

Chapter 12

The European World of Metropolitan Policing: interpreting patterns of governance, policy and politics

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1. Introduction, The metropolis as an object of policing governance, policy and politics

It is presumed in the Policing European Metropolises Project (PEMP) that the metropolitan area is an increasingly important object of policing governance, given the transnational challenges encountered by European nation states, including the movement of capital, labour, goods and services enabled by the Treaty on European Union: the ‘Amsterdam Settlement’. In this sense, metropolitan policing is, in part, an artefact of the Amsterdam Settlement and the four freedoms which facilitate mobility across national territories and, in doing so, create new internal security fields. This is a principal insight of the concept of multiple, overlapping, internal security fields introduced in Chapter One of this collection. Illicit, as well as licit, capital, labour, goods and services move from particular localities to others and, especially, to the metropolises in which the markets for these are concentrated. This can be understood as a specific European instance of the broader process of ‘glocalisation’, a concept coined by social scientists to characterise greater transnational mobility and how this privileges certain localities that are able to project their political, economic and cultural power, acting as ‘command points’ (Sassen, 2001; Massey, 2007) in emerging global markets, whilst subordinating those localities that struggle to adapt to these global forces (Swyngedouw, 1997). The basic assumption behind the PEMP is that this process is producing a significant and uneven development of security problems and responses that need to be registered at the level of the metropolis, given that city-regions have different trajectories in the import and export of security problems. Contributors to this edited collection were invited to reflect on the particular significance of metropolitan policing in different nation-state contexts, as registered through reference to particular governing arrangements and policy agendas, in order to test and to adapt this proposition (see Chapter One, this volume).

Contributions to Parts Two and Three of this book reflect on different trajectories for nation states in Europe and their implications for metropolitan policing, contrasting those nation states in which there has been an explicit attempt to create city-regions with metropolitan-specific policing plans or ‘metropolitan-centred metropolitan agendas’, as in Belgium (De Pauw and Easton, this volume), Britain (Edwards et al, this volume), Italy (Calaresu and Selmini, this volume), Germany (Aden and Frevel, this volume) and the Netherlands (Prins and Devroe, this volume), with those in which national policing strategies are predominant, or ‘national-centred metropolitan agendas’, produced by, *inter alia*, the defence of French Republicanism (de Maillard & Mouhanna, this volume), the transition from dictatorship in Portugal (Cardoso & Castro, this volume), the defence of Nordic social democracies (Virta & Taponen, this volume), or the transition from communism in Eastern and Central Europe (Modic et al., this volume). In Spain the reconciliation of regional conflicts between Catalunya and the Basque country on the one hand, and the Castilian State on the other,

produces a series of quasi-national police agendas driven by each of these regional powers (Recasens i Brunet & Ponsaers, 2014).

In interpreting the various contributions to Parts Two and Three of the book we argue here that it is possible to identify the existence of a ‘European world of metropolitan policing’ characterised by a significant diversity of metropolitan policing agendas. To elicit theoretical propositions from these contributions that are in turn capable of building explanations of this diversity, we revisit the conceptual framework for comparing metropolitan policing that was introduced in Chapter One, specifically the circuits of causal, dispositional and facilitative power that constitute multiple, overlapping, internal security fields.

The concept of a European world of metropolitan policing captures the particularity and urgency of the challenges currently confronting the politics of security in European city-regions better than the conventional framing of security issues as problems of inter-national relations. Most obviously, this concept is better placed to grasp the rapid and mass migration of populations around Europe, as EU citizens with the freedom to relocate from more economically depressed regions in the South and East of the Union into the more buoyant labour markets of the North and West, and as there is an intensification in refugees and economic migrants fleeing civil war and poverty in the Middle East and in Africa. This mobility can generate major challenges to internal security, including pressures on social cohesion arising out of the unplanned and significant demands for housing, labour, health and educational services and the cultural adaptation between settled residential populations and new arrivals, including, for example, sexual mores and expectations¹. At the same time, the recent history of terrorist attacks on particular metropolises has evolved from ‘home grown’ assaults on the public transport systems of Madrid (2004) and London (2005) into paramilitary assaults undertaken by transnational networks such as the Islamic State (IS), as in the attacks on Paris in January and November 2015, then on Brussels airport and the subway station at Maalbeek in March 2016, as well as the earlier attempted assault on the Thalys international train service from Brussels to Paris in August 2015 and the shooting in the Jewish museum in Brussels in May 2014. Again, these emphasise the inadequacy of framing internal security threats as either solely national or European-wide problems. Rather, these threats, as with the longer-standing concern with ‘transnational organised crime’, are a consequence of asymmetrical networks that traverse nation-states and in which particular metropolises are the key nodes. Another cause of the metropolis as a distinctive object of policing governance in this European world is the unfolding consequences of the financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent sovereign debt crises, and their highly uneven impact. The city-regions in the South and East of the Union, including Rome and Milan (see Caleresu and Selmini, this volume), that are amongst the initial destinations for refugees, are the very locations most under pressure from austerity measures and whose governing capacity has been so degraded by these measures. In turn, pressure on public services in the Northern and Western metropolises that are the ultimate target destination of these migrants has been identified as a key factor in the rise of national-populist political movements and anti-

¹ Celebrations of the New Year 2016 in Cologne and Malmo were marred by reports of a series of sexual assaults on females by recently arrived migrants. It was claimed these and other assaults had initially been covered up by the authorities for fear of exacerbating anti-immigrant sentiments. Subsequently, these assaults were attributed to a basic cultural misunderstanding over the presentation of self by western women and perceptions of their sexual availability on behalf of the migrants, see <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/11/swedish-police-accused-cover-up-sex-attacks-refugees-festival>, accessed on 10th August 2016.

European Union sentiment, epitomised in the ‘Brexit’ result of the UK referendum on EU membership held in June 2016 (Tilford, 2016; Edwards et al, this volume).

This concluding chapter offers an interpretation of the key patterns of governance, policy and politics arising out of this European world by distinguishing different types of metropolitan policing ‘regime’. Section two presents a diagnostic tool for distinguishing between regimes that seek to maintain, develop, reform or transform conventional criminal justice and public order agendas on the basis of the ‘rules of meaning and membership’ that integrate various policing actors into governing arrangements. These rules concern a regime’s orientation towards particular kinds of offenders, victims and environments, their privileging of particular populations, ‘at risk’ groups and individual offenders and victims known to the authorities, and finally the balance of their objectives for reducing crime, maintaining public order and/or enhancing social cohesion. It is argued that these rules have both the dispositional power to integrate various actors into metropolitan policing regimes but also the liability of generating contradictions that threaten their stabilisation and further reproduction. Section three applies this diagnostic tool to case studies of metropolitan policing presented in this edited volume and, in section four, their contradictions are discussed in terms of future scenarios and further implications for the comparative analysis of metropolitan policing.

2. Understanding the European World of Metropolitan Policing

To characterise metropolitan policing agendas within this European world, we draw upon one of the predicates of comparative analysis introduced in Chapter One: that of ‘disposition’, which can be understood as a type of power, more specifically, the ‘rules of meaning and membership’ which organise social actors, admitting those willing and able to adhere to these rules into membership of the organisation in question, whilst excluding those neither able nor willing to adhere to these rules (Clegg, 1989). In turn, dispositions can be distinguished from our other predicates of comparative analysis: the ‘causal’ power and agency of particular actors (strategic policy-makers such as elected mayors, chiefs of police, national ministers of the interior) and the ‘facilitative’ power of various technologies of production and discipline that can disorganise governing coalitions and shift their policy agendas (for example, the external shock of economic crises, incidents of terror and mass migrations of people, the invention of disruptive technologies such as digital communications and surveillance or political scandals such as the corruption of public officials). By contrast, dispositional power acts as a means of social integration, binding social actors together through rules of meaning and membership such that any one actor couldn’t participate in an organisation, including governing coalitions responsible for metropolitan policing, if they didn’t adhere to these rules, rules which predate the involvement of particular actors and are not reducible to their causal agency. For the purposes of this analysis, the concept of *dispositional power* can be used to characterise the rules of meaning and membership in rival metropolitan policing agendas. In applying this concept, we have developed a framework for diagnosing policing dispositions, summarised in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1. : *Diagnostic tool of Metropolitan Policing Dispositions: Orientations, Populations and Objectives*

***** HERE TABLE 12.1. *****

Dispositions	Rules of Meaning and Membership								
	Orientations			Populations			Objectives		
	Offender	Victim	Environment	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Social service	Public order	Crime reduction
Criminal Justice	X					X		X	X
Restorative Justice	X	X	X			X		X	X
Social Justice			X	X	X		X	X	X
Managing the risks of opportunities for crime & disorder		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Managing the risks of offending careers	X		X		X	X		X	X

This framework draws upon two intellectual traditions. Firstly, the rules of meaning and membership in policing dispositions are defined in terms of arguments over the different orientations, populations and objectives of policing (Graham & Bowling, 1995; Crawford, 1998; Reiner, 2010). Secondly, these rules are related to different concepts of justice and risk management, which are prevalent across Europe (Edwards and Hughes, 2012; Edwards, Hughes and Lord, 2013). These can be summarised in the following terms:

- **Orientations:** the classical and positivist traditions of criminological thought orientate policing toward *offenders* or those deviating from social norms, whereas the victimology movement, that gathered pace in North America and Western Europe in the 1970s, privileges a focus on *victims* and their vulnerability to further victimisation. A longer-standing tradition, epitomised in the work of the Chicago School, privileges a research and policy focus on the *environments*, especially within cities, which are thought to generate problems of offending and victimisation.
- **Populations:** another way of conceptualising competing priorities for policing agendas is to consider the different kinds of population that can be prioritised by alternative agendas. Here criminological thought draws upon a distinction found in epidemiology and public health policy between *primary* populations of interest, that is to say the entire population, *secondary* populations or particular social groups who are thought to be particularly ‘at risk’ of being victimised or of engaging in offending behaviour, and, finally, *tertiary* populations of actual victims and offenders known to the authorities, especially as a consequence of their multiple and repeated victimisation and/or their prolific offending.
- **Objectives:** a final set of concepts for diagnosing policing agendas draws upon the well-established literature on the alternative objectives of policing, to reduce *crime*, to maintain *public order* and to provide various social *services*.

These concepts help to define the necessary rules of meaning and membership in policy agendas in ways which, we contend, translate across different political and cultural contexts of policing governance whilst providing insight into the contingent political competition to formulate policing agendas within specific contexts. In this way this analytical dimension of

the diagnostic tool addresses the basic problem of comparative research in defining concepts that translate across cultural contexts without inhibiting contextualised insight.

This concern with reconciling the cross-contextual translation of concepts with context-specific insight is also behind our use of a second intellectual tradition to define metropolitan policing dispositions. This contrasts theories of justice with an increasing interest in the pre-judicial, precautionary, management of 'risks' and 'risky actors'. Again we contend that concepts of criminal, restorative and social justice, along with concepts of risk management, are now global in their scope of applicability and consequently translate across the different contexts of metropolitan policing found in Europe. More specifically, these global policing dispositions can be distinguished as follows:

- **Criminal justice:** Metropolitan policing is about the enforcement of criminal law by supporting the prosecution and sanctioning of offences against this law. As such policing is limited to a reaction to offences already committed and are thus essentially reactive.
- **Restorative justice:** Metropolitan policing is accomplished through the negotiation of reparations between offenders and victims and through a deliberate attempt to circumvent the criminal justice process and can be considered as a means of diversion. It is also concerned with the role of non-state actors, such as churches and other faith organisations, in the reintegration of offenders.
- **Social justice:** Metropolitan policing is accomplished through the use of social and economic policies to address problems of social and political exclusion of citizens that are, in turn, believed to cause social conflicts including criminal victimisation and civil unrest. A social justice agenda seeks to extend the entitlements of citizens to improved education, training, employment, housing, health, leisure and family support, and to address inequalities in access to these entitlements by means of wealth redistribution. Such a disposition is in essence aetiological in its concern with the root, social, causes of crime.
- **Managing the risks of opportunities for crime and disorder:** Metropolitan policing anticipates risks through such measures as reducing the situational opportunities for crime and prudential advice and inducements enabling citizens to take responsibility for reducing their own risk. It is in essence an anti-aetiological and proactive disposition.
- **Managing the risks of criminal careers:** Early interventions with groups 'at risk' of embarking on offending careers and desistance programmes for prolific and priority offenders. It is a proactive disposition but one premised on aetiological thinking and informed by the insights of innovations in longitudinal studies of criminal careers.

In defining these dispositions, we have been careful to use concepts that are in-use by policy-makers as well as social scientists although, of course, it is important for social scientists to retain their ability to place their own interpretation on what these concepts actually signify in practice if they are to maintain an important critical distance from policy-makers. As such these dispositions provide an initial means of diagnosing the often complex and contradictory admixture of dispositions that can be found in any one particular metropolitan policing agenda, often as a consequence of the bargaining and exchange relationships that occur in specific 'assemblages' of policing governance, policy and politics.

The concept of 'governing assemblage' (Bevir, 2013) alerts us to the bargaining and exchange relationships that are central to governing in liberal democracies where mandates to govern do not of themselves equip elected administrations with the financial, organisational and informational resources to translate their policy agendas into practice and where powerful organisations also need to legitimate their public authority. As a consequence of these bargaining relationships there is always the possibility of governance 'failure' and 'drift' in which a governing coalition cannot be stabilised long enough to deliver on its policy agenda. An assemblage still exists, in the sense that minority administrations stumble on, keeping the everyday machinery of public administration going but failing to advance the objectives of their policy agendas. Where, however, governing coalitions are stabilised long enough to implement their policy agendas or at least their key policy priorities, it is possible to diagnose the existence of a governing 'regime' (Stone, 1989; 2002; 2009; Edwards & Hughes, 2012).

Using this differentiation of policing dispositions it is possible to define the following types of governing assemblage:

- **Maintenance regimes:** in which the criminal justice disposition, the oldest and most familiar, ever-present, policing disposition is maintained, even in the face of severe criticism about the limits to this form of 'punitive display' (Garland, 1997), in which a policy agenda is stabilised around the following rules: an orientation around offenders rather than victims or environments, that are already known to the authorities for predicate offences against criminal and public order laws (Nagin, 1998; Pogarski, 2002);
- **Developmental regimes:** in which a criminal justice agenda is augmented by forms of risk management that are oriented around those known or suspected by the authorities of embarking upon offending careers and/or reducing the opportunities for victimisation that can include particular criminogenic environments and be targetted at whole populations as well as 'at risk' groups of repeat victims and prolific offenders;
- **Reformist regimes:** in which a criminal justice agenda is reformed to place a greater emphasis on the diversion of offenders and victims away from the criminal justice and penal process towards civil remedies such as reparation schemes and other forms of restorative justice;
- **Transformative regimes:** in which a criminal justice agenda is transformed from a core to a peripheral concern and replaced by a focus on social as well as restorative justice objectives. These entail reducing crime and reordering public safety through policies oriented towards the environmental conditions that produce offending, victimisation and civil unrest, in particular, gross social and economic inequalities and the exclusion of social groups from effective political participation;
- **Failed regimes:** in which rival agendas cancel each other out and effectively preclude the stabilisation of a governing regime.

3. Contemporary Metropolitan Policing Regimes in Europe

It is suggested that this conceptual scheme for diagnosing and comparing metropolitan policing encompasses the breadth of possible arrangements and agendas that seek to maintain, develop, reform or transform criminal justice agendas for policing or which can be characterised as failing to do so.

3.1. Maintenance regimes: the consolidation of criminal justice dispositions

Policing has been as, if not more, concerned with maintaining public order as it has with reducing crime but in its modern form, policing became associated with the use of criminal and administrative sanctions against particular offenders known to the authorities for predicate offences (Bittner, 1970). Whilst this disposition continues, we argue it is possible to differentiate those metropolitan policing regimes which have retained this core mission from others which have acknowledged its limitations and have sought to either develop, reform or transform it (van Dijk et al., 2015). In these terms, a maintenance regime can be diagnosed as one which continues to reduce the policy agenda for policing to a concern with:

- (1) offenders
- (2) already known to the authorities; and
- (3) subject to tertiary interventions for reducing crime and maintaining order amongst prolific and priority offenders, be these individuals concerned with particular kinds of offence and/or engaged in behaviour labelled ‘anti-social’.

In these terms, there may not be a public policy agenda explicitly stated as such, just an expectation that authorities responsible for enforcing laws on criminality and public disorder simply execute this role. This is the implication of studies of metropolitan policing in the context of Eastern and Central European countries in transition from former communist regimes (Devroe & Petrov, 2014; Meško et al., 2013; Meško & Lobnikar, 2005; Modic et al., this volume). This disposition can also characterise the direction which metropolitan policing has taken in France since the administration of President Sarkozy (de Maillard & Mouhanna, this volume) and in the strong continuity of the policing agenda in Finland, where high public confidence in established policing regimes has provided little stimulus for reform (Virta & Taponen, this volume). There are different kinds of maintenance regime that share particular orientations, populations of concern and objectives, but are nonetheless grounded in very diverse governing arrangements and histories.

In European countries with a Napoleonic tradition, as in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, police officers execute two different *maintenance* mandates: (1) they execute judicial police tasks guided by the public prosecutor (‘crime fighting’, compliance with the criminal code), with the objective of bringing criminal cases to court; and (2) they execute administrative police tasks, under the supervision of an administrative authority, mostly the local Mayor, who has important competences in this domain.

In the Napoleonic tradition, administrative police competences can be very broad, reflecting the autonomy and discretion of the Mayor to set municipal policing agendas about the maintenance of public tranquillity, security and health. Under the auspices of this mandate, police officers have essentially a preventive and service function (surveillance, patrolling, oversight during mass events including football matches and political demonstrations), but they also have the function of maintaining and restoring public order in the event of civil unrest. Interventions made under the auspices of the administrative police mandate are bound to specific regulations (administrative arrest, administrative search and frisk, use of force in the framework of public disorderly behaviour, administrative fines, administrative identity controls, administrative information gathering), which are different from those in the framework of judicial (criminal) police tasks. Administrative functions are considered in

Napoleonic countries as the core business of police forces, while the judicial mandate accounts for only a marginal part of the police role².

By contrast, in the governing arrangements for public policing in England and Wales the role of elected officials, such as Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), is limited by the ‘doctrine of Constabulary Independence’. This grants unelected police chiefs, ‘Chief Constables’, autonomy over matters of the operational deployment and conduct of police officers in their constabulary. Whilst PCCs and, in London, the elected Mayor, have the right to formulate the strategic goals of a constabulary (for example, to prioritise certain kinds of crime and anti-social behavior and even to aim to reduce their incidence by a specified percentage over the course of a PCC’s or Mayor’s elected term of office) they cannot instruct police chiefs, much less particular officers, on the operational details of how such goals are to be accomplished. This distinction between policing operations and policing strategy is regarded as an important means of insulating mundane policing from corruption. Further checks and balances exist in the execution of operational police powers beyond the enforcement of the criminal law, which is left to the discretion of individual constables, and for the maintenance of public order. There now exist a number of civil injunctions for controlling ‘anti-social behaviour’ between individual complainants such as household neighbours, ‘Community Protection Orders’ that control the behavior of particular individuals deemed to be damaging to the environment or local population and ‘Public Space Protection Orders’ that impose restrictions on collective behaviour in public places, such as group consumption of alcohol. In each instance, however, an application for an order or civil injunction needs to be made by the police (but can also be made by other ‘responsible authorities’ in multi-agency policing partnerships, including local authorities and environmental agencies) to the magistrates’ court for approval before it can be enforced.

It is clear that mayors in countries with a Napoleonic tradition of public administration have much more discretionary power and direct control over municipal policing than in common law countries. Notwithstanding these significant variations in governing arrangements for maintenance regimes, however, they share a policy agenda that privileges the enforcement of criminal laws and civil/administrative sanctions over other methods of regulating public behaviour. Maintenance regimes thus start from the conviction that sanctions have a preventative effect on future behaviour.

3.2. Developmental regimes: augmenting criminal justice with risk management

At the time maintenance regimes first encountered a major challenge, in the early 1980s, it was possible to identify a basic split between rival agendas that sought to develop these regimes and those which sought to reform or transform them (see 3.3., and 3.4., below). Whilst it is possible to distinguish different kinds of developmental regime, it is suggested here that they all share the following rules:

- (1) an orientation towards victims and environments as well as offenders;
- (2) a focus on entire populations or ‘at risk’ groups as well as individuals already known to the authorities; and
- (3) in ways that augment criminal justice and public order agendas with policing strategies aimed at managing the risks of victimisation and/or offending careers.

² E.g. the functional division of labour in Belgium requires the local police to invest 7% to 10% of their funding in criminal investigation. See the Law on the Police Function of 07.12.1998.

In turn, it is possible to distinguish different kinds of developmental regimes in terms of their *privileging* of offender, victim or environmentally-oriented policing, of primary, secondary or tertiary interventions and of crime reduction and/or public order objectives. Amongst the case studies reported in the book, we think it is possible to identify three basic variants of the developmental regime in metropolitan policing.

3.2.1. Offender-oriented tertiary strategies targeting prolific and priority offenders to expedite their desistance from criminal careers.

This variant of the developmental regime is exemplified in the Regional Safety Plans of Amsterdam (2010-2014, 2014-2018), Rotterdam (2010-2014, 2014-2018) and Antwerp (2003-2017), which are premised on the increasing research and policy interest in crime and the ‘life course’, in particular the idea that it is possible to identify common patterns in the onset and reproduction of offending behaviour amongst prolific ‘career’ criminals and, on the basis of this, to engineer desistance.

Allied to this interest is the belief that prolific criminals are responsible for the overwhelming majority of offences in a locality, the policing implication being that substantial reductions in crime and disorder can be accomplished quickly and can be sustained if these particular individual offenders can be identified and subject to intensive supervision, surveillance and rehabilitation. This conception of policing is neatly captured in the concept of the ‘Top 600’ programme that is the centrepiece of the Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the U-turn projects in the Antwerp Plans. These plans commit substantial resources to the involvement of a wide range of agencies in the intensive supervision, surveillance and rehabilitation of prolific offenders including their school or employers, their families, friends and extended kinship networks as well as a breadth of relevant municipal agencies including social workers, teachers, housing and health authorities as well as the police and probation services.

3.2.2. Offender-oriented secondary strategies targeting ‘risky’ groups on the basis of suspect profiles such as age, gender, ethnicity and residential status.

In stark contrast to the research-driven agenda of developmental regimes concerned with the desistance of prolific offenders, another kind of developmental regime is premised on the punitive-populist concern with ‘outsider’, ‘suspect’, groups, in particular migrants and refugees, homeless street populations and, more generally, young street populations. These regimes are oriented around offenders but employ secondary interventions against whole social groups, rather than particular individuals, whose members are thought to be ‘at risk’ of offending because of their demographic profiles. Although such (ethnic) ‘profiling’ is now proscribed by article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the related case law of the European Court of Justice, it nonetheless persists, explicitly in some metropolitan policing agendas in Europe, notably the security pacts signed between the Italian Minister of the Interior and successive Mayors of Rome from (2008 onwards), and in the use of the administrative orders passed by these Mayors, targeting ‘nomad populations’ street vendors and unauthorised camps of ‘Roma’ (see Selmini, this volume; Calaresu & Selmini, this volume).

The policing implication of this targeting is to employ aggressive, militarised, street patrolling to disperse and ‘move on’ street populations, to disrupt street vice and narcotics markets and tackle ‘incivilities’ or ‘anti-social behaviour’. It is precisely through this shift

from criminal justice to risk management that metropolitan policing in certain cities has witnessed an exponential increase in the innovative and highly discretionary use of administrative rather than criminal law to regulate citizens' freedoms of movement, assembly and speech.

3.2.3. Victim-oriented and environment-oriented primary, secondary and tertiary strategies aimed at reducing the opportunities for crime and disorder.

By contrast again, a third variant of the developmental regime, can be identified, which has been driven both by populist demands for more immediate security than possible through criminal justice and penal processes and by key innovations in applied criminological research in the British Home Office and subsequently in the research wings of other European ministries of the interior. The key innovation, as articulated by one of the principal researchers behind this thinking, is to shift policing from a concern with the dispositions³ of offenders to the opportunities for victimisation, in particular those opportunities afforded by, and remediable through, highly situational factors (Clarke, 1983). This approach has found particular favour in the UK, in some sense the 'home' of situational crime prevention given the amount of investment in the research and development of this agenda, and more recently, can be discerned in Mayor Johnson's Police and Crime Plan for London (Edwards et al., this volume). Part of the political appeal and success of opportunity reduction is the perceived economy and effectiveness of sustaining quick reductions in victimisation and/or deflecting the harmful impact of victimisation from particularly vulnerable groups to more resilient populations.

This agenda seeks to facilitate 'security for all' by embedding the reduction of opportunities for crime and disorder into the routines of everyday life and accomplishes this, again, through innovative applications of administrative not just criminal law to increase the effort of commissioning offences, reduce the rewards and increase the risks of apprehension (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Clarke, 1980). For example, improved surveillance, both natural and electronic, of particular victims (those repeatedly and multiply victimised), 'at risk' groups (e.g. users of car parks) and populations (e.g. all users of public highways). Of particular importance in the impetus behind the agenda of opportunity reduction has been the use of intelligence and data for analysing 'crime patterns' (Ekblom, 1988; Ekblom & Pease, 2005; Sherman et al., 1997; Leeuw, 2005) and the identification of concentrations of crime and disorder in 'hot-spots' and 'hot-times' which provide a logic for targeting policing, often used within the framework of problem-oriented policing strategies (Spelman & Eck, 1987; Tilley, 2003).

This logic is currently being developed further through 'smart policing', meaning the insights into patterns of crime and disorder that can be gleaned from so called 'Big Data' arising out of developments in the computation of digital communications, including social media as well as digitalised administrative data sets that include police, educational, health, employment and housing records. This intelligence-driven approach is also behind one of the most dramatic developments in metropolitan policing and that is the rise of 'predictive' modelling in such programmes as the US National Institute of Justice PREDPOL (predictive policing) and the UK Institute of Crime Science PROMAP programmes (Edwards, 2017).

The rapid development of smart policing has, in turn, provoked a dispute over the conceptual and political assumptions that are being fed into the modelling of policing problems using

³ Not to be confused with the dispositions of policing *policy responses* considered here.

Big Data. A basic argument exists between advocates of the ‘contagion thesis’ and the ‘immunisation thesis’. Contagion understands, and now seeks to predict, the distribution of crime and disorder in terms of its frequency in particular places (hot-spots) and times (hot-times) (Braga, 2001; Braga & Bond, 2008). Critics of the contagion thesis argue that a preoccupation with the frequency of crime and disorder ignores inter-relationships with the distribution of non-victims. Once Bayesian analyses of how patterns of victimisation are related to patterns of non-victimisation are taken into account, new logics of policing and security emerge. A key example of this is the analysis of victimisation and non-victimisation for high volume personal and property crimes in the UK (Hope, 2000, 2009a,b). This identifies an 80:20 distribution in which it is estimated that 80 percent of the residential population experience only 20 percent of crime (and most of the population experience no crime at all), whilst 20 percent of this population are chronically victimised experiencing 80 percent of all personal and property crime as indicated through self-report studies such as the British Crime Survey. Moreover, there is an interrelationship between populations of non-victims, able to better ‘immunise’ themselves against victimisation through access to private security goods (especially mobility in the housing market and the consequent capacity to exit high crime neighbourhoods), and chronically victimised populations whose vulnerability to victimisation is increased precisely by their lack of access to private security and their dependence on limited public services. As discussed below (see section 3.4), this ‘immunisation thesis’ implies a very different policing agenda, one that self-consciously uses social and economic policies to redistribute access to security particularly for chronically victimised and vulnerable populations.

Risk management agendas share a concern with anticipating various ‘risks’ or ‘risky groups’ for the purposes of ‘early intervention’ to reduce, if not completely prevent, the actual realisation of these risks and their associated harms. In turn, this generates a key strategic dilemma for metropolitan policing agendas: how to reconcile due process in criminal justice, prosecuting particular suspects on the basis of predicate offences and on the ‘facts’ of the cases to establish guilt ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ prior to any executive action to punish or ‘correct’ this behaviour, with the anticipatory and extra-judicial logic of risk management.

A further dilemma for reconciling security and justice arises out of the alleged displacement effects of risk management regimes in which targeted, extra-judicial, action on particular individuals, groups or places increases the vulnerability of the non-targeted individuals, groups or places. This is a distinctively different complaint from that of the ‘deflection’ argument which uses concepts of ‘distributional justice’ (Pease and Wiles, 2001) to justify the redistribution of offending and victimisation from more to less vulnerable populations (as in the example of using risk management strategies to deliberately deflect street vice from residential to deserted business districts). Rather, the dilemma here is that focussing intervention on prolific or priority offenders or ‘high crime neighbourhoods’ or multiple and repeat victims necessarily removes security from those who offend or are victimised but at less prolific rates or who live in areas of *significant* but not ‘high’ rates of crime and disorder. In these terms risk management regimes may enhance security but at certain costs to freedom of movement and/or equality before the law, including the right to equal protection by state authorities, a problem exacerbated by the enrolment of commercial security agencies into risk management regimes whose primary duty is to their clients not to the broader citizenry.

Within this shared disposition, however, an important distinction exists between risk management agendas that are oriented towards reducing the opportunities for victimisation and those oriented towards the promotion of desistance amongst prolific and priority

offenders. This distinction can be registered in the contrasting developmental regimes found in London Mayor Johnson's Police and Crime Plan, which invested a significant amount in opportunity reduction and Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which have prioritised investment in managing the 'Top 600' prolific career offenders. In turn this reflects another strategic dilemma and focus for political competition around metropolitan policing agendas: whether to pursue a highly targeted, tertiary, policing strategy in the belief that targeting the Top 600 offenders will produce a much greater impact on the volume and concentration of crime and disorder problems or whether to privilege secondary policing strategies aimed at those groups 'at risk' of embarking upon prolific offending careers or of becoming multiple and repeat victims or else to privilege strategies that address offending and victimisation amongst the whole population. This dilemma is represented most clearly in the use of administrative orders and security pacts in Rome, since 2008, to manage the perceived risks associated with 'nomad settlements' and 'mobile populations', in particular robbery, inter-personal violence, drug use and prostitution.

A key impetus behind the rise of developmental regimes since the 1980s and since the explicit invitation of a plurality of governmental actors to participate in metropolitan policing strategies, is the increasing recognition amongst municipal authorities of their ability to formulate their own policing agendas through the use of the administrative laws and sanctions under their control. The key analytical point here is that municipal authorities have negligible powers to set policing agendas in maintenance regimes but can develop these regimes through the use of the broad repertoire of administrative sanctions that are at their disposal.

We might identify a number of possible drivers behind the rise of developmental regimes including: the saturation and increasing incapacity of criminal justice systems to cope with the demands being placed upon them; evidence questioning the efficacy of criminal justice sanctioning for accomplishing sustainable reductions in volume crimes; the political and economic appeal of risk management policies promising substantial, sustainable and cost-effective reductions in crime and disorder, and the increasing interest of municipal authorities in using their powers in pursuit of this promise and for electoral gain. The promise of risk management becomes even more attractive to those municipal authorities under particular pressure from the 'perfect storm' of 'austerity', including severe reductions in public expenditure for policing, combined with the concentration of victimisation on those cohorts of the population who are most dependant on public services and least able to 'immunise' themselves through access to private security.

3.3. Reformist regimes: recognising the victim and the shift from criminal to restorative justice

Yet other kinds of regime can be distinguished in terms of their primary concern with reforming rather than maintaining or augmenting criminal justice and penal processes. The principal example of this in contemporary criminology is the global movement in restorative justice popularised in the action-research of John Braithwaite (1989, 2002, 2003), whose distinguishing qualities are:

- (1) an orientation towards repairing the inter-relationship of victims and offenders in the context of the familial and communal environments they inhabit;

- (2) the use of tertiary strategies to divert disputes between victims and offenders from criminal justice and penal processes and into reparations agreed directly between particular victims and offenders; and
- (3) repairing the harms experienced by victims whilst enabling the reintegrative, rather than stigmatic, shaming of offenders.

In terms of the case studies of metropolitan policing agendas reported in part III, this reformist regime can be most clearly identified in Cardiff and Edinburgh, reflecting, in part the commitment of the Welsh and Scottish governments, post-devolution, to a rights-based agenda particularly for youth justice (Edwards et al., this volume). A clear expression of this can be found in the Welsh Government's All Wales Youth Offending Strategy and the Child Hearings system in Scotland, which both express a policy commitment to diverting young offenders from the juvenile justice system and limiting the detrimental effects of early and deep contact with this system. Restorative justice approaches are, in this context, promoted as a means of diverting young offenders whilst recognising and repairing the harms experienced by their victims (McAra & McVie, 2005). Such is the political priority accorded to this diversionary strategy, that Cardiff explicitly portrays itself as a 'restorative city' (Cardiff Council, 2010). Another aspect of Cardiff as a restorative city has been its support for the street pastors movement and their role in repairing conflict in the night-time economy, in particular their role in reducing alcohol-related inter-personal violence. In principle, the priorities of reformist regimes can also be found in relation to corporate as well as volume personal and property crimes (Braithwaite & Ayers, 1992), although, as yet, this is less discernible in the particular metropolitan policing agendas considered in the second phase of the Policing European Metropolises Project.

A major limitation on the diffusion of reformist regimes in metropolitan policing in Europe, however, is its labour intensive and thus costly implications, particularly in the context of austerity and major pressures on public expenditure. Whilst Top 600-style programmes are labour intensive they are highly selective, whilst reformist regimes are extensive in replacing prosecution with reparation for high volume crime and disorder.

3.4. Transformative regimes: recognising environmental conditions, the shift from criminal to social justice

Further types of regime can be distinguished insofar as they seek not just to reform but to transform criminal justice agendas, in accordance with principles of social justice, to recognise gross inequalities in the experience of offending and victimisation within and between specific city-regions and to redistribute security accordingly. In contemporary criminology, this transformative agenda is most obviously related to preventive strategies that are:

- (1) oriented towards the environments that generate unequal distributions of offending and victimisation;
- (2) undertake remedial action to reduce the concentration of offending and victimisation in high crime environments; and
- (3) use social and economic policies to reduce criminogenic inequalities of wealth and opportunity throughout a social formation.

In relation to the case studies reported in parts II and III of the book, it is possible to identify two distinctive social justice agendas for policing. The first transforms criminal justice

agendas by reorienting the focus from street crimes to ‘crimes of the powerful’ (Pearce, 1976; Verhage & Ponsaers, 2009) as in Mayor Pisapia’s agenda for policing in Milan (Calaresu and Selmini, this volume). This prioritises the policing of corruption amongst public officials and various corporate crimes, including the health and safety of their workforces, an issue that has become increasingly prominent in criminological studies of the failure to enforce protection in the work place (Croal, 1989; Tombs & Whyte, 2009).

The second type of social justice agenda has a much longer provenance in criminology and in public policy agendas, although one thought to have been ‘eclipsed’ in ‘late-modern strategies of crime control’ by the combination of ‘punitive display’ and the risk management agendas discussed above (Garland, 1997, 2001). This agenda locates problems of crime and disorder as problems, primarily, of social and economic policy rather than of criminal justice and public order policing (Crawford, 2002; 1998). Indeed, a logical implication of this agenda is to challenge the very idea of crime and disorder as objects of ‘policing’, other than in the very broadest sense of this term as equivalent to ‘government’ (Pasquino, 1991), and to reframe them as objects of ‘social crime prevention’ (Hope and Karstedt, 2003), ‘community safety’ (Hughes, 2007; Hughes & Rowe, 2007), ‘integral security’ (Devroe, 2013) or as ‘urban security’ (EFUS, 2012; Edwards, Hughes and Lord, 2013).

This latter sense of social justice can also be detected in Pisapia’s agenda for Milan (2011-2016) (Calaresu and Selmini, this volume), in which problems of ‘street’ crime and disorder, such as prostitution and young people’s use of public space for leisure and entertainment, are reframed as issues of social and economic inclusion rather than as ‘risks’ to be controlled through aggressive, militarised, street policing and/or managed through forms of opportunity reduction or the targeting of prolific offenders. In Pisapia’s agenda these are issues to be addressed by interventions in the social and economic environments of Milan’s housing and labour markets and its educational and leisure services, promoting the social integration of hitherto excluded street populations.

Still another example of a social justice agenda is that pursued by the current ‘Centre-Left’ regional government in Brussels (De Pauw and Easton, this volume). This regional government is responsible for allocating funding for social policy to the 19 municipalities under its administration and has used its control of this funding to privilege the use of social and economic policy responses to problems of crime and civil unrest in these municipalities. This, however, is in tension with the current Federal Government agenda for policing in Belgium which seeks to maintain and further enhance criminal justice and penal policy responses. It is suggested that the relative power of the regional government in advancing its social justice agenda has, however, been disrupted by the series of terrorist incidents that have either occurred in Brussels, such as the attack on Brussels airport in March 2016, or that commenced in Brussels, in particular the use of the municipality of Molenbeek as a base by those undertaking the attack on Paris in November 2015 (De Pauw and Easton, this volume). These attacks have been used by the Federal Government and its supporters to discredit the social justice agenda of the regional government for failing to tackle the threat of terrorism and to reassert the case for a more punitive agenda.

The cases of Berlin and Cologne reveal other important challenges confronting social justice regimes as a consequence of the particular conditions of the post-war constitutional settlement in West Germany and, following reunification, in the Federal Republic (Aden and Frevel, this volume). As part of de-Nazification, policing governance was distributed between the Federal police (Bundeskriminalamt) and the state police (Landeskriminalamt). This, in

addition to the devolution of social and economic policy-making to the Lander, has created the opportunity for social justice agendas on crime and security, particularly in those Lander dominated by the Centre-Left social democratic party (SPD). When considered as a political and cultural and not just as a constitutional process, de-Nazification has also placed certain significant constraints on the adoption of pre-judicial ‘risk management’ agendas, most notably on the kind of extensive deployment of CCTV surveillance experienced in British city-regions. Such agendas run counter to the ‘Rechtsstaat’ principle of a state that adheres to due process in the rule of law and limits blanket surveillance of populations. This political and cultural anxiety over prejudicial and extra-judicial interventions has resulted in a ‘path-dependency’ for metropolitan policing agendas in Germany that constrains divergence in these agendas to varieties of criminal and social justice and helps to explain the relatively limited uptake of restorative justice and risk management, a phenomenon described as ‘unity in diversity’ (Aden and Frevel, this volume).

In considering the strategic dilemmas associated with social justice regimes it is useful to refer to criminological work that explicitly seeks to shift the policy response to crime and disorder in this direction. As noted in the discussion of the dilemmas associated with opportunity reduction (see 3.2.3., above), an alternative to targetting policing on hot-spots and times that are indicative of the ‘contagion’ of crime and disorder within a city is a concern with the political economy of ‘immunising’ particularly vulnerable populations against the risk of victimisation. This entails an appreciation of the immunity which the majority of the metropolitan population already have against crime as a consequence of their access to the ‘private club goods’ of security, especially their ability to exit high crime neighbourhoods through their access to alternative accommodation in urban housing markets and/or to better secure their accommodation through access to commercial security (Hope, 2000, 2009a,b). Those unable to access these private club goods are left dependent on residual public services (including state policing and crime prevention measures) which, in many metropolises, have been degraded through austerity programmes imposing severe public expenditure cuts, thereby intensifying their lack of immunity. In countering the concentration of victimisation on already vulnerable communities, a gross inequality that is often masked by reference to nationally aggregated trends indicating an alleged ‘crime drop’ in many Western societies over the past two decades, social justice agendas seek to enhance the collective efficacy of urban populations and thus their immunisation against problems of volume crime and disorder (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Morenoff et al., 2001).

However, a major dilemma encountered by social justice agendas *for policing* is the criticism from libertarians that it ‘criminalizes social policy’ and further fuels the ‘securitization’ of everyday life in cities (van Swaaningen, 2005; Hebberecht, 2002). From this perspective, the dilemma encountered by social justice agendas is the subordination of (negative) freedoms (*from* authoritarian welfare state intervention in citizens’ lives) to forms of collective security. More recently, however, advocates of social justice agendas in security advance a positive concept of the *freedom to* be an effective citizen, empowered by state social and economic policies (Schuilenberg, 2015). This positive concept of security can, for example, be detected in the post-war experience of Finland and in the social democratic programmes of other Scandinavian governing arrangements, even though this has been eroded by the influence of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and by the broader struggle of Nordic social democracy to adapt to the increased mobility of capital, labour, goods and services arising out of European integration (Virta & Taponen, this volume).

3.5. Regime failure: inchoate and contradictory policing agendas

A final diagnosis of metropolitan policing implied by the conceptual framework advanced here, is the absence of, or failure to stabilise, regimes as a consequence of governing arrangements and political competition. An example of this is the case of policing in Rome during Mayor Marino's administration, in which his political weakness and failure to form a stable governing coalition resulted in direct rule from national government (Calaresu & Selmini, this volume). It has also been suggested that Cardiff is an example of regime failure in that its agenda for restorative and socially just policy responses to problems of crime and disorder in the city were effectively subverted by the severe reductions in public expenditure it had to accommodate as part of the British government's broader austerity programme (Edwards et al, this volume). In such cases the dilemmas generated by competing programmes of freedom, security and justice destabilise rules of meaning and membership in metropolitan policing. Such a condition of governing 'drift' might, arguably, become a central tendency in metropolitan policing given basic disputes over reconciling the competing, in some instances mutually exclusive, conceptions of freedom, security and justice present in Europe (see 4.5., below).

4. Future scenarios in the European world of metropolitan policing

Given the strategic dilemmas encountered by maintenance, developmental, reformist and transformative regimes, it is possible to envisage a number of unfolding scenarios. The anticipation of these is a necessary pre-requisite of the kind of role that criminology and political analysis needs to play in continuing to constructively criticise metropolitan policing agendas, especially those prioritising pre-emptive interventions against threats yet to be realised over due process in prosecuting offences that have actually occurred. Proactive policing strategies cannot be adequately criticised by retrospective social science. If social science is to avoid being reduced to a backward facing narrative of success or failure, always one step behind its subject matter, then it needs to acquire its own capacity for anticipation. In terms of the conceptual framework adopted in this chapter, it is possible to engage in a number of thought experiments about policing futures which reflect upon the dialectical relations driving maintenance and other regimes and which may generate an increasing tendency toward regime failure in metropolitan policing. In promoting the concept of 'policing dialectics', the focus of analysis shifts to the contradictions inherent in each regime and their political-economic conditions for reproduction or failure. By way of conclusion, these scenarios also imply further questions for comparative research.

4.1. A renewed commitment to maintenance regimes?

Notwithstanding the substantial criticism encountered by policing agendas premised on criminal justice objectives, contributions to this book provide a number of reasons for expecting the persistence, even predominance, of maintenance regimes in particular national contexts. As noted above, maintenance regimes privilege a concern with due process and, a 'path-dependent' commitment to the rule of law and an antipathy toward pre-judicial and extra-judicial policing. In this context, it is plausible, even likely, that political choices will be made to subordinate the promise of greater security through risk management to the 'Rechtsstaat' tradition. If such maintenance regimes leave metropolitan populations more vulnerable to various security threats then this is a price worth paying to maintain the rule of law and constrain the proliferation of extra-judicial and pre-judicial interventions in processes of 'securitisation' (Buzan et al., 1998).

The political calculation to subordinate such pre-emptive security to the rule of law, in which individuals are prosecuted for predicate offences on the facts and only after these facts, is however likely to come under a number of considerable pressures. Specifically, a growing sense of injustice and popular frustration with criminal justice systems already saturated in terms of the demands placed upon them, the slow throughput of cases through the courts, and their incapacity to deliver ‘quick justice’ or at least timely justice for aggrieved victims. Secondly, the political, as well as technical, feasibility of maintenance regimes is likely to be challenged by the realisation of further catastrophic security incidents, such as the paramilitary assault on the civilian population in Paris in November 2015. It is precisely in relation to such ‘existential’ threats that commentators identify processes of ‘securitisation’ in European policing, in which normal democratic oversight and scrutiny is continuously suspended in favour of expediting executive actions capable of reducing the severity of such threats (Buzan et al, 1998). Other existential threats might be identified such as the vulnerability of critical infrastructures to being crippled by cyber-attacks as well as the vulnerability of civilian populations to other kinds of viral assaults including chemical warfare and the use of ‘dirty bombs’. In this climate, it is predictable that processes of securitisation cease to be time-limited and exceptional moments in the governance of metropolitan policing and segue into a permanent state. In this context, of the possible technical and political exhaustion of the criminal justice disposition in policing, a key question for further research arises, particularly in those metropolises, such as Paris or Cologne, in which maintenance regimes can be diagnosed:

Can maintenance regimes adapt to pressures for pre-emptive interventions without undermining their own conditions of existence?

4.2. The proliferation of developmental regimes?

Partly as a consequence of the perceived exhaustion of maintenance regimes, it is plausible to forecast the further proliferation of developmental regimes premised on variants of risk management. The prospective appeal of developmental regimes is enhanced by the political agency they grant to municipal authorities to define their own policing agendas particularly in national and broader European contexts which frustrate the formulation of more immediate and responsive security strategies in response to the demands of metropolitan electorates. The opportunities for such ‘metropolitan-driven, metropolitan agendas’ are enabled through a broadening of policing agendas beyond the use and enforcement of criminal law to innovations in the application of civil laws and the administrative regulations that are available to municipal authorities. Extra-judicial and pre-judicial methods of risk management also enable a greater role for commercial and nongovernmental organisations in metropolitan policing and thus offer opportunities for ‘leveraging’ increased investment in a context of austerity and substantial reductions in expenditure on public services.

As noted, however, the dialectics of developmental regimes includethreats to due process, in particular the imposition of major constraints on the freedom of movement, assembly and speech placed on entire populations as well as those targeted on particular groups believed to be ‘at risk’ of offending or victimisation. These are the concrete, practical, consequences of securitisation through risk management, elsewhere anticipated as the shift towards the ‘society of control’ (Deleuze, 1995) or, more provocatively, the advent of ‘micro-Fascism’ (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011) and increasingly used to refer to the forensic management of everyday life and citizens’ mundane routines. In addition, targeting can generate miscarriages of justice and other harms associated with the arbitrary exercise of policing discretion, the

Obrigkeitsstaat tendency against which the commitment to maintaining the rule of law, the *Rechtsstaat* tradition, was defined in post-war, de-Nazified, Germany. Precisely because risk management regimes enable municipal authorities to better define their own policing agendas, they can also be seen as existential threats to national political ideals aimed at protecting an equal guarantee of freedoms for all citizens within the national polity, as in French Republicanism or Scandinavian Social Democracy. In this scenario local discretion is regarded as a major threat to a (national) concept of democracy rather than as an unproblematic enhancement of local democracy. Again, the dialectics of developmental regimes provoke a further question for research, particularly in those cases of metropolitan policing, in Amsterdam, Antwerp, London, Rome and Rotterdam, that have pursued risk management agendas:

Can developmental regimes sustain pre-emptive policing in ways that don't undermine the very conditions of the liberal democracies they aim to secure?

4.3. The shift to civil society and prospects for reformist regimes?

Amongst the metropolitan policing agendas considered thus far in the Policing European Metropolises Project, regimes concerned to reform criminal justice agendas through reference to alternative and restorative concepts of justice have been peripheral. Even so, it is possible to identify episodic experiments in victim-offender conferencing, particularly in policies aimed at diverting juvenile offenders from the penal estate given well-established criminological research findings on the harmful effects of (criminal justice) 'system contact' on the stigmatic shaming of offenders and their subsequent recidivism (Braithwaite, 1989; McAra and McVie, 2005). There is the political attraction of augmenting metropolitan policing agendas with civil society-based conflict resolution, facilitating self-regulation amongst, and direct reparations between, offenders and victims, in ways that are less threatening to the freedom of movement, assembly and speech of other citizens not directly involved in these 'private' conflicts. In these terms, the more specific targeting of policing on the immediate parties of a conflict liberates other citizens to go about their business without the kinds of controls placed on their freedom by primary risk management strategies. Public authorities are envisaged as having a role in facilitating civil society-based policing and, within this enabling role, municipal authorities are provided with another means of defining their own policing agendas, a mission often expressed in the claim of some metropolises to be 'restorative cities' (see Edwards et al, this volume).

However, as conflicts between offenders and victims are effectively shifted from public criminal justice into private conferencing, from the state and into civil society, due process in their resolution is threatened. If risk management threatens the rule of law through the enhancement of forms of arbitrary state and commercial power, then restorative justice threatens it through the development of a kind of arbitrary private power to resolve conflicts (Ashworth, 1993; 2007; 2014). Moreover, reformist regimes necessarily undermine the collective symbolic power of public policing as conflict resolution is reduced from an issue of public interest into one of private troubles between individual offenders, victims and their immediate kin. These dialectics provoke the question:

Can reformist regimes establish forms of self-regulation and private conflict resolution without undermining the public interest in policing?

4.4. The prospects for socially just policing?

Advocates of social justice claim that whilst rival regimes entail trade-offs between citizens' freedoms, security and access to justice, their transformative agenda for metropolitan governing arrangements can better reconcile these different aspects of citizenship. The claim to prioritise intervention in the generative causes of insecurity distinguishes transformative policing regimes from the alternatives considered here. The claim is that through a focus on generative causes there is the possibility of accomplishing more secure and just metropolises without undermining the freedoms of the general population.

This claim, however, recalls Offe's (1984) criticisms of the 'contradictions of the welfare state' and the argument that attempts to accomplish social justice in one country, much less one city, encounter crises of rationality. One such crisis refers to the sheer magnitude of the governing programme envisaged in social justice regimes, entailing simultaneous action on generative causes of policing problems such as labour market conditions, access to education and training, housing conditions and the cultivation of social cohesion through multi-cultural awareness programmes. In turn such agendas can encounter a lack of clarity about the direction of causality between these 'distal' conditions and specific, 'proximal', security threats (Clarke, 2004). A second type of rationality crisis refers to the problems of collective action encountered by social justice agendas, in particular the redistributive costs of investing in socially just regimes requiring high tax localities provoking, in turn, the flight of corporate and other taxpayers to other, lower tax, city-regions. In pursuing the 'larger purposes' of social justice agendas, through necessary tax and spend programmes, transformative regimes can undermine their own conditions of existence (Stone, 2005; 2006). An antidote to this problem of the 'competitive dumping' of social justice agendas is to restrict the freedom of movement for capital, labour, goods and services but this fundamentally challenges the idea of a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (see Edwards et al, this volume). The attempt to pursue these larger purposes of metropolitan policing, for example in the cases of Milan and Brussels and more generally in the social democratic conditions of 'Nordic criminology', but without taking the British option of exiting the European Union, its single market and its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, provokes a further question for research:

How can socially just regimes be reproduced given the rationality crises they encounter in the European world of metropolitan policing without undermining the freedom of movement of capital, labour, goods and services that constitute this European world?

4.5. Prospects for regime failure?

Further reflection on these policing dialectics suggests another scenario in which metropolitan policing becomes increasingly stymied, if not 'ungovernable', as a consequence of the contradictions encountered by each of the regime types considered above. If social justice goals cannot be reconciled with the 'four freedoms' of the Amsterdam Settlement, if restorative justice cannot deliver common, equal, access to justice for the same kinds of victimisation, if the prejudicial threats of risk management are politically unpalatable and if criminal justice responses cannot adapt to the frequency and/or the severity of the case load confronting them, then what could constitute regime success? 'Failure', however, is a relative concept that provokes further reflection and argument:

What, in the context of the contradictions encountered by metropolitan policing regimes, can constitute relative success or failure?

Ultimately, we return to the core refrain of PEMP, that comprehending and intervening in these various scenarios necessitates a sociology of translation: *literally*, in terms of a common language of argument about freedom, security and justice; *conceptually*, in terms of some agreement over the terms of this argument, encompassing rather than precluding the breadth of debates about the orientation, populations of interest and possible objectives of metropolitan policing agendas and evaluative criterion for their success and failure; and *methodologically*, in terms of collaborative and deliberative methods that can combine extensive comparisons with contextualised insight. The contention of the Project is that in a European world of metropolitan policing, the metropolis will continue to be a key object of policing governance, policy and politics whether or not this is self-consciously acknowledged by national and European-level policy-makers, indeed especially where it is not acknowledged as this obscures an understanding of the experience of policing problems in the key, city-regional, markets for illicit as well as licit capital, labour, goods and services in which these problems are concentrated.

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