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The Netherlands

**Learning to wage and win wars in Africa: a provisional history of German military activity in Congo, Tanzania, China and Namibia**  
Gewald, J.B.

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Jan-Bart Gewald

African Studies Centre  
Leiden, The Netherlands

# **Learning to wage and win wars in Africa:**

A provisional history of German military  
activity in Congo, Tanzania,  
China and Namibia

Jan-Bart Gewald

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Agency in Africa  
African Studies Centre, Leiden  
Netherlands

African Studies Centre  
P.O. Box 9555  
2300 RB Leiden  
The Netherlands

Telephone +31-71-5273372  
Fax +31-71-5273344  
E-mail [asc@fsw.leidenuniv.nl](mailto:asc@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)  
Website <http://asc.fsw.leidenuniv.nl>

African Studies Centre  
P.O. Box 9555  
2300 RB Leiden  
The Netherlands

Telephone +31-71-5273370  
Fax +31-71-5273344  
E-mail [gewald@fsw.leidenuniv.nl](mailto:gewald@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)  
Website <http://asc.leidenuniv.nl/staff/jbgewald.htm>

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## **Abstract**

The central tenets of the paper are that genocide and crimes against humanity are learnt practice, and that the seeds of the genocides that occurred in Namibia between 1904 and 1908 were sown in the Congo in the late nineteenth century.

I argue that there is a direct causal link between violence perpetrated in the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania and China. In addition I argue that this violence was qualitatively different there where it could be and was checked by the intervention of civil society

Jan-Bart Gewald<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Europe's destruction of the "inferior races" of four continents prepared the ground for Hitler's destruction of six million Jews in Europe.<sup>2</sup>

The central tenets of this paper are that genocide and crimes against humanity are learnt practice, and that the seeds of the genocides that occurred in Namibia between 1904 and 1908 were sown in the Congo in the late nineteenth century.

- People learn from one another. i.e. how to commit crimes against humanity is something that has to be learnt and is often learnt by example.<sup>3</sup>
- Violence and violent acts are voluntary and learnt activities.
- In war there is a ratchetting effect in which violence becomes ever more brutal and ever more normal. i.e. there are gradations in levels of violence and cruelty in war.
  - The increasing radicalisation of warfare in the context of WWII is an example of this.
- In addition there is also varied impact on various opponents. i.e. Those considered to be like you, and those considered to be not only different, but also inferior to one self.
  - British POWs in WWII had death rates of 3 %
  - Soviet POWs in WWII had death rates in excess of 50%
  - This apart from the millions who died in the Nazi genocides.

In this paper I argue that there is a direct causal link between violence perpetrated in the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania and China. In addition I argue that this violence was qualitatively different there where it could be and was checked by the intervention of civil society.

My work can be read as a critique of the work by Mamdani, most notably his "A brief history of Genocide", in that it argues that there are more direct and closer links in the history of genocide, than the giant leaps of faith and links by association that characterise his work.<sup>4</sup> For a true understanding of the nature and history of genocide it is essential that the links and steps in the chain are shown and fleshed out. In large measure my work can be seen as building upon the hypotheses first put to paper by Hannah Arendt now already more than fifty years ago in, *The Origins of*

*Totalitarianism* (1951). In her work Arendt demonstrated how at the beginning of the twentieth century racism was deeply entrenched in the societies of Western Europe. In addition she drew attention to the manner in which imperialism “experimented with the possibilities of unspeakable cruelty and mass murder”.<sup>5</sup> That is, imperialism lies at the basis of the Nazi genocides, or to cite Sven Lindqvist:

European world expansion, accompanied as it was by a shameless defence of extermination, created habits of thought and political precedents that made way for new outrages, finally culminating in the most horrendous of them all: the Holocaust.<sup>6</sup>

## CONGO

From the colonial era, the major legacy Europe left to Africa was not democracy as it is practised today in countries like England, France, and Belgium; it was authoritarian rule and plunder. On the whole continent perhaps no nation has had a harder time than the Congo in emerging from the shadow of its past.<sup>7</sup>

Events in the Congo Free State of King Leopold of the Belgians, were formative for the manner in which German colonial forces came to wage war in Tanzania, China, and Namibia.

Throughout western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century the exploits of explorers in the heart of Africa formed the source for a very profitable publishing sideline in explorer literature. The role of fearless white men bringing the light of civilisation into the darkest realms of Africa was a trope that found strong and lasting resonance with people. The published accounts of the exploits of Mungo Park, Burton, Speke, Livingstone, and Stanley, were essential and popular reading for large numbers of would be explorers and adventurers. Undoubtedly the most infamous of these explorers was Henry Morton Stanley, accounts of whom still continue to be published in large and successful runs in the present. The published accounts of Stanley’s search for David Livingstone, and later, Emin Pasha saw large runs in German translation, and his exploits entered into the realm of popular culture and imagination in Germany.<sup>8</sup> Initially a fervent fan of Stanley, on account of his

serialised reports in the *Times* of London, King Leopold II of the Belgians, later became Stanley's prime backer in Africa.<sup>9</sup>

Inspired in part by his reading of Stanley, Leopold had long cultivated an interest in Africa, and facilitated in the creation of the International African Association, at the Brussels Geographical Conference in 1876.<sup>10</sup> The IAA, which consisted of autonomous national sections, aimed to explore and civilise central Africa, in such a manner that the Slave trade would come to an end and "legitimate" commerce would come to be introduced. In all, the Belgian section of this association conducted five expeditions from the Zanzibar coast. In November 1878, as the International African Association came to die a silent death, Leopold founded the Committee to Study the Upper Congo (*Comite d'Etudes du Haut Congo*).<sup>11</sup> Three months later, in February 1879, Stanley left Europe for Zanzibar to recruit travellers and carriers, and by 1881 he had established his headquarters at Stanley pool, at the settlement that would later become Leopoldville – Kinshasa – from which, with a steamer the forces employed by King Leopold patrolled the river and established stations. From 1879 – 1884 Stanley was in the Congo as Leopold's man on the spot, the man to open the Congo for exploitation.<sup>12</sup>

Many commentators have sought to discover and describe the life and personality of Henry Morton Stanley. With the benefit of so much information and hindsight, it is safe to assume that H.M. Stanley was a thoroughly brutalised man, who in turn came to brutalise countless others. Born out of wedlock, Stanley ran away from an orphanage in Britain and travelled to the United States, where he became the protégé of an Arkansas Cotton broker (Henry Hope Stanley), whose name he adopted and with whom he travelled up and down the Mississippi river valley. With the outbreak of the American Civil war he volunteered for the Confederacy and joined the "Dixie Grays," or 6th Arkansas Infantry. He was involved in the battles of Belmont and Shiloh, where he was captured. As a prisoner at Camp Douglas, near Chicago, where most of the inmates were dieing of typhoid fever, Henry Morton Stanley evaded death by enlisting in the Union army. With the ending of the Civil War, the United States literally surged westwards, and the final destruction of the independent Amerindian communities was undertaken. As a journalist Stanley was active in the Indian wars. He wrote glowingly of the destruction of Indians. As has been noted of Stanley at this time:



Stanley's editors wanted war reporting about dramatic battles, and this he gave them: "The Indian war has at last been fairly inaugurated ... the Indians, true to their promises, true to their bloody instincts, to their savage hatred of the white race, to the lessons instilled in their bosoms by their progenitors, are on the warpath".<sup>13</sup>

Having made a name for himself in newspapers with the Indian wars, Henry Morton Stanley was despatched to cover the British invasion of Abyssinia in 1867. Stanley accompanied British forces, but not before he had bribed the telegraph offices in Egypt to hold back his competitors' despatches until his had been published. In the event, the invasion led by general Napier led to the sacking and desecration of countless Ethiopian monasteries and churches, and culminated with the suicide of emperor Theodorus.<sup>14</sup> Looking back at Stanley's life, we can see that his ideas regarding the world, and the manner in which one stood within the world, were formed by his experiences in the brutal circumstances of, amongst others, being abandoned as a child, an orphanage in Britain, the deeply racist deep South of the confederacy, prisoner of war camps, being a turncoat, frontier wars, and brutal war in Africa. Nevertheless these experiences, experiences that served to make him deeply intolerant of others, also served to make him into the showman, journalist, and leader of expeditions that he was to become.

In 1877 Stanley returned to Africa for his last and most destructive of expeditions, the so-called Emin Pasha relief expedition. Accompanied by the Maxim gun, which had been "invented" in 1858, Stanley attempted to lead an expeditionary force from the Atlantic through the jungles of the Congo basin and the Ituri forests, through to southern Sudan. The conditions of the Emin Pasha relief expedition have been well documented. In particular the absence of provisions, which necessitated the continual plundering of porters, provisions, food and more from local inhabitants. In effect, the three year expedition, seeking to liberate a man who had no wish to be liberated, devastated the communities it came into contact with. In the absence of supplies, the expedition plundered and raided the countryside, and in so doing established a benchmark for later European involvement in Africa and the Congo in particular.<sup>15</sup> The effects of serving with Stanley are reflected in the future career of Captain Stairs, the man who would later lead the ill-fated and murderous expedition to the kingdom of Msiri in Katanga.<sup>16</sup>

Stanley, as a person, as well as the manner in which he behaved in the Congo came to be the benchmark for people travelling to Africa. Undoubtedly the greatest, if – with the benefit of hindsight - the most villain, of the pantheon of great European Explorers, Henry Morton Stanley epitomised for many Europeans the manner in which one ought to deal with Africans in Africa. Henry Morton Stanley operated with a very specific understanding of people in Africa. An understanding that believed in more ways than one, that the African continent and its people served but a single purpose, the betterment of the European world. Throughout his many expeditions in Africa, Stanley was accompanied by soldiers from many nations, many of them officers on leave from their regiments. Among these men were many German officers, members of a thoroughly militarised society, but of an army that since 1870 had failed to fight the “good fight”. Serving in Africa, or for that matter in colonial forces in the Dutch East Indies, as many German officers did in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, provided these men with the opportunity of participating in that most insatiable of drugs, active combat.<sup>17</sup>

### **Germans in Congo**

After the establishment of German unity in 1871 a large number of German soldiers ventured into Africa in search of sport and adventure. Many of these men published highly fictionalised accounts of their endeavours. These accounts, along with the earlier accounts of Park, Speke, and others, in part came to form the basis for ideas regarding Africa, as they existed in Europe, and amongst European soldiers despatched to fight in Africa.

In the 1870s and 1880s a large number of German expeditions, sponsored by the Berlin Geographical Society, and later in association with the German section of King Leopold’s International African Association, travelled to and through the Congo basin. In 1875 Paul Pogge, operating with the funding of the Berlin Geographical Society, visited the Lunda capital of Mona Kimbundu. His visit was repeated three years later in 1878 by Otto Schuett, and in 1879 by Max Büchner, who too was funded by the BGS, in association with the IAA.<sup>18</sup> These expeditions were followed up in the following years by those led by Von Mechow (1880), Pogge and Wissmann (1881), Wissmann (1884 – 85), and Böhm and Reichard (1884).<sup>19</sup> Bustin has noted that the frequency and number of German expeditions to the middle Kasai in the Congo should not cause great surprise, for even though Bismarck remained cool to the

idea of colonial expansion and was not a “Kolonialmesnch”, “there were enough German circles interested in a colonial empire to sponsor the kind of exploratory spadework which might open the way for subsequent territorial claims, ...”<sup>20</sup>

Of the many expeditions to the Congo the expeditions led by Paul Pogge are of relevance here, for when Pogge returned to Central Africa in 1881 he was accompanied by Hermann Wissmann, the later governor of German East Africa, and the founder of the *Schutztruppe* in GEA. In the course of this expedition Pogge established a settlement, in the name of the International African Association in the Congo at Kalamba’s village. Between 1883 and 1887 Wissmann operated on behalf of the International African Association and occupied the settlement, following Pogge’s death on behalf of the IAA and King Leopold II.<sup>21</sup> Henceforth the settlement became known as Luluaburg, present day Kananga. The settlement was later handed over to the control of the Congo Free State, but not without Wissmann having made disparaging remarks about the Belgians who were to take over the settlement.<sup>22</sup>

Upon his return to Germany, Wissmann compiled his thoughts and sought to put his experiences and advices to paper, as such he wrote and published, *Unter deutscher Flagge quer durch Afrika: von West nach Ost*. His book, published in 1902, two years prior to the outbreak of the Herero war in Namibia, contained a section entitled “Praktische Winke zum Reisen in Afrika” (Practical tips for travelling in Africa). In it he noted the following:

Was die Bewaffung des Reisenden anbetrifft, so kann ich nur rathen, möglichst wenig Gewehre mit sich zu führen, da die Instandhaltung, besonders in der Regenzeit, oft recht schwierig wird. Eine einläufige, starkkalibrige (14mm), schnell zu ladende Expressbüchse mit starker Pulverladung, Voll- und Expansionsgeschossen, zur Vermeidung des starken Rückschlages mit einer Gummiplatte am Kolben versehen, reicht aus für Elefant, Rhinoceros und Plussfred, bis hinab zur Antilope. Eine Doppelflinte, Kaliber 12, von etwas langem Lauf, mit Rehposten für Raubwild, vom Leoparden abwärts, Schweine und kleine Antilopen, sowie Vögel, als Trappen, Gänse, Perlhühner, Enten und Savannenhühner, mit Schrot Nr. 0 – 3, vervollkommnet die Ausrüstung für den Jäger. Der Reisende trägt praktisch ein Kurzes Bulldogrevolver im Gürtel. Für die Mannschaft ist ein einläufiges langes Schrotgewehr mit Hammer zum Verschliessen (nicht zum Aufklappen, da der Mann oft seine Last damit beim Tragen unterstützt), wie das Tabatiéregewehr, zu empfehlen. Dasselbe hat im

Falle des Gebrauches gegen feindliche Eingeborene den Vortheil, dass die Treffwahrscheinlichkeit bis auf 80 m, eine weite Entfernung für afrikanischen Krieg, grosser ist mit grobem Schrot, und auch die Wirkung nicht so tödtlich als die der Kugeln, da es ja doch nur darauf ankommt, den Feind Kampfunfähig zu machen.<sup>23</sup>

What is striking in reading these words of Wissmann, is that one starts off by noting that he calls for taking along as little armament as possible. Only later does one realise that he is talking about the European explorer alone, who as it is carries three firearms. Furthermore, one must bear in mind that for Wissmann, the explorer must be accompanied by armed bearers, all of whom are to be issued with weapons that can fell humans at 80 metres. That these lessons and practical hints learnt in the jungles of Congo were put to work within the German colonial armies can be seen from the activities of men who accompanied and worked with Wissmann in the Congo. In particular the brothers von Francois, one of whom - as Wissmann would do in GEA - went on to found the *Schutztruppe* in German South West Africa.<sup>24</sup>

### **Von Francois in Congo Free State**

Die Ankunft des Lieutenant Wissmann, welcher von seiner in Begleitung des hochverdienten Afrikaforschers Herrn Dr. Paul Pogge unternommenen Reise im Mai 1883 ruhmgekrönt heimkehrte, brachte mich dem Ziele meiner Wünsche nahe. Lieutenant Wissmann übernahm im Auftrage Sr. Majestät des Königs der Belgier Leopold II. die Führung ein der neuen Forschungsexpedition nach dem Innern Afrikas, und es war mir eine sehr grosse Freude, mich derselben als Geodät anschliessen zu können.<sup>25</sup>

In the same manner that the Congo explorer Hermann von Wissmann founded the *Schutztruppe* in German East Africa, so too his assistant and fellow Congo explorer, Curt von Francois founded the *Schutztruppe* in German South West Africa. In both instances, their experiences and activities in the Congo were of influence and import upon the manner in which they believed that the forces under their command in GEA and GSWA should act.

In November of 1883 Lieutenant Curt von Francois, on leave from his regiment, sailed from Hamburg to Luanda under the command of Hermann Wissmann

in the service of the Belgian King Leopold II.<sup>26</sup> Throughout 1884 von Francois travelled with Wissmann and his companions in the Kasai region of the Congo. Funded by King Leopold the men sought to establish the Congo Free State's authority through the establishment of stations in the area. A reading of von Francois's published summary of his activities in the Kasai, provides one with insight into what was going on.<sup>27</sup> Von Francois actively participated in the negotiation for and purchase of slaves (p. 266 & 279, ) used force and threats to travel wherever he wished (272 – 3), allowed his porters and accompanying party to engage in “*Rücksichtslos plündern*” (273)<sup>28</sup>, and did not hesitate to use his cutlass.<sup>29</sup> In the company of his German colleagues, von Francois did not hesitate to exercise a policy of shoot to kill.<sup>30</sup>

In 1885, after having left his colleagues at Luluaburg (Kananga), von Francois travelled to Stanley Pool where he joined missionary Grenfell and his small steamer “Peace” for an exploratory expedition up the Congo river.<sup>31</sup> On the 6<sup>th</sup> of August 1885, fifteen years to the day on which, as von Francois explicitly states in his record, his father had been killed at the battle of Spicheren in the Franco-Prussian war, von Francois packed his belongings and prepared to steam up the Congo with Grenfell.<sup>32</sup> Employed by the Baptist Missionary Society, missionary Grenfell captained the small steamer “Peace”, ostensibly for missionary work, but in practice the steamer acted as a sorely needed supply vessel for the stations established by the Congo Free State along the course of the Congo river.<sup>33</sup> The first station of the Congo Free State that they arrived at was Bolobo. In effect the station was a microcosm of what was taking place in the Congo at the time, and in itself is a fine cameo of the rest of von Francois's trip up the Congo.

Upon arriving at the station of Bolobo, von Francois and Grenfell were greeted by a Belgian artillery officer, Liebrecht, and an Englishman, named, appropriately enough, Slave. The irony of the matter was that Grenfell and von Francois carried with them letters for the station from the CFS administration ordering that Bolobo station be closed.

Die Herren der Station billigten die Massregel um so mehr als sie mit der anwohnenden Bevölkerung sehr unzufrieden sind. Vor ungefähr einem Jahr wurde durch Eingeborene einem Sansibariten der Kopf abgeschlagen und in ihrer Ortschaft als Trophäe auf eine Stange gesteckt. Den Anlass hatte eine kleine Differenz beim Einkauf von Lebensmitteln gegeben. Als repressalie wurde der Ortschaft der Krieg erklärt und dieselbe vom Lieutenant Liebrecht

gestürmt und niedergebrannt. Dies Niederbrennen hat hier nur wenig zu sagen; Schätze habe die Eingeborenen nicht und die Hütten sind in wenigen Tagen wieder aufgebaut. Schlimmer war nur, dass die Eingeborenen sich empfindlich dadurch rächten, dass sie nun ihrerseits die Station niederbrannten. Damit ging das nicht unbedeutende Material der Station verloren, unter anderm auch dieMunition für das hier befindliche Krupp'sche Geschütz.

.... Die Versuche des Stationschefs, die Bewohner von Bolobo zur Arbeit heranzuziehen, sind bis jetzt an der Unverschämtheit gepaarten Faulheit derselben gescheitert.<sup>34</sup>

Das grosse Wohnhaus zeigt den typischen, recht zweckmässigen Kasernenstil sämmtlicher Stationsgebäude des Freistaates, eine Mischung von Schweizerhaus und Pfahlbau.... Vor dem Hause steht eine Kruppsche Kanone, mit welcher man den Weg nach Bolobo, das Terrain vor der Station und den Fluss unter Feuer nehmen kann. Seitwärtsbefinden sich die Hütten für die 20 angestellten Sansibariten und 11 Haussa, ...

Die Baulichkeiten der Station sind nach der landseite durch einen starken Zaun eingefriedigt, der ebenso nöthig ist gegen die Einwohner wie gegen die Leoparden, welche die umgegend unsichr machen.<sup>35</sup>

The following station visited by Grenfell and von Francois was the Equatoria station run by the Swede, Pagels. In his memoirs, von Francois refers to the grave of a boy recently shot at the station and to 12 female slaves who work at the station.<sup>36</sup> In turn, upon his return from the Congo Pagels described his experiences at Equatoria station and noted that whilst administering a flogging with a hippo-hide *chicotte* it was particularly important that one should show no emotion:

If you have to order physical punishment to a savage, have this punishment carried out with not a muscle in your face betraying your feelings.<sup>37</sup>

Considering that a *chicotte* literally tears and rips its way across the exposed flesh of its victim, Pagels dictum that "The savage respects nothing but brute strength", was brought to life.<sup>38</sup> A statement that finds its echo in the words of General Lothar von Trotha nearly twenty years later in German South West Africa:

My detailed knowledge of many Central African tribes, Bantu and others, has taught me the convincing certainty that Negroes never submit to a contract but only to raw force.<sup>39</sup>

### **Learning of and in War**

People learn how to wage war, perpetrate crimes against humanity, and commit genocide.

Battles and wars fought in other places and other times are intensely studied by others hoping to learn from lessons learnt in the past. It is no secret that Von Schlieffen, who for fifteen years was the chief of the German General Staff, was obsessed by a battle fought 2000 years previously; the battle of Cannae fought between Rome and Carthage in 216 BC.<sup>40</sup> Reports and articles on wars, battles, skirmishes, and armed conflicts in general were and are regularly published in specialist journals and magazines. Less than a month after the fall of Baghdad, the first articles dealing with the effects of “shock and awe” had already made their way past peer review readers and editors prior to publication in *Janes Defence Weekly*.<sup>41</sup> When the Ruanda patriotic Front first invaded Ruanda from Uganda in 1990, Paul Kagame, the current president of Ruanda was a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as an officer of the Ugandan Army. Five years later, after RPF forces had swept across Ruanda in the wake of the genocide, the strategy and tactics applied and utilized by the RPF under Kagame were being taught to officer cadets at Military Academies in the United States of America.<sup>42</sup>

By the 1870s, military studies, as the subject for publication, had emerged as a genre in its own right in the western world. In Germany the books published by the General Staff alone, i.e. professional soldiers in the service of the Kaiser, numbered in the hundreds. There were a number of German periodicals that dealt specifically and solely with the conduct of war, these included, *Militär Wochenblatt*, and its monthly supplement *Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt; Militär-Literaturzeitung; Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde; and Jahrbücher für Deutsche Armee und Marine*.<sup>43</sup>

For many years the standard work for soldiers involved in “Small Wars”, that is colonial wars, could do no better than read the standard work on the subject by Sir Charles Edward Callwell, entitled simply enough, *Small wars: their principles and*

*practice*.<sup>44</sup> Published in 1906, whilst the Herero and Nama war against Germany was still raging, *Small Wars* explicitly makes mention, not only of British wars against the Marathas and Sikhs in India, but also of the lessons learnt in the Boer war of 1900 – 1902, as well as the ongoing wars being fought by the Germans against the Herero and Nama in Namibia. At this stage it would be at least another year before the official German war history of the Herero war was to be published under the authority of von Schlieffen.<sup>45</sup> For their part German soldiers, preparing for service in the colonies and overseas territories were referred to the work of Hauptmann Kurd Schwabe published in 1903, a year prior to the outbreak of the Herero-German war.

Kurd Schwabe originally travelled to Namibia as a Schutztruppler with von Francois.<sup>46</sup> In 1900 Schwabe volunteered for service in China, and it was upon his return from China that he drew up, *Dienst und Kriegsführung in den Kolonien und auf überseeischen Expeditionen*.<sup>47</sup> As with Callwell, Schwabe drew on the past, and referred to lessons learnt in Congo, China, Cuba, Abyssinia, India, the Boer War, East and West Africa. As with British forces who read Callwell, German forces who read Schwabe would have considered themselves well-informed with regard to war Germany's colonies. By way of illustration a profound lesson learnt in the Congo and elsewhere was that regarding the Native:

“...so findet sich dennoch auch in dem Chinesen der dünkelfhafte, rohe und hinterlistige Charakter des Negeres wieder. Sie sind sich eben hierin alle einander gleich und ebenbürtig, diese Eingeborenen, mögen sie nun Malayen oder Zulu, Chinesen oder Indianer heissen.”<sup>48</sup>

Schwabe continues that there may be exceptions to the rule, but that, “diese Ausnahmen können hier nicht in Rechnung gezogen werden”.<sup>49</sup>

### **The destiny of Nations and the Orders of the Kaiser**

Character is fate, the Greeks believed. A hundred years of German philosophy went into the making this decision [to ignore Belgian neutrality in 1914] in which the seed of self-destruction lay embedded, waiting for its hour. The voice was Schlieffen's, but the hand was the hand of Fichte who saw the German people chosen by Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe, of Hegel who saw them leading the world to a glorious destiny of compulsory *Kultur*, of Nietzsche who told them that Supermen were above ordinary



controls, of Treitschke who set the increase of power as the highest moral duty of the state, of the whole German people, who called their temporal ruler the “All-Highest”. What made the Schlieffen plan was not Clausewitz and the Battle of Cannae, but the body of accumulated egoism which suckled the German people and created a nation fed on “the desperate delusion of the will that deems itself absolute”.<sup>50</sup>

In Germany a specific form of looking at the world developed, which served to legitimate and justify excesses carried out in the name of the Kaiser and the Fatherland.

For Paul Johnson the modern world began in 1815 following the defeat of Napoleon and his final banishment to a diet of Namibian beef and an early death on the south Atlantic island of St. Helena.<sup>51</sup> Johann Gottlieb Fichte died in the year that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo by an alliance of Prussian and Anglo-Dutch forces. Before his death, Fichte held the chair of Philosophy at the University of Berlin. For Fichte the Germans were an *Urvolk*, who had an obligation to teach the rest of the world of their own natural civilisation. To do so, Germany needed to unite and become the great nation which its God given natural aptitudes would make possible. History was, as described by Fichte, a never ending struggle between nations –inseparable from states-, with the victor being the nation-state which most controlled the lives of its people.<sup>52</sup> For Fichte a nation-state, in this instance Germany, was naturally expansive:

Every nation wants to disseminate as widely as possible the good points which are peculiar to it. And, as far as it can, it wants to assimilate the entire human race to itself in accordance with an urge planted in men by God, an urge on which the community of nations, the friction between them, and their development towards perfection rest.<sup>53</sup>

As has been noted, “This was a momentous statement because it gave the authority of Germany’s leading academic philosopher to the proposition that the power impulse of the state was both natural and healthy, and it placed the impulse in the context of a moral world view”.<sup>54</sup>

Fichte’s chair of philosophy in Berlin came to be occupied by Germany’s greatest philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who developed and continued Fichte’s struggle for a unified German national state. Hegel attempted to Euclidize

philosophy, and fulminated against the mere pursuit of “*thinking for oneself*”. Hegel’s notion of dialectical progression, from the lowest to the highest forms, came to influence every academic discipline.<sup>55</sup> Of particular relevance here is the impact of Hegel’s thinking on the discipline of history. For Hegel there was an irresistible dynamic force, which he called the “world-spirit”, that propelled the march of progress from lower to higher forms. Hegel believed that, following the defeat of Napoleon, Germany had become the “nation of world-historical consequence”. Paraphrasing Hegel, Johnson states:

Such a nation, *for that time*, is entitled to absolute privileges over all the others. It should behave as the spirit willed it and will be dominant in the world.<sup>56</sup>

When the highest form of human institution, the state, embodied the world-spirit, it had the right to pursue its interests by any means, including war.<sup>57</sup> Needless to say that nation was now Germany. The world-spirit was not and could to be opposed. Those foolish enough to oppose it were deemed by Hegel to be, “powerless vermin”.<sup>58</sup> The frightening aspect of this philosophy was quite simply that it was the cutting edge of nineteenth century philosophy. It was, for want of a better term, hip, and as cannot be emphasised enough:

This philosophy was what intelligent young Germans were to be taught, throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century and beyond. A new force had entered the world: the force of history. Whether you called it a world-spirit or described it as a colossus giving not just people but entire epochs “marching orders,” ordinary men and women, however many of them there were, could not stop history pursuing its predetermined course, and the great men of the time, however powerful they seemed, were merely puppets stuck in the swaying howdah on the vast back of the advancing elephant.<sup>59</sup>

The establishment of German unity in 1871 is one of the most historically debated milestones in world history. Yet, the manner in which this unity should have come to be intimately linked to the establishment of a German empire with colonies is sadly under-researched. It is clear though, that within Germany the desire for colonies was a long sought after ideal that was intimately linked to the establishment of German unity and superiority. To be sure, Carl Peters position was a partisan one, nevertheless, his words express ideas that were prevalent in Germany at the time:

Die deutsche Kolonialbewegung ist die natürliche Fortsetzung der deutschen Einheitsbestrebungen. Es war natürlich, dass das deutsche Volk, nachdem es

seine europäische Machtstellung auf den Schlachtfeldern von Königgratz und Sedan empor gerichtet hatte, sofort das Bedürfnis empfand, nunmehr auch der elenden und zum Teil geradezu verächtlichen Stellung unserer Nation jenseits der Weltmeere ein Ende zu machen, und zu gleicher Zeit Teil zu nehmen an den Vorteilen materieller Art, welche eine Herrschaftsentfaltung im großen Styl noch zu allen Zeiten geboten hat.<sup>60</sup>

The widespread nature of these sentiments within sections of Germany's elite, has also been referred to by Nils Ole Oermann, who cited the official report of the Rhenish Missionary Society for 1884, and noted the euphoria with which the concept of German unity came to be directly linked with the establishment of a Germany with colonial possessions:

For the mission clearly a new, significant era has begun due to the fact that a strong and unified Germany has recently started to take its share in the ever expanding and final race of the European nations to dominate the world, in other words: that Germany starts to claim colonial possessions.<sup>61</sup>

Jürgen Osterhammel, suggests that colonialist thinking is deeply embedded in the mind-set of colonising nations. It manifests itself in a variety of ways: as the construction of an inferior otherness, of a colonising "mission" and mandate of guardianship, and as the utopian notion of a natural order to be achieved through "cultivation".<sup>62</sup> Recent work completed by the late Suzanne Zantop and others has outlined how deep-seated the desire for colonies and empire were within German popular culture long before German unity actually became a reality in 1871. In addition, and more importantly so, Zantop has described a long tradition within German literature which she linked to the construction of a "bourgeois, male German identity" which lay at the basis of German unity. For Zantop, -in an echo of Carl Peters-, German imperialism was inextricably linked to German national identity and unity. As such, it is hardly surprising that Zantop, Lennox, and Friedrichsmeyer would, "propose that a colonialist mindset existed before the desired object, the colonies, came within Germans' reach".<sup>63</sup> For Zantop the creation of imagined colonial societies, in which everything was as it should be, compensated for the "lack of national territory, unity, identity", and provided an impetus for change in Germany itself:

Indeed, the foreign soil onto which these fantasies are projected becomes the testing ground for the development of a distinct sense of national self and a national identity.<sup>64</sup>

Bereft of colonies, Germany was a colonial innocent in more than one sense, without colonies Germans were not to be found guilty of the slaughters perpetrated elsewhere: As fantasies of German difference they reinforced the posture of the “disinterested”, “Objective” observer whose colonial abstinence entitled him to criticize the excesses of others. Moreover, predating German colonialism by centuries, colonial fantasies generated a colonialist predisposition and the “colonial legend” of the moral, hard-working German colonizer of superior strength and intelligence who –unlike other colonizers- was loved like a father by his ever-grateful native subjects. As stories of benign patriarchal relations, these colonial fantasies reflected the fantasy of the *Vater Staat* who –through the *Landesvater*- would take care of his obedient “children”.<sup>65</sup>

Within Germany the belief developed that Germany, bereft of guilt, had a natural destiny to have colonies and would be a peerless coloniser. These fantasies, substantiated by a belief in itself, and the absence of colonies, allowed for the establishment of a self-image which emphasised good colonial order. When reality struck, and this did not turn out to be as expected, the subjects were seen to be acting against the natural order. In addition, if we extend Zantop’s line of reasoning, opposition or unrest in the colony would not only be a threat to the colonial order but also to a national German identity as a whole; Herero, or for that matter any colonial subjects’, opposition to German rule struck at the very essence of German identity.

We may wish, in the present, to claim that Hegel’s ideas of a dialectical progression from lower to higher forms, or ideas relating to ‘world-spirit’ and destiny, are incorrect. However history, or rather historical interpretations both scholarly and lay, do most definitely have an impact on the world in which we live. In this manner history most certainly does have power. History has power and force in that it lets people act in ways which they believe are in keeping with history.

One of the many intelligent young German students taught in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was none other than Kaiser Wilhelm II. George Ernst Hinzpeter, Wilhelm’s civilian tutor up to his 18<sup>th</sup> year, subjected the prince to a rigorous schedule of lessons, that started at six in the morning and ended at six in the evening, in Latin, history, religion, mathematics and modern languages.<sup>66</sup> Under Hinzpeter’s tutelage Wilhelm

successfully completed his secondary schooling in Kassel and entered university in Bonn. Wilhelmine biographer, John Röhl describes how at university Wilhelm's *Weltanschauung* developed:

In Wilhelm's mind, a distorted Prussian-dynastic view of history merged with a mystical pietism to form a heady view of his position as the sole, divinely chosen leader of the nation...<sup>67</sup>

The alarming aspect for myself as an historian is that Kaiser Wilhelm believed the myths which he had been taught as history. He truly believed that the world operated in the manner in which he had been told in the course of his schooling.<sup>68</sup> Not only did he believe the myths and clichés that had been told him by historians, he acted in accordance with these beliefs, and expected his followers to do so too. An address given by Wilhelm in September 1907 in the Rathaus in Memel, is characteristic of his providential belief. After urging his audience to remember the 'hand of divine providence' at work in the great historical achievements of Germany, he stated:

And if the Lord God did not have in store for us some great destiny in the world, then he wouldn't have bestowed such magnificent traits and abilities upon our people.<sup>69</sup>

Biographers of Wilhelm have emphasised his belief in destiny, the progress of nations, and the role of Germany and himself within this. Beliefs that were supported and developed by the men with whom Wilhelm chose to associate himself.

Particularly relevant here is the man whom from the early 1880s Wilhelm chose to associate ever more with, General Count Alfred von Waldersee. It has been suggested that in Waldersee Wilhelm found the father figure and acceptance that he had sought.<sup>70</sup> Waldersee, quartermaster-general of the Prussian army and deputy chief of the general staff, has been described as being:

Anti-Semitic, narrowly zealous in religion, and reactionary in domestic politics, the quartermaster-general was the personification of everything Wilhelm's parents most detested...<sup>71</sup>

Waldersee's anti-Semitism, reactionary politics, warmongering and persistent intriguing met with Wilhelm's support, but proved to be the catalyst for the eventual break between Wilhelm and Chancellor Bismarck. However, what is important to note here is Waldersee's belief in war as the solution to issues of policy. As Röhl has commented dryly, "Count Waldersee's obsession with war is unparalleled in German, if not world, history".<sup>72</sup>

Though he was a “military dilettante” who may have “adopted the external trappings but not the values and mental habits of a Pussian officer”<sup>73</sup>, Kaiser Wilhelm was a man who had a mystical fascination with and belief in the alleged nobility of war. In addition he believed that Norsemen, or for that manner, Chinamen, acted in particular ways and that, as with all ‘peoples’ of the earth, they had specific historically determined destinies in which war was a given.

Under Chancellor Bismarck the fiction existed that in Germany the Kaiser gave the orders and the empire obeyed. However, though constitutionally speaking this may have been the case, the truth was that Chancellor Bismarck determined the course of government. Wilhelm II’s biographer, John Röhl, has noted that:

After Bismarck’s dismissal, all that Kaiser Wilhelm II needed to do was to transform Bismarck’s political fiction into fact, though this could not be accomplished overnight, nor without severe internal crisis. Yet in the course of the 1890s a new system of power relationships *was* created, a genuinely monarchical régime in which the Kaiser and his court, rather than the Chancellor and ‘his men’, exercised political power and decision-making authority and thus laid down the fundamental guidelines of domestic, foreign and armaments policy.<sup>74</sup>

When Kaiser Wilhelm II ascended the throne, the German state, that had been moulded by Bismarck, was one filled with checks and balances, yet carried the myth of the Kaiser as the supreme being, whereas in actual fact the Chancellor determined what was to happen. Piece by piece, starting with the deposition of Bismarck Wilhelm II exculpated the state until he was surrounded by yes men who were prepared to fulfil his wishes and dreams as a divine leader. This with the world’s most effective bureaucracy in place, and with an army and productive capacity that would nearly bring the world to its knees.

## **TANZANIA**

In Tanzania lessons learnt in the Congo Free State by German Officers in the service of King Leopold, were deployed and developed. These experiences came to form the basis for further programmes of action later deployed in China.

In early 1885 the German Emperor issued a charter of protection to the German Colonisation Society declaring that he placed the territories that it claimed under his suzerainty and protection, and granted to the society the management thereof subject to the superintendence of, and further regulations by, the German Government. In effect this meant that lands claimed by the German Colonisation society on the basis of dubious agreements allegedly concluded with African leaders in East Africa would henceforth be subject to official German interference.<sup>75</sup>

In 1888 relations between German officials and Africans living in the coastal settlements of Tanzania came to a head. In 1889 the German government dispatched Hermann Wissmann to East Africa with orders to bring the Tanganyikan coast under German control. Wissmann had travelled and fought extensively in Africa. Between 1880 and 1882 he crossed the continent from west to east, after which he had undertaken a number of expeditions in the Congo basin on behalf of the Belgian King Leopold.<sup>76</sup> Selected by Bismarck and the new Kaiser Wilhelm II, as an experienced traveller and soldier in Africa, Wissmann was sent off to East Africa with the advice, “Siegen Sie!” [be victorious!].<sup>77</sup> Wissmann arrived off the Tanganyikan coast in 1889 with a force of 600 sudanese mercenaries, recruited in Egypt, and 400 Shanga mercenaries recruited in Mozambique. These recruits, some of whom had fought with Wissmann in his expeditions in Congo, came to form the basis of the *Schutztruppe* [protectorate force] as it came to be established in Tanganyika.<sup>78</sup>

Upon arriving in Tanganyika Wissmann launched his assault on those who were allegedly in revolt. German historian Helmuth Stoecker described what happened in the following manner:

In all the captured territories the new masters initiated their authority through the unleashing of terror. Countless Africans who were considered guilty of resistance were killed without process, or were handed over to the executioner following a conviction by court martial.<sup>79</sup>

Historian of the Swahili coast, Jonathan Glassmann wrote of Wissmann as the young protégé of the German Kaiser, and noted:

The expedition was one of the first occasions on which Europeans used the fully automatic Maxim machine gun, ... Wissmann wrote glowing letters informing his royal mentor of the ‘effectiveness’ with which the Maxims mowed down hundreds of fleeing warriors.<sup>80</sup>

For his activities in Tanganyika Wissmann was promoted to the nobility by the Kaiser, awarded the Royal Crown of the Order of the Red Eagle in 1894, and the University of Halle provided him with an academic gloss by awarding him an honorary doctorate.<sup>81</sup> Upon his return to Tanganyika Wissmann engaged in numerous punitive expeditions in the south and around Kilimanjaro, and was appointed governor of German East Africa in 1895, although he resigned in 1896, partly because he could not control the Schutztruppe which had been placed under the command of von Trotha, who outranked him.<sup>82</sup> Upon his return to Germany Wissmann, who was by this stage heavily addicted to morphine was elected as president of the Berlin Geographical Society in 1897. He died as a result of a “hunting accident” in Germany in 1905, and was buried in Cologne.<sup>83</sup>

### **Wahehe**

After having established some measure of control along the coast, imperial Germany sought to expand its influence further in land, and came up eventually against the forces of Mkwawa. On the first of April 1891 the German government took direct control of the territories claimed by the German East Africa Company, and the mercenary force of Wissmann became the official German protectorate force of German East Africa under the command of Emil von Zelewski.<sup>84</sup> No less than four months later Hehe forces routed a German expeditionary force under the command of Zelewski. Telegram, Zanzibar to AA, 13/9/91

expedition corps Zelewsky total aufgerien... seen expedition vorlaeufig unmoeglich situation Kritisch.<sup>85</sup>

This heralded the beginning of a sustained German campaign to destroy the Wahehe and its leaders.<sup>86</sup>

Following the defeat and destruction of the Zelewski column in 1891, Mkwawa maintained his position of power in southwestern Tanganyika. To this end emissaries of Mkwawa continued to collect and demand tribute on caravan routes leading to and from the coast and passing through his area of influence.<sup>87</sup>

In October 1894 German forces under the command of Colonel von Schele attacked, overran, and sacked Kulenga, the main residence of Mkwawa. In this attack the Germans captured no less than 1.500 women and children, 30.000 pounds of gunpowder, hundreds of rifles and guns, as well as over 2.000 head of cattle and 5000 head of small stock. Mkwawa was able to escape. The German authorities divided



Uhehe into two separate “kingdoms” placed under two Wahehe opponents of Mkwawa. For four years, between 1894 and 1898, German forces pursued and harried Mkwawa and his followers. In the euphemistic language of administrators describing war, a German official noted of the pursuit of Mkwawa:

Mkwawa always moved between our patrols. He was supplied with information and food in the very localities where our troops operated, but the inhabitants declined to give our forces any information and denied all knowledge of his presence. When we were hot on Mkwawa’s trail, food and liquor would often be found placed in the pathless bush; his people always knew where to find him, the direction he had taken and the points he would traverse. Altogether, it was certain that Mkwawa exercised an inexplicable influence over the natives, who, when the pursuing troops surprised his camp, would, time after time, blindly hurl themselves on the soldiers, sacrificing themselves merely to give Mkwawa the chance of escape. No scheme for his capture was possible and no one ever knew even what he looked like.<sup>88</sup>

### **Eating the land of Mkwawa<sup>89</sup>**

During the years between 1891, when Zelewski was killed, and 1898 when Mkwawa was killed, German methods of warfare had transformed considerably in Tanganyika. No longer were German patrols fitted out as if they were about to patrol the Alsace, instead the German army developed strategies and tactics which would guarantee success in Africa. German governor Liebert, 1898 – 1900 commander of German forces in German East Africa was personally involved in the war in Uhehe wrote:

In Bohemia and France I learnt about war in practice. For thirty years I have been continually engaged in the study of war and in the history of war in particular. But, what I experienced in Uhehe existed beyond the parameters of all that had existed previously. It was truly African.<sup>90</sup>

German forces began to operate by sector. In the war that developed German forces moved through the highlands, from one valley to the next. Each valley would be surrounded, all food resources and water sources within the valley destroyed, where after any surviving elders and men would be killed, while young women and children were taken into custody and put to work as concubines or labourers. In effect this resulted in the development of warfare that is now referred to counter-insurgency (Coin). The systematic and relentless move across the highlands, valley by valley,

sector by sector, resulted in the effective depopulation of the lands. Agricultural activities could not be undertaken, and when they were the produce was destroyed.<sup>91</sup> People were expected to provide unconditional allegiance to German forces, and to accede to all their demands; failure to do so resulted in death. Given these circumstances it is hardly surprising that those choosing to continue to oppose the Germans should choose to fight to the death rather than surrender. A German officer serving in the Wahehe campaign reported on the manner in which the war was waged in the following manner:

On 25 August at 5 o'clock we surprised the rebels at Kibata as they attempted to cross the river unnoticed. We shot 79 of them, apart from those that were slaughtered [zerfleischt] by the crocodiles. In the middle of the river there was a small sandbank on which the rebels attempted to rest. However, there they were also struck by our shots. That was a sight. I stood behind a fallen tree on the riverbank and fired 120 shots in the Bull! [Runde]. We did not take any prisoners. They were always hung.<sup>92</sup>

Eventually harried from valley to valley, bereft of food and followers Mkwawa committed suicide. Mkwawa was decapitated and his skull displayed as a trophy in the house of Tom von Prince where after it was sent to Germany.<sup>93</sup>

## **China.**

Der sagenumwobene "Boxer-Krieg" begann für die Deutschen eigentlich erst, als der Boxeraufstand weitgehend niedergeschlagen war.<sup>94</sup>

The deployment of sections of the German Army in China at the time of the Boxer rebellion, led to the further radicalisation of the German Army, with the consent and legitimacy of the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II.

The Kaiser's ideas regarding the workings of the world and history are epitomised in his speeches. *Der Reise Kaiser* [the travelling Kaiser], as Wilhelm was popularly known, continually travelled all around his realm. Between January 1897 and December 1902 he made 233 visits to no less than 123 German towns and cities, and in most of these instances Wilhelm addressed his subjects.<sup>95</sup> Until at least 1908 his speeches were not set pieces prepared by professional writers, but the products of his

own intellect. Wilhelm's biographers note that he rarely prepared his speeches before hand, indeed, "They were consciously performed as impromptu, unmediated acts of communication...".<sup>96</sup> As such they reflect what was keeping him occupied, what he was thinking, and what he believed at the time. Technically Wilhelm appears to have been a very good public speaker, however it was the "*content* of his public utterances [that were] often catastrophically misjudged".<sup>97</sup> Writing of Wilhelm's speeches Clark had the following to say:

...it must be said that Wilhelm was singularly ill-suited to the communicative tasks of his office. He found it virtually impossible to express himself in the sober, measured diction that the politically informed public clearly expected of him. His more flamboyant speeches were like nineteenth century history paintings -charged with heavy-handed symbolism, in which tempests alternated with shafts of redeeming light were all about was dark and sublime figures floated above the petty conflicts of the day.<sup>98</sup>

They were speeches that expressed very clearly the way in which Wilhelm thought about the world, and how he expected his subjects to behave. Undoubtedly, his most famous speech was the *Hunnenrede*, the speech that would tarnish German soldiers for the rest of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as "Huns".

In 1900 a substantial number of Chinese militants sought to rid China of foreigners, and to free China from the shackles of foreign control. When an international force of Russians, French, Italians, British, US, Japanese, Germans and Austrians marched on Peking on 10 June 1900, the German Ambassador Klemens von Ketteler was killed. Kaiser Wilhelm II ensured that the international force was to be commanded by his former confidant Generalfeldmarschall Alfred Graf von Waldersee. No less than 10.000 German soldiers volunteered to be part of the western powers expeditionary force which was dispatched to China to re-assert western control.<sup>99</sup> In July of 1900, as German volunteers prepared to set sail from Bremerhaven, the Kaiser, resplendent in a full dress uniform, addressed his soldiers from a raised platform:

When you come before the enemy, let him be struck down; there will be no mercy, prisoners will not be taken. Just as the Huns one thousand years ago ... made a name for themselves in which their greatness still resounds, so let the name Germany be known in China in such a way that a Chinese will never again dare even to look askance at a German.<sup>100</sup>

The Germans arrived in China on 13 September 1900, after negotiations had started and a month after the other coalition forces had taken Peking. Though the bulk of German forces arrived in China after peace negotiations had started, they participated in no less than 50 punitive expeditions. Peking and other cities were destroyed and plundered, women were raped and alleged Boxers were executed. As the Kaiser had ordered: “Peking must be levelled to the ground, Peking must be shaved”.<sup>101</sup> A German historian has noted:

Where German soldiers marched to the front, the native population attempted, where possible, to flee. A number of times “Boxer villages” were burnt down and “all inhabitants run through with bayonets”. In this “unfortunately” a number of “wrong” villages were visited.<sup>102</sup>

Without remorse or shame soldier Heinrich Haslinde described to his parents how when Chinese refused to provide foodstuffs which he had demanded he “hit them on the skulls with [his] lance to give more emphasis to my words”. When his victims attempted to protect themselves he “ran the one chinses through with my lance and stuck the other one down”. On account of this the village had to pay a fine of 30.000 Marks.

The highly respected and nuanced German weekly *Die Zeit* has noted that these expeditions entailed the straightforward mass murder of the Chinese civilian population by the German troops involved. It is apparent that what they saw, and had been ordered to do, shocked many of the German soldiers. Some wrote letters home in which they described in graphic detail their activities; “On this day I looked more akin to a butcher than a German soldier”.<sup>103</sup> Large numbers of these letters were published in German newspapers, where they became known as *Hunnenbriefe*. Letters that the opposition parties within the *Reichstag* made grateful use of. In parliamentary debates regarding costs incurred during the Boxer rebellion, the leader of the Social Democrats, August Bebel, quoted from one of the *Hunnenbriefe* that had been published in the newspapers:

The way in which we won the first battle. You should have seen how we advanced into the town. Everything that came across our way, be it man, woman or child, everything was slaughtered [abgeschlachtet]. Now, how the women screamed! But the Kaiser’s order stated: Show no mercy! – and we have sworn allegiance and obedience and that is what we are doing.<sup>104</sup>

It is clear that the boundaries of correct behaviour in war were transgressed in China. However, what was fundamental in this instance, was the fact that for many

German soldiers this had been sanctioned by the highest authority. That is, the boundaries of correct behaviour had been transgressed with the official sanction of the Kaiser. A large number of the German soldiers who had volunteered to fight in China would later volunteer again to fight in the war against the Herero. Indeed, the man personally chosen by the Kaiser to lead German troops in Namibia, General Lothar von Trotha had served in China, and in the campaigns against the Wahehe in Tanzania before that.

### **Namibia.**

Eine solche Kriegsführung kann jeder Metzgerknecht treiben, dazu braucht man nicht General oder Höherer Offizier zu sein.

August Bebel<sup>105</sup>

Wer hier kolonisieren wollte, mußte zuerst zum Schwert greifen und Krieg führen - aber nicht kleinlichen und schwächlichen Mitteln, sondern mit starker, Achtung gebietender Macht bis zur völligen Niederwerfung der Eingeborenen. Erst dann war eine wirkliche Kolonisierung des Schutzgebietes möglich.<sup>106</sup>

Gewalt mit krassem Terrorismus und selbst mit Grausamkeit auszuüben, war und ist meine Politik. Ich vernichte die afrikanischen Stämme mit Strömen von Blut und Ströme von Geld. Nur auf dieser Aussaat kann etwas Neues entstehen, was Bestand hat.<sup>107</sup>

The foundation and establishment of the German colonial army in Namibia by German officers who had previously served in the Congo Free State, ensured that excessive violence formed an integral part of German colonial presence in Namibia prior to 1904. (*Vide* the attack on Hoornkrans and the killing of Amraal Lambert.) The violent nature of German presence in Namibia prior to 1904, was strengthened between 1904 – 08 by the deployment of thoroughly brutalised German soldiers who had previously served in Tanzania and China.

Yet even before the Kaiser had sent his troops to China, atrocities had been committed in his name in Namibia. In June of 1888 Kaiser Wilhelm II became the emperor of an empire, which at that stage included a South West African protectorate abandoned by its three man German administration. Chancellor Bismarck seriously considered jettisoning the protectorate, an option that was unacceptable to the new Kaiser. Consequently in June 1889 a detachment of 21 German soldiers led by Curt von Francois landed in Walvisbay and marched inland to establish a colonial presence in Namibia.<sup>108</sup>

The first German troops to land in German South West Africa, did so wholly within the parameters that had already been established before hand in the popular and official mind with regard to what was necessary within Africa. The first German troops to land in German South West Africa did so under the command of Curt von Francois, who, in the words of the German foreign Office, was “the well known African explorer”. Wearing uniforms, the design of which had been inspired by Rhenish missionary director Fabri, the soldiers immediately brought about a diplomatic incident. Regarding the illegal importation of arms via a British port by von Francois and his men, the German foreign office official, in replying to the British Ambassador in Berlin simply lied when he stated:

I had no idea that these men who carried no arms and were landed like all other passengers, could be described as a 'debarkation of a German military force.' The embarkation of this military force took place in Liverpool and the munitions of war, mentioned in your note, were consigned to the Imperial German Commissioner,... Before proceeding to the interior the men were armed, as it is invariably the case with travellers in that part of the world.<sup>109</sup>

In a separate document the German Consul General for Great Britain and Ireland referred to von Francois and the soldiers under his command as a “party of scientists”. In addition, “that each member of the expedition carries for his personal use abroad one rifle and one revolver unloaded, but [sic] has no ammunition with him”.<sup>110</sup> That these terms were used by the German foreign office to deceive their British counterparts is not to be denied, nevertheless it must be remembered that this deceit took place within a specific paradigm, which was not only understandable, but also deemed acceptable to western European powers at the time. It was to be expected that European travellers to “that part of the world” should carry arms with them.<sup>111</sup>

The subsequent activities of von Francois and his men, most notably his attack on the settlement of Hendrik Witbooi in Hoornkrans, did little to bring about peace in the territory of German South West Africa. Nonetheless the reports and subsequent books written by the von Francois brothers, along with the published accounts of the Rhenish Missionary Society, formed the basis upon which future German colonial administrators, officers and soldiers acted. Most notably, Theodor Leutwein, the man who replaced Curt von Francois following the debacle of Hoornkrans, acted upon the information contained in the earlier intelligence reports of the von Francois brothers.<sup>112</sup>

Curt von Francois, who was accompanied by his brother Hugo, and would later be joined by yet another brother, Alfred, had made a name for himself in 1888 when he had successfully led a German colonial expedition in to acquire territory in northern Togo by treaty. Between February and June 1888 von Francois concluded no less than six treaties in the Dagomba kingdom and the trading city of Salaga.<sup>113</sup> In his activities he was assisted by Dr. Ludwig Wolf, who had accompanied von Francois and Wissmann to the Congo. However, within two months of his arrival in Namibia, Francois had so irritated and exasperated the inhabitants of the territory that he and his troops had been forced to withdraw to a waterhole on the edge of the Namib Desert. With the passing of time, the arrival of further troops from Germany, and a successful blockade of the arms and ammunition trade routes to central Namibia, von Francois began exerting an ever-greater control upon developments in the territory. Throughout the first three years of his presence von Francois, and his brothers, travelled throughout the territory gaining information.<sup>114</sup> In 1891 Lieutenant Hugo von Francois, and his brother Alfred, reconnoitred Hoornkrans, the settlement of the Oorlam leader Hendrik Witbooi. “Under the mask of a friendly visit”, Francois noted and sketched the layout of the settlement, and noted:

In the dry season the favoured route of attack would be from the South, during the rainy season, in contrast, the route would be from the North...

The huts are very well placed for quick occupation...

Therefore the only way to take the place, without artillery, is through an attack, in which one would have already crossed the terrain at night, and already occupied the first breastworks at the dawning of the day. However, even in these circumstance a guarantee for total destruction(*völlige Vernichtung*) cannot be given.<sup>115</sup>

Two years later, on the basis of this information, German soldiers, surrounded and attacked Hoornkrans. In the aftermath of the attack, a badly shaken Hendrik Witbooi wrote:

"(...) I knew of no war which would shoot me, therefore I was completely at peace and unsuspecting with my men, therefore the few guns we had were not carried in slings on our bodies but everything had been put away into the chests. In this condition the *Hoofman* [von Francois] shot us early in the morning as we still lay unsuspectingly asleep, I left with all my men, without offering them resistance, in this way the *Hoofman* captured our place, and destroyed the place in the most terrible manner, as I had never imagined from a white civilised nation, which knows the laws and conduct of war, but he robbed me, and small children, which still lay at their mother's breast, and bigger children and women and children he shot them dead, and many corpses, which he had already shot dead, he placed in the grass houses which he lit and burnt the bodies to ash. Sadly and terrifyingly the *Hoofman* did his work in disgraceful war."<sup>116</sup>

In all, according to Witbooi's own account, 10 men and 75 women and children were killed. The remaining women were captured and taken to Windhoek. Far from ending Witbooi's presence, the attack on Hoornkrans unleashed a guerrilla war against German forces and settlers in the territory, which was only ended following the dismissal of Curt von Francois and the arrival of a new German governor in the territory, Theodor Leutwein.

## **Soldiers**

"... fantasy produces social realities, and that social realities in turn create their own fantasies." <sup>117</sup>

German soldiers serving in Namibia were thoroughly radicalised by prior experiences in Tanzania and China either through first hand experience, or through the second hand of serving with veterans, reading of the exploits of veterans, or having attended theatre productions that depicted the adventures of the Kaiser's soldiers.

Following the outbreak of the Herero-German war, the information that German soldiers had access to determined in large measure their attitude vis-a-vis their



victims. The work of Schwabe, Wissmann, Pogge, the Von Francois brothers and others would have greatly influenced the thinking of the Schutztrupp officers. These works, *Deutsch Südwest-Afrika* and *Nama und Damara* created a world within which German soldiers could place and rank the inhabitants of Namibia as they came across them; thus the Herero as a master race, the Damara as their enslaved subjects and so forth. The novelist Uwe Timm had one of his protagonists reading works by the Anarchist author Kropotkin<sup>118</sup>, yet it was far more likely that German soldiers would have been reading the works of Karl May. We do know that these works deeply influenced the thinking of those who read them, none the least their author and creator May himself, who when confronted with the reality of the colonial situation suffered two nervous breakdowns and took to writing texts that ceased to glorify the colonial venture.<sup>119</sup> Nevertheless most soldiers would have garnered their knowledge of Africa from the popular *Völkerschauen* and vaudeville stage productions of Wilhelmine Germany.<sup>120</sup>

The case of soldier Henker, who entered the colony in 1890 fourteen years prior to the outbreak of the war, is representative for the experiences of the other German *Schutztrupp* who later entered the territory. In his diary Henker described how prior to his departure his contingent had been inspected and spoken to by Kaiser Wilhelm II in the gardens of Sans Soucci in Potsdam, where after, in an effort to gain some understanding as to where they were going, Henker and his comrades attended a show at the Viktoria Theatre in Berlin. The show that they attended was, "an African piece, *Stanley in Afrika* [we] were very satisfied with the beautiful jungles and the ample water, but when we later landed in Sandwich harbour we were very disappointed".<sup>121</sup> The case of the Schutztrupp who was shocked to discover that what he had believed existed as Africa, was something totally different to that which he found upon his arrival on the windswept sandy desert shores of German South West Africa, is a theme that consistently runs through the diaries, letters and literature of those who travelled to Namibia.<sup>122</sup> Describing this disappointment it has been noted that:

‘Afrika’ bedeutete Exotik, Tiere, ‘wilde Eingeborene’, ‘schöne Eingeborene’ und vor allem Palmen. Häufig war die Landung in Swakopmund daher mit einer krassen Enttäuschung verbunden: ‘Das ist doch nicht Afrika’. Diese Enttäuschung beim ersten Blick auf Afrika ist ein stereotypes Muster,

das sich bis heute in fast allen Romanen, Lebenserinnerungen, Kinderbüchern, Reiseberichten bis hin zu feuilletonischen Artikeln über Namibia findet.<sup>123</sup>

The soldiers arrived in a land that was in no way comparable to their imagined views. Instead of jungles and greenery they saw desert, instead of fertile lands they travelled through deserted landscapes into settlements in which people and cattle were stocked in large Kraals surrounded by the dead and decaying corpses of stock that had died of starvation.<sup>124</sup> It was an atmosphere in which the authority and statements of the “Alte Afrikaner” counted for very much. They were the men who had an understanding, however clouded, of events and developments in the territory. In addition, in conditions where typhus amongst German soldiers was rife, the advice and counsel of older experienced men was literally a question of life and death. In the absence of these men the issues of the camps, death and dying, dust, heat, and smell found no mediation.

A recurring theme in the texts of German soldiers en- route to Namibia is their willingness to “fight the good fight”. Oberleutnant Haak describes the joy of fellow officers who have been chosen to accompany a wagon train to the front.<sup>125</sup> Franke describes his frustration at having arrived in Namibia just as the Mbanderu Khauas-Khoi war ends, and Oberleutnant Stuhlmann is described as fearing that he might arrive too late to take part in the war.<sup>126</sup> However, not only was the country not what they had expected, but the war was not what they had anticipated either.<sup>127</sup> The soldiers experienced intense disappointment, frustration and alienation with what they found. In part, these conditions led to the absence of norms, and the venting of frustration upon those deemed to be responsible for the disappointment and fear being experienced by the German soldiers. The German marine Auer, who arrived with the S.S. Habicht in Swakopmund within a few days of the war having started, provides explicit descriptions of his abuse and hanging of people who claimed not to be Herero. Auer’s bland and brutal descriptions of killing and abuse mirror those of his comrades in arms. On the basis of recently acquired knowledge, people were deemed to be Herero, and as such, participation in the abuse and murder of these people was considered acceptable behaviour.<sup>128</sup> The absence of any sanction enforced by commanding officers on the indiscriminate killing and abuse of all those deemed to be Herero led to ever-greater brutality, indeed, the accepted nature of their own brutality.

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Intensely disconcerting in the present is the blithe manner in which descriptions of hanging, abuse, slaughter and the like are juxtaposed with images of naked women and children. The photographic albums of Lt. Von Duering are to be found in the Sam Cohen Library in Swakopmund, these contain unique photographs of the infamous concentration camp on Shark Island in Lüderitz. Amongst the photographs of dying women and children, Duering has placed a pornographic photographs of young naked Herero women.<sup>130</sup> Similarly the published works of Max Belwe, Erich von Salzmann, Georg Auer, and others contain photographs of naked Herero women alongside descriptions of the most terrible atrocities. Undoubtedly many soldiers believed that they would find tropical beauties in Africa. However, the women that they find in Namibia are not the beauties of South America, or the South Sea Polynesia as glorified by Paul Gauguin, instead they turned out to be ghastly creatures (*hessliche gestalten*).<sup>131</sup> Similarly Oberleutnant Haak's observations of Herero women prisoners is anything but romantic:

Neulich kamen mit einem Transport etwa 50 gefangene Weiber und Kinder ins Lager. Ihr Zustand war unbeschreiblich; halb verhungert, voller Ungeziefer, fraßen sie von weggeworfenen, halb verfaulten Ochsenknochen gierig die letzten Fleischfetzen. ... Die Weiber werden jeden Tag zweimal durchs Lager getrieben und müssen Scherben, Konservenbüchsen usw. Aufsammeln; manche können allerdings kaum noch kriechen.<sup>132</sup>

## **Postscript:**

### **The control, or Americans in the Philippines**

April 1898 Spanish American war started. In June 1898 US army landed in the Philippines after the Spanish fleet had been “swept away” in Manila harbour by the US navy. US forces were greeted by Filipino *insurrectos* led by Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy who had been fighting Spanish occupation for the past two years. At this stage the Americans were greeted as liberators and the Filipinos believed American assurances that the Philippines would not be annexed by the United States and on 12 June Aguinaldo issued a declaration of independence of the Philippines from Spain. American forces and *insurrectos* surrounded Manila and prepared to attack the city which at that stage was still occupied by Spanish forces. In the event Spanish commanders reached an agreement with US forces and the Filipinos were excluded from the actual occupation of the city. This was followed on 17 August by an order from the then American president William McKinley which was cabled to US forces in the Philippines:

The insurgents and all others must recognise the military occupation and authority of the United States.<sup>133</sup>

By December 1898 there were no less than 24.000 American troops in Manila, the majority of which were volunteers, with approximately 30.000 *insurrectos* surrounding the city. Open warfare broke out in February 1899 when in one day 300 Filipinos and 59 Americans were killed.

By May 1900 the number of US forces in the Philippines had risen to 75.000, more than three quarters of the entire US Army. Major General Arthur MacArthur assumed command.

At the same time the Boxer rebellion began in China and half the US Marines stationed in the Philippines, including Major Littleton Waller were despatched to China to join the international relief expedition that marched on Peking. Returned to the Philippines in October 1900 by which stage the war in the Philippines continued to rage in ever more horrific and terrible ways. American volunteer soldiers wrote letters home that echoed the words of the German Kaiser:

No more prisoners. [The Filipinos] take none ... we will kill the wounded and all of them.<sup>134</sup>

Sergeant Howard McFarland of the 43 Infantry reported that he and the men of his company had killed 85 *insurrectos* with the additional comment that: “When we find one that is not dead, we have bayonets”.<sup>135</sup> Commenting on these ideas and practices a contemporary military historian has written:

That this practice became widespread, if not universal, is attested to by the ratio of killed to wounded Filipinos in the insurrection – 40 dead to one wounded. The usual battle figure is three wounded for each killed.<sup>136</sup>

In December 1900 MacArthur declared martial law and cited the implementation of Army General Order 100 of 1863:

Natives who surrendered their arms would be considered prisoners of war, those who did not would be “regarded as murderers and treated accordingly”.<sup>137</sup>

In 1901 MacArthur was succeeded by Major General Adna Chaffee. Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith was a colleague of Chaffee from the “Indian wars” and was placed in command of the operations on the Island of Samar. Major Waller, who had served in China, was instructed by Smith with the following words:

I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn, the better you will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms.<sup>138</sup>

When Waller what the age limit was to be, he was told that this would be ten years of age. Upon arriving in Samar Waller ordered a census to be taken and ordered all Filipinos to register and pledge an oath of allegiance to the United States. Those failing to do so would be treated as combatants and dealt with in terms of General Army Order 100. At the same time Waller received a letter from Smith which ordered him to turn the interior of Samar into a “howling wilderness”. In a practice remarkably similar to German activities in China and Tanganyika Smith divided the island into sectors and proceeded to round up the population administer an oath of allegiance and march them off to internment. Settlements, fields, crops and so forth were torched and the people driven off.

In early 1902 reports on activities in the Philippines had become the focus of public outrage in certain sectors of the United States. The newspapers of the press magnate Randolph Hearst and public figures such as Mark Twain, who dubbed Waller “The Butcher of Samar”, lambasted American military activity in the Philippines. Waller was put before a court martial where he was acquitted on the grounds that he had been following orders in keeping with General Order 100. None the less Waller’s commanding officer General Smith otherwise known as “Howling Wilderness Jake” was dismissed from the US Army through the direct intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt.<sup>139</sup>

Die Früchte unserer Kolonialpolitik und der Kultur, die sie nach Afrika gebracht hat, sie heissen: Mord, Raub, Totschlag, Syphilis, Schnaps...Afrika hat sich in berechtigter Selbstverteidigung gegen unsere Kultur abgeschlossen, und wir sind gegenwärtig von dem Ziele der Erschliessung Afrikas weiter entfernt als zur Zeit, wo die Kolonialpolitik anfang.

Wilhelm Liebknecht<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This working paper is part of my ongoing work which seeks to place the Herero and Nama genocides of 1904 – 1908 in a broader historical context. As such this paper includes new material and has also culled from some of my previous papers. I would like to thank my many and varied colleagues for comments and suggestions. In particular, Klass van Walraven, Stephen Ellis, Rijk van Dijk, Jürgen Zimmerer, and Robert Ross.

<sup>2</sup> Sven Lindqvist, *‘Exterminate all the brutes’* London Granta 2002, p. x.

<sup>3</sup> <http://stoptorture.amnesty.org/> (AI Index: ACT 40/038/2000); Stopping the torture trade. This report has as its opening sentence: “Torturers are not born, they are nurtured, trained and supported.”

<sup>4</sup> In: Transition / ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Henry Louis Gates, Jr: (cop. 2001), issue 87, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 26-47.

<sup>5</sup> For a short introduction to Hannah Arendt see, Stephen J. Whitfield, Hannah Arendt, <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/biography/arendt.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Sven Lindqvist, *‘Exterminate all the brutes’* London Granta 2002, p. x.

<sup>7</sup> Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, Oxford 2000, p 301.

<sup>8</sup> Nina Berman, *Missions Impossible*,

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*,

<sup>10</sup> Édouard Bustin, *Lunda under Belgian Rule*, Harvard 1975, p. 32.

<sup>11</sup> From June 1878 Stanley was employed by Leopold.

<sup>12</sup> Hochschild, *Ghost*, p. 67

<sup>13</sup> Hochschild, *Ghost*, p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> R. Pankhurst, Indian reactions to the Anglo-Indian expedition against emperor Tewodros, In: Africa / Istituto Italo-Africano: (1981), vol. 36, no. 3/4, p. 390-418

<sup>15</sup> Ian R. Smith, *The Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, 1886 – 1890*, Oxford 1972. Frank McLynn, *Stanley: Sorcerer’s Apprentice* London 1991. Published in 1890 as *In Darkest Africa*. Fox Bourne, *The Other Side of the Emin Pasha Expedition* (1891).

<sup>16</sup> Janina M. Konczacki (ed), *Victorian Explorer: The African Diaries of Captain William G. Stairs 1887 – 1892*, Halifax 1998.

<sup>17</sup> Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, thousands of German soldiers enlisted in the armies of the Dutch colonial enterprises. Personal Communication, Prof. Dr. K. Ward 14, December 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Édouard Bustin, *Lunda under Belgian Rule*, Harvard 1975, p. 32.

<sup>19</sup> Paul Reichard, *Deutsch-Ostafrika. Das Land und seine Bewohner, seine politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung*. Leipzig, Spamer 1892

<sup>20</sup> Édouard Bustin, *Lunda under Belgian Rule*, Harvard 1975, p. 32.

<sup>21</sup> Wissmann signed a contract with the Belgian king dated 11/8/1883.

<sup>22</sup> Hermann Von Wissmann, *Second Journey through Equatorial Africa from the Congo to the Zambesi, In the Years 1886 and 1887*. Translated from the German by Minna J.A. Bergmann London Chatto & Windus 1891

<sup>23</sup> Hermann von Wissmann, *Unter deutscher Flagge quer durch Afrika von West nach Ost: Von 1880 bis 1883 ausgeführt von Paul Pogge und Hermann von Wissmann*, Berlin 1902, p. 420.

<sup>24</sup> Prior to embarking with the German Schutztruppe to Namibia Hugo von Francois had been recuperating from his activities with major Wissmann in the Belgian Congo. NAN, Acc 547, A.Henker, 25/1/1890.

- <sup>25</sup> Curt von Francois, *Die Erforschung des Tschuapa und Lulongo: Reisen in Centralafrika*, Leipzig 1888, p. v.
- <sup>26</sup> Hermann Wissmann, Ludwig Wolf, Curt von Francois, Hans Mueller, *Im Inneren Afrikas: Die Erforschung des Kassai während der Jahre 1883, 1884 und 1885*, Leipzig 1888.
- <sup>27</sup> Hermann Wissmann, Ludwig Wolf, Curt von Francois, Hans Mueller, *Im Inneren Afrikas: Die Erforschung des Kassai während der Jahre 1883, 1884 und 1885*, Leipzig 1888, p. 265.
- <sup>28</sup> A point that is picked up in Schwabe.
- <sup>29</sup> Wissmann, *Inneren Afrikas* P. 273. “ich mehrfach mit meinem Hirschfänger einschreiten musste”.
- <sup>30</sup> Wissmann, *Inneren Afrikas* Pp. 364 – 367. Interestingly the authors claim that the attackers shouted “Niama! Niama! D.h. Fleisch! Fleisch!”. The question is of course how far this is true or simply a copying of Stanley, or perhaps Stanley copying them?.
- <sup>31</sup> Curt von Francois, *Die Erforschung des Tschuapa und Lulongo: Reisen in Centralafrika*, Leipzig 1888, p. 5.
- <sup>32</sup> <http://homepages.paradise.net.nz/mcnelly/vbg/spicheren.htm>
- <sup>33</sup> Brian Stanley, “Grenfell, George 1849 to 1906, Baptist Missionary Society”, in *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, July 1997, Volume 21, Issue 3, pp. 120 – 4.
- <sup>34</sup> Francois, *Erforschung Tschuapa und Lulongo*, p. 25.
- <sup>35</sup> Francois, *Erforschung Tschuapa und Lulongo*, p. 26 - 7.
- <sup>36</sup> Francois, *Erforschung Tschuapa und Lulongo*, p. 39.
- <sup>37</sup> Cited in Lindquist, *Exterminate*, p. 17.
- <sup>38</sup> Cited in Lindquist, *Exterminate*, p. 17.
- <sup>39</sup> Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the practices of war in Imperial Germany*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2005, p. 59.
- <sup>40</sup> Hannibal, commander of the Carthagian forces, enveloped Roman forces and defeated the Romans through attacking their exposed flanks in a single crushing battle of annihilation. Between 1909 and 1913 von Schlieffen published a series of essays dealing with the battle of Cannae in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde*. An accessible overview of the battle of Cannae is to be found at, <http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/cannae.htm>.
- <sup>41</sup> For example Scott C. Turver, published an article entitled *Sea change for the US Navy* in *Janes International Defence Review* on 15 May 2003, which dealt exclusively with lessons learnt in the recent Iraq war. Similarly Duncan Lennox, editor of Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, published an overview article entitled, “Patriot: how did it perform?”, on 2 May 2003.
- <sup>42</sup> Personal communication Prof. Dr. J. Brown, New Orleans 12 november 2004. See, Major Michael F. Morris, USMC, *Flying Columns in Small Wars: An OMFTS Model*, which deals with the lessons that can be learnt from the activities of the SADF during Operation Modular in southern Angola and northern Namibia in 1987.
- <sup>43</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria, *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. p. 8.
- <sup>44</sup> Colonel C.E. Calwell, *Small Wars Their Principles and Practice*, London: H.M.S.O, 1906.
- <sup>45</sup> Grosser Generalstab. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika auf Grund amtlichen Materials bearbeitet von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Grossen Generalstabes: Teil 1: Der Feldzug gegen die Hereros*, published in *Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde*, Berlin 1906 – 07.
- <sup>46</sup> Kurd Schwabe, *Mit Schwert und Pflug in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, Berlin 1899
- <sup>47</sup> Kurd Schwabe, *Dienst und Kriegsführung in den Kolonien und auf überseeischen Expeditionen*, Berlin:Mittler 1903.
- <sup>48</sup> Schwabe, *Krieg und Dienstführung*, pp. 3 – 4.
- <sup>49</sup> Schwabe, *Krieg und Dienstführung*, p. 4.
- <sup>50</sup> Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* Toronto 1962, pp. 21 –22.
- <sup>51</sup> E. Wilmsen, *Land filled with flies* (), Paul Johnson, *The Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815 – 1830* (New York 1991).
- <sup>52</sup> Otto Dann, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte und die Entwicklung des politischen Denkens in Deutschland am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts* PhD History Heidelberg 1968. H. S. Reiss - editor. *The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 1793-1815* Oxford 1955
- <sup>53</sup> Cited in Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 810.
- <sup>54</sup> Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 810.
- <sup>55</sup> Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 811-4.
- <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/easy.htm>



- <sup>56</sup> Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 813.
- <sup>57</sup> Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 814. Commenting on this Johnson notes:  
This was the first time that a leading German philosopher, and one who had made a point of attempting a general rationalisation of how the world behaves and progresses, had thrown the whole weight of his academic reputation behind the proposal that war had the unqualified and definite sanction of history and a place in the world-view.
- <sup>58</sup> Hegel cited in Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 814.
- <sup>59</sup> Johnson, *Birth of Modern*, 814.
- <sup>60</sup> Carl Peters, “Über die deutsche Kolonialpolitik”, *Kolonial-Politische Korrespondenz*, 1. Jg. Berlin, 16. Mai 1885, cited in <http://www.lsg.musin.de/Geschichte/Quellen2/Carl%20Peters.htm>.
- <sup>61</sup> Nils Ole Oermann, *Mission, church and state relations in South West Africa under German rule (1884-1915)*, A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (D.Phil.) in Modern History at the University of Oxford 1988, p. 49, citing *BRMG* 1884, p. 324.
- <sup>62</sup> Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (eds), *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy* (Ann Arbor 1998), p. 18.
- <sup>63</sup> Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox and Zantop, *Imperialist Imagination*, p. 19.
- <sup>64</sup> Zantop in, Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox and Zantop, *Imperialist Imagination*, p. 99.
- <sup>65</sup> Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (eds), *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy* (Ann Arbor 1998), p. 20.
- <sup>66</sup> Christopher Clark, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, (London 2000) 4. Hinzpeter was later appointed by Wilhelm as a privy councillor, a position within which he assisted Wilhelm in his dismissal of Bismarck.
- <sup>67</sup> John C.G. Röhl, *Young Wilhelm. The Kaiser's Early Life, 1859 – 1888*, (New York 1998) 275.
- <sup>68</sup> In a sense this is the same as with Hitler who too believed the myths as told in history.
- <sup>69</sup> Kaiser Wilhelm II cited in, Clark, *Wilhelm II*, 165.
- <sup>70</sup> Röhl, *Young Wilhelm*, 617.
- <sup>71</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, 13.
- <sup>72</sup> Röhl, *Young Wilhelm*, 617. Röhl describes how a letter written by Wilhelm, but probably drafted by Waldersee, to Bismarck in May 1888, in which Wilhelm criticised Bismarck's foreign policy and advocated war against Russia, led Bismarck to comment: “Woe upon my poor grandchildren”, 814.
- <sup>73</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, 6.
- <sup>74</sup> John C.G. Röhl, *The Kaiser and his court: Wilhelm II and the government of Germany*, English translation 1994, (Cambridge 1997) 4.
- <sup>75</sup> Those seeking a detailed overview of German colonial rule in Tanzania are advised to read, John Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German rule, 1905-1912*, Cambridge : University Press, 1969.
- <sup>76</sup> Wissmann, Hermann von. *Unter Deutsche Flagge quer durch Afrika*, Berlin 1902.
- <sup>77</sup> Baer und Schröter, *Kopffjagd*, p. 41.
- <sup>78</sup> <http://www.traditionsverband.de/magazin/wissmann.html>
- <sup>79</sup> Stoecker, Helmuth (hrsg.): *Drang nach Afrika*. Berlin 1991, s. 90. JBG's translation.
- <sup>80</sup> Wissmann to Kaiser, 28 Nov. 1889 and *idem*. 15 June 1889, ZstA 743, 53 – 62, and RKA 739, 48. Cited in Jonathon Glassman: *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856 – 1888*, London 1995, p. 250.
- <sup>81</sup> Baer, Martin & Olaf Schröter: *Eine Kopffjagd Deutsche in Ostafrika*, Berlin 2001, s. 42.
- <sup>82</sup> L.H. Gann & Peter Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa: 1884 – 1914* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978. p. 67.
- <sup>83</sup> L.H. Gann & Peter Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa: 1884 – 1914* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978. p. 67.
- <sup>84</sup> Baer und Schröter, *Kopffjagd*, p. 45.
- <sup>85</sup> Bundesarchiv Berlin, RKA 1001, 279 Militärische Expeditionen der Schutztruppe Bd. 1, Juli 1891 - Nov. 1891
- <sup>86</sup> Those seeking a detailed yet accessible introduction to events in Uhehe are referred to, Martin Baer & Olaf Schröter, *Eine Kopffjagd: Deutsche in Ostafrika-spuren kolonialer Herrschaft* (Berlin 2000).
- <sup>87</sup> On portage, porters, and pre-colonial caravan routes in mainland Tanzania see, Stephen J. Rockell, “‘A nation of porters’: the Nyamwezi and the labour market in nineteenth-century Tanzania”, in *The Journal of African History*, 2000, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 173 – 195.
- <sup>88</sup> *The Handbook of Tanganyika*, p. 70.
- <sup>89</sup> “*Das Land des Quawa aufzuessen*”, Liebert, *Neunzig Tage im Zelt: Meine Reise nach Uhehe*,

- Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1898, p. 48.
- <sup>90</sup> Liebert, *Neunzig Tage*, p. 28.
- <sup>91</sup> Liebert, *Neunzig Tage*, p. 31.
- <sup>92</sup> Correspondent for the *Strassburger Neueste Nachrichten* cited in Detlef Bald (et.al.), *Die Liebe zum Imperium: Deutschlands dunkle Vergangenheit in Afrika*, Bremen: Übersee Museum, 1978, p. 143.
- <sup>93</sup> The skull of Mkwawa came to be mentioned in the treaty of Versailles.
- <sup>94</sup> Iwo Amelung, "Gegen die ausländischen Barbaren: Die "Boxer" und ihr Mythos" in Hans Martin Hinz and Christoph Lind, *Tsingtau: Ein Kapitel deutscher Kolonialgeschichte in China 1897 – 1914*, Eurasburg: Edition Minerva, 1998. Pp. 165 – 172.
- <sup>95</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 162.
- <sup>96</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 162.
- <sup>97</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 162.
- <sup>98</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 165.
- <sup>99</sup> For a brief introduction to the "Boxer Rising" see, Henrietta Harrison, 'Justice on behalf of heaven' in *History Today*, Volume 50 (9), September 2000, pp. 44 – 51 & Robert Bickers, 'Chinese Burns: Britain in China 1842 – 1900' in *History Today*, Volume 50 (8), August 2000, pp. 10 – 17.
- <sup>100</sup> Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 169. Kommt Ihr vor den Feind, so wird er geschlagen, Pardon wird nicht gegeben; Gefangene nicht gemacht. Wer Euch in die Hand fällt, sei in Eurer Hand. Wie vor tausend Jahren die Hunnen unter ihrem König Etzel sich einen Namen gemacht, der sie noch jetzt in der Überlieferung gewaltig erscheinen läßt, so möge der Name Deutschland in China in einer solchen Weise bekannt werden, daß niemals wieder ein Chinese es wagt, etwa einen Deutschen auch nur scheel anzusehen. [http://www.zeit.de/2000/31/200031\\_hunnen.html](http://www.zeit.de/2000/31/200031_hunnen.html)
- <sup>101</sup> Cited in Frank Brendle,
- <sup>102</sup> Frank Brendle,
- <sup>103</sup> [http://www.zeit.de/2000/31/200031\\_hunnen.html](http://www.zeit.de/2000/31/200031_hunnen.html) JBG's translation of, "Ich sah an diesem Tag eher einem Metzger als einem deutschen Soldaten ähnlich".
- <sup>104</sup> [http://www.zeit.de/2000/31/200031\\_hunnen.html](http://www.zeit.de/2000/31/200031_hunnen.html)
- <sup>105</sup> Gustav Noske, *Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie*, Stuttgart 1914, p. 113.
- <sup>106</sup> Grosser Generalstab, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrikas; Auf Grund amtlichen Materials. Vol. I: Der Feldzug gegen die Herero*, Berlin 1906, p. 4.
- <sup>107</sup> General Lothar von Trotha, cited in Horst Kühne, "Die Ausrottungsfeldzüge der "Kaiserlichen Schutztruppen in Afrika" und die sozialdemokratische Reichstagfraktion", in *Militärsgeschichte* 18: pp. 206 -216, p. 211. These two statements reflect a tendency that existed within the German military at the time, derived from romantic thought, which envisaged that it was only through the total and utter annihilation of that which was deemed to be incorrect, could something new, good, and proper come into being. Indeed, a cult of war existed within romantic thinking which argued that war alone could cleanse the world of the self-centred materialism of the new age industrialisation. Coupled to social-Darwinist thinking, excessive materialism, or any other unwanted condition, could only be 'cured' through war. The great German general Helmuth von Moltke the elder gave expression to these ideas when he stated: "Der Krieg ist ein Element der Weltordnung, beabsichtigt von Gott, ohne ihn würde die Welt stagnieren, sich im Materialismus verlieren" (Koch, 101). For a full text of von Moltke on the nature of war see, (Pross, 29 – 31).
- <sup>108</sup> Bundes Archiv Berlin (BAB), Reichskolonialamt (RKA) 2106 Ausrüstung einer Expedition Führung des Hauptmanns von Francois, 14 March 1889 - 4 September 1889.
- <sup>109</sup> BAP, RKA 2107, Draft reply 22 October 1889, to note from the British embassy in Berlin 21 October 1889 inquiring about the debarkation of a German armed force in W.Bay.
- <sup>110</sup> BAP, RKA 2106, Folio 37, Draft certificate, Lodon May 1889.
- <sup>111</sup> The collusion between science and colonisation has been emphasised and explored by Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York 1993) and Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Studies in Travel Writing and Transculturation*, (London 1992).
- <sup>112</sup> Prior to his embarkation for GSWA Leutwein had been a lecturer at the military staff college in Freiburg. In 1898 Leutwein became Governor of the territory. Theodor Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin 1906).
- <sup>113</sup> Arthur J. Knoll, *Togo under Imperial Germany 1884 – 1914: A Case Study in Colonial Rule*, Stanford: Stanford University 1978, p. 29.
- <sup>114</sup> BAB, RKA 2080, Rapportage von Südwest Afrika gemacht durch von Francois.
- <sup>115</sup> BAB, RKA 2109, Bericht über eine vom 5 bis 19 März 1891 ausgeführte Reise nach Heusis, Hornkranz und Rehoboth. For a published account of the scouting of Hoornkrans see, (Francois, 137 –

42).

<sup>116</sup> ELCRN, *Politische Briefe etc. 1876 - 1893*, Letter Hendrik Witbooi at "Hoornkrans den 18 April 1893" to kapt. H. van Wijk. JBG's translation.

<sup>117</sup> Citing Rose Susanne Zantopp and others have noted that p. 18.

<sup>118</sup> "Randnotiz von Wenstrup in Kropotkins Gegenseitige Hilfe in der Entwicklung.

Der Mensch, der im Wagen fährt, wird niemals der Freund dessen sein, der zu Fuß geht! (altindische Weisheit)." Uwe Timm, *Morenga* (Köln, 1985), 301.

<sup>119</sup> Nina Berman, "Orientalism, Imperialism, and Nationalism: Karl May's *Orientzyklus*", in Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox, Zantopp, *Imperialist*, 66-7.

<sup>120</sup> Paul Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World Fairs, 1851 - 1939*, (Manchester 1988).

<sup>121</sup> NAN, A. 547, A. Henker, 1890 1904, Manuscript of Schutztruppeler with Francois.

<sup>122</sup> Elsewhere the contents of six diaries kept by German soldiers in the course of the Herero-German war have been described and summarised. Particularly striking is the set structure, partially induced through the route travelled, Hamburg, Las Palmas, Monrovia, Swakopmund, of these and other diaries. However, apart from the set structure that relates to the changing scenery, there is the structure that relates to the changes that take place in the perceptions and understandings of the soldiers. It must not be forgotten that the majority of the German soldiers who participated in the Namibian campaigns were volunteers. Volunteers who, in large part, were motivated, by the chance to finally be able to prove themselves in war in the continent of Africa and all that this entailed. Indeed, it has been suggested that the campaigns became a veritable advertising campaign for settlement in the territory, and that, many soldiers did not travel to strange lands "for the fatherland and in defence of the colony, instead they fought for their own *Heimat* [fatherland], which was to be established in Africa". Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung*

<sup>123</sup> Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung*, 76.

<sup>124</sup> Haak, *Tagebuchblätter aus Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 1906)(Swakopmund, 1996), 20-3.

<sup>125</sup> Haak, *Tagebuchblätter*, 23.

<sup>126</sup> NAN, A. 560, Franke 25/6/96, "Die brennende frage: ist Krieg oder nicht, wird gelöst. Der Aufstand ist erdrückt. For Stuhlmann see, Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung*, 83 - 4.

<sup>127</sup> This theme is also explored in Krüger, *Kriegsbewältigung*, 96.

<sup>128</sup> Auer, *Kriegstagebücher*, 105 - 7.

<sup>129</sup> In the most eloquent manner, J.M. Coetzee, writing about American involvement in Vietnam, has described the anger engendered in colonial wars. Undoubtedly there will be many who believe that this is not fitting, yet, from a personal point of view, I believe that Coetzee's words most tellingly sum up what also occurred in Namibia:

These poisoned bodies, mad floating people of the camps, who had been –let me say it- the finest of their generation, courageous, fraternal – it is they who are the occasion of all my woe! Why could they not accept us? We could have loved them: our hatred for them grew only out of broken hopes. We brought them our pitiable selves, trembling on the edge of inexistence, and asked only that they acknowledge us. We brought with us weapons, the gun and its metaphors, the only copulas we knew of between ourselves and our objects. From this tragic ignorance we sought deliverance. Our nightmare was that since whatever we reached for slipped like smoke through our fingers, we did not exist; that since whatever we embraced wilted we were all that existed. We landed on the shores of Vietnam clutching our arms and pleading for someone to stand up without flinching to these probes of reality: if you will prove yourself, we shouted, you will prove us too, and we will love you endlessly and shower you with gifts.

But like everything else they withered before us. We bathed them in seas of fire, praying for the miracle. In the heart of the flame their bodies glowed with heavenly light; in our ears their voices rang; but when the fire died they were only ash.

*Dusklands* (London 1998) 17.

<sup>130</sup> Sam Cohen Library, PA 8/138.

<sup>131</sup> NAN, A 549, Affahrt, Letter to parents, gertrud and eduard windhoek 12/3/05. Arrived in Okahandja and was billeted at the Sanitätsamt. "Zum Transport meiner koffer gab mir die Kommandantur vier gefangene Hererofrauen mit, die zugehörigen Männert waren schon Arbeit eingeteilt. Die Frauen waren entsetzlich alt und Hässlich".

<sup>132</sup> Haak, *Tagebuchblätter*, 29.

<sup>133</sup> Michael D. Haydock, "Marine Scapegoat in the Philippine Insurrection", in *Military History* February 2002, p. 47.

<sup>134</sup> Haydock, *Marine Scapegoat*, p. 48.

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- <sup>135</sup> Haydock, *Marine Scapegoat*, p. 49.  
<sup>136</sup> Haydock, *Marine Scapegoat*, p. 48.  
<sup>137</sup> Haydock, *Marine Scapegoat*, p. 48.  
<sup>138</sup> Haydock, *Marine Scapegoat*, p. 49.  
<sup>139</sup> The court martial of Smith concluded that Smith, in writing to Waller, “did not mean everything that his unexplained language implied”. Cited in Haydock, *Marine Scapegoat*, p. 52.  
<sup>140</sup> Gustav Noske, *Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie*, Stuttgart 1914, p. 78.