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"Our way": responding to the Dutch aid in the District Rural Development Programme of Bukoba, Tanzania

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“Our way”
Responding to the Dutch aid in the District Rural Development Programme of Bukoba, Tanzania

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de
Sociale Wetenschappen

Proefschrift

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te Bukoba, Tanzania

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“Our way”

Responding to the Dutch aid in the District Rural Development Programme of Bukoba, Tanzania

Adalbertus Kamanzi

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This book is dedicated to my parents

Kawegere and *Kokuhirwa*

to my wife

Nnalongo Judith

and to our sons

Kigongo, Kakuru, *Kato,* and *Kaiza*

for the support and love

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List of abbreviations

ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
BDRDP	Bukoba District Rural Development Programme
BNPL	Basic Needs Poverty Line
CBLGA	Capacity Building for Local Governance Actors
CCM	*Chama cha Mapinduzi*
CDT	Country Department for Tanzania
CHADEMA	*Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*
CPM	Capability Poverty Measure
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CUF	Civic United Front
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire

DA	District Advisor
DFID	Department for International Development
DGIS	Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation
DOS	Disk Operating System
DRDP	District Rural Development Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluations Department
KCU	Kagera Cooperative Union
KRCA	Kagera Rare Crop Association
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
NFG	Network of Farmers' Groups
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Aid
ODA	Official Development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORUNDC	Operations Review Unit of the Netherlands Development Cooperation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
RNE-DRDP	Royal Netherlands Embassy funded District Rural Development Programmes
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
TANU	Tanzania African National Union
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party
TUNGO	*Tujiendeleze* Non-Governmental Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Commission on Economic Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
URT	United republic of Tanzania
UVT	*Umoja wa Vijana* Tanzania
UWT	*Umoja wa Wanawake* Tanzania
YFEC	*Yetu* Farmers' Extension Centre

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1

Aid and the modernising development discourse

Introduction

This study is prompted by two sayings that are found among the Haya people of Bukoba. The first one is: *ayazinire tawa itengya mabega*, literally meaning: whoever has danced in life never stops shaking the shoulders. The proverb wishes to convey a message that the good habits or the things that one has cherished never cease to be enjoyed even when the circumstances do not allow one to enjoy them. The second is: *arariirwe enjoka, ayekenga omunya*, literally meaning: whoever has been bitten by a snake in life will always avoid even a lizard. This proverb stresses the point that when problems occur, you must not take things for granted; you should, instead, avoid all circumstances that could lead you to a similar problem.

Let me explain how these two proverbs are linked with this study. The Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation has been involved in a bilateral development cooperation programme that was promoting RNE-funded District Rural Development Programmes (RNE-DRDPs) from 1987. The programmes wound up in 2004 with evaluation reports that were not positive. At the same time, however, notwithstanding the negativity of the performance, the evaluation proposed the continuation for the support of the ex-RNE-DRDPs. This proposition to continue support by the Dutch is like one who has enjoyed dancing in life and when there is no possibility to

dance any more, the person continues dancing through the shaking of the shoulders. However, because failure is a bitter experience, like that of being bitten by a snake, avoiding circumstances that can lead the Dutch into other failures should be of paramount importance (such as avoiding even a lizard that someone suspects could also bite like a snake). Concentration on failure, however, leads into thinking that aid is not relevant at all. That is why, in this study, instead of being guided by the pessimism of a perspective of failures, I wish to highlight the processes in which aid is made relevant by the recipients.

In the next two chapters, I present the theoretical debate of this study based on two cardinal discussions: international development cooperation and modernising development discourse and the livelihoods promotion and organising practices. In the first discussion, which is found in the first chapter, I establish links between the policy environment and aid success/failure; I also establish links between international development cooperation, modernising development discourse, the dichotomous world of the developed and underdeveloped, and the power asymmetries between the donors and the aid recipients. In the second discussion, which is found in the second chapter, I establish links between livelihoods promotion and organising practices; I also establish links between organising practices, participation, local politics, and empowerment.

International development cooperation

It is always considered that international development cooperation began with the Point-Four Programme of Truman in 1949, where the policy of the United States was to aid the efforts of economically underdeveloped areas to enhance their resources and improve their living conditions. Aid, according to OECD (2006), refers to

> those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25%.

However, after World War II, several other countries had already introduced funds to finance development and welfare programmes in their colonies. The United Nations had development assistance on its agenda. Pronk (2001: 611-612) gives a historical development of international development cooperation as based on altering international relations. In the late 1940s, international development cooperation was based on international technical assistance and funds. Aid for community

support followed in the 1950s. In the 1960s, aid filled trade and investment gaps. The 1970s saw aid for the provision of basic needs, while in the 1980s aid was for assistance in structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and debt relief. In 1990s, aid was for humanitarian assistance and support for the rehabilitation of countries after civil wars. At the turn of the century, aid was for human development and the prevention of violent conflicts to foster democratic governance. Pronk adds that international development assistance was not only a function of changing circumstances, but also a phenomenon of "learning-by-doing, on the basis of trial and error", embedded in the four pitfalls of "lack of knowledge about the countries, incomplete understanding of the process, inadequate experience with the instrument and an ever-changing setting" (Pronk 2001: 612, 613).

In this section of the chapter, I elaborate a few issues relevant to this study. The first issue concerns the clarification of aid from an orthodox understanding of development. The second issue deals with the fact that aid should not be looked at naïvely but as something that through history shows degrees of bias. The third issue is about the modalities through which aid is given as complex phenomenon because the modalities take trends from the empirical implications of aid given in conjunction with policy environments. The fourth issue is about policy coherence with respect to commitment to aid. The section concludes with issues related to power dominance in the aid machinery.

Aid and orthodox development

International development cooperation is about aid in different forms. Aid happens through multilateral and bilateral avenues for objectives including charity (for instance, against hunger, misery, and despair), economic objectives (for instance, development of resources for sustainable economic growth), and political objectives (for instance, addressing issues on peace and conflict resolution, democracy and keeping alive spheres of influence). International development cooperation has been attached to orthodox and heterodox development lines of thinking (Oman & Wignaraja 1991). Orthodox development is largely based on the classical and neoclassical trade theories and the free trade doctrines of comparative advantage. It is within this thinking that underdeveloped countries were to specialise in the production of raw materials and primary products for export so that they could finance import and growth. Due to the inherent difficulties of partitioning the world into these two specialised positions in trade, the focus was shifted to industrialisation. In this shift, modernisation thinking took over, characterised by the Rostowian thinking of aiding poor countries for a period of 20 years so that they could take off and aid is

no longer needed (Oman & Wignaraja 1991: 12). The opposite of orthodox development thinking is the "heterodox" development thinking, which is linked to accepting the centre-periphery paradigm, inspired by the dependency and Marxist theorists (Oman & Wignaraja 1991: 135).

This understanding of international development cooperation in the lines of orthodox development thinking is important for this study because it is in line with the modernising development discourse, a concept I shall clarify in the next section. In actual fact, Schulpen (1997: 11) mentions that it is this discourse that has influenced development cooperation. Thus, the discussion on international development cooperation has to be understood within the parameters of orthodox development thinking, embedded in modernisation theorisation.

Friedman (1958) already argued for aid not being effective because, instead of developing the resources of the aided countries, it would just substitute resources. These early pessimistic speculations were superseded by other economistic speculations and proofs whereby aid had stimulated growth. For example, Rosenstein-Rodan (1969: 1) laid a foundation for aid as a catalyst; thus, aid was to be "allocated where it will have the maximum catalytic effect in mobilising additional national effort". Chenery & Carter (1973: 459) elaborated on aid as to be used as the basis for several things: acceleration of investment, resource mobilisation, and structural transformation; however, aid was to be withdrawn once structural changes were under way. Hansen & Tarp (2000) showed that there was a relationship between aid and savings through positive effects on investment and income. These economistic discussions, however, implied the necessity of all aid resulting in high investment. However, there have been some criticisms about this optimism. Petras & Veltmeyer (2002: 282), for example, argue that "if aid is a catalyst of anything it is not of development but of regression". According to these authors, therefore, aid has acted as a disservice rather than a service to the aid recipients who have, for instance, shown more symptoms of dependency than ever before. Again, aid has ended up in the hands of a few people who have become richer, leaving the targeted people in even more vulnerable situations.

Aid and biases in history

Historically, aid has demonstrated elements of bias: depending on the historical moment and the cultural traits of the moment, aid has taken on different faces. An example of aid bias can be seen from the point of the different motives behind international development cooperation. Historically, these motives have acted as ideological reasons to guide the giving of aid. From the mid 1940s to the 1950s, for

example, the motivation for the international development cooperation was characterized by ideal political motivations of solidarity, interdependence, and an understanding of "common good" that goes beyond nationalism to internationalism, based on the concepts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. These were basic for multilateral cooperation and were incarnated in institutions such as the UN and its agencies (FAO, UNICEF, UNDP, and so on). In the 1950s, the motivation became political and economic due to the maintenance of relationships between the ex-colonies and the colonial masters for commercial reasons. In the 1960s, the motivations were geared towards addressing needy situations through public, religious, and humanitarian institutions, and the civil society. For example, the Roman Catholic Papal encyclical, *Populorum Progressio* (1967), became an agent of sensitisation through its interpretation of development as peace, stressing the duty to solidarity between the rich and poor.

In the 1970s, the shift was from producing to marketing produce due to the saturation of northern markets. Commenting on Swedish cooperation, Pontara (1988: 150) argues that one of the central reasons for bilateral cooperation was that the politics of assistance favoured the rapid expansion of markets for exports. In the 1990s, cooperation was motivated by security purposes (De Michelis 1991). It was to go beyond the vacuums caused by the end of the "cold war" by avoiding the common risks for rights, quality, and quantity in life. These motives, based on self-interest, are well summarised by the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs that argued in favour of aid in the following manner: "the most important reason is that nations are determined to develop. Only by participation in that process will we have an opportunity to direct their development along lines that serve our interest" (quoted in Pronk 2001: 614). Commenting on this position, Pronk finds three related donor motives: presence in the development process, steering the development process, and subordinating the development process to the donor's objectives. Let me sum up these comments on aid biases with Pronk's (2001: 612) argument that:

> Decolonisation, the cold war, the wars in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Southern Africa (three areas in which the north-south conflict and the east-west conflicts coincided), the oil crisis and the world economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s, the end of the Cold War, the internal conflicts, and last but not least economic and cultural globalisation – all these challenged the motives, aims, and character of the international development aid.

Thus, development assistance has been a function of biases, which I have discussed in the context of the historical motives of giving aid.

Aid and bad policies

In this study, the debate on aid is prompted by Pronk's (2001: 627-628) argument that in order for aid to succeed, there is a need for a good policy environment.

> Aid should, therefore, be used primarily as a catalyst, sometimes to help generate other resources or gain access to them, sometimes to help to create domestic capacity or manage conflicts resulting from various forms of unsustainable development. At this juncture, what is required is a special focus in aid policy on social harmony, political stability and peace, as preconditions for economic growth and development – not the other way round.

This is a position that attempts to rationalise the solution for the problem from the policy perspective. From the position of Pronk, this study goes several layers deeper in exploring the idea that the ineffectiveness of aid is a logical consequence of the internal contradictions of what inherently justifies aid.

The modalities through which aid is given are quite complex because they tend to take trends from the empirical implications of aid given in conjunction with policy environments. Cassen (1994) demonstrates that where there are optimum conditions for aid by donor and aid recipient, there are improved village lives, reduced mortalities, and access to services. Thus, there is a connection between aid and policy. A complex situation, however, is expressed by Mosse (2002) who argues that despite the energy that is devoted in generating the right policy models in development, there is little attention given to the relationship between the models and the practices and events that they are expected to generate or legitimise. This is a phenomenon that has led to a surprising conclusion: there is hardly any connection between policy and practice. Mosse (2002: 639) challenges the assumption that

> ... development practice is driven by policy, suggesting that the things that make for 'good policy' – policy which legitimises and mobilises political support – in reality make it rather unimplementable within its chosen institutions and regions. But although development practice is driven by a multi-layered complex of relationships and the culture of organisations rather than policy, development actors work hardest of all to maintain coherent representations of their actions as instances of authorised policy, because it is always in their interest to do so.

In other words, there is no direct relationship between policy and practice as such. Much practice happens guided by the interests of the people. This is a position that contradicts Pronk's (2001; 2003) question of good policy. For Pronk it is a question of good donor governance and good recipient governance. Thus, if the policy environment is good on both sides (and here what is "good" becomes an issue), then aid works. He argues for aid to consist of grants, adapted to technical and institutional capacity of the recipient, "demand-driven", covering additional, current, and complementary costs, "not replaceable of domestic skills", "non-distorter of

salary scales and consumption patterns or brain drain", and "accompanied by policies within donor countries to open markets for goods and services".

In order to show the complexity of the issues about policies and aid, Boyce (2002) explicitly points out areas in which for both the donor and the aid recipient countries governance issues can arise. He argues that aid does not smoothly and directly move from the donor country to the recipient one. That is why he sees a reason to question issues related to aid from the good governance point of view. Boyce (2002: 239) argues that the idea of aid flowing from donor countries to recipient ones is an oversimplification of the issue because

> ... there is often a counter-flow of resources in reverse direction by virtue of both 'tied aid' and capital flight. Second, countries do not send and receive aid. On the donor side the quantity and quality of aid are shaped by the contending economic, political, and institutional objectives of government agencies and their domestic constituents. On the recipient side, aid flows not to countries as a whole, but rather to specific individuals, groups, and classes within them.

This means that the disaggregation of donor and recipient interest is crucial. Very critically, Petras & Veltmeyer (2002: 282) argue that "what were viewed as 'good policies' (…), if not by design, serve as an aid to imperialism, and they have served as such as a social cost borne primarily by people in the developing countries". For these two authors, the problem of good governance is fuelled by the donors themselves and the aid recipients suffer the consequences. Thus, it is important to question issues about policies with regard to aid because policies are not that naïve, on one hand, and on the other hand, they are guided by ideological structures that operate at the expense of the recipient.

Aid and policy incoherence

The concept of policy coherence is central to the agenda of aid if it is taken to be the consistency of policy objectives and instruments applied by OECD countries individually or collectively in the light of their combined effects on developing countries (Fukasaku & Hirata 1995: 20). This understanding has to do with the objectives and motives of the donors. Forster & Stokke (1999: 20) define policy coherence, conceiving it from the rational choice model, as one that has to do with formulated objectives in clear and harmonised terms, with strategies and mechanisms attuned to the objectives, and outcome corresponding with intentions and objectives. Hoebink (1999: 324) defines policy coherence as

> the non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy. For this purpose, coherence can be defined either narrowly or broadly. A narrow definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities in this field; and a wide definition would be that objectives of policy in

> particular field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities of government in that field or in other policy fields.

This consequentialist conception of policy coherence by Hoebink is a rather "mathematical" way of looking at the cause-effect relationship. However, there is another way of understanding the concept of policy coherence by referring to it as synonymous with consistency, meaning free from self-contradiction. Thus, policy coherence means being free from self-contradiction in terms of policy. With policy coherence, the policy-maker and implementer are supposed to be in the front line to by the policies, otherwise they are not policy coherent. This understanding goes beyond the consequentialist argument because policy coherence means following in a non-contradictory manner what has been policy. This means that when a state is policy coherent, then, that state follows and executes the policies it has set in place. It is not about the coherence of events, but the coherence of agents of policies and policies themselves.

However, inherent with coherence is incoherence (Hoebink 1999: 325) because in order for governments to be coherent, they have to deal with a multiplicity of actors in terms of parties and pressure groups with different interests and values. Still, governments themselves consist of many departments, institutions, and corporations with different functions and priorities. It is also difficult to measure all factors and parties and their reactions to an initial policy decision. This implies that policies carry with them germs of contradictions due to the different orientations of the actors involved.

Much as there is commitment to solidarity that is expressed with policy coherence considerations and international commitment, the practical side of policy remains a puzzle. The practice of donor aid is welcome with cynicism because aid continues to be an illusion. According to Devarajan *et al.* (2002: xii), Wolfenson, the former president of the World Bank, made the following remarks about the "poverty state" in Africa:

> Between 1990 and 1998, the number of people living in poverty actually increased in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 242 to 291 million people. … Even with faster economic growth, the number of people living on less than a dollar a day will increase from nearly 291 million in 1998 to nearly 330 million in 2008. Under conditions of slower growth and rising inequality, that number could be as high as 406 million.

In a paper by Actionaid International UK and Oxfam International (2005: front page), the argument is simple:

> The aid donors currently preside over a system that fails the poor. Less than half of aid is spent in the poorest countries. This money is further devalued by donor red tape, duplication, conflicting objectives, intrusive conditions and tying *to overpriced?* goods and services. At a time

> when aid is increasing, it is critical that this money makes an effective contribution to the fight against poverty. Without concrete steps in Paris to make aid accountable and efficient, progress towards the Millennium Development Goals will be jeopardised. The choice facing development ministers at the OECD High Level Forum is simple: 2005 can either be a milestone in making aid work for the people it is supposed to help, or a millstone.

Another scene is presented by the Commission for Africa (2005: 1) in the first paragraph of its introduction:

> The Millennium Development Goals set out to halve world poverty by 2015. But we are now a third of the way to that date and the rich world is falling behind on its pledges to the poor. Nowhere is that more clear than in Africa, where the world is furthest behind in progress to fulfil those solemn promises. If that is to change we must act now.

The contradictions lie in the very way aid is handled. Actionaid UK and Oxfam International (2005: 1) have depicted the way the aid machine operates. As noted above, less than half of aid gets spent in the poorest countries:

> Only 10% gets spent on basic services that are critical to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 40% of aid continues to be tied to overpriced goods and services from the donors' countries. 80 official agencies are responsible for 35,000 aid transactions a year that are imposing a massive administrative burden on some of the poorest countries. Aid conditions continue to impose donor blueprints, such as trade liberalisation and privatisation of essential services, with often devastating results for poor people.

Aid and power dominance

The discussion on aid that I have presented in this section shows how aid is surrounded by circumstances that make it impossible to function. Many of these circumstances are matters of policies that do not work. It is for this reason that some scholars are suggesting radical and revolutionary ways to go about formulating and implementing such policies. For example, Desai (2003, as quoted by Hanlon 2004: 375) argues:

> We are giving fifty billion dollars of overseas aid. There are a billion poor people in the world. Why don't we just find the poor and give them one dollar a week and do nothing else. No questions asked. What they do with the money is not our concern. That would probably do more to relieve poverty than anything else.

I agree with this position of Desai with some precautions. The first thing he points out is that there is a need to review the policies that give directions to how and where to spend aid money. This policy change is necessary so that the money is directed towards where the beneficiaries, rather than the donors, think the recipients need assistance. However, it is not only a question of giving money to the poor: as money is only a medium of exchange, it is necessary to educate people in the use of

money. The education process, however, has to take an orientation that is self-defined-need-oriented and people-based.

To add insult to injury, policies are generally very stringent to the recipients (Desai 2003 as quoted by Hanlon 2004: 375-376):

> We impose so many conditions on those countries that receive money: they have to be gender sensitive; poor people must participate directly; they must have sustainability; they must have environmental friendliness; and they must have transparency, accountability and so on. … if we think of our own historical development process, or that of any developed country, none of the criteria was fulfilled. … Why, just because we give a pittance to other people, do we expect such bossy behaviour to be received properly? I do not understand why we think that it will be effective in removing poverty, whatever desire we have to show that we are virtuous.

The point is that donors think they can do it by themselves, and they forget that the needy people themselves know what they want and would take care of themselves better. This debate critically demonstrates how aid is linked with issues of power dominance of the donor over and above the aid recipients. This power dominance sows the seeds for aid failure.

Thus, it is not only a matter of non-good policy environment, as Pronk (2001) suggests, but a matter of internal contradictions in the relationship between donors and aid recipients. These contradictions are based on the conceptualisation of international development cooperation itself which is orthodox, on aid biases in history, on bad policies, on policy incoherence, and on power dominance of the donors over and above the aid recipients. Thus, aid is a matter of an unequal relationship between donors and aid recipients. In order to understand the dynamics of unequal relations, the next section of this chapter argues that aid is a function of modernising development discourse that has been able to create and justify the two worlds of the “developed” and the “underdeveloped”.

Modernising development discourse

International development cooperation is a function of the modernising development discourse. In the previous section of this chapter, I discussed some contradictions of aid machinery. In this section, I present the argument that the unequal relationship between the donors and the aid recipients has its foundation in the modernising development discourse. I begin with the clarification of the concept of modernising development discourse. Then I demonstrate that the modernising development discourse takes a dichotomising position. In order to see the modernising development discourse in practice through the international development cooperation, I develop a discussion on the link between the modernising development discourse and develop-

ment projects, followed by another discussion on the link between modernising development discourse and rural development. The section concludes with some additional notes on modernising development discourse.

Modernising development discourse

Discourses deal with the socio-political dimension of the people. Alvesson & Karreman (2000: 1127-1128) argue that:

> language put together as discourses, arranges and naturalises the social world in a specific way and thus informs social practices. These particular practices constitute particular forms of subjectivity in which human subjects are managed and given certain form, viewed as self-evident and rational.

Foucault's work (1979) conceptualizes discourses as interweaving knowledge and power because discourses, as régimes of truth and general politics of truth of each society, are certain ways of understanding reality or knowledge over reality. They exclude or include others. I agree with scholars who incline to the view that there is a relationship between discourses and social reality. In this study, therefore, the concept of discourse is influenced by Foucault's understanding of taking the socio-political context into perspective and its influence on human behaviour. Thus, a discourse is a guiding rationale or story that underlies human and organisational socio-political and economic behaviours. Grillo (1997: 19) argues that

> in many contexts there does indeed seem to be present a 'development gaze', or, to change the metaphor, an authoritative voice, which constructs problems and their solution by reference to *a priori* criteria, for example to 'broad themes which buzz around developmental agencies…

This is development discourse which is "institutionally extensive and comprises of a stock of ideas that informs the praxis of many groups" (Preston 1994: 4). I agree with Grillo's argument that there is a certain language in development within which development activities should be planned, implemented, monitored, and evaluated, and within which development activities should operate and be interpreted: in short, everything that has to do with development should be thought "within" a certain box. This is development discourse.

According to Preston (1994), there are three development discourses that have developed in the second half of the last century, each finding its vehicles of expression in particular organisations and disposed to particular political projects (Preston 1994: 222). The first development discourse is concerned with the state engendered order and the intervention of experts who are embodied in the UN agencies and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. This discourse developed after the Second World War: it is much elaborated, authoritative, and interventionist in

ideology (Preston 1994: 135). The second development discourse concerns market-engendered order. This is located within the World Bank and the IMF. The third development discourse has to do with the public sphere, which is founded "on the affirmation of the idea-set of modernity" and the "optimistic, reason-informed pursuit of formal and substantive democracy" (Preston 1994: 223). This discourse is located in universities, NGOs, and charities.

However, the three development discourses of Preston are none other than the three sides of the same prism. They all share the common concept of development as progress and material advancement. Apparently, the differences in the sides of the prism are the ways in which to achieve this development, something that has been shaped by the historical political, and economic changes. Thus, I argue that Preston's are not three separate development discourses as such, but the same development discourse that in order to be achieved, has been pursued by the state and experts, then the World Bank and IMF, and finally by research institutes, NGOs, and charities. I argue further that, much as these historical and chronological distinctions of Preston are useful for analytical purposes, they are not distinctive at all: the state, experts, World Bank, IMF, universities, NGOs, and charities interact in a complex web. All these facets together champion and promote a type of development discourse whose main characterisation is modernisation. This is what I term the modernising development discourse.

Woorst's (1997: 235-6) observation is central in this discussion on the modernising development discourse:

> Exposure to development discourse is a fact of everyday life. Merely walking through the cities, towns, villages, and junctions, one is subjected to a cacophony of signs and symbols related to development.

This observation underlines the extent to which the modernising development discourse has permeated in societies. Following the Foucauldian tradition, the modernising development discourse should, therefore, identify appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it. The modernising development discourse, then, becomes a global language that emerges with the creation of development, underdevelopment, and the subjects of development (Escobar 1995). This modernising development discourse constitutes its subjects as a "less developed" (Ferguson 1994), with deprivation of their dynamics, history, and politics. With the deprivation, the subjects become proper target for development interventions that the development machinery offers.

With the modernising development discourse, the whole body of practices has been centred on planned development interventions, of which four types can be identified:

1. Modernising development discourse as a "globaliser" that incarnates teleological and reification characterisations, with overtones of historical inevitability embedded in inferences that it is a unidirectional process of *fait accompli*, taking on a life of its own, a necessary condiment for the present development machinery, with a status moving from mythology to ideology (Schuurman 2001: 63-64).
2. Modernising development discourse as an "otheriser". It is a discourse which, according to Hall (2002: 63)

   > could not be innocent because it did not represent an encounter between equals. The Europeans had outsailed, outshot, and outwitted peoples who had not wished to be explored, no need to be discovered, and no desire to be exploited. The Europeans stood vis-à-vis the others in positions of dominant power. This influenced what they saw and how they saw it, as well as what they did not see.

   The modernizing development discourse has created the fabric for the alienation of the subject of development by the developers. Historically, Kanyandago (1998; 2002) argues for the negative relationship that has evolved during the encounter between Europe and the rest of the people on the globe. The rest has been otherised by the West, and thus objectified to the tolls of development. Rosemann (1998) captures this idea when he argues about Africa as "the other" of the West.
3. Modernising development discourse as a "shaper of subjects". It is a development gaze that, according to Croll and Parkin (1992: 3) "sets up statements about the construction of and competition between human and non-human agents, and the environment and human perceptions of the environment".
   It is an anti-politics machine, depoliticising everything it touches (Ferguson 1994); it is a space in which only certain things could be said and imagined (Escobar 1995). It creates, re-creates, modifies, and fine tunes culture.
4. Modernising development discourse as "problem definer". It is the "off-the-shelf narratives, current in development institutions, which come to define development problems and justify interventions" (Fairhead & Leach 1997: 35).

The attempt to formulate these modernising development discourse typologies is not to suggest that each typology operates independently, but to point out that analytically there are possibilities of establishing different perspectives in the conceptualisation of the modernising development discourse. It is possible, however,

to discuss these typologies at different levels, showing their hierarchical interaction. All these typologies operate within the international development cooperation at different levels. The first level is composed of the globalising function as an umbrella under which the efforts of interaction in international development cooperation are based. The second level splits the globe into the West and the Rest, an interaction function in the international development cooperation whereby an unequal relationship between the West and the Rest generates actions of the former Otherising the latter. The third level is a derivative of the dual world of the West and the Rest whereby the modernising development discourse shapes the subjects according to the different points of references that are created to characterise the West and the Rest. The fourth level is the problem definition according to the created subjectivities. In other words, problems and solutions are defined from the different established development perspectives according to the modernising development discourse.

The point of stress with regard to international development cooperation concentrates on all the levels of the modernising development discourse as shaper, problem definer, and otheriser. These levels are important in as far as the donors, who are aid dispensers, meet the aid recipients with such typological mindsets, on one hand, and on the other, how the aid recipients try to respond to these typological mindsets. I argue, therefore, that the relationship between the donors and the aid recipients has a foundation in this typological mindset of the modernising development discourse as globaliser, otheriser, subjects' shaper, and problem definer.

Modernising development discourse and the dichotomous world

The subjects of development have to be characterised more and more so that a development intervention can be justified. One of the characteristics of the subjects has been "povertising them", that is, subjecting them to poverty discursive structures. Levitas (1998: 39-42) looked at poverty as an issue that could be discussed from three perspectives in the United Kingdom. The first perspective was the redistributive, emphasizing the way in which poverty inhibits or prevents social participation or the exercise of full citizenship. The second perspective was social integrationist, emphasizing social inclusion or integration through paid work. The third perspective was the moral and cultural causes of poverty, emphasizing dependency. These perspectives of poverty referred to the "developed" world of Britain, with a central point being the fact that poverty is a function of "social exclusion". In the "developing" world, however, the nature and characterisation of perspectives on poverty change to the two main issues: lack of income and the socio-political and

economic problematic events. These two issues, of course, stem from the modernising development discourse: the "developing" world being problematic.

Killick & Asthana (2000: 179-183) argue for poverty as a multidimensional concept inclusive of material deprivation, vulnerability and resultant insecurity, dependency, and social exclusion. The concept is made more complex by its multi-conceptualisations and the heterogeneity of those classified as poor. However, they argue that there are regularly recurring cases of poverty including low incomes and productivities, socio-political factors, and inequalities. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have popularised the poverty discourse in the developing countries through their different policy-influencing documents, such as for instance, the famous Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Characteristic about such talk is the omission of the asset base of the people. The abundance issues on the resources and capabilities of the people are never the central point in characterising the people. It is the vulnerability context that transpires and becomes a point of departure for intervention. Poverty is, thus, taken to be the lack of material resources, especially income, and proneness to calamities.

In today's presentation of poverty, we are faced with a language of statistics and figures to portray the extent to which people are poor and how they are not, by contrast. The different reports of the Word Bank and different organs of the United Nations are specialists in this. Sherman (2002: 4) begins the inquiry into poverty by the observation that the late eighteenth-century novels had no vivid portraits of the poor due to the imaginative consideration of the poor by

> reconstituting their reality through quantifying protocols that submerged individual narrative … in statistics, input/output rations, and institutional accounts that flattened personal distinctions. The poor were abstracted, homogenised, put at a distance by the avalanche of printed numbers that replaced human beings in bourgeois readers' minds. … Readers were encouraged to imagine the poor … as a uniform cohort configured by numbers, uninflected by personal anecdote. … As such, the poor were 'poverty', a condition – a discourse – detached from individual referents, 'determined by bio-economic forces and movements of population, subsistence, and capital.

This imagination of poverty as presented by Sherman is still valid today. Part of the reason is the predominance of the three worlds configuration, which was a product of Eurocentric mappings of the world to deal with the post-colonial situation that emerged after World War II for mortgaging Third World futures to either capitalism or socialism, a premise of this mapping, but also a pointer to a future dominated by alternatives of European origin (Dirlik 2004: 131). De Haan (2000: 5-8) already argued that the third word was shrinking by pointing out the collapse of the "second world" and the presence and the expansion of "many worlds" within a

world. However, the world's configuration still persists and this makes it possible to talk about the world of the poor and the rich.

Rahnema (1991), as quoted by Escobar (1995: 79), critical about this poverty discourse, points out that

> The word poverty is, no doubt, a key word of our times, extensively used and abused by everyone. Huge amounts of money are spent in the name of the poor. Thousands of books and expert advice continue to offer solutions to their problems. Strangely enough, however, nobody, including the proposed "beneficiaries" of these activities, seems to have a clear, and commonly shared view of poverty. For one reason, almost all the definitions given to the word are woven around the concept of "lack" or "deficiency". This notion reflects only the basic relativity of the concept. What is necessary and to whom? And who is qualified to define all that?

The modernising development discourse has successfully created a dichotomic world, the "developed world" versus the "underdeveloped world", that has resulted in a partnership phenomenon between, on one hand, the "haves" who are the developed world, and on the other, the "have-nots" who are people from the underdeveloped world. This is the creation of both donors and recipients. Belonging to these contrasting worlds leads to different dynamics in development cooperation. The donors' perspective is that one of the "white man's burden" (Kipling 1899) to alleviate the miseries of the underdeveloped. The aid recipients' perspective is that one of the "black man's burden" to accept and be relieved from miseries by the developed. The donor undertakes the burden of aiding the underdeveloped, while the aid recipient has to be constructed as such in terms of qualifying to be the aid recipient so as to be able to receive aid. The aid recipients are destined to enjoy some packaged ideals that come with the modernising development discourse. These include things like efficiency, diligence, orderliness, punctuality, frugality, scrupulous honesty, rationality in decisions, preparedness for change, alertness to opportunities, energetic enterprise, integrity and self-reliance, and cooperativeness. To some, like Rostow (1960), not only does the modernising development discourse remain as an ideal but it has practical implications for transformation of "traditional countries" into "modern countries". The "traditional countries" have been baptised with several other names such as underdeveloped, southern countries, poor countries, Least Developed Countries, and Third World countries. Such countries are almost always labelled poor.

I argue, therefore, that the unequal relationship between donors and aid recipients finds its rationale in the characterisation of the subjects of development. The founding characteristic is the justification of the dichotomous world of the developed and the underdeveloped whereby the former world has the burden to intervene in the miseries of the latter. In order to see how this burden of the developed is being

addressed, I discuss the link between modernising development discourse and the development projects in the following paragraphs.

Modernising development discourse and development projects

The burden of the donors to intervene through international development cooperation has translated itself into many forms of development projects. Development projects are a set of activities to achieve certain given objectives within a time frame. The concept of reformist idea has to do with the efforts of "attacking poverty" that were developed due to the contradictions that were apparent between economic growth and poverty and inequality growth. The trickle down process had not worked. Due to this contradiction, then, it was not worthwhile to concentrate on the narrow conception of economic growth in terms of income, but to widen the concept in order to address the issues of poverty reduction**,** unemployment, and inequality. With the idea of poverty reduction on board, international development cooperation increased aid for poverty alleviation, with more emphasis on the support of basic needs sectors such as education, health and rural development and safe water, and a tendency to finance and promote small-scale localised projects as opposed to the large-scale projects (Schulpen 1997: 17).

There is something that should not be forgotten with regard to development projects spirited by the modernising development discourse: they have as a strong component sustainable development, which is a concept that evolved as criticism of development that jeopardises the environment. It is a concept which is, nevertheless, difficult to realise due to a conflict of the two economies of nature's processes and people's survival through assigning primacy to capital, separation of production from conservation, and assumption of substitutability of nature and capital (Shiva 1993). Even the mainstream development agencies such as the World Bank, UNDP, and FAO are still stuck in the concept of development as progress (Barraclough 2001), despite the fact that their development discourse is over-layered with concepttions of sustainable development and the ways to achieve it. However, the revival of growth, changing quality of growth, meeting needs for jobs, energy, water and sanitation, conservation and enhancement of resource base, reorientation of technology and risk management, and merging environment and economics and decision-making were at the heart of the vision (Salih 2000), as promulgated by the Brundtland Commission of 1987, an idealistic vision for maintaining inter- and intra-generational welfare, that is "a society that works for us and our descendants ecologically, economically, morally, culturally and politically (Prugh & Daly 2000: xv).

Thus, the burden of the developed to intervene through international development cooperation has been embedded in development projects, basically geared towards poverty alleviation. This burden is enshrined in other mini-modernising development discourses such as the human rights, sustainable development, and (appropriate) technology discourses, and many projects are designed within these rationales. In the following paragraphs, I present a discussion on the idea that an important aim of international development cooperation's intervention through development projects is rural development interpreted as poverty alleviation.

Modernising development discourse and rural development

The international development cooperation projects have had as their main aim addressing issues of rural development in terms of poverty alleviation. The rural reality is a source of paradoxes: whereas on one hand, it has a positive connotation of simplicity and romantic sentiments, on the other, it carries with it all the sentiments of "backwardness". According to Abidi (1991: 1), whose conception of the "rural" is the same as "village", rural

> has its own charm characterised in simple style of living, simple dresses, straw mats, sand floors, thatched mud huts, limited wants for only essential items of foods, absence of modern luxuries, but the dignified character of the village folk, their cheerfulness, most humane behaviour, great sense of partnership, understanding and tolerance. The post-colonial democratic setup cannot and should not ignore the urgent need for rural uplift.

In short, a rural place is a place where people live simply, promoting values that uphold human dignity, but a place that needs to be uplifted. With the modernising development discourse, the urban has been a centre for rural intervention. The urban, who are the outsiders of the rural, have been seen as solution agents for the rural realities interpreted as problems. According to Abidi (1991: xi), the typical recipes provided by the modernizing development discourse include more positive desirable ends in rural areas such as:

> good transport systems; good communication systems; good health delivery systems; good education systems; facilities for spiritual and moral upliftment; facilities for the advancement of better relations among people, in families and in the community.

These are urban prototypes of development in the rural areas. Chambers (1983: 2) notes that these

> outsiders under-perceive rural poverty. They are attracted to and trapped in urban 'cores' which generate and communicate their own sort of knowledge while the rural 'peripheries' are isolated and neglected. The direct rural experience of most urban-based outsiders is limited to the brief and hurried visits, from urban centres, of rural urban tourism.

Very practically, the development projects in rural development have tried to deal with the revival of growth and its changing quality, meeting the needs for jobs, energy, water and sanitation, conservation and enhancement of the resource base, reorientation of technology and risk management, merging environment and economics, influencing decision-making, and so on. In a word, they have tried to maintain inter- and intra-generational welfare (Prugh & Daly 2000: xv). Most of the projects, however, have concentrated on the promotion of rural development through agriculture (Ruerd 2005), even though some other academics are arguing for something more than agriculture (Brons 2002).

Thus, development projects that have been implemented by the international development cooperation through donors have had rural development in terms of poverty alleviation as their goal. The conceptualisation of rural development, however, has an otherising connotation: as the developed world is the prototype for the underdeveloped world, so is the urban area a prototype for the rural area.

Before I conclude this chapter, let me give some remarks on the modernising development discourse from the three critical perspectives: the neo-populist approach, endogenous development, and the emptiness of the concept of development.

Remarks

The triumph of the modernising development discourse is not without its criticisms. In actual fact, the presentation of modernising development discourse is already in itself a criticism because the concept is questioned about its absoluteness and it is scrutinised from the point of the unequal relationship between the subjects of development and their "subjecters". Many of the criticisms of modernising development discourse are based on the concept of development that is enshrined in the neo-liberal paradigm that delivers a modernist conception.

For the neo-populists, the neo-liberal paradigm does not have inevitability in the social change process. The neo-populist approach respects local diversity, the consideration of truth as a negotiable variable, the recognition of power relations, and the localisation of action (de Haan 2000: 14); the approach respects culture, indigenous knowledge, participation, and the contextualization of any development agenda (Kanyandago 1998). It is from this kind of perspective that development is particularized culturally and the people themselves decide what it is for them. Clark (1991: 26), for instance argues that development is

> … a process of change that enables people to take charge of their own destinies and realize their full potential. It requires building up in the people the confidence, skills, assets and freedoms necessary to achieve this goal.

For the promoters of endogenous development, the people are to develop from what they have and what they are (Kanyandago 1998: 143). In this perspective, it is endogenous development that should be respected and promoted: local resources should be combined and developed in local styles of doing things as a starting point and a yardstick for the evaluation of the eventual utility of elements from outside. These elements from outside will be internalized if they strengthen the local styles of doing things in terms of fitting with the local conditions, perspectives, and interests. Endogeneity should also lead to self-reliance, meaning the use of available resources and opportunities, and borrowing from somewhere else what one does not have. This argument on self-reliance and the use of available resources is similar to the critique already made in the late the 1950s that aid would stifle the development of the people's resources because it would substitute their resources (Friedman 1958).

For those who argue for development as an empty concept, their arguments have been directed to the notion of progress and development. They argue that these two notions have been constructed in the modern era and have attempted to direct progress and development into the dustbin of history (Knippenberg & Schuurman 1996). These authors argue, for instance, that the concept of development is a product of a special kind of modernisation which is intimately tied to the notion of progress. This notion, in the end, can be interpreted only in material terms, to such an extent that it almost completely coincides with economic growth. This concept of economic growth has no qualitative definable basis or direction whatsoever, even though it has a strong ideological basis. This basis is as difficult to reject as it is to adapt to, and as attractive as it is destructive (Knippenberg & Schuurman 1996).

Thus, much as the modernising development discourse seems to be triumphant, it is not without criticism. Generally speaking, the criticisms are based on the neo-liberal paradigm that leads to a modernist approach to development. After pointing out these additional ideas on the modernising development discourse from a perspective of those who see it differently, let me turn to the conclusion of this chapter.

Conclusion

As a way to recapitulate what I have discussed in relation to aid and the modernisation development discourse, let me point out some key propositions that have been cardinal in this section: i) the international development cooperation is a function of the modernising development discourse; ii) the modernising development discourse is responsible for the creation and enhancement of the dichotomous world of the

developed and underdeveloped; iii) the modernising development discourse, through the international development cooperation, has been a source of many forms of development projects, and; iv) the development projects have had as aim rural development with an Otherising connotation.

The chapter started with a discussion on the international development cooperation. I ascertained that international development cooperation is about aid within the orthodox development line of thinking which is largely based on the classical and neo-classical economic theories. I further argued that aid has been handled with biases in history. As aid is linked with policy, the policy incoherences have led to development project failures. I finally established that there is power dominance in the aid machinery. In the subsequent section, I demonstrated that the unequal relationship between the donors and aid recipients has a foundation in the typological mindset of the modernising development discourse as globaliser, otheriser, subjects' shaper, and problem definer. This mindset has been developed from the construction of the dichotomous world of the developed and underdeveloped. Such theorising proved to be useful in order to understand two discussions. The first discussion concerned the development projects as the donors' burden to intervene in the miseries of the underdeveloped countries through international development cooperation. The second discussion was on rural development as a manifestation of the otherising phenomenon. In order to demonstrate that notwithstanding the triumph of the modernising development discourse there are other different opinions against it, I presented an overview of ideas from the neo-populists, promoters of endogenous development, and the theorists of development as an empty concept as the most critical ones.

Thus, Pronk's (2001) argument on poor policy environment as causative to aid failure is a good starting point in discussions on aid failure. According to Mosse (2005) and Lewis & Mosse (2006), successful projects are not a matter of design or of policy, but of political acts of composition. That is why there is a need to go deeper into other variables, such as the orthodox understanding of development, historical biases in international development cooperation, bad aid policies, aid policy incoherence, and the power dominance of the donors over and above the aid recipients. All these variables lead to the unequal relationship between the different actors in the aid machinery. In the case of, for example, the two broad actor categories of donors and aid recipients, there is a poor relationship that leads to imposition of conditions on the aid recipients by the donors and a situation whereby the dialogue between the two parties is made almost impossible. The aid recipients are taken for granted as people who do not know properly their livelihood situations.

It is the constructed “having situation” of the donors that has shaped the scenario of unequal relationship between the donors and the aid recipients. As I demonstrate in chapters 6 and 7, the aid recipients are not a homogeneous category of actors; even the relationship between the actor categories within the aid recipients is influenced by the modernising development discourse.

In the following chapter, I turn towards an understanding of the situation of the aid recipients through their livelihoods promotion. So far, I have presented the international development cooperation and aid issue. There is a need to understand the situation of the aid recipients within their livelihoods promotion context as actors who are not innocent and dumb victims, but as active actors who come to meet the donors with a defined objective: promotion of their livelihoods. While the powerful donors intervene with the development projects, which are a manifestation of the modernising development discourse, as I show in chapter 5 of this study, the aid recipients engage in negotiations with the powerful donors through organising practices geared towards livelihoods promotion (chapters 6 and 7). Thus, it is important that I discuss the link between livelihoods promotion and the organising practices of the aid recipients.

2

Livelihoods promotion and organising practices

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I presented a discussion on aid and modernising development discourse. Central to the many issues discussed in the chapter is the fact that aid is a function of the modernising development discourse which is a foundation for an unequal relationship between the different actors in the aid machinery, particularly the donors and the aid recipients. In this chapter, I explore issues with regard to the aid recipients in trying to promote their livelihoods in their encounter with the donors. Due to the fact that the modernising development discourse renders the donors more powerful than the aid recipients in the different decisions about planning and implementation of the development projects, and due to the quest for livelihoods promotion of the aid recipients, both the aid recipients and the donors involve one another in the "battlefields of knowledge" in their negotiations in the different interface situations of development projects. The chapter begins with a discussion on the livelihoods promotion; it continues with an exploration of organising practices in which issues about participation are raised; it winds up with a discussion of empowerment as a necessary element for participation and local politics.

Livelihoods promotion

Both the donors and aid recipients meet for livelihoods promotion, which is about enhancement and sustenance of people's lives through the use of resources and opportunities. Livelihoods promotion is important in the international development cooperation fabric because it is the goal to which the efforts of both the donors and aid recipients should be directed. While the donors are busy formulating and implementing policies for aid to be available, the aid recipients are busy struggling to access and utilise the available resources and opportunities from the donors. In this first section of the chapter, I first present the general understanding of the concept of livelihoods promotion. I then discuss issues of access, followed by the actor-oriented approach, agency, and interface.

Livelihoods promotion in focus

The notion of livelihoods promotion is a child born of the concept of social exclusion that refers to the lack of decent living: access to social security, to employment, to safety, to human rights, and so on (de Haan 2000: 9). Social inclusion, instead, refers to the way in which people make themselves a living using their capabilities and their tangible and intangible assets. De Haan (2000: 9) continues to argue that

> livelihood is sustainable if it is adequate for the satisfaction of self-defined basic needs and proof against shocks and stresses. If livelihood is sustainable, it is synonymous with social inclusion; if not, it equates with social exclusion.

This concept derives from the work of Chambers & Conway (1992) who argued for the creation of livelihood strategies that account for their long-term impact in terms of maintaining the natural resource base for use by others and future generations, whilst being resistant to external shocks and stresses. On this note, DFID (1999: section 1.1) argues that:

> A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.

The theorisations on livelihoods promotion have evolved in three ways: as a concept, an analytical framework, and as a set of principles (Farrington 2001: 3; Toner 2003: 772-775). As a concept, it is about "environmentally and socially sustainable livelihoods that provide a living in a context less their negative effects on the benefits and sustainability of the totality of other livelihoods everywhere"

(Chambers & Conway 1992: 26). It is, thus, about the idea that people construct livelihoods by drawing on a range of assets and entitlements (Toner 2003: 772).

As a framework, livelihoods promotion is a tool that attempts to capture the interaction between livelihood assets, vulnerability, and transforming structures (such as policies and institutions). It draws from other types of analyses such as the economic, social, institutional, and so on in order to identify how people's options and constraints can best be understood (Toner 2003: 773-774).

As a set of principles for action, livelihoods promotion has far-reaching implications for how development interventions should be designed, implemented, and evaluated. The principles are essentially a checklist of current best practice, but they also reflect the concerns and assumptions that underpin the theoretical frameworks of the sustainable livelihoods approach. The normative principles include people-centeredness, participatory and responsive, sustainability, and empowerment, while the operational principles include interventions in partnership, interventions at multi-levels and in a holistic manner, interventions in a disaggregate manner, and interventions in long-term and flexible manner (Carney 2002: 14–5; Toner 2003: 774-775).

In the three ways that the livelihoods promotion thinking has developed, the issues of vulnerability and resources are central. According to Blaikie *et al.* (1994: 9), vulnerability is about "the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of natural hazard". It is possible to note two sides of vulnerability: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress and an internal side of defenselessness, implying a lack of means to cope with damaging loss (Brons *et al.*, 2005: 3). Thus, vulnerability is about insecurity of human well-being and survival. Vulnerability circumstances can be trends, shocks, and cyclical or seasonal shifts. These circumstances affect people at different levels of the population or specific to a particular social group, household or individual.

Access

What is central in the livelihoods promotion is the question of people trying to access and utilize resources and opportunities in order to overcome their circumstances of vulnerability. Resources are what people have and can have for use in order to address their problems. They could be tangible as well as intangible. People combine the five cardinal resources – natural, physical, human, financial, and social – for promoting their livelihoods (de Haan 2000: 10), even though Baumann & Subir (2001, as quoted by Toner 2003: 773) argue for the sixth capital resource, the

political resource, of which Toner (2003: 773) argues that it is included in a sound definition of social capital because it is about considerations of power and political relationships. Material resources become tangible and claims and access become non-tangible. As to claims, one can call upon moral and practical assistance. As to access, one needs to have or get possibility to use the resource in practice.

The concept of access is about the ability to utilize a resource when needed. According to de Haan (2000: 10), access "means having or getting the opportunity to use the resource in practice". This implies, for instance, that access refers to the real opportunity for an individual or group of people to use a given resource in order to address a perceived need. According to Blaikie *et al* (1994: 48), access is "the ability to use resources which are directly required to secure a livelihood". As access to resources is essential to maintain livelihoods, if there is less access there is also an increase in vulnerability. Each individual or household has specific resources and assets, material and immaterial that assist in determining a specific access level and opportunities and decisions, influenced by structures of domination (Nathan 2005: 8). This understanding of access is influenced by the "access model to maintain livelihood" by Blaikie *et al* (1994) whereby every household and every member has an access profile.

In order that the people address their vulnerability circumstances, they need to access resources and opportunities. The question of access is important for it determines the use of resources. Resources could be there, but if one cannot access them, they are not useful. Claim becomes an important factor. It is determined by the social resource which "includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contributes to economic and social development" (de Haan 2003: 4).

Actor-oriented approach, agency, and interface

Access, as I have demonstrated, is important in determining the livelihoods promotion of the people. When donors and aid recipients meet, they are both involved in activities in which their observations and interpretations are necessarily shaped by their own perspectives. Thus, it is important to understand the dynamics of the interactions between the two parties of donors and aid recipients, dynamics which enlighten the issues of access to livelihood promoting circumstances. In any international development cooperation, when donors come to meet the aid recipients, they come with their packages of interests, purposes, and motives, all encapsulated in the modernising development discourse. The aid recipients also approach, relate, and meet the donors as knowledgeable actors with their interests, purposes, and

motives. Issues of interests, values, motives, and power struggles of the actors are thus brought to centre stage (Long 2002:2). In order to understand the dynamics in the interactions, the concepts of agency and interface are of particular relevance.

The actor-oriented approach re-asserts the importance of the agency of individuals in the face of social structures that happen to be absolute explanatory categories for humans. While Emirbayer & Mische (1998: 963) have criticised what they call theorists of practice (such as Bourdieu) for having selective attention to the role of *habitus* and routinized practices, and thus seeing human agency as habitually repetitive and taken for granted, they have captured the complexity of agency. Emirbayer & Mische (1998: 963) re-conceptualise human agency as

> a temporary embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualise past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).

Their definition discards nothing of the previous discussions on agency, but only orders the important dimensional constitutes of agency within a temporal perspective.

Long (2002: 2) continues to argue that actors are able to negotiate, accommodate, and struggle over definitions and boundaries of meanings, and in doing so give new meanings and/or transform existing meanings. With the new meanings, then, knowledge is continuously built and re-built since the contexts in which the people live continuously create encounters that permit processing and absorption of new ideas and new cognitive frames. This communicative experience assists them in shaping the already existing stocks of knowledge and evaluative modes. Much as knowledge creation and/or dissemination is an interpretative and cognitive process, entailing bridging the gap between a familiar world and less familiar, or even sometimes an alien one, of sets of meanings, more importantly, knowledge emerges out of a complex interplay of social, cognitive, cultural, institutional, and situational elements. This implies that knowledge is always essentially provisional, partial, and contextual in nature, and people work with a multiplicity of understandings, beliefs, and commitments (Long & Long 1992: 212-213).

An important notion in continuously building and rebuilding of knowledge is the notion of interface. Long (2002: 2) argues that the notion of social interface

> provides a useful heuristic device for identifying and analysing the critical points of *intersection* between different fields or levels of social organization, since it is at these interfaces that discrepancies and discontinuities of value, interest, knowledge, and power are clearly revealed.

For Long, interfaces are battlefields of knowledge in which actors' understandings, interests, and values are pitched against each other (Long 1992: 2). In development programmes as interfaces, due to a multiplicity of actors with different backgrounds, mandates, and experiences, and the resultant differential viewpoints, perceptions, objectives, practices, and strategies, there are struggles, negotiations and accommodations.

Among the many key elements of the interface perspective is the issue of multiple power relations. The interface analysis can assist in the comprehension of how power wields and yields (Villareal 1994), how power is endorsed, transformed, or challenged. It is possible with the interface analysis to understand reasons for popularisation of some powerful people for legitimisation of claims upon authoritative bodies, on one hand, and on the other, the rejection of some with deployment of and defence from countervailing powerful people. Long (2002: 9) argues that the "major task of interface analysis is to spell out the knowledge and power implications of this interplay." Other elements in the interface perspective are interlocking relationships and intentionalities, site for conflict, incompatibility and negotiation, arena for clash of cultural paradigms, knowledge processes, and a stage for analysis of power as an outcome of struggles over meanings and strategic relationships (Long 2002: 7-9).

There is a substantial difference that Bierschenk (1988) makes with regard to this concept of interface. He uses the concept of arena as a place of concrete confrontation between social actors interacting on common issues, when he talks of development projects as an arena of negotiation for strategic groups. With this understanding there is an issue of spatial connotation of the notion of interface. It is in this space that there is a multiplicity of interactions. All these interactions are interfaces. With this notion of social arena, interface is seen as intersection in the fields and not in the levels. I make use of this interpretation of interface as social arena in this study.

Thus, in the striving for livelihoods promotion within international development cooperation, the social arena is central. It is in here that the donors and aid recipients try to make sure that their intended goals are exhibited, negotiated, and met, with as few compromises as possible. It is in such social arenas that the unequal relationship signals are manifested. In understanding the aid recipients' responses to the donors in the social arenas of development interventions, I use the concept of organising practices, which I present in the following section of this chapter.

Organising practices

In this section, I elaborate the concept of organising practices in relation to livelihoods promotion. The concept forms a backbone of the two empirical chapters of this study (chapters 6 and 7). In order to understand this concept, I first present a discussion on livelihoods strategies and later its link with livelihoods promotion through participation and local politics.

Livelihood strategies

In the sustainable livelihoods framework, livelihood strategies deal with shocks and stresses because both have their impact on the livelihoods of the people; that is why people continuously engage in initiatives to overcome them. In order to address shocks and stresses, such as bad weather, wars, economic instabilities, and so on, people tend to temporarily apply safety mechanisms. These are coping strategies; they are short-term responses to overcome shocks and stress. The temporary coping mechanisms can develop into more permanent adaptive strategies due to more frequent appearance of contextual impact of shocks and stresses. Even the idea of adaptive strategies can disappear and at this point there is a new livelihood established (de Haan 2003: 5).

The study on livelihood strategies does not put into consideration the issues of intentional and non intentional behaviours. De Haan & Zoomers (2003: 19) point out that "human behaviour should not always be seen as conscious, intentional or strategic: much of what people do cannot be classified as strategic". It is for this reason that instead of narrowly conceiving people's behaviour in terms of shocks and stresses, a more holistic understanding of behaviour is considered in the concept of pathways. In clarifying the difference between this holistic concept of pathways and strategies, de Bruijn & van Dijk (2003: 1-2) argue that

> A pathway is different from a strategy because a pathway needs not to be a device to attain a pre-set goal which is set after a process of conscious and rational weighing of the actor's preferences. Rather it arises out of an iterative process in a step-by-step procedure in which goals, preferences, resources and means are constantly reassessed in view of new unstable conditions. Individuals decide on the basis of a wide range of past experiences, rather than on a vision of the future, while these recollections of the past depend to a great extent on our intellectual concern in the present. Actors coordinate their actions with other actors. In this coordination process regularities arise which pre-structure subsequent decisions.

In this line of argument about pathways as a process, de Haan (2006: 16) defines pathways as:

> patterns of livelihood activities which arise from a coordination process among actors. This co-ordination arises from individual strategic behaviour embedded both in a historical repertoire

> and in social differentiation, including power relations, and institutional processes, which both pre-structure subsequent decision-making.

A trajectory is a similar concept as pathways, with a difference of who the subjects of analysis are: while pathways deal with the observed regularities or patterns in livelihood among particular social groups, the trajectories are about individual actor's life paths (de Haan 2006: 16).

Organising practices in focus

Whereas the conceptualisation of coping and adaptive mechanisms is based on a scope determined by shocks and stresses, pathways and trajectories present a more holistic way of looking at the struggles of the people to promote their livelihoods. In both considerations of coping and adaptive mechanisms and the pathways/trajectories analyses, the element of power is not explicitly delineated. It is for this reason that this study opts for organising practices as an analytical concept, whose patterning according to Nuijten (2005: 3), "is not the result of a common understanding or normative agreement [by local actors], but of the forces at play within the field". This is a conception that clearly underlines the question of power. Nuijten (2005: 3) continues arguing that

> the reflective talk, irony, self-reflection and dialogue of the people involved express struggle, contention and resistance in relation to existing organizing practices and relations of power. These dialogues reflect power relations and a continuous active engagement of social actors with the world around them.

This concept is central in Nuijten's works (1992 & 1998), especially her work *In the Name of the Land: Organization, Transnationalism, and the Culture of the State in a Mexican Ejido*. In this work, Nuijten (1998:12-13) groups organisation theorists into various categories: those who focus on the relation between organisations and development, the mainstream theories in sociology of organisation, and the post-structuralist organisation theories. She, however, discards these categories of theories and builds a framework based on Wolf's *Facing Power: Old Insights, New Questions* (1990) because of a strong link between organising and power. According to Nuijten (1992: 204), organising practices are patterns in the manifold and fragmented strategies of the poor that arise from particular combinations of ideas, material circumstances, and interactional potentials; they evolve around fields of power and struggle between different social actors around which certain forms of dominance, contention, and resistance may develop, and certain regularities and forms of ordering may emerge; they involve people in actions of manoeuvring, mobilisation, strategising, and so on whose aim is basically livelihoods promotion.

In this study, I am attracted by Nuijten's understanding of organising practices because of her consideration of power in the concept. This conceptualisation of organising practices can be linked to the concept of discourse as a conceptual means by which social actors come to understand their own interests and the strategies they pursue to realise those interests. Discourses involve power plays. People, as active and not passive actors, are able to go beyond and around discourses in order to achieve their goals. There are many ways in which people carry on activities in their daily lives without formal organisations, but with networks mobilised for provision of crucial information, financial support, practical help, circumvention of the law or resist forms of oppression. This is a clear indication of the inventiveness and skilfulness of the people in organising different personal and communitary matters and in defending their own interests in their daily lives. Thus, in a context whereby the local people meet with the modernising development discourse, for instance, organising practices become a challenging concept to explore.

Organising practices are non-formalised forms of manoeuvres in terms of actions as reactions, responses, and socialised behaviour geared towards livelihoods promotion. Such manoeuvres take place within personal networks such as in families and friendships, in groups, individual alliances, *ad hoc* constellations, and individual relations with officials or higher placed politicians (Nuijten 1999: no page). In order to stress the need to understand these organising practices, Shepherd (1998: 13) argues that this "local-level organisation is a field where greatly improved academic understanding has often not been translated into practice". Let me advance the discussion in the direction of a deeper understanding of organising practices and livelihoods promotion.

Organising practices and livelihoods promotion

In general, people are always looking for ways to promote their livelihoods. When the aid recipients interact with the donors, livelihoods promotion guides their actions. They get involved in a "response system" in order to maximise the opportunities brought by the donors, but very much controlled by them. According to Dijkstra (2002: 311), conditionalities render aid ineffective because there is a conflict of interest between donor and recipient on policies and asymmetric information. This is a conclusion that is arrived at when doing analysis through an "augmented principal-agent" framework (Dijkstra 2002: 311).

> P (donor) wants certain actions to be done by A (recipient), and rewards A for this. P and A have different objective functions, which means that A does not have the same interest as P in complying with P's objectives. The asymmetric information means that A will always have more information on what he actually does than P.

There is room left to manoeuvre as P, the donors, want A, the aid recipients, to reach their objectives as donors. The room to manoeuvre is not left "intentionally", but it is necessary because there is no way that the donors can know thoroughly well the livelihoods conditions of the aid recipients, on one hand, and on the other, there is no way that they can control all the conditions of aid recipients as actors. These differences in interests and information are an opportunity for the aid recipients to manoeuvre means to access and make use of donor resources.

This augmented principal-agent framework forms an important basis for the thesis of this study. Donors, coming from the modernising development discourse world that has created the "Other" as aid recipient, know less about the other world of the aid recipients. The aid recipients understand very well their creation as recipients and understand much more about what it needs to be done for their livelihoods than the donors do. Eventually, the aid recipients "respond diligently" to the donors so that they can access aid and make use of it. These diligent responses are organising practices: they happen in the interaction between the donors and the district officials who are at the points of aid entrance, as I demonstrate in chapter 6 when presenting the organising practices of the district officials and they happen in the formulation of development interventions, as I demonstrate in chapter 7 when presenting the organising practices of the village elite and the village people.

Thus, finding out the organising practices in the different social arenas of donor-funded development intervention is crucial. This study concentrates on organising practices from two perspectives. The first perspective considers organising practices as responses to the participation question with regard to the donors. The second perspective considers organising practices as responses in the local politics in donor-funded development interventions. In most donor-funded development projects, donor resources to the aid recipients are mediated by different actor categories such as those who can directly deal with donors and others who can deal with those directly dealing with the donors. As I show in chapters 6 and 7, the district officials deal directly with the donors, while the village elite deal with the district officials. In both perspectives, however, participation is crucial as a process in which to learn and de-learn through the different confrontations in the encounters, with sometimes possibilities of rub-offs that are violent or non-violent, tough or soft, and perceptible or imperceptible. For this matter, then, it is important to understand participation and local politics.

Participation in focus

As mentioned already, these organising practices are manoeuvres in terms of actions, reactions, responses, and the socialised behaviour of the people geared towards livelihoods promotion; they manifest themselves in different participation processes in the social arenas of development interventions. In a bid to conceptualise participation, White *et al.* (1994: 16) have imagined participation as kaleidoscopic because of its variety and diversity in definitions. Blackburn & Holland (1998: 2) express this variety and diversity as:

> a sacred cow of the international agencies that control and direct vast intellectual and material resources in the name of development. … All may be in participation-speak, but whether they agree with each other on what they mean by participation is another matter.

Among the elaborated understandings of participation is Hart's (1992) ladder of participation. He makes a distinction between non-participation and participation. Both non-participation and participation can be experienced at various levels. He develops this typology to guide thinking about children's participation. In the non-participation aspect, the lowest level is manipulation, followed by decoration and tokenism. According to him, participation begins from the level of assigned but not informed, followed by when people are consulted and informed, when projects are initiated by someone else, but the decisions shared with people, when people initiate and direct the project, and the climax being when people initiate the projects and share decisions with powerful people.

Pretty (1996, as cited by Dulani 2003) presents a different ladder whereby participation is viewed on a seven-step ladder. Table 2.1 summarises this ladder. The low tier of the ladder represents the narrowest type of participation. The different steps in the middle represent a gradual widening of participatory space, with the seventh and highest rung on the ladder representing the highest level of participation. These are the steps in an ascending order: passive participation, participation in information giving, participation by consultation, participation for material incentives, functional participation, interactive participation, and self-mobilisation (Pretty 1996).

All these consideration of Hart (1992) and Pretty (1996) are mere expressions of the complexity of the concept of participation. It is difficult to conceptualise participation because it is about interaction which is basically determined by the complexity of behaviour of human beings, who are the inter-actors; capturing it with a single outlook is difficult. Different scientists conceptualise participation according to their own ideological standpoints. For instance, politicians tend to conceive participation as involvement of rural people in decision making; economists as rural

Table 2.1 Pretty's participation typologies

Typology	Characteristics
7. Self-mobilisation	People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. Participation is seen as a right, and not just a means to achieve project goals. These groups take control over local decisions, and so people have a stake in maintaining structures.
5. Functional participation	People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement does not tend to be at early stages of project cycles or planning, but rather after major decisions have already been made. These institutions tend to be dependent on external initiators and facilitators, but may become self-dependent.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by providing resources, such as labour, in return for food, cash and other material incentives. However, the people have no stake in prolonging activities when the incentives end.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or answering questions, and external people listen to views. These external professionals define both problems and solutions, and may modify them in the light of people's responses. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's view
2. Participation in information giving	People participate by answering questions posed by extractive researchers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings, and research findings are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.
1. Passive participation	People participate by being told what is going to happen or has already happened. It is a unilateral announcement by an administration of project management without listening to people's responses.

Source: Pretty (1996), as cited by Dulani (2003: 5)

people sharing in benefits; development administrators as rural people assuming roles in implementation. When there is a positive conceptualisation of participation, then it is expressed in terms of "degrees", ranging from 'genuine participation' or 'self mobilisation' when the participants control their development process to 'non-participation' or 'passive participation', 'tokenism', 'manipulated' participation or '*pseudo'* participation when the development process is in the hands of planners, administrators**,** and the community elites and the local people are passive listeners to what is being planned for them (Kinyashi 2006: 4).

Participation is a concept that triumphs in the modernising development discourse. I discuss this concept within the modernising development discourse as part and parcel of the way development interventions, in terms of projects, were conceptualised historically.

▪ Participation and modernising development discourse

Participation of the different stakeholders from the beginning of any development intervention right to the end has been an important issue within modernising development discourse. This implies that the beneficiaries are supposed to participate from conception, to planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a development project in order that they become the owners and beneficiaries of it. Participation has been a practical point of intersection between donors and recipients in international development cooperation. However, as there is no universal understanding of the concept, each development has always had to clarify what participation is in order to get focused in its missions, strategies, and methodologies in which to operate.

The early conceptualisations of participation in development interventions were associated with the basic needs approach to development, signalling, according to Kanji & Greenwood (2001: 8),

> a shift from top-down, technocratic and economistic interventions towards popular involvement, human resources and basic human needs as critical to development processes. A full range of arguments for participation was explored: efficiency and effectiveness, self-determination and mutual learning.

For instance, Pearse & Stiefel (1979), as cited in Cornwall (2000: 21), defined participation as “the organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control”.

Cohen and Uphoff (1977), who saw participation as including people's involvement in decision-making processes, implementing programmes, sharing in the benefits of development programmes, and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes, provided an important interpretation in the identification of key-stages of the project cycle: decision-making, implementation, benefits and evaluation have influenced the understanding of participation in project arenas.

According to Abbot & Guijt (1999), it is possible to observe trends in participatory development over the years together with wider approaches to development. The 1970s and early 1980s signalled the need for participation due to frustration about ineffective expert research and planning. It is here that participatory develop-

ment and alternative people's self-development began to take shape. The 1980s and early 1990s saw a boom period in methods for PRA. This was a period of shift from "do it by yourself" to "do for yourself" because people were seen as active participants and would reduce the costs of implementing development programmes. The 1990s experienced participation as an imperative, with civil society engaging NGOs to assist in democratization processes by monitoring the state. Again, the notion of stake-holding came in with the debates on how participation was an issue of processes through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them. Towards the end of the 1990s, there were emerging paradoxes with the non-participatory approaches, embedded in standardised approaches that contradict the original aims of participation in terms of flexibility and context-specific approaches. According to Kanji and Greenwood (2001: 8), there are "more technical rather than empowerment-oriented use of methods with superficial knowledge of empowerment principles".

In the processes of development planning and implementation, participation has been incarnated in decentralisation, which, according to Lister & Betley (1999: 2),

> is regarded in developing countries as a critical mechanism for aligning public expenditures to local priorities, for improving management incentives, and for improving accountability to users close to the point of service delivery.

According to Rondinelli & Nellis (1986: 8), decentralisation is a transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government ministries and agencies to field units of central government ministries or agencies (de-concentration), to subordinate units or levels of government (devolution), to semi-autonomous public authorities (delegation), and to non-governmental private or voluntary organisations (privatization).

From the above definition of decentralisation, three main types of decentralisation have been identified (Lakwo 2004: 620). The first is political and aims at pluralistic politics and representative government. The citizens or their representatives have more power in public decision-making. The second is administrative and fiscal decentralisation which seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility, and financial resources for the provision of public services among different levels of government by the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing, and management of certain public functions. The third is economic or market decentralisation. Characteristic of this type of decentralisation is that there is shift in responsibility for functions from the public to the private sector. It is another discursive structure to salvage the situation of underdevelopment in the Third World (Lakwo 2004: 608), of which popularisation in developing countries was an attempt to undertake the

development paradigm that could integrate the structural approach with neo-liberalism (Rondinelli 1981: 133-134). This had a premise that decentralisation opens up government systems for citizens' participation in local governance. Ideally, decentralisation is to facilitate participatory development and shift responsibilities for development to local authorities "through improved local democracy, account-ability, and sustainability of quality and cost-effective locally chosen service delivery" (Lakwo 2004: 609).

Decentralisation could be described as a fashion, not least among aid agencies. The assumption is the fact that it is a "good thing which goes along with democracy, good governance, a market economy, poverty alleviation and efficiency in public expenditure" (Lister & Betley 1999: 3). I agree with Lister & Betley (1999: 5) when they argue that "for aid agencies, interest in decentralisation often reflects their exposure to public sector management reforms at home, as well as their increasing concern with governance and institutions".

This idea unveils the concept of participation as an outside concept that reflects the reality of decentralisation of organisations back home donor countries. It also points to the malfunctioning of the state machinery in terms of poor governance, and therefore, a way to bypass unsatisfactory central governments in the recipient country. Thus, decentralisation is a kind of 'cut and paste' phenomenon from a working experience in the aid donor countries to the aid recipient countries, a manifestation of the modernising development discourse carried along by the donors from their countries to the aid recipient countries.

▪ A critical eye on participation

There are criticisms in participation which I find very important in the study of organising practices primarily because the practicalities of participation have been an illusion. Much as, for instance, Agenda 21 of the 1992 UNCED conference emphasized consultation, capacity building, and empowerment through delegation of authority, accountability and resources, and therefore, people themselves becoming architects and engineers of their own development, mobilisation of the people is still a case in point. Local people contribute resources in pre-determined programmes, but control and direction remaining with the originators. So, participation is seen as a way of mobilising support from people to cause smooth, less costly means of carrying forward development programmes and agendas that come from above.

Deshler & Sock's (1985) critical review of literature on participation in development has revealed that ideas on rural development are laced with rhetoric for

popular participation. Thus, concepts, measures, and indicators of development participation are lacking, as are theories, definitions**,** and conceptual frameworks. At the practical level, it is really pseudo-participation; genuine participation is rare. Their conclusion (Deshler & Sock 1985: 7) is important with respect to a way forward in participation in practice:

> Development planners and policy-makers at the international, national, and regional levels might do well to adopt policies and operations that encourage genuine dialogue and participation in creation of development plans, if empowerment is to be more than rhetoric. Administrators and planners may need to examine their own attitudes, assumptions, and perspectives towards local participant.

The concept of empowerment that these authors propose as a way forward derives from a Freirian tradition (Freire 1983: 16) whereby all people have the right to individually and collectively speak their word: "this is not the privilege of some few men [*sic*], but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone – nor can he say for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words". It is in this line of all people having to say on matters affecting their lives that the concept of participation as empowerment is envisaged. I shall present the concept of empowerment in the next section of this chapter.

With respect to the community-based development-oriented projects, there is elite capture (Rao & Ibanez 2004; Platteau 2004; Mansuri & Rao 2004). Much as there is broad-based satisfaction with the outcome of the community development and development projects, the participatory processes are elite-driven and decision-making tends to be dominated by a small group of motivated individuals. Projects that rely on community participation have not been particularly effective at targeting the poor who are the majority, even though by completion of these projects the community expresses satisfaction.

It is important to note that some of these contradictions in participation are found in the participatory methodologies enshrined in the Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs), with their success and failure stories. Observations on the PRAs begin by questioning Chambers' PRA empiricistic orientation (Chambers 1994: 1262), which he expresses thus:

> Most of those who have innovated in developing PRA have been practitioners, concerned with what works, and what will work better, not academic theorists concerned with why it works. They have been searching not for new theories or principles but for new and better ways of learning and doing. For them, the power and utility of … PRA, undertaken with rapport and self-critical rigor, are empirical facts of common experience: they know that they work, and that done well they can lead to better development.

On the criticisms on Chambers, Parpart (2000: 233) concludes his argument that is focused on gender implications of PRA: "PRA techniques, particularly as outlined by Robert Chambers, are under-theorised, especially in relation to power". Kapoor (2002: 115) locates the weakness of PRA in the methodology which is empiricistic in orientation, with "lack of attention to crucial questions around legitimacy, justice and difference/consensus". In general, PRA downplays local socio-economic inequalities with ignorance of broader national and global socio-economic forces due to participatory development trend towards localism. According to Lewis and Mosse (2006: 3, paraphrasing de Sardan 2005), there has been naïve oversimplification of PRA which has resulted in ideological populism, that is: the unqualified valuation of indigenous knowledge and community tradition at the expense of methodological populism, which is a stance of taking a local point of view to discover a rationale of actions.

White *et al.* (1994: 17) argue that there is no doubt that power and control are pivotal sub-concepts which contribute to both understanding the diversity of expectations and anticipated outcomes of people's participation. Unless the power hierarchies are unravelled, there is no way that participation for empowerment will take place. In actual fact, participation for empowerment is a contradiction in the modernising development discourse because the control of projects and decision-making power rests with planners, administrators, and the community's elite because these people are knowledgeable, and therefore, capable of "modernising others".

Let me conclude this discussion on participation with this quite challenging image, which I borrow from the words of a colleague of mine who was in South Africa in 1995:

> Development policy-makers should walk alongside the people at the people's pace and to facilitate in identifying and removing obstacles along the way together with the people. If policy-makers walked behind the people, they would not be able to see, and if they walked in front, they would obscure the way and dictate the pace of the journey. In other words, people should own their journey and plot their own course.[1]

Participation opens for a field full of tensions due to the fuzziness in the understanding of the concept of participation, on one hand, and on the other, due to its embedment in the modernizing development discourse that makes it operational in terms of everything else except self-mobilisation. As I shall demonstrate in

[1] This idea was aired during the conference with the Department of Land Affairs in 1995 on the national land policy that took place from Thursday 31st August 1995 to Friday 1st September 1995 at the World Trade Centre, Kempton Park, Gauteng.

chapter 6 of this study, donors still walk in front of the aid recipients and dictate the pace of the journey.

Local politics in focus

Development interventions invariably have unintended consequences because such interventions typically occur in social arenas that are permeated by local politics, an expression of local power relations. These development interventions generate a specific kind of politics due to the resources they introduce into the social arena. Such politics are characterised by different interests from different actors within the donors' and recipients' sides, together with a diverse gallery of entrepreneurial brokers mediating among these various stakeholders. In the understanding of local politics, thus, it becomes important to scrutinise the consequences of localised development interventions, the competing forms of authority and normative systems in local arenas, and the roles and functions of brokers and brokerage under different types of relations in a society.

The issue of "modern" local politics in Africa is not a new phenomenon (Hartman 2003): it has governed societies from the early times of independence when institutions that represented local political processes began to be squeezed and became fragile as institutions of democratic representative governments. Many African leaders and scientists challenged their existence, abolished them, or, where they remained in existence, they were transformed into bodies with limited powers and autonomy. These institutions were perceived as political threats to national governments or as barriers to the realisation of national development plans.

There are two ways in which the analysis of local politics can be done. The first way is dealing with democratic local political processes that have been considered important for effective local governance. Political mechanisms hold local officials accountable for their performance because the local political process provides space for political actors to explain and market their activities, to build support, and raise additional resources (Hartman 2003: 1). It is the electoral process as a mechanism that replaces them when these political actors prove a failure. Important issues to note are de-concentration and devolution in decentralisation (Hartman 2003) whereby the former is about the political management of sub-national institutions by locally elected politicians, and the latter about appointing administrators. A democratic local political process demands an active civil society, some general political organisations, a legislative arena constituted in elections, and mechanisms to gather and spread information (Hartman 2003).

The second way is about dealing with complex sets of different bargaining processes among social actors in social arenas. There are facts that are crucial in order to conceive local politics in this way. Local elections serve as powerful mechanisms for the adjustment and revitalization of patronage and rent-seeking (Bierschenk 2003: 5), the formal political participation strengthens non-elected bodies or leads to fully-fledged re-centralization of political decision-making at the national level, and the consideration of the complementarities of formal institutions by informal rules (Bayart 1993; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Bierschenk & de Sardan 2003). From the policy perspective, the power relations among the local actors, who are connected in multiplex ways at the local community level, determine the policy effect, with a challenge of making these actors interact in different ways the change is desired. It is not strange, thus, to find the national members of parliament or chief executive officers who become important stakeholders in local politics independently from their formal inclusion in local councils or dominate local decision-making beyond their administrative roles, respectively.

These facts demand another way of dealing with local politics. A complex set of different, historically situated, ongoing bargaining processes among social actors, occurring at different places are accountable for institutional arrangements that deal with development interventions. The institutions are polycephalous, involving different public arenas, being the product of different historical periods and based on varying meaning systems, rules and actors (Bierschenk *et al*. 2000: 10). There is no central institutional realm where the ballgame is being played because, according to Migdal (1988: 39),

> many ballgames may be played simultaneously. In web-like societies, although social control is fragmented and heterogeneous, this does not mean that people are not being governed; they most certainly are. The allocation of values, however, is not centralized. Numerous systems of justice operate simultaneously.

The bargaining processes over the organization and rules of access are found in every social arena which, inevitably, has political under-stories, instead of solely being found in political bodies such as parliaments and village councils that are specifically and officially designed for this task. Thus, institutional arrangements are a political arena, that is, “a place of concrete confrontation between social actors interacting on common issues” (Bierschenk & de Sardan 1997: 240). Connected with the political arena is the question of a collective agency or a strategic group (Bierschenk & de Sardan 1997: 241) that devises and implements collective strategies and enter into alliances. After understanding this notion of local politics, let me discuss its link with social arenas.

▪ Local politics and social arena

I discuss the notion of social arena from the perspective of development organisations. Both the donors and recipients encounter one another with their social interests and normative values in development organisations as social arenas. In such development organisations, there have been, for a long time, encounters between people in vulnerable circumstances and donors geared towards people's livelihoods promotion. Here, it is important to clarify the difference between organisations and institutions. While organisations are structures of recognised and accepted roles which may operate on a formal or informal basis, institutions are complexes of norms and behaviour (Uphoff 1986: 8). Thus, the normative aspects are stressed on institutions, while structures are central for organisations. Institutions structure human interaction and have enforcement characteristics. They are about rules, laws, norms of behaviour, conventions and codes of conduct. According to Scott (1992: 33), institutions consist of

> cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers - cultures, structures, and routines - and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.

Thus, institutions call attention to the role of beliefs, rules, and socio-political elements in the structure and operation of organisations.

Collective actions and collective goals are essential in characterising organisations and institutions. While, for instance, Uphoff (1986: 9) argues that institutions persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes, Berkes & Folke (1997: 7-8) argue that institutions have to deal with how to control access to the resources and how to institute rules among users to solve the potential divergence between individual and collective rationality. This notion of collective goals, however, is a very tricky one. Researchers or policy-makers can perceive or determine the collective goal in a given development initiative. This collective goal, nonetheless, might not necessarily be for the actual stakeholders because the people involved in collective actions may all have different goals. This caution is to say that collective goals should not be taken as a central element in the definition of organisations or institutions. Instead, there should be more focus on the power differences and their distinctions that are created by organisations in order to understand the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (instead of collective goals), which are part and parcel of any organisation.

In any development organisation as social arena, institutions are very crucial; they are a springboard for local politics. Many institutions in society are informal, consisting primarily of regularised practices which persist over time rather than any

fixed set of rules or regulations (Nuijten 1999: no page). In organisations, one has to be critical about the seeming non-rules and non-procedures that form a big and direct part of the ways in which people's lives are organised. It is the "breaking" of the formal rules and procedures and the "realisation" of the non-rules and non-procedures that organising practices become important in such arenas for the people's livelihoods promotion. It is within this breaking-realisation phenomenon that the local politics become important.

▪ Local politics and elite capture

The role of the elite is central in the discussion about local politics in development intervention de Herdt & Abega (forthcoming 2007) point out that development planning is almost inherently self-defeating because "poverty alleviation, like institutional design more generally, might belong to the category of states which cannot easily be produced at will". Long (2001: 89) makes reference to this difficulty as the central dilemma of development planning: "no matter of how firm the commitment to good intentions, the notion of 'powerful outsiders' assisting 'powerless insiders' is constantly smuggled in". This is a contradiction with the idea of handing over the stick to the targeted people themselves. For Offe (1996: 214), "it is as if the man-made and hence contingent nature of institutional change must be denied and artificially 'forgotten'". It is as if, according to de Herdt & Abega (forthcoming 2007)

> the project manager wants to hide his or her own hand. Project 'ownership' - so important for guaranteeing the sustainability of an intervention - is crucially determined, then, by the capacity of the project planner to present his or her actions as part of a local development agenda.

It is in the same line that Bromley (1998:87) sees persistent poverty as a conesquence of the institutional arrangements that rendered the people poor before the development intervention. It is for this reason that he thinks that in development projects, there is no intention as such to upset the institutional arrangements that created the status quo.

I agree with de Herdt & Abega (forthcoming 2007) that this is a typical problem of elite capture:

> An evident and already well-documented problem is that of capture of development aid either by a landed, 'traditional' elite (Platteau & Gaspart 2003; Platteau & Abraham 2002; Conning & Kevane 2002) or by 'downsized' state bureaucrats who have reappeared as NGO-administrators (Platteau & Gaspart 2003; Chabal & Daloz 1999). At their respective levels, they behave like "interface experts" (Hilhorst 2003) or "development brokers" (Bierschenk, de Sardan & Chaveau 2000), who are able to manipulate and exploit outside intervention as well as local expectations on their own behalf. They exploit the 'structural hole' (Burt 1992) between different lifeworlds to create leverage in order to influence the dynamics of local political arenas in their favour.

Thus, local politics are extremely complex and involve a lot of bargaining between the different actors. They are very important as the context in which participatory planning takes place. Behind them are institutions which act as moderators. However, in development work, the elite capture the development processes, sometimes benevolently (Mansuri & Rao 2004: 23) and sometimes malevolently (Mansuri & Rao 2004: 30). In both cases of benevolent or malevolent elite capture, the fact is that the targeted population seem to be the loser in local politics because the elite are more powerful and have more advantages. I discuss these aspects of local politics within a development organisation in chapter 7 of this study whereby the village elite and the village people are in continuous bargaining processes in order to access and make use of donor resources.

In both participation and local politics, there is a crucial element that is common: the targeted beneficiaries of the interventions seem to be always the losers in the negotiations. These are the people, who according to Kinyashi (2006: 3) are the poor. They are "essentially those human beings who, for one reason or another, almost systematically end up at the losing end of the multiple bargains that are struck around available resources and opportunities". Much as there is too much planning, as Easterly (2006a: 1-9; 2006b) points out, the involvement of the targeted beneficiaries in the planning for their livelihoods promotion has been strategic. They have been used as informants, "patches" in the administrative "cracks", and acceptors of plans; they have enrolled themselves in the development plans of the elite, and together they have tried to have development interventions in their villages.

Much as it is difficult that disempowered people get involved in participation because this is about bringing people, often with suppressed livelihoods, to the table for discussions, these targeted beneficiaries are not "total losers" as a result of engaging in organising practices. In fact, their marginal position in the bargaining processes in participating in the affairs of their livelihoods promotion enhances their organising practices in order to make sure that they access resources and make use of them for their livelihoods, as Is shall demonstrate in chapter seven of this study when discussing about the organising practices of the village people. This consideration of the losers in the bargaining process in development, however, brings me to a discussion on the notion of empowerment as an essential element in participation and local politics.

Participation, local politics, and empowerment

Empowerment is a concept that has many conceptualisations and operationalisations. In this section of the chapter, I present a discussion on empowerment linked with the notions of participation and local politics. The term empowerment has become a stock-in-trade expression in the development lexicon, meaning different things to different people, or, more dangerously, all things to all people (Batliwala 1995: 1). Conspicuously, the term empowerment contains within it the word power. Roland (1997; 1998) conceptualises power under four facets of "power over" (a negative and controlling power wielded in a win-lose relationship), "power with" (a collective strength based on mutual support, solidarity and collaboration), "power to" (a generative or productive power), and "power within" (the spiritual strength and uniqueness a person has for his/her self-worth, self-knowledge). Thus, empowerment is concerned with power relations between individuals and groups in society. If participation, however, is about bringing people, often with suppressed livelihoods, to the table for discussion (Fetterman 2005: 10), these people need to be able to engage in intelligent and shared decision-making, with influence and control about decisions that affect them. This implies that they need to be empowered. Power has legitimacy because actors who institutionalise it accept it consciously or unconsciously; it is flexible because it adapts with social change; it is suitable because it fits within every social interaction; it is effective because it operates within the needs of actors; it is efficient because it is exercised at minimal cost compared to the benefits derived by the holder, and; it is sustainable because it has a long-term continuity in perpetuating hegemony (Lakwo 2004b: 1).

From the gender perspective, power is continuously embedded in symbols, social structures, and identity (Davids & van Driel 2000). When power is embedded in symbols it facilitates the non-questioning attitude of symbols and facilitates the operation of stereotypes, labels, and stigma; when it is embedded in social structures, it is fixed in institutions that are normative guidelines and custodians of the patriarchal structure, and when it is embedded in subjective identities, it assists in the production of individuals who have internalised and processed power asymmetries to an extent of facilitating the processes of "wielding and yielding power" – men wield and women yield power (Villareal 1994: 8).

This complexity and multi-dimensionality understanding of power has led to different conceptualisations of empowerment. For instance, Chambers (1993: 11) viewed empowerment as when people, especially the poor people, are enabled to take more control over their lives, and secure a better livelihood with ownership and control of productive assets; in the World Bank circles, empowerment is considered

in terms of the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives (Narayan 2002). According to DFID, empowerment occurs when people take control over the decision, assets, policy, institutions and processes that affect their livelihoods (DFID 1999). Batliwala (1995: 130) and Parpart *et al.* (2002: 10) give an economic understanding of empowerment as the process, and the outcome of the process, by which people gain greater control over material and intellectual resources, and challenge the ideology of dominant groups and discrimination in all the institutions and structures of society.

Basically, the concept of empowerment focuses on three issues: (i) a gradual process of change of both actors and structures; (ii) asserting oneself in resource access and attaining the desired human capabilities (Nussbaum & Glover 1995: 61-104); and (iii) interactions amongst actors at different levels from the micro to the macro. In a word, empowerment underpins the process of change to upset the dominant patterns of power relations by strengthening resistance, disengaging from oppressive power networks, and reinforcing claim-making capacity. In the development industry**,** empowerment emerged as a challenge to the varied forms of oppression and inequities that deny people their human rights in institutional, material, and discursive context involving the personal, relational, and collective spheres. According to Villareal (1994: 227), empowerment, thus, envisages processes of change that undermine the dominant patterns of power relations by strengthening resistance and the need to disengage from power networks using inherent stimulated autonomy.

There is no way that when participation and local politics are in action that power differences between the different partners in development interventions for livelihood promotion can be ignored. One cannot ignore, for instance, the difference between the village people and those who invite them to participate. Such ignorance does not only undermine the possibility of equitable consensual decision making, but may also restrict the possibility of thinking outside the box, and as such reinforcing hegemonic perspectives and *status quo* reinforcing solutions (Cornwall 2002: 13). In a similar manner, Gould (1996: 173) argues that downplaying the enhancing role of difference in the public sphere removes difference from the public sphere, together with enhancing the creativity that sparks off imaginative critiques and rejection of existing arguments so that there is generation of new and unexpected frameworks for agreement.

Thus, as Cornwall (2002: 28) puts it, enhancing people’s participation requires more than inviting or inducing people to participate, more than simply making

spaces available for people to express their needs and exercises in gathering voices; it needs commitment to give people access to information on which to base deliberation, mobilize, assert their rights, and demand accountability. Thus, empowerment in participatory planning and local politics is more than going through all planning stages, using the locally available resources, and/or identifying what external resources they need for development process; it is a matter of understanding the rules that provide the basis for development. People need to know the conditions in the global and local economic frameworks, the international and national institutional frameworks, the socio-cultural frameworks, and the ecological frameworks.

Conclusion

I began this chapter with a discussion on livelihoods promotion. In this section, I ascertained that the social arena is important for livelihoods promotion because it is here that both the donors and the aid recipients exhibit, negotiate, and try to meet their aims; it is here that unequal relationship behaviours of the donors and responses from the aid recipients are manifested. In the subsequent section about organising practices, I argued that the organising practices were diligent responses of the less powerful actors in trying to promote their livelihoods when they encounter more powerful actors. In a discussion about participation, the fuzziness of the concept and the obscurity enhanced by development practitioners and policy-makers who dictate the pace for development were revealed. Participation becomes more illusionary due to the complexity of the bargaining processes in local politics which are dominated by the elite who, generally capture the livelihood promotion opportunities. Looking at participation and local politics, I concluded the chapter by arguing that in order for people to promote their livelihoods in development projects, empowerment of the people is necessary so that they can participate usefully and make use of possibilities in local politics. It is difficult (almost impossible) that someone else empowers people; the people have to do it themselves. However, as it will be seen in the conclusion of this study, the people have a certain kind of empowerment which they use to engage in organising practices.

The aid recipients are faced with a situation of the powerful donors. Much as they (the recipients) would have opted for a different use of the funds, they cannot express this idea directly because they know that the power domination of the donor does not permit going outside the conditions and the set objectives of donor-funds. Both the illusionary experience of participation by those who directly deal with the donors and the engagement in the local politics by those who do not directly deal

with the donors, have led to the rise of organising practices in aid projects. This distinction between those who directly deal with the donors and those who do not is crucial. In Tanzania, it is very determined by the decentralisation system which guides development planning, as I discuss in chapter 4 when presenting the socio-political background of Tanzania. The organizing practices result in “development project pop-ups”, which are not necessarily expected and known by the donors, but often times known and expected by the beneficiaries. In the next chapter, I present the methodology I adopted in this study.

3

Research methodology

Introduction

In the previous two chapters, I presented the theoretical background of this study, based on aid and modernising development discourse, on the one hand, and on the other hand based on livelihoods promotion and organising practices. In this theoretical background the main argument is that the international development cooperation being a function of modernising development discourse has resulted into asymmetrical power relations between the different actors in the aid machinery; in order for the aid recipients to promote their livelihoods, they have engaged in organising practices in order to access and make use of the resources that the donors bring in the social arenas of development projects. As already mentioned, the organising practices are observed through participation in the two perspectives of responses towards the participation question with respect to the donors and responses in the local politics. In this chapter, where I present the research methodology that I used to get and analyse data, I begin with the presentation of the research problem, followed by the study questions and their operationalisation. I then present the data collection methods and analysis procedures used.

Research problem

In general, it has always been argued that aid has been unsuccessful, notwithstanding the many efforts to render it successful; many development projects yield unsatisfactory and unsustainable results and the qualitative change achieved is uneven. And many reasons have been advanced to explain these failures. Much as reports argue that there is more poverty created by the development projects than what was found there before intervention, it is given fact that wherever a development project has been, there has always been some promotion of people's livelihoods. Hence, there is a need to explore the relevance of these development projects, especially the processes through which the aid beneficiaries make these projects relevant.

On the one hand, therefore, it becomes crucial to explore the processes that lead to the relevance of the development projects from the modernising development discourse, which is foundation for the development projects. The modernising development discourse is responsible for the unequal relations between the donors and the aid recipients. On the other hand, it becomes important to explore the processes that lead to the relevance of the development projects from the organising practices of the aid recipients. Thus, in the middle of pessimisms about project failures, there is a problem that there is lack of knowledge of the processes of the aid beneficiaries to make aid relevant in their livelihoods.

These processes of making the development projects relevant to the aid beneficiaries are explored within the international development cooperation framework, in the bilateral development cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and the Netherlands government. Of all the interventions in this cooperation, I make use of the Royal Netherlands Embassy District Rural Development Programmes (RNE-DRPDs) that began in 1987 and phased out in 2004. Subsequently, I narrow down to one RNE-DRDP, the Bukoba District Rural Development Programme (BDRDP). In the context of this programme, I deal with the catchment area of one of the BDRDP projects: the *Yetu* Farmers' Extension Centre (YFEC). Thus, the exploration of the processes of making the development projects relevant for the aid beneficiaries is conducted within the bilateral development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands in the RNE-DRDPs, particularly in the BDRDP and the YFEC. Let me now present the questions for this study.

Study questions and operationalisation

It has been stated that this study explores the processes that lead the aid recipients into making the development projects relevant. In order to explore these processes, this study has as main questions: *how have the modernising development discourse of the donors and the organising practices of the aid recipients influenced the relevance of aid?* This main question has been broken down into three sub-questions:

1. How has the modernising development discourse manifested itself in the RNE-DRDPs?

The concept of modernising development discourse has already been discussed in chapter one. It refers to progress as the rationale or story or an explanatory thread behind donors' engagement in development interventions when addressing the livelihoods of the aid recipients. In the context of the bilateral development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands, I use the RNE-DRDPs, as a development intervention geared towards rural development through development projects, to identify elements of the modernising development discourse. I make analysis of the modernising development discourse in chapter five through the exploration of:

a. The key documents used by the RNE in the planning and implementation of the RNE-DRDPs. This is to set a platform in order to understand in general terms the content of the documents and their centrality in manifesting the concept of modernising development discourse within the RNE-DRDPs.
b. The concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation. The exploration of these concepts is geared towards exhuming the characteristics of the modernising development discourse in the RNE-DRDPs.

2. What organising practices of the district officials emerged as a result of the RNE-BDRDP?

The concept of organizing practices was presented in the second chapter; it is about diligent responses of the aid recipients in terms of actions/reactions and socialised behaviour geared towards livelihoods promotion. The district officials are found at the entrance of donor aid at the districts. These are the people who directly deal with the donors, given the structure of the decentralisation system, as I shall discuss in chapter four on the section about the socio-political landscape of Tanzania. Thus, the understanding of the nature of the district officials is crucial because these are the organising practices which are directly linked with the Dutch donors. These organising practices are presented in chapter six through the exploration of:

a. The Perceptions of the people in Bukoba about the Dutch people. The perceptions lead to the understanding of how the Dutch donors became perceived as powerful people by the people of Bukoba through what they did in the area.
b. Perception of participation by the Dutch RNE-DRDP insiders. This perception assists in providing insights about the non-participatory character of the Dutch development agents. This is important so as to establish that it is not only the "outsiders" who perceive the Dutch agents as non-participatory, but the Dutch agents themselves as well.
c. Livelihoods of the district officials. The understanding of the livelihoods of the district officials laid a foundation to see the reason as to why they engaged in organising practices.
d. The organising practices of the district officials in the context of the RNE-BDRDP. This is a part that describes the nature of the organising practices of the district officials who directly deal with the Dutch donors. Their engagement in organising practices is a response to their experience with the Dutch and motivated by their quest to promote their livelihoods.

3. What are the organising practices of the village people and its elite within the context of the RNE-BDRDP?

The organising practices of the village people and its elite are studied within the context of the local politics in the negotiations of resources between the village elite and the village people. It is important to bear in mind that the village people and the village elite do not come into direct contact with the donors. These actors are at the lower levels in the decentralisation system of Tanzania where, according to how they should participate in development planning, they cannot have direct contact with the donors. I present a discussion about the organising practices of the village people and its elite in chapter seven through the exploration of:

a. The identification of the village elite. This part is about knowing who the elite are and their characterisations are from the perspective of the village people.
b. The livelihoods of the village elite.
c. The livelihoods of the village people.
d. The relationship between the village people and its elite. The organising practices of the village elite and the village people. In the local politics, the village elite and the village people relate through organising practices.

After the presentation of the research questions and their operationalisations, let me now present the data collecting procedures.

Data collection procedures

In this section about data collecting procedures, I present the data collecting techniques and how I deployed them. The techniques include document review, in-depth interviews, participatory observation and a structured questionnaire. I present some of the problems I faced when collecting data.

Document review

A document review was the main data collecting technique in the understanding of the RNE-DRDPs as manifestation of the modernising development discourse. At the district headquarters, there is a documentation centre where district documents are kept. The key documents that I consulted include, among others, the *Identification Study for a Netherlands-Tanzania Rural Development Programme* (URT/RNE 1986), a document prepared by the URT and the Netherlands and the *Policy of the DRDP in Tanzania* (RNE 1998), a document prepared by the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) to guide its interventions in the RNE-DRDPs. Other documents that were used, such as the *Evaluation of the District rural Development Programme and the Formulation of Future Netherlands Support to Decentralisation and Local Development in the 'ex-DRDP' Districts: Evaluation Report, Vol. 1, final Report* (DGIS/URT 2004) and the *Poverty, Policies and Perceptions in Tanzania: An Evaluation of Dutch Aid to Two District Rural Development Programmes* (IOB 2004) are additional documents to complement the two key documents.

The choice of the two documents was purposive. The *Identification Study for a Netherlands-Tanzania Rural Development Programme* (URT/RNE 1986) was important for it contained the key elements that were considered central in considering an intervention in the cooperation. This document shed light on the ground data, how areas of intervention were reached, and perspectives from which interventions were to be done. The *Policy of the DRDP in Tanzania* (RNE 1998) was a framework for operation. It was like the "Disk Operating System" (DOS) to guide practical interventions. Other documents came in as supplements and enhancers of these documents.

In-depth interviews

The in-depth interviews were conducted with the district officials at the district headquarters, the Dutch RNE-DRDP Insiders, some at the district headquarters and some by email, and the key informants in the catchment area of the YFEC. The district officers included the civil servants and the councillors at the district. They gave data about the RNE-DRDPs in general and BDRDP in particular on different aspects of the modernising development discourse and organising practices. The Dutch Insiders included people who had worked with the Netherlands government in Bukoba and some officials who had worked with the RNE-DRDPs. They also gave data about the RNE-DRDPs in general and BDRDP in particular. The key informants in the catchment area of YFEC provided data on the different aspects related to organising practices. I organised a few interviews via email to some Dutch RNE-DRDP Insiders because of lack of possibility to physically meet the respondents due to reasons of distance; some key respondents from the RNE-DRDP offices had already moved away from Tanzania by the time I needed to interview them. There are not less than 30 interviews which were conducted between August 2003 and December 2006 whose views are presented in this study. The names of the categories of respondents are Dutch Insiders, District Officials, Village People, and the Development Organisations Insiders.

Focus group discussions

All the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the catchment area of YFEC in order to understand the organising practices of the village elite and the village people through involvement in the participation processes in development interventions. Between July 2004 and April 2006, 5 FGDs were conducted with the average 6 respondents per FGD.

Participatory observations

This data collecting technique was used in three particular occasions. The first occasion was about observing the physical state of the YFEC and the feelings of the people about it. The physical state of the YFEC meant the appearance of the project; this was crucial for building impressions about the project for gauging how it was functioning. The observation was based on the surrounding of the YFEC, including the demonstration plots, buildings, what physically takes place in the YFEC, animals, and the people found in the place.

The second occasion was about attending a participatory planning meeting at Ward level in order to get insights on how planning processes took place with the

village people. This meeting took place in August 2003. The third occasion was about attending a workshop in March 2006 in which there was a presentation of the findings of the baseline survey to different farmers' organisations. Among the respondents of the baseline survey and the forum to which the findings were presented were the members of a development organisation, *Tujiendeleze* Non-governmental Organisation (TUNGO), an organisation that is central in the analysis of local politics in chapter seven on issues about the organising practices of the village elite.

Structured questionnaire

In order to obtain the feelings of the people about the presence of YFEC, a structured questionnaire was devised and administered to the people around the YFEC. I needed to establish whether people felt that the project was theirs or not, and to see more areas for further enquiries in the study. The questionnaire contained the following questions: Do you know where YFEC is? Do you know what YFEC deals with? How many times have you visited the YFEC? For what reasons did you visit it? How do you assess the work of the YFEC? At random sampling, farmers from 30 households around the YFEC were selected as respondents with an assumption that as farmers they were supposed to be direct and first beneficiaries of the project.

Thus, the major data collection methods were basically the traditional methods of document review, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, observations, and a questionnaire. A combination of multiple techniques and respondents was for purposes of suitability for data collection on the one hand, and on the other hand, for purposes of triangulation, which became crucial in order to avoid the presentation of the viewpoints of the elite only, as issues of participation and local politics are linked with power issues in the communities.

Encountered difficulties

Before I conclude this section on data collection procedures, let me point out some related difficulties I encountered. Generally speaking, the tone of the field research was enshrined in a conversation that I had with one of the key respondents at the beginning of the research:

> You told me that you have to do research with BDRDP. It is a good thing. But how come? People who do researches on these programmes are *wazungu*[2] because it is their money! Or they are the ones who sent you for this task; and if so you should be very rich! But you have a long

[2] This is a common word used to mean "European". It originates from a Swahili word *kuzunguka*, meaning going around. The Swahili people used to see the Europeans moving around and that is why they came to call them people who go around *"wazungukaji"*, in short, *"wazungu"*.

> way to go because it will not be easy here: the Dutch boss is not an easy man; he has no time; our council is not simple with that chairman: it is enough that the he feels that you are not with him, and you are thrown out. Hey, but we have a resource centre with some key reports: the *Mulangira*[3] can assist you! And if you go to the village, there are many people who have been there. They will think you are one of them dealing with the same stories. (Int.DO1.Bkb. Sep2002)

This was the first statement I was told about my research by one of the people who was later to become my key informant. When I presented myself for the first time at the Bukoba District Headquarters as a researcher, I found this person at the reception of the District Advisor (DA). After introducing myself, he took me outside and expressed his small enthusiasm with these words, which were the welcoming words in the field research. I was caught up between going ahead with my study on BDRDP or changing to something different. I decided to go ahead, but devising some ways to get data. My first strategy was to use this person as a "connector" to the people I would like to talk to in the District. I had discovered that he was very knowledgeable of the District and the BDRDP. Slowly by slowly, I discovered that my concentration was more on the aid recipients rather than the donors because at that time the donor's side was difficult to access and I would understand some bits and pieces about the donors through the aid recipients.

In most cases, appointments with leaders and officials were difficult to make. One of the reasons for the difficulty was the perception that the leaders and officials had about researchers as spies, who must, therefore, be avoided. I had incidences where-by I made appointments with, for instance, the leaders of TUNGO. The officers said that they were busy and gave me an appointment after work hours, but there was nobody in the offices. I fixed another appointment which never materialised because these officers had another meeting. Discussing this situation with one of the workers in the organisation, he told me:

> They never wanted to meet you. The first time you made an appointment and you missed them they thought you would give up and not come back again because you had tight schedules. It is not true that we had any meeting; they just did not want to meet you. You see we have problems with our organisation: our leadership is weak and we are doing things the way we want. The fear is always that you researchers are going to report us to our donors; we already have enough problems with them. (Int.TI3.Bkb.Jun2006)

There was poor documentation and knowledge of where the documents where kept. I was advised by the District that if I wanted all the documents of the BDRDP (after failing to get them at the district), the best place would be at the RNE, where a

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[3] *Mulangira* means one from the royal clan. When someone is said to be so, it connotes behaviour as well: these are people who are not easy; they take their time; they are slow; they have to be respected; etc.

copy of all documents is supposed to be kept. When I went there, I was advised to go back to the district because that all the documents were found there.

Another difficulty has been the establishment of a workable rapport with the Dutch officials dealing with the RNE-DRDPs, especially at the RNE. I got some responses that blocked me from having data. For instance, I had answers such as the following: “I do not have much time for you; the best place to go is at the district”; “I am no more working in Dar es Salaam, I cannot help”; “I know much about your questions, but I am bound by rules of confidentiality”; and so on. Again, with the Dutch official at the district, I hardly got time because he was busy and he would always direct me to the district officials. This official told me when I presented myself to him as a researcher and one of my case areas being BDRDP:

> You are welcome in the district. … we are too busy; you have to know this from the beginning of your research. I have little time for you. But there are many officials here who have worked with BDRDP; they should be able to help you. There is a Resource Centre. … What I know is that we are concluding the programme in a year’s time. I do not have much to say because the programme is already in the hands of the people. We are busy. … The less you can deal with me, the better. … Just in case there is any document you do not find in the Resource Centre, you can always get one at the Embassy in Dar. (Int.DI1.Bkb.Sept2003)

This was the general attitude of some DRDP officials: they always avoided me because they were busy; they always referred me to something or someone else, and; they always referred me to more “right people”, instead of they themselves being available. As I researcher, I felt I was a problem to such people. With this attitude, my data collection shifted more and more into finding out issues from the recipient’s side, other than the Dutch donor’s side.

Data analysis procedures

In this study, theory has integrated with the case areas in the data analysis procedures. In the interplay between theory and case studies, there are two schools of thought. The first school argues that the good use of theory assists in designing the case study more effectively, as well as being useful for generalising the end results. The theory, thus, assists in selecting the cases for study, specifying what is to be explored, defining a complete and appropriate description, stipulating rival theories, and generalising the results to other cases (Yin 1993: 4). The second school draws from previous researches on the Grounded Theory (Glaser & Straus 1967; Miles & Huberman 1984). They argue for the induction of theory from case study research, saying that theory that is developed from case study research is often novel, and is testable and empirically valid (Eisenhardt 1989).

This study has combined the methodologies of both schools of thought whereby theory has informed the choice of the case areas and at the same time the case areas have informed the choice of theory. The choice of DRDP, BDRDP, and the YFEC catchment area has been informed by the theorisations on development, rural development, and the livelihoods framework. However, while dealing with such theorisations, for instance, issues of participation and local politics emerged leading to the consideration of TUNGO as a development organisation that could assist in understanding matters of local politics. This is the implication of the inseparability between a phenomenon under study and the case. Having explained the relationship between the theory and case areas, let me turn to three processes that I found important in this study: discourse analysis, content analysis, and co-data analysis.

According to Mills (1997), there are three forms of discourse analysis: the first is concerned with analyzing language use in context; the second, social psychology, is concerned with the analysis of talk and particularly the structure of argument, and; the third, critical linguistics, is concerned with analysis of different dialogical phenomena for action purposes because language is the central vehicle in the process whereby people are constituted as individuals and as social subjects, and because language and ideology are closely imbricated. The study uses the first form of analyzing language use in context in order to understand the modernizing development discourse with respect to the RNE-DRDPs. In trying to understand how the RNE-DRDPs have been a manifestation of the modernising development discourse, the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation are dealt with through identifying different statements from the key documents that have references to these concepts and developing discussions. The presentation of the empirical data that has to do with discourse analysis is done in chapter five that deals with RNE-DRDPs as manifestation of the modernising development discourse in this study.

According to Berg (1995: 174-175), content analysis is about examining artefacts of social communication, which include written documents or transcriptions of recorded verbal communication such as interviews and field notes. It is “any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying special characterristics of messages” (Holsti 1968: 608). Thus, content analysis is not amenable to analysis until the information conveyed has been condensed. Content analysis has been central in analysing data from interviews, observations, and the questionnaire. The different interviews and observations were transformed into free-flowing summaries. The structured questionnaire was analysed by getting the frequencies of each question and a general summary was made. These accounts from interviews,

observations, and a questionnaire were subjected to more interpretation through triangulation in in-depth interviews or discussions with individuals and focus group discussions. The triangulation aimed at either verifying what was found out or going deeper into what was said, or both verifying and going deeper. The presentation of findings in chapter six and seven in this study are fruit of content analysis.

A step further was made in the data analysis by taking into consideration the issue of inter-subjectivity and temporal limitation. As the dialogue that was carried on with the different respondents was an account for the whole of their life experiences until at the moment of the dialogue (Chanfrault-Duchet 1991), I, the data collector and interpreter, first, at the moment of the dialogical process, and second, at the moment of analytical processes of data generated, was involving my life experiences also. This implies that I was part of the dialogical exchange (Borland 1991) from the beginning to the end as the respondents were. As my listening during the interactive process of dialoguing was a listening for meaning, so was the listening of the informants and respondents. Let me cite an example of this issue of inter-subjectivity and temporal limitation.

> I asked the Village Executive Officer (VEO) to get me six to ten people who were to be my respondents in a focus group discussion in order to understand how people plan together for a common project for the community. The VEO brought me six people, all of whom were women and all had Muslim names. The discussion that I expected to take at least an hour and a half finished within twenty minutes. Unanimously, the group had very fast established a project that would be for the community: a dispensary.
>
> I wondered why all respondents were women, on one hand, and on the other hand, I wondered why all were Muslims. I came to realise that even the VEO was Muslim. Then I thought that he had invited his fellow Muslims. But why his fellow Muslims and why only women? I later came to find out the story that in the Ward there is a dispensary that belongs to the Lutheran Church; it gives services with preferences to fellow Protestants. There are other three hospitals nearby this village, one belonging to the Lutherans, and two belonging to the Catholics, with the same problem of preferential treatment to fellow Christians. So, what these people wanted was that they get their own health facility that would cater for Muslims.[4]

Here is a situation of participation in a focus group discussion. From the person who is allocated work to select the respondents to the outcome of the discussion, the whole process is being manoeuvred towards addressing the perceived need of the Muslim community. Some of these needs are particular and context specific that one needs to get into the social fabric of the place to be able to unearth them. It is the case of this community whereby to understand that the Muslims were in need of a health unit, one needed to have prior information of the relationship between other religions with respect to accessing resources in and around the community. Thus,

[4] This is an account taken from research notes in one of the villages in the catchment area of the YFEC, April 2004.

from the beginning of planning for a focus group discussion, during, and after it, the different people involved in the process were involved in actions of inter-subjectivity and temporal limitations. All the interactions, beginning from the VEO, whom I had asked to get the respondents, through the respondents in the whole discussion, were determined by the temporal issues of need to get into issues of organizing practices by me, and my respondents' need to address their identified need as a marginalized Muslim community in the area of health. My triangulation and continuous questioning of why particularly Muslims were the selected respondents and the connection between them and the dispensary meant my continuous thrust into interpretation and involvement of my and their life experience in issues of religious relationships in the area, and particularly my interest in their organizing practices, whereby the people are involved in struggling to make sure that they utilise every opportunity that comes their way in order to address their needs.

The inter-subjectivity and temporal phenomena led this research to a co-data analytical process, which was realised through consistent feedback to the respondents about the notes and summaries made from the data. I discussed with officials of Bukoba District and the Dutch Insiders most of the conclusions I was arriving at from the data. The continuous sharing of my interpretations about the data assisted in keeping in touch with the respondents, not losing sight of the stated objectives of the encounters for dialogue**,** and always being updated. After developing stories about the case studies, a few of the people who participated in their creation when they were respondents discussed the summaries of the stories. They were to think about the stories to see if they reflected what they knew of their community. A lot of details and particulars were omitted to cater for privacy, but at the same time making sure that the core of the story remained substantially intact.

Before I get to the conclusion of this chapter on research methodology, let me present two issues that are important in the understanding of presentation of the respondents and the local institutions involved in the data collection of this study. All the respondents are coded in terms of the instrument for data collection, the category of respondent, the place of response, and the month and year of response. Thus, for example, a respondent code like "Int.DI1.Bkb.Sept2003" can be interpreted as "an interview (int) to a Dutch Insider number one (DI1) in Bukoba (Bkb) in September 2003 (Sept2003). With regard to the local institutions involved in the processes of data collection, I have faked their names. This has been a deliberate choice in order to enhance the confidentiality with respect to these institutions.

Conclusion

This chapter about the research methodology has presented four issues: the research problem (the lack of knowledge on the processes that the aid beneficiaries get involved in so as to make aid relevant); study questions and their operationalisation; the data collection procedures, and; the data analysis procedures. The data collecting techniques and the data analysis procedures were geared towards the understanding of how the modernising development discourse and the organising practices have influenced the relevance of aid. As this study is about the bilateral development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands government, there is need to understand the general context in which the study has taken place and the background information behind this cooperation. This is the subject of the next chapter.

4

Tanzania, Kagera, and Bukoba

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the research methodology pertaining to this study. I presented the research problem, the questions and their operationalisations, and the data collecting and analysis procedures. This chapter presents the have the background information of the area in which data collection was done from a broader perspective of Tanzania as a country to a more specific scope in terms of Kagera Region, and Bukoba District, and the catchment area of YFEC. The landscape is observed in terms of the geographical, socio-political, and economic landscapes. I also present the historical development of the bilateral development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands. The background information is important because it influences the planning and implementation of the development projects by the donors. It is this information that is scrutinised using the modernising development discourse. Again, the livelihoods and the organising practices of the aid recipients are largely influenced by the context in which they live. Thus, the presentation of the background information is important in order to understand the general context in which the Dutch donors encounter the Tanzanian aid recipients.

Tanzania

Geographical landscape

Tanzania is the largest country in East Africa with a land area of 945,000 square kilometres, of which 62,000 square kilometres is occupied by water and 3,350 by forests and woodland. It has 26 administrative regions (21 Mainland and 5 Zanzibar) and 130 administrative districts (Zanzibar has 10 and Mainland has 120 administrative districts). It borders with Kenya and Uganda in the North, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique in the south, and in the east it borders the Indian Ocean. It has a landscape of mainly three physiographic regions namely the Islands and the coastal plains to the east; the inland saucer-shaped plateau; and the highlands. The Great Rift Valley that extends from north east of Africa through central Tanzania runs to south of Tanzania, splitting at Lake Nyasa. A branch goes down beyond Lake Nyasa to Mozambique and another to north-west alongside Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and the western part of Uganda. The valley has several lakes, including Rukwa, Tanganyika, Nyasa, Kitangiri, Eyasi and Manyara. The uplands of Tanzania include the Kipengere, Udzungwa, Matogoro, Livingstone, and the Fipa plateau forming the southern

Map 4.1 Tanzania: major cities and towns

Source: Maps of the World 2005

highlands. The Usambara, Pare, Meru, Kilimanjaro, the Ngorongoro Crater and the Oldonyo Lengai form the northern highlands.

Tanzania has 12 National Parks, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, 13 Game Reserves, 38 Game Controlled Areas, and about 120 National Cultural Heritage Sites. It has three large lakes of Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa, in which it can engage in fisheries activities together with the Indian Ocean coastline, rivers and wetlands. It has a non-reserved forest-land of 1,900 square kilometres, forest/woodlands with national parks etc. of 200 square kilometres, and gazetted forest reserves of 1,250 square kilometres.

It has a tropical type of climate. In the highlands, temperatures range between 10°C and 20°C during cold and hot seasons respectively. The rest of the country has temperatures never falling lower than 20°C. The hottest period spreads between November and February (25-31°C) while the coldest period occurs between May and August (15-20°C). There are two rainfall seasons in Tanzania. One is unimodal (December-April) which is experienced in southern, south-west, central and western parts of the country. The other rainfall regime is the bimodal (October-December and March-May) which is found to the north and northern coast. In the bimodal regime, the March-May rains are referred to as the long rains or *Masika*, whereas the October-December rains are generally known as short rains or *Vuli*.

Socio-economic landscape

In this subsection of the chapter, I present the socio-economic background of Tanzania from both the positive and negative descriptions about Tanzania. There follows the description of how Tanzania has been struggling to deal with its poverty problem. The section concludes with a brief presentation of the aid situation in Tanzania. Let me begin with the positive description of the socio-economic background of Tanzania.

Positive description

Reading the various documents written by the Government of Tanzania, it is recognisable that the statistics talking about the Tanzanian economy are positive, with a great amount of optimism for the future. The optimism is already traced from the development vision of Tanzania by 2025 (URT 1999: 2).

> What is envisioned is that … Tanzanians will be living by then will be substantially a developed one with a high quality livelihood. Abject poverty will be a thing of the past. … Tanzanians will have graduated from a least developed country to a middle income country by the year 2025 with a high level of human development. The economy will have been transformed from a low productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industrialised one led by modernised and highly

> agricultural productivities which are effectively integrated and buttressed by supported industrial and service activities in the rural and urban areas. A solid foundation for a competitive and dynamic economy with high productivity will have been laid.

This kind of optimism is traced in other policy documents. When reviewing the macro-economic performance and outlook of Tanzania, there is praise of the sound macroeconomic and structural policies that have yielded substantial economic growth and low inflation, laying the requisite conducive ground in the reduction of income poverty, with an economic growth rising consistently over the past five years (except for the drought-hit 2003), averaging about 5.5 per annum, and inflation contained at below 5% (URT 2005: 3-4). Similarly, URT (2004: 3-4) looks at the macro-economy of Tanzania positively:

> The national economy has generally continued to improve in recent years, with substantial achievements having been made in sustaining macroeconomic stability, following successful implementation of rigorous economic reforms. Notwithstanding recent adverse weather conditions that has affected agricultural output, overall real growth remains strong and inflation has been contained at below 5.0 percent, while gross official reserves continue to be above 8 months of imports of goods and services during the past two years. While performance of the economy during 2003 was largely expected to be adversely affected by drought and the Middle-East tensions, the outturn has not been to the extent earlier anticipated, with overall real GDP growth slowing down by 0.6 percentage points to 5.6 percent, compared to 6.2 percent registered in 2002. Merchandize exports for the year increased by 26.6 percent to US Dollars 1142.4 million, compared with USD 902.5 million during 2002. In view of the foregoing, the country appears to have weathered through the difficult period with notable success. In view of the improved macroeconomic fundamentals, coupled with the Government's strong resolve to stay the course of economic reforms, real GDP is expected to increase in the medium term, reaching 7.4 percent by 2007, consistent with the aspirations of Vision 2025. Domestic resource mobilization will be enhanced, while the Government's expenditure policies will focus on achieving poverty reduction objectives, as articulated in the PRS. Invariably, the Government will take policy measures that sustain and consolidate recent achievements as well as gear up for higher performance in all sectors of the economy.

These optimisms are backed by statistical analyses on the Tanzanian economy over a period of time. Table 4.1 shows the real GDP growth rates within a period of ten years.

Table 4.1 Real GDP growth rates 1998-2008

Year:	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*
GDP%	4	4.7	4.9	5.7	6.2	5.6	6.3	6.6	7	7.2	7.5

Source: Adapted from URT 2005: 5

The table shows the GDP growth rates between 1998 and 2008. The figures from 2005 to 2008 were projected figures. However, it is clear how the GDP growth rates are increasing. There is an exception in 2003 where it dropped and this is explained by the severe drought (URT 2005: 3) and the Middle East tensions (URT 2004: 1). Such analyses indicate one thing: that the growth rates are determinately and assertively positive.

Much as these figures should be respected for the authority they have on the issues they present, some authorities point out that it is a question of opportunism and the flexibility of a poor government. For instance, Voipio & Hoebink (1999: 26) point out that:

> In reality, a government of a poor country like Tanzania has to be opportunistic and flexible in adapting its 'strategies' to the rhetorical tones favoured by its various donors. This is why one can hear the Tanzanian authorities sing different tunes, depending on the piper.

This implies that it is important to understand the political weight of the different documents and strategies. It is important, once again, to note the insights of Voipio & Hoebink (1999: 27) when they argue that besides the academic economists who have learnt how to write the donors' texts, it is more probable that many Tanzanians regard market liberalization and monetization of rural life as the fundamental pillars for alleviating poverty in Tanzania.

Negative description

Tanzania's image in the world is of a persistently poor country. The ranking of Tanzania among the poor countries, however, depends on the choice of indicators. If one used the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, Tanzania would rank among the bottom 5; if one used the Human Development Index (HDI), 26 countries would lag behind Tanzania; using the Capability Poverty Measure (CPM), Tanzania leaves 43 countries behind (Voipio & Hoebink 1999: 14-15). The Human Development Report (HDR) of 2001 raises Tanzania's rank by moving up to the 140th position from the 156th of 2000 (XNA 2001). However, Voipio & Hoebink (1999: 14) capture well the situation of Tanzania when they argue that "whatever indicator is used, Tanzania is one of the poorest countries of the world".

In continuing to describe poverty in Tanzania, the different arguments offered by the different players in poverty alleviation initiatives in Tanzania can be distinguished into six groups. The first group is the government narrative that takes economic growth as the key for poverty alleviation. The government sees poverty as characterised by deprivations, lack of capabilities, poor social indicators, and gender inequalities. The second group uses the argument that Tanzania should be in the

driver's seat, a narrative by the Nordic countries. These countries argue that poverty in Tanzania is due to the Tanzanian mentality of aid dependency. They propose the government reform whereby the state should see itself as responsible for alleviating poverty, rather than waiting for someone from outside to do it. The third group is derived from the neo-liberal narrative from the World Bank and IMF. According to this typology, poverty is due to and is characterised by low income and poor social indicators. The solution to poverty is the liberalisation of the economy and reformation of the social sectors. The fourth group is one that argues that poverty is associated with participation. The multi-dimensionality of poverty is taken for granted and the donors impose their own understanding of it at the expense of Tanzanians' understanding. The solution to poverty from this argument is that the building of capacity and a bottom-up system of accountability is necessary because participation of the affected by poverty is ensured. The fifth group is based on the social capital argument that characterises poverty as location specific. The implication of this argument is that the solution to poverty is the investment in the local social capital. The last group uses the trade and debt relief argument, which is characterised by the debt trap, limited and undiversified supply base, and a weak capacity to adjust to multi-lateral trade system. The solution proposed within this argument is the reduction of the debt burden and assisting Tanzania to take advantage from global markets to allow reduction of poverty.

The struggling Tanzania

Tanzania has always been in a struggle against poverty in its development agenda right back to the time of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 when poverty was among the three main enemies for Tanzanian development: ignorance, disease, and poverty. There have been successive five-year development plans from the 1960s to the 1980s, with institutions designed to manage these enemies (mono-partism, centralized planning, and *Ujamaa* villages). Contrary to many arguments against *Ujamaa*, until mid 1970s, there was noticeable progress (GDP at average rate 4.7%; population growth of 3.3%; 90% entering standard I; literacy rate 90%; and so on (URT 1998: 7-8; Semboja 1998: 6-7).

In the mid-1980s, Tanzania was pressurized by the IMF to undergo a major macro structural adjustment programme, "aimed at tightening the fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies in order to restore the growth and dynamism of the national economy" (Voipio & Hoebink 1999: 21). Much as there have been reports accounting for the positive performance of the structural adjustment programmes that began in the mid-eighties, there have been melancholic signs in the mid 1990s.

According to the Country Department for Tanzania, (CDT 2000: i), "Tanzania's reform programme fell off track, resulting in high budget deficits, increased inflation and low economic growth. In parallel, corruption increased significantly".

While the Tanzanian economy responded to the reform programme, and the era of stagnation and decline that typified the mid 1970s and early 1980s, a process of true structural change in the economy has yet to begin. Agricultural and livestock activities continue to dominate economic life, together accounting for more than 80% of employment. Moreover, at a national level macro-economic stability has proved elusive, with overall economic growth averaging no more than 3-4% p.a. With the population continuing to grow at upwards of 3% p.a., per capita incomes have barely risen and Tanzania does remain one of the poorest countries in the world. There is little evidence of dynamism in the industrial or services sectors; lack of economic buoyancy is reflected in low levels of public resource mobilisation.

Decentralisation aims to mobilise additional local resources but, given the low level of economic activity, these are unlikely to prove significant and the public investment programme seems likely to remain very limited. The situation is exacerbated by the aid-dependency syndrome that is reflected in the foreign assistance's role compared to other resource flows. The value of ODA as **a** percentage of GNP has more than doubled between 1975 and 1994. For two decades, foreign assistance has been contributing between 50% to 75% of Tanzania's development budget (Voipio & Hoebink 1999: 22).

The current struggle for structural change in the economy in order to alleviate poverty is expressed through the *Tanzania Development Vision 2025* (URT 1999) and the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (PRSP) (URT 2000). The *Tanzania Development Vision 2025* (URT 1999) provides a guiding framework for all other policies for over the next 25 years. The vision is for Tanzania to move from a less-developed country to a middle-income country by 2025, with a high level of human development. The economy is to be transformed from a low productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industrialised one. This means a high quality livelihood characterised by sustainable and shared growth (equality), and freedom from poverty. Specifically, this means food self-sufficiency and security, universal primary education and extension of tertiary education, gender equality, universal access to primary health care, 75% reduction in infant and maternal mortality rates, universal access to safe water, increased life expectancy, good governance and the rule of law, moral and cultural uprightness, adherence to the rule of law, elimination of corruption, a well educated and learning society, a strong and competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth and shared benefits, a diversified and semi-indus-

trialised economy, macro-economic stability, a growth rate of 8% *per annum*, adequate level of physical infrastructure, and an active and competitive player in regional and global markets!

Tanzania's PRSP was launched in October 2000 following broad consultation with national and international stakeholders. The paper sets out Tanzania's medium-term strategy for poverty reduction and the indicators it will use for measuring progress. It is further supported by the National Poverty Eradication Strategy which sets out Tanzania's strategy and objectives for poverty eradication through to 2010. The key priority areas for achieving poverty reduction include reducing income poverty through equitable economic growth, improving human capabilities, survival and social well being, and containing extreme vulnerability among the poor. In addressing these areas, it outlines various approaches from central level financial budgetary reform to mobilising local communities to take action themselves. The approaches include reducing income poverty through support to rural sector development with improving market efficiency, particularly in agriculture, encouraging private investment in cultivation of traditional and new crops, and small and medium sized enterprises, and promoting the expansion of crops grown for export and diversification of these crops.

Aid situation

The poverty situation of Tanzania and the commitment to alleviate it has led Tanzania to be a darling of many countries with aid. It has reputation for receiving aid for many years because of its known image of poverty and pro-poor politics and action (Voipio & Hoebink 1999: 36). A paradox of more-aid-more-problems and a wishful thinking of more-aid-for-more-prosperity that forms a core for demand for more aid, govern the dynamics of aid in Tanzania. For instance, from 1960 to 2000, the reception of net ODA has increased from 10.4 million to 1022 million USD. Look at Table 4.2 to see the increases in the net ODA.

Table 4.2 Increases in Tanzanian net ODA (million USD)

1960	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*1992*	*1994*	*1998*	*2000*
10.4	51.3	678.6	1173.3	1338.8	965.7	1000.2	1022

Source: OECD 2003

Even the current statistics demonstrate the same trend. For instance, from 2001 to 2003, the reception of net ODA has increased from 1271 to 1669 million USD (from 13.7% to 17% of the Gross National Income (GNI). Look at Table 4.3 about the increases in the net ODA and the GNI.

Table 4.3 Increase in net ODA and GNI (%)

	2001	*2002*	*2003*
Net ODA (million US$)	1271	1233	1669
GNI (%)	13.7	13.2	17.0

Source: Adapted from OECD and World Bank 2004

Socio-political landscape

In this sub-section of the chapter, I explain the socio-political situation of Tanzania in terms of participation politically and administratively. Politically, participation has been construed in terms of a shift from single party politics to multi-party politics as an expression of democracy; administratively, it has been construed as shift from centralised government system to decentralisation.

Political process

Tanzania is a multi-politics state. From independence in 1961, Tanzania pursued a bi-political system – the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba and Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in the Mainland – until 1977 when there was a merger of the two parties to form *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) – Revolutionary Party. From then, Tanzania was a mono-party state till the first half of the 1990s. The socialist model of economic development began to take shape in 1962 with the issuing of a pamphlet entitled *Ujamaa*. The political processes that embraced the policy of African Socialism culminated in the 1967 Arusha Declaration where the principles of *Ujamaa*, collective production, equal opportunity and, self-reliance, were set out. *Ujamaa* was to be carried out in villages that regrouped farmers in specific areas for specified types of production. By the mid 1970s, more than 8,000 villages were created.

Much as *Ujamaa*, as a strategy to bring change in Tanzania, has been criticised by many political analysts and its period portrayed as symbolic of retrogression in post-independence Tanzania, Voipio & Hoebink (1999: 27) still point out that many Tanzanians seem to find rationale and validity of ideals for their development in the basic tenets of the Arusha Declaration. In this regard Voipio & Hoebink (1999: 27-

28) quote Benjamin Mkapa, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania (1995-2005):

> The kind of socialist values that are so clearly part of this manifesto (Arusha Declaration): African life history and African life tradition, the caring for each other, the caring for the aged, the caring for the children, the brotherhood, unity and so on. These are the values that really must remain with us because they are deeply rooted in our history … Now the pressure is to say that government has no role … To swing from one extreme of the pendulum to the other. That's nonsense. I don't accept that. There must be a role, but re-defined or moderated… But for me, the area we should have worked on more was this business of self-development, self-reliance… This was the message of the Arusha Declaration. Work and work. We have the land, we have the people, we have to work on it.

Beginning from the second half of the 1970s, Tanzania faced a socio-economic crisis that went on for a decade or so. Boesen *et al.* (1986: 20) point out the manifestations of the crisis as "an acute foreign-exchange, financial, and production crisis, with social, political and moral overtones". The crisis was a function of many complex factors beginning from the development policies pursued by the Tanzanian government since independence to international happenings such as the war with Uganda, the break up of the East African Community, the second oil price shock, and widespread drought (Boesen *et al.* 1986: 220-21).

In 1992, the government decided to adopt multi-party democracy, with legal and constitutional changes leading to the registration of eleven political parties. After a period of more than thirty years of one-party rule, there were multi-party politics in 1995 whereby the ruling party won beyond two thirds.

Decentralisation system

When discussing the participatory development processes in Tanzania, the decentralisation system is crucial in matters of administrative processes in order to handle development. Decentralisation is enshrined in the legal system of Tanzania. It is a result of local governance considerations, provided by the *Constitution of the Republic of Tanzania* (URT 1984: section 145 & 146):

> There shall be established local governments authorities in each region, district, urban area, and village in the United Republic, which shall be of the type and designation prescribed by law to be enacted by parliament or by the House of Representatives.
>
> Parliament or by the House of Representatives, as the case may be shall enact a law providing for the establishment of the local government authorities, their structure and composition, sources of revenue and procedure for the conduct of their business.
>
> The purpose of having local government authorities is to transfer authority to the people. Local government authorities shall have the right and power to participate and involve the people in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective areas and generally throughout the country.

> Without prejudice to the generality of sub-article (1), of this article, a local government authority, in conformity with the provisions of the law establishing it, shall have the following functions: a) to perform the functions of local government within its area; b) to ensure the enforcement of law and public safety of the people, and; c) to consolidate democracy within its area and to apply it to accelerate the development of the people.

As the constitution provided, two Acts were enacted: the Local Government (District Authorities) Act and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act; they came into effect on the 1st of January 1984 and were accommodated in the amended constitution by the Act number 15 of 1984, establishing two categories of local authorities, the district councils and the urban local authorities (town/municipality/-city councils). The legal structure entitles people to participate competently in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective areas of authority.

According to the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (URT 1984), the basis of the Local Government structure in a rural local authority is the elected District Council. It has to perform the following functions: maintaining and facilitating the maintenance of peace, order, and good government in their area of jurisdiction; promoting the social welfare and the economic well-being of all persons within its area of jurisdiction, and; subject to the national policy and plans for rural and urban development, furthering the social and economic development in the area of jurisdiction.

In Tanzania, there are two models of decentralization that seem to be competing (den Dool 2003: 120-123). On the one hand, the devolution model devolves authority to the districts. In this model, the highest authority in the district is the elected District Council with six committees, namely, Finance and Planning, Establishment and Administration, Social Services, Education and Culture, Economic Services**,** and Human Resources Deployment. On the other hand, the de-concentration model brings to the districts organizations and resources, and formal authority remains at the centre. In this model, the authority is vested in the regional offices. Under a region, there are several districts. There is a Regional Commissioner who is representative of the central government, gives orders to the District Council and approves major financial transactions and by-laws. Therefore, there are two parallel alignments of authority: one is the bottom-up authority of the District Council and the other is the top-down authority from central government institutions (den Dool 2003: 120-123). The development planning processes have to follow the local government organizational structure, starting from the bottom because the ideal is the bottom-up approach. This is in line with the *Constitution of the Republic of Tanzania* (URT 1984) that states that

> local government authorities shall have the right and power to participate and involve the people in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective areas and generally throughout the country.

It is important to note that the RNE-DRDPs were implemented under the decentralisation system. This implies that the decisions of how to spend the resources that were disbursed for the RNE-DRDP projects were, principally, to depend on the development plans that developed from the sub-village level to the district level, which is the final authority. It is for this matter that the Dutch donors are in direct contact with the people who are found at the district headquarters, the district officials, as I shall demonstrate in chapter six of this study. It is due to the practices of the decentralisation system that other participants in the development planning process cannot come into direct contact with the donors. These are the village people and the village elite who are engaged in development planning at the lower levels in the development planning hierarchy established by the decentralisation system. These village elite and people are a point of discussion in chapter seven of this study and they have their own types of organising practices based on the local politics.

In this section, I have presented Tanzania's geographical, socio-economic, and socio-political landscape. It is important to understand this landscape because it is this background that the *Identification Study for a Netherlands–Tanzania Rural Development Programme* (URT/RNE 1986) worked upon when carrying on a study for possibilities of intervention in Tanzania. It has been important to point out how the RNE-DRDPs are embedded in the decentralisation system because this impacts on the organising practices of the aid recipients: there are organising practices which are directly linked with the district officials who are directly in contact with the Dutch donors and the organising practices of the village people and the village people who are not directly in contact with the Dutch donors.

Kagera region

This is the region in which the study was conducted. As was mentioned, Tanzania operates within a decentralisation structure that has two models of decentralisation competing with one another: the devolution and de-concentration models. Regions in Tanzania are elements of the de-concentration model whereby officials are representatives of the central government. Formal authority, therefore, remains at the centre. In this model, the approach to administration is top-down. In practical terms, it can be argued that the Tanzanian central government has Regions as its

Map 4.2 Kagera region

Source: Darhotwire 2005

satellitic institutions which check and control the Districts. For instance, the Regional Commissioner, who is the top official in the Region, can give orders to the District Council and has to approve major financial transactions and by-laws.

Geographical landscape

Kagera Region has a land area of 28,388 square kilometres. It lies between 30.75 and 32° longitude east and between 1 and 2.5° latitude south. The natural boundaries

are Lake Victoria on the east, and Kagera River, which on the west separates the region from Rwanda and Burundi. In the north is the straight line at 1° south of the Equator that separates the region from Uganda. This line was fixed in the Anglo-German agreement of 1st July 1890.

Kagera is a hilly region with high plateaus and valleys and steep cliffs in the lands bordering Lake Victoria. There are valleys that lead into rivers such as the Ngono, Mwisa, and Ruvuvu, all tributaries of Kagera River. It has fertile high plateaus such as Kihanja, Ihangiro, Karagwe, and Bugufi that are densely populated, and the less fertile ones such as the Rusubi plateau, which is less populated. Besides Lake Victoria, of which Kagera enjoys more than 200 kilometres of coastline, there are other inland lakes: Ikimba, Burigi and Rwanjana. Besides the Kagera River and its two big tributaries, Ngono and Mwisa, there are Kasongeye and Rwiza Rivers. These two rivers pour into Lake Burigi. Many other small rivers pour directly into Lake Victoria. They have marshes and swamps that cause them to flood in the rain season. There are hot springs in Karagwe, locally known as *Omutagata.*

The temperatures in the low lands of Kagera, that is, areas near Lake Victoria, range from a maximum of 26°C in February and the minimum of 14°C in December. In the highlands, the temperatures range from a maximum of 25°C and a minimum of 10°C. There are four seasons in Kagera, two wet and two relatively dry seasons. The major dry season is experienced from June to August. From September to November, Kagera experiences minor rains which are used to grow seasonal crops. December to February is season for a minor dry period that peaks with two hot windless weeks in mid-February. This is time for harvesting. March to May is characterized by the rainy season with torrential rains and occasional floods. The annual rainfall ranges from 200mm a year, on the shores of Lake Victoria, to 800mm on the low plateau of Rusubi. Kagera is rich in flora and fauna. Given the above physical resources, it is not strange that Kagera is rich savannah with a large variety of animal and plant life. The Kihanja-Ihangiro plateaus are richer in vegetation. In the Kagera bordering with Uganda, in Minziro, there is a large dense equatorial forest of hard wood. In the open plains there are many species of tropical wild animals and birds. The rivers and lakes are rich with aquatic creatures.

Socio-economic landscape

Kagera Region has a population of 2 million with an annual population growth rate of 3.1 (URT 2002). The population in the region depends on agriculture, livestock and fishing for subsistence and income, with major food crops including bananas, maize, cassava, and beans, and cash crops being coffee and cotton, together with

vanilla. Other food crops include sorghum, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, and rice. Kessy (2005) describes Kagera Region as a land of paradoxes, where on the one hand, it is a land of plenty with food supplies, and on the other, a region with the lowest per capital GDP by national standards.

On issues about development, the Kagera CWIQ[5] (EDI 2004: 3-5) establishes the poverty situation of the Region in terms of the percentage of the households living under the Basic Needs Poverty Line (BNPL) as 31%. According to EDI (2004: 8), the BNPL

> is defined by what a household, using the food basket of the poorest 50 percent of the population, needs to consume to satisfy its basic food needs to attain 2,200 Kcal/day per adult equivalent. The share of no-food expenditures of the poorest 25 percent of households is added. The BNPL is set at TZS 7,253 per 28 days per adult equivalent unit in 2000/1 prices; households consuming less than this are assumed to be unable to satisfy their basic food and non-food needs.

Socio-political landscape

Kagera Region is one of the remotest regions from the administrative centre of Dar es Salaam, sandwiched by the countries of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi in the north and west, and by the Lake Victoria waters on the east. This is the reason for the influx of refugees who are a result of the Great Lakes Region conflicts in the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. As already mentioned, Tanzania pursues a decentralisation strategy in administration and that is why Kagera region, like any other region in Tanzania, is composed of districts, namely, Bukoba, Karagwe, Muleba, Biharamulo, and Ngara. Each district is divided into Divisions, which are again divided into Wards. Wards are divided into Villages, which are then divided into hamlets. Kagera Region has a total of 25 Divisions, 153 Wards, and 608 Villages.

Bukoba district

Bukoba is one of the five Districts of Kagera Region. This section presents the geographical, socio-economic, and socio-political landscapes of the district together with the description of the catchment area of YFEC.

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[5] CWIQ stands for Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire. It is a survey package that has been developed by the World Bank to produce standardised monitoring indicators of welfare. The questionnaire is purposively concise and is designed to collect information on household demographics, employment, education, health and nutrition as well as utilisation and satisfaction with social services.

Geographical landscape

Bukoba District has an area of 5282 square kilometres. It is on the west of Lake Victoria, between 32° and 3° south, bordering Uganda on the northern side, Lake Victoria on the east, Muleba district on the south, and Karagwe district on the west. A considerable part of the district is of high altitude with several streams flowing into Kagera and Ngono rivers, and ultimately into Lake Victoria. For purposes of effective planning for development interventions in the basic livelihood source of the people (agriculture) and natural resource management, Bukoba Rural is divided into four agro-ecological zones: the Bukoban high rainfall zone, the Bukoban medium rainfall zone, the Karagwe-Ankolean low rainfall zone, and the alluvial system zone. These major agro-ecological zones have been formulated following the criteria of rainfall, soils, population density, agriculture, and livestock production systems, and migration.

Map 4.3 Bukoba District



Source: Adapted from Shand (2006)

Different types of grass occupy 64% of dry land, while riverine and groundwater forests occupy 8%. Swampy areas amount to 10%. Lakes and rivers, rock outcrops,

and buildings take 5%. Between October and November, and between March and May, the District experiences rains, with the annual rainfall between 1,400 and 2,000 mm along Lake Victoria, 1,000 and 1,400 mm in the highland belt, and between 600 and 1,000 mm in the western zone. The average temperature is 20ºC with the extremes of 15ºC and 28ºC.

Socio-economic landscape

Bukoba District has a total population of around 400,000 people with around 195,000 males and 205,000 females, and around 90,000 households with an average size of 4.4 people per household (URT 2002). Along the shores of Lake Victoria, there are around 30 fishing/farming communities. About 50% of the population live in the three divisions of Kiziba, Kyamutwara, and Bugabo (around 20% of the total district area). These are parts near Lake Victoria which are getting soil impoverishment in soil fertility due to intensive cultivation and high leaching of nutrients. Poverty in soils largely accounts for the out-migrations from the divisions bordering the lake to the western divisions of Missenye and Rubale, and to other districts, such as Karagwe.

It is difficult to view Bukoba district within Kagera region statistically in terms of poverty indicators. However, the Kagera CWIQ (EDI 2004) provides some insights on this. Generally speaking, Bukoba district is better off than other districts in Kagera region when the variables of ownership of livestock, literacy rate, and dissatisfaction with the health services are taken into consideration. For instance, of the total population of Kagera region, 24% which is the highest percentage, of the population owns livestock (same as Karagwe), followed by Muleba district 21%, Biharamulo 18%, and Ngara 13% (EDI 2004: 98). Again, of the average of 70% for Kagera region in literacy rate, Bukoba district has the highest literacy rate (77%), followed by Karagwe 71%, Muleba 68%, Biharamulo 65%, and Ngara 64% (EDI 2004: 100). Bukoba district demonstrates the lowest but one districts in people who are dissatisfied with the health services. While the average of the region is 22%, the lowest is Biharamulo (20%), followed by Bukoba (21%), Ngara 22%, and Muleba 24% (EDI 2004: 104).

The Haya make up the biggest portion of the peoples of Bukoba District. They claim to be the original people of the area; they are part of the Bantu peoples. They belong to the Lacustrine Bantu group of the so-called Great Lakes Region, that is, the region to the North and west of Lake Victoria, bounded on the North by Lake Kyoga and the Nile, and on the west and south by Lakes Albert, Edward and Tanganyika (Taylor 1969).

The basic economic activities in Bukoba District are performed on the land. There are three types of land in Bukoba District, *kibanja, omusiri, and rweya.* The *kibanja* is the most fertile and is used for banana and coffee plantations. It undergoes regular manuring and mulching. It is the most expensive land. According to Cory & Hartnoll (1971: 137), the *kibanja ky'oruganda* (clan-land) can be acquired by inheritance only and every plantation that is inherited from a relative becomes *kibanja ky'oruganda.* This customary land is handed to one member of the family as owner who, if wanted to dispose of it, there is no possibility of doing it without consent of the members of the paternal family. The person is basically the custodian of the land. When the custodian dies, the plantation is divided among the offspring, the eldest and the youngest getting bigger portions. If the banana plantation is too small for the children some migrate to other villages to open new plantations. Normally, women cannot inherit land. There are large chunks of land that belong directly to the chief or princes, *Nyarubanja.* Tenants, basically, have no right of ownership, but they cultivate the lands and use them as theirs. The tenant periodically takes gifts to the owner of the land. There is, however, private ownership of *kibanja*: someone can acquire one or can transform some bare land into one and it becomes a private property. He/she can dispose of it the way and when he/she wants.

Omusiri is the family plot for plantation of supplementary food crops such as cassava, sweet potatoes, yams, and so on. These are called annual crops. With the annuals, shifting cultivation is practised: after a year, the plot is left to rest and recover before the next planting is done. *Rweya* lands are wastelands, the green hill lands of the region. These lands are used for grazing and grass cutting. They are communally or privately owned.

Annual and perennial crops include coffee, banana, tea, sugar-cane, maize, beans, cassava, yams, and vegetables. Mixed farming is common: banana plots are intercropped with coffee trees and during the rainy season with beans and maize (*kibanja* farming system). Farms are small-scale (average 2.7 acres), except for tea plantations owned by public institutions, the products of which are processed in factories situated in the district. Coffee, mainly the Robusta type, is grown by the majority of the households and is the main cash crop, followed by beans, tea, and bananas in areas of surplus. A number of people are engaged in growing vanilla, a cash crop that has been spearheaded by a farmers' organisation, Development of Farmers. The promotion of vanilla is strategic due to the collapse of a cooperative union that dealt with coffee and the decline of the coffee prices. Vanilla is a substitute crop for coffee, the price of which has drastically gone down. Bukoba district has indigenous

as well as exotic cattle. At the introduction of exotic cattle, mainly for dairy farming, 43% of the people already owned cattle (Ricardo 1986: 6) grazed in the *rweya*. Indigenous cattle are mainly kept for manure and meat. Other animals kept include goats, sheep, pigs, and rabbits together with a variety of birds (chicken, ducks, and pigeons).

The people of Bukoba District have always used forests and bushes for fuel wood. However, the uncontrolled cutting of trees and poor forestry management in forest reserves has resulted in the diminishing of the traditional tree species. The growing demand for fuel wood, timber, and bricks results in the preference for Eucalyptus and pine trees because they are fast growing, easy to maintain, and suitable for the acid soils of the grasslands, even though in some places in the Region, the Eucalyptus trees are being cleared away near the wetlands because they drain them. Villages along the shores of Lake Victoria are involved in fisheries activities for supplement to cash income and daily diet. Additional employment is obtained from the informal sector activities such as carpentry, welding, plumbing, car repairs, and in the transport sector.

Generally speaking, the economic set-up of the people of Bukoba is a consequence of their traditional social structure. These people can be divided into two social groups: the pastoralist semi-nomadic *Nilo hamitic Bahima* and the Bantu speaking agriculturalists. The Bahima people, who made up the minority of the people in Bukoba, were conquerors who specialized in cattle-keeping. The latter group, made up of the indigenous Bantu speaking agriculturalists, formed the majority of the population. To the Bahima pastoralists, cattle was their source of livelihood, while for the Bantu agriculturalists, their livelihood was based on the banana plantation. The combination of the two livelihood systems gave rise to a complex livelihood system whereby, for instance, the Bahima lent their cows to the Bantu farmers in order to keep them and in return the farmers got manure for their plantations and milk for themselves. Eventually, the Bantu farmers were grateful, dependent and loyal to the Bahima people who were rulers. In general terms, however, it can be said that the socio-economic state of the Haya, which is more than income and material things, rotates around the *Kibanja*, that is: the banana plantation.

Socio-political landscape

The administration of Bukoba district, as any other district in Tanzania, is based on the decentralisation system. Bukoba District has 55 Wards and 168 villages. The authority to make decisions in the Ward is vested in the Ward Development Com-

mittee, which is also in charge of Ward development planning, safeguarding the policy and priorities of the country. From the Ward structure there follows the Village in which the authority is vested in the Village Council. From the village level, there follows the hamlet.

In accordance with the political changes that began in 1993 following the formation of Political Parties Act of 1992 that gave provisions for multiparty politics, elections have been held at various levels within the local Government system in Bukoba District. *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (Revolutionary Party) is still the dominating party, co-existing with other smaller parties that are still in search of identity. The lion's share in politics is taken by CCM because it is currently the only party that has been able to penetrate the villages by including women and the youth. Its strength is embedded in the grassroots mobilisation: The *Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania (UWT)* – Union of Tanzanian Women, and the *Umoja wa Vijana Tanzania (UVT)* – Union of Tanzanian Youths are CCM wings whose efficiency as foot soldiers cannot be under-looked. Moreover, CCM uses its historical political experience.

Catchment area of YFEC

This is the area in which field research was done. It is an area which is supposed to be served by a Dutch-funded agricultural project, the Yetu Farmers' Extension Centre (YFEC). The YFEC is among the Dutch projects that the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation visited in 1992 and was told by the village people that the project was needed in the place. The village people asked for its improvement in terms of sleeping facilities for it to be more useful to the village people. The catchment area for the YFEC is about the two villages around the YFEC and the village in which the YFEC is situated. The three villages are situated on the east, west, and south of Lake Ikimba (see Map 4.3).

The area is multi-ethnic with a composition of more than 60% Haya people and others being Burundians, Rwandese, Nyambo, Subi, Shubi, Zinza, and Hangaza. The biggest population in terms of religion is composed of Christians and Moslems, with a tiny portion of people of traditional religions. Sometimes, based on ethnic composition, there are conflicts in the area: the Haya people assume superiority above others due to the belief that the area belongs to them; others are immigrants who are supposed to be their casual labourers. Another struggle is between religions in the area: Christians, especially Catholics and Moslems, are always struggling to control the development initiatives in the area.

The area is typically agricultural. It has land for grazing and cultivation. The major economic activity of the area is farming in bananas, sweet potatoes, and groundnuts as food crops, coffee as a cash crop, and maize and beans, as both food and cash crops. There are many periodic open markets where people sell and buy agricultural produce and other items for home consumption. Due to the presence of a small lake in the area, on the bank of which two villages are situated, there is fishing for local consumption. The *murram* roads in the area facilitate the collection of agricultural produce and the transportation of people to periodic markets and other areas.

There are other income-generating activities such as businesses of food crops and kiosks selling everyday consumables, such as sugar, salt, cigarettes, and vegetables. There are also quarrying, construction, casual labouring, and administrative jobs in the area. Many people have moved into this area from other rural areas of Bukoba and farther; many others have moved out, all of whom in search of land to farm and other job opportunities in Bukoba Town and other urban centres of Tanzania. People of the age between 26 and 50 generally leave this area for other places for casual labouring in Bukoba Town or fishing along the shores and on the islands of Lake Victoria. There are more young people migrating to Bukoba Town for *boda boda* business: transporting people for a fee on bicycles and motorcycles.

The ruling party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM-Revolutionary Party), is still the dominant political machine in the area. Other parties include the Civic United Front (CUF), *Chama cha Demokrasia and Maendeleo* (CHADEMA – Party for Democracy and Development), and Tanzania Labour Party (TLP). With the multi party politics in the area, the village people in the area are busy checking and controlling leaders of the ruling party, on one hand, while on the other hand, the leaders of the ruling party are fastening their control in the area.

The major problems that farmers from this area face include drought, bush fires, pests and weeds, conflicts between farmers dealing with crop husbandry and farmers dealing with animal husbandry. Pastoralists in search for greener pastures in swamps meet with farmers in search for fertile land for arable land. These elements of the geographical, socio-economic, and socio-political landscapes of the Tanzania, Kagera, Bukoba and the catchment area of the Dutch-funded project of YFEC have influenced the organising practices of the village elite and the village people in the local politics of the area, as I shall demonstrate in chapter seven of this study. Let me now turn to the historical development of the development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands government.

Historical development of the cooperation

According to the Operations Review Unit of the Netherlands Development Cooperation (ORUNDC 1994), the development cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Netherlands government can be traced as far back as the second decade of the 20th century when the Dutch Protestants and Catholics replaced the Germans in Tanganyika after "World War I", with a concentration on missionary activity. Commercial activities between the two partners started appearing in the 1950s when merchant houses became involved in marketing of Tanzanian coffee and sisal. By then**,** manufacturing companies, such as Philips, opened their branches in Tanzania. The first bilateral aid contact between the Netherlands and Tanganyika took place in the early 1960s: the Netherlands consul in Tanzania, who was the Director of the Netherlands-British Trading Company in Dar es Salaam, asked the Netherlands government for financial support in developing the Kilombero sugar industry. Concessional loans from the International Finance Company and the Commonwealth Development Corporation were arranged. The Dutch firms, then, established the Kilombero sugar estate by constructing the factory through the Stork/VMF and by appointing the Dutch consultants in managing the estate. In 1965, aid contribution was made for the reconnaissance study of Kilombero valley for assessment of further agricultural developments. Later a Fishery Research Institute in Mwanza and a Fishery Training Institute in Kunduchi in Dar es Salaam were established as part of the bilateral assistance between the Dutch and the Tanganyikans.

Bilateral cooperation expanded in the 1970s with aid characterised by a heavy orientation towards capital investment projects for increase in production and service capacities. Sectors for the bilateral aid included sugar production and processing (Kilombero, Mtibwa, and Kagera), air transport (Hangar at Kilimanjaro), industrial development (Tanga cement, Mbeya farm implements, steel billets plant, Aluminium Africa), fisheries (Mwanza), livestock development, agricultural infrastructure – cold storage chain, and rural water supply – Morogoro and Shinyanga – (ORUNDC 1994).

Towards the end of the 1970s, Tanzania suffered an economic crisis which influenced the macro-economic situation of Tanzania. The thinking of the bilateral aid policy in terms of project mechanism was altered to non-project forms such as balance of payments, budgetary support, and commodity aid to make available assets more productive rather than creating new assets. In the early 1980s, the Netherlands government became critical of Tanzania's development policy and wished to continue its assistance with economic reforms in line with the IMF and

the World Bank. The change of vision led to a shift from programme aid to the sector aid approach because first, it permitted the Netherlands government to enter into policy dialogue in areas it thought intervention were necessary; second, some degree of transparency and accountability was offered; and third, sector aid had more potential for disbursement. In finding new areas of cooperation, the first priority went to the infrastructure sector (ORUNDC 1994).

From 1986 to 1992, the cooperation witnessed the restructuring phase. Since 1986, Netherlands aid has been made available as support to the economic reform process. It has aimed at supporting the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as agreed upon by the IMF and the World Bank. From the beginning of the economic recovery programme, the Netherlands government has stressed attention to poverty alleviation, environmental conservation, and human resource development. There was a reduction of import support; with the adjustment process, Tanzania would earn the foreign exchange it needed and use it for projects geared towards the improvement of the living conditions in the rural areas. It is in this phase that the project aid expanded the formation of the District Rural Development Programmes (DRDPs), geared towards specific target groups in the rural areas. Until 1985, when the development cooperation was reformulated, it was neither regional nor sector-oriented. A new thinking resulted into a multi-sectoral orientation whereby development was looked at from the overall long-term district perspective with an open-ended process approach that entailed different sectors and development initiatives were institutionally embedded in the local government structures, particularly the District Councils (RNE 1992). This new thinking saw agriculture as a fulcrum. Tanzania was to be responsible for low level operational costs; interventions were to be compatible with the rural levels of technology, and they were to concentrate on specific areas for efficiency. The development cooperation from 2005 has turned its efforts towards basket funding, that is: putting the funds in the Ministry of Finance in Tanzania together with other donors.

District Rural Development Programmes (RNE-DRDPs)

The RNE-DRDPs are a result of the reformulation of the Netherlands and Tanzania development cooperation in 1985 with a policy plan for a period of five years, 1986-1989. The identified areas on intervention included import support, continuing support for parastatals, enterprises and government bodies concerned with large scale production, strengthening of large scale service organisations, and small-scale development activities oriented to the small-holder agricultural sector (URT/RNE 1986: 1).

The RNE-DRPDs operated in three phases. The first phase (1987-1991) was about focusing on implementing activities in the productive sector and supporting the planning, implementation, and the monitoring capacities of the district councils. The second phase (1992-1996) presented a more integrated programme. There was a shift to improving the living conditions and increasing household income with an inclusion of social sector activities, especially education and health. In the third phase (1997-2004), there was a gradual shift from rural development to local governance, especially strengthening the capacity of local government authorities to take up their increased responsibilities effectively within a decentralised system of governance with stress on two specific objectives: assisting the district councils in identifying core tasks and improving their overall service delivery, and assisting local authorities in promoting and stimulating sustainable development processes by involving the local population, their representatives, community organisations, NGOs, and the private sector in identification, implementation, and evaluation of development activities (TAT 2004: 3-4).

Table 4.4 shows the years in which the different DRDPs have been started, together with the responsible institution. They began in 1987 and grew from three districts to fourteen districts over ten years. Eleven districts have been supported through the RNE, while three have been supported through SNV-Netherlands Development Cooperation. The overall objective of the DRDPs has been to improve structurally the level of well being of the rural population of the districts. The Netherlands' new thinking, based on the SAPs in the second half of the 1980s, resulted in RNE-DRDPs in 1987, and in 1992 the SNV-DRDPs. These programmes

Table 4.4 RNE and SNV DRDPs

Year	DRDP-RNE	DRDP-SNV
1987	Mbulu (Arusha Region)	
	Maswa (Shinyanga Region)	
	Bukoba (Kagera Region)	
1989	Meatu (Shinyanga Region)	
1992		Kondoa (Dodoma Region)
		Songea (Ruvuma Region)
1993	Kahama (Shinyanga Region)	
	Karagwe (Kagera Region)	
	Biharamulo (Kagera Region)	
1994	Ngara (Kagera Region)	
1996	Muleba (Kagera Region)	
1997	Bukombe (Shinyanga Region)	
1999	Karatu (Arusha Region)	

had two characteristics. The first characteristic is that they were multi-sectoral: they looked at development from the overall long-term district perspective with an open-ended process approach that entailed different sectors and they were institutionally embedded in the local government structures, particularly the District Councils (Inspection Mission 1992). Four districts were identified at the beginning, Bukoba, Karagwe (Kagera Region), Mbulu (Arusha Region), and Maswa (Shinyanga Region) in 1987 for the RNE-DRDP. With time, other districts came on board. By the end of 2004 when RNE-DRDP was phased out, there were already thirteen districts in the programme: eleven funded by the RNE and two by the SNV.

The second characteristic is that the DRDPs followed a process approach, whereby the participatory planning process was central in determining the activities to be funded, as well as to ensure flexibility and the inclusion, over time, of new insights or identified priorities. The key to this process is the fact that the responsibility for defining the programme content rests at the district level and results from a negotiated process involving the district administration, the rural population, and the donor. This approach implied that the programme focus was to shift over time in response to changing needs and priorities, while not losing sight of the overall programme purpose.

RNE-DRDPs evaluation

The RNE-DRDP-RNE phased out in 2004. Evaluations have been done: the overall assessment being failure to meet the main objective of alleviating poverty. However, for the continuation of the assistance, it has been argued that there is a need for serious thinking for intervention through the support in local governance as consequence of the observation and pointers made by the evaluation reports (DGIS/URT 2004; IOB 2004). The donor support is to be oriented towards the common basket funding system through central government. The Evaluation Report of the RNE-DRDP in Tanzania (DGIS/URT 2004) presented these pointers for the formulation of the continued support process of decentralisation and local development based on the main observations emerging from the evaluation. I shall quote at length both the pointers and the observations because of their relevance to this study. The pointers are (DGIS/URT 2004: xiv):

1. Modalities for continuous discretional funding to the implementation of District Development should be explored and developed. To that end the up-coming capital grant transfer system will be reviewed with a view to establish its applicability for the Netherlands future support to decentralisation and local development.
2. Modalities for continuous discretional funding for an intermediate period for districts that do not qualify for entering into the grant system should be explored and developed.

3. Continued support for local governance capacity building to address (a) LGA performance gaps; (b) the political process; (c) roles of CSO sector; (d) the role of the private sector should be explored and developed.
4. Support (likely in the form of TA) should be considered to be provided for:
5. Rolling out and refinement of national systems such as the M&E system; planning and reporting database; national participatory planning guidelines as planned for under LGRP etc.
6. Compiling lessons of DRDP experiences that are of use for the national level e.g. participatory planning, O&M, revival of Ward Tribunals etc.
7. Informing national fiscal decentralisation modalities with documented experiences from the ground, including the integration of the LGR and the sector reforms.

The observations from which these pointers stem are (DGIS/URT 2004: xiv):

> First, emerging inter-governmental grant transfer systems based on objective allocation formulae and performance related incentive mechanisms provide a new national modality for the funding and transfer of grants to local governments.
>
> Second, the successful features of the DRDP design, i.e. provision of discretional funding for the Councils to implement the District Development Plans, should be secured in a sustainable manner, e.g. through the national budget.
>
> Third, the fact that the DRDP supported districts do not stand out for the performance in various performance assessments indicates the importance and relevance of linking access to development funding with objective measurable performance criteria, which ideally should be set in a national context.
>
> Fourth, the Evaluation suggests that support for local governments does not automatically lead to improved service provision let alone poverty reduction. It is argued that consideration should be given to a more broad based approach for strengthening *local governance*, which includes attention to the political process within LGAs as well as the role of the CSO sector and the private sector.
>
> Fifth, the concept of technical assistance should be broadened to a demand driven and flexible strategic capacity building approach for good governance, which, as far as the LGAs themselves are concerned, will take the gaps identified by the performance measurements as a starting point.

Coupled with these pointers and observations is the Operations Evaluation Department (IOB 2004: 2) with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs through an evaluation done in two DRDP districts of Mbulu and Songea that points out as one of the main findings that

> District Rural Development Programmes have not achieved their main long term objective: the improvement of living conditions and the structural alleviation of poverty. … The two districts experienced an increase rather than a decrease of poverty, a trend that corresponds largely with that of Tanzania as a whole ….

The same report (IOB 2004: 2) points out the reasons for the structural failure of the DRDPs:

> There are two principle causes for the disappointing impact on poverty. Firstly, the refractory socio-political environment in Tanzania and the non-conducive government policy. Second, deficiencies in aid approach, including the non-identification of the basic problems of the poor and several changes in DRDP focus during implementation. Consequently, DRDP support was only inadequately targeted towards the poor, if at all. If DRDPs continue in the present way, their contribution to poverty reduction will be negligible also in future.

This evaluation (IOB 2004: 6-7) report does not end without giving suggestions for future attention.

> A strategy for structural poverty alleviation in the wider framework of support to decentralised rural development should be operationalised in greater detail. Such a strategy must include identification of the resource potential and of the basic constraints to poverty reduction, and of the approaches needed to make effective use of that potential and to remove the constraints to the benefit of the poor. Democratisation and empowerment of the local population is also an essential element of an effective poverty reduction strategy. A district-specific strategy for rural poverty alleviation requires specification of the issues that can effectively be addressed at district level and of those that need measures at national level. …Any programme for poverty reduction in rural areas must indicate ways by which to increase production, productivity and profitability of agriculture. ….

A couple of issues need to be pointed out in this evaluation: that there is admission for failure of the DRDPs to meet the overall objective of poverty alleviation; that there is need to strategise for the continued assistance of Dutch intervention in Tanzania; that the continued assistance has intention for supporting capacity building in the areas of addressing Local Government Authority (LGA) performance gaps, political processes, roles of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and the role of private sector.

From the RNE-DRDPs to the SNV-DRDPs

As it has been pointed out, the RNE-DRDPs phased out in 2004. The funds that used to come for this programme from the RNE are now being channelled into the common basket, which is found in the Ministry of Finance. The RNE-DRDPs have not as such been abandoned by the Dutch: currently they are running under the SNV, with slightly different objectives. According to the management brief of the SNV inception Report (May 2005),

> Capacity Building for Local Governance Actors (CBLGA) is the title of the challenging intervention strategy SNV is engaged in since November 2004 within 13 districts in 5 regions. … The overall goal of the programme is to: contribute to poverty reduction and improved well-being of the population (through increased social services provision at the local level). And the purpose [is] defined as: strengthen[ing] local governance and financial viability of LGAs, private sector and civil society organizations through capacity building and promotion of inter-linkages between these actors and emerging national initiatives.

Thus, the task of the SNV-DRDPs is not very much different from what the RNE-DRDPs were doing: they aim at poverty reduction and improved well-being of the population. The intervention is more on capacity building and networking the actors in local government, the private sector, and the civil society. The big difference with the RNE-DRDPs is that SNV-DRDPs have no idea of direct intervention to the smallholder farmers as was with the RNE-DRDPs. That notion of rural development is submerged to governance.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I began the discussion with the presentation of the landscapes of Tanzania, Kagera region, and winded up with Bukoba district. The presentation of the landscapes was important in order to understand the general context in which the Dutch donors effected their development intervention. The chapter concluded with a presentation of the historical development of the bilateral development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands government. This section concentrated on the RNE-DRDPs, as these were the centre for analysis. The RNE-DRDPs, however, have been transformed into the SNV-DRDPs.

This background is important for this study because the livelihoods of the people and their organising practices as responses to the different relationships established between the different actors in the aid machinery, with the modernising development discourse as a guiding spirit, are contextual. In the following three chapters, I present the empirical data about the modernising development discourse of the Dutch donor and the organising practices of the aid recipients. In the next chapter, I present data related to the RNE-DRDPs as manifestation of the modernising development discourse.

5

Bilateral development cooperation and the modernising development discourse

Introduction

In the first chapter that presented part of the theoretical framework to this study, I argued that the international development cooperation is function of the modernising development discourse, which guides the donors' engagement in development interventions. The interventions are characterised by the processes of globalisation, Otherisation, shaping subjects, and problem defining. One of the sub-questions in order to gain more knowledge about the processes through which aid recipients make aid relevant is about how the RNE-DRDPs have been a manifestation of the modernising development discourse. I already outlined in the previous chapter of this study that the RNE-DRDPs are a package in the bilateral development cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and the Netherlands government that began in 1986 with the aim of improving structurally the level of wellbeing of the rural population of the districts. In this chapter, therefore, I present a discussion on how this bilateral development cooperation between the URT and the Netherlands government is a manifestation of the modernising development discourse through the examination of the RNE-DRDPs.

This chapter is based on the examination of the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation through the analysis of

some key documents. I begin with the presentation of the documents and continue with the examination of the concepts.

Understanding the key documents

There are many documents that talk about the RNE-DRDPs. In this chapter, I make use of the "Identification Study" (URT/RNE 1986) and the "Policy Document" (RNE 1998). Each of these documents is relevant to the discussion in this chapter about the modernising development discourse. The Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986) is important because it provides insights on necessary information. The Policy Document provides the framework for operation. I use some more documents to support these two. Let me now present in brief what each of these two documents is about.

The Identification Study

This document, entitled *Identification Study for a Netherlands–Tanzania Rural Development Programme* (URT/RNE 1986), was a report from a study that was conducted in 1986 as a joint venture between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Royal Netherlands Embassy. The study aimed at forging a bilateral development relationship in 1986; it is within this study that the DRDPs are conceived. The document is composed of three parts. The first part presents the introductory notes with the preface by the then Ambassador of the Netherlands, and the Map of Tanzania showing the selected districts. The second part is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with the general outline of the rural development programme; the second outlines the selection of districts; the third chapter describes the district programmes. The third part of the document is composed of three annexes, the first of which shows the regional and district profiles; the second annex describes the comparative analysis of the regions; the third annex outlines the relative levels of well being in Tanzanian regions. In the analysis of this thesis, however, I concentrate on the general outline of the rural development programme (chapter one), the three pioneer district programmes (chapter three), and parts of the regional/district profiles (Annex A), especially the descriptions of the regions where the pioneer districts belong because these are areas with the insights that these parts provide on the concepts of development, rural development, and sustainable development.

The Netherlands government has been running RNE-DRDPs only in Arusha, Kagera, and Shinyanga regions, as it was recommended by the identification team in

1986 for reasons of manageability, concentration of funds, and for decision-making processes with respect to future prospects of intensification and extension of the programme (URT/RNE 1986: 8). The chief aim of the programme was to improve the income of the smallholder households, mainly farmer smallholders, who are the key to social and economic progress locally and nationally. The secondary aim was concerned with the conservation strategy of the endangered ecosystems (URT/RNE 1986: 2). Apart from these common aims, each programme had its specific aims according to the specific needs of a given area where the programme operates.

The Policy Document

The *Policy of the District Rural Development Programme in Tanzania* (RNE 1998) is a 15-page document. It was formulated by the RNE to guide the operations of the RNE-DRDPs. The document is divided into six parts. The first part spells out the objectives; the second explains the methodology; the third deals with the criteria for selection of activities. In the fourth part, the document presents the instruments used by the RNE-DRDPs, while the first part is about implementation. The final part of the document tackles the potential benefits and risks of the programme.

According to the document (RNE 1998: 3), "the overall objective of the programme is to improve the level of well-being of the rural population in the district in a sustainable way". The methodology of the programme was to follow the process approach that enabled the identification of bottlenecks in the different fields of development, experimentation with solutions on a manageable scale and internal evaluations to check whether the objectives were being attained. Subsequently, a decision on further action could be taken (RNE 1998: 4). The criteria of the programme spelt out the general criteria for individual activities as activities that: answer the needs of the intended target group; demand the mandate of the participation of the beneficiaries; are of priority in district development plan; have no adverse effects on planning and management of capacity of the districts; have as recurrent costs borne by the districts; have all actors playing role in implementation (RNE 1998: 5).

The instruments of the programme are the financial and technical support (RNE 1998: 7). In the implementation, "the areas of intervention foreseen in this programme are directly derived from the objective" (RNE 1998: 8) and related to the basic human needs in achieving a condition of well-being and the bottlenecks in the development process. In the part describing the procedures of the programme, the implications of how "the DRDP is formally part of the technical assistance programme of the bilateral cooperation between the Netherlands and Tanzania" (RNE

1998: 10) is spelt out. It points out the documents behind the DRDP framework, that is, the documents that have influenced the DRDP, and the responsibility of financial resources (RNE 1998: 11).

The part on evaluation spells out how "there is need to evaluate the results of the programme inputs and measure the programme's contribution towards the ultimate objective of improving the well-being of the rural population in a sustainable way" (RNE 1998: 12). To ease evaluation, DRDP has to

> establish a data base consisting of carefully selected data that can give clear indication of changes taking place within the various field of development, based on existing data collection by the various departments of the districts and information systems under development by sectoral ministries with support from donors.

As with the potential benefits and risks of the programme, the document is optimistic about the programme objective and sub-objectives in realising them through the 'action-reflection model', that is, realisation of objectives and sub-objectives with "flexibility in adjusting actions to the changing circumstances, or when more insight into the problems at hand indicate different route to reach the sub-objectives" (RNE 1998: 13). It points out that the main risk is that the "objectives of the activities are insufficiently related to the programme objective and the sub-objectives.

In this section, I have presented the two key documents used for analysis in this chapter. They are central in this chapter because they give insights on the modernising development discourse through the use of the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation, as I demonstrate in the next section.

Development in focus

In this section, I present a discussion on the concept of development underlying the RNE-DRDPs from three perspectives: the interventionist ideology, the notion of "improvement of levels", and the notion of "wellbeing". Whereas the interventionist ideology stems from the whole idea of bilateral development cooperation and the whole rationale of the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986), the notions of "improvement of levels" and "wellbeing" stem from the objectives of the DRDPs as stated in the Policy Document (RNE 1998).

Interventionist ideology

The Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 1) says that "the Netherlands Tanzania development cooperation was reformulated in 1985 and a Policy Plan for the period 1986-1989 has been accepted". This is an indication of the existence of the bilateral development cooperation, a fertile ground for the development interventions. In this bilateral cooperation, there are four areas that are distinguished as areas of intervention: import support, continuing support for parastatals, strengthening of large service organisations, and small-scale development activities oriented to the smallholder agricultural sector (URT/RNE 1986: 1). The document goes on to define the aims of the programme, the target groups, the time frame, the selection of districts, and so on. According to the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986:4), in these interventions,

> expatriate manpower involvement will have to start with one coordinator for each district. … As feeder roads development has been selected as a priority sector for each district, requiring specialised knowledge, a separate post for a road engineer has been proposed from the start of the programme.

All these are indications of the interventionist ideology which translated itself in development projects of so many types. The idea behind the RNE-DRDPs is the issue of intervention as a mutual arrangement between the two countries of Tanzania and the Netherlands. A critical observation of the selection criteria for the three starter districts demonstrates this eagerness to intervene. According to the Evaluation Report (DGIS/URT 2004: 8), the initial three districts of Bukoba, Maswa, and Mbulu were selected on the basis of five-loosely interpreted criteria, one of which being "absorptive capacity for *quick implementation* of starter activities [emphasis mine]". When one of the Dutch development experts resident in Tanzania was asked how the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986) was conducted, he said:

> Early 86 the Tanzania government agreed with IMF and donors were again in love with Tanzania. … at that time the slogan was "*one Dutch guilder to produce a lot of revenue*" … and the *selection was quickly made* based mainly on areas with production potential and active farmers. … The *decision was made very fast* in the embassy around March and in April/May a team visited promising regions. (I.2.DI.Oct.2006; emphasis mine)

The use of such words as "quick implementation", "one Dutch guilder to produce a lot of income", "selection was quickly made", and the "decision was made very fast" demonstrate the eagerness to intervene by the RNE. There was reason for this: "it was their baby" (1.2.DI.Oct.2006), answered a Dutch development expert when he was asked why he thought they were rushing to intervene.

Another important element in the intervention ideology is the question of "technicalism", that is: provision of a technical position in an intervention. According to the Evaluation Report (DGIS/URT 2004: 12),

> The Programme … consists of a Technical Assistance component ... The technical assistance is provided primarily through provision of long term technical advisers but also through external consultancies. …
>
> In each district the programme deploys a *District Development Advisor* (DDA) (in the previous phase called the Coordinator) who is to be positioned directly under the District Executive Director (DED) and with the District Planning Officer as the direct counterpart. The advisor is regarded both as the donor representative at district level (essential for monitoring and implementation) and as a technical advisor to the district management in all matters of physical and financial formulation, implementation and evaluation of programme activities.
>
> The DDA is in general to provide technical advice to the District Management Team and technical departments, contribute to capacity building, provide on the job training and give advice on and monitor the use of funds. Up to the actual time of de-linking the advisor had to co-sign financial reports and requests for funds. The DDA is further to participate in all statutory district council meetings and to maintain good communication and regular contacts with all actors in the district setting (e.g. councillors, NGOs, private sector, other donors etc).

In any intervention, once a problem has been identified, there needs to be a technical component that justifies competence in addressing the problem. It is a problem-defining and solution-defining phenomenon of the modernising development discourse. The technical personnel (who was Dutch), the DDA, is so powerful because, much as he is positioned directly under the DED and the District Planning Officer is his direct counterpart, he represents the donor, he is a technical advisor to the district management team and departments, he engages in capacity building activities and monitors funds; he was to co-sign financial reports and requests for funds, he was to participate in all statutory district council meetings and maintain contacts with all actors in the district setting. In other words, this person was very powerful and had responsibilities that made him powerful and influence events in the districts.

Thus, RNE-DRDPs enshrine the interventionist ideology, concerned with the state engendered order and the intervention of experts, who are embodied in the bilateral aid agencies. The RNE-DRDPs demonstrate eagerness to intervene and is characteristic of technicalism. This is a replica of the modernising development discourse that evolved after World War II, very much elaborated by studies (as is this case of the Identification Study), with authority (as is this case of involvement of states and experts), and with eagerness and technical arrangements to intervene in order to solve the defined problems and to shape the subjects of development.

Improvement of levels

The first part of the Policy Document that spells out the objectives of the DRDP points out the overall objective of the RNE-DRDPs as "to improve the level of well-being of rural population in the district in a sustainable way" (RNE 1998: 3; DGIS/URT 2004: 8). In this objective, the key notions are namely: "improvement of levels", "wellbeing", "rural development", and "sustainability". In the following paragraphs, I discuss the notions of "improvement of the levels" and "wellbeing". The components of "rural population" and "sustainability" will be discussed in other sections of this chapter.

Improvement of levels is an important notion of the modernising development discourse in the objective of the RNE-DRDPs. The notion is repeated as "increase of" in the same document (RNE 1998: 5). This is a notion that refers to the concept of development as progress, a linear understanding of processes of development entailing shifts of standards from what are considered to be lower standards to higher standards.

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB 2004: 2) talks about the notion of improvement of levels as "the improvement of living conditions and the structural alleviation of poverty". The same document links development, poverty and aid (IOB 2004: 13-22). According to Sterkenburg (2005: 1),

> Direct poverty reduction became the explicit aim of Dutch development co-operation policy in the early 1970s. … Aid should focus on the poorest groups in poor countries with policies conducive for poverty reduction. The project was the preferred modality, as it could identify the needs of the poor in the geographical pockets of poverty. … During the 1980s the focus of aid shifted towards economic reforms and structural adjustment and macro-economic aid became the main instrument. Poverty reduction received attention particularly through so-called safety net constructions, i.e. programmes to reduce the disadvantageous effects of macro-economic reform for the poor. The 1990s showed a renewed focus on poverty reduction. … Strengthened by international developments, the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals in particular. … Qualification required that recipient countries designed policies at overall macro-economic and sector level that were beneficial for the poor, labelled pro-poor policies. These policies were to be laid down in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the design of these papers required broad consultation in society. … Sector aid became the preferred modality. … In the late 1990s, the Netherlands adopted the SWAP in its bilateral development aid as a suitable modality for creating the conditions for effective poverty reduction.

Thus, poverty has been the Dutch government target in development cooperation. It is at the central stage of the conceptualization of improvement of levels. However, it is interesting to find out that in the selection processes of areas for RNE-DRDP interventions, poverty was not among the selection criteria. According to the Evaluation Report (DGIS/URT 2004: 8, referring to Bol (1994),

> Poverty was not among the criteria, neither geographical spread, although the districts were located in three distinct regions. Additional districts were added the following years, without any explicit reference to poverty issues or a poverty assessment.

But still, it is with the "poverty thinking" that the interventions of the DRDPs were to take place and that was one of the strong evaluation points. IOB (2004: 2), in actual fact, discredits the DRDPs for having little impact on poverty.

> The DRDPs supported a wide-range of activities directed towards rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure, strengthening of the economic base, improvement of social services, and enhancement of human capabilities in local governance. Despite 10-15 years of support and considerable achievements in various fields, the impact on poverty has been limited.

Poverty is characteristically a notion that has configured the world into the rich and poor and it has constructed intervention as a moral obligation of the rich.

Well-being

According to the Policy Document (RNE 1998:3), the concept of well-being is broken down into two basic components: 1) basic needs, and 2) bottlenecks in the development process. Table 5.1 summarises the understanding of well-being as presented by the document.

Table 5.1 Components of well-being

Basic needs	a.	Food security
	b.	Safe drinking water within a reasonable distance
	c.	Shelter
	d.	Prevention care
	e.	Curative care
Bottlenecks in the development process	a.	Inadequate education and formation
	b.	Insufficient resources to fulfil subsequent needs:
		i. Inadequate income generation capacity of the population
		ii. Inadequate income generation capacity of the district
	c.	Inadequate infrastructure

Source: RNE 1986: 3

This understanding of well-being is an indication of how the modernising development works: based on the defined basic needs in terms of food, water, shelter, and health, and the necessary ingredients of development, that is, education, resources, and infrastructure, the people to be developed are defined as "lacking" them. Then, this is rational enough to argue for the presence of poverty among the

people, and therefore justification for intervention. However, it is important to point out that the bottlenecks of the development process should not only be taken as means of development, but also ends of development. This argument implies that they should not only be facilitating agents in order to achieve a better quality of life, but measurements of quality of life of the people, as well.

Let me go a little deeper in the analysis of the bottlenecks in the development process and develop a discussion about education and resources. Among the bottlenecks in the development process is the question of inadequate education and formation. The issue of education is always controversial, especially in its characterisation. From the Policy Document (RNE 1998: 3), the conceptualisation of education leads to thinking about education and formation as schooling in classrooms, workshops, seminars, and different types of trainings. This has been concretised like this in different implemented projects. This positioning in conceptualising education is being criticised by some scholars. For example, Kanyandago (1998: 145), making a distinction between formal and non-formal education, argues for the difference between African education, which he considers non-formal, and the western school education, which he considers formal. His distinction aims at arguing for the non-formal education for its suitability in the African context. He, for example, presents Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Some aspects of African education in relation to school education

	African education	*Western school education*
Philosophy	Communitarian	Rather individualistic
Content	Relevant/integral	Often irrelevant
Objectives	For life	Often for jobs
Costs	Free	Too expensive
Dispensers	Community/members	“Special” people
Duration	Throughout life	For periods
Context	Natural and social	Artificial
Approach	Inclusive	Discriminatory
Methodology	Flexible	Not very flexible
Place	Where need arises	Buildings

Source: Kanyandago 1998: 145

In the same vein, Mataze (1998: 154) sees formal education as a non-neutral agent because it has been decisively anti-people. He qualifies this by arguing that

> it has produced civil servants who do not serve civil society but serve their own needs first; politicians who speak, but say nothing; voters who vote but do not elect; a media which

> misinforms; schools where they teach how to ignore; members of the judiciary who sentence victims and take bribes; a military that is always at war with the citizens it is meant to protect; a police force that cannot fight crime because it is busy committing crime; socialised bankruptcies and privatised profits; money which happens to be freer than people, and people who serve things.

Irrespective of the vague nature of the characterisations of the so-called African education and the western education from both scholars, the idea brought forward is the argument that education that has come from the donors' side is an education that is Otherising because, sometimes, it does not respect contextual circumstances. However, this consideration should not be used to neglect formal education. According to the principle of endogeneity, whereby people should use what they have as material resources, and what they are as cultural heritages, it is self-reliance that is to be encouraged. On recognition that no people is self-sufficient, people can borrow what they do not have and what they are not, on condition that they really need what they borrow for their development (Kanyandago 1998:143). Endogeneity, therefore, leaves room for formal and non-formal education to dialogue. Therefore, both formal and informal education should be stimulated, instead of reduction of education to formal only.

The Policy Document (RNE 1998: 3) provides a concise explanation about the "insufficiency story": there are "insufficient resources to fulfil subsequent needs". This insufficiency is qualified by two elements: "inadequate income generating capacity of the population" and "inadequate income-generating capacity of the district" (URT/RNE 1986: 3). What is more intriguing is the selection of resources by the document: it is only the "income resources" that have been identified and spoken about by the document. According to the livelihoods framework, people have other vital resource such as the natural, physical, social, and human resources. The "insufficiency story" does not mention any of the rest because with the modernising development discourse income in the development enterprise is crucial. In this line, Escobar (1995: 23) argues that modernisation determines

> the belief that capital investment was the most important ingredient in economic growth and development. The advance of poor countries was thus seen from the outset as depending on ample supplies of capital to provide for infrastructure, industrialization, and the overall modernization of society.

It is from this perspective that income has become a fulcrum to hinge people's livelihoods promotion.

I have presented the understanding of development from the perspective of the interventionist ideology, the notion of "improvement of levels" and "well-being". The interventionist ideology has demonstrated how the RNE-DRDPs were a state

engendered order and the intervention of experts embodied in the bilateral aid cooperation between Tanzania and the Netherlands. Whereas the notion of improvement of levels is caught up in the understanding of progress, the notion of wellbeing is caught up in the poverty question. While the bottleneck of education and formation has been argued to be an Otherising phenomenon, the insufficiency story about resources has been presented as an indication of the centrality of financial capital investment for growth and development.

Rural development in focus

Rural development is an important concept with respect to the DRDPs and the modernisation development discourse. The name of the programme has this concept embedded in it. There are insights into the discussion with the two key elements of the "rural population" and the "interventions in the rural areas".

Rural population

The Policy Document (RNE 1998: 3) sheds some light on the rural population. The word "population" is a gender sensitive word: "as the rural population is equally composed of men and women, all activities must take gender aspects into account". Thus, from the beginning, the policy orientation is articulate about the gender dimension being at the centre of development activities of the RNE-DRDP interventions. Gender was central in the evaluation because it was "considered as an integral component of the evaluation" (DGIS/URT 2004: 3).

When the document speaks about the improvement of the wellbeing of the rural population, it qualifies this by saying that this is to be done "in the district". Thus, it is the whole population, men and women, of the rural districts. According to the laws that govern the decentralisation system in Tanzania district authorities are divided into two categories of urban and rural authorities (URT 1982). The Policy Document refers to the districts of the rural authorities, which it defines as the rural districts.

The Policy Document adds more characteristics of the rural population: they live in small townships that function as service centres for surrounding areas. The small townships are trading centres. They have services like retail shops, food and drink places, and bicycle repair places. Some of the trading centres have dispensaries or health centres.

Bearing in mind the modernising development discourse, with urbanisation as one of the key tenets, as Escobar (1995: 23) points out, "industrialization and

urbanization were seen as the inevitable and necessarily progressive routes to modernization", the urban has been seen as a centre for the emanation of ideas for rural intervention. Thus, if a rural area resembled an urban area, then it meant that the rural area is developed. Chambers' idea (1983: 2) is that the urban reality, as an "outside reality" of the rural, is presented as a solution path to the rural. I agree with Chambers and I think that this is a reason as to why the rural is always constructed as problematic. That is why not only do development people move from the urban to the rural area, but also ideas and lifestyles move from urban to rural areas. In the understanding of RNE-DRDPs as an intervention informed by the modernising development discourse intervention, there is an inherent dichotomous thinking of the urban versus the rural whereby the rural is problematic and the urban a solution. Therefore, both men and women in villages and small towns are problematic and were a target group of RNE-DRDPs.

Interventions in the rural areas

From the interventionist ideology and given that "poverty is largely a rural phenomenon" (IOB 2004: 40), there was need to intervene in rural areas. The interventions have had a number of characteristics. When the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 1) points out the activities eligible for the Netherlands assistance, it says that the import support has to deal with the "rehabilitation of the agricultural sector"; it argues that the interventions should be directed to "small-scale development activities oriented to the smallholder agricultural sector ...". Thus, the first characteristic of the interventions refers to the nature of the interventions: rural development has to take place through agriculture. The rural is linked to agricultural activities. IOB (2004: 6) argues, as a main finding, that "any programme for poverty reduction in rural areas must indicate ways by which to increase production, productivity, and profitability of agriculture".

The second characteristic continues with the nature of interventions, but from the technological point of view. Even if there are interventions that are not directly agricultural, they should, in a way, be oriented towards agricultural promotion. IOB (2004: 6) points out technology as one of the constraints of agricultural production and that is why "most aid programmes for rural development emphasize the removal of technological constraints". Technology is construed as the means to facilitate production, transport communication, water services, crop storages, and repairs. With regard to production, promotion of indigenous production systems such as use of hoes and oxen is paramount (URT/RNE 1986: 122). As for transport communication, the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 12) argues that "improvement of

feeder roads is one of the biggest priorities. … An improvement strategy should be aimed at removing obstacles, e.g., by construction of bridges and culverts". For water services, the Identification Study points out repairs and constructions of wells and dams (URT/RNE 1986: 29), rehabilitation of water supply systems, and production of gravity-fed piped supply systems (URT/RNE 1986: 45). Facilitation for storage technologies is seen in terms of construction and repairs of go-downs (big stores) for cash crops (URT/RNE 1986: 20, 29). Repairs are seen in terms of facilities to repair the indigenous production machines such as ox-ploughs and ox-carts (URT/RNE 1986: 12). All these technological interventions rotate around agriculture: they have to facilitate the agricultural livelihood system because this is the fulcrum for development in the rural areas.

The third characteristic is about the nature of the people for whom the interventions should be made. According to the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 2),

> the chief aim of the programme is to improve the income of smallholder households because it is felt that in the Tanzanian context the farmer is the key to social and economic progress, not only at local, but also at the national level. Only by improving the lot of the smallholder, self-sustained growth and its fair distribution in chosen target areas can be achieved and preserved.

Thus, the interventions in the rural areas are targeted to the small-holder farmers. In real everyday life, these are farmers who are engaged in crop and animal husbandries for daily life consumption purposes together with engagement in coffee production as a cash crop. Some have started the production of vanilla. In most cases, the different agricultural produce is sold or exchanged for other goods and services. However, with the clarification of what the small-holder community means as consisting "of men and women, progressive and more traditional farmers" (URT/RNE 1986: 3), it becomes difficult to make distinctions between farmers: it actually means that RNE-DRDP did not focus on smallholders, but on all farmers.

The fourth characteristic is about intervention guided by insights from the past experiences to avoid previous mistakes. The Netherlands-Tanzania rural development programme was to be a mixture of approaches from the past (URT/RNE 1986: 2). However, the Netherlands government (URT/RNE 1986: 1) points out its limitedness in experience and opportunities for learning:

> Rural development planning on district level in Tanzania has been very limited so far. However, the experience of the other donors in Tanzania and our own experiences in other developing countries, give us valuable information on how a programme should not be planned and executed.

Avoiding past mistakes was crucial and that is why blue print interventions were to be avoided: "The hey-days of 'blue print' approach in rural development planning

are definitely over …" (URT/RNE 1986: 1). Thus, rural development meant interventions in the rural areas based on agricultural development. After exploration of this concept of rural development, let me now turn to another concept, sustainable development.

Sustainable development in focus

This is another central concept in the understanding of the RNE-DRDPs as manifestation of the modernising development discourse. In the first part of the Policy Document (RNE 1998) that presents the objectives of the RNE-DRDPs, the concept is elaborated through its consequences for three components, namely: partnership, generation of financial resources, and attention for the environment.

Partnership

The Policy Document (RNE 1998: 3) states that

> sustainability is understood to have consequences for partnership in the development process between the beneficiaries and the various development agents, such as the district administration, NGOs and others.

In this quote, it is important to note that in the late 1980s, the notion of partnership was already in use. According to the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation (Minbuza 2006),

> partnership is a special form of collaboration between partners from different sectors, like governments, civil society organisations, the business sector and knowledge institutes. In a partnership every partner brings in 'his' resources, be it money, knowledge, networks or labour. Partners in a partnership share risks, responsibilities and rewards.
>
> Partnerships provide the multi-actor, integrated solutions often required by the scope and nature of the problems being addressed by development cooperation, for example in health care or sustainable economic development.

Even by then, it was this understanding that was in use: multiple actors in the development processes are supposed to cooperate in performing specified roles. Development, therefore, should not be a one actor's show, but a collaborative process.

The partner actor categories that can be identified are namely: RNE-DRDPs, the Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation, the district councils, NGOs, the central government of Tanzania, and the beneficiaries. All of them have their specific roles to play, in a rather hierarchical manner. At the top of the hierarchy is the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation, which through the RNE evaluates the selected areas for intervention and disburse funds. At the top level is also the

government of Tanzania which is supposed to disburse some funds to some of the selected projects. At the meso-level is the RNE-DRDP that finances, trains, and holds consultancies. At this level, there are district councils also, which are charged with bearing recurrent costs, maintenance of equipment, and selection of areas of intervention. At the lower level, there are NGOs which are supposed to organise the beneficiaries and implement some schemes. There are also beneficiaries at this level. They are charged with mandatory participation and some contributions on some programme activities.

This structure of partnership is based on the assumption of the donor acting like a "jump-starter" of the development process, the politicians and technocrats at the district level being "servicers", and the beneficiaries being the "owners" of the interventions. Thus, sustainability in partnership means each actor category playing specified roles. This hierarchical structure has maintained the top, especially the RNE, powerful in the partnership. For instance, activities to be funded were to follow the set criteria set by the RNE; but with the mandatory participation in planning and implementation of activities, the beneficiaries have to dance to the tunes of the RNE and state preferred development interventions. The meso level has been an effective nod to link, perpetuate, and enforce the preferred development interventions of the powerful RNE and the state with the "manoeuvred" intervention ideas of the local beneficiaries. At the end of the day, it is a matter of unequal relationship between partners, the donor assuming a higher position compared to the aid recipients.

Generation of financial resources

Another important element with regard to sustainability is the generation of financial resources. The Policy Document (RNE 1998: 3) states that

> sustainability is understood to have consequences for the generation of financial resources to operate and maintain the assets obtained through the programme. These resources must be available at the level of the organisation that is responsible for the operation and maintenance.

Thus, there is a link between sustainability, assets, and finances: there is need for finances in order to operate and maintain acquired assets. That is why the Policy Document (RNE 1998: 6) argues that

> whenever the financial situation of the district and the beneficiaries allows for support of the recurrent costs, the Netherlands can provide the financial means for implementation of these activities, but as a matter of principle, resources provided under the programme cannot be used for recurrent costs, as this would undermine the conditionality of sustainability.

This was conditionality for funding, of which compliance was to be made explicit to the Dutch donors by the districts. The same conditionality issue is raised later in the document (RNE 1998: 6):

> … recurrent costs that are engendered by the intervention must be covered by the financial resources of the district and/or the beneficiaries in order to ensure sustainability of the activities. The latter means that sources of income, at the district, village and individual level must be developed and properly managed.

This conditionality is, however, put with awareness of Tanzania's financial position: "the Government of Tanzania does not have sufficient financial resources to implement all these activities", says the Policy Document (RNE 1998: 6). This implies that Dutch aid was to come in proportionality with the capacity of the beneficiaries to take care of the recurring costs. The conditionality aimed at reducing and avoiding dependency, but then it meant "little and slow" development due to the modest financial input of Tanzania.

There is a belief that when people are forced to take care of the financial generation for their projects, then the projects will be sustainable in that they will have longer lives to when the needs they address are finished. Behind this belief is an assumption that since the people will feel the pinch of raising funds on their projects, then they will take care of the projects because they feel they are theirs for they have been implemented with their money. In fact, according to the Evaluation Report (DGIS/URT 2004: 41), one of the challenges for participatory planning and budgeting is in the villages/wards prioritising investments beyond their mandate where they cannot meet the recurrent costs. At play, however, are two characteristics from the modernising development discourse: the first characteristic is the centrality of financial capital in driving people's development choices and actions, and the second is the configuration of the world into the "haves" and the "have-nots", whereby the "haves" have a bigger say compared to the "have-nots": the donors can dictate terms for the aid recipients by imposing almost impossible conditionality, as a conditionality to meet the recurrent costs.

Attention to the environment

The Policy Document (RNE 1998: 3) states that "sustainability is understood to have consequences for attention for the environment". In the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 2), the understanding of the concept of ecology is developed in terms of conservation:

> … another subordinate aim springs from the mission's realisation that a major part of the programme's development strategy will have to aim at conservation, that is to say that it will

> have to protect the seriously endangered eco-systems (various types of erosion, overgrazing, soil deterioration, etc.).

In fact, at the choice of the three starter districts, one of the selection criteria was "the physical and/or agricultural development potential including possibilities for environmental conservation" (DGIS/URT 2004: 8). In this sense, then, the programme sees the environment as threatened and needs to be rehabilitated. There are 'cultural deserts', lands stripped of their original woodland vegetation, fuel-wood crises, desertification, soil degradation, erosion, overstocking, decline of soil fertility, the occurrence of flood and drought, and encroachment of bush-land by crop production, birds and wild life. These threats are caused by human actions such as the increasing pressure on the land due to the high population growth, encroachment of bush-land by crop production, birds and wild life, and over-grazing, and competition between cash and food crops (URT/RNE 1986: 28, 36, 125).

When trying to address the areas of intervention related to basic human needs, the Policy Document (RNE 1998: 8) states that

> due attention must be given to the use of natural resources – the environment. This means that activities related to conservation of the environment and the present use that the population is making of the environment will need attention.

The document recommends soil and water conservation programmes (RNE 1998: 8) and continues stating that "special attention can be made of replacement of wood as supplier of energy and of alternative fodder supply, if grazing by animals is to be controlled". The conservation spirit could be achieved through activities that have to do with trainings "to improve know-how" of adverse use of the environment, with concerned persons being policy-makers, planners, officers, village leaders, and group leaders at sub-village level (RNE 1998: 9-10).

The concern about the ecological problems, as they are expressed by the RNE-DRDPs, is an echo of the concerns that were expressed by the Brundtland Commission in 1987. This Commission pointed out that the problem with the environment has to do with development understood as economic progress and its negative effects on the environment. This same Commission suggested a solution to the ecological problems as using, but maintaining the environmental stock for the next generations. This solution, however, is embedded in the modernising of development discourse as at the centre is the concept of progress based on economic growth.

It is crucial to note that the RNE-DRDPs did not offer another conceptualization of ecological sustainability, apart from the Brundtland-dominated one: there is no indication where the RNE-DRDP explored, encouraged, or promoted other more localised perspectives in the restoration of ecological sustainability. For instance, an

outlook from the other perspectives based on the holistic visualisation of nature with an aim of harmonisation would have appealed more to ecological sustainability efforts among the many populations in Tanzania. In this perspective (Nkemnikia 1999: 165),

> … the whole brings about the unifications of the parts: it would be contradictory and equally impossible to think of a whole without its parts. It would be equally difficult to imagine the parts without having an idea of the whole to which they belong.

This is a position that assists in "avoiding all hierarchical postures, by being with things and not above things" (Engel & Engel 1990: 141). The disregard of other perspectives, however, is characteristic of the modernising development discourse as an otheriser: only the perspectives of the donor moderniser are worth exploring and adopting; the perspectives of the aid recipient who is being modernised get little attention at all.

Thus, sustainable development in the understanding of the RNE-DRDPs meant partnership, whereby each actor was to play a specific role; fulfilment of the conditionality to pay recurrent costs by the beneficiaries, and rehabilitation of ecological disasters. The partnership structure is hierarchical with the donor's position formidably strong. This is characteristic of unequal relationship between the donors and the aid recipients whereby the donor assumes higher positioning with respect to the aid recipient. The conditionality for beneficiaries to cater for recurrent costs is not easy because the aid recipients cannot manage to pay for the costs. Whereas on the one hand it is an indication of the centrality of capital investments, it is an indication of the donors' characteristic of imposing hard conditionality to the aid recipients, on the other hand. The rehabilitation of the ecological disasters by the RNE-DRDPs is based on the Brundtland conceptualisation of ecological sustainability, without exploring, encouraging, and promoting other localised ecological sustainability perspectives. Let me now turn to the concept of participation.

Participation in focus

The concept of participation is presented in the policy orientation for the RNE-DRDPs as a process approach, which is a methodology for planning and implementation of development projects in the districts under the RNE-DRDPs. According to the Policy Document (RNE 1998: 4),

> The process approach enables the identification of bottlenecks in the different fields of development, experimentation with solutions on a manageable scale and internal evaluations to check whether objectives are being attained. Subsequently, a decision on further action can be taken.

So as to have a better understanding of this concept of process approach, the *DRDP 'End-of-Phase III' Report* (TAT 2004: 3) points out that the process approach allowed for:

> … a participatory planning process to determine the activities to be funded, as well as to ensure flexibility and the inclusion, over time, of new insights or identified priorities. … The consequence is that the scope of the programme in operational terms has remained broad, varying from district to district and over time. It also means that programme focus has shifted over time in response to changing needs and priorities while not losing sight of the overall programme purpose.

This implied that observations and lessons that were pointed out by different officials and local beneficiaries were to be taken and incorporated in the decisions pertaining to RNE-DRDPs. With the process approach, it was important that the people themselves planned for what they thought was best for their own development according to their perceived needs. This implied that the DRDP funds were to aid what came from people and not what the donors wished to fund. According to the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 1),

> The hey-days of the "blue print" approach in rural development planning are definitely over, because it is now realised that not even the immediate future can be controlled properly. The other extreme in planning, the programmatic approach, quickly has shown weaknesses related to lack of coordination and the impossibility to budget the financial flows.

Thus, the process approach was rather an open approach that was a result of the failure of blue-print and programmatic approaches in development planning and implementation of projects. The approach needed a lot of flexibility and deep understanding of the socio-political and economic dynamics of the local beneficiaries for whom it was being applied. It, therefore, went beyond the strict regulatory schemes of how development plans and programmes should be done and implemented because the definition of what problems were was left in the hands of the local beneficiaries themselves and the donor had to participate at the level of responding to demands from the perceived needs of the people. According to the Evaluation report (DGIS/URT 2004: 11), the intention of the process approach was to allow

> a participatory planning process to determine the activities to be funded, as well as to ensure flexibility and the inclusion, over time, of new insights or identified priorities. The process approach is also intended to allow the programme to adapt the speed of implementation to the local development process as well as to the implementation capacity of the councils and other partners.

Therefore, the process approach was a move to improve the involvement of the development projects' beneficiaries. According to the Evaluation Report (DGIS/-URT 2004: xi), however, "a process approach can be too open-ended and can lend

itself to the criticism of being un-focused and without clear exit strategy". This was its risk and that is what happened in the guiding the RNE-DRDPs.

Much as the process approach was innovative and revolutionary because the "responsibility for defining programme content rests at the district level and results from a negotiated process involving the district administration, the rural population and the donor" (DGIS/URT 2004: 11), the findings of the evaluation of the DRDPs (IOB 2004: 3) still show the strong hand of the Dutch donors:

> The changes in DRDP focus were largely inspired by Dutch development cooperation policy, and received a positive response from politicians and bureaucracy in Tanzania. The emphasis in DRDP shifted from strengthening the economic base and agricultural production towards improving social services and, subsequently, towards enhancing the capabilities of local governance. These changes were largely inspired by Dutch development co-operation policy.

This implies that the evolution of the changes in the DRDP focus were basically Dutch-centred because the "inspirations" were derived from the Dutch Development policy. The Tanzanian counterpart "responded positively": the politicians and the bureaucrats thought the changes were ok and gave them a go-ahead.

The missing thousands

Much as from the beginning of the RNE-DRDPs the blue-print and programmatic approaches were to be avoided (URT/RNE1986: 1), the conceptualisation of participation is limited to some categories of actors. In actual fact, the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986) can be described as an activity incorporating three key actors, as clearly expressed in the preface to the study (URT/RNE 1986: no page):

> This report, the *Identification of a Netherlands – Tanzania Rural Development Programme*, has been a joint effort of the regional and district authorities of eight regions of Tanzania, a team of Netherlands experts resident in Tanzania, and the Netherlands Embassy in Dar es Salaam.

In this statement, it is clear that the study has as central actors the authorities, the experts, and the embassy. The authorities are the government officials. These are necessary as people who should see to it that agreements are made and implementations are taken care of. The Netherlands experts who reside in Tanzania are people experienced in different development activities such as baseline surveys, project planning, designing, implementations, and evaluations, and experience in development work. The experts are needed because the Identification Study is a technocratic adventure. The Embassy is necessary as a diplomatic agent by nature of the RNE-DRDPs being a realization in bilateral cooperation; it is representative of the Dutch government.

Such a grouping is necessary for any modernising adventure. There is always need for government officials: they represent the interest of the state in terms of

government development policy perspectives; they channel the voice of the government; they facilitate government policy and development orientations. There is always also need for technocrats: they know development because they are experts; it is out of such activities that they earn a living, as well. Finally, there is always need for diplomatic relations through embassies: they act as representatives of the donors, enforcers, and carriers of policies of the mother countries.

Among these three categories of actors, however, there are thousands of people who necessitated the intervention, but who were left out as key actors in the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986). These were the major stakeholders on what the other actors dealt with; it was the promotion of their livelihoods that was targeted, the central element of the RNE-DRDPs; these were the real target of the intervention. They were left out as they were considered to be represented by their authorities. Thus, much as the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986) tries to put together different actors, the missing thousands call for attention of the missed ideas and perspectives of the targeted beneficiaries, who, at the end of the day, are to be the subjects of intervention. However, generally speaking, the three categories of actors, that is, the regional and district authorities, the team of Netherlands experts resident in Tanzania, and the RNE belong to the state engendered order; their basic task is to perpetuate the stock of ideas of the modernising development discourse and enforce it to the missing thousands who are the subjects of development.

Bukoba district development problem

RNE-DRDPs in Kagera Region include Bukoba which started in 1987, Karagwe and Biharamulo started five years later in 1993, Ngara in 1994, and Muleba in 1996. According to the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986: 28), involution was found to be a problem in Bukoba District:

> Due to population pressure and the gradual loss of soil fertility, competition between cash (tree) crops and food crops becomes more and more acute. With further declining soil fertility more and more land will be used for cassava production. Income per head and the nutritional status of the population will decline. … A rural development programme for Bukoba will first and foremost have to develop a strategy to transform the involution process. This task is difficult and might even prove to be impossible.

Thus, development problems to be dealt with in Bukoba District were population pressure, gradual loss of soil fertility, and competition between cash crops and food crops. With further declining of soil fertility, more land was to be used for cassava cultivation, and this would result in the decline of income per head and the nutritional status of the Haya. While on the one hand, this is a rationalisation of the competition between population and land as resource, on the other hand, it is a

manifestation of the centrality of income in people's livelihoods. This is another typical way of replicating the modernising development discourse by repeating the Malthusian population trap and theories on economic returns. Thus, from the beginning, BDRDP had to strategise for the transformation of this involution process. That is why BDRDP had to give highest priority to agricultural packages in order to increase arable land area, plant tree nurseries on a large scale, rehabilitate feeder roads, and to rehabilitate existing village go-downs (URT/RNE 1986: 28-29). This kind of development problematising is nothing else other than the typical alarmist characterisation of the modernising development discourse whereby problem-defining is done from the off-the-shelf narratives for eventual justification of solutions.

In this section, I presented a discussion on the concept of participation. I outlined its understanding as embedded in the process approach in the planning and implementation of development projects. I demonstrated that notwithstanding the centrality of participation of all the actors in development, the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986) misses the key actor category: the development beneficiaries. At end of this section, I showed how the development problem of Bukoba district to be addressed by the RNE/DRDP was characterised by the off-the-shelf narratives for eventual justification of the solutions.

Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to demonstrate how the bilateral development cooperation between Tanzania and the Netherlands is a manifestation of the modernising development discourse. I demonstrated this through the use of the RNE-DRDPs conceptualisation of the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation. I began the chapter with the presentation of the key documents that facilitated the analysis of these concepts. The presentation of these documents aimed at knowing the general contents of the sources of concepts in discussion. In the subsequent section, I discussed the concept of development, ascertaining that development was conceived as progress. In the section on rural development, I presented the argument that rural development was about interventions to smallholder men and women farmers living in villages and town centres on activities that rotate around agriculture. The section on sustainable development demonstrated how the understanding of the concept was based on partnership, generation of financial resources, and attention to the environment. Due to the powerful position of the donor, and therefore the aspect of unequal relationship between the donor and the aid recipient, the donor imposed a tough conditionality of catering for

the recurrent costs of development projects to the beneficiaries. On the attention to the environment, I discussed how the ecological rehabilitation was based on the Brundtland Commission, and there was no exploration, encouragement, and promotion of other localised ecological perspectives, an aspect that highlighted the otherising nature of the RNE-DRDPs. In the section about participation, I underscored the centrality of the notion of process approach as a methodological approach in the planning and implementation of development projects in the RNE-DRDPs. I, however, pointed out that the local beneficiaries were not involved in the Identification Study. The problem diagnosis, therefore, was based on the perspective of the three categories of actors: the district and regional authorities, the Netherlands experts resident in Tanzania, and the RNE because these were the actors who are perpetuators of the modernising development discourse.

From the discussion about the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation, I argue that the bilateral development cooperation between Tanzania and the Netherlands has been a perfect example of the concretisation of the modernising development discourse. It is the belief in the role of modernisation as the transformation force involved in the processes of capital investment (aid money), the application of science (technology), and the urbanisation that would lead to the development of the aid recipients. However, with the contradictions that have emerged in the concept of participation, the unequal relationship between the donors and the aid recipients demonstrates how the donor still controls the development machinery.

What is crucial with the RNE-DRDPs is the fact that such conceptualisations have led to the enhancement of the power asymmetry in the relationship between the different actors in the aid machinery. The Dutch donors being the protagonists of the modernising development discourse, have assumed powers as globalisers, Otherisers, shaper of the subjects of development, and problem definers; as I demonstrate in chapters six and seven, the different actor categories of the aid recipients relate in terms of power, with the modernising development discourse being a defining factor.

When presenting the RNE-DRDPs, I am aware of the IOB report (2004) which was very critical about the RNE-DRDPs. The report is fundamental with respect to the challenge to the modernising development discourse. However, in this chapter, I have not presented a discussion of the report with respect to the modernising development discourse because I find there is still need to present issues about organising practices. The report is discussed in the final chapter of this study. Having discussed the bilateral development cooperation as manifestation of the

modernising development discourse through the examination of the RNE-DRDPs, I discuss issues related to the organising practices of the district officials in the area of operation of one of the RNE-DRDPs, the Bukoba District Rural Development Programme (BDRDP).

6

Organising practices of the district officials

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I presented a discussion on the bilateral development cooperation as manifestation of the modernising development discourse. I argued this through the conceptualisation of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation as presented in the RNE-DRDPs selected key documents. I concluded that the RNE-DRDPs were a function of the modernising development discourse because they were embedded in development as progress; rural development was to be realised through agriculture; in sustainable development, partnership was hierarchical, aid based on conditionality, and there was no consideration of other ecological perspectives in the efforts to rehabilitate the environment, and; participation did not involve the RNE-DRDP beneficiaries. With this understanding of the concepts, the Dutch donors embarked on the development intervention of the RNE-DRDPs. With the modernising development discourse, the power asymmetry has been enhanced in the different actor categories in the aid machinery.

IN this chapter, I present the district officials as an actor category found at the entrance of the Dutch aid. The district officials base their operations at the district headquarters where, by virtue of the decentralisation system, they work in offices of the highest authority in the district. Their organising practice are analysed, on the one hand, as response towards the Dutch officials, who are considered more power-

ful than they are, and on the other hand, as responses towards the people living in the rural areas. In both directions, the district officials aim at promoting their livelihoods.

The district officials directly deal with the donors. It is a crucial encounter because it is an arena in which the donor resources are negotiated for, acquired, and (ab)used as soon as they enter the districts for the livelihoods promotion of the people living in rural areas. They deal with the compilation of all the development plans from below and the allocation of resources to the plans.

In order to understand this encounter between the Dutch donors with respect to participation and the eventual organising practices of the district officials, I present several sections. I begin the discussion with the section about the perception of the Haya people about the Dutch people in Bukoba. I continue with a section on issues related to the Dutch and participation. In the third section, I present a discussion on the livelihoods of the district officials. I wind up the chapter with a discussion on the organising practices of the district officials that stem from the participation experience with respect to the Dutch donors.

Dutch people in Bukoba

In this section that presents the issues regarding the perception of the Haya people about the Dutch people in Bukoba, I contextualize the Dutch people in the development context of Bukoba where the Dutch were involved. The aim is to give an overview as to why the Dutch people emerge as powerful people in the area. This is crucial in order to understand the organising practices of the district officials that stem from the power relations between them and the people in the area, but more particularly the district officials of Bukoba. I express the perception of the Haya people about the Dutch from their interventions before and during the RNE-DRDPs.

Before the RNE-DRDPs

Even though the people of Bukoba have some difficulties in making distinctions between the different Europeans who have worked in Bukoba before the advent of RNE-DRDPs, they have known a few Dutch men and women as missionaries in Christian-related institutions such as schools and hospitals and as development practitioners.

In the development realm, they have known the Dutch as successful introducers of hybrid cattle in the region through the livestock project which promoted the development of dairy cattle. This was the case about an umbrella organization called

Kagera Livestock Development Programme (KALIDEP) [initiated in 1990] for the four sub-projects of Kikulula Heifer Breeding Unit (KHBU) [initiated in 1976], Kagera Small Holder Dairy Extension Project (KSHDEP) [initiated in 1982] Kikulula Farmers Training Centre (KFTC) initiated in 1982, and Kagera Indigenous Livestock Improvement Project (KILIP) [initiated in 1988]. KALIDEP promoted heifer breeding and trained local farmers in dairy farming through the credit scheme for heifer supply in the region (Rugambwa *et al.* 1995).

In development practice before the RNE-DRDPs, however, there is an instance whereby people speak of Dutch people as "conmen", "mis-managers" and "failures". The instance is about an abortive 400kw Kitogota mini hydro project with a scandal of little to be shown of the £2 million spent by the Dutch consultants (Pennington 1998). This hydroelectric power station in a district adjacent to Bukoba, Muleba district, was to serve a number of institutions in the area, especially the hospital and some schools, a church, and convent. After excavating what was supposed to be a dam, the project never went ahead and the people never saw the Dutch man back again. The people in the district and in Bukoba refer to this experience as a "coning", "mismanagement", and "failure". Thus, before the RNE-DRDPs the perception of the people about the Dutch is a mixture of good work done by missionaries and some development initiatives such as the dairy project in the region. However, with the failure of the hydro-electric power station, the Dutch were seen as conmen, mis-managers, and failures. Let me now turn my attention to the perceptions of the Dutch during the RNE-DRDPs.

During the RNE-DRDPs

With the advent of RNE-DRDPs, however, the Dutch in Bukoba became very popular. They were associated with development in terms of rehabilitation of roads:

> The Dutch have been a blessing to us for some time. They have repaired and constructed some roads for us. From Kyetema to Izimbya, it was a "mat" [this is an expression to say that the roads were smooth like a mat], even though with a lot of dust. Many cars passed through the roads, especially the government vehicles and some very few private vehicles for rich people, business people, and organisations. Of course, we are now back on our poor roads after the rains. (Int.DO1.Bkb.Jul2003)

Bukoba used to have a number of tarmac roads that were built during the colonial period. The feeder roads were made of murram and they were in a bad state due to rains and poor maintenance. With the Tanzania-Uganda war of the late seventies and early eighties, the road situation deteriorated: the tarmac main road was spoilt by war machinery, especially by the tanks; the feeder roads that were continuously eroded by rainfall were abandoned because there were no sufficient funds to take

care of roads after the war. Going to the rural areas became almost impossible due to impassable roads. It is due to this situation of poor roads that the government officials, some rich people, and development organizations evolved the use of four wheel drives because they were the only cars that would manage the road situation. So, with the Dutch embarking on the road rehabilitation, they became famous because they had dealt with an area that had for a decade or so looked as if there was no possibility of control.

The people of Bukoba have a way they saw the Dutch people work. In an interview with a district official, this is what he says about their style of work:

> … Anyway, they could not be in nice offices and move around with big cars talking to big people in the villages, and thinking that they would understand the problems of the poor people in the villages. (Int.DO1.Bkb.Jul2006)

The first thing to note is that these officials were always in "nice offices". With nice offices it is meant clean offices with space and equipped with office gadgets such as computers, photocopying machines, fax, email services, and the possibility to access and send emails. To many district officials this is striking, given their offices are without such facilities. Once they moved out to see the village people, they dealt with leaders, who are considered big people in the villages. Consequently, these Dutch officials were hardly people who understood what was happening with village life and the people in it because what they knew was what was already filtered for them from the leaders. However, these Dutch officials showed interest in understanding people's situation by learning and speaking the language of the people, at least Swahili.

Big cars refer to four-wheel off road vehicles. Among the people of Bukoba, a car and a house are symbols of wealth and the bigger they are, the wealthier one is. Having a big car and house, moreover, are associated with having a comfortable life:

> These people have lived in big houses. One of them used to live in that big district house overlooking the town up there with the wife. It was built by them. There is one who decided to live in Mwanza town while working in Bukoba. Another one lived in that big house near the lake. (Int.DO7.BkbJul2006)

Thus, when the people point out that the Dutch officials used to travel in big cars and lived in big houses, they mean that they were wealthy and had comfortable lives. This means that these officials had a much better life compared to the people in the area. This is not a complement as such, but a complaint about how much of the money that is meant for development in the area goes to service the good lives of the donors.

Another characteristic perception of the district people about the Dutch has been the strictness and stringiness on finance issues:

> The Dutch are very mean with their money: they will never give it to you just like that and will always reduce on what you tell them. You need papers; you need explanations; you need signatures; you need proofs and many things. … and you are not sure that the money will be given. And you must be careful to begin asking for the money earlier. … You really have to work for it and prove that the money is needed. (Int.DO5.BkbJul2006)

The strictness and stinginess perceived has developed from the Dutch control of money in the implementation of the development plans. According to a Dutch official,

> This is tax-payers money in our country. We have to be accountable. There are lots of people who are corrupt in the country. That is why we have to control our money. Again, sometimes I have an impression that the financial management in the district is not the best because of incompetent personnel. People are money-hungry and so if we are not careful, the money will get lost. … Moreover, there is no way you will develop without money. … You need the money from those who have it; and if we are the ones with the money, we should control it. (Int.DI1.Bkb.May2004)

This comment of the Dutch official implied that on issues of money, control was necessary through strict measures of accountability and transparency from the district officials on the moneys that was disbursed and used. It is the control that the district officials construed the Dutch as strict and stringy.

A case that needs particular attention is the conflict that arose between a Dutch development practitioner and the RNE in Bukoba. Let me quote an account from a Dutch RNE-DRDP insider who narrated the conflict to me:

> Basically the conflict concerns the wish to continue with KALIDEP (old style) advocated by [some people] based on practical and local considerations, best practices, achieved output and some degree of success and maybe also because of self-interest {who knows: [some people were] not awarded the contract!}. The RNE opted for another consultancy agency (Euro-consult) and another approach to 'off load' KALIDEP resources (cows and other resources from a central KALIDP organisation to individual farmer groups organised in a new umbrella organisation called KADADET! You have to understand RNE position as part of a general downscaling of sectors for structural development aid … and general donor fatigue to continue with KALIDEP after 25 years of assistance.
>
> So, basically, it was a 'death-house' construction, to nicely get rid of a long-term programme under the pretence to advocate for a new bottom-up approach to sustain KALIDEP (understand?)! Anyway, we all know how it went. After conflict the programme was 3 year supported by RNE as exit strategy. The programme was completely dismantled, assets were stolen and basically nothing remains and this all under strict Monitoring and Evaluation by DSM-based consultants without much knowledge and affinity with Kagera. (Int.DI5.Bkb.2003/4/5/6)

This is a clear case of power manifestation in interventions among the Dutch development actors. An individual who had managed to make a visible intervention

in the livelihoods of the people is overrun by preferences of a powerful organ, the RNE. What is more interesting is that the district officials noticed the power struggle and as one official commented, “the Dutch are tough; they have even managed to disorganise him”. This was an expression that referred to a person who had spear-headed the development of KALIDEP, an organisation that has been considered by the people of Bukoba as successful in introducing dairy cattle. For the people in Bukoba, this person was a strong man who was to be respected for his efforts and work done, which were proof of his being powerful. However, as the RNE was able to interfere in what he was doing and make his efforts phase out, the people construed the Dutch in the RNE offices as very tough and more powerful than the Dutch man they had seen as very powerful. Thus, much as the district officials considered the man behind KALIDEP as a powerful person, they recognised the RNE as more powerful for it managed to “oust” him. To the people of Bukoba, this implied that the RNE it could do anything it wished, regardless of what is on the ground as achievements in development or the fame of the people behind such routes to development.

In this section, I have not been expressing the organising practices of the Dutch, but the way they have been perceived by the people in Bukoba. These perceptions constitute the context for the organising practices of the district officials. Given the initiatives of the Dutch people in missionary and development activities, combined with their work ethic, lifestyle, control of money, and power exercise, the Haya people perceive the Dutch as powerful financially and politically. They also see them as people who can “con”, “mismanage”, and “fail” projects.

Perceptions on participation by Dutch RNE-DRDP insiders

In this section, I discuss issues related to participation as perceived by the Dutch insiders in the RNE-DRDPs. These are people who have dealt with the RNE-DRDPs in Tanzania. The Policy Document (RNE 1998) acknowledges the centrality of the concept of participation. The importance of getting the perceptions in the perspective of participation by the Dutch insiders is important as an acknowledgement by the Dutch people themselves that the RNE-DRDPs had elements of non-participation. There are two perspectives in the perception: some Dutch RNE-DRDP insiders see that there were participation and others see the opposite.

Participation lived

There is acknowledgement of the Dutch being participatory in the implementation of the RNE-DRDPs by some Dutch officials who worked in the programme. A former RNE-DRDP, when asked to comment on RNE-DRDPs and participation, said:

> It has always been interesting for me to hear that DRDPs have not been participatory. … There are many situations in which the RNE-DRDPs have practiced participation. …But look, for example: the health and education district plans of 1992/3 and 1993/4 in Bukoba were prepared by the development stakeholders in the district; these were their issues and we had to facilitate them in realising them. We have supported NGO forums in order to have their ideas on the development of the district. (Int.DI3.Nij.Aug2006)

This comment demonstrates that there has been participation, at least by interacting, because some stakeholders are involved in the planning, the beneficiaries are represented, and it is a joint analysis which leads to precise development plans. Participation is the right of the people and that is why there have been initiatives by the RNE-DRDPs to support NGO forums for development planning in the district.

In the third phase of the RNE-DRDPs (1997-2004), when there was a shift from rural development to local governance by strengthening the capacity of local government authorities to take up their increased responsibilities, the RNE practiced participation, as other former RNE-DRDP official comments:

> The role of RNE continued to be providing financial and technical assistance. The system of financial assistance became more transparent. …. Technical assistance changed from project coordinators to development advisers in each district. ... Increasingly emphasis was on national guidelines and procedures, with RNE more in an advisory role. … In fact [RNE-] DRDP became basically a funding source of the integrated district council development plan, with the services of an adviser for the overall development plan. (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006)

So, in this third phase, the RNE strongly takes the advisory role in the development matters of the district. And that is why

> The District Council became formally responsible ("owner") of the DRDP. It was up to the Council to approve the plans and reports. RNE subsequently committed funds to plans approved by the council. (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006)

The shift from rural development to local governance by strengthening the capacity of local government authorities to take up their increased responsibilities rather than being an exit strategy or a consequence of analysis with new insights, was a move guided by the policy orientation in the development cooperation outlook of the Netherlands that was putting good governance at the centre of intervention, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the consequence of the ongoing local government reform programme in Tanzania.

Thus, there have been elements of participation in the RNE-DRDPs because there have been experiences of joint analysis leading to development plans; there has been

recognition of the right of people to planning for themselves, and the RNE in the last phase of the DRDPs took an advisory role, letting the council to be the owner of the DRDP.

Participation unlived

Much as there is a positive outlook about participation from the Dutch RNE-DRDP insiders, there is also a negative outlook from the same respondents. When discussing about participation and in the history of the RNE-DRDPs, a Dutch RNE-DRDP insider said:

> I know that as participation is an ideal, there is no way that we could have it one hundred percent. … We tried as much as we could in the middle of many forces. … For example, it is true that sometime the RNE has wanted things done their way; it is true, again, that some Dutch officials have done things their way. (Int.DI3.Nij.Aug2006)

In this response, there is an indication that participation was not lived to its maximum. The RNE is given as an example of having practices of non participation by doing things its own way. This same idea of the RNE not living participation is echoed in the words of a Dutch development expert in Tanzania when he argues about participation with respect to the RNE in the first phase of the RNE-DRDPs:

> … the role of the RNE in development projects was very close supervision, interference, very direct involvement and very controlling. … At the end they messed up things. (Int.DI2.Dar. Oct2006)

Another Dutch RNE-DRDP insider, when talking about the role of the RNE in the second phase (1992-1996) of the DRDPs where the issue at hand was improving the living conditions and increasing household income with an inclusion of education and health social sector activities, says:

> The role of RNE was prominent in steering the programme through its coordinators and through the approval of the district development plans. Decisions on refusing to fund parts of the development plans were not always transparent or understood by the districts. (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006)

It is the same attitude of the RNE to do things the way it wishes with respect to the policy orientation of the third phase. A Dutch RNE-DRDP argues: “It was entirely initiated and pushed by RNE. Local authorities for a long time resisted the change in orientation” (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006). In this regard, therefore, policy controllers, the RNE, took the development process in their hand at the expense of the beneficiaries of development.

In the second and third phases, another non-participatory phenomenon cropped up in the name of participation: “Beneficiaries were usually involved in construction activities, contributing labour or materials as cost sharing” (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006).

Cost-sharing became paramount in the third phase of the RNE-DRDPs: “Cost sharing became even more important with the introduction of C-matching -25% matching of projects by community funds” (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006). According to Pretty (1996, see chapter 2 of this book), this aspect of cost-sharing in development projects is a kind of participation of the people for material incentives. People are made to participate by providing resources in return for development assistance.

Towards the end of the RNE-DRDPs, there was a decision to shift funding from direct funding of the development projects by the RNE into basket funding. A Dutch RNE-DRDP insider commented when I asked whose decision it was to make such a shift: “The decision to pass RNE funds to basket funding is no doubt a Dutch decision, in line with common thinking by like-minded donors” (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006). Likewise, on the issue of deciding RNE-DRDPs to be taken care of by the SNV, I asked who made the decision and the respondent answered:

> This is an RNE decision, resulting from recent development in Dutch development aid. Dutch embassies are not supposed to implement projects directly. Preferably they should channel funds through national programmes or budget support, but if there is a need/wish to support a project, it must be contracted out. Normally a project of DRDP-size must be tendered internationally, but there is the alternative of “giving” the project to SNV, which has a special status with the Netherlands ministry. RNE Dar opted for this alternative and gave the project to SNV, thereby avoiding the hassle of a tender procedure. (Int.DI4.Nij.Sep2006)

These two decisions are an example of passive participation: the beneficiaries of the RNE-DRDPs were in both cases told what was to happen and what already happened. The decisions were unilateral by the RNE and there were hardly any chances and possibilities of listening to people’s responses and taking care of them.

Thus, instances of some form of participation have co-existed with instances of non-participation. However, even in these instances of participation that I have identified, it is not possible to talk about the self-mobilisation (Pretty 1996, see chapter 2 of this book), as the highest form of participation having taken place: because in the relationship between the Dutch people and the aid beneficiaries in Bukoba, there is no situation in which the beneficiaries themselves have taken initiative of involving the Dutch donors without the Dutch donors being the ones to initiate involvement to promote livelihoods; there is no instance in which the people have been the actors to develop contacts with the donors for resources and technical advice they need, and remain in control on how resources are used. The available participation instances, therefore, are different manifestations of pseudo-participation. Hence, this is a situation of non-participation of the beneficiaries of the RNE-DRDPs, a situation that has led to some organising practices of the RNE-DRDP beneficiaries. As the district officials were in direct contact with the Dutch

donors at the district, they experienced the non-participatory aspect of the Dutch donors and they responded to it through organising practices. Coupled with the non-participatory aspect of the Dutch donors is the livelihoods aspect of the district officials, of which understanding is important because it provides an ulterior motive for engaging in organising practices.

Livelihoods of the district officials

By district officials I mean a combination of both civil servants and councillors in the district. The civil servants are government employees who work at the district. They are in charge of the implementation of these development projects in the district. The councillors are politicians who are elected by the village people at the Ward level to represent them at the district. They are responsible for the political debates on decisions of development plans to be implemented in the district. Both civil servants and the councillors are crucial in the donor-recipient relationship because they directly deal with the donors. In order to understand the livelihoods of the district officials, I use the following extract from an in-depth interview about the life of a retired district official who used to work in Bukoba district as an officer.

> I am married to one wife and God has blessed me with eleven children. I moved to the current village where I am staying in 1969. I was trained as veterinary personnel. I then left the village to town to work as a veterinary officer. I have a modern house, banana plantations with coffee in them, and some dairy cattle. …
>
> I have been a civil servant for thirty years. After retirement, I moved back to my village, where the first to do was to renovate my house using my pension money. In 1997, I started a dairy cattle project to supplement the income obtained through farming. Coffee is my major source of income, together with pension funds, milk, and some remittances from my children who are now employed. Although retired, I still practice my profession in the village to people with livestock.
>
> I am a member of three "plots" [community based organizations]: one for the youth, another one for the clan, and the last one that I inherited from his deceased father is for adults. (Int.DO9.Apr2004)[6]

This is an extract from an in-depth interview that can guide in the analysis of the livelihoods of the district officials. Even though the person is retired as an officer, his account can demonstrate the livelihoods of the district officials as a tension between living the present and living the future during their time as district officials.

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[6] This in-depth interview was part of the study on *Income Dynamics in Kagera Region Tanzania*, (Kessy 2005), in which I participated as a research team member. In this report, this in-depth interview is reported in Appendix 2 about Life histories from KHDS Respondents as "Respondent A2: (15210101) (Kessy 2005: 66).

Living the present

In order to qualify as a civil servant, as the respondent points out when he says "I was trained as a veterinary officer", one needs to have attained a certain level of education, to have certain skills, and to be trained in something. These are education characteristics that have permitted them to compete for employment in the job market as civil servants. If they are councillors, they are the leaders of the people. Thus, they have been chosen because they are trusted by the people they represent. The trust depends on so many issues among which the level of education, sometimes religious affiliation, age, exposure, networks, and their capacity to work.

The district officials have many commitments and responsibilities from their home communities. They have many dependents around them to pay for different things, including school fees for their children and other people's children; they pay for medical bills and have to assist their relatives, young and aged, in cash and material means. They take care of the relatives in terms of shelter, especially the parents, the aged, and the children of their relatives. When the respondent says, "I am a member of three 'plots' [community based organisations]", he indicates the responsibilities of the district officials which go beyond their families and relatives to a larger community. They make contributions in the different groups they belong to and in places where they go for worship; they do voluntary leadership and administrative activities in community- and religious-based organisations. With the Christians, for example, it is typical that these are the leaders and organisers of the faithful in the communities. They provide space for meetings, normally in their homes. All these contributions and activities to the different groups they belong to consume their time, financial and material resources. They need to refuel and repair the vehicles they use to travel in order to make sure that the responsibilities they have for the groups are done, and well-done.

These district officials are expected to have jobs for the people in the village. They provide some jobs personally such as employing people to work in their banana and coffee plantations, to keep their local and dairy cattle, to work in their businesses such as kiosks or bars, and to work in their homes or their relatives' or parents' homes for wages. They are expected to look for jobs for their relatives at the district or in different organisations because they have wider networks.

The district officials have responsibilities because it is thought that they have lots of money. There is a difference in earning income between the civil servants and the councillors. While the civil servants have the salary and allowances which vary a lot, the councillors do not have salaries and they only have allowances. The highly paid civil servants earn around 500,000 to 600,000 Tanzanian shillings (TZS)

(around 300 to 370 EUR)[7] a month after taxes. Other lower officials earn around 120,000 to 400,000 TZS (74 to 246 EUR) a month. Added to the salaries are the allowances. When an official goes to work in the rural areas, he/she is paid 25,000 TZS (15 EUR) a day; when he/she works in town, he/she is paid a maximum of 55,000 TZS (40 EUR) a day; extra duty allowance is paid at a maximum of 10,000 TZS (6 EUR) a day, and when he/she attends a meeting or seminar or workshop, he/she is paid a seating allowance of a maximum of 15,000 TZS (9 EUR) a day. These allowances are added to one's salary. The highest share of allowance goes to one who goes for work in an urban place, and the lowest goes to extra duty. This implies that for instance, if an official went to work in the urban area for 10 days, he/she already has an extra income of 400 EUR besides his/her monthly salary. On the other hand, the councillors get an allowance of a maximum of 15,000 TZS (9 EUR) a day. This implies that if a councillor worked for 20 days a month, he/she would earn a maximum of 300,000 TZS (185 EUR) as allowances in a month.

Thus, the district officials have a sure source of income which they can get at every end of month, an earning that the majority of the village people do not have. For sure, the civil servants earn much more income, given their two channels of income (salary and allowances), compared to the councillors who only depend on the allowances channel.

However, it is important to note that the civil servants have very high consumption patterns. They buy and maintain means of transport like cars and motorcycles (in Bukoba, a bicycle is regarded as a poor person's means of transport); they buy expensive clothing and foot wear; they sustain bars and pubs by buying drinks and offering many others to friends and colleagues (drinking beer is a symbol of being well-off financially); they make large pledges in wedding meetings, parties, and so on. In a way, their salaries combined with allowances should manage to meet the responsibilities and the extras in their lives. Thus, in living the present, the district officials are faced with commitments and responsibilities together with their own high lifestyles, all of them, primarily, depending on the salaries and allowances.

Living the future

During the time of service as district officials, their lives are characterised by privileges, for instance, driving and being driven in government vehicles, having an office to work in, getting free medical treatments, and so on. Thus**,** they are important and respectable people. And, of course, the commitments and responsibili-

[7] The exchange rate used is 1 EUR equivalent to 1,731.79 TZS, according to the FX converter, http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic, accessed 22nd November 2006.

ties they have in their families, among their relatives, and in the community, together with what they get as income, earn them high status. Many district officials, however, get worried about how to maintain the state of good life during, but more especially after their service as district officials.

There is a pension scheme for civil servants. The pensioners have different incomes, depending on their salaries and the time they have worked as civil servants. However, in the lowest category, pensioners receive between 60,000 to 65,000 TZS (36.9 to 40 EUR) for each six months. The middle category receives between 120,000 to 125,000 TZC (74 to 76.7 EUR) for each six months. The higher category receives 200,000 TZC (123 EUR) for each six months. If this is compared to what these officials get during their service period, it is too little and it becomes insufficient for their way of living. They cannot cater for all the commitments and responsibilities together with their extras when they are not working as officials.

As a way to address the problem of maintaining the good life, the district officials begin living the future during their service as district officials through investments. By investment, I mean an action of putting some resource into an activity or process in return for an expected outcome in the future. There are a number of categories of investments by the district officials, based on their expected outcome, as a way of living the future. The first category is embedded in the respondent's account when he says that he gets some remittances from his "children who are now employed". This is investment in education: these officials make sure that they educate their children and relative's children so that these can be remitters of moneys and other material resources later. There are other investments in terms of taking their children to vocational trainings like carpentry, driving, masonry, mechanics and so on so that later they have their jobs to take care of themselves and their parents. In fact, not only do they educate their children but they also try as much as they can to get opportunities to go to school themselves. Trainings that are taken are more professional in terms of management and accounts or human and animal related medicine trainings. Not only do these courses lead to and guarantee more knowledge, more salary increment, and more possibilities of promotion at work, but also they are courses that can lead to and guarantee more jobs and work after employment as civil servants.

The second category is expressed in this sentence of the respondent: "After retirement, I moved back to my village, where the first thing to do was to renovate my house". The investment consists in securing a sure permanent place in the village in terms of a plantation and house so that when he retires he has a sure place to go to and continue with life without employment. As a matter of fact, many officials try to

get as many immobile assets such as land and houses in the villages**.** One of the famous councillors, at his death he had acquired more than 30 banana plantations with coffee trees, cattle, and houses in them. Sometimes this search for a permanent place to stay after retirement is accompanied by some sentimental attachment to the sense of home. Look at what this respondent says when I asked him why he had to move from the city to the village and he said:

> I was born here; part of me [referring to placenta] is already buried here in this banana plantation. … I have eaten and drunk almost everything from this plantation. … I have five children who were born in this plantation and part of them already buried here. … My wife was married with many gifts from this plantation. … I have already allocated portions of this plantation to my children. … My parents were buried here; I shall be buried here also. So, my coming back is nothing else other than life itself: this is home; all of us in this home are all here and shall remain here. (Fgd.1.VP3.Kab.Jul2004)

So, some people feel that their lives cannot be detached from the villages: they were born there, their placenta is buried there, they married there, and they should be buried there. Thus, they feel that they are part and parcel of the village and that is where they need to be permanent.

The third category of investment is found in the respondent's account that "I started a dairy cattle project to supplement my income". The investment consists in putting money and effort into an agricultural project in order to get income. Much as the district officials have a sure monthly source of income, they are always engaged in different types of income-generating activities such as businesses that have to do with selling agricultural produce (coffee, bananas, banana brew), retail shops (kiosks), taxis and motor-cycles for hiring, bars and pubs, and so on. They have houses for renting out. It is in this category of investment that the respondent narrates: "Although retired, I still practice my profession in the village to people with livestock". With the use of skills they have obtained at work, they participate in different committees in the villages. For instance, the district officers who come from the education department will go to the school committees; those with the medicine background will go to the health committees, and so on. Out of these committees they earn a living. Take an example from this person who used to work in the education office who is now in the school committee, who said:

> I have educated so many children in this and many other villages; I have assisted many when I worked at the district in the education office; … Now, in this committee, I feel a little relaxed: I use my experience in education work and I plan with the members. I have some allowances. I have something to eat in my old age. … I worked hard before, now I am enjoying when I am back home in another service at the school. (Fgd.2.VP6.Kab.Jul2004)

This implies that the district officials make use of their education or skills or trainings acquired when they are retired so that they can gain income when they are out of service as civil servants.

Education, acquiring immobile assets, and back to business, again, are three important categories of investments for the district officials. They assist them in maintaining their status and assure them of status in future.

There is something else worth mentioning about the councillors. The selection of the politicians in order to become councillors entails a political process in which they have to convince people that they work for them. They need to be trusted by the electorate. They promise and make good rapport with the people before elections. Once they are in office as councillors, they are never sure if they will go back again. It is, therefore crucial for them to maintain the trust with the people through fulfilling the promises they made during campaigns and through good rapport with the electorate. It is for this reason that you find many politicians in groups where there are parties or funerals or entertainment joints. Others pull development resources in their villages.

For example, a councillor used to pull development projects to his Ward: he assisted in the expansion and rehabilitation of the village primary school through funds raised by him; he had several agricultural projects which provided employment and help to the village in his Ward. In fact, when he died people said that if there was a possibility of resurrecting him by each paying 3,000 or 5,000 Shillings (1.8 to 3 EUR) that would be done immediately without any problem. For the village people this is not little money. This means, then, that because he was trusted that much due to his efforts to bring projects and employ people in the village, village people would pay a lot of money for him to come back! This means that he had had good rapport with the village people in his constituency. For politicians it is important that the trust is maintained because they have to come back as politicians again and again.

Thus, the livelihoods of the district officials is tensed between living the present and living the future. In living the present, they maximise the use of available resources and possibilities that accrue from the service as district officials and in living the future, they invest for remittances, where to live, income generation, status and continuous trust.

District officials and their organising practices

I have presented the Haya perception of the Dutch people as powerful financially and politically; I have shown how the Dutch have not practiced participation, and; I have demonstrated how the livelihoods of the district officials are tensed between living the present and the future. All these factors have influenced the organising

practices of the district officials. Due to the fact that they are concerned with the everyday activities on the planning, allocation of resources, and implementation of development projects in the district, they have worked closer with the RNE-DRDP donors; and due to the fact that they have worked with the development plans that have evolved from the participatory planning according to the decentralised system, they have also worked with the people in the rural areas. Their organising practices, therefore, as diligent responses in the manifold and fragmented strategies, arising from particular combination of ideas, material circumstances, and interactional potentials, have evolved within the field of power and struggle between them and the Dutch donors, on the one hand, and on the other hand, between them and the people in the rural areas. The power struggles have involved the district officials in actions of manoeuvring, mobilisation, and strategising with the aim of livelihoods promotion.

The organising practices of the district officials of Bukoba are studied in the context of their perceptions of the Dutch people in the history of their interaction in development issues in Bukoba as powerful people financially and politically. Due to the character of the "power over" that the Dutch donors assumed due to being agents of the modernising development discourse, on the one hand, the district officials engaged in the implementation of the RNE-DRDPs in a non-participatory manner. In order to promote their livelihoods, on the other hand, they engaged in organising practices in order to circumvent the non-participatory character of the Dutch donors in the RNE-DRDPs. And again, taking advantage of the official position of being at the district headquarters which is the entrance of Dutch aid, they have engaged in some organising practices to maintain their power positions with respect to the people in the rural areas. The organising practices of the district officials are based on the categories of collaboration, corruption, and domination. The different manifestations I point out within a category are the indicators for such organising practice.

Collaboration

Collaboration of the district officials as an organising practice means a diligent response of district workers to work together with the donors. This working together can be distinguished between the two classifications of the district officials working together with Dutch donors, on one hand, and on the other hand, the district officials working together amongst themselves. When district officials work together with the donors, collaboration is manifested as "blocking enquiries about money" and "listening for behaving". When district officials work together amongst themselves,

collaboration is manifested as “speaking underground” and “networking”. Let me now explain each manifestation, beginning with the manifestations in the classification of district officials working together with the donors.

Blocking enquiries about money

This is one of the manifestations of collaboration in the classification of district officials working with donors. It was difficult to get information about the financial accounts of the BDRDP. In fact, as it was not easy to obtain documents that had information about the amount of donor aid to finance the RNE-DRDPs in Kagera, I expressed my disappointment of not having documents about finance to a district official, and he said to me:

> Who are you in this research? Who are you to know how much the donors have spent on development activities? This kind of research can only be done by them because it is their money. What is your interest in their money? Are you surprised that you fail to get the documents? It is my first time to hear that someone like you is doing research on issues about donor money. (Int.DO2.Bkb.Jun2004)

This implied that I was doing research in an area which I was not supposed to. It was not my money; I was peeping into other people’s money! At one level, one would think that the district officials still nurture the mentality of the beggar who has no choice but to accept uncritically what comes from the donor, without asking for any accountability or transparency from the donor. This thinking would be fuelled by the thinking that questioning issues about donor money could result in annoying the donors and the diminishing of the funds. So, it would be better to keep quiet and dig less into money issues.

However, one of the critical ways to understand why district officials do not want anybody to know about donor money is expressed in this response of the Dutch RNE-DRDP insider when answering to the question as to what was the role of the district officials with respect to implementation of RNE-DRDP projects: “Implementing but with the accent of getting as much as possible allowances, and doing as little as possible… They slowly realized that there was a nice cake to be distributed” (Int.DI2.Dar.Oct2006). So, one reason as to why they never wanted anybody to tamper with the funds issues was because they thought this would be a way in which some of the misconducts with money would come out. And if they came out, then the donors would know and would limit the funding. Thus, the important thing would be to block any initiative that has to do with enquiries about money. In so doing, it was as if there is utmost collaboration with the donors in terms of financial management because there were no contradictory stories coming out.

I had a discussion with one of the district officials about the Dutch donors and the expenditures in the first phase of the BDRDP. According to the table from De Boer *et al.* (1992:40), 63% of the expenditure in the initial phase of the money was not spent in Tanzania, but in the Netherlands. Commenting on this allocation of expenditures in the first phase of the BDRDP, the district official said:

> I understand that it is true that there is a lot of donor's money that is spent in the donor countries than in the recipient countries. … I should not disclose this, but I know very well that the Dutch people who are here working in the BDRDP get a lot bigger amounts of money than we do. That is money that goes back to them. We give them employment; we buy their machines and equipment; we maintain them with the nice houses and many things for free, and so on. Aren't we aiding them? But, we should as well; admit that it is their money. Why should we, then, make noise about it? …
>
> If they want to bring money, they bring it with their reasons. In any case, it is not our money; it is theirs. We have little say and even if we had say, we cannot control it. They can choose what they want to do with it. If we do not want to collaborate, they go somewhere else. And we stay the losers because even the small that we would manage to get from them, we cannot get it any more. (Int.DO5.Bkb.Jul2006)

This district official did not see any reason as to why people should question the prioritisation of donor funds. It is recognised that there are financial problems from the donor's side, but there should not be a way of addressing the problem because the donors have the money and they can do with it what they want. This is a reason as to why it is difficult to make donors accountable. For example, instead of questioning donors why they are spending lots of money in their respective countries if they have come to give aid, aid recipients keep quiet. People are so preoccupied with keeping the donors around to an extent that even when they see and understand blunders, they tend to be submissive. They would not like to bite the hand that feeds them. Let me now go to listening for behaving as another manifestation of working together of district officials with the donors.

Listening for behaving

In this manifestation of collaboration, district officials go beyond simply listening, but they listen and take action towards what they need, money. In one of the interviews about the presence of SNV, a district official argued:

> We, people in the district who have to implement development programmes, have little to say; … For example, they have told us that SNV has taken over. So, we are no *more orphans* after BDRDP died! … These people of SNV are here on our compound and they have another office in town. … *Slowly by slowly we shall know what they want and we shall try to work with them*. That is how it goes. … There is no much news: they have their procedures which they follow and *we shall know how to handle that*. …
>
> Look, we have had an introductory meeting with these people of SNV. They were strange: they told us that everything was in our hands; they are there to be called for work; we are the

> ones to give them work. … Those are their tricks to dodge us, and that is how it always goes. … Anyway, they will never go completely, and we benefit from that. … But we listen, and we see how to behave. (Int.DO1.Bkb.2003/4/5/6)

The metaphor about orphans is interesting: as orphans lack parents, so were the district officials without BDRDP. This implies that, in a way, the source of livelihoods promotion was curtailed. SNV is a substitute who is a saviour they have not yet understood properly. That SNV belongs to them and they have to call SNV for work seem to be treacherous to the district officials because this perspective turns things upside down: instead of SNV providing sources of livelihoods, they are supposed to do it to SNV! But the district officials do not give up!

Such phrases as "slowly by slowly we shall know what they want and we shall try to work with them", "we shall know how to handle that", and "but we listen, and see how to behave" are expressions of careful listening for a diligent action. It is a listening for behaving. Another district official commented when I asked if he knew the roles of SNV:

> Things are still so hidden; things are still tight. But there is a rumour that they have come for capacity building in local governance; they have not yet said it directly, but people say that documents say so. We shall get them there. We want workshops, and long ones. We want to understand issues; we want to benefit as much as possible from these donors! My friend, shall we go and ask for something to eat at police?

The last remark in this response of the official, "my friend, shall we go and ask for something to eat at police?", is an expression to say that when you want money, you do not go and get it from police: you need to get it from somewhere else, in this case through capacity building so that he may have long workshops for more allowances. He makes it clear that the way to get money is through donors and not through police. At police you can only be behind bars in cells.

Another example of listening for behaving is found in the development of the Farmers' Extension Centres (FECs) in Kagera region. These are an offshoot of the then Livestock Development Centres (LDCs), meant to support livestock extension and veterinary services. The establishment of LDCs was planned throughout Kagera Region from 1987 by the Kagera Livestock Development Programme (KALIDEP), in the Kagera Indigenous Livestock Improvement Development Programme activities. The target groups were farmers and their families in the villages and adjacent wards. Due to the fact that rural development is a multi-sectoral phenomenon, and as farmers needed to see, learn, organize, and acquire basic farm inputs, the LDCs proved not sufficient. Then, the idea of FECs was born in July 1990 at the meeting of the regional agricultural and livestock personnel, BDRDP coordinators of all projects, and NGOs oriented to agriculture production and development in

Kagera. The idea was geared towards servicing agricultural development in crop and livestock production, agro-forestry, basic input supply, animal traction, and demonstrations. The FECs had several roles: acting as focal point of extension services; training centres for aspiring dairy farmers; stocking and distribution of various agriculture, livestock, and agro-forestry input; collecting economic and technical data related to farming in the area; service centres for simple veterinary diagnostics, animal breeding and oxenisation services; facilitation of farmers groups, societies and women's activities; training centre for agricultural and/or livestock staff, and a working ground for adaptive research.

For the whole region, 36 to 40 FECs were envisaged to cater for 15 villages each, with a demonstration farm, an office, laboratory, classroom, strong room for input storage, housing for the manager and extension staff, and a shed for dairy cattle. The construction of the FECs was funded by different donors, including the KALIDEP, DRDPs, the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Japanese Food Aid Counterpart Funds (JFACF). Table 6.1 shows the FECs established in Bukoba District together with their respective donors and the years of establishment. In Bukoba District, the RNE contributed to the establishment of 30% of all the FECs, out of which it is only one that seems to be still working, the Kabirizi FEC. All the other FECs in the District have almost collapsed, even though the buildings are still standing.

Table 6.1 FECs in Bukoba District and their donors

FEC name	*Year of establishment*	*Main construction donor*
Bukoba	1988/89	EEC/CF
Kyakailabwa	1989/90	EEC/CF
Kayanga Kiziba	1988/89	EEC/CF
Nsunga	1992/93	EEC/CF
Kanyigo	1993/94	EEC/CF
Mushozi	1992/93	BDRDP
Kabirizi	1991/92	BDRDP
Kyema	1994/95	BDRDP
Kashaba	1995/96	EEC/CF/JFACF
Nyakibimbili	1996/97	JFACF

Source: Rugambwa, V.K, *et al.* (1997)

The supervision and management of the FECs are done with several committees: the first two are policy bodies, that is: the Regional Agriculture Coordinating Committee chaired by the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS), and the District

Agriculture Coordinating Committee chaired by the District Executive Director (DED). The other two committees are technical bodies: the Regional FEC Technical Committee chaired by the Regional Agricultural and Livestock Development Officer (RALDO), and the District FEC Technical Committee chaired by the District Agricultural and Livestock Development Officer (DALDO). In the whole establishment of the FECs, it was the donors, the regional officials, and some few district officials who were busy participating to plan and see to it that the FECs work.

I asked a district official to what extent the farmers were consulted in the establishment of the FECs and she said:

> You see, donors have always been generous. They have tried to assist us in all ways. We have one problem with the farmers: they are difficult to understand and that is why if you are not careful they can spoil everything. They speak too much. They have no time to think twice; they will just speak out of their frustrations. That is why if you are not careful and ask them everything, they can easily spoil deals. It is better to keep some discussions within people who can understand what is happening.

According to this official, farmers are too open and they will speak out their problems according to how they see them (they speak too much). That is why they do not "think twice"; "frustrations" make them speak out their minds! This explanation of the district officials about the farmers can be understood through another comment that when he says that "they can easily spoil deals**"**. This statement implies that there is something else, apart from the problems of the farmers that the officials are "scheming". It is "this thing" that they are afraid will be spoilt. In the continuation of her comment, she says:

> Moreover, who of us could say no to incoming projects? That is more chance to increase your income through field visits. Don't you know that the implementation of these projects is also an opportunity for business people in terms of contracts, tenders and so many other things? If you do not consider all these issues you end up messing around with opportunities. So, you need to be careful in involving a lot of people, especially the farmers.

With this final part of the comment, it is clear that the officials present were trying their best to see to it that the opportunity that had come through donors was to be maximised for them to get more money in terms of allowances and benefits that could accrue from the implementation of the FECs, for the business people to boost their businesses and tenders, for experts to do some consultancy works, and something for the farmers too. In a way, this was an opportunity to boost the economy for livelihoods of the different people. But what was crucial was the listening for behaving (which the farmers do not have and that is why they were not involved in the discussions on the establishment of FECs) of the district officials in order that the opportunity was to be utilised without any unfortunate politics to divert it.

It can be argued, therefore, that in listening for behaving, the district officials are trying to understand the intentions of the donor and design and insert projects that promote not only their livelihoods but even the livelihoods of others like the business people and to some extent the farmers. Listening for behaving is crucial because the opportunity that presents itself should not be allowed to go back; it should be utilised.

Whereas in blocking enquiries, working together is geared towards hiding financial mistakes on the side of the aid recipient and not questioning the financial problems on the side of the donor, in listening for behaving working together is geared towards understanding in order to design and insert projects for different people including allowances for officials, business opportunities for business people, and some benefits for the farmers. Thus, with respect to district officials working together with donors, these two manifestations of blocking enquiries and listening for behaving demonstrate how it is in the interest of the district officials that the donors who bring opportunities for livelihoods promotion should be maintained. They should not be upset in any case so that they may not go away and the funds that are given for different operations are not available any more. But again, it is necessary that the way they do things is understood so that proper ways of getting money from is designed. It is for this reason that people, like farmers, who would openly talk about their problems are avoided so that there may be better opportunity to maximise the possibility of funding for projects that could bring in more money. Let me now turn to the third type of collaboration in which the district officials work together amongst themselves.

Speaking underground

This is the first manifestation of collaboration in the classification of district officials working together amongst themselves. I had a discussion about participation with a civil servant who worked with BDRDP in a number of projects. The discussion was based on the chronological overview of BDRDP as presented by den Dool (2003: 122-3). I summarise this overview in Table 6.2. I asked his opinion if such a text represented the development of BDRDP over time within the council. He argued:

> This is somehow a true picture. … Working together is good, of course. But you see our problem: these people do not work with us at all; they bring us problems. Look at this Dutch man who was an expatriate: he says we should plan together, we at the district and many other organisations. This was difficult. (Int.DO5.Bkb.Jul2006)

Table 6.2 Chronological overview of BDRDP

Period	*Events*
1988 February	Arrival of expatriate Programme Coordinator arrived in Bukoba District
1988 May	Initial action plan prepared
1991	First time annual plan was an integrated plan covering all departments and all donors active in the district
1993	New system of village elections introduced. Village and Ward executive officers were established and paid by the Bukoba District Council
1994	In 1994 a mid-term evaluation was carried out by Dutch and Tanzanian experts. Problems identified included poor road maintenance, lack of good extension messages, inadequate involvement of village other private partners, lack of impact assessment and poor implementation of the water programme. Recommendations: more emphasis on the productive sectors, donors insisting on central government to provide qualified personnel, suggestion that the DRDPs cooperate closely with regional and central government, a third phase of the DRDPs to take place.

Source: Adapted from den Dool 2003: 122-123.

In this part of the first response, the district official refers to the experience of bringing together different stakeholders in development, such as the Kolping Society of Tanzania, Partage, the Churches, and the district council, for developing a district development plan. This was the experience of the 1992/3 and 1994/5 district health and education development plans. It was a new approach for planning in the district and difficult to realise. As a district official commented, there was lack of preparation and officials' input on the approach:

> We needed to be trained and sensitised enough to this way of working; we needed to say whether that way of working was ok or not. … We could not air out this view, at least to the Dutch because we never knew what would be the reaction, most likely not to be funded. You see, this Dutch man comes and says that we have to plan for ourselves.
>
> You see, people need to be educated on such issues. You do not simply come and say participate in making your own plans. Not all organisations can work together. … Look at me, I provide everything at home. But since nowadays we say that we are all equal, … I wake up one morning and I tell my wife and children, 'discuss together so that you can go and get food for the family'! Can it work? … Surely, it cannot work. I need to educate my family into planning together, the reasons behind, advantages of planning together, and so on. (Int.DO5.Bkb.Jul2006)

This is an expression of complaints about participation. In general terms, this official complains that the way they were made to participate was improper. At one level, the complaint seems to be genuine based on the general feeling that participation was introduced in a non-participatory manner: there was no education on the way to plan together. The bottom-up approach that was introduced by the RNE-DRDP was not understood, given the authorities' experience of the 1970s whereby

expatriates came and formulated projects. Thus, people were used to a top-down approach in development planning and implementation. Many officials knew that development was supposed to be top-bottom. So, change of approach upset their working ways.

But again, this kind of approach missed another important issue in the livelihoods of the people of Bukoba in general: development interventions are done in competitive ways by the different stakeholders. These competitions are along religious lines, and sometimes along individual lines. For example, there is always competition between Roman Catholic and Protestant institutions in implementing development projects. Again, in some places, some donor organisations have had a monopoly of interventions in some areas, excluding others. Along such competitive atmosphere, it was difficult that these people sit together and have a meaningful planning. Not only would each organisation want to attract attention to its interests, but also prejudices about the other negatively affect the planning. The district officials are caught up in such lines of competition because they belong to specific religious denominations. Some of them have been caught up in the conflicts between their offices and donors who have wanted to monopolise interventions in some specific areas. Thus, speaking underground for them was very important as a way to give a "soft protest" to the planning together so that the differences may not come out sharply and spoil whatever is already being done by the competing organisations.

At another level, however, it is important to note the insistence on "training", "sensitisation", and "education" in participatory planning issues. These are moments for workshops and seminars in which the district officials benefit from allowances. Not only allowances, but also there was need for training and sensitisations that would gradually iron out the religious and "sphere of influence" differences that cause unhealthy competition.

The Dutch decision to move away from direct funding to the projects to a common basket has been taken by the district officials as a breach to participation. For example, the decision of the RNE to put the funds to a common basket with other donors has raised some complaints from the officials:

> Look, with their idea of improving participation, they have decided to take the money away from the district and hand it over to the central government where other donors are, and they say this is participation. Why couldn't they come and ask us who are down here toiling? Why couldn't they go and ask the people in the villages what they prefer, whether the money in Dar or here in the district? They claim they have built the capacity of the local government; if that is the case, why can't they trust us in making decisions about how to handle our things as people belonging to the local government? … What they do is to deal with the local government in Dar! (Int.DO1. Bkb.Jul2006)

The same feeling of not being involved in the "major decisions" is expressed by another district official when commenting on the basket funding:

> They can shift their money the way they want. … There is something strange, though: … The whole idea with BDRDP was to make development initiatives come nearer to people; Dar es Salaam was very far to know the problems of people in the village; … and that is why they came in. … Now we hear that the money is going back to Dar es Salaam; … are we not going back to the same problem of distancing poor people? (Int.DO6.Bkb.Jul2006)

These are interesting comments about participation. The district people feel that they are marginalised because they are not made to participate in major decisions regarding money. The complaint, though, is based on the money issue that is being taken away and shifted to Dar es Salaam because it does not remain in the District. With the money away from the district, there are few chances to plan for ways to have it percolate to the pockets of the district officials in programmes such as those to do with training. In the name of participation, therefore, the district officials are arguing for the money back in the district because that way there can be more opportunities to plan for it and use it in the district for local needs rather than when it is in the Ministry of Finance in Dar es Salaam.

Thus, the district officials have spoken underground so as not to antagonize themselves with the Dutch donors on the complaints that the funds were leaving the districts to basket funding. This shift of funds allocation has minimized their chances of gaining from the allowances that would come out of the trainings, seminars, and workshops.

A district official commented on the question as to how they would make sure that they participate equally in development planning with donors:

> … my complaints are like the frog's noise in a drinking well which can never stop cows from drinking water; but what I know is that the cow always drinks the water while scared! … It is their money, yes, but they should respect us; they should not plan with it the way they wish. … We have been speaking underground all along. That is why even the small money we have got from them is because they could hear our whispers. … You researchers should assist us to air out our views underground wherever you will present your findings. … The only way you can deal with a powerful person with money is to speak underground and make sure that everybody understands. When you speak louder, they will ignore you and sometimes you can even lose your job. (Int.DO6.Bkb.Jul2006)

These complaints, therefore, are not made publicly in newspapers or radios or through demonstrations. They are careful complaints discussed among the officials alone. Sometimes, however, they seek to incorporate other people, such as researchers or high-ranking politicians in order to be carriers of their complaints. This is speaking underground. "Speaking loudly" would antagonize them with the donors who should continue giving funds, even though reduced. Through incorporating

people like researchers and high-ranking politicians, these underground voices are bound to reach the donors and increase chances for more donor funds in the districts.

Speaking underground, therefore, has several functions for the livelihoods of the district officials. The first function is making sure that the little funds they get from the donors are not affected. Instead, speaking underground should influence some more funds from the donors. Funds are needed by the district officials for more opportunities for income generation in terms of allowances and the different projects that can take place in their communities. The second function of speaking underground is to avoid clashes between the different competing organisations involved in development implementation in the district. These organisations compete, especially, along religious lines. This implies that these differences involve part of their networks where they belong and have commitments and responsibilities. Speaking underground assists in avoiding direct confrontations between the competing organisations. This helps in avoiding disruptions on what initiatives the organisations are already doing. The third function of speaking underground is to incorporate other people who can be of use in carrying the complaints to the people who can listen to them and take action. Let me now turn to networking as another manifestation of collaboration

Networking

This is another manifestation of district officials working together amongst themselves. As manifestation of collaboration, I give an example of civil servants collaborating with politicians in order to secure development projects from donors. In one of the Farmer's Extension Centres (FEC) constructed by the Dutch, a request for construction of dormitories was presented to a Dutch high-ranking government official who had come to inaugurate the FEC. Much as it is general knowledge that the farmers asked for the dormitory, this is what a civil servant told me about the dormitory:

> I got the idea of having dormitories from when I started working here. But I was already tipped that there was a big person from the Netherlands who was coming and if possible I was to ask for something in order to make the FEC look much better. I was advised by my colleagues at the district that what we should ask for should be something that has to do with the people. …
>
> There are farmers who cannot go back home because of distance. The idea was for farmers to sleep around. … Moreover, this would generate some income. I gave this idea to the Councillor and his fellow politicians and asked them to present it to our visitor [Dutch high ranking government official]. (Int.DO4.Kab.Aug2003)

In this observation of one of the district officials, it is clear how the idea of the dormitories was generated by the district officials and then sold to the councillors

who presented it to the Dutch official. This is networking among the district officials themselves: civil servants and councillors. District officials have learnt how to make use of local politicians (councillors): for civil servants it is important that the projects are asked for and implemented because then there is the possibility of having more income when they are being supervised, when tenders are being made, and when purchases are done; for councillors, projects are important when they ask for them and when they are implemented because they are seen as serious people who are promoting development in the area and this gains them more trust, fame and popularity to qualify as good politicians.

Thus, with speaking underground the district officials want to influence some more funds from donors by complaints without negatively affecting the funds they already get, to avoid direct confrontations between competing development organisations, and they want to incorporate more people in order to carry their complaints to higher authorities; with networking the district officials want to have projects running (and therefore possibilities for more income) and to demonstrate the seriousness of officials among the village people in order to gain their trust and popularity.

In this first organising practice of collaboration, I have presented the four manifestations: blocking enquiries, listening for behaving, speaking underground, and networking. All these four manifestations are manifold and fragmented strategies of the district officials that take place in a complex web of their interactions with the donor situation. They are manoeuvres to make sure that the donor's presence and opportunities are maximised for the benefit of their livelihood promotion. However, what is important in these manifestations is the aspect of working together. Conflict is avoided. In this way, income is obtained and development projects go as far as the villages, with the district officials benefiting from the incomes, the village people around them benefiting from them through their commitments and responsibilities. These indications of organising practices become a vehicle for the district officials to balance the tension between living the present and the future.

Corruption

This is another organising practice whereby district officials seek illegitimate personal or public gain. Corruption is discussed in the following manifestations: theft, forgeries, and favouritism.

Theft

This is one of the complicated manifestations of corruption. Much as there are clues about theft, it is difficult to come out with "substantiated" facts from the ground:

> As theft in BDRDP would bring a negative publicity for both the Tanzanians and the Dutch people, the officials tend to keep quiet about it. While drinking a beer with some of the Dutch, they will complain about theft; but if you ask specific information they close up. (Int.DI2.Dar.-Nov2006)

Theft is criminal; people do not want to discuss anything about it. However, there are some clues about theft with regard to district officials and Dutch aid. A Dutch respondent mentions as one of the problems the failure of the district council to control theft: "However, they failed to control the massive thefts occurring in the district" (Int.DI2.Dar.Oct2006). He continues to point out that

> in some areas we worked together but it was with problems, like setting up of Farmers Extension Centres (FECs). I wanted them to be as cheap as possible while the District made them very expensive due to robberies. (Int.DI2.DarOct2006)

He means that district officials were involved in stealing. Thefts have occurred in many construction activities. "We had to build a strong wall around the store in order to deal with stealing from the store by some of our staff", said a district officer (Int.DO5.Bkb.Jul2006). "I remember in one night there were two lorries full of cement that were grounded at police", said a Dutch insider of the RNE-DRDPs (Int.DI2.Dar.Nov2006). District officials in stores collaborate with drivers and business people in the stealing of construction materials for roads and buildings. During the construction of the roads, many people stole cement and used it to build their houses. Drivers used to load sand, stones, and cement for themselves and their bosses using BDRDP vehicles in order to construct their houses. More often, drivers would transport building materials for people at a fee. Making FECs very expensive was deliberate: there was demand for extra charges and extra construction raw materials so that some money and construction materials may remain and are used by individual officials.

In the same vein, another Dutch insider of the RNE-DRDPs mentions that "assets were stolen and basically nothing remains" (Int.DI5.Bkb.2003/4/5/6), when he is talking about the assets of KALIDEP and its phasing out. These assets included cars and office equipment. Thus, there has been theft of construction materials and assets by the district officials. There was also misuse of district property in terms of using vehicles for private use and personal financial gains. Let me now turn to forgeries.

Forgeries

According to the decentralisation system in Tanzania, participatory development planning is supposed to take place down from the sub-village, to the village, to the Ward, and finally to the district. However, in many cases, in the hamlet and village levels, participatory development planning meetings are hardly done. This is a

situation that the leaders at the Ward level are aware of. During a Ward Development Committee (WDC) meeting, for example, the chairperson of the meeting, who is a councillor, advised:

> You people, I know that there are no meetings down there. …That is not a problem; you should not get worried because you know it very well, all of you, what is to be done. … All of you know how to read and write. If that is true, can you fail to write minutes of the hamlets and villages tonight and give them to me for presentation in the district tomorrow? I need them tomorrow because that is when we are meeting. (Mtg1.Pol1.Izi.Aug2003)

By this phrase, "you know it very well, all of you, what is to be done", it is implied that the village chairpersons were not doing something new; they were to do what they are used to do: forging minutes for undone meetings. That is why, confidently, the chairperson of the WDC asks the village chairpersons to forge minutes of the meetings in their respective villages. Minutes are important as supporting documents that participatory planning has taken place. And the motive for forging the minutes of the meetings is clear from the councillor who argues that: "Just do that [writing the minutes] … We have to get money in our ward" (Mtg1.Pol1.Izi.Aug2003). Thus, the reason as to why the minutes were to be forged was connected to demonstrating that participatory meetings had occurred and so moneys would come to the ward.

Not only are forgeries asked for and done by councillors to fake meetings, but also civil servants produce fake reports and receipts asking for refunds and allowances. One of the district officials working with the finance department confided:

> You must be very careful in an office like this one. You have to control people in everything they bring to you. Everybody is looking for money. Some deserve it, but some not. There are many fake reports of workshops and meetings that took place; when people go for fuel, they put less and demand more; they go to work for one night and they claim five days; that is how it goes. And you must be very careful because when you become very strict, then you are their enemy: they can eliminate you. (Int.DO7.Bkb.Jul2006)

Thus, forgeries are everywhere from the politicians to the civil servants. In participatory development planning meetings, they become a manifestation of corruption because they forge hamlet and village meetings that did not take place by falsely boosting the image of participation of the hamlet and village people on development projects through fake documents. The motivation of councillors in this respect is to have the money in the village for promotion of individual and sometimes community projects. With community projects, the councillors are rated as serious politicians working for the people. With the civil servants, forgeries are corruptions because they aim at extorting money from the district coffers. These

moneys are normally for personal use in their families or with their relatives. Let me turn to another manifestation of corruption, favouritism.

Favouritism

I take favouritism to mean an inclination to give favours to some person or group or relatives or friends because of the relationship ties rather than because of their abilities to do something. This is another manifestation of corruption by the district officials. In the WDC meeting, the issue of favouritism deserves attention from the communication of the councillor, for instance:

> [write the minutes] and leave the rest to be taken care of me when I am there [at the district headquarters] *together with my colleagues*. We have to help our people. … There is need to trick the government, otherwise it tricks you. *Our brothers we have there in the district will assist us*. (Mtg.Pol1.Izi.Aug2003; emphasis mine)

The use of such words as "together with my colleagues" and "our brothers we have there in the district will assist us" are expressions of "connections" at the higher level of authority in order to get favours. These "colleagues" and "brothers", who are officials in the district who can be talked to because they are relatives or friends or come from nearby villages or belong to the same political party, reduce the lengthy and level of scrutiny of procedures in allocation of development projects by allocation of resources without passing through a lot of political discussions by favouring them. This is the meaning of "tricking the government": to circumvent the necessary participatory procedures and to engage in connections that can result in favours.

Tendering is another example where favouritism is manifested. When explaining how the tenders in the district are awarded, an official said:

> During the selection process [of development projects to be implemented], it is when some of our colleagues tell friends and relatives to apply and they give them the tenders. It is easy to share this money …
>
> And you should not forget that these politicians must favour their business people because they assisted them in campaigns. … Some politicians have shares in the business; some business people are sons to these politicians. … these employ other people; the profits made go to build houses in the villages; some profits are the ones used to take children to school; … you can see why, I think. (Int.DO7.Bkb.Jul2006)

In this quote, it is seen that some district officials favour their friends, relatives, and business associates. In a particular way, business people are favoured because they campaigned for these politicians at the district. It is a kind of gratitude these politicians give, but again as a way to ask for more votes when it is time for elections. Favouritism happens, again, because these district officials have shares in some companies that do businesses and some business people are their relatives. So,

when these companies get profits, they also get profits. The dimension of the benefits to the village is important for any district official, especially the politicians because when they are being assessed for another term of office, the question is what they did for their respective villages. If it happens that there is some project that was directed to the village, in a way then, they are voted in because they are successful politicians who were able to pull development resources to the village.

The presence of a development project in an area is seen as a function of interested politicians who can make good connections with the different people, among which the relatives or friends or village-mates who are civil servants. Favouritism is fuelled by behaviours of village people who would always question a civil servant later what he/she did for the village when he/she was in service. In short, favouritism influences the decision-making and allocation of development resources within relationships. Favouritism, thus, short-circuits the participatory development planning procedures and influences the allocation of development resources according to the likes of the officials. The allocation of development resources in their villages is important for councillors and civil servants because while it brings councillors fame and popularity as politicians, it also enhances the image of the civil servant who is seen as someone who did something for his village when he was in service as a civil servant.

All these three manifestations of corruption, that is: theft, forgeries, and favouritism, are strategies that have evolved around material circumstances and particular ideas. The material circumstances involved are related to the presence of means of transport and building materials. For example, the means of transport have been used to transport building materials and get funds through carrying building materials for a fee. The particular ideas involved are related to the concept of participation. For example, forgeries have been done as a proof for participation in order to justify participatory development planning. However, what seems to be crucial in these manifestations of corruption is the aspect of grabbing resources for their own private use and their communities. This is how the district officials have been able to acquire financial and material resources to cater for their responsibilities and commitments, on the one hand, and on the other hand, maintaining their status, fame, and popularity among the village people.

Domination

This is an organizing practice, which is particularly related to the councillors. It is expressed in three main ways: influence peddling, suppression, and smart force. Whereas the first two types of organising practices were responses of the district

officials directed towards their relationship with the Dutch donors who have been non-participatory in development interventions, this organising practice of domination is a response directed towards the aid beneficiaries who are people living in the rural areas, given the position of the district officials as people who are found at the entrance of Dutch aid. This is a privileged position for the district officers because they are the link between the Dutch donors and the aid beneficiaries in the rural areas. This organising practice is geared towards creation of neo-kingdoms, a phenomenon that I shall explain at the end of this section. Let me begin by describing influence peddling as manifestation of domination.

Influence peddling

This is a practice of using one's influence in government or connections with people in authority in order to get favours or preferential treatment for other people or the community. This is a common practice with the councillors, especially the ones who have got leadership positions in the district council. Councillors use their political positions to influence matters in the district and in their constituencies.

Let me give an example of a councillor who won the favour of the district officials and was elected to a bigger position of leadership in the district council. He used his position in the office to influence development initiatives in the district to pass through him and have a say in their allocation and mode of operation. For example, in the early stages of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), he posed resistance on the initiative in the district because, according to him, the people who were implementing it did not collaborate with the district. In fact, there is an incident when one of the TASAF coordinators was speaking to the district council and this prominent councillor moved a motion to have them out because they were "bringing development initiatives without consulting the beneficiaries". In actual fact, the issue was that the people who were introducing the idea of TASAF had not consulted him before for his final decision in the district. From such influences that he exerted on the development initiatives, this councillor directed many projects towards his home area; the village people testify this when they argue:

> He was a "real man": he assisted us in many development projects, like building the school. He used his position he had in the council to develop our area. He was very generous, as well: when he was alive, we could get cow dung for free; now a sack is already at 750 TZS, that is, buying it at 500 and paying for its transportation at 250. He was a great man for us. (FGD.4.VP1.Nbz. Apr2005)

The people in his ward really liked him because he used his influence to bring projects into his home area. This is not an unusual phenomenon with politicians' relationship with the electorate. In fact, when they are elected in political positions,

they are supposed to make sure that they pull resources to their home constituencies. If they do not do so, they run the risk of not being re-elected. And a way to realise this is by influence peddling. Let me turn to the second way of domination.

Suppression

Suppression is an act of keeping people low, subjugating people. Councillors in Tanzania, as politicians, belong to political parties in Tanzania. The opposition parties do not have many followers. The councillors of the ruling party suppress those who do not belong to the ruling party. These councillors are so strong that they can dictate on different issues. They are nasty with people who do not collaborate with the ruling party. Let me give examples from two narrations from two members of the opposition party. A house was burnt in a village and the village government, which is composed of members of the ruling party, claimed that the members of the opposition party in the village had set fire to the house. There was hardly a link between the incident and the opposition party members. However, the village government promised not do anything to the opposition party members if they surrendered their party membership cards and bought those of the ruling party. As the members of the opposition party did not heed to the village government, they were to be disciplined, something that did not take place because there was interference of another big politician against the decision of punishing them.

Another example is about how the opposition party people face difficulties when they need assistance from officials of the ruling party. A member of the opposition political party wanted a statement that he belonged to the village from the chairman of the village who belonged to the ruling party. The chairman of the village told the person:

> You oppose us, but when you have problems, you bring them to us. So how do you think your opposition is going to help you? If you need a letter from me, get one from the court first requesting me to write one. (Int.VP1.Nbz.Apr.2005)

The suppression of the opposition is crucial for the councillors of the ruling party: it is a power struggle to remain in political positions. When someone is in the leadership position, he/she is in command and has capacity to make decisions that favour him/herself and the people around him/her. Remaining in power, as a leader from the ruling party, allows the leader to associate with other politicians who are high in politics. This is a way to continue enhancing personal status and popularity. Let me now turn to the use of smart force.

Use of smart force

"Smart force" is about involvement of the village people in development activities by making them think of the nasty consequences if they did not comply with the idea of "joining the bandwagon for development". People are put in a situation of thinking that they will be the losers. In order to understand this "smart force", let me give an example about a village project that involved the construction of a class-room. In this project, the beneficiaries had to contribute 20% of the costs of the project. One respondent commented:

> We were told by our leaders that we had to make contributions of around 20% of the total expenses of the project. We had to give our labour: digging the foundation, bringing the stones, sand, contributing bricks and laying them; we were supposed to be labourers. Each person had to contribute, except the elderly, the sick and the disabled. Some people contributed food; women were to cook for those on the site working. …
>
> If you did not contribute, then you would have problems because your children would not have anywhere to study. Again, there was a possibility of being disciplined by the village committee by imposing on you a heavier fine. So, it was wise to make the contribution with others. (FGD3.VP4.Izi.Apr2006)

In Bukoba district, local peoples' contribution is an issue that can be linked with the conditions that donors were putting in order to give funds. The donor's idea behind contributions is that if people were involved in their own development activities, they would learn to be key players in the development interventions for their own livelihoods promotion. The Dutch people in Bukoba brought in such formats as the "E-Matching" whereby the donors were to fund the whole project; "B-Matching" whereby the beneficiaries were to contribute 20%, and; "C-Matching" whereby the beneficiaries contributed 50%. The contribution of the beneficiaries, according to the Dutch, meant more participation of the people and ownership of the projects. One of the District Advisors commented on the issue of local beneficiaries' contributions:

> In this way, people will learn how to be self-reliant because they will be involving some of their resources in the projects. This will bring more ownership of the project by the beneficiaries. This will allow that funds are used in other projects. (Int.DI1.Bkb.May2004)

Much as the people would not like to contribute towards development projects, which they think are their given right from the state, it is difficult for them to refuse making the contribution, because they are afraid of the sanctions that would come from the councillors. It is through such smart force in the name of participation that development projects are implemented. The councillors get credit for having implemented development projects; in the times for campaigns, these are the very development projects that are used to justify the performance of councillors. Thus, the smart force makes projects happen in the communities, and gains trust for the

councillors and secures for him/her chance to be re-elected. Still, the smart force is an opportunity to (mis-)use the funds of the village people.

I have presented the organising practice of domination in terms of influence peddling, suppression and the use of smart force. But why would these councillors engage in such organising practices? Why would they use influence peddling, suppress people, and use smart force? The answer to this question lies in the will to power of the politicians in order to create neo-kingdoms.

Generally speaking, before and after independence, the ethnic groups found in Tanzania were organized in kingdoms. In most ethnic groups, becoming a king was a hereditary affair. All the kingdoms were said to be organized along socio-political and economic lines, based on traditional cultural elements. The kings and their respective royal clans used to enjoy many benefits. The Haya people of Bukoba district were not an exception; they were organized in kingdoms of Bugabo, Kyamutwara, and Bukara. However, with the Arusha Declaration of 1967 that brought about socialist ideas in order to establish an egalitarian society, kingdoms were abolished. Other political structures that were formed on new forms of democracy in terms of elections were brought in. The power structures changed from the traditional kings to the newly elected political leaders at different levels. According to de Weerdt *et al.* (2005: 33)

> … with the demise of the old kings, a new type of kings emerged. They received their powers mainly through the newly government structures, assisted by their influence over the allocation of development assistance money. A new type of kings emerged. Just as the old kings, the new kings have the freedom to go beyond the accepted traditional cultural and religious norms. They do so while maintaining respect and love from the community in which they live.

These people who received powers through newly government structures are politicians. They are elected by the village people themselves from the communities, as provided by the constitution. After being elected, however, they have become so powerful, their power depending on how they manage to live politics. They are so powerful that they can afford to go beyond what the normal persons in the village would do. A good example is provided by a late politician in one of the villages where this research was conducted. He was the councillor of the Ward. He had managed to occupy one of the top leadership positions in the district council. He had more than twenty wives and more than fifty children. He had banana plantations all over the villages in the Ward. Many politicians enjoy such villages. They become “idols” in the societies they come from. Thus, to answer the question as to why the councillors would use influence peddling, suppress people, and use smart force in the domination organising practice, it is important to understand this urge of the

politicians to become neo-kings, a state, like that of the old kings, that would give them privileges in the society.

With respect to domination, I have pointed out how the councillors influence development initiatives and direct them towards their home areas; how the ruling party councillors, and the use of smart force by the neo-kings. Domination is crucial because at stake is the question of power maintenance of the councillors. Through dominance, these councillors are able to gain fame and popularity over the village people who would elect them as councillors to go and represent them at the district. Through dominance, they can have some development projects implemented in the villages. With these development projects, they can be trusted and re-elected again in leadership offices. After seeing the sections on the perception of the Dutch people by the Haya people, the Dutch and participation, the livelihoods and the organizing practices of the district officials, let me now come to the conclusion of this chapter on the organizing practices of the district officials.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed issues related to the organising practices of the district officials in their encounter with the Dutch donors. In this encounter, donor opportunities are negotiated for, acquired, and (ab)used by the district officials in order to promote their livelihoods. The chapter began by showing how that the Haya people of Bukoba, from the different experiences they have had with the Dutch donors, have perceived the Dutch as powerful financially and politically. In the section about the Dutch people and participation, I observed that even in the cases where there has been some elements of participation, there is no instance when the aid recipients have mobilised themselves to involve donors. This observation is crucial because the district officials engage in some organising practices in order to go around the non-participatory way of working of the Dutch people. When discussing the livelihoods of the district officials, I demonstrated how their livelihoods are characterised by a tension between living the present and living the future. This tension is important to understand because it explains why these district officials engage in organising practices as collaboration (geared towards extracting resources from the donors at the district by working together without antagonising the donors); corruption (geared towards extracting resources from the donors at the district by treacherous and criminal ways), and; domination (geared towards power maintenance). All these organising practices are intended to promote the livelihoods of the district officials.

The organising practices of the district officials are important to recognise in this study about aid. Most of the time, it is thought that the relationship between donors and aid recipients is a direct one. It is always forgotten that between the donors and the people in the rural areas, the people whose livelihoods are compromised, there are other “official actors” whose livelihoods are compromised as well. These are district officials who are at the entrance of aid in the district. They engage in organising practices in order to access and use resources brought by the donors in two specific ways. The first way is by responding to the non-participatory character of the donors and the second way responds to their will to dominate the people of the rural areas. Their organising practices are enhanced by their ideas about participation, the material circumstances, and power maintenance so that they can make use of the donor possibilities to sustain their livelihoods. Thus, while the district officials respond to the power over by the donors, on the one hand, they exercise the power over to the people living in the rural; areas, on the other hand. Whereas with respect tot the donors the aim is to access and use the donor resources, with respect to the people living in rural areas, the aim is gaining status, fame, and popularity.

In this chapter, I have dealt with the organising practices of the district officials who are at the entrance of donor aid in the district. In order, to deepen the understanding of organising practices in the aid machinery down to the people who are supposed to be the destination of aid, it is important to see the organising practices of the people in the rural areas. It is here that an encounter between the aid recipients amongst themselves is crucial to understand, an encounter characterised by elite domination. This is subject of the next chapter on organising practices of the village people and its elite.

7

Organising practices of the village people and its elite

Introduction

In the previous chapter of this study, I presented a discussion on the organising practices of the district officials, as an actor category at the entrance of aid in the district. I looked at the district officials' organising practices as a response to the powerful nature of the Dutch donors and as a response to their will to power over the people living in the rural areas. These organising practices are geared towards their livelihoods promotion by maximising the use of the opportunities that come with the Dutch donors.

In this chapter, I present a discussion on the organising practices of the village elite and the village people as other actor categories in the aid machinery. These are people who live in the rural areas. They are supposed to be the destination of aid. The organising practices of these people are analysed from the catchment area of the *Yetu* Farmers' Extension Centre (YFEC), a Dutch-funded project under the Bukoba District Rural Development Programme (BDRDP). Given the reality of the decentralisation system in Tanzania, these village elite and village people could not come into direct contact with the Dutch donors in the planning and implementation of the development projects. Instead, they were involved in participation in order to formulate development plans that were to be sent at the district and were funded by the Dutch donors. What becomes crucial, therefore, is the local politics in which

these village elite and village people were involved in so that they can formulate development plans.

By the time of the research, the YFEC was already there and it was already declining. It was difficult to establish the different processes involved in order to have this project planned and implemented. This project was no more at the centre of people's attention. Looking at another ongoing development project in the area which is donor-funded and being run under the *Tujendeleze* Non-governmental Organisation (TUNGO), I established the context of the local politics in the area and the kind of organising practices that the village elite and the village people engage in with respect to donor-funded development projects.

While the organising practices of the village elite are a response to the aid system by capturing the development opportunities of the donor-funded projects in order to promote their livelihoods, the village people's organising practices are a response to the village elite who capture opportunities that enter their villages through donor-funded projects. When discussing the issue of livelihoods promotion and organising practices, I showed how the elite capture was crucial in local politics. The local politics are central because in them are embedded the dynamics of negotiations, acquisition, and use and diversion of donor funds by both the village elite and the village people.

In order to understand the organising practices of the village people and its elite, I present several issues. In the first section, I discuss issues pertaining to the identification of the village elite, followed by issues about the livelihoods of the village elite. In the third section, I present a discussion about the village people's livelihoods, followed by the relations between the village elite and the village people. I wind up this chapter with a conclusion that binds together the three empirical chapters of this study.

Village elite identification

In this section, I present a discussion about the village elite. It is necessary to establish who the village elite are according to the perceptions of the village people. The village people refer to the elite as "important people". The village people acknowledge that all people are important because everyone has an important function in the community, but they find some to be more important than others, given the role they play in community. That is why they make categorisations and prioritisations of the important people, the elite. During the FGD, the village people

made categorisations and prioritisations of the important people, based on the roles they play in the community in development projects (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Categories and prioritisations of important people and roles

Category	*Prioritisation*	*Role*
Leaders	Priority 1	Organise people
		Supervise development projects
		Link people with authorities
Elders	Priority 2	Give advice
Government employees	Priority 3	Give ideas
		Have experience
		Know many people outside
Business people	Priority 4	Give financial contribution
Youth	Priority 5	Do heavy jobs
		Provide some financial assistance
		Sometimes they have ideas

Source: Field data (FGD, April 2006)

In a way to stress the issue of importance of these categories of people deemed important in the village, a respondent in a focus group discussion argued:

> Our leaders are very important. They are the ones who can organise us so that we can receive and accept any contribution from outside for a development project. They act as a link between us in the village and the outside world. We never go to the district, but they go. Even if we went, whom do we know? What can we say? Our words are village words, but theirs are development words. They know what to say! (Fgd.VP1.Nyk.Apr2006)

Thus, the important people are central to the village people's livelihoods promotion. If such people were not there in the community,

> We would have problems with our development projects in our village: many projects would not come in; we would have less people to contribute ideas on these projects; we would not have people to push us to work; we would not have people to push some of our leaders to do their work as leaders. (Fgd.VP2.Nyk.Apr2006)

These are the leaders, elders, government employees, business people, and the youths. These important people have their characterisations, namely: being educated, political, medium economically, and being religious.

Being educated

In a focus group discussion, a village man points out how an educated person looks like:

> We have a young man who is very smart at talking; he has gone to school. … The last chairman of the village is an old fellow now; but he is tough and he uses his experience as one who was a qualified civil servant in those days. .... We have a family in this village that is blessed: the father, the mother, and their sons have all gone to school. That is why they are all politicians. The current chairman is a retired person; that is why we chose him to be our leader: he was good and knew many people and things. (Fgd.VP3.Nyk.Apr2006)

Thus, education is important because it leads people to be smart talkers, tough and good; through education people get experience, know many people and many things that can be useful to themselves and the community. Conversely, when there is lack of education in a place, people perceive that their livelihoods promotion is compromised. One of the village people commented:

> You see how some families are in suffering everyday: they have nobody working in high offices; such families do not have moneys coming in; similarly, you see our villages with no new ideas coming; it is simple: we have less people who have gone to school. … But again, the few people who have gone to school, when they finish school they will never stay around; they go to town where they can find jobs and can be paid better. That is why you see towns flourishing everyday: they are full of educated people. But even if these important people stayed here, what would they do? With whom would they speak their English? (Fgd.VP4.Nyk.Apr2006)

Thus, it is no doubt that education is very important in order to assist in the promotion of the livelihoods of people, be it in the villages as well as in towns. That is why lack of it leads to compromised livelihoods. According to the village people, if one is educated, the person needs to be argumentative. Commenting on this opinion, a woman said:

> The issue is not on which people come in bigger numbers than the others. The issue is who speaks, what he/she says, how he/she convinces us, and how we come to make decisions. … Everywhere in the world, there are people who are gifted. Even here in this village, we have our people who are always very argumentative because they know things. These people normally assist us when we are all stuck because they are used to arguing out things. Such people never miss in these meetings and their contributions are important for our development. (Fgd.VP5. Nyk.Apr2006)

Thus, being argumentative is important. But, why should, for instance, a leader be argumentative? Another woman commented on this question:

> … Where did you see a dumb leader? Whose leader will he/she be? If you know, you talk; if you do not know, you don't talk. It is in talking that we can see whether you have a point or not. But if you are quiet, where is the point? You saw Nyerere, he talked and talked and he was a great leader. We saw him, followed him, and we still refer to him now. Talking is important for a leader, especially political leaders who have to get people in order to elect them. (Fgd.VP6.Nyk. Apr2006)

Educated people who are argumentative are useful when there happens to be any discussion of development. Arguing reveals one's capacity to air out views; it shows that one has something to contribute to the community development. Thus, educa-

tion goes hand-in-hand with the expression of one's mind as an elite for the good of the community. Arguing is central in taking any leadership position in the village. One needs to convince people with the power of words. People vote and elect people to leadership positions because they can argue.

Being political

Another characteristic of the elite is that he/she is engaged in political matters. In a focus group discussion, I asked the respondents to mention five names of people they considered important in their Ward. The five people who were named were politicians. In describing politicians, one of the men respondents said:

> I remember very well what one of the priests said about politicians: a man wanted his son to be either a farmer, or banker or, teacher. He thought that the best way to know this was closing him in a room and putting in there a banana, banknote, and a book. If he ate the banana, he would become a farmer; if he took the money, he would be a banker, and; if he read the book, he would be a teacher. He locked the boy in the room and when he came back he found out that he had eaten the banana, pocketed the money, and he was reading the book. So he concluded that his son was to become a politician. … People think that politicians are everything because they pretend to do everything; in fact, in most times they are liars because politics is about telling lies to win favours. (Fgd.VP2.Nyk.Apr2006)

This is a paradoxical situation of how people view their politicians: they like them and maintain them as important people because they can do many things for them. But still, they see them as "gamblers" because of their pretences to be everything, to know everything, and to tell lies. The negative connotation embedded in politics is seen in the following words of another respondent who expressed what he thought politics was:

> Many people think that *siasa* is a game of words because politicians use a lot of words. In fact, I was told that the word *siasa* comes from two words: *si* and *hasa. Si* means "not"; *hasa* means "real". So *siasa* means "not real". Therefore, politicians are people who deal with "non real things"; they talk a lot; they tell many lies. (Fgd.VP1.Nyk.Apr2006)

Siasa is a Swahili word for politics in English. It is a word derived from Arabic, *sasa*, meaning governance or politics. However, in common speech, people like to break the word into two Swahili words of *si* and *hasa*, as the above quote has demonstrated. This usage is important to understand because it demonstrates the underlying negative connotation of politics from what people have experienced of politics: people speak a lot in political meetings, but there is little done; in the name of politics, bad decisions are taken nationally and internationally; it is through politics that people are oppressed, and; it is in the name of politics that some people become richer than others, even though as politicians they speak for the poor people.

The village people, however, distinguish between being a political leader and being an opinion leader. Some people choose to remain out of political leadership, but they remain influential all the same as opinion leaders. A man commented:

> We have several people who are influential in this village and they do not have any political leadership position in the village. They are wise and they always contribute towards development issues in this village. They have refused to become political leaders, even when we requested them to be so. They say that they do not want to abuse the offices and be abused as other political leaders. (Fgd.VP2.Nyk.Apr2006)

According to the village people, politics is associated with leadership. As politics is negatively construed, there are people who have chosen not to join leadership positions. However, some of such people have become influential because they are the opinion leaders: they are interested in the different affairs of the village people and they use their influence to influence the different processes and activities in the livelihoods promotion of the village people. Much as these distinctions can be made between political leaders and opinion leaders, both are considered leaders by the village people. Nevertheless, the general perception of the village people about the elite with regard to being political is negative. However, this negative connotation does not impede the village people to consider politicians as vital actors in the village livelihood promotion affairs. Let me turn to the third characteristic of the elite, being medium economically.

Being medium economically

The village people distinguish the economic status of the people in three categories: the poor, medium, and rich. De Weerdt *et al.* (2005: 10) give the details of this categorisation in Table 7.2. The table is a "ladder of life" in terms of economic welfare. From the bottom, steps 1 and 2 correspond to poor people; steps 3 and 4 correspond to the medium economically, and step 5 and 6 correspond to the rich people. Thus, while the village people see the poor people as still struggling to get the basics in order to survive, the rich people have a luxurious life because of the extras they posses. The medium people economically have only enough for their lives. This framework of the understanding of the people from the economic perspective is crucial in the characterisation of the elite. According to the village people, the poor people are not important people. A respondent argued, for instance:

> *Atain'amwe, tagona* – [If you do not have your own home, you can never snore when asleep]. … If you are not rich, what can you do? You cannot manage yourself, and do you think you can manage issues of the community? You are busy trying to survive. (Fgd.VP4.Nyk.Apr2006)

Table 7.2 Different steps in the ladder of life

Step no.	*Characteristics*
6 (richest)	Misses nothing in his life Can never fall down, except when God has decides so He has houses, banana plantations, animals, children, wives, cars His children have gone to school He is able to take care of all his people in terms of all needs
5	The person has a motorcycle, a shop, a banana plantation that does not suffice the family The person has to get food from somewhere else through buying or exchange The person can deteriorate at any time
4	The banana plantation can hardly be enough for the family At least a bicycle as means of transport The person should have a home, with an iron-roof When this person gets a problem that demands 5,000/- (5 dollars) he should be able to deal with it. The person had better not get a problem that needs him to sell off his property. That could ruin him. If someone among his relatives died, the person should not fail to buy a shroud (*ekilago*) It is possible to meet this person with a bicycle tire that is covered with animal skin
3	The house is grass-thatched If the house is iron-roofed, the iron sheets are so tired The person does not have any balance left in his/her account The person can have a bicycle as means of transport The person solves his/her problems through loans and is able to pay back the loan in time When the person goes for a loan, they normally do not question him/her
2	The person can have land, but it is not enough The house is badly off: it leaks; it is mud one; it is never rehabilitated Food is not enough: the person goes for casual labour in order to have food
1(poorest)	The person can have, or not have land The house is *omukondeka* – a non-permanent house built with non-firm trees and grass He/she sells his/her labour for food No wife No children They are the ones who are arrested for not having paid the poll-tax They are poorly dressed They do not have instruments for work

Source: Adapted from de Weerdt *et al* (2005: 10)

With this proverb, *atainamwe tagona*, the Haya want to insist on the importance of the benefits of economic independence and discredit situations of being poor. When you are economically independent, you are able to be free and practice some of your "vices" such as snoring. If you lived in someone's house because you were poor, you would be concerned that you are disturbing the owner of the house, and as such you loose your freedom. Being poor, something that can be seen through not having a house, means that you are not able to manage your affairs.

People who are poor are not thought of as important people in the community because they are not trusted enough. If such people are given resources in order to deal with development activities of the community, village people think that they are susceptible to using the moneys for private use, rather than for community use. In many instances, this is what has happened with community funds. A woman argued in this respect:

> Can you trust such a person in giving him/her responsibilities? He/she is busy doing a lot of activities so that he/she gets something to sustain his/her life. Normally, again, such people have had problems in their lives: they are people who drink too much; they smoke *bangi* [marijuana]; they have quarrelled with their families; they have divorced or sometimes they are witches. Such people, for sure, I do not think can be good in leading for development activities. They will eat the money. (Fgd.VP5.Nyk.Apr2006)

Thus, the poor people are excluded from the class of the important people because they cannot perform. Such people correspond to step 1 and 2. However, one would think that since poor people are not taken as important people, then the rich people would be taken as such. The village people, however, attribute negative images to the rich people. For example:

> Rich people have funny behaviours: they do not respect their fellow human beings; they look at you as if you do not count anything. … But this is not a problem; it is theirs. The problem with such people is how they become rich: let alone those who have earned their money honestly, many, whom we know very well, have been thieves and still they are; we know of others who have got money through ways nobody knows except themselves! All these are rich people, but they are not important people at all! (Fgd.VP4.Nyk.Apr2006)

And again:

> Rich people are proud. It is difficult that they work with you so that you can gain. I know that they know many people who could be useful, but again they use such people to mistreat you. For example, they will bribe the police and the judges and if you have a case with him/her, you will never have it right. They have tried to bring development projects; we know that, even though they put in their relatives and they also take a lot of money from such projects. (Fgd.VP4.Nyk. Apr2006)

Thus, the village people do not have good perception of the rich people in their behaviour; they disqualify them as elite because they do not respect others, have got

rich from thefts, mistreat others, bribe, favour their relatives, and have private gains from development projects. The village people do not trust rich people, even when they seem to be doing something for the community. A woman argued:

> Rich people know many things. … They ask for money on our behalf. They are shrewd. They get people to convince in the village and they get support. They impose themselves because of their money and the fame they have. They can pay for anything and they can use money to acquire whatever fees are needed. What they do is to use us poor people and get themselves the largest share. Sometimes we enjoy part of their projects because there is something that always comes our way. (Fgd.VP5.Nyk.Apr2006)

This is an example of mixed feelings of rich people who perform development work for the community. Much as they should be credited for work, still the village people find contradictions on how they do their work: they impose themselves; they use poor people, and; they get larger shares of development projects. Thus, according to the village people, the rich people are not important people because they behave against the village people.

Instead, the village people find important people in step 3 and 4 of the "ladder of life". These are medium economically people. Such people are expressed by a respondent in a focus group discussion as

> … people who are not rich and at the same time not poor. They have gone some distance from poverty, but they are still struggling to settle: they are not yet rich. When such people get a problem that demands some small money, they are able to deal with it. If someone among his relatives died, the person should not fail to buy a shroud. However, such people had better not get any problem that needs them to sell off their property because this could ruin them completely: they are fragile and they are not very stable. (Fgd.VP3.Nyk.Apr2006)

This is to say that such people are not yet distanced from the normal way that the village people live. They are not desperate because they are not poor; but again they are not rich to an extent of being far away from the normal lives of the village people. These medium economically people are able to link people in development interventions. When I asked about the role that the medium economically people can play in a development intervention, one respondent from a group explained:

> Such people struggle to see to it that they make ends meet. They are normally hard workers and have interest in people. They are normally the ones whom you find in the village trying to unite people so that they can work out something good. Normally they know what it means to be poor because part of their lives is poor and at the same time they know what it can mean to be rich because they have certain elements that belong to rich people. But do not forget that these are friends to many rich people because they work for them or together with them. (Fgd.VP4.Nyk. Apr2006)

Thus, the medium economically people are the important people because of their hard work and the links they can establish among the different people in the community and the rich people.

Being religious

Among the characterisation of the elite is being religious. In order to understand the centrality of religious people as elite, let me give an account of a development project in the catchment area of YFEC whose unfolding is characterised by confusion due to religion: a conflict between Muslims and Catholics. In this village, there is a man who wants to construct a secondary school. De Weerdt *et al.* (2005b: 32) give the following account:

> … There are a lot of religious misunderstandings between Christians, especially the Roman Catholics, and the Muslims. The case in point is about the building of a secondary school that has had mixed feelings from the different actors involved … People in [this] … village have long desired to build a secondary school in their village. … They have two primary schools, but do not have a secondary school. A native of the village, who worked in a high position outside the village and country for most of his life time, suggested to construct one for the village. His money together with his connections with donors are able to raise funds sufficient to build the school. All he needs are 50 acres of land from the village. However, the idea and the necessary steps towards building of this secondary school have divided the village into different camps based on religion, all with their own opinions and interests.
>
> The rich man who wants to build the school is a very religious Christian man. Before embarking on this project, the first thing to be done was to ask for God's blessings from the Bishop and asked that the school be named after a Saint. Next, he requested the village government for a piece of land, which he was granted. The problem begins from the fact that the land given to him was already allocated to other people and projects: there were people who had banana plantations on part of this plot; it included one of the primary schools of the village, and finally, part of the land belonged to the Muslims in the community for they had already planned to build a *madrasa*, an Islamic religious school, for children in that land.
>
> It is clear that there are many actors involved in the negotiations: the initiator of the project, the village government, the Christians, and the Muslims. Among these actors, there is the Muslim community that feels that it is being marginalised because the project has a clear Christian flavour to it: the initiator is a deeply religious Christian, the school will be named after a Saint and the Bishop was involved, but not the Imam, for example. This secondary school project is planned on a piece of land that had, at least verbally, already been allocated to the Muslim community to build their *madrasa.* As there was no structure to show that it was already given to the Muslims, an easy excuse for the Christians to claim that the Muslims had never been serious about building the *madrasa,* one night, in complete secrecy, a large group of Muslims gathered together and built the foundation of the *madrasa*, so as to have a physical evidence in place. The Muslims have staged enough resistance for the project to take off, while the Christians are involved in negotiations through different levels of authorities in order to have their school built on the land. The negotiations are at the level of conflict between the Muslims and Christians, a religious conflict in a word.

From this account, it is important to note the role of the religious people as elite. People like Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, and Muslim imams, together with other religious community leaders in the villages deal with the everyday religious affairs of the faithful: advising people, burying people, registering the born, and all official religious activities in the village. The religious elite is very critical in so many issues, especially the social and the political issues. They are able to (de)mobilise people for development; they are able to make people follow them in what they say and do. They have chance and possibility to do so because they are entrusted with people who are the faithful in the religion and they have institutions through which to speak to their people.

Being religious is taken as something central in the lives of the people. It is believed that religion is a source of human values. And God, who is being taken seriously in religion, is a source of those human values. One of the women respondents in the focus group discussion argued:

> People who do not have religion do not have values. If someone does not have reverence to God, how do you think he/she can respect people? Where will such a person get values from? He/she does not pray; he/she does not go to church/mosque; he/she does not belong to any religious community; do you think that person can ever be useful in the society? (Fgd.VP4.Nyk.Apr2006)

As far as religious characterisation is concerned, it is important, therefore, that an important person belongs to a clear religious affiliation. Moreover, it is not only a matter of belonging, but also a matter of practice because one's opinions and actions are judged and evaluated from his/her religious background. Thus, being religious is fundamental in the characterisation of the elite.

In this section about the identification of the elite, I have first presented who the elite are and then their characterisations under the four cardinal areas of education, politics, economics, and religion. These characterisations are necessary in the bargaining processes of the social actors. In order to understand the ulterior motive for which the village elite engage in organising practices, it is important to explore their livelihoods state.

Livelihoods of the village elite

Understanding the livelihoods of the village elite is important because their organising practices are geared towards promoting such livelihoods. In order to understand the livelihoods of the village elite, I use two cases. The first case is about the everyday life productive activities of the elite. The second case is about the leadership positioning of the elite in the villages.

Everyday productive life of village elite

The following is an extract from an in-depth interview about the life of an important young man in the village.

> I completed my primary school in 1994 and joined a vocational school at in 1997 in Uganda, sponsored by the World Vision. I got a loan of 270,000 TZS from the World Vision and some other benefactor; with the money, I bought carpentry items and began working as a carpenter in the village.
>
> I have a banana plantation with coffee. I have got students of carpentry who pay me 2000 TZS a month. My monthly income is between 50,000 and 200,000 TZS.
>
> I have a plastered house with a cemented floor and iron sheets. I have a television that I charge with a car battery, and sometimes dry cells. I have a bicycle that assists me in my movements to get and deliver furniture orders together with my private life activities.
>
> I belong to two community-based organizations. The first one deals with providing help in moments of death, sickness, and parties. The entrance fee for this organization is 1,000 TZS and a monthly contribution amounts to 1,000 TZS. The second organization deals with giving loans that extend from 5,000 TZS to 40,000 with an interest rate of 25%.
>
> My future plans are establishing a tree plantation, rearing dairy cattle, opening an account in bank, and getting higher in politics. (Int.VP1.Buk.Apr2004)[8]

This extract encompasses all the characterisations of the village elite. It fits well with the characterisation of the village elite as medium economically from the "ladder of life", as presented in the previous section. What is important in this extract is the description of the engagement of the village elite in the daily productive activities in the villages.

When the young important person talks about a banana plantation with coffee and his carpentry activities, he refers to the everyday livelihood productive activities in order to earn a living. The village elite are engaged in agricultural and business-oriented activities, like any other village people. As I already explained in chapter four when giving the background to the catchment area of YFEC, the livelihoods of the village people in this zone rotate around the banana plantation. Food crops such as bananas, sweet potatoes, cassava, and yams, together with beans, are intercropped in the banana plantation. Coffee and vanilla are cash crops which are found in the banana plantation as well. These are crops that need shade, which the banana plantation provides.

Not only do the village elite deal with agriculture, but they also deal with business-oriented activities, especially in the trading centres, which are like town centres in rural areas. When the young man speaks about his future plans as

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[8] This in-depth interview was part of the study on *Income Dynamics in Kagera Region Tanzania*, (Kessy 2005), in which I participated as a research team member. In this report, this in-depth interview is reported in Appendix 2 about Life histories from KHDS Respondents as "Respondent A7: (15200403)" (Kessy 2005: 72-73).

“establishing a tree plantation, rearing dairy cattle, opening an account in the bank …”, he refers to investment for more income generation. The business-oriented activities in the trading centres are investments from the village elite. They include small shops and kiosks, selling the daily needs of the people in their households (sugar, salt, tea leaves, match boxes, paraffin, cooking oil, and so on); bar and restaurant activities; milling machine(s) in order to take care of maize, sorghum, cassava, and so on. Most of these business activities belong to the important people in the village, the elite: they can directly do the businesses themselves, even though in most cases, they employ the village people to take care of them.

Linked to the aspect of business is the use of the education by the elite to engage in their areas of profession and generate income out of those areas. Taking as an example the young important person, he was trained as a carpenter. He earns a living from selling furniture and he trains people in carpentry for which he is paid. Other village elite are engaged in practicing private extension work, mechanics tasks, while others are engaging in teaching. All these types of work stem from their areas of profession they were trained in. From the income obtained from agriculture and business-oriented activities, the elite possess property such as land, houses, means of transport, and can spend money on equipment such as a television.

Another part of the livelihoods of the elite is the nature of the networks they are involved in. A good example is presented by the community-based organisations in which this young important man is involved. In the first organisation about funeral activities, there is some money to be paid as entrance at the beginning and every month some more. Much as it is little (0.6 EUR) at the beginning and every month, not many people would be able to spend the money in this way for the community-based organisations. Such organisations are already expensive and belong to a certain category of people, the village elite. This applies to the second organisation that gives loans. One needs to be trusted and to have a way that money will be made productive in order to pay back the money with an interest of 25%. The village elite can manage this because they have sources of income from their professions, agriculture, and more reliable business-oriented activities. Other village elite have recreation clubs: they contribute money which become capital to begin a recreation club where they drink and eat; in a rotational way, according to the time they agree upon (normally a year), each village elite runs the club, providing services to the member elite, and therefore enhancing the elite network, and at the same time getting some profit out of the activity. Thus, generally speaking, the village elite engage themselves in agricultural and business-oriented activities, professional-oriented jobs and financial-oriented networks.

Leadership positioning of the village elite

This is an important aspect in the livelihoods of the village elite. They lead the community/village people in politics, religion, and development organisations. I give a description of the leadership positioning of the village elite with the use of a donor-funded development organisation, TUNGO. In the next section, I particularly present a description of this organisation when I deal with the livelihoods of the village people.

The leadership positioning of the elite in TUNGO begins with its formation and development. The founders are government employees who used the experiences and networks they have had in order to create a development organisation. The founder and first chairperson of TUNGO invited some of his friends who had served in different civil servant positions. These founder members became the first policy regulating committee of TUNGO. All the founder members are still in that policy making committee of TUNGO. These are people who have invited other people they have known in order to work in the organisation. They organised the people into formation of farmers' groups which were registered under TUNGO.

These village elite consider themselves a necessary component in the livelihoods promotion of the village people. In a discussion with one of the policy-making body of TUNGO, he said:

> We had to work hard to see to it that we help our farmers. You see, they are there despaired. They used to grow coffee and it really brought lots of money for them. But now, the prices of coffee have gone down.
>
> That is why we had to be saviours. Many people are proud of Bukoba. Many people have grown up from here and worked here. We could not accept that our people suffer because we knew many people who could help us in getting an alternative for agricultural problems. (Int.TI1.Bkb.Aug2005)

Not only have these elite managed to form the organisation, but also they have managed to organise resources for it. One of the TUNGO insiders commented: "We have different donors from abroad; we are soon getting some more from America. We have to see our organisation working". The village elite take a leadership role in this development organisation by controlling everything and everybody. They think that once they have founded an organisation, it belongs to them and that is why they should control it.

This way of conceiving leadership and personalising it has caused some tensions in the organisation. Look at this quote from a response of a TUNGO insider:

> The main weakness of the project was the lack of trust and cooperation between the policy-making body and the management team. … The tension between them dated back from the project start. The policy-making body considered TUNGO as "their" project (for reasons of prestige!) and liked to be in the "driver's seat". They wanted to be in control of most processes

> (including daily management issues) and had difficulties delegating responsibilities, partly because the chief manager was not trusted/appointed by them. (Int.TI1.Nig.Dec2006)

The tension between the policy-making body and the management team is basically caused by the fact that it is never clear where the boundaries of each are. Contention is on the distinction between technical work which should be done by the management team and the policy work which should be done by the policy-making body. The policy-making body which is dominated by the founders feels that it should do everything. The elite in TUNGO hold the public relations of the organisation, that is, they are responsible for the public image of the organisation. They attend all kind of meetings and they represent the organisation in different forums.

Much as the consideration of the leadership position has been taken from TUNGO, this is a typical experience of the leadership positioning by the village elite even in other fields such as politics and religion: they create opportunities for the livelihoods promotion of the village people (and themselves) through development organisations.

Having presented in this section the livelihoods of the village elite from the two perspectives of everyday productive life and leadership positioning, it can be said that the village elite are in continuous struggle for their livelihoods promotion. They try to capture all the possibilities that would generate resources for survival, including development organisations. Sometimes, and this is the case with the development organisations, they tend to speak for the people while in actual fact they are trying to address their livelihoods. I shall come to this point when discussing the organising practices of the village elite. After finishing this discussion about the livelihoods of the village elite, let me now go to the section about the livelihoods of the village people.

Livelihoods of the village people: Participatory development planning and developmental organisations

Generally speaking, the livelihoods of the village people of Bukoba rotate around agricultural practices. The YFEC and its catchment area are found within the Karagwe-Ankolean low rainfall zone. In this zone, there is low rainfall and prolonged drought periods. This is an element that already demonstrates how agriculture is difficult in the place. In discussing the livelihoods of the village people of the catchment area of YFEC, I do not present issues about agriculture and business-oriented activities as the basic ways of earning a living of the village

people because I already presented the most important elements of this aspect earlier on in this study in chapter four; moreover, these have been discussed again in this chapter in relation to the livelihoods of the village elite. I dwell more on the village people's participatory development planning and development organisations as other key situations for the village people's livelihoods promotion.

Participatory development planning

Village people's livelihoods promotion involves other activities with the general development of the village where the government intervention is necessary. Such activities include constructions of roads, schools, and hospitals; provision of services such as the educational and health services, and; provision of different types of expertise. Dealing with such activities needs the involvement of the village people in identifying their needs and planning for such activities as means to address them. This involvement of the village people is enshrined in the decentralisation system which has participatory development planning as a central element.

According to the decentralisation system in Tanzania, participatory development planning should take place from the sub-village, through the village, the Ward, and finally to the district. It is at the sub-village level that the development problems of the people are identified. At the village and the Ward levels, there is development of the development plans where prioritisations are made. The prioritisation of the development plans at this level should follow the national and district policy priorities. At the district level, development plans and budgets for the whole district are made. It is at this level that the political process of the district council passes the development plan. Thus, in order to address the development needs of the village where the government intervention is necessary, the village people are supposed to engage in the participatory development processes in identifying their problems and needs and prioritising them.

Participatory development planning is a constitutional affair. The elected district council is the rural local authority, comprising of: a councillor from each ward within the district, three members appointed by the Minister for Local Government, members of parliament representing the constituencies within the district, the national member of parliament elected from the region in which the council is situated (if resident in district), district-elected village chairpersons, and each party representative. With respect to development planning, the rural district council has to formulate, coordinate, and supervise the implementation of all plans for the economic, commercial, industrial and social development, regulate and coordinate development plans, projects and programmes of village councils so as to ensure the

enhancement of economic productivity, the acceleration of social and economic development of villages, and the amelioration of rural life.

Development planning processes have to begin from the bottom of the local government organisational structure, the hamlet or sub-village. Any development planning is supposed to begin from the hamlet by identifying and prioritising the problems in the hamlet. The identified and prioritised problems are forwarded to the village council which discusses them and formulates development plans and their priorities. The selected plans are forwarded to the Ward Development Council for further screening according to the national and district priority areas. Priorities are made and the Ward forwards the plans to the District Council. The development plans from the Wards are presented at the district. The planning office prepares the five-year plan, the annual action plan and the budgets. The different departments in the district contribute to the formulation of these plans. The finance and planning, establishment and administration, social services, education and culture, economic services, and human resources deployment committees discuss the sector-specific issues. It is the district council to ratify the district development plan, the annual action plan, and the budgets. In matters of development planning, however, the finance and planning committee is central because it takes administration and finance responsibilities together with consolidation of all sectoral project plans, and it votes for the budget. It is chaired by the Chairperson of the Council. In short, therefore, participatory development planning is about the village people being involved in identifying their problems, needs, and their respective prioritisations. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, practically participatory planning does not work in this way due to the local politics involved in the relationship between the village elite and the village people. Before I get into the relationship between these two actor categories, I first deal with the development organisations as part of the livelihoods promotion of the village people.

Development organisations

The village people have lived with the development organisations which have always been at the forefront to boost the agricultural activities of the village people in order to boost their livelihoods. These development organisations have mainly aimed at agricultural promotion through implements and market provisions. Among the village people of Bukoba, the Coffee Cooperative Union (CCU) and currently the *Tujiendeleze* Non-Governmental Organisation (TUNGO) are very central. While CCU has been dealing with coffee promotion for 50 years now, TUNGO has been

dealing with vanilla promotion for now almost ten years. The understanding of CCU is crucial because it forms a basis for the rise of TUNGO.

Coffee Cooperative Union (CCU)

CCU deals with the promotion, buying, processing, and selling of coffee. Most of the coffee of the Haya people is grown in their banana plantations and some outside. Since the colonial times of the 1930s, Robusta coffee has been the dominant cash crop of Kagera Region, especially in Bukoba. The cash derived from coffee has always been used to pay for education, health, constructing houses and everyday basic necessities.

During the formation of larger villages[9] that was encouraged in Tanzania after independence for the improvement of access to health services, education, and clean water, the small farmers who were found in these villages were required by the government to become members of cooperatives. These cooperatives were grouped together to form regional unions. CCU which was already founded in 1955 in Bukoba, aimed at freeing farmers from their dependence on Asian merchants who controlled the regional coffee market. CCU obtained an export licence in 1986, even though without international contacts and this implies that CCU could not sell any coffee abroad. With fair-trade organizations, however, CCU received its first export orders in 1990-91, a reform that assisted in increasing coffee production and cutting out intermediaries. With the privatisation policy of the early 1990s, cooperatives were encouraged to become autonomous. From this time, the local farmers could sell their coffee to buyers outside CCU. Many other people smuggled coffee across the border to Uganda.

The cooperative aims at the following: buying the farmers' coffee and selling it on the market; helping farmers obtain essentials and agricultural equipment, and

[9] The formation of the larger villages refers to the villagisation program that is enshrined in the *Ujamaa* policy whereby people where to live in centres, close together so that services could be provided to them easily. I discussed some issues with regard to *Ujamaa* in chapter 4 on the sections about the Struggling Tanzania and the Socio-political Landscape of Tanzania. Much as there are arguments against *Ujamaa*, its positive effects can be acknowledged (URT 1998; Semboja 1998). Normally, *Ujamaa* is associated with the socialistic ideology, which was to be systematically fought for a more capitalistic political economic ideology. In Tanzania, the IMF, protagonist of the capitalist ideology, came up with the structural adjustment policies (Voipio and Hoebink 1999: 21), whose boom lasted for 10 years beginning from the mid-eighties and began falling off (CDT 2000: i). I tend to agree with Voipio and Hoebink (1999: 27) when they point out that many Tanzanians still find rationale and validity of ideals for their development in the basic tenets of the Arusha Declaration, especially with their list of values from the speech of one of the Presidents of Tanzania, Benjami Mkapa (1995-2005), as the central message of the Declaration: African life history and African life tradition, caring for each other, caring for the aged, caring for the children, brotherhood, unity, and the government's role of promotion of self-reliance. Within these values, it is enshrined the whole issue about the livelihoods promotion of the village people.

providing training to farmers, committee members, and cooperative workers. There are around 120 cooperatives that are affiliated with the CCU. Each of these cooperatives appoints three members to represent it at the general assembly. In principle, any farmer can become a member, but practically the role is reserved for men who are the heads of families and who own land and coffee trees. In the general assembly, the representatives assess the past season, develop plans for the coming season, and adopt a budget. It is in this assembly that an executive committee is elected.

CCU has been useful, accounting for numerous development initiatives in Kagera Region. In one of the focus group discussions, this is how CCU was presented:

> CCU offered scholarships to study in the Region, within Tanzania, and abroad; it assisted us in paying the salaries of teachers, and; CCU has built secondary schools. CCU built us "societies" [collecting, buying and selling points for agricultural implements, and payments after selling coffee]; CCU used to bring us farm implements and to subsidise the prices of the implements; CCU provided employment to us and made us known. (Fgd6.VP1.Izi.Jul2005)

The people of Bukoba are stressed because CCU is on the decline. CCU is offering low prices for coffee; there are many private buyers at the moment who go for coffee in the villages and they pay in cash more money than CCU does. Some coffee is being smuggled to Uganda. The people have followed different court cases whereby different farmers and business people demand big sums of money from CCU; people have seen CCU's vehicles grounded and some of them being auctioned and sold, and finally; the people have seen CCU's schools collapsing and being closed.

People's reasons for the decline of the Union are summarised in the following words of a respondent in an interview with a CCU ex-official:

> It is difficult to say what exactly caused the collapse of CCU because there are so many reasons. CCU could not pay enough money to the farmers who were discouraged and did not want to sell coffee to it any more. At some point, there came in other companies which were providing better prices than CCU and there was a lot of coffee that was being sold in the Uganda. So, many people did not sell coffee to CCU. A lot of money was being spent on many meetings of the CCU leaders as allowances instead of organising subsidies to the coffee farmers. Many leaders and business people ate the Union's money. (Int.CU1.Bkb.May2005)

Thus, the decline of CCU has, basically, been due to local factors such as competition from local companies and small buyers, smuggling, and selfishness of Union leaders. With the privatisation policies that came in during the mid-eighties, backed by the IMF, the World Bank, and the support of donors, the private small buyers came in the villages, collected coffee, and sold it to bigger registered private buyers. Union leaders struggled as much as they could to remain in power in the Union; the representatives of the different cooperatives failed to see why they would

allow others to come in; those in top positions of leadership in the Union tried as much as they could to maintain their friends who were representatives in the societies. It was a game of "scratch my back and I scratch yours". Lack of ethical behaviour has been a problem in the running of CCU. One of the officials who used to work with CCU made this comment:

> The major concerns of CCU are about ethics. There was a lot of corruption. The top officials in the Union were involved in swindling the money of the Union. This has not only been for top officials but even the local ones in the villages where the societies are. But again the legal system allowed the confiscation and auctioning of the Union's property in order to pay rich fellows who claimed to owe the Union. In both these cases, it was ethical conduct at stake. (Int.CU2.Bkb.May2005)

The decline of CCU meant compromising with the livelihoods of the village people. Generally speaking, CCU was the only institution that addressed farmers directly in their needs as farmers; it managed to deal with economic issues as well as social responsibilities. When CCU began declining, there were negative impacts on the livelihood state of the people of Kagera. Such impact is seen through the following testimonies when discussing about the effects of CCU's decline.

> You cannot understand what it means to have a child who does not go to school: you imagine a child tomorrow and you think that he/she is either to be a thief or die of drinking; you are lucky if your child will escape to town to ride bicycles; others disappear in the lake; others to Uganda; others are in our houses and what they know best is weeding in banana plantations, eating, drinking, and sleeping. Of course, why should we hide, they then die of HIV/AIDS! …
>
> We are farmers; you reduce prices on our crops and you think that we can survive. How? You have just prepared our death beds; you have killed us. We have no money to take children to school; no money to go to hospital; no money to dress up; no money to take to church. You have made us poor by giving us little coffee prices. …
>
> CCU lorries used to come and pick our coffee. We could even get lifts to town. Now, you have these people who send others with sacks and bowls; the lorries they drive belong to their Indian bosses. When they have collected enough, an Indian's lorry comes, packs only the coffee and takes off; no lift to any! (Int.VP19/20/21.Bkb.Apr2005)

Thus, CCU has been central in the livelihoods promotion of the people in Bukoba agriculturally, educationally, and economically. Much as it was born out of the need to out-compete the coffee market dominated by the Indian merchants, it evolved into an organisation to intervene in the agricultural, economic, and educational sectors. Its decline has been a scar to the village people and has led to the rise of TUNGO as an organisation to promote an alternative cash crop, vanilla. TUNGO is central in this study because it is a development organisation in which part of the relations between the elite and the village people are analysed.

Tujiendeleze Non-Governmental Organisation (TUNGO)

TUNGO is an association of farmer members who pay a membership fee that is aimed at supporting the development of the organization. Membership gives access to technical training and provision of inputs and marketing support. Currently, the members supported by TUNGO grow vanilla and oyster mushrooms. TUNGO is conceived as a business unit with socio-economic goals aimed at becoming economically viable and donor independent. It was founded in 1997 and is based in Bukoba. It has partnership with some international NGOs. Currently, TUNGO's donors focus on strengthening the capacity of small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs by providing demand-driven services and supporting the initiatives of local associations of farmers and entrepreneurs.

Given the decline in coffee prices, TUNGO seeks to provide an extra income to the farmers in Bukoba through buying people's vanilla and mushrooms. With the vanilla farming, other income-generating activities evolve: collecting and selling of vanilla supporting trees, fetching water, cutting grass for mulching and mulching itself, and so on. According to its objectives, TUNGO is supposed to focus on improving the farmers' access to the (inter)national market; train the local farmers to improve, diversify, and commercialize their production through the promotion of alternative cash and food crops; train farmers' groups, farmers' facilitators, government extension officers and other stakeholders in crop management and self-help strategies through organizing workshops, practical courses, field seminars, farmers' exchange visits and technical follow-up; assist in diffusing improved crop varieties, distributing high quality inputs, and propagating organic farming methods; finally, TUNGO is supposed to strengthen the coherence and collaboration between the farmers' groups in order to protect their socio-economic interests and improve their organizational skills.

So as to have an idea of how TUNGO became a livelihoods promotion circumstance through the promotion of vanilla, look at Table 7.3 showing vanilla prices. The prices rose steadily from 1999 when a kilo of fresh vanilla beans was at 6 EUR to 2003 when a kilo was at around 15.2 EUR. From 2004 the prices have steadily started going down again from around 9 EUR per kilo to this year when they are at around 1.8 EUR per kilo. For comparison reasons, Table 7.4 shows the prices for coffee. It can be noticed that there are different prices for different types of coffee and the prices depend on whether the coffee to be sold has husks or not. Robuster coffee has better prices than Arabica coffee. However, the coffee prices went down from 1999. They began picking up slowly in 2001. Much as the vanilla prices have dropped drastically, they are still favourable compared to coffee prices. Therefore,

economically, vanilla has been a viable alternative option for people who have been affected by the low prices of coffee.

Table 7.3 Vanilla prices per kilo, selected years

Year	*TZS*	*Equivalent in EUR*
1999	10,000	6
2000	15,000	9
2001	15,000	9
2002	25,000	15.2
2003	25,000	15.2
2004	Between 15,000 & 10,000	Between 9 & 6
2005	6,000	3.7
2006	3,000	1.8

Source: Field data

Table 7.4 Robuster and Arabica coffee prices per kilo, selected years

Year	*Robuster with husks*	*EUR*	*Robuster without husks*	*EUR Equivalent*	*Arabica with husks*	*EUR Equivalent*	*Arabica without husks*	*EUR Equivalent*
1998/99	360	0.2	790	0.47	400	0.24	870	0.52
1999/00	350	0.2	300	0.18	390	0.23	300	0.18
2000/01	200	0.12	410	0.24	200	0.12	410	0.24
2001/02	80	0.04	175	0.1	80	0.04	175	0.1
2002/03	50	0.03	125	0.07	50	0.03	125	0.07
2003/04	150	0.09	350	0.2	150	0.09	350	0.2
2004/05	200	0.12	500	0.3	200	0.12	500	0.3
2005/06	400	0.24	925	0.55	450	0.27	1000	0.6
2006/07	500	0.3	1100	0.66	580	0.35	1360	0.82

Source: Field data

In this section about the livelihoods promotion situations of the village people, I have presented two issues, additional to agriculture and small business activities which were already discussed in the previous sections, as situations in which the village people earn their living. The first issue was about the participatory development planning situation and the second one about development organisations. Thus, the livelihoods promotion situations of the village people encompass earning a living together with participatory development planning situations for wider societal development initiatives that involve the government and the use of the development organisations for promotion of their agricultural activities.

Relations between village elite and village people

The relations between the village elite and the village people can be understood within the context of local politics between the two. The village elite and the village people are found at the lower levels of the decentralisation system. They hardly deal directly with the donors, but they engage one another through participatory development planning in the negotiations in order to access and make use of resources that the donors bring. The relation between the village elite and the village people is about the organising practices of both the village elite and the village people. While the elite engage in certain types of organising practices in order to capture opportunities in the arena of development interventions, the village people respond to the elite capture with other types of organising practices. As I mentioned already, I make use of a donor-funded development organisation, TUNGO, in the catchment area of the YFEC to observe the organising practices within the context of local politics. I also use a development planning meeting to point out some organising practice of the village elite.

Organising practices of the village elite

The organising practices of the village elite are their manoeuvres to capture opportunities in the livelihood promotion circumstances of the village people. I analyse these manoeuvres within the framework of TUNGO in which there are ongoing negotiations between the village elite who are the creators of such organisations and the village people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries. The village elite get involved in manoeuvres in order to promote their livelihoods through motivations of personal gain. Such motivations are the driving force in the negotiations and actions with respect to the village people. I also analyse some organising practice through a development planning meeting in order for the village elite to enrol the district officials.

In order to understand some organising practices of the village elite geared towards the village people, I make use of the insights from a workshop for the presentation of the baseline information for a Network of Farmers' Groups (NFG). This network comprises of small scale farmers' groups, operating at the grassroots level. NFG has a policy-making body, which is supposed to be an organ representative of all the farmers' groups in the region. Apparently, all the members in the policy-making body belong to two other policy-making bodies of two dominant farmers' development organisations, one of them being TUNGO. During the workshop, however, the different farmers' groups which were involved in the baseline survey sent their representatives. In the workshop, the attendants got engaged in

thinking about their roles in the farmers' organisations. The topic for discussion was phrased as follows:

> The biggest problem in our farmers' organisations is the fact that the representatives in the organisations always operate with the question: "what has the organisation done for me?", rather than "what have I done to the organisation?"

This topic of discussion triggered off a discussion on how farmers' donor-funded development organisations have been a place for the village elite to exhibit power weaving and corruption, as the key organising practices by the village elite.

Power weaving

Literally, weaving means interlacing threads into a piece of cloth; conceptually, it means combining elements into something complex to address a problem or an issue; it also means contriving, that is, planning with cleverness so that an identified goal can be reached without being said explicitly. Thus, power weaving as an organising practice is about planning with cleverness to maintain and get into power. I discuss the issue of power weaving from two perspectives of leadership. The first perspective deals with blocking others to come into leadership positions and the second perspective is about other village elite struggling to come into leadership positions.

1. Village elite blocking other village elite

As I mentioned already, the policy-making body of the NFG was composed of the members of TUNGO and another farmers' organisation, the Fruit Farmers' Organisation (FFO), from Muleba district. I asked one of the officials of NFG why it was only the members of the two organisations that had assumed positions in the Steering Committee of NFG. The official said:

> Look, these two organisations had registered in NFG sometime back before we had officially opened the offices in Kagera region [the offices were opened in February 2006]. One of their tasks was to make NFG known to other farmers' organisations, something they never did. …
>
> When it came to electing the Steering Committee, it was only the members of TUNGO and FFO that were present on the General Assembly and therefore the members were to come from these two organisations. In actual fact, the chairperson, who was already a chairperson of FFO, imposed himself and nobody objected. …
>
> The struggle was between who was to get more members between the two organisations because this meant that the decision powers would lie more on who will have more representatives in the Steering Committee. In fact, all the members elected were already members of the two Steering Committees of TUNGO and FFO. (Int.NI1.Bkb.Mar2006)

Thus, the two organisations never did the task of popularising NFG. This was aimed at reducing potential members of NFG so that the two pioneer organisations

may be the only beneficiaries of NFG. The main tactic used in order to reduce competition was not to disseminate information about NFG to other farmers' organisations so that they may be competitors in the elections, on one hand, and on the other, to make sure that the competitors of the posts in the new policy-making body belong to the already existing policy-making bodies of the two development organisations. So, only two organisations remained members and the members of the policy-making bodies remained the only potential members for the NFG policy-making body with the aim of controlling NFG. Thus, power hunger was at the base of the elections.

One of the recommendations of the baseline report (MVIWATA 2006: 31) stated:

> Given the diversity and multiplicity of the farmers' groups, and given the poor representation that happened in the General Assembly and the eventual general elections of the leaders of NFG, there is need for more representation of the farmers' groups in the leadership structure of NFG. It has to be borne in mind that NFG has a provisional constitution that provides for leaders being in office for three years. However, given the gravity of the matter at the level of representation, waiting for the three years can be a long period of time. This implies, therefore, that another General Assembly could be prepared with an assistance of a consultant, in order to guide in the preliminary preparations and execution of [other] General Elections.

This recommendation was debated upon during the workshop. One member of the policy-making body of NFG argued:

> This recommendation must be removed because it is going to bring more problems in our organisation. It will generate more discussions for nothing. People will get confused because instead of concentrating on work, they will continue asking for elections and looking for people to vote for them in the elections… In order to listen to the voice of the majority, we had better vote. (Dis.VE1.BkbMar2006)

This member of the policy-making body was afraid that if at all it is agreed upon that there should be other General Elections before the three years involving other farmers' groups, there was a possibility of losing power. His idea that the majority should speak in the vote was a motion to remove the recommendation, which would imply no more discussions about the issue, and the people would remain uninformed about the lack of proper representation. He would not like people to get more informed about the issue of representation. Another member argued to support him:

> We have an agreement with our donors that we should be the only members in NFG and steer the process of having other members come in. So, there is no need for such recommendation and it is against our agreement. We do not need to be derailed. (Dis.VE2.BkbMar2006)

With this intervention, the manifested fear is about losing the control of deciding who is to be a member of NFG. The power of the member organisations would lie in the deciding who was to become a member. And of course, the "stubborn members" would not have joined the NFG. In actual fact, in the three years of membership of

TUNGO and FFO in NFG, they never made any effort to register any other organisation as new member of NFG. In order to enforce their intention to remain in control of recruitment of members, this member justifies himself with another powerful actor, the donor: “We have an agreement with our donors that we should be the only members…” These two interventions are geared towards maintaining leadership positions at all cost. Those who are already in leadership positions do not want others to get in. This is power weaving because in a clever way the village elite engage in defensive processes such as denying others of necessary information and using powerful people, as donors, to justify remaining within livelihoods promotion situations and excluding other fellow village elite.

2. Other village elite struggling to leadership

The desire to stay in leadership position by some village elite is counteracted with other village elite who want to get in leadership positions. For example, the desire to get in leadership positions was manifested in an argument by a representative of another farmers’ organisation who argued against a clique hiding and agreeing upon issues on behalf of others:

> If NFG is for all of us, then, we should as well be represented. It is useless that we hide behind agreements and constitutions. If anyone made agreements for us all because he/she had known something and refused to involve all of us, then that agreement should not be valid for all of us. If NFG is for us all, let there be ways that we can get involved at the leadership level. (Dis.VE3.Bkb.Mar2006)

This village elite is against hiding information and he advocates for the inclusion of all the stakeholders, given the NFG is open to all farmers’ organisations. In contributing to this same idea of the move against leadership monopoly and interest in getting in the leadership position, a young man from another farmers’ organisation argued:

> The biggest problem that I see in this issue of leadership in NFG and the member organizations is that we young people are not involved in development issues. Only old people have gone in and they are trying to keep us out by arguing that we are always busy in business activities rather than agriculture. This is not true at all because there are many young people who are farmers and there many young people who would like to be leaders in these organizations; but there is no way they can get this information about elections because such seem to be reserved to old people.
>
> Look at our leaders in the two organisations that make up the Steering Committee: all are aged people. When do you want to rest and let us work? Don’t you want to rest a little bit? Do you want to die in work? I should remind you of a Haya saying that *Obuyo butaina nyana, bufa buchweke* [a herd without calves perishes]. It is time that you begin stepping down and follow what the new President has said: *Ari mpya, kasi mpya, nguvu mpya* [New zeal, new speed, and new energy]. We young people can do that! (Dis.VE4.Bkb.Mar2006)

This intervention of a young man village elite reveals a number of things. One of them is that the elderly people do not want to give up leadership positions. They want to remain in power and that is why they struggle to be in all the leadership positions. The second thing is that even the young people who are elite are interested in leadership and they are in a struggle to enter into leadership positions. In a clever way, this young elite uses a political slogan of the President of Tanzania, who is also a "young President", but a powerful political figure in Tanzania, to sell the idea of elderly people moving out of leadership positions leaving positions for the young people. Even the young people, therefore, are in a struggle for leadership positions through pushing ahead the issue about age differences. Thus, whereas the village elite who are already in leadership positions want to maintain their leadership plus more leadership positions by blocking other village elite to come into leadership, those who are not yet in leadership positions are struggling to get into them.

As I had already discussed in the section on the livelihoods of the village elite, leadership positioning is crucial for the village elite because in such a way they maintain power to control the village livelihood promotion circumstances. Thus, power weaving involves processes of circumventing competition to leadership positions in order for a few people to remain in power and to exclude other potential comers, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to get into leadership to get into power. In this case, it can, therefore, be argued that power weaving is about competition between the village elite.

Corruption of the village elite

In chapter six, I presented corruption as one of the organising practices of the district officials. Corruption of the village elite means a system whereby the village elite seek illegitimate personal or public gain. The village elite become corrupt in order to remain as important people in the villages. Corruption manifests itself in looking for allowances and cheating, refusal of price information to village people, and entertainment of exploitative contracts.

1. Looking for allowances and cheating

During the workshop presentation, however, one of the representatives from another farmers' organisation besides TUNGO and FFG argued, while pointing to the slogan of NFG that was projected on the wall: "the advocate of the farmer is the farmer him/herself":

> Big liars! They say that the "advocate of the farmer is the farmer him/herself". They themselves who invented those words belittle the farmers. They are the same people who everyday and in everything want allowances to increase. They are cheats! I would propose that the allowances

> reduce because those are the things they run after when they want to become leaders; let their works be given to experts who would be given good pay and they do a good job rather than continuing with this kind of chaos of allowances and poor work! We are tired of these stupidities! (Dis.VE5.Bkb.Mar2006)

Behind this observation is the revelation of the rhetoric whereby the elite coin "catch phrases" for mobilisation of people and resources. The village elite support development organisations and repeat their catch phrases in order that they join these organisations for economic gains. Once they have campaigned for the organisation, they are able to secure a leadership position, which guarantees them economic gains in terms of allowances. Thus, the economic motives guide many people's thrust in joining leadership positions in development interventions. I asked an official of NFG to give an opinion about the allowance issue:

> I am tired of these people of the policy-making body who are always here looking for repayments of the bills they used. Sometimes, they have fake receipts and they want to be paid twice or more. Sometimes, they create journeys so that they can claim travel, meals, and lodging costs. We end up giving much more to these leaders than the farmers themselves. (Int.NI1.Bkb.Mar 2006)

Of course, giving the leaders allowances is in view of the fact that they are working for the farmers they represent; therefore they request that the expenses they incur and the time they spend is rewarded through allowances. However, there are two problems with respect to allowances. The first problem is that these village elite are cheats: they tell lies and fake receipts in order to get money. The second problem is that these village elite do not, in most of the times, work for the farmers they say they represent, as a farmer argued in a focus group discussion:

> We always hear that they are our representatives and they are supposed to take our ideas. … But that these representatives really represent us, that is not true. We hardly get reports from them, apart from hearing some information from their friends that they were in Arusha or Morogoro. (FGD7.VP11.Kab.Apr.2005)

Thus, the village elite who represent the farmers do not deserve the allowances because they do not do their task of taking village people's ideas and giving feedback from the meetings. Development organisations have become income-generating entities for the village elite. The leaders found in the policy-making bodies of such organisations have created opportunities for themselves in meetings, trainings, seminars, and workshops in and outside the country. With such activities they are able to get allowances.

2. Refusal of price information to the village people

The development organisations through their policy-making bodies do not want the village people who are farmers to know the market prices of their agricultural produce. During the workshop, an official of NFG argued:

> It is necessary for NFG to make sure that the farmers get enough information on issues about agriculture. One of the crucial information that farmers need is related to the market: farmers need to know prices of the crops they grow and where they can find the market. In this way, they are able to choose to whom they want to sell their crops and at their prices of choice. (Int.NI1.Bkb.Mar2006)

On this argument of an official from NFG, a policy-making body member of the TUNGO and NFG argued:

> That cannot be the work of NFG because then, it will be going against the rules and regulations we have established in our organisations that have existed here before NFG. There is no need for farmers knowing the prices; they have to listen from us and that is all. (Dis.VE6.Bkb.Mar2006)

This village elite refers to the traditional power that the policy-making body of TUNGO had reserved for itself: to decide on the prices of vanilla and to simply inform the farmers who knew nothing about market prices. The challenge from NFG is that it wants the farmers to know the different prices offered by the market and to make their own decisions. This is a revolution because, even with regard to other development organisations like CCU, farmers never knew what the market prices for their products were. Following up the discussion with one of the policy-makers of TUNGO, I asked why they should not tell the farmers about the market prices of vanilla, for example. He told me:

> We are dealing with farmers and donors and ourselves. We are working hard to see that they can get something out of their crops. But we are never sure of how much our donors will offer in order to buy their crops. We have to get something out of what we are doing. The only thing that can be done is to keep the story among ourselves in our meetings so that we can balance the equations: let them not know the prices; we give them prices higher than those ones offered by coffee buyers and we benefit from what is excess. We cannot work for nothing. (Int.TI1.Bkb. Mar2006)

Thus, they hide the price of the crops so that they may benefit from the excess money made as profit.

3. Entertaining exploitative contracts

During the course of the discussion on hiding prices for the agricultural crops to the farmers, another village elite from FFG argued in support of the argument not to disclose market prices for agricultural produce:

> We have made contracts with farmers. The farmers have to sell their products to us because we offer them extension services; in return they have to sell us their crops at the prices we set. We

> are providing them with a sure market. In fact, if they do not sell them to us, they risk losing the market and they are not grateful to us who are working for them in order that they can grow crops and they can sell them to us. (Dis.VE2.BkbMar2006)

Signing contracts is a way to be sure of the agricultural produce from the farmers. The contracts help such organisations binding people from selling their produce to other buyers. They control competition and farmers remain compromised with selling their own crops at lower prices compared to other buyers who would come in. These contracts are signed between the farmer and the development organisation. They keep the farmers non-knowledgeable of the prices of the crops they grow and the farmers are obliged to accept prices given them by the organisation. This allows for more availability of excess income for the benefits of the policy-making bodies. In a focus group discussion, a village person commented on contracts:

> I can understand if an organisation is a business company that it needs to make money in order to keep running and make profits; it should put checks and balances to make sure that it gains from its business. But if an organisation has been started in the name of promoting us village people and it operates with the donor-funds to assist us, why should it force us into contracts that bind us for exploitation? FGD7.VP12.Kab.Apr.2005)

Thus, through corruption, the local development organisations have turned against the village people they are meant to serve: they look for allowances and cheat in the organisations; they want the village people ignorant of the market prices of their agricultural produce, and; they want them to remain in exploitative contracts. The excess money has to be used by the members of the policy-making bodies in terms of allowances in the name of organisational development. Farmers are blackmailed: the development organisations argue that they have done them a favour by promoting their crops and by giving them the market, and therefore they should be grateful to them and abide by what they say.

Speaking the languages

This is an organising practice of the village elite in order to enrol the district officials into prioritising the development projects they have for the village people. I argued in this chapter that among the characterisations of the village elite is being educated and that the elite are delegated by the village people to deal with many things, among which development matters which they have to advance to the district officials. It is at this point that this organising practice of speaking the language by the village elite becomes crucial. Language, in this case, means specialised lines of thoughts. The village elite use these specialised lines of thought so that the messages about addressing the needs of the village people may get through the district officials and may be addressed. In order to understand this organising practice, I make

use of a development planning meeting where the village elite were discussing the Ward development plan which was to be presented to the district.

According to what was being discussed in the development planning meeting, the biggest problem in the area was drought which had resulted into famine, conflict between pastoralists and farmers, and rampant bushfires. A member of this development planning meeting commented on the issue:

> There is little food to eat amongst our people. Rainfall has been a problem for the last three years. Many crops have dried up. The pastoralists and the farmers are now fighting for the waters in the swamps. And there is no hope that we shall be getting the rains soon. (Mtg1.Pol2. IziAug2003)

This reality of drought was the real problem of the villages around the YFEC which was lived by the village people. Thus, when the village elite expressed this problem, they were speaking the language of the people that expresses the true life being affected by bad weather.

However, when it came to prioritization of the development plans for immediate attention in the area, these village elite prioritised educational infrastructure, first (classrooms, teachers' offices, and building teachers' houses and toilets in schools), health infrastructures, second (more dispensaries, house for the health workers, and facilities for expecting women), and transportation, third (lorries and buses, culverts, and bridges). One would wonder what the link is between the priorities and the real problem of drought in the villages. But this is the official language of the "traditional sectors" of education, health, and transportation. They know that if they want the needs of the village people to be addressed, the understandable language by district officials who make decisions on the possibilities to intervene is the official language of sectors used in development planning and implementation. The village elite have learnt this language from the different meetings, seminars and trainings. This language is enhanced by some councillors, who are part of the district officials, who are found working together with the village elite. For instance, commenting on these priorities, the Councillor made some clarifications:

> The development plans have to match with the development thinking and the eventual priorities of the district have to be derived from the nation's priorities, otherwise there is no possibility of getting these plans passed by the district council. The priority of the nation that is to be translated in the district is the Ministry of Agriculture with the central focus related to agriculture. (Mtg1.Pol1.Izi.Aug2003)

These development plans should follow the national and district priority areas because it is on these priorities that the debates base to decide which plans to include and which not to include. Thus, the official language is important to be known by

the village elite in order to speak it out and increase the chances of having their development plans passed by the district officials.

What is more important is the language of the village elite that tries to put together the language of the village people and the official language. In this case of the Ward development planning meeting, this is the language that is enshrined in the priority that was set by the village elite after the reminder from the councillor. The agricultural priority set was:

> We want projects that stress on more people going in for agriculture and reducing happenings such as the conflicts between farmers and pastoralists and pyromaniac behaviours. Agriculture is central in our lives and any conflicts or behaviour that jeopardises it should be discouraged. But farmers do not deal with only agriculture. So, more projects in education and in health are necessary to accompany agriculture. Projects aimed at dealing with such conflicts and behaviours are encouraged. (Mtg1.Pol.Izi.Aug2003)

As it can be seen from this priority, these village elite tried to accommodate the sectoral priority as set by the national and district priorities. At the same time, however, they tried to bring in the language that speaks of the needs of the people as a necessary accompaniment to the national and district priority. Thus, in order that the village elite enrols the district officials, they need to incorporate the language of the village people that has got the real needs of the people and the official language that incorporates sectoral and national and district priorities. What is more interesting in the language of the village elite is the fact that the district officials understand the language because it is the daily language they use for their work in planning and implementation of development activities, on one hand, and on the other hand, it is a language that is presentable to the donors and they provide resources.

I have presented the three organising practices of the village elite: power weaving, corruption, and speaking the languages. At least verbally, the main orientation of donor-funded development organisations like TUNGO is to be in line with assisting the village people with promotion of their livelihoods through the intervention in agricultural activities. Apparently, the village people seem to be losers to the village elite on such projects that are initiated in their names. The village elite "hijack development projects" and they benefit from them by the woven power through leadership positions and the income generated through corruptions. However, the village elite are not totally defaulters to the village people: they transmit their messages and the messages of the village people about development planning to the district officials through speaking the language that the district officials understand for addressing the needs of the village people. This analysis of the organising practices from the perspective of the village elite has to be complemented by the analysis of the organising practices from the perspective of the village people.

Organising practices of the village people

The organising practices of the village people are a response to the elite capture of the development projects. The village people do not directly interact with the donors in the development organisations that promote their livelihoods; instead, they are mediated by the elite who are concerned with the thinking, planning, implementing, monitoring, and communicating with the district officials. This implies that in the rural areas, the village elite work closer with the district officials and the donors than the village people.

The interactions between the village elite and the village people in the development organisations take place within localised power relations in the different bargaining processes. The bargaining processes happen in formal democratic local political processes as in decentralisation, and at the same time they take place in informal complex sets among social actors. In both cases, however, the village elite are involved in roles and functions of brokers and brokerage, while the village people respond to this by engaging in organising practices in order to manoeuvre the village elite. I present these organizing practices in the categories of elite ordination, enrolling the other, and resistance.

Elite ordination

Much as this term is generally used in religious circles, it means setting apart someone for administration of various functions. Thus, with ordination of the elite, it means that someone is set apart and "authorized" by the village people to perform certain functions on their behalf. There are many complaints from the village people that they are not involved in different forums for the development of their villages. This complaint is extended to the development organisations, such as CCU and TUNGO. It is a complaint extended as well to the more formalised systems of development planning processes as elaborated in the decentralised system of Tanzania that should begin from the hamlet, then to the village, to the ward, and should end up in the district. There are rarely meetings taking place with the village people in order to form the development organisations; the thinking about them and the planning is done by the village elite. It is the same with the hamlets and villages where development planning meetings for problem-shooting, needs assessment, and development planning should take place: hardly do meetings actually take place with the village people. In both scenarios, the elite have taken over through being "ordained" by the village people.

A woman responding to the question as to why she has never gone for any development planning meeting said:

> What do you want me to say there? What do I know? I am a farmer; I take care of children and my husband. Probably, my husband can go there, but even him what do you think he can say? We are all farmers for a long time in this village. We cannot have a lot to say on development. … We are not teachers or politicians. (Fgd6.VP1.Izi.Jul2005)

Another woman commented on why she does not participate in participatory development planning meetings.

> I rarely hear of such meetings. Again, I know that there are people who lead us. That is their work: let them plan. Again, what do you want me to plan? I have never been to Mwanza and Dar es Salaam and that is where plans come from; I have no phone; I have no car; … I hear nowadays people can send a letter very far and it reaches the same day without any transport (talking of emails), I don't know that. … Those plans are yours. … Leave us to dig, but bring us good seeds. (Fgd6.VP2.Izi.Jul2005)

These responses are very important in highlighting several issues. The first issue is that many village people are not aware of the ongoing development issues and information that are required for formulating plans for their own development. This implies that they feel out of place when it is a matter of planning for they cannot speak the appropriate language of development planning. The second issue is that development planning at the hamlet and village levels has been left to some people such as teachers and politicians; farmers cannot manage because they only know issues about farming. The third issue is that the development plans reflect urban realities: Mwanza and Dar es Salaam, cities in Tanzania, are a symbol of development and that is why the people who have gone there are taken to be those who can have something to say about development. The fourth issue is about the mentioning of a phone and a car. These are symbols of being wealthy. The respondent implies that one needs to be wealthy in order to plan. The fifth issue is the question of gender asymmetries: the woman respondent thinks that her basic task is to take care of the children and husband; the husband could be the one to participate in development planning meetings. But, she thinks that he does not qualify because he has nothing to say! An important thing that unites all these issues is the fact that the village people look at themselves as incapable of planning and there are special people who should plan.

Development planning has been established as an issue for the important people in the villages, and not everybody. The important people are teachers, retired civil servants, and young men and women who have been in towns. A woman commented on the important people:

> We have many people who have gone to school. Others are teachers, workers, business people, and others are lucky because they can easily speak. You see, for example, if we all listened to a radio, not all of us would remember and tell people what has been said in the radio. The important people will remember what has been said and they will talk as if the radio was talking

> about this village. … They understand things because they have seen them, worked with them, tasted them. (Fgd6.VP3.Izi.Jul2005)

This implies that other people in the village, apart from the important people, are convinced that they cannot participate in development planning; the important people can talk to the different leaders, informing them of what are supposed to be the problems of the people according to what they think in order to carry on the development plans. The important people having lived with the village people are led them to the understanding of the development plans of the village people. Strictly speaking, then, there is no development planning by the village people themselves because not all village people can discuss development issues: the important people should deal with development issues, whereas the other village people should continue concentrating on their farms.

In fact, the village people engage in processes of bringing the important people on board so that they can be the ones to deal with development issues be it in participatory development planning or in development organisations. There was an elderly man standing in an open space, a little distant from where the village meeting was taking place. I asked him why he was far from the audience in the meeting. Look at his response, a demonstration of the struggle to bring the important people on board development issues:

> Why did you go to school? These are your things. *Okuzaara ti kunya* [giving birth is not going for a long call]: it means bringing out someone who should assist you. Don't expect me to go for these village meetings for planning for development. They have taught you these things at school, me not. I am already tired. I attended such meetings from long time ago. I think that my ideas have expired already. … So, you go because you are young and you will tell me what has happened. (Int.VP13.Izi.Jul2005)

This elderly person "delegates" someone to attend the meeting and he minds that he is given feedback on what transpires in the meeting. That is the reason as to why he is near the meeting place. The person to be delegated is trusted. Look at this testimony from a young leader of the youths:

> The young people in my village elected me to represent them and their ideas. They trusted me. This is what I am trying to bring forward to any meeting. I always talk about their employment, but nobody wants to understand this. The point they always make for me is that these young people are a perverse generation: they do not want to engage in agriculture; they want quick money, and; they do not respect elders. What I have decided is to mobilise the young people and do what we think is possible without passing through such meetings. When there are occasions in town or elsewhere we shall go; when there is a big leader coming, we shall go. This involves a lot of sacrifice in terms of time and financial resources. I put some of my moneys, that one I know, but sometimes the young people themselves assist me. And if I do not do it now, the youths are doomed and we shall have problems tomorrow because they will be poor and disorganised.

This youth leader is enthusiastic about his work that he was delegated to do by his fellow youths. He has studied as far as secondary school and that is why the other youths trusted him and thought that he would lead them. In his work, a lot of sacrifice and self-initiatives are involved. These understanding people are the village elite. As I have already mentioned, they take over development planning and implementation in the development processes. However, before they take over the development processes of the village, these elite are ordained by the village people, who from the feelings of inability to deal with development planning, they delegate them to the development stage to work for them. This is elite ordination: village people give them mandates to participate and plan for them.

But why would the village people ordain the elite? I shall give an answer to this question using three cases. One case is about delegating "canny important people". The second case is about delegating those who are networked, understand, and speak the language of development. The third case is about delegating those people who can be sent to town to go and bring something in the village. The village people understand that not all the important people whom they delegate work for them. They are aware that some of them are corrupt and people engaged in favouritisms, but they still delegate such people. Sometimes they delegate very old people who are unable to be very efficient. Why would they do this? Look at an example of how they reason with such corrupt and people engaged in favouritism:

> I know that many understanding people are not clean. Look at them when we elect them as representatives in our organisations or in our committees: immediately you see them grow fat; they build houses; they take their children to school; their wives begin putting on expensive clothes; and so on. Many times, they favour their relatives and colleagues. They are *wajanja* [Swahili word meaning "canny"]; we know that they eat on our money. But I think that sometimes it is better to give leadership to a *mjanja* who can deliver something and you get it, rather than one who does not understand anything because you will never get anything from him/her. With *wajanja* leaders, there will be no money left in any account, but something can be seen in the village to benefit the village. (Int.VP14.Izi.Apr2006)

In this quote, it is clear how the village people are aware that some of their understanding people are corrupt and engage in favouritism. However, they still delegate them as understanding people to represent them in different development activities because these are able to bring something in the village. People who do not understand anything end up either getting everything for themselves or not getting anything at all because they are not canny!

The second case is about people who can manage development issues because they are networked in the sense that they can access high officials in the district or development organisations, understand, and speak the language of development.

Asking how the village people came to know that TUNGO was promoting vanilla, a man argued in a focus group discussion:

> The information came from a colleague in this village. He has many agricultural activities, but mainly he currently works with the World Vision in our area. He knows many people in town and in the district. He can easily move to town because he has a motorcycle. He was once a member of a small association that dealt with scarce crops. You see, there is no way you can know such organisations and how to join them if you do not have connections above. (Fgd7.VP4.Izi.Jul2005)

Thus, this man who is a good farmer and employee of World Vision was able to know about the project and spread it in the home area. He used his networks and since he was trusted by his village people, he managed to have groups organised in order to register with TUNGO. In another example of construction of classrooms, it was necessary that the village people rely on the school committee which is taken to be composed of the elite in matters of education problems and needs of the village. In this project about the construction of the classrooms, most of the village people had no idea about the procedures in order to have the project. However, the "school committee", which is a structure responsible for development planning at the school, was to do everything. A respondent said in a focus group discussion:

> The school has always been there. This school has a committee which has to deal with the daily identification of school problems. … After the committee knew that the government was encouraging schools to build more classrooms and there was a possibility of funding these constructions, it made a proposal to the village council. … This proposal was taken to the Ward Committee and went as far as the District Council where it went through for funding. What do you want us to know about all these procedures? Let the committee members sort it out by themselves because that is part of their task and they know all these things. (Fgd7.VP3.Izi. Jul2005)

In the same way, even issues about money are not understood by the village people. This leads them to get people who can understand the financial language, for example. According to the respondents of a focus group discussion, the districts are more transparent in accounts than the development organisations:

> If I want to know what the district has spent, I can go to the notice board at the district and I can see the accounts. They put them there. But, go to TUNGO, you can never know how the moneys go. You will hardly get information about the budget, how it is prepared, by whom, and to whom. Accounts in TUNGO are total darkness. You can hardly even know what the exact price of vanilla should be. They do not even want us to know what the general market price is. That is information reserved for the insiders only, not the general public who are the owners of TUNGO. (Fgd7.VP4.Izi.Jul2005)

Thus, it is possible to know issues about expenditures of district programmes, rather than those of development organisations like TUNGO. In the case of TUNGO, this is a situation whereby development organisations find themselves in a

situation of being more accountable to donors than to the beneficiaries. The attention to the donors is geared towards getting more funds from the donors. And the pressure and precision is great from the donors' side to an extent that these organisations should get specialised people to deal with the accounts. Even if they put these accounts on the notice board, most likely very few people would understand them. In actual fact, even in the case of the district council where the accounts are pinned on the public notice boards, there is actually a problem. A woman commented on the display of the accounts at the district, when I asked her if she had ever checked the accounts on the notice board and if she knew how much the district was spending:

> Ask me an easier question, which is not about finance: it is difficult to know these issues and probably they will never be known by us. We do not know these things, they are known by the leaders! I hear they put them on the board at the District headquarters. But who goes there? Can you simply go there to check on them? Where is the time? Where is the money? And where is that notice board? And if I saw them, would I understand them? Our leaders are the ones to go there and bring clear information to us. (Fgd7.VP5.Izi.Jul2005)

In fact, many village people do not know how the finances were handled and how they can get information about them.

The third case is somehow related to the second one in that it is about delegating the important people, but to towns in order to bring something in the village. It has to be remembered that the urban has been seen as a centre for the emanation of ideas for rural intervention. An elderly man shared his views on improvement of the life standards of the village people when they go to towns:

> No more lies about the villages. We are tired of you people making us want to remain in the village and you, there in towns. Look at our councillors: they have to meet in town to discuss village issues. When you ask them why they go to town, they say that it is where the headquarters of the district are. If it is true that the village is important, why couldn't they construct the headquarters of the district in one of the villages? In town that is where things are.
>
> … I do not remember the music properly, but I know that some band in Dar has vowed to remain in Dar; they sing that all the ministers are there; all businesses are there; even the big teams of Simba and Young Africans are there; moreover, you need not have a big job in order to stay there because you can live by selling water and you can live by rumour mongering. Why should you people continuously tell us to stay in the village? Why can't we go where life is improved already and take care of us there?
>
> And once you come from the town to the village, you are a big person. You are different: you know good Swahili; you have eaten good food; you have good clothing; you look nice … And this is what we want. But some people continuously want us to remain only in the village. For what? (Fgd1.VP2.Kab.Jul2004)

This is a comment that puts at the centre the urban reality. In towns, there is everything, and so there is no need as to why people should not go there for good things. However, according to the village people, not every person should go to

town. It is for this reason that they delegate the important people. A man argued for who should go to towns and the reasons for going there:

> I do not see any reason as to why young people and educated should not go to town. Let them go there to do business and get good jobs. In towns there are moneys from projects; in towns they can get employed by the donors; in towns they can find donors for our village projects. … If these people remain here in the villages, donors and employers might not see them … Having many youths and educated people in towns is like having many hooks in the lake because you are sure you have more possibilities of catching some fish at the end of the day. (Fgd1.VP5.Kab. Jul2004)

According to this response, when more people are outside the villages and they are in towns, it implies that there are more chances to get possibilities of assistance. And as experience has shown, when the educated and young people go to towns, they come back with new ideas about development projects and sometimes they bring development projects. So, the village people encourage young and the educated people to go to town for future village opportunities:

> Our youths and educated people take care of us in the village. They have the nice houses you see. They pay fees for our children. But again, the village is their home. They will come back when they are tired, or sometimes when they are dead, and they will be settled in the village. When they come back we are all happy because they bring something, even if it is small: *akake okalya n'owawe* [you eat a small thing with your people]. So, let them go; they will bring things. The village is their home and it will remain theirs. (Fgd1.VP2.Kab.Jul2004)

Thus, continuous movements of the young people and the elite from villages to urban areas and vice versa are encouraged by the village people. This is due to the conceptualisation of the urban life as source of inspiration for the village life. Young and educated people are encouraged to go for greener pastures and social amenities in towns. These people are able to manage donors, government officials, and rich people who are mostly found in town. But these young and educated people are required to come back to the villages (at home) to share what they have acquired in town. Sometimes they bring cash and goods which are shared; sometimes they bring entire projects to the villages that can assist in the promotion of the livelihoods of the people. Thus, the village people remain with the option of delegating some people because they are networked, they can understand the language of development, in terms of accounts, for example, and are able to negotiate with donors, government people, and rich people in town so as to be able to bring something to the villages.

Thus, elite ordination is about formation processes of the elite; with elite ordination the village people get the important people and delegate them so that they can deal with different matters that concern development. It is not enough to ordain the elite; they need to be given work; this entails enrolment as an organising practice.

Enrolling the village elite

Enrolling means entering or registering or recording someone somewhere; it means bringing someone on your course. Thus, enrolling the village elite as an organizing practice means manoeuvres that the village people engage in so that they can bring the village elite on their course. In this organising practice of enrolling the village elite, I present three issues. The first is about the village people enrolling the elite of TUNGO and TUNGO in order to address their own needs in the village. The second issue is about the village people pleasing the agents of development so as not to disappoint them. The third issue is about scheming. Let me begin with the village people trying to enrol the elite of TUNGO and TUNGO.

1. Addressing proper needs

In addressing the proper needs, I discuss the argument that the village people have learnt to enrol the elite in their struggles to address their needs. I shall describe this phenomenon through an experience of the village people, using the growing of vanilla as an opportunity as a way to enrol the elite of TUNGO and TUNGO in their perceived needs. In a discussion about the needs of the village people and the assistance they need from TUNGO, a group presented these three needs and their prioritisation:

> Priority 1: Agriculture. We do not have agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, hoes, and seeds. We hardly see agricultural experts: our extension officer hardly visits us and when he comes, he visits his friends who have money. It is for this reason that we lack education in new animals and crops. There are many monkeys around here. They eat our bananas, cassava, potatoes, maize and so on. It is difficult to kill them because we do not have enough guns or other means to deal with them. Land for cultivation is becoming scarce: some big pieces of land are no more fertile; others have been invaded by pastoralists; sometimes it is difficult to cultivate because we are afraid of fires during the dry season.
>
> Priority 2: Constructions. Our children are still suffering at school because they are packed in classrooms. This place is very dry; when the rains come they really pour, but when they go, they really go and we get prolonged drought.
>
> Priority 3: Economy. We lack sources of generating money; there is less opportunities for making money in the village, apart from agriculture which does not pay at all. You just put in a lot of efforts and you earn little. The prices which are given for bananas, cassava, potatoes, beans, and other crops are very low. Coffee has lost money value; coffee has become a hopeless crop to deal with: when you have a lot of it, then the prices go down and when you have less of it, the prices go up. We have so many orphans who need assistance. They have lost their parents due to HIV/AIDS (Fgd.Kab.Aug.2005).

So, according to the discussants, the first priority in terms of perceived needs was agriculture, followed by constructions, and the last priority was economic. As farmers, then it is logical that their first priority deals with agriculture. Similarly, if

agriculture is the first priority as a need, then even in the assistance needed agriculture would be prioritised first. However, in prioritisation of the assistance from TUNGO, first was assistance in constructions, followed by economic assistance, and finally agricultural assistance. This is how the respondents categorised and prioritised the assistance needed:

> Priority 1: Constructions. We need to get donors in order to repair our primary and secondary schools because they are getting old; we still need more donors to assist in constructing classrooms in the very schools. What is crucial for us in this village is the fact that we have a problem of water in this area. We really ask for donors to intervene by constructing more wells and improving our traditional wells. Drought is long in this area and we have very few sources of water. We cannot rely on rain.
>
> Priority 2: Economy. We need people to come and assist us in giving us more loans for small businesses. These loans can assist us in improving our crop and animal husbandry: we can grow more crops, have enough of them, and get more to sell.
>
> Priority 3: Agriculture. We need agricultural advice of what we do not know. Everyday many people tell us what we know about growing bananas and coffee. We need something new and practical to us. (Fgd.Kab.Aug.2005)

According to the prioritisation of needs, the village people prioritise agricultural needs first. But, according to the prioritisation of assistance, they prioritise agricultural assistance last. So, why would the village people prioritise agriculture as first need and then prioritise it last for assistance? Moreover, given the fact that TUNGO deals with agriculture, it would be expected that the village people focus more on asking agricultural assistance because of more likelihood of assistance from TUNGO. So, why did the village people prioritise as first assistance constructions and not agriculture?

According to people, the economic issue in terms of moneylessness is very important. The village people are arguing that if they had money, some of the problems they face would be solved. Even the agricultural problems they have are due to lack of economic power. Village people are expressing the idea that TUNGO should be interested in the economy of the people, rather than agriculture as such. Village people have agricultural needs simply because the economic situation is not favourable. So, once the economic situation is addressed, then the needs can be addressed by the village people themselves. Other livelihood activities, besides agriculture, are necessary in people's livelihoods promotion. What the village people are doing is to try to enrol TUNGO in more diversified economic activities than a narrow minded view of promotion of their livelihoods through solely vanilla growing.

Again, if the objectives of TUNGO as an organisation to promote agriculture, but specifically the growing of vanilla and mushrooms, were clarified, why did the

respondents present those perceived needs and proposed those types of assistance to TUNGO? In other words, what is the connection between TUNGO and the presented needs and assistances asked? In order to answer this question, it should first be clarified how people perceive organisations such as TUNGO. Such organisations are perceived to have lots of money because there are donors behind it. For example, TUNGO has lots of money from donors because they see the big vehicles of TUNGO; they see their offices; they see some of their workers with private transport; they see that the vehicles of TUNGO take their workers to work and from work; they see these vehicles carrying the Steering Committee members; they see that when the officials call them for meetings or seminars or workshops, they give them allowances, and; they see their Steering Committee going for tours every now and then. And therefore, TUNGO has lots of moneys and possibilities. So, TUNGO is an opportunity to be exploited to address their needs. This implies that any forum that is presented by organisations like TUNGO should be usefully utilised to put forward the perceived needs that people have and ask for assistance, not necessarily needs and assistance that rhymes with what the organisation provides.

Village people do not give up in trying to enrol the village elite in order to address their needs. As I mentioned already when introducing the section on the livelihoods of the village people in this chapter, the catchment area of YFEC, part of the area of operation of TUNGO, is in the Karagwe-Ankolean low rainfall, according to the agro-ecological zones of Bukoba District. This is a rather dry area for growing of vanilla. However, in order that people may try to enrol TUNGO in addressing one of their basic problem, drought, they adopted vanilla growing and among the assistance they ask from TUNGO is to construct them wells and dams. Their argument is to make sure that they can water their vanilla, but in actual fact it is generally to address the water problem in the area.

Thus, from this experience of TUNGO and the vanilla growing, the village people have wanted to enrol the elite of TUNGO and TUNGO in their perceived needs, using the growing of vanilla as an opportunity. The village people have indirectly argued for TUNGO’s engagement in diversified economic activities in order to address the problem of moneylessness; they have used vanilla growing as bait for TUNGO to provide water services in order to address the problem of drought in the area. Let me now turn my attention to pleasing.

2. Pleasing

In one of the agricultural trade shows in Bukoba, I discussed issues about agriculture with a farmer who had brought a traditional species of banana for demonstration.

This banana was besides other huge banana hybrids. I asked him why he thought that banana was important to be demonstrated in the show. One farmer gave me the following account:

> I am a farmer for a long time. I know where I plant what and for what reasons. … The good bananas are planted around the house. The very good ones are in front of my house: I can see them every time and work on them; that is why they are nice; each one who comes to visit me should see them. … If you go behind my house, you will see other types of bananas; some of them are small in size and poor quality; others are strange … I go there once in a while and people cannot see them easily. These bananas cannot be planted in front of your house: they will give you shame, and that's all!
>
> Now, these people bring us *Mtwishe*[10]. They think that I shall put it in front of my house. Why? … It is not nice. I have seen it cooked: it is hard. … I shall never put it in front of my house. Even I do not trust it because it can kill other bananas: it grows very fast with so many stems. …. It cannot be as good as *Nshakala* or *Ntobe* or *Kinunu* or *Njubo* [types of bananas]. ….
>
> Who do you think can know bananas better than us who have grown them from when we were here? If you come to my home, I shall show you one banana tree near my house on the left side; I was given by the *Bi shamba* [female extension officer]. I did not want to disappoint her; she is my friend; I do not want her to think that I never took her serious. But, if I have to tell you the truth that is in my heart, I am not convinced of any good thing from that banana tree: I just planted it for the sake of pleasing her! (Int.VP2.Bkb.Aug2003)

This account demonstrates how the rationale in planting bananas can reveal an organising practice of how, once the village people have understood what an agent of modernising development wants, they please him/her. As bad bananas are planted behind the house and receive less attention, the hybrids are supposed to be planted behind the house because they are perceived as bad bananas. But since the village people have to be seen as serious people in order to please the modernising development agent, hybrids receive a front position in the homestead as if they were good bananas. Even in agricultural shows, the traditional bananas are brought alongside the hybrids: if the village people brought only the traditional bananas, this would be disrespect to the agents of development who promote hybrids, which are big and good-looking. So, village people bring their treasured traditional species for demonstration and again for the sake of pleasing the donors, they also bring hybrids.

So, when the development agent does not find resistance among the village people on what he/she has introduced, he/she thinks that things are moving on pretty well. As one who does not know that a plantation is organised in a certain way that

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[10] This is a Swahili word meaning "load it on his/her head". Normally, the Haya people have average size bananas which they can carry without anybody's assistance. The hybrid bananas which have been introduced in Bukoba are so big that one cannot carry it alone: there is need for someone to "load it on someone". So, the Haya people have called these hybrid big bananas *Mtwishe,* to show how big the banana is and to distinguish it from their traditional bananas. The name *Mtwishe,* however, carries a negative connotation of something to eat which is not nice.

can demonstrate farmer's preferences and choices, the development agent does not understand how people have resisted his/her idea. Pleasing is a way of enrolling the elite, in this case represented by the development agent, by speaking the language of the elite so that he/she can continuously have attention on the village person. The village people are diligent in relating with their elite; the village people know what their needs are and know much better how to strategise for them than the elite. The village people please the elite and in so doing they win their favour. The elite fall prey to the tricks of the farmers and carry forward the projects of the village people to the donors through their development organisations. Let me now turn to scheming.

3. Scheming

This concept means "coldly" planning to achieve personal aims; it is about concealing a design or desire or plan or intention for advancing personal interests. In scheming, there are connotations of cleverness, calculation, and sometimes conniving, shrewdness, and deceit. In the case of this study, it means cleverly involving the elite in the planning and targeting something in future, which the elite is not aware of. I shall illustrate this with an example of the construction and improvement of the YFEC, which was constructed in 1992 to promote agriculture in a village and villages nearby. I shall again give an example of prioritisation of infrastructural projects.

In order to find out the beneficiaries' sense of ownership of the project, I made some observation about the project: the buildings were getting old and were not repaired; there were cracks in the walls; many of the gadgets in the YFEC were no longer working (the laboratory is gone; the solar energy systems for lighting and running small electric gadgets are dead; the toilets and bath rooms are gone; the water pipes are broken and do not have running water); the place is not clean, and the plantations are full of weeds. Thus, the place looked abandoned.

If the people wanted the YFEC, one would think that it would be because they needed it for their livelihood promotion. If that was the case, then, why is it abandoned? Why do the beneficiaries not take care of it? Half of the beneficiaries who were interviewed on the project showed dis-interest about the project. When one of the farmers was asked why he was not interested in the YFEC, he responded:

> … it is not for us poor farmers, but for rich people who can attend meetings and pay some money or the government pays for them ... But if the manager or the husband is your friend, you can go there. … But, then, what much do you get? There is no money there and they will always blame you on how you do your farming. … Again, what you have at home is what they have in

> the YFEC, except one or two expensive cows, many chickens, and many dogs. (Int.VP1.Kab. Aug2003)

The place is for people who have money because services rendered are paid for. Moreover, apart from having no news in the centre, the farmers are always blamed and they resist this by avoiding contacts with the agricultural personnel. In some particular moments, however, the centre can be useful, as another farmer argued:

> I do not need to go to the YFEC every day. … When it is time for planting, because I need to know how to do it, especially with new types of crops, then I can go there. … Sometimes, you can get an emergency because there is something that is eating up your plants, as it has happened with cassava and coffee plants, and that is why they are drying, then you can go there. But you cannot just go there. … And once you have learnt something, you learn it for good and you do not go there to keep on asking the same thing. (Int.VP2.Kab.Aug2003)

But still, more people were dissatisfied with the project: 16.7% were satisfied; 30% did not know how to assess the project, and; 53.3% were dissatisfied. Three farmers' accounts testified this. A vanilla farmer, with a three-acre banana plantation and a two-acre coffee plantation said on the general impressions of the YFEC:

> … not many of us go there. … I think that there are no big reasons to go there. … I have seen the manager here several times, and she tells me what I can do, which in most cases I know. … She is my friend, and a friend to many. … I think that her advice is a friendly advice and not because she comes from the YFEC. … I hardly go to the YFEC. Why could I go there? I do not participate in seminars … because they do not invite me, and if I go there I have to pay money. (Int.VP3.Kab.Aug.2003)

A herbalist woman, with an acre of banana plantation, and in it cassava, sweet potatoes, and coffee, was concerned about the YFEC that had become a family business, and not a community affair. She saw herself as one who would be a beneficiary as a herbalist, but she was not. She said:

> Few, almost no farmers and people who are from here, come to the YFEC for agricultural purposes, or even to visit the place. … It is like the Haya saying that *ente telya bunyasi bwa ahi (*the cow does not eat the near-by grass). … I know that there are many seminars and workshops organized by the district that take place at the YFEC. … There are researchers who come around in the place and they can be accommodated there. … The place has become a business place that makes a lot of money through lodging and meal charges. The moneys go to the owners of the YFEC. … It is a family business because the manager works together with the husband, children, and the house girl; … they buy things, clean the place, and cook for visitors who pay money. … The people know nothing about herbs: children and the old people are dying every day. … I would like to know more about herbs from that centre; … I would also give things I know to other people and they pay me for that; … but the owners of the YFEC are on their businesses, and not on our business. (Int.VP4.Kab.Aug.2003)

An elderly leader in the village, with a big plantation and big family, commented:

> … Many people have come here to ask us about the YFEC. When we tell them our stories about the YFEC they go back disappointed with many ideas from us. … All promise to help us, but I

> have never seen anything. … We hear that the YFEC is ours, it is our money, and we can always go there and make use of it. I tell you, … it is not ours at all: it belongs to others and the moment you start saying it is yours you have problems with them. … You see those people who run it, … it is their business with their friends. … You are a young man you still have enough life to do this; make sure that if we are truly the owners of the thing, we claim it; … and we can make the other people who have exploited us pay for their sins!
>
> But, let the YFEC be there because something useful can come out of it sometime later. For example, if someone came asking for where to put a school and he/she did not have buildings, we would propose that he/she uses the YFEC. Why not? Let it be there, anyhow! (Int.VP5.Kab. Aug2003)

The YFEC has been hijacked by the village elite who are working there because they use the funds generated and the village people do not benefit from it. However, much as the project is not profitable to the community, it should not be stopped from functioning because, strategically, if there arises some other project that would need buildings instead of starting afresh, the YFEC buildings are already there. This is scheming by the village people. Often times, village people have asked for development projects because they think that the presence of a project might lead to another project. It is like seizing an opportunity that has come for further making use of what can unfold from it.

In fact, scheming has been a way of dealing with the donors, for example. An elderly man, who was at the meeting when a Dutch official went for the official opening ceremony of the YFEC, said when I asked him why the people in the village did not ask for something else outside the YFEC:

> You see, I have dealt with many Whites from the Germans to these days the Dutch and many others. … One important thing is to read their minds and speak what they already know. You see, they are big people with a lot of money and they want to help us. … It is upon you if you want to be helped or not. This time came a very big and important man to open our centre and who was willing to assist us in its improvement. … We knew this because they told us he was doing it elsewhere. … Would we say no to the man? Would we ask for something else outside his idea? Would we not be stupid? … The best thing he could do to us was to continue making our centre better for something that could happen on our way tomorrow. … *ekigwa tikilaga* [what falls never informs before hand that it will fall]. (Int.VP6.Kab.Aug2003)

This respondent argues that, in a way, they knew what the big person wanted and they just said what he wanted. That is why in 1992 at the inauguration of the YFEC, the people asked for the construction of buildings that would be used as dormitories for farmers who would come from far away and would have not had a possibility of going back home. Much as the village people were not interested in the service of this YFEC, they asked that it is made better in view of future opportunities. The village people were sure that the YFEC is not doing fine for them; they also knew that the Dutch man who came for the inauguration wanted to hear good stories about the centre. From their experience, they can only succeed with such big people if they

speak their language. What the village people did not know, however, was what could be their future needs. So, they opted for the improvement of the centre so that when there is something that presents itself in future and needs buildings, they already have them ready and improved. This is scheming.

But why should the village people prioritise first projects that have to do with infrastructural development, instead of something else that would directly address their tangible problems such as famine? The answer to this question is hinted from this comment about development projects in a school where there was addition of classrooms with donor funds:

> There were so many people when they were building the classrooms for the other school. … You see, builders eat and drink a lot: we used to cook food and they would buy it; we used to make banana juice and it would not be enough. In the village, people had money because they would sell banana wine. … Projects are good; they bring money in the village. (Fgd3.VP4.Izi. Apr2006)

It can be argued, therefore, that the infrastructural projects are good at boosting people's income because there are many people who are involved at work. Many people get involved and they are paid for the work done. The economic motivation for gain is strong: infrastructural projects provide not only work but also people get money through selling their agricultural produce. Thus, when the people in the village suggest such projects to their leaders, they are scheming for these economic opportunities. It is true that agricultural-related projects can boost production; apart from being slow and giving tangible effects after a long period of time, the experience of people with regard to cash crops is one of illusions due to price declines. People want quick money which can be obtained with the implementation of infrastructural projects through payments to labourers and small businesses that take place during the works. Infrastructural projects offer people with fast economic opportunities, which even alleviate their agricultural-related problems such as famine because people can buy foods from somewhere else if they have money. Thus, when people propose infrastructures, they use the normal explanation of infrastructure and development, but they are scheming for the economic benefits when implementing such projects.

Thus, the village people enrol the village elite through addressing their own proper needs by using development organisations and the elite in them, through pleasing the village elite, and through scheming. Let me now turn to the last organising practice, resistance.

Resistance

As I demonstrated, among the organising practices of the village elite was power weaving in which there was capture and control the development processes of the village people. Resistance is an organising practice that responds to the capture and control of the political village elite. It differs in scale from village to village, but hardening and opportunism are common elements which I present in this study, as observed from a local political context in a village around the catchment area of YFEC.

1. Hardening

The term hardening means the act or process of something becoming more and more enduring. The case I present is about how the village people of the opposition party deal with the members of the ruling party, who are the dominant village elite. Hardening means becoming more and more enduring at the domination acts of the dominant village elite and reacting towards the same. Many villages in Bukoba district are bipolar partied villages, with the ruling party and opposition parties competing over leadership and political positions. As I showed in the previous chapter, many leaders of these villages are members of the ruling party. This has resulted in the suppression of the opposition party members.

However, these members of the opposition party do not succumb to suppression easily. One of the members of the opposition party, when commenting on the political situation in the village, claimed that *"Kijijini humu tunaishi kingangari"*. The literal meaning of this expression is that in this village we live in a *ngangari* manner. *Ngangari* is a slogan for one of the key opposition parties in Tanzania. The use of the word *ngangari* stimulates to thinking of people as strong or stable; these are people without fear; they are steadfast. The word originated from some opposition leaders who coined a Swahili phrase "*jino kwa jino*", meaning "tooth for tooth". It became a favourite campaign slogan, suggesting the prospect of bloody clashes. Later on, the *jino kwa jino* was replaced by *ngangari*. So, living in a *ngangari* manner means living as strong and hard people. Another slogan that is used is "*Ngangari Nkangabuye*". The core of this concept is the word *Ngangari;* it has already been explained. *Nkangabuye* is a Haya word meaning a hard stone. It is actually a marble. As it was already expressed, the use of the word stimulates to think of *Ngangari* as a strong or stable person; a person without fear; steadfast. The addition of the word *nkangbuye* is to stress on the element of hardness.

This hardening phenomenon is so socialised that it is even found in songs. For example, there is a song from a Dar es Salaam-based band that identifies itself as

stubbornly *Ngangari,* that is, stubbornly hard. A group of *Ngangari nkangabuye* youths cherished in an evening:

Nani hao? (Who are those?)
Tamutamu *ngangari*,
Bendera chuma, (The flag is iron),
Mlingoti chuma, (The pole iron)
Tamutamu *ngangari*,
Ngangari ngangari ngangari kinoma! (Stubbornly Ngangari X 3)

Due to the dominations of the village elite who belong to the ruling party, the village people from the opposition side have manifested signs of hardening in several ways. During the General Elections of 2005, there were elements of conflicts: in the villages, some family members and friends separated. There were threats. For example, the campaigners of the ruling party were told several times: "if any member of the ruling party takes over any leadership, we shall make sure that we eliminate the campaigners". Someone used to scare people by wearing a cow-horn in one of his hands. This was to threaten the village people so that they may not vote for the ruling party to get into leadership positions. In fact, the ruling party members won the elections; more than a year has passed and no one has so far been eliminated.

There were elements of violence: some members of opposition parties carried stones around to hit people, and some houses, cars, and people were, in fact, stoned. There were lots of abusive language; some people were listed for torture after elections; some houses and kiosks were broken down and burnt.

Another manifestation of hardening comes with the fact of brushing off of any development initiative that is initiated from the ruling party. For example, a politician from the ruling party had promised to provide a gadget to secure a school from occasional lightening and thunder that had killed several pupils at that school. After the elections, this politician brought the gadget and some members of the opposition party argued that it is simply "cheating and children will continue dying of lightening and thunder". In another occasion, this politician has procured an ambulance to take the village people to hospital free of charge when there are health emergencies. Some opposition members have construed this as the "tricks to cheaply win the favour and popularity of the village people by the ruling party".

Thus, hardening manifests itself through conflicts, threatening, violence, and brushing off development initiatives. This becomes an organising practice for the minority group of the village people because it is in this way that they can resist the suppressions (real and perceived) of the village elite politicians who belong to the ruling party. The problem with hardening is related to the fact that sometimes the

opposition is conducted for the sake of opposition: there is lack of constructive criticism and acknowledgement of something good to be learnt or attended to. Not only have the village people engaged in resistance, but also in opportunistic behaviour.

2. Opportunism

In order to explore opportunism, I use a case of a politician who came into prominence as a leader of the opposition party. Opportunism means the tendency of the village people to support candidates whom they expect to deliver more material things and soon, instead of those whom they think might deliver less things and not so soon. The village from which this politician originates was proud of him. The village people wanted to maintain him in the same political position in the general elections of 2005. However, he lost the elections to a politician of the ruling party with a rather small margin of votes. He did not do so well in his home village because of a combination of the votes for his opponent and those of the people who never voted at all. One of the reasons as to why some people did not vote is enshrined in this argument from a respondent who never went for voting:

> You know very well that one of the running politician is born in this village; I am related to him, and so are many other people. But the man has not worked in the last five years; he told us lies. I cannot give him my vote. But the problem is that if I vote for his opponent, the results will show that his opponent got more votes from here. So, I did not vote. By the way, we are many who did this. (Int.VP15.Bkb.Dec2005)

So, such people did not vote because if they were to vote, they would have voted for the opponent; this would lead to an image that the village has betrayed their son in elections. Thus, they decided not to vote in order to hide their political preferences.

The reasons for the downfall of this politician and the win of the other are more interesting. One of the factors was the highly organised campaigns of the opponent. Another reason is that he counted a lot on his home village and he took it for granted that his village people would elect him, in any case. This assumption was accompanied by the reluctance of the village and his campaigners to take care of the young people who went around scaring people with violent acts. A mid-aged man commented on the failure of this politician:

> Yes, he is our son, but his boys have disturbed us; he took us for granted. He could not stop them from abusing us and throwing stones on us. Some of them were dressed in horns to scare us. Some families do not stay in their families because these young people have unroofed the houses where they were renting. Now, what did you expect? That people in the village would bless him and give him a go ahead because he is a son? Forget about it!

> If during the campaigns, time to beg for votes, time to show your worth, time to be a good person, you are so arrogant and think that because you are a son therefore people would support you forget about it. We parents know that not all our children are ok: some are thugs; some are thieves; some are womanisers; some are drunkards; and some can be good. That is why when we are writing our wills, we do not give the same things to all: some are more favoured than the other ones; some others might not get any! (Int.VP16.Bkb.Dec2005)

And another testimony from a woman said:

> They had already got their list for people who were supporting the ruling party and for those whom they were not sure of whom they would vote. These would have suffered after *Ngangari* won. If you want peace, why would you vote such people? If they won, instead of being happy and trying to bridge the created gaps, for them they think about punishing. There was no way I would give my vote to such people. (Int.VP17.Bkb.Dec2005)

While organised campaigns worked in the favour of the politician from the ruling party and violent acts worked in disfavour of the incumbent, there is another strong reason that led to the failure of the incumbent and rise of the new politician. A woman commented:

> It is true that he is our son. But he cheated us by not doing anything. But we know him: what much do you think he would offer us? He has not travelled a lot. To Dar es Salaam yes, that one I know. But outside Africa, I do not know. If he has gone there, he was hidden and never stayed there for long. He has no connections outside. (Int.VP18.Bkb.Dec2005)

This is an observation that explores the networks of the incumbent. With the idea that he has less networks, the incumbent looses credibility to function well. In fact, the argument is that he did not function well because he has no networks outside Tanzania. On the other hand, however, his opponent is spoken of well with respect to international networks.

> This man has moved a lot. He has even stayed in Europe. He can really assist us with his networks. He has friends who can do a lot for us. He has businesses that we can see. He has money; he knows what money is and therefore there is a possibility that he assists a lot in getting us opportunities for money. (Int.VP19.Bkb.Dec2005)

This reason has core opportunism to take advantage of the exposure of the politician. The electorate sees possibilities of going ahead with the chances that this politician can offer, given his networks. Moreover, given what they see he has done for himself in terms of businesses, they think there is possibility of benefiting from it.

Opportunism strikes in another way. Look at this argument:

> We have been with this person for the last five years and nothing has happened in our area. It is because he belongs to the opposition party. Belonging there means losing from the government because it can never think about you. Let us change and have someone from the ruling party. The government cannot abandon us. It will think of us. (Int.VP20.Bkb.Dec2005)

This is an argument that is opportunistic in what the government can offer if the people do not support the opposition party. As the government is made up of the majority of people who are from the ruling party, the assumption is that if they support one from the ruling party, then there are chances to get favours from the government. Thus, the village people are opportunistic. They have resisted to elect their "son" because of his poor practice of politics and they have elected another politician because they see in him and the government which is formed basically by the ruling party more opportunities.

In this organising practice of resistance I have demonstrated two issues, hardening and opportunism. The village people use hardening in order to resist the elite politicians of the ruling party who suppress them. Opportunism is used to discredit mal-functioning politicians and to try out some other politicians who show possibilities of more opportunities.

In this section, I have discussed issues about the relations between the village elite and the village people. Since their relationship is determined by the power relations between the two, I demonstrated how both engage in organising practices to influence each other. While power weaving, corruption, and speaking the languages are the major organising practices for the village elite, elite ordination, enrolment of the village elite, and resistance are the major organising practices of the village people. These organising practices must be seen as complementary and interacting processes. This does not imply that their relations are not asymmetrical; the village elite assume power over the village people in development processes While the organising practices of the village elite are geared towards getting and using of power, the village people's organising practices are geared towards circumventing the power of the village elite and making use of the elite.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I dealt with the exploration of the relationship between the village elite and the village people, which is characterised by the organising practices of both. I began with the identification of the elite in the village, who are the leaders, elders, government officials, business people, and the youths with characterisations based on the areas of education, politics, economics, and religion. On the livelihoods of the village elite, I showed how their livelihoods are based on two perspectives of everyday productive life and leadership positioning. It was crucial to understand the livelihoods of the village elite in order to situate well what their organising practices are geared to. On the livelihoods of the village people, I presented the two situations

of the participatory development planning and the development organisations, situations in which the livelihoods of the village people are taken care of. The relations between the village elite and the village people were presented in terms of the organising practices of both. The village elite and the village people are two sides of the same coin in the local politics of the people in the rural areas. Their relationship is asymmetrical; the village elite assume power over the village people. While the organising practices of the village elite are geared towards getting and using power, the organising practices of the village people are geared towards circumventing the power of the village elite and making use of the elite. Thus, the entrepreneurial brokerage of the village elite meets with the bargaining manoeuvres of the village people.

In discussing the relations between the village elite and the village people, the organising practices have been derived from a donor-funded development organisation, TUNGO, dealing with an agricultural development project of promoting vanilla as an alternative cash crop to coffee. This organisation has been considered within the catchment area of YFEC, a Dutch-funded development project. Much as the project has nothing to do with the YFEC as such, TUNGO has been able to unveil the experiences of the local politics in which the YFEC is situated. The centrality of the local politics in the arena of donor-funded development interventions in which there is a direct confrontation between the village elite and the village people is important. The elite capture the livelihoods promotion processes, no matter how firm their commitments and good intentions. This is simply because the notion of the “powerful” assisting the “powerless” is smuggled in and this perpetuates the power asymmetries between the two. As local politics deal with bargaining processes, the “powerless” are not at all victims of the “powerful” as such, but they engage the “powerful” through organising practices in order to make use of them and sometimes to oppose them.

This is the last chapter of the three chapters that presented the empirical data for this study. Chapter six that discussed the RNE-DRDPs as manifestation of the modernising development discourse demonstrated how the RNE-DRDPs became a foundation for an enhanced power asymmetry between the different actor categories in the aid machinery, particularly between the Dutch donors and the aid recipients. In order to circumvent the power of the Dutch donors which the people had perceived financially and politically and which manifested itself in their non-participatory character, the district officials engaged in organising practices, as it was shown in chapter seven. Still, these district officials engaged in organising practices in order to maintain their power over the people living in the rural areas. It is in

chapter seven that I demonstrated that the relationship between the village elite and the village people is based on the organising practices between the two, on the one hand, and on the other hand, other organising practice of the village elite geared towards the district officials. All these organising practices, however, have one goal: to make sure that the actors concerned promote their livelihoods.

A crucial element is about the influence of the modernising development discourse among all actors in the aid machinery. Generally, the donors are powerful over the aid recipients due to being the champions of the modernising development discourse through their development interventions; the district officials and the village elite become important because they know and operate within the thinkings of the modernising development discourse, and; in order for the village people to engage with their elite in the local politics, they use the elements of the modernising development discourse to get their elite and involve them in the livelihoods promotion. In fact, the nearer the actors are nearer to the donors in the chain of the aid machinery, the more powerful that actor category is with respect to other actors.

This element of the influence of the modernising development discourse to the actors leads to considerations about the power game and the looking to different directions in which the other actors are in the power game. That is the reason as to why the district officials, for instance, look “in front” where the donors are and “behind” where the people living in the rural areas are; the village elite look “in front” where the district officials are, “within” themselves in their power struggles, and “behind” them where the village people are, and; the village people look “in front” where the village elite are. There is a common “sandwich pattern” between the “middle actor categories”, that is: the district officials and the village elite. The power game involves them into organising practices that address the more powerful category and the less powerful one, while they remain in the “middle”. This looking into the different directions is enhanced by the decentralisation system whereby a hierarchy in relations is established when dealing with development issues. The lowest in the hierarchy are the sub-village authorities and the highest is the district authority. This is a structure that establishes a power game in the promotion of the livelihoods of the people.

The main issue with this study has been the need to know more about how the aid recipients make donor aid relevant for their livelihoods through the examination of the role of the modernising development discourse and the organising practices. This is subject of the next chapter that deals with the conclusions of this study.

8

Conclusions

Introduction

In this chapter of the conclusions, I present four sections. The first section is the recapitulation of the theoretical background and the study problem, the second section concerns the summary and synthesis of findings, the third section is about the general conclusion, and the last section about the food for thought discusses a recent evaluation of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB).

Recapitulation of the theoretical background and study problem

The key debate areas in this study are centred on the concepts of international development cooperation, modernising development discourse, livelihoods promotion, organising practices, participation, local politics, and empowerment. The discussions on international development cooperation are based on the struggle to make aid work, focusing on the link between aid and policy (Pronk 2001; 2003). It is in this struggle to make aid work that the development enterprise faces a challenge of interactions between actors of different statuses with varying resources and dissimilar goals (Lewis & Mosse 2006), and for whom the development enterprise "constitutes a resource, a profession, a market, a stake or a strategy" (de Sardan 2004: 11, as cited in Lewis & Mosse 2006). International development cooperation is, however, a function of the modernising development discourse which has influenced the configuration of the dichotomous world of the "developed" and the "underdeveloped". This configuration has led to the complementary perspectives in

development cooperation: whereas the donor's perspective is linked to the "white man's burden" to alleviate the miseries of the underdeveloped, the aid recipient's perspective is linked to the "black man's burden" to accept and be relieved from the miseries by the developed.

The aid recipients, however, are not innocent dumb victims, but active actors (Long 2002) who come to meet the donors with organising practices (Nuijten 1997; 1998) in order to access and make use of the donor's resources for promotion of their livelihoods. In the processes of livelihoods promotion, participation is a circumstance in which the village people, for instance, get involved in trouble-shooting and prioritising plans to promote their livelihoods. Participation is charged with the local politics, with the elite (whether benevolent or malevolent) taking a lead in the development planning processes (Platteau 2004; de Herdt & Abega 2007) as entrepreneurial agents of the developmentalist configuration (Bierschenk *et al.* 2002). Due to the village people's lack of understanding of a wider institutional framework that provides the basis for their livelihoods promotion (Cornwall 2002), they end up losers in the bargaining processes with the elite. The entrepreneurial agents gain through their possibilities to access resources in their names and/or in the name of the village people. The entrepreneurial agents are able to manipulate situations on their way simply because the village people are less empowered in the insights of the modernising development discourse.

International development cooperation has been operationalised in development projects with records of many failures, leading to a pessimistic view about the functioning of aid. Many projects have not performed to the expectations of the donors; and sometimes, according to some donors, these projects have caused more problems than what they found before intervention. The concentration on failure leads into thinking that aid is not relevant at all. By relevance I mean importance or usefulness of aid. That is why, in this study, instead of being guided by the pessimism of a perspective of failures, I wished to highlight the processes in which aid is made relevant by the aid recipients. While on the one hand, it was crucial to explore the processes that led to the relevance of the development projects from the modernising development discourse, on the other hand, it was important to explore the processes that led to the relevance of the development projects from the organising practices of the aid recipients. Thus, in the middle of pessimisms about project failures, there is a problem that there is lack of knowledge of the processes of the aid beneficiaries to make aid relevant in their livelihoods.

With such a problem of lack of knowledge of the processes of the aid beneficiaries to make aid relevant in their livelihoods, the study sought to answer the

following main question: *how have the modernising development discourse of the donors and the organising practices of the aid recipients influenced the relevance of aid?* This main question was broken down into three sub-questions: 1) How has the modernising development discourse manifested itself in the RNE-DRDPs? 2) What organising practices of the district officials emerged as a result of the RNE-DRDPs programme? 3) What are the organising practices of the village people and its elite within the context of the RNE-DRDPs?

The study was conducted within the bilateral development cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and the Netherlands government. I made use of the Royal Netherlands Embassy District Rural Development Programmes (RNE-DRPDs) that began in 1987 and phased out in 2004. With the aspect of the modernising development discourse, I made use of the key documents of the RNE-DRDPs. In order to get into the aspect of organising practices of the district officials, I narrowed down my study to the Bukoba District Rural Development Programme (BDRDP). I went to the catchment area of one of the BDRDP projects, the *Yetu* Farmers' Extension Centre (YFEC) in order to understand the organising practices of the village people and the village elite.

Summary and synthesis of the findings

In the presentation of the summary of the findings, I give a reflection and a discussion on how the findings address the respective sub-question in the study. I begin with the modernising development discourse, followed by the organising practices of the district officials, and the village people, and its elite.

Modernising development discourse of donors and aid relevance

As I had discussed in the theoretical framework, the modernising development discourse deals with development as progress, a framework within which development activities should be planned, implemented, monitored, evaluated, and within which development activities should operate and be interpreted (Preston 1994). Analysing the RNE-DRDPs, it was found out that they are a manifestation of the modernising development discourse with the centrality of the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation. Development was conceived as progress; rural development was conceived in terms of agricultural development; sustainable development was conceived in terms of the Brundtland Commission, partnership whereby the Dutch donors are the powerful partners, and conditionality to the aid recipients, and; pseudo-participation was the norm because

the dialogue was blocked by the RNE-DRDP officials with their own attitudes, assumptions, and perspectives towards the local participants. Such conceptualisations have been a conceptual arena for processes of globalising, Otherising, shaping subjects, and defining problems.

What is crucial, however, is the fact that the conceptualisations of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation have enhanced the processes of globalising, Otherising, shaping subjects, and problem defining. These processes, in turn, have enhanced the power asymmetry between the different actor categories in the aid machinery. The donors, in their position as the springboard for realising the "excellent ideal" of development, ignored issues of endogenous development and frustrated people's capacity to define their problems and needs and to localise their actions for their livelihoods promotion. They became the major players in setting the pace for the idea of development as progress. They controlled agenda setting and decisions about what got discussed and what was not. Thus, as the international development cooperation is a matter of partnership, the life of the power asymmetry between the donors and the aid recipients confirmed Crawford's (2003) idea that partnership is permeated by the relations of power which generate clashes of interest among the different actors and involve the exertion of power by controlling the agenda setting and decisions: the Dutch externally shaped, drove, and influenced the programme. They decided when to intervene, what to be done, and when to exit. So, with the RNE-DRDPs, the relationship between the URT and the Netherlands government remained a partnership myth.

With such a state of power asymmetries between the donors and aid recipients, the donors have enhanced their "power over", that is: a negative and controlling power wielded in a win-lose relationship (Rowlands 1997 & 1998). The donors have been the pace setters for the aid recipients because what they bring, development, is a necessary, beneficial, superior, and *a priori* defined reality to the recipients. In order that the aid recipients accommodate and respond diligently to the development challenge of the donors, they fell back to their livelihoods situation. Stimulated by their quest to promote their livelihoods, the aid recipients struggled for the access and utilisation of the resources that the donor brought: direct and violent confrontation would not yield any positive results for the aid recipients and that is why they engaged in organising practices, as diligent responses, in order to circumvent the powerful donor who rendered them powerless with the modernising development discourse. Thus, the influence of the modernising development discourse on the relevance of aid to the beneficiaries is linked to the enhancement of the power

asymmetries which have led to the rise of organising practices of the aid recipients in order to access aid to promote their livelihoods.

Organising practices of the district officials and aid relevance

In a decentralised structure, like that of Tanzania, the district officials are at the entrance of aid. They are central in the aid chain: they deal directly with the donors; they receive aid in the name of the local beneficiaries; they facilitate the flow of aid from the donors to the aid beneficiaries through development projects in the villages; they facilitate the question of access to donor resources because they are at the field of interaction between the donors and the local beneficiaries; they introduce the donors to the beneficiaries and vice versa; they carefully and step by step make the donor familiar to the reality of beneficiaries, and; they are informants of both the donors and the recipients. The situation of the district officials being at the entrance of aid gives them a chance to be able to collaborate and engage in corruption acts on one hand, and on the other to dominate the village people due to their continuous struggle for the promotion of their livelihoods, and therefore, in search for opportunities in which to access resources and put them to use.

This fact of struggle for livelihoods promotion, coupled with the power asymmetry between them and the donors, result in organising practices of the district officials in two directions. The first direction is towards the donors whereby collaboration and corruption are prominent. Collaboration is an organising practice that enhances a good working relationship between the powerful and less powerful actors so that both sets of actors can continue working together. When the district officials blocked the enquiries about aid money, listened to the donors critically and behaved diligently, spoke underground, and networked with people they thought could assist them in carrying forward their complaints, they aimed at creating a harmonious working environment with the donors, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they furthered their struggle about promoting their livelihoods. Thus, collaboration was a way to manoeuvre a field of power where a donor was dominant. These organising practices of the district officials are like resistance in order to make sure that the dominant partner, the donor, is not antagonised, the relationship between the two goes on, and the benefits accruing from the donor are smoothly enjoyed in the line of promotion of livelihoods. With corruption, in the form of thefts, forgeries, and favouritism, the district officials extracted, with treacherous and criminal ways, resources from the strict donors in order to promote their livelihoods. This organising practice of corruption is in many ways linked to the notion of good governance which is among the current development buzzwords in development

cooperation. According to Hoebink (2006: 147), good governance deals with transparent, responsible and focussed use of authority and resources. In a way, corruption is lack of good governance when taken to be "illegitimate" personal or public gain. This is, however, a rather political and moralistic way of looking at corruption. As an organising practice, however, corruption is an attempt to "beat the system of the powerful", which system is construed as a stumbling block in the efforts to promote the livelihoods of the district officials.

The second direction of the organising practices of the district officials concerns their domination on the village people. Whereas the donors have direct "power over" the district officials at the entrance of aid, the district officials are powerful over the village people through influence peddling by influencing decisions and diverting funds to their home areas, suppressing the people who think different from them politically, and using force to make people participate in contributions for development. Their powerful position with respect to the people living in the rural areas is related to the fact that they are directly linked to the donors and are a link between the donors and the people living in the rural area. Domination becomes an organising practice to affirm their dominant positions in the rural areas and the eventual allocations of resources according to their wishes.

The organising practices of the district officials evolved from the field of "power over" of the Dutch donors of the RNE-DRDPs. Due to this power asymmetry between them and the donors, the district officials engage in organising practices in order to access the funds of the donors and use them for their livelihoods promotion. As part of their livelihoods promotion is about status and popularity, their access and acquisition of donor resources is geared to their "power over" the people living in rural areas. Thus, the organising practices of the district officials as diligent responses towards the "power over" of the Dutch donors made aid relevant by facilitating the access to and use of the donor resources, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to have "power over" the people living in rural areas. All were geared towards promoting their livelihoods.

Organising practices of the village people and its elite

In examining the relations between the village people and its elite, it was found out that the village elite engage in three major types of organising practices: power weaving, corruption, and speaking the languages. In power weaving, the village elite tried as much as they could through treacherous and clever plans to remain in leadership positions; the village elite who were not in leadership positions struggled to get into them. Villareal (1997) talks about power in terms of a complex process

whereby men wield and women yield power: men exercise power and women accede to the exercise. In the case of the village elite, power weaving is a matter of becoming powerful through getting into leadership positions and once there to exercise the power carefully because there are other village elite who are weaving power: they would like to get into the leadership position to exercise power as well. In addition to the discussion about corruption and the organising practices of the district officials, it is important to note refusal to give price information to the village people and entertainment of exploitative contracts as manifestations of corruption as well. With these two elements, the village elite take advantage of the ignorance situation of the village people. This is another dimension to be added in the understanding of corruption; it is beyond the moralistic perspectives of illegitimacy as contrasted with transparent, responsible, and focussed use of resources and authority: it is about taking advantage of the ignorance of the village people, with the aim of keeping the village people under the services of the development organisations whose leaders are the village elite and making use of the extra monies from the sales of their agricultural produce. With speaking the languages, the village elite are able to present their ideas and the ideas of the village people through a complex language that captures the needs of the people and the official development language. This is a language that must be convincing and understandable to the district officials so that they can allocate donor resources in order to address the livelihoods needs of the village people. Thus, the village elite engage in organising practices in two directions: towards the village people and towards the district officials.

The village people, however, are not passive actors. As a way to relate with the village elite, who captured their different livelihoods promotion processes, they engaged in organising practices of three types: elite ordination, enrolling the village elite, and resistance. With elite ordination, the village people were involved in actions of identifying and delegating people they deemed important because they could manage development matters and they were able to exploit possibilities in order to bring something in the village. While Hilhorst (2003) talks about interface experts and Bierschenk (2002) calls them development brokers, both authors meaning the “representatives” of local populations in development matters who manipulate and exploit outside intervention and local people’s expectations (de Herdt & Abega 2007), Platteau (2004) sees their role in development in terms of capturing the development processes”. Elite ordination, however, is different from elite capture in that it is about a process in which a person is “processed” into an elite for use of the very community. Once the village elite have been ordained and

have begun their roles as elite in different development activities, the "ordainers", that is: the village people, begin enrolling them through using a language that diligently asks for addressing their needs, pleasing them so that they can continuously have attention, and scheming in order to achieve certain economic benefits which they never tell directly to the elite beforehand. And when the village elite does not function according to their expectations, they engaged in an organising practice of resistance in actions of violence and in supporting the political elite whom they expect to deliver more material things and soon.

Thus, much as the relations between the village elite and the village people are characterised by the former capturing the livelihood promotion processes of the latter, the interaction of both through organising practices is relevant in making donor aid relevant. Whereas the village elite are able to access and make use of donor resources that are found in development organisations, the village people ordain these village elite so that they may make use of them. This is a typical "mutual enrolment and the interlocking of interests" (Lewis & Mosse 2006: 13) in order to make project realities real to the livelihoods of the people. Each of the actors has his/her livelihoods situation as point of reference to begin interpreting opportunities in front of him/her and enrolling the other into making use of the opportunity. Thus, despite differences in livelihoods situations between the village elite and the village people, they are both constantly engaged in creating order through bargains in order to make sure that the donor resources are made use of for each one's livelihoods promotion.

Before I turn to the general conclusion for this study, I need to say a word about the power question with respect to how projects become real. According to Lewis & Mosse (2006: 13), projects become real "through the work of generating and translating interests, creating context by tying in supporters and so sustaining interpretations". By translating interests, it is meant the mutual enrolment and the interlocking of interests of the actors. However, according to Latour (1996, as cited in Lewis & Mosse 2006), all actors produce interpretations, but powerful actors offer performative interpretations, that is: their interpretations become interpretations of others for sometime.

As has been seen in this study, there are two dimensions in which we can analyse the power issue: the "power over" and "power to" dimensions. Generally speaking, the donors have the "power over" with respect to the aid recipients; on the side of the aid recipients, the district officials have "power over" on the village elite and the village people, and; the village elite have "power over" with respect to the village people. Thus, in a reality of development cooperation, there is a hierarchical order of

the “power over” beginning from the donors to the village people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of aid. Whereas the category of actors who are subject to the “power over’ can be understood as people lacking the “power to”, which is a generative or productive power that can improve people’s capacities to upscale their own social or economic status (Rowlands 1997; Batliwala 1997), they manage to go around the performative interpretations of the powerful people with the use of another type of power, the “power for”, that is: a hidden power that makes them be able to respond diligently through sneaking their interests into the projects dominated by the powerful. The “power for” is generated by the quest for the livelihoods promotion in social relations which are resourceful.

General conclusion

In the bilateral development cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Netherlands government, the Dutch donors have come along with the modernising development discourse which has informed their development interventions through the RNE-DRDPs. With the modernising development discourse, while the Dutch donors are interested in fulfilling the established modernising development discourse dictates, the aid beneficiaries are interested in promoting their livelihoods. That is why many actions of interpretation that result in organising practices, rather than overt actions of resistance, are adopted in order to transform a donor project into their own consumable projects. Once the objectives of the donors which are translated into the development projects fail, the development projects are viewed and assessed as failure. But are they really a failure?

Even though the development projects have not achieved the objectives of the donors, the resources (material and financial) that have come along with the donor projects have proven useful to the beneficiaries. For instance, with the responses obtained from intended infrastructural projects or from moneys obtained from created opportunities for allowances, people have constructed permanent houses, they have educated children, and so on. Due to the fact that the aid beneficiaries are not passive actors, they have found and made use of the room to manoeuvre within their relationship with the donors. The room to manoeuvre is created by the fact that the aid beneficiaries know much more about their livelihoods state than the donors do. With this discrepancy of knowledge, the aid beneficiaries have exploited the “power for” in engaging in organising practices. The “power for” has led them to the appropriation of the Dutch development projects in accordance to their own livelihoods needs.

There is, hence, need to re-think about the notion of failure. Is it failure as such? It is, perhaps, partially failure because the objectives of the donors have not been met and the aid beneficiaries do not seem to be listened to. But taking into consideration what the objectives of the aid beneficiaries are, it is not failure because they have managed to slot in their objectives that have to do with livelihoods promotion and they have appropriated the Dutch aid to promote their livelihoods. The modernising development discourse, which has characteristically enhanced the power asymmetry between the Dutch donors and the aid beneficiaries, has been a favourable environment to breed organising practices. The aid beneficiaries have managed to engage in organising practices that have pulled resources from the Dutch development projects in order to address their needs.

Food for thought: Going beyond the modernising development discourse

As I have shown in this study, the modernising development discourse is what the Dutch donors come with as a package that informs their interventions with the aid recipients they meet in development cooperation. I would like to give a food for thought in order to continue the debate on what could be an alternative for the modernising development discourse on the side of the donors. I discuss a case of an evaluation of the RNE-DRDPs which was provided by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB).

Eighteen years after the implementation of the RNE-DRDPs, the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB 2004) issued a critical report stating, as one of the main findings, that the “District Rural Development Programmes have not achieved their main long-term objective: the improvement of living conditions and the structural alleviation of poverty” (IOB 2004: 2) due to un-enabling Tanzanian and Dutch national policies. This criticism raises a question as to whether the IOB evaluation still sticks with the modernizing development discourse or not.

On the one hand, the report is not free from conceptualising development in terms of progress. The report begins with an idea of progress as a way to reduce poverty. It argues that rural development can be reduced by increasing production, productivity, and profitability of agriculture (IOB 2004: 6). It asserts that the neglect of the resource-poor and remote areas in order to concentrate on resource-dotted areas should lead to “growth from which benefits spread to other areas” and migrations “from low potential areas” to resource-dotted areas (IOB 2004: 5). The findings of the report do not provide any insights with regard to the inclusion of other ecological

perspectives in the environmental rehabilitation processes. As discussed in the chapter on the RNE-DRDPs as a manifestation of the modernising development discourse, these elements are indication of the manifestation of the modernising development discourse in the report.

On the other hand, the report is very challenging to the modernizing development discourse in many aspects. It challenges the hierarchy in partnership between the Netherlands government, Tanzania, and the local beneficiaries. When the report identifies the weaknesses of both governments (IOB 2004: iii), and in a particular way, when it points out how the perceptions of the local beneficiaries on their poverty were left out (IOB 2004: 3), the evaluation implies that the failure of the DRDP interventions lies in the hands of the Tanzanian and the Netherlands governments, and not the local beneficiaries. It is for this reason that the report argues for more democratization and empowerment (IOB 2004: 5) in order that the local beneficiaries can deal with the Tanzanian mal-functioning leadership (IOB 2004: 4) and have a say on the changes in such development programmes as the DRDPs, which are largely inspired by Dutch development cooperation policy (IOB 2004: 3). Still, within the perspective of active partnership and participation, the report challenges the exclusion of the local beneficiaries in studies on their own lives, as it was done in the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986), by making them participate in this evaluation by giving their views on their perception of poverty. Partnership is, again, enhanced by making use of the local (Tanzanian) academic institution for field research and report writing, instead of only the Dutch experts living in Tanzania, as it was during the Identification Study (URT/RNE 1986).

The evaluation report poses another challenge. It has a much more contextualized strategy for dealing with district development programmes. The DRDPs experienced fragmented Dutch contribution over a wide range of activities and there were no strategic interventions in key areas for poverty reduction in view of the low volume of aid. That is one reason why the DRDPs never met their primary objective of reducing poverty (IOB 2004: 2). The IOB report, however, suggests a concrete strategy as one of the issues for future attentions for Dutch aid in the district development programmes: to identify resource potentials and constraints in the locality and deal with the constraints with the available resources (IOB 2004: 5). This is an attention on self-reliance, which demands the use of available resources first, and borrowing what is not available and is needed. This attention challenges the centrality of finance as the sole resource for people’s livelihoods promotion. Implicitly, this is a challenge to finance-centred heavy conditionality, such as local beneficiaries taking care of re-current costs of their development projects.

Thus, the IOB evaluation (IOB 2004) is at the crossroads: much as it is still prey to the language of the modernizing development discourse by using its rationalities of poverty alleviation and rural development, it challenges the modernizing development discourse by questioning the powerful, handing over the processes of development to the owners of development, and suggesting a much more contextualised strategy for dealing with district development programmes. But this situation poses a question: what other donor discourse would be desirable besides the modernising development discourse? This is food for thought for both development practitioners and development theorists.

One way to look beyond the modernising discourse is to deconstruct the whole idea that a successful project is a matter of design or policy simply because behind policy representations are concealments of the messiness of interests and practices of the key policy players. This implies that it is also time to question the assumptions of poverty alleviation and rural development and the whole practice around them which, according to Lewis and Mosse (2006: 8), are among the "ubiquitous seductive mix of development words … which combine a no-nonsense pragmatism with almost unimpeachable moral authority". This means that the ambitions of the international policy models have to be questioned in order to unveil the political economy of the international inequality systems that underlie the international development cooperation. It is by viewing both donors and aid recipients as social interacting actors who are embedded in their struggle to meet their interests that there will be a possibility of going beyond the modernising development discourse.

One final word is about the "power for" issue with respect to the organising practices. The organising practices are an important eye opener to show how the people who are subjected to the inequalities of the "power over" can go beyond the subjection by engaging into initiatives to promote what they perceive as central to their livelihoods. This is the "power for livelihoods promotion", which actually circumvents the "power over" of the modernising development discourse.

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Summary

This study is about the bilateral development cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and the Netherlands government. It deals with the ways in which the Tanzanian aid recipients make the Dutch aid relevant in their livelihoods through appropriating the donor projects. More specifically, it is about the organizing practices of the aid recipients, that is: actions of manoeuvring, mobilisation, strategising, and so on whose aim is basically livelihoods promotion. These organising practices have been studied in the context of the Dutch District Rural Development Programmes (DRDPs) in Tanzania, a programme that was run through the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) from 1986 and winded up in 2004. The study is prompted by the concentration on the development projects' failures as an indication that aid is not relevant. By acknowledging the fact that wherever aid goes, things are never the same, the study does not cherish the pessimism embedded in development projects' failures, but goes into highlighting the processes in which aid is made relevant by the recipients.

The study begins with a discussion on the international development cooperation, a concessional aid flow from official agencies, including state and local governments, or by from executive agencies in order to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. The international development cooperation has evolved historically from the late 1940s to today, based on altering international relations. One of the discussions has always been whether aid works or not, particularly the link between aid and policy. To some, good policy environment facilitates aid effectiveness and efficiency and to some, inherently aid is embedded in bad policy environments and that is why it cannot work. However, the international development cooperation, being a function of the modernising development discourse, which is characterised by the practical interventions based on globalisation, Otherisation, shaping of the subjects, and problem definition, has responded to the demands of the dichotomous perspectives of the "developed" world of the donors

and the “underdeveloped” world of the aid recipients and it has enhanced power asymmetries between the actors in the aid machinery.

The study continues with the issues about livelihoods promotion and the organising practices. As aid recipients are not innocent, dumb victims, but active actors, they meet the powerful donors with the organising practices in order to promote their livelihoods. These organising practices are patterns in the manifold and fragmented strategies that arise from particular combinations of ideas, material circumstances, and interactional potentials; they evolve around fields of power and struggle between different social actors; they are geared towards accessing and making use of the resources that the donors bring in the development projects. With the deployment of organising practices, the aid recipients go around the powerful donor who controls the resources; they circumvent the interests of the donors in order to serve their interests, and; they use the information about their livelihoods state, which is more than the amount of information that the donors have, in order to diligently respond to the donors for their livelihoods promotion. The organising practices take place in any encounter that involves different actors with power differentials. They take place in circumstances of complex sets of bargaining processes among actors in social arenas. As soon as there is involvement of local politics in livelihoods promotion, there is also involvement of power relations between different actors and the organising practices take place. In order to benefit from the local politics, a certain level of empowerment of the participating actors is necessary.

In the aid machinery, however, due to the failure of many projects in international development cooperation, there has always been a pessimistic view about the functioning of aid and less knowledge about the way the aid recipients make aid relevant to their livelihoods. That is why this study aimed at answering the following main question: *how have the modernising development discourse of the donors and the organising practices of the aid recipients influenced the relevance of aid?* The subquestions for this study were: 1) How has the modernising development discourse manifested itself in the RNE-DRDPs? 2) What organising practices of the district officials emerged as a result of the RNE-DRDPs programme? 3) What are the organising practices of the village people and its elite within the context of the RNE-DRDPs? Data collection was done in Bukoba district, Kagera region, Tanzania. There was use of document review of the key documents of the Royal Netherlands Embassy District Rural Development Programmes (RNE-DRDPs), interviews, focus group discussions, a structured questionnaire, and participatory observations. Data from the document review were analysed through discourse analysis, while data from the interviews, focus group discussions, and participatory observations were

subjected to content analysis. Frequencies from the structured questionnaire were obtained. The accounts that were created from the different data collecting instruments were subjected to co-data analysis for triangulation.

With respect to the RNE-DRDPs as manifestation of the modernising development discourse through an analysis of the concepts of development, rural development, sustainable development, and participation, it was found out that development was conceived as progress through the concepts of improvement of standards and wellbeing; rural development was about interventions through agriculture; sustainable development was about 1) partnership in which the donor is more powerful than the aid recipient; 2) the ecological rehabilitation based on the Brundtland Commission, and; 3) the generation of recurrent costs to be taken care of by the aid beneficiaries as a conditionality; finally, participation was about the process approach that assumed that the aid beneficiaries would be involved at all stages of development planning and implementation, but which had missing thousands of the local aid beneficiaries at the problem and needs identification at the beginning of the study. Thus, through the conceptualisation of these concepts, the RNE-DRDPs were conceived and engaged in the processes of globalising, Otherising, shaping subjects, and defining problems, enhancing the power asymmetries between the different actors in the aid machinery.

With regard to the organising practices of the district officials, I found out that the district officials engage in collaboration corruption, and domination. Collaboration is about the district officials trying to engage in manoeuvres so that they can continue working together with the donors in harmony and amongst themselves by avoiding to deal with anything that would bring controversy; corruption is about the district officials seeking illegitimate personal or public gain, and; domination is about exercise of power by the district officials on the people living in rural areas. These organising practices of the district officials evolve from the field of “power over” of the Dutch donors of the RNE-DRDPs to the district officials and the “power over” of the district officials to the people living in the rural areas.

With regard to the organising practices of the village people and its elite, I found out that the village elite engage in power weaving, corruption, and speaking the languages. Whereas power weaving is about the village elite planning with cleverness to get into power and maintain it, speaking the languages is about giving some specialised lines of thought so that the messages about addressing the needs of the village people may get through to the district officials and donor resources may be allocated in order to alleviate the needs.

As the village people are not passive actors when relating with the village elite, they engage in organising practices, namely: elite ordination, enrolling the village elite, and resistance. Elite ordination is about the village people setting apart and authorising a village person to perform development-related functions on their behalf; enrolling the village elite is about the village people bringing the village elite on their course in order to meet their needs, and; resistance is about the village people's reactions against the capture and control by the village elite. In the relationship between the village elite and the village people, the village elite want to have the "power over" the village people.

From these findings, I came up with four conclusions made with respect to the three sub-questions of this study:

1. The influence of the modernising development discourse on the relevance of aid to the beneficiaries is linked to the enhancement of the power asymmetries of the different actors in the aid machinery. The power asymmetries have led to the rise of the organising practices of the district officials, village elite, and the village people in order for each actor category to access and make use of aid for livelihoods promotion.
2. The district officials, with collaboration and corruption as diligent responses towards the "power over" of the Dutch donors, and with domination as an expression of the will to power to the people living in the rural areas, made aid relevant by accessing and using it for their livelihoods needs.
3. The village elite, with power weaving and corruption as manoeuvres for "power over" the village people and speaking the languages, as a way to send the message of the needs of the people living in the rural areas, have accessed and utilised donor resources to promote the livelihoods.
4. The village people, with elite domination and enrolment of the village elite as manoeuvres to have the elite and assign them work and resistance as reaction to the capture and control of the village elite, have been able to access resources from the donors through the interventions of the village elite.

And as a general conclusion to the whole study, I argued that even though the donor-funded development projects in international development cooperation have not achieved the objectives of the donors, the resources (material and financial) that have come along with the donor projects have proven useful to the beneficiaries through the use of organising practices. This conclusion demands for re-thinking about the notion of failure. Is it possible to talk about donor aid failure as such? It is,

perhaps, partially failure because the objectives of the donors have not been met and the aid beneficiaries do not seem to be listened to. But taking into consideration what the objectives of the aid beneficiaries are, it is not failure because they have managed to slot in their objectives that have to do with livelihoods promotion and they have appropriated the aid to promote their livelihoods. The modernising development discourse of the RNE-DRDPs has enhanced the power asymmetry between the different actors in the aid machinery. This has been a favourable environment to breed organising practices that were used to pull resources from the Dutch RNE-DRDPs.

One final issue that the study raised was the need to look for ways to go beyond the modernising development discourse. For example, much as there has been some strong criticism on the outcome of Dutch District Rural Development Programmes in Tanzania through questioning the powerful, suggesting the hand-over of the development processes to the people themselves, and suggesting a much more contextualised strategy for dealing with district development programmes, the critics are still prey to the language of the modernizing development discourse by using its rationalities of poverty alleviation and rural development. It is for this reason that this study invites development practitioners and theorists to continue reflecting on the question: what other donor discourse(s) would be desirable besides the modernising development discourse? I suggested from the insights of this study: 1) to go beyond the idea that a successful project is a matter of design or policy, and; 2) to have more attention to people's "power for livelihoods promotion" that circumvents the "power over" of the modernising development discourse.

Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)

Deze studie handelt over de bilaterale ontwikkelingssamenwerking tussen de United Republic of Tanzania en de Nederlandse regering. Het behandelt de wijze waarop de Tanzaniaanse hulpontvangers de Nederlandse hulp van belang maken voor hun bestaansverwerving door zich de donorprojecten toe te eigenen. Meer specifiek behandelt deze studie de organisatiepraktijken van de hulpontvangers zoals manoeuvreren, mobiliseren en strategiseren. Deze organisatiepraktijken zijn bestudeerd in het kader van de Nederlandse District Rural Development Programmes (DRDP's) in Tanzania van 1986 tot 2004. De belangrijkste beweegreden van deze studie is de overdreven aandacht voor het falen van ontwikkelingsprojecten als indicatie dat hulp niet relevant zou zijn. Door ervan uit te gaan dat waar hulp geboden er hoe dan ook verandering plaatsvindt, maakt deze studie duidelijk dat het pessimisme over falende ontwikkelingsprojecten niet terecht is. In tegendeel, deze studie laat juist de processen zien waardoor hulp relevant wordt gemaakt door de ontvangers.

De studie begint met een discussie over internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking, een hulpstroom van nationale en lokale regeringen en van andere officiële instellingen ter bevordering van de economische ontwikkeling en het welzijn van ontwikkelingslanden. De internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking maakte vanaf het eind van de jaren '40 tot heden belangrijke veranderingen door, veroorzaakt door wijzigende internationale verhoudingen. Een belangrijke vraag was altijd of hulp werkt of niet. Sommigen zijn van mening dat een goede beleidsomgeving de effectiviteit en efficiëntie van hulp vergemakkelijkt. Anderen zijn echter van mening dat hulp onlosmakelijk is verbonden met een slechte beleidsomgeving en dat het daarom nooit goed werkt. Echter, de internationale ontwikkelingshulp – als onderdeel van het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours dat gekarakteriseerd wordt door praktische donorinterventies in de context van globalisering, *otherisation*, themavorming en probleemdefinitie – heeft de tweedeling tussen perspectieven van de "ontwikkelde" wereld van de donoren en de "onderontwikkelde" wereld van de

ontvangers bestendigd en de machtsongelijkheid tussen de actoren in het hulpapparaat versterkt.

De studie gaat vervolgens in op kwesties van bestaansverwerving en organisatiepraktijken. Aangezien de ontvangers van hulp geen domme, onschuldige slachtoffers zijn maar actieve actoren, benaderen zij, om hun bestaansverwerving te bevorderen, de machtige donoren met hun organisatiepraktijken. Deze praktijken zijn eigenlijk patronen in de veelvoudige en gefragmenteerde strategieën van de hulpontvangers, die voortkomen uit bepaalde combinaties van ideeën, materiële omstandigheden en interactieve capaciteit; zij ontstaan rond velden van macht en strijd tussen de verschillende sociale actoren; zij zijn gericht op de toegang tot en het gebruik van de hulpbronnen die donoren inbrengen in ontwikkelingsprojecten. Met hun organisatiepraktijken werken de hulpontvangers langs de donor, die de controle heeft over de bronnen, heen; zij ontduiken de belangen van de donoren om zo hun eigen belangen te behartigen; zij gebruiken hun informatievoorsprong over hun eigen bestaansverwerving voortdurend om de donorinterventies om te buigen ten voordele van hun bestaansverwerving. Deze organisatiepraktijken worden toegepast in alle situaties van machtsongelijkheid tussen actoren, dus ook wanneer de lokale politiek in beeld komt. Echter, om te kunnen profiteren van het lokale politieke spel is een bepaald niveau van *empowerment* van de actoren noodzakelijk.

Echter, wegens het falen van vele internationale ontwikkelingsprojecten heeft er in het hulpapparaat altijd een pessimistisch beeld geheerst van het functioneren van hulp en is er weinig kennis van de manier waarop de ontvangers deze hulp relevant maken voor hun bestaansverwerving. Om die reden tracht deze studie de volgende hoofdvraag te beantwoorden: *hoe hebben het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours van de donoren en de organisatiepraktijken van de hulpontvangers invloed gehad op het belang van hulp?* De subvragen zijn: 1) Op welke manier komt het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours naar voren in de Nederlandse DRDP's? 2) Welke organisatiepraktijken van districtsambtenaren zijn ontstaan als gevolg van het Nederlandse DRDP-programma? 3) Wat zijn de organisatiepraktijken van de dorpsbewoners en de dorpselite in het kader van de Nederlandse DRDP's?

Gegevens om deze vragen te beantwoorden werden verzameld in het Bukoba District, in de Kagera Region van Tanzania. Sleuteldocumenten van de Nederlandse ambassade zijn geraadpleegd en verder zijn interviews en focusgroepsdiscussies gehouden en zijn een gestructureerde vragenlijst en participerende observatie gebruikt. Documenten zijn geanalyseerd door middel van discoursanalyse, terwijl de data uit interviews, focusgroep discussies en participerende observatie onderworpen werden aan inhoudsanalyse. Uit de gestructureerde vragenlijst werden frequenties

verkregen en de met verschillende technieken verzamelde data werden onderworpen aan triangulatie.

Een analyse van de Nederlandse DRDP's als uiting van het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours vond plaats via een analyse van de begrippen ontwikkeling, rurale ontwikkeling, duurzame ontwikkeling en participatie. Bevestigd werd dat ontwikkeling gezien werd als vooruitgang via de noties van verbetering van levensstandaard en welzijn. Rurale ontwikkeling ging met name over interventies in de landbouw. Duurzame ontwikkeling bleek zowel te gaan over partnerschappen waarin de donor meer macht heeft dan de ontvanger, als over ecologisch herstel volgens de uitgangspunten van de Brundtland Commissie, en over de voorwaarde dat de hulpontvangers de terugkerende kosten moeten kunnen dragen. Participatie betrof de procesbenadering, die ervan uitging dat de hulpontvangers betrokken zouden worden bij alle stadia van ontwikkelingsplanning en uitvoering. Maar bij de vaststelling van problemen en behoeften in de identificatiefase bleken duizenden hulpontvangers niet betrokken te zijn geweest. Aldus werden de Nederlandse DRDP's onderdeel van processen van globalisering, *otherisation*, themavorming en probleemdefinitie, die de ongelijke machtsverhoudingen tussen de verschillende actoren in het hulpapparaat versterkten.

Voor wat de organisatiepraktijken van de districtsambtenaren betreft, bleek dat zij betrokken zijn bij collaboratie, corruptie en dominantie. Met collaboratie wordt bedoeld dat de beambten er alles aan doen om in harmonie met de donoren – en onderling – te werken door alles wat onenigheid met zich meebrengt te vermijden. Met corruptie wordt bedoeld dat zij proberen er op onwetmatige wijze, zowel privé als publiek, op vooruit te gaan. Met dominantie wordt bedoeld het uitoefenen van macht door de districtsambtenaren over de plattelandsbewoners. Deze organisatiepraktijken van de districtsbeambten komen voort uit de ongelijke machtverhouding tussen de Nederlandse donor en de DRDP's aan de ene kant en de districtsambtenaren aan de andere kant en tussen de districtsbeambten enerzijds en de plattelandsbewoners anderzijds.

Wat betreft de organisatiepraktijken van de dorpsbewoners en dorpselite bleek dat de dorpselites zich bedienen van *power weaving* en corruptie en jargon spreken. Terwijl *power weaving* te maken heeft met het slim handelen van de elite om aan de macht te komen en te blijven heeft jargon spreken te maken met het gebruik van taal op een dusdanige manier dat bij de districtsambtenaren en donoren duidelijk wordt welke hulpbronnen nodig zijn om behoeften te vervullen. Omdat de dorpsbewoners geen passieve actoren zijn in hun relatie tot de elite, bedienen zij zich ook van organisatiepraktijken zoals benoeming, werving en verzet. Met het benoemen van

elite wordt bedoeld dat de dorpsbewoners iemand aanwijzen om, namens hen, ontwikkelingsgerelateerde functies uit te oefenen; met het werven van elite wordt bedoeld dat de dorpsbewoners proberen om de elite *hun* koers te laten varen als het gaat om belangenbehartiging; en met verzet wordt de relatie tussen bewoners en elite bedoeld, waarbij de dorpsbewoners zich verzetten tegen controle door de elite.

Via deze bevindingen is deze studie tot de volgende conclusies gekomen met betrekking tot de onderzoeksvragen:

Ten eerste hangt de invloed van het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours op het belang van de hulp voor de ontvangers samen met de versterking van machtsongelijkheid tussen de verschillende actoren in het hulpapparaat. Deze machtsongelijkheid heeft geleid tot het ontstaan van organisatiepraktijken van districtsambtenaren, dorpselite en dorpsbewoners waarmee iedere groep toegang probeert te krijgen tot de hulp en die probeert te gebruiken ter bevordering van de eigen bestaansverwerving.

Ten tweede hebben districtsambtenaren door middel van collaboratie en corruptie als reactie op de macht van de Nederlandse donor, en door dominantie als uiting van macht over de plattelandsbewoners, de hulp nuttig gemaakt voor hun eigen bestaansverwerving. De dorpselite heeft hetzelfde gedaan door middel van *power weaving* en corruptie. Niettemin zijn ook de dorpsbewoners in staat geweest – door de dorpselite voor hun karretje spannen – toegang te krijgen tot de hulpbronnen van de donor.

Als algemene conclusie kan gesteld worden dat ondanks het feit dat de ontwikkelingsprojecten niet de doelstellingen van de donoren hebben gehaald, de hulpbronnen (zowel materieel als financieel) die aan deze projecten werden verbonden van belang zijn geweest voor de hulpontvangers doordat zij gebruik maakten van hun organisatiepraktijken. Deze conclusie roept op tot heroverweging van het idee van het falen van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Kan er wel over falen van hulp gesproken worden? Is er misschien sprake van een gedeeltelijk falen omdat de doelstellingen van de donoren niet behaald zijn en er niemand schijnt te luisteren naar de ontvangers van hulp? Lettend op de doelstellingen van de hulpontvangers is er *geen* sprake van falen omdat zij in staat zijn geweest hun doelstellingen op het gebied van bestaansverwerving te behartigen door zich de hulp toe te eigenen. Het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours van de Nederlandse DRDP's heeft de machtsongelijkheid tussen de verschillende actoren in het hulpapparaat versterkt, maar dit bleek een gunstig omstandigheid te vormen voor het kweken van organisatiepraktijken waarmee hulbronnen uit de DRDP's kon worden gehaald.

Een laatste kwestie die uit deze studie naar voren is gekomen is de noodzaak om naar wegen te zoeken om het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours te overstijgen.

Zo is er aan bijvoorbeeld veel kritiek geuit op de uitkomst van de DRDP's in Tanzania. Vraagtekens werden gezet bij de rol van de machthebbers en er werd gesuggereerd om het ontwikkelingsproces aan de mensen zelf te over te dragen en om een meer contextuele strategie te ontwikkelen voor district ontwikkelingsprogramma's. Aan de andere kant wordt deze kritiek nog altijd verwoord in de taal van het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours en de ratio van armoedeverlichting en rurale ontwikkeling. Om deze reden nodigt deze studie ontwikkelingswerkers en theoretici uit om te blijven nadenken over de vraag: welke ander donordiscours(en) wenselijk is (zijn) naast het moderniserende ontwikkelingsdiscours. Deze studie suggereert om het idee dat het succes van een project afhankelijk is van het ontwerp of beleid te overstijgen, en om meer aandacht te schenken aan de eigen macht van actoren om hun bestaansverwerving te organiseren.

Ufupisho (summary in Swahili)

Utafiti huu unahusiana na ushirikiano wa kimataifa wa kimaendeleo baina ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania na Uholanzi. Uhusiano wa nchi hizi mbili katika masuala ya kimaendeleo ni wa muda mrefu. Unaanza baada ya Vita ya Kuu ya Kwanza. Wakati huo, Waholanzi walijishughulisha zaidi na maendeleo kupitia katika dini ya Kikristu. Lakini, kuanzia baada ya Vita Kuu ya Pili, hapo ndio Waholanzi walianza kujishughulisha zaidi na masuala ya maendeleo na uchumi. Utafiti huu umejihusisha zaidi na mradi wa Waholanzi wa *District Rural Development Programme* (DRDP) ulioanza mwaka 1987 na kuisha mwaka 2004. Mradi huu ulikuwa una-fadhiliwa na nchi ya Uholanzi kupitia Ubalozi wao ulioko jijini Dar es Salaam. Lengo kuu la mradi huu lilikuwa kuuondoa umaskini katika sehemu ulipokuwa ukitekelezwa katika wilaya 11 (kumi na moja).

Ushirikiano wa kimataifa wa kimaendeleo umesimikwa katika fikara zinazoyaagalia maendeleo kama mabadiliko ya jamii kuwa katika hali za kisasa, ambayo ni sawa maendeleo ya nchi zisizo za Ulaya kubadilika kuwa kama nchi za Ulaya. Ni katika harakati za kuyatafuta maendeleo haya, misaada kutoka kwa wafadhili mbalimbali imekuwa ikitolewa kwa nchi zinazoendelea kutoka katika nchi zilizoendelea.

Katika nchi zinazoendelea, kila siku watu wanajishughulisha na mambo mbalimbali ambayo yanawasaidia kuboresha maisha yao. Kila wanapokumbana na vikwazo vya aina yoyote, wanatumia mbinu mbalimbali ili kuweza kuepukana navyo na kuweza kuishi vizuri zaidi. Jambo fulani la msingi katika harakati za kuboresha maisha yao ni kwamba watu hawa wanapokumbana na watu ambao wanadhani wanao uwezo wa kuwasaidia, hujihusisha na mbinu mbalimbali ili kusudi waweze kufaidika na watu hawa. Ni kwa kutumia mbinu hizo mbalimbali watu katika nchi zinazoendelea wameweza kuhusiana na wafadhili katika miradi mbalimbali ya maendeleo ili waweze kutumia misaada kuboresha maisha yao.

Tathmini nyingi zinazohusiana na miradi ya maendeleo ambayo inatokana na misaada kutoka katika nchi zilizoendelea zinaonyesha kwamba miradi hii haikidhi malengo yake; hali hii inaleta kusemekana kwamba misaada hii haisaidii lolote. Tathmini hizi zimechangia katika mawazo ambayo yanalitazama suala zima la misaada kama suala potofu na lisilofaa. Kuna hali ya kukata tamaa kwa wanaotoa misaada na fikara kwamba hata iweje, misaada haiwezi kusaidia lolote. Tatizo la mtazamo huu mbaya wa misaada ni kwamba upande wa watu wanopokea misaada hauangaliwi. Bila kuuangalia upande huu ni vigumu kuelewa jinsi watu wanaopokea misaada wanavyoitumia misaada hiyo iwe ya umuhimu kwao kwa kuboresha maisha yao. Ni kwa sababu hii utafiti huu umelishughulikia suala nyeti la kuangalia jinsi ambavyo mtazamo wa maendeleo ya ukisasa na mbinu za watu za kuweza kufaidika na wafadhili vinavyochangia katika kuifanya misaada iwe ya umuhimu kwao ili kuboresha maisha yao.

Ili kuweza kuuangalia mtazamo wa maendeleo ya ukisasa na mbinu za watu za kuweza kufaidika na wafadhili, utafiti huu ulishughulika na mambo matatu:

1. Kuchunguza jinsi mradi wa DRDP ulivyokuwa na mtazamo wa kisasa kwa kuchunguza nyaraka muhimu za mradi huo;
2. Kuchunguza mbinu za kutaka kufaidika na wafadhili za wafanyakazi katika wilaya ulipo mradi huu, na;
3. Kuchunguza mbinu za kutaka kufaidika na wafadhili za “wajuaji” na watu wa kawaida wa vijijini.

Utafiti huu uliofanywa katika wilaya ya Bukoba vijijini kwenye mradi wa *Bukoba District Rural Development Programme* (BDRDP) umeonyesha mambo yafuatayo:

1. Baada ya kuzichunguza nyaraka nyeti za mradi huu wa DRDP niliweza kuonyesha kwamba mradi huu unao mtazamo wa maendeleo ya ukisasa, ambao unawafanya watu mbalimbali wanaohusiana na mradi kuanza mahusiano ambayo yanategemeana na uwezo alionao kila mtu anapojilinganisha na ukisasa. Kwa mfano, wafadhili Waholanzi wanao uwezo na mamlaka kuwapita wafanyakazi katika wilaya; wafanyakazi hawa wanao uwezo na mamlaka zaidi kuwapita “wajuaji” na watu wa kawaida wa vijijini, na; “wajuaji” wanao uwezo na mamlaka kuwapita watu wa kawaida wa vijijini. Hali hii ya mahusiano imesababisha hali ambayo yeyote anayehusika na msaada anajitahidi kadiri awezavyo kufaidika na misaada ili kuyaboresha maisha yake kwa kutumia mbinu mbalimbali ili “kumzunguka” aliye na uwezo na mamlaka juu yake.

2. Baada ya kuwadodosa watu mbalimbali niliweza kugundua kwamba wafanyakazi katika wilaya wanatumia mbinu za “kushirikiana”, “uharabu”, na “kunyanyasa” ili kuweza kuhakikisha kwamba wanafaidika na misaada ili kuweza kuyaboresha maisha yao.
3. Vile vile baada ya kuwadodosa watu mbalimbali niliweza kugundua kwamba “wajuaji” hutumia mbinu za “kuwania utawala”, “uharabu”, na “kuzungumza lugha Fulani” za kuwapendezesha wafanyakazi wa wilayani ili kusudi waweze kutimiza matakwa ya watu wa kawaida wa vijijini, na kwa namna hiyo waweze kuboresha maisha yao.
4. Mwisho, niliweza kugundua kwamba watu wa kawaida wa vijijini nao wanazo mbinu wanazozitumia ili kusudi waweze kufaidika na misaada ya wafadhiri. Watu hawa wa vijijini, “huwateua wajuaji”, “huwapa shughuli zinazohusiana na maendeleo ya kisasa”, na vile vile wanapoona wananyanyaswa na “wajuaji” hawa, hujitahidi “kuwapinga”.

Jambo la msingi katika utafiti huu ni kwamba mtazamo huu wa kisasa umeleta mahusiano yaliyojibanza kwenye uwezo na mamlaka ya watu mbalimbali kulingana na jinsi walivyoguswa na maendeleo ya kisasa. Mahusiano haya yamemsababisha kila mhusika ajaribu kumzunguka aliye na uwezo na mamlaka kumpita ili kusudi aweze kufaidika na misaada katika kuboresha maisha yake. Kwa hiyo, kuhusiana na hoja kwamba misaada haisaidii, inabidi kuwa macho sana: ni sawa, misaada haijasaidia katika kutimiza malengo ya wafadhiri; lakini kulingana na malengo ya wafadhiriwa, yaani kuborehsa maisha yao, misaada imesaidia sana.

Vile vile utafiti huu umejaribu kutoa changamoto Fulani: Umewaalika wahusika mbalimbali kwenye masuala ya maendeleo kujaribu kuutafuta na kuutumia mtazamo ambao ni tofauti na mzuri kuliko ule wa maendeleo ya ukisasa. Pamoja na kwamba, kwa mfano, kuna changamoto dhidi ya mtazamo huu wa ukisasa, bado dhana mbalimbali kama “umaskini” na “maendeleo vijijini” (ambazo ni nguzo kubwa kwa mtazamo wa maendeleo ya ukisasa) zatawala masuala ya maendeleo.

Kutokana na utafiti huu, nimependekeza kwamba ili kuweza kupata mtazamo mzuri zaidi inabidi 1) kutoa changamoto dhidi ya hoja kwamba mafanikio ya miradi ya maendeleo yanategemeana na sera, na 2) kulitilia mkazo zaidi suala la nguvu za watu wenyewe kutaka kuboresha maisha yao, suala ambalo linawafanya watu “wawazunguke” wanaharakati wa maendeleo ya ukisasa, kwa mfano wafadhili.

About the author

Adalbertus Kamanzi was born on the 19th September 1970 in Bukoba, Tanzania. Between 1992 and 1997, he underwent philosophical and theological training in Italy. From 1997 to 2002, he studied Ethics and Development Studies at Uganda Martyrs University (BA and MA) in Uganda, where he has been lecturing since 2002.

Adalbertus Kamanzi has specialised in qualitative research on issues pertaining to people's livelihoods. He has been involved in a number of research activities with different research institutions, among which OSSREA (on gender issues, 2006-2007), VICRES (on a multidisciplinary research approach on dealing with environmental issues, 2006-2009), EDI Ltd (on economic issues, 2004 until to-date), and some other researches and capacity building activities with the local development organisations in Kagera region.

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