On inclusive reference anaphora: New perspectives from Hungarian

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1. Problems of inclusive reference anaphora: A bird's eye view

Sentences in which an object overlaps in reference with a c-commanding noun phrase in its local domain (cf. Postal 1974:77–82, Lasnik 1989 for seminal work; for recent discussion, see Safir, forthc.: Chapter 3, and references therein) never involve a reflexive in English — (1a–c) are all ungrammatical. Both Principle A of Chomsky's (1981) Binding Theory (2a) and Condition A of Reinhart and Reuland's (1993) 'reflexivity' approach to binding (3a) straightforwardly guarantee the ill-formedness of (1): the object reflexives are not coindexed with the local subjects, nor are the reflexive-marked predicates (fully) reflexive. The anaphor cases of inclusive reference anaphora would hence seem to be under control.

(1) a *we saw/voted for/elected myself
b. *I saw/voted for/elected ourselves
c. *he saw/voted for/elected ourselves

(2) a. *Principle A*: an anaphor is bound in its local domain
b. *Principle B*: a pronoun is free in its local domain

(3) a. *Condition A*: a reflexive-marked predicate is reflexive
b. *Condition B*: a reflexive predicate is reflexive-marked

When the reflexive in (1) is replaced with a pronoun, as in (4) (where we have suppressed diacritics marking grammaticality), both the theoretical predictions and the empirical facts turn out to be substantially trickier. Discussions in the extant literature report varying judgements on (4a,b), some bringing in additional semantic factors (like the collective/distributive dichotomy; cf. especially Reinhart and Reuland 1993) along the way, others essentially dismissing the entire issue as 'beside the point' and 'contrived' (cf. Chomsky 1981:314 n. 3; also cf. Chomsky 1973).

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(4) a. we saw/voted for/elected me
b. I saw/voted for/elected us
c. he saw/voted for/elected us

What Principle B (2b) would say about the pronoun cases in (4) depends on one's interpretation of 'free'. If BT–B demands that there be no coindexed binder in the pronoun's governing category, all examples in (4) are ruled in; if, on the other hand, BT–B demands that there be no overlap in reference ('intersection of indices' in Lasnik's 1986 terms) between a pronoun and a local potential antecedent, all examples in (4) are ruled out. For (4a), the 'reflexivity' approach to binding à la Reinhart and Reuland (1993), with its distinction between syntactic and semantic predicates, allows one to take a more subtle position, one that distinguishes between collective and distributive readings. On the assumption that 'predicate' in (3) equals 'semantic predicate', (4a) with *vote for* is ungrammatical because the semantic representation of this distributive predication contains a reflexive predicate *x voted for x* (with *x=I/me*) which, in violation of (3b), is not reflexive-marked. The variant of (4a) with *elect*, by contrast, is well-formed since it involves a collective predicate; the semantic representation of this sentence hence does not include a reflexive predicate at all, and Condition B never comes into play. This account of the difference between *vote for* and *elect* in (4a) is potentially interesting, though the judgements that underlie it are not generally shared. On a more general plane, many speakers find the different-person case of inclusive reference anaphora in (4c) better than the same-person cases in (4a,b), a cut which neither the Condition B approach nor the Principle B account would seem equipped to make.

A bird's eye view of several decades of intensive research on binding would have it, then, that the anaphor cases of inclusive reference are essentially under control, but that there is serious disagreement about the treatment of the pronoun cases — both as far as the facts go, and with respect to the theoretical machinery needed to handle them. But this picture seems both too optimistic and too pessimistic, as we will argue.

In this paper, we will present binding facts from Hungarian to show two basic things. First, that languages do not systematically rule out inclusive reference with reflexives — Hungarian allows the counterpart of (1b), seemingly calling the optimistic view with respect to anaphors into question. And second, that more microscopic (agreement) properties of language allow us to substantially tidy up the picture with respect to inclusive pronoun reference — Hungarian accepts the counterpart of (4b) with an out-of-the-ordinary type of object agreement only, a proper understanding of which makes us optimistic about the binding theory's chances of accommodating the inclusive-reference pronoun cases. Along

the way, we will exploit our Hungarian data to make a case against the semantic-predicate based approach to Condition B of Reinhart and Reuland (1993), and to argue for a syntactically complex representation of first person plural pronouns (in terms of a comitative-like structure).

2. A fresh perspective: The case of Hungarian

2.1. Reflexives and inclusive reference

In English, all examples in (1) are impossible. Interestingly, however, Hungarian differentiates between the plural–singular and singular–plural same-person cases in this domain: as seen in (5), the former is bad with a reflexive whereas the latter is perfect (in fact, by far the best way of translating something like English *I saw/represented/elected us* in Hungarian; we turn to translations featuring a pronominal object in section 2.2). The counterpart of English (1c) with a first person plural reflexive object is ungrammatical.

(5) a. *mi magamat {látjuk/képviseljük/választjuk meg}
we myself-ACC see-1PL.DEF/represent-1PL.DEF/elect-1PL.DEF PV
b. én magunkat {látom/képviselem/választom meg}
I ourselves-ACC see-1SG.DEF/represent-1SG.DEF/elect-1SG.DEF PV
c. *ő magunkat {látja/képviseli/választja meg}
(s)he ourselves-ACC see-3SG.DEF/represent-3SG.DEF/elect-3SG.DEF PV

Two things are worth noting in addition. First, the asymmetry in (5a,b) is not specific to reflexives in direct object positions: it rears its head in all reflexive contexts, including the dative examples in (6a,b).[1]

(6) a. *hozunk magamnak sört
bring/fetch-1PL.INDEF myself-DAT beer-ACC
b. hozok magunknak sört
bring/fetch-1SG.INDEF ourselves-DAT beer-ACC
c. hoz magunknak sört
bring/fetch-3SG.INDEF ourselves-DAT beer-ACC

1. A ‘real-life’ example we found, featuring an ‘about’–PP, is *magam sem tudom, mit is gondolnék a helyükben magunkról* ‘I don’t know myself either what I would think about ourselves (i.e., us) in their place’. The fact that (6c) is grammatical (in contrast to (5c)) is presumably due to the fact that in contexts of the type in (6) (unlike in (5), where the reflexive object and the subject are co-arguments) logophoric construal of the anaphor is possible; we leave this aside here.

And secondly, inclusive reference is not in general asymmetric in Hungarian. The examples in (7) are both grammatical; in (7a) the reference of the subject is included in that of the non-subject (cf. (5b), (6b)) while in (7b) it is exactly the other way around. Hence, the facts in (5) and (6) cannot be explained with an appeal to some general 'asymmetry constraint' on Hungarian inclusive reference.

(7) a. az elsősök fogalmazást írtak az iskolásokról
the first-graders essay-ACC write-PAST-3PL.INDEF the pupils-about
b. az iskolások fogalmazást írtak az elsősökről
the pupils essay-ACC write-PAST-3PL.INDEF the first-graders-about

2.2. Pronouns and inclusive reference: The role of agreement

In the domain of object *pronouns*, we find a similar kind of asymmetry in the context of inclusive reference anaphora, but in the opposite direction: (8a) and (8c) are grammatical this time, and (8b) is bad. Given the general complementarity between pronouns and anaphors that the binding theory predicts, this is not much of a surprise.

(8) a. mi engem képviselünk/választunk meg
we me represent/elect-1PL.INDEF PV
b. *én minket/bennünket választok meg
I us/us elect-1SG.INDEF PV
c. ő minket/bennünket választ meg
(s)he us/us elect-3SG.INDEF PV

More interesting, however, is the fact that, although the reflexive (as in (5b)) is the expression of choice in the same-person singular–plural case for all speakers, there are informants who report that for them, the first person plural object pronouns *minket/bennünket* 'us' *can* be used in this context, *provided* that the verb bears *definite* agreement.[2] So for all Hungarians (8b) is ungrammatical; for many, the same holds for (9b), but for a subset of speakers this example, with definite agreement on the finite verb, is grammatical. Using definite verb agreement in plural–singular inclusive reference cases such as (8a) or in different-person inclusive reference contexts like (8c), on the other hand, is completely impossible throughout (cf. (9a,c)).

2. For those speakers who accept (9b) alongside (5b), then, the first person object pronoun and its corresponding reflexive anaphor can be used interchangeably here. This is not to say that, even for those speakers, there are no differences between pronouns and reflexives in the domain of first (and second) person at all. As Anna

(9) a. *mi engem képviseljük/választjuk meg
we me represent/elect-1PL.DEF PV
b. %én minket/bennünket választom meg
I us/us elect-1SG.DEF PV
c. *ő minket/bennünket választja meg
(s)he us/us elect-3SG.DEF PV

Speaker variation 'mellows' when, instead of *minket/bennünket*, either one of two other Hungarian first person plural object pronouns is selected: *mindannyiunkat* and *mindnyájunkat* (both translating as 'us all/all of us'). This time, speakers who reject both (8b) and (9b) outright report less categorical judgements; and significantly, of the two variants of (10), the one with definite agreement is again deemed better than the one with indefinite agreement (confirming the picture emerging from the examples with *minket/bennünket*). Thus the pattern seen to hold for *some* speakers in the context of (8b)/(9b) is reproducible for *all* speakers (in a somewhat less robust yet still interesting way) when *mindannyiunkat* or *mindnyájunkat* is selected. We take it, then, that the facts are systematic — singular–plural same-person pronominal anaphora in inclusive reference contexts triggers *definite* agreement; plural–singular and different-person pronominal inclusive reference anaphora, on the other hand, consistently gives rise to *indefinite* agreement.

(10) a. ??figyelmeztetek mindannyiunkat/mindnyájunkat
warn-1SG.INDEF us all/all of us
b. ?figyelmeztetem mindannyiunkat/mindnyájunkat
warn-1SG.DEF us all/all of us
'I (will) warn us all'

2.3. Notes on Hungarian agreement

Which of these two agreement patterns is the surprising one? The answer to this question turns out to be: the one with *definite* agreement. For in Hungarian, first (and second) person object pronouns normally trigger *indefinite* agreement on the finite verb — that is, despite their semantic definiteness, they pattern with indefinite noun phrases when it comes to the determination of verb agreement.

The examples in (11)–(13) serve to illustrate this. The ones in (11) feature a variety of garden-variety definite noun phrase objects and the verb

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Szabolcsi (personal communication) points out to us, the pronoun will typically identify a group without individuating its members while the anaphor will be used if the speaker knows all the people who make up the group.

shows up with definite inflection as a result.[3] In (12) the object is indefinite and concomitantly the verb bears indefinite agreement morphology. These two pairs set the stage for an inspection of (13), the key examples involving a first person object pronoun. And here we find (to our initial surprise, given that first person object pronouns are unquestionably definite) that indefinite agreement is the only option.[4]

(11) a. *szeret {magát/őt/Jánost/a srácot}
like-3SG.INDEF himself/herself/him/János/the guy
b. szereti {magát/őt/Jánost/a srácot}
like-3SG.DEF himself/herself/him/János/the guy

(12) a. szeret {valakit/egy lányt/mindenkit}
like-3SG.INDEF someone/a girl/everyone
b. *szereti {valakit/egy lányt/mindenkit}
like-3SG.DEF someone/a girl/everyone

(13) a. szeret {engem/minket/bennünket}
like-3SG.INDEF me/us/us
b. *szereti {engem/minket/bennünket}
like-3SG.DEF me/us/us

In Den Dikken (1999), a detailed account of the syntax of Hungarian first and second person object pronouns is developed which explains the *prima facie* astonishing behaviour of the pronouns in (13) in the domain of definiteness agreement. We need not concern ourselves with the details of this analysis here. The thing to bear in mind is, quite simply, that whenever Hungarian first (or second) person pronouns are themselves the *direct object*, they obligatorily trigger *indefinite* agreement on the finite verb. Let us lay this down in the generalisation in (14):

(14) Hungarian first/second person pronouns in *direct object* position trigger *indefinite* agreement

3. On Hungarian *maga* 'him/herself' as a definite noun phrase, see section 3.2, below.

4. Second person object pronouns behave like first person object pronouns when it comes to verb agreement: they likewise trigger indefinite agreement. For *mindnyájunkat* and *mindannyiunkat* 'us all' (cf. (10)) and their second person counterparts *mindnyájatokat* and *mindannyiótokat* 'you all', the agreement judgements are hazier, although there, too, speakers prefer indefinite agreement in a context such as (13) (while they prefer definite agreement in inclusive reference contexts like (10)).

From the perspective of this generalisation, the *we...me* (8a) and *(s)he...us* (8c) cases of inclusive anaphora in Hungarian are entirely uneventful: the object pronoun triggers indefinite agreement, as usual. But singular–plural same-person cases of inclusive anaphora (*I...us*) treat us on two surprises — one concerning speaker variation, and one concerning the form of finite verb agreement. Those speakers for whom (9b) is good do *not* seem to treat *minket/bennünket* as a garden-variety first person object pronoun — or else they would have elected to use indefinite agreement, as in (8b) (which is impossible for all speakers). If the generalisation in (14) holds exceptionlessly, then the conclusion that suggests itself is that in (9b) we are *not* in fact dealing with a first person object pronoun:

(15) if (14) holds exceptionlessly, then (9b) does *not* feature a first person direct object pronoun

This, we believe, is precisely the right conclusion to draw — and by drawing it we can make the Hungarian pronominal inclusive reference facts canvassed in section 2.2 fit in perfectly with Principle B (3b) of the binding theory of Chomsky (1981).

3. The facts explained

3.1. The pronoun cases

The empirical generalisation that now presents itself for the paradigms in (8) and (9), against the background of our conclusion in (15), is (16):

(16) a. the reference of a first person pronoun in direct object position *can be included in* the reference of a same-person subject
b. the reference of a first person pronoun in direct object position *cannot include* the reference of a same-person subject

That is, in order for *I...us* to come out right in Hungarian (with an accusative pronoun instead of a reflexive), the first person *plural* accusative pronoun must *not* be in the regular direct object position (which is reflected in the emergence of definite agreement in (9b)). But if its reference includes that of a local subject of a *different* person (as in (8c)), it *must* be placed in the direct object position. And a first person *singular* accusative pronoun is always construed as the direct object (and hence triggers indefinite agreement systematically), in inclusive and non-inclusive reference cases alike.

This is exactly the result one expects once one realises that first person plural pronouns have a syntactically complex representation in languages like Hungarian — a comitative structure of the type instantiated by examples of the type in (17) (cf. Hetzron 1973, Schwartz 1985).

(17) [(*mi*) a nővéremmel] nem mentünk moziba
we the sister-1SG-COMIT not went-1PL cinema-to
'my sister and I did not go to the cinema'

The thing to note about such examples is that the comitative phrase 'we with my sister' is a constituent and it is introduced by the first person *plural* pronoun *mi* (which may freely be dropped — Hungarian is a *pro*-drop language), despite the fact that *nővér* 'sister' has a first person *singular* possessor. Since it is *mi* that is responsible for first person plural agreement on the finite verb (*mentünk*), the structure of *mi a nővéremmel* 'we with my sister' will be headed by the first person plural pronoun.[5]

But *mi* is not itself the subject of the comitative PP containing *a nővérem* 'my sister' — instead, we suggest, the comitative PP has a first person *singular* null subject (*pro*), and this entire predication is construed with *mi*; cf. Vassilieva (2000) and Larson and Vassilieva (2001) for an interesting argument to the effect that the first person plural pronoun takes the comitative phrase as its complement (but nothing hinges on the complement/adjunct distinction here: for our purposes, the comitative could also be an adjunct). The resulting structure reads roughly as in (18), where *x*, *y* and *z* are non-first person null pronouns.[6]

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5. That the head of the comitative phrase is 'we', not 'I', is clear not only from verb agreement (which some might wish to analyse in semantic rather than syntactic terms) but also from control: on the comitative (or inclusive) interpretation of *hosszas habozás után, elindultunk a vezetőmmel* 'after long hesitation, we (i.e., I) left with my guide', the controller of the adjunct is 'we' ('me and the guide'), *not* 'I' (see Hetzron 1973). While this indicates clearly that comitatives have a structure with a plural pronoun as its head, two questions come up with respect to the null pronoun inside SC linked to the head. First, it is apparently a fact about the representation of 'we' that the subject of the SC in (18) is always pro_{1SG} (i.e., 'I') — the first person singular subpart of the structure of 'we' apparently cannot be represented in the complement of the comitative P (with any one of *x*, *y*, *z* occupying the subject position). We suspect (though more careful consideration is needed) that this restriction is rooted in the content-licensing requirement on this *pro*: it must be content-licensed, for person, by the head of the complex noun phrase, and must therefore be sufficiently local to its content-licenser. Secondly, the subject of the SC in the structure in (18) cannot be a lexical pronoun: as Hetzron (1973) points out, **én a nővéremmel nem mentünk moziba* 'I the sister-my-with not went-1PL cinema-to' is ungrammatical, even though, in substandard Hungarian, ?*a férfi a vezetőjével elindultak* 'the man the guide-his-with off-left-3PL', with a full DP instead of *pro*, is an acceptable comitative (on third person comitatives, see also Camacho 2000). We cannot address the roots of this restriction here.

6. The representation in (18) is not unlike Rooryck's 1998 structure of *second* person plural pronouns: [PRO [WITH *pro*]]. Rooryck's structure of *first* person plural pronouns is more complex. Rooryck shows that in the languages that he

(18) [$_{NP}$ 'we'/'us' [$_{SC}$ *pro*$_{1SG}$ [$_{PP}$ COMIT [*x* (& *y* (& *z* ...))]]]]

We propose (18) as the structure of first person plural pronouns in languages like Hungarian — an abstract comitative structure, overtly reflected by constructions of the type in (17). Given this representation of first person plural pronouns, three different patterns of inclusive reference possibilities present themselves, schematically presented in (19):

(19) a. [$_{NP}$ 'we' [$_{SC}$ *pro*$_i$ [$_{PP}$ COMIT [x_j (& y_k (& z_l ...))]]]]$_m$
see/represent/elect *me*$_i$

b. **I*$_i$ see/represent/elect [$_{NP}$ 'us' [$_{SC}$ *pro*$_i$ [$_{PP}$ COMIT [x_j (& y_k (& z_l ...))]]]]$_m$

c. *he*$_{j/k/l}$ sees/represents/elects [$_{NP}$ 'us' [$_{SC}$ *pro*$_i$ [$_{PP}$ COMIT [x_j (& y_k (& z_l ...))]]]]$_m$

In (19a), *pro*$_i$ does not c-command *me*$_i$; hence Principle B will never be violated in this kind of context — binding is coindexation with a c-commanding antecedent; since c-command between *pro*$_i$ and *me*$_i$ fails in (19a), no binding will ever ensue, Principle B is respected, and (8a) is ruled in. No binding problems are expected in (19c), the representation of (8c), either. For even though *he* c-commands NP, the pronouns *x, y, z* are perfectly free to be bound by a c-commanding SC–external noun phrase: the governing category for *x, y, z* in (18) is the SC.

Things are different in (19b), which represents (8b). Here, Principle B is violated. This time *I*$_i$ not only c-commands *pro*$_i$, but it also finds itself in *pro*'s governing category. For the governing category for *pro*$_i$ in (19b) is the first category outside NP that has a subject (SC lacks a governor for *pro*; and NP is not an accessible SUBJECT for *pro* since it dominates *pro* (cf. *[*his*$_i$ *cook*]$_i$). So with the complex pronominal NP sitting in the regular object position, *pro*$_i$ will be bound in its governing category if the subject of the clause is a first person singular pronoun. This is why (19b)/(8b) is ill-formed.

To avoid a clash with Principle B in (19b), the complex pronominal NP must not itself be the direct object of the verb. Two options present themselves, both featuring an abstract object noun phrase with a null head (annotated here as 'Ø', arguably a null demonstrative — see also fn. 8, below). The pronominal NP in (18) could either be *embedded* in the direct object,

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discusses (French, Dutch) there are non-trivial differences between first and second person plural pronouns when it comes to inclusive reference anaphora. As far as the Hungarian agreement facts canvassed in this paper are concerned, no systematic differences seem to assert themselves, however: the paradigms in (8) and (9) carry over into the realm of the second person.

serving as the predicate of the direct object's null head, as in (20a) — here the DP–embedded SC is the governing category for the 1SG *pro* inside 'us' in (18), and within this SC, *pro* can be free as desired; or it could be in a non-argument position, loosely construed with the null element in the direct object position, as in (20b).

(20) a. *v*/AgrO ... [$_{VP}$ V [$_{DP}$ D$_{[def]}$ [$_{SC}$ Ø$_i$ [$_{NP}$ 'us' (=(18))]$_i$]]]
b. *v*/AgrO ... [$_{VP}$ V [$_{DP}$ D$_{[def]}$ [$_{NP}$ Ø]$_i$] (...)] [$_{NP}$ 'us' (=(18))]$_i$

In (20a), the first person plural pronoun functions as the predicate of a DP–embedded small clause whose subject is a null demonstrative. Thus, (20a) can essentially be paraphrased as 'those who are us' — with the whole NP in (18) serving as a predicate of a null noun phrase, much like in free relatives. The structure in (20b) is basically the 'relative clause extraposition' counterpart of (20a) (on a base-generation approach to 'extraposition'; cf. e.g. Rochemont and Culicover 1990), akin to 'list/ colon' constructions ('these/the following: me with *x*, *y*, *z*'; cf. Higgins 1979, Koster 1995): the NP in (18) is rather more loosely construed with the null noun phrase here than it is in (20a); it is outside the confines of the direct object altogether.[7]

The choice between the two representations in (20) is immaterial as far as we are concerned. The key point for us is that, given the standard binding theory of Chomsky (1981), we correctly force the first person plural pronoun out of the regular direct object position — it can be embedded inside the direct object as in (20a) or it can be loosely linked to the direct object position as in (20b); but in any event it *cannot* be the direct object all by itself: (19b) is ruled out by Principle B.[8] Whichever of the two structures

7. For some speakers (9b) is better with *bennünket* than with *minket* — though in cases not involving inclusive reference anaphora they actually have a preference for *minket* over *bennünket*. This shift of preference may be a consequence of the fact that, in the representation of (9b), the first person plural pronoun is not itself the direct object but rather a 'modifier' thereof: it may be that, for some speakers, it is easier to use *bennünket* (which is formally a PP) that way than *minket* (a nominal expression); PPs are well known to be more 'versatile' than NP/DPs.

8. In French, the first person plural object pronoun in *I...us* cases of pronominal inclusive reference anaphora *does* have a crucial direct object property: it triggers agreement on a past participle (cf. (i), below; Johan Rooryck, p.c.). If French structurally represents *I...us* inclusive reference anaphora the same way as Hungarian, our analysis will take these gender and number (but crucially *not* person or definiteness) agreement facts to be the result of an agreement relationship between the participle and the *null demonstrative* heading the direct object (cf. (20)); the null demonstrative in turn agrees in number and gender (but not person, definiteness) with the pronominal noun phrase that it is construed with.

in (20) we end up choosing (and remember that they do not necessarily exclude one another: (20b) may well be the 'extraposition' counterpart of (20a)), the fact that the 'real' direct object is a null *definite* correctly rules out indefinite agreement in (8b). The standard Principle B in (3b) thus manages to make the desired distinction between (8b) and (9b), given a representation of first person plural pronouns as in (18).

We have already seen that Principle B also captures the grammaticality of (8a,c): the representations in (19a) and (19c), representing these indefinite agreement examples, are well-formed. To rule out *definite* agreement in these contexts (as in (9a) and (9c)), what now remains to be said is that structures of the type in (20) will be resorted to only if there is no other choice. Recourse to structural economy will do the job here — structures like (20) are more complex than the ones in (19) in that they contain a null-headed noun phrase *in addition to* the pronominal constituent in (18); by general economy guidelines, (20) will hence be employed only if using the structurally simpler (19) delivers an ill-formed output. With this much said, we have all the Hungarian facts in (8) and (9) under control. Principle B of the standard binding theory, in conjunction with the structure of first person plural pronouns in (18), leads us there straightforwardly.

By contrast, Reinhart and Reuland's (1993) 'reflexivity' approach cannot in any straigthtforward way take advantage of the structure in (18) to account for Hungarian (8) and (9): we are obviously not dealing with *syntactically* reflexive predicates; but when we invoke *semantic* predicates, (18) is unlikely to be of assistance. The bottom line is that we still fail to account for the *asymmetry* between the a- and b-examples, and presumably also for the contrast between the b- and c-sentences. We do not mean to suggest that the reflexivity approach could not possibly capture (8) and (9); it seems hard to imagine an account of them, though.

So we have seen in this section that pronominal inclusive reference anaphora of the Hungarian type is perfectly compatible with the approach to pronoun binding restrictions taken in Chomsky (1981) (with no need for sophisticated definitions of 'free' à la Lasnik 1986, or any other special amendations), given a syntactically complex representation of first person plural pronouns along the lines sketched out in (18).[9]

(i) je nous ai conduites à la gare
I us have driven-F.PL to the station
'I drove us to the station'

9. Recall that not all speakers of Hungarian are equally happy with (9b). In this context it may be relevant to note that Hungarian exhibits speaker/dialect variation in a domain that, on the approach to (9b) taken here, may in fact turn out to be closely related. While many Hungarians reject (ia) and (iia) (using a reflexive instead, as seen in (ib) and (iib)), there are speakers for whom the a–examples are

3.2. The anaphor cases

The downside of the Hungarian data canvassed in the foregoing is that they seem to complicate the picture of anaphor binding. For recall that, unlike English, Hungarian allows (in fact, prefers) a reflexive anaphor in the object position of inclusive reference anaphora constructions corresponding to English *I...us* (cf. (5b)).

The resulting picture is one of full complementary distribution between pronouns and anaphors in the paradigms in (5) and (8), which is good news. But what is less pleasant about (5b) is that it does not seem to fit in with either Principle A in (3a) or Condition A in (4a) — the reflexive is not bound, and the predicate that it reflexive-marks is not in fact (fully) reflexive.

We believe, though, that regardless of what the optimal analysis of Hungarian reflexive facts should turn out to be (and we will not have space here to address this question in any detail), it is unlikely that the binding theory will need to make special amends for Hungarian (5b) — in all likelihood, its grammaticality should be made to fall out from special properties of the reflexives of Hungarian rather than from some complication of the binding condition on anaphors. In particular, the morphological properties of the Hungarian reflexive seem crucial here — *mag-unk-at* is the concatenation of the noun root *mag* (whose lexical meaning is 'core/kernel'), a possessive inflectional suffix *-unk* (for first person plural) and the accusative marker; the same is true of the other Hungarian reflexives. In essence, then, *magunkat* is the accusative form of 'our core'. If the possessive identity of Hungarian reflexives is in fact syntactically real, in the sense that the syntactic structure of Hungarian reflexives is that of a possessed noun phrase, then (5b) is syntactically parallel to something like 'I represent/vote for our friend', which of course straightforwardly supports an inclusive reference interpretation.

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perfect. What these examples share with the sentence in (9b), if the latter is analysed as suggested in the main text (cf. (20)), is that the pronoun finds itself (embedded in) an adjunct/non-argument position. Exactly how to integrate (9b) and (ia)/(iia) into a comprehensive theory is an issue we cannot go into here.

(i) a. %vigyél *pro* veled esernyőt!
take-2SG.INDEF with-2SG umbrella-ACC
b. vigyél magaddal esernyőt!
take-2SG.INDEF yourself-with umbrella-ACC

(ii) a. %látok *pro* mellettem egy kígyót
see-1SG.INDEF beside-1SG a snake-ACC
b. látok magam mellett egy kígyót
see-1SG.INDEF myself beside a snake-ACC

If this is on the right track, all of the inclusive reference anaphora facts of Hungarian are accommodated by the standard Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981) without any difficulty. In particular, what we have found is that Principle B makes precisely the desired cut in the Hungarian pronoun cases, given an independently motivated analysis of first (and second) person plural pronouns in terms of a comitative structure of the type in (18).

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