

Research Note

Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions

PETR KOPECKÝ,¹ JAN-HINRIK MEYER SAHLING,² FRANCISCO PANIZZA,³ GERARDO SCHERLIS,⁴ CHRISTIAN SCHUSTER⁵ & MARIA SPIROVA¹

¹*Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands;* ²*School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK;* ³*Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK;* ⁴*Department of Public Law, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina;* ⁵*School of Public Policy, University College London, UK*

Abstract. This Research Note presents a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions. The data was collected using the same methodology to compare patterns of patronage within countries, across countries and across world regions that are usually studied separately. The Note addresses three research questions that are at the centre of debates on party patronage, which is understood as the power of political parties to make appointments to the public and semi-public sector: the scope of patronage, the underlying motivations and the criteria on the basis of which appointees are selected. The exploration of the dataset shows that party patronage is, to a different degree, widespread across all regions. The data further shows differences between policy areas, types of institutions such as government ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises, and higher, middle and lower ranks of the bureaucracy. It is demonstrated that the political control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments. However, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve the purpose of both political control and rewarding supporters in exchange for votes and services. Finally, the data shows that parties prefer to select appointees who are characterised by political and personal loyalty as well as professional competence.

Keywords: patronage; political appointments; political parties; clientelism

Introduction

The exercise of political patronage within the state is an enduring phenomenon in the political world and has received considerable scholarly attention. Why do patronage systems emerge? Why does patronage differ between countries? Why is patronage a principal method of staffing bureaucracies in one area of the state while elsewhere the state institutions appear to be much stronger in resisting interference from (party) politicians? A lively scholarly debate exists around these questions. Some authors emphasise the role of historical legacies as the principal factor for the emergence and/or endurance of patronage systems (Shefter 1994; Piattoni 2001), others focus on the structure of party systems and political competition (Geddes 1994; O'Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007). Numerous authors consider organisational and ideological characteristics of political parties (Panebianco 1988; Kemahlioglu 2012; Cruz & Keefer 2015) to be the key drivers of

patronage. There is also a rich literature on the politicisation of the civil service that highlights the impact of administrative traditions, public management reform and the party change in government (Peters & Pierre 2004; Lewis 2008; Painter & Peters 2010; Dahlström & Niklasson 2013).

No matter what explanations are offered by scholars, however, most literature on patronage politics points to the negative consequences of these practices. Contrary to professional bureaucracies, patronage politics is typically regarded as an obstacle to economic development; it promotes public sector corruption and lowers the capacity of agencies to manage policy programmes (Evans & Rauch 1999; Lewis 2008; Bearfield 2009; Dahlström et al. 2012; Nistotskaya & Cingolani 2015). Moreover, the literature dealing with these questions highlights difficulties in reforming systems in which patronage has come to play a large role in public service and in partisan politics (Geddes 1994; Grindle 2012). It is for these reasons that patronage politics has received considerable attention among policy makers and international organisations that seek to promote the professionalisation of the state in transition and developing countries (Dimitrova 2002; Andrews 2013).

This Research Note adds to these debates by examining patterns of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions. The dataset that is presented here is based on the same methodology, providing a unique opportunity for the comparison of countries and regions that are usually studied separately. The Note addresses three questions that are at the centre of debates on party patronage, which we define as the power of political parties to make appointments to the public and semi-public sector. First, it examines the scope of party patronage – that is, the range of state institutions that is subject to political appointments and the extent to which patronage reaches into state institutions (cf. ‘depth of patronage’). Our dataset allows for the comparison of patronage across countries and regions as well as *within* countries across types of institutions, policy areas and levels in institutional hierarchies. The Research Note therefore presents a starting point for a more fine-grained understanding of patronage practices around the world.

Second, the Note examines the motivation of parties and politicians for appointing people to positions within the state, particularly, the distinction between political appointments made for the sake of political ‘control’ as opposed to the ‘reward’ of political supporters. Our dataset hence provides an empirical assessment of assumptions from large parts of the comparative politics literature that refer to patronage as a form of clientelistic politics for the reward of supporters in exchange for political services including electoral support, on the one hand, and the common understandings in the comparative public administration literature of political appointments as a management tool for the political control of policy making and implementation, on the other.

Third, we examine in more detail the criteria that parties and politicians prioritise when selecting personnel for political appointments. We focus on the selection on professional, political and personal grounds in order to better understand whether key selection criteria such as professional competence and political loyalty are complementary or mutually exclusive.

Our chief empirical concern is to examine these three aspects of party patronage on a cross-national and cross-regional basis. We also examine differences across policy domains and types of institutions to identify patterns of patronage across regions and countries and within countries. The analysis of this data yields an updated and comprehensive *state of*

the art assessment in the field of party patronage in contemporary democracies. The Note begins with a discussion of the concept of ‘party patronage’ and the methodology that was employed when compiling the dataset. We then present the empirical results and conclude with a discussion of avenues for future research.

Concepts, research design and methodology

The key concept that we employ in this Research Note is that of ‘party patronage’. In contrast to most studies written in the tradition of particularistic politics, clientelism and corruption (Scott 1969; Eisenstadt & Roninger 1980), we use a relatively narrow but also more precise conception of party patronage, limiting the phenomenon to political appointments (Sorauf 1959; Wilson 1973; Kopecký et al. 2012). Unlike many other studies in the field of clientelism and patronage politics that include various personal rewards and gifts, allocation of public service projects, contracts or licenses, pork-barrel legislation and so on as forms of patronage, this Note is exclusively concerned with the ability of political parties to appoint individuals to (non-elective) positions in the public and semi-public sector, including posts in core civil service, foreign embassies, state-owned companies, quangos or regulatory agencies, and the practical exercise of this ability. In other words, our major empirical concern is to establish how far political parties are in control of the allocation of public positions.

We therefore see party patronage as related but conceptually and empirically distinct from both clientelism (i.e., exchange of benefits in order to secure votes) and corruption (i.e., exchange of public decisions for private gain).¹ At the same time, our understanding of party patronage resonates with definitions of ‘civil service politicisation’ (e.g., Peters & Pierre 2004), particularly those that focus on political appointments to positions that are nominally within the scope of the professional civil service (Lewis 2008).

However, three caveats apply. First, party patronage in our conceptualisation includes appointments where merit and professional qualifications – rather than partisan and political criteria exclusively – may have been taken into account. Rather than excluding merit or professional competence by definition, we empirically investigate the criteria party politicians employ when making appointments. Second, party patronage in our conceptualisation includes appointments of nonpartisan individuals. Our empirical interest not only includes the appointments of party members, but rather all appointments in which parties and their politicians play a meaningful role. However, the residual category of non-patronage appointments remains meaningful. It includes, for instance, all public appointments in the hands of the civil servants and various professions (doctors, judges, etc.). The third caveat concerns the term ‘party patronage’. In practice, appointments made by parties and individual politicians are hard to distinguish. Most appointments within modern states are officially undertaken by individual politicians (usually ministers). In this legal sense, party patronage rarely exists. A key question therefore is the extent to which parties are involved in practice when ministers and other top executive politicians appoint: Is the party the principal and the minister the agent, or vice versa? Strictly speaking, party patronage should imply that the mechanisms of control within parties are sufficiently strong for politicians, who occupy executive office in the name of the party, to merely appoint whoever the party proposes. Yet in presidential democracies, in particular, individual party politicians often appoint from within their own networks; the parties are relatively empty

Table 1. Countries included in the dataset (with year of data collection)

Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Southern Europe	Latin America	Africa
Austria (2008–2010)	Bulgaria (2007)	Greece (2009)	Argentina (2007–2008)	Ghana (2007)
Denmark (2009)	Czech Republic (2007)	Italy (2008)	Dominican Republic (2013)	South Africa (2006)
Germany (2008–2010)	Hungary (2008–2009)	Portugal (2008–2009)	Paraguay (2012)	
Iceland (2008)	Romania (2012–2013)	Spain (2008–2009)	Uruguay (2014)	
Ireland (2009)				
Netherlands (2009–2010)				
Norway (2009–2010)				
United Kingdom (2009)				

organisational shells (Scherlis 2013).² Our survey and complementary research provides a tentative tool to distinguish these types of patronage politics.

With these caveats in mind, the dataset brings together data collected in independent research projects in 22 countries from 2006 to 2014.³ All projects used the methodology based on an expert survey developed by Kopecký et al. (2012). The 22 countries cover five regions (see Table 1). This allows us to engage in a broader comparative analysis of party patronage.

The survey comprised 947 experts; these were sampled through snowballing from, principally, six groups: academia, the nongovernmental sector, donors, media, bureaucracy, and political appointees and politicians. Experts were chosen for their knowledge of patronage in nine policy areas in each country: the judiciary, economy, finance, foreign service, healthcare, culture and education, military and police, media, and regional government.⁴ Following Peters (1988), these nine areas were selected to cover a generic model of the state.

The data provides patronage estimates for 179 policy areas in 22 countries. Each policy area was further divided into three types of institutions: ministries, NDACs (non-departmental agencies and commissions), and executing institutions (policy delivering and commercial institutions, such as state-owned enterprises or embassies). In each country, research teams utilised a common protocol to draw up a list of institutions falling under these policy areas and institutional types.

Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with experts then provided quantitative estimates and qualitative accounts of patronage. The interview protocol introduced and defined the phenomenon studied, presented quantifiable response options and permitted a qualitative discussion of the meaning and interpretation of each category to enhance

measurement validity. Responses on closed-end questions were subsequently coded for use in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) format.

Three common patronage indicators were estimated. The first – the Index of Party Patronage (IPP) – was calculated by multiplying the median values for coded expert estimates of the range and depth of patronage in each of the nine policy areas and three institutional types. Range and depth of patronage were measured in separate questions. Whether respondents believed party appointments happened in some (score = 1), most (score = 2) or all (score = 3) institutions in the institutional arena and policy area yielded the patronage range estimate; whether respondents believed party appointments happen on the top managerial level (score = 1), middle level (score = 2) or lowest level (score = 3) yielded the patronage depth estimate. Because of the ordinal nature of the data, the median score as a measure of central tendency was used (Healey 1999: 78). The IPP was subsequently aggregated to produce policy area and country estimates, standardised from 0 (no party politicisation of the state) to 1 (full party politicisation). To facilitate interpretation of the Index, note that a value of 0.65 implies that parties appoint in most institutions at all levels of the administration; a value of 0.4 that parties appoint in most institutions at top and middle levels; and a value of 0.1 that parties appoint in a limited number of institutions at only the top level.

The second indicator measures parties' motivations for appointments. Following the question 'Why do parties appoint?', it reports the proportion of respondents opting for one of three answers: 'reward to members and activists', 'control of various aspects of the policy-making process and institutions' or 'a combination of both reward and control'.⁵ These answers were coded for each policy area within countries.

The third indicator captures the criteria prioritised by parties when appointing, thus illuminating the characteristics of appointees. It does so by reporting the proportion of respondents mentioning any of three criteria as explanations for being appointed to a state position: professional background, political allegiance, or personal connections or other criteria deemed relevant.⁶ Respondents could further opt for one or several selection criteria allowing for the possibility that both political and professional considerations influence appointments.

These three indicators improve upon existing studies in several ways. While precisely measuring patronage as a phenomenon of covert politics is elusive (Müller 2000), the indicators broaden the scope of patronage measurement by including ministries, agencies and executing institutions alike, rather than only one type of state institution. Contrary to other cross-country expert surveys (Dahlberg et al. 2013; Kitschelt 2014), they also go beyond country-level data. This adds validity, as it takes into account within-country variation of patronage across policy areas and institutions. In addition, an expert survey, such as the one presented here, does not suffer from the validity limitations of proxy indicators – such as personnel expenditures and state employment trajectories – employed elsewhere (Calvo & Murillo 2004; O'Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Remmer 2007). These indicators are often influenced by factors beyond the ability and likelihood of parties to appoint and may thus not reflect patronage practices (Kopecký et al. 2012).

The expert survey also took an important duty of care to mitigate bias: at least four experts were surveyed in each policy area, and, on average, roughly 43 semi-structured expert interviews were conducted per country. Local research teams conducted all interviews in




Figure 1. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by country.

person and provided further validation through contextual knowledge. Reliability tests were conducted on parts of the data and indicated high consistency of the estimates. Potential problems notwithstanding, we have no reason to doubt the reliability of our measures. Confidence in the validity of our estimates as *approximations* of patronage is thus enhanced. Finally, rather than basing inferences on assumptions about motivations and uses of party patronage, the survey examines them empirically.

Patterns of party patronage in contemporary democracies

The Index of Party Patronage (IPP)

According to the expert survey, patronage is anything but a phenomenon of the past. With an average IPP score of 0.43, parties appoint at top and middle levels in most state institutions in the countries in the dataset. The 22 countries thereby differ starkly in the prevalence of patronage, with IPP values from 0.09 in the United Kingdom to 0.98 in the Dominican Republic (Figure 1).

The scope of party patronage varies not only across countries, but also across types of institutions – albeit less so. The standard deviation of patronage scopes across institutional types is roughly a third of cross-country deviation. When comparing the IPP across types of institutions, ministries are found to register by far the highest patronage scope (0.54). NDACs and executing institutions score substantially lower, at 0.39 and 0.36, respectively (Figure 2).⁷ The greater politicisation of ministries holds across all regions covered in the survey: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Africa and Latin America.

Party patronage also varies across policy areas – albeit with only roughly 58 per cent of the standard deviation of institutional types (Figure 3).⁸ Scholarly works examining intra-country variation in state politicisation would thus do well to give greater prominence to types of institutions, rather than solely cross-sector variation (Gingerich 2013). Across policy areas, media (0.43) registers the highest average patronage scope. That parties prioritise political control of public media may not surprise given its potential centrality for re-election. Economy and health also come out with relatively higher patronage scores.




Figure 2. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by institutional type.




Figure 3. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by policy area.

We could argue that health policy and economic policies such as industrial policy and privatisation are high-risk areas for corruption and hence also with particular appeal for party patronage. By contrast, finance (0.32), education and culture (0.32), and military and police (0.33) score lowest. This finding is congruent with scholarly works pointing to incentives to depoliticise public finances given its centrality in macroeconomic performance, and the role of professional groups, such as teachers and policemen, as constituencies for depoliticisation (Leonard 2010; Grindle 2012; Meyer-Sahling & Jager 2012).

Figure 4 shows that party patronage also varies across regions.⁹ Exploring such regional variation is insightful not least for examining the extent to which regional historical, political, legal and cultural commonalities shape patronage patterns. The five regions covered in the survey differ in legacies of pertinence for patronage, from patrimonialism and corporatism in Latin America to British colonial institutions in parts of Africa, communist state legacies in Eastern Europe, longstanding Weberian bureaucracies in Western Europe and clientelist democratic legacies in Southern Europe, to name a few (see, among many, Fukuyama 2014). The dataset may, of course, not claim representativeness for all regions. While European regions are well-covered, only four countries are sampled in Latin America. More problematically, in Africa, the two countries included (Ghana and South Africa) share a British colonial legacy and relatively successful democratisation episodes. These attributes may make for less politicisation than in the remainder of Africa. This should be considered when interpreting the data.

With this caveat in mind, the scope of patronage varies between 0.27 (Western Europe) and 0.81 (Latin America) across regions. Eastern Europe (0.42), Southern Europe (0.45) and Africa (0.40) score roughly around the dataset average. Western European countries occupy the five lowest positions in the IPP, while Latin American countries occupy four of the five highest ranks. On average, patronage is restricted to the highest levels of state institutions in Western Europe, while it permeates all levels of the hierarchy in the large majority of




Figure 4. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by region.

state institutions in Latin America. This confirms evidence from qualitative studies pointing to high state politicisation in Latin America, and relatively low politicisation in Western Europe (Page & Wright 1999; Peters & Pierre 2004; Grindle 2012).

These patterns are insightful not least for scholars studying the determinants of patronage. To illustrate this assertion, consider congruence of these patterns with just two – of many hypothesised – key determinants: economic development and regional legacies. With regard to the former, the cross-country data suggests that accounting for politicisation solely through variation in economic development is not warranted (e.g., see Kitschelt and Kselman (2013) for a corresponding critique). Uruguay – with the least patronage in Latin America in the dataset – is more politicised than Romania (0.48) and Ghana (0.4) – the countries with the most patronage in Eastern Europe and Africa, respectively. Yet, Uruguay's gross national income (GNI) per capita is 68 per cent higher than Romania's and more than 8.5 times higher than Ghana's (World Bank 2015).

Differential regional legacies appear more plausible at first sight. The standard deviation of patronage across regions is twice that of patronage within regions. Yet region-specific legacies by no means predetermine the scope of patronage. Significant intra-regional differences remain: for example, patronage scopes range from 0.6 (Uruguay) to 0.98 (Dominican Republic) in Latin America; from 0.29 (Portugal) to 0.62 (Greece) in Southern Europe; and from 0.09 (United Kingdom) to 0.49 (Austria) in Western Europe. Regional legacies thus do not suffice to explain patronage patterns, either. Instead, multiple concurrent causes are likely to produce the observed variation in party patronage.

Motivations for party patronage

As mentioned previously, two different motivations of (party) politicians to appoint within the state are distinguished: a desire to control state institutions (e.g., in order to ensure formulation and implementation of policies compatible with politician's aims); and a desire to reward party or politician's supporters, activists or even friends and family (e.g., for their electoral support or for their loyal service to the party). The distinction between different motivations for patronage appointments is not only interesting in itself, but also underscores two rather different general patterns of patronage politics: one which is clientelistic in nature and where public jobs are used on a large scale as currency for purchasing votes, mobilising grassroots activism and establishing loyal clienteles (Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013); and one which is non-clientelistic and where public jobs are used as a resource to exert control over, and establish presence within the state (Bearfield 2009; Jalali & Lisi 2009; Kopecký et al. 2012).




Figure 5. Party motivations (average across countries).




Figure 6. Motivations of party patronage by region.

As discussed above, the expert survey sought estimates on whether parties were motivated by ‘control’, ‘reward’, ‘both’ or ‘other motivations’ when appointing. The implication from the data is clear: across the 22 countries, patronage serves either solely purposes of control of state institutions (43 per cent), or both control and reward for political support (41 per cent) (Figure 5). This suggests that parties use patronage either principally as a resource to control the state through networks of political appointees in state institutions, or as a control *and* electoral resource – yet rarely solely as an electoral resource.¹⁰ Studies equating patronage solely with ‘jobs for votes’ are therefore misguided.

This conclusion holds across regions. In no region or country is the traditional clientelist conception of patronage as reward the most important category, although it is higher in Latin America (11 per cent) than elsewhere. Patronage motivations across regions vary principally in regards to whether ‘control’ or ‘control *and* reward’ are dominant. Perhaps unsurprisingly, patronage is principally motivated by control in Western Europe. In Latin America, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, by contrast, patronage serves as both a control *and* an electoral resource (Figure 6).¹¹

Characteristics of patronage appointees

Party patronage varies not only in scope and motivations, but also in the characteristics of appointees. To explore this variation, the expert survey inquired about the criteria prioritised by parties when appointing: professionalism, political allegiance or personal connections (Figure 7). On average, professionalism is the most important criterion for selecting appointees in the 22 countries sampled (84 per cent). This is followed by political allegiance (70 per cent) and personal connections (62 per cent). *Prima facie*, this is welcome news: if professionalism of appointees takes centre stage, the effect of patronage on organisational performance in state bureaucracies is likely to be less pernicious (cf. Gallo & Lewis 2012). The relatively high proportions for all three criteria, however, imply that parties typically prioritise multiple criteria when appointing to the state. Party politicians thus frequently




Figure 7. Qualifications of appointees (average across countries).




Figure 8. Qualifications of appointees by region.

select appointees who are, concurrently, professionally competent, loyal to the party and personally connected to an individual in the party.

Moreover, the characteristics of appointees differ markedly across regions. Professionalism trumps in Western and Southern Europe; political allegiance is central in Eastern Europe and Latin America; and personal allegiance is prioritised in the two African countries (Figure 8). With this in mind, the next section will explore associations between the three distinct patronage dimensions in the dataset.

From jobs-for-votes to democratic responsiveness? Patronage prevalence and the nature of patronage

To complement the analysis of patronage patterns, we examine associations between patronage scopes, motivations and appointee qualifications. To our knowledge, this analysis is a first in the literature. It sheds light on the extent to which the nature of patronage – its motivations and the characteristics of appointees – evolves with changes in the extent of patronage. Such an evolution is deductively intuitive. With a lower patronage scope, the capacity of parties to appoint is curtailed. Control could then become more central: parties need to ensure a responsive state apparatus with fewer appointees. Concurrently, reward may become less valuable: elections are less likely to be won with (fewer available) jobs-for-votes offers. With control-motivated patronage taking centre stage, we may expect parties to seek more professional appointees. Controlling state institutions is likely to require more professional competence than electoral campaign support. If these expectations are true, we might expect that the more limited the patronage scope, the more patronage would revolve around assuring the democratic responsiveness of bureaucracy through

Table 2. Patronage scope and motivations: Country classification

	Low (0.00–0.29)	Medium (0.3–0.6)	High (0.61–1.00)
Control	Denmark, United Kingdom, Norway	Ghana, South Africa, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Uruguay	Argentina
Control & Reward	Portugal	Iceland, Ireland, Spain, Romania, Bulgaria*	Greece, Paraguay, Dominican Republic

Note: *Control and Control *and* Reward are equally important in Bulgaria.

Table 3. Patronage motivations and appointee qualifications: Country classification

	Professional (≥ 0.7)	Professional & political allegiance (≥ 0.7)	Political allegiance (≥ 0.7)
Control	United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, South Africa, Ghana	Hungary, Czech Republic, Argentina, Germany, Austria	
Control & Reward	Iceland, Italy, Netherlands	Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece	Bulgaria, Romania, Paraguay, Dominican Republic

professionally qualified appointees rather than the clientelist mobilisation of votes through appointments of party members.

This analysis indicates that the expected relations are common, but several exceptions are noteworthy. The first hypothesised association – between patronage scope and motivations – is the most tenuous one. Countries are, as noted, split as to whether control or control *and* reward is the principal patronage motivation. Per our expectation, patronage scopes are negatively associated with ‘control’ ($r = -0.20$) and positively with ‘control and reward’ ($r = 0.45$). Control is the dominant motivation in only one country with high patronage (Argentina); and *not* the dominant motivation in only one country with low patronage (Portugal) (Table 2). A negative association between patronage scope and control-motivated patronage thus exists, yet is not deterministic. This is unsurprising. As in Argentina’s central government, patronage may be extensive where it serves to secure state control in contexts of weak formal control mechanisms and limited incumbent trust towards public employees appointed by predecessors, for instance (Scherlis 2013).

As expected, control is also associated with more professional appointees: professionalism trumps where patronage is principally motivated by control (Table 3). Vice versa, however, professionalism also trumps in three countries (Iceland, Italy and the Netherlands) in which patronage is principally motivated by control *and* reward (Kopecký et al. 2012). While more ‘control *and* reward’ (rather than solely control)

Table 4. Patronage scope and the qualifications of appointees: Country classification

	Low (0.0–0.3)	Medium (0.31–0.60)	High (0.61–1.00)
Professional (≥ 0.7)	Denmark, United Kingdom, Norway, Netherlands	Iceland, Ghana, South Africa, Italy	
Professional & political allegiance (≥ 0.7)	Portugal	Germany, Spain, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland	Greece, Argentina
Political allegiance (≥ 0.7)		Bulgaria, Romania	Paraguay, Dominican Republic

motivated patronage is thus negatively associated with professionalism ($r = -0.49$); and positively associated with political allegiance ($r = 0.45$), this association is, once again, not deterministic.

In accordance with our theoretical expectations, appointees are also less professional ($r = -0.54$) and more politically allegiant ($r = 0.52$) where the scope of patronage is greater. Outliers are less present in this association. Where the scope of patronage is limited, professionalism trumps; where patronage is pervasive, political allegiance takes centre stage (Table 4). Patronage thus prioritises professionalism where it is limited, and political allegiance where it is extensive.

The nature of patronage thus tends to evolve with its scope. Where patronage is extensive, it prioritises political allegiance of appointees and is motivated by control of state institutions *and* reward for political support. In other words, it serves parties as a resource to gain electoral support *and* control the state through the embedment of a network of party political appointees. In contrast, where patronage is limited, it typically revolves around control of state institutions through professional appointees. Outliers exist, however, as exemplified by Argentina and Portugal. While the scope, motivation and focus of appointee qualifications therefore tend to be closely related, the exceptions indicate that the relation between dimensions of patronage remains an empirical question worthy of exploration.

Conclusion

This Research Note has presented a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five regions. The data was collected based on the same methodology and provides a unique opportunity to compare patterns of patronage across countries and regions that are typically studied separately. The exploration of the dataset has shown that party patronage is widespread across all regions including Western Europe. Regional differences are evident. Latin America especially stands out with a higher scope of party patronage. The data further shows that patronage is particularly relevant for central government ministries, which are located closer to the centres of political power. Agencies and other non-ministerial bodies as well as executing institutions such as state-owned enterprises, hospitals, universities and the

police are relatively less exposed to political appointments. This pattern has been shown to be consistent across all five regions covered in the Research Note. There is also considerable evidence that patronage is more common in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy. The middle and lower ranks are mainly subject to political appointments in countries with a high scope of patronage, indicating that patronage creeps down institutional hierarchies rather than upwards.

Our data has further indicated that the control of policy making and implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments. This appears to be especially true for the low patronage cases of Western Europe. By contrast, in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve both as a control and a reward function. Our data hence indicates that the clientelistic understanding of party patronage as an electoral resource remains important. However, it also suggests that it is unusual to find settings in which appointments are exclusively made for the sake of rewarding party affiliates in exchange for political services and support.

Finally, the exploration of the dataset showed consistently that parties prefer to appoint, on average, politically and personally loyal professionals. In other words, it is problematic to assume a simple dichotomy between political and professional appointments, as politicians appear to be interested in both professional competence and political loyalty. However, the extent to which different selection criteria are applied remains an empirical question.

The main purpose of this Research Note has been the presentation of a cross-regional dataset on patterns of party patronage; the first of its kind. Yet the data provides a number of opportunities for further research. First, the cross-regional dataset increases the number of observations at the country level. It further increases the variation in the scope of patronage and for the study of other dimensions of patronage captured by the dataset.

Second, the cross-regional dataset yields new opportunities for the explanation of patronage politics. For instance, a cross-regional perspective allows for a comprehensive assessment of the impact of parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential regimes on party patronage, which is not possible in research that focuses on one region only. Similarly, governance in Latin America, Africa and the European regions is subject to very different forms of international influence that will allow for a better understanding of party patronage.

Third, while cross-regional differences were evident, the exploration of the dataset has confirmed the importance of intra-regional variation in patronage politics. This suggests that determinants well known from the literature such as administrative traditions, the structure of political competition, the type of political parties – to name but a few prominent ones – are indeed essential for the explanation of variation in party patronage.

Finally, the dataset provides new avenues for the within-country analysis of patronage. Indeed, the data points towards important differences across policy areas, types of institutions and organisational hierarchies. Both domestic and international factors are likely to be relevant here. For instance, the globalisation of markets might have put pressure on governments to insulate, at least partially, the management of the economy and public finances from political interference. In the literature on the political economy of development in Latin America, these patterns are commonly discussed under the heading of ‘pockets of effectiveness’ (Leonard 2010; Bersch et al. 2013). By contrast, ‘islands of

excellence' in Central and Eastern Europe have been linked to the EU accession process (Goetz 2001; Meyer-Sahling & Van Stolk 2015). A cross-regional perspective therefore opens new agendas for research as much as it presents an invitation for further research on party patronage around the world.

Notes

1. For a more detailed discussion on the differences between patronage, clientelism and corruption, see Piattoni (2001) and Kopecký et al. (2012).
2. This applies especially to contemporary Argentina and many other presidential systems in Latin America. However, it is recognised that parties have relatively more organisational resources in some presidential systems such as Chile.
3. The data can be obtained from the authors upon request. For Romanian data, see Volintiru (2015).
4. Depending on the territorial structure of the state, the regional government category included the state level, provincial level or regional level of public administration in the countries under study. It did not include the local government level.
5. The full text of the question reads: 'In your opinion, why do political parties actually appoint people to these jobs? Are they interested in rewarding their loyal party activists and members with state jobs or do they want to control these sectors and institutions by having personnel linked to the party appointed in them?'
6. The full text of the question reads: 'Now, we want to ask you a question about the people appointed by political parties to these positions. Would you say that they have gotten their jobs because they are professionally qualified for them, or because of their political link, or because of their personal allegiance, or any other allegiance?'
7. Note that the data does not differentiate between NDACs and executing institutions in the cases of Uruguay, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. The conclusions are not affected by this conflation.
8. Figure 3 only includes countries with data for the eight policy areas included in the figure. Germany, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic are thus excluded.
9. The regional classification is but one of many potential country classifications. For space limitations, others are not explored. Other scholars may use the data to examine other analytically pertinent country classifications, such as waves of democratisation, income or human development.
10. Note, however, that, for our interviewees 'control of state institutions' meant slightly different things. Meanings ranged from control of policy making and implementation to control of political content/media coverage and over possibilities for building clientelistic and corrupt networks in the state. Yet these different interpretations all stress the benefit patronage appointments bring to the appointing agent – the party – as opposed to the appointee, which is captured by the reward motivation.
11. In Africa, control is the dominant motivation. As mentioned previously, this may, however, be an artefact of case selection.

References

- Andrews, M. (2013). *The limits of institutional reform in development: Changing rules for realistic solutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bearfield, D.A. (2009). What is patronage? A critical re-examination. *Public Administration Review* 69: 64–76.
- Bersch, K., Praça, S. & Taylor, M. (2013). State Capacity and Bureaucratic Autonomy within National States: Mapping the Archipelago of Excellence in Brazil. Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Conference, Washington, DC, 29 May–1 June.
- Calvo, E. & Murillo, M.V. (2004). Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 742–757.

- Cruz, C. & Keefer, P. (2015). Political parties, clientelism and bureaucratic reform. *Comparative Political Studies*. doi: 10.1177/0010414015594627
- Dahlberg, S. et al. (2013). *The Quality of Government expert survey, 2008–2011: A report*. Gothenburg: Quality of Government Institute.
- Dahlström, C. & Niklasson, B. (2013). The politics of politicization in Sweden. *Public Administration* 91(4): 891–907.
- Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V. & Teorell, J. (2012). The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy and the institutional deterrents of corruption. *Political Research Quarterly* 65(3): 656–668.
- Dimitrova, A.L. (2002). Enlargement, institution-building and the EU's administrative capacity requirement. *West European Politics* 25(4): 171–190.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. & Roninger, L. (1980). Patron–client relations as a model of structuring social exchange. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22(1): 42–77.
- Evans, P. & Rauch, J.E. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of Weberian state structures on economic growth. *American Sociological Review* 64(5): 748–765.
- Fukuyama, F. (2014). *Political order and political decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the globalization of democracy*. London: Profile Books.
- Gallo, N. & Lewis, D. (2012). The consequences of presidential patronage for federal agency performance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22(2): 219–243.
- Geddes, B. (1994). *Politician's dilemma: Building state capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gingerich, D. (2013). Governance indicators and the level of analysis problem: Empirical findings from South America. *British Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 505–540.
- Goetz, K.H. (2001). Making sense of post-communist central administration: Modernisation, Europeanization or Latinization? *Journal of European Public Policy* 8(6): 1032–1051.
- Grindle, M. (2012). *Jobs for the boys: Patronage and the state in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2007). *Rebuilding Leviathan: Party competition and state exploitation in post-communist democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Healey, J.F. (1999). *Statistics: A tool for social research*. Belmont, CA: Adsworth.
- Jalali, C. & Lisi, M. (2009). Weak societal roots, strong individual patrons? Patronage and party organization in Portugal. *Revista Enfoques* 7(11): 411–470.
- Kemahlioglu, Ö. (2012). *Agents or bosses? Patronage and intra-party politics in Argentina and Turkey*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2014). *Democratic accountability and linkages project: 2008–9 dataset*. Available online at: <https://web.duke.edu/democracy/data.html>
- Kitschelt, H. & Kselman, D.M. (2013). Economic development, democratic experience and political parties: Linkage strategies. *Comparative Political Studies* 46: 1453–1484.
- Kitschelt, H. & Wilkinson, S. (eds) (2007). *Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kopecký, P., Mair, P. & Spirova, M. (eds) (2012). *Party patronage and party government in European democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leonard, D. (2010). Pockets of effective agencies in weak governance states: Where are they likely and why does it matter? *Public Administration and Development* 30: 91–101.
- Lewis, D.E. (2008). *The politics of presidential appointments: Political control and bureaucratic performance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Meyer-Sahling, J.-H. & Jager, K. (2012). Capturing the state: Party patronage in Hungary. In P. Kopecký, P. Mair & M. Spirova (eds), *Party patronage in contemporary European democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meyer-Sahling, J.-H. & Van Stolk, C. (2015) A case of partial convergence: The Europeanization of central government in Central and Eastern Europe. *Public Administration* 93(1): 230–247.
- Müller, W. (2000). Patronage by national governments. In J. Blondel & M. Cotta (eds), *The nature of party government: A comparative European perspective*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Nistotskaya, M. & Cingolani, L. (2015). Bureaucratic structure, regulatory quality and entrepreneurship in a comparative perspective: Cross-sectional and panel data evidence. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*. doi: 10.1093/jopart/muv026
- O'Dwyer, C. (2006). *Runaway state-building: Patronage politics and democratic development*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Page, E.C. & Wright, V. (eds) (1999). *Bureaucratic elites in Western European states*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Painter, M. & Peters, B.G. (eds) (2010). *Administrative traditions: Inheritances and transplants in comparative perspective*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Panebianco, A. (1988). *Political parties: Organization and power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peters, B.G. (1988). *Comparing public bureaucracies: Problems of theory and method*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Peters, B.G. & Pierre, J. (eds) (2004). *Politicization of the civil service in comparative perspective: The quest for control*. London: Routledge.
- Piattoni, S. (ed.) (2001). *Clientelism, interests and democratic representation: The European experience in historical and comparative perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Remmer, K.L. (2007). The political economy of patronage: Expenditure patterns in the Argentine provinces, 1983–2003. *Journal of Politics* 69: 363–377.
- Scherlis, G. (2013). The contours of party patronage in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review* 48: 63–84.
- Scott, J. (1969). Corruption, machine politics and social change. *American Political Science Review* 63(4): 1142–1159.
- Shefter, M. (1994). *Political parties and the state*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sorauf, F. (1959). Patronage and party. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 115–126.
- Stokes, S.C. et al. (2013). *Brokers, voters and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Volintiru, C. (2015). The exploitative function of party patronage: Does it serve the party's interest? *East European Politics* 31(1): 39–55.
- Wilson, J.Q. (1973). *Political organizations*. New York: Basic Books.
- World Bank (2015) *World development indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Address for correspondence: Petr Kopecký, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 (0) 71 527 3602; E-mail: kopecky@fsw.leidenuniv.nl