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Nietzsche's rejection of stoicism. A reinterpretation of Amor fati

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Chapter 5: AMOR FATI AND STOICISM 2: THE DIALOGUE WITH THE STOICS IN 1881

5.1 INTRODUCTION: SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM TO THE YEAR 1881

This chapter brings together two lines of argumentation. On the one hand, it is a follow-up of chapter 1 on the concept of *amor fati*; as I have argued there, its meaning undergoes a change between 1881 and 1888. The differences concern both the love and its object. In this chapter I will elaborate in detail on the concept as it is developed in 1881, since it is in the texts of this year that the notion is introduced and many references to the Stoics can be found. In particular I will focus on Book IV of *FW*. This Book, written in the first months of 1882⁶⁵⁰, contains the aphorism evaluating Stoics and the Epicureans (*FW* 306), and opens with the aphorism on *amor fati* (*FW* 276), its first and only published occurrence of this time. On the other hand, this chapter takes up the thread of chapter 3 and 4. Since we have seen how Nietzsche's Middle Works increasingly criticise the Stoic stance towards emotions, it becomes more and more questionable that *amor fati* is positively influenced by the Stoics. But should we infer from it that Stoicism plays no role of significance at all? Nietzsche might still have been influenced negatively.

A comparison between the two most important aphorisms in Book IV for our thesis, *FW* 276 and *FW* 306, leads to a nuancing of the question concerning the relation between *amor fati* and Stoicism. The last sentence of *FW* 276 reads: 'Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!'.⁶⁵¹ It suggests that *amor fati* is connected to an attitude of yes-saying only; one that Nietzsche aspires to adopt but is somehow not able to now. However, looking at *FW* 306, we have perceived how Nietzsche mocks the Stoic attitude of 'Ja-sagen', described as the attempt to eat 'stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions'. We should be selective like the Epicureans, Nietzsche maintains, and we should drop the Stoic exercise of trying to make our stomach 'gleichgültig' towards everything 'der Zufall des Daseins' might throw at us. If Nietzsche does not have the Stoic kind of insensitivity in mind, then what does the 'Ja-sagen' at the end of *FW* 276 entail?

I will begin this chapter by approaching from a different angle the intimate relation between the pursuit of knowledge and the enhancement of humanity. The *Nachlass* fragments of 1881, influenced by a reading of Lange and Roux⁶⁵², show that Nietzsche perceives the individual as a final stage of a long development: an individual starts out as a mere functional part of a larger whole, a mere 'organ' in a social organism, whose growing independence is determined in

⁶⁵⁰ Young, J. (2010), 326.

⁶⁵¹ *FW* 276 3:521.

⁶⁵² On Lange's influence on Nietzsche see Young, J. (2010), 89–91. On Nietzsche's reading of Roux, see Müller-Lauter, W. (1971), ch. 9 'The Organism as Inner Struggle: Wilhelm Roux's Influence on Nietzsche', 161–82.

terms of digestion and ‘Einverleibung’, terms that are also relevant in the context of science (5.2). This analysis, then, is necessary in order to reach a more refined understanding of *amor fati* (5.3): I will argue that it amounts to the appropriation of that which meets the aim of developing into a new (kind of) individual without leading to death or petrification. We have seen at the end of chapter 4 that the notion of danger is of increasing importance in *FW*. We will see in this section how it influences the meaning of *amor fati* as well, turning it into a concept that combines elements of the dangerous desire for truth and the importance of art as a counterbalance.

Then, after the completion of a thorough assessment of the 1881/1882 concept of *amor fati*, I will return to the question concerning its affinity with Nietzsche’s thought on Stoicism (5.4). I will compare the limited ‘Ja-sagen’ of *amor fati* once more to Nietzsche’s analysis of the Stoic exercise of extreme openness. In this section I will give a more detailed account of the remark of *FW* 276, ‘*Wegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung!’, relating it to what Nietzsche takes to be the explicitly ‘negative’ virtues of ‘Verneinen und Sichversagen’⁶⁵³, which can be attributed to his evaluation of Stoicism in *FW*. I will then come to the final conclusion of my thesis: the notion of *amor fati* can only be taught of as influenced by Stoicism in a negative sense.

5.2 THE CONTEXT OF FW: SCIENCE AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF HUMANITY

In section 4.3 we noticed how a number of arguments need to be taken together in order to understand why exactly Stoicism is rejected in *FW*. First; Nietzsche is more and more convinced that in order to learn it is pivotal to involve and stimulate passions and ‘Trieben’, the painful as much as the joyful ones. He explicitly agrees with the Stoics in *FW* 12 that the two kinds are interconnected and cannot be enhanced independently, but he concludes that science may be discovered, not for its traditional power to make man ‘kälter, statuenhafter, stoischer’, but as the ‘grosse Schmerzbringerin’.⁶⁵⁴ In line with this observation, he detects in Stoicism a lack of heroism: in order to deal with the painful process of science and even add more pain one has to possess an un-Stoically heroic strength. Secondly; Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of a lack of sensitivity. The characterization of Stoicism in terms of ‘Versteinerung’ and a ‘harte Haut’ has been discussed in detail. This insensitivity forms an obstacle to the process of science: the more one develops the Stoic insensitivity, the less one is inclined to encourage the passions – if only because one has become incapable of experiencing their influence. As a way out of this impasse Nietzsche recommends living ‘in danger’: ‘gefährlich leben! Baut eure Städte an den Vesuv! Schickt eure Schiffe in unerforschte Meere!’⁶⁵⁵ After all, as we have seen; the ‘Recept gegen „die Noth“ lautet: *Noth*’.⁶⁵⁶ Thirdly, Nietzsche argues that the aim of living dangerously is not only more knowledge but also the enhancement of humanity, so that it eventually awaits a greater and stronger future.

The last summarizing point to make on 4.3 is that Nietzsche’s judgement of Stoic insensitivity is framed in terms of a diet. In *FW* 306 the Epicureans are preferred to the Stoics, who are

⁶⁵³ *FW* 304 3.543.

⁶⁵⁴ *FW* 12 3.384.

⁶⁵⁵ *FW* 283 3.526.

⁶⁵⁶ *FW* 48 3.414.

unselective in what they take in and end up having a stomach indifferent to external influences. In order to avoid this unwelcome result, Nietzsche advocates following the Epicurean diet of selectivity. At the same time this should be read in its context: Nietzsche does not advise one merely to be protective of one's sensitive nature, for it should be challenged as well. Only in the process described in 4.3.2 of a 'dance', a 'play', and dangerous 'self-experiment' can we expect the enhancement of both knowledge and humanity.

I will first develop a more thorough analysis of Nietzsche's thoughts on the relation between the physical constitution of human nature (in which the increasing importance of the stomach will be emphasised) and its relation to the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis', knowledge, science and truth. As it turns out, important texts on this subject can be found in the *Nachlass* of 1881, the period in which the first occurrences of *amor fati* appear. Exploring the main arguments in these texts (related to aphorisms in *FW*) will therefore lead to a more advanced account of the field in which *amor fati* functions.

5.2.1 SCIENCE AND THE ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The *Nachlass* of 1881, in particular book 11, contains some very interesting thoughts on the physical, that is, 'organismic' constitution of humanity, implementing Roux's terminology.⁶⁵⁷ Nietzsche develops several speculative narratives of the historical developments of humanity, and so reaches a different outlook on its future. These narratives are rarely taken up in the published works, but they may have served as a heuristic model for diagnosing the modern age. Nietzsche seems to be engaged in particular with the question of egoism versus altruism. Spencer's account of altruism, which is one of Nietzsche's critical targets in these texts, results in a 'loss of individuality and diversity, and a levelling assimilation of all to all' (an observation already explored in the section on pity; see 4.2.6.2).⁶⁵⁸ In this light, Nietzsche examines the possibilities and limitations of individual sovereignty, understood as the power to exercise the freedom of self-determination. One of the strategies Nietzsche uses in this context is to approach the domain of altruism not as the result of individuals interacting, but as a stage preceding the development of egoistic individuals: 'Der Egoism ist etwas Spätes und immer noch Seltenes: die Heerden-Gefühle sind mächtiger und älter.'⁶⁵⁹

The following passage makes apparent how Nietzsche develops an understanding of individuality as the very late outcome of a long process: all individuals used to be a functional part of a social organism, changing into more or less independent entities. Nietzsche describes how individuals started out as mere organs, working in order for the larger organisation to survive and become powerful, and so developing the instincts that belong to its function. Slowly, the organisation breaks down and a process of individualization takes place.

⁶⁵⁷ M III 1 from early 1881; 9.441-575.

⁶⁵⁸ See H.S. Siemens' paper given in September 2015 during the yearly FNS Conference at Hull University. The texts he referred to are *NL* 11[46] 9.458-9 and 11[40] 9.455-6. For more on Nietzsche's reading of Spencer see Moore, G. (2002), 1-20.

⁶⁵⁹ *NL* 11[185] 9.513.

NL 11[182] [...] Er verwandelt sich zum Organ im Dienste seiner Gesellschaft durchaus und macht von allen Eigenschaften nur den dadurch eingeschränkten Gebrauch: richtiger: er hat jene anderen Eigenschaften noch nicht und erwirbt sie erst als Organ des Gemeinwesens: als Organ bekommt er die ersten Regungen der sämmtlichen Eigenschaften des Organischen. Die Gesellschaft erzieht erst das Einzelwesen, formt es zum Halb- oder Ganz-Individuum vor, sie bildet sich nicht aus Einzelwesen, nicht aus Verträgen solcher! [...] Also: der Staat unterdrückt ursprünglich nicht etwa die Individuen: diese existieren noch gar nicht! Er macht den Menschen überhaupt die Existenz möglich, als Heerdenthieren. Unsere Triebe Affekte werden uns da erst gelehrt: sie sind nichts Ursprüngliches! Es giebt keinen „Naturzustand“ für sie! Als Theile eines Ganzen nehmen wir an dessen Existenzbedingungen und Funktionen Anteil und einverleiben uns die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen und Urtheile. Diese gerathen später mit einander in Kampf und Relation, wenn das Band der Gesellschaft zerfällt: er muß in sich die Nachwirkungen des gesellschaftlichen Organismus ausleiden, er muß das Unzweckmäßige von Existenzbedingungen Urtheilen und Erfahrungen, die für ein Ganzes paßten, abbüßen und endlich kommt er dahin, seine Existenzmöglichkeit als Individuum durch Neuordnung und Assimilation Excretion der Triebe in sich zu schaffen. Meistens gehen diese Versuchs-Individuen zu Grunde.⁶⁶⁰

When the ties within the societal organisation break down ('wenn das Band der Gesellschaft zerfällt'), the organs serving the life-interests of the organism, i.e. the individuals-to-be, have to develop their own independence and inner organisation. They have learned ('einverleibt') about the organism they used to be part of, which is useful for the process of becoming organisms themselves. They have to select which experiences, life conditions and judgments are still useful for them, and which are not. They have to reorganise their own inner dynamics of impulses, passions, experiences, judgments, adopting new ones and pushing out old and redundant ones. Not surprisingly, Nietzsche adds that only few of these 'Versuchs-Individuen' survive this process.

Nietzsche's defence of egoism as opposed to a dangerous kind of altruism can be related to our question concerning the relation between the future of humanity and the importance of scientific thought. The role of science is explored in these passage both on the level of human society and species ('Gattung'), and of the individual. It is understood first as a general practice of judgment, that is: the acknowledgement of certain interpretations of reality as 'true' by the community. In particular, Nietzsche continues the project of *MA* to show that what is usually understood as truth is merely the successful outcome of a long process of coping with the world. This process merely selects the interpretations of the structure of the world that are successful, allowing the 'Gattung' to survive.

NL 11[156] Im Grunde ist die Wissenschaft darauf aus, festzustellen, wie der Mensch – nicht das Individuum – zu allen Dingen und zu sich selber empfindet, also die Idiosyncrasie Einzelner und Gruppen auszuscheiden und das beharrende Verhältniß festzustellen. Nicht die Wahrheit, sondern der Mensch wird erkannt und zwar innerhalb aller Zeiten, wo er existirt. D.h. ein Phantom wird construirt, fortwährend

⁶⁶⁰ 9.511. 14.645: 'Dieses Fragment [ist] entstanden im Zusammenhang mit Ns Lektüre von Wilhelm Roux, Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus.'

arbeiten alle daran, um das zu finden, worüber man *übereinstimmen muß*, weil es zum Wesen des Menschen gehört. [...] Die Wissenschaft setzt also den Prozeß nur *fort*, der das Wesen der Gattung *constituit* hat, den Glauben an gewisse Dinge endemisch zu machen und den Nichtglaubenden auszuscheiden und absterben zu lassen. Die erreichte Ähnlichkeit der Empfindung (über den Raum, oder das Zeitgefühl oder das Groß- und Kleingefühl) ist eine Existenzbedingung der Gattung geworden, aber mit der Wahrheit hat es nichts zu thun.⁶⁶¹

The practice of science is connected explicitly in this passage with the survival for the ‘Gattung’; ‘**nicht** das Individuum’. It is the continuation of a long process, one that determines what can and cannot be agreed upon. This analysis may be read in connection with what we saw in the *Nachlass* passage quoted above: ‘Als Theile eines Ganzen nehmen wir an dessen Existenzbedingungen und Funktionen Anteil und *einverleiben uns die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen und Urtheile.*’ It is emphasised again that parts within this constitution (for instance ‘das Individuum’) that have deviating beliefs are set apart and are ultimately left to die.

Yet there are also passages that reveal the use of science on the level of the individual: it can be used by individuals (the ‘*Versuchs-Individuen*’) to understand better their unique conditions of existence.

NL 11[290] Der letzte Nutzen der Erkenntniß und Wissenschaft ist, die Lösung neuer Eier vom Eierstocke zu ermöglichen und immer neue Arten entstehen zu lassen: denn die Wissenschaft bringt die Kenntnisse der Erhaltungsmittel für neue Individuen. – Ohne Fortschritte der Erkenntniß würden neue Individuen immer schnell zu Grunde gehen, die Existenzbedingungen wären zu schwer und zufällig.⁶⁶²

Knowledge and science contribute to the development of new species. They must be plural, for Nietzsche regards it as his ‘Tendenz’ to envision ‘*möglichst viele wechselnde verschiedenartige Organismen*, die zu ihrer *Reife und Fäulniß* gekommen ihre Frucht fallen lassen’.⁶⁶³ Only with the knowledge established in the former organisation can a deviant individual, a species to be, attempt to stand on its own, hoping to further its own organisation independently and creating its own version of the ‘truth’. Understanding that the ‘truth’ valued in the former constitution of the organism served its ‘Existenzbedingungen’ is of great value to the individual in this process: the knowledge yielded by ‘Wissenschaft’ in the service of the ‘Gattung’ provides insight into the necessary functions of organic life that can be used to secure the unique conditions of existence of an individual. Without this knowledge the newly developed ‘Existenzbedingungen’ would be ‘zu schwer und zufällig’, unfitting to organic needs and leading to a certain death.

⁶⁶¹ 9.500-1. See also *NL 11[286] 9.551*: ‘Den Erfolg und den Mißerfolg als Beweise und Gegenbeweise gegen den Glauben betrachten ist menschlicher Grundzug: „was gelingt, dessen Gedanke ist wahr“.

⁶⁶² 9.552.

⁶⁶³ *NL 11[222] 9.527*. He opposes this ‘Tendenz’ to that of contemporary philosophers: ‘Aus dem Geiste der Funktion heraus denken jetzt die Philosophen darüber nach, die Menschheit in Einen Organismus zu verwandeln – dies ist der Gegensatz meiner Tendenz.’

This line of reasoning may explain why Nietzsche regards himself as a unique figure in the history of philosophy. The outcome of the process described in chapter 4 with respect to the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ is that Nietzsche redirects the pursuit of truth to the exercise of one’s ‘Tribe’. This exercise, understood as a dangerous ‘game’, inevitably leads to an increase in knowledge about these ‘Tribe’. Nietzsche, now possessing a new kind of self-knowledge, could therefore be seen as the first individual (or ‘*Versuchs-Individu*’, if we fully apply the narrative to Nietzsche’s case) who understands the relation between knowledge and survival in this way. He is thus one of the first individuals who knows himself well enough to understand what may kill him and what not.

Importantly, the way in which Nietzsche connects science to the process of becoming an independent individual forms a direct link to *amor fati*. As I will explain in more detail in 5.3, the notion of *love* should not be seen independently of the terms ‘digestion’ and ‘internalization’, that is, ‘Einverleibung’. The process of accepting and refusing outlooks on the outside world in order to demarcate the identity of the individual is described in terms of taste, nourishment, and greed. In the passage quoted earlier we see Nietzsche summing up:

NL 11[182] Ein starker freier M<ensch> empfindet gegen alles Andere die Eigenschaften des Organismus

- 1) Selbstregulierung [...]
- 2) [...] *Habsucht* Aneignungslust Machtgelüst
- 3) Assimilation an sich [...] Einverleiben von Urtheilen und Erfahrungen
- 4) Sekretion und Excretion: in der Form von Ekel Verachtung der Eigenschaften an sich, die ihm *nicht mehr* nützen [...]
- 5) metabolische Kraft [...]
- 6) Regeneration⁶⁶⁴

These are all processes whereby the organism regulates its needs in relation to its environment so as to secure its existence. Clearly, both appropriation and excretion are involved, as well as the (re)organisation of what is appropriated. The passage below illustrates how the desire for knowledge is understood by Nietzsche as a possible transformation of the desire for or the hunting of property and nourishment.

NL 11[47] Der Eigenthumstrieb – Fortsetzung des Nahrungs- und Jagd-Triebs. Auch der Erkenntnißtrieb ist ein höherer Eigenthumstrieb.⁶⁶⁵

Whereas the desire for property is a ‘continuation’ (‘Fortsetzung’) of the appropriative drive, the drive for knowledge is a ‘higher’ form: a sublimation.⁶⁶⁶ This indicates that the ‘Erkenntnißtrieb’ Nietzsche discusses could be understood as an expression of the underlying drives of ‘Habsucht’; it could in this way be connected to the narrative of ‘*Versuchs-Individuen*’.

⁶⁶⁴ 9.509–10.

⁶⁶⁵ 9.459.

⁶⁶⁶ See for instance *NL 11[105]* 9.478–9: ‘Die Menschen sehen die kleinen sublimirten Dosen nicht und leugnen sie: sie leugnen z.B. die Grausamkeit im Denker, die Liebe im Räuber.’

Now that we have explored in more detail the way in which science plays a significant part in the dangerous process of a developing individual, two more aspects need to be developed before we turn to *amor fati*. One: Nietzsche dedicates several passages to the consideration that the acceptance ('Einverleibung') of new outlooks on reality is not an easy process. It is related, as we have seen, with danger – more specifically with the danger of perishing. I will therefore explain, secondly, what practice is essential according to Nietzsche to make sure one does not perish in this process: art. As we have seen in chapter 1, the occurrence of *amor fati* in FW 276 has a strong aesthetic component, which makes a closer examination of the relation between art and science even more pressing. The next section will thus show how art and science are seen by Nietzsche as intimately connected strategies for new individuals (like himself).

5.2.2 THE DANGER OF APPROPRIATING KNOWLEDGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ART

The references to the presence of danger so far (the importance of which has first been explored in the final sections of chapter 4 on FW) do not denote the same kind of danger. There is the danger for individuals attempting to understand and meet their own 'Existenzbedingungen', who develop new kinds of judgements etc., but are excluded from the community and left to die. This danger is real because of the fragility of these individuals-to-be; as they are still experimenting and searching they are not yet able to function on their own. Two other forms of danger can be distinguished. Both of these we have encountered before and they are closely related, to each other and to the practice of pursuing truth. The first concerns the only method we possess to increase our knowledge, after realising the insufficiency of adopting a purely (Stoic-like) 'objective' point of view. In line with what we saw in chapter 4, most passages of the 1881 *Nachlass* deny that the pursuit of knowledge can be the consequence of adopting a rational and emotion-free standpoint. The accurate method is rather the accumulation of perspectives, that is: the exercise of seeing things from a variety of different standpoints, different 'pairs of eyes', all of which have to be personal⁶⁶⁷ (although Nietzsche seems still to be equivocating in these notes⁶⁶⁸). This exercise not surprisingly has a certain disturbing effect on the organisation of drives and sensations within the individual; it

⁶⁶⁷ NL 11[65] 9.466: 'Aufgabe: die Dinge sehen, wie sie sind! Mittel: Aus hundert Augen auf sie sehen können, aus vielen Personen! [...] Viele Nächste und aus vielen Augen und aus lauter persönlichen Augen sehen – ist das Rechte. Das „Unpersönliche“ ist nur das *geschwächt-Persönliche*, Matte [...].'

⁶⁶⁸ One can still find remarks in this *Nachlass* book that remind us of the more 'Stoic' approach to truth we have investigated in chapter 4, namely the attempt to adopt a neutral standpoint, undisturbed by affects as well as alien voices, focused on our 'indifference' towards the object of knowledge; see for instance NL 11[10] 9.443-4: 'Das Erkennenwollen der Dinge, wie sie sind – das allein ist der *gute Hang*: nicht das Hinsehen nach Anderen und das Sehen mit anderen Augen – das wäre ja nur ein *Ortswechsel* des egoistischen Sehens! Wir wollen uns von der großen Grundverrückheit heilen, *alles nach uns zu messen* [...]; Selbsthaß und alle Affekte sind fortwährend thätig mit diesem kurzen Sprunge; als ob *alles zu uns hinstrebe*. [...] Vermehrung der Gleichgültigkeit! Und dazu *Übung*, mit anderen Augen sehen: Übung, ohne menschliche Beziehungen, also *sachlich* zu sehen! [...] Die *Leidenschaft für das* trotz allen Personen-Rücksichten, trotz allem „Angenehmen“ und Unangenehmen „*Wahre*“ ist die höchste – darum Seltenste bisher!'; see also NL 11[10] 9.480: 'Die Gleichgültigkeit! Ein Ding geht uns nichts an, darüber können wir denken, wie wir mögen, es giebt keinen Nutzen und Nachtheil für uns – *das* ist ein Fundament des wissenschaftlichen Geistes.'

takes up all their energy. This effect constitutes the first type of danger involved in pursuing truth: it points at the threat of perishing out of exhaustion.

NL 11[119] „Wissenschaft“ angeblich [...] beim reinen Schweigen des „Willens“! In Wahrheit sind *alle unsere Triebe* thätig [...]: ein Trieb regt den anderen an, jeder phantasirt und will *seine* Art Irrthum durchsetzen [...] Es ist eine Jagd. Je mehr Individuen einer in sich hat, um so mehr wird er allein Aussicht haben, eine Wahrheit zu finden – dann ist der Kampf *in ihm*: und *alle* Kräfte muß er dem einzelnen Phantasma zu Gebote stellen und später wieder einem anderen entgegensemmt: große Schwungkraft, großen Widerwillen am Einerlei, vielen und plötzlichen Ekel muß er haben.⁶⁶⁹

NL 11[73] Wir können weder des Bösen noch der Leidenschaft entbehren [...]. Selbst zum Erkennen brauche ich alle meine Triebe [...]. Alle großen Menschen waren durch die Stärke ihrer Affekte groß. [...] Gewiß sind sie oft Anlaß, daß man zu Grunde geht – aber dies ist kein Argument gegen ihre *nützlichen* Wirkungen im Großen.⁶⁷⁰

Reading these two passages together gives a clear indication of what danger we will encounter if all our drives are stimulated for the attainment of just ‘eine Wahrheit’: the process of drives fighting for their own fantasy and error, searching for arguments and means to become dominant, confronting and contesting each other with their perspectives, culminates in great feelings of turbulence. Because of the great amount of emotional restlessness there is the constant danger of perishing; great men derive their greatness from the ‘Stärke ihrer Affekte’, but these are also the ‘Anlaß, daß man zu Grunde geht’.

This type of danger, to perish because of the overwhelming strength of all the ‘Leidenschaft’, ‘Triebe’, and ‘Affekte’ in play, is taken up in Book IV of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. Like FW 333 (in which ‘jene gewaltige plötzliche Erschöpfung, von der alle Denker heimgesucht werden’ is mentioned⁶⁷¹), FW 309 explicitly discusses the turbulence that is the consequence of the development of science:

FW 309 Aus der siebenten Einsamkeit. — Eines Tages warf der Wanderer eine Thür hinter sich zu, blieb stehen und weinte. Dann sagte er: „Dieser Hang und Drang zum Wahren, Wirklichen, Un-Scheinbaren, Gewissen! Wie bin ich ihm böse! Warum folgt mir gerade dieser düstere und leidenschaftliche Treiber! Ich möchte ausruhen, aber er lässt es nicht zu. [...] Ich muss den Fuss weiter heben, diesen müden, verwundeten Fuss: und weil ich muss, so habe ich oft für das Schönste, das mich nicht halten konnte, einen grimmigen Rückblick, — weil es mich nicht halten konnte!“⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁹ 9.483-4.

⁶⁷⁰ 9.469.

⁶⁷¹ FW 333 3.559: ‘jetzt erst dämmert uns die Wahrheit auf, dass der allergrösste Theil unseres geistigen Wirkens uns unbewusst, ungefühlt verläuft; ich meine aber, diese Triebe, die hier mit einander kämpfen, werden recht wohl verstehen, sich *einander* dabei fühlbar zu machen und wehe zu thun –: jene gewaltige plötzliche Erschöpfung, von der alle Denker heimgesucht werden, mag da ihren Ursprung haben (es ist die Erschöpfung auf dem Schlachtfelde).’

⁶⁷² 3.545-6.

The constant desire for what is true and real wears the ‘Wanderer’ out. It is difficult not to stop and pause, but the desire drags him along, he *has* to continue. Even the beautiful perspectives he discovers during the process cannot be appreciated for long, for they may be beautiful but they are still *untrue*. In the *Kommentar* by Colli and Montinari on FW 309 we read how Nietzsche can be identified with this ‘Wanderer’: in the Vorstufe to this passage, that almost literally mirrors the aphorism above, Nietzsche writes in the first person and admits that he suffers from his desire for the truth. Moreover, he quotes the famous Stoic exclamation that originates in Cleanthes’ Hymn: ‘Lead me, Zeus, and you, Fate, wherever you have assigned me. I shall follow without hesitation; but even if I am disobedient and do not wish to, I shall follow no less surely.’

14.268 In meiner Seele ist ein düsterer und leidenschaftlicher Hang für das Wahre. Ach, ich habe oft die Erholung so nöthig! Wer wird so verführt wie ich, zu verweilen! [...] Aber ein unüberwindlicher Zug treibt mich, und ich folge, oft wie geschlagen. [...] „Schicksal, ich folge dir“ und wollte ich nicht, ich würde es müssen unter Schlägen seufzend. Das röhrt mich zu Thränen.

This citation hints at a warm appreciation and understanding of the Stoic prayer to follow fate, even though we sometimes feel imprisoned by it. Later on (in 5.4) I will come back to this remarkable link with Stoicism, and, put in the right context, it will become clear to what extent it may be revealing of the Stoic influence on *amor fati*. But first more needs to be said on the strategies Nietzsche adopts in order to continue the process of science, in connection with the second type of danger to be distinguished: the threat of the ‘Einverleibung’ of truth itself.

The following passage reveals how Nietzsche explains the origin of the disquieting character of pursuing truth in familiar terms: it may be almost impossible to *find* ‘eine Wahrheit’, it is of even greater difficulty to *absorb* what has been discovered, given the radical incompatibility between its nature and our organic constitution. This incompatibility can thus be seen as the second type of danger to be distinguished:

NL 11[162] Damit es irgend einen Grad von Bewußtsein in der Welt geben könne, mußte eine unwirkliche Welt des Irrthums – entstehen [...] – doch kann dieser Irrthum nicht anders als mit dem Leben vernichtet werden: die letzte Wahrheit vom Fluß der Dinge verträgt die *Einverleibung* nicht, unsere **Organe** (zum *Leben*) sind auf den Irrthum eingerichtet.⁶⁷³

The ultimate kind of ‘truth’ to be acknowledged by human beings, which is a negative result of the critique of substance, is described in this passage as ‘die letzte Wahrheit vom Fluß der Dinge’. It is further elaborated on in FW 110. There it is presented as the opposite of the ‘Irrthum’ ‘dass es dauernde Dinge gebe, dass es gleiche Dinge gebe, dass es Dinge, Stoffe, Körper gebe, dass ein Ding Das sei, als was es erscheine’.⁶⁷⁴ It is clear for Nietzsche that letting

⁶⁷³ 9,503-4.

⁶⁷⁴ FW 110 3,469. In this aphorism it is described how the drive for truth is a relatively young drive; ‘Der Intellekt hat ungeheure Zeitstrecken hindurch Nichts als Irrthümer erzeugt’. Some of these ‘Irrthümer’ proved to be life-enhancing and became part of the ‘menschlichen Art- und Grundbestand’. It was only after the development of the drive to truth into a ‘lebenserhaltende Macht’ that it became clear that the

go of all these erroneous beliefs would be the opposite of what our organs require, constituting an endangering threat for their survival: if we would force ourselves to swallow this ‘truth’, ‘so geht der Mensch zu Grunde’.

So, taking the three dangers together, we arrive at a picture of an individual suffering from a devastating and dangerous desire for truth that nevertheless provides the only path towards humanity’s enhancement: not only does the pursuit of truth demand the disturbing and exhausting involvement of all ‘Affekte’ and ‘Tribe’ in order to increase the number of perspectives on things outside; when finally some knowledge is gained (that is, when ‘eine Mitte, eine Beruhigung, ein Rechtgeben nach allen drei Seiten, eine Art Gerechtigkeit und Vertrag’ is attained, as described in *FW* 333⁶⁷⁵), it will be unlikely that its result is easily ‘einverleibt’, given the ultimate incompatibility between the nature of this truth and our organic constitution, which is in need of all kinds of stable ‘Irrtümer’ in order to survive. The attempt to incorporate this ‘truth’ in spite of its hostile nature is referred to in *FW* 110 as ‘die letzte Frage um die Bedingung des Lebens’: ‘Inwieweit verträgt die Wahrheit die Einverleibung? – das ist die Frage, das ist das Experiment.’⁶⁷⁶

Apart from the explanation of the inevitable dangers associated with science, the above passage also suggests how to deal with it: we have to view erring and gaining knowledge as two distinct phases, like the low and rising tide or night and day:

NL 11[162] Leben ist die Bedingung des Erkennens. Irren die Bedingung des Lebens und zwar im tiefsten Grunde Irren. Wissen um das Irren hebt es nicht auf! Das ist nichts Bitteres!

[...] Um des Erkennens willen das Leben lieben und fördern, um des Lebens willen das Irren Wählen lieben und fördern. Dem Dasein eine ästhetische Bedeutung geben, *unseren Geschmack an ihm mehren*, ist Grundbedingung aller Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß.

So entdecken wir auch hier eine Nacht und einen Tag als Lebensbedingung für *uns*: Erkennen-wollen und Irren-wollen sind Ebbe und Fluth. Herrscht *eines* absolut, so geht der Mensch zu Grunde; und zugleich die Fähigkeit.⁶⁷⁷

Since we need to err in order to live, and since we need to live in order to gain knowledge, we therefore need to find a way to accept and even further our errors paradoxically for the sake of knowledge. Even if we cannot as knowers affirm errors, we also cannot live as knowing living beings without the low tide of believing in our errors: ‘Wir haben zeitweilig die Blindheit nötig und müssen gewisse Glaubensartikel und Irrtümer in uns unberührt lassen – so lange sie uns im Leben erhalten.’⁶⁷⁸ In this passage the phase of temporary blindness is described in

insights yielded by this drive are in conflict with the age-old ‘Irrtümer’. This conflict becomes visible only now, for the first time, in a ‘thinker’ (3.471). For more on this aphorism, see 5.3.2.4.

⁶⁷⁵ 3.558.

⁶⁷⁶ *FW* 110 3.471.

⁶⁷⁷ *NL* 11[162] 9.504.

⁶⁷⁸ *NL* 11[217] 9.526; see also *NL* 11[171] 9.506-7: ‘Ich erkenne etwas Wahres nur als Gegensatz zu einem wirklich lebendigen Unwahren: so kommt das Wahre ganz kraftlos, als Begriff, zur Welt und muß sich durch Verschmelzung mit lebendigen Irrtümern erst Kräfte geben! Und darum muß man die Irrtümer

aesthetic terms: the condition for the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß’ is to give life an aesthetic meaning, to ‘enhance our taste for it’.

FW 107 picks up on this *Nachlass* fragment, and explains why art is the only way to affirm error or blindness: it is equated to ‘der gute Wille zum Scheine’. Art makes ‘Schein’, in its multidimensional meaning of ‘shine’, ‘appearance’ and ‘falsehood’, bearable: ‘Als ästhetisches Phänomen ist uns das Dasein immer noch erträglich’.⁶⁷⁹ *FW* 107 further describes the dynamics of the low and rising tide of going back and forth between art and science as follows.

FW 107 *Unsere letzte Dankbarkeit gegen die Kunst*. – Hätten wir nicht die Künste gut geheissen und diese Art von Cultus des Unwahren erfunden: so wäre die Einsicht in die allgemeine Unwahrheit und Verlogenheit, die uns jetzt durch die Wissenschaft gegeben wird – die Einsicht in den Wahn und Irrthum als in eine Bedingung des erkennenden und empfindenden Daseins –, gar nicht auszuhalten. Die Redlichkeit würde den Ekel und den Selbstmord im Gefolge haben. Nun aber hat unsere Redlichkeit eine Gegenmacht, die uns solchen Consequenzen ausweichen hilft: die Kunst, als den guten Willen zum Scheine. [...] Wir müssen zeitweilig von uns ausruhen, dadurch, dass wir auf uns hin und hinab sehen und, aus einer künstlerischen Ferne her, über uns lachen oder über uns weinen; wir müssen den Helden und ebenso den Narren entdecken, der in unsrer Leidenschaft der Erkenntniss steckt, wir müssen unsrer Thorheit ab und zu froh werden, um unsrer Weisheit froh bleiben zu können!⁶⁸⁰

This aphorism makes apparent once more what danger is involved in being a scientist: the virtue of ‘Redlichkeit’, which reveals that errors are necessary for our existence, would have disgust and even suicide as its consequence; not only because it implies the stimulation of all Triebe and Affekte (see *FW* 333), but also because as knowers we cannot affirm errors: our knowledge is inseparable from truth as highest value. It is thanks to ‘Redlichkeit’s’ counterforce, art, that this destructive element is kept in check. Art is a way of taking a rest from ourselves – giving in, thus, to the desire expressed in *FW* 309: ‘Ich möchte ausruhen’. And the way to proceed is described in terms of laughter. We should look at ourselves from an artistic distance and laugh and cry at our own folly. Our passion for knowledge (‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’) contains ‘heroes’, but also ‘fools’ – and we must be cheerful (‘froh’) about our folly in order to remain cheerful about our wisdom. We have encountered an important example of this in chapter 4.2.3: the serious self-reflection present in the Stoic expression ‘was liegt an mir?’ had been taken up in a comic perspective, the perspective of laughing birds, in *FW* 332.

The relation between art and science is, however, developed along different lines as well. The function of art is not merely to be a counterbalance for the stringent practice of science, nor a

leben lassen und ihnen ein großes Reich zugestehen. – Ebenso: um individuell leben zu können, muß erst die Gesellschaft hoch gefördert sein und fort und fort gefördert werden – der Gegensatz: im Bunde mit ihr bekommt das Individuelle zuerst einige Kraft. – Endlich erscheint in Punkt, wo wir über das Individuelle und Idiosynkratische hinauswollen: aber nur im Bunde mit dem Individuum, dem Gegensatze, können wir diesem Streben Kräfte verleihen.’ See also *FW* 1.3.369-72.

⁶⁷⁹ *FW* 107 3.464.

⁶⁸⁰ 3.464-5.

necessary preparation for its workings; it can also be taken to be science's *purpose*. In the summer of 1881 Nietzsche writes:

*NL 11[23] NB! Die Wissenschaft lieben, ohne an ihren Nutzen zu denken! Aber vielleicht ist sie ein Mittel, den Menschen in einem unerhörten Sinne zum Künstler zu machen! Bisher sollte sie dienen. – Eine Reihenfolge schöner Experimente ist einer der höchsten Theatergenüsse.*⁶⁸¹

A similar thought can be recognized in *FW 335*.

*FW 335 Hoch die Physik! [...] Wir aber wollen Die werden, die wir sind, – die Neuen, die Einmaligen, die Unvergleichbaren, die Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden, die Sich-selber-Schaffenden! Und dazu müssen wir die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt werden: wir müssen Physiker sein, um, in jenem Sinne, Schöpfer sein zu können, – während bisher alle Werthschätzungen und Ideale auf Unkenntniss der Physik oder im Widerspruch mit ihr aufgebaut waren. Und darum: Hoch die Physik! Und höher noch das, was uns zu ihr zwingt, – unsre Redlichkeit!*⁶⁸²

The passage written in the summer of 1881 suggests that science must be pursued for its own sake but can also be a means for human beings to become artists – artists even in an ‘unheard of’ sense. *FW 335* speaks about ‘us’: we want to be our own creators, that is: we want to give ourselves our own laws, so that we become who we are, the new, unique, incomparable ones. We are strongly reminded of the function we saw Nietzsche ascribing to science before: the development of new individuals and new species. As we can see now, this development not only demands the furthering of science and the ‘Einverleibung’ of new and more truthful perspectives. It also demands the development of a certain creativity. All evaluations and ideals developed so far have been built, according to Nietzsche, upon a lack of knowledge of physics or in opposition to it. New ideals and evaluations have to be created, based upon a solid knowledge of our physical condition, on all that is ‘necessary or lawful’, and therefore on the outcome of our ‘Redlichkeit’. Aesthetics, thus, is important to prepare our organs for the destructive workings of science; yet, it is also for the sake of the creation of our new identity (becoming ‘die Sich-selber-Schaffenden’) that science needs to be promoted.

This conclusion might seem circular. The function of art is to help develop science, and the function of science is the artistic creation of new individuals. Nietzsche summarizes this double relation in terms of a process, entitled ‘Kur des Einzelnen’. In order for the individual to develop enough strength to one day create a whole new species, away from the organisation it belonged to before, it has to take the following six steps:

NL 11[258] Zur „Kur des Einzelnen.“

- 1) er soll vom Nächsten und Kleinsten ausgehen und die ganze Abhängigkeit sich feststellen, in die hinein er geboren und erzogen ist
- 2) ebenso soll er den gewohnten Rhythmus seines Denkens und Fühlens, seine intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Ernährung begreifen

⁶⁸¹ 9.451.

⁶⁸² 3.563-4.

The first two steps summarize what we have seen in 5.2.1. An individual starts out as an organ, part of a social organism, and develops the instincts and intellectual judgments, its taste, within that context. The first task of an individual is therefore to understand and define these elements, starting from the nearest and smallest, using the virtue of ‘Redlichkeit’ to honestly determine its ‘intellectual taste’.

- 3) Dann soll er *Veränderung* aller Art versuchen, zunächst um die Gewohnheiten zu brechen (vielen Diätwechsel, mit feinster Beobachtung)
- 4) er soll sich geistig an seine Widersacher einmal anlehnen, er soll ihre Nahrung zu essen versuchen. Er soll *reisen*, in jedem Sinne. In dieser Zeit wird er „unstät und flüchtig“ sein.

Von Zeit zu Zeit soll er über seinen Erlebnissen *ruhen* – und verdauen.

The third step is to practice changes of all kinds. In order for the individual to become independent, it has to try out different diets. It has to break away from what it normally absorbs, and try out different kinds of nutrition, even of the kind it normally finds repulsive. We noticed how the drive for knowledge (the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’) forces us to stretch the boundary of what we would normally consider ‘edible’, and how a dangerous internal battle, between life-enhancing ‘Irrthümer’ and a life-threatening ‘Wahrheit’, cannot be avoided. Even though this passage does not explicitly mention the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, we cannot but understand it as part of the procedure: at the end of section 5.2.1 the ‘Erkenntnißtrieb’ was presented as a sublimation of an ‘Eigenthumstrieb’, a ‘Fortsetzung des *Nahrungs-* und *Jagd-Triebs*'.⁶⁸³ The ‘Diätwechsel’, in other words, concerns the incorporation of different forms of knowledge as well.

We also analysed the aesthetic strategy Nietzsche adopts for dealing with the inevitable struggle: we should allow our organs to sometimes take time and adjust. The fourth step mirrors this strategy. After the phase of ‘Einverleibung’ it is time to rest and to digest what has been taken in.

- 5) Dann kommt das Höhere: der Versuch, ein Ideal zu *dichten*. Dies geht dem noch Höheren voraus – eben dies Ideal zu leben.
- 6) Er muß durch eine Reihe von Idealen hindurch.⁶⁸⁴

The last two steps suggest again that the (aesthetic) creation of a new species is at stake. This process cannot be executed without the adoption of an ideal. It is not easy to create (‘dichten’) an ideal – but it is an even higher task (‘dem noch Höheren’) to live up to it. And not just to one ideal; an ambitious individual cannot escape going through several ideals. It remains unclear what exactly these ideals are: they could be identified as belonging to the past, but could also signify future ideals, ideals we have not even heard of yet.

Nietzsche briefly mentions what he has in mind in terms of the outcome of this whole process in FW 113, combining again the scientific and artistic forces, and foreseeing how a higher organic system will go beyond the by that time old-fashioned types of scholars, physicians, artists and law-givers:

⁶⁸³ NL II[47] 9.459.

⁶⁸⁴ 9.539.

FW 113 [...] Und wie ferne sind wir noch davon, dass zum wissenschaftlichen Denken sich auch noch die künstlerischen Kräfte und die praktische Weisheit des Lebens hinzufinden, dass ein höheres organisches System sich bildet, in Bezug auf welches der Gelehrte, der Arzt, der Künstler und der Gesetzgeber, so wie wir jetzt diese kennen, als dürftige Alterthümer erscheinen müssten!⁶⁸⁵

5.3 AMOR FATI

We have a clearer idea of the context in which we must place and understand the concept of *amor fati* against the background of the relation between science and the enhancement of humanity in *FW*. The context of the heuristic model in the *NL* fragments of the summer of 1881 together with some of the aphorisms of Book IV of *FW* can be summarized now in terms of the following three main aspects: 1. Nietzsche is concerned with the future of humanity, and analyses its development in physiological/organismic terms, whereby an individual (a new species to be) has to slowly develop new conditions of existence, distancing itself from the social group and the 'Gattung' it used to be part of (by way of a refined and thoughtful egoism); 2. the dangerous and disturbing desire and search for knowledge, or truth, hostile as it is to the life-conditions of the individual, plays a key role in this development; 3. aesthetic taste and art, too, are of major importance: without the 'night' or the 'Ebbe' of art and laughter the individual knower would have no chance of survival; moreover, the creation of ideals, related to what the new individuals should look like is an aesthetic process. In this section the meaning of *amor fati* will be analysed against this background, discussing the meaning of *amor* and *fati* independently.

Stern, as we have seen in chapter 1, is one of very few commentators who attempts to understand the concept in the context of *FW*. He does not include the *Nachlass* in his analysis, but he nevertheless arrives at a more convincing interpretation than most others. In section 5.3.2, in which the notion of fate is discussed, I will offer four possible interpretations of *amor fati*, the first of which will be his. In two respects in particular I think Stern's account does a better job than others. First, he does not assume that *amor fati* is a notion that has the same function and meaning for Nietzsche throughout his life. In chapter 1 we have seen how the textual occurrences of *amor fati* in 1881 differ significantly from those in later years. Stern's account is to be preferred furthermore because it does not interpret *amor fati* as a therapeutic device intended to make us all happily affirm our personal fates. As we have just seen, the problem that Nietzsche faces in this period is the appropriation, endurance and furthering of a truthful yet life-threatening outlook on life, to be adopted only by the individual who possesses (and is possessed by) the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis'. We must therefore dismiss all accounts (and there are quite a few as we have seen in chapter 1) of *amor fati* that take it to be a therapeutic attitude we should all adopt.

I will first develop an account of 'love', opposing it to the analysis of Béatrice Han-Pile, whose article defends an interpretation of *amor* as agapic. Secondly, I will focus on what should be understood as the object of love. In distinguishing four different possible accounts, I will not

⁶⁸⁵ 3.474.

only point out why I think Stern is ultimately wrong; in the fourth account I will come back to the context of science and the development of a higher life-system that I developed in the previous sections.

5.3.1 AMOR

The aphorism in which *amor fati* is introduced in the published works, the opening of Book IV called ‘Sanctus Januarius’, I will quote in full again.

FW 276 Zum neuen Jahre. — Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken. Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Heute erlaubt sich Jedermann seinen Wunsch und liebsten Gedanken auszusprechen: nun, so will auch ich sagen, was ich mir heute von mir selber wünschte und welcher Gedanke mir dieses Jahr zuerst über das Herz lief, — welcher Gedanke mir Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit alles weiteren Lebens sein soll! Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen: — so werde ich Einer von Denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen. Amor fati: das sei von nun an meine Liebe! Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen. *Wegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung! Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!⁶⁸⁶

The first sentence, ‘Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken’, shows how Nietzsche seems to be surprised to find himself alive still.⁶⁸⁷ One way to understand this ‘noch’ is to remind ourselves of *FW 110*, in which Nietzsche defines what it is to be like to be a ‘thinker’: ‘Der Denker: das ist jetzt das Wesen, in dem der Trieb zur Wahrheit und jene lebenerhaltenden Irrthümer ihren ersten Kampf kämpfen’: living for knowledge conflicts with life itself.⁶⁸⁸ We have already seen several times, for instance in *FW 107*, that this conflict is dangerous; it could easily lead to (self-)destruction. It is not surprising therefore to see the thought of death recurring in an aphorism following 276 closely: 278 is titled ‘Der Gedanke an den Tod’. The opening of Book IV, ‘Sanctus Januarius’, thus expresses a sense of wonder. As we have seen at the beginning of chapter 3, ‘Sanctus Januarius’ denotes for Nietzsche the beginning of an unexpected new phase, one that is associated with spring, new life, hope, and the return of light after a long period of sickness and struggle.

The thought that ‘first touched his heart this year’ is one that he hopes will provide him with ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit’ for the rest of his life. Again, the notion of danger is present: the thought of *amor fati*, the thought that takes the shape of a wish, is to protect Nietzsche from too much danger in the future.

Han-Pile argues that Nietzsche’s understanding of *amor* has to be agapic as a solution to the problem sketched in chapter 1: if fate is not intrinsically lovable, how can we be summoned to

⁶⁸⁶ 3.521.

⁶⁸⁷ Stern is right, I believe, when he remarks that this sentence is rarely taken seriously as informative for the meaning of *amor fati*. Stern, T. (2013), 155.

⁶⁸⁸ *FW* 110 3.471.

love it? She denies that the love of *amor fati* must be identified as a certain reaction to loveable characteristics (which would be typical for the erotic type of love, famously pictured by Plato as an immediate response to beauty⁶⁸⁹). Rather, it is *through* loving an object (fate, in this case) that it becomes loveable, or ‘valuable’ in Han-Pile’s words.⁶⁹⁰ Importantly, *amor* unfolds in her view independently of the subject’s desires and needs, for it would be unlikely to desire a fate that contains so many features at odds with one’s needs; moreover, this type of love cannot be taught or learned. Hence Han-Pile proposes to understand *amor* as ‘a secularised version of grace’⁶⁹¹: agapic love, similar to a ‘divine gift’, transforms the object not by means of an active engagement of the subject, but rather in a ‘mediopassive mode’.⁶⁹²

We have seen in chapter 1 that there are several problems with Han-Pile’s account, the most important of which is the lack of textual references to back up her interpretation. She refers to the letter by Nietzsche to Overbeck written in the summer of 1882, in which he speaks of *amor fati* as a ‘Gott-Ergebnigkeit’. She concludes from it that ‘the proper attitude to *amor fati* is one of *surrender*, not of erotic pursuit’.⁶⁹³ I will come back to the problem of ‘Gott-Ergebnigkeit’ in section 5.3.2.3, and will show that it is not at odds with an erotic reading of love. And then there is only one more textual argument in Han-Pile’s article: she quotes a very early passage in *UB* III saying that ‘it is impossible to teach love’.⁶⁹⁴ Strangely enough she leaves out of the discussion the numerous remarks on love to be found in *FW* and its *Nachlass*, written in the same time-period as the first occurrences of *amor fati*. Importantly, there is an aphorism in Book IV that has a title suggesting the opposite of the *UB* III quote: ‘*Man muss lieben lernen*’.⁶⁹⁵ In what follows I will therefore examine in more detail the references to love in these texts, arguing that they undoubtedly reveal an erotic type of love that moreover reflects the context of the danger of being a ‘thinker’ explored above.

5.3.1.1 AMOR AS THE EROTIC RESPONSE TO BEAUTY

Yet, Han-Pile is correct in pointing out that interpreting Nietzsche’s idea of love in *amor fati* as erotic requires some argumentation: we have seen remarkably few textual examples in which fate was considered attractive. Loving fate was compared to loving ‘Furien’ in *NL* 16[22], and endowed with a ‘schreckliche Herkunft’ in *NL* 15[20]. On the other hand, the frequency with

⁶⁸⁹ Although it should be noted that Nietzsche’s approach to love is far from an exact copy of Plato’s reference to it in his *Symposium*; as we will see further on, one of the main differences concerns Nietzsche’s turn away from the transcendent (cf. the divine ‘Form’ of Beauty in *Symposium* 21e) to the physiological processes informing all judgements of beauty. See for instance *GD Streifzüge* 19-20 6.123-4.

⁶⁹⁰ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 4: ‘In a nutshell, erotic love is motivated by the perceived value of its object: we love someone or something *because we value them*. By contrast, agapic love bestows value on its object, and this regardless of the value previously attributed to it: we value someone or something *because we love them*.’

⁶⁹¹ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 19: ‘like grace (which, in the Lutheran tradition Nietzsche was raised in cannot be secured by works either), love happens (or not) to us from the outside [...]. [A]mor fati is meant to change our *relation* to our (unchanged) past, and more generally to time, in such a way that neither revenge nor despair can hold sway on us anymore.’

⁶⁹² Han-Pile, B. (2009), 10.

⁶⁹³ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 9.

⁶⁹⁴ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 9. She refers to *UB* III 6.1.385: ‘[...] weil es unmöglich ist, Liebe zu lehren’.

⁶⁹⁵ *FW* 334 3.559-60.

which Nietzsche associates love and beauty, which unavoidably invokes the erotic account of love, has escaped Han-Pile's attention. *FW* 334 for instance, entitled '*Man muss lieben lernen*' as indicated above, describes in great detail how the love of initially unattractive things is the result of a process of 'learning': the efforts of 'unseren guten Willen, unsere Geduld, Billigkeit, Sanftmütigkeit' are rewarded 'indem das Fremde langsam seinen Schleier abwirft und sich als neue unsägliche Schönheit darstellt'.⁶⁹⁶ The process of learning, which precedes the appearance of beauty, which in its turn evokes love, is compared to the process of learning to listen to unfamiliar music.

FW 334 – *Man muss lieben lernen*. So geht es uns in der Musik: erst muss man eine Figur und Weise überhaupt hören lernen, heraushören, unterscheiden, als ein Leben für sich isolieren und abgrenzen; dann braucht es Mühe und guten Willen, sie zu ertragen, trotz ihrer Fremdheit, Geduld gegen ihren Blick und Ausdruck, Mildherzigkeit gegen das Wunderliche an ihr zu üben: – endlich kommt ein Augenblick, wo wir ihrer gewohnt sind, wo wir sie erwarten, wo wir ahnen, dass sie uns fehlen würde, wenn sie fehlte; und nun wirkt sie ihren Zwang und Zauber fort und fort und endet nicht eher, als bis wir ihre demütigen und entzückten Liebhaber geworden sind, die nichts Besseres von der Welt mehr wollen, als sie und wieder sie. – So geht es uns aber nicht nur mit der Musik: gerade so haben wir alle Dinge, die wir jetzt lieben, lieben gelernt.⁶⁹⁷

Loving requires learning: first we need to *hear* a melody, to discriminate it, to isolate it from the rest. Then we must be patient and have a 'guten Willen'; for it is only in enduring the music, listening to it again and again, practicing mildness with respect to its strangeness, that one can learn to first become *used to* it. If we reach that point, we start expecting it, and we would miss it if it were not there. In that way the music continues to exercise its force ('Zwang') and magic ('Zauber'), just for as long as it takes to uncover its beauty and make us its lovers. And once we are, we would not want anything more from the world than this again and again ('nichts Besseres von der Welt [...] als sie und wieder sie'). This formulation reminds us of the notion of the eternal return, introduced in *FW* 341: 'die Frage bei allem und Jedem „willst du dies noch einmal und noch unzählige Male?“'.⁶⁹⁸ Connecting *FW* 334 and *FW* 341 thus suggests that in order to answer the demon's question affirmatively it is necessary to *learn to love*; that is: to slowly become familiar with things that are alien ('fremd').

The emphasis on learning in *FW* 334 takes us back to *FW* 276, in which *amor fati* was described in similar wordings: 'Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen'. *Amor fati*, being a form of love, must thus be seen as the result of a process of learning, which means that it first requires the slow and patient endurance of a 'Fremdheit', which results in seeing fate as 'nothwendig' (it would be missed if it 'fehlte'); only then can it be seen as 'beautiful'. This connection between love and beauty clearly points to the erotic type of love rather than the agapic.

Another aphorism in *FW* IV, *FW* 299, provides some further suggestions of how to learn to see 'das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne'. It may be read as a complementing strategy

⁶⁹⁶ *FW* 334 3-560.

⁶⁹⁷ 3-559-60.

⁶⁹⁸ 3-570.

to the ‘guten Willen’, ‘Geduld’, ‘Billigkeit’, and ‘Sanftmüthigkeit’ of FW 334: what further means do we have ‘uns die Dinge schön, anziehend, begehrenswerth zu machen, wenn sie es nicht sind?’. This is the question which guides the rest of the aphorism, and Nietzsche adds, in a way that differs from FW 334: ‘ich meine, sie sind es an sich niemals!’. The strategies developed in the rest of the text are inspired by methods adopted by physicians and artists.

FW 299 Was man den Künstlern ablernen soll. – Welche Mittel haben wir, uns die Dinge schön, anziehend, begehrenswerth zu machen, wenn sie es nicht sind? – und ich meine, sie sind es an sich niemals! Hier haben wir von den Aerzten Etwas zu lernen, wenn sie zum Beispiel das Bittere verdünnen oder Wein und Zucker in den Mischkrug thun; aber noch mehr von den Künstlern, welche eigentlich fortwährend darauf aus sind, solche Erfindungen und Kunststücke zu machen. Sich von den Dingen entfernen, bis man Vieles von ihnen nicht mehr sieht und Vieles hinzusehen muss, *um sie noch zu sehen* – oder die Dinge um die Ecke und wie in einem Ausschnitte sehen – oder sie so stellen, dass sie sich theilweise verstellen und nur perspectivische Durchblicke gestatten – oder sie durch gefärbtes Glas oder im Lichte der Abendröthe anschauen⁶⁹⁹

There are several methods for seeing things as beautiful; like the physicians we could mix ill-tasting drinks with sugar and wine, and like the artists we could constantly change our perspectives, looking at things from a distance, from another angle, or in a certain light. Making things beautiful is a matter of manipulation and change therefore; but although there is no explicit connection with love in this aphorism, the suggestion is implicitly there that by making things attractive ('schön, anziehend, begehrenswerth') we may end up loving them. What is more, this aphorism finishes with the suggestion, in line with FW 341 ('Oder wie müsstest du dir selber und dem Leben gut werden, um nach Nichts mehr zu verlangen, als nach dieser letzten ewigen Bestätigung und Besiegelung?'), that these strategies can and should be applied to our lives:

das Alles sollen wir den Künstlern ablernen und im Uebrigen weiser sein, als sie. Denn bei ihnen hört gewöhnlich diese ihre feine Kraft auf, wo die Kunst aufhört und das Leben beginnt; *wir* aber wollen die Dichter unseres Lebens sein, und im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst.⁷⁰⁰

We must be wiser than the artists, Nietzsche claims here, because they apply these strategies only to their art, whereas we want to apply them to our lives, becoming the ‘Dichter unseres Lebens’. This reminds us of the importance of the aesthetic forces explored in 5.2.2: we may read these final sentences as consistent with FW 335, in which it is said that ‘we’ wish to become ‘Die [...], die wir sind, – die Neuen, die Einmaligen, die Unvergleichbaren, die Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden, die Sich-selber-Schaffenden!’. It seems, therefore, that the strategies of making things beautiful so as to love them, as presented in FW 229 and 334, can be placed in the context of aesthetic self-cultivation.

⁶⁹⁹ 3.538.

⁷⁰⁰ 3.538.

5.3.1.2 AMOR AS GREED

Another clue to the interpretation of love as erotic is given by the references to love in *FW* and its *Nachlass*, which betray an intimate link with greed or ‘Habsucht’. In *FW* 14, for instance, we read:

FW 14 *Was Alles Liebe genannt wird.* – Habsucht und Liebe: wie verschieden empfinden wir bei jedem dieser Worte! – und doch könnte es der selbe Trieb sein, zweimal benannt, das eine Mal verunglimpt vom Standpunkte der bereits Habenden aus, in denen Trieb etwas zur Ruhe gekommen ist und die nun für ihre „Habe“ fürchten; das andere Mal vom Standpunkte der Unbefriedigten, Durstigen aus, und daher verherrlicht als „gut“. Unsere Nächstenliebe – ist sie nicht ein Drang nach neuem *Eigenthum*? Und ebenso unsere Liebe zum Wissen, zur Wahrheit und überhaupt all jener Drang nach Neuigkeiten?⁷⁰¹

Love and greed could be ‘der selbe Trieb’, ‘zweimal benannt’, and appearing in two situations. First there is the case of those already having: in them the instinct is ‘etwas zur Ruhe gekommen’, which makes them start to fear for ‘ihre „Habe“’. Secondly, Nietzsche speaks of love from the standpoint of ‘der Unbefriedigten, Durstigen’. Their love is a craving for new possessions. Two situations from our daily life are brought up and ‘translated’ in the light of the equation between love and greed: is not our love of our neighbours ‘ein Drang nach neuem *Eigenthum*; and ‘ebenso unsere Liebe zum Wissen, zur Wahrheit’? Moreover, further in the aphorism Nietzsche ‘translates’ the love we feel for those who suffer into ‘die in ihm erweckte Begierde nach neuem Besitz’. Also sexual love betrays the same drive for possession: it ‘verrät sich [...] als Drang nach Eigenthum: der Liebende will den unbedingten Alleinbesitz’.⁷⁰²

Although this aphorism seems to pose the relation between ‘Habsucht’ and ‘Liebe’ as a question, and although Nietzsche says here that the two notions *could* (‘könnte’) be two names for one and the same concept, several *Nachlass* fragments lack this careful hesitation. One of them is the following.

NL 11[134] [...] Ein solches Wesen assimiliert sich das Nächste, verwandelt es in sein Eigenthum (Eigenthum ist zuerst Nahrung und Aufspeicherung von Nahrung), es sucht möglichst viel sich einzuverleiben, nicht nur den Verlust zu *compensiren* – es ist **habbüchtig**. [...] „Liebe“ ist Empfindung für das Eigenthum oder das, was wir zum Eigenthum wünschen.⁷⁰³

The first thing to notice in this text is the fact that ‘Liebe’ is within quotation marks. This indicates that what we usually understand as ‘love’ may conceal a variety of drives (contrary to Han-Pile’s account of a love independent from our drives). It can be translated along the organicistic lines of what we saw in 5.2, into ‘Empfindung für das Eigenthum oder das, was wir zum Eigenthum wünschen’: a new individual develops through assimilation, and the lust for obtaining new things to be ‘einverleibt’ is identified as ‘Habsucht’ and ‘Liebe’. We moreover recognise what we noticed in *FW* 14: love’s object is twofold. In the situation of a lack of

⁷⁰¹ 3.386.

⁷⁰² 3.386-7.

⁷⁰³ 9.490-2.

possession, comparable to ‘hunger’, it is that which is ‘desired as possession’; secondly, in the situation in which one possesses, one loves what one has.

When we furthermore connect both *FW* 14 and *NL* 11[134] to *FW* 334 and *FW* 299, we may observe first that the idea of love as ‘Habsucht’ seems absent in those texts. Love appears rather as the result of the hard work of familiarizing and making beautiful what is unattractive at first. Still, an important element connecting love as the response to beauty with love as ‘Habsucht’ is ‘knowledge’.

Knowledge as a possible object of love is introduced in *FW* 14, where it is understood as an example of ‘Eigenthum’. And many other texts point to a comparable connection between this kind of love and the desire for knowledge, the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. We have already seen in 5.2.1 how the drive for knowledge is related to the drive for ‘Eigenthum’, an ‘Eigenthumstrieb’ that is moreover the ‘Fortsetzung des Nahrungs- und Jagd-Triebs’⁷⁰⁴, revealing how love, ‘Habsucht’, greed and the drive for knowledge are connected for Nietzsche. Other *Nachlass* fragments are comparable; the following for instance shows how Nietzsche challenges the idea that love is unrelated to ‘Gerechtigkeit’ and ‘Vernunft’:

NL 12[75] Ich *wehre mich dagegen*, Vernunft und Liebe, Gerechtigkeit und Liebe von einander zu trennen, oder gar sich entgegenzustellen und der Liebe den höheren Rang zu geben! Liebe ist comes, bei Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, sie ist die Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit – die *aesthetische Seite* der Gerechtigkeit und Vernunft, ein Nebentrieb.⁷⁰⁵

Love is ‘Besitzlust’, ‘Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen’; and again it seems that love can be dedicated to objects – objects of knowledge this time – that are to be obtained and those that are one’s property already, be it perhaps not ‘ganz’, not completely, or not ‘in ihrer ganzen Schönheit’. Love is described as ‘comes’, a ‘companion’, as a ‘Nebentrieb’ of the practice of justice and reason. As its ‘aesthetic side’ it represents the joy of the process of complete appropriation, and so it is the joy of truthfully acknowledging, i.e. knowing, something.

This idea of love as the ‘aesthetic side’ of justice and reason reintroduces the notion of love as identified with the erotic response to beauty in 5.3.1.1. Based on the texts discussed so far, we may suspect at this point the presence of a complex pattern regarding the connections between love, ‘Habsucht’, knowledge and beauty. First, it seems that there are rare individuals who possess a desire for knowledge, the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. This desire, which could be understood as a form of love aimed at a specific ‘Eigenthum’, is a drive to incorporate, ‘eat’,

⁷⁰⁴ *NL* 11[47] 9.459.

⁷⁰⁵ 9.589. See also, for a lively example of how loving entails listening and judging carefully, and not, as one would expect, overlooking imperfections; *NL* 15[33] 9.646: ‘Was wir lieben, soll an sich selber keine Flecken finden –: so will es der Egoismus dieser feinsten Besitzlust, welche Liebe heißt. Gesetzt, man ist der Liebhaber einer Sängerin, mit was für ängstlichen Ohren hört man da sie vor irgend welchen Zuhörern singen! Man urtheilt fein und überfein, keineswegs voreingenommen, verliebt, verklebt: vielmehr entgeht uns keiner ihrer kleinsten Fehler, kein noch so flüchtiges Ausgleiten oder Ausbleiben; wir wissen, wenn auch die Zuhörer jubeln und klatschen, daß für die Sängerin selber nicht Alles so klang und lief, wie ihr feinstes Gewissen es verlangt hat’.

particular things that are outside us.⁷⁰⁶ Yet it is clear that some of the desired things resist being appropriated, as they are unattractive. This is the case for ‘fate’, as we have seen, and also for ‘knowledge’. FW 334 and FW 299 provide us with strategies of how to deal with those. FW 334 takes ‘music’ as its main example, but in such a way that it may very well be extended to knowledge in general. Part of the process is the ‘*hören lernen*, heraushören, unterscheiden, als ein Leben für sich isolieren und abgrenzen’: all necessary in any process of knowledge. Whereas FW 334 suggests to have an attitude of patient ‘good will’ in order for the unfamiliar object to reveal its beauty, FW 299 adds several beautifying tactics. Once we have come to see the beauty in what was regarded unattractive we may come to familiarize what was unfamiliar before; in that stage we come to see love as the ‘Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit’.

What is more, this process of coming to love and to own what was unattractive and unfamiliar at first is closely connected to the aesthetic process of becoming the ‘Dichter unseres Lebens’ (FW 299). Nietzsche subtly connects FW 334 to FW 335, the aphorism quoted in 5.2.2 in which science was presented as the condition for being self-creators: ‘dazu müssen wir die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt werden: wir müssen Physiker sein, um, in jenem Sinne, *Schöpfer* sein zu können’. FW 334 finishes with a remark on *loving oneself* (‘Auch wer sich selber liebt, wird es auf diesem Wege gelernt haben’); FW 335 opens with the difficulty of *knowing oneself*: ‘der Spruch „Erkenne dich selbst!“ ist [...] beinahe eine Bosheit.’⁷⁰⁷ FW 299, which as we saw focuses on self-cultivation as well, may serve in this context as consolidating the connection between FW 334 and FW 335. Becoming the ‘Dichter unseres Lebens’ requires the beautification ‘im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst’: loving ourselves (FW 334) and knowing ourselves (FW 335) are both part of an aesthetic process of self-cultivation in which the familiarization of the unfamiliar plays a significant part.

Yet, not surprisingly perhaps, the difficulty with the connection between love and knowledge is precisely the aesthetic distortion that comes with love. FW 59, in line with FW 299, discusses the possibility that love has a certain distorting effect on the process of familiarization:

FW 59 Wir Künstler! – Wenn wir ein Weib lieben, so haben wir leicht einen Hass auf die Natur, aller der widerlichen Natürlichkeiten gedenkend, denen jedes Weib ausgesetzt ist; gerne denken wir überhaupt daran vorbei [...] – wir sind beleidigt, die Natur scheint in unsrem Besitz einzugreifen und mit den ungeweihtesten Händen. Da macht man die Ohren zu gegen alle Physiologie und decriert für sich insgeheim „ich will davon, dass der Mensch noch etwas Anderes ist, ausser Seele und Form, Nichts hören!“

Love in this context jeopardises the strict preference for science (FW 335: ‘*Hoch die Physik!*’) characteristic of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ and ‘Redlichkeit’. It precludes the lover from keeping his eyes open for what is termed ‘Natur’ or ‘Physiologie’. Nature is seen as a hated force (‘so haben wir leicht einen Hass auf die Natur’) attempting to interfere with our object of love, our property (‘Besitz’); it is an unwelcome intruder. The lover is a dreamer – what is more, he is a *day-dreamer*:

⁷⁰⁶ See NL 11[134] 9.490: ‘Ein solches Wesen assimilirt sich das Nächste’.

⁷⁰⁷ FW 335 3.560.

[...] so verhehlte er [der Verehrer Gottes] sich die Natur und Mechanik, so gut er konnte und lebte im Traum. Oh diese Menschen von ehedem haben verstanden zu träumen und hatten nicht erst nöthig, einzuschlafen! – und auch wir Menschen von heute verstehen es noch viel zu gut, mit allem unsern guten Willen zum Wachsein und zum Tage! [...] wir Nachtwandler des Tages! Wir Künstler! Wir Verhehler der Natürlichkeit!⁷⁰⁸

Lovers, Nietzsche included, are strongly inclined to close their eyes and conceal the nature of the ones (and things) they love. They dream during the day, yet trick themselves into thinking that they are awake. Love can thus be a dangerous obstruction in the process of the pursuit and appropriation of knowledge, linked to daylight in 5.2.2. The day is meant to be dedicated to ‘Redlichkeit’, the time in which we are alive to the life-threatening realisation that ‘reality’ or truth is ultimately out of reach (as we have seen in MA I Book 1). At the same time we must still strive to gain knowledge about the illusions informing our perception of ‘reality’; out of ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, but also because the illusions teach us about our own organismic organisation. Daytime is when the difficult process of developing this knowledge takes place, the fight between the ‘lebenerhaltenden Irrthümer’ and the ‘Trieb zur Wahrheit’. Night is the time to rest, and to adopt an aesthetic perspective. The danger raised in this aphorism is that love may get these two phases, night and day, dream and knowledge, mixed up, by over-aestheticising, distorting and neglecting parts of nature. Lovers are dreamers, but their dreams should be dreamt during the night, not in daytime.

We cannot but conclude that love must be intimately connected with the aesthetic process of concealment and distortion. The above aphorism is titled ‘*Wir Künstler!*’ and the same expression significantly returns at the end. Love is thus not only important for the process of learning and gaining knowledge, but also for art, its counter-force. This is of course of great relevance for our understanding of *amor fati*: in FW 276, an element of art, or aesthetics, is clearly present as well. This implies that the love at stake here is one that not only initiates the process of knowledge out of a sense of ‘hunger’, but also results from the process of learning as described in FW 334, and from the process of beautifying in FW 299. As a ‘Nebentrieb’ of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ it accompanies and furthers the pursuit of knowledge, but also threatens to obstruct this procedure through an aesthetic appreciation and possible distortion of ‘Natur’.

5.3.2 FATUM

In the previous section we have seen that the notion of love is deeply tied up with the process of pursuing and appropriating knowledge as developed earlier. Being the term that covers several erotic desires it both stimulates and potentially distorts, aesthetically, the difficult and dangerous process of identifying and incorporating knowledge. It thereby forms a connection between the two sides of this process, its night and day, its ‘Ebbe’ and ‘Fluth’. This characteristic makes the word ‘love’ alone seem to have the power to disclose all elements at play in this difficult process. Importantly, FW 276, being the main entrance for our

⁷⁰⁸ 3.422-3.

understanding of *amor fati*, contains references to both elements of art and science as well: opening with the Cartesian connection between being and thinking ('Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum'), it is clear that the thought of *amor fati* is meant as a kind of protection against the threat of perishing in the pursuit of knowledge; moreover, *amor fati* is presented as the wish to 'learn to see as beautiful that which is necessary', so becoming 'one of those who make things beautiful'; clearly revealing the importance of art and aesthetics.⁷⁰⁹

Yet the investigation of this chapter (and of this whole thesis) concerns not just the meaning of love, but the meaning of the love of *fate*. What should we understand '*fate*' to be? Filling in '*fate*' as the object of love described in FW 334 would at least result in the following picture: it is that which is alien initially, but for which we must put some effort into exercising 'Mühe und guten Willen', 'Geduld', and 'Mildherzigkeit' in order to make it reveal its beauty (perhaps adding some of the strategies of FW 299), so that we end up being its lovers. In connection with FW 14 and the *Nachlass* passages discussed above on the connection between love and knowledge we may add that fate, too, might be appropriated.

But before analysing the meaning of fate any further I first evaluate Chouraqui's account, arguing that he is right in saying that *fatum* must be considered 'local'. I will then distinguish between four possible interpretations of fate which result in four different interpretations of *amor fati*. The first is represented by Tom Stern; the fourth returns to the account of individuality and science developed at the beginning of this chapter. I will make clear for each interpretation what can be said in favour of it, and what its weaknesses are.

Frank Chouraqui's article 'Nietzsche's Science of Love', published in 2015, argues that the object of love (his account of love I will not include in the discussion⁷¹⁰) must be considered as 'local'. That is; the fate referred to in *amor fati* is not a cosmic totality – or at least not in 1881. As we have seen in chapter 1, the 1888 occurrences of *amor fati* do seem to be involved with a kind of totality, which does not escape Chouraqui's attention. He writes: 'In this, his first formulation of *amor fati*, Nietzsche insists on [one thing] that will later vanish from his thought: the necessary is presented as "what is necessary in the things," that is to say, it is a certain portion of what Nietzsche calls "the things", i.e. reality. [...] In this [...] characterization, *amor fati* appears as a local form of affirmation, it is attached to some things in particular, not to any "fate" in general.'⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁹ The importance of the combination of art and science is emphasised regularly and in many different ways in FW; it is introduced in the very first aphorism, and the 1882 book-motto from Emerson reveals its centrality as well: 'Dem Dichter und Weisen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Erlebnisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.' As Brusotti, M. (1997) rightly remarks, 382–3 ft. 6: 'Emerson hatte eigentlich geschrieben: „Dem Poeten, dem Philosophen wie dem Heiligen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Ereignisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.“ (*Versuche*, S. 9, mehrmals angestrichen [...]).' Nietzsche thus slightly but significantly changed the wording of Emerson; according to Brusotti this is informative for our understanding of *amor fati*: 'Schon im Motto kündigt sich der fundamentale Gedanke des *amor fati* an. Nur wer – wie Nietzsche es in seiner Schrift vorexerziert – zugleich Dichter und Weiser ist, ist des *amor fati* fähig. Diese Haltung krönt die Einheit von Dichtung und Weisheit.'

⁷¹⁰ The reason for this omission is not that I am not sympathetic to his account, which defends love as an ontological force transcending object and subject – but I simply think that this notion of love is absent in the writings of 1881.

⁷¹¹ Chouraqui, F. (2015), 272.

Chouraqui's account of the fate to be loved is right, I think. That is: in all three passages that make mention of *amor fati* in 1881 it is clear that the love is not directed at a totality:

FW 276 Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen⁷¹²

NL 15[20] Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst!
„Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“⁷¹³

NL 16[22] „Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist!“⁷¹⁴

The *FW* passage speaks about ‘das Nothwendige an den Dingen’, implying that there is a necessity *about* things – not that things are entirely necessary. It might also refer to a particular way of seeing things, as the interpretation of things as being necessary (after all, we can learn to see them as beautiful as well). *NL* 15[20] distinguishes between what is and is not ‘nöthig’, saying that ‘das Nöthige’ should come first; and 16[22] expresses the wish to love only that which is necessary, implying that a selection needs to be made. I agree therefore with Chouraqui that *amor fati* in 1881 is the love for a necessity that is a *part* of reality, not its totality. The analysis of *amor* in 5.3.1.2 provides us with yet another argument for the ‘locality’ of *fatum*. If the interpretation of love as ‘greed’ can be applied to *amor fati*, then the object of love cannot but be limited, since only portioned objects can be appropriated and digested. As I will argue in more detail in the fourth part of this chapter, this idea also forms the basis of Nietzsche's criticism of the Stoics:

FW 306 [...] Der Stoiker dagegen übt sich, Steine und Gewürm, Glassplitter und Skorpione zu verschlucken und ohne Ekel zu sein; seine Magen soll endlich gleichgültig gegen Alles werden, was der Zufall des Daseins in ihn schüttet⁷¹⁵

The Stoics, according to Nietzsche, mistakenly think they have to take in everything, including elements that our stomach cannot stand: stones, worms, glass shards and scorpions. This, clearly, is not what Nietzsche has in mind as a correct representation of *amor fati*. Continuing the recurrent awareness of a contradiction between our organic constitution and forms of knowledge, it is maintained that our stomach cannot cope with particular elements or perspectives, and the necessity loved must therefore be a selective limitation, a ‘local’ one.

How to determine what is necessary in things, what to incorporate and what not? *FW* 109 provides us with at least one clearly negative answer. It resolutely dismisses the option of selecting necessity as opposed to chance.

FW 109 *Hüten wir uns!* [...] Hüten wir uns, zu sagen, dass es Gesetze in der Natur gebe. Es gibt nur Nothwendigkeiten: da ist Keiner, der befiehlt, Keiner, der gehorcht, Keiner, der übertritt. Wenn ihr wisst, dass es keine Zwecke giebt, so wisst ihr auch, dass

⁷¹² 3.521.

⁷¹³ 9.643.

⁷¹⁴ 9.664.

⁷¹⁵ 3.544.

es keinen Zufall giebt: denn nur neben einer Welt von Zwecken hat das Wort „Zufall“ einen Sinn.⁷¹⁶

We read how Nietzsche excludes both the possibility of purposes in nature ('Zwecke') and their opposite: chance ('Zufall'). There are only necessities – meaning that this aphorism leaves no room for a clear-cut distinction between what is necessary and what is not. Again we need to ask: if everything is necessary, and if there is no fundamental distinction to be found in Nietzsche's analysis of nature between the necessary and the non-necessary, how should we understand the 'local' fatalism implied in *amor fati*? How should we, in short, make sense of *fatum*?

5.3.2.1 STERN'S ACCOUNT: LOVE OF THE NECESSITY TO ERR

The recent article by Tom Stern can shed some light on the matter. His suggestion is not to take the mentioning of necessity as a characteristic of nature, the world, or a totality. Instead, the 'Nothwendigkeit' mentioned is one related to *us*, to what *we* need. '[We] find, in *The Gay Science*, plenty of discussion of what is necessary *for us*. [...] In fact, they are surprising and completely general claims about what all humans must do, if they are to survive at all. The basic message is: if we are to survive, we must use our cognitive abilities; but our cognitive abilities are necessarily entwined with error. Living means thinking, thinking means erring.'⁷¹⁷ The necessity to be loved is therefore described as follows: 'The point is, as we know, a very familiar one from *the Gay Science*: to be alive, we have to think; but to think is to err – and we don't get any choice about that. [...] Taking this '*muss*' seriously, my suggestion is that loving what's necessary for us means loving that we get it wrong – that we misrepresent, simplify and misconstrue.'⁷¹⁸

Our lives are deeply and necessarily bound up with error; this erring is an inevitable necessity; therefore, to love fate is to love to err. It is not surprising, then, to see Stern focusing strongly on the aesthetic elements within Nietzsche's thought: 'What he recommends is the artistic appropriation of these errors at a second-order level – to make these errors beautiful.'⁷¹⁹ The artistic appropriation of the errors has to take place on a 'second-order level' because it is not the errors themselves that are the object of love; rather, it is *the fact that* we cannot avoid making errors that is our fate. Since we have to make errors, let's do so in a loving, beautifying way; so Stern proposes.

On the one hand, Stern's case could have been made stronger if he had included the *Nachlass* in his research. We have already come across the following note, which encourages us to love our making errors, precisely as Stern suggests:

⁷¹⁶ 3.468.

⁷¹⁷ Stern, T. (2013), 153.

⁷¹⁸ Stern, T. (2013), 155.

⁷¹⁹ Stern, T. (2013), 157.

NL 11[162] [...] Leben ist die Bedingung des Erkennens. Irren die Bedingung des Lebens und zwar im tiefsten Grunde Irren. Wissen um das Irren hebt es nicht auf! Das ist nichts Bitteres!

Wir müssen das Irren lieben und pflegen, es ist der Mutterschoß des Erkennens. [...]

Um des Erkennens willen das Leben lieben und fördern, um des Lebens willen das Irren Wählen lieben und fördern. Dem Dasein eine ästhetische Bedeutung geben, *unseren Geschmack an ihm mehren*, ist Grundbedingung aller Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis.⁷²⁰

On the other hand, if Stern had included this *Nachlass* text, he would have come to a slightly different conclusion. This text indeed tells us to love the erring; but not because, as Stern argues, it is the only way in which to use our cognitive abilities, and hence to survive – rather, because it is the condition for life and life is the condition for knowledge. Erring is a necessity: yet, not just in order to live, but in order to *learn*. The importance of knowledge is underestimated in Stern's article. Stern himself seems to acknowledge this imperfection, since he finishes his article as follows: 'But the sentiment remains: this is not a love of *necessity* at all, but rather a love of an artistic representation of one particular necessity, beautified by manipulation. We originally asked [...] why we should prefer *amor fati* to wishful thinking; what we have here looks like wishful thinking after all.'⁷²¹

In other words, Stern's contribution to the debate is valuable for redirecting the focus of *fatum* to us and our needs, away from the metaphysical structure of the universe. But the weakness of his analysis is that he takes *fatum* to be connected with our erring only, neglecting the importance and problematic nature of knowledge for Nietzsche in this phase. The outcome of his proposal would be that Nietzsche wishes for himself to only learn to err as beautifully as possible (a kind of 'wishful thinking' indeed) – an outcome that hardly reflects what Nietzsche has in mind, given his attempt to endure the battle within himself, as a thinker, between the life-saving errors and the passion for truth.

However, this is not the only weakness of Stern's account. In order to really grasp the meaning of *amor fati*, it is of great importance to include in the discussion all references to *amor fati* made in this period. Below the other two passages containing an explicit reference in full again, after which I will list three more weaknesses in Stern's approach.

NL 15[20] Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst! „Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“ – *amor fati* dies wäre meine Moral, thue ihm alles Gute an und hebe es über seine schreckliche Herkunft hinauf zu dir.⁷²²

NL 16[22] „Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist! Ja! Amor fati sei meine letzte Liebe!“ – Vielleicht treibst du es so weit: aber vorher wirst du erst noch der Liebhaber der Furien sein müssen: ich gestehe, mich würden die Schlangen irre

⁷²⁰ 9.504.

⁷²¹ Stern, T. (2013), 161.

⁷²² 9.643.

machen. – „Was weißt du von den Furien! Furien – das ist nur ein böses Wort für die Grazien.“ – Er ist toll! –⁷²³

To begin with, the last passage clearly pictures the love of fate as an immensely difficult task. In the dialogue constructed, the voice representing the wish to only love that which is necessary is told that he must be the lover of ‘the Furies’ first. And being their lover would mean to endure their maddening snakes. *FW* 276, too, pictures *amor fati* as something difficult: it is connected with something to be achieved in the future (‘ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!'); and moreover as something to be *learned* ('Ich will immer mehr lernen...'). In Stern's account, the difficulty of achieving *amor fati* seems to be overlooked. What is the difficulty in loving to err? Is it a matter of accepting the fact that we cannot escape our own errors? Why would Nietzsche compare that to the loving of ‘Furies’? Is the loving of errors not rather, as Stern himself seems to suggest, an easy way out – a kind of ‘wishful thinking’, that completely disregards the struggle related to being a thinker?

Secondly, Stern's interpretation fits badly with the analysis of *amor* given in the previous sections. If *amor* is a sublimation of the drive for property, the urge to make something one's own, and to aesthetically incorporate it – then it becomes utterly unclear how ‘the necessity to err’ can be seen as its object. How can we make sense of appropriating the necessity to err? A solution to this problem would be to focus on the errors themselves, instead of the second-order fact that we cannot live without them. This solution will be explored as the next possible interpretation of *amor fati*, below.

But before that a third, related, objection to Stern's account needs to be raised. If the necessity to be loved is the inevitability of erring, then how can we explain the expression in *FW* 276 ‘Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen?’ *FW* 276 speaks about the necessity ‘of things’, implying that the necessity to be loved is one that is somehow attached to ‘things’. To understand the necessity to err as one that can be discovered ‘in things’ seems unlikely.

5.3.2.2 LOVE OF ERRORS

The second possible way to understand *fatum*, therefore, would be to shift from the second-order level to the first-order, and to see what happens if we would understand *fatum* as the errors themselves. In that interpretation, loving fate would be something like: learning more and more to see the necessity of things – thus, the necessary but erroneous views on things – as beautiful. This interpretation would solve the last two problems detected in Stern's analysis: we can give an explanation of *fatum* as mistaken views on the world being appropriated and aesthetically distorted, that is, as a clearly identifiable object of love; and we can explain now why Nietzsche speaks of ‘das Nothwendige an den Dingen’. Moreover, the following passage from the *Nachlass* seems to support this interpretation of fate:

NL 11[286] [...] *Gewohnheit* und *unbedingter Glaube*, daß es so sein muß wie es ist, ist Fundament alles Wachstums und Starkwerdens. – Unsere ganze Weltbetrachtung ist

⁷²³ 9.664.

so entstanden, daß sie durch den *Erfolg* bewiesen wurde, wir können mit ihr *leben* (Glaube an Außendinge, Freiheit des Wollens). [...] Wenn wir alles *Nothwendige* in unserer jetzigen Denkweise feststellen, so haben wir nichts für das „Wahre an sich“ bewiesen, sondern nur „das Wahre für uns“ d.h. das Dasein-uns-Ermöglichende auf Grund der Erfahrung – und der Prozeß ist so alt, daß Umdenken unmöglich ist. Alles *a priori* gehört hierher.⁷²⁴

This passage explicitly connects the erroneous perspectives on the world with the ‘*Nothwendige*’ (its emphasis, importantly, being Nietzsche’s), unfolding once more how we depend on certain ways of viewing the world – namely: the mistaken view that there are ‘things outside of us’, ‘Außendinge’, and that there is ‘freedom of will’. Believing that there is truth in these erroneous concepts only shows that these are ‘true for us’, not that they are true ‘in themselves’; we have long denied any relation between the specific conditions of our existence and our perception of truth. Yet this perception forms the basis for all our growth and strength (*Gewohnheit* und *unbedingter Glaube*, daß es so sein muß wie es ist, ist Fundament alles Wachstums und Starkwerdens’). It is the condition for our existence based on experience, comprising all ‘*a priori*’ thinking. ‘Umdenken’ is impossible, says Nietzsche here, it would go against the most fundamental conditions of our living.

So, *loving* these necessary yet mistaken perspectives on life, not only believing in them as if they could not have been different, as formulated here, but also *incorporating* them through a further aesthetic adaptation to our taste – yes, that would make us stronger. It would explain why Nietzsche speaks about *amor fati* as the thought that gives him ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit’ in FW 276, against the danger of allowing the life-threatening desire of knowledge to play its conflicting part. But it would also suggest that *amor fati* opposes the project of unmasking our ‘*Weltbetrachtung*’ as illusionary and only successful because it enables us to live, and of developing new perspectives, even if they initially resist our organic constitution. Given the number of passages on this project, it does not seem plausible that Nietzsche gives up his ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ for this interpretation of *amor fati*.

Let me formulate a related difficulty, comparable to what we perceived in Stern’s interpretation: it cannot account for the difficulty involved in loving fate. Again we face the problem of interpreting the sentence ‘vorher wirst du erst noch der Liebhaber der Furien sein müssen’: what aspect of loving mistaken views can be so horrific that it is comparable to the loving of ‘Furien’? Loving the erroneous view of things being necessary is something we would do naturally, it seems – so why make a mission of it? This question becomes even more pressing if we recognize that the mistaken views to be loved have been developed and appropriated during the last centuries. What would be the merit of beginning to love something that has been ours for so long? And what is the point of aesthetically distorting these views, if they are mistaken to begin with?

We have now discussed two possible interpretations of *amor fati*, both of which take the necessity of erring as their starting point. Their main problem is that the aesthetic aspect acquires too much attention at the expense of the desire for (new) knowledge. Since it is only the erroneous perspectives that are loved, we are strongly reminded of the dreamers of FW 59:

⁷²⁴ 9.551.

'Wenn wir ein Weib lieben, so haben wir leicht einen Hass auf die Natur [...]. Da macht man die Ohren zu gegen alle Physiologie [...]' In other words: the loving of our errors closes our eyes to 'nature' or 'physiology', which hardly represents Nietzsche's project.

5.3.2.3 LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE

The third and fourth interpretation of *amor fati* I will consider now mirror the first and second. Instead of focusing on erring, they take 'knowledge' as their starting point. Since developing and incorporating newly developed insights in our lives is a difficult task, the idea is that this perspective might provide a solution for the main problems found in the first and second interpretation. I begin with the possibility of loving a first-order level of knowledge, that is: loving knowledge itself instead of the drive for knowledge (which will be explored fourthly).

We may, at this point, distinguish between three phases in the process of developing new knowledge in Nietzsche's texts. The first is negative: it represents the attempt to rid the world of illusionary (metaphysical) presuppositions. This is the main aim of *MA* I Book 1 as we have seen, which may result in a nature that is 'ganz entgöttlicht', as articulated in *FW* 109.⁷²⁵ This phase fits Nietzsche's understanding of 'truth' in the *Nachlass* passage above, where it is defined negatively in terms of the mistaken belief in 'Außendinge' and 'Freiheit des Wollens'. This formulation is comparable to *FW* 110 in which the 'irrthümliche Glaubenssätze' are 'dass es dauernde Dingen gebe, dass es gleiche Dinge gebe, dass es Dinge, Stoffe, Körper gebe, dass ein Ding Das sei, als was es erscheine'.⁷²⁶ Nietzsche always merely tentatively describes 'die letzte Wahrheit' as 'Fluß der Dinge' as a positive formulation of a negative result, rejecting substance, being and unity. Of particular importance is the realisation that what we have understood as 'truth' for so long merely fits our organicistic constitution and has in this way guaranteed our survival.⁷²⁷

The second and third steps in the pursuit of knowledge may be connected to the two kinds of love distinguished earlier. The first follows from the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' and represents the painful desire to explore new perspectives, especially those that are unfitting to our organicistic constitution; all our 'Trieben', including the negative, have to be engaged in this endeavour (as *FW* 333 made clear, see 5.2.2 and 4.3). The knowledge in this stage is the object of desire, and is still out of reach. We may connect this stage to what we read in *FW* 334: it requires the exercise of patience and good will before we can see the beauty of what is still unfamiliar. In the third stage, in which love is directed not at a desired object, but rather at something we possess (it is 'Empfindung für das Eigenthum'⁷²⁸), some form of knowledge has been attained. At this stage it is necessary to familiarize it to the fullest until it is 'einverleibt'.

⁷²⁵ *FW* 109 3.469: 'Wann werden wir die Natur ganz entgöttlicht haben! Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernaltürlichen!'

⁷²⁶ 3.469.

⁷²⁷ *NL* 11[162] 9.504. We are also reminded of the different levels of errors that we see Nietzsche distinguishing in the following passage: *NL* 11[156] 9.501-2: 'Die Gattung ist der gröbere Irrthum, das Individuum der feinere Irrthum, es kommt später. [...] So lernt es: wie alle genießende Erkenntniß auf dem groben Irrthum der Gattung, den feineren Irrthümer des Individuum, und dem feinsten Irrthum des schöpferischen Augenblicks beruht.'

⁷²⁸ *NL* 11[134] 9.492.

We can connect it to *NL* 12[75] discussed above, in which love was defined as ‘die *aesthetische Seite* der Gerechtigkeit und Vernunft, ein Nebentrieb.’⁷²⁹

If we take the two last stages as guides for our next interpretation, *amor fati* can be understood first as the initial desire. In that case, *amor fati* closely resembles if not coincides with the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. ‘Leidenschaft’ would have to be the drive underlying *amor*, and *fatum* may be the term denoting ‘Erkenntnis’. At first sight it is not strange to equate *amor fati* with the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’: both notions play a central role in Nietzsche’s philosophy, signify an important passion, and are closely linked with the process of acquiring knowledge. What is more, this option seems to be confirmed by the way Nietzsche writes about *amor fati* in the letter to F. Overbeck, dated June 5th 1882:

Übrigens bin ich von einer fatalistischen „Gottergebenheit“ – ich nenne es *amor fati* – dass ich einem Löwen in den Rachen laufen würde, geschweige denn –⁷³⁰

This fragment is comparable with the *Nachlass* passage in which *amor fati* is associated with the love of ‘Furien’: here the danger is described as walking in a lion’s mouth. The love of fate is a ‘fatalistischen Gottergebenheit’, a kind of fatal yet ‘divine’ (the quotation marks are Nietzsche’s, as we have seen in chapter 1) devotion that provides him with the courage not only to walk into the mouth of a lion, but also... The sentence breaks off, but the suggestion ‘chase a horrific truth’ is not, I think, far from Nietzsche’s mind. *Amor fati* is thus possibly identified here with the will to truth, a kind of devotion that encourages the fated thinker to follow through his dangerous project. Clearly, this type of *amor fati* cannot be interpreted in terms of an agapic kind of love, as Han-Pile suggests. The connotation of the devotion as ‘divine’ should be taken with some irony, and it still seems to function like any erotic desire drawn to a certain object, even if it is a perilous one – initially.

On the other hand, *amor fati* is presented in *FW* 276 as a means to protect oneself from too much danger – and as we have seen, the danger at hand is caused precisely by the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. So if *amor fati* were the equivalent of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain why this would be the thought that offers ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süssigkeit alles weiteren Lebens’ and constitutes a threat to life at the same time. Moreover, this interpretation of *amor fati* cannot explain the references to beauty in *FW* 276; after all, the focus should be on *knowledge*, which does not allow for a beautified version. Nor is it clear why this type of love should be learned, as it rather seems a spontaneous and inescapable force.

But *amor fati* can also be seen as that which helps to continue the process of acquiring knowledge, the third of the stages distinguished above. As such it is of assistance in slowly getting used to the strangeness of what has been judged ‘truth’ and adapting it, aesthetically, to our taste. In that way it could be the ‘Nebentrieb’ that accompanies and furthers the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’.

Yet, the first question that comes to mind when thinking through the idea of *fatum* as truth, in both accounts, is: what is the relation between ‘truth’ (or ‘Erkenntnis’) and ‘necessity’? Why

⁷²⁹ 9,589.

⁷³⁰ KGB III/1.199-200.

present the love of truth as the love of a *necessity*? Again we are confronted with the question we encountered earlier: since *FW* 109 precludes the use of any distinction between what is and is not necessary ('Es giebt nur Nothwendigkeiten'⁷³¹), what meaning of the 'necessary' do we have left? How to make the distinction between what is and is not necessary, and hence between what is and is not the object of love?

One possible solution for this problem might be found in *FW* 242, in which it is stated that the source of knowledge is never external. This solution can be applied only to *amor fati* seen in the second instance, namely as the drive to incorporate truth:

FW 242 *Suum cuique*. – Wie gross auch die Habsucht meiner Erkenntniss ist: ich kann aus den Dingen nichts Anderes herausnehmen, als was mir schon gehört, – das Besitzthum Anderer bleibt in den Dingen zurück. Wie ist es möglich dass ein Mensch Dieb oder Räuber sei!⁷³²

Learning, according to this aphorism, is to take 'from the things' that which already belongs to us – more is simply impossible, since 'the property of others' remains out of reach. This may again underscore the closeness, if not the inextricability, between what is considered 'truth' and the organic dynamics informing this judgement.⁷³³ Knowledge is clearly approached in this context as something we already possess, and one could maintain that it is related to necessity as follows: what belongs to us is inevitable as a kind of 'fate' betraying the necessity of our own 'Physik'. One might argue therefore that there is a parallel between two sentences, one from *FW* 242, the other from *FW* 276:

FW 242 [...] ich kann aus den Dingen nichts Anderes herausnehmen, als was mir schon gehört⁷³⁴

FW 276 [...] Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen⁷³⁵

If there is nothing that can be taken from things other than that which already belongs to us, then it might be the case that 'das Nothwendige an den Dingen' must be seen as that which is necessarily ours already. The love of fate, seen from this perspective, means: the love of the knowledge of things, which we already and necessarily possess.

This interpretation underscores once again that the process of developing new perspectives on 'truth', the second of the three steps distinguished above, is full of danger: since what is regarded as 'truth' is dependent on one's 'Physik', adopting a different outlook on truth would be life-threatening. The expressions in the other *amor fati* passages can be accounted for in this way: both 15[20] 'Zuerst das Nöthige' and 16[22] '„Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist! [...]“' can be taken to mean that we should love the knowledge we own first, before returning to the second phase of acquiring new perspectives on 'truth'.

⁷³¹ 3.468.

⁷³² 3.514.

⁷³³ See also *FW* 307, discussed in the next section.

⁷³⁴ 3.514.

⁷³⁵ 3.521.

This analysis also fits within the description of love encountered earlier: ‘Liebe ist [...] Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit’.⁷³⁶ Loving fate would then be the exercise of possessing knowledge *in full*, and with joy instead of disgust or fear (since love promises to eventually change ‘Furien’ into ‘Grazien’ – which also provides the argument for seeing it as a difficult process that demands learning). Through the exercise of love, our knowledge becomes adapted to our physical and organic constitution. Moreover, the process of ‘Einverleibung’ does, as we have seen, make us stronger: instead of exposing ourselves to the danger of acquiring further outlooks, we are forced to focus on the knowledge we possess and to familiarize it. This way we can understand the thought of *amor fati* as offering ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit’.

At the same time this analysis of *amor fati* reintroduces the idea of *fatum* as closely related to ourselves and our ‘Physik’. If the ‘truth’ to be loved after being aesthetically ‘einverleibt’ is one that is inextricably linked with our organismic constitution, then what we end up loving is not only this knowledge, but also ourselves. This insight introduces the fourth possible interpretation of *amor fati*, namely the love of the physical constitution underlying the knowledge to be loved; in Nietzsche’s case, not only the drives belonging to the second step which generate new insights, but also the painful but necessary presence of ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ which underpins the whole process.

5.3.2.4 LOVE OF THE ‘LEIDENSHAFT DER ERKENNTNIS’

Several texts further support the idea of an intimate connection between a judgement concerning truth and falsehood and the drives. *FW* 307 reinforces the idea of a link between *FW* 242 and *FW* 276 discussed in the previous section. It explicitly states that there is nothing ‘Willkürliches und Unpersönliches’ in the exercise of criticism; rather, accepting something as true while rejecting what was previously ‘loved’ as a truth is ‘ein Beweis davon, dass lebendige treibende Kräfte in uns da sind’.

FW 307 *Zu Gunsten der Kritik*. – Jetzt erscheint dir Etwas als Irrthum, das du ehedem als eine Wahrheit oder Wahrscheinlichkeit geliebt hast: du stösst es von dir ab und wähnst, dass deine Vernunft darin einen Sieg erfochten habe. Aber vielleicht war jener Irrthum damals, als du noch ein Anderer warst – du bist immer ein Anderer –, dir ebenso nothwendig wie alle deine jetzigen „Wahrheiten“, gleichsam als eine Haut, die dir Vieles verhehlte und verhüllte, was du noch nicht sehen durftest. [...] Wenn wir Kritik üben, so ist es nichts Willkürliches und Unpersönliches, – es ist, wenigstens sehr oft, ein Beweis davon, dass lebendige treibende Kräfte in uns da sind, welche eine Rinde abstoßen.⁷³⁷

The idea of an ‘Irrthum’ which was previously ‘geliebt’ ‘als eine Wahrheit oder Wahrscheinlichkeit’ is significant: it confirms the idea of the possibility of love directed at a form of truth or knowledge as presented in the previous section. On the other hand, it is the necessity of being this way and no other that renders this judgement necessary (‘jener Irrthum

⁷³⁶ *NL* 12[75] 9.589.

⁷³⁷ 3.544-5.

[war] [...] dir ebenso nothwendig wie alle deine jetzigen „Wahrheiten“). *Amor fati* seen in this light might thus also concern the necessity of the ‘lebendige treibende Kräfte in uns’.

Other texts have been discussed which underscore the intimate connection between scientific judgements and the underlying drives. In section 5.2.1 Nietzsche’s extraordinary position was explained, as he understands himself as the first to realise that the pursuit of truth amounts to the exercise of one’s ‘Tribe’. We saw then that this exercise inevitably leads to an increase at least in knowledge about *them* (as there is only limited hope for any other kind of knowledge):

M 483 [...] Niemals aus anderen, als aus diesen Augen in die Dinge sehen können? [...] Was wird am Ende aller ihrer Erkenntniss die Menschheit erkannt haben? – ihre Organe!⁷³⁸

This insight explicitly redirects the knowledge acquired in the three steps discussed in the previous section to the organicistic constitution informing it, claiming that the only possible object of knowledge is our ‘Organe’.

This text can thus be taken as a strong suggestion that these ‘Organe’ may be the intended object of *amor*. Nothing of the knowledge we have gathered so far reveals anything of ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ itself (nor is it the result of a rational exercise of ‘Vernunft’, as stated in FW 307).⁷³⁹ It is insightful only with respect to the way in which our judgements originate, necessarily, from our bodily constitution. This implies that the whole procedure is governed by a form of self-reference: the knowledge resulting from the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ discloses nothing but itself and its organicistic workings.⁷⁴⁰ The fourth option of *amor fati* thus mirrors the first in this way: it interprets *fatum* as the second-order necessary drive to truth, that is, the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. It aims, in other words, to love not just any outcome of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, but specifically that of the drive itself, with the self-referential complexity involved in its process.

The most apparent advantage of this approach is that the possibility of fate denoting Nietzsche’s physical constitution is confirmed in the acclamation we have encountered before:

14.268 In meiner Seele ist ein düsterer und leidenschaftlicher Hang für das Wahre. Ach, ich habe oft die Erholung so nötig! [...] Aber ein unüberwindlicher Zug treibt mich, und ich folge, oft wie geschlagen. Ich sehe das Schönste oft mit einem grimmigen Rückblick und bin ihm böse wie einem Verführer: und meine Redlichkeit peinigt mich wegen dieser Art von Rache. „Schicksal, ich folge dir“ und wollte ich nicht, ich würde es müssen unter Schlägen seufzend. Das röhrt mich zu Thränen.

⁷³⁸ 3.287.

⁷³⁹ This follows directly from what we have seen in WL 1 (‘die Wahrheit sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind’), discussed in 3.2.2.

⁷⁴⁰ Which may explain why FW 335 3.560-4, ‘Hoch die Physik!’ opens with a remark on self-knowledge, claiming that all ‘Nierenprüfer’ know that „Jeder ist sich selber der fernste“. Nevertheless, later in the aphorism it is argued that we have to become ‘die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt’, which means that we have to be ‘Physiker’. Yet we know now that being ‘Physiker’ does not reveal anything new about the world, and all the more about our ‘Nieren’.

This remark reveals how Nietzsche sees the painful drive for truth as a kind of ‘fate’, a ‘Schicksal’. The necessity that becomes apparent in the ‘Zug’, and in ‘ich würde es müssen’, is represented in FW 309 – the aphorism of which the statement above is a ‘Vorstufe’.

*FW 309 [...] Ich muss den Fuss weiter heben, diesen müden, verwundeten Fuss: und weil ich muss, so habe ich oft für das Schönste, das mich nicht halten konnte, einen grimmigen Rückblick, — weil es mich nicht halten konnte!*⁷⁴¹

Even though the things Nietzsche encounters in his unstoppable search for truth are ‘das Schönste’, the ‘Hang für das Wahre’ prevents him from stopping and resting there. He ‘must’ lift his foot for another step, even if it is tired and hurt. The reaction of frustration is understandable: we have seen how beauty is the ultimate way to escape from the threat of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. But since the drive will not accept anything short of truth (‘Dieser Hang und Drang zum Wahren, Wirklichen, Un-Scheinbaren, Gewissen’), the possibility of stopping and resting is excluded. The drive to continue is an inescapable yet painful fate.

This option of equating *fatum* with this ‘Schicksal’ thus reveals a picture of *amor fati* as the wish to fully appropriate the fact that a necessary drive within, a drive that opposes other drives, a drive to know, has become dominant in our organismic constitution. This image fits within the pattern of several other aphorisms as well. To begin with, it explains the very first line of FW 276: ‘Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken.’ This connection between life and thinking might well be an indication that, given Nietzsche’s ‘Physik’, it is impossible for him *not* to think when he is alive. Thinking, in other words, is his fate.⁷⁴² But it is also compatible with FW 110, which contains a definition of a thinker in organismic terms.

*FW 110 [...] der Denker: das ist jetzt das Wesen, in dem der Trieb zur Wahrheit und jene lebenerhaltenden Irrtümer ihren ersten Kampf kämpfen, nachdem auch der Trieb zur Wahrheit sich als eine lebenserhaltende Trieb bewiesen hat.*⁷⁴³

The fact that Nietzsche finds himself to be alive still in the opening of FW Book IV is evidence of the fact that, in him, the ‘Trieb zur Wahrheit’ has become a ‘lebenserhaltende Trieb’. For a long period this ‘Trieb’ has been very weak, because it appeared ‘dass man mit ihr nicht zu leben vermöge’; ‘unser Organismus war auf ihrer Gegensatz eingerichtet’.⁷⁴⁴ Again, we may see it as Nietzsche’s fate to be the first organism in which this drive for knowledge has not been the cause of death. His fate is determined by this drive.

Moreover, this account fits well with the idea of love being directed at a form of self-cultivation. As we have seen in both sections on love, 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2, the practices of love as

⁷⁴¹ 3.546.

⁷⁴² As is Brusotti, M. (1997)’s point when he says, referring to the motto of Book IV: ‘Das Denken ist für ihn diesem „liebevollsten Muss“ geworden, und der *amor fati* ist die Liebe zu allem Notwendigen’. 449. One of the sentences of the motto is the following: ‘Frei im liebevollsten Muss’; 3.521. Immediately after the motto we read the opening lines of FW 276: ‘Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, den ich muss noch denken.’

⁷⁴³ 3.471.

⁷⁴⁴ 3.471.

developed in the cluster of aphorisms *FW* 299, 334, 335, and 341 all point to a certain attitude towards oneself. *FW* 334 finishes with a remark on the love of the self; the opening of *FW* 335 mentions self-knowledge, suggesting that the two are related (which they clearly are in this account). *FW* 299, on the beautifying strategies, claims it is wisest to apply these to the ‘Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst’ (which reminds us of the remark in *NL* 15[20] ‘Zuerst das Nöthige’⁷⁴⁵), in order to in this way become ‘Dichter unseres Lebens’.⁷⁴⁶ *FW* 341 contains the famous ideal of being ‘gut’ with ‘dir selber und dem Leben’. *FW* 290, discussed in 1.2.4, claims that one thing is needful, namely that ‘der Mensch seine Zufriedenheit mit sich erreiche’.⁷⁴⁷ Even *FW* 14, the aphorism in which love and greed are claimed to be the same drive named twice, contains a remark on the love of oneself.

FW 14 *Was Alles Liebe genannt wird.* – [...] Wir werden des Alten, sicher Besessenen allmählich überdrüssig und strecken die Hände wieder aus [...]. Unsere Lust an uns selber will sich so aufrecht erhalten, dass sie immer wieder etwas Neues in uns selber verwandelt, – das eben heisst Besitzen. Eines Besitzes überdrüssig werden, das ist: unserer selber überdrüssig werden.⁷⁴⁸

Our property is part of who we are, it is suggested. If we become tired of our property, we become tired of ourselves. The importance of the reference to ‘ourselves’ as the object of greed (‘Lust an uns selber’), even if our desire seems fixated on something outside us, is that in loving ourselves we end up changing constantly, hungry for new possessions. The dynamics of constant alteration are described in further detail in *FW* 295, an aphorism that clearly belongs in the same group as those discussed before.

FW 295 *Kurze Gewohnheiten.* – Ich liebe die kurzen Gewohnheiten und halte sie für das unschätzbare Mittel, viele Sachen und Zustände kennen zu lernen [...]; meine Natur ist ganz für kurze Gewohnheiten eingerichtet [...]. Immer glaube ich, diess werde mich nun dauernd befriedigen – auch die kurze Gewohnheit hat jenen Glauben der Leidenschaft, den Glauben an die Ewigkeit – und ich sei zu beneiden, es gefunden und erkannt zu haben [...]. Und eines Tages hat es seine Zeit gehabt: die gute Sache scheidet von mir, nicht als Etwas, das mir nun Ekel einflösst – sondern friedlich und an mir gesättigt, wie ich an ihm, und wie als ob wir einander dankbar sein müssten und uns so die Hände zum Abschied reichten.⁷⁴⁹

In this aphorism Nietzsche claims that he loves ‘brief habits’; also (and in line with *FW* 14) that his nature is ‘suited’ for these habits: loving brief habits is the consequence of loving one’s nature as a thinker. The aphorism following *FW* 295 further explains that the nature of a ‘thinker’ is opposed to a ‘festen Ruf’ (‘Die Gesinnung des Erkennenden als im Widerspruch mit

⁷⁴⁵ *NL* 15[20] 9.643: ‘Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst! „Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“.

⁷⁴⁶ This remark follows the observation in *FW* 299 3.538 that to give style to one’s character is ‘eine grosse und seltene Kunst! Sie übt Der, welcher Alles übersieht, was seine Natur an Kräften und Schwächen bietet, und es dann einem künstlerischen Plane einfügt’, thereby like in *FW* 335 suggesting that knowledge of oneself precedes aesthetic self-cultivation.

⁷⁴⁷ *FW* 290 3.531.

⁷⁴⁸ 3.386.

⁷⁴⁹ 3.535.

dem „festen Rufe“⁷⁵⁰); that is, to a calling that lasts for a lifetime.⁷⁵¹ This statement makes clear once more that what is at stake in this set of aphorisms is coming to terms with being a thinker. Reading the texts together as I propose suggests that loving oneself as a thinker means to be engaged in this circle of (self-)possession and (self-)satisfaction, which results in the constantly changing desire for new possessions, new habits, new perspectives, even those that are painful, as *FW* 309 made clear.

This picture can be understood perfectly, moreover, against the background of the *Nachlass* texts explored in the first sections of this chapter (see especially 5.2.2). The constant change of the thinker is identified as a ‘Kur des Einzelnen’ in *NL* 11[258]. The importance of science for the development of new individuals for the future of humanity, though not taken up literally in *FW*, clearly plays an important role in the development of Nietzsche’s thinking in the published texts.

NL 11[258] Zur „Kur des Einzelnen.“

- 1) er soll vom Nächsten und Kleinsten ausgehen und die ganze Abhängigkeit sich feststellen, in die hinein er geboren und erzogen ist
- 2) ebenso soll er den gewohnten Rhythmus seines Denkens und Fühlens, seine intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Ernährung begreifen
- 3) Dann soll er *Veränderung* aller Art versuchen, zunächst um die Gewohnheiten zu brechen (vielen Diätwechsel, mit feinster Beobachtung)
- 4) er soll sich geistig an seine Widersacher einmal anlehnen, er soll ihre Nahrung zu essen versuchen. Er soll *reisen*, in jedem Sinne. In dieser Zeit wird er „unstet und flüchtig“ sein.

Von Zeit zu Zeit soll er über seinen Erlebnissen *ruhen* – und verdauen.

- 5) Dann kommt das Höhere: der Versuch, ein Ideal zu *dichten*. Dies geht dem noch Höheren voraus – eben dies Ideal zu leben.
- 6) Er muß durch eine Reihe von Idealen hindurch.⁷⁵²

The first step, the determination of ‘die ganze Abhängigkeit’ in which one is ‘geboren und erzogen’, may be understood now as being parallel to the first of the three steps of scientific endeavour as explained in the previous section. The ‘Abhängigkeiten’ may then be identified as those perspectives that ensure the survival of the individual (who used to be part of a greater ‘Gattung’, as we have seen in 5.2.1), even though we know now that they are ‘Irrtümer’. *NL* 11[286] confirms how we are born and raised within the realm of these perspectives: ‘Wenn wir alles *Nothwendige* in unserer jetzigen Denkweise feststellen, so haben wir nichts für das „Wahre an sich“ bewiesen, sondern nur „das Wahre für uns“ d.h. das Dasein-uns-Ermöglichende auf Grund der Erfahrung.’⁷⁵³ The second of the six steps of the ‘Kur’ continues this line, suggesting that ‘sich feststellen’ and ‘begreifen’ also comprises ‘den gewohnten

⁷⁵⁰ *FW* 296 3.537.

⁷⁵¹ This is not to say, though, that the thinker does not hope for his newly found habit to last an eternity: ‘auch die kurze Gewohnheit hat jenen Glauben der Leidenschaft, den Glauben an die Ewigkeit’. We may therefore suspect that the question of the demon in *FW* 341 concerns this kind of love rather than the doctrine of a world returning in eternally identical circles. This may be seen as yet another argument against the idea that the eternal return belongs to the domain of ‘physics’, as I argued in 2.2.

⁷⁵² 9.539.

⁷⁵³ 9.551

Rhythmus seines Denkens und Fühlens, seine intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Ernährung'. The importance of these steps is again the self-referential character of the investigation of all our presuppositions concerning truth; as we have seen already in chapter 4, this whole procedure culminates in a deepened awareness and understanding of one's own 'Physik', framed in terms of metabolism.⁷⁵⁴

In order, then, to increase the number of perspectives through the enhancement of all our drives (the second step of the three distinguished in 5.3.2.3), one has to undergo 'Veränderung aller Art', break with 'Gewohnheiten', and accept 'vielen Diätwechsel'. Connecting this passage with FW 296 suggests that this constant change of 'Gewohnheiten' is typical for a thinker; FW 14 suggests that it is the consequence of the love of oneself that we may now come to see as the effect of the full 'Einverleibung' of the 'possession' that one is to oneself at this point. This means that the dangerous phase of opening up life-threatening perspectives is the consequence of being a thinker, but may at the same time be the consequence of the effect of self-satisfaction and self-love. The danger of this phase is characterised once again in terms of diet: 'er soll sich geistig an seine Widersacher einmal anlehnen, er soll ihre Nahrung zu essen versuchen'. We may recall FW 334's observations on love, in which the practices of good will and patience are recommended in order to change something strange into something familiar. But an important part of the attempt to absorb new perspectives is '*ruhen – und verdauen*'. This can be connected to the third of the three phases explored in the previous section, in which the gained insights are fully appropriated; we are reminded in this stage of NL 12[75], in which love was defined as the 'Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit'.⁷⁵⁵

This whole procedure (of which the final steps are the creation and adoption of ideals) must be understood against the background of Nietzsche's intricate reflection on the relation between science and the enhancement of humanity. It is not difficult to see at this point how the three stages may form a cyclical process, changing not only the perspectives of the subject in a constant movement, but also changing its inner constitution. In this way, the individual thinker may end up being one of those *Versuchs-Individuen* who, by engaging in this process, may stand at the beginning of a new species. After all, we have seen how in NL 11[290] it is claimed that the 'letzte Nutzen der Erkenntniß und Wissenschaft ist, die Loslösung neuer Eier vom Eierstocke zu ermöglichen und immer neue Arten entstehen zu lassen'; and this is the case, because 'die Wissenschaft bringt die Kenntnisse der Erhaltungsmittel für neue Individuen. – Ohne Fortschritte der Erkenntniß würden neue Individuen immer schnell zu

⁷⁵⁴ In line with FW 59 3.423, in which it was stated that the love of one's 'Physik' is rejected out of the sentiment '„ich will davon, dass der Mensch noch etwas Anderes ist, ausser Seele und Form, Nichts hören!“', we can find in NL 14[18] 9.627-8 another example of fate being a necessary part of our organismic constitution that we have neglected because it was considered too 'plain': 'Es ist eine Haupterkenntniß, daß bei der Werthschätzung aller Dinge der Mensch allem *Gewöhnlichen* und noch mehr allem schlechthin *Unentbehrlichen* einen niederen Werth gab. Das *Gewöhnliche* war dem Ungemeinen entgegengesetzt, als das „*Gemeine*“ –: das *Unentbehrliche* als ein Zwang dem, was der freie Mensch sich willkürlich verschaffen kann oder nicht kann, dem Überflüssigen, Luxushaften des Lebens. So wurde alles, was *nöthig* ist und alles, was *üblich* ist, zum Geringen: alles Fatum wurde *Gemeinheit*. ' This remark can be seen as in line with what we have seen in section 4.3 on the 'nearest things' having gained new 'Zauber und Flaum': what was considered uninteresting now reveals itself as carrying great significance: we understand ourselves better.

⁷⁵⁵ 9.589.

Grunde gehen, die Existenzbedingungen wären zu schwer und zufällig.⁷⁵⁶ We are now in the position to fully grasp the implications of this statement: only a thinker, in whom the drive for truth has become ‘lebenserhaltend’, can experiment with different perspectives without perishing, and slowly change its inner organicistic constitution, and the belonging ‘Existenzbedingungen’ in this way.

What, then, is *amor fati*? *Amor fati* seen from this angle constitutes the love of the fated being that one is, namely a *thinker*. To love being a thinker begins with being grateful for being alive still, as we can read in the opening of *FW* 276; being a thinker, after all, means being endowed with a life-threatening drive to truth (hence the ‘schreckliche Herkunft’ in *NL* 15[20] and the ‘Furien’ in *NL* 16[22]). But now that the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ is understood as the drive that reveals its very own organicistic workings and nothing else, the love of this drive means the full incorporation of it in one’s physical constitution. The result of this love is not static. Rather, it finds its expression in the cyclical exercise of the ‘brief habits’ as we read in *FW* 295, the constant search for new perspectives, and the time needed to incorporate them fully (‘verdauen’). Once these phases are completed, the desire for new properties and new perspectives presents itself again (*FW* 14). *Amor fati* can be seen as the ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit alles weiteren Lebens’, because it provides Nietzsche with the security of not perishing in an untimely manner, while at the same time giving him direction and purpose. Loving oneself as a thinker in this way might be the first step in the direction of a new future for humanity.

We therefore have to understand the ‘Kur’ of *NL* 11[258] not in the traditional sense of a therapy. Rather, it is a way of being that enables the individual to be a thinker without perishing, while at the same time providing the prospect of a future for the human species. As a consequence, loving the fated inner constitution results not in the acceptance of something unchangeable; instead, it sets in motion a cyclical process opening up new possibilities. As *FW* 319 formulates it: ‘Aber wir, [...] Vernunft-Durstigen, [...] wollen unsere Experimente und Versuchs-Thiere sein.’⁷⁵⁷

5.4 ‘WEGSEHEN’ VERSUS STOICALLY ‘NEIN-SAGEN’

Thus far, four possibilities of *amor fati* are explored, all with their individual advantages and weaknesses. All share at least one advantage, inspired by Stern and Chouraqui, namely that of accounting for the ‘locality’ of fate. None contains a reference to metaphysical cosmology. The main imperfection of the first two, their inability to account for the difficulty of loving fate, which is related to their focus on merely error and art and their neglect of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, is solved in the third and fourth interpretation. Taken together these may form an interesting and convincing account of *amor fati* as developed in 1881.

Now that we have developed a more detailed account of what *amor fati* could mean to Nietzsche in 1881, it is time to return to the original question: to what extent can we say that the introduction of *amor fati* is influenced by Stoicism? Understanding *amor fati* in terms of

⁷⁵⁶ 9.552.

⁷⁵⁷ *FW* 319 3.551.

Nietzsche's organismic narrative as attempted in the previous sections shows how *amor fati* cannot be Stoic in several respects. First, we have seen that *amor fati* falls short of total affirmation in the texts of 1881, and that love is associated with 'Habsucht', nourishment, and incorporation ('Einverleibung'). The accusation in FW 306 that a Stoic 'trains himself to swallow stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea' points out that the Stoic strategy is opposite to *amor fati*. We may even suspect that the idea of a careful exercise regarding what to incorporate and what not in the process of becoming a new individual is developed precisely in the context of the increasing dissatisfaction with Stoic insensitivity and 'Versteinerung'; after all, we have seen in section 4.3 how sensitivity is indispensable in this process. If we accept this line of reasoning, we must conclude that *amor fati* should be considered not just non-Stoic but even anti-Stoic; it may be developed as a strategy for 'knowers' to protect themselves from the effects of Stoicism.

Secondly, we can formulate more clearly at this stage why the reference to Cleanthes' Hymn in 14.268 should not be taken to be an indication that Nietzsche implements Stoicism, or that Stoicism is a serious inspiration for *amor fati*. When mentioning the passage of 14.268 Brusotti is right to refer to M 195, in which a part of Cleanthes' Hymn is cited explicitly.

M 195 [...] Zu entdecken, dass unser Leben der Erkenntniss *geweiht* ist; dass wir es wegwerfen würden, nein! dass wir es weggeworfen hätten, wenn nicht diese Weihe es vor uns selber schützte; jenen Vers sich oft und mit Erschütterung vorsprechen:

„Schicksal, ich *folge* dir! Und wollt' ich nicht, / ich *müsset'* es doch und unter Seufzen thun!“⁷⁵⁸

Brusotti's comment on this text is that Nietzsche changes 'die stoische Fügung in das Schicksal in einen leidenschaftlichen und aufopferungsbereiten Fatalismus, der die dominierende Leidenschaft selbst als ein über ihm waltendes Schicksal empfindet. [...] Nietzsche, der sich diesen „Vers“ „oft und mit Erschütterung“ vorspricht, ist jemand, dessen „Leben der Erkenntnis *geweiht* ist“ und der nur wegen dieser „Weihe“ (ebd.) vom Selbstmord absieht. Die Leidenschaft selbst ist zu seinem Schicksal geworden'.⁷⁵⁹ This interpretation is in agreement,

⁷⁵⁸ 3.168. Brusotti, M. (1997) reemphasises the tragic character of the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' by pointing out that danger is present either way. On the one hand, the drive to knowledge is life-threatening as we have seen. On the other, the option of living a life without this drive is so unattractive that 'wir es wegwerfen würden, nein! dass wir es weggeworfen hätten'. Nietzsche thereby seems to anticipate FW 324 3.552, in which 'der grosse Befreier' is presented as 'jener Gedanke, dass das Leben ein Experiment des Erkennenden sein dürfe'. We may even suspect that he anticipates *amor fati* as understood in the previous section.

⁷⁵⁹ Brusotti, M. (1997), 207-8. 208 ft. 394 indicates moreover that M 195 does not mention the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' explicitly, but 'wenn Nietzsche sich 1880 Kleanthes' Verse zum ersten Mal notiert, kennzeichnet er sie als Ausdruck seines „düstere[n] und leidenschaftliche[n] Hang[s] für das Wahre“ (KSA 14, S. 268). The suggestion that follows, namely that the 'Herausgeber der KSA' may have been mistaken in their assumption that 14.268 belongs to FW 309 (as it would make more sense to see it connected to M 195) does not seem farfetched, therefore. Moreover, Brusotti, M. (1997), 207, compares this Nietzschean way of adopting and changing the Cleanthes' hymn to what we have seen earlier in relation to the Stoic expression 'was liegt an mir?': 'Und nicht nur im Fall des Wahlspruchs „was liegt an mir!“ wird so aus der stoischen Fügung in die *heimarmene* leidenschaftliche Tapferkeit. Auf ähnliche Weise eignet sich Nietzsche auch einige Verse aus dem Hymnus auf Zeus von Kleanthes an'.

therefore, with the suggestion developed above that *amor fati* has the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ as its proper object.⁷⁶⁰

M 195 is thus recognised as an early version of *amor fati*⁷⁶¹, but it is denied that there is an actual form of Stoicism involved: ‘Diese fatalistische Ergebung in eine Leidenschaft ist nur scheinbar stoisch’.⁷⁶² We are in the right position now to see why. Chapter 1 and 2 show that this interpretation of ‘Schicksal’ is completely different from the Stoic, all-encompassing one. What is more, keeping in mind the fact that for the Stoics ‘fate’ should be seen as rational and devoid of any kind of sentiment, the idea of a ‘Leidenschaft’ being a ‘Schicksal’ goes beyond any possible kind of Stoic philosophy. Chapter 4, moreover, reveals that the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ involves a great amount of danger, not least because it requires the conscious and heroic infliction of pain, elements which we have seen Nietzsche describing as utterly un-Stoic.

Thirdly, the account of *amor fati* just offered pays only little attention to the final sentences of *FW* 276: ‘Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen. *Wegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung! Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!’⁷⁶³ Although we have seen in chapter 1 that the allowance of ‘wegsehen’ still present in 1881 disappears in the later *amor fati* passages, we have not yet addressed the question of what ‘Ja-sagen’ entails. We know how *FW* 276 has a significantly future-oriented atmosphere, different from all other *amor fati* texts. Yet if Nietzsche envisions himself being ‘irgendwann’ ‘nur noch ein Ja-sager’, how does this relate to his dismissal of the Stoic attitude of full incorporation? The Stoics seem to possess exactly the attitude Nietzsche hopes for himself to achieve one day; how to explain why the Stoic attitude is not presented as Nietzsche’s ideal?

As a final argument why *amor fati* cannot be Stoic, I will point out how ‘wegsehen’ should be analysed in opposition to the ‘Krieg gegen das Hässliche’, to ‘anklagen’, which includes ‘die Ankläger anklagen’. Even if ‘wegsehen’ is presented in *FW* 276 as a form of ‘Verneinung’, it is clear that *FW* distinguishes between several forms of ‘Verneinung’. Moreover, the Stoic attitude of attempting to incorporate even dangerous objects such as stones, worms, glass shards and scorpions, cannot be simply equated with ‘Ja-sagen’. In their ‘training’ (‘Der Stoiker [...] übt sich’) they ascetically deny themselves the satisfaction of certain drives, if only the desire for incorporating other, more desirable objects. With this in mind I shall argue in line with sections 3.3 and 3.4 that Nietzsche’s analysis of asceticism, which is associated with both ‘Ja-’ and ‘Nein-sagen’, reveals how he comes to understand Stoic asceticism as the kind of ‘Nein-sagen’ that he wishes to distance himself from.

⁷⁶⁰ Moreover, as Brusotti, M. (1997), 208 ft. 394 again rightly points out, *M* 270 3.212 provides further proof for seeing the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ as ‘Schicksal’, as it describes the ‘gierige Sehnsucht der Erkenntniss’ as ‘ein Gesetz über [ihm] waltend’.

⁷⁶¹ Brusotti, M. (1997), 455, referring to *M* 195: ‘Der *amor fati* entwickelt sich aus dem Fatalismus des leidenschaftlich Erkennenden, wie ihn *Morgenröthe* beschrieben hat.’

⁷⁶² Brusotti, M. (1997), 455 ft. 139.

⁷⁶³ 3.521.

5.4.1 ASCETICISM

According to the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* article on ‘Askese’, Nietzsche’s texts reveal a distinction between two kinds of asceticism. The first, a positive kind, is empowering (‘solche Askese ist nicht daseinsfeindlich oder widernatürlich, sondern eine Prozedur, um sich (oder den eigenen Willen) zu stärken’), the second results in a weakening of life forces (‘die Entwertung des Lebens, der Instinkte und des Leibes aus der Sicht des höheren Ideals’⁷⁶⁴). In section 3.3, on Nietzsche’s early appreciative remarks on Stoicism, we already encountered such a distinction. In that section it was argued that Nietzsche distances himself from Dühring’s conclusion that the Stoic ‘Triumph über Empfindung und Affekt’ leads to an unwelcome kind of asceticism; according to Nietzsche, Dühring overlooked the ‘allgemein helfenden und für Alle wirksamen Pathos des Asketenthums.’⁷⁶⁵ On the other hand we noticed how already in these texts the connection was made between a weakening kind of asceticism and ‘Rache’:

NL 9[1] [...] Hat jemand genug an sich gelitten, sich selbst genug verletzt, in Sündhaftigkeit – so beginnt er gegen sich das Gefühl der Rache zu spüren: seine eindringende Selbstbetrachtung und deren Resultat Selbstverachtung ist das Resultat. Bei manchen Menschen selbst *Askese*, das heißt *Rache an sich* in Thätlichkeit des Widerwillens und Hasses.⁷⁶⁶

Although the earlier texts by Nietzsche do not yet disclose the possibility of an explicit connection between Stoicism and this analysis of asceticism as ‘Rache’, we have seen in section 3.2.1 that *FW* 359 does connect the two: only a man possessed by the ‘Wille zur Rache’ needs ‘das Bumbum von Gerechtigkeit, Weisheit, Heiligkeit, Tugend, immer den Stoicismus der Gebärde’.⁷⁶⁷ There are several more implicit textual indications in *FW* IV and related texts that proclaim an association between asceticism, revenge, and Stoicism.⁷⁶⁸ What is more, these texts must be read as negative examples of what Nietzsche envisions in *FW* 276.⁷⁶⁹ The ascetic ‘Nein-sagen’ associated with Stoicism should be interpreted as the opposite of the ideal of ‘Ja-sagen’, and significantly different from ‘wegsehen’.

The first textual clue that Nietzsche regards Stoicism as an unhealthy kind of asceticism is historically influenced.⁷⁷⁰ As Orsucci reveals, the works Nietzsche reads in 1880 impact his

⁷⁶⁴ *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* (2004), 156.

⁷⁶⁵ 8.139.

⁷⁶⁶ 8.180.

⁷⁶⁷ *FW* 359 3.606.

⁷⁶⁸ One of those may be the following, even if it mentions neither Stoicism nor revenge: *M* 331 3.234: ‘Recht und Gränze. – Der Asketismus ist für Solche die rechte Denkweise, welche ihre sinnlichen Triebe ausrotten müssen, weil dieselben wütende Raubthiere sind. Aber auch nur für Solche!’

⁷⁶⁹ And not only of *FW* 276, but also of several of the passages of the *Nachlass* on *amor fati*. *NL* 12[75] 9.589, for instance, seems to oppose the difficult love of the past, emphasised in *NL* 15[20], to a revengeful approach: ‘Gegen die Vergangenheit gerecht zu sein, sie wissen wollen, in aller Liebe! Hier wird unsere Vornehmheit auf die höchste Probe gestellt! Ich merke es, wer mit rachsüchtigem Herzen vom Christenthum redet – das ist gemein!’ Here the love of ‘Vergangenheit’, and the desire to get to know it, is opposed to a ‘rachsüchtigem Herzen’.

⁷⁷⁰ As can also be read in *Nietzsche Wörterbuch* (2004), 156: ‘Sie [die negativ bewertete Bedeutung für Askese] entstammt hauptsächlich der christlichen Tradition, z.T. aber auch der Stoa und dem Brahmanismus.’

understanding of early Christian asceticism. He follows Lecky and Hellwald⁷⁷¹ in their assumptions that Christian asceticism has oriental roots. We read for instance in a *Nachlass* note of spring 1880: ‘Europa hat einen Excess von orientalischer Moralität in sich wuchern lassen, wie die *Juden* ihn ausgedacht und ausempfunden haben.’⁷⁷² The oriental and Semitic background in Christian asceticism is traced also to the Stoic forms of ‘Selbst-Tyrannie’, and already in the *Nachlass* of this same year we read ‘*Orient* [...] Stoicism ist semitisch’.⁷⁷³ The late *Nachlass* fragments contain the most explicit analyses of Stoicism in terms of ‘Semitic’ and ‘Arabic’ asceticism. An example:

NL 11[294] Insgleichen für den Stoicismus, der wesentlich das Werk von Semiten ist (– die „Würde“ als Strenge, Gesetz, die Tugend als Größe, Selbstverantwortung, Autorität, als höchste Personal-Souveränität – das ist semitisch: der Stoiker ist ein arabischer Sheik in griechische Windeln und Begriffe gewickelt.⁷⁷⁴

This type of asceticism is denoted by Nietzsche as a sick kind; the details of its ‘Entartung’ are worked out in detail in *GM* III (‘Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?’) and briefly touched upon in a *Nachlass* passage from spring/summer 1883:

NL 7[42] Das *Gute* zu betrachten, wie es als *Zeichen der Entartung* auftritt – als religiöser Wahnsinn z.B. als Philanthropie usw.: überall wo der gesunde Egoismus nachlässt und Apathie oder Ascese erstrebt werden. Der „Heilige“ als Ideal leiblicher Verkümmерung, auch die ganze Brahman-Philosophie ein Zeichen der Entartung.⁷⁷⁵

This association of Stoicism as an oriental, Semitic and Arabic (influenced, one may suspect, by ‘Brahman-Philosophie’) kind of weakening, then, finds a published manifestation already in *FW* 306.

FW 306 [...] Der Stoiker dagegen übt sich, Steine und Gewürm, Glassplitter und Skorpione zu verschlucken und ohne Ekel zu sein; [...] – er erinnert an jene arabische Secte der Assaua, die man in Algier kennen lernt⁷⁷⁶

The ‘Arabian sect of the Assua that one encounters in Algiers’ clearly belongs in the same category as all the other references above. What is more, the ‘Verneinung’ that Nietzsche objects to in this kind of asceticism is further illuminated in *FW* 304. We have seen in 4.3 how *FW* 305 points out that there is something wrong with ‘those moralists who command man first and foremost to take control of himself’; they leave their students ‘impoverished and cut

⁷⁷¹ Orsucci, A. (1996), 171-3. He refers to Lecky’s (1879) *Sittengeschichte Europas* and Hellwald’s (1875) *Culturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart*. He also mentions the influence of Spencer on Nietzsche’s interest in asceticism.

⁷⁷² *NL* 3[128] 9.88-9.

⁷⁷³ *NL* 1[130] 9.33.

⁷⁷⁴ 13.114. See for a comparable comment *NL* 6[7] 12.236: ‘Zur Psychologie der Philosophen. Wie es Einem zu Muthe ist bei langem Verweilen in abstractis; die abkühlende Wirkung, die Plato empfand; die hypnotisirende, welche vielleicht die Inder empfanden und suchten. Ob nicht das Verlangen ins Om im Grunde das Verlangen des Fakirs ist, durch alle möglichen Mittel gefühllos zu werden; ebenso bei der Stoa? – Nebeneinander sinnliche derbste Lustbarkeit und speculative Träumerei.’

⁷⁷⁵ 10.256.

⁷⁷⁶ 3.544.

off from the most beautiful fortuities of the soul! Indeed from further *instruction!*.⁷⁷⁷ The preceding aphorism FW 304 introduces the topic of ‘Selbst-beherrschung’ as ‘Sich-versagen’ as follows.

FW 304 Indem wir thun, lassen wir. – Im Grunde sind mir alle jene Moralen zuwider, welche sagen: „Thue diess nicht! Ent sage! Ueberwinde dich!“ [...] Aber ich will nicht mit offenen Augen meine Verarmung anstreben, ich mag alle negativen Tugenden nicht, – Tugenden, deren Wesen das Verneinen und Sichversagen selber ist.⁷⁷⁸

This text does not imply that ‘Ja-sagen’ is all we should do; the negative must also have its place. The difference between Nietzsche’s ‘placitum’ (‘so gefällt es mir, so lautet mein placitum’) and that of the moralists who recommend ‘Selbstbeherrschung’ (of which the Stoics and the Epicureans provide the best example in FW 306) is that they have eyes only for what is *not welcome*: ‘das Verneinen und Sichversagen’; Nietzsche, on the other hand, focuses on the positive, the goal, that for which the ‘Entsagung’ is exercised. The elements that have to be denied will disappear in a natural way ‘ohne Hass und Widerwillen’, so Nietzsche asserts.

*FW 304 [...] ich bin dagegen jenen Moralen gut, welche mich antreiben, Etwas zu thun und wieder zu thun und von früh bis Abend, und Nachts davon zu träumen, und an gar Nichts zu denken als: diess gut zu thun, so gut als es eben mir allein möglich ist! Wer so lebt, von dem fällt fortwährend Eins um das Andere ab, was nicht zu einem solchen Leben gehört: ohne Hass und Widerwillen sieht er heute Diess und morgen Jenes von sich Abschied nehmen, den vergilbten Blättern gleich, welche jedes bewegtere Lüftchen dem Baume entführt*⁷⁷⁹

This resembles what we saw Nietzsche describing as ‘kurze Gewohnheiten’ in section 5.3.2.4: ‘Immer glaube ich, diess werde mich nun dauernd befriedigen [...]. Und eines Tages hat es seine Zeit gehabt: die gute Sache scheidet von mir, nicht als Etwas, das mir nun Ekel einflösst – sondern friedlich und an mir gesättigt, wie ich an ihm, und wie als ob wir einander dankbar sein müssten und uns so die Hände zum Abschied reichten.’⁷⁸⁰ But more importantly, it reminds us of the final sentences of FW 276: ‘Ich will keinen Krieg [...] führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen’: Nietzsche’s main point is that the best kind of rejection takes place in the light of the affirmation of something else, something higher; only then is ‘Ekel’, ‘Hass’, ‘Widerwillen’ and ‘Krieg’ circumvented.

This should not be taken to mean that Nietzsche rejects ‘Entsagung’ tout court. There is a subtle difference between ‘Entsagung’ out of a positive aim and one that is merely negative. FW 27 explains how ‘Entsagung’ can be an indication that one is a ‘Ja-sager’ still.

FW 27 Der Entzagende. – Was thut der Entzagende? Er strebt nach einer höheren Welt, er will weiter und ferner und höher fliegen, als alle Menschen der Bejahung, – *er wirft Vieles weg*, was seinen Flug beschweren würde, und Manches darunter, was ihm nicht unwerth, nicht unliebsam ist: er opfert es seiner Begierde zur Höhe. Dieses Opfern,

⁷⁷⁷ 3.543.

⁷⁷⁸ 3.542-3.

⁷⁷⁹ 3.542-3.

⁷⁸⁰ FW 295 3.535.

dieses Wegwerfen ist nun gerade Das, was allein sichtbar an ihm wird: darnach giebt man ihm den Namen des Entzagenden [...]. Ja! Er ist klüger, als wir dachten, und so höflich gegen uns – dieser Bejahende! Denn das ist er gleich uns, auch indem er entsagt.⁷⁸¹

In this aphorism we find Nietzsche identifying himself as one of those who defend ‘Entzagung’, but only insofar as it is the expression of the ‘striving for a higher world’, that is, of ‘affirmation’ (‘dieser Bejahende!’).⁷⁸² FW 307 makes this same point in yet another way: ‘Wir verneinen und müssen verneinen, weil Etwas in uns leben und sich bejahren will, Etwas, das wir vielleicht noch nicht kennen, noch nicht sehen!’⁷⁸³ The fact that this aphorism immediately succeeds the one on Stoicism suggests that its procedure betrays the opposite course: as it is described in FW 305, such a ‘Morallehrer’ ‘steht beständig mit abwehrende Gebärde da, bewaffnet gegen sich selber, scharfen und misstrauischen Auges’. There is no expectation of a greater future or a higher world here; the motivation for ‘Entzagung’ is merely out of a defensive fear that ‘seine Selbstbeherrschung in Gefahr gerathet’.⁷⁸⁴

5.4.2 WEGSEHEN’

The non-Stoic affirmation that Nietzsche validates in these aphorisms, finally, could be read as a subtle elaboration on FW 276’s *amor fati*. It is revealing not so much for the meaning of love or the scope of fate, but of the form its affirmation takes. We know that FW 276 projects total affirmation in the future; Nietzsche wishes to become ‘ein Ja-sagender’ only ‘irgendwann’ and for now still allows for ‘Verneinung’ in the form of ‘wegsehen’. This type of negation is elaborated on in FW 321, in an aphorism that reemphasises that there is a difference between engaging directly with the negative, such as the improvement or punishment of others, characterised as ‘Ringen [...] im directen Kampfer’, and the positively inspired affirmation of our own ‘Zufriedenheit’. Focusing on ourselves, ‘raising ourselves that much higher’ and ‘stepping aside’, away from the ‘darkening’ effect of being like those who ‘punish and are dissatisfied’; that is Nietzsche’s ‘new caution’. ‘Let us look away!’

FW 321 Neue Vorsicht. – Lasst uns nicht mehr so viel an Strafen, Tadeln und Bessern denken! Einen Einzelnen werden wir selten verändern; und wenn es uns gelingen sollte, so ist vielleicht unbesehens auch Etwas mitgelungen: *wir* sind durch ihn verändert worden! Sehen wir vielmehr zu, dass unser eigener Einfluss *auf alles Kommende* seinen Einfluss aufwiegt und überwiegt! Ringen wir nicht im directen Kampfer. [...] Sondern erheben wir uns selber um so höher! [...] Nein! Wir wollen nicht

⁷⁸¹ FW 27 3.400.

⁷⁸² A similar attitude can be found in terms of ‘Schwangerschaft’ in M 552 3.322: ‘Die idealische Selbtsucht. – Giebt es einen weihevolleren Zustand, als den der Schwangerschaft? Alles, was man thut, in dem stillen Glauben thun, es müsse irgendwie dem Werdenden in uns zu Gute kommen! Es müsse seinen geheimnissvollen Werth, an den wir mit Entzücken denken, erhöhen! Da geht man Vielem aus dem Wege, ohne hart sich zwingen zu müssen! Da unterdrückt man ein heftiges Wort, man giebt versöhnlich die Hand: aus dem Mildesten und Besten soll das Kind hervorwachsen.’

⁷⁸³ 3.545.

⁷⁸⁴ 3.543.

um seinetwillen selber dunkler werden, gleich allen Strafenden und Unzufriedenen!
Gehen wir lieber bei Seite! Sehen wir weg!⁷⁸⁵

FW 290 moreover, discussed in sections 1.2.4 and mentioned in 5.3.2.4, takes the aim of attaining ‘Zufriedenheit mit sich’ one step further; here, the connection is made explicitly between a lack of self-satisfaction and ‘Rache’. The implicit connection with *FW* 276 can be found in the association between attaining self-satisfaction, ‘wegsehen’, and ugliness: those who are unhappy with themselves cannot hide this and become ugly. Clearly, this is a reference to the aesthetic aspect of *amor fati* in *FW* 276 and, more specifically, to the sentence ‘Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen.’

FW 290 Denn Eins ist Noth: dass der Mensch seine Zufriedenheit mit sich erreiche [...]! Wer mit sich unzufrieden ist, ist fortwährend bereit, sich dafür zu rächen: wir Anderen werden seine Opfer sein, und sei es auch nur darin, dass wir immer seinen hässlichen Anblick zu ertragen haben. Denn der Anblick des Hässlichen macht schlecht und düster.⁷⁸⁶

In line with Brusotti we must conclude therefore: ‘Von den mit sich Unzufriedenen (vom Häßlichen) will Nietzsche hingegen wegsehen. [...] Mit sich zufrieden sein, sich an anderen nicht rächen, von einigen aber wegsehen – all das gehört zu *amor fati*.’⁷⁸⁷ But beyond this we must also conclude that there is an indirect association between Stoic asceticism, with its ‘negativen Tugenden’, ‘deren Wesen das Verneinen und Sichversagen selber ist’,⁷⁸⁸ and the kind of ‘Entsagung’ Nietzsche rejects. This association, then, cannot but indicate that the combination of affirmation and ‘wegsehen’ wished for in *FW* 276 is utterly different from what Nietzsche regards as Stoic ‘Ja-’ and ‘Nein-sagen’.

We have thus found yet another argument against the idea that *amor fati* is in any way Stoic. The image of *FW* 306 of a Stoic who ‘trains himself to swallow stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea’ is clearly not the ideal of affirmation in *FW* 276. The interpretation of *amor fati* in terms of organismic metabolism and digestion (‘Einverleibung’) as presented in the previous sections already forecloses an identification with the Stoic attempt to incorporate *everything*. But also the allowance in *FW* 276 of one type of ‘Verneinung’, namely ‘wegsehen’, opposes what Nietzsche clearly characterises as the Stoic, ascetic type of ‘Verneinen’: a direct ‘Krieg’ against what cannot be accepted. The indirect association, developed in later works, between Stoicism, asceticism and revenge seems to be present in *FW* IV as well, be it still in a more submerged manner.

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that there can only be a negative answer to the main question of this thesis: is *amor fati* influenced by Stoicism? After tracing Nietzsche’s growing dissatisfaction

⁷⁸⁵ 3-551-2. Interestingly, this aphorism is future-oriented like *FW* 276.

⁷⁸⁶ 3-531.

⁷⁸⁷ Brusotti, M. (1997), 470.

⁷⁸⁸ 3-542-3.

with Stoicism in the years of writing *M* and *FW*, it has become evident that the first appearance of *amor fati* should be understood in the same context. This context is dominated by a focus on the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, the desire for knowledge that painfully reveals how all truths are indicative merely of our physiological constitution; furthermore on the question of what role danger and emotions, including pain and suffering, have in the pursuit of knowledge, and the prospect of the enhancement of humanity by adopting an organismic understanding of the human species.

After a thorough analysis of the texts of 1881/1882 we may come to understand *amor fati* as a concept comprising several complicated lines of thought. When discussing ‘love’ we arrived at the conclusion that it must be an erotic concept, as opposed to the ‘agapic’ account by Han-Pile. Nietzsche develops some lines of thought closely connected to his ideas on the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’: love, which comprises several desires, must be seen as a greedy reaction to beauty, one that also constitutes the joy of full appropriation. Yet in order to love something as unattractive as fate it is imperative to make use of several strategies to make it beautiful. This aspect of love is directed at knowledge, but also at fate – and oneself, making possible the association between love, self-cultivation and *amor fati*.

Fate, then, cannot be taken to denote a metaphysical characteristic of the totality of the universe. Rather, as Chouraqui and Stern argue, it is ‘local’, and related to ourselves and ‘what we need’. Although Stern’s account of fate as the necessity to err is mistaken, as well as the account of fate as the erroneous perspectives themselves, the third and fourth accounts of fate as knowledge and the desire for knowledge may shed some new light on the complex meaning of *amor fati*. It can and must be situated in the context of the *NL* passages on the organismic understanding of ‘*Versuchs-Individuen*’ who attempt to distance themselves from the ‘Gattung’ they used to be part of, by investigating and slowly rearranging their ‘Existenzbedingungen’. The ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ is an extraordinary drive, revealing itself to be precisely that, a drive; the suggestion is therefore that by loving knowledge we end up loving that which precedes all knowledge: our drives, and the drive for knowledge in particular. In this sense, *amor fati* can be understood only in the context of coming to terms with being a thinker. Being a thinker means possessing this life-threatening drive for truth. Loving oneself is thus the equivalent of its full appropriation, the result of which is the constant change of ‘kurze Gewohnheiten’ in a permanent and cyclical process of self-experimentation. This is the only path towards the development of a new and stronger species.

This model of *amor fati* can be understood only against the background of a newly developed understanding of the meaning of knowledge; as we have seen, this development goes hand in hand with a growing disagreement with the Stoic perspective. Not only is the love of *amor fati* based on a kind of diet distinguished from the Stoic lack of selectivity, but it is also opposed to the Stoic demand for insensitivity and ‘Versteinerung’. We may even suspect that *amor fati* seen from this perspective is developed against these threats. It may be not only non-Stoic therefore, but even anti-Stoic. What is more, the reference to Cleanthes’ Hymn in both *M* 195 and the Vorstufe of *FW* 309 reveals a radically non-Stoic appreciation of a Stoic expression. The reference to the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ as ‘Schicksal’ is as far away from Stoicism as it can be. Thirdly, the references to ‘Verneinung’ in Book IV of *FW* can be read as early instances of what later becomes a common association between (oriental) Stoicism and a

weakening kind of asceticism, out of ‘Rache’. The ‘Wegsehen’ that is still allowed in FW 276 is unlike any Stoic attitude of asceticism. This association between Stoicism and the decadent form of asceticism invalidates any possibility of a positive connotation between *amor fati* and Stoicism therefore.

