

Abstract: The Valletta Convention has drastically changed archaeology and its role in society. Nevertheless, its almost universal adoption by European countries has not only had positive consequences. The paper discusses a number of different developments, some foreseen, some unforeseen, that have had positive as well as negative consequences and some, such as commercialization, that can be said to have had both. This is also true of the concept of 'preservation in situ' that is examined at length because it has become a dogma and the holy grail of preventive archaeology. While recognizing its value the paper shows how the concept has also become an instrument that favors simplistic CRM archaeology and hampers innovation of archaeological research in Europe. When the concept is 'exported' to developing countries, recent experiences show that its dangers are even more apparent.

As was already pointed out by Geoff Wainwright in his address to the inaugural meeting of the EAC in 1999 (Wainwright 2000), the Valletta convention has changed archaeology and its role in society in some very drastic ways. The European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage defines a standard for the way in which states should manage their archaeological resources and provides a frame of reference with global impact. The Valletta Convention has moved archaeology from being only an academic discipline firmly in the world of spatial planning and public decision making.

When I went to Strasbourg in 1988 to represent the Netherlands in an expert meeting of the Council of Europe, I could not have foreseen that I was going to be involved in a process that would dominate two decades of my professional life. That meeting was the first in a series of committee meetings between 1988 and 1991 (Willems 2007, 2008). The committee had been convened by the Council of Europe to prepare a revision of the Convention of London of 1969. It was felt that this convention, which had not been ratified by many countries, was ineffective and unsuited to face the challenges of archaeology in the 1980s.

Our profession had become aware that its source material was rapidly disappearing while only a tiny fraction of the information could be recorded by rescue excavation. The urgent need for a different approach became apparent. An approach that required communication with society at large and that recognized we had to be involved in spatial planning and in the political and socio-economic decision making, instead of just reacting to its consequences. At international conferences such as in Florence in 1984 and in Nice in 1987 (Council of Europe 1987, 1989), an international debate arose on these issues.

This then led to the initiative of the Council to put the issue on the political agenda and the Committee of Ministers decided that a revision of the existing convention would be the best way forward, and that is what started the process in 1988. For further details, I refer to the contribution of prof. M. Gautier (this

volume). The main issues were those that ended up in Articles 5, 6, and 9 of the convention that regulate that archaeology should become part of the planning process, that it should be financed through the budget of development schemes, and that its results should be communicated to the public. There is however no need to discuss these further. In the present context I will look at some of the consequences of the Valletta convention.

Consequences of the Convention: the good, the bad, and the ugly

In my opinion one of the most obvious differences that the treaty has brought about, is the increase in the level of public awareness and interest. The public benefit of archaeology has become a central theme, and the willingness of its practitioners to open up to the public and increasingly to consciously involve that public as stakeholders in their work, has greatly improved. In part, this is no doubt also a result of improved technical means and the effect of drastically changed communication patterns through cable television, the internet, visualisation techniques, and recent inventions such as smartphones and other gadgets. But the basic change has come through the fact that the strongly increased cost of archaeology and the expenditure of public funds can only be legitimized by demonstrating its public benefit. Therefore communication with the public has gained enormously in importance, and although it is by no means the only aspect of the public benefit need, it is one that was foreseen as is evident from the commentary on the Convention (Council of Europe 1993).

Another consequence that was foreseen at the time was commercialization. Archaeological resources as well as their management have economic values that may benefit society, and it was clear from the outset that commercialization already present in the USA, the UK and some of the German states would need political decisions at state level to reject it, incorporate it, or regulate it in some other way. I will return to commercialization below and I will count it as neither

good nor bad. But it definitely has some uncomfortable aspects that are an ugly contribution to the changes in archaeology.

A related aspect, but one that was unforeseen, is the diminished role of hobby archaeologists in archaeological practice. Increased regulation and professionalization and vested commercial interests have led to a decrease of the opportunities for these stakeholders to participate in archaeology. Especially in a time when participatory forms of heritage management and community archaeology are gaining in importance, the decimation of voluntary archaeology in the past two decades as a more or less involuntary and I think mostly unintended consequence of implementing the Valletta treaty is surely one of the more negative changes. It may be that this development is partly due to a more general trend in society where increased individualization has led to a decline in all sorts of voluntary organizations (Myklebust 2001, Tully 2007, van de Rijdt 2011). But nevertheless there is a clear link to the implementation of Valletta.

Another unforeseen and in my opinion decidedly negative consequence is the bureaucratization of archaeology. Like commercialization, I will come back to this below, but it is clear that the increased impact of archaeological resource management in development has led to a far more bureaucratic system for policy, supervision, and also for doing work in the field. Although I have nothing against bureaucracies as such, I qualify this as a negative consequence. They are unavoidable and necessary but they are self-serving organisms that increase the distance between policy and practice and often stand in the way of good research instead of stimulating it.

As everybody hoped, the implementation of the Valletta convention in national legislation has led to a very substantial increase in archaeological research, but also to an even more substantial increase in archaeological work that should be research but isn't. There is a problem here, because a lot of work is done that is either sloppy and unsatisfactory or irrelevant, more of the same, rife with plagiarism or otherwise superfluous and done only for legal reasons or commercial profit. That is why I have classified this as an ugly change. I certainly do not agree with assertions that commercial research as such brings little or no relevant results. Indeed it can be demonstrated that a lot of very good research is being done in a commercial context and I can see nothing inherently wrong with compliance driven research. But at the same time it can also be demonstrated that a lot of money is spent on archaeological investigation that produces nothing relevant. That in itself poses a serious risk and it is not difficult to imagine why that should be so, especially not in times when public spending has come under increasing scrutiny and government budgets are being trimmed. It is, however, exceedingly difficult to put a stop to and inspectors or other civil servants often shy away from being taken to court.

On a more positive note, archaeological research as well as practice have become much better integrated with planning science and other spatial sciences (for example: Fairclough & Rippon 2002). Urban and

rural landscapes are being studied by a variety of disciplines that have achieved at least some measure of integration. Also, programmes have been initiated in various countries to link the conservation and development of the landscape, and the areas of land-use planning and heritage policy have become intertwined to a much larger extent than ever before. In my own country, programmes such as Belvedere and the Protection and Development of the Archaeological-Historical Landscape have made an important contribution (Bloemers, Kars, Van der Valk & Wijnen 2010). In any case, we have seen major advances in both the internal integration of cultural historic disciplines like archaeology, historical geography and architectural history, and their external integration with other relevant disciplines from the social sciences. In retrospect, it is actually a bit strange to notice that this development was the result, rather than the cause of the integration of the practice of archaeological resource management in land-use planning.

Finally, one more positive consequence of the Valletta Convention should be mentioned because it is clear that the whole process at the Council of Europe and its aftermath, such as the European Plan for Archaeology launched in 1992, were of major influence in getting European archaeology organised (Willems 2013). Of course here too, external circumstances provided a trigger as well, in this case the fall of the Iron Curtain. That led to expansion of the Council of Europe and to initiatives such as the creation of the EAA and in its footsteps came the EAC. That history has been documented in the very first EAC publication (Willems 2000).

The Valletta Convention was in part a response to the massive infrastructure developments that had caused the destruction of archaeological remains at an unprecedented scale that the rescue archaeology of the 1970s and 80s had been unable to cope with. In that situation, there were essentially two approaches that were not mutually exclusive. One was to try and organize the rescue archaeology in such a way that maximum knowledge about the culture history of an area was obtained by large scale and innovative research projects (Willems 1997). The other was to try by surveying, predictive modeling, regional inventories and other such means to obtain advance knowledge about archaeological sites so that they could be avoided and preserved in situ.

The thoughts behind this were clear enough. A substantial part of the soil archive was being destroyed with no option to prevent that from happening, so the attitude was that the need for consumption of archaeological sites for research purposes was more than satisfied anyway, and it was best to preserve sites in situ as archives for future consumption by academic research and occasionally for public enjoyment when there were suitable visual aspects. Preservation in situ became enshrined in the Valletta Convention. In my view the most reasonable approach to this was voiced by Bill Lipe (1996) in his conclusion to a paper in which he poses that preservation is only a means, not an end: *In sum, what should drive archaeological preservation is the social benefit that archaeology can provide to society over the long run. That benefit is primarily the contribution*

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Borehole survey	-	-	2231	233	2556	2261	2318	2100	2093
Watching brief	177	242	214	246	249	279	296	354	426
Trial pits/trenches	232	323	410	420	500	503	540	481	465
Excavations	194	193	187	194	204	200	148	179	174

Table 19.1: The number and type of archaeological projects in the Netherlands from 2004–2011 (source: Erfgoedinspectie 2012, 15), supplemented with data from 2012 (source: Archis).

of knowledge about the past derived from systematic study of the archaeological record. In situ preservation of archaeological resources is a tool for optimizing that benefit. (.....)

Long-term, frugal consumption of the archaeological record by well-justified research—both problem-oriented and mitigation-driven—must be an accepted and integrated part of the preservation program. If the research doesn't get done, or if it gets done and we don't learn anything from it, or if only scholars learn from it and the public is shut out, then preservation will have been in vain, because its goals will have not been achieved.

What has happened, however, is that what is considered in this quote as a tool, has in practice become an end, a purpose by itself. It has become a dominant ideology (cf. also Willems 2012, from which what follows was derived) and I believe there are two main causes for this that I have already mentioned above: one is bureaucratization, the other commercialization.

Valletta and *in situ* preservation: a mixed blessing

Archaeological sites, or remains, or resources are also cultural heritage. And when archaeological resources are defined as heritage, it is clear that we are dealing with ascribed values, with conflicting interests, with local, national or international importance and therefore with governmental and administrative concerns and hence with a need for regulation. Until the 1970s archaeology was still largely an academic pursuit, and the specialized bureaucracies dealing with archaeological heritage management were mostly still in their infancies. When they began to grow, they were initially - and in some countries they are still - run by people with academic attitudes and training. By contrast archaeological heritage management today is usually part of a much larger bureaucracy within organizations such as quango's or state services and ministries of culture, or tourism, or national parks or combinations of that which have much larger and sometimes very different core purposes, who have senior staff with management and not academic qualifications, and who almost universally believe that the pursuit of knowledge is something that has no place in their organization because that is what

universities are for. As a policy, preservation *in situ* suits them well: it is respectable; internationally everybody else does it; as a rule it doesn't cost much money and if it does there are so-called mitigation strategies. And last but not least it is of course a source of considerable bureaucratic power.

The other reason is commercialization. Table 19.1 presents a table with the various types of archaeological work over the past eight years in The Netherlands. It was derived from the 2011 Annual Report of the Dutch Heritage Inspectorate (Erfgoedinspectie 2012), but the country and dates are in fact not important in this context, because the same can be found all around the globe. What is relevant is that the first three lines all indicate evaluation work and only the fourth indicates excavations. It is clear that only about 5–6 percent of all archaeological work involves excavation. Table 19.2 shows that about one third of these excavations are actually just a very short affair of a few days, usually just one. This is typical, and apparently in all western countries that have commercial archaeology, it is primarily evaluation work that gets done. It is much more in demand by the bureaucracy and it is much less risky as a business. No company that is honest and works according to normal standards and ethical principles, can exist from only excavation as a business, let alone make an acceptable profit. They can, however, do real well on evaluation work and consultancy.

If you are starting to wonder where all this is leading: I am just saying that this is how the system works. Everybody does surveys and other evaluation work and what is supposed to be a cyclical process whereby some sites are then excavated and generate new knowledge, does in fact most of the time stop with some test pits or trial trenches and lots of site avoidance or preservation *in situ* (Figure 19.1). The result is that fewer and fewer proper excavations get done, that we therefore learn less about the past and that the social role of archaeology diminishes where its negative economic impact increases. We simply have less stories to tell and of course the public has no interest in shovel testing.

In a recent Dutch report (Schute, Lobbes and Verbruggen 2011) it was concluded on the basis of

Table 19.2: The duration of excavations in the Netherlands from 2004–2011 (source: Erfgoedinspectie 2012, 15), supplemented with data from 2012 (source: Archis).

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1-5 days	54	58	63	60	58	59	38	59	64
6-10 days	23	23	29	38	43	37	30	29	36
11-30 days	41	69	55	57	71	63	47	52	48
more than 30 days	38	39	34	37	29	40	31	37	26
unknown	38	4	6	2	3	1	2	2	-
total excavations	194	193	187	194	204	200	148	179	174



Figure 19.1: a) A labour intensive academic research excavation of a burial mound in Apeldoorn. b) A labour extensive commercial excavation of a settlement in Barneveld, the Netherlands. (photos: municipality of Apeldoorn and H. Woudenberg).

a selected sample that - of the selection of sites that have been evaluated as 'worth preserving' - 38% is then actually preserved in situ. It is difficult to interpret that figure, because it is unknown how many sites were not considered valuable enough ('worth preserving') and it is also unclear if the percentage is representative for the Netherlands in general. However the same study indicates that in practice virtually none of these sites are subsequently protected legally or subjected to actual preservation measures, though a small part (almost 9%) receives protection from destruction through the spatial planning system. For the remainder (30%) development plans have been adapted or abandoned. The other 60% was excavated in some form or examined under a watching brief. These may not be representative figures but at least they give some indication of the situation in a densely populated country with a high development pressure.

What is achieved by this preservation in situ policy is no doubt that less excavation work is necessary so the development becomes cheaper, and substantial numbers of sites remain in situ. By itself that is of course what the policy aims to do, though in most cases it is totally uncertain what will happen to the sites involved. In addition to this lack of legal or planning protection, there is still little research being done that could underpin the assumption that preservation in situ would actually be the best solution in the increasingly polluted environment of today. There are groups such as around the Paris meetings, where PARIS stands for "preserving archaeological remains in situ" (Kars & Van Heeringen 2008). This type of science-based research is of course very useful (Huisman 2009), but also quite expensive and for the moment its results remain limited because of the complexity of degradation processes. The ongoing process of climate change probably dwarfs anything that can be done through technical preservation measures and so does the intensification of agriculture.

Also, as mentioned above, it gets increasingly common in the practice of heritage management to define all sorts of damaging impacts that are allowed to take place on preserved sites as part of mitigation strategies. There are sites that are allowed to be built over, or partially excavated sites of which the remaining portions are

"preserved in situ" in awful conditions by administrative decision, just to reach a compromise and with virtually no chance of survival until a very hypothetical future research excavation. Even in the western countries discussed so far, that is quite unlikely to ever happen. There still are a very few pure research institutions left, but their capacity is infinitely small compared to the size of the problem, and they also serve political goals as is evident from their connection to Ministries of Foreign Affairs such as the *Deutsches Archäologisches Institut* and the *Écoles françaises* in various parts of the world. University based academics are in fierce competition over scarce grants and increasingly need to publish in peer reviewed journals and in the English language, or perish. The contribution they can make is also very limited.

To be fair, it should also be acknowledged that the system does have at least one real benefit because at the regional level our knowledge about the landscape and its uses in the past, does on average increase and we get much better ideas on its habitation and other uses (Van den Dries 2011).

There is the obvious truth that where the gains for society are more appealing, there will be more political and public support for preservation policies. As has long been recognized, subsurface archaeological sites can best be preserved through the careful management of change in landscapes (Fairclough and Rippon 2002, Lozny 2008, Bloemers a.o. 2010). This creates added values that may be perceived as compensation for and legitimation of the cost of preserving land containing archaeological resources. But in the end, it remains of course the visible landscape that is perceived as valuable or enjoyable, and so even within that framework it is necessary to provide historical and other context about places to illustrate their relevance and justify why they should be preserved. Buried archaeological sites lack associative values of visible sites, but they have to be regarded as an asset, not a burden.

This is a point that has recently been put forward most explicitly by Spennemann (2011), who rightly points out that the cost of historic preservation is incurred *today*, in the here and now, so its benefits should be clear today. He warns against the "preserving the past for the future" phraseology so widely used by heritage organizations as justification for preservation

policies. Indeed, heritage is all about ascribed values and archaeological resources become archaeological heritage through the values we attach to them. There is no way to predict what values will be held by future generations so essentially, according to Spennemann, we are preserving the past for ourselves. That fits well with earlier statements such as by Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) who concluded that “the present selects an inheritance from an imagined past for current use and decides what should be passed on as useful to an imagined future”.

So in order to be relevant for the world of today, archaeological heritage can contribute in various ways to the economic and social well being of present day nations or communities, it can be “a driver of development” (Gottfried & Hidalgo Sánchez 2012), a source of income through tourism and it can be used to provide identity and a sense of rootedness. None of these is without problems and risks, and much attention is nowadays paid to develop best practices and standards to help overcome unwanted effects and consequences. But in the end, in order to actually be useful and relevant today, all this needs to be based on research. No matter whether we ‘discover’ the past or ‘create’ it, and no matter if we do this through scientific research or by more collaborative means involving stakeholder communities, we do need to investigate so that we can have the stories needed for interpretation.

An important conclusion from this - in my opinion - is that the trend in which heritage management agencies or bureaucracies are taking less responsibility for bringing research to fruition and make sure the public enjoys its benefits, should be reversed. That is especially relevant because the contribution that academic archaeology can make in the bulk of development-driven archaeological research, is severely limited for quantitative reasons and the constraints under which academic research works.

Beyond Europe

That point is even more true in third world countries, where academic archaeology is usually even smaller in absolute terms and may be limited to just a few people at the national level. In a recent paper, MacEachern (2010) has outlined what can happen in such a situation when western companies start large scale projects. International organizations such as UNESCO, the World Bank, the European Development Bank, or major international businesses like Exxon and Rio Tinto, have developed standards on how to manage cultural heritage and they have ethical policies to deal with the impact of development on cultural resources. For international companies such as Rio Tinto, good cultural resource management (CRM) policies have become sound business principles and part of their risk management strategies, so compliance is not an issue. Most companies are used to taking responsibility for cultural heritage, an outstanding example is Rio Tinto’s recent cultural heritage guide (Bradshaw 2011), but it appears that the way in which this is done determines if it is any use.

MacEachern has been dealing with Exxon in Central Africa, and worked on a pipeline project in Chad

and Cameroon. In his paper he comments on the archaeological heritage management strategy that was mirrored after western practices. This implied that, for example, senior local academics not used to tenders and contract work were excluded because they could not respond adequately. Apart from such mostly unintended consequences, the western (in this case North American) model of CRM programs was used, which meant that site avoidance and mitigation of construction impacts on cultural heritage were the primary goals. Excavation for research purposes - to learn something about the cultural history of an area - or for training purposes, were seen as both an illegitimate use of client funds and an unacceptable act of destruction of archaeological resources. However, the idea that site avoidance and preservation are the only valid strategies in CRM work is, in MacEachern’s view, based upon assumptions about archaeological work that are not realistic in a third world and particularly a Central African context.

Unlike in western countries, it cannot be assumed that resources exist to support research archaeology in a context separate from that of development-led heritage management work. Even to assume this will be possible in the future, is unfounded. Another circumstance that is very different from the situation in western contexts is the fact that after the conclusion of a CRM program it may well be totally impossible to get access to particular areas or particular classes of sites. And in cases where it would be possible to undertake any follow up research, that is still rather unlikely to ever happen because resources are normally lacking. Even worse is the presumption that the primarily commercial relationship between contractor and client should not take into account ‘extraneous’ issues like the development of national archaeological capabilities and the investigation of culture history in different parts of the world. This makes sense in the western world where the developer does not want to pay for things that belong to the responsibility of the state. But elsewhere it is not just shortsighted, it is worse than that. Not taking these opportunities into account goes against principles codified in World Bank directives on cultural heritage protection in bank-assisted projects (MacEachern 2010, 357). Using such opportunities of infrastructure development, capacity building and investigation of culture history are in fact seen by the bank as legitimate objectives. The same attitude is also evident from other examples, such as the cultural policy of Rio Tinto. In that policy (see Bradshaw 2011, 16) it is stated explicitly that “cultural heritage management for Rio Tinto businesses is broader than just managing the impacts of ground disturbance”.

In general, it would therefore seem to be a bad idea to export European notions of preservation in situ and site avoidance and mitigation procedures that are embedded in the Valletta Convention. Instead, it would be much more useful if in third world contexts capacity building and taking advantage of properly resourced research opportunities *as a rule* take precedence over maintaining principles. In addition, while in many situations it may be unavoidable to employ western methods and staff, care should be taken not to transplant the complete *modus operandi*. If we don’t use the opportunity when it presents itself, we will

lose not just the information about the past and what it can be used for, but also the sites, the fabric, will be lost and possibly even the rare chance to properly train and educate local colleagues. Especially if the work is done in a collaborative setting, much can be learned from both sides.

To conclude, it is evident that of course in some particular situations and especially in densely populated European countries, preservation in situ sometimes is a useful strategy. In non western countries that may occasionally also be the case. After all we are dealing with a non renewable resource that is limited, and sometimes local populations do not wish resources that they value - as heritage or in other ways - to be touched. But often preservation in situ is either misused by uncritical application in situations where research and other objectives might have been better served by proper investigation, or it is consciously misused to prevent additional costs and investment. As an ethical principle that has universal application it is therefore questionable and in need of serious reconsideration, as a bureaucratic policy it has serious negative aspects that need to be considered, and as a dogma of archaeological resource management, it is highly dubious and may even be counterproductive. We should be very cautious in exporting Valletta.

References

- Bloemers, T., Kars, H., van der Valk, A. & Wijnen, M. (ed.) 2010: *The Cultural Landscape and Heritage Paradox. Protection and development of the Dutch Archaeological-Historical Landscape and its European Dimension*. Amsterdam.
- Bradshaw, E. (ed) 2011: *Why cultural heritage matters. A resource guide for integrating cultural heritage management into Communities work at Rio Tinto*. Melbourne/London.
- Council of Europe 1987: *Archaeology and planning. Report of the Florence Colloquy*. Architectural Heritage Reports and Studies 5, Strasbourg.
- Council of Europe 1989: *Archaeology and major public works. Report of the Nice Colloquy*. Architectural Heritage Reports and Studies 12, Strasbourg.
- Council of Europe 1992: *European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised)*. European Treaty Series 143, Strasbourg.
- Erfgoedinspectie 2012: *Verslag van het toezicht in 2011*. Den Haag.
- Fairclough, G. & S. Rippon (ed.) 2002: *Europe's Cultural Landscape: archaeologists and the management of change*. EAC Occasional Paper 2, Brussels.
- Gottfried, C. & S. Hidalgo Sánchez (ed.) 2012: *Heritage, a driver of development. Proceedings of the 17th ICOMOS General Assembly Symposium*. Paris.
- Huisman, D.J. 2009: *Degradation of Archaeological Remains*, Den Haag.
- Kars, H. & R.M. van Heeringen (ed.) 2008: *Preserving archaeological remains in situ. Proceedings of the 3rd conference 7-9 December 2006, Amsterdam, Geoarchaeological and Bioarchaeological Studies 10*, Amsterdam.
- Lipe, W.D. 1996: In Defense of Digging: Archeological Preservation as a Means, Not an End. *CRM Cultural Resource Management* 19.7, 23-27.
- Lozny, L.R. (ed.) 2008: *Landscapes Under Pressure. Theory and Practice of Cultural Heritage Research and Preservation*. New York.
- MacEachern, S. 2010: Seeing like an oil company's CHM programme. Exxon and archaeology on the Chad Export Project, *Journal of Social Archaeology* 10, 347-366.
- Myklebust, D. (ed.) 2001: *First European Conference on Voluntary Organisations in the field of cultural heritage*, Oslo.
- Schute, I.A., Lobbes, M.E. & Verbruggen, M. 2011: *Wie wat bewaard die heeft wat*. Amsterdam (RAAP Rapport 2525).
- Spennemann, D.H.R. 2011: Beyond "Preserving the Past for the Future": Contemporary Relevance and Historic Preservation, *CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stewardship* 8, 7-22.
- Tully, G. 2007: Community archaeology: general methods and standards of practice. *Public Archaeology* 56.3, 155-187.
- Tunbridge, J. E. & Ashworth, G.J. 1996: *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*. New York.
- Van den Dries, M. 2011: The good, the bad and the ugly? Evaluating three models of implementing the Valletta Convention, *World Archaeology* 43(4), 594-604.
- Van de Rijdt, T. 2011: Malta en de rol van vrijwilligers in de archeologie [5]: Belangenbehartiging bij ruimtelijk beleid. *Westerheem* 60.5, 210-218.
- Wainwright, G. 2000: A future for European Archaeology, in W.J.H. Willems (ed.): *Challenges for European Archaeology*, Zoetermeer, 53-56.
- Willems, W.J.H. 1997: Archaeological Heritage Management in the Netherlands: Past, Present and Future, in: W.J.H. Willems, H. Kars & D.P. Hallewas (ed.), *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Netherlands*, Amersfoort, 3-17.
- Willems, W.J.H. 2007: The work of making Malta: the Council of Europe's archaeology and planning committee 1988-1996, *European Journal of Archaeology* 10.1, 57-71.
- Willems, W.J.H. 2008: Sur la genèse de la convention de Malte, *Archéopages*, hors série, février 2008 [Festschrift J.-P. Demoule], 135-139.
- Willems, W.J.H. 2012: Problems with preservation in situ, *Analecta Praehistorica Leidensia* 43/44, 1-8.
- Willems, W.J.H. 2013: On the Organization of European Archaeology, in: S. Bergerbrant & S. Sabatini (ed.), *Counterpoint: Essays in Archaeology and Heritage Studies in Honour of Professor Kristian Kristiansen*, BAR S2508, Oxford, 17-20.