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The Socially Constructed Security Dilemma between India and Pakistan: an Exploration of norms for a Security Community

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                     Dr. Lee Seymour (Universiteit Leiden)

"Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth:

that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true"

<div align="right">(Foucault 1994: 31)</div>

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Abbreviations and List of Tables

ASEAN   Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BJP   Bharatiya Janata Party

BJS   Bharatiya Jana Sangh

CBFC   Central Board of Film Certification

CENTO   Central Treaty Organisation

EU   European Union

IR   International Relations

KRL   Kahuta Research Laboratories

MAD   Mutually Assured Destruction

PAEC   Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

RSS   Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

SAARC   South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SEATO   Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation

TWF   Television Without Frontiers

VHP   Vishva Hindu Preshad

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1: Introduction

The intense rivalry between India and Pakistan has prevented regional peace in South Asia since the birth of these two states in 1947. The absence of peace between these two nations has put the destiny of more than one billion people at stake. Pakistan is a small state when compared to India, it has a weak institutional base, and it has mostly been ruled by the military since its inception. In comparison, India is geographically the largest country in South Asia and shares borders with all seven states of this region. It has a long tradition of democracy. Naturally, because of her sheer size, military might, economy and huge population [billion plus], India considers itself to be a great regional power if not a global power. In order to counteract China, India works hard to maintain its supremacy in the South Asian region. But its security relations with Pakistan impede India from becoming a regional superpower. This ebb and flow in their security relations has brought India and Pakistan to war three times in 1948, 1965 and in 1971, as well as leading them to a passive armed conflict in 1999. A new dimension of rivalry was added in 1998 when both states became overt nuclear competitors. This has brought the South Asian region to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. A major factor which is deteriorating regional peace is the dismal security relations between these two states.

Now let us look at the sentiments of Indians and Pakistanis towards this conflict. A survey was jointly done by two leading national dailies of India and Pakistan [*The Times of India* and *The News*] at the beginning of 2010 to gauge the popular sentiments of Indians and Pakistanis regarding their security relations. This survey showed that "72% of Pakistanis desired 'peaceful and friendly relations with India' while '60 percent

Indians were hopeful of such an eventuality" (*TheNews* 1.1.2010). *The Times of India* reported: "About two-thirds of those polled in India and almost three-fourths of those in Pakistan said they desire a peaceful relationship between the two countries. Only a tiny minority, 17% in India and 8% in Pakistan, are opposed to the idea of consigning hostility to the dustbin of history" (*ThetimesofIndia* 1.1.2010). The survey was part of the efforts launched on New Years Eve [2010] by these two leading mass media conglomerates of India and Pakistan, captioned under the title of "Aman ki Asha" [desire for peace]. People were polled in six major Indian cities and eight Pakistani cities as well as 36 villages. Without deliberating on the methodology employed or the data set used in it, this survey gives us a general idea of variations in the two levels of analysis adopted in this study. One is the level of distrust which is conventionally presented by both states' political and military elites which I have discussed in the first paragraph and the other is the popular level which is the desire for peace in the region among the majority of people from both sides.

This inherent tension between popular perceptions and the perceptions of the ruling elites has created a security dilemma between India and Pakistan. This security dilemma is unique because it is caused by the social practices of both states' ruling elites. The ideas propagated by the elites are responsible for shaping the conflict between these two states. The propagation of this elite-designed security dilemma is necessary for pursuing the elites' vested interests. For example, in Pakistan, the army is the principal actor in state politics and it needs the perception of a continuous Indian threat to keep hold on its stakes in the state polity. Similarly, in India, the Hindu fundamentalist parties have based their political agenda on anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani sentiments.

Consequently, in the sixty three years since the founding of Pakistan, the army has ruled directly for thirty-three years, while the Hindu fundamentalist parties in India have been in power three times [1996, 1997 and from 1998-2004]. These examples show the high stakes of the elites of both states that make up this rivalry.

All scholars agree that a security dilemma exists between India and Pakistan. A security dilemma refers to the predicament that arises in the relations between state A and state B, whereby any security initiative of state A is perceived by state B as a threat that weakens the security of state B. Since the separation of the two states in 1947, India and Pakistan have had conflict with each other many times over the past sixty-three years. There have been few long durations of peace without either of the two countries accusing the other of wrongdoing. Their rivalry has traditionally been studied as a power struggle between two states in an anarchic world system. If India tests a new nuclear device or fires a missile it is perceived as an aggressive act by Pakistan and ultimately results in some kind of reciprocal action. According to the realist model, the security dilemma between India and Pakistan can easily be described as being caused by the selfish interests of the states. But is this a security dilemma based solely on the materialistic capabilities of the states? Are these two states really like units engaged in cost benefit calculations? Moreover, are the defensive moves by one state always considered as an act of aggression by the other?

There is something more to the relationship of both states than the usual explanation based only on the material capabilities of states. The security dilemma between India and Pakistan is also influenced by ideational factors, such as national and religious identities and the social practices of the principal actors of both states.

Moreover, I assume that there are some aspects or attributes which are very peculiar to the region and cannot be grasped fully by these traditional materialistic theories. These factors among others include culture, states' identities, an intersubjective social environment and other domestic factors that contribute to the overall 'social cognitive structure' of the conflict between India and Pakistan (Hopf 2002). These additional factors are better addressed by a social constructivist approach, due to its emphasis on ideational discourses, rather than with materialistic theories like neorealism or institutional liberalism.

Why do these negative perceptions prevail in both countries regarding each others security concerns? Why is an Indian security act perceived as a threat to Pakistan's security and how does it add fuel to the security dilemma? Pakistan's social construction of Indian identity can be traced back to the days when these two countries were undivided during the British colonial period. The Muslims and the Hindus never amalgamated as a nation and there was never a common self-abnegation of these two communities. The 'we feeling' required for peaceful coexistence within the subcontinent and the integration of the region has never been allowed to develop by these country's respective elites (Fierke 2007). The perception of many Indian elites regarding Pakistan after independence in 1947 was that it was "the vivisection of the motherland" [the phrase used by Mahatma Gandhi of India] (Wolpert 2005: 103).Various Hindu leaders issued policy statements at the birth of Pakistan describing the division as a temporary phase in the history of the subcontinent. At that time, the Congress party [the founding party of India] passed a resolution that in the future Pakistan would come back under the folds of 'mother India.' Pakistan was born as a weak state. It was weak not only in terms

of capital, but also weak institutionally, as well as psychologically due to the huge influx of refugees and communal violence. The perception of Pakistan in this environment and under these circumstances towards India was that of fear and annihilation. The continued survival of the state of Pakistan and the fear of the Indian army posed at its borders became the immediate concerns after independence in 1947. These two different and opposing perceptions of the two states have helped in carving out their identities with respect to each other. Pakistan perceives India as a hegemonic power and the ultimate enemy, while India perceives Pakistan as a breakaway part of India and a constant threat to its own fragile communal balance. The daily interaction of both states has ascribed an intersubjective structure of non-cooperation on all issues. Every action by the two states is always perceived to be the result of this intersubjective anarchic structure.

This intersubjective part of their relationship, apart from its materialistic connotations, also has an equally important ideational component based on socio-cultural norms, the states' narratives and the elites' discourses regarding both states' identities. The inadequate knowledge of the socially constructed nature of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan is one aspect of the problem that will be examined in this dissertation. The other aspect is normative and deals with the resolution of this security dilemma by envisaging a hypothetical security community. Creating a security community is one of the means of obliterating a security dilemma. It simply refers to the stable expectations of peace, the absence of war or the absence of any 'organized' planning of war between states (Deutsch 1970; Khoo 2004). This security community will be theoretically conceptualized in Chapter 3. Every security community needs some common material interests. What could be the common material interests between India

and Pakistan? They can be economic, security or political interests. At the same time the ideational component requires the articulation of such common interests in order to bring them to the attention of the decision makers for joint policy making and collective action. I will be exploring this ideational component as the first step in the formation of the security community. Such a community requires an intersubjective understanding of mutual cooperation among states. The irony for the formation of a security community between India and Pakistan is that although the people of both states have knowledge, as well as shared understandings of each other, this shared understanding of each other's identity has been negatively articulated as states' interests through the elites' social practices. Therefore, there are several advantages to explain the existing security dilemma from a cultural vantage point and to look for its normative solution in a security community.

First, there is a noticeable gap in the existing literature dealing with South Asian security (Nizamani 2008). The security relationships between India and Pakistan are mostly explained through existing theories of power politics (Talbot 2000b; Ganguly 2005; Paul 2005; Kapur 2006). Similar premises of materialistic theories developed in the Western hemisphere do not take into account the important aspect of culture in the lives of South Asians. The enormity of the task in the absence of any alternative framework demands a comprehensive analysis of these two states' security relations. Such a study should not only take into account the core security disputes between India and Pakistan [Kashmir dispute and the nuclear issue], but should also consider those social factors contributing to the genesis of both states' rival identities which led to such intractable security disputes in the first place.

Second, without summarily discarding explanations based on material expositions or the power struggles between states the added value in this study is the exploration of social norms which form an important aspect of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, my normative research objective, to explore the possibility of a security community between India and Pakistan, will be aided by the exploration of these social norms. Finally, a socio-cultural perspective will help us to devise ways of conflict resolution among states that are bound together in similar cultures. Insights gained from this case study will help us emulate security communities based on the cultural patterns of a particular region around the globe.

The importance of explaining the security quagmire between India and Pakistan with an alternate theoretical framework can result on the one hand in identifying peaceful norms that can lessen bilateral security tensions and on the other hand can eliminate the space given to transnational terrorists who threaten the region. A classical example of this has been witnessed recently in 2008 in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist attacks when India used phrases like 'surgical strikes' and 'limited war' referring to Pakistan. The hostile relations between India and Pakistan have provided terrorists a chance to exploit the dismal security relations between these two states for their own gains. The trust deficit between these two states, in addition to the incongruity of material power, has an equally important socio-cultural aspect that is often neglected and seldom gets enough recognition.

This leads to my main research question which is as follows: Can a security community be socially constructed between India and Pakistan as a means to solve the security dilemma between these two countries? This main puzzle will be unraveled in the

subsequent chapters of my dissertation. My thrust of arguments for explaining the security dilemma and exploration of an abstract security community between India and Pakistan are based on the following two assumptions;

- The rivalry between the two states is elite centric and carefully grafted in the identity and security discourses of two states by the elites.

- The social norms required for the formation of a security community that are found in the culture of both states are held hostage by the social practices of elites.

My argument is that the security dilemma in South Asia is constructed by the social practices of the elites in India and Pakistan and that there is enough justification to envisage a security community based on the intersubjective socio-cultural norms found in both states among the people in general. Presently, there is a hidden tension among the elites and the masses concerning the two states' mutual threat perceptions. The identity discourses which both states have undertaken for their security are being constructed by elites which require a threat perception of the 'Other', in order to survive the 'existential anxiety' of self identity (Giddens 1991). The elites have not tried to explore the existence of socio-cultural norms that are required for security community formation because of their own vested interests.

This research adopts a two pronged approach. I will first explain the security dilemma that exists between the two countries from a social constructivist perspective. I will then formulate normative arguments for the creation of a hypothetical security community as an alternative to the current security dilemma.

In order to better explain the security dilemma that exists between India and Pakistan, I have selected as my case studies the Kashmir issue and the nuclear problem. The Kashmir dispute was the main reason behind three out of four wars [1948, 1965 and 1999] between India and Pakistan. The dispute regarding Kashmir is also one of the longest standing issues before the United Nations. While the nuclear issue has led to a regional nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, it is also the core case of materialistic theories and by exploring its socio-cultural component, this study aims to add value to the existing knowledge about the conflict. The proposed security community between India and Pakistan is also compared with two existing security communities, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the European Union [EU]. The significance of this comparative analysis depends upon the comparability of the three regions. Are these three security communities comparable? At a first glance, it appears that the answer is negative, considering the optimal level of security and cooperation achieved in the EU, the increased skepticism concerning ASEAN's function as a security community and the non-existent India-Pakistan security community. But the motive of this research is not to score points over the efficacy of a security community, rather its aim is to explore the nature and 'path dependence' of security communities (North 1990). The selection of the EU and ASEAN as existing security communities has been made after taking into consideration the distinctiveness of geographical regions and their divergent cultural fault lines. It is a move to explain that security communities are dependant upon regional norms and cultural distinctiveness and a varied geographical perspective is required for the comparability of cases.

Traditional International Relations theories are commonly used to define security relations in the Third World, yet these theories usually ignore cultural factors. My objective is to explore these socio-cultural factors and other variables which influence the context of security relations in Third World states like India and Pakistan and which are important stepping stones for security community formation. The case study of India and Pakistan security relations shows the impact of such context related variables. Similarly, the case study of ASEAN presented in the later part of this dissertation affirms the 'context bounded ness' of security communities (Acharya 2009b).

In other words, exploring the possibility of a security community between two arch rivals first requires the explanation of their security dilemma by going beyond the pre-destined notions of the materialistic theories. If these theories have failed in the West to predict the end of the Cold War by remaining in the narrow confines of bi- polar, ego-centric Cold War power politics, how can they be of relevance to a region full of cultural dogmas, divisive politics, personality cults and religious norms such as South Asia and Southeast Asia? In summary, this dissertation seeks to identify the socio-cultural factors behind the security dilemma as well as contemplate the 'context boundedness' of security communities (Acharya 2009a). This study by adopting a social constructivist approach is basically a theory guided dissertation. This does not imply that I am testing the validity of a theory, but rather it explains the 'problem solving' nature of a theory (Cox 1981). This means my arguments are derived from the theoretical spring board of social constructivism. This will become apparent in the explanation of the security dilemma and the security community, as well as in the empirical analysis of the study subsequently.

In order to answer the main research question at two levels of analysis [elite and popular], the methodology mainly used is critical discourse analysis [CDA] (Wodak and Meyer 2001). To explain in simple terms, discourse is a linguistic term commonly defined as "texts and talk as part of social practices" (Potter and Hepburn 2008: 276). Critical discourse analysis examines the 'structural relationship' between power and language (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This means that language can only gain prominence if it is used by those who are in power. There are two prior steps which are of utmost importance while adopting the methodology of CDA. One is the proper grounding of language in the historical context which means giving prominence to 'extra linguistic factors' like 'cultural, society and ideology' (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 15). The other is the 'continuous feedback' or resonance between data and the theoretical framework. Context is a 'social structure' whose 'properties' help us to explain the discourse (Dijk 2001). In other words, CDA is strongly embedded in theoretical insights. It is an 'abductive approach' which demands a constant' to and fro motion between theory and 'empirical data' (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 70). 'Cultural competence' is a strong prerequisite for any form of discourse analysis (Neumann 2008). The person should not only be able to identify the cultural metaphors used by those presenting a discourse, but also recognize their influence on the general public. The data sets used for this study vary from press clippings, to elites' statements and to mass media programs.

To understand the role of elites in the security dilemma, an analysis of speeches of the elite will be conducted. In this regard, this dissertation seeks to analyze the political rhetoric of elites who use a specific cultural phraseology while attempting to establish their discourse as the predominant discourse. This phraseology is carefully

measured by taking into account the relevant historical context and is then put into the wider context of security. The thesis explains the social norms of animosity, historical narrations of rivalry and distinct religious norms employed by the ruling elites in their respective states' identity and security discourses. This 'politico-linguistic analysis' explains why the state's security practices are being strongly influenced by the nexus between 'polity' (states), 'policy' (states' identity) and 'politics' (elites' rhetoric) (Reisigl 2008). This interpretive technique involves explaining the discourse by first qualitatively taking into account 'the social, historical and the political context' or the wider discourse in which the discursive factors are being placed (Reisigl 2008).

To understand the exploration of socio-cultural norms of India-Pakistan security community at the popular level, the popular culture methodology is used in Chapter 7. The methodology of popular culture in social constructivism traverses the identity course of a state through mass media, 'pulp fiction' and literary classics found in societies (Milliken 2001; Hopf 2002; Mautner 2008). Milliken who defends this methodology explains, "[by] analyzing the everyday cultural conditions of novels, comic books, television and film and how they render sensible and legitimate particular state action" (Milliken 2001: 149). The methodology studies the role of social factors and their impact on regulating and constituting social norms of behaviour. The popular culture approach studies the role of mass media to construct a lay man's identity. It explores social norms by studying 'pulp fiction' and popular films (Hopf 2002). Although this methodology is relatively new in the field of International Relations, its potential has already been demonstrated (Shapiro 1997; Milliken 2001; Weber 2001; Hopf 2002). The various genres of popular culture among others include films, television, literary classics, novels

and fiction. By considering Indian films as cultural arenas of mass production of meaning in both India and Pakistan, this study not only analysis the thematic approach of films, including their scripts and settings, but also the censorship regimes imposed on these films by the ruling elites of India. I will not discuss the scope of Pakistani films for a number of reasons. First, I will not consider Pakistani films because of their poor view ship as very few people watch them. Second, an average Pakistani prefers watching Indian films and third, the Indian films are cheap and easily accessible through out Pakistan. Indian films are not only a major source of entertainment in India and Pakistan, but they are also responsible for the production of meaning in the every day lives and routines of the people.

It is also important to mention that since the beginning of the 1990s anti-Pakistan films in India are on the rise and this critical junction also marks the rise of Hindu fundamentalist parties in India and reflects the brittle security relationship between the two states. A brief overview of the methodology adopted in the study of the popular culture of films is explained below:

- Selection of Indian films based on India-Pakistan security relationship.

- Critical discourse analysis of the content and underlying message of the films.

- Examine the strict 'censorship regime' imposed by the state's elites on these films.

- Link these themes to the wider discourse of elites' social practices and security in the region.

The popular culture methodology also analysis the literary classics of India and Pakistan. It brings to surface the nostalgic feelings of both societies which have so far been denied space by the ruling elites. There is an advantage to use the popular culture methodology, since it reveals the hidden tension between the states' ruling elites and aspirations of the majority of the people by exposing the strict 'censorship' regimes imposed by elites. This clearly demonstrates the difference between elite social practices and the people's aspirations. It is an interpretive phenomenological exercise of explaining states' identities.

Chapter 7 also offers a comparative study of security communities and adopts discourse analysis along with 'anthropological insights' of regional norms as being highlighted in respective discourse of a security community (Klotz and Lynch 2007). It brings out hidden social norms influencing the course of security communities by focusing on the discursive factors that can be found in the political speeches of the ruling elites. Social norms are explored from the domestic source of security communities and then these variables are tabulated and compared. The precarious security situation in both states impedes me from conducting open ended interviews in India and Pakistan. The data that has been used for CDA are the speeches of both states ruling elites found in the archives and national newspapers. These data sources are complemented with secondary sources obtained from books, periodicals and existing literature. The primary data also analyzes history text books in India and Pakistan which are being taught at the primary and secondary schools as well as the thematic analysis of Indian films of 1990s. In order to control my own biases, 'triangulation' was adopted through the content analysis of the leading contemporary national newspapers from India and Pakistan. Fortunately, both

states have national dailies available online and are easily accessible. The data used comes from three leading Indian dailies which include *The Times of India*, *The Hindu* and *India Today* while the main newspapers from Pakistan are the preeminent English daily *Dawn*, *The News* and the *Daily Times*. In order to examine the policy statements of Indian elites I will specially focus on the national media coverage of the Indian general elections of 2009. This will help to understand to what extent Pakistan plays a role in the Indian security discourse and vice versa. The study of these national dailies provides additional coverage and information concerning the state of affairs in contemporary South Asia.

The methodology used brings to light the intersubjective character of the shared interests and social norms of the people. The leaders' speeches reported in the press and archives are contextualized with secondary sources from the existing literature. In a nut shell, discourse analysis explains the context of meanings and the 'accompanying process of communication' (Klotz and Lynch 2007:19). However, there are some methodological constraints in the study of both types of social practices [elites vs. masses].

Regarding the social practices of the elites, the requirements of a rigorous discourse analysis demand that texts gathered from different sources should be clearly defined and demarcated. The primary sources used for the discourse analysis of the elite should be subdivided into official texts, intra-party debates and so on. But there is a problem in constructing the ideal settings required for such a discourse analysis. This problem not only has to do with the paucity of well documented materials, but also, more importantly, relates to the inaccessibility of these materials to researchers. There is a coterie of elites that are actually involved in decision making and an outsider has no

access to this decision making processes in both India and Pakistan. Nor for that matter can I ascribe relative weight to any of the sources studied for the elites' discourse since there is no catagorisation of such sources in the first place. That is why I have to rely a great deal on my secondary sources to collect the speeches of elite from archives and books as well as from newspapers. However, this does not mean that the entire trajectory of discourse analysis is lost due to the inaccessibility of sources. This study adopted a critical discourse analysis [CDA] rather than an ordinary discourse analysis. The CDA particularly studies the language of those who are in power (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). If we study the role the elites in India and Pakistan played in chartering the course of both states' security relations by making a causal link of their public speeches through CDA to their social practices, then we can better appreciate the importance of this critique. This is because CDA, as explained by Wodak, is "fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language" (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). The paucity of sources is a problem, but not a major impediment for the use of CDA because the 'structural relationship' of the dominance of the elites is readily apparent in both states' intersubjective security relations (Wodak and Meyer 2001). This means studying the context of the speeches of both states' elites becomes more important than studying a simple text in order to expose these structures of dominance.

The CDA is different from normal discourse analysis in a number of ways. First of all it is deliberately focused on the discourse of the powerful and how they manipulated the organs of the dissemination of information in order to present their constructed reality. One of the pioneers of this approach van Dijk explains that CDA

"focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination…[it shows] 'solidarity with the oppressed' with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk" (Dijk 2001: 96). Moreover, "there is no typical CDA way of collected data" (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 23). That may make the CDA a biased approach, but that is just what it is. As van Dijk explains, "CDA is biased - and proud of it" (Dijk 2001: 96). Actually, CDA is more concerned with exposing the embeddedness or the 'context' in which the text is placed by focusing on the "concepts of power, history and ideology" (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 3)

By following the above parameters of CDA, this study does not further elaborate on the essentiality of establishing well defined parameters for the relevant data. However, it does promise to explore the embeddedness of the text by locating it in the relevant historical time frame. The aim is clear since the CDA was used in order to explain the role of the powerful elites in constructing the intersubjective security dilemma between the two states. Right from the onset this study may seem biased and the verdict which implicate the elites may be evident through out the study. But that is what the aim of this study is all about, to expose the 'regimes of truth' held by the powerful elites while constructing the identity and security discourses of the two states (Foucault 1994). The methodology adopted first explains the 'theoretical analysis' of the research problem and then in the light of a predestined theoretical approach the 'discourse or social structures' are analysed (Dijk 2001: 98). It is called 'theoretical sampling' which means that we first analyse the theoretical requirements of the research problem and then the relevant data is examined (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 24).

Regarding popular social practices, the methodology of popular culture and anthropological insights demands a very careful analysis of the complexity of societal views in India and Pakistan. But again this study focuses on the social norms with an impact on people's daily practices. For this purpose, Indian films, educational curricula and the rhetoric of the elite have been singled out as examples. But these are not the only ones that form the major portion of the 'social cognitive order' on which the social practices of the average Indian and Pakistani are constructed daily (Hopf 2002). This means that the study does not aim to bring to light the complexity of societal differentiation based on various aspects of public opinion. This study instead focuses on the explanation of socio-cultural norms that form the social practices of both the elites and the masses alike. The text books studied in Chapter 7 are the compulsory text books which have been taught to young students from grade school through University since the independence of both states. So there is no need to explain the sampling in terms of time and other similar factors. The data demonstrates for us the unidirectional focus of the elites' guided discourse concerning identity and security in both states and shows how speaking out against these established perspectives is not only considered a taboo, but is also understood as an act against religious dogma.

It is important here to explain a bit more about the elites which are the focus of this study. The elite of a country are commonly considered the nation's leaders, i.e. the President or the Prime Minister, meaning their political and military elites. But there is a certain section which focuses on political party elites. Haas has defined the elite elites as "the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen

of political parties" (Haas 1958: 17). The word 'habitual' in the definition of elites is noteworthy in the case of India and Pakistan since the elites of both countries are 'habitually' or 'routinely' involved in constructing the ominous imagery of conflict that is supposed to exist between the two states. In order to sustain their sense of self identity the elites of both states continually find themselves engaging in hostile behavioural patterns towards one another.

Each chapter starts with a brief preview of the main arguments to be discussed and ends with its main findings. After presenting and explaining the problem statement, the research questions, and the methodology in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework of social constructivism and especially focuses on the question of why this approach should be preferred rather than choosing neo-realism or neo-liberalism. A question may also be asked regarding the selection of neo-realism and neo-liberalism for their comparison with social constructivism over other theories of International Relations. Why do I make these two theories the centre of my analysis? My reasons for adopting these two theories are due to the fact that the security relations between India and Pakistan are to a large extant shaped by systemic conditions. Both states' security relations have become entrenched due to the excessive involvement of the super powers. Pakistan joined the USA's camp early, after independence in 1947, when it became the member of SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation] in 1954 and a member of CENTO [Central Treaty Organisation] in 1955. Although India helped to found the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] in 1955, it received substantial American aid after its war with China in 1962. India was also the largest recipient of military aid and trade from the USSR. In 1969, India signed a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with

the former USSR. In a nut shell, understanding global politics does seem to go a long way in helping to explain the interstate behaviour between the two states. That is why neo-realism and neo-liberalism have been selected which are the major exponents of systemic level theories. Moreover, in many prior studies of their bilateral relations, India and Pakistan security relations have been explained from these systemic perspectives. I extended this explanation right up to the societal level in order to examine the socio-cultural norms which lie behind their rivalry. The domain of finding such norms falls with in the theoretical framework of social constructivism. Therefore, it is important to first explain why the systemic level theories, namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism, are ultimately inadequate, before I move on to argue the case for establishing a social constructivist framework. It is also important to explain the relevancy of these theories with practical examples of the issue at hand [India-Pakistan conflict] since my aim is not to formulate a new theoretical approach, but rather to show the efficacy of the social constructivist approach.

The conceptual terms of the security dilemma and the security community are defined from a social constructivist perspective in Chapter 3. It reinterprets the security dilemma from the realist perspective of a materialistic power struggle to a social security dilemma grounded in the two states' 'daily routines' or social practices. In order to understand the formation of identities of India and Pakistan, the identity discourse initially adopted by both states under the influences of their founding fathers' ideologies, which was later on distorted by both states' social practices, will be traversed in Chapter 4. I will look at what are the ramifications of identity discourse on contemporary security practices of both states. For instance, the nuclear India is closely tied to 'Hindutva'

identity, but at one time India was also being influenced by its' founding fathers' dream of secular identity based on *'ahimsa'* or non violence. After having discussed these theoretical questions the two empirical cases that shape contemporary relations between India and Pakistan are elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, the conflict over Kashmir will be discussed as an identity tussle between the two states. In Chapter 6, the nuclear issue is presented as an upshot of elites' social practices deeply entrenched in cultural metaphors. The symbolism used by Indian and Pakistani elites in their speeches and in their party manifestos explains the importance of such metaphors. How do domestic social factors contribute to it by making it a corollary of each state's respective identity discourse?

The Chapter 7 explores the possibility of a hypothetical security community between India and Pakistan and further juxtaposes this proposed security community with already established security communities. This chapter explains which social norms are required for establishing an abstract security community between India and Pakistan. The educational norms, literary classics, mass media as a venue of the 'cultural production of insecurity' as well as elites' rhetoric will be some of the social practices highlighted in this Chapter (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). The presence of 'negative norms' at the elite level have so far prevented the possibility of a security community between these two states (Khoo 2004). In contrast to it the positive norms found at popular level help to facilitate the formation of one such security community. The later part of this chapter construes a dialogue between different security communities of the world. Can we find distinct cultural patterns in established security communities like the European Union and ASEAN?

Finally, the concluding chapter synthesizes the main arguments and emphasizes the value of adopting a socio-cultural prespective in explaining security relations between states, especially when conceptualizing security communities around the globe according to the cultural patterns peculiar to the region itself.

2. The India-Pakistan conflict: Social constructivism versus neo-realism and neo-liberalism

Why do we need theories? Waltz's has argued, 'Theories are collections or sets of laws pertaining to a particular behaviour or phenomenon' (Waltz 1979).[1] In his most sought after work in International Relations the *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz points out that theory is distinct from reality, but at the same time it also explains some part of reality. It enables us to 'simplify reality' by providing an 'intellectual foundation' to frame policies (Ferguson and Mansbach 1997). A sound empirical analysis needs sound footing in its theoretical framework. I present my theoretical framework in two chapters. This chapter explains the theoretical efficacy of social constructivism over neo-realism and neo-liberalism for my case study of the India-Pakistan conflict. The next chapter explains the key concepts of the security dilemma and the security community from a social constructivist perspective.

This chapter is divided into three interwoven sections. The first section defines the key assumptions of the neo-realism and the neo-liberalism approaches and it explains why both fall short of explaining the India-Pakistan conflict. The general assumptions of the neo-realist and liberalist approaches are not dealt with in detail because both are well known approaches in International Relations. The second section consists of three sub-sections. This section explains the main attributes of a social constructivist analysis, and

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1. My explanation of neorealism is focused around Kenneth Waltz's work. See the detail of the relevance of the theories with reality and their explanatory powers in Kenneth N. Waltz , Theory of International Politics (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 2.

why these attributes merit their use in my case study. These attributes include identity

formation, intersubjectivity and the relevance of ideas, culture and norms. These three

sub-sections elucidate in considerable detail how the social constructivist approach that

emphasizes a cultural perspective can better explain the security relations between India

and Pakistan. The third and final section concludes the whole argument by analyzing

variants of social constructivism as well as their relevance for my case study. The

inadequacy of neo-realism and neo-liberalism will further be exposed from my case

studies [Chapters 5 and 6] which will show that the conflict between India and Pakistan is

much more complex than realism and liberalism allow us to comprehend. It is for this

reason that the inadequacy of both theories [neo-realism and neo-liberalism] will also be

shown in tandem with the social constructivist perspective by using concrete examples of

the conflict between India and Pakistan.

2.1 Neo-realism and neo-liberalism

Main stream theories in International Relations, particularly neo-realism and neo-

liberalism, both focus on the material capabilities of states. They agree that interstate

relations develop in an anarchic environment which is exogenously created by an

international system. In other words, it is an inherent trait of a competitive world system

from which there is no escape for states. Most of the realists consider states to be

distrustful of each other and war is always in the offing (Mearsheimer 2001). Realists

also do not have much confidence in the ability of international institutions to convince

states to cooperate with each other in order to overcome their existential threats

(Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Snyder 2002). To save neo-realism from obscurity in a fast changing, interdependent and globalised world, the neo-liberalism approach comes to its rescue by devising various means of cooperation among states. However, according to both these theories, states' interests are presumed to be selfish and they are 'not problematized' (Finnemore 1996a).[2] This means that the attainment of the selfish states' material interests is taken for granted, as a given fact, as part of the world competitive system. The prominent difference between them is that neo-realism on the one hand emphasizes structural systemic constraints under which states work, treating states themselves as unitary actors with fixed self interests. While, on the other hand, neo-liberalism though acknowledges the anarchic environment as a constraint on states' behaviour, emphasizes the remodelling of interstate anarchy with institutional norms leading to cooperation among states. In a nut shell, the neo-realist and the neo-liberalism's level of conceptual analysis begins with the states as unitary actors [selfish or cooperative], their emphasis is on material capabilities [power or economic interests] and their causal argumentation is directed towards the structural management of states in a world system [anarchy or institutions]. These are the basic assumptions common in all varieties of realist and liberalist approaches.

According to the neo-realist perspective, the security situation between India and Pakistan is usually defined as volatile due to the differentiation in material capabilities of the two states as well as the structure of the South Asian security system which is greatly tilted in favour of India. India because of its size and economy tends to want to dominate

2. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 9. Finnemore has discussed the impact of international norms and institutions in transforming the interests and identities of the states. She has worked in an institutional constructivist vein.

and act as a hegemonic power in its relations with Pakistan. While Pakistan has the tendency to counteract every Indian move as the only plausible solution for its own survival. There is nothing more to offer from a neo-realist angle apart from these materialistic considerations. The same holds true for the neo-realist explanation of their core security disputes. The two core security issues between India and Pakistan are the Kashmir dispute and the nuclear issue. The first issue, the Kashmir dispute, is commonly viewed as an 'intractable' territorial dispute between these two states since their independence in 1947 (Hassner 2006). It is the 'unfinished' agenda of the partition of the subcontinent (Schofield 2000). The second is the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region. Both these security issues are often defined in terms of the material interests of both states. Realists' often narrate the 'disputed legacy' (Lamb 1991; Lamb 2002) of Kashmir from the historical account and charges are attributed to the 'institutional failure' (Ganguly 1996; Ganguly 1997) of Indian democracy to accommodate Kashmiri aspirations (Bose 2003; Ganguly 2007). The issues of identity in the Kashmir conflict in 'rational' theoretical accounts are raised only at the 'sub-national' level (Mitra 1995). Yet it is precisely the affirmation of India and Pakistan's national identities that have empowered the sub-national and indigenous Kashmiri identity that has made Kashmir one of the longest standing territorial disputes in the United Nations since 1948. [This point will be argued in detail in Chapter 5 which deals with the Kashmir dispute].

The 'enduring' India-Pakistan rivalry (Paul 2005) and the ensuing 'unstable' (Kapur 2006) nuclear peace in the region is usually studied from the traditional realist perspective of the 'stability instability paradox' (Snyder 1965). This paradox explains that nuclear or strategic stability in a region lessens the prospects of an all out nuclear war

among states. However, according to this perspective, it may at the same time encourage states to pursue localized conventional conflict with the hidden assurance that the other state will not pursue the nuclear option since it would lead to the mutually assured destruction [MAD] of both states. In other words there is an intrinsic paradox of nuclear stability and conventional instability. In 1999, Pakistan took advantage of this situation during its localized armed conflict with India over the Kargil hills [Kashmir]. Although some may differ in their assessments arguing that Pakistan's 'asymmetrical' nuclear posture has actually violated the conventional wisdom of nuclear stability in the region [i.e. more nuclear weapons leads to more stability as argued by Waltz],[3] still these arguments challenging this wisdom remain strictly within the realist's presumption of an anarchic world system (Narang Winter 2009). The nuclear issue is also being viewed according to the realist assessment of selfish state interests and power politics. There is another problem of propagation of nationalist feelings in the writings of Indian and Pakistani realists. Most Indian or Pakistani authors affirm the pre-defined notions of their states' official identity discourses formed at the expense of ascribing negative attributes to each other. Moreover, any attempt to deviate from this nationalist perspective is rejected. This sometimes makes indigenous neo-realist work on the India-Pakistan conflict biased where Indian and Pakistani 'antinomies of nationalism' hamper any alternative explanation of the conflict (Varshney 1991). [The nuclear issue and all its complexities will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6].

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[3] Kenneth Waltz forwarded this hypothesis after examining the scope of conflicts in the post Cold War scenario. ("The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be Better": 2005, Longman Publishing Group).

Neo-liberalism accepts three core assumptions of neo-realism. It adopts the state centric approach, the belief that the order of modern day politics is systemic anarchy and the belief that the interests of states are tied to its material capabilities. It only differs from the neo-realist perspective in that it views institutional norms or 'regimes' acting as constraints on states' behaviour thereby leading them to cooperate (Keohane 1989). Neo-liberals believe cooperative ties between states can be enhanced by the prescriptive guidance of norms achieved through 'formal' institutions (Keohane and Nye 1977: 54). According to Nye, the various brands of liberalism are: "(1) commercial liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of trade; (2) democratic liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of republican government; (3) regulative liberalism, which asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries; (4) sociological liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interest" (Nye 1988: 246). They all explain the effect of transnational institutional norms or ideational sources on states leading them to cooperation (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). With the neo-liberalism approach, unlike the neo-realist approach, we can identify norms as an additional variable affecting state's interests. I would now examine what is meant by norms in the neo-liberalism approach.

The International Relations literature generally focuses on two trajectories of norms, the first deals with the top-down institutional effects of norms on actors' identities. The second is about the bottom-up effects of social norms generated from domestic culture and effecting actors' identities. In neo-liberalism the emphasis is on the top-down trajectory of institutional norms. Consider the case of Pakistan joining the

regional security organizations of SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization] in 1954 and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] in 1955. According to the neo-liberalism perspective, the sole reason behind Pakistan's decision to join these defence pacts was because of the [top-down] influence of institutional norms to join the USA sponsored forces [SEATO & CENTO] to serve as a bulwark against the communist threat in South-Asia. However, it can also be argued that Pakistan's decision to join these organisations was the result of [bottom-up] domestic influences. This viewpoint explain that Pakistan's decision to join these organisations in its formative phase of state building was an attempt to get weapons in the face of the potential threat of Indian aggression (Nawaz 2008). This bottom-up perspective of domestic norms shows us the Indo-centric approach as the other viable explanation for joining these defence pacts. In order to explain the India-Pakistan conflict we have to examine both types of influences [top-down and bottom-up].

Now the question arises, how we can distinguish whether a state's actions are taken under the influence of transnational institutional norms or because of domestic social norms. For this intricate question we have to explore the social practices of elites either coercively done by institutional norms or persuasively done by domestic social norms. The second route can be explored further by examining a state's identity discourse. Every state's identity is particular to its own history which means that it normally develops through domestic sources. It enables the ruling elites of a state to pursue a certain security discourse in line with its identity. The causal relationship between a states' identity and its actors' social practices helps to explain the influence of domestic norms by distinguishing them from institutional or systemic norms.

The neo-liberalism emphasis on regional cooperation by promoting the economic interdependence among South Asian states is based on the existing power structure which gives India a 'pre-eminent' or 'managerial' role to regulate South Asian affairs (Ayoob 1999). At an institutional level, the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] may be explained from the neo-liberalism perspective. It was established in 1985 among seven countries [now eight with the inclusion of Afghanistan] in South Asia. Yet even here success cannot be declared, because since its inception, in the past 25 years no tangible results have been shown of cooperation between the two major states [India and Pakistan]. The neo-liberalism logic expects institutional norms to affect both states' selfish interests by binding them together with mutual interests in an institutional framework (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1989). But the problem with the neo-liberalism approach is its adherence to the influence of institutional norms from the top-down. For analyzing the conflict between India and Pakistan there are two different perspectives [top-down and bottom-up] that need to be taken into account. For example, the official 16th summit meeting of SAARC in Bhutan in 2010 was a mere 'talk show', but the unofficial 15th get together of people from eight countries of South Asia, under the banner 'the people's SAARC' in Delhi was a success culminating in the demand of 'a union of South Asian countries' patterned after the European Union (Nayar 30.4.2010). This aspect of studying norms from the bottom-up is missing in neo-liberalism and it becomes an acute problem when both these views [elites guided top-down and people guided bottom-up] often clash with each other. Neo-liberalism is fond of explaining a unidirectional flow of institutional norms towards member states because both [views] are more or less synchronized in the Western

democracies. But in the case of India-Pakistan, popular perceptions seem divergent from the institutional ones, so in this case neo-liberalism does not adequately explain the influence of norms. An editorial in one of Pakistan's national newspapers, *Dawn*, discusses the institutional perspective of SAARC during its 2010 summit meeting as follows:

> "Unfortunately, animosities between the two South Asian neighbours [India and Pakistan] have dogged SAARC ever since its inception 25 years ago. Although many do not admit to this major impediment to progress in regional cooperation, the fact is that India and Pakistan tend to dominate and influence multilateral developments in South Asia. This is unavoidable given their size. The SAARC founders were aware of this when they inserted a proviso in the association's charter that contentious political issues of a bilateral nature would not be taken up by the regional body. That principle may have been observed strictly but it has not prevented the agenda of SAARC from being overshadowed by bad patches in India-Pakistan relations (…). Initially each had feared that the other would use the rest of the members as a tool to promote its own interests in South Asian affairs. Mercifully that did not happen. But by allowing their frustration with each other to be reflected in the working of SAARC they have done a great disservice to the regional body" (*Dawn* 27.4.2010).

We might have been expecting to see the results of twenty-five years of SAARC's service formulating some sort of mutual interest between India and Pakistan. Yet it seems

to have seldom made any difference or changed interests. Instead, as recent history has shown, quite the opposite has occurred. After the establishment of SAARC in 1985, India and Pakistan both became overt nuclear powers in 1998, fought a localized conflict in Kargil in 1999, were in a military standoff at their borders in 2001-2002 and have been exchanging threats of 'surgical strikes' in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorists' attacks in 2008. Expecting the institutional norms of SAARC's to have a positive influence on India and Pakistan's relations is like putting the cart before a horse without first understanding members states' identities. What is needed is to first explore this rivalry by trying to define India and Pakistan's identities, rather than establishing an institutional framework without any normative value.

Neo-realism developed in the West when the world was divided between a capitalist and a communist camp. Waltz's neo-realist explanation of security relations between the USA and the former USSR might have been right during the Cold War with notions of self help and anarchy. Both states were poles apart psychologically, geographically and culturally and were involved in a zero sum game where the loss for one was the gain for the other. The prime focus of neo-realism is on peace through bipolar stability in a particular time frame of history. However, as a theory it has come under criticism. It has been labelled as 'too static' a theory without any predictions due to its failure to predict the end of the Cold War (Buzan, Jones et al. 1993; Williams 2005). It lacks foresight due to its inability to include other factors apart from materialistic ones. The geo-strategic conditions between India and Pakistan are entirely different. No doubt both are rival states, but they are not poles apart geographically, culturally or psychologically, rather both were united for centuries and were only separated in the

aftermath of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Their rivalry is based on much more complex factors than only the material dispersion of power politics. The socio-linguistic ties between the societies of these two neighbouring states add an additional level of complexity to this rivalry which was virtually non existent between the USA and the former USSR. The people of both states grew up together for centuries on the united subcontinent. They have shared unique social practices of their own. Yet these common social practices are not recognized in rationalist theories like neo-realism and neo-liberalism. These shared characteristics among others include popular culture, social norms and elites' behaviour. This does not mean that these theories are of no value, but that in this case, they do not adequately explain the exact nature of this complex conflict, since both theories have their own set of prior assumptions or basic premises.

I shall offer two examples to illustrate my point; one is taken from the Pakistani press and the other one is taken from India. An editorial in the *Daily Times* states,

> "At independence, Pakistan inherited an over developed colonial
> structure, a relatively weak political class, and a fragmented society
> from the British. Rather than sparing efforts for nation building,
> the colonial state structure, designed to maintain hold over 'subjects'
> rather than 'citizens', soon asserted its control over the polity and
> sidelined the political class in national decision-making"
> (*DailyTimes* 28.4.2010: emphasis original).

The editorial mentions 'subjects' not 'citizens' of Pakistan. From this perspective two levels of analysis are being generated, one deals with the social practices of elites, while the other deals with the social practices of the masses. Rationalists' theories explain

the behaviour of states in the context of what leaders or political actors say at the helm of affairs. In India and Pakistan there are two different levels of opinions of what is in the states interest. One level is what the leaders think of the state and its interests. The other is determined by societal norms and how the masses conceive of what is in the states' interest. Sometimes both views overlap, but most often they clash with one another. In such circumstances understanding the behaviour of a state only from its principal actors is like denying space to the other very important majority. I will illustrate this with the second example taken from India.

In an article in the *Dawn*, the former Indian External Affairs and Finance Minister from 1998 to 2004, Mr. Jaswant Singh said while referring to the Indian-Pakistan relations that "They are possibly the [most] complex relations between any two countries on earth. They are hostage to high emotions and history as no other. In India-Pakistan relations, the past is also the present" (*Dawn* 23.2.2009). On another occasion while in Pakistan promoting his book entitled *Jinnah India-Partition Independence*, Jaswant Singh was asked "what was the major stumbling block in India-Pakistan peace". He responded with four words: "the shadow of history" (*Dawn* 14.4.2010). Paraphrasing the above statements in simple terms without ascribing to any conceptual technicality, the question comes to mind, is there any room in the prevalent rational approaches of international relations for high emotions [social norms], the 'shadow of history' [local myths and culture], or the dichotomous and often contradictory stances of the elites and the masses [social practices]? Are all states like units and we keep on singing monotonous rhythms of their predicted behaviour as enshrined in realist and liberalist epistemologies?

To summarize, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are static theories that seem unable "to foreshadow let alone foresee" any change (Katzenstein 1996: 3). The formulation of states' interest cannot be explained only by rational behaviour (Katzenstein 1996: 2).[4] Embracing strong generalizations about the behavioural pattern of the superpowers and explaining the interstate behaviour of the rest of the world states by disregarding their regional cultural factors make them too narrow approaches. That is the price a parsimonious theoretical analysis has to pay. The problem only becomes acute when we travel to the 'oriental' side of the globe (Said 1978). It means turning away from the incubatory base of these theories in Western democracies, created as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), towards eastern nascent states being recently set free from the clutches of their foreign colonial masters. The parsimonious characters of these theories may explain a lot about interstate relations in the West since all these states developed on some how the same pattern and more importantly, are held together by common norms of democracy, rule of law, and public opinion as a check on elite behaviour and so on and so forth, but these theories cannot fully comprehend state characteristics of the East. Here the common state characteristics stem from the ravages of colonialism, affluent, but inefficient elites, poverty, culture, religious dogmas, totalitarianism, among other things. The understanding of the interstate behaviour of these countries, which is a far more complex process, requires recognition of their peculiar characteristics.

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4. Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press,1996), p.2. Katzenstein's edited book is the first comprehensive book which has discussed the concept of national security along cultural lines. All the authors in this volume have discussed various case studies by defining the national interests of states on cultural lines which the neorealists often take for granted.

The most important part missing in both neo-realist and neo-liberalism approaches is the question of identity. The formation of state identity is an ongoing creative process and various factors contribute to this discourse. However, a project of deconstructing states' identities, taking into consideration both domestic as well as systemic norms, has never been given a place in neo-liberalism. Although such a project is not yet fully accommodated by the social constructivist approach, it still is much better than the neo-liberalism or neo-realist attempts. The historical narratives of the formation of India-Pakistan identities requires a central place in order to better understand their rivalry instead of throwing them under the carpet as 'like units' or 'black boxes' (Waltz 1979).

Therefore, the neo-liberalism approach is not much different from neo-realism in its basic premises. The only difference in the words of Keohane, is for "those who accept the foundations of neorealism, and the overall shape of the building, can still argue about the exact design" (Keohane 1986: 22). But if the foundation is faulty then there is no use thinking about changing the design since a building stands on its foundations and not on its design. There are some peculiar elements of the region like culture, norms, and identities which are not given recognition by these theories. These elements have a large role to play in my case study of security relations between India and Pakistan. It is because in addition to the material power structure of the region there is an equally important ideational structure based on socio-cultural norms which needs to be examined. This structure is dependent upon elites' social practices and prevalent popular social practices. The social constructivist approach, by taking these elements into account, is better suited for analyzing South Asian politics, rather than the rational approaches of

International Relations that seem obsessed with their explanation of power politics of the region.

2.2. Social constructivist framework

Social constructivism defines states' identities and interests "discursively structured by intersubjective rules, norms and institutions" (Reus-Smit 2002: 488). Adler, a leading constructivist explains, "Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world" (Adler 1997a: 322). According to the constructivist perspective, the identity of a state is of vital concern; it is socially constructed and is a prerequisite to interests. Social constructivism has emerged as a meta-theoretical debate with its emphasis on the construction of states' identities and interests through culture and norms and it has challenged the notion of fixed states' interests. It hypothesizes that "structures of human association are primarily cultural rather than a material phenomenon" (Wendt, 1992: 32).

Social constructivism has its roots in sociology. It explains states' interests from a social behavioural point of view. In contrast to neo-realists' and neo-liberalism's preoccupation with the material interests of states, the 'sociological perspective' points out that agents' interests are most commonly derived from their 'cultural' beliefs (Katzenstein 1996). The conventional constructivists usually adopt the sociological perspective. While partially accepting that state's interests are based on the material disposition of power, social constructivists push further by asking "what other kinds of

power and security do states seek and for which purpose" (Katzenstein 1996). This sociological perspective provides the context, or the social environment, in which the material interests of states develop. Conventional social constructivism explains numerous accounts of states' behaviour under the influence of social norms which defied and even contradicted the materialistic connotations of state interests, as the only viable option. It is not only material considerations [states capabilities, power structure, systemic constraints], but also equally important cultural aspects [social norms, identities] which are primarily responsible for creating shared or intersubjective understandings among states (Choi and Caporaso 2002).

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┌──────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────┐
│ Material factors     │        │ Cultural variables   │
│ (states capabilities),│        │ (norms,             │
│ External structural  │        │ intersubjective      │
│ constraints          │        │ understandings)      │
└──────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────┘
            │                              │
            ▼                              ▼
            ┌──────────────────────┐
            │   Actor identities   │
            └──────────────────────┘
                       │
                       ▼
            ┌──────────────────────┐
            │ Interests (material  │
            │ and ideational)      │
            └──────────────────────┘
```

Figure 2.1: The confluence of material and cultural variables on actors' identities and interest.

Figure 2.1 shows the material and cultural variables and their cumulative effects in shaping the identities of the actors as well as formulating their interests. It explains that

there are two sets of influences shaping actors' identities which then in turn formulate their interests. One set is regarding the influence of cultural variables like norms or intersubjective understandings, while the other set pertains to the material interests of states and systemic material constraints of the region. Material capabilities defined by Glaser refer to a state's 'military capabilities' or the "measure of the ability of its forces to perform missions against an adversary" (Glaser 2010: 41).

I do not assume that states' interests are formulated by material and ideational factors in a cyclic form i.e., cultural/ideational variables leading to material interests and then to actors identities and again to cultural variables, rather my assumption is that state interests are sometimes guided solely by ideational/cultural parameters even defying material connotations. That is why there are independent arrows from cultural variables and material variables towards the actors' identities. Sometimes a state's behaviour conforms to ideational factors which are 'not rational at all' (Jong 2007). Sometimes only material factors define states' interests, while other times there may be a confluence of material and ideational factors influencing actors' identities and actions. But the important thing in social constructivism is that the identities of actors are formed prior to their interests.

Social constructivism in International Relations theory is an approach to study interstate behaviour by examining the influence of socio-cultural forces on the identity formation of states. It focuses on a shared intersubjective structure developed through states' interactions. These 'shared beliefs' create agents' identities and are a 'precursor' to their interests (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 392-393). Here I would also like to

conjecture that domestic culture is the principal contributing factor in the formation of

agents' identities through an interface of societal norms and narratives. It is mainly

domestic culture and social norms which compel state actors to adopt a specific line of

action in their relations with rival states. Identity denotes a society and a 'society is

constituted by identity' (McSweeney 1999: 74). Social norms and identity are both

'facets of culture' (Kowert and Legro 1996). The evolution of identity formation for a

[nation] state is a long process which is embedded in historical narratives and maintained

through out the ages. The collective identity of states is not a ready made solution which

can redeem all problems which may arise in interstate behaviour. It is actually a discourse

which involves the efforts of various segments of society who collectively gather a

'response' to 'urgent demands' (McSweeney 1999). Since there is no room to discuss the

entire theoretical debate surrounding social constructivism, I want to concentrate on some

core postulates of the social constructivist theory which are directly related to this case

study.

2.2.1 Identity formation

Identity in social constructivism has usually been dealt by two overlapping

approaches. One is from the psychological insights based on Tajfel's social identity

theory (Kowert 1998) and the other is from a sociological perspective based on Mead's

'symbolic interactionism' (Wendt 1999). After taking these ideas into account, I will

also add to them by conceptualizing India-Pakistan identities from their ideological

parameters. The identity of an actor is defined as the "relatively stable, role specific

understandings and expectations about self" (Wendt 1994: 385). The expression of 'state identity' is being exhibited through the social practices of 'key decision-makers' (Jackson and Sorensen 2007: 172). Constructivists argue that the interests of a state originate from its identity. They consider human thought, ideas and norms crucial in making states' identities and the present international order.

According to Giddens, identity is required whenever 'existential anxiety' threatens 'ontological security' (Giddens 1991). Ontological security gives oneself a sense of 'fundamental' security and 'trust' by making the world us around comprehensible and avoiding threats to our 'existential anxiety"(Giddens 1991: 38-39). Therefore, it can even be said that identity is a precursor to interests. In other words, the state identity is developed by elites through its cultural and social milieu and then its interests are configured according to this identity. The process of identity formation is 'enacted domestically and projected internationally' (Katzenstein 1996). A state may have many identities and it can assume an accomplished identity towards any state with which it is in conflict through its social practices. Wendt has categorized identities into two types: 'type identities and role identities'(Wendt 1992). 'Type identities' may be shared by many states like a democratic state, liberal state, and Islamic state and so on. While 'role identities' represent the relationship between specific states. With regard to the relationship between India and Pakistan, both states have developed enemy 'role identities' toward each other. India's identity as an enemy of Pakistan is acquired through its social practices towards Pakistan.

The development of a state's identity is a social process contributed by socio-cultural norms of society. It is within this 'social structure' that national identities

develop (Kowert 1998). Since this 'social structure' is based on domestic social norms, the whole idea of an identity is endogenous and is prone to change (Kowert 1998). Identity develops from 'domestic' sources of 'national ideologies' which form state's interests (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). The absence of problematizing a state's identity in neo-realist assertions makes it difficult to understand Indian and Pakistani identity vis-à-vis each other. The domestic culture exhibits traces of Indian and Pakistani identities at two distinct levels. One is a dominant discourse of state identity which transpires through elites' social practices, while the other is the subjugated popular identity defined by popular social practices which is hidden under the official identity discourse. Oddly enough, both these identity discourses are lumped together representing a homogenous state identity in the rationalists' theories. These popular social practices will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. At this point, what is important to understand is that the identity of a state changes and whenever it changes, it produces shifts in the intersubjective understanding of states. The conflict between India and Pakistan is the result of such shifts which I will explain in following paragraphs.

Identities are not in flux all the time, nor are they 'carved in stone' (Wendt 1995: 71). McSweeney, a theorist in social constructivism, reprimanded Weaver and Buzan for taking a culturalist stance in the construction of state identity. According to McSweeney, identity is always in flux due to the changing norms of states (Roe 1999). Buzan and Weaver reject this charge claiming that if one keeps on studying identity which is in flux then there will be no finished product. They argue it is important to study identity at its stable points using recurrent social practices of a state as a "possible referent object for

security" (Buzan and Waever 1997: 243). Identities and interests can change over time which may produce 'subtle shifts' in the relationship of states (Walt 1998:8). Wendt uses the term 'alter casting' (Wendt 1992) to refer to the change of identities in a given situation. This means that in an anarchic situation between two states A and B, if state A wants to change its identity towards state B, then it will send a gesture of good will to state B. This will be very novel to state B given the history of its relationship with state A. Now if state B accepts its new role and reciprocally sends a goodwill gesture to state A, then the identities of both states will change vis-à-vis each other. The change in Indian and Pakistani identities by their respective elites has been accomplished primarily through ideological and psychological routes.

Pakistan and Indian identities have shown that they become less accommodative of each other whenever elites with strong ideological commitments come to power. Whenever ideologically committed political parties hold power in India they try to change the identity discourse resulting in violent shifts in the intersubjective behaviour of India and Pakistan. I propose that by closely studying the social practices of elites who are ideologically committed with in a stipulated time frame, we can discern the change in intersubjective behaviour which develops between these two states. It is important to understand this critical link between ideology and identity for the context of India and Pakistan security relations.

Identity and ideology are correlated. Pakistan is an ideological state that was established on the basis of the "Two Nation Theory". Similarly, the presence of a mainstream ideologically committed Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] in India made it imperative to study both states identities through the ideological practices of their elites.

According to anthropologist Clifford Geertz, ideology has cultural connotations that make "incomprehensible social situations meaningful for those experiencing them". Geertz believes that "ideologies are born and come into conflict where societies are in the throes of change" (Festenstein and Kenny 2005: 11). Identity dilemmas for a state become acute primarily during two phases of state building. First, when a state achieves independence; and second, when there are sudden and violent shifts in the history of state building. In the history of the subcontinent both these stages converged at the time of the independence of India and Pakistan. There was an abrupt end to British colonial rule in India followed by the worst communal carnage in the region where millions of people lost their lives as a consequence. This created identity crises among people of both states who had previously lived together for centuries. The Pakistani elites used Islamic ideology and Indo-centric approach for its identity. Islamic ideology has greater potential to fill the void of anxiety by acting as a 'thick signifier' to an identity (Huysmans 1998). Ideology in this sense is the 'wider framework' or an important 'structural' constraint which encompasses the identities of the two states, and without it we cannot understand the identities of India and Pakistan (Huysmans 1998). Among these norms, religious beliefs played the most dominant role in shaping the ideological beliefs of the two societies.

India has a secular identity, but since the 1990s ideological slogans of 'Hindutva' have started to be used in the Indian body politic. Religion in India and Pakistan is a way of life. Religious beliefs encompass all aspects and spheres of life. When religious slogans were first used to define distinct and separate identities of the Muslims and the Hindus in the subcontinent during the colonial phase, it automatically constructed two

communities. Religious norms have been largely employed by the elites of both states to construct the identities of both India and Pakistan. Some argue that religious norms tend to influence the social psychology of individuals more than other sources of norms (Seul 1999). In the case of Pakistan, religion is a source of stability for its ethnically, linguistically and culturally disparate regions. The rationale for establishing the state of Pakistan was supported more by those provinces in India where Muslims were in the minority, than in the Muslim majority provinces which actually formed the territory of Pakistan in 1947 (Jalal 1985). The state itself was also sandwiched between two regions of East Pakistan and West Pakistan with a thousand miles of Indian territory separating them. Given this separation, there was a pressing need to form a common identity. Thus, there developed a strong nexus between state elites and the propagation of their ideology by the state regulated media machinery. This means that those who provide a 'discourse' can also present it as 'true' (Kinvall 2002). The elites developed a strong feeling of hatred based on the process of 'Othering' against the rival state in order to overcome threats to existential anxiety. Nationalism and religious ideological tools helped to fill this existential void by providing a stable sense of identity for the people through their self claimed true narratives (Kinnvall 2004). But identity as a discourse does not end here as there are various transforming phases in social practices of the two states depending on the ideological commitments of the ruling elites in power which I will explain in detail in my empirical chapter on the ideology and identity of India and Pakistan [Chapter 4]. The ideological-identity route is one way of trying to ease the 'existential anxiety' of people in India and Pakistan. The other route is the psychological route.

The second discourse on identity resulted in a deliberate attempt by both states'
elites to create hostile binaries among them in order to fortify one's own claims of self-
identity. In psychology, the theory of social identity maintains that people belonging to a
group always project a positive image of their group and associate negative attributes to
another group in order to maintain feelings of 'Us versus Them' (Tajfel 1982). Social
identity is defined by the 'values' or the norms of a group (Monroe, Hankin et al. 2000:
421). People in an in-group see their actions on the basis of situational logic, negotiations
and so on but behaviour of an out-group is always being considered as homogenous,
'intentional' and directed against an in-group (Kowert 1998). It is called 'attributional
bias' in psychology (Kowert 1998). The 'concert' of social constructivism and cognitive
psychology depends on the role of the elites while explaining 'national identity' (Kowert
1998). The elites play on people's attributional bias by 'exaggerating' (Kowert 1998) the
differences between 'Us versus Them' (Lebow 2008). Moreover, the absence of the free
movement of people across borders between India and Pakistan has created an identity
void, which has helped the elites by giving them the opportunity to develop each other
identities as 'hostile binaries' (Lebow 2008).

The commonality found among either the ideological or the psychological route is
the role played by the elites in India and Pakistan. The elites' 'discursive practices' have
played a significant role in both states' identity construction (Waever 1995). The social
world is intersubjectively created through such 'rhetorical practices' (Waever 1995). Just
a brief example can demonstrate this point. There were almost two simultaneous
announcements in India at the beginning of the year 2010; one was at the state's elite
level, while the other was at the societal level. At the elite level, the Indian outgoing army

chief General Kapoor proudly reiterated that the Indian army was ready to simultaneously cope with twin threats from China and Pakistan. However, at the societal level, the people of both countries had launched 'Aman ki Asha' [A desire for peace] through the largest mass media groups in the two states [see Chapter 1]. It was at this level that the majority of people from both states voted for peaceful relations. Hence, having an identity is not the problem as it explains 'how a self' can sustain changes throughout ones lifetime (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997: 206).[5] It only becomes a problem when deliberate attempts are undertaken to develop identities as the in-group versus the out-group. These social practices cannot be understood from a strictly rationalist [neo-realist and neo-liberalism] standpoint because these theories are "at base about redefining identity and interest" (Wendt 1997). The attempt to understand states' identities leads to an intersubjective relationship among states. In my next sub-section, I will examine what is meant by this intersubjectivity and how it develops in India Pakistan relations.

2.2.2 Intersubjectivity

Why there exists a hostile relationship between India and Pakistan? This is an intersubjective situation which means it is neither objective [final], nor subjective [deductive], but rather it is intersubjective or shared. The mutual understanding of each other's behaviour among the states has led to a socially constructed structure of intersubjectivity. It is a malleable structure that has been formed by each other's perceptions and reinforced by the social practices of the states' elites. In short it is based

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[5] Kratochwil and Lapid have used the metaphor of a ship to signal the arrival of cultural studies in International Relations after the demise of Cold War.

on the 'shared cognitive' social practices of the states (Pettman 2000). According to

Calhoum, "the ways in which people share understanding of their social world…are

effective in shaping that world itself as well as their identities as individuals within it"

(Calhoum, Gerteis et al. 2007: 6). The behaviour of a state is influenced by

intersubjective knowledge rather than the material structure (Wendt 1992). All

'meaningful behaviour' of a state can be explained in this 'intersubjective social context"

(Hopf 1998). It forms a 'collective' understanding which helps to 'organize' behaviour

(Wendt 1992: 397). This also refers to the collective knowledge which develops in the

relations of states. Once this intersubjective structure is formed it also has the power to

'empower' and shape the actions of actors by presenting to them the 'social reality'

(Adler 1997a: 328).

In order to change a hostile pattern in a relationship, there must be a greater role

for the intersubjective structure. In other words the structure must not only be shaped "by

material power [alone] but by social meaning and interaction" (Fierke 2007: 61).

According to Wendt, "the process of creating intersubjective meanings starts with

signalling, interpreting and ends with responding" (Wendt 1992: 405). Consider the

influence of intersubjectivity based on animosity when an unprecedented situation is

introduced in the relationship between two states. For example, intersubjectivity is more

or less akin to the 'empathy' of others. 'Empathy with your enemy' was the first principle

out of eleven drawn by McNamara, the former US Secretary of State during the Vietnam

War, in the Oscar winning documentary 'Fog of War' (Morris and Glass 2003). It refers

to the ability to put oneself in the place of one's enemy and view them sympathetically in

a particular situation. It can also be argued that the Cuban missile crisis [1962] between

the USA and the former USSR which nearly led to a nuclear war was the result of prior

intersubjective hostilities in the relationship between these two states. Similarly, the

change in the former USSR's policies in 1980s such as 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' took

its time to influence the mindsets of people in the USA, but once a renewed and

cooperative intersubjective pattern developed; it led to the fairly peaceful disintegration

of the former USSR.

The social practices of the elites' have so far constructed a hostile intersubjective

relationship between India and Pakistan. Elites act as an agency in this process. The

power of social practices lies in "their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings

that constitute social structures and actors alike" (Hopf 1998: 178). We will have to know

about, "culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices" of the actors

of India and Pakistan in order to define this intersubjective structure (Hopf 1998: 173). It

is being implanted through the cognitive and epistemic social forces of the state firmly in

control of the states' elites. Every action of Indian policy makers passes first through this

intersubjective structure before it is interpreted by their Pakistani counterpart.

In the absence of wide scale people to people contacts between India and

Pakistan, the codes of appropriate behaviour [social norms] are being formulated

through elites' social practices in the identity discourses of both states. All forms of

social behaviour 'presuppose' some 'prior' social structure (Dessler 1989: 451). For

example, is the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan due to the constraints of

the structure itself, or has the agency's itself [elite's social practices] developed this

relationship? Which one is prior to the other? Some emphasize the 'process' by

subordinating 'structure' to that of 'process' (Wendt 1992). The attributes of power

politics among states do not automatically emerge from a prevalent anarchic system as neo-liberalism and neo-realism have claimed; rather it is due to the 'process' (Wendt 1992). Structure does not exist separately from the process, i.e., the practices of the actors. The identities of states and their interests are formed through practices and they can change the structure of the system through this process. So if the identities of two rival states can be changed through mutual practices, then we may envisage a change in the system as a whole. Even the identities and interests of the states have been subordinated to the process (Wendt 1992: 407).

However, my arguments are more in favour of agency than the structural constraints. The two states' respective elites have developed this rivalry through their social practices and for their own vested interests. It has become habitual for Indian and Pakistani elites to malign each other. This habitual pattern of hostility between actors has led people of both states to believe in these constructed norms and any deviation from this way of seeing things is not possible. Although I agree that structure and agency are mutually constitutive since they both reinforce each other, I maintain that any qualitative change in inter state behaviour can only be brought via a change in agency. If Indian and Pakistani elites decide to behave differently on the world stage then the present hostile structure will slowly wither away. Similarly, if the structural constraints of the system entice these two states to cooperate then the properties of agency [states] can also change. The structure can not only 'shape' identity, but it can also 'constrain' behaviour (Shannon 2005). States contribute through their social practices and intersubjective understandings [process or agency] while making this structure. In this way, it serves as mutual reinforcement. So both domestic factors [social practices based on social norms] and

systemic constraints [regional/global power structures] have to be studied in order to explain interstate behaviour. However, in comparative case study research, systemic constraints are studied most often, while the equally important domestic structure including the social practices of states are usually ignored.

Sometimes an external or structural constraint from outside can also bring about change in the belief system of principal actors. The systemic or exogenous shocks are epiphenomenal, while domestically institutionalised norms if contested can bring an enduring change in the belief systems of the principal actors. 'Exogenous shocks' can force state actors to change their 'beliefs' (Berman 2001: 237). In Pakistan the presence of army in politics has a strong connection with the norms of American involvement in the South Asian security environment, be it the Afghanistan proxy war against the former USSR in 1979 or the recent war on terror in the post 9/11 era. The Afghanistan imbroglio helped the Pakistani army rise to power with the help of American military aid and shaped the identity of the Pakistani army as the sole arbiter and saviour of the nation. The USA over the years has actually supported all martial law regimes which emerged in Pakistan. There is a famous saying in Pakistan which states that Pakistan is governed by three "As, Allah, America and Army" (Abbas 2005).

Similarly, the rise of religious parties in Pakistan's politics in the aftermath of its alignment with the United States' war on terror in the post 9/11 period, shows the impact of an exogenous shock on a state's identity. During the 2002 elections, religious parties were able to invigorate religious sentiments in their election campaigns by introducing anti-American slogans. They were able to win enough seats to form a provincial government in the NWFP province [its new name is Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa which is on

the border with Afghanistan]. They were also able to win 53 seats in the National

Assembly [which has a total of 373 seats]. This amazing achievement has no parallel in

the past electoral history of Pakistan where liberal forces have dominated electoral

politics since its independence. This challenged the existing expectations of the majority

of Pakistani's who are moderate voters. Yet the success of these parties was only possible

because of the exogenous or external shock of the American war on terror and the U-turn

which Pakistan took on its Afghan policy. Once the concern for the war on terror was

eased, most of the religious parties faired miserably in the general elections in 2008

where they won only one percent of the total seats. In developing countries like Pakistan

and India with fragile social indicators of development, the elites with their social

practices change existing norms by appealing to people on religious or communal lines. I

will now elaborate on the ontology of norms discussed in social constructivism.

2.2.3 Ideas, Culture and Norms

Before discussing the social constructivist's assertions on norms, I will juxtapose

it with the neo-liberalism perspective on norms. There is also a close nexus between neo-

liberalism and social constructivism in the form of institutional constructivism.

Institutional constructivism explains the influence of institutional norms on states'

behaviour or preferences (Finnemore 1996b). Neo-liberalism also emphasizes

institutional norms and ideas (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). There is no need to bring

neo-realism into the discussion again on norms, since neo-realism does not place any

onus on norms or on the possibility that ideational factors can help reconfigure a states'

interests unless it is supported by a 'powerful' agency (Hurrell 2002).

Neo-liberalism conceives of institutional norms prior to understanding the context

in which they are embedded with an emphasis on formal and informal rules and ideas. In

social constructivism, norms have a 'life of their own' which means that they go through

a process before being adopted by a state leading to concrete changes in a state's

behaviour. This process involves 'context bounded' norms which are implanted in

domestic discourse through 'constitutive localization' (Acharya 2004). Furthermore, their

'diffusion' (Checkel 2007) requires the socialization of states' elites either through

'persuasive argumentation' (Checkel 1997; Checkel 1999; Checkel 2007) or through

coercion. Neo-liberalism has its focus on the after affects of norms and not on the

processes involved in their genesis in the first place. Neo-liberalism usually studies the

'stickiness' of institutional norms and how states behave under the influence of such

norms (Acharya 2005). It does not offer a causal explanation of the diffusion of norms in

the domestic arena of states or their influence on the identities of the practitioners of such

norms. The emphasis of neo-liberalism is on the regulatory effects of institutional norms,

rather than on their constitutive aspects. Social constructivism differs from neo-liberalism

on precisely this point, because it takes into consideration not only the regulatory effects

of norms, but also their constitutive effects which shape actors' identities (Katzenstein

1998). How do norms influence state actors' identities?

Socially accepted norms, behaviour and traditions act as a sort of guide for an

actor when making decisions (Parsons 1991). At the one end they keep an existing social

system running by restricting choice of individual action, and at the other end they keep the action of an actor in line with accepted traditions. The rational choice theories focus on the behaviour of state from an individual point of view of cost benefit calculations. These cannot define the wider 'social order' (Jong 2007). Society is built on "socially accepted rules of behaviour, norms and values" (Jong 2007: 225). The social norms of a state are important for understanding the context of a state's identity. It helps us in anticipating the 'primacy of norms' in a state's interaction with another state (Palan 2000: 578).

For social constructivists, norms and ideas play a significant role in shaping the identities of actors. Norms are defined as, "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Some constructivists define norms as, "shared expectations [of] appropriate behaviour" (Zehfuss 2002: 31). Others believe that they are shared understandings which constitute actor's identities and interests (Checkel 1997). In other words, they are collective understandings that make behavioural claims on actors. There are two groups of constructivists that explain the effects of norms on prescribing or proscribing the behaviour of states. Some emphasize the importance of international norms on state behaviour [Fennimore, Checkel, Wendt] while others [Kaufman] emphasize domestic norms as the determining factor of state behaviour. Yet "all of them agree that the state identities are constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics" (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 399). Norms help to establish 'inter-subjective meanings' among actors so that they can form a pattern of interaction between them (Zehfuss 2002: 18 quoting Kratochwil).

Norms have been defined as 'shared expectations' of behaviour of a state with a particular identity, which is being forged upon it by state actors (McDonald 2008). Ideas embedded in cultural norms can explain the political actions of an actor. Culture generally explains 'social and legal norms' and how they form ' actors' identities and interests' (Reus-Smit 2005). Once ideas are defined as 'beliefs' they shape 'political outcomes' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3). Ideas give way to norms. Norms are "collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996: 5). They are 'shared' and 'unspoken premises' (Katzenstein 1993: 268). Norms are not rigid structures, insulated from change. In order to understand them better, we have to deconstruct the definitions of norms. First, norms are shared. This means that they are widely accepted as customs, traditions or accepted forms of behaviour by a majority of people in a state. Second, norms can exist at the intrastate level or at the interstate level, which means when after being constructed at the intrastate level, they are being projected at interstate level where they are being contested and afterwards intersubjectively developed through interaction of both states. Neo-liberalism or social constructivist institutionalist's normally study the second way which is at the interstate level (Keohane 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001), while it is at the intra-state level that a lot is revealed about the India-Pakistan conflict. But how can we separate social norms which are influencing the elites' social practices?

In that case, we have to argue for the primacy of these social norms which help to define a state's social practices. This means those norms that not only prescribed or proscribed the behaviour of the state's elites, but also helps to influence an

intersubjective pattern already developed between states. But the question arises, which

aspects of norms should be studied to explain their 'constitutive' and 'regulative'

effects on actors in a security relationship (Katzenstein 1996). In order to explain them

in security relations, we have to understand them as an "interplay between [states]

interest and ideas" and how socio-culturally defined interests of states relate to "the

situational logic" in a particular time frame (Archer 1996: 188).

This means first of all delineating the material components of a state's interest

from its social aspects and then freezing or locking the actions of state's actors in a given

period in order to look for social or cultural reasons for their actions, e.g. India became an

overt nuclear power in 1998. If we were to freeze this period of time for examination, we

would be able to distinguish the obvious material explanation of Chinese nuclear

programme, from the socio-cultural slogan of 'Hindutva' used by the Bharatiya Janata

party which was in power at that time. The same can be done in other cases concerning

India-Pakistan security relations. In other words, it is possible to identify the key groups

in power in both states and gauge how they maximize their power through cultural

determinants with in a given time frame. The rise of the Hindu fundamentalist parties and

the Indian decision to go nuclear shows that those who 'wields' power through cultural

norms can also formulate state's interests based on them (Archer 1996).

The suspicion of Pakistan towards India and vice versa is based on social norms

which have become part of the political culture or 'national character' (Bloom 1990).

This "national character" propagated by the ruling elite is guided by "a particular

ideological and cultural framework that determine decision outcomes" (Bloom 1990: 18).

For Indians, Pakistan is considered a breakaway region so it does not accept the existence

of Pakistan and formulates policies to malign it at every front. Similarly, Pakistan's raison d'être is its Islamic character and anti-Indian policy. The threat of India is used as a unifying tool in the nation building process of Pakistan. Every act of friendship towards India is considered to be against the long term survival of Pakistan. It has become part of their social cognition. The reason behind this are the elites social practices which are being 'tied' to this "normatively determined identity" (Bloom 1990: 49). These national characteristics based on socio-cultural norms disseminated by the ruling elites of both states have resulted in the dismal security relationship between India and Pakistan.

2.3 Which constructivism?

As explained in Figure 2.1, the social constructivist analysis emphasizes the value of cultural variables concerning Indian and Pakistan's identities and interests. These factors are never taken into account by the neo-realist and the neo-liberalism approaches of International Relations. But they serve as the corner stone of all social constructivist analyses. At this point, one final question can be asked which is, what brand of social constructivism am I going to use in my research? I do not treat the state as a given, but I consider instead that state formation is an ongoing process constructed by the elites through an intersubjective pattern of identity and interest formation. The next chapter [Chapter 4] will trace in detail, the ideological grounds of the formation of the states of India and Pakistan by their respective elites in the colonial period. Although my focus of attention remains on state elites in this social constructivist analysis, I have deliberately

avoided the categorical acceptance of conventional constructivism. Why I have done this, I will explain in the rest of this section.

There are as many brands of social constructivism [based on their typological criterion] as there are of any rationalist theory like realism. The 'postmodernists' or critical variant of social constructivism argue for the importance of language following Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* [1922] by defining the structure of language as 'rules' and international relations as 'intertextual' relations (Derian and Shapiro 1989; Onuf 1989). A critical constructivist, Onuf argues that 'rules' or language are the primordial mode for forming an intersubjective structure of understanding between agents (Onuf 1989). They are mainly concerned with the affect of language (Fierke 2003). Some simply focus on language by way of discursive practices among states (Waever 1995). While the critical social constructivism based on cultural premises, often refutes all claims of statehood and instead describes security relations as a cultural product of human practices (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). The effects of culture have also been studied independently by dismissing parsimonious claims of state centric theorists through affixing the primacy of culture on states' identities (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997). Among all these variants, the moderate one is the conventional or 'soft' constructivist variety which accepts states as their main focus of study and yet which problematizes a state's identity by exploring the 'constitutive' and the 'regulative' affects of norms (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Wendt, a conventional constructivist, believes systemic factors serve as 'supervenience' to domestic ones while constructing states' identities (Wendt 1997).

The basic difference in the understanding of identity between conventional constructivists (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999) and critical or linguistic constructivists (Onuf 1989; Kowert 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999) is the role assigned to societal factors in the construction of identity. For critical constructivist, identity is based on the 'active role' of people through social norms resulting into "the fabrication of their own political identities" (Kowert 1998: 103) and it is conveniently ignored by social constructivism 'structuralists' who still believe that the world system is 'superveneous' (Wendt 1994). Critical constructivists place more importance on language by saying "speaking is doing" (Kowert 1998). Language may be pivotal in critical/ linguistic or post-modernistic social constructivism, but it is fraught with the danger of 'double-speak' (Nizamani 2000) which means saying one thing and doing another. In order to bridge that gap an interpretation of the social norms of society provides an additional resilient layer for argumentation. My conception of Indian and Pakistan's identity is especially centred on the elites' 'speaking' and social norms 'doing' the rest. It means that the ruling elites intentionally initiate endeavours for their own vested interests by emphasizing contentious norms hidden in history in order to establish rival social practices. It is also being aided by the fact that there is minimal interaction among people of both states so what ever picture is painted of the other it is considered fairly close to reality. Social norms based on centuries old myths are more resilient and stronger for stereotyping Indian or Pakistani identity than merely focusing on the double speak of actors.

It does not matter for my case study whether it is critical [language], conventional [norms], or post-modern [cultural] social constructivism which should be adopted, rather

I argue for considering the relevance of soft variables like identity, culture, and norms that subsumes various brands of social constructivism. Without indulging in a discussion of the slight ontological differences among different brands of social constructivism, it can be claimed that all broadly agree that the behavioural pattern among states is being socially and intersubjectively created.

All these labels vary and different typologies are applied to one extent or the other in various works. In order to avoid a needless debate in trying to situate this study in one specific camp, my frame of reference instead remains fixed on elites. I do not claim this study to be an exclusive conventional constructivist variety. In my thesis I will first elaborate on the domestic factors that contribute to the formation of state identities. I will then look at the cultural imperatives that need to be given due consideration. I will also draw parallels from critical constructivism by focusing on the discursive practices used by the Indian and Pakistani political and military elites. Lastly, allying myself with the anti-foundationalist camp, I refute the traditional methodology to formulate a security community between the two states. I intend with this by adopting the popular cultural approach. To summarize, the aim of this study is to show the inadequacy of materialistic International Relations theories that are based solely on state social practices by emphasizing the relevancy of identity and culture and the processes involved in its social construction. Problematizing the identity of states or human practices or community practices is common among all brands of social constructivism and I also tread along this same path. While the rational IR theories, namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism, never venture down this path. As a result, these issues and discussions are absent from all their scholarship.

3. The social constructivist security dilemma and the security community: the popular and elites' social practices

The two basic themes of my dissertation are the security dilemma between India and Pakistan and exploring norms for its solution through the establishment of a security community. In this chapter, I present a social constructivist understanding of the security dilemma and the security community. The objective of this chapter is to create a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the two case studies, the Kashmir problem and the nuclear issue, by delineating the security dilemma from its traditional realist confines. The term security dilemma is often used by the realist approach in IR and it is an integral part of its scholarship. A dilemma is commonly defined as a 'quandary'. It refers to the situation one finds oneself, where the only choices are 'choices of evils' (Kindersley 1997). A security dilemma occurs, when two states are not sure of each other's intentions, thereby, any defensive act of a state is perceived as an offensive act by the other state which thereby reciprocates with its own security measures, thus leading to insecurity for both states. The choices of a state are limited due to the lack of any other viable options to get out of this predicament. It can lead to anxiety among states in their bilateral relations with other states and in some cases can also result in war. My argument is that by understanding the dichotomy between elites' social practices and popular social practices, we can not only better understand the dynamics of a security dilemma, but we can also conceive of a security community between the two states. The elites' social practices define the identity discourse of a state which is ultimately linked to its security practices. These routinizations are designed by elites to overcome the existential anxiety

of a state's identity and to provide the state a sense of its ontological security. A contradiction sometimes appears between the two social practices, elucidating the constructed-ness of this dilemma only at the elite level. This will be elaborated on further in this chapter. The popular social practices are based on socio-cultural norms of society. Based on these popular social practices, the security dilemma can be overcome by envisaging a security community, a concept that has already been rejuvenated and revitalized by other social constructivists (Adler 1997b; Adler 1998; Waever 1998; Adler, Barnett et al. 2000).

The chapter is divided into five interlinked sections. The first section is a historical overview of the realist security dilemma which explores the work of prominent realists. At the end of this section a definition of the security dilemma is arrived at which bridges a realist and a social constructivist security dilemma. The second section defines a social constructivist security dilemma. It is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section starts with the ideas of Wendt and then moves forward by fusing them with the cultural norms of society. The second sub-section explains four steps to understand social norms of state's identity based on this cultural prespective. The third sub-section describes the role of elites and popular social practices. The third main section traverses the theoretical discourse of a security community and also explains the dismal role of SAARC in the context of India and Pakistan security relations. My emphasis in this section explains how popular social practices can explicate shared social norms for peaceful coexistence. The fourth section of this chapter explains the importance of the normative structure underlying security communities for their comparative study. The

fifth section concludes the whole argument by emphasizing the relevance of socio-cultural norms on the security dilemma and the security community.

3.1 The realist perspective of the security dilemma

John Herz was the first to introduce the term security dilemma in International Relations in the seminal work he published in 1950's after the commencement of the Cold War. In this work, he highlighted the predicament human society was facing in the absence of any organizing principle or authority. Herz has defined a security dilemma as a problem encountered by humans in a 'social constellation' (Herz 1950). He does not call it a 'biological condition' [inherent trait of human nature which was the standard version of the leading realists of that time] or 'anthropological', but a hard fact of human beings in a 'social constellation' (Herz 1950). At around the same time when Herz was writing about security dilemma, Herbert Butterfield, a British historian, coined the term 'irreducible dilemma'. Butterfield's thesis was based on the Hobbesian understanding of the inherent selfish nature of human beings and the predicament they face when they are epitomized as states battling for survival. Butterfield describes this predicament facing human kind with the following reflection, "you cannot enter into the other man's counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous ... since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he cannot have the same assurance of your intentions that you have" (Butterfield 1951: 21)

Initially there was no immediate response in the IR community to the works of Butterfield and Herz in the 1950s, and the concept of the security dilemma was not developed further at this time. This may seem strange as it was the beginning of the Cold

War which had already created the security dilemma between the USA and the USSR. It took many years until the school of neo-realism or structural realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz, began to work with the concept (Waltz 1979). There are other two prominent variants of neo-realism, defensive realism and offensive realism.

Robert Jervis, a defensive realist, reinvigorated the security dilemma with great fanfare in his article 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'. Jervis defined a security dilemma as the result of two states interaction in which the gain of one is the loss of another leading to uncertainty between the two states (Jervis 1978). The entire dilemma or confusion among states is built around 'perceptions and misperceptions' (Jervis 1976). It revolves around a false belief system which the two states hold towards each other. As the states are not sure of each other's motives and intentions, they often misperceive the actions of the other. Thus a defensive measure by one state can easily be misunderstood as an offensive act by the other state. Here it is important to understand the realist's explanation of insecurity which consists of two elements. One is due to the world anarchy and the other is the uncertain relationship developed between two states due to their self seeking selfish interests. In an uncertain environment where there is a lack of authority misperceptions can lead to creation of a security dilemma.

After the publication of Jervis's article during the peak of Cold War era, interest in the examination of security dilemmas was rejuvenated with a plethora of new issues that developed. Glaser, Kydd and a few others who consider themselves defensive realists, introduced and redefined the idea of the security dilemma by placing emphasis on the defensive powers of states to create harmony among them. Glaser differentiated between security seeking states or 'status quo' states and 'greedy states'. In other words,

between states which have benign intentions and states with malign intentions towards other states (Glaser 1997). Glaser's contribution to the security dilemma resulted in the addition of two more variables of "greedy states and unit-level knowledge of the state's intentions" (Glaser 1997: 190-191). Greed is the characteristic of a state which can be corroborated with an identity of the state, but it is not an identity which is intersubjective, rather it is an objective identity of a state through which the motives of a state develop. 'Unit level analysis' of other state's motives is an interesting variable for the study of security dilemma and at face value it looks some what similar to socio-cultural norms of a state. However, Glaser does not develop the explanatory power of this variable in this sense, but rather he explains the general propositions of the democratic attributes of states that do not indulge in war. By differentiating between 'security-seeking or status-quo' states and 'greedy states' (Glaser 1997), where the former acquires weapons for a defensive role, while the latter for offensive intentions (Jervis 1978), defensive realists' try to devise means of getting out of this dilemma (Jervis 1978).

Defensive realists introduced another term, "costly signalling", which is intended to reduce the tensions of a security dilemma between two states (Kydd 2000b). It means a state deliberately and substantially lessens its material capabilities to harm the 'Other' state, in order to gauge the response of the 'Other' state. It is a materialist strategical approach by one state to end the psychological insecurity in the minds of actors of the other state. Kydd defines costly signals as "signals designed to persuade the other side that one is trustworthy by virtue of the fact that they are so costly that one would hesitate to send them if one were untrustworthy" (Kydd 2000a: 326). The underlying idea of costly signalling is "to dispel these [false] beliefs through strategies of reassurance"

(Kydd 2000a: 325). He uses a model developed by Charles Osgood called the quantitative Gradual Reciprocation In Tension Reduction (GRIT) analysis to examine the Cold War with rational choice theory (Kydd 2000a). The underlying philosophy is to develop trust between two arch rivals locked in a security dilemma by a gradual piece meal approach of confidence building measures. He concludes that "the essence of reassurance is sending costly signals" (Kydd 2000b: 415). Furthermore, he maintains that "common sets of norms, expectations, and institutions may facilitate the development and maintenance of trust" (Kydd 2000b: 416).

According to the offensive realists, there is no end to uncertainty and the anarchic environment in which every state has to interplay. For the offensive realists, uncertainty is infinite and is the 'determinative constraint on state behaviour' while for the defensive realists, although the core assumption of uncertainty remains, it is not infinite and it is assumed that the factors leading to such a dilemma can be overcome by reconciliation (Montgomery 2006). The offensive realists' strategy for overcoming a security dilemma lies in maximizing a state's power to its utmost level. The only way for absolute security lies in becoming the most dominant hegemonic state in the world (Mearsheimer 2001). By assuming that fear among states in anarchy is a 'constant fact of life' (Mearsheimer 2001), offensive realists do not put trust in any 'institution' (Mearsheimer 1994-1995) to help facilitate cooperation among states. Instead of a focus on cooperation, there exists a quest for 'hegemony' by the powerful state (Snyder 2002).

Thus, the parsimonious characteristics of a security dilemma become apparent when we look at both the defensive and offensive realist accounts. Realists assert that security dilemmas have a rational foundation and that a material response is needed in

order to find any solution for them. Even the structural realism of Waltz takes states as similar units making no concrete differentiation among them. Moreover, no further study has been conducted by structural realists to try to characterize these units (Waltz 1979). All realists hold in contempt the social constructivists, especially Wendt, for questioning the long established and well defined materialistic terminology regarding a security dilemma, and moving the discussion towards an intersubjective ideational structure of two states social interactions (Glaser 1997).

According to the realists' appraisal, a security dilemma starts with confusion or misunderstanding the motives of the other state and ends with the net loss of security for both states. Or in some cases, if one state is powerful enough, with the annihilation of the other state. The main argument of all the realist approaches explaining the contours of a security dilemma revolve around three basic assumptions:

1. An anarchic environment leads to uncertainty.

2. A lack of trust that exists among states.

3. A misperception of each other's motives or intentions.

No matter which version of realism one is alluding to, be it offensive realism or defensive realism, one will be able to find these three basic premises in all of them. Fear is at the heart of all realists' understanding of security dilemmas. This means, as per the realist logic, because one state does not know what the other state's intentions are, and since all states are concerned with their own security, they are always fearful of other states actions. Booth and Wheeler acknowledge that "fear is primordial,...[but] the way fear is felt and expressed is invariably social: it has a history, a culture and a politics" (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 172). It is strange that we quite often refer only to the political

part of the fear constructing the security dilemma, while the socio-cultural aspect of fear

is often ignored. Here the question emerges whether world anarchy really does pose such

a constraint on the security of states invariably leading to security dilemmas, or not?

The problem with the realist accounts is that they all agree that anarchy between

states is a constant and that a "constant cannot explain variations" (Mearsheimer 2001:

43). From this constant the realists have tried to generalize and establish the probabilities

of state behaviour. The bipolarity and strategic stability in the world during the Cold War

[1947-1989] helped realists define its key aspects according to scientific propositions. All

realists agree that we cannot know the motives of the states since they are unobservable.

It is again a material solution to an ideational problem. The diagnosis of the problem

shows that the security dilemma has something to do with the social norms which

influence the state's actors to be greedy or benign and its prognosis lies in studying the

cultural or social environment of the state. Every realist who writes about security

dilemmas knows that they are largely based on false beliefs. However, the response

realists prescribe for this is only a material response by treating this set of false beliefs as

if it were some sort of black box. First, this black box has to be opened to understand the

construction of a security dilemma. And second, what about states where rivalry, material

interests and power are not as clearly defined and coherent as was the case between the

USA and the former USSR?

The conflict between India and Pakistan is one such example where in addition to

material factors, the security dilemma has been greatly influenced by social factors. Even

Herz, who coined the concept, acknowledged this fact in the last article he published on

security dilemmas before he died in 2005. He deplored the present day scenario of power

politics and security confrontation among states. In an email published in a journal to commemorate the 50[th] anniversary of the use of the term 'security dilemma', he stressed that the causes of a security dilemma are "in a socio-political rather than an innate psychological condition" (Herz 2003).

It is important at this phase of the chapter to finally arrive at some sort of a definition for security dilemma which bridges the gap between the realist's security dilemma and the social constructivist's security dilemma, before embarking on its further deconstruction. I use the definition provided by Booth and Wheeler in their book '*The Security Dilemma: Fear Cooperation and Trust in World Politics'*. They have explained it in realist terms as "in logic 'lemma' is a proposition that is assumed to be valid. A dilemma therefore occurs when two related lemmas forced a choice … a dilemma is particularly [a] vexing predicament" (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 3-4). By further dissecting it at two levels, the 'dilemma of interpretation' and 'the dilemma of response' they explain that at the first level, the state or actor is in a state of confusion about the motives of other actors, while the other level relates to the 'most rational way of responding' after understanding motives at the first level (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4).

In bilateral relations a dilemma makes both states vulnerable to misperceptions. This means that any wrong calculation of the other state's motives may lead state [A] to a tense confrontation with state [B] resulting in a 'security paradox' between these two states. Booth defines a security paradox "as a situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all around" (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 9). In other words, there is a slight difference between a security dilemma and a

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security paradox in the sense that a security dilemma lies at the level of deliberations or decision making while a security paradox lies at the action level. Both these acts, when taken together in interstate relations, can cause insecurity all around. The reason for choosing this definition over others is because it dissects the security dilemma at two distinct levels, the level of 'interpretation' and the level of 'response', hence, it leaves room for the social constructivists' account of security dilemmas at the level of 'interpretation'. Yet it may be asked, how can we interpret a security dilemma from a rival state's identities, norms and social practices?

The next section explains how these social factors contribute to the understanding of the security dilemma.

3.2 The social constructivist security dilemma: a cultural prespective

As a concept, the security dilemma was born during the days of the Cold War with the 'balance of terror' in place in the world which might have explained a lot about super power rivalry. But the world has changed a lot since then, for example, what about states whose security dilemma revolves around their identities? Here the security dilemma is being created by an intersubjective structure through the interplay of their social identities. Before embarking on my project, I want to clarify some misperceptions regarding the social constructivist approach in international relations.

First, social constructivism does not imply that a security dilemma or a state's foreign policies can be changed over night or that they are in flux all the time. Social constructivism with its focus on processes of interaction between states tries to explain the structures [intersubjective or transitory] that develop between states. It is akin to the

"social construction of reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1967), which means that the reality is out there, but the social processes involved in making that reality undergo change, there by influencing the construction of reality itself. For example, the security dilemma between the former USSR and the USA was a reality, but societal norms and cultural determinants of both societies as social processes acted upon the mindset of agents involved, to construct and then resurrect the security dilemma.

Second, constructivism is not equal to relativism. Constructivism in International Relations especially the 'conventional' (Checkel 1998) or 'conservative' (Pettman 2000) constructivist approach accepts the epistemology of realism giving due importance to the constraining power of the material structure. The main difference with the traditional approaches lie in the attributes of the structure developed between the two states in a security dilemma. A realist structure is exogenous and hard to change, while a social constructivist one is intersubjective [shared] which means that it remains as long as the agents involved in making it intend it to.

Third, a constructivist analysis is more dependent on the agency or process side rather than on the structural side while explaining relations between two states. By presenting how states' social practices lead to structure [mutually constitutive], it gives us a ray of hope to envisage different social practices in order to alter the overall structure of a security dilemma between states.

Fourth, with the concept of intersubjectivity between states which can be changed by altering state practices, social constructivism is better equipped for the explanation of security dilemmas among Third World states from the post-colonial era. This is because these states face common predicaments of state building, subjugated societies, identity

dilemmas and more importantly their societies share socio-cultural norms and associates themselves with social practices guided by these norms. For example, in Third World states, mired with ethnic and religious cleavages, the state elites face the predicament wherein their benign intentions of nation building may lead to unforeseen 'outcomes' by antagonizing various other communities (Roe 1999). Thus a security dilemma "become theoretically messy: benign intentions, malign outcomes" (Roe 1999: 199). This is the paradox of a state's identity in the Third World.

According to the social constructivist's approach, the two states develop their relationship through a mutual understanding of each other's identities which means that identities of states are prior to their interests or objectives. These identities are not developed in a vacuum. States do not behave as inordinate like-minded units, but rather they are formed by the social activities of their actors. This 'social structure' has to be given *a priori*, in addition to its material counterpart (Wen and Wai 2003: 4). The identity of the state depends upon the knowledge an actor obtains during its interaction with another actor (Wen and Wai 2003). A security dilemma according to the social constructivist explanation revolves around identity conceptions of a state which the other state maintains about it. Starting with Wendt, the constructed nature of anarchy was explained by him with an example of 'alter and ego' which start their relationship by 'signalling' (Wendt 1992). Each do not consider the other as inherently aggressive and bent upon crushing the other, rather the communication between them is developed subtly, with every action and gesture being monitored by the other (Wendt 1992). The interpretation of these signals and watching each other's actions leads to the development of an intersubjective cooperative or hostile relationship between the states rather than a

relationship based on systemic constraints or inherent selfish interests (Wendt 1992).

Based on these basic premises of social constructivism, I argue that an examination of the domestic cultural milieu of a state can provide us with an operational understanding of a state's actions. There is a specific cultural environment of a state consisting of social norms, national narratives, as well as its historical background which gives meaning to a state's identity.

Social constructivists as well as anthropologists question why realism does not explore the belief system surrounding a states' social elites and more importantly how cultural differences between two societies can shape a state's actors perspectives (Avruch 1998). It is important to explain the significance of culture on actors' perspectives because if these cultural influences on a states' identity are not properly understood then it may lead to misperceptions which lie at the heart of the realist's security dilemma.

Culture is a highly contested term in the social sciences. Without delving into its complex ontology, I simply define it as "socially inherited solutions to life's problems" (Avruch 1998: 106). Culture is not static, but rather is dynamic and changes in societal customs and traditions evolve over time. The interpretive understanding of culture forms an integral part in identifying an actors' perspective in a security dilemma. In order to explain conflict resolutions among states, anthropologists derive '*etic*' and '*emic*' approaches to study the cultural behaviour of actors' involved in a conflict (Avruch 1998). The *emic* approach, explains cultural norms surrounding an actor's behaviour, and reveals the cultural rationale behind the actions of an actor. In other words, it offers us the 'native point of view'(Avruch 1998: 60). It helps us to understand the cultural sensitivities of the parties involved in the conflict. In contrast to this the *etic* approach

studies only the systemic context of a conflict which is the cultural perspective of the whole system. The reason a state misperceives the other state is due to a 'disjunction' caused by 'cultural interaction' rather than the constraining power of structural anarchy (Inayatullah and Blaney 1997). Underlying the '*emic*' or 'native point of view' are certain narratives of statehood which are held sacred by states and these have social or cultural sensibilities tagged to them. For example, 'Hindutva' is a cultural slogan of statehood devised by a mainstream Indian political party. It envisages the pre-dominance of Hindus in India. When such parties come to power and the elites' social practices are derived from such cultural parameters, the hostile relations between the Hindu majority in India and Muslim majority in Pakistan will likely develop. Similarly, for both the Israelis and the Palestinians there are cultural sensibilities attached to Al-Quds and without understanding the cultural embedded-ness of these narratives it is impossible to achieve conflict resolution.

Culture helps an actor to see politics in a specific way. It helps in "constructing a sense who we are in relation to them" (Giles and Middleton 2008: 27). It gives a sense of identity to the competing actors in a conflict. Lebow explains, that "culture generates identity in a double sense" because "it emphasizes some motives and downgrades others and regulates the ways in which ones should be developed and expressed" (Lebow 2008: 563). Material forces have their interplay at a much later phase. Although the United States and present day Russia still possess weapons of mass destruction, once the feeling of 'us versus them' was gone, then so was the security dilemma.

However, this does not mean that the cultural understanding of a conflict can provide us with ready-made solutions. There is no linear or reductionist effect to culture

since there is a 'fuzzy logic' attached to it, which means that culture provides us with 'rubbery' statements or sets of 'more or less true or false' arguments in times of uncertainties (Avruch 1998: 36). In other words, if we take the security of a state as a discourse, then the culture of security guides us through various narratives of statehood and the significance these narratives have for understanding a state's identity. The relationship between a 'state' and a 'society', as well as the 'values and norms' of a state's 'political culture' explains the identity discourse of the state (Risse-Kappen 1994). If we understand a state's narratives, it will help us to comprehend its security dilemmas. But the question remains, how can we understand the norms underpinning the narratives of a state's identity?

3.2.2. Steps to understand social norms of state's identity

Security dilemmas revolve around the unobservable part or intentions or motives of the states which cannot be calculated. This unobservable part can be identified through the existence of social norms which shape a state's identity as a precursor to the state's motives or interests. How can we empirically quantify norms which influence state behaviour? In this regard, Farrell emphasizes that "shared beliefs often leave physical residues…of strategic culture [which can] include the public statements and confidential papers of policy and political policy elites" (Farrell 2002: 60). For the evidence of norms in a state, Farrell emphasizes the "norm salience…in domestic political discourse, national institutions (procedure and law), and national policies" (Farrell 2002: 61). This leads us to a four step approach for understanding a security dilemma:

1. Understanding the cultural sensibilities of the states in a conflict.

2. Quantifying the social norms of a state's identity [narratives, history, etc.].

3. Comprehending elites' social practices [national policies, identity discourse, etc.].

4. Understanding the dichotomy between elite and popular social practices.

After having explained the first two steps, I will now concentrate on the third and fourth points. The 'speech acts' (Waever 1995) of elites are being employed for 'securitization' or 'de-securitization' as referent of security in a state's security discourse (Ross 2001; Williams 2007). This means that the ruling elite in their speeches can highlight or downplay the importance of a security subject. This can be shown by conducting a critical discourse analysis of the speeches of the elites in order to comprehend their social practices. Thus, the constructivist approach seeks to explain how "something we cannot directly observe (culture) shapes something we can (behaviour) (Farrell 2002: 62). There is no consistency in the uncertainty of a security dilemma so it cannot be 'assumed' as 'it is a variable' which can be explained by the social practices of the elites' (Farrell 2002). Once the norms of a state are fully understood by another state, after examining their daily social practices, then this confusion is replaced by certainty. The examination of the social practices and norms of state can also help in reading the minds of the policy makers who are behind a state's security policy. I will now look at the last step of dichotomy between the 'speech acts' of elites and popular social practices which contribute to a security dilemma.

3.2.3 Elites' 'routinization' versus popular social practices

Critical constructivists or 'social theory constructivists' (Pettman 2000) have pointed out the parameters of the 'language' of a state's elites or actors as 'rules' (Onuf

1989) in 'interstate interactions' (Kowert 1998; Fierke 2003). This requires an interpretive understanding of the security discourse rather than the positivist methodology of realism (Avruch 1998). For example, India's specific national jargon regarding Kashmir is that 'Kashmir is India's "*attootang*" [a part of the body which cannot be separated]. Similarly, the specific phrase Pakistan uses to refer to Kashmir is "Kashmir is Pakistan's *sharag* [the jugular vein of Pakistan]. These examples show the primacy of language among these state's security discourses. The history books of both states are filled with such particular phrases adopted by both states' elites. The ruling elites in India and Pakistan have employed these metaphors in their respective security discourses. The elites are not only influenced by the environment in which they work, but they also help to construct this environment. There is no denying the fact that power politics are part and parcel of any policy orientation of a state's actors, but they are strongly affected by their state's interactions with other states on a daily basis.

A state's identity is sometimes linked to its quest for ontological security [self security] which results in the deliberate construction of a security dilemma (Mitzen 2006). The state's actors themselves want 'routinization' in their social practices with other states (Mitzen 2006). In order for the self to feel secure, 'routines' or social practices are needed to help comprehend the uncertainties of the world around us (Mitzen 2006: 354). 'Routines' are 'everyday rituals' which hold the society together in this era of uncertainty and anxiety (Goffman 1959). In order to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the other state's motives, states develop among themselves a deliberate pattern of social interaction that does not depend on whether it is conducive to their security. Some state

elites prefer to cling to the 'conditions of uncertainty' for the sake of their state's identity (Mitzen 2006).

The states themselves want certainty in their relationship with other states. At times, this may mean maintaining a conflictual relationship with other states in order to overcome scepticism of each other's identities. It is the social practices of the elites which determine this certainty in the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. More importantly, both states' identities emphasize differences with the other, instead of being based on shared commonalities. As a consequence, an Indian identity cannot be constructed without a negative Pakistani identity and vice versa. But all these identity discourses are the creations of the elite and they destroy the possibility of any other alternate discourse on identity development.

Both the states' elites create "routines which regularize social life, making it, and the self, knowable" (Mitzen 2006: 346). The ruling elites desire for ontological security helps us understand the common patterns of behaviour among decision makers over a long period of time, despite signals of assurance and cooperation from the other state (Mitzen 2006). India and Pakistan's security dilemma is the classical example of such type of state behaviour, in which despite repeated gestures of confidence building measures both the states have failed to cease their hostilities and end their security dilemma. It is because their ontological security is based on these routines which have constructed their identities and they cannot disengage from these social practices for fear of losing their identities. These routines or state's social practices have been intentionally embedded in the socio-cultural norms of society. If there are cultural myths woven

around a state's enemy, then the identity discourses of a state will reify its ontological security.

In such cases, a state's ruling elite may use the fear and uncertainty of a security dilemma in order to construct patterns of animosity. Such situations are more nuanced especially with post-colonial states who share a bitter past or who came into being as the result of partition. For them clinging to their cultural mores of labeling the other as the enemy is an important part of defining the self through the state's daily practices or routines at the expense of castigating the other state. The daily social practices of states can help either to reduce or cause uncertainty surrounding the security dilemma. The elites quest for ontological security and sociological approaches to understand their behaviour, helps to explain state identities and can reduce uncertainty surrounding security dilemmas between states.

In a socially constructed environment, the two states through their daily practices create an intersubjective understanding of each other. This intersubjective structure is sustained by the social norms of society. In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict, the social norms of society are not sustaining this hostile intersubjective structure. The understanding of these divergent social practices between the ruling elite and the rest of society is of added value to this social constructivist security dilemma. The discourse analysis of the speeches of elites will show that this security dilemma is deliberately created by the elites in each state's security discourse. At the same time an analysis of the popular culture of both states will show the presence of common social norms required for a security community which remain underdeveloped due to both states' ruling elites vested interests. So far the social constructivist understanding of a security dilemma has

focused on a state's social practices and does not make a distinction between popular social practices and elites' social practices. This might not be problematic in security dilemmas involving Western states where the majority of the public are generally supportive of the ruling elites' social practices, but in the case of India and Pakistan there is an evident disparity between the social practices of the masses and the elites.

I will now briefly explain some of these popular social practices in order to bring to light the dichotomy between the elites and the masses. Since my security community is based on these popular social practices, I will cover these in detail in the last section.

Popular social practices refer to societal norms and traditions which help to formulate the behaviour of the majority of people in a state. If we examine societies of India and Pakistan, we find that popular social practices share some common norms that will facilitate the formation of a security community, while the practices of the ruling elite encourages the formation of a security dilemma between India and Pakistan. According to the constructivist approach, actions and interests are shaped by 'social norms' instead of by 'material' considerations (Barkin 2003: 326). Socio-cultural norms produce 'power relationships' which is a 'structure of feeling' to see the existing world in a 'particular way' (Giles and Middleton 2008: 25).

The popular culture of both states shares some unique popular social practices which include among others, the Pakistani masses eagerly watching Indian films, the presence of nostalgic feelings toward 'the Other' depicted in the acclaimed literary classics of both states, the similarity of linguistic norms and the educational curriculum formulated under state patronage which inculcates the seeds of hatred toward each other. This will be elaborated on in more detail in Chapter 7 which deals with the hypothetical

India-Pakistan security community. There appears to be two distinct "social cognitive structures", one is operating at the elite level perpetuating the security dilemma through routines and the other at the mass level generating peaceful social practices (Hopf 2002). Unfortunately, stringent restrictions imposed by both states on people to people contact give an edge to the elites' 'social cognitive structure' to operate freely, denying space to the other more popular one.

This hidden tension between popular social practices and elite social practices opens the black box of society. This helps to explain what is happening inside states. It sheds light on the darkness surrounding the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. The more we understand the social factors by bringing back the "society in" for our discussion of states involved in a conflict, the better we are able to understand the security dilemma as shown above (Hopf 2002). But why is there a wide gap in the opinions of the ruling elites and the popular masses in India and Pakistan? Some of the most glaring features of both states' societies resulting in a wide gulf between the elites and the masses are among other things, the existence of mass poverty, a landed aristocracy, the caste system in India and the inheritance of British imperial bureaucracy. The dominant values and norms being propagated by the state's elites do not match those held by the wider population with respect to the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan. How these popular social practices lead us to identify social norms of an abstract security community between India and Pakistan?

3.3.1 Security community: a theoretical perspective

In this section, I show how understanding the social environment of a security dilemma helps us in our exploration of social norms that are required for the construction of a security community between states. What is the essence of a security community and how can it be conceived in the realm of security relations between India and Pakistan? The advocates of a security community argue that the absence of war among participant countries is its most significant feature. According to Khoo, security communities "are characterized by the absence of war, and the absence of significant organized preparations for war, such as military contingency planning" (Khoo 2004: 38). The formation of a security community is meant for cooperation. Some security communities are institutionalized in the shape of multilateral or bilateral organizations (e.g. European Union, EU and NATO). However, other times a sociological underpinning is first required to change the identities of the states as a precursor for the development of the common interests of a community. A security community is a step towards peace.

Nearly forty years ago, Karl Deutsch made the connection between peace and a security community in International Relations (Deutsch, 1970). He discovered this observation while differentiating between political communities and security communities. In the former there is the possibility of war, but with the latter there are "stable expectations of peace among participating units or groups, whether or not there has been a merger of their political institutions" (Deutsch, 1970: 33). Furthermore, there are two forms of security communities. The first is an amalgamated security community in which states renounce their formal sovereignty to a higher authority and join together against a common threat. Such an example is the United States of America. The other one

is a pluralistic security community in which states retain their formal sovereignty, but formally agree on the renunciation of war and the peaceful resolution of their disputes (Deutsch 1970). Such an example would be the EU or any other multilateral and formal organization which provide participating states a forum to resolve all their disputes through discussions.

In addition to the security community there are a few other concepts that are associated with the mutual association of states, such as regional society, regional systems, or nascent security communities. All of these are common terms used in security studies. What these terms have in common is the existence of shared understandings including common values or norms in order to weave their fabric of cooperation. The concept was further refined in a social constructivist framework, but mainly in pluralistic security communities leaving aside amalgamated security communities (Adler 1997b; Adler, Barnett et al. 2000). These pluralistic security communities require a sense of "we-ness" (Fierke 2007) among the members of the community in order to maintain "dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Adler, Barnett et al. 2000: 7).

The question now arises why should we want to formulate a constructivist security community and why not a neo-realist or neo-liberalist one? First, all major conceptions of security communities have been developed by constructivist scholars. Apart from Karl Deutsch who first defined a security community back in 1950's, all major work since has been done by social constructivists. Whether it is a case study of security communities around the globe (Adler, Barnett et al. 2000), or conceiving of the role of 'cognitive regions' as a precursor to a security community (Adler 1997b), most of the

scholars have written in a social constructivist vein. Discussing the 'ASEAN way' while elaborating on ASEAN's norms as 'mushawarat', the constructivist approach is better suited with its emphasis on norms and the influence of the social environment in constructing a state's identity (Acharya 2001)

The formation of a security community requires states' change their identities, and if the state interests and identities are bracketed as exogenous, then how can we conceive of any change in a state's behaviour? Identity is the pivot around which revolves the idea of cooperation or a security community. It is the identity of the state which needs to be accommodative of the other state's identity to bring about any change in the intersubjective understanding developed between them. Now looking through the prism of neo-realism and realism, the basic premises of these approaches holds that there is absolute anarchy in the world and states have to watch out for their own self interests. As the 'offensive realist approach' suggests, each state has a pre-established identity and self-interests which demands that its interests should be maximized (Mearsheimer 2001). Given such circumstances, it is first of all only a 'false promise' that any organization will be able to hold countries together on the path of cooperation that are pursuing their own self interests (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). Second, the systemic condition of anarchy in the world seems to have sealed the fate of all states by treating them all the same as if they are merely 'similar units' (Waltz 1979). This "neo-neo" synthesis comprising neo-liberalism along with neo-realism have the same basic priori conditions while converging at a rationalist epistemology (Waever 2008). Neo-liberalism also does not emphasize any change in the identities and interests of states apart from their minor modifications under the affect of 'regimes' or international organizations (Jervis 1982). The neo-liberalists

can conceive of cooperation between states, but to envisage any change in the identities of state is beyond their scope. The problem with both neo-realism and neo-liberalism is that they are both rationalist theories of IR and cannot formulate the underlying matrix of a sociological security community.

The formulation of a security community requires the identification of the social forces involved in constructing the "we – feeling" between two or more countries or an intersubjective understanding of a collective identity (Fierke 2007). To understand the constellation of social forces involved in the formulation of a security community one needs to explore the cultural traditions, customs and narratives of societies and not treat states as like units whose capabilities are constrained under the influence of an anarchic system. The social constructivist 'turn' starts with the basic premises of change in the identities of the states (Checkel 1998). It is not novel 'ideas in foreign policy' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) which matter, but rather what changes these ideas can bring in the 'culture of national security' (Katzenstein 1996) by transforming states identities. The hallmark of social constructivism is the intersubjectively conceived collective identity of states. The identities and interests are socially constructed by the states, rather than pre-determined by the system.

It is also interesting to engage in some of the debates concerning a regional association between India and Pakistan. Although there is nothing explicit on the formation of a security community between these two states, it has been argued that a 'regional security complex' could be established based on the existing power structure in South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986; Buzan and Waever 2003). The 'regional security complex' can be achieved with the desecuritisation of the speech acts of the elites in

which their interstate security concerns are downplayed in lieu of emphasising their mutual benefits (Buzan and Waever 2003). The main problem with all these approaches is that they are primarily based on the existing power structure and do not give any room for forces to develop from the bottom up [regional social norms] which can influence and change the elites' identities and interests.

While looking for regional security arrangements, Ayoob, who is the protégé of Hadley Bull, coined the terms regional society or regional system that correspond with the term international society. In order to understand these terms one has to "visualize a continuum stretching from a regional system at one end to a regional community at the other … regional security would fall closer to a regional system, whereas a regional society would be located nearer to the regional community end" (Ayoob 1999: 248).

The figure 3.1 shows a single line being dissected at intervals and the closeness of one section with the other explains the adherence of the two compartments. A regional system shows the existing power structure of a region and it lies close to the next dissecting line of regional security which emphasizes that the most dominant state has the final say in the politics of the region. Similarly, a regional society lies close to a regional community due to its emphasis on the social norms of society as the harbinger of peace in the region.

Regional System   Regional security   Regional society   Regional Community

Figure 3.1: A continuum showing regional security arrangements

A 'regional society' is intended to provide peaceful conditions because of states 'conscious recognition' of matters of 'common interests' (Ayoob 1999: 248). Now the question arises, how to devise "conscious recognition"? For conceptualizing a stable regional order in South Asia, Ayoob assigned a "pre-eminent role" to India as the core or the nucleus of such a regional society. This role has to be accepted by all states in the region (Ayoob 1999). Yet this Indian role is unacceptable for Pakistan. Role assignment and recognition is a consensual process which must be collectively assigned and unanimously recognized. The existence of any hostile prior intersubjective understandings between major states of a region can inhibit or prevent the formation of regional orders. Again, Ayoob's conception of a regional society is based on material structural arrangement where the regional 'norms and values' have the backing of 'pre-eminent' regional power, rather than based on any consensual role of the participating states.

The problem with the understanding of these concepts [regional society, regional community and regional complexes] in the context of India and Pakistan is that they are all tied to the existing power arrangements of the region. My conception of an India-Pakistan security community is a more ideational one. It is based on the exploration of shared norms to build such an order, community or society, if not for the entire region then at least between these two countries. The need is to define the term community. Community in this sense does not mean integration, but rather it is a mechanism devised by norms and shared understandings to solve all disputes through formal organizations, such as SAARC or through informal means. I would like to review the role of SAARC as a security community. So far the attempts made to promote regional cooperation have

been largely unsuccessful. The organization has been unable to create a South Asian identity which is required for the establishment of a future security community. This is primarily because of two reasons. The first reason is because there are inherent flaws in its charter. The second reason is the rivalry between India and Pakistan that has made the entire organization ineffectual. When we look at the first reason, it is evident that SAARC has had little effect. The SAARC charter not only prevents its member states from discussing bilateral contentious issues at the forum of SAARC, but it also being promoted primarily as an economic organization leaving aside the contentious security issues. Its founding fathers have drawn parallels with the founding of the European Union, but this is not a good comparison since the EU has the backing of the USA which strongly supports NATO that serves as a security umbrella protecting the EU's economic progress. In the case of SAARC, the attempt to side step security issues has made this organization an abject failure. By focusing solely on economic interdependence, with utter disregard to the security problems among its member states has led to SAARC's failure. The second interrelated cause is the rivalry between India and Pakistan, the two neighbouring nuclear countries of the region.

SAARC's efforts to establish joint economic action have so far not been successful because the economies of the participating states are more competitive than complementary. Almost every SAARC member country is producing similar products with agrarian based economies. Moreover, intra-SAARC trade is minimal when compared to bilateral trade with the EU and other advanced countries, despite the announcement of SAFTA [South Asian Free Trade Area] which came into effect in January 2006. The solution again lies in providing an adequate security shield through

the re-chartering of SAARC by incorporating a security clause in it, whereby all states would be able to settle their security disputes at this forum. Acharya argues that "the key aim of a security community is to develop the common interests of actors in peace and stability, rather than to deter or balance a common threat" (Acharya 2001: 19). I am not conceiving of a security community which requires integration between India and Pakistan as a prerequisite. Pakistan simply cannot afford to lose its identity by amalgamating into the folds of India and go against its ontological base of the 'Two Nation Theory'. I am envisaging the possibility of a pluralistic security community, as a first step in an attempt to end this perennial security dilemma between these two countries in the South Asian region. "The goal is to explore processes of construction and change, the processes by which identities and interests are produced" (Fierke 2007). This approach to the security community between India and Pakistan as a social construction will help us to analyze the 'processes' of change. There is a role for agents or state's actors in all forms of security communities (Adler, Barnett et al. 2000).

My conceptualization of an India-Pakistan security community hinges on the domestic norms of society. This is due to the fact that up until this point there has been no effective institutional backing to envisage the establishment of a security community between India and Pakistan. However, this does not mean that I aim at domestic variables from a neo-classic realist theory. Although neo-classic theory focuses on the state's domestic factors, it is based on rationalist assumptions. This means that the aim of the neo-classic theory is to augment a state's given identity and interests from the domestic core. First, there is no room for 'intersubjectivity' between two states' behaviour according to the neo-classic theory, rather it explains the behaviour of a state by focusing

on the domestic conditions with the same prior attributes of fixed state identity and selfish interests. Second, the major attributes of culture and social norms have no room in neo-classic realism. We need to understand the identities and interests of Pakistan and India constructed from the socio-cultural norms of the society. In neo-classic realism the 'logic of consequence' is applied, which means that the state's action has to be explained by a rational calculus model and so there is less likelihood of the 'logic of appropriateness' explaining a state's behaviour according to norms, roles and identities (Krasner 2009). Although both these logics are not 'mutually incompatible' (Krasner 2009), in the explanation of security relations between India and Pakistan, the 'logic of appropriateness' is seldom invoked to explain the two states behaviour. In other words, there are few explanations offered for both states behaviour based on the influence of social norms and identities.

I am not claiming here that a state's actions can always be seen as the result of its normative values since all states definitely resort to rational calculations under a constraining systemic structure. What I want to point out here is that if we look at the case of India and Pakistan their behaviour may better be understood if we take into account the causal explanation of the constraining power of norms. Furthermore, I am not so much interested in the study of a 'regional security complex', but rather the search for a collective identity formulated on the basis of the acceptance of norms of behaviour by states (Buzan and Waever 2003).

Similarly, the concept of security community is also different from 'security regimes' which have a time constraint regulation and have a limited scope of state cooperation without any qualitative change in the fundamental identities of the states

involved (Jervis 1982). For example, a security regime between two countries based on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Although, both a security community and a security regime are devised to mitigate the classical security dilemma between states and develop a level of trust between them, the security regime does not offer concrete, effective and long term mutually assured prospects of peace among the states. This is because the states in a security regime remain egoistic, self-interested and power maximizing actors who are only constrained by the anarchic structure of the system. While they may alter some of their interests in order to cooperate in a security regime, it is impossible for them to change their basic characteristics. However, in a security community, the emphasis is on changing the overall environment of anarchy by encouraging the states to alter their identities and interests. The characteristics of the state change from self-interested into 'other-regarding' (Collins 2007).

I will pinpoint the negative norms propagated by the ruling elites of the two states which hamper the progress of the formation of such a security community. The educational curriculum devised under state patronage and subsequent pedagogical approaches has constructed animosity between the people of both states. The elites' rhetoric during electoral campaigning also plays a major role in contributing to the dismal security relations. Similarly the censor ship regime imposed on Indian films by the elites will explain some of these negative norms constructed at the elite level on one hand. While, on the other hand, I will also identify positive social norms at the popular level between the two countries which include linguistic similarity, presence of nostalgic feelings of each other in literary classics and some mass media initiatives. The common people of both countries speak the same language called Urdu in Pakistan and Hindi in

India. The writing style is different, but it can be easily understood by the people of both countries. The relatively independent and influential mass media in both countries acts as an intervening variable for the propagation of these norms. The Indian film industry is the largest in the world and virtually all Indian films are viewed in Pakistan with the utmost interest because of their common language. I assume that change not only comes from outside, but it also comes from within. In other words, the intersubjective understandings constructed by popular opinion can also influence the elites of both states.

The foundation of a security community between India and Pakistan depends on the popular social practices between both states. By connecting the popular social practices of these two states, there is a better likelihood for the possibility of the foundation of a security community. Popular culture generates a regional identity when contemplating a security community between India and Pakistan. Populism, simply asserted is 'appealing to people' and, if given space it can help bridge the gap between the elites of India and Pakistan (Canovan 1999). This may lead to the solution of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan that is a construction of the interests of the elites.

3.4 Comparative study of security communities

As a litmus test, I will also compare the abstract India-Pakistan security community with established security communities like the European Union and ASEAN in Chapter 7. In that chapter, I will assume that there lies an underlying normative structure based on the historical cultural settings of a region which effectively guides us towards the dynamics, inclusion and exclusion processes of a security community. These

norms are unwritten or un-codified cultural conventions that form a major part of the collective identity of states in the security community. The normative structure is based on cultural myths, identity politics and the shared interests of states in a security community. Therefore, the constitutive and regulative norms of a security community are directly dependant on regional socio-cultural norms which in turn form states' social practices. The normative structure of a region not only helps us to understand why security communities can be formed through states' interaction, but it also helps to define the 'shared interests' of states involved in a security community. Moreover, this explains the reasons behind the exclusion of other states from its ambit. In a subtle way, the argument begins from the social constructivist explanation of the identity of security communities and then explores their normative substructure and finally explains the salience of their norms. I will briefly define the key variables of identity, culture and the shared interests of states working in a security community.

The culture of a security community refers to the core traditions, epochs and interlinked historical narratives that identify a region. For example, in Europe, the two World Wars, the Enlightenment, the crusades, the rise of Christianity, and the struggle for democracy against despotism are all important historical narratives. These narratives help us to identify the normative structure of Europe. Similarly, for Southeast Asian societies, the colonial struggle, informality, family values and mutual consultations form their cultural bedrock. In the India-Pakistan region, religious fervour, popular culture and the post-colonial national identity struggles are the key features of South Asian societies. A cultural constructivist, Michael Williams in his work '*Culture and Security'* argues that the security practices are centred on agents 'dispositions' towards themselves and to the

outside world (Williams 2007: 25). The more we understand the 'disposition' or cultural orientations of security communities, the more we will be able to appreciate the causal relation of its working norms.

Within the confines of a security community, identity refers to the collective identity of a community. It is not every state's individual identity, but rather it refers to the 'we-feeling' aspects of a security community. Who are 'we' in a community versus 'them', the other? All security communities are contingent upon their group identities. Differences in how its works, membership status and role specification are causally linked to the collective identity of the regional security community. Intersubjectivity refers to the mutually agreed parameters of a state's interest which is determined by all the states through persuasion and discussion without any appearance of coercion. The shared interests of the security community refer to the intersubjectively defined norms of the behaviour of states while working in the community. These shared interests are reached through 'other regarding behaviour' of states in a community and are not solely dependant upon materialistic connections which only forms a part of it. In other words, socially constructed and mutually agreed norms form the shared interests of states in a security community.

3.5 Conclusion

We can understand the security dilemma of third world states if we make a distinction between elites and popular social practices by using socio-cultural variables. This helps to shed light on state's motives which remain concealed in the realist understanding of security dilemmas. If a security dilemma is a security predicament faced

by states that are in a 'social constellation' (Herz 1950), then what is social constructivism all about? Is it not the way to explain how relations among states are constructed by their social practices and intersubjective understandings? There are two diametrically opposed ontological positions to the study of security dilemmas. One is the positivist structuralist approach in which every dilemma is centred on the anarchic structure of world politics. The other is the post-modern or post-structuralist approach in which agents and structures are mutually constitutive and no one can work independent of the other. Folker points out for its synthesis, "reconciling the two approaches so that both stasis [realism] and change [constructivism] in global social order are explained simultaneously seems desirable" (Sterling-Folker 2002: 74). The constructivist approach being a post-modern one revolves around the centrality of human agency and the role that ideas play in mitigating or exacerbating conflict through the reinterpretation of two states' mutual understandings.

The security dilemma in social constructivism is the culmination of two states' social practices. In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict, the dilemma is the result of the confluence of the elites' social practices in line with their respective states' identities. The understanding of popular social practices gives us a clue of the extent of the constructed-ness of this dilemma only at the elite level. If we give the socio-political norms of a state an explanatory role, then we can better understand the concept and reduce the confusion surrounding it. The basic difference in the understanding of security dilemmas between realism and constructivism is the treatment given to the identity of states. In realism, all states are 'rational actors', whereas in constructivism the state is a social actor (Snidal 1985). The treatment of a security dilemma as a social construct between states takes into

account many rich variables in its explanation, while the realist model is largely shrouded in mystery.

How should security dilemmas between countries that share cultural affinity and geographic proximity and are still entangled in the conflict, be understood? This is due to the fact that their identities have been constructed by their respective elites through their social interactions which are in stark contrast to popular social practices. The routinization of states' elites makes this dilemma an essential discourse followed by both states in order to overcome existential threats to their states' identities. The theoretical edifice of a security dilemma is based on the conceptions of two state's identities, understanding of socio-cultural norms and more importantly the generalization of the 'routines' of two states' behaviour. The discourse analysis of the speeches of both India and Pakistan's elites will show how cultural norms, local myths and national narratives are used as the backdrop in the state's daily 'routines' for their respective ontological security and this has led to the creation of a security dilemma between them.

4. The identities of India and Pakistan in the formative phase of state-building: ideology as a key identity signifier

This chapter traces the identity discourses of India and Pakistan historically, with an examination of the social practices of their respective elites. It argues that both India and Pakistan are in search of their identities. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 has served as the 'chosen trauma' for both states from which they have failed to emerge (Volkan 1988). This has given further incentive to both Indian and Pakistani elites to configure their respective state's identity based on each other's chosen traumas under the influence of their professed ideologies. Whenever these elites arrive at the helm of affairs, they have changed state's social practices by adhering to their supposed ideology. Ideology in this respect has played the role of an identity signifier**.** This chapter traverses the path of identity formation in both states at the time of independence because it is at this point that their respective founding fathers presented their own vision of Indian or Pakistani identity. After explaining this initial phase, the argument then describes the state's identity discourse through the subsequent social practices of Indian and Pakistani elites. The social practices of the current ruling elites show a serious discrepancy when contrasted with the state's identities as espoused by their founding fathers and enshrined in their respective constitutions. The main argument culminates with an interesting anomaly which explains that India's apparent secular identity has been shattered by the social practices of it's ruling elites which is not in conformity with this original secularist vision. In other words, even though Indian identity carries a secular label in its constitution, the contemporary Indian identity is being shaped by elites social practices

based on "Hindutva" identity [those ideologically committed to Hindu identity]. Similarly, the social practices of the Pakistani elites show how Islamic nomenclature as well as the threat towards India is being used instrumentally for the sake of national unity. If both states revert back to their identities which were originally envisioned by their respective founding fathers, then it would help to decrease tensions in their intersubjectively constructed security dilemma.

This chapter consists of five sections. The first section of this chapter deals with the importance of chosen traumas in the identity discourses of India and Pakistan. It explains the relevancy of the partition of the subcontinent as the biggest chosen trauma inscribed on the psyche of both states which has influenced their formation of identity. The later part of this section also explores other chosen traumas in the turbulent history of both states. The second section describes Pakistan's identity discourse by focusing on the speeches of its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It also explains the constitutional arrangement of Pakistan's identity and explores the tension between the elites' social practices and the popular perceptions regarding Pakistan's identity. The third section examines the Indian identity discourse by explaining the vision of its founding fathers, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It explains the constitutional provisions to safeguard Indian secular identity and the contrasting popular and elites' social practices. The fourth section sums up the identity discourses of India and Pakistan which show the influence of ideology on the social practices of both states' elites. The fifth section synthesizes the main argument that the search for identity in both states is going on unabated due to the repeated re-visiting of their chosen traumas by their respective elites. The sources used for my critical discourse analysis are the speeches of the founding

fathers of India and Pakistan, as well as the analysis of the constitutions of the two states. The secondary sources also include history books and articles written in the daily newspapers.

4.1 The role of chosen traumas

How can we define Indian and Pakistani identities? Smith defines national identity as "the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of a nation" (Smith 2000: 796). This chapter explores a state's identity in the speeches of its founding fathers, constitutions, social practices of its elites and ideologies. The reason to adopt this multi-pronged approach is because the identity of India and Pakistan cannot be explained at face-value, solely from the rhetoric of the elite or from a state's constitution, but rather its traces can be found among all of the above. The speeches of Mohammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru of India in the initial phases of state building are of utmost importance. The reason for singling out these two founding fathers is because on the one hand, Nehru was responsible for shaping India's identity discourse after the early demise of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. Moreover, Nehru was also India's longest serving Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964. On the other hand, Jinnah served as Pakistan's 'sole spokesman' in its struggle for freedom (Jalal 1985). He was the only leader for Muslims of the subcontinent who not only created a 'nation-state', but also changed the 'course of history' (Wolpert 2007). Furthermore, 'the great-man-of-history approach' has singled out the role of 'Nehru-Gandhi and Jinnah in the freedom struggle' (Talbot 2000a). It is imperative to understand the founders' views on their respective states' identities. But the actual argument of exploring state's identity does not end here, as, afterwards there arises

an inherent tension between the elites' social practices and the popular perceptions of states' identities. I will explore the identities of India and Pakistan by using discourse analysis of the speeches of their founders, constitutional clauses and the historical discourse which highlight the tension between popular and elite centric identities. However, before examining these sources, it is first necessary to discuss one peculiarity of Indian and Pakistani identity. What is particular about Indian and Pakistani identity is the repeated re-visiting of their shared chosen traumas by the ruling elites of both countries in their speeches in order to shape contemporary Indian and Pakistani identity.

In this case, chosen traumas refer to past experiences of Indians and Pakistanis based on a sense of deprivation which has played an important role in the formation of their identities. These feelings of trauma have been used by the elites of India and Pakistan at critical historical junctures in the interplay of their identities. For example, the upheaval and traumatic partition of the subcontinent is a common chosen trauma of both states and many national narratives are associated with this single event. How do these narratives help in conflating the dismal security between these two states? According to Patterson, "narratives refers to the ways in which we can construct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality" (Patterson and Monroe 1998: 315). Ross explains that "narratives are accounts groups develop to address both the substantive and emotional levels of a conflict" (Ross 2001: 165). Culture helps to explain the narratives of the parties involved in a conflict in such a way that their identity is constructed when they recall past experiences again and again (Ross 2001). If such experiences are traumatic then these experiences may become the 'chosen traumas' of a state (Volkan 1988). These chosen traumas "symbolize feelings of helplessness and

victimization" (Ross 2001: 166). Volkan explains that after the collapse of colonial rule

in the Indian subcontinent "many large groups became involved in an exaggerated

process of defining or redefining their identity" (Volkan 1999: 999). Although Volkan's

approach is psychoanalytical, it provides important insights into the construction of a

state's identity since he links it further with a state's behaviour. Volkan finds that 'group

identity' requires a 'persistent sense of sameness' (Volkan 1999: 32). This includes the

continuous reification of a state's identity by alluding to its historically 'chosen traumas'

in order to create 'sameness' or the presumed homogeneity required for a state's identity.

One of the major reasons behind the rise of religious parties in India with their

ideological slogans of a revitalized Hindu identity is "cultural defence". For Haynes the

act of cultural defence refers to "when culture, identity, and a sense of worth are

challenged by a source promoting either an alien religion or rampant secularism and that

source is negatively valued" (Haynes 1997: 713). In other words, when these groups

come to power and their norms and values influence the identity discourse of a state, we

see a subtle shift in intersubjective relations between states. Kinvall has used the term

"chosen traumas" in studying the factors responsible for the rejuvenation of Hindu

identity (Kinvall 2002). She argues that past traumas or past glories of a community are

being used by the interest groups of that community in order to create an image of "us"

versus the "other". Chosen traumas work as an intermediary between a collective identity

and the perception of the other. Chosen traumas are deeply embedded in the culture of a

particular community. The partition of the subcontinent on religious grounds and the

carnage associated with it is a mutual chosen trauma for both Indians and Pakistanis.

Kinvall argues that "the rise of Hindu nationalism shows the force with which cultural

bases have been used to build a categorical notion of Hindustan that derives power from its ability to integrate nationalism with a constructed version of the Hindu religion" (Kinvall 2002: 101). The obvious chosen trauma used for this purpose is the creation of Pakistan (Kinvall 2002). Kinvall's core argument is that in India the forces of modernity have challenged the previous notions of secular identity by inculcating the fear of ontological insecurity; this loss of security has created a void which was identified and filled by the religious parties through 'Hindutva' (Kinvall 2002). In order to provide ontological security, the identity of the nation was reconstructed by emphasizing the chosen traumas, creating an essentialist 'Other' and 'demonizing' Pakistan as an enemy to its 'existential security' (Das 2005).

Interestingly, many literary classics of both states explain a sense of disillusionment of this elite constructed chosen trauma by explaining the plight of the common man on both sides of the border after the partition. The exploratory analysis of these literary classics will be done in Chapter 7 which portrays the essentials of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. It should be mentioned here that the chosen trauma of partition is perceived differently by the elites and the masses of both states. For the elites, it is a necessary stepping stone to construct their identities as hostile binaries, while for the masses it uprooted them from their cherished home or community. After independence, the elites of both states intentionally constructed their state identities on contrasting narratives based on their shared chosen traumas. For example, for the Muslims of the subcontinent the rule of the Mughal kings may be viewed as the past glory of their forefathers, but for the Hindus of India it is considered as the invasion of their motherland which is seen as a trauma for the Hindu nation. The security relations

between India and Pakistan throughout their history have been shaped by such chosen traumas that are being deliberately emphasized by the elites of the two states.

These elite social practices that are based on contrasting historical narratives did not end at the time of independence, but they continue unabated to this day. For example, in 1992 there was the demolition of the historic Babri Mosque in Ayodhya [India]. The frenzied fundamentalist Hindu mob was led by the elites of the Hindu fundamentalist party to raze this historic mosque (Veer 1994). [This episode is covered in detail in Chapter 6 which explains the role of the Hindu fundamentalist elites in the Indian nuclear discourse]. Not unsurprisingly for Muslims, the demolition of the Babri Mosque became their contemporary chosen trauma. Such chosen traumas serve the interests of the political elites of both the countries. Without the help of chosen traumas based on cultural history, the narratives of state identity which castigate the other state cannot be created by the elites forcefully.

These types of chosen traumas demonstrate the underlying struggle or the dialectic between elites' social practices and popular social practices. There appeared certain confusion on the part of elites as well as the masses. The Hindu dominated Indian elites' social practices defy the essence of a secularist identity, while the Muslim dominated Pakistani identity is based on ideological social practices of elites who may have a secular outlook but they cling to their Muslim heritage and Indo-centric chosen traumas for the sake of Pakistan's identity. The hidden tension between the elites and the popular perceptions of the state's identity can be shown more clearly by charting the discourse of India-Pakistan identities at the time of independence. I will first explain the case of Pakistan's identity.

4.2 Pakistan's ideological discourse of identity: Secularism versus Islamic

The ideological grounds on which Pakistan got its independence were based on the 'Two Nation Theory', which demanded a separate homeland to be created for the Muslims of the subcontinent. What is this 'Two Nation Theory' and what role does it play in forming the identity of an independent Pakistan? The crux of the 'Two Nation Theory' states, that the Hindus and the Muslims are two separate and distinct nations who despite living together for centuries on the subcontinent have failed to amalgamate into one nation (Khan 1973). This is because of the distinct social, cultural and religious norms of the Muslims and the Hindus. It was thought that Muslim and Hindu identities were too distinct to be 'properly reconciled' (Ganguly 2007). After the fall of the British Empire in the subcontinent, Muslims feared as a minority, if the rule of Western democracy was adopted then they still would be dominated by the Hindu majority. After finding no respectable space in the rigid Hindu caste system prevalent in undivided India, the Muslims asked for a separate land in order to preserve their own culture and traditions. It is ironic that the caste system that was officially abolished by India immediately after independence in 1947 is once again being revived by the Congress party. The ruling Congress party [2009 onwards] has announced that the 2011 census in India will "include a caste column" (Nayar 14.5.2010). The views of Jinnah explained this Two Nation Theory in concrete words.

Jinnah explained the desire for a Muslim state on the anniversary of the Pakistan resolution in March 1947 which was five months before its establishment in August 1947, He concluded:

"Pakistan is the only practical solution of India's constitutional problem;
Pakistan alone will lead to stable and secure governments in Hindustan
and Pakistan and Pakistan alone will guarantee real progress, welfare and
happiness of all the people inhabiting this vast subcontinent (…).
One India is an impossibility. For it can and will only mean the establishment
of Hindu Raj-and for Musalmans [Muslims, 100 million at that time], merely
transfer from British domination to the Hindu Caste Imperialism"
(Zaidi 1993:364 facts within brakets mentioned by Jinnah later in the speech).

It is important to understand the social context of his speech. By March 1947, the British government had already shown its inclination for the division of the subcontinent on religious lines. At this time, there was also the likelihood that various modes of representation were going to be applied to the subcontinent in order to ascertain the wishes of the people. 'Islam in danger' was a handy slogan in the hands of powerful elites to explain the rationale of founding Pakistan. Under this slogan of the 'Two Nation Theory', the Muslims of India were successful in winning a separate piece of land called Pakistan on the 14th of August 1947.

During the independence movement, Gandhi, the founding father of India, had epitomized himself in the fashion of a religious Hindu saint. Both his dress and his demeanour were evident of this peculiar behaviour. However, Jinnah was a westernized educated lawyer. His manners and social outlook were influenced by Western norms. When referring to the pre-independence period, Ziring pointed out that "Gandhi's symbols and actions appealed to essentially Hindu religious sensibilities" (Ziring 2003: 5). However, during the post-independence period, both states' identities after being incorporated into their respective constitutions experienced a reversal in their fortunes. It was Gandhi's India which received a secularist constitution, while the constitution of Jinnah's Pakistan included Islamic principles. This contrast of personal identities of the founding fathers of India and Pakistan was evident even at the very beginning of freedom

struggle in India, since Jinnah was a nationalist with utter disregard for the differentiation of people based on religion. He vehemently on record opposed the idea of infusing religion in politics and was given the title of the 'ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity' by Indian [Hindu] nationalists. Yet Gandhi, the founder of India, infused religion into politics as early as 1920 by becoming part of the Khalafat movement in the subcontinent. But how did the nationalist Jinnah became a communalist Muslim? Although this is a question that extends beyond the scope of this chapter, it can be argued that Jinnah in the late 1930s was convinced that religion was not just a set of rituals, but it represented a complete code of life for Muslims which was utterly in contrast to that of the Hindus of the subcontinent (Ahmed 1997).

The failure of the Hindu leaders in the Indian National Congress [later on called Congress party] to accommodate the Muslim League in provincial ministries in 1937 made Jinnah an ardent supporter of the partition of the subcontinent. This fact was even accepted by the Hindu fundamentalist party elites like Jaswant Singh (Singh 2009). V.N. Naik has put the responsibility of his transformation on the shoulders of the short sighted leadership of the Indian National Congress (Kazimi 2005). The prime motive behind Jinnah's 'Two Nation Theory' was the preservation of the distinct culture of Muslims. The Hindu culture and religion were in stark contrast to the Muslim way of life. The Hindu fundamentalists were "using the ballot box as its instrument, and hypocritically concealing itself behind the Congress party's secular cloak" (Stephens 1963: 27).

Jinnah was successful in rallying the Muslims of the subcontinent under the flag of Islam and he only used religion instrumentally in order to get political mileage and not as an ideological foundation for the future course of Pakistan (Jalal 1985). Once Pakistan

was established, Jinnah wanted a *fusionist Islamic-secularist* democratic model as the future constitution of the state. This was understandable considering the need to establish peaceful coexistence with its one time cohabitant, yet current enemy neighbouring India. However, there remains a great deal of debate and controversy on the question of whether Jinnah wanted secular or Islamist attributes in the constitution of Pakistan (Ahmed 1997). Many believe that he dreamt of a modern democratic secular state as his main objective in the founding of Pakistan (Munir 1980). Yet at the same time, he was quite explicit that no law would be implemented in Pakistan that would go against the basic injunctions of Islam. There are many speeches of Jinnah which called for Pakistan's identity not to be contrary to Islamic principles. Therefore, there is no doubt that Jinnah 'negotiated Pakistan' in order to preserve the distinct Islamic culture of Muslims of the subcontinent (Hussain 1979: 29).

The question may arise, why then Shariah rules not being practiced as part of the state policy of Pakistan? Although a complete answer is beyond the scope of this chapter, the simple answer is because of the lack of unity among the various sects of Islam regarding the interpretation of Islamic principles. After considering the pragmatic nature of Jinnah and the geo-political realities of independence, it was highly unlikely that the Westernized Jinnah would aspire to such a course for the identity of Pakistan (Hussain 1979). The founder of Pakistan was well aware of the security situation and the plight of millions of Muslims who were still in India after the partition. Without getting too deep in the historical abyss, we may safely conclude that Jinnah was impressed by the spirit of Islam based on the universal principles of brotherhood and peace, but he was not a fundamentalist nor was he an ardent secularist as understood by the term in the West

(Ahmed 1997). He was at that time contemplating of a fusion between the liberal democratic ideals found in the West and the principles of Islam. I have labelled his discourse on Pakistan's identity as *fusionist Islamic-secularist.* If analyzed in their social and historical context, the speeches of Jinnah help to explain this fusion.

In order to shape the contours of the first constitution of Pakistan, Jinnah presented his secular vision quite explicitly in a speech on the 11[th] of August 1947 to the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan which was assigned the task of making a constitution. Jinnah said:

> **"**You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – That has nothing to do with the business of the State…there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one cast or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state…you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state" (Burke 2000: 28-29).

As the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah envisioned 'no discrimination' among 'citizens' of Pakistan on 'religious' basis. The timing of this speech was also important as it was delivered to the Constituent Assembly in 1947 and should have been taken as a guideline for the future constitution of Pakistan. This discourse shows the modern democratic emphasis for Pakistan's future identity that focuses on the general principles of humanity and tolerance borrowed from the spirit of Islam (Zaidi 1999).

In another interview with Doon Campbell a Reuters's correspondent in New Delhi in 1946, Jinnah claimed that "The new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed "(Munir 1980: 29). Jinnah focused on the spirit of Islam and its universal message of peace and brotherhood.

In an interview with the Muslim delegation on the 25[th] of July in 1947, approximately three weeks before the birth of Pakistan, Jinnah vehemently asserted that "Just as I want every Hindu [living] in Pakistan to be loyal to Pakistan, so do I want every Muslim in India to be loyal to India" (Zaidi 1999: xv).

In another speech while addressing a *durbar* [elite gathering] in Sibi, Pakistan on the 14[th] of February 1948, just a few months before his death in September 1948, Jinnah said:

> "It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for us by our great law-giver, the Prophet of Islam. Let us lay the foundations of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles"
> (Ahmed 1997: 197).

These passages reveal the Islamic fusionist's trends in Jinnah's understanding of the rationale of Pakistan. Without contradicting one point or the other, it can arguably be said that during the pre-independence period Jinnah was ambivalent concerning Islam and the demand for a separate homeland in order to garner the much needed political support among the Muslim masses. However, any definitive conclusion about this issue is beyond the scope of this present chapter.

From these two different perspectives [secular or religious] arises the tension between the elites' and the popular perceptions of Pakistan's identity. At the time of independence, in the popular image, Pakistan was considered a safe place to practice Islamic principles in their absolute totality. This popular perception was in stark contrast to Jinnah's vision as the founder of Pakistan. The extracts of a letter written to Jinnah found in the national archives of Pakistan illustrates this viewpoint. A retired junior

commissioned official [*subedar*] from the British army wrote to Jinnah on the 3rd of

August 1947,

> "Heartiest congratulations on the achievement of Pakistan … I retired as
> Subedar after rendering 21 years service … I am very keen to serve in the
> Islamic Army, even if the period of service is one month. I would be very
> proud of this honor … The offer of service is motivated by my devotion
> to Islam"
>
> (Zaidi 1999: 173).

This letter was written days before the birth of Pakistan and it shows the direct

correlation between Pakistan and Islam in popular perceptions [social context].

Jinnah did not survive long after the inception of Pakistan in 1947 and died in

1948. The pertinent question for my analysis is why did Pakistan begin to identify itself

in such a way that it ultimately led to hostile relations with India?

The early demise of Jinnah barely one year after Pakistan's independence led to

identity crises. The political elites were assigned the task of making the constitution. This

triggered a struggle in Pakistan between the liberal forces that focused on establishing

secular democratic institutions like those in the West and the orthodox religious forces

contemplating an Islamic vision of the state. What specific kind of Islamic role model of

governance they envisioned for Pakistan remains an ambiguity since Islam itself is

divided in various sects with different theological interpretations. This struggle showed

the first twist in the ideological discourse of Pakistan immediately after its establishment.

In contrast to secular principles, those interest groups which propagated Islamic

ideological norms had interesting insights for the identity of Pakistan. As mentioned

before, Islamic nationalism is identified with the identity of Pakistan for two reasons.

First of all, Islam is the only common bond among the people of Pakistan who are

divided along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and racial lines. From the Pathans of Khyber-

Pakhtoonkhwa [the province in Pakistan bordering Afghanistan] to the Sindis of Sind province there is no common bond among the people except Islam. Secondly, the preservation of Islamic identity was central to the creation of Pakistan and Islam represents a thin line forming the Line of Control [LOC] separating India from Pakistan. An eminent professor Shariful Mujahid, claimed that "Islam alone is the primary and most pronounced factor in making us into a nation: it is the basic sentiment in drawing and linking us" (Jawed 1999: 16). It is the cultural heritage and national identity of Pakistan based on the 'the principle of Muslim nationalism' (Iqbal 1959: 118).

While the demand for a separate state based on religious grounds required the slogan of the 'Two Nation Theory' as a political necessity, state building required the cooperation of the whole nation regardless of their religion, caste or creed. Pakistan received its independence as an abode for the Muslims of India, but the reality of post-independence demanded the extension of equal rights to all citizens of the state. These citizens include Hindus, Christians, Parses and Muslims. But the demand for a separate Muslim homeland along religious lines required that the clauses of the constitution should at least look Islamic. That is why the distinctiveness of Muslims from Hindus is highlighted in every future constitutional framework which shapes the contours of the state's identity. This has been emphasized by all successive ruling elites of Pakistan. It involves the inculcation of the fear of India as an enemy state in the minds of the people of Pakistan and appeals to religion as a necessary binding force for promoting nationalist sentiments while keeping the provincial, separatist elements at bay. These two different course of actions [constitutional and Indo-centric] after independence shaped the future security relations of India and Pakistan.

Consequently, to the dismay of secularist forces an Objectives Resolution was passed in Pakistan in 1949 which effectively defined Islamic parameters to serve as a guideline for the future constitution. The resolution clearly divided the rights of the citizens of Pakistan along religious lines. The Objectives Resolution defined citizens of Pakistan from a religious point of view with a guarantee of rights to minorities. Furthermore, it declared that sovereignty belongs to Allah and people must use His delegated power as a sacred trust. This objectives resolution became Article 2(a) of the 1973 Pakistan constitution [which is still valid]. Although the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan after passing of the resolution categorically stated that Pakistan would not become a theocratic state, it seems the dye was cast. The resolution subsequently became the object of an intense debate in Pakistan (Mehdi 1994). Pakistan's identity became pseudo-religious. It was neither purely Islamic governed by Shariah law, nor was it purely secular. Rather it represented a hodge-podge of Islamic and secularist trends. This tension can be exposed if we explore the Islamic clauses in the constitution of Pakistan and link it to actual state practices. If we consider, for example,

Article 227 (1) of the constitution of Pakistan which states: "all existing laws shall be brought in conformity to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions" [1973 constitution of Pakistan until amended in 2010]. In Islam usury is strictly forbidden, but in reality the state has so far unable to do away with it, despite its abhorrence by Muslims and the rulings of the Supreme Court against it. So what is stated explicitly in the constitution regarding the future identity of the state, the state is guilty of breaching with its own social practices. This is how identity crises are compounded through the social

practices of the elites. The later course of the history shows that Islam was only instrumentally being used by the elites as a rallying point to curb provincialism and establish the vested interests of the elites. Its distortion and false interpretation at the hands of fundamentalist religious parties has led to state's practices which in turn have permanently established the intersubjective understandings of an "enduring rivalry" between India and Pakistan (Paul 2005). The confusion regarding Pakistan's identity whether it is an Islamic one or a "a liberal-theocratic state run by the Muslims still awaits an answer" (Brasted 2005: 114).

For more than half its entire history, Pakistan has been governed by military elites and even under democratic governments the military elites have played a pivotal role in the affairs of the state. The military has assumed the role of the sole guardian of Pakistan's identity by carefully constructing the myth of India as 'the Other'. Today, Pakistan has become more of a security state than a modern democratic state. The army in Pakistan has become a state within a state with its strong hold on every democratic government. It has also assumed a financial corporate role through its involvement in various developmental projects of the states (Siddiqa 2007). Ex-President Musharaff's remarks when leaving his coveted post as Chief of the Army Staff alluded to this aspect of the army when he claimed, "This army is an integrating force, the saviour of Pakistan …without it, the entity of Pakistan cannot exist" (Khan 2007). Pakistan army's enormous role in the state has changed the identity of the state to a patriarchal authoritarian state.

The political culture of Pakistan has been based on Indo-centric norms of animosity, hence allowing military involvement in politics. This has resulted in deteriorating security relations with India. Whenever the army came to power, the social

practices of the state changed and war became imminent. All the major wars with India have been fought by Pakistan during army rule. The 1965 war with India was fought when General Ayub Khan was in power and the war in 1971 took place when General Yahya Khan was in power. Similarly, during the Kargil war in 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif denied his involvement by squarely putting the onus of blame on General Musharraf [the then chief of army staff] for his misadventure. The intersubjective understandings between India and Pakistan which developed as a result of the dominant role of Pakistan's army are those of mutual mistrust and hatred.

The connection of Pakistan's identity based on an anti-Indian stance has provided the military elites every opportunity to define state practices and interests. But even among the military elites we observe changes in state practices based on ideological commitments. During General Ayub Khan's rule, who was the first military dictator to rule Pakistan from 1958 to 1969, the state's social practices were largely secularist. This is despite the fact that in theory the 1962 constitution requires that the head of the state be a Muslim and the name of state should be referred to as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. [The same was adopted in prevalent 1973 constitution]. But in practice the laws passed were inclined towards secular leanings, e.g., the family laws of 1961. During the reign of General Ziaul Haq from 1977 to 1988, the Islamic character and identity of the state in theory [the constitution] as well as in actual state practices were quite convergent. For example, there was the establishment of a Federal Shariah court and the promulgation of a zina [adultery] ordinance. In turn in the era of General Musharaff, who ruled from 1999 to 2007, we find secularist leanings. [Musharaff used the rhetoric of enlightened moderation]. The identity crisis is more acute due to differences in the theoretical

connotation of ideology as mentioned in the constitution, than its practicability in the shape of elites' social practices which by and large show secularist leanings.

Elites have used Islamic ideology to shape Pakistan's identity in order to prolong their stay in power. The harm this focus has caused is obvious, given the state preference which has led to bad security relations with India. Even before the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 [currently Bangladesh], the people of East Pakistan thought that Islam was being used by West Pakistan in order to maintain solidarity, but that not much had been done to readdress the economic grievances of the people of East Pakistan (Jawed 1999). The analysis of the speeches of the leaders of Pakistan shows that Islamic slogans were used extensively to shape the state's security preferences against an impeding Indian threat. The elites in Pakistan constantly emphasized its Islamic heritage with regard to Pakistan's identity in order to serve the purpose of 'national' integration, but at the same time many "exploited religious idealism in order to mask our efficiency, misdeeds and our lack of faith in a national purpose" (Jawed 1999: 33).

After having explained the identity discourse of Pakistan, I will now delve into a discussion of Indian identity to show what significance it has for India-Pakistan security relations.

4.3 Indian identity discourse: Secularist versus Hindutva ideology

Nehru was one of India's founding fathers and its longest Prime Minister serving from 1947 to 1964. Gandhi was the main founding father, but he died in 1948. India was fortunate enough to have more of its founding fathers survive longer than those of Pakistan. After Gandhi, some of the other leaders in India were Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar

Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. However, the "sole spokesman of Pakistan" was Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Jalal 1985). Jinnah died barely one year after Pakistan's independence in 1948. In order to examine the formation of Indian identity, I will focus on Nehru's vision due to his long association with India after independence in his capacity as its prime minister. Nehru was disgusted with the communal division of India on religious lines and he was cognizant of the presence of multifaceted Indian religious nationalities. He believed that religion had no place in politics. In his own book entitled "The Discovery of India", Nehru stated "the bitter conflict between science and religion which shuck up Europe in the nineteenth century would have no reality in India" (Nehru 1947: 446). In the same book, he states that:

> "India must therefore lessen her religiosity and turn to science.
> She must get rid of the exclusiveness in thought and social habit
> which has become like a prison to her, stunting her spirit and
> preventing growth" (Nehru 1947: 447).

Nehru wrote this book before Indian independence in order to show the rich cultural heritage and civilization of India. His abhorrence for religion in politics was an open secret in the subcontinent politics.

At another occasion on the 3[rd] of April 1948, when addressing the Indian Constituent Assembly which was assigned the task of making the Indian constitution, Nehru stated:

> "The combination of politics and of religion in the narrowest sense
> of the word, resulting in communal politics, is - there can be no doubt
> a most dangerous combination and must be put an end to (…).
> This combination is harmful to the country as a whole; it is harmful to
> the majority, but probably it is most harmful to any minority that seeks
> to have some advantage from it" (Nehru 1967: 74).

The social context of this speech was also important in the sense that it laid down the basic parameters for the future Indian constitution. Nehru remained committed to his

secularist vision for India. Yet he was aware of the scourge of communalism in multi-ethnic and multi-religious India. Months before his death in May 1964, Nehru revealed that he believed greatest threat to India was the threat of communalism and not the twin threats from either Pakistan or China. He stated, "this communal trouble is entirely opposed to our policy and to our future, and I do appeal to you to fight it and to put an end to it" (Nehru 1968: 12). The Chinese army had defeated India in 1962 and Pakistan had been India's nemesis since its independence. In a radio broadcast to the Indian nation on the 26[th] of March 1964, Nehru stated,

> "India is a country of many communities and unless we can live in harmony
> with each other, respecting each other's beliefs and habits, we cannot build up
> a great and united nation (…). We must remember that every Indian, to whatever
> religion he might belong, is a brother and must be treated as such"
> (Nehru 1968: 12,13).

One of the problems with religion in India is because of its interpretation by its founding fathers. For example, Mahatma Gandhi categorically stated, "for me there are no politics devoid of religion … politics bereft of religion are a death-adder because they kill the soul" (Bazaz 2003: 368). However, in a public address in Calcutta on the 13[th] of December 1953, Nehru stated, "If religion is allowed to come into politics ... then communalism will have its sway" (Bazaz 2003: 368). However, before getting into an examination of the actual social practices of Indian elites, it is first worth while to discuss the constitutional identity of India.

These views are fully enshrined in the Indian constitution which guarantees individual freedom of religion as a fundamental right in Article 25(1). The Article states:

> "Subject to public order, morality and health and to all the other provisions
> of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the
> right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion" (Mitra 1991: 765).

The above clause in the Indian constitution does not mean that there is no recognition of religion by the state, but instead the emphasis is placed on the state which does not discriminate against anyone on religious grounds. Furthermore, it gives freedom to everyone to profess and propagate any religion of his choice. Nehru's significant influence in India in the post-independence phase helped formulate the policy of secularism into 'concrete' policies of the state (Mitra 1991). The question may arise, that if India has professed its secularist vision in its constitution [1950], then why after so many decades of secular politics has there been a resurgence of Hindu fundamentalist parties since the 1990s onwards? It was anticipated by Indian elites, especially Nehru that the forces of modernization would soon engulf religious bigotry and a coherent secularist India would eventually emerge. The 'special' characteristics of the Indian polity do not assume that there can be a neat distinction between religion and politics as required under secularism (Prasad 1976: 133). This demonstrates the same inherent struggle that exists in India between popular and elites' perceptions of identity as was also explored earlier in the discussion of Pakistan's identity discourse.

For the average Hindu, India is their permanent abode to practice Hinduism and there are number of references by Hindu fundamentalist parties alluding to the birth of Pakistan as a state solely for Muslims. So why should India not be solely for the Hindus? The social norms of Hinduism are too resilient to be absorbed by the modernist tide. Polarization caused by ideological commitments to a rejuvenated Indian identity began to strongly emerge since the mid-1990s. [This polarization will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6]. But even before this period, the inherent tension between Hindu identity and a secular outlook was evident from the social practices of the elites after independence.

These social practices of elites show an ideological commitment towards the propagation of Hinduism exclusively and implicitly. This commitment acted as a thick signifier to Indian identity.

The reasons for the failure of secularization in India lies in the fact that modernization and development have so far failed to trickle down and to reach the most marginalized segments of Indian society. Instead, the forces of modernization have converged with democratic processes, thereby providing fundamental religious parties an option to appeal to such neglected segments of society. The religious parties often create an acute sense of identity crisis in Indian society. They use the ideological myths of 'Hindutva' or Hindu cultural domination quite often, in order to develop a true Hindu identity in the Indian polity. They exacerbated their lack of ontological security by propagating 'Hindutva', a reinterpretation of Hindu social and religious norms. Among such cultural norms the most important one is the labelling of Muslims as "the Other" or the fifth element in the Indian state.

The popular perceptions of a revivalist Hindu cultural identity do not match with the officially sanctioned secular label of Indian identity. The Indian elites face the same predicament of trying to appease the large majority of Hindu voters, as well as the other minorities in India, especially Muslims. However, in the case of India, we can find the elite bias toward secularism is largely no more than lip service, while the actual social practices are directed toward reviving the dominant cultural Hindu identity in India. It is important to understand that the Indian elites treatment of Muslims in India, inadvertently has repercussions for its relations with Pakistan. It can lead to the downward spiral of

security relations between the two states. Before arguing this point further, I will first

explain some of these social practices.

As early as 1948, one year after independence, the former President of the Congress

party which helped to found India, Das Tandon, retorted:

> "There should not be any more talk of separate culture and language in
> the Indian union. There should be no room for such persons in the Indian
> Union who advocate separate culture and separate language for a particular
> community … If Muslims are anxious to stay in the Indian Union which
> is a secular state they will have to adopt Hindi as their language and Devangri
> as their script … Muslims in India will have to win the confidence of their
> fellow country men and government not by words but by deeds. They must stop
> looking to Pakistan for inspiration and make India's culture their own**"**
> <div align="right">(Bazaz 2003: 346).</div>

The social context of this speech shows how Indian elites used the scar of the chosen

trauma of the partition of the subcontinent. After one year of independence the Indian

elites demanded that the 'Muslims' in India should prove their loyalty by adopting the

dominant Hindu culture. In 1949, Professor Yashwant Rai, who was a member of

Congress party, made a similar demand. While speaking to the Indian parliament, Rai

claimed:

> "The present education system which is mainly based on Western ideologies
> should be overhauled and ancient culture re-introduced, if we want to have one
> culture, one language and one country, we will have to keep one ideology - our
> ancient ideology" (Bazaz 2003: 346).

Another case pertained to the role of 'Lingua Franca' or the official language in

India. Here is yet another example of the anomalous behaviour of Indian elites. In India,

the Urdu language, which is commonly called Hindustani, was not recognized by the

state even though up and to the present this language is still understood and spoken by the

majority of Indians. As Dr. Syed Muhammad a Muslim leader in Congress party

explained, Urdu is neither a "Muslim language nor is it being spoken in Arab Muslim countries, all its basic structure, grammar, and the greater part of its vocabulary is Indian" (Bazaz 2003: 352). In reality, 'Sanskiriti Hindi' with 'Devanagri' script became the official language of India (Bazaz 2003). This language explains the old cultural heritage of the Hindus. It is ironic that in spite of the common dialect in Urdu, which both Hindus and Muslims perfectly understand and which has no connection with Islam, the Indian elites were bent upon searching for an exclusive Hindu vernacular. This was done much to the chagrin of the Muslim leaders in founding Congress party of India.

The same exclusively Hindu mindset was evident by the elites' social practices when the time came for the selection of the national anthem and the national flag. The national anthem of India is 'Jana Gana Mana' along with 'Vande Mataram' that have very difficult prose and anti-Muslim feelings (Bazaz 2003). These national anthems were given preference over the widely famous song 'Saray jaha say acha Hindustan hamara' of Allama Iqbal [poet of the subcontinent]. It was discarded because it was compiled by a 'Muslim' and it was in 'Urdu' (Bazaz 2003: 355). The same struggle for identity [secular identity versus elites practices based on Hindu norms] was evident in the finalization of the flag of India after independence. The Indian flag is tri-colour with a wheel called 'Dharma Chakra' at its centre. This wheel was the "symbol of ancient Hindu culture and religion" (Bazaz 2003). This step was appreciated by the leaders of the Hindu fundamentalist party the Hindu Mahasabha at its 28[th] convention in Calcutta. V.D. Savarkaar, the Hindu Mahasabha's leader, stated:

> "It is a matter of great pleasure to all that the flag of freedom
> is flying over Bharat Varsha today. Call it a secular flag if you
> like but it [is] at the same time our Hindu flag. There is that
> Ashoka Chakra inscribed on it" (Bazaz 2003: 355).

The social context of all these speeches explains the value of narratives, symbols and elites' social practices in the identity discourse of India. The significance of the Hindu symbol on the flag of secular India, as well as the adoption of the Devnagri script for India's national language demonstrates the incongruity between the social practices of the ruling elite and the founding fathers vision of Indian identity. Yet another point that is not unrelated in this regard is the role of ideology behind elites' social practices. The divergent attitude of the elites was reinforced once they also became committed to "Hindutva" ideology, as was shown in the 1990s with the politics of the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]. [I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 6 which argues that the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan can be seen as an offshoot of 'Hindutva'].

Another elite social practice that was adopted was to succumb to the demand of Hindus to ban the slaughter of cows in India. Cows are considered sacred animals in Hindu mythology. The Indian Constituent Assembly which was formed after the partition of the subcontinent had to include this demand as "one of the Directive Principles of State Policy" for the future constitution of India (Bazaz 2003: 356). This was done much to the dismay of the minorities in India (Bazaz 2003). Hence the list of social practices of the elites based on Hindu norms under the guise of a secular identity goes on and on. It is evident that although living in a secular constitutional state, the elites in practice were involved in "the creation of a Hindu state with the avowed object of the revival of ancient Brahminic culture" (Bazaz 2003: 362).

Paradoxically, the social practices of the Indian elites justify the separation of Pakistan on religious and distinct cultural lines because of the lack of accommodation for "any other cultural pattern" than "Brahmanism" (Bazaz 2003: 363). It is this cultural

connotation of identity which is at the forefront of the India-Pakistan rivalry. The same was acclaimed by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Pakistani Prime Minister, in his address to students on the 22[nd] of January 1949. Khan claimed that "it was for the sake of this cultural freedom that Muslims in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent made Pakistan the supreme goal of their political efforts" (Bazaz 2003: 363-364).

What we see in India after more than sixty years of independence is the reinvigoration of this cultural heritage by the orthodox Hindu parties. The secular identity simply does not match with the popular perception of a Hindu dominated India. The elites of religious parties have tried to rejuvenate the identity of the nation which they believe has been lost in the recent tide of modernization. The electoral success of the fundamentalist Hindu party envisages that the social meaning attached to secularism by the masses is different than that of the state's official document [constitution]. Hinduism as a religious ideology is a code of life and it is completely embedded in the cultural and social norms of the people. Whenever the fundamentalist parties come to power in India, they are obliged to take popular actions under the Hindu ideology which are in stark contrast to the constitution in order to support their beliefs of Indian identity based on Hindu culture. There has been a corresponding change between the rise of such an identity and the state's social practices. These changes have a direct effect on the intersubjective understanding of the security relationship with Pakistan. This has led to the process of 'Othering' where the Muslims in general and Pakistan in particular are at the centre stage. These parties project historical events of Hindu mythology by humiliating its Muslim counterpart, whether it was the demolition of the Babri Mosque that was mythically portrayed as the birth place of Ram [the Hindu god] or the re-

construction of the Somnath temple razed by Mahmud of Ghaznavi [a Muslim Turk who invaded India in the twelfth century].

Political activities are being linked to these cultural aspects through the reincarnation of historical events by pledges made in party manifestos. Ontological security is being constructed by explaining the narratives of Hindu subjugation during the Muslim Mughal rule in India. This cultural or ideologically religious agenda has its obvious connection with the security practices of the Indian state. In this identity discourse all the invaders of the subcontinent are considered to be the heroes of Muslims [invariably of Pakistan] who denounced the Hindus. Both Indian and Pakistani elites' have failed to appreciate the fact that genealogically both Hindus and Muslims have the same ancestors. It was the low cast Hindus who first converted to Islam due to its universal message of brotherhood and equality in order to liberate themselves from the yoke of the oppressive Hindu caste system. No one had any link with the Turks or Arabs who ruled the subcontinent or invaded it.

4.4. Ideology as a thick signifier for elites' social practices

In short, the argument which I want to emphasize is that identity and ideology go hand in hand in the context of India-Pakistan relations. How such ideologies become national narratives and change elites' social practices which affect the course of security relations between the two countries? Ideology acts as a thick signifier because it brings to light again and again the chosen traumas inscribed in the psyche of the nation. Psyche of the nation refers to the core ideological values referred to time and again by the elites for identity construction of a state. This helps the task of the elites by creating fear of the

'Other' and providing cohesion among culturally disparate regions of these states. This thick signifier exposes the hidden cultural, social and religious differences among the people who were once together and were later divided on these lines. Gradually with the passage of time and with the absence of people to people contact between the two states, these differences have become rigid enough to create 'hostile binaries' (Lebow 2008). The elites' social practices have to allude to such chosen traumas for the sake of their state's integrity in order to get the much needed reification or identity signifier. Both states' identities are more or less tagged with religious ideologies where their shared chosen traumas are being constructed by the elites. This 'religious discourse' can help explain 'changing social identities' in the Indian state (Veer 1994). These social identities change into national identities when they become "socially shared mental constructs" (Dijk 1998). Shared social norms and culture play a definitive role in propagating ideologies (Dijk 1998).

The political parties which use cultural slogans based on the resurrection of a former identity have more chances to succeed if undercurrents of us versus them are already present along with the polarization of the society on ideological lines. Therefore, both identity discourses in India and Pakistan need each other albeit negatively (Veer 1994). The Indian founding fathers have feared that communal violence "could render meaningless the careful work which has gone into the establishment of a secular state" (Smith 1963: 415). After some twenty years of secular politics, many authors prophesized that there would emerge perfect harmony between the constitutional identity of the Indian state and the social practices of its ruling elite leading to the Indian-isation of the people of India (Smith 1963). But so far this has not happened. After more than sixty years of

Indian independence, we are witnessing the resurgence of Hindu ideology since 1990, leading to more fragmentation and the de-secularisation of the Indian state. The difference between secularism in Europe and in India and Pakistan has largely to do with the success of modern Western state to successful separate itself from any religious or cultural commitments and focus purely on modernization. However, in the case of India and Pakistan, religious and ideological commitments have worked in connivance with the state's thrust for modernization. Security relations are developed by such practices and do not operate in a vacuum. That is why we see the secularist Indian identity transformed into a religious ideology in the late 1990s. Yet there is also an anomaly. It was largely expected that Pakistan was going to be trapped in fundamentalism because of its ideological commitments, however it was India which first succumbed to these forces way back in the 1990s (Abbas 2005).[6]

In this way religious ideology is used by certain political elites to construct the insecurity between the two states. This shows the clear dichotomy between Indian secular identity as envisaged in the Indian constitution and the social practices of Indian elites. This resulted in reciprocal social practices by Pakistani elites through their anti-Indian ideology. Thus ideology serves as a strong link between identity and the intersubjective understandings of states. Culture and religion are at the forefront of this rivalry (Das 2005). The case study of Pakistan also shows other strange anomalies. Here the case is exactly topsy turvy, with religion being given the perfect place in the shape of state ideology in all constitutional documents. In theory the constitution of Pakistan explicitly

1. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and American's War on Terror* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 161. Abbas has blamed the periodic military take over's in Pakistan as well as the interests of America in the region to offset the Communist threat as the primary reason for the rise of extremism and fundamentalism in Pakistan.

states that no law should be made that would clash with Islamic principles, but in practice we see that the laws are being enacted that correspond to modern secular principles. What does this have to do with security relations between the two countries? The leadership of the two countries have found it very convenient to use religious slogans in order to overcome the centrifugal forces of their societies at the expense of creating out-group and in-group feelings between the two states. An ideological commitment to national identity defines the basis of inclusion in a society just as in a group setting ideology "defines the basis for the group's identity" (Dijk 1998). For example, if I am a staunch believer of Pakistan's Islamic identity then I am a true Pakistani patriotic, otherwise I favour a secularist India and I am anti-Pakistani; similarly a fervent Hindu is equivalent to true Indian-ness. Furthermore, the elites of both states often appeal to their respective people by suggesting that these identities are at stake and without their proper securitization the very survival of the Hindu or the Muslim nation is in jeopardy. The process of securitization is *intersubjective,* meaning thereby that it is neither a question of an objective threat nor a subjective perception of a threat. Instead, the securitization of a subject depends upon the state actors' discursive acts.

It seems that both states identity has become what ideology through state practices make of it[7]. There is no denying that states can contribute to peaceful coexistence or conflict through their social practices and intersubjective understandings. The point I want to make here is that in the case of India and Pakistan, the intersubjective understandings of each other are largely based on ideological differences that have been exacerbated by the elites of both states. The secular constitutional identity of India is

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[7] I paraphrased this sentence with some alteration from Wendt, A. (1992). "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization **46**(2): 391-425.

unable to overcome the tides of 'Hindutva' and is unable to amalgamate the various communal identities in India into one national identity. From secularism to Hindutva, India exhibits the transformation in its identity and accordingly shapes the social practices of the state. Similarly, the 'Two Nation Theory' with its religious overtones completes the process of 'Othering' of India and helped the Pakistani elites especially the military to get a strong hold in state building. Religious norms in a state's constitution not only guarantees their role in state building, but also provides 'social meaning' to it (Mitra 1991). This difference in theory [the constitution] and the state's actual social practices under the influence of religious ideology has contributed to the security dilemma between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan and India's complex security relations are based on the elites' perceptions of identity and it has become difficult for them to reinterpret their chosen traumas in different vein. The identity discourses of both states' are being trapped by such traumas since secular Indian identity has no room for elite social practices based on Hindu mythology. Similarly, the formative phase of Pakistan shows that religion played a predominant ideological role in shaping the national identity of Pakistan, but the lack of its interpretive role in the post-independence phase only caused strained security relations with India. The argument on Indian identity is also based along similar lines. The secularist commitment of the Indian National Congress in the pre-independence phase has been unable to transform the state as a modern secularist polity in the post-independence period. By marginalizing religion in a society with lots of religious cleavages entrenched in cultural Hindu norms, the state has failed to establish peaceful security practices with Pakistan. This shows two divergent perceptions of identities in

India and Pakistan. There is an elite version of identity [constitutional identity, social practices] and there are popular perceptions of identity.

What would be the impact on security relations with India if Pakistan had adopted a purely orthodox religious identity? There were millions of Muslims in India who stayed behind either by their own free will or because of geographical constraints. If at its independence India like Pakistan had adopted an exclusive Hindu identity, then these Indian Muslims would have been completely annihilated. This would have further complicated state relations so that they would come to an impasse. What would happen, if we consider another scenario? For example, what would happen if Pakistan had adopted a Western secular identity in its initial phase of state building? By adopting a purely westernized democratic secular identity the whole rationale of its establishment of a separate state would be lost since Pakistan was formed in the name of Islam. It also explains the wide gulf between the elites and the masses who cannot understand their raison d'etre without religious foundations because of the lack of education and misperceptions. The crux of this study is that the process of state building in a Third World state is closely linked to its security situation (Ayoob 1995). For Third World states which were once together, the cultural dimension is important for understanding the dynamics of state making. 'Ethnic heterogeneity' and cultural pluralism' are considered to be 'threats' by Pakistani elites and their 'rhetorical emphasis' was based on 'religious commonality' (Malik 1997: 168). This is precisely the dilemma of Pakistan's identity, the shadow of religious ideology looms over its identity in which negative attributes of Hindu-India play centre stage and whose interpretation is at the mercy of the ruling political and military elites.

To arrive at some sort of solution to this identity and ideological nexus, we may revert back to the 'secular nationalist discourse' of the founding fathers of both India and Pakistan in order to change India and Pakistan into modern polities (Talbot 2000a: 286). Indigenous scholars, like T.V. Sthyamurthy see this identity discourse as an 'intra-elite conflict' to grab 'resources' while the fate of the popular masses of both states are being linked to "dispossession, disinheritance, poverty and marginalisation" (Talbot 2000a: 286). There is a pressing need to 'spread a new "pro-people" sense of identity which transcends existing elite styles' (Talbot 2000a: 286)

4.5 Conclusion

Security relations between India and Pakistan are closely linked to their respective identity discourses that show ideological overtones. For the people of India and Pakistan their respective elites are still using the chosen trauma of the partition of the subcontinent and have not taken an alternate route after more than half a century since partition in 1947. It seems that the "political-cultural-economic geographies of otherness" created by the partition cannot be gotten rid of (Chaturvedi 2001: 158). Here social constructivism is seen as an intertwined 'nexus' between culture and material interests (Shaffer 2006). Today Islamic fundamentalism, in its most virulent form in the shape of suicides attacks, has made a mockery of Pakistan's credentials of having an Islamic identity. In the case of India, slogans of Hindutva or revival of one Hindu culture for the whole nation are justifying the separation of Pakistan from India. The commitment of both states elites is still tied to 'ethnicity and religion' (Ahmed 1997: 249). Ethnicity and distorted religious

ideologies based on contrasting cultural myths and a nostalgic past have added fuel to the fire in the rivalry between India and Pakistan.

The biggest impediment for India to be a great power or to serve as a regional power, is its strained relations with Pakistan that has resisted Indian 'dominance' in the region through "military and ideological means" (Cohen 2001: 32). This chapter shows the ideological commitment of this rivalry. The elites' constructed rivalry based on ideational factors is largely different from the material considerations of interstate rivalry as expounded by realism and liberalism. These ideational factors include socio-cultural norms in the shape of religious and cultural myths that were constructed by elites right from the initial phases of identity formation in these two states. In order to understand this rivalry, I have suggested that both states have been formed by their respective elites through the process of identity and interests formation. This chapter shows how the founding fathers of India and Pakistan articulated the identity of their respective states from the repository of conflictual norms thus making interstate harmony an anathema for the succeeding generations of ruling elites. An understanding of this socio-cultural part of identity is an *a priori* requirement in order to explain the perennial security dilemma between India and Pakistan. The state centric theories particularly neo-realism and neo-liberalism only devise a material calculus to understand the fluctuating interests of the states. They do not take into account the socio-cultural aspects influencing the ruling elites. Without such understandings we can not come up with social norms on which the foundations of peace between India and Pakistan can be based.

5: The Kashmir dispute: the quest of India and Pakistan identities and Kashmiriyat, the estranged Kashmir's identity

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan started at the time of their independence in 1947. It has since been a major destabilizing security issue between these two countries. This territorial dispute has mostly been discussed as the main source of the classical security dilemma [from the materialistic vantage point] between India and Pakistan. I will not explain in detail these realist explanations of the Kashmir conflict. These explanations have been briefly discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. I will primarily focus on the socio-cultural account of this conflict. The main argument will emphasize that Kashmir's indigenous identity has been encircled by the social practices of Indian and Pakistani elites resulting in the exacerbation of this dispute. The state narratives being constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan with their respective allegiances to Kashmir have their roots in the identity discourses of both states. It has now become difficult for both states to re-negotiate any other alternative narrative due to the fear of losing popular support and this has led to a stalemate concerning Kashmir. This chapter also discusses historically the distinct and indigenous Kashmir identity based on its own socio-cultural norms called 'Kashmiriyat'. This identity is quite different from the traditional Hindu-Muslim identities of the subcontinent. The discourse of Kashmiri identity was developed through peaceful, mutually accommodative and religiously tolerant popular social practices of Kashmiris including Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists for centuries. However, after the independence of India and Pakistan, this indigenous Kashmir identity has not been recognized by either the Indian or the Pakistani

ruling elites in their respective state's identity discourses. The role of ideas and norms has been neglected in many previous studies on this dispute. Yet if this territorial dispute is explored from the vantage point of the interplay of the competing identities of the major actors involved, then it will helps us to better understand one of the longest standing unresolved disputes before the United Nations.

This chapter is divided into seven sub-sections. The first section explains the narratives constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan about Kashmir and the sources used for this case study. The second section briefly explains the material significance as well as realist solutions to this dispute through the annals of history. The third section defines the ideational or socio-cultural component of this security dilemma. The fourth section presents the gist of my argument by examining the indigenous Kashmiri identity and the distinct social norms underpinning it. This section further explains that this identity is distinct from the contrasting identities of India and Pakistan. The fifth section explains the present imbroglio over Kashmir by highlighting the social practices of India and Pakistan elites. The sixth section explains the struggle between the popular social practices of the Kashmiris and the elites' social practices of India and Pakistan. This section further highlights how elites' social practices have exacerbated the Kashmir conflict by denying space to popular social practices of the Kashmiris based on their own indigenous identity. The seventh section concludes the whole argument of this triangular tussle between identities [India, Pakistan and Kashmiris].

5.1 India-Pakistan narratives on Kashmir

Kashmir is an inalienable part of Pakistan. Pakistan without Kashmir is incomplete since Kashmir is considered as Pakistan's jugular vein. Kashmir is the unfinished agenda of partition of the subcontinent. Pakistan is founded on the principle of the preservation of Islamic identity and as an abode for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Without the inclusion of the Muslim dominant Kashmir, the identity and rationale of Pakistan is meaningless and incomplete. All the rivers of Pakistan come from the melting snow of the Himalayas after passing through Kashmir valley. This is a standard narrative which can be easily found in all history text books published by the state of Pakistan for study in primary and secondary schools, for example, Pakistan Studies for class tenth, published by Punjab Text Book Board, Lahore, year 2010. It is a typical Pakistani narrative which is being used by the Pakistani elites to justify their claim on Kashmir. The genesis of these Pakistani narratives can be traced back to the speeches of its founding fathers. For example, the first Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated in 1950,

> "Judged by every consideration, cultural, demographic, economic and strategic,
> Kashmir should be a part of Pakistan. For Pakistan, Kashmir is a vital necessity;
> for India it is an imperialist adventure" (Khan 1950).

These comments were made by Khan in the Pakistani parliament on the 5[th] of October 1950 during a debate on the Kashmir Report submitted by Sir Owen Dixon (1950). The United Nations had appointed Sir Dixon as its representative after India took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council in 1948-1949. The then Pakistan government had rejected the proposal of a selective plebiscite in Kashmir that was proposed in Sir Dixon's report (social context of this speech).

Now let us take a look at the Indian narrative. Kashmir is an integral part of India; it's inclusion in India is essential for the sustenance of its secular identity. Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in the Indian Union. The presence of Kashmir in India means the negation of a separate identity for Pakistan. If Kashmir can be part of India with a Muslim majority population, then what is the significance of the creation of Pakistan as a separate abode for Muslims of the subcontinent? This standard narrative can be easily found in all history and social science text books published by the Indian state owned publishers the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) in New Delhi. The term "integral part of India" [*attootang*] was first used by the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and has since been adopted as part of the Indian state narrative on Kashmir (Nehru 1956).

In a speech to parliament on the 24[th] of July 1952, after India had rejected the United Nations' arbitration over the Kashmir issue, Jawaharlal Nehru stated:

> "I want to repeat that Kashmir is an integral part of India and is governed, in so far as the subjects of accession are concerned, by the Constitution of India. We cannot upset or violate our Constitution because of some resolution put forward in the Security Council" (Nehru 1956: 26).

By juxtaposing Indian and Pakistani narratives on Kashmir it is evident that the identity of Kashmir is being inextricably linked to Indian and Pakistani identities. These two competing and conflicting narratives constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute constitute an important aspect of their security dilemma. Why have these narratives been imbued as essentialist versions of the identity of both states?

In fact, these competing narratives underlie most of the voluminous literature on Kashmir, making it all the more difficult to reach any conclusion of the problem. I have

primarily focused on the work of indigenous Kashmiris, especially, Prem Nath Bazaz's *opus magnum* entitled '*The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, Cultural and Political, from the Earliest Times to the present Day*' that was first published in 1954, but has been reprinted several times since then. Bazaz's work presents the cultural account of Kashmir from an impartial and lucid angle and is termed as a 'classic' (Lamb 1991: 99). He is an indigenous Kashmiri and a Hindu pundit. He was actively involved in the struggle for the freedom of Kashmir since the 1930's, when the people of Kashmir rose up and demanded their rights against the atrocities committed by the Maharaja. Bazaz was a member of a commission established by the Maharaja in 1932 in order to re-address the grievances of the people of Kashmir. The commission upheld the legitimate demands of the people of Kashmir in its report in 1932 (Blinkenberg 1998). Other sources used in this case study are the speeches of the Indian and Pakistani elites gathered from the archives and the commentaries of British and American authors. These were important in order to examine this conflict from a neutral angle.

Before explaining the socio-cultural factors underlying these narratives, I will briefly dwell upon the history of the Kashmir issue. Although the roots of the Kashmir dispute stem from the vast upheaval, the territorial partition of the subcontinent, I will look at it from another angle which is based on the interplay of the Indian and Pakistani identities. Nevertheless, in order to have a broader historical perspective of the Kashmir conflict, it is also pertinent to elucidate some of the materialistic [realist] explanations.

5.2 The historical perspective and some realist solutions

The state of Jammu and Kashmir [i.e., the nomenclature of Kashmir adopted during the British imperial rule] is presently sand-witched between India and Pakistan. This area has a complex history of territorial advancement. While analyzing the Kashmir conflict, I refer to that problematic area of Indian held Kashmir which has been a security concern for both India and Pakistan. The genesis of this dispute has been studied from various angles. One dimension propagated by Indian authors is to study the Kashmir dispute by questioning the rationale of the establishment of Pakistan, as well as the reasons for the partition of the subcontinent. From their perspective, they argue in the first place that the partition of the subcontinent along communal lines should not have taken place since it has led to the problem of the Muslim majority Kashmir in India. But partition is a reality and has resulted in the establishment of an independent India and Pakistan. This fact cannot now be applied retrospectively to the Kashmir dispute which currently awaits a solution to its dilemma. This perspective can also be dismissed based on accounts of the irreconcilable attitudes between the views of the leaders of the Indian National Congress [Indian's founding party later on Congress party] and the Muslim League [Pakistan's founding party] where the only solution at the time was the partition of the subcontinent (Lamb 2002: 21). The Kashmir issue should not be linked with the rationale of partition itself. However, the partition plan on Kashmir that was not adopted should be studied further as one of the causes of the dispute.

Another historical aspect introduced by Indian scholar Dr. H.L. Saxena, is to study Kashmir by linking it to the nefarious 'Anglo-American' designs, whereby a portion of Kashmir was deliberately given to Pakistan in order to maintain the strategic

check post at Gilgit to serve as a 'Central Asian outpost' or a bulwark against the spread of communism (Lamb 1991). This is also an absurd idea considering the fact that at the time of independence, neither the British, nor the Americans had any clue of the future ties of India and Pakistan with either the communist or the capitalist blocks. By leaving these perspectives aside, I will briefly explain the historical facts in order to allow the Kashmiri discourse to emerge on its own.

The history of Kashmir can be divided into three phases. The first phase is from 1846-1947 when Kashmir was under the rule of the Maharaja [King], the second phase is from 1947-1989 when it was divided between India and Pakistan, and the third phase is the post-1989 period when armed struggle started in Kashmir. I will briefly examine the historical facts of these three phases.

In 1846, the British sold the valley of Kashmir, the most prized part of Kashmir, to the Raja of Jammu, Gulab Singh. At that moment, the 'State of Jammu and Kashmir' came into existence (Lamb 1991). The Maharaja as well as his descendants ruled Kashmir with utter disregard to the rights and liberties of its citizens (Bazaz 1987). The rule of the Maharaja and his dynasty is referred to as the Dogra Rule in the history of Kashmir. During this period, abject poverty could be found throughout Kashmir. Wide scale protests against atrocities committed by the Maharaja started in 1931. In order to quell the protests, the Maharaja had to form an independent commission under the chairmanship of an Englishman. After conducting an investigation, the commission ruled in favour of the Kashmiri people and upheld their claims for rights. In short, the plight of the Kashmiri people was despicable by the time the British announced the division of the subcontinent in 1947.

At the time of independence for the subcontinent in 1947, Kashmir was one of 562 'princely states' in India (Lamb 1991). These states were autonomous and were governed by independent rulers who had a special agreement with the British. Among these princely states, Kashmir was significant because of its vast territory [80,000 square miles] and a population of 4 million people in 1947 (Lamb 1991). Strategically, the undivided Kashmir in 1947 had borders with half a dozen countries which included Afghanistan, China and the former USSR. The 1947 plan for the partition of the Indian subcontinent gave three options to all princely states. They were given the choice to join the future India, or the future Pakistan or to remain independent. Kashmir was predominantly Muslim [over 90%], but it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja. He first signed a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan in order to retain autonomy for Kashmir. However, the Muslim majority in Kashmir resisted this violently and demanded accession to Pakistan. Upon seeing unrest in Kashmir, the Hindu Maharaja signed an 'instrument of accession' with India in 1947 [the exact details and date of which are still disputed]. This led to the beginning of a local uprising against his rule in the same year. This local uprising coupled with the covert military support of the Pakistan army and the ensuing India-Pakistan war resulted in the division of Kashmir. One third of Kashmir was held by Pakistan, while India retained the rest along with the most precious part, the Kashmir valley.

In 1948, India took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations Security Council and agreed to conduct a plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir for their future. This plebiscite was never allowed to be held by India, despite the best mediatory efforts of the United Nations. A United Nations Security Council

Resolution in 1948 urged both India and Pakistan to make efforts "to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the state of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan" (Lamb 1991: 183). The Security Council Resolution 47 stipulates "that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite" (Khan 1994: 513). However, if India was reluctant to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, why then was Pakistan insisting on its inclusion in its territory? In order to answer this question, we have to define the material interests of Pakistan on Kashmir from a realist perspective.

The rivers of Pakistan, including the Sind, the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Ravi come from the Himalayan Mountains and after passing through the Kashmir valley end in the Punjab [Pakistan]. Along with the rivers, all the major highway links of Kashmir with the outside world were through parts of present day Pakistan (Bazaz 2003). It was part of the British 'great game' to keep the Russians at bay from the subcontinent and for that purpose an out post at Gilgit was acquired from Kashmir's Hindu Raja in 1935 with a sixty year lease. After independence this region became the northern part of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that in that strategic area Pakistan and China developed the Karakorum highway. Paradoxically, the same outpost which was used by the British to keep the communist threat away has now become the bridge between communist China and Pakistan. Kashmir now consists of two parts, one is the Pakistan held Kashmir and the other is the Indian held Kashmir. Demographically, the Indian held Kashmir again consists of three very conspicuous areas. One is the mountainous Jammu where the Hindus are dominant. The other is the Muslim majority valley or the vale of Kashmir and

the third is the Buddhist area of Ladakh. Yet overall 80% of the population of the Indian held Kashmir is Muslim. The area of Kashmir that Pakistan occupies is also predominantly Muslim. Therefore, realistically speaking, on the eve of 1947, all communication networks, the Muslim majority population of the princely state of Kashmir, water ways, as well as its economy "was bound up with what was to become Pakistan" (Lamb 1991: 12).

The armed struggle for freedom started in Indian held Kashmir in 1989. The reasons why this armed struggle began vary. These reasons include, the Indians preventing the people of Kashmir from holding a plebiscite, the instigation of the Pakistani armed forces and the fraudulent elections that were conducted in Indian held Kashmir. All these causes will be explained in detail in section five of this chapter. For the Indian authors, the realist explanation of the security problem of Kashmir is the result of the 'institutional' instability of the Indian state and increased 'political mobilization' of the Kashmiris in lieu of opportunities given to them by the Indian democracy (Ganguly and Bajpai 1994; Ganguly 1996). Although the democratic credentials of the Indian polity might have provided opportunities to Kashmiris to excel in public life, because of the failure of institutions in Kashmir like flawed elections, central government governor's rule to dissolve the state legislature, many of the various avenues for opportunity have been curbed for them (Ganguly 1997).

The materialistic solutions of this conflict have so far proved futile over the years. They oscillate between proposals of international arbitration or holding a 'regional plebiscite' in the three distinct regions of Kashmir depending upon their demographical profile. This involves the Hindu dominated Jammu, the Buddhist dominated Ladakh and

the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley. Ultimately it will result in the Hindu dominated Jammu and the Buddhist dominated Ladakh going to India, while the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley will join Pakistan. It is not a novel idea. This option was already presented by Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent Australian Jurist and the UN representative on the Kashmir issue, in his report to the UN in the 1950's. It asked that "regional plebiscites" be conducted. However, it was conceived a little differently. It was suggested that the Kashmir valley where Muslims are in a majority should be given the chance of a plebiscite to vote for India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Similarly, Pakistan held Kashmir should also be given this choice. Since the Simla agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan, any international mediation on the dispute is an anathema for India which insists on bilateral negotiations of all conflicts between the two states.

To 'craft peace' in Kashmir the material considerations include making the line of control between India and Pakistan an international border, giving a 'third option' of autonomy or independence to Kashmiris while exerting their right of self determination (Koithara 2004). Some authors have called the 1947 partition plan of India and Pakistan an 'incomplete partition' of the subcontinent because the issue of Kashmir was never settled (Lamb 2002). A new dimension of terrorism has also been added to the dispute. India now blames Pakistan for supporting the terrorist activity in Kashmir. Without refuting or debating these charges, it can safely be said that realist assertions of this dispute are presently focused on power dynamics in the region. The problem with all these realist perspectives is that they are tainted with the nationalist agenda of India or Pakistan and are being solely confined to the material significance of Kashmir. The most 'flexible' stance until now was presented by the ex-President of Pakistan Musharraff

known as Musharraff's formula (2004-2005) which is a 'four point' solution to the problem (Jones 2009). These four points are as follows:

- The geographical demarcation of the Kashmir dispute.

- The demilitarization of the disputed territory.

- The power of self governance given to the people of Kashmir.

- "Some parts of Kashmir be subject to joint Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri supervision" (Jones 2009: 136).

But after the ousting of President Musharraff in 2008 and the 'cold' response by the Indian elites, the whole idea was abandoned (Jones 2009). Moreover, after the Mumbai attacks by Pakistani based Kashmiri militants in 2009, all talks or negotiations between India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue were stopped.

My argument is that these materialistic solutions based on realist assertions of the dispute do not uncover the ideational socio-cultural components of this dispute. I do not intend to present the familiar realist versions of this dispute, but to offer a social constructivist reading of the conflict. Therefore, after providing a cursory overview of these materialistic assertions, I will look at the socio-cultural components in the next section of this chapter.

5.3 The ideational component of the Kashmir conflict

How these competing narratives of India and Pakistan help to conflate the Kashmir conflict between these two states? The ideational component attached to the Kashmir dispute has made it a very hard nut to crack and this has led to its irresolvable

nature. The ideational components I am referring to are the socio-cultural aspects which are central to the identities of India and Pakistan that vow to hold on to Kashmir. It has led to the intractability of this territorial dispute which means that it not only involves the material interests of the contesting states, but also refers to the "entrenchment" of these disputes for normative reasons (Hassner 2006). Hassner defined entrenchment as "the process by which disputes become increasingly resistant to resolution over time, marked by an enhanced reluctance to offer, accept, or implement compromises or even negotiate over territory" (Hassner 2006: 109). Although there appears to be no tangible material benefits attached to long irresolvable disputes among states, the states become 'entrenched' to intractability because of their own 'material, functional and symbolic' entrenchments (Hassner 2006). In the case of the Kashmir dispute, there is no lack of negotiation, but the net results show that there is entrenchment. The material and functional entrenchment means the difficulty of separating the disputed territory from the host country due to economic reasons. The symbolic entrenchment is defined as the process through which emotional, cultural and religious colours are deliberately added to the dispute leading to its entrenchment (Hassner 2006). In the case of Kashmir, these socio-cultural narratives are being added so that it has now become a dispute transfixed to the identities of India and Pakistan. For example, Kashmir is often seen as the symbol of Pakistan's Islamic identity, while others view Kashmir as the jewel of Indian secularism. Both these metaphors are used by the elites in Pakistan and Indian to make this dispute seemingly irresolvable. The 'territory' of Kashmir is being 'metaphorically' treated as a human body where the loss of Kashmir means 'death' for Pakistan and 'amputation' for India (Inayatullah 2008).

The Kashmir issue has entangled the identities of India and Pakistan. The social norms of animosity used for their own identities have enmeshed this dispute as an extension of their own identity discourses. For example, the Indian claim on Kashmir is incomplete without maligning Pakistan for promoting terrorism in the valley. Similarly, Pakistan's identity based on a separate abode for Muslims of the subcontinent resists the Indian hold on the Muslim majority Kashmir. This Indian hold is considered as the reason for the negation of Pakistan. These social norms do not offer an alternative explanation of the dispute. These norms are the actual cause of the dispute which is not adequately taken into account by the realist materialistic explanations of the dispute (Forsberg 1996). They not only become 'concrete interests' of the states involved, but also act as "threats to identity crucial to the disputants" involved in a conflict (Ross 1997: 300). Kashmir is entangled to the point of being a hostage and has been unable to come up with an identity of its own. The state narratives embedded in identity discourses are being used frequently as "psycho-cultural dramas" (Ross 2001). These are analytical 'tools' of 'cultural identity' which helps us to understands and resolve the 'ethnic conflicts' 'constructively' (Ross 2001: 157). In the Kashmir dispute, such 'psycho-cultural dramas' are constructed by the social practices of both states' elites.

For example, the loss of the Holy relic/ hair of the Holy Prophet in Hazarat bal (Srinagar) in Indian held Kashmir in 1964 was one of the many incidents after which large scale riots broke out not only in Kashmir, but in the rest of India as well. After some days, it was found and its sacredness was authenticated by a board of religious scholars. This issue was linked to the identity of the contending states. The Kashmir problem reflects the contrasting identities of India and Pakistan, but there is also an indigenous

identity of Kashmir. The next section explores this distinct identity of Kashmir and how

its non-rendition by Indian and Pakistani elites led to this distress in Kashmir.

5.4 'Kashmiriyat': the essence of an indigenous identity of Kashmir

This section will explore the identity of Kashmir independent of the parameters

designed by Indian and Pakistani elites. The Kashmir problem emerged due to the

convergence of three factors. Varshney identifies these three factors: "religious

nationalism represented by Pakistan, secular nationalism epitomized by India, and ethnic

nationalism embodied in what Kashmiris call Kashmiriyat" (Varshney 1991: 999).

Kashmir has a specific culture and identity of its own. The history of Kashmir from

medieval times until the present is important for uncovering certain peculiar socio-

cultural norms broadly subsumed under the rubric of 'Kashmiriyat'. Kashmir was

dominated by four centuries of "imperial rule, from Mughal (1586-1757) and Afghan

(1757-1819) to Sikh (1819-1846) and Dogra (1846-1947)" (Cockell 2000: 326).

Therefore, the desire for self rule has always been the core 'valuational' determinant for

the identity of Kashmir (Cockell 2000). "The essence of Kashmiriyat ethnicity is the

network of socio-cultural, historical and linguistic ties that bound all Kashmiris,

regardless of religion, into an interdependent social collective" (Cockell 2000: 327).

During the rule of the Dogra Raj, the Kashmir valley remained geographically

isolated from the rest of the subcontinent. This helps to explain why the Kashmiri identity

is different from the identity of the Muslims and the Hindus of the subcontinent. While in

the subcontinent religious differences and divergent cultures led to a communal divide, in

Kashmir religious diversity has created a common collective identity. As I will explain

below, this identity complex has four distinct components which include religious

tolerance, desire for freedom, socio-cultural distinctiveness and linguistic similarity.

The religious norms include "rishi" which focused on the development of "mutual

tolerance and non orthodox devotion" especially among co-religionists, the Hindus and

the Muslims (Cockell 2000: 327). It is ironic that in contrast to other regions in India, the

spread of Islam was peacefully introduced to the Kashmir by mystics and Sufis referred

to as 'Rishis' (Khan 1994). Muslim rule in Kashmir was established without any blood

shed. Islam was propagated in Kashmir peacefully through the efforts of Mir Sayyid Ali

and his followers in the medieval period (Bazaz 2003). The reason behind this is that

Sufism in Islam and Shaivism 'Trika' of the Hindus in Kashmir were akin to each other

(Bazaz 2003). Both focused on respect for co-religionists and they believed in 'religious

Humanism' (Khan 1994). In Kashmir, the saints of Islam are revered by both Hindus and

Muslims alike, e.g., Lalla, Lal Ded, Sheikh Norruddin called 'Shazanand' by the Hindus

(Bazaz 2003). After the death of Sheikh Norruddin in 1808 AC, his followers formed a

religious order called the 'Rishis or Babas' in Kashmir (Bazaz 2003). It is based on

"Religious Humanism under the veneer of Islam" (Bazaz 2003: 87). Although the basic

tenants of the Quran remain the same, there was a peculiar synthesis of Islamic traditions

with the regional socio-cultural norms of Kashmir (Bazaz 2003).

The spread of Islam in Kashmir during the 13[th] and 14[th] centuries was neither

abrupt nor violent, but rather it subtly altered "the social structure of the Kashmiris"

(Iqbal and Nirash 1978: 15). The Hinduism practiced in Kashmir is peculiar to the region

when compared to the orthodox Hindus in other parts of India. It all transpired in

Kashmir during medieval times and continued for centuries. For instance, the Kashmiri

pundit eats meat in contrast to the 'vegetarian Brahmans' of the rest of India (Iqbal and

Nirash 1978). There were conversions in Kashmir as the Hindus accepted Islam, but with

conversion there also came the 'exchange of two cultures' (Kalla 1978). Marshall

explains that, "seldom in the history of mankind, has the spectacle been witnesses of two

civilizations, so vast and so strongly developed yet so radically dissimilar, as the Hindus

and [the] Muslims, meeting and mingling together" (Kalla 1978: 27). There is also free

participation of the Hindus and the Muslims in each other's social events like marriages.

Even today the annual Hindu pilgrimage to holy Amarnath shrine in mountains of

Kashmir valley has been arranged among others by local Muslim maliks. They are also

given their due share from the offerings of the shrine by the Hindus. The site became

controversial in 2008 when the governor of Kashmir appointed by the Indian state gave

an adjoining forest area to the shrine board for pilgrimage use. The local Kashmiri

Muslims protested against this decision because they feared the resettlement of Hindus in

Kashmir would change the demographic profile of the valley.

These characteristics of Kashmiri social norms have inculcated in the Kashmiris

the desire for freedom and independence. However, this desire among the Kashmiri

people has been thwarted since the nineteenth century, when Kashmir along with its

inhabitants was sold by the British to a foreign Maharaja Gulab Singh for the paltry price

of 75 lakh in 1846. The harmonious 'ethno-national' and 'religio-cultural' relations

between different communities in Kashmir make up the essence of 'Kashmiriyat' (Bazaz

2003). The narrative of Kashmir obtaining its freedom is still vibrant and can be gauged

from the following couplet.[8]

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[8] Note the emphasis here is on obtaining freedom, rather than joining either India or Pakistan. However, this is always shoved under the carpet by both India and Pakistan elites.

"I have accepted the burden of ages on my hand
The angels of the heavens have shuddered at my doggedness
I have chewed steel, I have braved fire;
But thus my head has not, till this day
Bent low before anyone else but thee"

Poet Azad Kashmiri (Bazaz 2003).

The spirit of 'Kashmiriyat' explains why the Kashmiris prefer freedom over independence. They have chosen the benevolent rule of foreign masters rather than the despotic attitude of their own kings (Bazaz 2003). Twenty-eight dynasties have ruled Kashmir since 1339 A.C and ten of these were from outside Kashmir (Bazaz 2003). The reign of Dogra Sikh Maharaja Gulab Singh started in 1846 and from this period on the transformation of Kashmiri identity began (Bazaz 2003). However, this change only became apparent in the 1930's when the tyranny of the outsiders was so despotic that the Kashmiris not only started demanding freedom, but independence as well (Bazaz 2003: 121).

The socio-cultural norms of the Hindus and the Muslims in Kashmir also differ from others 'outside Kashmir' (Iqbal and Nirash 1978). The 'composite' Kashmir culture is made up of 'Hindu, Muslim and Buddhist' characteristics making it a 'synthetic' one 'with unity in diversity' (Kalla 1978: 26, 32). The social caste system of the Hindus in Kashmir was not as 'rigid' as what was being practiced in other parts of the subcontinent (Singh 2000). In Kashmir, 'many Hindu converts' did not even change their 'old surnames' like 'Bhatts' 'Mantus' or 'Rathores' (Singh 2000: 2). This practice was in direct contrast to converts of the rest of the subcontinent. There was no communal clash between the Hindus and the Muslims during the 'Muslim rule in Kashmir' which was quite divergent from the history of strife between the Hindus and the Muslims of the subcontinent (Singh 2000). The only clash was during the reign of Sultan Hasan Shah

and apart from that there was wide spread tolerance, mutual amity as well as incidents of 'inter-marriages' among the Hindus and the Muslims of Kashmir (Singh 2000: 43).

Finally, as far as linguistic similarity is concerned, the 'homogeneous' Kashmiri culture has over 89% of the people who speak 'Kashmiri' as their 'mother tongue' (Puri 1995). This language is called 'Kashur' by the Kashmiris and is "one of the oldest spoken and literary languages of modern India" having a 'Dardic origin' (Puri 1995: 58). The following comment made by Sufi demonstrates the composite influence of cosmopolitan Kashmiri culture. While discussing the Kashmiri language, Sufi pointed out that "the original Dardic language has supplied the skeleton, Sanskrit [Hindu dialect] has given it flesh, but Islam has given it life" (Puri 1995: 58). The 'unity' of all the faiths of Kashmir is the essence of Kashmiriyat and any effort to divide this socio-cultural part on rationalist lines has met with great opposition from the Kashmiris (Ellis and Khan 1995). For example there was a proposal by the ex-prime minister of the Pakistani held Kashmir, to divide Kashmir between India and Pakistan at the Chenab river which originates in Kashmir, but this proposal was met with strong opposition by the Kashmiris (Ellis and Khan 1995). This distinct culture of the Kashmiris has developed unique social relationships among the Hindus and the Muslims in Kashmir.

In his thought provoking work, Bazaz explains that "the people of the valley have evolved through ages a distinct culture of their own which they are loath to part with" (Bazaz 2003: 733). He explains further that the Hindu pundit of the Jammu region has no problem with a Kashmiri Muslim of the valley and in fact would feel more at home with him than with a Hindu from mainland India. Similarly, the Muslim of the Kashmir valley is comfortable in the company of the Hindu pundit of the Jammu region (Bazaz 2003).

The question arises, how have the socially constructed identities of the Hindus and the Muslims in Kashmir become opposed to each other after have such a long history of friendship and amicable relationships? The self fulfilling prophecies of the elites of India and Pakistan have mutilated the entire concept of an indigenous Kashmiri identity. Ironically, neither the Indian secular image, nor Pakistan's pseudo-religious profile, applies to the Kashmiri identity (Bazaz 2003).

5.5 The social practices of India and Pakistan elites

The socio-cultural part forming the interests of Indian and Pakistani elites over Kashmir is based on their own struggle for identities. Fearon explains that "ethnic violence occurs when political elites construct antagonistic identities in order to strengthen their hold on power" (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 853). In social constructivism the process of "primordialism" or the given nature of self interest is often rejected and criticized, but seldom is there an alternative explanation offered for the construction of identities during times of violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Sometimes it is the process by which the identities of two groups are constructed in a way that it 'yields violence' (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). In other words, the process of the construction of identities entails in it the seeds of violence. But how is this process formed and by whom?

In the case of Pakistan, Muslim ideology was used by Pakistani elites to shape the identity of the Kashmiri Muslims. However, Kashmir's history and indigenous culture demonstrates that Muslims and Hindus have lived in harmony. Yet after the creation of Pakistan, the identity of Kashmir was aligned to the identity of Pakistan based on their

common religious moorings. Similarly, the Indian state established institutions in Kashmir which failed to coalesce the common identity of the Kashmiris. In his constructivist analysis of ethnic conflicts in South Asia, Chatterjee explains the clash between the nationalist discourse of identity and the sub-nationalist identity discourse (Chatterjee 2005). He found that "throughout South Asia, the discourse of territorial nationalism has been used by the state to counter the 'threat' of assertive and divisive ethnic identities with an aim to create monolithic construction(s) of nationhood" (Chatterjee 2005: 85). How have the Indian and Pakistani elites adopted such a discourse? This section will explain chronologically the social practices of the Indian and the Pakistani elites.

The Indian and Pakistani elites adopted social practices for their own political gains in Kashmir which was evident during their struggle for independence prior to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The people of Kashmir wanted to get rid of the Maharaja rule and in order to achieve freedom started their own independence struggle in the 1930s. They invited the leadership of both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress [party] to help them in their struggle for freedom. But the leadership of both the Indian National Congress [party] and the Muslim League wanted Kashmir for the sake of bolstering their own identities. At the invitation of Kashmiri leadership, both Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the founding father of India, visited Kashmir in 1944 and 1940 respectively. They both spoke of Kashmir in the context of the wider struggle for freedom without considering the demand of the 'fight for freedom' started by the Muslim Conference [party] of Kashmir (Blinkenberg 1998: 60).

Nehru's secularization credentials were becoming popular in 1940 and the Kashmir struggle led by Muhammad Abdullah completely aligned itself with the Indian National Congress [party]. This period of history also witnessed a split in the Muslim Conference of Kashmir, with the pro-Pakistani leadership led by Ghulam Abbas remaining under the banner of the Muslim Conference in alliance with the Muslim League. The secularists led by Muhammad Abdullah formed the National Conference to instil the secular credentials of the Indian National Congress [party]. Nehru referred to his trip to Kashmir in 1940 as the 'beloved visit'. Nehru was himself born as a Kashmiri pundit. While Jinnah asked the people of Kashmir to "awaken and instil life in the dead bones of the Muslim Nation" (Blinkenberg 1998:61). Jinnah saw the struggle in Kashmir as part of a wider Muslims struggle in the subcontinent. Gandhi also visited Kashmir in August 1947 days before the partition of the subcontinent and stated that "The people of Kashmir should be asked whether they want to join Pakistan or India. Let them do as they want. The ruler is nothing. The people are everything" (Wolpert 2001). The pre-independence speeches of Indian and Pakistani elites reflect how they were seeing the struggle in Kashmir through the prisms of Indian-secular and Pakistani-Muslim identities.

After independence, Nehru had reiterated time and again the solemn pledge of India to the people of Kashmir to ascertain their wishes by holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. When in 1957 he was taunted for going against his pledge made before the United Nations Security Council for a plebiscite in Kashmir in 1948, Nehru stated that "Kashmir is not ours but it is of the Kashmiris. We cannot stay in Kashmir for a moment without the consent of the Kashmiris. It is not our property" (Abdullah 1964: 532). The Kashmiri leaders in Indian held Kashmir, like Mohammad Abdullah [the Lion of

Kashmir], had thought of independence from both India and Pakistan as a third option. They wanted to make Kashmir "the Switzerland of the East" (Lamb 2002). After its accession to India, Kashmir was led by Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, who became Prime Minister in 1948. However, after he reminded Nehru of his pledge before the United Nations Security Council to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, Abdullah was dismissed as Prime Minister of Indian held Kashmir in 1953 and was subsequently arrested. The Indian government in the 1950s was also accused by Abdullah of abusing the terms of the 'Accession of Kashmir' in which it is explicitly stated that apart from defence, communications and foreign affairs, every other state function had to be performed by the Kashmir government itself (Nayyer 2010). For speaking out, he was put behind bars for eleven years. A local pro-Indian leader Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad was installed as Prime Minister of Kashmir in 1953. The cause for self-determination in the 1960's and 1970's was carried out by another popular political party the Plebiscite Front. Another important junction in the political history of Kashmir came after the death of Nehru in 1964. Any semblance of secularism maintained by Nehru for the Indian state also vanished with his death.

In the post-independence phase in Pakistan, the elite's social practices vis-à-vis Kashmir can be divided into two categories. One is the civilian elite and the other is the military elite. The civilian elites of Pakistan have tried to wade their way through the marshy waters of Kashmir by engaging in dialogue, but they were given less manoeuvrability by the military elites as principal stake holder due to the army's stranglehold on Kashmir. The military elites have kept their hold on power by deliberately raising the issue of Kashmir every now and then (Acharya and Acharya

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2006). Kashmir lies at the critical junction of India and Pakistan's 'contesting national identities' with both not willing to accomodate Kashmir's own distinct identity discourse (Acharya and Acharya 2006).

Moreover, whenever the military elites came to power in Pakistan, from General Ayub to General Musharraff, they have always adopted a proactive military strategy in Kashmir. This resulted either in the direct involvement of Pakistan's army or with the active support of the militant factions in Kashmir in their fight against the Indian might. This helped the Pakistan army in primarily two ways. First, it helped the army to construct its place as the sole guardian of state identity and the saviour of its founding ideology; and second, it helped engage half of the Indian military in Kashmir. In 1965, General Ayub Khan launched the 'Gibraltar Operation' and 'Operation Grand Slam' to liberate Kashmir from India by force. Similarly, the 'Kargil Operation' was the brain child of General Musharraff in 1999. These historical examples support the proactive military strategy of engaging the Indian army in Kashmir. However, it should also be noted, that the actions of Pakistan's army in 1965 did not result in a popular uprising among the Kashmiri population to stand up against the Indian army. Similarly, in 1971, when India and Pakistan went to war, there was no popular struggle against the Indian army in Kashmir. This may be because of two reasons. First of all, it was the precise timing of the event. Kashmir's identity in 1965 and 1971 was not radicalized enough to take up arms against India. Secondly, the older generation of Kashmiris including pro-nationalist secular leaders like Abdullah still had enough influence so that they could help keep peace in the valley.

However, this state of affairs changed altogether after the infamous Indira-Abdullah pact was agreed upon between the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Kashmir Prime Minister Muhammad Abdullah in 1975. The special status of Kashmir in the Indian Union was forgiven and tacit approval was given by the central government of India to integrate Kashmir firmly into mainstream India. After this pact was adopted the autonomous character of Kashmir changed. The post of Prime Minister of Kashmir was re-designated as the Chief Minister. Abdullah was given Chief Minister-ship of Kashmir as his reward. This was a turning point, because after 1975, the local Kashmiris became disillusioned with their nationalist Kashmiri leadership (Bazaz 1978). The fears of the Kashmiri people were justified after the flawed and fraudulent elections that were subsequently held in the 1980s (Ganguly 1997). Democracy in Kashmir was conducted by 'intimidation and terror' (Bazaz 1978). The Kashmiris feared annihilation of their indigenous culture under the dominance of India. The new generation of Kashmir, now better informed and qualified, became disenchanted with Indian state practices and took up arms against the Indian army in 1989 (Ganguly 1997). The hopes of Kashmiris for the establishment of democratic norms by the largest democracy in the world were crushed by the despotic autocratic rule in Indian held Kashmir (Bose 2003). The centralist practices of the Indian state's institutions had disillusioned the Kashmiris. India often blame Pakistan for the militant insurgency that erupted in the Indian held Kashmir in 1989. All Indian governments routinely accuse Pakistan of instigated the problem by sending militant infiltrators to the Kashmir valley. However, it can also be seen as the failure of the state apparatus in Indian held Kashmir to respect the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The centralist policies of keeping Kashmir in a nationalist fray and the increase in

political mobilization, imbued a sense of deprivation among Kashmiri masses (Ganguly and Bajpai 1994; Ganguly 1996). The struggle was exacerbated by the failure of Indian institutions to satisfy local demands for autonomy because of the implementation of central government policies, the imposition of the governor's rule in the 1980s, as well as the fraudulent state elections held in 1987. The agency responsible for the entrenchment of this dispute is both leadership of India and Pakistan. It is useful to highlight some of the social practices of the elite by examining institutional policies developed for the sake of governance in Kashmir.

The ethnic nationalism in Kashmir presented an interesting deviation between state interests and the indigenous ethnic nationalist movement (Cockell 2000). The core values and norms of Kashmir directly clash with the institutions developed by the Indian state (Cockell 2000). The social practices of Indian elites were based on the nationalist discourse of an Indian identity whose corner stones are complete subordination to the nationalist cause with minimum recognition of cultural autonomy amid central control. While, the social practices of Kashmiris are based on the indigenous and autonomous discourse of a distinct identity of 'Kashmiriyat'. The 'state discourse' rejects the 'recognition of nationalist movements' due to its own vested interests in national unity (Cockell 2000: 321).

The post-colonial Indian threat that seeks to engulf and draw this distinct Kashmiris identity into the main folds of the nationalist cause has resulted in 'existential fear of anxiety' and 'ontological insecurity' among the Kashmiris (Kinnvall 2004). In India, the central government policies paid no heed to the Kashmiris' "shared socio-cultural values and identity referents" (Cockell 2000: 321). The repressive measures

taken by the Indian central government to control militant activities in the valley of Kashmir invariably led the local Kashmiris developing a strong adherence for freedom and independence as a part of their core identity (Cockell 2000). The problem with both India and Pakistan is that they have inherited the post-colonial system of their foreign masters which was totally alien to the local culture and traditions. The only advantage of this colonial structure was its ability to extract the maximum amount of revenues from its colonies by allowing the local population few avenues for governance. They had set up the state apparatus accordingly and built institutions which had a centralist control and had no room for the recognition of autonomous local bodies based on the cultural traditions particular to that region. This inheritance of post-colonial rule by the state elites after 1947 carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. The violence in Kashmir is one such example. Cockell points out that "subaltern ethnic minorities are excluded from this centralized definition of national identity, and often have circumscribed avenues for political mobilization" (Cockell 2000: 322). The Indian quest for a secular identity, versus Pakistan's emphasis on an all pervasive Islamic identity, has led to ethnic insurgencies in Kashmir. It has led to the imposition of "a monological definition of national identity, and links this with the political closure and coercive control structures of national security" (Cockell 2000: 323).

The Indian constitution of 1950 gave Kashmir a special status in Article 370 by giving the state of Jammu and Kashmir all powers except defence, currency, external affairs and communications (Teng, Bhatt et al. 1977). This acceptance of the *de jure* autonomy of Kashmir was infringed upon and was eroded time and again by the Indian elites under pressure from the discourse of its secular Indian identity and it has now

virtually ceased to exist. These social practices of the Indian elites in the shape of direct central government rule, the abrogation of the Kashmir legislature and manipulating elections resulted not surprisingly in violence in the valley of Kashmir (Tremblay 2002). In reality between 1954 until 1975 when the Kashmir accord was signed which formally abrogates the special status of Kashmir, there was in total 28 constitutional orders passed in one form or the other to integrate Kashmir with India and 262 Union Laws [laws applicable in other Indian states] were adopted in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir (Guha 2007). The utter disregard shown by the central government of India towards the rising demand for autonomy and the local population's desire for the right of self determination ultimately had a spiralling centrifugal affect.

Without going into the legal framework of the constitutional history of India, the point which I want to reiterate is that Kashmir has never been allowed by both states to develop its own ethnic cultural identity. Both India and Pakistan have tried to superimpose their own identities of secularism or Islamic identity respectively so as to keep their own nationalist agendas on the table. Pakistan looks at Indian held Kashmir as the negation of its own identity. If a peaceful Kashmir can exists within India then the whole reason of the partition of the subcontinent on communal lines falls to the ground. For Pakistan supporting the Kashmir cause is like giving a new lease of life to its own identity.

This has developed a 'contested concept of justice' wherein Pakistan felt incomplete without Kashmir on account of its Muslim credentials and principles of the partition of the subcontinent (Forsberg 1996). Similarly, India contests on the basis of its secular credentials to thwart the secessionist trends in multi-ethnic and pluralist India.

But who has suffered in such conflicting and contested versions or viewpoints? It is the local Kashmiri population whose third generation has grown up bearing the brunt of this dispute that has lingering on unabated since 1947 some sixty three years after the independence of India and Pakistan. Some authors like Mitra have used cultural nationalism as a rational approach to study the ethnic movements in South Asia (Mitra 1995). He is of the view that the direction of the sub-national movement is guided by rational interests while the resources used by its protagonists are linked to cultural causes of identity (Mitra 1995). The Kashmir struggle is guided by cultural factors the essence of which is a separate identity based on "Kashmiriyat". It is not directed by rational interests or material determinants, but rather an ideational component has inculcated a sense of an "imagined community" which a Kashmiri cannot resist (Anderson 1983). In short the contemporary checkered history of present day Kashmir is full of elites' highhandedness. But the state of Jammu and Kashmir "was not monolithic: it contained many peoples with divergent pasts, traditions and patterns of life " (Lamb 1991: 217). The next section explains some of the popular perceptions of the Kashmiri people regarding the action of the elites of India and Pakistan. The popular social practices draw attention to the distinct identity of Kashmiris as practiced by the indigenous population. This also explains the tussle between elites' perceptions and popular perceptions of the Kashmir identity.

5.6 The popular social practices of Kashmiris

The tainted visions of India and Pakistan through the prism of their own identities have torn apart the socio-cultural fabric of the mutual coexistence of Kashmiris. Some

authors are sceptical of the existence of any distinct cultural identity for the Kashmiris especially in the aftermath of violence that has led to the polarization of the various cultural identities (Hewitt 1995). Furthermore, Pakistan's support for militant activities in Kashmir and Indian's attempt to label the freedom struggle in Kashmir as state terrorism, has resulted in quashing these common norms. It is difficult to come up with any statistical data concerning the popular perceptions of the Kashmiri people about the actions of the Indian and Pakistani elites due to the instability in the region. However, increased militancy in the region by Pakistan, as well as the flawed general elections by India in Kashmir both have disillusioned the Kashmiri people (Jones 2009). The militant groups also vary with some supporting an active pro-Pakistani stance and a religious outlook, while others are fighting for their independence (Jones 2009).

A survey conducted by a 'British company, MORI' in a sample of 850 Kashmiris found that an 'overwhelming majority' of them wanted themselves to be 'at the forefront of the search for a settlement' (Jones 2009). The question of independence was not asked in the survey (Jones 2009). Another survey was carried out by the 'International Crisis Group (ICG)' in 2002 on a smaller sample of 80 people in 'the Kashmir Valley and Srinagar' (Jones 2009: 131). In that survey many viewed Indian rule as 'oppressive' and they believed the fight of Kashmiri militants was 'justified', but at the same time 'they were also exhausted by the conflict and sceptical of Pakistan's motives in Kashmir (Jones 2009: 131). However, '70 percent' were in favour of opening the Kashmir border between India and Pakistan for economic and 'cultural' reasons (Jones 2009). The results of these surveys are 'disputable' but time is still the testimony (Jones 2009). For example, in the past 63 years, the elites' social practices of India and Pakistan have so far not borne

any tangible results for peace in the region. The difficulty lies in the disharmony between the popular social practices [Kashmiri people] and the elites' social practices of India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan both have sidelined the Kashmiri leadership in their negotiations, though in rhetoric, both states' elites have desired the resolution of the Kashmir dispute according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, the chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) a conglomerate of diverse political parties in Indian held Kashmir, complained against this fact. Farooq pointed out that:

> **"**The main purpose of our visit is to reiterate our stance that without involving Kashmiris of both sides in dialogue, the issue could not be resolved and no durable solution could be reached. Kashmir is not a territorial or border area issue. It involves lives of 13,000,000 Kashmiris" (*Dawn* 22.6.2008)

Another question which arises is whether the popular social practices based on the norms of 'Kashmiriyat' still exist in the turbulent part of Kashmir itself? Is there still a viable option that such norms can be propagated given the recent turmoil in Kashmir? Nasreen Ali has studied the distinct Kashmir identity in the diaspora Kashmiri community in Great Britain (Ali 2002). She has concluded that the "discourse of Kashmiriyat emerges in a diasporic space" (Ali 2002: 146). This diaspora community in Britain came mostly from the Mirpur district of Pakistan held Kashmir. In Britain, they found the space necessary to foster their own distinct identity that they were not able to have in Indian and Pakistani held Kashmir. The underlying message of the research carried out on the diaspora is that Kashmir is a nation in every sense of the word with a distinct culture and identity (Ali 2002). The disharmony between the elites and the popular social practices has resulted in the 'tragedy over Kashmir' in which 'the voices'

of the Kashmiris "have been drowned out by the Islamists, nationalists and ideologues in both Islamabad and Delhi" (Jones 2009: 139).

In a 'content analysis' of 46 proposals introduced for the resolution of the Kashmir issue between 1947-2008, Yusuf and Najam found that 'autonomy to Kashmiris' has been the recurring theme among all such proposals (Yusuf and Najam 2009). Furthermore, they also identified the 'virtual consensus' on 'catalysts' leading to its resolution which involves 'soft borders', the 'involvement' of Kashmiris in the resolution of the dispute and the 'demilitarization' of the region (Yusuf and Najam 2009). This sounds somewhat familiar to the Musharraff formula introduced previously and points towards enhancing harmony between the elites and the popular social practices. But in reality we see that the ideological commitments of Indian and Pakistani elites towards their respective state's identity discourses have never allowed this to be actualized.

The tension within India due to the pressures of the centripetal forces demanding a common identity under the canopy of secularism and the outward centrifugal forces demanding more autonomy in the region has caused relentless struggle in Kashmir. The Bharatiya Janata party, as flag bearer of Hindu domination, has also proposed that the special status given to Kashmir by Article 370 in the Indian constitution be eliminated (Dutt 1998). Even though such a guarantee only remains in *de jure*, while Kashmir is being treated *de facto* as one of the ordinary states within an Indian Union. For India, the fundamental question being asked is can "a Muslim-majority state exist, without undue fuss or friction, in a Hindu-majority, but ostensibly "secular" India?"(Guha 2007: 249, emphasis of the author). The answer seems to be 'no'. It was the government of India

which took the matter of Kashmir to the United Nations Security Council and now it has backed down from both the United Nations Resolutions 47 and 211 to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir (Malik 1993).

Kashmir's own identity discourse based on popular social practices that have been around for centuries was never allowed to come at the forefront. As Bazaz points out, "the prerequisites to attain that ideal [free Kashmir] is a mental revolution"(Bazaz 2003: 737). This demands the propagation of social norms for peaceful coexistence based on Kashmir's indigenous culture of 'Kashmiriyat'. Only with the "assertion of a nationalist Kashmiri identity" will the dispute be resolved (Ellis and Khan 2008). The identity of the two main actors India and Pakistan have submerged the indigenous composite Kashmir identity in their own nationalistic discourses. Weldes explains, "insecurities are cultural in the sense that they are produced in and out of the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives " (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). The social practices of Indian and Pakistani elites have up until this point formed their particular narratives on Kashmir based on their own national identities and have sold them to their respective audiences. The population of both states has conformed to this as the sole reality of the dispute. The material disposition of this dispute may include many resolutions, but it is its cultural context which renders all such settlements null and void. The partitioning of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has sacrificed its identity based on 'Kashmiriyat' at the altar of pragmatism.

5.7 Conclusion

The lack of space given to the Kashmiris for the propagation of their own indigenous social norms of peaceful coexistence as well as the parallel irredentist claims of both India and Pakistan have led to the security issue of Kashmir. The rival discourses of the identities of India and Pakistan have had a spill over affect on Kashmir which has been forced to lay down its own specific identity in lieu of an Indian or Pakistani version. The Kashmir dispute can be better explained if we abandon these nationalist discourses of the secularism of India and the Islamic identity of Pakistan and instead focus our minds on the construction of an identity for Kashmir. The distinction between the security dilemma in a realist sense and in a constructivist one is over the material versus the ideational components. The explanation of the ideational component of a security dilemma requires "taking seriously the parties' culturally rooted interpretations and the fears and threats underlying them" (Ross 1997: 317). The various strategic solutions to the dispute based on realist explanations have not achieved the desired results (Winner and Yoshihara 2002).

The security dilemma over Kashmir examined from a social constructivist perspective shows that Indian and Pakistani elites have contributed to the aggravation of this dispute. What was formerly a territorial dispute in Kashmir, has now evolved into an intractable identity crises. There are "very few movements in the world [which] have been so determined and so sustained" (Nayar 11.6.2010). The Kashmiris are in search of their own identity by looking for its roots in their indigenous culture. As Adler explains "people imagine that with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end" (Adler

1997b: 250). Kashmir has made the whole environment of South Asia into an insecurity quagmire. The Muslim leadership in Kashmir wants tripartite negotiations among the principal stakeholders India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris for a solution to this problem.

The denial of space for the recognition of Kashmiriyat norms by way of India-Pakistan elites' social practices is the major cause of the present stalemate over Kashmir. The Kashmiriyat forms the socio-cultural norms underlying the traditional popular social practices of the Kashmiri people. The elites social practices in the shape of flawed elections, the lack of impartial enforcement of Article 370 of the Indian constitution and the use of excessive force in the shape of the Indian army, as well as Pakistan's support for the militants, has so far not allowed the popular social practices of the Kashmiris to come to the forefront.

6: India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry: the influence of ideology upon elites' social practices

This chapter seeks to answer the following questions. Why did India and Pakistan become overt nuclear states one after the other in 1998? More specifically, why did India suddenly shed its former ambiguous nuclear posture on the 11[th] of May 1998 only to be followed by Pakistan after barely two weeks? The nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan is often studied with the realist approach of IR which looks at the nuclear discourse of a state in an environment of the 'survival of the fittest'. Without assigning any major role to these materialistic premises or minimizing their scope, I will explain this rivalry based on the ideational components of both states' identities. I will argue that it was the ideologically based routines or the social practices of both states' elites which contributed to their decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. If we assume 'security as practice' and believe that the identity discourse of a state is directly related to the social practices of a state's elites, then the argument can be made that these practices can influence and change the security discourse of a state (Lene 2006).

The discourse analysis of the speeches of the elites in India and Pakistan show the importance of religious myths as well as cultural symbols and how they are used by the elites in constructing a 'social reality' (Nizamani 2000). The elites further sell this constructed 'social reality' by disguising it under popular social practices. This led to the creation of a synchronized intersubjective environment between popular social practices and elite social practices which further paved the way for India and Pakistan to make the decision to go nuclear in 1998. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and the army in

Pakistan have emerged as the principal actors in their respective state's nuclear discourse. Hindutva as a distinct ideological slogan was incorporated by the BJP and applied to the Indian nuclear discourse, while Indo-centric myths along with the acquisition of an Islamic bomb were being constructed around Pakistan's nuclear discourse. Due to the vastness of the subject, the time frame of this study is primarily, though not exclusively, focused around the social practices of the elites during the decade of the 1990s.

This chapter is divided into seven sub-sections. The first section deals with the standard narratives constructed by the elites of India and Pakistan concerning their respective nuclear discourses. The second section provides an historical perspective and looks at some of the realist explanations for the emergence of the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. The third section defines the ideational or socio-cultural framework of this rivalry. The fourth section deals with the key aspects of my argument regarding the centrality of elites' social practices in the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. The Indian nuclear discourse is explained through the all pervasive 'Hindutva' identity of the Indian polity. This section also elucidates the routines of Pakistani elites by revealing the underlying discourses of otherness towards India as well as the attainment of an Islamic bomb. The fifth section illustrates the socio-cultural component of this rivalry in the context of India and Pakistan's missiles programmes. The sixth section elaborates on the popular social practices of Pakistanis and Indians towards their nuclear programme. These popular social practices show that a dichotomy exists regarding the nuclear issue, since at times we find people's derision towards conducting such nuclear tests while other times these tests are actively supported by the people. This section further emphasizes that this dichotomy is due to the lack of public knowledge in this crucial

security matter and the mystery surrounding both states' nuclear discourses. Finally the seventh section concludes this case study by arguing that the social practices of the elites and their conflict with popular social practices can be seen as central to the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan.

6.1 India and Pakistan narratives on the nuclear issue

Pakistan is the only Islamic country in the world which has the nuclear bomb. It will make Pakistan the fortress of Islam for the fifty plus Islamic states in the world. The nuclear bomb is essential for the safety of Pakistan against the evil designs of India. India has been the nemesis of Pakistan's existence and has never accepted the independent status of Pakistan. The nuclear bomb is the ultimate price for state survival paid by the people of Pakistan by sacrificing their comforts and needs. This is a standard Pakistani narrative which can be easily found with only minor differences of words in the majority of Pakistan Studies text books. The books are published by the Pakistan state and studying them is compulsory for students [Pakistan Studies for the Tenth Class, Sind Text Book Board, Karachi, 2009].

This type of typical Pakistani narrative has been used by the elites to build support for their decision to establish a Pakistan nuclear programme. Not only is this programme particularly Indo-centric, but Pakistan's entire security discourse has always been formed as a reaction to and linked with Indian security practices. For example, the following statement by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, to a Guard Commander of the Pakistan Navy in March 1948, offers further testimony to this Indo-centric threat construction approach. Jinnah told the Commander:

"Pakistan has been created and its security is now your responsibility,
I want them to be the best soldiers in the world, so that no one can
cast an evil eye on Pakistan, and if it does we shall fight him to the end
until either he throws us into the Arabian Sea or we drown him in the
Indian Ocean" (Khan 2005).
The reference to the 'Arabian sea' and the 'Indian ocean' is clearly intended to

apply to India as the sole enemy of Pakistan. But these were the initial years of

independence and Jinnah had fought a bitter war with the Indian National Congress

[party] to win over Pakistan. He could be given the benefit of doubt. It was barely a year

after the independence of Pakistan in 1948 that Jinnah passed away. In subsequent years,

the increased army's influence in the state's body politics has resulted in the state's

security practices being directly focused on India. This Indo-centric myth has been the

corner stone of all military regimes in Pakistan. The third law of the motion of physics

holds that "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction". If we alter this law

slightly it can also be applied to the context of Indian-Pakistani relations since "for every

Indian action there is an equal Pakistani reaction, but in the same direction". It has been

ingrained in the mind set of every Pakistani that India has never accepted the identity of

Pakistan. Pakistan's security practices are designed by the ruling political or military

elites based on this kind of logic.

At the outset, the reasons for Pakistan wanting a nuclear bomb seem to be rational

considering the presence of its neighbouring arch rival India. I will not deny this

rationality, as I have explained in the beginning of this chapter. The reasons that Pakistan

established a nuclear programme are no doubt rational and can in part be explained by

realism. However, there are two ideational components of this narrative that are under

emphasized. One is the Islamic nomenclature of the bomb, the other is the military elites'

Indo-centric approach which is constructed through Pakistani identity. I will explain this is detail in section four of this chapter.

Now let us consider the Indian narrative, India is the sixth nuclear power in the world. The attainment of the nuclear bomb is purely an indigenous and highly scientific endeavour of the nuclear scientists of India. It has given India a definitive and qualitative role among nation states. India's history as a great civilization has given it this 'shakti' [pride]. India's impregnable defence with nuclear technology will not allow anyone to 'vivisect the motherland' of India again. India has removed the 'nuclear apartheid' created by a few 'haves' against the 'have-nots' in nuclear technology. This is the standard Indian narrative which, with only few changes in phraseology that every Indian student has to study in the compulsory text books of Political Sciences and Social Sciences. These books are published by the Indian state [National Council of Educational Research and Training, NCERT, New Delhi]. The roots of this discourse can be found in the speeches of the Indian founding fathers.

At the first Constituent Assembly of India, Prime Minister Nehru presented a bill on the Atomic Energy Act [1948] for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission. After the bill was passed with some opposition, Nehru culminated the debate by stating:

> "I think we must develop it for purpose of using it for peaceful purposes.
> It is that hope that we should develop this. *Of course, if we are compelled*
> *as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any*
> *of us will stop the nation from using it that way*".
>   (Perkovich 1999:20 italics by the author).

The speech above shows a persuasive mixture of the realist and ideational components of the Indian nuclear programme. At one time it sets out the reason for obtaining nuclear technology as for 'peaceful purposes', but at the same time it also explicitly states that 'no pious sentiment' can deter India from going down the path to

acquiring nuclear weapons which is a realist outlook based on the balance of power politics. This 'ambivalence' or 'ambiguity' surrounding the Indian nuclear programme remained the hallmark of Indian nuclear discourse from the 1950s until the 1990s and it also effected India's decision to declare an overt nuclear posture that was adopted in 1998 (Perkovich 1999). These issues will be elaborated on further in section 2 and section 3 of this chapter. Before I look at the ideational components of this rivalry, I will first briefly explain the history of the nuclear discourse of India and Pakistan and I will then examine some of the realist explanations provided for the existence of these nuclear programmes.

6.2 The historical and some realist explanations

The founding father of India, Mahatma Gandhi was the great preacher of 'ahimsa' [non-violence]. His ideological commitment to non-violence was the cornerstone of the Gandhian philosophy of life. Gandhi explained the horror of nuclear bombs in the aftermath of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki [1945] in these words:

> "The only moral which can be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it shall not be destroyed by counter-bombs"
>
> (Gandhi 2001: 25-26).

Indian political horizon has been for the most part dominated by its founding party, the secular Congress party from independence in 1947 until 1996. There were a few brief interludes of the Hindu religious fundamentalist party Baharatiya Jana Sangh [the predecessor of the BJP] which ruled from 1977 to 1979 and of the National Front coalition which ruled from 1989 to 1991, but primarily the Congress party dominated the political scene until the mid-1990s. The Congress party has produced many national leaders including Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.

The nuclear discourse under the secular Congress party showed remorse for a proliferated nuclear policy. Nehru asked for a "Standstill Agreement" to suspend the future testing of nuclear weapons in the 1950s.

India's first nuclear explosion was in 1974, but it was disguised under the cloak of "Smiling Buddha" and was claimed for peaceful purposes. It was conducted under Indira Gandhi's Congress party ministry in 1974 and was referred to as PNE [Peaceful Nuclear Explosion]. Moreover, after conducting this test, the successive Indian governments up until the 1990's did not actively pursue massive nuclear weapons build up as compared to the situation which developed after its overt nuclear policy was adopted in 1998. Although the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme [IGMPD] was started during Indira Gandhi's rule in 1983, it was not pursued on a massive scale. There was no sign at that time that India's secular Congress party intended to create a nuclear rivalry with Pakistan. In fact, in 1982, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proposed a "Program of Action on Disarmament" during the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament. And in 1988, her son Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi asked for an "Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order" at the Third Special Session in UN. Ostensibly, the proposal was rejected and no heed was paid to it as it involved renunciation of nuclear weapons by all five major nuclear powers. Yet here the aims of the secular Congress party for global peace and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are quite evident. The secular Indian identity prescribed by the Congress party eschews the role of religious myths based on cultural norms in the security discourse of the state at that time.

The nuclear policy of the ruling Congress party governments from 1974 until 1989 can be termed as 'ambivalent' (Perkovich 1999). It was tied to the universal moral principle of 'ahimsa' [non-violence] as advocated by Gandhi, but at the same time the real-politick of Nehru demanded that India should also strive for its true share and prestige in the world. India became a nuclear state in 1974, but remarkably there was little effort made by the state to pursue the rapid production of nuclear weapons (Perkovich 1999). This appears to contradict realist predictions concerning the behaviour of a nuclear state surrounded by its enemies.

Pakistan's nuclear programme was initiated in 1954 in collaboration with the United States 'Atom for Peace' programme. In 1956, the Atomic Energy Research Council was established in Pakistan which later on became the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC]. It was established purely for peaceful energy purposes. In the era of President General Ayub Khan [1958-1969], it gained momentum, but largely remained focused on satisfying the energy requirements of the country. However, things changed drastically in the aftermath of India's test of a nuclear bomb in 1974. After getting the news that India had conducted a nuclear test, Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gathered the country's top 50 scientists at Multan and challenged them "to build a nuclear bomb that would help restore Pakistan's strength and reputation" (Nawaz 2008: 339). In his former capacity as a cabinet minister for Ayub Khan, Bhutto had hinted earlier in an interview to the *Manchester Guardian* in March 1965 that if India went down the path to nuclear weapons then "we should have to eat grass and get one, or buy one, of our own" (Nawaz 2008: 340). This indicates the centrality of the Indian nuclear program in the security discourse of Pakistan. However, this is not just a rivalry between

two enemy states, but it is a rivalry that has been formed around the identities of the two states. The link between these identities and ideologies has already been explained in Chapter 4, however I will further trace this link with Pakistan's nuclear discourse by looking at the speeches of the Pakistani elites in section 4 of this chapter.

After the Indian nuclear test in 1974, Prime Minister Bhutto laid the foundation for the Kahuta Research Laboratories [KRL] in 1976, an autonomous body separated from its parent organization the PAEC. There appeared to be an urgent desire to match India in its nuclear quest. The finances for the nuclear programme were generously being sent by Muslim countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya (Nawaz 2008). The Islamic summit at Lahore in 1974 paved the way for financing the nuclear programme in the face of sanctions from the West. Bhutto's rhetoric and national cry was instrumental in luring Abdul Qadeer Khan, the famous Pakistani nuclear scientist, to come to Pakistan in the mid-1970 from the Netherlands. However, Bhutto, who was the only civilian Prime Minister with a firm control over Pakistan's nuclear programme, was ousted by a military coup in 1977. From this point on, it is the military elites in Pakistan who have kept a stronghold on Pakistan's nuclear policy.

It is important to understand the central role that military elites play in Pakistani nuclear policy. Although the nuclear programme of Pakistan was initiated by the civilian government of Prime Minister Bhutto, after his execution in 1979, the programme was carefully guarded and nurtured by the army. The domination of Pakistan army's control over state government and thus over the nuclear programme, is evident after thirty years of direct military rule during only its sixty three years of existence since independence. Because of the inferiority of Pakistan's conventional defence forces when compared to

Indian forces, the military elites in Pakistan have tried to establish a ratio of 3:1 of conventional man-power between India and Pakistan. However, during the years of military sanctions [1989-1994], it became difficult for the Pakistani military to buy the essential military hardware it needed from the West in order to maintain this prescribed ratio. Furthermore, there was the economic rise of India in the 1990s which gave India more room to spend on defence allocations. This diverted the attention of the Pakistani elites who desperately looked for non-conventional means to counteract the Indian might. Therefore, Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear capabilities to deter India seemed the only plausible solution. This course of action was also motivated by Pakistan's geo-strategic proximity to India.

The military elites developed the idea of an 'Indian threat' and the need for 'countervailing nuclear weapons' to get popular legitimacy for their regimes (Ahmed 1999). The martial law regime of General Zia ul Haq exploited the lenient clauses of European legislatures in countries like Germany and the Netherlands in the 1980s in order to get 'uranium enrichment technology' (Ahmed 1999). Pakistan's nuclear discourse show a 'symbiotic relationship' with the Indian nuclear programme (Zahra 2000). This special relationship was keenly followed by Pakistan since the Indian nuclear test of 1974. The aim of acquiring a minimum nuclear deterrence in the wake of the Indian explosion was helped by geo-strategic changes in the region. These include the Afghan war during the 1980s, as a result of which Pakistan got military assistance from the USA. The United States also turned a blind eye towards clandestine Pakistani efforts for the procurement of fissile materials for nuclear tests. The clandestine nuclear programme in Pakistan continued uninterrupted under all governments no matter whether

it was martial law or a democratic regime. As a result, Pakistan tested its nuclear weapon in 1998 in reaction to the Indian tests.

After this brief history of the India and Pakistan nuclear programmes, let us now examine some plausible and some non-plausible realist explanations of this rivalry.

A state's decision to go nuclear is most often explained in rationalist terms and based on the cost benefit calculations of its material interests. According to realists, a state will be more likely to pursue nuclear options if its vital national interests are threatened by rival states. However, with the absence of any external threats to its security, this does not explain why India took such urgent actions to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 followed shortly thereafter by Pakistan (Cohen 2000: 340). India's decision to go nuclear has strong links to the belief system which influenced the ruling elites of that day. These cultural and social influences are not adequately address by traditional theories of nuclear deterrence (Cohen 2000). The behaviour of India can neither be explained as coercive politics of a state in anarchy, nor a state under the duress of international institutional norms or regimes of non-proliferation. Thus, a single theoretical straitjacket cannot be universally applied to every state's nuclear discourse on account of various constraints [domestic and regional] faced by the states.

The realist theories of nuclear deterrence explain that in the case of a security threat, a state will always keep a minimum nuclear deterrence level. Yet this theory does not account for the large number of nuclear stock piles in the possession of the USA and the former USSR that exceed far beyond the anticipated minimum deterrence level (Perkovich 1999). Waltz acknowledges this fact when he stated that "the United States and the Soviet Union have multiplied their weaponry far beyond the requirements of

deterrence" due to military and political pressures (Perkovich 1999: 316). Again, it is interesting to note, that deterrence theories can not explain why India and Pakistan are the only democracies engaged in such nuclear competition (Perkovich 1999).

Neo-realism has generally predicted that states in an anarchic system will seek nuclear weapons if there is a threat to their survival. But this general assumption does not define 'how and when' states choose the nuclear push button, because neo-realism renders all states as 'like units' (Perkovich 1999). Realists generally presume that it is because of insecurity that states desire to go nuclear. This 'abstractness' and 'timelessness' in the neo-realist approach makes it ineffective to predict the 'real-time' effectiveness of the nuclear discourse of states (Perkovich 1999). It does not explain why India waited for thirty-four long years after the Chinese test in 1964 to start a massive nuclear build-up or proliferation (Perkovich 1999). The Chinese threat was imminent considering the fact that India lost a war to China in 1962. There are always a host of factors involved in a state's decision to go nuclear and among these factors a state's national identity discourse plays a dominant role. It explains how the elites have 'identified, constructed, and followed the state's "national interest" in nuclear policy' (Perkovich 1999: 454 emphasis of the author himself).

Another realist argument which can be critically analyzed is that the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan is a sort of vicious cycle whereby India went nuclear because of the Chinese nuclear programme, and Pakistan went nuclear because of Indian nuclear ambitions. Kanti Bajpai, a leading Indian security expert, explains that any 'realistic' Chinese threat towards India is a figment of the imagination, as history is testimony to the fact that no Chinese Emperor ever attacked Indian soil during 'thousands

of years' of their 'close co-existence' (Ghosh 1999: 94). India was always invaded from its eastern side, the area that today is the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhawa [K-P] province of Pakistan where the famous Khyber Pass lies. It was historically the main route for all the Turk and the Afghan invasions into mainland India. At present, however, there exists a rivalry between India and China in the Indian Ocean with regard to their development of naval bases. Furthermore, there are India-China border disputes in Aksai Chin in Ladakh, in Arunachal Pradesh in India, as well as in Tibet and the eastern area of India adjoining Bhutan. The border between India and China is 2,520 miles, one of the longest borders in the world. However, my focus is not on Indian and Chinese territorial dispute, what I want to point out is that there was no imminent Chinese threat that could have influenced India's decision to go nuclear in 1998. Even the 1962 India-China war was localized at the disputed border region of Aksai Chin. The Chinese did not attempt to impose a full scale war on any other Indian city at that time. Therefore, it can be argued that India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and the subsequent Chinese nuclear test in 1964 are among some of the contributing factors that may have partially influenced India's decision to go nuclear 1974. However, China's nuclear posture in the 1990s never cast its shadow over the reinvigoration of an Indian nuclear proliferation program in 1998. Both countries enjoyed good diplomatic relations during that period. Just a few days before India conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998, the Chinese Chief of General Staff General Fu Quanyou was the guest of his Indian counterpart. At the time, pleasantries were exchanged between the two leaders and there was no talk of war (Roy 2001).

In an opinion poll conducted by *The Times of India* in April 1995, one year prior to the Indian tests, 79 percent of the population polled in urban cities of India believed

that 'Pakistan's possession of a nuclear bomb is a 'serious security threat to India' while only 47 percent believed that the Chinese nuclear programme is the real threat to Indian security (Balakrishnan and Chatterjee 22.4.1995). Let us examine the realist argument regarding the perception of threats concerning Pakistan's nuclear programme from an Indian perspective.

The realist policy of 'robust countervailing' measures was not followed by India in the 1980s (Perkovich 1999). At that time, Pakistan was getting massive military aid from the United States, because of the Afghan war (Perkovich 1999). According to the realist theory, given the geo-strategic situation and the clandestine advancement of Pakistan's nuclear programme in the 1980s, it was expected that India would have pursued a policy for the rapid build up of its nuclear arsenal. India, however, continued to follow a policy of nuclear ambivalence or ambiguity towards its nuclear programme in the 1980s. That is why it is important to look at what may have been some of the domestic changes in the 1990s which could have influenced a change in the course of this decades old policy concerning India's nuclear programme. Furthermore, realists' define the 'strategic interests' of states based on the materialistic capabilities of states in the region (Tellis 2001). However, these variables do not explain in the first place the particular context in which a state becomes nuclear.

The prevalent nuclear discourse in Pakistan is always retaliatory or reactionary in response to India without any regional or global influences of its own. In a realist sense, there is no doubt that Pakistan's nuclear discourse is 'unambiguously' derived from its security concerns (Perkovich 1999). Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests just two weeks after the Indian nuclear tests, confirmed the widely held belief that Pakistan

already had achieved the weapons grade uranium level at this point. But the nuclear discourse of Pakistan is also linked to the wider struggle of both states' contrasting identities, as well as to its attainment of an Islamic bomb. Any potential roll back of Pakistan's nuclear programme is contingent upon India's course of action. Both are like 'Siamese twins', whereby, the initiation of Pakistan's nuclear programme in the mid-1970's was a reaction to the Indian nuclear test of 1974 (Perkovich 1999). It is this kind of obsession with India that has become a routine in determining Pakistan's security practices. So it is crucial to understand the role of Indian elites, when contemplating the reasons behind this nuclear rivalry.

Why should one focus on the elites and not other forms of cognition which can also influence public opinion? The security dilemma between India and Pakistan is being constructed by elites' social practices [as argued in Chapter 3]. The elites of India and Pakistan have manipulated the religious norms of their societies by using them as metaphors or constructing symbols of animosity in their speeches in order to create this nuclear rivalry. Pakistan's foreign policy or state's rhetoric always revolves around India and the elites have never been able to escape this feeling of otherness. These feelings of animosity are propagated by the elites at all times and when the crunch time came to respond to Indian nuclear tests, there was no other way than a tit for tat response by Pakistan. The complexities of cultural myths in India and religious norms in Pakistan are so profound that the elites in both countries find it easier to manipulate public opinion for their own gains by constructing the image of 'the Other'. I will focus on the political elites in India, specifically of the BJP which was the party in power at the time of the Indian nuclear explosion in 1998, and on the political, as well as the military elites in

Pakistan. The nuclear politics of the 1990s in India and Pakistan also revolve around global non-proliferation issues but I will not touch upon these. My objective is to explain the decision of both states to go nuclear in 1998 and to explain how their rivalry is based on intersubjective social norms.

6.3 The ideational component: the role of soft power variables

The nuclear discourse of India-Pakistan is woven around the wider discourse of the identities of the Hindus and the Muslims of India and Pakistan respectively. Identity with regard to the security discourse has become 'securitized subjectivity' (Kinnvall 2006). The subjects in a state desire securitization when they are afraid or when they feel a threat to the existence of their identity. In such situations, every self identity requires a threat from others. The threats to self identity are socially constructed by carefully selecting the narratives of threat constructions. The elites in both countries are responsible for the construction of threats. In a constructed world, identities are in a state of 'flux', but according to Robert Cox , "there may be periods and places where intersubjective understandings of these social facts are stable enough that they can be treated as if fixed and can be analyzed with social scientific methods" (Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006: 700). The decision to go nuclear made by both countries in 1998 is one such instance of a period of stability in the hostile intersubjective understandings of India-Pakistan. This intersubjective environment was strengthened further by social norms which helped to influence the decision making of the elites.

At one time, norms not only inform the perceptions of political leaders but also help to shape the national identities of the state (Jackson 2008). This does not mean that

the international structure or material factors are not important in a state's decision to go nuclear, but the point to be emphasized here is the causal relations of cultural factors in influencing such a decision. Bourdieu has added the concept of 'habitus' to explain the cultural orientation of actors which is "a semi-conscious (though not innate) orientation that individuals have of the world [forming] a basis for practice " (Jackson 2008: 164). In other words, every political actor has been working under the influence of certain norms of the society. Bourdieu explains that such norms act as an "effective constraint" on the behaviour of actors (Jackson 2008: 167). But it is pertinent to mention here that all such norms are continuously contested and re-contested by the elites in their respective 'fields' of action (Jackson 2008). We can define such norms by linking them with the social practices of the elites.

Soft power variables like religious myths, socio-cultural norms, belief systems and the ideological commitments of the elites have great salience in the nuclear discourses of India and Pakistan. Joseph S. Nye has defined soft power as "the power of attractive ideas" that can appeal to people and make them comply which includes "intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions" (Nye 1990: 166). The constitutive norms derived from culture, described as formal and informal rules, identify the characteristics of a group (Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006). The 'contestation' of a group's identity explains the degree to which a particular norm influences the actual social practices while 'context' refers to the main attributes of a group's identity (Abdelal, Herrera et al. 2006). If we examine the 'context and contestation' of BJP's identity under the influence of 'Hindutva' norms, we can explain the social practices of the Indian state at the time of the nuclear test explosions in 1998. With an established

collective identity of the group, the elites of this group engage themselves in social practices that are appropriate to their group characteristics. When such elites arrive at the forefront of state politics, then they have the clear aim of imposing their view of national identity of the state. They come up with a world view of their own and they try to construct the same view at the level of national politics. As a result, the social practices of the state are being influenced by this particular elites' identity. The elites' practices before obtaining state power can be viewed as social practices. However, after these elites become state elites, then their practices become security practices of the state. The above argument can be split into three tiers in order to clarify the ideational framework behind the Indian nuclear decision of 1998.

- By understanding the social norms underpinning the identity of a political party. For India, it is the BJP and the socio-cultural norms are "Hindutva".

- By linking the social norms of BJP to the social practices of the political elites [The speeches of the elites when they are outside the helm of affairs].

- By explaining the social practices of Indian elites related to a state's security after the party elites become national elites. [The speeches of the elites when they are at the helm of affairs].

For Pakistan the same scheme can be adopted while only slightly altered.

- By linking the state's identity discourse in the speeches of the elites to the broader context of the ideological commitment of Pakistan's identity towards Islam and the 'Two Nation Theory'. [See also Chapter 4].

- By understanding the social norms of identity constructed by the political elites at

the initiation of the nuclear programme. For Pakistan, it is the Indo-centric myth

and the attainment of an Islamic bomb. [The political elites' speeches after they

became state elites].

- By understanding the social practices of the military elites when they become

  state elites and linking them with the security discourse of the state.

These social practices of elites are principally derived from the soft power of

religion such as the use of 'Hindutva' politics in India and the use of Islam in Pakistan

(Haynes 2008). The ideologically committed use of 'Hindutva views' or social norms has

'influenced' the Indian elites "in relation to Pakistan, Kashmir terrorism and nuclear

weapons" (Haynes 2008: 155). Some analysts dismiss the relationship between the BJP's

Hindutva ideology and the nuclear decision of Indian state in 1998 (Corbridge 1999). But

I assert that if we link the identity of the BJP by exploring its 'constitutive' and

'regulatory norms' then we can see that they form a causal link to the state's security

practices which in turn can explain the reasons behind India's nuclear decisions in 1998

(Katzenstein 1996).

6.4 The social practices of India and Pakistan elites

Indian civilian leadership is firmly in control of its nuclear programme with little

influence by India's military. Nevertheless, from 1974 until 1998, India's nuclear

programme was more or less ad-hock and was devoid of any institutional mechanism like

a National Security Council or other supervisory body. In May 1998, the Indian Prime

Minister Deve Gowda stated, **"The decision to conduct the nuclear tests is not a military**

decision. It is a political decision…made by two or three persons in your cabinet"
(Perkovich 1999: 377). There was no long term policy or institutional body to formulate
and implement any nuclear security doctrine until 1998. These decisions were made by a
few political elites who were at the top echelons of power. Most of the time, the elites'
mind set was influenced by domestic conditions and their nationalist agenda to satisfy the
voters. The social practices of the elites affect state security practices when these elites
arrive as state elites in the political arena after winning elections. Obviously, any prior
ideological commitments to party norms by these elites can transform the state's security
practices, especially if there is an absence of any institutionally designed decision making
or regulatory bodies to put a check on the change in policy direction. This state of affairs
was exploited by the Hindu fundamentalist party the BJP in favour of pursuing the bomb
after it assumed power in 1996.

The foundational norms of secularism were established by the founding fathers of
the Congress party almost five decades after independence. A novel phenomenon
occurred in the decade of the 1990s with the resurgence of religious fundamentalist
parties in India. The BJP elites arrived on the national political scene in the 1990's with a
new ideology and a new vision for the state's identity and security discourses. They
believed that an overt nuclear posture would "deliver to Hindu India, the international
status as a great civilization and nation" (Perkovich 1999: 377). The reasons behind the
successful electoral campaign of the BJP which ultimately led to the nuclear decision are
varied. First, their success was partly due to the degeneration of the secular identity of
India as formulated by Nehru [1947-1964]. Second, because of India's history of
uninterrupted democracy, there was an increase in the political mobilization and

participation of the masses at this time (Kinnvall 2006). The third reason was the glaring economic disparity between a few wealthy elite groups and the poverty stricken masses. And finally, the fourth reason for their success was the Hindu fundamentalist party's successful propagation of mythical religious stories to gain popular support among the people (Jaffrelot 2005). It was this last reason that played a dominant role in influencing the Indian nuclear discourse and will be elaborated on in more detail in the section discussing popular social practices.

The cultural appeal of BJP's revitalized Indian identity with the reconstruction of religious myths, deviated from the long established secularist social practices of Indian elites. According to Cohen, the reasons for the success of the Hindu fundamentalist party at centre stage include "social and caste tensions, the stresses of rapid and uneven economic growth, and the erosion of traditional caste norms spur on it" (Cohen 2001: 121). While discussing the identity politics of BJP, Cohen notes that "the nuclear program is one in a series of important symbolic projects that the centre has undertaken to develop a sense of Indian nationhood and identity" (Cohen 2000: 26). India's decision to go nuclear in 1998 is culturally and symbolically constructed in order to carve out an Indian identity based on religious nationalism [Hindutva]. The 'Hindutva' ideology emerged in India after the Hindu fundamentalist parties gathered together to form what is commonly called the 'Sangh Pariwar'. Gandhi's secularist 'ahimsa' vision of Gandhi was discarded by Sangh's new ideology which considered 'ahimsa' tantamount to 'emasculating Hindu manliness' (Bidwai 2001).

The Sangh Pariwar is made up of different Hindu fundamentalist parties which include the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh], the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and

VHP [Vishwa Hindu Preshad]. The RSS is the primogenitor of all the Hindu fundamentalist parties in India. It's well knit organization has provided the cadre and ideological tools necessary for all subsequent Hindu fundamentalist parties in India. The BJP is one such party whose leadership comes from the cadres of the RSS even though publicly these connections are denied (Jaffrelot 2005). The difference between the BJP and the other parties of the Sangh Pariwar is that the other fundamentalist parties never achieved major electoral successes. They only held power briefly from 1977 to 1979 while the real power remained with the Congress party until the mid-1990s. If we look at the history of the Sangh Pariwar, then first comes the RSS, followed by the BJS and only after that there was the rise of BJP from the 1980s onwards. Today the RSS and the BJS still exist. However, the BJP is the only religious fundamentalist party in India that has come to power three times and it is still the main opposition party in India which enjoys vast popularity. Because the majority of the party elites of the BJP, including the former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and stalwarts like L.K. Advani, came from the cadres of the RSS, it is fruitful to take a closer look at the core ideology of the RSS.

The RSS was founded in 1925 and drew its main inspiration from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's book 'Hindutva' [1923]. The book described Indian national identity in terms of Hindu culture, Hindi language and the worship of the sacred land 'India' under the influence of the 'Vedic Golden Age' (Jaffrelot 2005). The major beliefs of Hindutva are explained by D.R. Goyal as follows:

> "Hindus have lived in India since times immemorial;
> Hindus are the nation because all culture, civilization and
> life is contributed by them alone; non-Hindus are invaders
> or guests and cannot be treated as equal unless they adopt
> Hindu traditions, culture etc." (Guha 2007: 646).

The centrality of 'Hindus' in the political, cultural and civilizational discourses of India is evident in the speech. A critical discourse analysis shows the macro structural components of this quotation as 'Hindu culture', 'traditions' as well as timelessness in the shape of 'times immemorial'. These opaque as well as powerful themes constructed by the RSS elites demonstrate the biased discourse of Indian identity heavily tilted towards being solely a Hindu identity. It explains why it is difficult for the Muslims of India to accept the culture of Hindus. It is a monolithic perspective of the domination of one community over all others. The Muslims in Pakistan consider the Muslim invaders of India to be their forefathers, yet these same people are thought of as the plunderers of 'mother India' by Hindus in India. These are two opposing myths of identity with no point of convergence.

The BJP derives its Hindutva ideology from its mentor the RSS which has a distinct view of Indian state identity. Hindutva identity is based on the social norms of Hinduism and it is believed that if a large section of Indian society practises these norms then they will help form a distinct identity for the Indian state. The question may arise what then is wrong, if the BJP has an indigenous Hindu identity as a road map for the progress of India? If Pakistan can be for the Muslims, why can India not be for the Hindus? It can be corroborated that Indian society is predominantly Hindu, with the next largest minority being Muslim that constitutes 14 percent of the population. According to the 2001 census, India has the third largest Muslim community in the world with 138 million Muslims.

The problem with BJP's road map is its anti-Muslim agenda in contrast to the secular, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and pluralistic identity of Indian polity. Since

Muslims are still in the minority, the BJP policies generally win the support of the Hindu majority. In spite of the BJP's ideology, there is no homogenous Indian identity. Even among the Hindu community there exists diversity since Indian society is riddled with the caste system. Thus, there is no monolithic culture as such for either the Hindus of India or the Muslims of Pakistan (Kinnvall 2006). This means that there are various types of Hindus among the Hindus and Muslims among the Muslims in India and Pakistan respectively. The Hindu society is divided into four distinct castes and every caste has a role to play according to its social significance in society. The upper most or the most revered caste is the 'Brahmins' who according to Hindu mythology are created from the head of the Hindu god and they are the teachers as well as the guardians of the religious places like 'Mandirs' [temples]. Second in line are the 'Kushtarayas' who are born from the hands of the god and they are the warriors and kings. Then comes the 'Vaishyas' or the peasant class born from the stomach of the god and their role is to feed the masses. The last are the 'Shudras' who are born from the feet of the god and who are intended to serve the other castes by conducting all the menial work for them. There are also the outcastes or the untouchables who are outside the domain of the caste system and they are looked down upon in society on account of not being Hindus. This caste system or strict compartmentalization of humanity is still being practiced is many parts of India today.

Hindutva identity is based on 'Bharatiya sanskriti and maryyada' [language and tradition] (Puri 2005). These social norms speak the specific language understood by the Hindu masses at large. This is reflected in the idea of 'cultural nationalism' (Kampani 1998). The attributes of cultural nationalism refers "to build a grand, powerful, and

masculine national security state that will emerge as the symbol of national mythology and the converging point of high science, national identity, and achievement" (Kampani 1998: 18). The cultural socialization of the BJP elites "constructed the notion of a civilizational Indian nation based on the myth of an unbroken brahamanic traditions, language, and symbols" (Kampani 1998: 18). It brought a new niche for Indian state identity based upon the ideal of an 'imagined community' and norms of ancient Hindu civilization (Anderson 1983). This socially constructed, new Indian identity of 'Hindutva' was reinforced by state's security practices during BJP reign and led to an intersubjective understanding of hostility between India and Pakistan. How did it happen?

After only a brief taste of holding power for fifteen days in 1996, the BJP was able to win broad support among the electorate for its populist slogan of Hindutva identity and formed the central government in India in March 1998. The new Prime Minister Vajpayee met with Indian nuclear scientists before his inauguration on the 20th of March 1998 (Perkovich 1999). The 'adhocism' in nuclear decision making and the absence of any institutional framework for nuclear decisions, allowed the BJP party elites to make the decision to conduct a nuclear test (Perkovich 1999: 389). Only a 'handful of the BJP elites' who now became state elites actually knew about the impeding nuclear tests (Perkovich 1999: 404). These state elites included Vajpayee [the Prime Minister], Brajesh Mishra [the National Security Advisor], L.K. Advani [the Home Minister], Jaswant Singh [the Foreign Minister] and one or two others (Perkovich 1999). The few top Indian nuclear scientists who knew about the tests were referred to as the 'strategic enclave' (Perkovich 1999). In the absence of any institutional body to formulate and decide the core national interests of the state, the state's lack of institutional capacity

became quite evident. A few Indian elites made the decision to go nuclear in the face of a pristine security question of not only regional importance, but also of global significance. It was only in 1998 that the idea of the formation of a National Security Council was introduced by the Prime Minister Vajpayee and was subsequently established in November 1998 after the nuclear tests. This body now has the mandate to review the political, economic, energy and strategic concerns of India with proper structural mechanisms involving a strategic policy group, an advisory board, a joint intelligence committee and a national security advisory board.

After conducting the Pokhran tests II, the ruling BJP committed itself to building a national monument at the site where India detonated its nuclear device in 1998. Furthermore, the Vishva Hindu Perished [VHP], a political party whose norms or ideals are also shared by the BJP, wanted to distribute the radioactive sand from the Pokhran desert as '*Prasad*' to all the nooks and corners of India (Roy 2001). 'Prasad' has a special significance in Hindu culture, since at every religious or culturally significant occasion [like marriages or religious festivities] sweets are distributed to all participating people as 'Prasad'. It is considered to be a good omen and its eating is obligatory for all participants. The link between 'Prasad' and the nuclear security discourse of the state shows the conflation of cultural identity with Indian state security.

The conflation of cultural norms with the strategic culture of India was explained by Jaswant Singh, the External Affairs Minister of India in the BJP's government during India's nuclear tests in 1998, as:

> "an intermix of many influences: civilization, culture, evolution,
> and the functioning of a civil society, etc. It is a by-product of
> the political culture of a nation and its people; an extension of the
> functioning of a viable state more importantly its understanding of
> the ways in which the power of a state can be used"(Singh 1999: 2).

The 'influences' of Indian strategic culture includes various components of 'civil society'. These components include the 'political culture' as well as the 'people' themselves. More importantly, it shows how powerful elites 'use' popular 'understandings' to carry forward their own constructed discourse. The speech was delivered a year after India's nuclear test and it explains the power of the state linked to political culture and the social practices of the people ['functioning of civil society']. This is a distinct vision of India as well as of the Hindus in the eyes of BJP elites. The rhetoric used by BJP called for an overt nuclear weaponisation policy for India with a full fledged nuclear doctrine. The tool kits employed in the election campaign were cultural ones in order to construct a favourable environment for conducting nuclear tests. The Indian nuclear policy had never been part of any political party manifesto until 1990 and there were few discussions about it in the election campaigns (Cortright and Mattoo 1996). It only came up for public discussion after the pro-nuclear stance of the BJP was set. The Hindutva tool provided the BJP, a vision of Hindu identity, based on Indian cultural themes and religious myths and as a means to formulate an assertive jingoistic national security policy (Datta 1999).

While addressing the Parliament, the Indian BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee defended the rationale of having nuclear weapons as "the right of one-sixth of humanity" (Kothari and Mian 2001: 18). The speeches of the BJP state elites show the extent to which Indian prestige had been tied to the detonation of nuclear devices. The renewed Indian identity under 'Hindutva norms' has tied India's prestige and status to nuclear explosions as compared to the economic well being of the Indian state. After the nuclear tests, Vajpayee explained that "the greatest meaning of the tests is that they have given

India shakti [prestige], they have given India strength, they have given India self-confidence" (*IndiaToday* 1998). The symbolic reference to *shakti* has a rich cultural history in Hindu mythology where it refers to wealth, goddess and material well being. In the words of the psychologist Robert Jay Lifton, "it is called nuclear numbing, the process by which we domesticate these [nuclear] weapons in our language and attitudes, rather than feel their malignant actuality, we render them benign" (Mian 2001: 102).

After the nuclear tests, the Indian political elites defended their reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons with primarily two arguments. One line of argument focused on the discriminatory attitudes of the nuclear "haves" towards the "have-nots" resulting in a "nuclear apartheid" (Singh 2004). While the second argument dealt with the construction of an environment of fear and external threats for the domestic Indian audience by justifying the social norms of Indian identity. The norms of the BJP party played a special role in the construction of such outside threats.

In short, the ideological components of 'Hindutva' identity can be seen as playing an important explanatory role in India's decision to go nuclear in 1998. The social practices of the Indian elites especially the rise of the BJP in the 1990s shows the underlying resolve of the party elites to acquire nuclear capabilities in line with their vision of a renewed Indian identity. This identity shattered the ambiguity and ambivalence common to the nuclear discourse in India since 1947 by transforming it into an overt nuclear power. The vision of great India under Hindutva norms conferred the Hindu state identity. In his *magnum opus* entitled *India's Nuclear Bomb: The impact on Global Proliferation*, Perkovisch concludes that, apart from the materialistic variables of insecurity faced by the states, two other factors motivated Indian elites to go nuclear.

According to Perkovisch the first factor was the pressure that was being exerted by India's 'strategic enclave' which included India's nuclear scientists. While the second factor was related to the "the normative/ national identity interest in achieving major power status" (Perkovich 1999: 452). It is again interesting to note that Perkovich did not equate the rational, material interests to 'great power' status, but rather he focussed on the normative identity-nuclear nexus as the prime motive behind the Indian decision to go nuclear.

Before beginning to analyze the nuclear discourse of Pakistan, I would like to point out again that when compared with India, Pakistan's nuclear discourse shows more realist than ideational tendencies. However, along with the realist assertions, there are also two ideational components. The first component relates to the pledge of the Pakistani elites to make Pakistan's bomb as an 'Islamic bomb,' and the other it its offshoot, which ties the bomb to the struggle of identities between the Hindu-India and the Muslim-Pakistan. I will deal with these two ideational components side by side during the discourse analysis of the speeches of Pakistani elites.

The first ideational component is regarding the Islamic bomb. While discussing the Islamic bomb, Bhutto, who was the architect of the nuclear bomb in Pakistan, noted that:

> "The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have nuclear capability along with communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but the situation was about to change" (Bhutto 1979: 136).

This discourse is carefully constructed and linked with the pseudo-Islamic identity and cultural roots of Pakistan. The connection of a nuclear security discourse with the cultural renaissance of the glory of Islamic civilization shows how the leaders cautiously constructed and strode upon the nuclear path by making a link with culture and religion.

The second ideational component is regarding the struggle of identities between the Muslim-Pakistan and the Hindu-India. In another parliamentary debate, Bhutto reiterated the centrality of India. Bhutto noted that:

> "India is acquiring nuclear weapons at very great costs and to intimidate and blackmail Pakistan (…) That has been the purpose (…) to brandish the nuclear sword at Pakistan (…) Pakistan cannot rule out the possibility that India will use the nuclear device if the war was there" (Das 2008: 54).

This is called the "Indo-centric" approach of Pakistan's nuclear policy (Hoodbhoy 1998). Bhutto made this quote in a brief interlude of civilian control over the nascent nuclear programme of Pakistan, after the debacle of the 1971 war with India and the demoralization of Pakistan's army. In the subsequent decades of Pakistan's history [after 1970], the military emerged as the sole guardian of its nuclear programme. Pakistan army's image as the sole saviour of the state has been carefully orchestrated by all the military elites who ruled Pakistan. After the coup of General Zia ul Haq in 1977 and the subsequent hanging of Bhutto in 1979, Pakistan's army never allowed the civilian leaders to get a hold on the nuclear programme. Zia's military junta was afraid of holding elections after hanging Bhutto. The nascent nuclear programme started by Bhutto came in handy for the military elites in order to justify their hold on power by alluding to the same 'logo centric logic' of otherness towards India (Nizamani 2000). In a countrywide address on the 30[th] of August 1979, Zia stated:

> "The acquisition of nuclear energy [is] (…) a matter of life and death for the country (…) unholy plans are being promoted to destroy our research program (…) the true mettle of the Pakistani nation and its spirit of self respect (…) the Pakistani nation is convinced that acquisition of atomic technology (…) is its basic right, which cannot be denied by any foreign power nor can any government in Pakistan surrender it" (Nizamani 2000: 102).

The discourse analysis of this speech points to three important variables regarding Pakistan's nuclear path. First, it was linked to the identity of the state, a matter of 'self respect'. Second, it was linked to the security of the state and third it was correlated with the Islamic character of the state's identity. This Islamic character could also be augmented by propagating otherness towards India. During his reign, General Zia walked on a nuclear tight rope. He kept on denying Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to the Western media and at the same time he was involved in clandestine efforts to enable Pakistan to acquire a nuclear bomb to counter the Indian threat. He constructed Indo-centric logic for the domestic audiences to perpetuate his own authoritarian rule. Geo-strategically he was helped by the Afghan war of 1979 and he could easily bluff the Western leaders. Zia continued the nuclear security discourse of Pakistan by reiterating the already existing myths of political culture (Nizamani 2000).

Thus, the era of Zia gave a new impetus to the culturally constructed theme of "Otherness" towards India and the formal recognition of Pakistan's army as Allah's army with its motto 'Jihad in the name of Allah'. These culturally constructed 'regimes of truth' were primarily based upon religious traditions and cultural norms (Foucault 1994). The security politics of the regime merged this nuclear discourse with the wider discourse of Pakistan's identity. The rationale of having a bomb became akin to Pakistan's Islamic identity and soon the bomb was being referred to as the 'Islamic bomb'. The financial funding of Pakistan's nuclear programme by Islamic states like Libya, Iran and Saudi Arabia tended to lend credence to the belief that the bomb was in some sense an 'Islamic bomb'. But more importantly, the military elites' social practices during the regime of General Zia established this norm. The aim of Zia was to develop an Islamic identity of

Pakistan by using rhetoric and creating an 'Indo-Jewish conspiracy' as an external threat

to Pakistan's nuclear programme (Shaikh 2002). These types of threats were being

constructed by the military elites in Pakistan through out the 1980s. They even

speculated, in 1984-1985, that the connivance between the Indian and Israeli air forces

might be used to sabotage Pakistan's nuclear facilities at Kahuta. The bomb was being

projected as a 'bulwark against Zionism' (Shaikh 2002). Pakistan is one of the few

countries in the world that does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, the

passport of every Pakistani broadly states 'this passport is valid for every country in the

world except Israel'. Pakistan is also the only ideological Muslim state in the world.

The central role of the Pakistani army in nuclear politics can also be demonstrated

by the structure of command and control over the nuclear programme. The former

President General Musharraff founded the National Command Authority [NCA] in 2000

which has oversight of the nuclear programme. Since 2009, it is being headed by the

Prime Minister of Pakistan, however, *de facto*, the director general of the Strategic

Planning Division (SPD), headed by a retired army general is in charge of the nuclear

assets. The key involvement of the military in Pakistan's nuclear programme was also

further illustrated when in 2008 the [civilian] President Zardari's pledged that Pakistan's

was abhorrent to the idea of a first strike, only for this to be dismissed by Pakistan's

military establishment. Moreover, the strategic analysts and policy makers of India also

received the news about 'no first strike' with scepticism since this policy did not have the

support of the army (Naqvi 2008).

Pakistan's army has been able to rise to the echelons of power, by not only

constructing an image of India as an enemy state, but by also projecting its own image as

the custodian of Pakistan's identity. Security policy, or to be more precise, nuclear policy has primarily remained the exclusive ambit of Pakistan's army with civilian elected leaders having only a marginal role in guiding the nuclear discourse (Ahmed 1998). Some Indian authors have argued that it in the "vested interest" of Pakistan's army to keep the Indo-Pakistan rivalry in tact (Thakar 2006). Whatever may be the explanation, the reason for this continued rivalry stems from the clashing norms of the two states, making up their respective identities.

In fact, the direct beneficiary of Pakistan's Indo-centric identity is the Pakistani army. Pakistan's former army chief from 1996 to 1998, General Jehangir Karamat commented on the eve of India's nuclear tests that the BJP's aim was to "cut Pakistan down to size" (Talbott 2004: 63). According to General Zia, Pakistan could only "be kept together by the armed forces and not by politicians" (Nawaz 2008: 359). The repeated interventions of Pakistan's army in the political discourse based on the pretext of saving the country has instilled among the population the "feelings of fear and loathing" (Nawaz 2008).

The nuclear brinkman ship between India and Pakistan led to an interesting episode in 1990. In 1987, India initiated a war exercise with the name of 'Operation Brasstacks' at the Rajasthan border, a place close to Sind province in Pakistan. In 1990, Pakistan started its own border exercise in retaliation code named 'Zarb-e-Momin'. Here the phrase 'Zarb-e-Momin' demonstrates the centrality of religious norms. 'Zarb-e-Momin' refers to the final punch or blow from a devout Muslim; hence the security practices were neatly camouflaged in religious myths by the elites. In May 1990, these events resulted in an 'upsurge of nationalist violence' in Kashmir and it took frantic

efforts by the USA to defuse the simmering tensions between the two states. The nuclear

programme of Pakistan continued in the 1990s with the overall aim of counteracting

India's threat despite US sanctions [Presler's amendment, Glenn amendment].

India detonated five nuclear devices on the 11[th] and 13[th] of May 1998. The central

place of India in the nuclear discourse of Pakistan is evident from the speech that the

Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif delivered on the occasion of Pakistan's nuclear

tests on the 28[th] of May 1998 only two weeks after India conducted its tests. Sharif said:

> **"**I am not the representative of a cowardly and submissive nation.
> The series of provocative statements that the Indian leaders have
> been giving after the nuclear explosions is becoming intolerable for us.
> Pakistanis are a self-respecting and honourable people who can sacrifice
> their lives to protect their honour and dignity. If these people were able
> to tolerate anyone's hegemony and arrogance, this country would not
> have come into existence at all. Bowing and submitting to others is not
> our wont. When the enemy resorts to challenging the Pakistanis, they do
> not flinch from offering any sacrifice*" (BBConline 1998).*

The use of phrases like 'submissive nation,' 'arrogance,' 'hegemony,' and

'enemy' were all carefully selected. This type of phraseology alludes to Pakistan's

'chosen traumas' and helps to support the elites socially constructed belief, i.e. "otherness

towards India." Again, after the Pakistani tests on the 28[th] and the 30[th] of May, Prime

Minister Sharif announced, "today we have settled scores with India by detonating five

nuclear devices of our own." He further explained, "We have paid them back" (Ahmed

1999: 195). This all shows the reactionary nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme to

India. Thus, the Indo-centric approach remains the hallmark of Pakistan's nuclear

programme and its civilian and military leaders have used the socio-cultural norms of the

society to further strengthen it.

The first anniversary of the nuclear explosion by Pakistan in 1998 was declared

"Youm-e-Taqbeer" [a day of greatness] and had clear religious cultural connotations.

Before every prayer, a Muslim says taqbeer [Allah o Akbar] to acknowledge the greatness of Allah. The government of Pakistan had held contest through out the country to choose the best name for the anniversary and this name was finally selected by the state elites.

6.5 Nomenclature of missile programmes

Another socio-cultural aspect of the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry is the naming of the missile programmes. What is important here is not just what name is given to the missiles, but the underlying narrative which creates yet more hostility in an already tense intersubjective relationship between India and Pakistan. For example, the Indian missile programme uses names such as Agni, Trishul, Prithvi, Nag, Shakti, among others. All of these names allude to various Hindu Maharajas and Hindu gods and goddesses. The narratives are reconstructed to glorify 'mother India' based on Hinduism. The identity and security discourses of both the countries converged in their respective spheres. By naming the missiles Akash or Agni the attempt is being made to identify India with Hindutva.

Prithvi in Hindu mythology refers to the "mother earth" but Prithvi is also the name of a Hindu raja who ruled over the subcontinent. If we look for a corresponding name in Pakistan's missile programme, we find "Ghaznavi". This missile is named after the Muslim conqueror Mahmud of Ghaznaavi who destroyed a Hindu temple at Somnaath in 1024. Similarly another nuclear capable missile in Pakistan is the Ghauri. This missile is named after Mahmud Ghauri who was rival to the Hindu ruler 'Prithvi". Prithvi Raj Chauhan was the greatest Hindu raja in the last decade of the 12[th] century on

the subcontinent. An eminent nuclear security expert on South Asia, Strobe Talbott, when referring to the names of the two countries missiles said, "even the nomenclature of the weaponary accumulating in South Asia kept alive, on both sides, vengeful and largely mythologized memories from nine centuries earlier" (Talbott 2004: 22). In the *Asia Times* online Hassan Askari Rizvi, a leading military and security analyst of Pakistan, noted that "the names of some Indian missiles - Agni and Prithvi for instance - appear to have cultural and historical reference points" (Ramachandran 2005). The author of the report went on to add that these names of the missiles have special significance and people in both the countries are incited by such symbols and this symbolism conveys with it a special feeling of hatred towards each other. The elites in both the countries carefully selected the names of the missiles from religious narratives and myths in order to reconstruct the whole rivalry on cultural norms. These were not mere symbols given to the nuclear capable missiles, but rather were carefully constructed identity discourses based on feelings of "Otherness" towards each other.

Nizamani categorized the discourse of India's nuclear programme over the years as from "nuclear celibacy" (1947-1964) to "nuclear ambiguity" [1964-1998, with the exception of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion PNE in 1974] towards "overt nuclearisation" (1998-onwards) (Nizamani 2000). I rephrase the last stage as "overt culturisation". By overt culturalisation I mean the synthesis of the nuclear programme with cultural factors.

6.6 The popular social practices of Indians and Pakistanis

The popular social practices of Indians towards the nuclear tests vary a great deal. After the explosion of the nuclear device in 1998, the opinion polls in six Indian cities

showed a 91 percent approval rating for the tests in May 1998 (Perkovich 1999: 416). But

by October 1998 in a data set of two thousand urban voters the support rate fell to 44

percent and the BJP suffered defeat in four union states elections (Perkovich 1999). There

may be many factors which contributed to this fall in public support, yet two things are

crystal clear. First, most people in India do not know enough about India's nuclear

programme. It is interesting to examine why there is so much ignorance among the

masses about India's nuclear programme as well as non-proliferation issues such as the

NPT and the CTBT. While interviewing BJP elites in 1996, Perkovich was able to

illustrate this mass ignorance using the words of a BJP elite who claimed:

> "Security is a very important issue (…), but to an average man, security
> relates to violence in a village or communal strife. We politicians can affect
> a tie between Pakistan and security or China and security - we can create
> rhetoric to win elections, as politicians do in all countries. But the people
> do not know anything about CTBT (…) People read about sex, crime and
> corruption, but do not know anything about CTBT (…) Pakistan and India
> are the only countries in the world now where you could organize public
> protests *for* the bomb. Atavism can be readily tapped here (…) we
> democracies take initiative due to compulsions of our domestic agenda"
> (Perkovich 1999: 372 itallics of the author)

Second, the change from nuclear ambivalence towards an overt nuclear posture

exhibited by Indian elites led to some confusion among the wider population. By using

cultural slogans the BJP carried out its decision to go nuclear in front of the Indian public

which became 'confused' over India's changing nuclear posture from ambiguity to overt

nuclearisation (Perkovich 1999: 450). The root cause of this change was also attributed to

the identity politics of BJP in the 1990s. The ignorance on the part of popular social

practices gave room to the elites to carry forward their own agenda of creating a renewed

Indian identity. The pledge towards an overt nuclear posture was the cornerstone of this

Hindutva identity being envisaged by the BJP in the 1990s. The nexus of a revitalized

Indian identity and its nuclear discourse are based upon norms of Indian moral superiority and a desire to achieve a great power status (Perkovich 1999). The political regimes prior to BJP had adopted an ambiguous and ambivalent stance towards the Indian nuclear discourse. But there is an inherent tension between morality and obtaining a great power status since having a great power status is mainly connected to a state's military might. Hence the BJP policies followed the "great power" norm but, interestingly, they also did not denounce the 'normative' aspect (Perkovich 1999). This normative aspect was spearheaded by slogans calling for complete nuclear disarmament worldwide (Perkovich 1999). I further argue that the normative cushion was also disguised in the shape of the renewed identity politics of Hindutva. The popular perceptions are derived from these identity politics.

The reactionary nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme in response to the Indian tests is evident from a survey conducted by Kroc Institute of educated 'elites' to gauge the factors influencing its nuclear programme. The survey concluded that 94 percent of the educated people in Pakistan "based their tacit or overt support of the nuclear option on the perceived threat from India" (Ahmed and Cortright 1998: 17).

The survey further explained that the perceived threat from India and Pakistan army's domineering role in state building has "resulted in widespread acceptance of the military's threat perception and their proposed means of countering it" (Ahmed and Cortright 1998: 17). The same Kroc Institute conducted a research study in India to see what were the perceptions of Indian "educated elites" in response to the Indian nuclear posture. In 1996, the results were published a book nearly two years before the Indian nuclear explosions in 1998. The survey found that among the educated Indian elite the

two most important considerations regarding India's nuclear posture were the threat from Pakistan and the "possibility of a time bound plan for global nuclear disarmament" (Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 11-12). The survey was conducted at the time when the BJP had already started to push the nuclear issue and had already created an environment of hostility before the actual tests. The educated elites in the survey were referred to the academicians and educated masses in India and Pakistan. The official Indian explanation that China was the most significant factor contributing to India's decision to go nuclear was corroborated by only 17 percent of the total people surveyed while 48 percent linked it to the threat from Pakistan (Cortright and Mattoo 1996). The study reiterated that "the perceived nuclear threat from Pakistan was the single most important factor motivating Indian elites to consider the nuclear option" (Cortright and Mattoo 1996: 17).

Pakistanis have always exhibited an 'inferiority' complex concerning Indians and this is in part due to their long turbulent history (Perkovich 1999: 367). It is the desire of the average Pakistani to be one up against their Indian counterpart in every aspect of life. Whether it is a game of cricket or nuclear rivalry it has always been ingrained in their mindset to beat India. But this desire by elites is not totally independent of the reality on the ground. The discriminatory social practices of the Indian state elites conform to this reality. For example, the treatment today given to Muslims in India who make up almost 20 percent population demonstrates this type of elites' policies. Despite the large number of Muslims in India, there is only 3 percent Muslim representation in the Indian Civil Service, 1.8 in the Foreign Service and only 4 percent in the Police services (Mehmood 20.6.2010). The popular perceptions of their nuclear rivalry are obviously the result of this identity. But it is also facts that like their Indian counterparts, the majority of the

Pakistanis care little about the nuclear gobbledygook including terms like CTBT, NPT and deterrence. There has been no effective means adopted by the state to educate the people about the use or misuse of nuclear weapons. This has helped the cause of the elites to promote their own agenda of 'reactionary syndrome' towards India (Zahra 2000: 168). The politicians can easily sway public opinion in favour of the bomb based on the simple pretext that India has already done this. The rivalry constructed by the elites was attuned to the popular perceptions of Indian power in the wake of the 1998 explosions. It was effectively endorsed by the social practices of the Indian elites where leaders like L.K. Advani [Home Minister during the BJP government] publicly declared that Pakistan should forget Kashmir (Zahra 2000). The Pakistani people naturally asked "Qadeer Khan bumb nikalo!" ["Qadeer Khan take out the bomb"] (Zahra 2000: 147).

On the eve of the test the *Pakistani Observer* wrote, "five nuclear blasts have instantly transformed an extremely demoralized nation into a self-respecting, proud nation of 140 million people, having full faith in their destiny" (Talbott 2004: 71). Ironically, the Pakistani elites got themselves trapped by the weight of their own myths constructed against India in order to get popular support. Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State during President Clinton's second term, visited Pakistan in order to dissuade the Pakistani Prime Minister from following India's lead in 1998. He explained the dilemma of Prime Minister Sharif, who stated that "I am an elected official and I cannot ignore popular sentiments" (Talbott 2004: 64).

To conclude, it can be argued that the Pakistani nuclear discourse is transfixed on India and that it also has ideational components. The coup-prone Pakistan will never accept the hegemony of India or the role of India as the regional policeman since this

runs up against the role of Pakistan's military norms as the sole saviour of Pakistan. When commenting on the Indian threat, the former army chief of Pakistan General Aslam Beg declared that it is "emanating from the deeper recesses of the Hindu psyche" (Mian 2001: 105).

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter examined the ideational component of India and Pakistan nuclear discourses which is based on socio-cultural norms. These norms include Hindutva, Indo centric myths and attainment of an Islamic bomb. In the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan there is a close nexus between material variables, such as power and prestige, and soft cultural variables like norms, beliefs and religious myths. The central argument illustrates how conflicting socio-cultural norms of identity were constructed by elites' social practices. The BJP in India is bent upon reinvigorating cultural norms based on the ideal of 'Hindutva' meaning, thereby, one culture, one identity and one nation at the expense of marginalizing the minorities in India and propagating feelings of animosity in Pakistan. The same is true for the elites of Pakistan who used animosity against India as well as its attainment of an 'Islamic bomb' as corner stones in constructing this nuclear rivalry. There exists a causal relationship between India and Pakistan's nuclear rivalry and domestic cultural variables which can be unearthed in the propaganda of the BJP in India and the speeches of political and military elites in Pakistan. India and Pakistan's nuclear discourse is closely intertwined with the identity discourse of the two states. The elites of the two states discursively contested the religious myths embedded in culture when forging this discourse. This was being

accomplished by the elites at the expense of exclusion of the 'Other'. The states' security practices augmented this belief system of the elites leading to an intersubjective understanding of hostility. It is quite evident even today when the elites, of both states, find it convenient to point the finger at the other side for being behind every terrorist act taking place in their own state. Whether it is the Marriot suicide bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan [September 2008] or the Mumbai terrorist attacks in India [November 2008], lapses in both states' security apparatuses have been conveniently let off the hook by such blame games. The detrimental effects of these policies are clearly visible in the abysmal security relations between both states. The already fragile peace process has been abandoned and confidence building measures have been lost because of these blame games. There is no eagerness shown by the elites of both states to improve the environment of mistrust between them. Moreover, no concerted effort is being made by these states to curb the menace of terrorism in the region. This is because they cannot yet unravel themselves from the confiscatory nature of norms which they themselves have propagated and now find that they have become their hostage. The rivalry between India and Pakistan was created by elites who dredged up particular cultural myths in order to cause friction between people, rather than championing conciliatory norms of peaceful coexistence among them.

The analysis of the security relations of India and Pakistan requires a different paradigm. We have to understand the cultural underpinnings of the rivalry. This will lead us to focus on the socio-cultural norms of the society and will help us to find the right norms for peaceful coexistence. Norms in the context of nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan are culturally constructed and discursively propagated by the elites. The

popular social practices of both states sometimes respond favourably to the nuclear decisions of the elites' and other times they are opposed. This change in people's opinions may in part be due to the fact that most people do not have sufficient knowledge about their states nuclear programmes. It can also be because of the experiences of shared chosen traumas in the shape of social and violent upheavals during independence that was faced by the populations of both states. The people still have to grapple with these traumatic experiences in their recent common history. There are enough undercurrents of these chosen traumas in the nuclear programme of both states constructed by their respective elites. The religious myths used for this purpose by the elites sometimes trap the elites themselves and they have no other alternative than to follow the dictates of these myths. The decision to go nuclear by both states was one such instance of the stranglehold of these ideational components that were constructed by the elites. The tragedy of these discourses was even acknowledged by the elites of the two states themselves who still hope that the popular social practices will bridge the trust deficit found at the elite level. For example, at recent talks held in Islamabad in June 2010 between the foreign secretaries of both states, Mrs. Nirupama Rao India's Foreign Secretary stated:

> "We owe it to our people to chart a way forward, to narrow
> differences and ensure collaborative engagement " (*Dawn* 2010).

These were the first talks held between India and Pakistan since the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 and the first bilateral talks between both states' foreign secretaries since May 2008. How to 'chart the way forward' will be the theme of the next chapter which will hypothetically propose a security community between India and Pakistan based on common social norms and popular culture.

7: Exploration of norms for a hypothetical security community between India-Pakistan and its comparative analysis with the EU and ASEAN

The emphasis of my argument in the preceding chapters has been primarily focused on the tussle between elites' and popular social practices that has contributed to the current security dilemma between India and Pakistan. The case studies of identity and ideology [Chapter 4], the Kashmir dispute [Chapter 5] and the nuclear rivalry [Chapter 6] were discussed in the context of elites' routines or social practices. These chapters also present the states' narratives constructed through educational curricula by the elites for their respective masses. For example the use of the phrase '*attotang*' [inseparable part] or jugular vein are just some of the ways Indian and Pakistani elites refer to Kashmir and this type of phraseology has always been an integral part of the national educational curriculum of both states. Moreover, Chapter 4 discusses the Two Nation Theory as has been taught in the educational system of Pakistan. This last chapter focuses on these educational norms in much greater detail by employing the same line of argument [elites versus masses]. This is intended to envision a hypothetical security community based on ideational norms between India and Pakistan. This chapter will utilize the methodology of the popular culture approach within an interpretive exploratory framework. At the elite level, it will explore 'negative norms' constructed by the elites' social practices in both India and Pakistan. Some of the norms that will be examined include: the educational policies of both states; the rhetorical practices of maligning 'the Other' during election campaigns; and ruling state elites' censorship policies imposed on the mass media. These social norms have so far proven to be an obstacle for the formation of a security

community. At the popular level, this chapter will explore 'positive norms' constructed by popular social practices in both states. These include literary classics written by acclaimed writers of both societies that depict nostalgic feelings of each other; religious practices [Bhakti movement] of the subcontinent and contemporary media initiatives by private mass media conglomerates of the two states with the code name of 'Aman ki Asha' [Desire for Peace].

This chapter will also make a brief comparative study of hypothetical India-Pakistan security community with two existing security communities the European Union [EU] and Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. It argues that every security community has an implicit normative structure. This normative structure works as a foundation by formulating regional ideational interests as well as creating the collective identity of a security community. This final argument will demonstrate that a security community is a 'context' bounded construct and that its applicability and possible replication in other parts of the world is largely unfounded. This means that every security community is based on its own regional normative structure and there is no simple way of duplicating a successful security community arrangement from one region to another region without first understanding its own particular regional socio-cultural normative order. Similarly, the word security community has different meanings and different connotations for the people involved in making it. This all depends upon the socio-cultural norms of the respective regions.

This chapter is divided into two main sections with each having three sub-sections. The first main section exclusively focuses on the hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. Its first sub-section elucidates the path dependence model of

security communities. The second sub-section deals with elites social practices by examining the negative norms which are impediments to the formation of an abstract India-Pakistan security community. The third sub-section explains some of the positive norms by highlighting popular social practices. This section at the end sums up the arguments on hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. The second main section briefly juxtaposes the EU and ASEAN security communities with the India-Pakistan abstract security community. The first sub-section is on the EU. The second sub-section identifies the normative structure of ASEAN. The third sub-section presents a comparative analysis of the three security communities. This section concludes the argument by emphasising the context bounded-ness of security communities.

The primary sources used for this chapter includes the examination of the compulsory history text books taught at primary schools and high schools in India and Pakistan. I have established no limit of time frame for the content analysis of these text books since regarding questions of identity, ideology and India-Pakistan security relations there has been little change in the syllabi of these text books published by the state. Another primary source is the study of commercial Indian films in the last decade of 1990s until the present. The popularity of these films is gauged from the mass media reports and from the national recognition they received in the shape of awards from the state. It can be argued that there may not be a linear effect of films on the masses. But watching commercial Indian [Bollywood] films in India and particularly in Pakistan is not only a favourite pastime for the ordinary citizens, but it has become part of the daily practices of the people in both states. Another source was the study of novels written by acclaimed Indian and Pakistani literary giants on themes of partition and community.

7.1 A path dependence model of a security community

A path dependence model refers to the understanding of institutions according to their normative behaviour by historically tracing their roots in their respective regional cultures (North 1990). For the establishment of a security community, two states may develop a 'path dependence model' which means that there should not be a fixed correlation between cause and effect, but rather their security ties should be strengthened step by step and in any direction (Waever 1998). The formation of a security community thus "remains precariously balanced on a constellation of a large number of factors" (Waever 1998: 76). Protagonists of a security community have singled out 'desecuritization' as the prime reason behind security community formation (Waever 1995). This means that once a state joins a security community its contentious security concerns will 'progressively' decrease in favour of other mutual benefits (Waever 1995). By accepting identity and security as a discourse, I further examine the path dependence model of a security community by arguing:

- That it is dependent upon the shared experiences of chosen traumas in the psyche of the population. Elites can construct experiences positively for a community's sake or negatively for their own vested interests.

- That the public rhetoric of the elites plays a role in security community formation. Weaver has already defined 'desecuritization' as the prime reason for security community formation. However, this is not only about desecuritization. Perhaps more importantly, it also has to do with the formation of a collective identity for the sake of desecuritization. States which are involved in a conflict will only

lessen their guard towards each other, if they see an alternative progression of collective identity formation in a security community.

- That there is a confluence between the socio-cultural norms of a society and the regional norms of the security community. Most often studies of security communities are aimed at the level of norms compliance by the participating states. However, I will argue that a lot is also at stake in obtaining a better understanding of the socio-cultural norms of societies that are involved and participating in such a security community.

- That there is a hidden normative structure based on the socio-cultural norms of societies which can bind the states together, such as set rules for inclusion and exclusion in a security community, which further acts as a deterrence for its norms compliance.

Therefore, the formation of a security community is a long gradual process and more importantly, it is not strictly related to security at all. This path dependence model of security communities will be comparatively examined in the third sub-section of this chapter. It will examine how this path or some of its features are being followed by the security communities and what are the lessons to be learned for the formation of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community from the particular experiences of the EU and ASEAN security communities.

I argue with regard to the formation of an India-Pakistan security community, that there is little possibility of having an 'amalgamated' security community, since this goes against the rationale of creating an independent Pakistan in the first place. Instead, I argue

for the creation of a 'pluralistic' security community hypothetically conceived at the popular level which would have enough potential to change the elites' constructed security dilemma which exists between India and Pakistan. Ideationally, there is enough normative ground to unite the two countries in a security community framework of their own. This is due to the fact that the people of both states know each other very well with a shared experience of living side by side as communities before the partition of the subcontinent. The popular social practices based on the socio-cultural norms of these two countries share much in common.

An important factor in the context of the formation of a security community is the ruling elite's behaviour with regard to their 'speech acts'. One argues of 'speech acts' or 'discursive practices' when the elites discursively construct an issue (Waever 1995). The elites' discursive practices can play an important role in a state's security discourse since at critical junctions they help to create an intersubjective understanding of either hostility or cooperation among states. So my conception of a security community lies at the junction of elite and popular social practices.

A hypothetical India-Pakistan security community refers to some intangible or abstract factors. These factors have been discussed in terms of 'negative norms' at the elite level and are seen as being responsible for preventing the formulation of a security community (Khoo 2004). Among these negative norms, I will particularly focus on the educational policy of both states, the elite's electoral behaviour and the popular culture of Indian film industry. I mean by educational policy the history books illustrating state narratives of identity which are published by the state and are being taught at all levels of education. The elites' social practices in popular culture also include their role in

imposing a 'censorship regime' on popular Indian cinema. At the popular level, the positive norms I will be examining include the content analysis of literary classics, religious norms of Sufism and mass media initiatives for friendship between the two countries.

7.1.2 Elites social practices and propagation of negative norms

Among social norms, the educational text books used at the primary and the secondary school levels are of considerable importance. It is at this level that young minds are exposed to the outside world for the first time. These young minds come to know their existential identity by learning various national narratives that are being taught to them in their history text books. On average, a child begins school at the age of four and finishes high school at age sixteen. In India and Pakistan, the curriculum, prescribed books and the publication of history books at both the grade school and higher school/ college level are under governmental control. In Pakistan, history has been taught under the subject label of 'Social Sciences' since 1961. History is a compulsory subject at school and the officially prescribed text books are a way of imparting historical knowledge. The content analysis of these books illustrates that up to this point the text books have been used as a means to create the image of India and Pakistan as "Us versus Them'. The relational aspects of social identity in the young minds of these students are being formed in these texts by positively attributing a Pakistani identity and negatively describing an Indian one or vice versa. By the time children reach adolescence, almost every Indian child is fervently anti-Pakistani and every average Pakistani is ardently anti-Indian. From high school to the graduate college level, history changes its taxonomy to

"Pakistan Studies". Every student must pass these obligatory courses in this subject area and the subject material comes only from the officially prescribed text books.

The pedagogical culture that uses these text books is also very interesting, since in both India and Pakistan the knowledge provided in text books is largely unexamined and is often considered sacred. In order to pass their examination, students are required to memorize the subject matter by heart. The critical evaluation or cross examination of the material is discouraged in the class room (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997). It seems that the history is not being taught with unbiased views or with objective facts, but rather teaching has become a useful conduit for the state elites' to superimpose their biased nationalist ideas on young minds. I start with the case study of the educational practices in Pakistan.

A distinguished historian of Pakistan K.K. Aziz, in his text entitled "The murder of history", surveyed the history text books of Pakistan that are prescribed for educational institutions (Aziz 1998). The following are some of the examples taken from his book. The excerpts from a history text book published at Peshawar [Khyber- Pakhtoonkhawa province] in Pakistan states:

> "The Hindus wanted to control the government of India after independence.
> The British sided with the Hindus. But the Muslims did not accept the decision"
> > (Aziz 1998: 13).

More extracts from the Grade 4 text book:

> "The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things…
> Hindus did not respect women" (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997).

> "Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark
> places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the
> temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims
> can say their prayers together" (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997).

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Another prominent Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, quotes from a compulsory history text book used for college students written by Ikram Rabbani and Monawar Ali Sayyed entitled the "Introduction to Pakistan Studies" which states that "the coming of Islam to the Indian subcontinent was a blessing because Hinduism was based on an unethical caste system" (Jalal 1995: 78). As Aziz has pointed out, the titles of the chapters in these text books also make interesting reading. Some of the chapter names include: "Differences in Muslim and Hindu civilizations," "The need for the creation of an Independent State," "The Ideology of Pakistan" and "India's Evil Designs against Pakistan" (Aziz 1998: 16).

Invariably, in almost all history books, whether they are grade school text books or academic history books, what is common among them is the tendency to label Hindus as 'unclean' and their culture as 'inferior' (Aziz 1998). The treatment of the history of the post-independence years of Pakistan is not that much different either. For example, it is claimed in the texts books in Pakistan that the India-Pakistan war of 1965 was a success for the Pakistani army and that it was initiated by Indian forces. This is in spite of the fact that there is now a general consensus among various Pakistani intellectuals that the 1965 war was started by Pakistan in the Kashmir region under the code name "Operation Gibraltar" which sought to liberate Indian held Kashmir, but that the conflict ended in a stalemate with neither side accomplishing anything (Nawaz 2008). The same is true for the 1971 war with India. The Pakistani text books frequently refer to India's involvement in the separation of East Pakistan which may be true, but seldom are there references made to the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and the social practices of the political elites leading to the chaotic situation in 1971.

The Pakistan Studies text book for Grade 9 and 10 [Secondary School level]
states: "In 1971 while Pakistan was facing political difficulties in East Pakistan, India
helped anti-Pakistan elements and later on attacked Pakistan" (Aziz 1998).

The processes involved in writing, publishing and printing these text books reveals
the involvement of state's ruling elites. For example, the government of Pakistan selects a
panel of educational advisors who devise the syllabi and curriculum. The advisors have
themselves acknowledged that there are set policy 'guidelines' given to them that indicate
which historical aspects are to be emphasized (Aziz 1998). Moreover, they are advised to
write these books with the ideological framework of the establishment of Pakistan in
mind. The ideology of Pakistan, obviously, demands the marginalization of Hindus or
India and promoting Islamic ideology or highlighting Muslim rule of the subcontinent.
After the submission of drafts by the educational advisors, their work is again reviewed
and revised by the government before it is sent for final publication (Aziz 1998). The
policy guidelines given to the writers of these text books include, the development of an
awareness of Hindu-Muslim differences among the students, evaluating the role of Indian
aggression towards Pakistan and the reinvigoration of the Kashmir dispute by elaborating
the evil designs of India (Naseem 2006).

There is a strong connection between historiography and the state's identity
concerning the writing of these history text books. It seems as if the state's elites are
involved in a self-fulfilling prophecy that seeks to glorify the identity of the state while
sacrificing objective historical facts to the altar of nationalism and patriotism. This is
done despite that fact that people in both India and Pakistan have a common history and
ancestral heritage. The majority of Pakistanis are the descendents of Hindus who later

converted to Islam. But it is a strange fact that in all the history text books of Pakistan the genealogy of Pakistanis is linked to the Turk militias and Afghan war lords who invaded India time and again. The educational norms have become a cultural repository for the state's identity.

This shows the ways in which the social practices of elites have an influence on educational policies and demonstrates how Pakistan's identity is being discursively constructed at the cost of portraying India as the sole nemesis of Pakistan's identity and stability. I am not saying that there are no differences between the Muslim and the Hindu culture or civilization. There is no doubt that both have distinct cultures and that this difference is one of the basic reasons for the independence of Pakistan. However, to emphasise on the differences when teaching young minds these socially constructed historical narratives is not unlike germinating conflict for future generations. At the educational level, the teaching of history can serve as a tool to instruct the future generations of society what is wrong and what is right. Currently the educational norms in both states serve to promote malice when constructing each others identities. Once these identities are carved out and formed then the narration of history becomes the conflict between the 'righteous Muslim' or Pakistanis and the 'idolatrous Hindu' or Indians (Jalal 1995).

What is common between the various regimes [democratic or totalitarian] in Pakistan is the historiography of Pakistan under the tutelage of its ideology. This has helped to formulate the state's identity under the broad rubric of Islamic nationalism on the one hand and the 'Otherness towards India' on the other hand. How does identity based on an ideology strengthen the elites who profess it? Apple points out that it

"distorts one's picture of social reality and serves the interest of the dominant classes in the society" (Apple 1979: 20,21). For a Pakistani student the 'social reality' is constructed by distorting the facts of history. The national symbolism of Pakistan's identity is paraphrased below from some of the history text books used in Pakistan. Some of the text books claim that:

1. Pakistan came into being when Muhammad Bin Qasim entered Sindh in 712 AD. Sindh is referred to as the 'Bab-e-Islam' or gateway to Islam in the text books. The symbolism used to create a common ancestry between Muslims of the subcontinent and former Arab rulers is being connected by the naming of 'Bab-e-Islam'. However, Islam was not spread throughout India by Arab invaders. Islam was in fact spread throughout India by 'Sufism'.

2. Akbar, the great Mughal Emperor who ruled India, is denounced as a ruler of the subcontinent since he practiced many 'Hindu' traditions and married Hindu 'ranis' or ladies.

3. The freedom movement of India is symbolized by the struggle against Hindu domination and the search for an Islamic identity of the state. The emphasis has been placed on the struggle against Hindu domination rather than on the attempts by the people to throw away their common colonial yoke (Ali 2.11.2002)

4. The post-independence period in the text books is repetitive with symbolic phrases of 'our neighbouring enemy state' casting an 'evil design' on our statehood. Thereby, holding India responsible for being behind all the misery of Pakistan.

Let us now take a look at the educational policies of India. In many ways, the basic tenants for a biased historiography remain the same with the categorization of Muslims as "violent, despotic and masculine" while their Hindu counterparts are portrayed as "indolent, passive and effeminate" (Chaturvedi 2001). The history text books for schools and colleges in India have been produced by the National Council of Educational Research and Training [NCERT] since 1970s. NCERT is a central body formed by the Indian government in New Delhi. Some books for school children are also published by the respective states' boards. An interesting episode occurred in 2002 when NCERT issued four new text books under a revised curriculum. A supervisory organization that was intended to watch the development of Indian history 'The Indian History Congress' [not to be confused with Indian Congress Party], scrutinized the new text books especially on the question of how new "values" are being indoctrinated through the "education in religion" by the elites (Habib, Jaiswal et al. 2003: preface). The Indian History Congress was established in 1935 to oversee the development of Indian history. It published its detailed report in 2003 which heavily criticized the history text books being used in Indian schools and colleges. It is interesting to read the report which states: "the text books draw heavily on the kind of propaganda that the so called Sangh Parivar [a group of Hindu fundamentalist parties] publications have been projecting for quite some time" (Habib, Jaiswal et al. 2003: 3).

In the text books the Hindu leaders were being portrayed as 'true patriots' during the freedom struggle to throw away the colonial yoke, while all the Muslim leaders were portrayed as communalist separatists. The narratives about Muslim rulers on the subcontinent depicts them as 'invaders' and 'temple-destroyers' with nothing positive

brought by them to India in terms of monuments and cultural heritage (Habib, Jaiswal et al. 2003).

The revised curriculum was issued when the BJP was in power and its slogan of "Hindutva" or cultural revitalization of India was in vogue. Educational norms were being used here as a vehicle to promote the Hindutva values of the BJP. An explanation of these 'new values' and their indoctrination in educational norms will help us to better understand the constructed nature of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Text books in India are easily accessible and are a cheap source of knowledge and history which play a fundamental role in 'transmitting' cultural values to future generations (Pandey 2006). The cultural myths spread about Muslims in Indian text books portray them as being arrogant, belligerent and prone to fundamentalism (Nandy 1997).

In almost all history text books in India the symbolism used for the partition of the subcontinent and the independence of Pakistan is punctuated with phrases like 'entirely inevitable', 'with a heavy heart', 'was allowed to happen', 'a blow to nationalism', 'to allow the scourge of communalism'. A Grade 10 text book, published by NCERT, states: "the nationalist leaders agreed to the partition of India in order to avoid the large scale bloodbath that communal riots threatened…but they did not accept the two-nation theory" (Kumar 2001: 207).

According to renowned Indian historian R.C. Majumdar, the primary reasons for distortions of objective history in these text books was because of the government's directives to the historians who were put in charge of writing them (Majumdar 1970). These directives from the government included the repudiation of Muslim rulers of the subcontinent and their portrayal as invaders and destroyers of Hindu temples which led to

the 'politicisation of history' (Bhargava 22.1.2000). In other words, it is evident that a deliberate policy was adopted by the political elites at the helm of affairs to hold hostage the various means of disseminating knowledge by concealing the true facts and distorting the adequate portrayal of historical events. This paved the way for the development of distrust between the people of both countries and trust is the fundamental edifice required for building a security community. In spite of having a common cultural past and having struggled together for independence from colonialism, the 'official' historians of the two countries are at loggerheads with each other. One despises the 'Other' while portraying their competing national narratives of the past. The aim is to forge a nexus between historiography and the national identity of the Indian state (Bhargava 22.1.2000). The paradox of history text books is self explanatory, where in, the Indian text books often reject the 'Two Nation Theory', the basis of the independence of Pakistan, and the partition of the subcontinent is only being accepted under the cloak of dire circumstances. It is the demand of Indian identity to marginalize sentiments toward the partition and keep the communalist forces at bay, while in Pakistan the incessant clinging to Islamic ideology at the expense of Hindu alienation is an alternate projection (Kumar 2001).

To summarize, the elite guided educational policies of India and Pakistan have encouraged the establishment of intersubjective feelings of hostility between India and Pakistan. The identities of the states are conflated with the reconstructed myths from the socio-cultural norms of society. The presence of this kind of material in the educational curriculum has long lasting effects on the minds of impressionable school children. India as 'the Other' becomes an easy scapegoat to imbibe ethnic and regional fissures within

Pakistan. The same is true for India, where lessons are being taught on the futility of the founding of Pakistan along communalists lines in a multi-ethnic pluralistic India.

Now the question arises, how does the trust deficit spread to every nook and corner in India and Pakistan, given the high illiteracy rates of the huge population of both countries? In this regard, the role of the mass media, especially popular Indian films, and electoral norms, which disseminate hate towards each other, must be taken into account as significant contributing factors. Starting with the electoral practice of maligning Pakistan, I will focus on the electoral campaign and the related atmosphere during the 15[th] general Lok Sabha [lower house] elections in 2009 that was created by the BJP and the Congress party [as the two major main stream parties]. Due to periodic martial law regimes in Pakistan, I overlook the case study of Pakistan's political parties' electoral campaigns. However, one common focus of all main stream Pakistani political parties in their election campaigns is engaging in dialogue with India regarding the settlement of all out-standing issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

The shadow of both states' identities looms large in all electoral campaigns in India, but has particularly become a more prominent feature in Indian election campaigns since the 1990s. It is cultural in the sense that the contested socio-cultural norms of Hinduism are being deliberately rejuvenated by political parties and used in their electoral campaigns in order to re-vitalize the Hindu identity of India. This all started after the demolition of the Babari Mosque in 1992 and various communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, i.e. the Ayodhya riots in 1992 and the Gujarat riots in 2002 and 2005. The state's identity became more narrowly defined and based on the idea of one people - one community. The secularist fervour during the Congress party

governments' before the 1990s nose dived with the emergence of 'Hindutva" at the centre stage of politics.

With the rise of the BJP in the 1990s, Indian election campaigns took on a more belligerent tone toward Pakistan. This is because the BJP quite often use the anti-Pakistani card to stir nationalist feelings among the electorate. Even the secular Congress party which was in power in India before the 2009 general elections cannot break away from the established electoral norms of maligning Pakistan. It is pertinent to see what the elites of these parties propagated through their social practices towards Pakistan. The Manifesto of BJP was released in April 2009 under the title 'Good Governance, Development and Security' for the 15[th] general elections in India (BJPManifesto 2009). The opening pages explained the rich cultural history of India from 900 AD to the present times, evading the period of Mughal rule in India. It states, with regard to cultural heritage that is irrevocably linked to Hindu mythology, that: "The civilisational consciousness of India has been well defined by the sages and philosophers and has its roots in Bharatiya or the Hindu world view… Hinduism is the most ennobling experience in spiritual co-existence" (BJPManifesto 2009: 5). Here India's cultural heritage is being directly linked to the 'Hindu world view', without any regard to the cultural influences of more than 300 years of Muslim rule during the Mughal period. It is a conscious effort on the part of the BJP party leaders to reinvigorate Hindu norms leading to animosity with Pakistan and the abhorrence of Muslim rule in India. It is akin to 'the return of culture' in the identity politics of the state (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997). The Manifesto further pledged that if the BJP were elected it would pursue the construction of the contentious Ram Temple at the site of Babari Mosque which had previously been demolished by

Hindu mobs that were actively supported by the elites of the BJP in 1992. It is interesting to explain the role of the elites in this episode. The Liberhan Commission Report officially recognized the role played by the BJP elites in the demolition of the Babari Mosque. This one man commission headed by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan was established in 1992 to probe and find the reasons behind this gory incident. The report was submitted and later on was leaked to public after 17 years in 2009. The report formally indicts the ex-BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee, the ex-Home Minister of the BJP Advani and some other BJP stalwarts behind the 'meticulously planned' demolition of Babari Mosque (*TheTimesofIndia* 1.7.2009; Gilani 24.11.2009). This formal indictment shows the centrality of the elites' social practices behind the India-Pakistan rivalry.

Coming back to the Manifesto, it reiterated that the special status granted to Kashmir under Article 370 of the constitution of India would be withdrawn along with the promulgation of a uniform civil code of India. This would mean that Muslims would no longer settle their family disputes according to Muslim social laws and customs. All these issues were bracketed together in a chapter in the Manifesto entitled "cultural nationalism" (BJPManifesto 2009: 8). Cultural terms like "Ramjanambhoomi' [birth place of Hindu god Ram] and 'Hindutva' have seeped into the society's vernacular after their propagation. The BJP elite's belief in "Hindutva" raises a new level of mistrust between India and Pakistan as is evident in the electoral norms which form another component of the [in]-security community between the two states. The bashing of Pakistan was one of the central points in the electoral campaign of 2009 in India. Pertaining to security, the BJP Manifesto states: "terrorism sponsored by Pakistani

agencies is only one of the reason behind the fear that grips the people in cities, towns and villages" (BJPManifesto 2009).

The other major party that participated in the 2009 elections was the Congress party. The Congress party does not profess 'Hindutva' credentials and labels itself as a 'secular and nationalist' party. It was the party in power [2004-2009] before the general elections and it highlighted various achievements in its Manifesto for the 2009 elections. Among its achievements, it listed the government of Pakistan's formal acceptance of the involvement of a Pakistani national behind the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 as a 'notable victory' in foreign policy for the Congress party government (INCManifesto 2009). During an electoral campaign speech the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated, "We all know the epicenter of terrorism in the world today is Pakistan. The world community has to come to grips with this harsh reality" (Naqvi 1.4.2009). It is not just communal politics within India, when analyzing the broader context of India-Pakistan security relations it becomes readily apparent that what happens to Muslims in India has far reaching affects in the security relations between the two states. In addition to elites' rhetoric, popular culture is another medium of the propagation of negative norms constructed by elites.

The cartoon shown below was published on the 26th of December 2008 in the *Daily Jang* [the leading Urdu daily in Pakistan which has the largest circulation in Pakistan as well as in the UK and Europe] in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks that occurred in India one month earlier (November 2008). This cartoon shows the crux of the India and Pakistan security dilemma. The right side of the pictures shows the official policy statements of the ruling elites of the two countries lambasting each

other. While, the left side shows the more popular image of people in their homes in Pakistan being glued to their TV sets watching the latest Indian film on the cable TV network and listening to popular Indian songs at marriage ceremonies (Iqbal 26.12.2008)

Popular culture includes the mass media, films, and print media, among other things. Mass media in the form of electronic and print media are fairly independent in both countries when compared to the film industry. As an offshoot of popular culture approach, I will examine the role of Indian elites in the film industry in establishing norms of animosity towards Pakistan. Indian films are one of the largest sources of entertainment for the population of both states and millions watch them in their leisure time. Yet the film industry is not completely free in India. It is under the control of political elites who use state censorship policies to control and limit what is being produced. I will elaborate on this in significant detail.

My selection of Indian films as representative of popular culture is due to their significance in terms of their global reach, industrial status, popular following in Pakistan and the interference of the elites in their production. It is the only mass medium where all these factors have converged. All other forms of mass media, like print media and television, are relatively free from government control, however, due to government censorship policies elites' have a sort of leverage on films. Popular cinema is a vast medium with huge mass appeal irrespective of high illiteracy rates in both states. When compared to other forms of popular culture, Indian films share certain commonalities with Pakistani audiences and so what is being depicted in them has a direct impact on the psyche of the people across the border.

To understand the role of Indian films it is important to appreciate the global and domestic reach of the Indian cinema industry. The Northern Indian film industry is called Bollywood from the historic city of Bombay which is now called Mumbai in India. It is the biggest industry in the world in terms of viewers and budget allocation (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). It is estimated that the yearly production of films in India is between '800 to 1000' films with '10-15 million' tickets sold daily (Srinivas 2002). The Bollywood film "Slumdog Millionaire" won eight Academy Awards [Oscars] in 2009. For the majority of people in India and Pakistan watching Indian films is part of their regular social activities. More importantly, Indian films are easily available throughout Pakistan and since the language is perfectly understood with only small variations in dialect, no translation is required. In Pakistan, the language is called Urdu and in India it is referred to as Hindi or Hindustani. In the aftermath of the 1965 war with India, Indian films were banned in Pakistan, but pirated CDs and cassettes of Indian films are easily

available (B.B.C.online 23.1.2006). In 2006, the Pakistani government lifted the ban on

Indian films to allow that they be viewed in cinemas (B.B.C.online 23.1.2006).

It is interesting to mention here that Bollywood films are the ones which need 'no

passport, no visa' to cross the border and reach Pakistan (Sen 2005). It is the major

source for knowing the identity of the 'Other'. In contrast to it, the Pakistan film industry

is very weak and they have few viewers even within Pakistan. Currently, the Pakistani

film industry is almost 'non-existent' with only '12 films per year' being produced (Tahir

3.7.2010). Therefore, how the Bollywood film industry portrays Muslims and Pakistan in

its movies has an important link with the social norms of society, since there is very little

contact between the populations of both states. The cinema in India is an important

indicator for understanding the social milieu of Indian society. It can be taken as 'a

metaphor for society' (Ahmed 1992).

Since 1990 onwards, India witnessed two phenomenal rises in two sectors of its

polity. One is the rise of the right wing orthodox Indian party the BJP and the other is the

growth of mass media in the shape of numerous television channels along with the surge

of high budget Indian movies. A close nexus is established between the values and norms

articulated by the orthodox right in India and the interpellation of these norms by the

mass media. Prior to the 1990s, there were very few films made on contentious subjects

like the partition of the subcontinent, security issues, the Kashmir dispute and the identity

issues of the state. For example, 'Garam Hawa' [Hot Wind] was released in 1973 and

Indo Pakistan wars 'Hindustan ki Kasam' [Pledge to India] was released in 1973.

However, the decade of 1990 saw the popularity of 'martial themes' in Bollywood

increase (Athique 2008). The state elites strongly used the right of censorship on Bollywood films while 'Policing Hindi cinema' (Bose 2009).

I have taken my data on Indian films from the 'Encyclopaedia of Indian cinema' (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). This encyclopaedia is an authoritative account of the Indian film industry published in joint collaboration with the British Film Institute and the National Film Archive of India. It includes national film entries from 1896 through 1995 along with all the major regional language films of India [Tamil, Telugo, Bengali, Gujarati and Marathi]. The statistics are also staggering stating that '23 million Indians go to the movies everyday' (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). The statistics regarding the number of viewers of Indian films in Pakistan cannot be easily determined. However, the popularity of Indian films in Pakistan can be gauged by taking into account their accessibility on the cable television network in major parts of Pakistan as well as the presence of pirated CDs in the open market and the projection of Indian films in Pakistani mass media. There are many 'blockbuster' Indian films based on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes such as Roja, Mission Kashmir, Pukar, Gadar, LOC, Bombay and Border, among others films. I referred to these films as 'blockbusters' since they were a commercial success at the box office as reported in the encyclopaedia of Indian cinema (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999).

These types of films caused resentment among Pakistanis because of their negative propaganda. It seems that these sorts of films are only being produced to spread the elites' agenda of constructing negative norms concerning Pakistan. The availability of cable television in almost every part of Pakistan and the frequent airing of new Indian films has made the accessibility of watching Indian films easier for the people of

Pakistan. The Indian films also witnessed a change in their credentials. From the romantic and melodious films of the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s, the tone and tenor of Indian films changed in the 1990s so that they were more action packed, more nationalist and increasingly anti-Pakistani. The connivance of the social norms of Hindutva explicated by the Indian elites and the majority of Indian films released since the 1990s has helped to produce 'a monolithic Indian identity that is Hindu' (Malhotra and Alagh 2004). Such an exclusive identity has marginal spatial place for the Muslims of India. In most of the films produced since the 1990's, Muslims are stereotyped as traitors, terrorists, insurgents and brutal in order to create a 'phobia' in Indian society by portraying 'negative images' of Muslims (Jinabade 2009). In the post-independence period, many Muslim stars in Indian cinema adopted Hindu names to receive acclaim in order to pass implicit norms of the 'All India League of Censorship' (Hijri 2008). Some of these big names include "Dilip Kumar" [Yusaf Khan], "Menna Kumari" [Mahjabeen Bano], "Madhubala" [Mumtaz Jehan Begum Dehlavi] (Hijri 2008: 60-61). The Bollywood films that are based on the nationalist discourse derive their themes extensively from Hindu 'mythology and symbolism' in spite of India being a multi-cultural secular country (Hijri 2008). Many films are produced on thematic issues of the confrontation with Pakistan [films like Fiza, Soldier, Border, Bombay, Gadar, etc.] in order to reify the Hindu identity.

For example, 'Bombay' is a Bollywood film released in 1995, after being censored many times by the Indian government (Bose 2009). The film was released amid the social milieu of the demolition of the Babari Mosque (1992) and the role played by the Hindu religious parties. The film portrays the role of Mr. Bal Thackeray, the Hindu

fundamentalist leader of "Shiv Sena", an anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani militant party from Mumbai. The film is based on a love story between a Muslim girl and a Hindu boy and was shown during the heightened religious and communal tensions in India at that time. The Indian Censor Board deleted the words "Pakistan", "Islamic state", "the visuals of Babari Mosque" under the pretext of suppressing communal violence which might ensue after the release of the film (Bose 2009). But this did not help its cause, since after the film was released its director had to run for his life and his home was bombed. 'Bombay' was also boycotted by Muslims in India and its release was banned in many Muslim countries on account of its incorrect portrayal of Muslim social norms. Bollywood films like 'Bombay' have the power and social recognition of disseminating the views of powerful groups or elites at the expense of 'misrepresenting' Muslims who are in the minority in India (Mallhi 2005).

Indian films that deals with Kashmir dispute tend to emphasise India's claim on Kashmir, include 'Mission Kashmir' and 'Refugee'. These films were banned by the Pakistani government, but pirated cassettes and CDs were still available and were watched by people of Pakistan with a 'pinch of salt' (Athique 2008). Another Bollywood film "Roja" was one of the most popular films in 1992 in India. It was based upon the India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir when the Kashmir separatist struggle started in 1989 in Indian held Kashmir. The film has long sequences to convince viewers of the 'righteousness' of the Indian claim over Kashmir and has many scenes which are anti-Pakistani. In one dialogue in the film the viewer is told, "India has already been partitioned once and now we will not allow it to divide again". The Indian claim over Kashmir was supported with powerful national narratives and Pakistan was depicted as

the source of evil and the aggressor state behind the Kashmir separatist struggle. Dirks explains that 'Roja' was used as medium for "a particular set of political arguments about the state" (Dirks 2008: 142). The film was officially recognized by the state. The film won three national awards and surprisingly, it also won the award for the "Best Film on National Integration". Here Indian national integration is forged at the expense of maligning Pakistan and vice versa. In other words, the Indian identity gets an 'identity signifier' through films by castigating Pakistan's identity. The aim of films like 'Roja' is for the 'manufacture of consent' of the people on state's practices which are disguised with cultural contestations (Bharucha 1994). 'Border' is another Indian film released in 1997 and was a blockbuster in India, receiving many national awards. The songs of the films were an instant hit. The film is based on the theme of the 1971 war with Pakistan. Naturally the Pakistan army was on the losing side in the film and the image of Indian army was projected with valour and dignity. The anti-Pakistani dialogues in the film are its hallmark, punctuated with nationalist melodrama to impress the Indian audiences. However, it may be asked, what message is being conveyed to the Pakistani audiences? It reflects the stereotyping of Pakistan as the "Other". It is important here to elaborate further on the 'manufacture of consent' by censorship policies in Indian films and how these films contribute in developing norms of animosity towards Pakistan.

There is a long history of the involvement of the state's elites in lieu of the 'censorship policies' on Indian films. Significantly, the influence of elites is more prominent in those films where the image of Pakistan is being portrayed as an enemy of the state or the "Other". Every film in India requires a certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The Board is a statutory body organized under the Indian

Cinematograph Act of 1952. Even though the first amendment of the Indian Constitution grants people's 'Right to the Freedom of Speech and Expression', the constitution also grants special powers to the executive to impose restrictions on the mass media if what is to be aired is deemed detrimental to the security of the state (Bhowmik 2002). The 14[th] amendment to the Indian constitution also gives more authority to the state to impose 'reasonable restrictions' on forms of expression on the pretext of the sovereignty and the integrity of India (Granville 1999). It is also interesting to note that other forms of expression like print and electronic media manage to secure their freedom because of their "political clout" and it is only the popular cinema which 'remained vulnerable' (Bhowmik 2002). Here political clout refers to the involvement of Indian political elites who are sometimes the owners of the various media channels or in other cases there are media conglomerates which finance the election campaigns of the ruling political elites in India. Every film meant for public viewing, be it a commercial venture, documentary film or an art movie has to be reviewed by the state to get a CBFC certificate before it can be shown publically. Appeals against any arbitrariness lie with the Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Even the appellate body is a government ministry and it is like 'an appeal from Caesar to Caesar' (Noorani 1983). A film is given a certificate for ten years and it can be renewed after that period. This shows the arbitrary and impulsive attitude of the executive to keep forms of mass media in check and control (Noorani 1983). All the guidelines, principles and policies of the CBFC are framed by the government. Section 5B of the Indian Cinematograph Act of 1952 sets the 'Principles for guidance in certifying films' as:

> "A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion
> of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part

of it is against the interest of the security of the state, friendly relations
with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or involves
defamation or contempt of court, or is likely to incite commission of any
offence" (Bhowmik 2002: 3576).

Along with the above 'set guidelines' for film certification the central government
also has the discretion to issue 'directives' to the competent authority, i.e., the CBFC.
The members of the CBFC are politically appointed and are not selected based on their
expertise in the field of cinema (Bhowmik 2003).

In 2002 the CBFC refused to give a certificate to Anand's documentary film 'Jung
aur Aman' [War and Peace]. The committee made the following recommendation to the
director to 'delete the scenes showing Pakistanis burning India's national flags. But
nothing was said regarding 'Indians burning Pakistan's national flag' (Bhowmik 2002:
3575). Many critics of Indian films have questioned this governmental role as 'cultural
police'(Bhowmik 2002).

Similarly in March 2003 the CBFC also refused to give a certificate to the
documentary film 'Aakrosch' [Cry of Pain] based on the communal violence directed
against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. This incident caused a communal frenzy in India and
led to increased tension between the two countries. The state police did not even allow
private showings of the film since it did not have the censor certificate by the CBFC
(*TheHindu* 2003). In any case, most private television channels in India do not even dare
to air documentary films on political issues (*TheHindu* 2003)**.**

Nevertheless, Indian films that portray violent scenes usually go uncensored by
the CBFC when they show the bravery of the Indian armed forces at the humiliation of
the Pakistan army (Bose 2009). An example worth mentioning here is the film 'LOC'
[Line of Control] released in 2003. This is a film about the Kargil war between India and

Pakistan. 'LOC' was released during a heightened military stand off between the Pakistani and Indian armed forces in the year 2001-2002. At this time, India had rapidly mobilized its military to the border under the code name of 'Operation Parakaram', only for Pakistan to reciprocate by sending its military. In the film, Pakistan was treated as a rogue state and an overtly hostile one with General Musharraff being portrayed as the main architect of the Kargil war among Indian audiences. Another film, "Gaddar: Ek Prem Katha" [Mutiny: A Love Story] was released in 2001 and depicts the turbulent partition period of 1947. In this film, the Pakistani Muslim father of a girl is the villain behind an otherwise love story of a Sikh boy and a Muslim girl. 'Pukar' [Cry Out] is another film based on theme of cross border terrorism.

'Lamhaa' [Moment] is another film based on Kashmir struggle. In the movie previews it promised 'to tell the story of violence in the region as never seen before' (*Dawn* 30.6.2010). The film faced stringent censorships before its release in July 2010. The Indian censor board objected that the narration on Kashmir in the preview of the film should not start with 'the most dangerous place in the world' (*Dawn* 30.6.2010). The film explains the post-partition traumas in Kashmir and wide spread corruption in Indian held Kashmir, and was at loggerheads with the Indian film censor board.

The censorship of films in India and Pakistan are firmly controlled by the government in power. The Indian Supreme Court's decision regarding the state's right to censor, as not only 'desirable, but also necessary' is quoted in all the annual reports of Indian certification board (Bose 2009). It is evident from this analysis of India's censorship policies that they are significantly influenced by the ruling elites who are 'politically motivated' in constructing social norms of hatred towards Pakistan (Bhowmik

2002). The connivance of CBFC with state elites shows state patronage of anti-Pakistan 'jingoistic films' like 'Roja', 'Gadar' or 'Sarfrosh' that incite audience to shout 'anti-Pakistan slogans' (Bhowmik 2003). These kind of films show the stark contrast in the state's attitude towards films which are based on themes of mutual harmony and peace like Anand's documentary 'Jung aur Aman' [War and Peace]. Even the Indo-China relations were not spared from this state manifestation in a film entitled 'Haqeeqat' made by Anand in 1964. This film showed the valour of Indian forces in the shadow of the 1962 war with China, received 'unprecedented' acclaim by the state (Bhowmik 2003). In many ways, Indian popular cinema seems to be held hostage by 'politicians malice' and tailored to match their vision of Indian security (Bhowmik 2002). The film censorship regime in India has become a 'manifestation of state power' (Bhowmik 2003). Vasudevan attributes this to the lack of a 'modernist outlook of the political elite' (Vasudevan 2005). It is the culmination of Indian rulers' desire for 'cultural homogeneity' by way of 'social engineering' that leads to 'disoriented cultural' practices (Bhowmik 2003)**.** It serves as a vehicle for imposing Hindu identity on the entirety of multi-cultural India by excluding minorities as a project of the 'Hindu nationalist discourse' and identifying a common enemy [Pakistan] (Bose 2009). The aim of the 'political manipulation' of the censorship regime is not only to prevent 'objectionable films' from mass screening, but also to deliberately promote 'favourable' ones and such actions have been taken by all governments 'irrespective of their ideological bias' (Bhowmik 2003).

The state's involvement in censor boards can help shape and determine public opinion to support its social practices. Films that produced animosity toward the other are

responsible for creating a 'stereotyping image'. This is what French philosopher Michel Foucault refers to as the 'Power of Knowledge'. He points out that those who hold power are also in the position to disseminate particular beliefs and values of society (Foucault 1994). Power relations cannot be explained solely in terms of governmental authority, but they are also found in a 'system of social networks' (Foucault 1982). The power of popular cinema in India particularly from the 1990s onwards has helped to disseminate 'Hindu majoritarian nationalism' by constructing myths from religious norms (Vasudevan 2000). This explains the underlying structure of social power that has its roots in cultural norms but is being controlled by the ruling elites in India and Pakistan. They have helped in the construction of knowledge and power relationships by reinforcing negative stereotypes of each other.

The question may be asked, can change be brought about in people's perceptions of one another, if alternative films are released about each other that reinforce norms of friendship and goodwill between the two countries? Although examples of these types of films are rare, I argue, particularly considering the large demand for Indian films in Pakistan, that, if they are given a chance, there is every possibility that the current hostile relationship may blossom into friendship. In the backdrop of a military standoff between the two countries in 2002, a film was released in India in 2004 entitled 'Veer Zaara'. This film was based on friendship between the two countries and was extremely popular among both Indian and Pakistani audiences. Another film that was nominated for an Oscar award is 'Lagaan'. This is a film which focuses on the past and shows how Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Dalits joined hands to defeat an imperial power. It shows the 'cultural accomplishment' of the past (Stadtler 2005). The venue of battle is an imagined

field of cricket. Do such past cultural accomplishments have the potential to change the current scenario of security dilemma between India and Pakistan?

7.1.3 Popular social practices and some positive norms

The suggested normative structure of an India-Pakistan security community can be found in nostalgic literary works written by acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers. Some of the Pakistani authors include Saadat Hassan Manto, Intizar Hussain, Bapsi Sidhwa and many others. On the Indian side these famous writers include Krishen Singh Bedi, Ismaat Chughtai, Krishna Sobti, Bhisham Sahni, Gopi Chand Kishan, Qurratul Ain Haider, Krishna Baldev, Khushnet Singh and others. All these authors have fictionalized their own experiences of living together in an undivided India (Chakravarty and Hussain 1998; Bhalla 2008). Their narration of the period of partition carries within it the seeds of a conceptualized normative security community between India and Pakistan. Their status as towering personalities of Urdu/ Hindi literature is never in doubt in their respective societies; however, they seldom get recognition from the state in lieu of teaching their books as part of educational curriculum for the younger generations. This shows the difference between the elite versions of a state's identity and the popular one. The commonality of language has made these master-pieces easily accessible and understandable for the population of both states. However, the state guided discourses of national identity do not offer these authors any place in the national curriculum.

Ted Hopf, a conventional constructivist, has examined the relationship between a state's identity and domestic or societal claims. He identified a 'social cognitive structure' based on 'discursive formations' which includes the study of literary classics in

order to formulate a domestic 'discourse' of the state's identity (Hopf 2002). In the preface of his *magnum opus*, Hopf encouraged scholars to "read pulp fiction in order to understand a state's foreign policy". Presently, the state's elites postulate educational norms by way of spreading cultural myths of ancient rivalries against one another in the minds of people. An alternative 'social cognitive structure' could be offered that would be based on the work of these renowned literary personalities in both states. Thus, it can be considered as a way of informing and presenting the credentials of the 'Others' identity. I will briefly explore some of these classic texts in order to show what kind of social cognitive structure can be offered as an alternative.

The classic short story writer in Pakistan, Saadat Hasan Manto in his story 'Dekh Kabira Roya' [Look Kabir has Wept] presents the uselessness of savagery behind the carnage during partition. The main character is Kabir named after the Sufi saint Kabir who was the main figure behind the seventeenth century 'Bhakti movement'. The movement promoted the mutual coexistence of Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent by encouraging them to shun their religious differences. In another classic, 'Toba Tek Singh', Manto laments over the level of hostility between India and Pakistan. In this story, Hindu and Muslim elites are portrayed as lunatics fighting incessantly over a piece of land in 'Toba Tek Singh' [a city in Pakistan]. Intizar Hussain, another Pakistani writer, derided the present day animosity between India and Pakistan and talks about tranquil times in his novel 'Basti' [community]. The name of Intizar's novel 'Basti' or community explains the ideal type of co-habitation between Hindus and Muslims in the pre-partition days. He explains how the Muslims and the Hindus respected each other's religious traditions and fervently participated in each other's festivities. While giving an interview

he narrated his devout Muslim father's best friendship with an equally devoted Hindu (Bhalla 2008). This again shows one of the differences between Western understanding of a security community, where secularism serves as the foundational pillar, as opposed to religious South Asian states like India and Pakistan. It should also be mentioned here that there is a big difference between a religious Hindu or Muslim fundamentalist and a devout Hindu or Muslim.

The nostalgia created in these writings by the first generation of people who participated in the partition of the subcontinent needs to be shared with today's fourth generation. These stories should also be included in the history books taught in schools in both India and Pakistan. Indian writer Qurratulain Hyder's novel 'Aag ka Darya' [River of Fire] is one of the most famous works on both sides of the divide (Hyder 2007). The list is never ending, since literary classics are being created by literary elites of both states in abundance. The popular social practices show that these novels and stories are being read and enjoyed by the people in both states, yet these sorts of stories or texts are not included in the educational curriculum of the two states. Both writers in India and Pakistan have shown nostalgic feelings toward one another in their works. Many acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers and novelists set their works in the past when people lived together in peace and tranquillity. After partition, these writers have emphasized mutual respect and love of each other's country. Bapsi Sidhwa in the opening page of Alok Bhalla's book wrote, "We, Indians and Pakistanis alike, are always emotionally involved in our politics…I should add that politics in the subcontinent touches each person's life" (Bhalla 2008). The novels of these writers are extremely popular on both sides of the border. They have written extensively on the former periods

of friendship between the two communities [Hindus and Muslims]. The irony is that though the contribution of these writers have been recognized by their respective governments and some of them have even been given national awards, the works of these authors have never been incorporated in the general curriculum of the education system.

In summary, the main thrust of these great classics is that they present Hindu and Muslim identities in a more complex manner than the antagonistically articulated identities in the two states' nationalist identity discourses. But the question arises why is this 'social cognitive structure' not given a central place by the states' ruling elites? The answer is obvious and points towards the vested interests of the ruling elites of both states and their politically motivated agendas. Now I explain some of the popular social practices based on religious norms.

Hinduism and Islam are generally considered to be two very distinct religions. Islamic principles and the Hindu religion are believed to have nothing in common between them. Although Muslims and Hindus lived side by side for centuries on the subcontinent, their religious beliefs are poles apart. However, in the 15th century, the 'Bhakti Movement' developed in the subcontinent tried to bridge the gap between the two communities with regard to their religious differences. The movement was highly successful in the region with a mass following in the subcontinent. This does not mean that Muslims and Hindus started to ignore their religious differences, but that their followers started giving respect to each other and each others religious doctrines. The Bhakti movement developed peaceful religious norms of mutual coexistence. It is useful to mention some of the salient principles of the Bhakti movement in the context of establishing better security relations between India and Pakistan.

The movement was initiated by Kabir [1398-1518] of Banaras [India] who is considered a saint by both Muslims and Hindus. His aim was to propagate peaceful religious norms of Islam and Hinduism. The idea behind the movement was to help Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent to rise above their religious differences and live peacefully together in the undivided India. The Bhakti movement was the converging point of mysticism in Islam and Hinduism. Kabir taught that the attributes of God remain the same whether one calls him "Ram" in Hinduism or "Allah" in Islam. He believed that all these differences were human artifices and not divinely created. He emphasized the positive attributes of Hinduism and Islam which were acceptable to both Hindus and Muslims. He stressed the unity of Muslims and Hindus in a common 'religio-social platform' (Hedayetullah 1977). Kabir also denounced the self appointed guardians of Hinduism, the Brahmins, the caste system in India and the Muslim pirs [clergy] who distorted religion according to their own interests. He proclaimed the universality of human beings while stressing upon the simple and comprehensible principles of Islam and Hinduism to the people. However, after Kabir's death the Bhakti movement fell into disarray**.** The other important popular social practice derived from religious norms is reverence towards Sufism. The shrines of Muslim saints in India are held in high esteem by Hindus and Muslims alike. It is quite interesting to see local Hindus meditating at the shrines of Muslim saints like Saleem Chisti in Fatehpur-Sakri, Mueen uddin Chisti and many others in India.

The popular mass media initiative, "Aman ki Asha' [Desire of Peace] of national dailies like *The News* (*Daily Jang*) of Pakistan and *Times of India* [partially explained in Chapter 1] also explain the deviation of popular social practices from elites social

practices. The popular stories of the masses of both states are published daily in these widely read newspapers in both states. These stories depict the desires of the people to visit their lost belongings on either side of the border, visit their distant and close relatives and a desire for family reunification. The strict visa requirements of both states do not allow people to freely visit each other's countries. Visas are usually issued only for the intended city and people are not allowed to travel throughout the whole country. In spite of all these limitations, the Pakistan High Commission in India on an average issues 500 visas daily (Butalia 2.7.2010). The absurdity of these stringent visa sanctions enforced by the elites are even more evident whenever the border controls are eased a bit with emotional reunions at the border crossings between India and Pakistan of lost family members (Butalia 2.7.2010).

To conclude, the differences between popular and elite social practices allow room for community formation at the popular level. It is important that we study security and identity as a discourse, and not as a pre-established reality of an anarchic world system. The prominent grey areas of cooperation between the two states have been held hostage by the elites due to their dichotomous separation of identities. Indian and Pakistani elites after having identified each other as the other's existential threat, try to fortify their constructed claims with daily routines in order to create the right context for their message. At the elite level, the preparation of educational curriculum, elite's rhetoric and censorship regimes imposed on popular culture are some of the daily routines of the elites. At the popular level, the role of literacy classics, Sufism and popular mass media initiatives show congenial popular social practices for security community formation. In recent decades, the citizens of India and Pakistan have been

presented only one perspective of the other as their enemy. No effort has been made by the ruling elites of either country to promote living with a friendly neighbour with whom both have centuries old cultural ties and experiences.

There is no doubt that a systemic power structure does explain a state's behaviour to a certain extent, but what is often ignored is the cultural determinant of power politics. How does power influence the beliefs of people by supporting myths and the contested social norms of society? The people of both countries have common ancestors, understand the same language, wear the same clothes and quite often imitate each other's social norms at occasions like marriages, yet the 'we-feeling' required for a security community is currently at its lowest ebb. The absence of economic transactions with virtually no interstate institutions to conduct trade between the two countries has hampered the cause of creating an economic community according to the neo-functionalist and functionalist theories of regional integration (Choi and Caporaso 2002). There is limited social mobility across the borders between India and Pakistan which is a key variable required for regional integration. The silver lining lies in re-constructing the state narratives from the vestiges of some common norms developed as Hindu-Muslim communities and evolved by living together for centuries.

The overwhelming success of the secular Indian Congress Party in the 15th general elections in May 2009 and the resolve of the Pakistani government to bring the plotters behind the Mumbai carnage to justice are steps taken in right direction. The Indian Congress party emerged as the largest party in the Lok Sabha [lower house] with its alliance [UPA] winning 262 seats in a house of 573 seats, slightly short of simple majority of 273 and the BJP alliance [NDA] won only 158 seats. These elections are

significant in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist attacks and the belligerency of the BJP camp towards Pakistan. The Indian electorates' dismissal of the BJP's credentials of 'Hindutva' and their communal politics along with their anti-Pakistan slogans are further testimony of the gulf that exists between the elites professed social norms and their acceptance at the popular end.

The norms of mutual respect and friendship are not allowed to develop between the people of both countries by the ruling elites who have their own vested interests in perpetuating the current security dilemma and state rivalry. Indian cinema has the potential to act as an effective non-state actor by playing a vital role in establishing social norms of cooperation and trust building across the borders. A joint venture could be set up between the two countries to produce films on common themes and issues such as poverty and terrorism. It is also essential that text books which profess hatred and intolerance toward each other should be eliminated from the educational curriculum of both states. This is a tall order, but here in lies the foundations of an ever illusive security community based on social norms of peace and harmony. Along with materialistic determinants of a security community what is needed as a precursor is a socially conceptualized "collective identity".

For the resolution of any conflict or the formation of any security community, it is imperative to understand the cultural contexts of the two states. As Bailey explains:

> "In the end the best conflict managers will not be cultural outsiders.
> They will be those for whom the culture is second nature. The enlightened
> outsider, laboriously searching for the relevant cultural constructs, has much
> to learn. The willful outsider, who disdains the search and thinks he has a
> formula good for all occasions and all cultures,has almost everything to learn"
> (Avruch 1998: 108).

In the next section, I will make a brief comparative analysis of hypothetical India-Pakistan security community with the EU and ASEAN. I will first examine two existing securities communities the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This analysis will be based on the path dependence model of security communities discussed in Section 7.1 of this chapter. It will particularly focus on the question of what lessons should be learned from the EU and ASEAN experiences when contemplating an India-Pakistan security community in a social constructivist framework.

7.2 A comparative study of security communities

This section deals with the ideational components of the EU and ASEAN security communities by identifying their hidden normative structures. The argument of elite versus popular social practices will remain the same while treading on the path dependence model of security communities [section 7.1].

7.2.1 European Union [EU]

The first two steps of the path dependence model examined the discursive practices of elites and the role of chosen traumas in effecting the formation of a security community [section 7.1]. In the case of India-Pakistan, I have explained how partition of the subcontinent served as a tool in the hands of the elites to construct each other's identities as hostile binaries [Chapter 4]. In the case of Europe, the shared chosen trauma was the ravages of World War II and the positive role played by the elites in 'desecuritizing' their contentious security issues for higher mutual benefits (Waever 1998). Europe's need for having a common security community has been discursively

constructed out of the fear of war from Europe's past history. The myth of the past fear of war was too strong behind more integration without delving into the minutiae of the we-feeling as a precursor to the formation of a security community. The 'referent' of security shifted from the traditional state centred approach towards a collective fear of Europe's past (Waever 1998).

Critical social constructivists have examined the role of the elites' discursive practices in the integration discourse of the European Union (Onuf 1989; Diez 1999). The language spoken by the elites at 'critical junctures' (Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999) of European integration have special meanings attached to them. It is not only the particular words used by the elites in order to speak for or against the Union , but they can also be viewed in a wider context as 'performatory acts' (Diez 1999). The case of British identity is often juxtaposed with that of German or French identities (Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999). For the British integration with the European Union means the loss of their 'Common Wealth' status and the loss of the portrait of their monarch on the British Pound. The British debate is often Euro-sceptic. The speech of Sir Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on the 11[th] of May 1953 still reflects the British mind set vis-à-vis the European Union. At the time, Churchill stated: "we have our own Commonwealth and Empire" (Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999). In contrast to this perspective, an analysis of German and French elites shows the use of 'Euro-Speak' rhetoric. For the Germans their identity construction after World War II required integration and more Europeanization to overcome the guilty feelings of being responsible for the war. At the time, Thomas Mann claimed, "we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany" (Marcussen, Risse et al. 1999: 622).

The third step in the formation of a security community at the popular level is the presence of socio-cultural norms for the formation of a collective identity. For the case of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community, I have chosen linguistic similarity and common popular social practices. In contrast to it the European Union is a peculiar security community in the sense that though every European state strives for its membership, there is no common perception of European identity which binds the European societies together. It is remarkable that states in the European Union have compromised their sovereignty to a supra-national organization without socializing or presenting a unified European identity to their people. If it is essential for a security community to develop a "we-feeling" among the people of various nations, then it can be asked where is this common feeling in the case of the EU?

It is part of the European integration process that there is no essentialist version of national identity which is based upon the categorical assessment of an out-group and an in-group identities or us versus them (Tajfel 1982). In other words, at the popular level, although people in Europe today have national identities, they also carry with them the semblance of a 'European' identity which is not based on the concept of Europe as the 'Other'. From a sociological point of view, people carry multiple identities and these identities do not necessarily have to conflict. Instead these multiple identities can be seen as forming 'eccentric' circles of identities, each accommodative of the other (Risse 2009). European identity also includes the concept of 'bounded integration'(Cederman 2001). This means that the nation states carry their national identities along with the 'we feeling' of a community while bound together in a territory (Cederman 2001). Cederman examines the reality on the ground by exploring the level of the 'civic participation' of

Europeanization norms in 'education, language and mass media'(Cederman 2001). The

conclusions drawn are startling, since the nation states in Europe have a tight grip on their

educational policies. The curriculum is primarily being taught in respective national

nomenclature and Europeans show a preference of choosing their own national channels

when watching mass media (Cederman 2001). This sense of bounded-ness may be one of

the prime reasons for the absence of a European 'demos' that is a community that is made

up of people carrying the 'we-feeling' among themselves

Another aspect of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community is the role of

the mass media and the impact Indian films have on Pakistani audience. Let us analyze

the role of the mass media as an intermediary between national identities and European

identity. Deutsch has already conceptualized the 'we-feeling' as a result of the dense

communicative network between the states in a security community (Deutsch 1970).

There is a definitive role which the mass media plays in constructing collective identities

(Schlesinger 1991; Schlesinger 1993; Rajagopal 2001). A space for the 'European Public

sphere' was created in the national public sphere in order to realize this objective. This

reality grapples with the fact that there was no national recognition or legislation to

provide the European public sphere a space in the various countries' national media until

the first half of the 1980s (Semetko, Vreese et al. 2000). In 1984 the European

Community issued a 'Green paper' on 'Television without Frontiers' (TWF). The

implementation of this TWF directive depended upon the national regulations which each

state had devised for its media policy (Harcourt 2002). The E.C. directive 'Television

without Frontiers' was amended twice and its latest version is now a days called the

'Audiovisual Media Services Directive' (AVMSD). It 'covers all EU audiovisual media

services' and must be incorporated into national law by the end of 2009 (AVMSD 2009). This latest directive does not oblige any European nation states to promote the imaginary concept of European cultural identity, but rather its aim is to create a 'level playing field' for the commercial activities of the audiovisual industry among various media players of the Union. In an ambiguous way Article 3(i) of the directive asks the member states to promote 'European works', but does not specify what exactly is meant by 'European works'. What then is the normative structure of the EU which sets the terms of inclusion and exclusion in this security community?

The cultural demarcation of European identity can be found in the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 and which came into effect in 2009. In the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty it is clearly written what is meant by Europe.

> "DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist
> inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values
> of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom,
> democracy, equality and the rule of law, (*Europa* 2007: emphasis original)

Therefore, the 'inspiration'-al value of the European Union forms the core of European identity. If we historically examine the inheritance of Europe we find a cultural fault line running through the entire region of Europe. Judean-Christian identity, the schism between the Judean-Christian tradition, the struggle with the papacy and absolutism, the Crusades, the period of the Enlightenment and the civil rights movements, are all various manifestations of this grand family 'inheritance' that is shared by all Europeans. It does not matter if the interest of the various individual European states were conflicted with regard to these trends, the states were still all involved in one way or the other. All European states owe their traditions to this common 'inheritance'. It is important to historically deconstruct the values of this inheritance in order to arrive at a

better sense of what constitutes European identity. In his book 'Europe, a history', the

historian Norman Davies explains the 'concept of Europe'. It is worth quoting his exact

words, he points out:

> "Europe" is a relatively modern idea. It gradually replaced the earlier
> concept of 'Christendom' in a complex intellectual process lasting from
> the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. The decisive period, however,
> was reached in the decades on either side of 1700 after generations of
> religious conflict. In that early phase of the Enlightenment it became an
> embarrassment for the divided community of nations to be reminded of
> their common Christian identity; and 'Europe' filled the need for a
> designation with more neutral connotations" (Davies 1996: 7).

Davies quotes T.S. Eliot, a famous poet, who said on the eve of the German defeat in

1945 that:

> "I am talking about the common traditions of Christianity which has
> made Europe what it is, and about the common cultural elements which
> this common Christianity has brought with it.…It is in Christianity that
> our arts have developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe
> _until recently_ have been rooted. It is against a backdrop of Christianity
> that all our thoughts have significance. An individual European may not
> believe that the Christian Faith is true, and yet what he says, and makes,
> and does, will all…depend on [the Christian heritage] for its meaning"
> (Davies 1996: 9).

It might be true that a simplistic monolithic European cultural identity does not

exist in today's European Union. The long hiatus of changing trends has severely limited

the scope of a single European identity. But I am interested here in exploring a unified

European identity. I am interested in tracing the legacy of Europe which is based on these

historical epochs, shared among diverse European states and experienced by all ordinary

Europeans. In other words, it is Europe's shared interests based on its common heritage

that determine the rules for inclusion or exclusion from membership in the EU.

At the popular level, the opinion polls conducted by the BBC in various EU

countries shows strong opposition to Turkish membership. This can be explained on the

parameters of the European Union's normative structure. The reasons cited against

Turkish membership were its large population, high poverty levels and 'doubts about cultural compatibility with Europe'. The strongest opposition came from the French, the Germans and the Austrians (www.bbc.com 30.9.2005). In the same BBC survey a very interesting remark was made by Guillaume Parmentier, a leading French political pundit, who said, "the Turkish elite has been European for centuries; but the vast democratic expansion of Turkey involves Anatolian peasants, who are not European by culture, tradition or habit"(www.bbc.com 30.9.2005).

The famous phrase by nineteenth century Italian statesman Massimo d'Azeglio, that "we have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans" (Cederman 2001), still has some resonance in today's European identity discourse. There are a few lessons to be taken from the formation of the EU. One lesson is the positive role played by the ruling elites in creating a common security community. Another lesson can be drawn from the popular level that is how in the end Europe's chosen trauma of World War II had the positive effect of increasing support among European nation states and peoples for the formation of a common security community which ultimately led to the formation of the European Union. I will now explain the normative structure of ASEAN.

7.2.2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]

ASEAN is an association of ten countries of Southeast Asia formed in 1967. These include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam. If the EU was able to flourish in a cobweb of legalistic norms guided by their institutionalist's practices, then ASEAN represents a different type of security community which shows an aversion to such

institutionalism. There is little interference by the Secretariat of ASEAN in Jakarta in the domestic affairs of its member states. ASEAN's policy of non-interference has been proudly cited as the "ASEAN way" and this is the normative structure of ASEAN. The problem with ASEAN countries is that some of them have been under long spells of despotic rule. In these cases, the state's identities were being 'engineered' by these elites amid challenges of increased ethnic diversity and the lack of civic culture whereby, they served as socio-cultural 'gatekeepers'(Shaw 2009). Faced with conditions of increased ethnic diversity and the weak institutional stability of ASEAN, the task of formulating 'national values' was conducted by the states elites as a 'legitimate discourse'(Shaw 2009).

Why ASEAN is such a loosely structured security community and what is the relevance of 'the ASEAN way' in its normative structure in making this security community? The 'socio-cultural' norms that make up 'the ASEAN way' are "Mushawaraya" [consultation] and 'Mufakat" [consensus] (Acharya 2009b). ASEAN norms have already been studied at the elite level (Solidum 1981; Adler, Barnett et al. 2000; Acharya 2001; Rumelili 2007). However, at the popular level, they have seldom been explained. My study of ASEAN is based on some anthropological insights taken from its member states. This will help us to understand the informality behind the normative structure of the ASEAN way.

Generally, the political culture of ASEAN countries shows that all Southeast Asian states are "galactic" polities. Stanley Tambiah first used the term "galactic" polities to refer to states that act as if they occupy their own autonomous galaxies in the universe where each has its own 'sphere of influence' and distinctiveness (Huang 2009: 16).

Anthropological and sociological studies of ASEAN countries (Kahn 1998; Goda 1999) explain the presence of highly patriarchal and hierarchical societies where subservience to the command of the higher authority does not represent the transgression of individual rights or liberties, but rather is seen as a matter of respect towards the authority. Southeast Asian culture as a whole shows reverence to religious ideals and the beliefs of Confucius.

All ASEAN countries, with the exception of Thailand, were subjugated by colonial rule for a long time. This is their common and shared chosen trauma. There are more spiritual and social obligations of 'give and take' in a community setting, rather than any explicit rules or codified laws. The other important factor underlying Southeast Asian nations (apart from subjugation from colonialism) is the reverence of the people towards religion. It is a strange concomitance that four different religions are practiced by ASEAN countries which includes Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism.

The 'ASEAN way' is a delicate balance of religious, cultural and ancient social practices from Southeast Asian societies. Ancient kingdoms and the presence of four religions have made it a very long cultural discourse to traverse, but I will only focus on those aspects which are relevant for understanding the 'informality' behind the decision making processes of the ASEAN security community. The Indonesian concept of a leader and a follower revolves around the traditional norms of "bapakism" which refers to a 'bapak' (father) and the 'anuk buah' or children (Pye and Pye 1985: 117). A leader is like a father who guides his children through the vicissitudes of the dangers of the outside world and in return desires the respect and reverence of his followers. That is how the former Indonesian President Sukerno developed the concept of 'guided democracy'

during his reign. There is explicit 'reciprocity' in 'patronage clientage relationship' in an Indonesian society (Pye and Pye 1985). In the Philippines, they also have a similar cultural practice called 'utang-na-loob'. This means if someone receives a favour in the Philippines then he is personally obliged to reciprocate the favour (Pye and Pye 1985: 124).

In Burma, group identity is centred around the concept of 'awza' (Pye and Pye 1985) which means that one who has leadership qualities in a group will be implicitly recognized and will not be openly celebrated as the group leader. In other words, it is a 'subjective' attribute which is intersubjectively recognized by all the members of the group. But at the same time it is also a contested concept since every Burmese boasts of 'pon' or authority and aspires for 'awza' in a group setting. Furthermore, if one fails to succeed in one's endeavours he will attribute it to 'abnadeh' (Pye and Pye 1985) which is an innate desire to help the cause of others at the expense of one's own personal sacrifice. Similarly, in Thai culture the consideration towards others or deference for other's cause is a virtue called as 'krengjie'(Pye and Pye 1985). Thai culture explains that ordinary people are vulnerable and therefore must bow before the commands of the superior. Every superior has to manifest kindness towards others which is called 'metta' which in return 'certifies' the superior with 'karuna' which is the 'constructive' leadership quality to lead from the front (Pye and Pye 1985). The legitimacy of the use of power in Vietnamese culture depends upon 'uy tin' which means 'trustworthy authority' (Pye and Pye 1985) and there is a moral sense attached to it (Pye and Pye 1985). Another obligation for leaders in Vietnam is to uphold the practice of 'phuc duc' which means

that one has to do good deeds so that the future generations will enjoy the fruit (Pye and Pye 1985).

The Malaysian culture in times of conflict demands complete silence and withdrawal by suppressing the emotions and preventing any hue and cry (Pye and Pye 1985). This helps us to understand the Malaysian people's peaceful posture towards Indonesia in the mid-1960s during Suharto's reign in Indonesia, in spite of 'konfrontashi' [armed conflict] with Indonesia during the years of President Suekarno's term in office in Indonesia. It was during this same time that ASEAN was founded in 1967. Malaysian cultural norms eschew violent revenge or crying out in pain. Malaysian society is also 'loosely structured' (Pye and Pye 1985). In the eyes of Malaysian people, authority is centred on "deferential accommodation, Islamic norms of fatalistic commitment to uncompromising ideals and British aristocratic standards of fair play but with status barriers" (Pye and Pye 1985: 256).

ASEAN represents a socially constructed community that has been carefully created by the elites who at the same time remain sensitive to the prevailing cultural norms of the region. 'Communitarian' values that stress upon people's obligations rather than their 'individualistic' rights form a central part of "Asian values" (Blondel 2006). The ideational components of a security community also emphasise on individual's obligations and the respect one owes to his superiors or guardians similar to the traditional Asian family structure. For example, for Thai people the King is the highest source of authority and the monarchy is Thailand's 'cherished' national symbol which is accorded the highest level of 'legitimacy' (Reynolds 2005). How can the structure of

ASEAN's 'nascent' security community overtake a centuries old traditional system of monarchy?

The mutual compatibility of local traditions and foreign ideas has led to the distinctive 'constitutive localization' (Acharya 2004; Acharya 2009a) of security community norms. With 'constitutive localization', 'foreign' ideas of regional cooperation or community are not being subsumed en-mass, but rather they are trimmed and tailored by the elites according to the popular prescription and cultural milieu, before its adoption at the regional level. The lessons to be learned from the formation of the ASEAN security community is the unique informal role consultation plays for elites in shaping policies that respect the social traditions and cultural milieu of ASEAN societies. The long struggle of these states against colonial rule is their common shared chosen trauma so the elites are particularly mindful of the independence and sovereignty of each state. This explains the absence of intuitionalism in ASEAN. ASEAN is also an elite driven project, but it has no wide popular base to carry this project forward.

7.2.3 The comparison

It is important to note that the amalgamation of both material and ideational components is required for the formation of a security community. The presence of a normative structure in the security community provides states with a shared world view. However, the impact of this normative structure differs in all three security communities. Popular culture in the India-Pakistan security community is of immense significance to both states, even though it might be meaningless in the EU or ASEAN contexts. The hypothetical India-Pakistan security community follows a bottom-up approach [from

popular to elite] due to the similarity of socio-cultural factors at the popular level. In contrast to it the EU and ASEAN followed a top-down approach [from elites to popular] in the formation of a security community. A comparative table of these variables and their impact on the three security communities summarises the result as follows:

Material factors	European Union	ASEAN	India/ Pakistan
Shared Interests	No war after 1945, the communist threat	The communist threat	The nuclear rivalry and the Kashmir dispute
Hegemony	USA security shield	USA withdrawal	USA & USSR rivalry
Ideational factors			
Chosen trauma	World War II	Colonialism	Partition of the subcontinent
Interests	Elites' guided project	Elites' talk shop	Elites social practices as hostile binaries
Normative variable			
Culture	Judaea-Christian common culture	'ASEAN way' at elites level only	Positive norms at popular level
			Negative norms at elites' level

Positive Impact	(yellow)
Negative impact	(orange)
Partially positive impact	(green)

Table 7.1: A comparative analysis of security communities

In the case of the EU, all the three variables [material, ideational and normative] have a positive impact since the states show shared cultural traits along with a shared interest to avoid the communist threat. Perhaps more interestingly is the role played by the presence of United States hegemony that offered a sort of security umbrella to help achieve the target of the formation of a collective security community. The chosen trauma of World War II was positively constructed by the elites to further the cause of integration in Europe and at the popular level, it also acted as a psychological deterrent in the minds of Europeans not to become an obstacle in the path of the formation of the European Union. The Judaea-Christian culture of the European Union is an implicit normative structure which forms the rules of inclusion and exclusion.

Southeast Asian states also possessed a shared interest in preventing the spread of the communist threat and this helped to facilitate the establishment of the ASEAN security community since there was no large superpower in the region [both are considered positive attributes]. The colonial struggle was the common chosen trauma of all ASEAN countries except Thailand [partial positive]. ASEAN does not share a common culture at the popular level, but it shows some positive effects at the elite level. The ASEAN way is the normative structure of ASEAN and after tracing its way from the socio-cultural norms of ASEAN societies it works well at the elite level only [partial positive].

In the case of the India-Pakistan hypothetical security community, both states have shared material interests to resolve the Kashmir issue and their nuclear rivalry [positive attributes], but during the Cold War the superpower rivalry in the region re-aligned India and Pakistan in opposite camps [negative attribute]. India sided with the

former USSR and Pakistan became the 'allied ally' of the USA. Among both states the partition of the subcontinent is their shared chosen trauma, but this was negatively portrayed by the elites' social practices in the identity discourses of both states [negative attribute]. The normative structure in the shape of popular culture of India-Pakistan shows some partial positive trends by way of popular social practices, but they are negatively valued by way of elites' social practices.

In order to understand the nature of security communities, I invoke here the dichotomous sociological terms first introduced by German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies. The terms are 'Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft' (Tonnies 1955). 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' are both forms of associations between people but on a slightly different scale. In the Gemeinschaft, the 'natural will' forms the underlying core of the association in which people share the same cultural understandings and memory groups together in a community. In the Gesellschaft, the 'rational will' of participating members forges them to make an alliance or association and their primary motives are to achieve individual material interest through collective action. It does not mean that there is no material interests involve in Gemeinschaft, but the trigger for an alliance is primarily based on shared common norms.

The European Union is more rationally organized and consensually formatted where Gesellschaft features are more common in contrast to the ASEAN and the India-Pakistan security communities which possess Gemeinschaft attributes. Although the member states of the European Union have an implicit understanding of their common heritage, it is still primarily their rational material interests which drive the engine of the European Union. In contrast to it the highly paternalistic Asian societies are more akin to

organize themselves normatively than following an organized economic agenda for the fulfilment of security community objectives. It is perhaps good to end this section by quoting Tonnies who pointed out that "the essential character of such organizations is an existing common natural will or a constituted common rational will, both of which are conceived of as unities" (Tonnies 1955: 247).

The 'context bounded' security communities are working according to their 'role specific' behaviour. The European Union security community affirms the efficacy of institutional norms and a move forward approach despite its vast cultural diversity. The fear psychology of Europe's past has had a huge impact in gathering support for the cause of the greater union. But how much integration and how long it will go is the question being asked in today's Europe? It seems that there is too much on Europe's integration plate than it can be safely digest. This has taken the EU to the crossroads. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the novel experiment of the EU in the twenty first century has severely dented the rationale of state centric approaches, but the sustainability of such a *magnum opus* is making further policy choices hard to realize. On the other hand, the individual member states in Europe are increasingly becoming schizophrenic to any new tides of immigration in lieu of further integration. The lofty ideals of multi-culturalism and liberalism are now being questioned daily not only in the public discourse, but on the floors of the parliaments of the member states.

The ASEAN security community is dependant upon the constraining power of norms on its ruling elites. The changing behaviour of states in ASEAN is well accounted for if we seek guidance from cultural factors constructing the societies of Southeast Asia. It is imperative to study these social factors instead of lumping them together as like

units. ASEAN is better understood by using the metaphor of the 'two level game' (Schelling 1980). One game is being played by the elites at the forum of ASEAN while the other is being played by the societal norms which shape the conduct of the elites' at home. If we deconstruct ASEAN at the two levels and see the influence of cultural variables we can understand the presence of a wide gulf between its official claims of intersubjective community norms and the states' actual social practices.

The hypothetical India-Pakistan security community shows viable and visible under currents present at the popular level of the two countries which can provide focal points for the ruling elites. In order to explain the duality between state's social practices and people's mass perceptions, one needs to look at socio-cultural accounts. The problem with both India and Pakistan relates to the 'forces of production' being in the hands of contesting elites who are involved in making 'cultures of insecurity' (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999).

In sum, every security community is context specific and culturally 'bounded' where its ditto replications around the globe are only a delusion. The making of a security community is contingent on pre-existing cultural fault lines which define the identity of the region. A common or similar identity is in turn commensurate with the building of a security community. Security communities revolve around a shared sense of belonging to a region. There are common ideational factors or normative structures underlying the collective material interests of the states in a security community. This leads to 'we-ness' among the member states of the security community. The normative structure is based on a cultural core described by Anand as the 'value systems and perceived norms shared by states' delegates at formal and informal meetings which are helpful in creating a sense of

regional solidarity, leading to jointly approved decisions" (Anand 1981: xxiv). It is

important to stress in conclusion the immense value of the cultural and the normative

aspects of security communities. The more we appreciate their path dependence model on

normative grounds the better we can identify their respective spheres of influence and

understand their motivations and actions.

Conclusion

The former Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral once commented , "A solution between Pakistan and India had to be evolved, not presented to the people, as if a magician had pulled a rabbit out of a bag" (Nayar 16-7-2010). Accepting this evolutionary nature of India-Pakistan security relations, I examined the security discourses of both states by exploring the complex and dichotomous relationship between elite and popular social practices. It is also important to understand this dichotomous analysis. In both countries people have minimal contact with each other and this gives the free hand to the ruling elites to promote animosity through their social practices toward each other for their own vested interests. These divergent attitudes are closely tied to the respective identity discourses of the two states. But paradoxically, the cross border transcendence of popular culture has brought the people of both states, who share linguistic commonalities, closer together. This inadvertently encouraged me to adopt the 'popular culture approach' and study these two societies at the popular level (Milliken 2001).

The constructed-ness of this security dilemma was elaborated at the elite level, while steps for an abstract or hypothetical security community were explained at the popular level. The stranglehold that both states' elites have on their respective state's security discourses shows some of the impediments that stand in the way of forming a security community between India and Pakistan. This study highlighted the ideational or the socio-cultural components of the rivalry between India and Pakistan and these components play a central role in my arguments. Foucault called these social aspects of society as 'regimes of truth' (Foucault 1994). He further insisted that there are social and

cultural limitations of these truths (Nizamani 2008). In the context of India and Pakistan security relations these 'regimes' of truth constructed by ruling elites encircle both states' identities and are based on an inventory of their social norms. My aim was to bring to light some of these social norms on which these 'regimes of truth' are based. The elites have manipulated socio-cultural myths to spread animosity between the populations of both states. An American observer during India Pakistan war of 1965 vividly captured this popular mood. His views expressed over thirty five years ago are valid even for our contemporary times. He noted:

> "Again and again I have heard Pakistanis say India does not accept
> Pakistan and is determined to destroy it; that Indians can't fight and
> won't fight…again and again I have heard Indians say that Pakistan is a
> ruthless dictatorship and theocracy; that Pakistan is bent on destroying
> India and determined to destroy the large Hindu minority in Pakistan"
> (Jones 2009: 94).

This study uses social constructivism as its theoretical basis while at the same time employing anthropological observations. The theoretical edifice of social constructivism seems the obvious choice among the myriad of other state centric rational theories in International Relations because of its emphasis on understanding the social identities of states as the precursor to their material interests. I avoided adopting any particular variant of social constructivism, but my effort to study states' identities as a discourse or part of a process is conducted from a social constructivist perspective. This was an interpretative study. It was not intended to provide an exhaustive history of India-Pakistan security relations. To explain interstate behavior by looking at material dispositions of power which are based upon predefined realist epistemologies is a much easier task. As compared to this, in order to develop a causal argument that shows the link between socio-cultural factors and states' identities is an altogether a completely

different proposition. I dwelled on the later part by highlighting soft variables like culture, norms and narratives that are often not even considered by the state centric rational approaches.

There have been a few examples of cultural or social constructivist studies that have examined the historical events of these two countries, however, no one had yet attempted to conduct a comprehensive study to unravel the contrasting identities and interests of the two states from a social constructivist standpoint. The aim of this study is to bridge that gap by looking at additional socio-cultural contributing factors. I argued that the socio-cultural dimension of the security dilemma, which has hitherto remained unexamined by rational theories in IR, must be given more attention in the context of India-Pakistan rivalry. I showed that problematizing states' identities can provide an alternative way to understand their mutual security relations. Although I acknowledged that this security dilemma was partly created because of the material interests of the two states, I argued that socio-cultural components are equally important and also need to be examined. The rivalry between the two states is because of an intersubjectively designed or mutually consensual social structure that was created by the elites of the two states through their social practices. My effort was to explore these social practices and if the state is the societal writ at large then we should be able to explain the security practices of a state to be the offshoot of these societal norms. Let us review the arguments presented in the earlier chapters.

After explaining the general proposition, my problem statement, research questions and methodology in Chapter 1, I pointed out the theoretical relevancy of social constructivism for my case study in Chapter 2. It was not my intent in Chapter 2 to

completely disregard the materialistic claims of rationalist theories of IR, but rather I seek to add to this body of knowledge by taking additional socio-cultural components into account. Chapter 3 defined security dilemmas and security communities from this ideational perspective. This chapter sets a theoretical framework which reformulated security dilemmas from a social constructivist's ontology and referred to it as a *social security dilemma*. This was done because of the need of having new insights on this term which form the basis of my two empirical case studies which were done in Chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 4 studied the identity discourses of India and Pakistan during the formative phase of state building by accentuating the role of ideology as a thick signifier of identity. I explored identity through the speeches of founding fathers of India and Pakistan, their constitutional arrangements, the ideological commitments of elites and the divergent attitudes between popular and elite social practices. The identities of both states were constructed as hostile binaries due to the ideologically based social practices of the elites. The popular social practices showed disillusionment towards the elites' constructed identity discourses of the two states. Following this argument, I examined the credentials of Pakistan's pseudo-Islamic identity and Indian 'Hindutva' norms which give us clue regarding the nature of the two states' divergent social practices. The results were startling as it laid bare the Indian secular claims to its identity and exposed the equally important link of Islamic discourse to Pakistan's identity. The constitutional history of the two states further enhances doubts regarding the presence of the two states' espoused identity claims. The elites have been able to construct these identities with the help of shared 'chosen traumas' experienced by the people of both states.

An empirical case study of the Kashmir dispute was conducted in Chapter 5, while the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan was discussed in Chapter 6. Normally, both cases are strong avenues for realist assertions of power politics in the region. They have frequently been cited as the core disputes of materialistic dispositions and the primary causes of the security dilemma between the two states. An examination of the social practices of Indian and Pakistani elites showed how the distinct identity of Kashmir is being suppressed underneath India and Pakistan's vested identity discourses. The case study of Kashmir was explained as a trilateral quest of identities of India, Pakistan and Kashmir. The distinct identity of Kashmir based on indigenous norms called 'Kashmiriyat' was examined in detail. These are the norms specific to Kashmir and have so far been denied any space to flourish by the elites' social practices of both India and Pakistan.

The study of nuclear rivalries is commonly based on the nexus of power and prestige. Without negating the significance of these factors, I explored the ideational components of this issue by conducting a discourse analysis of the speeches of Indian and Pakistani elites which strongly showed the presence of socio-cultural norms underpinning their decision to go nuclear in 1998. The social practices of the Hindu fundamentalist party BJP elites and the decision to go nuclear in 1998 showed the importance of 'Hindutva' norms. Similarly, Pakistan's nuclear discourse showed elites' propagating pseudo-religious myths based on an eminent Indian threat while projecting the cause of an Islamic bomb. This 'symbolic entrenchment' of their nuclear discourses based on religious myths was also demonstrated through the nomenclature of the nuclear missiles programmes of the two states (Hassner 2006). However, popular social practices showed

a general lack of knowledge by the majority of the people in both states concerning these vital security issues regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.

A corollary of my central hypothesis is to indicate any prospect of change in the security relations between India and Pakistan. Social constructivism is not a recipe for predicting whirlwind changes in the security relations of staunch foes. However, by focusing on the fluidity of the social identities of states, as well as on the formation of the ensuing intersubjective normative structure prescribing and proscribing agents' actions, it does hold out 'promise' for prescribing 'how and where change may occur' (Hopf 1998: 180). It raises some prospects of change, mainly through its emphasis on highlighting the process, rather than focusing on the inherent flawed structure of anarchy. This aspect of change was studied under a normative shadow which looms large in the later part of my study. This transpired in the shape of envisaging a hypothetical security community between the two countries in Chapter 7. By exploring what norms would be necessary for a hypothetical security community between India and Pakistan, this examination anticipated that 'promised' change. In my view, it is important to explore such a community between the two countries considering the low levels of trust between them and the incessant tides of terrorism in the region. For India and Pakistan, change will be an evolutionary process that requires the exploration of peaceful norms on which the foundations of a relationship between the two states can be built. This study actually identified the negative norms constructed at the elite level which impede the formation of a security community between the two states. The norms identified here include educational norms, the rhetoric of the elites, the censorship regimes imposed on mass media and political party manifestos. At the same time the positive norms were studied

under the banner of popular social practices. These norms included the impact of Indian films on Pakistani audiences, the mass media initiative for peace, the presence of nostalgic feelings of each other in literary classics and religious practices. Popular culture in the form of Indian films was identified as an intervening variable between identity and the social practices of the states.

In Chapter 7, the abstract India-Pakistan security community was further juxtaposed with the already established security communities of the EU and ASEAN. This brief comparison sought to expose the differences in the normative sub-structures underlying these security communities. This implicit normative intersubjective structure varies across regions and is primarily dependant upon regional norms. More importantly, it forms the rules of exclusion and inclusion for states in a security community. The presence of distinct normative sub-structures underpinning these three security communities further corroborates the efficacy of taking into account socio-cultural factors when studying security communities.

After recapping and skimming through the main arguments what can we conclude? I conclude my remarks by looking at some ontological and epistemological questions. My ontological premises in studying this security dilemma are both cultural and social constructivist. While exploring the distinct national narratives and religious myths regarding India and Pakistan's identities, I brought some of the influencing socio-cultural factors that influence the construction of these identities to the forefront. Moreover, by exploring the social norms necessary for the formation of a security community, I adopted a social constructivist epistemology. It infact showed that the attempt to use a theoretical straightjacket in order to have a better understanding of

security issues of the Third World in particular is futile. One way of overcoming this theoretical inadequacy, is to study the cultural variables of a region. Social constructivist scholars working on Asian regional integration have explored the intersection of local norms with the international nomenclature of security communities through a process called 'constitutive localization' (Acharya 2009a). This 'constitutive localization' depends upon a 'cognitive prior' in the shape of local beliefs and 'local agents' (Acharya 2009a). The role of Indian and Pakistani elites as entrepreneurs of norms of animosity have had their work cut out for themselves with the careful 'framing' and 'grafting' of these norms through local myths and traditions while shaping the discourse of their respective national identities. Rather than following institutional norms of security community as universal prescriptions of security problems around the globe, the localised norms tell us about areas of convergence and disparities before arriving at empirical generalizations.

In other words, a cultural perspective supplants an explanation based on material interests for the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. While lamenting the poverty of South Asian intellectuals in bringing forward any coherent theoretical understanding of their regional security relations, Nizamani explains security policies as "responses to the constant making and re-making dynamics of the societal fabric in which internal and external realms are fused together in a complex manner" (Nizamani 2008: 103). It is most of the time a state's external social practices which get acclaim for a state's social identity. In the subcontinent the identity of a state owes a huge debt to its internal 'social fabric'. I tried to expose these underlying social forces in order to provide a framework for the dynamics of a security community, while showing that hitherto

Indian and Pakistani social identities have remained unexplored in the state centric terrain of the rational theories.

Throughout my dissertation, I remain beset with one primary concern, 'When will the poverty stricken people of South Asia be able to enjoy the fruits of cooperation or social harmony'? The worst scenario for Pakistan is that it will be torn apart in the wake of current terrorist upsurge and that this may have a domino affect in the region leading to the destabilization of many states. India is also vulnerable since it has already been hit by terrorists' attacks and currently faces a dozen plus secessionist movements amid Hindu jingoistic parties. Sri-Lanka, battered by 30 years of war against LTTE, has a long way to go to pacify the grievances of the ethnic Tamils in order to bring them into the mainstream national discourse along with the majority Sinhalese. Bhutan and Nepal have refugee crises and have come to blows several times at their borders. Amongst all these security crises of South Asian states, the rivalry between nuclear armed India and Pakistan is at the centre stage. The pragmatic answer to the question of peace is always negative with the security situation becoming grimmer with each passing day. Banking on political realism, perhaps the stakes first need to be raised. Maybe if there is a nuclear confrontation between the two states this will finally lead to the stark realization that there is a pressing need for the elites of India and Pakistan to stop demonizing each other and start to cooperate for the mutual benefit of the peoples' of both states. Yet is it realistic to kill with nuclear bombs over one half of a billion plus population of both states? Is this not rather mutually assured destruction [MAD]? Then what are some of the other alternatives to initiate the states elites to cooperate? The potential for peace lies in their shared indigenous cultural norms. Western devised theoretical insights cannot

capture the exploratory or explanatory powers of these norms. I have only emphasized a handful of these norms to explore long term prospects of confidence building measures [CBMs] between the two states. By long term I am referring to a sociological change in the mind sets of the people of the two states and this does not refer to changes in the strategic interests of the two states. The differences between the European Union and the hypothetical India-Pakistan security community can be highlighted by using German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies' concepts of 'Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft' (Tonnies 1955). According to Tonnies:

> "Gemeinschaft relates to a certain sense of belonging based on shared loyalties, norms and values, kinship or ethnic ties…Gesellschaft, on the other hand, relates that people remain independent from each other as individuals, but may decide in a 'social contract', or a 'convention', to group together for the conduct of profit-making transactions" (Quayes 2008:130).

The EU falls into the camp of Gesellshaft meaning thereby, that a social contract is being constructed for exclusive monetary gains by rational actors to keep disparate states together in an association, while the India-Pakistan abstract security community alludes to Gemeinschaft which refers to a normative sense of belonging based on shared memories, myths and social norms. There is enough potential in emphasizing common shared social norms found at the popular level which can later be used in the path dependence model of their security community. The future discourse of community formation between India and Pakistan depends on the ruling elites who should bring to light these hidden norms of Gemeinschaft, evolved while living together for centuries, in order to ensure a safe and peaceful future of subsequent generations. The irony behind this is that elites do recognize the proclivity of working amicably with each other, but they themselves are entrapped in their socially constructed security dilemma. For

example the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Pakistan in 1999. In the visitor's

book at the historic Minar-i-Pakistan [place where Pakistan resolution was passed in

1940], Vajpayee wrote: "India's integrity and prosperity depends upon the integrity and

prosperity of Pakistan" (Nayar 16.7.2010).

Although, the socially constructed security dilemma between India and Pakistan is

an elites' creation, its obliteration via a security community is based on popular social

practices. Understanding this dichotomous level of analysis [elites versus popular] will

help us to understand the security dilemma of India and Pakistan and will further

encourage to envisage the foundation of a security community between these two arch

nuclear rivals.

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Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift worden de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen India en Pakistan bestudeerd vanuit een perspectief dat afwijkt van de gangbare benaderingen. In deze studie wordt de doeltreffendheid van de sociaal-constructivistische benadering bij het verklaren van de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen India en Pakistan onderzocht. Waarom deze benadering? Er is geen twijfel over mogelijk dat er veel materiële verklaringen zijn geopperd voor de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen deze twee landen. Er worden echter zelden alternatieve verklaringen gegeven die afwijken van deze materialistische ideeën. Mijn werk benadrukt echter de sociaal-culturele aspecten van de rivaliteit tussen India-Pakistan. Het verklaren van het veiligheidsdilemma en het verkennen van sociale normen voor de potentiële vorming van een veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen deze twee landen, zijn de uitgangspunten van dit proefschrift.

Ik beargumenteer dat de rivaliteit tussen India en Pakistan grotendeels veroorzaakt wordt door het gedrag van elites. Daarbij onderscheid ik de sociale gebruiken van de elites en de bevolking en benadruk de verschillen tussen beide. Het is belangrijk om dit onderscheid goed te begrijpen. Enerzijds zijn het de elites die een intersubjectief patroon van animositeit tussen India en Pakistan creëren en zo het veiligheidsdilemma vormgeven. Anderzijds zijn er op het niveau van de bevolking ook positieve normen - gebaseerd op onderling begrip tussen de bevolkingen van de twee staten – die mogelijk tot een veiligheidsgemeenschap kunnen leiden. Voortbouwend op deze sociale gebruiken van de bevolking, werpt dit proefschrift licht op de mogelijkheden voor een potentiële veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen India en Pakistan. In andere woorden, er wordt een *bottom-up* benadering van veiligheidsgemeenschapformatie geformuleerd. In de regel

worden veiligheidsgemeenschappen vanuit een *top-down* perspectief geanalyseerd. Hierin gaat het om elites die door middel van gedeelde normen de intersubjectieve coöperatieve omgeving creëren die nodig is voor het vormen van een veiligheidsgemeenschap. Ik benadruk dat er in India en Pakistan sprake zou kunnen zijn van een *bottom-up* proces dat gevormd wordt door de dagelijkse gewoontes en sociale gebruiken van de bevolking van de twee staten.

Het theoretische deel van dit proefschrift licht toe waarom het neo-realisme en het neo-liberalisme niet in staat zijn om de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen India en Pakistan adequaat te verklaren. Daarnaast werpt dit deel licht op hoe een sociaal-constructivistisch perspectief ons deze rivaliteit kan doen begrijpen door middel van het problematiseren van de identiteit van de staat. Als onderdeel van dit sociaal-constructivistische theoretische kader is de term 'veiligheidsdilemma' – wat in wezen een realistische term is – geherdefinieerd als 'sociaal veiligheidsdilemma'. Dit sociale veiligheidsdilemma is gebaseerd op het onderscheid tussen de sociale gebruiken van de elites en de bevolking. De postkoloniale samenlevingen van India en Pakistan laten een cognitieve kloof zien – vanwege de tegengestelde sociale gebruiken van de elites en de bevolking - omtrent de identiteit en de belangen van de staat. De elites hebben deze kloof gebruikt om een staatsidentiteit te stichten gebaseerd op normen van rivaliteit opzichte van de andere staat. Dit heeft tot een cultuur van animositeit tussen India en Pakistan geleid. Aldus is een veiligheidsdilemma, dat conventioneel wordt gekarakteriseerd als een strijd op basis van materiële ongelijkheid, geherformuleerd op grond van de sociaal-culturele tegenstelling tussen de elites en de bevolking.

Het empirische gedeelte van de dissertatie concentreert zich op de ontwikkeling van de identiteit van beide staten, zoals die door de elites zijn gecreëerd. De rol van ideologie als duiding van de identiteit van de staat, verklaart de tegenstrijdige aard van de identiteiten van India en Pakistan. De identiteitsdiscoursen werden in eerste instantie gedefinieerd door de ideologieën van de grondleggers van beide landen, en werden later verklaard door de sociale gebruiken van de opvolgende elites. Op basis van deze identiteitsdiscoursen zijn twee casussen -het Kasjmir conflict en de nucleaire competitie -bestudeerd. De sociaal-culturele aspecten van deze rivaliteit zijn in beide casussen benadrukt. Het Kasjmir conflict wordt beschreven als een trilaterale strijd tussen de identiteiten van India, Pakistan en de losstaande Kasjmiri identiteit. De identiteit van Kasjmir is nader verkend door te kijken naar de plaatselijke sociaal-culturele normen, genaamd 'Kasjmiriyat'. Het hoofdstuk over Kasjmir concludeert dat deze regionale identiteit geen werkelijke erkenning krijgt in de gevestigde identiteitsdiscoursen van zowel India als Pakistan.

De casus van de nucleaire competitie benoemt de rol van religieuze normen, de 'Hindutva', die de sociale gebruiken van de Indiase elites definieerden en uiteindelijk leidden tot de beslissing om een openlijke nucleaire macht te worden in 1998. Deze sociale gebruiken hadden tot doel een 'Hindutva' (Hindu) identiteit te definiëren voor de Indiase staat. Het sociaal-culturele perspectief van het Pakistaanse nucleaire programma werd gedefinieerd door het perspectief van een 'Islamitische bom': voorts was dit een reactie op het nucleaire programma van India.

Het normatieve deel van de dissertatie concentreert zich exclusief op het definiëren van de contouren van een veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen India en Pakistan en

vergelijkt deze kort met gevestigde veiligheidsgemeenschappen zoals de Europese Unie [EU] en de Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. Het onderwijscurriculum dat door de elites wordt vastgesteld, de retoriek van de elite en de censuur die de regimes de media opleggen tonen de aanwezigheid van negatieve normen, geconstrueerd door de sociale gebruiken van de elites. Dit zijn de obstakels voor de formatie van een veiligheidsgemeenschap tussen deze twee staten. De positieve normen op het niveau van de bevolking verklaren de aanwezigheid van 'wij-gevoelens' in de werken van belangrijke auteurs uit beide landen. Deze normen bevatten ook de religieuze normen van de Bhakti beweging, evenals initiatieven van de massa media in de vorm van 'Aman ki Asha' [verlangen naar vrede]. Het verschil tussen de sociale gebruiken van de elites en de bevolking geeft de 'kunstmatigheid' van de rivaliteit op elite niveau aan en illustreert dat er ruime mogelijkheden zijn om, met behulp van de sociale gebruiken van de bevolking, de onderlinge verhoudingen te verbeteren. De vergelijkende analyse van drie veiligheidsgemeenschappen – de EU, ASEAN en de hypothetische India-Pakistan veiligheidsgemeenschap- in het laatste deel van het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat elke veiligheidsgemeenschap bepaald wordt door de regionale culturele context. Daarnaast laat dit hoofstuk zien dat er ook een onderliggende normatieve structuur is, gebaseerd op regionale sociaal-culturele normen die aanwezig zijn elke veiligheidsgemeenschap. Deze normatieve structuur definieert de regels van insluiting en uitsluiting van een veiligheidsgemeenschap.

Dit proefschrift concludeert dat het sociaal-culturele aspect van de rivaliteit tussen India en Pakistan zeer belangrijk is. Daarbij gaat het niet allen om de sociale gebruiken van de elites maar ook om de dagelijkse gewoonten van de bevolking. Begrip over dit

wezenlijke deel van de rivaliteit helpt ons de veiligheidsverhoudingen tussen de twee

staten te verklaren. Verder helpt het ons na te denken over een veiligheidsgemeenschap

tussen deze twee aartsrivalen. Ik heb in deze studie geen specifieke variant van het

sociaal constructivisme (zoals bijvoorbeeld de postmoderne variant of de conventionele

variant) als uitgangspunt genomen. Het belangrijkste doel was om de identiteiten van de

twee staten te problematiseren en hun materiële belangen te verklaren aan de hand van de

sociaal-culturele normen van de regio. Dit alles om het veiligheidsdilemma te verklaren

en de mogelijkheden tot vorming van een veiligheidsgemeenschap te verkennen.

Curriculum Vitae

Muhammad Shoaib Pervez was born in Lahore, Pakistan on 16th December 1976. He received his early education from premier institutions of Pakistan, Crescent Model School Lahore and Cadet College Hasanabdal. In the year 2000 he got his M.A. degree in Political Science with distinction from the oldest higher education institute in Pakistan, Government College University Lahore. In the same institution he was also appointed as Lecturer in Political Science in 2003. He stood first in the Public Service Commission Examination in the province of Punjab (Pakistan) in 2003. Later he joined the department of Population Welfare Punjab as an Assistant Director (December 2003 till to date). In 2007, he was awarded an overseas PhD scholarship by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. He started his PhD at Leiden University in February 2007 under the supervision of Prof. Rob de Wijk. He has presented six papers in international conferences and has also contributed to the Advanced Defence Course (ADC) of the Netherlands Defence Academy, at the Clingendael institute, The Hague. His PhD research is focused on India and Pakistan security relations and he presents a model of establishing a security community between them.

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