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## Becoming a European homegrown jihadist: a multilevel analysis of involvement in the Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005

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# **Becoming a European homegrown jihadist: A multilevel analysis of involvement in the Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005**

**Bart Schuurman**



**Becoming a European homegrown jihadist: A multilevel analysis of involvement in the  
Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005**

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