.53.163.218/SubSites/huisstijl/bzcoo035.htm#4.31>.
- 22 Stafeenheid Strategische Beleidsoriëntatie (SBO) & Afdeling Beleidsplanning (SBO/PL),
<http://213.53.163.218/SubSites/huisstijl/bzcoo035.htm#4.31>.
- 23 Memo IOB-18/1/99 van Directeur IOB aan PLVS [Plaatsvervangend Secretaris-Generaal].
- 24 Memo # IOB-092/99 van Directeur IOB aan S [Secretaris-Generaal] van 27 januari 1999.
- 25 Memo # IOB-137/99 van Directeur IOB aan R van 5 februari 1999.
- 26 Concept-memo van S aan R van 22 februari 1999.
- 27 "*er gegronde aanleiding was om de organisatorische zelfstandigheid van IOB te handhaven*", Concept-memo # S-3945/99 van S aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van 9 maart 1999.
- 28 See, for example, IOV/1975-1984/23, "Procedures met betrekking tot de Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde, vastgesteld op 05/08/1980"; "Profile of the development cooperation Operations Review Unit"; "Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde, Signalement 1982".
- 29 IOV/1975-1984/24, Symposium: doel en werkwijze IOV. Van Paulus aan Leden bureauvergadering, early 1982, Voorstel.
- 30 IOV, *Globale evaluatie van de Nederlandse bilaterale ontwikkelingssamenwerking* [A general evaluation of Dutch bilateral development cooperation], The Hague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 168/A-1 January/April 1984, p. 30.
- 31 See esp. section 2, but also sections 8 and 14, which observe that tying aid to Dutch goods and services was often only effective in terms of developing economic autonomy. Cited in Rob van den Berg, "Does the aid community learn from experience? Do something right and do look back", being a translation of Van den Berg, "Leert de hulp van lessen uit het verleden?", in *Internationale Spectator*, Mei 2001, 253 – 267.
- 32 "De werkwijze en het functioneren van de Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde"
- 33 De vaste Commissie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.
- 34 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1985 – 1986, 19475, "De werkwijze en het functioneren van de Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking te Velde", lijst van vragen en antwoorden 20 maart 1986; lijst van nadere vragen; lijst van nadere antwoorden 18 april 1986; verslag van een mondeling overleg 28 april 1987; & verslag van een mondeling overleg 8 december 1988.

- 35 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1985 – 1986, 19475, Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, vastgesteld 20 maart 1986.
- 36 IBA, IOV, “Samenvattingen IOV rapporten 1983 – 1994”.
- 37 IOV, *Bevindingen en aanbevelingen 1984 – 1994*, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1995.
- 38 IOV, *Netherlands Aid Reviewed: An analysis of Operations Review Unit reports, 1983 – 1994*, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1996. In translated form the document provided valuable information for Walter Stolz, of the OECD/DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, who in May 1997 submitted a working document on IOB.
- 39 Walter Stolz, “Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Survey of Users of Evaluations”, Working Document as part of the OECD/DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation’s Review of the Principles of Evaluation of Development Assistance, May 1997.
- 40 Bibian Gerlag, Ted Kliet en Rob van den Berg, *De Reikwijdte van IOB Studies: Een Analyse van Evaluatierapporten 1978 – 1999*, Den Haag; IOB werkdokument, 2000, p. 2.
- 41 *Reikwijdte*, p. 2.
- 42 IOB, *Ongoing Programme for 2000 - 2001*, Den Haag: IOB Working Document, 2000, p. 1.
- 43 Full text of this document can be accessed at:
<http://www1.oecd.org/dac/Evaluation/pdf/eval.pdf>
- 44 IOB, *Ongoing Programme for 2000 - 2001*, Den Haag: IOB Working Document, 2000, p. 2.
- 45 IOB, *Ongoing Programme for 2000 - 2001*, Den Haag: IOB Working Document, 2000, p. 2 – 3.
- 46 An overview of the fields in which IOB currently carries out research is to be found in IOB, *Jaarverslag 2001: Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie*, Werkdocument, Den Haag, 2002, p. 13 – 22.
- 47 IOB, *Voortrollende Programmering 2000 – 2001: Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie*, Den Haag: IOB Werkdocument, 2000, p. 3.
- 48 Prof. Dr Lex Heerma van Voss, associate director of research IISG, 25 jaar IOV-IOB: *Voorstel voor een onderzoeksproject*, 14 mei 2002, p. 3. Welke opeenvolgende taakopvattingen en bevindingen kenmerkten het werk van IOV-IOB? Welke rapportages en debatten speelden een cruciale rol bij de gesignaleerde ontwikkeling van het beleid? Hoe valt dit te verklaren vanuit de interne ontwikkeling van IOV-IOB, en in de context van het Nederlandse en internationale debat over de ontwikkeling van de inspectie van overheidstaken (zowel in het algemeen als ten aanzien van ontwikkelingssamenwerking).
- 49 Prof. Dr Lex Heerma van Voss, associate director of research IISG, 25 jaar IOV-IOB: *Voorstel voor een onderzoeksproject*, 14 mei 2002, p. 3. Hoe kan er naar inspectie van ontwikkelingssamenwerking gekeken worden vanuit een zuidelijk perspectief?
- 50 Prof. Dr Lex Heerma van Voss, associate director of research IISG, 25 jaar IOV-IOB: *Voorstel voor een onderzoeksproject*, 14 mei 2002, p. 4. Om deze vragen goed te kunnen beantwoorden is vanuit de Nederlandse kant nodig dat onderzoek verricht wordt in de publicaties en archieven van IOV-IOB, de archieven en publicaties van het ministerie van Buitenlandse zaken en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en algemene publicaties over ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Bovendien zal een aantal nog beschikbare betrokkenen door middel van interviews, groepsinterviews of andere middelen geraadpleegd worden, vooral waar dit een efficiënte manier is om cruciale ontwikkelingen snel in beeld te krijgen.
- 51 Bibian Gerlag, Ted Kliet en Rob van den Berg, *De Reikwijdte van IOB Studies: Een Analyse van Evaluatierapporten 1978 – 1999*, Den Haag: IOB Werkdocument, 2000; DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, *Review of the DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance*, Paris: OECD, 1998; World Bank Operations Evaluations Department, *Higher Impact Adjustment Lending (HIAL) in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington: World Bank, 1999.
- 52 R.D. van den Berg, “Leert de hulp van lessen uit het verleden? Doe wel en zie niet om”, *Internationale Spectator* 55 (2001) 253 – 260; J.A. Nekkers en P.A.M. Malcontent (eds), *De Geschiedenis van Vijftig Jaar Nederlandse Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1949 – 1999*, Den Haag: Sdu, 1999; P. Hoebink, *Geven is nemen: De Nederlandse Ontwikkelingshulp aan Tanzania en Sri Lanka*, Nijmegen: Stichting Derde Wereld Publikaties, 1988.

- 53 Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in Den Haag, IOV archief, IOV/1975 – 1984; IOV/1985 – 1989; IOV/ 1999; IOV/2025; IOV/2006; IOV/2007; IOV 2009 en IOB archief, IOB/2025; IOB/2010; IOB/2009.
- 54 For example all the files bearing the designation IOB/ara are not to be found. It is possible that these files have been transferred to the Algemeen Rijks Archief in The Hague, though inquiries at the ARA were without success.
- 55 Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in Den Haag, DTH: Nederland Algemeen; 1965 – 1974 (Nr. 5), 610.300.
- 56 For example no less than four boxes dealing with the results of a six-month evaluation, carried out in the early 1980s, regarding the implementation of advice contained in inspection reports.
- 57 Transcripts of formal interviews, as well as notes of informal interviews, along with copies of all archival material utilised in the project will be deposited with the archives of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam.
- 58 A listing of all respondents will be included as an appendix in the book.
- 59 “Notulen zijn alleen interessant voor geschiedkundigen, niet voor de mensen die hier werken” Pers. Comm. IOB employee, 16 October 2002.
- 60 There is an extensive corpus of literature dealing specifically with the methodology of oral history. Prime texts would include, David Henige, *Oral Historiography*, New York: Longman, 1982; Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985; & David Stricklin, and Rebecca Sharpless, eds., *The Past Meets the Present: Essays on Oral History*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.
- 61 Bibian Gerlag, Ted Kliet en Rob van den Berg, *De reikwijdte van IOB studies: Een analyse van evaluatierapporten 1978 – 1999*, Den Haag: IOB werkdocument, December 2000.