Hoke Robinson, Memphis

Editor's Introduction.................................................................i

SECTION 1
OPENING SESSION

Allen Wood, Cornell

Kant's Project for Perpetual Peace..............................................3

Jules Vuillemin, Collège de France

On Perpetual Peace, and On Hope as Duty..................................19

SECTION 2
KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

SECTION 2A
FREEDOM AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Henry Allison, California-San Diego

of Perpetual Peace.........................................................................37

Paul Guyer, Pennsylvania

Nature, Morality and the Possibility of Peace.................................51

Bernd Ludwig, München

Moralische Politiker und Teuflische Bürger: Korreferat zu den
Vorträgen von Henry Allison und Paul Guyer..............................71
SECTION 2B
RELIGION AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Pauline Kleingeld, Saint Louis
*What do the Virtuous Hope For?*
*Re-reading Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good* ........................................... 91

Reiner Wimmer, Tübingen
*Kants philosophischer Entwurf Zum ewigen Frieden und die Religion* ...... 113

SECTION 2C
HISTORY AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Rudolf A. Makkreel, Emory
*Differentiating Dogmatic, Regulative, and Reflective Approaches to History* ........................................... 123

Jan Joerden, Frankfurt (Oder)
*From Anarchy to Republic: Kant’s History of State Constitutions* ......................... 139

Volker Gerhardt, Berlin
*Eine Theorie der Politik: Zu Kant’s Entwurf “Zum Ewigen Frieden”* ...... 157

SECTION 2D
LAW AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Sharon Byrd, Augsburg
*The State as a “Moral Person”* ................................................................. 171

Ernest J. Weinrib, Toronto
*Publicness and Private Law* ................................................................. 191

—*Comment: Norman Gillespie, New York*
*Publicness and the Fundamental Precepts of Tort Law* ..................................... 203

Joachim Hruschka, Erlangen
*Co-subjectivity, the Right to Freedom and Perpetual Peace* ......................... 215
SECTION 2E
GOVERNMENT AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Patrick Riley, Wisconsin/Harvard
Politics Homage to Morality:
Kant's Toward Eternal Peace after 200 years.................................231

Pierre Laberge, Ottawa
L’application du principe “Exeundum e statu naturali”
aux relations interétatiques.........................................................243

SECTION 2F
SOCIETY AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Ludwig Siep, Münster
Kant and Hegel on Peace and International Law..............................259

Georg Geismann, München/Firenze
On the Philosophically Unique Realism of Kant’s
Doctrine of Eternal Peace..........................................................273

SECTION 2G
MORALITY AND PERPETUAL PEACE

Leonid Kalinnikov, Kaliningrad
The Categorical Imperative of Law and International Law...................293

Allen Wood, Cornell
Humanity as End in Itself..............................................................301

SECTION 2H
THE POLITICS OF PEACE

Reinhard Brandt, Marburg
Zu Kants politischer Philosophie...................................................323

—Concluding Discussion—

Sharon Byrd, Augsburg
Perpetual Peace: A 20th Century Project........................................343
VOLUME I.2

SECTION 3
KANTIAN THEMES

SECTION 3A
PRE-HISTORY OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Klaus Erich Kaehler, Köln
Die prästabilisierte Harmonie nach der transzendentalen Wende.................363

Manfred Kuehn, Purdue
The Moral Dimension of Kant's Inaugural Dissertation:
A New Perspective on the "Great Light of 1769?"...........................................373

Ludger Honnefelder, Bonn
Die "Transzendentalphilosophie der Alten": Zur mittelalterlichen
Vorgeschichte von Kants Begriff der Transzendentalphilosophie...............393

SECTION 3B
SPACE AND TIME

James Van Cleve, Brown
The Ideality of Time.........................................................................................411

William L. Harper, Western Ontario
Kant, Riemann, and Reichenbach on Space and Geometry.........................423

Jill Vance Buroker, San Bernardino
Kant and the Private Language Argument.....................................................455

SECTION 3C
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION, FIRST CRITIQUE

Manfred Baum, Wuppertal
Über die Kategoriiendeduktion in der
1. Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft..................................................467

Richard Aquila, Tennessee
Transcendental Unity as a Quasi-Object in the First Critique.....................483
SECTION 3D
DIALECTIC AND METHODOLOGY, FIRST CRITIQUE

Susan Neiman, Yale
Understanding the Unconditioned..........................................................505

Béatrice Longuenesse, Princeton
The Transcendental Ideal and the Unity of the Critical System.................521

Mario Caimi, Buenos Aires
On a Non-Regulative Function of the Ideal of Pure Reason........................539

SECTION 3E
KANT AND LOGIC

Vladimir Bryushinkin, Kaliningrad
The Interaction of Formal and Transcendental Logic................................553

Thomas M. Seebohm, Mainz
Some Difficulties in Kant's Conception of Formal Logic.........................567

Michael Young, Kansas
Kant's Ill-Conceived "Clue".................................................................583

SECTION 3F
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Michael Friedman, Indiana
Matter and Material Substance in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature:
The Problem of Infinite Divisibility......................................................595

Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., Montana State
The Continuity of Matter........................................................................611

SECTION 3G
PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

Carl Posy, Duke
Unity, Identity, Infinity: Leibnizian Themes in Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics.................................................................621
SECTION 3H
KANT’S PSYCHOLOGY

Patricia Kitcher, California-San Diego
Kant on Some Functions of Self-Consciousness

Dieter Sturma, Lüneburg
Self-Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind:
A Kantian Reconsideration

Karl Ameriks, Notre Dame
Kant and Mind

SECTION 3I
KANTIAN ETHICS

Marcia Baron, Illinois/Urbana-Champaign
Sympathy and Coldness: Kant on the Stoic and the Sage

—Comment: Nancy Sherman, Georgetown
Kant on Sentimentalism and Stoic Apathy

Roger J. Sullivan, South Carolina
Kant Confronts Machiavelli: A Pedagogy for a
Contemporary Course in Moral Theories

—Comment: Walter E. Schaller, Texas Tech
Comments on “Kant Confronts Machiavelli”

John E. Atwell, Temple (read by Aeon Skoble, Central Arkansas)
Kant and the Duty to Promote Others’ Happiness

—Comment: Stephen Engstrom, Pittsburgh
Happiness and Beneficience

SECTION 3J
THE PEACE ESSAY: EAST EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Rado Riha, Ljubljana
Zur Möglichkeit einer moralischen Politik heute
SECTION 3K
AESTHETICS

Claudio La Rocca, Pisa

Ästhetische Erfahrung und ästhetisches Bewußtsein:
Das Lustgefühl in Kants Ästhetik .................................................. 757

—Comment: Maria Filomena Molder, Lisbon
Comments on Professor Claudio la Rocca .......................................... 771

Jane Kneller, Colorado State

The Interests of Disinterest ................................................................. 777

—Comment: G. Felicitas Munzel, Notre Dame
The Privileged Status of Interest in Nature’s Beautiful Forms: A Response to Jane Kneller ............................................. 787

Christel Fricke, Heidelberg

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly ......................................................... 793

—Comment: Salim Kemal, Scotland
Feeling and Judgment: Ethics and Aesthetics ...................................... 803

SECTION 3L
TELEOLOGY

Bernd Dörlinger, Mainz

The Underlying Teleology of the First Critique ................................ 813

Rudolf Langthaler, Linz

Zu Kants Idee der ’Praktischen Teleologie’ ....................................... 827

Ralf Meerbote, Rochester

Function and Purpose in Kant’s Theory of Knowledge ......................... 845
VOLUME I.3

SECTION 3M
KANT’S OPUS POSTUMUM

François Marty, Paris

La philosophie transcendantale, au terme de l’Opus postumum.................865

Burkhard Tuschling, Marburg

Transcendental Idealism in Leibniz and Kant: The Paradigm, Problems, and the Dialectic of the I as the First Principle of Philosophy?.................................881

SECTION 3N
THE KANTIANS

Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Catholic University

Kant and Jacobi.........................................................907

Günter Zöller, Iowa

Changing the Appearances: Fichte’s Transcendental Theory of Practical Self-Determination..........................................................929

Daniel Breazeale, Kentucky

“More than a Pious Wish”: Fichte on Kant on Perpetual Peace.............943

SECTION 3O
KANT AND HEGEL

Sally Sedgwick, Dartmouth

Hegel’s Critique of Kant on Matter and the Forces.................................963

—Comment: David S. Stern, Toledo

Kant and Hegel on the Logic of Being-for-Self.................................973

Robert B. Pippin, Chicago

Avoiding German Idealism:
Kant and the Reflective Judgment Problem...........................................977

—Comment: Frederick Neuhouser, Harvard

Response to Robert Pippin......................................................999
Rolf-Peter Horstmann, München
What’s Wrong with Kant’s Categories, Professor Hegel? 1005

—Comment: Stephen Houlgate, Warwick
Response to Professor Horstmann 1017

SECTION 3P
KANT AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Ernst Wolfgang Orth, Trier
Husserl’s Phenomenology as Realization of Kantian Philosophy? 1027

Gian-Carlo Rota, MIT
Kant’s Synthesis A Priori and Husserl’s Phenomenology of Fulfillment 1037

SECTION 3Q
KANT AND CRITICAL THEORY

Thomas M. McCarthy, Northwestern
Kant’s Enlightenment Project Reconsidered 1049

James Bohman, Saint Louis
The Public Spheres of the World Citizen 1065

SECTION 3R
CONTEMPORARY READINGS, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

Dennis J. Schmidt, Villanova
Lyrical and Ethical Subjects 1083

John Sallis, Penn State
Mixed Arts 1093

John Llewellyn, Edinburgh
Arendt’s Judgement 1105
SECTION 3S
KANT RESEARCH TODAY

Graham Bird, Manchester
Tradition and Revolution in Kant.................................................................1119

Fumiyasu Ishikawa, Sendai, Japan
Kants Erwerbung der Systematologie der Vernunftkritik..............................1137

SECTION 4
SPECIAL SESSIONS

SECTION 4A
THE RAWLS LEGACY

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Chapel Hill
Rawls’ Legacy: An Ideal and a Project..........................................................1157

Christine M. Korsgaard, Harvard
Rawls and Kant: On the Primacy of the Practical..........................................1165

Susan Neiman, Yale
Symposium: The Rawls Legacy......................................................................1175

Andrews Reath, California-Riverside
Understanding Kantian Autonomy.................................................................1185

John Rawls, Harvard
Remarks........................................................................................................1193

SECTION 4B
KANT RECEPTION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Leonid Kalinnikov, Kaliningrad
Kant Research in Kaliningrad and its Place in Russian Kant Research............1201

Karol Bal, Wrocław
Kant in Poland...............................................................................................1207
Rado Riha, Ljubljana
Zur Kantrezeption im ehemaligen Jugoslawien und im heutigen Slowenien.................................................................1213

Alexandru Boboc, Bukarest (read by Rodica Croitoru, Bukarest)
Zur Kantrezeption in Rumänien.................................................................1221

SECTION 4C
KANT RECEPTION IN ASIA

Shin-ichi Yuasa, Kyoto
A Historical View of the Japanese Response to Kant’s Philosophy........1227

Hua Terence Tai, Taipei
Kant and Contemporary Neo-Confucians............................................1245

Zhang Shi-Ying, Peking
Kant and Chinese Philosophy...............................................................1251

Steven Palmquist, Hong Kong
Kant-Studies in the Hong Kong Philosophical Context.........................1257

Md. Golam Dastagir, Bangladesh
Kant Reception in Bangladesh: Perspective Humanism..........................1273

Arindam Chakrabarti, Delhi
Kant in India.............................................................................1281

Zeynep Direk, Memphis
The Reception of Kant in Turkey........................................................1287

SECTION 4D
KANT DISSEMINATION

Margit Ruffing, Mainz
Die Kant-Forschungsstelle in Mainz und ihre Projekte (insbesondere das der Internationalen Kant-Bibliographie)..............1297

Werner Stark, Marburg
Winfried Lenders, Bonn

Manfred Kuehn, Purdue
*The Bibliography of the North American Kant Society* ...................... 1323

Paul Guyer, Pennsylvania

Burkhard Tuschling, Marburg
*The Project of the German-Russian Edition of Kant’s Works* ............... 1329

SECTION 5
COLLOQUIA COMMENTARIES
(The colloquium papers to which the comments refer are printed in Vol. II.1 under the headings below.)

SECTION 5A
DISCUSSIONS—KANT’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY

Ted Uehling, Minnesota-Morris
*Comments on Ken Rogerson’s “Beauty Without Concepts”* .................. 1337

Jay Rosenberg, Chapel Hill
*Comments on Professor Markku Leppäkoski, “The Transcendental Schemata”* ................................................................. 1341

Olav Wiegand, Mainz
*Necessity: Its Constitutive and Regulative Aspects
—Comments on Hansgeorg Hoppe* ................................................... 1347

Hans Seigfried, Loyola/Chicago
*Professor Gloy and Kant’s Critical Experiments* ................................. 1355

Frank Kirkland, Hunter/CUNY
*Comments on Richard McDonough’s, “Kant’s Argument Against the Possibility of Cognitive Science”* ..................... 1361
SECTION 5B
DISCUSSIONS—KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

M.H. McCarthy, Brockville, Ontario
   Comments on George di Giovanni’s
   “The Morally Responsible Individual”.................................1369

Natalie Brender, Johns Hopkins
   Commentary on Larry Krasnoff:
   “Formal Liberalism and the Justice of Publicity”...................1375

Sidney Axinn, Temple
   Comments on Harry van der Linden, “Kant, the Duty to Promote
   International Peace, and Political Intervention”.............................1381

Howard Williams, Wales
   Judgements on War: A Response
   —Comments on Georg Cavallar, “Kants Urteilen über den Krieg”......1385

VOLUME II.1
SECTION 1
DISCUSSIONS: KANT’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY

Ken Rogerson, Florida International
   Beauty Without Concepts..................................................3

Markku Leppäkoski, Stockholm
   The Transcendental Schemata...........................................13

Hansgeorg Hoppe, Saarbrücken
   Why Kant has Problems with Empirical Laws..........................21

Karen Gloy, Lucerne
   Die Bedeutung des Experiments für die Kantische Philosophie........29

Richard McDonough, Tulsa
   Kant’s Argument against the Possibility of Cognitive Science........37
SECTION 2
DISCUSSIONS: KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

George Di Giovanni, Montreal
The Morally Responsible Individual..................................................49

Larry Krasnoff, Virginia Tech
Formal Liberalism and the Justice of Publicity..................................61

Harry Van der Linden, Indianapolis
Kant, the Duty to Promote International Peace, and Political Intervention..........................71

Georg Cavallar, Vienna
Kants Urteilen über den Krieg..........................................................81

SECTION 3
KANT AND HIS PREDECESSORS

Anselm Model, Freiburg
Sprache und Symbol. Aspekte der Leibniz-Rezeption Immanuel Kants..................................................93

Daniel Leserre, Buenos Aires
Language and Method in the Preisschrift of 1764...............................101

Myron Sloboda, Toronto
Missing the Blue Schema: A Critique of Hume’s Theory of Physical Series Formation..........................109

Alfredo Ferrarin, Pisa
Kant’s Productive Imagination in its Historical Context........................119

Gordon Treash, Sackville, Can.
Kant and the Moral Sense: 1765......................................................125

Katsutoshi Kawamura, Kyoto
Bemerkungen zur Vorgeschichte der Freiheitsantinomie Kants...........133
SECTION 4
THE FIRST CRITIQUE:
TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

Jan Bransen, Utrecht
Contemporary Anthropocentrism, Salomon Maimon, and the Problem of Experience.................................................................145

D. L. C. Maclachlan, Kingston
The Thing in Itself Appears in a Meta-language..............................................155

Isabel Cabrera, U. Nat. Aut. de México
Kant's Transcendental Arguments.................................................................163

William Blattner, Georgetown
The Non-Synthetic Unity of the Forms of Intuition in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.................................................................169

Frederick Van de Pitte, Edmonton
Kant's Problems with Space and Time...........................................................179

Margaret Morrison, Toronto
Space, Time and Reciprocity........................................................................187

SECTION 5
THE FIRST CRITIQUE:
ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

Predrag Cicovacki, Worcester MA
Kant on the Nature of Truth........................................................................199

Marco Frangiotti, London
The Kantian 'I think', the Cartesian Soul and the Humean Mind........................207

Quanhua Liu, Duke
The Problem of Self-Intuition and Kant's Solution........................................217

Andrew Carpenter, El Cerrito CA
Kant's (Problematic) Account of Empirical Concepts....................................227
SECTION 6
THE FIRST CRITIQUE:
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

Claude Piché, Montreal
Self-Referentiality in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy.................................259

Darrell Johnson, Carbondale
Kant's Metaphysical Deduction...........................................................................269

Wing-Chun Wong, Towson State MD
A Step Toward a Semantic Interpretation of the Deduction of the Categories..................277

Bernard Freydberg, Slippery Rock PA
Concerning 'Syntheses of Understanding' in the B Deduction.............................287

Johnson, Carbondale
Kant's Two-Step B Deduction.............................................................................295

Ted Kinnaman, Konstanz
Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Ideas of Pure Reason............................303

SECTION 7
THE FIRST CRITIQUE:
PRINCIPLES AND DIALECTIC

Andrew Brook, Carleton Univ
Realism in the Refutation of Idealism................................................................313

Charles Nussbaum, Arlington TX
Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics in Kant's Schematism.....................................321
Georg Mohr, Münster
*Wahrnehmungsurteile und Schematismus* ................................................. 331

Mark Wollman, Leuven
*The Development of Kant's Notion of the 'Sum Total of All Possibilities' and its Application to Science* ......................... 341

Wolfgang Malzkorn, Dormagen BRD
*Die Seele als Pseudogegenstand metaphysischer Erkenntnis* ......................... 349

Kenneth Westphal, New Hampshire
*Kant's Critique of Determinism in Empirical Psychology* .............................. 357

SECTION 8
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Andrew Ward, York UK
*What is the Relationship between Kant's Defense of Natural Science and his Attack on Hume's Sceptism about Causation?* ........................................ 373

Eric Watkins, Notre Dame
*Is a Transcendental Deduction Necessary for the Metaphysical Foundations?* .................................................. 381

Renate Wahsner, Berlin
*Das notwendige Dritte* ................................................................. 389

Carsten Held, Freiburg
*Bohr and Kantian Idealism* ................................................................. 397

Wing-Chun Wong, Towson State
*Kant's Conception of Ether as a Field in the Opus postumum* ......................... 405

Kenneth Westphal, New Hampshire
*Does Physics Have a 'Metaphysical Foundation'? Kant's Proof of the Law of Inertia* .................................................. 413
SECTION 9
KANT ON TELEOLOGY

Werner Euler, Marburg
Zur Problematik des Verhältnisses von äußerer und innerer Zweckmäßigkei in Kants Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft.............427

Irmgard Scherer, Baltimore
Kant's Eschatology in Zum ewigen Frieden: The Concept of Purposiveness to Guarantee Perpetual Peace..............437

Kevin Thompson, Florida Atlantic
The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment and the Concept of an Intuitive Intellect: Transformation and Conflict.................445

Hannah Ginsborg, Berkeley
Purposiveness and Normativity........................................453

VOLUME II.2

SECTION 10
KANTIAN AESTHETICS

Piero Giordanetti, Milan
Kant und Winckelmann: Beobachtungen zu einer Quelle der Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft........................................463

Birgit Recki, Münster
'Ideal der Schönheit' und Primat der Natur...........................473

Beate Bradl, Heidelberg
'Erkenntnis überhaupt' in empirischen Erkenntnisurteilen und reinen Geschmacksurteilen: Überlegungen zu §21 der Kritik der Urteilskraft.....481

Patricia Matthews, Florida State
Kant on Taste and Cognition..............................................489

Theodore Gracyk, Moorhead State
Art, Nature and Purposiveness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory................499
Gene Fendt, Nebraska-Kearney
Sublimity and Human Works: Kant on Tragedy and War..........................509

SECTION 11
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Heiner Klemme, Marburg
Beobachtungen zur Kantischen Vermittlung von
Theorie und Praxis in der praktischen Philosophie..............................521

Marcus Willaschek, Münster
Was sind praktische Gesetze?...............................................................533

Toshiro Terada, Kyoto
'The Universal Principle of Right' as the Supreme
Principle of Kant's Practical Philosophy..............................................541

Jennifer Uleman, Pennsylvania
Kant on the Right to Property and the Value of External Freedom........549

David James, Old Dominion
Kant on Ideal Friendship in the Doctrine of Virtue..............................557

Louise Marcil, Montreal
Possessio noumenon et réciprocité: Kant et la femme
dans la Métaphysique des Moeurs....................................................567

SECTION 12
KANT ON MORALITY

Frederick Rauscher, Villanova
Kant's Conflation of Pure Practical Reason and Will..........................579

Richard McCarty, East Carolina
Moral Weakness and Self-Deception..................................................587

Charles Kielkopf, Ohio State
Saving Freedom with Non-reductive Eliminative Materialism.................595
Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Bonn
*Obligation and Prohibition: The Only Possible Outcomes of a Moral Decision Following Kant's Categorical Imperative* ..................... 605

Darrell Johnson, Carbondale
*Analytic and Synthetic Method and the Structure of Kant's Grounding* ................................................................. 613

Franz Nauen, Haifa

SECTION 13
KANT ON RELIGION

Jose Miguel Odero, Pamplona
*Methodological Considerations for the Study of the Kantian Philosophy of Religion* .................................................. 633

Michelle Grier, San Diego
*Kant's Rejection of Rational Theology* ................................................... 641

Michael Gass, Wooster OH
*Kant on Moral Alienation in Religion* ................................................... 651

Victoria Wike, Loyola-Chicago
*Another Look at Kant's Arguments for Immortality* ......................... 661

Rolf George, Waterloo, Ont.
*Immortality* ................................................................................. 669

Philip Rossi, Marquette
*The Social Authority of Reason: The 'True Church' as the Locus for Moral Progress* ................................................. 679

SECTION 14
KANT ON HUMANITY AND HISTORY

Sharon Anderson-Gold, Rensselaer
*A Common Vocation: Humanity as a Moral Species* .............................. 689
Sarah Holtman, Washington DC  
*Kant's Formula of Humanity and the Pursuit of Subjective Ends* ............... 697

Alfred Nordmann, South Carolina  
*Community, Immortality, Enlightenment: Kant's Scholarly Republic* ............. 705

Bruce Merrill, Cambridge NY  
*Kant's Importation of Historical Materialism* .................................................. 713

John Moore, Emory  
*Reflection and Orientation in Kant* ................................................................. 721

William Clohesy, Northern Iowa  
*A Constitution for a Race of Devils* ................................................................. 733

SECTION 15  
POLITICAL THEORY

Liliana Oprea, Bucharest  
*Sur la relation entre l'antinomie politique et l'antinomie pratique kantienne* ................................................................. 745

Kevin Dodson, Beaumont, Tex.  
*Kant's Idea of the Social Contract* ................................................................. 753

Dieter Hüning, Marburg  
*Kant auf den Spuren von Thomas Hobbes?* ......................................................... 761

Franz Hespe, Marburg  
*Recht, rechtliche Verbindlichkeit und ursprünglicher Kontrakt bei Kant* ........... 773

SECTION 16  
KANT ON PEACE (I)

Olaf Asbach, Marburg  
*Der ewige Friede, Europa und das Alte Reich* .................................................... 787

Lutz Baumann, Mainz  
*Zum Verhältnis von Regenten und Philosophen im Denken der Neuzeit* ........... 805
SECTION 17
KANT ON PEACE (II)

Susan Robbins, Austin Peay
From Duty to Enlightenment: The Place of the Spectator.........................831

W. van der Kuijlen, Nijmegen
The Politics of Reason: The Theoretical Background of Perpetual Peace and Secrecy.........................839

C. A. Brincat, Chicago
Kant's Highest Good: Individuality, Society and Perpetual Peace........849

Aleksander Bobko, Rzeszów, Poland
The Problem of Evil and the Idea of Eternal Peace in Kant's Philosophy.........................857

Arto Siitonen, Helsinki
Transcendental Reasoning in Kant's Treatise on Perpetual Peace........865

Heinz Wichmann, Bielefeld
Zum Problem des ewigen Friedens bei Kant.................................873

SECTION 18
KANT AND HIS SUCCESSORS

Lu De Vos, Duffel, Belg.
Kants Zum ewigen Frieden und Fichtes Rezension.................................883

Jean-Christophe Merle, Tübingen
La réception du Projet de paix perpetuelle par Fichte:
La critique d’un Kant prisonnier du droit des gens.............................893
Jeanne Schuler, Creighton Univ.
*Reasonable Hope: Kant as Critical Theorist* ......................................................... 901

Susanne Weiper, Bonn
*Eine Idee zwischen Politik und Moral—Der Friedensgedanke bei Kant und Scheler* ................................................................. 909

Armin Sollbach, Giessen
*Der Einsatz der Vernunft* ........................................................................... 919

Tassilo Eichberger, Munich
*Die Architektur der Vernunft* ........................................................................ 927
What Do the Virtuous Hope For?  
Re-reading Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good

Pauline Kleingeld, St. Louis

Within discussions of Kant’s practical philosophy, the role and status of the highest good has long been a matter of dispute. There are three main reasons for this. First, by conceiving of the highest good partly in terms of happiness, Kant seems to undermine his own attempt to eliminate the concept of happiness from the foundations of moral theory. Second, although he asserts that it is a duty to promote the highest good, Kant fails to present an argument to this effect, and the inclusion of happiness in the highest good seems to make the prospects for a successful argument dim. Third, in various texts, Kant employs markedly different notions of the highest good that seem to be at odds with each other. According to his best-known account (from the Critique of Practical Reason), the highest good consists in happiness in proportion to virtue, a condition often interpreted as otherworldly. In other writings, however, he speaks of the highest good as an ideal moral world which the sensible world should approximate through historical progress. These differences have led several commentators to speak of radically different conceptions of the highest good in Kant.

The three difficulties just mentioned have led some commentators to argue that the concept of the highest good is better put aside. In this paper, I present a reconstruction of Kant’s doctrine of the highest good in a way that addresses these problems. I wish to show both how the duty to promote the highest good can be derived and how the notion of happiness as a component of the highest good can be interpreted in a way that makes it more consistent with the principles of Kant’s ethics. Third, I investigate the origin of the multiplicity of notions of the highest good in Kant.

The structure of this paper is as follows. I start by investigating why and how the question of the highest good arises in Kant’s moral theory. I investigate the function of the highest good as a goal or end of moral agency by examining Kant’s description, in the Critique of Pure Reason, of the highest good as the idea of a “moral world” of virtuous agents who bring about general happiness. In the second section, I reconstruct a possible Kantian justification for the claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good. In the third section, I look at the problem of the possibility of the highest good and the development of Kant’s solutions to this problem in his writings, beginning with the first Critique. Here it becomes possible to locate the emergence of a bifurcated conception of the highest good, first, as a moral world and, second, as happiness in proportion to virtue. Kant starts out with a conception of the highest good as a moral world.
and with an assumption of the moral duty to further the realization of such a world. But in the course of his discussion, when it comes to the question of the possibility of the highest good, he shifts gears and begins to focus on the possibility of what first had been only an aspect of the idea of the moral world, namely, the connection between virtue and happiness. In the second Critique, Kant pursues this line of argument further. As a result, the question of the possibility of approximating the highest good understood as a moral world drops out of the picture in the first two Critiques and is only addressed properly in the third Critique, in *Perpetual Peace, Religion*, and in other writings on history. There Kant offers an answer in the form of a teleological conception of history as a process in which the legal and moral development of humankind takes place, a process to be furthered through our moral agency. In the final section, I turn to the concept of happiness as component of the highest good. There I argue that an interpretation of this concept that recognizes the difference between the happiness of the hedonist and that of the virtuous agent can reconcile Kant's account of the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue with the principles of his ethics. However, I conclude that although basically consistent, this account of the highest good is less interesting, from a Kantian moral point of view, than the account of the highest good as a moral world found in the first Critique and elsewhere.

A. The Highest Good as a Moral World:
Constructing an Idea of the End of Moral Agency

Throughout the so-called 'critical' period, Kant maintains that pure reason can determine a priori and unconditionally how one ought to act. In answering the question how exactly to specify the highest moral principle, the concept of the highest good plays no role whatsoever. Neither the *Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals* nor the Analytic of the *Critique of Practical Reason* mention it, for “as far as the principle of morality is concerned, the doctrine of the highest good...can be completely passed over” (ÜdG VIII, 280). This principle is the moral law, which for finite rational beings such as humans takes the form of a categorical imperative: “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law” (KpV V, 30).

On the basis of the determination of the moral law, however, a secondary problematic arises. According to Kant, knowledge of one's duty leads to a need to relate one's moral action to a final end, an end which can be called the 'highest good' (Rel VI, 4). It is often thought that questions of ends can have no place in Kantian ethics. But the question is legitimate as long as it follows the moral determination of the will and the answer is not motivationally decisive. Kant speaks of the “morally produced need, to conceive, in addition to one's duties, a final end, as their result” (Rel VI, 6). Although Kant does not really
explain the genesis of this need, he locates its origin in reason: “it cannot be indifferent to reason how the answer to the question *What then is to result from this right action of ours?* may come out, and toward what we can direct our activities as an end” (Rel VI, 5).  

What Kant is talking about here is the possibility, for a virtuous agent, of intending an end and not, of course, a prediction of empirical outcomes. Nor is the issue one of a particular end of a particular action from duty. Rather, the question is whether moral agency as such and in general can be regarded as being directed at some final end, a “highest good”.  

One should not, of course, designate an arbitrarily chosen object as highest good. The sought-after final end must be an end of moral action. In order to answer the question of the final end of moral agency, Kant must therefore choose a different strategy. He abstracts from any and all hindrances to moral agency and constructs an idea of what the world would be like, if all its members were always to act virtuously. That is the idea of a moral world.  

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant introduces the idea of the highest good as the idea of a moral world, i.e., of a world of universal virtue and true freedom. We arrive at this idea when we abstract from “all conditions (ends) and all the special difficulties to which morality is exposed (weakness or depravity of human nature)” and think a world in which all members always obey the moral law (A808f./B836f.). This moral world can safely count as a ‘final end’ and highest good at which moral agency can be said to aim. For it is not a pre-given, autonomy-threatening material end. On the contrary, the highest good as a moral world is itself defined in terms of moral agency, through a totalizing and abstracting operation of reason. As a result, per definition, this highest good can only be promoted through moral agency.  

Our action, Kant says, should aim at bringing the sensible world into conformity with such a world. The idea of a moral world is an idea that “really can and ought to have an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that [i.e., the sensible] world as much as possible into conformity with the idea of the moral world” (A808/B836, cf. A807/B835). In saying this, Kant is implicitly speaking of a duty to promote the realization of a moral world.  

The only way to bring the sensible world into conformity with the moral world is through obeying the moral law. The idea of a moral world is not presented here as an attractive goal independent of the moral law, for which we subsequently have to figure out the most expedient means to attain it. Rather, the idea of a moral world is constructed on the basis of the question what a world would look like in which everyone would always obey the moral law from duty. Only in light of the goal thus constructed can moral agency in turn be regarded as a “means”.  

After his introduction of the idea of the highest good as a world of general virtue, Kant goes on to argue that such a world would also be characterized by
general happiness. In the moral world general virtue and general happiness are “necessarily connected” [notwendig verbunden] (A809/B837). Kant claims this “connection” (Verknüpfung, A810/B838) is a causal one: virtue (in this context also called “worthiness to be happy”) is said to produce happiness. The rational beings in this world are said to be “themselves, under the guidance of such [moral] principles, the authors both of their own enduring well-being and of that of others” (A809/B837). Therefore, Kant also describes this world as a “system of self-rewarding morality” (ibid.).

But why and how are virtue and happiness “necessarily connected”? It is clear that the “connection” is always such that virtue is the condition of happiness and never the other way around—in the second Critique Kant expresses this order by calling virtue the “supreme good”, and virtue plus happiness the “complete” good (KpV V, 110). Kant’s description is cursory, but there are some clues as to the nature of this necessary connection. First, because these rational beings are fully virtuous and all act according to the same moral principle, they will live in harmony and not arbitrarily interfere with each other’s freedom. Second, already at the time of the first Critique Kant defended the existence of a duty to further the general happiness. Since the members of the moral world do their duties, they will all actively work to promote general happiness.

Importantly, Kant says that the members of the moral world are themselves the cause of general happiness (A809/B837). This makes it possible to rule out several potential misinterpretations of the concept of happiness at issue here. First, happiness in the moral world is not a reward handed out by God. General virtue, directly and without divine mediation, causes general happiness. The idea of God does not enter Kant’s discussion until a later stage of the argument. Second, the fact that general virtue is the cause of general happiness and that the members of this world are said to promote their own and each other’s happiness means that happiness is not merely thought of as that which Kant calls “moral self-contentment” in the Critique of Practical Reason. For Kant, moral self-contentment is only an “analogon” of happiness, which accompanies the consciousness of one’s own virtue (KpV V, 116ff). Although this “analogon” may very well be included in the concept of happiness in the moral world, the latter is not exhaustively defined in terms of moral self-contentment. Happiness here is neither entailed by virtue, nor indirectly connected with it (through divine mediation), but is said to be directly caused by it.

Whether Kant’s thesis that virtuous agents in the moral world would bring about general happiness is convincing, is a separate matter, to which I shall return in the last section of this article. I would like to conclude this section with two further observations.

With the determination of the highest good as the final end or object of all moral agency, the horizon of a moral agent shifts. The will extends [erweitert]
What Do the Virtuous Hope For?

itself from the narrow perspective of the immediate duty to act on maxims that one can at the same time will to become a universal law, to a broader perspective, from which all moral actions are seen in the light of the one final end to which they contribute. As Kant writes in “On the Common Saying”:

The need for a final end set by pure reason and comprehending the totality of all ends under a single principle (a world as the highest good, possible also through our collaboration) is a need of the will that is unselfish and extends itself beyond observing the formal laws to the production of an object. (ÜdG VIII, 280,n, cf. Rel VI, 7,n.)

Instead of only knowing how one ought to act, and instead of only looking at single maxims in isolation, one thus obtains an all-encompassing end and sees one’s individual moral efforts as contributions to that final end, the highest good. Importantly, this shift in no way involves giving up the primacy of the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is and remains the foundation for the notion of the highest good as a moral world.

Furthermore, this account makes it possible to understand what Kant may mean when he states, in the second Critique, that the concept of the highest good denotes the “unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason” (KpV V, 108). For Kant, a morally determined will is not empty, because every maxim has a certain content, and all willing has an object (KpV V, 34). Although its moral status depends on its form, i.e. on the possibility of willing it to become a universal law, every maxim nevertheless has a certain ‘matter’. Think, for instance, of Kant’s oft-mentioned maxim to further the general happiness. This maxim can be adopted by a virtuous agent, because it can be willed as universal law. Although its universalizability, and not its content as such, forms the basis for its moral justification, the maxim nevertheless does state an end: the general happiness. The same goes for other moral maxims, such as those of spreading Enlightenment, or developing one’s talents, to mention some other Kantian examples. The concept of the highest good is said to unite the manifold of moral ends implicit in maxims, under one final end of moral agency as such.

B. The Duty to Promote the Highest Good: An Attempt at a Derivation

Not only do humans have a need to form an idea of a final end of moral agency, according to Kant; they also have a duty to promote the highest good. Kant claims that this duty is a duty of a special kind, a duty not analytically entailed by the categorical imperative. Rather, it is a thesis that goes beyond the concept of duties in the world and that adds a consequence of them (an effect), which is not contained within the moral laws and which therefore cannot be analytically developed out of these laws. (Rel VI, 7,n., cf. ÜdG VIII, 280,n.).

Nowhere, however, does he formally derive this duty. Especially in combination with Kant’s talk of the highest good as the proportionate harmony of virtue and
happiness (about which I will say more later), this alleged duty has generated a
great deal of puzzlement.

Lewis White Beck, for example, argues in his classic commentary on the
Critique of Practical Reason that the various formulations of the categorical
imperative do not contain a duty to promote the highest good, and that—if Kant
were consistent—such a duty could not possibly consist in anything else but the
duty to act out of respect for the moral law, which would make the former
indistinguishable from the latter.\textsuperscript{16} Beck’s interpretation leads to the conclusion
that Kant’s talk of a duty to promote the highest good has to be regarded as just
so much nonsense if it means anything else than the duty to obey the moral law.

Thus, the challenge for any attempt at deriving the duty to promote the highest
good is to make sense of Kant’s claims both that we have such a duty \emph{and}
that this duty is not already analytically entailed by the categorical imperative.\textsuperscript{17}

I shall now propose a reconstruction of how Kant could have derived this
duty, given what was said above about the construction of the concept of the
highest good. One has to keep in mind that Kant arrives at the idea of the moral
world not by analyzing the categorical imperative, but by \emph{constructing} the idea
of a moral world on its basis, through the rational operations of abstraction
(from empirical hindrances to morality) and synthesis (by thinking a \emph{world} of
perfectly virtuous agents). The argument, on the basis of premises established
above, runs as follows:

1. It is a duty to act in accordance with the categorical imperative
2. Acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, and only acting
   in accordance with the categorical imperative, promotes the highest good
   (understood as a moral world).
3. Therefore: Promoting the highest good is a duty.

Kant’s point of departure is that it is an unconditional duty to act in accordance
with the moral law out of respect for the moral law. This premise is so central to
his moral philosophy that it is not necessary to establish it here (1). In my earlier
analysis I showed that Kant defines the highest good as a moral world, a world
according to moral laws and brought about by moral agency. Conversely, it was
also established that moral agency, and \emph{only} moral agency, furthers this highest
good (2). From these premises combined it follows that promoting the highest
good is a duty (3).

Let me add a few comments and clarifications.

Crucial for the conclusion that promoting the highest good is a duty is the
condition, stated in the second premise, that the highest good \emph{is not furthered in
any other way} than by acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. As I
have shown above, that too is something Kant defends, since he defines the
highest good in terms of moral agency. Nonmoral or immoral agency cannot contribute to the realization of a moral world.\textsuperscript{18}

By itself, however, individual moral agency cannot lead to the full realization of the highest good, since the latter is a world in which everyone acts morally, which is not something one individual can bring about. As a result, there is only a duty to promote the highest good, not a duty to realize it. Of course, the virtuous person works towards its realization, but it cannot be a duty to fully achieve this. The fact that Kant occasionally mentions a duty to realize it\textsuperscript{19} has rightly been criticized by commentators.

The proposed reconstruction also explains why the difference between our general duty to act morally and the special duty to promote the highest good does not lie in an independent moral principle. Beck is right: there cannot be a second moral principle competing with the categorical imperative. But there is no second principle here. The duty to promote the highest good entails an (imperfect) duty to strive for a better world,\textsuperscript{20} whereas the categorical imperative only demands that one act on maxims that one can at the same time will to become universal law. The duty to promote the highest good "broadens" and "extends" the perspective of duty, and this extension is brought about not by the introduction of a new moral principle, but by the rational construction of the idea of a moral world.

The duty to promote the highest good can thus be understood as the duty to strive for a moral world, and as such it can be justified in Kant’s terms. I shall indicate below the origin of a second conception of the highest good, namely, as happiness in proportion to virtue. When it comes to the duty to promote the highest good, this second conception gives rise to the critical question as to whether Kant means that there is a duty to further other people’s happiness in proportion to their virtue. It would seem that there can be no such duty on Kantian principles, since the exact moral quality of other people’s disposition is inaccessible for a third person observer, and thus human beings cannot judge other people’s worthiness to be happy. But this is not necessarily Kant’s view. There are no unambiguous indications that he actually held that promoting the highest good involves furthering other people’s happiness in accordance with their virtue.

The Achilles heel of Kant’s argument for a duty to promote the highest good, as reconstructed above, seems rather to be the claim that humans qua finite rational beings construct the idea of a moral world. This claim is based on the assertion that they will do so out of a need to conceive of a final end of moral action, a need which Kant attributes to reason. It is understandable that he should base this need in reason, given that only by doing so can he guarantee its universality, which is required in order for him to be able to speak of a duty to promote the highest good. But Kant neither presents an argument for the existence of such a need, nor explains its emergence out of the nature of
rationality. As it stands, Kant’s assertion is in need of further justification here. But a further discussion of the possibility of providing such a justification would take us beyond the bounds of the present essay.

In any event, the truth of the second premise above depends on whether or not the highest good is possible. If it is impossible, moral agency cannot be regarded as furthering the highest good, since one cannot promote the impossible. If the highest good is impossible, “the moral law which commands that it must be furthered must be fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently inherently false” (KpV V, 114). This is why the question of the possibility of the highest good becomes essential for Kant.

I now turn to Kant’s discussion of the possibility of the highest good. I start by looking again at Kant’s discussion in the Critique of Pure Reason. As will become clear, this is where the bifurcation of Kant’s concept of the highest good takes place.

C. The Question of the Possibility of the Highest Good

a. The Critique of Pure Reason

Decisive for Kant’s argument concerning the possibility of the highest good is his thesis, mentioned above, that the connection of virtue and happiness is only guaranteed when all members of such a world act morally. “Such a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the execution of which rests on the condition that everyone does what he ought” (A810/B838). We live in a world that certainly does not meet that standard. And as long as it is not the case that “everyone does what one ought”, the causal connection between virtue and happiness is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, this in no way diminishes our moral obligation. One ought to act morally, even though this may not immediately bring about happiness (A810/B838, cf. GMS IV, 438f).

Given this diagnosis of the problem, one would expect Kant to examine whether—and if so, how—humans can realize or at least promote a world in which all act as they ought. That would be the question of whether a moralization of humankind is possible, and it would have been a logical question for Kant to ask. If moral agency ought to aim at making the sensible world conform more to the idea of a moral world as “highest good”, and if the fact that not everyone acts morally raises doubts about the possibility of the highest good, then the answer to that question would seem to depend on solving the problem of the lack of virtue. If a positive answer could be found and there were good prospects for such improvement, the issue of the connection between virtue and happiness would take care of itself. For, in a moral world, the rational beings “would themselves be the authors both of their own enduring well-being and that of others” (A809/B837).
The question whether humans could morally improve may not look like a viable inquiry to many philosophers today, cynics and skeptics as many of us are when it comes to the moral improvement of the species. Yet, it is remarkable that Kant did not take up this question, given that he did hold rather strong beliefs about the possibility of the moral improvement of humanity, views expressed, for example, in the “Idea for a Universal History” (1784), written only a few years after the publication of the first Critique. There he proposes a model for interpreting history as a teleological process, the telos of which is the moral perfection of humankind (cf. IaG VIII, 26). Similarly, in Perpetual Peace and Religion, respectively, Kant describes history as a gradual approximation of a world of external (legal) and internal (moral) freedom, a process which can and ought to be furthered by moral efforts. Legal freedom, Kant says, creates the preconditions for an increase in moral freedom. In the “Idea for a Universal History” Kant claims, further, that humanity’s legal and moral progress will increase general happiness (IaG VIII, 20), and he advocates his teleological view of history as a way of avoiding having to give up on this world and place one’s hopes on a life in an after-world (IaG VIII, 30).

In the Critique of Pure Reason, however, we find nothing similar. Instead of addressing the root problem of a lack of virtue in this world, Kant merely treats the symptoms. He merely addresses what I shall call the “connection problem”, i.e., the problem of the connection between virtue and happiness in an imperfect world. Kant argues that a noncontingent connection of virtue and happiness can be assumed only if one assumes the existence of God and of a “future world” (A810ff./B838ff.).

The first assumption clearly bears the most weight. Kant indeed initially mentions the existence of God as the only necessary assumption. The connection “can be hoped for only if a supreme reason, governing in accordance with moral rules, is simultaneously posited as underlying nature as its cause” (A810/B838). In discussing the idea of the moral world, Kant portrayed free rational agents as bringing about the general happiness themselves. Here, by contrast, in solving the problem of the connection between virtue and happiness in an imperfect world, he calls God the cause of happiness (A810/B838), the one who “distributes happiness according to worthiness to be happy” (A812f./B840f., cf. A811/B839), i.e., in proportion to virtue.

The exact activity of this assumed divine existence is not at all clear. The fact that Kant calls God the cause of nature seems to imply that God somehow establishes the connection between virtue and happiness in the phenomenal world. Why else would Kant stress God’s role as creator and as intelligence “underlying nature as its cause”?

But Kant also claims in several places that the distribution of happiness takes place in an intelligible world and that the empirical world does not show any prospects for a connection between virtue and happiness (A812/B840,
This claim underlies the second assumption Kant mentions as necessary for solving the connection problem, that of a “future world” (A811/B839). That Kant does not mean a future sensible world, but an afterlife, can be inferred from his claim just mentioned that the connection problem does not appear to be soluble in the sensible world, as well as from the fact that he elsewhere in the first Critique refers to this assumption as that of the immortality of the soul. However, if we take this statement seriously, it becomes unclear why Kant thinks it is important to mention God as the cause of nature. He provides no explanation of how these different functions of God relate and, especially, of how God’s function as author of the world is crucial for solving the connection problem.

Even if Kant’s argument were clear and successful, however, it still would solve only part of the problem of the possibility of the highest good. At most it could solve the connection problem, i.e., the problem of how virtue and happiness can be assumed to be connected, given that the world is imperfect. But if virtue and happiness are brought in harmony only in an afterlife, we are still entirely in the dark regarding the question of whether and how the sensible world can be brought more into “conformity” with the moral world. Kant has yet to explain how a world in which all act as they ought can be promoted, and whether moral agency can, as he claims, really have an “influence” on the sensible world. By reducing the question of the possibility of the highest good (as a moral world) to the connection problem, he does not answer this more fundamental issue, which follows from his own analysis in the first Critique.

Kant’s discussion of the problem of the possibility of the highest good in the first Critique reveals a fork in the road between two conceptions of the highest good. At first the highest good is conceived of as a moral world, i.e., a world of virtuous agents; one feature of such a world is that general virtue produces general happiness. Then Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of the highest good to the connection problem. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant even goes so far as to define the highest good in terms of happiness in proportion to virtue (as highest good both “in a person” and “of a possible world”, KpV V, 110). There he focuses almost entirely on the connection between virtue and happiness, and conducts his discussion largely in terms of a virtuous individual’s own happiness. However, in the Critique of Judgment, as well as in Perpetual Peace, Religion, and other writings on history, Kant returns to the original definition of the highest good and works out the problem of the possibility of promoting a moral world. I shall now examine this development in some more detail.
What Do the Virtuous Hope For?

101

b. The Critique of Practical Reason

In the second Critique, Kant's solution to the problem of the possibility of the highest good follows that of the first Critique. His whole analysis in the Critique of Practical Reason is framed in terms of the connection problem. With this focus, the description of the highest good as a world recedes in favor of a concentration on the individual and a concern with one's own happiness.

This time, however, Kant thematizes the possibility of perfect virtue and, in the process, reconceptualizes the assumption of a future world. Even though the question as to how perfect virtue is possible for an individual leads to a richer account than the account found in the first Critique, where the question was not even asked, his answer in terms of the immortality of the soul is notoriously bad. It is important to note, however, that the immortality postulate is no longer invoked for the purpose of a post mortem reward. Its sole purpose is to give an account of how perfect virtue is possible: the afterlife enables individual agents to continue progressing towards moral perfection (KpV V, 122f.).

In giving up the notion of a post mortem reward, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant locates happiness in the sensible world. Although happiness cannot be produced by the sensible world qua sensible world, because the latter is ordered according to natural laws without regard for moral disposition (KpV V, 119), happiness is nevertheless located in the world. Kant calls it a "condition of a rational being in the world..." which "rests on the harmony of nature with his entire end..." (124, emphasis mine). Only if we postulate the existence of God can we give an account of how a harmony of virtue and happiness can be brought about in the sensible world. For then "it is not impossible that the morality of the disposition, as cause, stands...in a necessary connection with happiness as effect in the sensible world", this necessary connection is "not immediate, but mediate (through an intelligible author of nature)" (115). One then regards nature no longer as "mere object of sense," but as created and ordered by a moral author of the world (ibid.).

With this shift to locating happiness in the sensible world comes a more unified role for God. The condition of the possibility of the highest good is, Kant says in the second Critique, "the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of morals" (145). Kant mentions God primarily in his function of the 'author of the world', 'cause of nature', 'creator' (cf. KpV V, 126, 128, 129, 130, 145), who is assumed to bring about such harmony. Thus, the account of God's role is more unified than in the Critique of Pure Reason, where God was both the cause of nature and the distributor of happiness in a future world, a combination that remained unclear.

Despite the greater unity of the account in the second Critique, however, Kant fails to explain either how God, as the cause of nature, is supposed to bring about this harmony or even how this harmony is to be conceptualized. His account remains abstract, and his discussion of the possibility of the highest
good does not clarify how God brings about this purposive relationship between virtue and happiness.

I shall come back to the second Critique in the last section of this article, in order to discuss the concept of happiness in more detail and to ask whether the concern with one’s own happiness is legitimate within Kant’s theoretical framework. For now, I postpone that issue so as to continue sketching Kant’s solutions to the problem of the possibility of the highest good.

c. The Critique of Judgment

In the Critique of Judgment Kant returns to the idea of a moral world found in the first Critique and finally addresses the question of how moral agency can transform the phenomenal world and make it conform more and more to the idea of a moral world. Although Kant does not entirely give up the definition of the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue for an individual, he does reintroduce the definition of the highest good as a moral world composed of general virtue (humanity under moral laws, KU V, 445, 448) and general happiness (453). Kant mentions the duty to promote the highest good and says the latter “consists in the connection between the greatest welfare [Wohl] of the rational beings in the world, with the supreme condition of their being good, that is it consists in the general happiness connected with morality according to law.” (453). He refers to the question of the possibility of the highest good as the question of the “practicability of the final end” [Ausführbarkeit des Endzwecks] (455, 471,n.). As in the second Critique, happiness is not transposed to an afterlife, but is to be approached in this world: In this final purpose the possibility of the one part, namely, happiness, has an empirical condition, that is it depends on how nature is constituted.... (KU V, 453).

Here too, God is postulated as the cause of a purposive relationship between the realm of nature and the realm of morals without any further specification as to how we are to conceive of God’s activity. But this time more can be said. Although Kant literally says, in the sections on the highest good in the Critique of Judgment, that the possibility of the highest good can be secured through the moral proof of the existence of God alone, and although he stresses that this proof is independent of the question as to whether or not there is teleology in nature (478f.), he does say that if there were occasion to regard the world as teleological order, this could count as “desired confirmation” of the possibility of the highest good (479). Earlier in the ‘Critique of teleological Judgment’ he argues that we can indeed regard nature as teleological order. This makes it possible to turn the abstract assumption that the highest good is possible (supported by the postulate of the existence of God) into a more concrete representation of God’s role as the cause of a teleological order in nature and history. Importantly, Kant thinks that a teleological order in nature cannot be conceived of without also thinking a highest intelligence as its ground (e.g., KU
V, 389, 410). Thus, if we regard nature and history as teleologically ordered, we must also regard this order as the product of a highest intelligence. This assumption makes it possible to interpret the role of the idea of God as follows: as the ground of the “purposive connection” between the realm of nature and the realm of morals, God is thought to have created a world that is hospitable to moral agency and teleologically directed toward the “culture” of humankind.

“Culture”, on Kant’s usage, consists in the development of the rational predispositions of humanity and ultimately prepares humankind for moral agency. Social antagonism plays an instrumental role in this process, impelling progress in the legal sphere. However, legal freedom is not the telos of history. Rather, culture prepares humanity “for a sovereignty in which reason alone dominates”, and it lets “us feel a hidden aptitude within us for higher purposes” (433f.)—that is, the historical process of culture is conducive to moral improvement. Kant here presents an account very much like the one we find in “Idea for a Universal History”, where he describes history as a process of development of humanity’s predispositions, which prepares the way for moral development (see above).

d. Perpetual Peace and Religion: Legal and Moral Progress

As mentioned above, Kant develops this teleological perspective further in Perpetual Peace, Religion, and other writings on history. In Perpetual Peace, Kant focuses on legal progress. He argues that it is a duty to promote the interdependent goals of a perfect, republican state and an international legal order. Only republics (in the Kantian sense of the term) are naturally inclined to peace, but they will be secure only in a stable international legal order of republics.

Kant calls perpetual peace the highest political good, but it is by no means the highest good, simpliciter. For the latter is defined in terms of the virtue of its members, whereas perpetual peace is a legal condition. But if one looks at Perpetual Peace in light of the preceding discussion, it becomes significant that Kant not only argues that perpetual peace is morally demanded itself, but also that it is a means to a further end, namely, the “moral development” of citizens ([moralische Bildung], ZeF VIII, 366), because this can best take place within a well-constituted state. Kant also develops the idea of a link between a just legal system, a free public sphere, and the moral development of citizens in other writings on history (see above, n.21).

Thus, Perpetual Peace—and other texts in which Kant thematizes the importance of legal progress for the moral learning processes of humanity—can be said to indicate a crucial step on the way to making the empirical world conform more to the moral world, not only because perpetual peace establishes legal freedom, but also because it paves the way for furthering “moral culture”.

In the third section of the Religion, Kant focuses on moral progress and the establishment of a community of virtuous agents. He here describes the process
of the gradual “victory” of good over evil and of what he calls the “establishment of a kingdom of God on earth”. He claims it is morally required that individuals join an ethical community governed by the moral law, which aims at the moral “improvement” of humankind and at fending off evil (Rel VI, 94). As long as people are not so united they tempt each other into evil. An ethical community acts against this hindrance to morality, and thus promotes morality. Because the highest good requires such a community, we have a duty to join it (96ff.). The complete ‘reign of the good’ is only attained when this community encompasses all of humanity. Although this must remain an ideal which can never be fully realized, Kant claims it can be approached.

Both progress in the legal sphere and the promotion of an ethical community are conducive to the moral improvement of humanity, albeit in different ways. If we conceive of the highest good as a moral world, Kant’s idea of legal and moral progress in Perpetual Peace, Religion, and other writings on history can be interpreted against the background of the doctrine of the highest good. They stand in the tradition of Kant’s critical treatment of the highest good that started with the Critique of Pure Reason, and they answer the question that Kant failed to answer there. They provide necessary detail as to how the highest good as a moral world can be approached, i.e., of how the sensible world can be brought into “conformity” with the ideal moral world.28

The following picture is now in place. Kant argues that the highest good, conceived of as a moral world in which general virtue causes general happiness, can be considered possible if one postulates the existence of God and assumes this highest intelligence has ordered nature teleologically in such a way that it is conducive to human “culture” and in such a way that moral agency can be effective in the world.

This account should not be read as implying that the prospect of progress makes moral action superfluous. First, teleology does not have more than a regulative status, and thus can never trump a moral command. Second, according to Kant’s teleological view of history, nature prepares but does not produce moral progress. The decisive step needs to be taken by moral agents themselves and autonomously.

At this point, however, two important new problems emerge. First, Kant asserts in several writings that there has been not only legal, but also moral progress, and in other writings he holds out at least the prospect of such progress.29 This raises the fundamental question of the basis on which one could speak, in terms of Kant’s critical philosophy, of moral progress on a historical level. Since only actions, not dispositions can be observed, it would seem to be impossible to distinguish between progress in “legality” (action in outward conformity with the moral law, but not out of respect for the law) and progress in morality. Kant does not address this issue in sufficient detail.
Second, Kant’s teleological account of history may indicate how a moral world may be approached, but it does not account for a possible proportional allotment of happiness according to individual worthiness to be happy. Whether that is a serious loss depends on the status and importance of such proportionality. This is the issue to which I now turn.

D. Happiness and the Highest Good

I now return to the conception of the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue. Even if we were to grant Kant that in the moral world happiness is the result of virtue, and even if we were to grant him that happiness so conceived poses no threat to autonomy—can the same be said of happiness in this second conception of the highest good? Happiness is here conceived as personal happiness in proportion to individual virtue. Two questions arise here. First, can the concept of happiness function consistently in this context? And, secondly, if it can, is the concern with one’s own happiness permissible within the bounds of Kant’s practical philosophy? These questions necessitate a closer examination of the concept of happiness.

I have already briefly touched on the notion of happiness in the context of the initial description of Kant’s idea of a moral world. But more needs to be said about this notion, since it is so often suspected of contaminating the purity of Kantian moral theory. In particular, it is important to stress that Kant’s notion of happiness as component of the highest good is not identical with the notion of happiness entertained by the hedonist. I shall bring this out by means of a systematic reconstruction supported by Kant’s own definition of happiness in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason. After clarifying this, I shall finally be able to address the legitimacy of the notion of a highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue.

Many commentators understand the categorical imperative as a maxim-filtering device. On this interpretation, it is supposed to work very much like an apple sorting machine that separates bad apples from good ones. (Most apple sorters sort by size, of course, but a qualitative, not quantitative task is necessary for this analogy to work). The apples here are maxims that serve the natural end of happiness. Being virtuous means having the machine turned on and letting all one’s apples be sorted. The only function of the categorical imperative, on this reading, is to test given maxims as to the possibility of their being thought and willed as universal law. For example, the maxim to satisfy one’s inclinations at the expense of other people will not pass. The maxim to take good care of one’s children, on the other hand, can stay.

When it comes to determining our will morally, however, something else happens besides weeding out bad maxims (although that certainly happens, too). If necessary, we also come to see new maxims that we ought to adopt. This can be clarified with a passage from the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant says that
we can presuppose that all finite beings desire their own happiness. But he also says that the maxim of my own happiness “can become an objective practical law only if I include within it the happiness of others” (*KpV* V, 34). On this basis he argues that we have an obligation to promote the happiness of others (34/5). But then, even though my natural, pre-moral end is my own happiness, general happiness becomes the content of my maxim if I decide to act morally. Thus, we have the “obligation to extend the maxim of self-love also to the happiness of others” (35). Virtuous agents, insofar as they are virtuous, give up the natural end of their own happiness in favor of general happiness (which includes their own) as a moral end. Likewise, according to Kant, virtuous agents who are not naturally so inclined, come to see that they ought to strive for their own perfection and develop their talents.

If this analysis concerning the structure of the moral determination of the will is correct, it has interesting implications for our understanding of the concept of happiness as a component of the highest good. For it means that if one acts virtuously and lets the moral law be the principle determining one’s will, a change takes place in how one imagines one’s own happiness.

Hedonists, who let their will be determined by pre- and non-moral desires, imagine their happiness as the satisfaction of exactly those desires. These desires remain what they are. But for virtuous agents, the situation is different. Insofar as they let their will be determined by the moral law, they no longer pursue primarily their own happiness. They now pursue that of others as well, given the duty to perfect oneself morally and to promote general happiness.

If happiness consists in the satisfaction of all one’s ends, what constitutes happiness for virtuous agents depends on what they want. As explained above, qua virtuous agents, they strive for their own perfection and for general happiness. But they may also have a number of desires that fit the category of the morally permissible. For example, they may like to listen to blues, or hope their children and friends will get interesting jobs. Insofar as these desires are also among their ends, they may count their satisfaction among the things that would make them happy.

But the satisfaction of desires in this second category alone cannot constitute full happiness. For suppose their children and friends do get the jobs and their favorite blues bands move to town, will this make them fully happy? Even if they might actually be very pleased, the question whether this—and other things in the same category—would constitute complete happiness would still have to be answered negatively. For they also strive for their own perfection, for general happiness, and other morally required ends. This is the content and object of their will insofar as they are virtuous. For example, as long as they live in a society in which people are oppressed and in which human rights are violated daily, they will not be completely happy. If happiness is the state in which all our ends are attained, then it requires that the complete object of one’s will—
and not just the permissible non-moral desires—is satisfied. Put more generally, happiness for moral agents will in part, if not primarily, be the consequence of the realization (or at least the prospect thereof) of the moral good they intend.\textsuperscript{32} That Kant holds this view comes out most clearly in his definition of happiness in the Dialectic of the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}:

\begin{quote}
Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world, in whose existence everything goes according to wish and will. It thus rests on the harmony of nature with his entire end and with the essential determining ground of his will. (KpV, V 124)
\end{quote}

Note that Kant here speaks of nature being in harmony with a perfectly virtuous agent’s “essential determining ground of his will”, and says that this means everything is going according to this will (and wish). I read Kant as referring here not only to a harmony between nature and a virtuous agent’s private permissible ends, such as going to blues clubs, but also, given the mention of will here, as referring to a harmony between the \textit{moral} good intended by a virtuous agent and the actual state of the world.

Because acting in accordance with the moral law out of respect for the law does affect and sometimes transform the content of our maxims, the ends implied in our maxims and thus our notion of happiness are affected as well. Happiness for a virtuous agent is then understood as the result of satisfaction of permissible \textit{and morally required} ends. If my analysis is correct, it would also follow that one’s own happiness and the happiness of others are interdependent, although Kant does not himself bring this out in the second Critique. If one wants to promote general happiness from duty, one cannot be fully happy unless others are happy as well.

On the basis of this analysis, the concept of happiness in the Dialectic of the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} appears to be consistent with the principles of Kant’s ethics. Happiness as a component of the highest good does not threaten moral autonomy, both because it presupposes virtue and because it cannot be interpreted hedonistically.

At least one significant problem emerges for this account, however, one that regards not so much Kant’s concept of happiness as his claim that moral agency, if universal, can bring about general happiness. The difficulty is that there are many cases in which our moral intentions cannot be realized owing to non-human factors: acting from duty I try to save a person who has fallen in a river and cannot swim; a maelstrom takes her down and I fail. I may feel some moral self-contentment, but I will otherwise be very frustrated, though not due to moral failure on anyone’s part. Such frustration of moral agency must interfere with the happiness of the virtuous, but, unfortunately, this is not an issue Kant discusses. In the final analysis, then, Kant’s concept of happiness may not be fully satisfactory, even if reinterpreted along the lines just sketched. Nonetheless, once one stresses the importance to moral agents of promoting the good,
Kant’s concept of happiness is at least much more interesting than is usually thought.

The next question becomes whether or not the concern with one’s own happiness is justifiable in Kant’s terms. Now the question can finally be addressed of how to assess the importance of the “connection problem”. As far as I can see, my analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the concern with the possibility of harmony between one’s own virtue and one’s own happiness is illegitimate. There is nothing wrong with the question: “If I am virtuous, what may I hope?”, provided the answer does not have any motivational relevance in the sense that one makes the determination of one’s will depend on the answer. But that is already built into the question by the condition “if I am virtuous....” If a virtuous agent asks it, the answer cannot be anything but: “not more, but also not less, than is proportional to the moral worth of your disposition.”

The preceding analysis does, however, lead to the conclusion that this question, although legitimate, will not really be the most interesting one for a Kantian moral subject. On the basis of the reconstruction above, one would have to say that Kant should not have given this question the central place he did, and that he certainly should not have substituted it for a discussion of how the idea of a moral world can have “influence”, and of how we can make the sensible world “conform” more closely to the idea of a moral world. Truly virtuous agents are so unselfish as to be more interested in the question whether the world will become a better place than in questions about how things will turn out for them personally. In this vein, Kant indeed argues elsewhere that the belief that one’s moral action can lead to progress leads to a fully unselfish pleasure, and that the prospect of a better world is satisfying, even if one knows one will not live to see it (OdG VIII, 309).

The question “What may I hope?” is ambiguous, but in both of its possible meanings it is legitimate. As the question of what I may hope with regard to the improvement of the world, it should be deemed most interesting to a virtuous agent. Interpreted as the question of what I may hope in terms of my life and my happiness, provided I act morally, it is not a morally suspect and “bad” question, but, rather, not really a very interesting question for moral agents. Regrettably, in the first two Critiques, Kant chose to focus on this question and the connection problem, rather than getting at the more central issue of the possibility of promoting a moral world.

Conclusion

I hope to have shown that Kant, by reducing the problem of the possibility of the highest good as a moral world to the problem of the connection between virtue and happiness, in the first and second Critiques, does not really solve the problem emerging from the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, that of how “the idea of a moral world can really have an influence”. As a result, when we
Discuss the issue of the highest good in Kant's moral theory, it becomes crucially important that we look beyond the first two Critiques, to the third Critique, *Perpetual Peace* and *Religion*, and other writings on history. For there Kant attempts to answer the real and most interesting issue that he brings up in his discussion in the first Critique, namely, how the sensible world can be "brought into conformity with the idea of the moral world".

This is not to say that all problems connected with Kant's account of the highest good can be solved. I have argued that the duty to promote the highest good can be derived and that the status of happiness as a component of the highest good can be understood as consistent with Kantian ethical principles. But I have also argued that Kant's reduction of the problem of the highest good as a moral world to the connection problem is unfortunate.

Furthermore, new problems were shown to emerge in the doctrine of the highest good. Kant's argument for the existence of a duty to promote the highest good seems to depend on the construction of the idea of a moral world, but Kant does not present an argument to show that all humans qua finite rational beings do or should construct such an idea. Second, even though the concept of happiness can be interpreted as basically consistent, Kant's thesis that if everyone would act morally this would cause general happiness is questionable, because of the way in which natural circumstances can frustrate morally intended ends. Third, if the duty to promote the highest good is understood as a duty to promote a moral world, the question emerges as to how it would be possible, in Kantian terms, to discern whether or not moral progress is being made, given that the moral quality of dispositions is not accessible for an observer and thus is indistinguishable from progress in "legality". Fourth, the proportionality of happiness to virtue appears to be much less important for a virtuous agent than Kant makes it out to be, and thus, the conception of the highest good in terms of such proportionality is much less interesting than Kant claims.

These problems remain. But they are markedly different from those usually associated with Kant's doctrine of the highest good. What is more, on the interpretation advanced in this article, the concept of the highest good is shown to be an essential, integral element of Kant's moral theory, from the first Critique through to the writings of the nineties.

**Notes**

1. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the pages of the first (A) and second (B) editions. All other page references are to *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, edited under the auspices of the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-. Translations are my own.

Abbreviations used:
- EaD = *Das Ende aller Dinge* [*The End of All Things*]


4. This distinction between two conceptions of the highest good in Kant bears some resemblance to the distinction drawn by Andrews Reath between a “secular” and a “theological” conception of the highest good in Kant. Whereas Reath argues that the “secular” conception (a moral world, brought about by human agency) stands in no essential relation to the “theological” conception (happiness in proportion to virtue, brought about by God in another world), I aim to show here how the second is connected to the first. See Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory”. Moreover, as will become clear below, the conception of the highest good as happiness in proportion to virtue does not invariably entail an otherworldly reward.

5. See for the first Critique: A547f./B575f.; A807/B835.

6. The following account is a reconstruction of a systematic conceptual constellation. I will use passages from various works as support where I think this is justified because they stand in this same conceptual constellation. This should not suggest there are no significant differences between Kant’s accounts of the highest good in his various works. Notable and important differences between Kant’s accounts will be spelled out later.

7. For a more detailed discussion of Kant’s concept of a “need of reason” and its relation to his conception of reason as striving for the unconditioned, see Ch. 6 of my *Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1995).


9. Cf. also Rel VI, 5. The explicit identification of the highest good and the moral world in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be found in A810f./B838f. Kant here calls the moral world the “highest derivative good”, as distinguished from the “highest original good”, which is said to be God. In what follows, I ignore this distinction, as does Kant in most of his discussions.

10. Kant claims that “alle Handlungen vernünftiger Wesen so geschehen, als ob sie aus einem obersten Willen, der alle Privatwillkür in sich oder unter sich befaßt, entsprängen” (A810/B838).


12. This thesis that if everyone acts morally, general happiness follows, also appears in GMS, IV 438f. Cf. also XIX, p. 272, Refl. 7204: “Die Vernunft zeigt, daß die durchgängige Einheit aller Zwecke eines vernünftigen Wesens sowohl in Ansehung seiner selbst als ander, mithin die formale Einheit im
Gebrauche unserer Freiheit, d.i. die Moralitat, wenn sie von jedermann ausgeübt wird, die Glückseligkeit durch Freiheit hervorbringen...würde." (emphasis mine).

13. Cf. XIX, S. 272, Refl. 7199: "Die erste und wichtigste Bemerkung, die der Mensch an sich selbst macht, ist, daß er durch die Natur bestimmt sey selbst der Urheber seiner Glückseligkeit und sogar seiner eigenen Neigungen und Fertigkeiten zu sein, welche diese Glückseligkeit möglich machen".


15. E.g., KrV A807f./B835f.; KpV V, 114; KU V, 450.


17. This goes against a trend in recent secondary literature on Kant’s doctrine of the highest good, where it is claimed that the duty to promote the highest good is entailed by the categorical imperative. Cf. Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant”, p.595, and Harry Van der Linden, *Kantian Ethics and Socialism* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), p.19. In fact, however, neither author actually derives this duty from the categorical imperative alone. Rather, both do so with the help of additional considerations and in a way that is to some extent compatible with the account given in this paper. My aim is here to make explicit how and why the derivation of this duty goes beyond the categorical imperative in requiring the construction of the idea of a moral world.

18. I shall address the role of God later.

19. E.g., KpV V, 113.

20. For a good account of this duty as an “active” duty, see Van der Linden, *Kantian Ethics and Socialism*, Ch.1.

21. laG VIII, 22 (fifth thesis); KU V, 432f.; cf. also ZeF VIII, 366.

22. This is not the only definition in the second Critique. As mentioned above, Kant also defines it as the “unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason”, KpV V, 108.

23. Of the many serious problems with Kant’s argument for the immortality of the soul, I shall only mention two here. First, Kant’s unexplained shift from virtue to holiness is problematic (see Beck, *A Commentary*, pp. 265ff. and Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.172). A second notorious problem is that, on the one hand, the immortal existence is not in time and is intelligible, while, on the other hand, it is supposed to make a moral progress possible, which can only be thought as change, i.e., as succession in time (see Beck, *A Commentary*, 265ff.; Wood, *Kant’s Moral Religion*, p. 116-124.)

24. See, e.g., KU V, 449,126-29; 458.

25. Of course, we do not “find” teleology, but, rather, reflective judgment cannot but judge certain empirical phenomena as purposive.

26. The meaning of Kant’s term “culture” is still close to that of “cultivation” and “development of predispositions.” See my *Fortschritt und Vernunft*, Ch.2.

27. Mds, VI, 355.

28. It is important to note that although Kant speaks of the legal and moral progress of “humankind”, the roles of men and women in this process are markedly different. Women’s role in the legal sphere is limited, since Kant denies them many political rights (such as the right to vote). Moreover, despite his claims that all finite rational beings ought to act morally, there are indications that Kant doubted women could do so. See my “The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant”, *The Philosophical Forum* 25 (1993) 134-150.

29. In the “Idea for a Universal History” and the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant speaks of “development of predispositions” and “culture”, respectively, which he thinks will culminate in moral development in the future (laG VIII, 21; KU V, 433). In “On the Common Saying”, “The End of All Things”, and the *Religion*, Kant claims such progress has already been taking place (ÜdG VIII, 310; EaD VIII, 332; Rel VI, 131f.).

30. I here leave aside the problem of whether we have a duty to further other people’s perfection, although—against Kant’s own assertion in the Mds VI, 386—a case could be made for the existence
of such a duty. See “On the Common Saying”, where Kant mentions a duty to promote the betterment of posterity (VIII, 309), and Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion*, p. 74ff.

31. I am supposing that the conditions for permissibility are fulfilled.

32. Thus, this interpretation goes much further than other defenses of the role of happiness in the highest good, which stress the difference between Kantian and hedonistic concepts of happiness and argue that happiness as a component of the highest good consists in the satisfaction of morally permissible ends. Cf. Engstrom, “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory”, Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant”. Along slightly different lines, Yovel argues that “the concept of happiness generalizes all hedonistic desires”, but that it does not threaten the autonomy principle, since it only comes into play after the moral determination of the will (*Kant and the Philosophy of History*, 51).

33. For an in-depth defense of the idea of a proportionality between happiness and virtue, although along somewhat different lines, see Engstrom, “The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory”.

34. I agree with Reath that the proportionality between virtue and happiness is not a necessary component of the concept of the highest good. I do not think it is necessary, however, to call this proportionality a “bad idea” (“Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant”, p. 614,n. 29).