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Gaasterland, H.L.J.

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
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Is Nietzsche's *amor fati* a concept inspired by the Stoic therapy of accepting fate and 'living in accordance with nature'?

Reflecting on this question, this thesis develops the idea that Nietzsche introduces *amor fati* rather as an alternative strategy of dealing with emotions in the dangerous quest for knowledge. It offers both a thorough analysis of Nietzsche's peculiar reception and rejection of Stoicism, and an interpretation of *amor fati* in terms of a more refined kind of digestion.



Nietzsche's Rejection of Stoicism


A Reinterpretation of Amor fati

Hedwig Gaasterland

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Nietzsche's Rejection of Stoicism

A Reinterpretation of Amor fati



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Nietzsche's Rejection of Stoicism. A Reinterpretation of *Amor fati*
Hedwig Gaasterland
PhD Thesis, Leiden University, The Netherlands
January 2017

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A Reinterpretation of Amor fati

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Aus dem Lande der Menschenfresser. – In der Einsamkeit
frisst sich der Einsame selbst auf, in der Vielsamkeit
fressen ihn die Vielen. Nun wähle. (VM 348)

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ABBREVIATIONS

EDITIONS

- KSA FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, *SÄMTLICHE WERKE. KRITISCHE STUDIENAUSGABE IN 15 BÄNDEN*. EDITED BY GIORGIO COLLI AND MAZZINO MONTINARI, MÜNCHEN/ BERLIN (DTV/WALTER DE GRUYTER), 1980
- KGB *NIETZSCHE BRIEFWECHSEL. KRITISCHE GESAMTAUSGABE*. EDITED BY GIORGIO COLLI AND MAZZINO MONTINARI, BERLIN/NEW YORK (WALTER DE GRUYTER), 1975FF
- KGW *NIETZSCHE WERKE. KRITISCHE GESAMTAUSGABE*. FOUNDED BY GIORGIO COLLI UND MAZZINO MONTINARI, CONTINUED BY WOLFGANG MÜLLER-LAUTER AND KARL PESTALOZZI, BERLIN/NEW YORK (WALTER DE GRUYTER) 1967FF

NIETZSCHE

- AC *DER ANTICHRIST. FLUCH AUF DAS CHRISTENTHUM*
- EH *ECCE HOMO. WIE MAN WIRD, WAS MAN IST*
- EH WEISE *WARUM ICH SO WEISE BIN*
- EH KLUG *WARUM ICH SO KLUG BIN*
- EH (GT) s. GT
- EH (M) s. M
- EH (Z) s. Z
- EH (WA) s. WA
- FW *DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT („LA GAYA SCIENZA“)*
- GD *GÖTTZEN-DÄMMERUNG ODER WIE MAN MIT DEM HAMMER PHILOSOPHIERT*
- GD SOKRATES *DAS PROBLEM DES SOKRATES*
- GD MORAL *MORAL ALS WIDERNATUR*
- GD STREIFZÜGE *STREIFZÜGE EINES UNZEITGEMÄSSEN*
- GD ALTEN *WAS ICH DEN ALTEN VERDANKE*
- GM *ZUR GENEALOGIE DER MORAL. EINE STREITSCHRIFT*
- GT *DIE GEBURT DER TRAGÖDIE*
- JGB *JENSEITS VON GUT UND BÖSE. VORSPIEL EINER PHILOSOPHIE DER ZUKUNFT*

M	<i>MORGENRÖTHE. GEDANKEN ÜBER DIE MORALISCHE VORURTHEILE</i>
MA I	<i>MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES. EIN BUCH FÜR FREIE GEISTER. ERSTER BAND</i>
MA II	<i>MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES. EIN BUCH FÜR FREIE GEISTER. ZWEITER BAND</i>
VM	(MA II ERSTE ABTHEILUNG) <i>VERMISCHTE MEINUNGEN UND SPRÜCHE</i>
WS	(MA II ZWEITE ABTHEILUNG) <i>DER WANDERER UND SEIN SCHATTEN</i>
NL	<i>NACHGELASSENE FRAGMENTE</i>
NW	<i>NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER</i>
NW EPILOG	<i>EPILOG</i>
PHG	<i>DIE PHILOSOPHIE IM TRAGISCHEN ZEITALTER DER GRIECHEN</i>
UB	<i>UNZEITGEMÄSSE BETRACHTUNGEN</i>
UB I	<i>UNZEITGEMÄSSE BETRACHTUNGEN, ERSTES STÜCK: DAVID STRAUSS DER BEKENNER UND DER SCHRIFTSTELLER</i>
UB III	<i>UNZEITGEMÄSSE BETRACHTUNGEN, DRITTES STÜCK: SCHOPENHAUER ALS ERZIEHER</i>
UB IV	<i>UNZEITGEMÄSSE BETRACHTUNGEN, VIERTES STÜCK: RICHARD WAGNER IN BAYREUTH</i>
WA	<i>DER FALL WAGNER. EIN MUSIKANTEN-PROBLEM</i>
WL	<i>UEBER WAHRHEIT UND LÜGE IM AUSSERMORALISCHEN SINNE</i>
WM	<i>DER WILLE ZUR MACHT</i>
Z	<i>ALSO SPRACH ZARATHUSTRA. EIN BUCH FÜR ALLE UND KEINEN</i>
Z I VERWANDLUNGEN	<i>VON DEN DREI VERWANDLUNGEN</i>
Z II INSELN	<i>AUF DEN GLÜCKSELIGEN INSELN</i>
Z II GRABLIED	<i>DAS GRABLIED</i>
Z II SELBST-UEBERWINDUNG	<i>VON DER SELBST-UEBERWINDUNG</i>
Z II ERLÖSUNG	<i>VON DER ERLÖSUNG</i>
Z III RÄTHSEL	<i>VOM GESICHT UND RÄTHSEL</i>
Z III TAFELN	<i>VON ALTEN UND NEUEN TAFELN</i>
Z III SEHNSUCHT	<i>VON DER GROSSEN SEHNSUCHT</i>
Z IV MITTAGS	<i>MITTAGS</i>
Z IV NACHTWANDLER-LIED	<i>DAS NACHTWANDLER-LIED</i>

ZB

*UEBER DIE ZUKUNFT UNSERER BILDUNGSANSTALTEN****OTHER ABBREVIATIONS***DL DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS*DK DIELS-KRANZ, *DIE FRAGMENTE DER VORSOKRATIKER*WW SCHOPENHAUER, A., *DIE WELT ALS WILLE UND VORSTELLUNG*, I/IISVF VON ARNIM, H., *STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA*

INTRODUCTION

The formula '*amor fati*' is Nietzsche's. Yet no concept introduced by a philosopher stands on its own. Like all new formulae, the idea of loving fate is the consequence of an engagement with other philosophers – or their texts, to be precise. Nietzsche, who started his career as a classicist, may well have been inspired in this case by classical ideas. Several commentators claim to recognize the influence of Stoicism. Thomas Brobjer, for instance, opens his article on Nietzsche's reading of Epictetus as follows: 'Nietzsche had an ambivalent and complex relation to Stoic philosophy. He had a Stoic temperament, and Stoic philosophy may have been an important influence on some aspects of his philosophy. This is especially likely for his idea of eternal recurrence and *amor fati*, which have both a close kinship with Stoic thinking.'¹ Nuno Nabais similarly argues that *amor fati* betrays the influence of Stoicism: 'Nietzsche knew that this *wanting what is necessary in each happening* was the central pillar of the ethical programme of the philosophy of the Portico and that it was embodied in the maxim "live in accordance with nature."²

Yet when Nietzsche reflects on Stoic philosophy, his tone often betrays disagreement and contempt. Stoicism is deemed to be a form of 'Bilsäulenkälte', associated with the stiff coldness of a statue.³ Other aphorisms describe the Stoic as having a 'hard skin', with 'porcupine spines'⁴, and the *Nachlass* of 1881 contains one of the most critical passages: '*turning oneself into stone* as a weapon against suffering [...]. What significance can be attached to embracing a statue in wintertime if one has become entirely deadened against the cold? [...] I am very antipathetic to this line of thought.'⁵ What is more, this *Nachlass* passage appears significantly close to one of the earliest occurrences of *amor fati* in Nietzsche's oeuvre.

What arguments, then, do commentators use to still defend a 'kinship' between Stoicism and *amor fati*? Like Nabais, most authors point out its similarity with the maxim to 'live in accordance with nature'. Nietzsche, like the Stoics, seems to defend a notion of a fully predetermined, eternally recurring world, in which all humans play their immanent part; the thought of free will is only illusory. At the same time the adoption of a certain affirmative attitude towards the inescapable is encouraged, as it is understood to have a positive influence on our well-being. The Stoics claim that focusing on 'what is in our power' and accepting the

¹ Brobjer, T. (2003), 429.

² Nabais, N. (2006), 85.

³ *Jenseits von Gut und Böse (JGB)* 198 5.118: 'jene Gleichgültigkeit und Bilsäulenkälte gegen die hitzige Narrheit der Affekte, welche die Stoiker anriethen und ankurirten'. All the texts by Nietzsche are taken from the *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden* (KSA), ed. by Colli, G. and Montinari, M. (1967 ff). See Abbreviations for a list of the references used throughout this dissertation. After this Introduction all references to Nietzsche's texts will be in German.

⁴ *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (FW)* 306 3.544: '[Es] wäre [...] der Verlust der Verluste [...] die stoische harte Haut mit Igelstachen [...] geschenkt zu bekommen.'

⁵ *Nachlass (NL)* 15[55] 9.653: '*Versteinerung* als Gegenmittel gegen das Leiden [...]. Was ist es, eine Statue im Winter umarmen, wenn man gegen Kälte stumpf geworden ist? [...] Diese Denkweise ist mir sehr zuwider'. Translation by Elveton R.O. (2004), 200.

things we cannot change (which is synonymous with ‘living in accordance with nature’) will lead to a state of calm happiness (*eudaimonia*)⁶; Nietzsche explicitly associates loving fate with ‘greatness’: ‘my formula for greatness is *amor fati*: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity.’⁷

Yet, Nietzsche also criticises the Stoic adage: ‘So you want to *live* “according to nature”? Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase!’⁸ Nabais, referring to this aphorism, argues that we should not be intimidated by it. Its critique is only superficial, he claims; it hides the implicit ‘confrontation with Stoic ethics and Stoic physics’, which concerns Nietzsche’s ‘attempt to absorb ethics into a philosophy of nature.’⁹ Theodore R. Schatzki, likewise, persistently argues that living ‘in accordance with the essence of life is the deepest thought animating Nietzsche’s ethics’¹⁰; what is more, ‘for Nietzsche as for the Stoics, the good life is a life of virtue, and a life of virtue is a life in accordance with nature.’¹¹ Schatzki concedes that Nietzsche’s position is not exactly identical with Stoicism, but he does so without explaining why Nietzsche’s attitude is so fiercely critical. Nabais by contrast bites the bullet: ‘The only explanation for Nietzsche’s response is that what he is really doing is taking issue with himself, since, in the moment that he jeers at the Stoic ideal of the complete absorption of human will in the cosmic dynamism of each happening, he betrays the basis of his own ethics of immanence.’¹²

But why would Nietzsche ‘take issue with himself’ by way of criticising the Stoics? Why would he want to hide the (seeming) similarities? Shouldn’t we rather take Nietzsche’s criticism seriously, and assume that his *amor fati* must in significant respects be different from Stoicism? Importantly, what do we know exactly about the meaning of *amor fati*? Might it not be the case that misunderstanding the concept explains our struggle with Nietzsche’s judgment of Stoicism?

Typically, authors who write on *amor fati* and Stoicism can be divided in two groups. Authors who focus on Nietzsche’s relation with Stoicism (Brobjer, Schatzki and Nabais for instance) fail to do justice to the complexity of *amor fati*.¹³ Others, who are interested mainly in *amor fati*, briefly mention that it may have a Stoic background but tend to overlook Nietzsche’s critical

⁶ The first words of Epictetus’ famous *Encheiridion* are: ‘There are two classes of things: those that are under our control and those that are not. [...] Remember, therefore, that that if you regard the things that are by nature slavish as free, and the things that are up to others as your own, you will be hampered, you will suffer, you will get upset, you will blame both gods and men’. Translation by Boter, G. (1999), 276.

⁷ *Ecce Homo (EH)* klug 10 6.297: ‘Meine Formel für die Grösse am Menschen ist *amor fati*: dass man Nichts anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht.’ Translation by Norman, J. (2005), 99.

⁸ *JGB* 9 5.21: ‘„Gemäss der Natur“ wollt ihr *leben*? Oh ihr edlen Stoiker, welche Betrügerei der Worte!’ Translation by Norman, J. (2002), 10.

⁹ Nabais, N. (2006), 85.

¹⁰ Schatzki, T.R. (1994), 158.

¹¹ Schatzki, T.R. (1994), 159.

¹² Nabais, N. (2006), 86.

¹³ See also Neymeyr, B. (2009), Bertino, A.C. (2007), Groff, P.S. (2004), Elveton, R.O. (2004), and Armstrong, A. (2013).

remarks.¹⁴ This thesis aims to avoid both pitfalls. Its main hypothesis is that our understanding of *amor fati* may be illuminated through a careful, more historical examination of Nietzsche's engagement with Stoicism. If it can be shown whether and in what sense Nietzsche was or was not inspired by Stoicism in the period in which *amor fati* was introduced, it may potentially uncover features that have gone unnoticed so far.

Tracing the background of a certain concept requires more than just analysing similarities and differences, in this case between *amor fati* and Stoicism. At least three other, more historical sets of questions need to be answered as well: 1. When and in what context does *amor fati* appear for the first time? How does it function in this context? 2. What was Nietzsche's judgment regarding Stoicism in that time-frame, and what aspects of it did he consider? 3. Related to the second question: what knowledge of Stoicism did Nietzsche have? What were his sources, and which other, later authors may have influenced him in his judgments?

Let me start by concentrating on the third set of questions. Stoicism is not a clear-cut and unchanging set of axioms, as our access to traditional Stoic texts has evolved over the years. The so-called *SFV*, the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, is a collection of fragments and testimonia of the earlier Stoics composed by Hans von Arnim in 1903-4. In a situation of complete loss of primary sources, this collection has proven to be highly influential in shaping our contemporary understanding of Stoicism. The two frequently used volumes by Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, contain many references to the *SFV*.¹⁵ But this collection was not yet available to Nietzsche, whose last sane words were written early 1889. Moreover, Stoicism has a long and rich reception-history. Whereas some centuries witnessed a revival of Stoicism – as for instance the 16th Century with Lipsius – in most others Stoicism was deemed dangerously un-Christian, even pantheistic, allegedly defending a solipsistic and overly rational ethics.¹⁶ Both the question of Nietzsche's sources and of the historical assessment of Stoicism should be considered carefully in a study that investigates Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism.

Strikingly, Stoicism as a form of therapy is becoming ever more popular today. In the fall of 2015, the fourth 'Stoic Week' was organised in England. Its idea was to follow daily instructions collected in the 'Stoic Week Handbook', written by an interdisciplinary group of academics and psychotherapists, and published online.¹⁷ Every day offered a different theme and related exercises, based on original Stoic texts. All participants were encouraged to take well-being surveys before and after the week, so that the effectiveness of the course could be measured. The results of the 2015 week can be found on the website: around 2,500 people took part, and their findings supported the view that Stoicism is 'helpful'. Participants reported a 15% improvement in life satisfaction, a 10% increase in flourishing, a 10% increase in positive emotions and a 14% reduction in negative emotions.

¹⁴ See for instance Stern, T. (2013), Han-Pile, B. (2009), Cobb-Stevens, V. (1982), Domino, B. (2012), Stambaugh, J. (1994), and Brodsky, G. (1998).

¹⁵ Long, A.A., Sedley, D.N. (1987), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Vol. I and II. The first volume contains a collection of translated fragments and commentary; the second presents the fragments in their original language.

¹⁶ See for instance Ierodiakonou, K. (1999) or Neymeyr, B., Schmidt, J., Zimmermann, B. (eds.) (2008).

¹⁷ <http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/stoicismtoday/>.

The obvious question is: was Stoicism considered to be of therapeutic value in Nietzsche's days as well? Some commentators think it was. Keith Ansell-Pearson, for instance, in his 2011 article 'Beyond compassion: on Nietzsche's moral therapy in *Dawn*', adopts Martha Nussbaum's suggestion that Nietzsche wishes to 'bring about a revival of Stoic values – self-command and self-formation – within a post-Christian and post-Romantic context'.¹⁸ He agrees with her that the picture sometimes presented of Nietzsche as advocating the value of unbridled egoism 'fails to capture what we might call the Stoic demands Nietzsche places on the self and its cultivation: harshness toward oneself, self-discipline, self-control, honesty, and a profound love of fate.'¹⁹ Michael Ure, whose 2008 book is entitled *Nietzsche's Therapy*, goes even further and claims that 'what looms large in Nietzsche's thinking is the question of psychological health and sickness [...]. In the middle period, [...] he conceives the patient, piecemeal labour of psychological self-observation as a therapy of the soul.'²⁰ Ure argues that Nietzsche 'critically explores what we might call, borrowing from psychoanalytical parlance, the pathological symptoms of wounded narcissism. [...] Nietzsche draws on the Hellenistic and Stoic traditions to conceptualise a therapeutic art of self-cultivation oriented toward treating such pathologies.'²¹

Ure's book, however, has one major handicap, even apart from its neglect of the critical passages on the Stoic 'weapon against suffering' mentioned earlier: it fails to take as its starting point the texts which we know Nietzsche had read. Instead, he turns to Foucault, claiming that 'Foucault's schematic presentation of the concepts and practices of Hellenistic self-cultivation, especially his analysis of Roman Stoics, can be used to clarify the extent to which Nietzsche takes up not just its general ethical orientation, but also its substantive conception of the work of the self.'²² In order to see if his analysis is correct, as well as those of Martha Nussbaum and Keith Ansell-Pearson, much more historical work needs to be done, bearing in mind the possible risk of anachronistically failing to do justice to Nietzsche's knowledge and influences.

On top of this historical difficulty at least two more complicating factors should be considered in tracing the Stoic influence on Nietzsche's *amor fati*. Addressing the second question (what was Nietzsche's judgment regarding Stoicism in the years of introducing *amor fati*, and what aspects of it did he consider?) means that we have to deal with Nietzsche's peculiar way of writing: it is notoriously polemical and especially so when mentioning philosophers he admires. Socrates, possibly the most prominent example in this context, is analysed antagonistically in several texts²³, and yet we know that he was particularly relevant to Nietzsche. Neither the depiction of the Stoic as having a 'hard skin' with 'porcupine spines' nor that of Stoicism as a form of 'Bildsäulenkälte' in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* should therefore induce the overhasty conclusion that Stoicism is considered worthless. Moreover, there is a lack of consistency in Nietzsche's assessment of thinkers, a rule to which the Stoics form no exception. One negative remark might well be outweighed by another betraying consent and

¹⁸ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 185. He refers to Nussbaum, M. (1994), 139-67.

¹⁹ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 185. Another article Ansell-Pearson refers to in this context is Elveton, R.O. (2004).

²⁰ Ure, M. (2008), 3.

²¹ Ure, M. (2008), 4.

²² Ure, M. (2008), 59.

²³ The most famous one probably being *Götzen-Dämmerung* (*GD*) 'Das Problem des Sokrates' 6.67-73.

even sympathy. Both extremes may occur even in one book, as is the case for *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*: only a few pages away from the remark on ‘Bildsäulenkälte’ we find Nietzsche identifying himself as one of the ‘last Stoics’: ‘We will stay *harsh*, we, who are the last of the Stoics!’.²⁴ What is more, Nietzsche regularly discusses a particular philosopher without mentioning a name. This means that we should avoid limiting our scope to the texts with explicit references to Stoicism and develop a certain sensitivity to implicit references. Keeping all these difficulties in mind, it is vital to include the context for all remarks and follow Nietzsche’s very own advice on *Morgenröthe*: ‘My patient friends, this book desires for itself only perfect readers and philologists: *learn* to read me well!’²⁵ Taking this hint seriously usually proves to be the best method; this case is no different.

This brings us to the first, perhaps most important question: when and in what context does *amor fati* appear initially, and what connotation does it acquire in this context? Detecting a possibly Stoic background in its introduction presupposes at least a well formed idea of the meaning of *amor fati*. Unfortunately, since it only appears ten times in Nietzsche complete oeuvre (including the *Nachlass* and the letters), it is far from easily determined. In fact, some recent articles suggest new and interesting interpretations.²⁶ Not all of these betray awareness of its philological difficulties, however. Béatrice Han-Pile claims in her 2009 article ‘Nietzsche and Amor Fati’ that she has been able ‘to identify only seven passages’ on *amor fati*, of which one is from the controversial book *Der Wille zur Macht*.²⁷ Most commentators also assume without much further deliberation that *amor fati* must have just one consistent meaning. Yet, since the first passages occur in 1881 and the last in 1888, it might well be the case that its meaning develops or even changes, as many of Nietzsche’s concepts do. As far as I know, only Tom Stern takes this idea seriously.²⁸

Not only philological issues stand in the way of a good understanding of *amor fati*. Neither the conceptual meaning of ‘love’ nor that of ‘fate’ is unproblematic. Should we interpret love as an erotic drive, or rather, as Béatrice Han-Pile suggests, as an agapic gift? And to what extent does Nietzsche’s use of ‘fate’ entail the acceptance of determinism? Does ‘fate’ refer to a cosmic totality, as it does within Stoicism, or is it a personal concept, connected only with one’s very individual character traits or possibly tragic life history? And what kind of concept is *amor fati*? Is it, indeed, a moral or therapeutic device? Which patients does it attempt to cure in that case, and from what diseases? Or should we take it as a mere description instead? If so, a description of what exactly?

In the first chapter all these difficulties relating to *amor fati* – both philological and philosophical – will be mapped out. It will be argued that there is a difference between *amor fati* when it is introduced in 1881/1882 and that of later years, from *Also Sprach Zarathustra* on

²⁴ JGB 227 5.162: ‘Bleiben wir *hart*, wir letzten Stoikern!’. Translation by Norman, J. (2002), 118.

²⁵ *Morgenröthe* (*M*) Vorrede 5 3.17: ‘Meine geduldigen Freunde, dies Buch wünscht sich nur vollkommene Leser und Philologen: *lernt* mich gut lesen!’ Translation by Hollingdale, R.J. (1997), 5.

²⁶ To mention a few examples: Stern, T. (2013), and Domino, B. (2012).

²⁷ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 1. The passage from *Der Wille zur Macht* (*WM*) corresponds with NL 16[32] 13.492, which will be the reference used throughout this thesis, keeping in mind the highly controversial status of *WM*. For more information on the dubious history of this book for which Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche was responsible, see Fuchs, D. (1997).

²⁸ Stern, T. (2013).

(1884). The later *amor fati* can be seen as a more ‘religious’ concept, stressing the immanence of all individuals within a fated cosmos, and revealing what image Nietzsche has of himself, namely the fated thinker of life-affirmation in a history dominated by life-negating Christianity. This notion of *amor fati* has some striking similarities with what John Sellars has baptised ‘Cosmic Stoicism’: the idea that loving fate entails embracing the cosmos of which we are a small part, thereby essentially dissolving the boundary between the individual and the cosmos.²⁹ The early texts on *amor fati*, however, seem to involve a different notion of fate, one that is more subtle and not as inclusive as the later. So if *amor fati* is Stoic, one might think that this only applies to the later version. In that case it would be implausible for *amor fati* to be inspired by Stoicism. In that light, the question concerning the relation between *amor fati* and Stoicism becomes more complex; and the questions of the meaning of the early *amor fati*, and of Nietzsche’s relation to Stoicism, become more pressing.

The second chapter sums up and analyses the parallels between *amor fati* and Stoicism in the secondary literature. It first reflects on the relation between *amor fati*, Stoicism, and the eternal return, investigating whether there are any conceptual or historical connections linking the three, and if so, of what kind these are. I conclude that the parallels are very limited; Nietzsche’s own remarks on the eternal return cannot be taken as an argument that he was inspired by Stoicism when he introduced it. Next, I examine and nuance Sellars’ thesis that there is a striking parallel between Nietzsche’s *amor fati* and ‘Cosmic Stoicism’. Thirdly, I offer a close reading of *JGB* 9, in which the Stoic adage ‘live in accordance with nature’ is rejected. Although this text discloses a multi-layered and complex relation to Stoicism, one that partly confirms Nabais’ claim that Nietzsche covers up a striking similarity between his naturalism and that of the Stoics, it makes clear at the same time how Nietzsche cannot agree with the basic Stoic presupposition that knowledge of nature is possible (let alone attained).

Tracing all of Nietzsche’s explicit references to the Stoics has resulted in an article on the lemma ‘Stoa’ to be published in the Nietzsche Dictionary. This forms the basis for analysing Nietzsche’s historical approach of Stoicism in the third chapter. I present the main outcome of this research in three frameworks. The first concerns Nietzsche’s engagement with Stoicism as a specific school within late antiquity, historically situated between pre-Socratic philosophy and Christianity.³⁰ Secondly, there are several remarks in which Stoicism is approached as a psychological attitude. In this context the question arises of whether the Stoic way of life deserves approval or rejection. Thirdly, some texts betray a direct engagement with Stoicism on a specific subject. The most prominent example of this are the reflections on pity, which are explored in more detail in chapter 4. Chapter 3 furthermore works out four of the main characteristics Nietzsche ascribes to Stoicism: (1) a lack of honesty, even dishonesty, theatre, pretension, arrogance; (2) a sense of hardness, coldness, numbness, stupidity, as the consequence of (3) a long and persistent ascetic overpowering of the passions (self-tyranny), out of (4) a desire for clarity, abstraction, systems, ‘truth’.

I conclude this chapter by claiming that Nietzsche’s interest in Stoicism is restricted mostly to the context of the scientific quest for knowledge – which puts into perspective the

²⁹ Sellars, J. (2006a), 157-71.

³⁰ I follow in this respect Nietzsche’s own use of the term ‘late antiquity’; in contemporary literature it usually describes the period roughly between the 2nd and the 8th Centuries AD.

contemporary analyses by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Martha Nussbaum and Michael Ure, who claim that Nietzsche's interest is mainly therapeutic. The next step must be to focus in more detail on Nietzsche's dealings with Stoicism in the years leading up to the first published pronouncement of *amor fati*, which is in Book IV of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, early 1882. This is the program for chapter 4. In contrast to chapter 3, which examines Nietzsche's reflection on Stoicism, chapter 4 explores his appropriation of it. This invokes, as has been mentioned, a more refined sensitivity to implicit references. I will offer a close analysis of the way in which Nietzsche initially adopts (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*) and gradually (*Morgenröthe*) comes to reject (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*) the moral-psychological 'Kunstgriffen' of the Stoics in the context of the search for knowledge and science. Nietzsche's shifting thoughts on pity will be explored as well. And as it turns out, the disappointment with Stoicism as it is traceable in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* should indeed influence our understanding of *amor fati*.

Finally, chapter 5 returns to chapter 1 in its concern with interpreting *amor fati*. Other than chapter 1 though, chapter 5 does not analyse all occurrences of *amor fati*. This chapter will develop a new and nuanced account of *amor fati* in the context of the texts in which it occurs for the first time. The *Nachlass* texts of 1881 reveal a deepened interest in an organismic and evolutionary analysis of humanity, which Nietzsche strongly relates to the drive for truth understood as a 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis'. Seen in this light, *amor fati* turns out to be quite different from the Stoic adage to 'live in accordance with nature'; what is more, it is a concept that actually developed out of a growing sense of disappointment with the Stoic strategy for dealing with the desire for truth. The surprising result is that *amor fati*, when it is first introduced, is not only non-Stoic, or un-Stoic – it is even anti-Stoic.

Chapter 1: NIETZSCHE'S AMOR FATI: AN OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

It is not uncommon in the secondary literature to see *amor fati* as a Stoic notion. In the Introduction I mentioned Thomas Brobjer and Nuno Nabais, but there are others as well. John Sellars, for instance, observes in Gilles Deleuze's book *The Logic of Sense* a tendency to connect Nietzsche's *amor fati* to Stoicism, and concludes after examination: 'Deleuze's presentation of Stoic ethics as the precursor to Nietzsche's *amor fati* is thus legitimate'.³¹ In a similar vein, Peter Groff finds it 'illuminating to read Nietzsche as a kind of late modern neo-Stoic, providing us with a veritable banquet of spiritual exercises aimed at the cultivation of the self and the affirmation of fate.'³² The connection between *amor fati* and Stoicism is, moreover, not only argued for in the context of ethics and self-cultivation. Nietzsche's concept of the 'eternal return', closely related to *amor fati* according to most commentators, adds another reason to argue for a Stoic background. Groff claims for instance: 'The joyful affirmation of all generation and destruction, for its own sake, willed over and over again, eternally – what could be more Stoic than that?'³³ Likewise, Andrea Christian Bertino stresses the similarities between *amor fati* and the Nietzschean and Stoic doctrines of eternal recurrence: 'Die ewige Wiederkehr schließt für Nietzsche und die Stoiker einen vollen und unbedingten *amor fati* ein.'³⁴

This is not to say that Nietzsche and the Stoics put forward exactly the same ideas both within the domains of ethics and 'physics' (the Stoic expression for what we would nowadays call 'cosmology', 'metaphysics', or 'theology'), nor is this defended by most commentators. As we will see in chapter 2, it is broadly recognized that Nietzsche cannot agree with the Stoic notion of an eternally returning cosmos guided by divine reason and providence. But this obvious difference does not discourage commentators from continuing to see similarities, for instance in the emphasis on ethics in the context of 'fatalism': 'Es handelt sich vor allem um die Nietzsche und den Stoikern gemeinsame Vorliebe für die anthropologische Seite der kosmologischen Gleichung [...], es handelt sich vor allem um ihre kühne Konfrontierung mit den Auswirkungen des Kreislaufs der Welt auf das Schicksal des Menschen.'³⁵ Like Mihailo Djurić, whose lines these are, Aurelia Armstrong argues that Nietzsche endorses one of the 'key Stoic themes', namely 'the Stoic reconciliation of a naturalistic perspective with an ethical

³¹ Sellars, J. (2006a), 165.

³² Groff, P.S. (2004), 154. Ure, M., in Sellars, J. (2016), makes the same point when he writes, 293: 'In ancient Stoic philosophy Nietzsche believed he had found a salutary reminder of an ancient ethic based on pride in oneself and love of fate that stood in sharp opposition to the self-contempt and hatred of this world'.

³³ Groff, P.S. (2004), 159.

³⁴ Bertino, A.C. (2007), 113.

³⁵ Djurić, M. (1979), 9. Quoted by Bertino, A.C. (2007), 112. Nishigami, K. (1993), 226, who has written one of the very few works dedicated on *amor fati* only, similarly claims: 'Sieht man die stoische Affirmation des Fatums [...] genau an, und vergleicht man sie mit Nietzsches "Amor fati" [...], so kann man über die Affinität der beiden geistigen Haltung verblüfft sein, und sie ist nicht zufällig.'

perspective', 'or "fatalism," and *amor fati*.³⁶ Roy Elveton adds to this that 'both Epictetus and Nietzsche view [the] goal of radical independence and self-mastery as being tinged with a profound fatalism. The Stoic doctrine of *amor fati* is well-known'.³⁷

This thesis aims to unravel the precise relation between Nietzsche's *amor fati* and Stoicism. Elveton's assumption that *amor fati* is a 'Stoic doctrine' will be carefully examined: is Nietzsche's introduction of the term indeed inspired by Stoicism? In order to avoid answering this question on the basis of an anachronistic contemporary account of Stoicism, chapter 2, 3 and 4 will map out Nietzsche's specific understanding and assessment of Stoicism. But first of all, we need to know more about *amor fati*. What kind of concept is it? How does it relate to the eternal return? Is it, indeed, a concept that belongs in the domain of ethics? It may be a 'spiritual exercise' related to 'self-cultivation'; alternatively, it could be the 'ideal' to be attained through these exercises. But what kind of ideal would it be in that case? Looking at the separate elements of the concept, how to interpret 'fate' exactly; what are we supposed to love? Does it include the totality of our world, including its history, or can we select bits and pieces? Should we perhaps just love ourselves, our personal character and history? And what does it mean for Nietzsche to 'love'? Can it be trained like our will (if our will can be trained at all), or is it rather the description of a certain experience that happens to some, but not to all – making the idea of it being a spiritual exercise implausible? Could the occurrence of *amor fati* itself be 'fated'? Is it, then, *not* intended as something to be adopted or strived for?

Significantly, even those commentators who elaborate in more detail on the exact meaning of *amor fati* do not take into consideration the possibility that its exact meaning may shift between 1882, when it is first introduced in the opening aphorism of Book IV of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (*FW*), and 1888, when it appears for the last time, not long before Nietzsche's so-called 'collapse'. This is all the more surprising, given the important developments of the years in between. It is then that Nietzsche writes *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (*Z*, 1882-1885), develops further his 'discovery' of 1881, i.e. the thought of the 'eternal return', and coins the concepts that made him famous: the will to power and nihilism. Also, the reference to Dionysos, which was introduced in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (*GT*) in 1872, reappears again for the first time in *Z* and gains more importance in the works that follow. The so-called 'Middle Period', ranging from *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* (*MA*, written between 1876-1879, published in parts in 1878, 1879, and 1880) until *FW*'s Book IV (finished and published in 1882; Book V was written in 1886) is therefore the period that should be looked at closely, as it leads up to the introduction of *amor fati*. Yet, these years are often seen as a rather un-Nietzschean phase, at least in comparison to the more famous texts. The risk of misinterpreting the very first *amor fati* occurrences by using passages of the later Nietzsche is overtly present therefore and should be taken into account.

Consequently, I agree with Stern's remark that 'Nietzsche scholars are far too relaxed about picking and choosing from his different books to construct a version of Nietzsche that suits their particular interests'.³⁸ He admits that this procedure 'would be unobjectionable if his views about some of the key notions associated with *amor fati* (in *The Gay Science*) were not

³⁶ Armstrong, A. (2013), 7.

³⁷ Elveton, R.O. (2004), 194.

³⁸ Stern, T. (2013), 157.

subject to change in the coming years. As it happens, they were.³⁹ Stern is, as far as I have been able to trace, the only commentator in the field who distinguishes between the *amor fati* of 1882 and that of the later years. In this chapter I will argue that he is right. I will trace the development of *amor fati* closely, offering textual analyses of all ten passages (which I numbered) in the context of the time frame and philosophical questions relevant to it. I will present them in five groups, along chronological and thematic lines. The first group discusses the first three passages of *amor fati*, all three situated in 1881/1882. One of these is *FW* 276, the first aphorism in which it occurs in the published works. The basic questions of its conceptual meaning will be introduced here, together with a closer analysis of the three passages. The second section concerns a 1882 letter to Franz Overbeck, which raises the question of the meaning of *amor fati* in the context of religion. The third section concerns a *Nachlass* note in the time that Nietzsche is working on *Z*, which opens up the question of the relation between *amor fati* and this book. More specifically, the dimension of time will be explored here, related to the *Übermensch* and will to power. Fourthly, I will discuss one of the *Nachlass* notes from 1888. The question of nihilism will be discussed as well as tragedy and the Dionysian. The fifth group considers the final four passages, all occurring in 1888. Two of these can be found in *EH*, one in *NW*, one again in the *Nachlass*. The question of the meaning of both love and fate is considered, returning to the questions related to the 1881/1882 passages.

I will not be able to answer all the questions raised above concerning the meaning of *amor fati* in this chapter. What I hope to show, however, is that in order to trace the inspiration of *amor fati* it would be best to focus on the very first passages, which I will do in detail in chapter 5.

1.2 *AMOR FATI IN 1881/1882: A THERAPEUTIC DEVICE?*

Whereas most commentators writing on *amor fati* merely draw a comparison between Nietzsche's philosophy and that of the Stoics, there is one exception. Michael Ure's article 'Nietzsche's Free Spirit Trilogy and Stoic Therapy' addresses Nietzsche's dealings with the Stoics directly and its influence on *amor fati*. Focusing on the Middle Period⁴⁰ he argues that *amor fati* should be interpreted as part of the endeavour to develop a new philosophical therapy. Nietzsche has come to disagree with Stoicism in *FW*, he claims, 'on the grounds that it entails a radical extirpation of the value judgements that underpin the emotions.'⁴¹ Nietzsche therefore attempts to develop a rival therapy, 'one that aims to enable human beings to unconditionally affirm fate but without this affirmation entailing, as it does for the Stoics, the dissolution of all emotional valuations.'⁴² Leaving the question of the accuracy of his evaluation of Nietzsche's relation to Stoicism to chapter 3 and 4, I will focus here on the implications of his argument for *amor fati*. To what extent is *amor fati* intended as a therapeutic alternative to Stoicism, presupposing that Nietzsche 'borrowed from the Hellenistic schools their medical

³⁹ Stern, T. (2013), 158.

⁴⁰ The three books written in that time frame, *MA*, *Morgenröthe (M)*, and *FW* I-IV are subsumed sometimes under the heading of 'Free Spirit Trilogy' as the idea of the 'free spirit' is prominent in these writings.

⁴¹ Ure, M. (2009), 61.

⁴² Ure, M. (2009), 61.

conception of philosophy and with it the assumption that the purpose of philosophy is to enable us to live well?⁴³

Looking closely at the three passages in which *amor fati* occurs in this time frame reveals some arguments in favour of an interpretation similar to Ure's. But there are difficulties as well. A first argument can be found in the motto preceding the first occurrence of *amor fati* in the published works, namely in the opening aphorism of Book IV of *FW*.

Sanctus Januarius.

Der du mit dem Flammenspeere
Meiner Seele Eis zertheilt,
Dass sie brausend nun zum Meere
Ihrer höchsten Hoffnung eilt:
Heller stets und stets gesunder,
Frei im liebevollsten Muss: –
Also preist sie deine Wunder,
Schönster Januarius!
Genua im Januar 1882.⁴⁴

Not only do we find here a precursor of *amor fati* in the formulation of 'Frei im liebevollsten Muss', also the phrase 'Heller stets und stets gesunder' indicates that becoming clearer and healthier is the effect of St. Januarius, the one who is praised. But although health is introduced here, there is nothing that suggests that one could choose a specific therapy to attain it. The sentences rather describe a physical process: the 'burning lances' of St. Januarius 'melt the ice sheets of the soul', which then 'speeds towards the ocean'. It makes the soul healthier and clearer, and free, but only in a particular way, namely in loving necessity. This suggests that Nietzsche did not decide to adopt a new kind of morality, love, or therapy. The passage rather seems to praise the unfolding of an inevitable yet liberating process.

The aphorism immediately following this motto introduces *amor fati* in the published works.⁴⁵ Here, too, the idea that Nietzsche puts forward a 'new therapy', as Ure argues, does not seem plausible.

1. *FW* 276 *Zum neuen Jahre*. — Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken. Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Heute erlaubt sich Jedermann seinen Wunsch und liebsten Gedanken auszusprechen: nun, so will auch ich sagen, was ich mir heute von mir selber wünschte und welcher Gedanke mir dieses Jahr zuerst über das Herz lief, — welcher Gedanke mir Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit alles weiteren Lebens sein soll! Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen: — so werde ich Einer von Denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen. *Amor fati*: das sei von nun an meine Liebe! Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen. Ich will nicht

⁴³ Ure, M. (2009), 62.

⁴⁴ 3:521.

⁴⁵ That this is the first *amor fati* passage is pointed out by the '1.' in front of the text. All other texts containing '*amor fati*' are numbered as well.

anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen. *Wegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung! Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!⁴⁶

The first sentences indicate an autobiographical reading: 'Noch lebe ich'. This observation, taking place on New Year's day, expresses a sense of wonder. Nietzsche's being alive should not be taken for granted, apparently. Then, playfully turning around the Cartesian expression 'cogito, ergo sum', an intimate connection between life and thought is underscored. Thinking is not possible when life is absent – in the case of death – but, vice versa, no life would be possible for Nietzsche without thinking. What is more, there is a sense of necessity introduced here as well: 'ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken'. The necessity in both life and thought, or the connection between the two, might be considered as a possible candidate for what is loved in *amor fati*, connected also with the phrase 'Frei im liebevollsten Muss'. Although the notion of freedom is absent in *FW* 276, it could be argued that love is a liberating passion – even if it does not change anything in the loved situation, and might itself be fated. In line with this, the thought that first came up in this new year (*amor fati*) takes the form of a wish; it 'shall be the reason, warrant, and sweetness of the rest of my life!'. This, too, suggests that *amor fati* is not a certain act or a therapy, or its result. Wishing for it implies that it may appear, while leaving open the possibility that it may not: '*amor fati*: let that be my love from now on!'.

Yet *amor fati* also involves learning more and more to see 'what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them', and in the case of success it would make Nietzsche one of those 'who make things beautiful'. This indicates that the love of fate is bound up with one's agency. The last sentences of this aphorism further describe what is needed. Nietzsche ('Ich') does not want to wage war against ugliness; he does not want to accuse, he does not even want to 'accuse the accusers'. 'Wegsehen' is the only form of negation allowed. He concludes: 'all in all and on the whole: some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer!', suggesting that *amor fati* has everything to do with 'yes' and 'no' saying: it denotes affirmation without negation (except for the negation of 'Wegsehen') – an affirmation that seems active rather than passive.

But even if there is activity involved, this is not enough to conclude that *amor fati* is a kind of therapy. Nietzsche does not directly address his readers in this aphorism, for instance. We should always be careful not to take Nietzsche's references to himself merely autobiographically (the new preface to *FW* reads: 'Aber lassen wir Herrn Nietzsche: was geht es uns an, dass Herr Nietzsche wieder gesund wurde?'⁴⁷). But if there is something at stake that transcends 'Herr Nietzsche', it remains questionable whether this concerns the readers' health and well-being and that *amor fati* is presented as the means towards it.

There are two other passages containing *amor fati* in the *Nachlass* of the year before the publication of *FW*.

⁴⁶ 3.521.

⁴⁷ *FW* Vorrede 2 3.347.

2. *NL* 15[20] Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst! „Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“ – *amor fati* dies wäre meine Moral, thue ihm alles Gute an und hebe es über seine schreckliche Herkunft hinauf zu dir.⁴⁸

The phrase '*amor fati* dies wäre meine Moral' together with the imperative preceding it suggests that *amor fati* at least *could* be Nietzsche's morality, depending on how one interprets the subjunctive form of 'wäre'. It seems to be implied that *amor fati would* be his morality, but what inhibits the adoption of *amor fati* as a 'Moral' remains unclear. Nevertheless, this reference to morality can be taken as an indication in favour of Ure's interpretation, that is, if we can see 'meine Moral' as a kind of therapeutic device aimed at happiness. This would make this passage significantly different from *FW* 276 and the motto preceding it.

The sentence with which this passage ends, 'thue ihm alles Gute an und hebe es über seine schreckliche Herkunft hinauf zu dir' again suggests that the addressee is asked to *act* in a certain way that is described as *amor fati*, or in order to attain it. The personal pronoun 'ihm' could be interpreted as masculine, referring in that case to 'amor'; yet the addition of 'es' implies that 'ihm', too, must be neuter. The only words in the preceding sentences that can be referred to therefore are '*fatum*', 'das Nöthige' and 'das, was nothwendig ist'. The advice is thus to 'treat necessity well' and to 'raise necessity out of its horrible provenance towards you.'⁴⁹ What this entails exactly remains undetermined; we can only suspect that the notion of 'schreckliche Herkunft' suggests the presence of a problematic past. This may well be connected with the opening of *FW* 276, in which 'noch lebe ich' expresses a sense of surprise: I am still alive, despite what I have gone through. The 'schreckliche Herkunft' could then be the reason for this sentiment.

The only other point we can make about this passage is that there is an element of beauty involved, like in *FW* 276. The addressee of the imperative is told to make (although the verb 'to make' is absent) the necessary ('das Nöthige', and 'das, was nothwendig ist') as beautiful and perfect as possible ('so schön und vollkommen als du kannst'). It could be argued, thus, that 'taking necessity with you, raising it out of its horrible provenance' and 'making it as beautiful and perfect as possible' could be part of a (moral) therapy, although there is still no argument in this text for why and how it would improve our lives.

The note preceding *NL* 15[20] seems to connect the notion of love to that of an ideal, suggesting that love could be a kind of (possibly moral) ideal. Every love, like every ideal, should take as its object something as specific as possible:

NL 15[19] Ist es nicht ein Grad der Entweihung, wenn der Liebende denkt „nicht eigentlich nach dieser Geliebten verlange ich, sondern nach Liebe“ – ist nicht jede Verallgemeinerung des Ziels eine Entweihung? Ja schon dies ist grob und beleidigend „ich verlange nach dieser Geliebten“ – sondern die Sprache der Leidenschaft will nur Weniges, nur Einmaliges, nur ein Zeichen und Symbol. Schon alles Ganze als Ziel zu

⁴⁸ 9.643.

⁴⁹ Translation mine.

nennen ist Entweihung. Das Ideal muß zu groß als Ganzes sein – du sollst nur einzelne Strahlen abpflücken dürfen.⁵⁰

Connecting this passage to *NL* 15[20] indicates that the *fatum* referred to cannot be a totality, as that would be 'eine Entweihung', 'a sacrilege'. The formulation in *NL* 15[20], 'Zuerst das Nöthige', confirms the idea that *fatum* does not denote a totality, for if 'das Nöthige' comes first, it is implied that something else will follow – which is impossible if *fatum* includes everything. I will come back to this point below, and more extensively in chapter 5.

NL 15[19] and 15[20] taken together suggest that *amor fati* can be a kind of morality, one that seems to equate love (associated with desire and passion; 'ich verlange', 'Sprache der Leidenschaft') with the adoption of a certain ideal, one that is highly specific. *NL* 16[22] however, the other *amor fati* passage from 1881, sheds a different light on this picture. The dialogue of this passage underscores that the mission to love fate is not easy. It implies that one has to love 'Furien' before one can achieve the state of loving fate; and loving 'Furien' is 'maddening' because of the presence of snakes (perhaps again constituting a link with the 'schreckliche Herkunft' – a thought to which I shall return shortly).

3. *NL* 16[22] „Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist! Ja! Amor fati sei meine letzte Liebe!“ – Vielleicht treibst du es so weit: aber vorher wirst du erst noch der Liebhaber der Furien sein müssen: ich gestehe, mich würden die Schlangen irre machen. – „Was weißt du von den Furien! Furien – das ist nur ein böses Wort für die Grazien.“ – Er ist toll! –⁵¹

The dialogue in itself does not make clear which of the two voices is Nietzsche's, if there is one; it is clear however that the one claiming to 'want to love only that which is necessary from now on' is declared 'toll' ('mad') by the one who admits that the snakes of the Furies would drive him crazy (a reference to the 'Erinyen', figures sometimes referred to as 'infernal goddesses' in Greek mythology).⁵² Although this passage does not indicate any counter-argument against the idea that *amor fati* is a kind of morality, or therapy (the expression 'Vielleicht treibst du es so weit' suggests the presence of an ideal achievable with action), it cannot be taken as an argument straightforwardly supporting this thesis either. On the contrary: not only is the process of loving 'Furien' declared maddening, also the statement that 'Furien' is only a malicious word for 'Grazien' prompts the reaction 'he is mad'. In other words: *amor fati* seems to be associated with madness more than with therapy in this passage.

⁵⁰ 9.643.

⁵¹ 9.664.

⁵² According to Brusotti, M. (1997), the connection between 'Furien' and 'Grazien' was inspired by Nietzsche's reading of Emerson; 456, ft. 14: 'Emersons Fatalismus hatte Nietzsche bereits in seiner frühen Jugend beeinflusst. In dieser Aufzeichnung bearbeitet er ein Bild, das am Ende des Kapitels „Von der Bildung“ in dessen *Führung des Lebens* vorkommt: „Und wenn man die Zukunft der Rasse in dem organischen Streben der Natur sich zu erheben und zu verbessern und in der entsprechenden Richtung der menschlichen Rasse zum Bessern vorgezeichnet sehen soll, so werden wir zu bestätigen wagen, daß es nichts giebt was sie nicht überwinden und bekehren kann, bis zuletzt die Cultur Chaos und Gehenna absorbiren wird. Sie wird die Furien in Musen und die Höllen in Paradiese verwandeln.“ (R.W. Emerson: *Die Führung des Lebens. Gedanken und Studien*. Ins Deutsch übertragen von E.S. von Mühlberg, Leipzig 1862, S. 115)'.

1.2.1 *AMOR FATI AND THE ETERNAL RETURN*

Even though we can conclude from the three passages that it is unlikely that *amor fati* denotes a therapy, there are still commentators who argue for this position. Garry Brodsky is one of those. He does not refer to the *Nachlass* fragments, nor to *FW* 276, but to an aphorism which is frequently connected to it: *FW* 341. 'While [Nietzsche] is a superb critic, he says very little about how those of us who are impressed by his criticisms should live our lives. Further, the one general doctrine or idea Nietzsche advances which is evidently intended to serve this purpose, namely, the idea that we should love our respective fates (*amor fati*), seems to require us to respond positively (indeed, enthusiastically) to being told by a demon that we have recurred and will recur eternally, exactly as we are and have been.'⁵³ Although it is far from 'obvious' that *amor fati* is indeed intended to inform the readers 'who are impressed by his criticisms' how to live their lives, Brodsky has a point; at least *FW* 341 seems to address the readers more directly than *FW* 276.

FW 341 *Das grösste Schwergewicht.* – Wie, wenn dir eines Tages oder Nachts, ein Dämon in deine einsamste Einsamkeit nachschliche und dir sagte: „Dieses Leben, wie du es jetzt lebst und gelebt hast, wirst du noch einmal und noch unzählige Male leben müssen; und es wird nichts Neues daran sein [...]“⁵⁴

The aphorism describes two possible reactions, formulated as questions to the reader. 'Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are a God and never have I heard anything more divine"?' The last sentence of this aphorism in particular has led many commentators like Brodsky to connect *amor fati* to this doctrine of the eternal recurrence:

Oder wie müsstest du dir selber und dem Leben gut werden, um nach Nichts mehr zu verlangen, als nach dieser letzten ewigen Bestätigung und Besiegelung?

Maudemarie Clark, for instance, claims that *amor fati* is 'the attitude of one who affirms the eternal recurrence'⁵⁵, a position also maintained by Julian Young⁵⁶, implying that *amor fati* must be equated with being 'well disposed to yourself and life'. Yirmiyahu Yovel takes the eternal recurrence as 'an existential fable'; 'this way, eternal recurrence serves to better explicate the content of *amor fati* and also to test its existence.'⁵⁷ Whereas some see the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as a kind of test (e.g. Leslie Paul Thiele: 'The eternal recurrence is best understood as the test of one's *amor fati* and thus of one's greatness'⁵⁸), others rather take the two doctrines as synonymous.⁵⁹

⁵³ Brodsky, G. (1998), 35.

⁵⁴ 3-570.

⁵⁵ Clark, M. (1990), 282.

⁵⁶ Young, J. (2010), 18, 501 ('willing'), 337, 351 ('desiring'), 531 ('embracing'), 501.

⁵⁷ Yovel, Y. (1989), 124.

⁵⁸ Thiele, L.P. (1991), 95. She adds on 96: 'Everybody who does not fully affirm life, including its terrifying mystery, is decadent.' Also Han-Pile, B. (2009) remarks on the first page of her article on Nietzsche and *amor fati*: 'Amor fati is often mentioned by commentators in connection with the eternal return and implicitly taken as an illustration of the sort of existential attitude characteristic of someone who would

Brian Domino summarizes the therapeutic importance of *amor fati* in combination with the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as follows: 'To love your fate involves examining those ideals you hold that suggest that your life could be better than it is. These are the ideals that prevent you from loving your actual life and that convince you to redirect your love to another, non-existent life. To love your fate means, in part, to shut the door on possibility, to reject the imaginings of the toxic ideals as merely so much phantasy that could not come to pass and so should not be mourned or desired.'⁶⁰ Even if this interpretation, which rejects the acceptance of any ideals, questions the reference to ideals we have encountered in *NL* 15[19], its main idea remains attractive: *amor fati*, read together with *FW* 341, may be intended to draw our attention away from non-existent possibilities and redirect it to words embracing what cannot be avoided: fate. Yet, this interpretation raises a new difficulty. If *amor fati* entails 'becoming so well disposed to yourself and life' that you are capable of willing every aspect of your life to return eternally, how to deal with its difficult aspects? To borrow from Han-Pile's way of putting it: 'fate is bound to entail at least some suffering and unhappiness for each of us. [...] In order to love fate, then, one would have to accept the paradoxical possibility of loving a repellent object'.⁶¹

How to love a repellent object, such as fate? How to deal with the Furies' 'maddening snakes' described in *NL* 16[22], or the 'schreckliche Herkunft' of *NL* 15[20]? Of course, the way in which this question is answered depends on the understanding of what fate is. Most commentators agree that fate must be connected to the recurring events of one's life, as described in *FW* 341 and summarized as 'dir selber und dein Leben'. If that is what fate entails, it means one has to love all one's characteristics, even the unattractive ones, and one's past, including its difficult moments. How to do this? It is far from easy, as Brodsky points out in a lively way.

[Even] if we are reasonably well disposed to ourselves we will still want to bargain with the demon and attempt to have some alterations made in the subsequent editions of ourselves. For who of us is so egomaniacal as not to want to be a bit smarter, more energetic, wealthier, better looking, more patient, and/or possessed of a better palate, a livelier libido and a greater appreciation of art, music, literature and the rest of the things which make life worth living? And that, alas, is not all. For all of us have done things of which we were and perhaps still are ashamed and will, therefore, want to have these things eliminated from subsequent versions of our lives and selves.⁶²

respond positively to the challenge of the daimon and affirm his or her life as worth living over and over again'. She refers in this context to Magnus, B. (1978), 145; Hatab, L. (2005), 49; Reginster, B. (2006), 229-30. See also Oger, E. (1997).

⁵⁹ E.g. Magnus, B. (1978), 216 ft 2: 'The expression "*amor fati*" appears to have been Nietzsche's own. It is, of course, a handy synonym for eternal recurrence and the attitude Nietzsche recommends.'

⁶⁰ Domino, B. (2012), 294.

⁶¹ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 3. Stern, T. (2013) makes the exact same point, 145-6: 'Put simply: fate isn't loveable. [...] Adorno is among the first to object in this way. *Amor fati* looked too much like the pathetic love of the captive for the bars of his cage'.

⁶² Brodsky, G. (1998), 44.

1.2.2 *AMOR FATI: LOVING THE UNLOVABLE*

Some commentators respond to this problem by turning to the accepting attitude of surrender we find Nietzsche describing in *Ecce Homo* (*EH*) as 'Russian Fatalism'. Brodsky, too, claims that Nietzsche's 'is the familiar fatalistic advice to understand and passively accept things as they are and must be. In *EH* I,6 he refers to this attitude as "*Russian Fatalism*".⁶³

EH weise 6 [...] Kranksein ist eine Art Ressentiment selbst. – Hiergegen hat der Kranke nur Ein grosses Heilmittel – ich nenne es den *russischen Fatalismus*, jenen Fatalismus ohne Revolte, mit dem sich ein russischer Soldat, dem der Feldzug zu hart wird, zuletzt in den Schnee legt. Nichts überhaupt mehr annehmen, an sich nehmen, in sich hineinnehmen, – überhaupt nicht mehr reagiren... Die grosse Vernunft dieses Fatalismus [...] ist die Herabsetzung des Stoffwechsels, dessen Verlangsamung, eine Art Wille zum Winterschlaf.⁶⁴

Although this attitude is presented as a therapeutic reaction (a 'grosses Heilmittel') to a disease identified as 'ressentiment', it is clear that slowing down, hibernating ('Winterschlaf') and refusing to act cannot be seen as similar to what we saw Nietzsche describing in *FW* 341 and 276 (even if we ignore the chronological gap between *FW* and *EH*⁶⁵). The two aphorisms in *FW* seem to advocate a more active attitude, one that regards the eternal recurrence as the 'letzte[n] ewige[n] Bestätigung und Besiegelung' of one's life, containing the hopeful wish to be 'irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender'. Russian fatalism, instead, is described as the last recourse in a state of distress: the Russian soldier can no longer withstand in an unbearable campaign. Even though we should not forget that *FW* 276 opens with the surprising 'Noch lebe ich', the pathos of the New Year's wish remains utterly different from that of the *EH* passage. Han-Pile suggests similarly that *if* Russian fatalism is to be connected to *amor fati*, it can only be seen as an antecedent state. The physical reaction of a metabolism slowing down arises only in emergencies, 'until one finds the courage and strength to measure oneself against one's pain'. Only after one has regained one's strength, one may achieve *amor fati*. Thus it 'can perhaps be seen as [*amor fati*'s] precursor', but not its equivalent.⁶⁶

Han-Pile's interpretation suggests that the love of *amor fati* is more than passive resignation. However, she also argues against any position that takes the love of *amor fati* as erotic in the Platonic sense, that is, as an active desire that reacts possessively to the attractiveness of something beautiful. Although *FW* 276 and *NL* 15[20] mention beauty in association with *amor fati*, we should note that a major part of this concerns *making* fate beautiful; the fact that *FW* 276 describes *amor fati* as something to be learned and to be achieved at some point in the

⁶³ Brodsky, G. (1998), 38. Also Stambaugh, J. (1985) differentiates between what she calls 'fatalism', referring to Nietzsche's rejection of Turkish fatalism in *WS* 61, and 'fate', which she equates to 'Russian fatalism' (134: 'Fate is his own positive concept; fatalism is his polemical target. He loved fate, not fatalism.');

⁶⁴ 6,272.

⁶⁵ The distance in time finds its expression in the growing relevance of 'ressentiment' for instance; in the first four books of *FW* this diagnosis is absent.

⁶⁶ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 15.

future can only be understood if one takes the object of love to be unattractive initially (which is consistent with the mentioning of snakes in 16[22]'s *amor fati* as the love for 'Furien').

Han-Pile therefore argues for a middle position, in between *EH*'s passive resignation and erotic, active desire. According to her, *amor fati*'s love should be understood in the 'medio-passive' form, which is in between active and passive, leaving the lover in such a state 'that s/he participates in the action but without being in control of it'.⁶⁷ Anyone who ends up loving fate is actively engaged with him-/herself and the past, yet 'without any guarantee that the presence of such sensitivity will generate [...] love'.⁶⁸ Loving an unattractive object such as fate must be the effect of an agapic kind of love, one that is passively received like a 'secularised version of grace', and 'bestows value on its object, and this regardless of the value previously attributed to it'.⁶⁹ The sentence in *FW* 276 'Amor fati: das sei von nun an meine Liebe!' (and the similar one in *NL* 16[22]) fits Han-Pile's line of argumentation well, for it suggests that Nietzsche humbly wishes for love, aware that it can neither be demanded nor learned. She concludes: 'love happens (or not) to us from the outside [...]. [A]mor fati is meant to change our *relation* to our (unchanged) past, and more generally to time, in such a way that neither revenge nor despair can hold sway on us anymore'.⁷⁰

Still, understanding the love of *amor fati* this way does not solve all problems. Her account suggests once again that we cannot *choose* to love fate; it may happen to us, or not, similarly to what we saw in the motto to *FW* IV and the presentation of *amor fati* as a wish in *FW* 276. The only thing up to us is the degree of receptivity that we can maintain. Yet, even though this suggestion does seem to fit some of the fragments discussed thus far, her argument that agapic *amor* cannot be learned does not. *FW* 276 points explicitly in the opposite direction: 'Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen'. Even if this sentence does not read literally 'Ich will lieben lernen', the suggestion is implied that love is a reaction to beauty, which is a typically Platonic perspective. What is more, further in Book IV we find an aphorism entitled '*Man muss lieben lernen*', a text that seems to have escaped Han-Pile's attention. It will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.⁷¹

1.2.3 *AMOR FATI: WHAT TO LOVE?*

There are several commentators, then, who hold on to an interpretation of *amor fati* as something that can be chosen, learned, and practically adopted; in Brian Domino's words: 'Nietzsche presents *amor fati* as a practical teaching'.⁷² Nevertheless, these commentators usually keep struggling with the impossibility of loving what is unlovable. One of them is Ure. We should keep in mind, first, that his standpoint is coloured by a slightly different take on the exact meaning of fate. Whereas Han-Pile and others mostly regard the love of fate as the love

⁶⁷ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 10.

⁶⁸ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 10.

⁶⁹ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 4. The reference to grace is made on 19: 'I would suggest that *amor fati* represents a human, heteronomous alternative to willing backwards and a secularised version of grace.'

⁷⁰ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 19.

⁷¹ *FW* 334 3.559-60. For an elaborate discussion of this aphorism and its relation to Han-Pile's argument, see section 5.3.1.

⁷² Domino, B. (2012), 292.

of oneself and one's past, Ure argues that Nietzsche's approach resembles Sellars' description of 'Cosmic Stoicism': 'Stoicism believes that it is possible to consent or say yes to all that comes to pass by adopting a cosmic perspective that dissolves the boundaries between oneself and the cosmos so that there is no longer any opposition between the two.'⁷³ Ure's interpretation of Nietzsche's *amor fati* therefore entails not only the affirmation of one's own fate, but also that of the entire cosmos in which it is embedded. Although we have seen in *NL* 15[19] that 'jede Verallgemeinerung des Ziels' should be avoided because it is 'eine Entweihung', there are other textual indications for accepting Ure's cosmic interpretation of fate.⁷⁴ I'll discuss two. The first explicitly takes on board not just one's own past, but suggests that the entire history of mankind be included:

FW 337 [...] Wir Gegenwärtigen fangen eben an, die Kette eines zukünftigen sehr mächtigen Gefühls zu bilden, Glied um Glied [...]. In der That: diess ist Eine Farbe dieses neuen Gefühls: wer die Geschichte der Menschen insgesamt als *eigene Geschichte* zu fühlen weiss [...]: diess Alles endlich in Einer Seele haben und in Ein Gefühl zusammendrängen: – diess müsste doch ein Glück ergeben, das bisher der Mensch noch nicht kannte⁷⁵

In this aphorism several examples of events and figures with their emotional states are brought up: an invalid dreaming of health, an old man thinking of the dreams of his youth, a lover robbed of his beloved, a martyr whose ideal is perishing – all summarized as 'the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, conquests, victories of humanity'. Not so much a generalized concept of the past therefore (a 'Verallgemeinerung'), rather an accumulation of as many particular events and feelings as possible.⁷⁶ The idea that the love of fate includes the totality of the past may be supported moreover by a more cosmic analysis in *FW* 109:

FW 109 *Hüten wir uns!* [...] Der Gesamt-Charakter der Welt ist [...] in alle Ewigkeit Chaos, nicht im Sinne der fehlenden Nothwendigkeit, sondern der fehlenden Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, Schönheit, Weisheit, und wie alle unsere ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten heissen. [...] Hüten wir uns, zu sagen, dass es Gesetze in der Natur gebe. Es giebt nur Nothwendigkeiten: da ist Keiner, der befiehlt, Keiner, der gehorcht, Keiner, der übertritt. Wenn ihr wisst, dass es keine Zwecke giebt, so wisst ihr auch, dass es keinen Zufall giebt: denn nur neben einer Welt von Zwecken hat das Wort „Zufall“ einen Sinn.⁷⁷

⁷³ Ure, M. (2008), 75. He refers to Sellars on 68.

⁷⁴ The texts I discuss are not mentioned in Ure's article. The text that he does refer to, from the *Nachlass*, is highly controversial: *NL* 11[7] 9.442-3: 'Die Irrthümer des ego entdecken! [...] Nein! Über „mich“ und „dich“ hinaus! Kosmisch empfinden!' For more on how to interpret this aphorism see section 2.4.

⁷⁵ 3.564-5.

⁷⁶ Brusotti, M. (1997), 477-8, agrees that this implies a notion of *amor fati* that goes beyond one's own past: 'Gerade im historischen Sinn wird die Bejahung auch des Leidens so weit wie sonst nie in der *Fröhlichen Wissenschaft* über die eng persönliche Sphäre hinaus ausgedehnt; die Bejahung reicht hier bis zu einer nahezu allgemeinen Identifikation mit dem historischen Leiden. Wer das Einzelne bejaht, bejaht die jeweiligen ereignishaften Zufälligkeiten (*amor fati*) ebenso wie die unterschiedlichen historischen Individualitäten (historischer Sinn).'

⁷⁷ 3.467-8.

It would be wrong to try to designate some general features of the cosmos as 'necessary' in order to love merely these; we should be aware, according to this aphorism, that all our human ways of understanding the cosmos are just that: anthropomorphisms. There are no laws governing the unfolding of the world, nor does the opposition between chance ('Zufall') and purpose ('Zwecke') apply. At the same time necessity as a category is not rejected: 'Es giebt nur Nothwendigkeiten'. It remains unclear in this text what it entails exactly (an uncertainty that is not solved in *FW*, not even in the totality of Nietzsche's oeuvre according to some); yet it is clear that if necessity is to be equated with *fatum*, *amor fati* cannot refer to merely one's own character and history; it should include the chaos and history of the 'Gesammt-Charakter der Welt'.

So, if Ure is right and Nietzsche's *amor fati* entails the love of the entire cosmos, which comes down to 'a transcendence of the individual will and its identification with the whole'⁷⁸ (a suggestion the immanence of which seems confirmed in the final sentence of *FW* 109: 'Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernatürlichen!'⁷⁹), the burden of embracing the unpleasant aspects of the cosmos has become even heavier. Can we really love all the instances of a cosmos filled with meaninglessness and pain, historical (i.e. the 'schreckliche Herkunft') as well as present (including the 'Furien')? This line of reasoning leads Ure to conclude that Nietzsche ultimately fails in his endeavour to develop a new kind of therapy. After a period in which Nietzsche had adopted many of the Stoic elements of therapy⁸⁰, he can no longer concur with the Stoic ideal of a calm, passionless state in *FW*: 'Contra Stoicism he seeks to revalue passions like distress, fear, delight and desire.'⁸¹ This shift in Nietzsche's judgment of Stoicism is taken up by Ure as an argument that the attempt cannot but end up in paradoxical impossibility; affirming passionately even those events that we now abhor, such as the holocaust or slavery, is simply undoable. How are we supposed to feel the passions of love and fear, or rejection, at the same time? As Domino puts it, making the same point as Ure: 'It is often noted that if everything repeats, including the inauspicious night when one first learned of eternal recurrence from the demon, the proper response is indifference.'⁸²

One possible solution to this problem, namely that we may affirm horrible events in the light of something else, something more loveable which owes its existence to them, is doomed to fail because of one of the late *amor fati* passages from 1888 that will be considered in more detail further below:

NL 16[32] [...] *amor fati*... — Hierzu gehört, die bisher verneinten Seiten des Daseins nicht nur als nothwendig zu begreifen, sondern als wünschenswerth: und nicht nur als

⁷⁸ Ure, M. (2008), 76. Of course, keeping in mind *FW* 109 just quoted, this 'whole' cannot be equated to the rationally structured sense of totality endorsed by the Stoics. Perhaps the word 'whole' is not well chosen therefore.

⁷⁹ 3.469.

⁸⁰ This is the position defended by Ure, M. (2008), and I agree with him. For more on this see chapter 3 and 4.

⁸¹ Ure, M. (2008), 72. For a more detailed analysis of Nietzsche's change of appreciation of Stoicism before *FW* see chapters 3 and 4.

⁸² Domino, B. (2012), 288.

wünschenswerth in Hinsicht auf die bisher bejahten Seiten (etwa als deren Complementary oder Vorbedingungen), sondern um ihrer selber willen⁸³

Another possibility, that we may want not only the events to return, but also our disapproval and opposition to them, is dismissed by Ure's argument that 'if we retrospectively want [the events] to happen, this can only occur by disconnecting ourselves from those affective judgements that made us not want them in the past. It is to want the return of the event *minus* the past judgment that made us experience it as painful and abhorrent.'⁸⁴ Which means that we would not fully want the return of *all* events, because we would carve out the event of our disapproval – and wanting our disapproval to return means to not want the return of the event itself. In other words, Ure's claim is that we simply cannot want and not want the return of an event at the same time. Consequently, the idea of *amor fati*, introduced as a therapy, fails.

1.2.4 *AMOR FATI AS THE AESTHETIC TURN TO THE SELF*

Where does all this leave us? We have now examined the textual possibilities of regarding the idea of *amor fati* as a therapeutic device by looking closely into the three *amor fati* passages of 1881/1882. We have seen that *amor fati* is introduced in the *Nachlass* passages as a possible morality ('dies wäre meine Moral'), perhaps an ideal, but in either case something maddening. *FW* 276 presents *amor fati* as something wished for in the future, and also something to be learned. The opening motto of Book IV mentions health, but not as the consequence of the adoption of a certain therapy. Thus only connecting *amor fati* to the doctrine of the eternal return in *FW* 341 opens the way for some arguments in favour of this idea. Yet, doing this runs into difficulties, the most apparent one being that it is almost impossible to love something so utterly unlovable as the reappearance of everything in a never-ending sequence. Many commentators have attempted to come up with a satisfactory solution to this question; some, like Ure, by merely pointing out that its paradox cannot be escaped, others with the aim of saving Nietzsche from its impossibility.

There are roughly three ways for taking the second path. One: we may go along with Han-Pile's suggestion and attempt to change our understanding of love until it can face the unlovable. We have seen, however, that this path is not without its problems: it would be difficult to continue to see *amor fati* as a therapy, and it fails to address the textual references to love as something to be learned. Two: we may attempt to develop a different notion of fate, such that loving it may still be difficult but not impossible. To love fate, then, entails something completely different from wishing the return of all events.⁸⁵ This line will be developed in chapter 5, but a first indication of it will be offered below. Three: we may explore the possibility of *amor fati* as non-therapeutic, at least not in a traditional sense. It is this line that I will adopt in chapter 5 as well.

⁸³ 13.492.

⁸⁴ Ure, M. (2008), 79.

⁸⁵ Domino, B. (2012) argues for this standpoint in the following way, 290: 'most scholars today agree that eternal recurrence is not a descriptive claim. [...] In contrast, *amor fati* does not offer prescriptive advice. If anything, *amor fati* would offer solace, not regret or fear of eternal repetition. [...] There is no need for *amor fati* as the proper response to eternal recurrence because eternal recurrence already contains one.'

We have seen that there are textual indications for seeing fate as something inclusive. *FW* 109 and 337 have been cited in that context. Yet, we have also come across textual evidence for *not* seeing the object of *amor fati* thus. Both *Nachlass* passages in which *amor fati* is introduced, together with the one preceding *NL* 15[20], 15[19], identify fate with 'what is necessary', allowing for a distinction between what is and is not necessary (*NL* 15[20]: 'Zuerst das Nöthige', '„Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“'; and *NL* 16[22]: '„Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist! [...]“'). Also *FW* 276 reveals a similar pattern. Not only does Nietzsche allow himself to look away ('*Wegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung!'), he moreover refers to necessity 'in things' ('Das Nothwendige an den Dingen'), as if there could be a non-necessary element to things as well.

The question is: how to distinguish between what is and is not necessary, so that we know what is to be loved and what not? Although chapter 5 will address this question in depth, let me just discuss some more approaches in the secondary literature here. Frank Chouraqui names *amor fati* a 'local form of affirmation', claiming that 'it is attached to some things in particular, not to any "fate" in general.'⁸⁶ Similarly, Domino argues that Nietzsche 'is not using the phrase "what is necessary" in the metaphysical sense.'⁸⁷ But if the necessity of *fatum* is not metaphysical, what is it? Tom Stern brings forward a straightforward answer in this context. His interpretation of necessity in *FW*'s *amor fati* is deeply tied with what we *need*, being the humans we are. His reasoning: '[we] find, in *The Gay Science*, plenty of discussion of what is necessary for us. [...] In fact, they are surprising and completely general claims about what all humans must do, if they are to survive at all.'⁸⁸

Even though there are some difficulties with Stern's account (to be discussed in chapter 5), it does take us back to the conclusion of *FW* 341: loving fate is becoming 'well disposed to yourself and life'. If we now leave aside the doctrine of the eternal return put forward in this aphorism and focus on other aphorisms in *FW*, we find plenty of fruitful suggestions that circumvent problems related to this doctrine. What is more, these aphorisms offer a more attractive idea of how to go about loving fate. As Stern argues, loving has everything to do with beauty and art. And so we return to the statement of *FW* 276: 'Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen: — so werde ich Einer von Denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen' (a statement that resembles the sentence in *NL* 16[22] 'Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst!'). Loving fate seen from this perspective means aestheticising (seeing as beautiful and so making beautiful) these aspects of ourselves and our lives that we cannot change because they are needed in order to survive.

One of the authors defending this idea is Marco Brusotti. In his book many references to other *FW* texts can be found. I will mention three: *FW* 290, 299 and 17. *FW* 290 is an often quoted aphorism in the context of Nietzsche as a philosopher interested in self-cultivation:

⁸⁶ Chouraqui, F. (2015), 272. He discusses in this same context (273) 'what Daniel Dennett calls "local fatalism"', referring to Dennett, D.C. (1984), 104-6, and Solomon, R.C. (2002), 63-88.

⁸⁷ Domino, B. (2012), 293.

⁸⁸ Stern, T. (2013), 153. The idea that 'necessity' may be the outcome of our way of seeing things, as a result of our human way of interpreting, will be explored in chapter 5; in particular 5.3.2.3 and 5.3.2.4.

*FW 290 Eins ist Noth. – Seinem Charakter „Stil geben“ – eine grosse und seltene Kunst!*⁸⁹

This text offers some practical advice on how to 'stylise' one's character: it takes 'long practice and daily work', and elements that are ugly and 'that could not be removed' should be 'concealed' or 'reinterpreted into sublimity'.⁹⁰ *FW 299* offers even more suggestions in that direction: we may turn to physicians, who 'dilute something bitter and add wine and sugar to the mixing bowl', 'but even more to artists, who are really constantly out to invent new artistic *tours de force* of this kind.'⁹¹ *FW 17* might be the best example in this context, not least because it is the only other aphorism in *FW* that contains the word *fatum*:

*FW 17 Seine Armuth motiviren. – Wir können freilich durch kein Kunststück aus einer armen Tugend eine reiche, reichfliessende machen, aber wohl können wir ihre Armuth schön in die Nothwendigkeit umdeuten, sodass ihr Anblick uns nicht mehr wehe thut, und wir ihrethalben dem Fatum keine vorwurfsvollen Gesichter machen. So thut der weise Gärtner, der das arme Wässerchen seines Gartens einer Quellnymphe in den Arm legt und also die Armuth motivirt: – und wer hätte nicht gleich ihm die Nymphen nöthig!*⁹²

The analogy is clear. Like the 'wise gardener', who places a 'poor little stream in the arms of a nymph', hiding its poverty in this way, we, too, should be creative with respect to our own character, artistically turning something unchangeable like a 'poor virtue' into a loved necessity. Peter Groff, one of the commentators who places Nietzsche in the context of self-cultivation, formulates this position as follows: 'This is the raw material we have to work with; our fate, as it were, the portion or allotment given to us by that blind, incompetent demiurge, nature. The challenge is to sculpt it into a work of art.'⁹³

This approach reopens the question: why would we do this? According to *FW 17* so that we stop making 'reproachful faces at fate', which suggests that we should make sure we are happy with it instead; in a similar way, *FW 290* pronounces that 'one thing is needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself – be it through this or that poetry or art':

*FW 290 [...] Denn Eins ist Noth: dass der Mensch seine Zufriedenheit mit sich erreiche – sei es nun durch diese oder jene Dichtung und Kunst: nur dann erst ist der Mensch überhaupt erträglich anzusehen! Wer mit sich unzufrieden ist, ist fortwährend bereit, sich dafür zu rächen: wir Anderen werden seine Opfer sein, und sei es auch nur darin, dass wir immer seinen hässlichen Anblick zu ertragen haben. Denn der Anblick des Hässlichen macht schlecht und düster.*⁹⁴

⁸⁹ 3.530.

⁹⁰ 3.530: 'Hier ist das Hässliche, welches sich nicht abtragen liess, versteckt, dort ist es in's Erhabene umgedeutet.'

⁹¹ 3.538: 'Hier haben wir von den Aerzten Etwas zu lernen, wenn sie zum Beispiel das Bittere verdünnen oder Wein und Zucker in den Mischkrug thun; aber noch mehr von den Künstlern, welche eigentlich fortwährend darauf aus sind, solche Erfindungen und Kunststücke zu machen.'

⁹² 3.389.

⁹³ Groff, P.S. (2004), 156.

⁹⁴ 3.531.

These aphorisms taken together lead Brusotti to conclude: 'Prinzip einer Ästhetisierung des Lebens ist der *amor fati*. Wer sein Schicksal bejaht, ist mit dem eigenen Lebensweg zufrieden und zugleich mit dem eigenen Charakter. Den Lebensweg muß man ästhetisch so stilisieren, bis man mit seinem Schicksal zufrieden ist.'⁹⁵ And, a few pages further: 'Von den mit sich Unzufriedenen (vom Häßlichen) will Nietzsche hingegen wegsehen. Wie zu sich selbst, so will er sich zu anderen ästhetisch verhalten. Mit sich zufrieden sein, sich an anderen nicht rächen, von einigen aber wegsehen – all das gehört zu *amor fati*.'⁹⁶ Interestingly, this interpretation of *amor fati* sheds new light on the idea of *amor fati* as a therapeutic device. Brusotti connects it explicitly to the importance of 'attaining satisfaction' with ourselves; likewise, Peter Groff regards *amor fati* as one of these 'spiritual exercises', a term borrowed from Pierre Hadot⁹⁷, that are 'all ultimately directed toward the therapeutic cultivation of a self untouched by sorrow and capable of joyfully affirming everything that occurs.'⁹⁸ What is more, 'human beings who have redeemed their existence through aesthetic self-cultivation are not only more capable of joyful affirmation, but they also serve as exemplary persons who indirectly help to banish the sorrow [...] of others.'⁹⁹

Yet, this analysis of *amor fati*, convincing as it is, is not unproblematic. First of all, it seems to avoid the difficulty of the eternal return – but to what extent can it really escape it? Does not the question 'wie müsstest du dir selber und dem Leben gut werden, um nach Nichts mehr zu verlangen, als nach dieser letzten ewigen Bestätigung und Besiegelung?' in *FW* 341 automatically tie the therapeutic ideal to the eternal return? Also, can this interpretation really do justice to the difficulties raised in the two *Nachlass* fragments: the 'Furien' and the 'schreckliche Herkunft'? Thirdly, connecting love to the aesthetic techniques developed in *FW* 290 and 299 opens up a new problem. For it seems that Nietzsche, too, knows that love is blind. In *FW* 59 we read: 'Es genügt, zu lieben, zu hassen, zu begehren, überhaupt zu empfinden, – sofort kommt der Geist und die Kraft des Traumes über uns, und wir steigen offenen Auges [...] hinauf auf die Dächer und Thürme der Phantasterei [...]! Wir Künstler! Wir Verhehler der Natürlichkeit!'¹⁰⁰ In other words: if loving something means artistically changing it, if it implies that our imagination 'conceals naturalness', to what extent can we still say that a lover of fate really loves fate, and not some adapted, more appealing version of it?¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Brusotti, M. (1997), 467.

⁹⁶ Brusotti, M. (1997), 470; strictly speaking, *FW* 290 does not advise 'wegsehen vom Häßlichen', but that everyone should attain 'Zufriedenheit mit sich', so that there is no 'Häßliche[n]'.
⁹⁷ Hadot, P. (1995), *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, Part II 'Spiritual Exercises', 79-144. 82-83: 'The Stoics, for instance, declared explicitly that philosophy, for them, was an "exercise". In their view, philosophy did not consist in teaching an abstract theory – much less in the exegesis of texts – but rather in the art of living. It is a concrete attitude and determinate life-style, which engages the whole of existence. The philosophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level, but that of the self and of being.'

⁹⁸ Groff, P.S. (2004), 159.
⁹⁹ Groff, P.S. (2004), 157.
¹⁰⁰ 3-423.

¹⁰¹ As Thiele, L.P. (1991), 93, formulates it: 'In the realm of love, the line between illusion and reality is not thin: it simply does not exist.'

1.3 *AMOR FATI* AS A 'GOTT-ERGEHENHEIT'

Before reaching some final conclusions regarding the *amor fati* passages within this time frame, let me first discuss one more passage that can be said to belong to it as well. It is found in a letter to Franz Overbeck, written the fifth of June 1882:

4. Mein lieber Freund, [...] Die Wahrheit ist: in der Art, wie ich hier handeln will und werde, bin ich einmal ganz und gar der Mensch meiner Gedanken, ja meines innersten Denkens: diese *Übereinstimmung* thut mir so wohl, wie mir das Bild meiner Genueser Existenz wohlthut, in der ich auch nicht hinter meinen Gedanken zurückgeblieben bin. Es sind eine Menge meiner Lebensgeheimnisse in diese *neue* Zukunft eingewickelt, und es bleiben mir hier Aufgaben zu lösen, die man nur durch die That lösen kann. – Übrigens bin ich von einer fatalistischen „Gottergebenheit“ – ich nenne es *amor fati* – dass ich einem Löwen in den Rachen laufen würde, geschweige denn – –¹⁰²

This passage reintroduces the difficult question concerning the amount of activity and passivity involved in *amor fati*, not in the least because of the way in which the letter expresses a kind of happiness about the sense of '*Übereinstimmung*' between thought and action. Not surprisingly, Han-Pile refers to this letter to strengthen her argument that *amor fati*'s love is medio-passive. Mentioning the phrase 'fatalistischen Gott-Ergebenheit' in this letter, she argues 'that the proper attitude to *amor fati* is one of *surrender*, not of erotic pursuit, affirmation or willfulness.'¹⁰³ More will be said below on the possibility of a degree of passivity in what Han-Pile defines as the 'active' erotic type of love related to aesthetics and art in section 1.6 and chapter 5; in this section I will focus on the religious dimension of *amor fati*. If *amor fati* is indeed, as Han-Pile suggests, a kind of 'secularised version of grace', to what extent should we see *amor fati* as a religious notion? How much influence should we allow this letter and its mysterious reference to God to have on our understanding of *amor fati*?

Paul van Tongeren takes the letter to be of great importance. 'That Nietzsche does relate the experience of this ideal [*amor fati*] to religion seems obvious. As early as 1882, in a letter to his friend Overbeck, he writes: " – For that matter, I am of a fatalistic 'godgivenness' – I call it *amor fati* –" [...]. The affirmation of fate, or even the identification with it, is experienced as being given by God, as being released by God *and* like him, as being enabled to comply with fate, as a divine resignation.'¹⁰⁴ Van Tongeren goes on exploring the exact role God has to play in this process. After examining *Jenseits von Gut und Böse (JGB)* 56, he concludes: 'The world to be affirmed is a vicious circle, an endless repetition of the same without any progress, without any

¹⁰² *KGB* III/1.199-200.

¹⁰³ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 9. She moreover detects a biblical background in the reference to the lion, 30, ft. 36: 'Rushing into a lion's jaws is clearly a reference to the Book of Daniel, 6, 16-23.' Although she might be right, it does not follow that *amor fati* is a straightforwardly biblical or religious notion.

¹⁰⁴ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 299. Young, too, sees this letter as an indication that *amor fati* should be seen as something religious. Young, J. (2010), 35: 'When, at the beginning of 1882, he hit upon *amor fati* [...] he described it as an expression of 'submission to God'. In short, once he had cast off the shackles of doctrinaire positivism, his most fundamental problem became the question of how to recover the religious attitude to life – without backsliding into supernatural myths.'

telos, and therefore without any meaning. This meaningless fatality is first presented as the spectacle of a god, but then identified with the god. The name of this god is Dionysus.¹⁰⁵

Van Tongeren thus holds that God, later identified as Dionysos, is not only that which allows Nietzsche to affirm fate, as the 'giver' of the divine 'grace' of 'resignation'; it is moreover identified as fate itself, that which is affirmed in the act of loving fate. Since Van Tongeren also maintains that *amor fati* entails an identification with fate, it follows that the lover of fate becomes himself God, or Dionysos. This interpretation not only closely resembles what we encountered earlier as 'Cosmic Stoicism', that is, the 'cosmic perspective that dissolves the boundaries between oneself and the cosmos'; now that the divine Dionysos has entered the stage it can also be seen as a 'mystic' attitude, one that describes the experience of a 'union with God', the '*unio mystica*'.¹⁰⁶

But to what extent does this position suit Nietzsche's own thoughts of the 'cosmos' or 'God' in this time frame? We have seen how he warns against any anthropomorphism in our understanding of the universe in *FW* 109, claiming that the 'Gesamt-Charakter der Welt ist [...] in alle Ewigkeit Chaos', not because of a lack of necessity, but because there is no 'Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, Schönheit, Weisheit' and all other 'ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten'. Importantly, the final sentences of this aphorism explicitly associate these with the shadows of God still present in our human perspective: 'Wann werden uns alle diese Schatten Gottes nicht mehr verdunkeln? Wann werden wir die Natur ganz entgöttlicht haben!' If Nietzsche defends a form of immanence in this aphorism ('Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernatürlichen!'¹⁰⁷), it is clear that it should not be associated with anything divine – at least not in the traditional (Christian) sense of the word.

Whereas *FW* 109 seems mainly to deny the universe all kinds of anthropomorphic characteristics, the idea of an identification with the cosmos will become even more difficult after the introduction of the term 'nihilism' and 'will to power', painting a picture of an even less lovable world. This leads Yovel to conclude that Nietzsche's *amor fati* is incomparable with the Spinozistic conception of *amor dei intellectualis*: 'There can be no form of *unio mystica* here, as in Spinoza, because the defiant posture entails a distance between the affirming person and the universe he or she affirms and loves. [...] Thus Dionysus, though he bears a mystical name, actually stands for a non-mystical attitude.'¹⁰⁸ More will be said on this subject in section 1.5. For now, there are other arguments against *amor fati* as a religious experience.

¹⁰⁵ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 299-300. *JGB* 56 5-75: 'das Ideal des übermüthigsten lebendigsten und weltbejahendsten Menschen, der sich nicht nur mit dem, was war und ist, abgefunden und vertragen gelernt hat, sondern es, so wie es war und ist, wieder haben will, in alle Ewigkeit hinaus, unersättlich da capo rufend, nicht nur zu sich, sondern zum ganzen Stücke und Schauspiele, und nicht nur zu einem Schauspiele, sondern im Grunde zu Dem, der gerade dies Schauspiel nöthig hat – und nöthig macht: weil er immer wieder sich nöthig hat – und nöthig macht – – Wie? Und dies wäre nicht – circulus vitiosus deus?'

¹⁰⁶ Although this kind of 'mysticism' is incomparable with the traditional Neo-Platonic or Medieval Christian interpretation of it, to be found for instance in Meister Eckhart or John of the Cross, whereby the experience of unification implies an understanding of God as radically transcendent.

¹⁰⁷ 3-469.

¹⁰⁸ Yovel, Y. (1989), 127-8.

Even if we set aside for the moment the mystic aspect and merely concentrate on the 'god-giveness' of *amor fati*, there are enough textual arguments to question this implication. First of all, we should not forget that the term 'Gott-Ergebenheit' is in between quotation marks. It would not be far-fetched to take the reference to God here non-literally, perhaps even ironically. In support of this idea it should be noted that 'Gott-Ergebenheit' does not reappear anywhere in Nietzsche's published works; it only occurs once in the *Nachlass*, in a passage written in 1883, in brackets and with quotation marks.¹⁰⁹ All other instances (I counted six) appear in Nietzsche's letters, the majority of these again with quotation marks.¹¹⁰

Moreover, if we take a closer look at what 'Gott-Ergebenheit' is supposed to mean, it appears that its adoption is discouraged in *FW 277*, the aphorism immediately following the one in which *amor fati* is introduced. In addition to the letter quoted above, two more letters were written in June 1882 containing the word 'Gott-Ergebenheit'. They reveal in a clearer way what it means. The first was written the 18th of June 1882 to Lou Salomé, the second the 19th of June to Heinrich Köselitz.

Liebe Freundin, Also: ich habe eine kleine anscheinend sehr thörichte Reise nach Berlin gemacht, bei der mir *Alles* mißrieth [...]. Heute aber bin ich schon ganz wieder in meine fatalistische „Gott-Ergebenheit“ zurückverfallen und glaube von Neuem, daß mir Alles zum Besten reichen muß – – sogar diese Berliner Reise¹¹¹

Mein lieber alter Freund, ein seltsames Jahr! [...] Denn es muß mir *Alles* zum Besten reichen: ich lebe ganz in einer fatalistischen „Gott-Ergebenheit“. – Genauer läßt sich nicht schreiben.¹¹²

These lines suggest that the 'fatalistische „Gott-Ergebenheit“' is the faith that everything will turn out well, even the smallest things that went wrong (like the failed travel to Berlin); they are part of a greater 'divine' plan designed for Nietzsche personally, in which even the failures turn out 'for the best'. This faith is described in more detail in *FW 277* as follows:

FW 277 [...] Das Leben jedes Tages und jeder Stunde scheint Nichts mehr zu wollen, als immer nur diesen Satz neu beweisen; sei es was es sei, böses wie gutes Wetter, der Verlust eines Freundes, eine Krankheit, eine Verleumdung, das Ausbleiben eines Briefes, die Verstauchung eines Fusses, ein Blick in einen Verkaufsladen, ein Gegenargument, das Aufschlagen eines Buches, ein Traum, ein Betrug: es erweist sich sofort oder sehr bald nachher als ein Ding, das „nicht fehlen durfte“, – es ist voll tiefen Sinnes und Nutzens gerade *für uns!*¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ *NL 14*[2] 10.476: 'eine Art Glück ("Gottgebenheit")'.

¹¹⁰ In total I have found seven instances, two of which have been mentioned above. The other five all appear in letters, three of which with quotation marks. The first letter is written January 25 1882 to Heinrich Köselitz (*KGB III/1.158-60*); the second May 8 1882 to Paul Rée (*KGB III/1.191*); the third June 18 1882 to Lou Salomé (*KGB III/1.206-7*); the fourth June 19 1882 to Heinrich Köselitz (*KGB III/1.207-8*); the fifth July 17 1887 to Franz Overbeck (*KGB III/5.109-11*).

¹¹¹ *KGB III/1.206-7*.

¹¹² *KGB III/1.207-8*.

¹¹³ 3.522.

Young concludes that Nietzsche advises us to 'to discover, as it were, a 'personal providence' running through [our lives]. 'We need to be able to show how 'everything that befalls us continually turns out for the best' (*GS* 277), [...] we need to have turned, or be confident we will turn, a traumatic event into a 'learning' or, in some other way, 'growth' experience. This then – desiring the eternal return, i.e., *amor fati* – is Nietzsche's ideal of happiness."¹⁴ Even apart from the questionable equation between *amor fati*, the eternal return, and the connection with happiness, Young seems to have misread *FW* 277. For, as far as his reading presupposes that we should have faith that everything will, indeed, 'turn out for the best', Nietzsche rather warns against this kind of faith:

FW 277 *Persönliche Providenz*. – Es giebt einen gewissen hohen Punct des Lebens: haben wir den erreicht, so sind wir mit all unserer Freiheit, und so sehr wir dem schönen Chaos des Daseins alle fürsorgende Vernunft und Güte abgestritten haben, noch einmal in der grössten Gefahr der geistigen Unfreiheit und haben unsere schwerste Probe abzulegen. Jetzt nämlich stellt sich erst der Gedanke an eine persönliche Providenz mit der eindringlichsten Gewalt vor uns hin und hat den besten Fürsprecher, den Augenschein, für sich, jetzt wo wir mit Händen greifen, dass uns alle, alle Dinge, die uns treffen, fortwährend *zum Besten* *gereichen*.

After having experienced 'a certain high point in life', so Nietzsche reasons, we are in great danger of losing the freedom we have achieved. For now that we have acknowledged that there is no 'fürsorgende Vernunft und Güte' in the world, that is, in the 'schönen Chaos des Daseins', we are still tempted to adopt another kind of irrational faith: that of a 'persönliche Providenz': it may seem, as we have seen above, that everything that happens contains a secret significance especially *for us*. On the one hand, we should 'leave the gods alone' and 'be content with the assumption that our own practical and theoretical skill in interpreting and arranging events has now reached its apex', according to the following sentences of this aphorism.¹⁵ On the other, we should not think too highly of 'the dexterity of our wisdom.' For, analogous to music, sometimes our actions create a harmony that 'sounds too good to dare to give credit to ourselves'; 'hier und da spielt Einer *mit* uns' – not a God, or Dionysos, but 'der liebe Zufall'.

There are only two possible explanations when things seem to turn out for the best therefore: it is either our highly developed skill of interpretation, or else 'der liebe Zufall'. 'Personal providence' as a form of 'Gott-Ergebenheit', taken literally, must be ruled out. Which leaves us with one question: why would Nietzsche associate *amor fati* with 'Gott-Ergebenheit' in one of his letters while clearly separating the two in the opening of Book IV? Although it is doubtful that we will ever reach a satisfying explanation, I think we should in this context give precedence to Nietzsche's published texts over his letters. Whereas the aphorisms of *FW* were intended to be read by an anonymous and large public, the letters were written for a very specific audience (in this case Franz Overbeck), one that would perhaps appreciate better the mild form of self-irony present in the confession. Or, another possibility, it could be that Nietzsche allowed himself to be somewhat less articulate in his letters than in his aphorisms.

¹⁴ Young, J. (2010), 337.

¹⁵ Probably these sentences inspired Thiele, L.P. (1991), to conclude that fate 'becomes a sort of providence for those capable of breathing soul into accident', 94. Although he may be right, we should not forget that Nietzsche completely dismisses the notion of providence in this aphorism.

In any case, if we are to choose between the texts in *FW*, composed with care and precision, and the letters, the outcome is evident.

Now that we have dismissed the religious background of *amor fati* as it appears in this letter, we can reach a conclusion in relation to the four *amor fati* passages considered so far. It can be a kind of morality, a wish, an ideal, but a difficult one, as it seems to entail a reconciliation with something that resists being loved – whether it be the eternal return or another notion of fate. In the letter to Franz Overbeck an element of courage can be detected, as it is thanks to the ‘fatalistischen Gott-Ergebenheit’ (‘ich nenne es *amor fati*’) that Nietzsche is ready to ‘rush into a lion’s jaws, let alone...’. So even if we have ruled out the idea that *amor fati* is a divine kind of ‘grace’, one that entails the faith that ‘all will be well’, we can imagine that *amor fati* asks for an almost inhuman kind of courage: it involves dealing with something with a ‘schreckliche Herkunft’ and loving ‘Furien’ with maddening snakes. Whether this understanding of *amor fati* allows for a therapeutic interpretation cannot be decided at this point, though it is clear that it is implausible.

The remaining six *amor fati* occurrences, all within their contexts, will be explored in the remainder of this chapter. It will be made apparent that their context gradually changes; a situation that influences the meaning of *amor fati* along with it.

1.4 *AMOR FATI AND ZARATHUSTRA*

The next occurrence can be found in the *Nachlass* of 1884, written in the spring. This is the time in which Nietzsche had finished the first three books of *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (*Z*) and considers what should come next.¹¹⁶ The fragment denotes one of several attempts to find a suitable title for a possible new work.

5. *NL 25[500] Weisheit und Liebe zur Weisheit Prolegomena zu einer Philosophie der Zukunft. Von Friedrich Nietzsche. Amor Fati.*¹¹⁷

We have seen previously how *amor fati* is oriented to the future (especially in *FW* 276 and *NL* 16[22]). To this we can add a new element: the association with wisdom, ‘Weisheit’. The only earlier encounter we have had with this notion is in *FW* 17, where the ‘wise gardener’ knew how to aesthetically cover up a ‘poor stream’. As I will argue in more detail in chapter 5, *amor fati* cannot be seen separately from Nietzsche’s engagement with wisdom, truth, and science (indicated in one of the first sentences of *FW* 276: ‘Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum’). I will argue that the appearance of *amor fati* in a work called ‘*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*’ is far from coincidental.

¹¹⁶ According to Young, Nietzsche announced in the fall of that year that he worked on *Z*’s Book IV, although this book was never meant for publication. Young, J. (2010), 383: ‘By 1886 [...] his letters make clear that he genuinely did not want to publish Part IV: on account of its extremely blasphemous nature, he feared ‘the police’, and the possible loss of his pension.’

¹¹⁷ 11.145.

Although this small fragment does not offer any further clues concerning the exact relation between love of wisdom and *amor fati*, the following passage, to be found in the same notebook, reveals in more detail how to interpret philosophy as love of wisdom.

NL 25[451] *Philosophie als Liebe zur Weisheit*. Hinauf zu dem Weisen als dem Beglücktesten, Mächtigsten, der *alles Werden* rechtfertigt und wieder will. – nicht Liebe zu den Menschen oder zu Göttern, oder zur Wahrheit, sondern *Liebe zu einem Zustand, einem geistigen und sinnlichen Vollendungs-Gefühl*: ein Bejahen und Gutheißen aus einem überströmenden Gefühle von gestaltender Macht. Die große Auszeichnung. **wirkliche Liebe!**¹¹⁸

The formulation 'Hinauf zu dem Weisen' points to the importance of the future again, possibly even denoting the presence of an ideal, the ideal of the sage; this idea is confirmed in recurrent fragments hinting at love of wisdom as a future philosophy.¹¹⁹ The wise one is described as the one most happy and powerful, capable of justifying and willing all becoming again; clearly a reference to the eternal return. Love of wisdom, according to this fragment, should not be confused with love of humanity, or Gods, or of truth; it is the love of a certain condition – implying that wisdom is a state of being rather than the possession of truth or knowledge. It is, to be exact, a feeling; a feeling of sensate and spiritual completion, it is the abundant feeling of the exercise of power, resulting, importantly, in 'Bejahen' and 'Gutheißen'. Although it is not clear exactly where and how *amor fati* should be placed within this context; that it belongs to it seems undeniable.

Also in Z itself, Book II, we find a critique of the will to truth.

Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung. „Wille zur Wahrheit“ heisst ihr's, ihr Weisesten, was euch treibt und brünstig macht? Wille zur Denkbarkeit alles Seienden: also heisse *ich* euren Willen! Alles Seiende wollt ihr erst denkbar *machen*: denn ihr zweifelt mit gutem Misstrauen, ob es schon denkbar ist. Aber es soll sich euch fügen und biegen! So will's euer Wille. Glatt soll es werden und dem Geiste unterthan, als sein Spiegel und Widerbild. Das ist euer ganzer Wille, ihr Weisesten, als ein Wille zur Macht [...]. Schaffen wollt ihr noch die Welt, vor der ihr knien könnt: so ist es eure letzte Hoffnung und Trunkenheit.¹²⁰

The reference to 'ihr Weisesten' seems to be intended as different from 'wisdom' in the previous passage; here, the word 'wisest' has an almost ironic tone, referring to those that have mistakenly been taken to be thus – or only up until now. The will to truth is revealed to be the opposite of passivity, usually presenting itself as a modest will inclined to patiently receive truth; we now see how it rather wants to *make* all beings *thinkable* as a 'Wille zur Denkbarkeit alles Seienden'. It is a *creating* will therefore, as a will to power imposing its will upon its object, forcing it to adjust itself ('sich fügen'), bend ('biegen'), and be made submissive ('unterthan'). But only so that it can kneel before it afterwards (the apparent link with

¹¹⁸ 11.133.

¹¹⁹ Such as the *amor fati* passage, but also, among others, NL 25[490] 11.142: '*Weisheit und Liebe zur Weisheit*. Fingerzeige zu einer Philosophie der Zukunft. Von Friedrich Nietzsche'.

¹²⁰ Z II Selbst-Ueberwindung 4.146.

asceticism, which Nietzsche will work out in more detail in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* III, is explored in chapter 3.3 and 5.4; in 2.5 the association with Stoic 'tyranny' is examined).

We should thus not conclude too hastily that the will to truth is itself an inappropriate drive. It is rather argued here that the 'Wille zur Denkbarkeit' discloses something else, namely the will to power. And, as Nietzsche writes a bit further: 'Wo ich Lebendiges fand, da fand ich Willen zur Macht; und noch im Willen des Dienenden fand ich den Willen, Herr zu sein.'¹²¹ The passage *Auf den glückseligen Inseln* might be helpful in reconstructing the exact relation between will to power, life, creation, wisdom and the eternal return in the way Nietzsche envisions it for the future – also, albeit indirectly, for a better understanding of *amor fati*. Its opening suggests that we should replace God with the *Übermensch*:

Eins sagte man Gott, wenn man auf ferne Meere blickte; nun aber lernte ich euch sagen: Übermensch. [...] Könntet ihr einen Gott *schaffen*? – So schweigt mir doch von allen Göttern! Wohl aber könntet ihr den Übermensch schaffen.¹²²

Auch im Erkennen fühle ich nur meines Willens Zeuge- und Werde-Lust; und wenn Unschuld in meiner Erkenntniss ist, so geschieht diess, weil Wille zur Zeugung in ihr ist. Hinweg von Gott und Göttern lockte mich dieser Wille; was wäre denn zu schaffen, wenn Götter – da wären!¹²³

Although it is often stated that *Z* is a religious work (Nietzsche even refers to it as a 'fifth Gospel'¹²⁴), it is clear from this fragment that the element of religion cannot be identified as the desire to worship God¹²⁵; instead, the focus is on creation and procreation. God cannot be created, it is claimed, but the *Übermensch* can be – so let's focus on him and use our powers for his future appearance (similar to 'Hinauf zu dem Weisen'). The same seems to hold in the context of 'knowing' and 'wisdom'; only if we understand these in terms of creation can they be 'innocent' and productive.

When we think about *amor fati* in this context we should note therefore, first of all, that it cannot be a religious concept in the traditional sense of the word (not as something 'god-given' that is). Secondly, we have seen that *Z* puts a lot of emphasis on creation; if *amor fati* has a role to play in this context, it will have to be connected to it somehow. Importantly, when creation is discussed, much attention is dedicated to the drives producing it. The passage quoted above mentions 'meines Willens Zeuge- und Werde-Lust', 'Wille zur Zeugung'; the *Nachlass* passage quoted previously describes the love of wisdom as 'einem überströmenden Gefühle von gestaltender Macht'. This is of importance in particular because several texts in *Z* denote the productive will as 'fated'. In the final text within *Von alten und neuen Tafeln*, for instance, we find:

¹²¹ *Z* II Selbst-Ueberwindung 4.147-8.

¹²² *Z* II Inseln 4.109.

¹²³ *Z* II Inseln 4.111.

¹²⁴ Young, J. (2010), 366; *KGB* III/1.375.

¹²⁵ On the contrary: everything that is traditionally associated with divinity (one-ness, motionless-ness, fullness, immortality) is deemed 'bad' and 'misanthropic'; see *Z* II Inseln 4.110: 'Böse heisse ich's und menschenfeindlich: all diess Lehren vom Eine, und Vollen und Unbewegten und Satten und Unvergänglichlichen! Alles Unvergänglichliche – das ist nur ein Gleichniss!'

30 Oh du mein Wille! Du Wende aller Noth du *meine* Nothwendigkeit! [...] Du Schickung meiner Seele, die ich Schicksal heisse! Du-In-mir! Über-mir!¹²⁶

The text preceding this one explicitly connects 'Schicksal' with creation, while introducing the connection between being a 'Schicksal' and being 'hard'.

29 [...] wollt ihr nicht Schicksale sein und Unerbittliche: wie könntet ihr mit mir – siegen? Und wenn eure Härte nicht blitzen und scheiden und zerschneiden will: wie könntet ihr einst mit mir – schaffen? Die Schaffenden nämlich sind hart.¹²⁷

Amor fati seen from this perspective would mean the love of one's own fated will, loving and allowing for the fact that one's will is hard, creative, 'victorious'. It is similar in this respect to the love of wisdom discussed above; both designate the love of a certain condition, an inner state and a powerful, creative feeling. Why would it be 'fated'? Probably first to emphasise the absence of choice in processes like this. All creation is the inevitable consequence of a will that does not 'choose' but proceeds continuously¹²⁸; as it is described in *Das Grablied*:

Ja, ein Unverwundbares, Unbegrabbares ist an mir, ein Felsensprengendes: das heisst *mein Wille*. Schweigsam schreitet es und unverändert durch die Jahre. Seinen Gang will er gehn auf meinen Füßen, mein alter Wille; herzenshart ist ihm der Sinn und unverwundbar.¹²⁹

Also, secondly, because there is a sense of inevitable pain involved. Creation involves inescapable – fated – suffering (even though it also functions as its redemption):

Schaffen – das ist die grosse Erlösung vom Leiden, und des Lebens Leichtwerden. Aber dass der Schaffende sei, dazu selber thut Leid noth und viel Verwandlung. Ja, viel bitteres Sterben muss in eurem Leben sein, ihr Schaffenden! [...] Aber so will's mein schaffender Wille, mein Schicksal. Oder, dass ich's euch redlicher sage: solches Schicksal gerade – will mein Wille.¹³⁰

The confrontation of *amor fati* with these fragments clearly suggests that the love of fate may signify the love of oneself, particularly one's will or soul; as we read in *Von der grossen Sehnsucht*: 'Oh meine Seele, [...] ich gab dir selber den Namen „Wende der Noth“ und „Schicksal“. [...] Oh meine Seele, es giebt nun nirgends eine Seele, die liebender wäre und umfangender und umfänglicher!¹³¹ Interestingly, this last quotation opens up a new

¹²⁶ Z III Tafeln 4.268-9.

¹²⁷ Z III Tafeln 4.268.

¹²⁸ Significantly, in the previous passage the hardness of one's 'Schicksal' is not only presented as a law ('Diese neue Tafel, oh meine Brüder, stelle ich über euch: *werdet hart!*'); also, the process of 'becoming hard' is described as the physical (and hence unalterable) process from 'Küchen-Kohle' ('kitchen-carbon') into diamond. 'Warum so hart! – sprach zum Diamanten einst die Küchen-Kohle; sind wir denn nicht Nah-Verwandte?' 4.268.

¹²⁹ Z II Grablied 4.145.

¹³⁰ Z II Inseln 4.110-1.

¹³¹ Z III Sehnsucht 4.279. Stambaugh, J. (1985) too, signifies the effect of this passage on the meaning of *amor fati*, 138-9: 'This passage dramatically expresses why we are no longer dealing with two separate questions: fate is a name for the soul. [...] This means that the soul is not to be understood in a personal

perspective: if the soul, identified as Schicksal, is not only the object to be loved but is itself a loving subject too, this changes the relation between the terms 'love' and 'fate'. It might point to an alternative interpretation, whereby '*fati*' can be seen as a 'subjective genitive' instead of the usual 'objective genitive'.

There are several other candidates for the position of the object of *amor fati*. One that has received a lot of attention in secondary literature is that of time, more in particular the past. We read in *Von der Erlösung* the following famous passage:

Wille – so heisst der Befreier und Freudebringer: also lehrte ich euch, meine Freunde!
Und nun lernt diess hinzu: der Wille selber ist noch ein Gefangener. Wollen befreit:
aber wie heisst Das, was auch den Befreier noch in Ketten schlägt? „Es war“: also heisst
des Willens Zähneknirschen und einsamste Trübsal. Ohnmächtig gegen Das, was
gethan ist – ist er allem Vergangenen ein böser Zuschauer. Nicht zurück kann der Wille
wollen; dass er die Zeit nicht brechen kann und der Zeit Begierde, – das ist des Willens
einsamste Trübsal.¹³²

Yet for this problem of unfreedom of the will there seems to be a solution; the will must learn to conjoin willing and necessity by reinterpreting the 'es war' as 'so will ich es'.¹³³

Alles „Es war“ ist ein Bruchstück, ein Räthsel, ein grauser Zufall – bis der schaffende
Wille dazu sagt: „aber so will ich es! So werde ich's wollen!“¹³⁴

According to Joan Stambaugh, '[r]econciliation with time occurs as willing back. This could mean either of two things: 1. to will backwards in time, so to speak, turning time around, reversing it, or 2. to will things and event back, to will them to come again, to return.'¹³⁵ The second option resembles the eternal recurrence and is explicitly associated by Stambaugh with *amor fati*, whereby the past is its object, equated to *fatum*¹³⁶; the first is 'so obscure that we are

or psychological way, but as part of the cosmos, indeed a very important part. [...] The soul is fate and necessity, fate and turning the need.'

¹³² Z II Erlösung 4.179-80.

¹³³ The other possible solution, to stop willing (the solution brought forward by Schopenhauer) is rejected firmly on several occasions. Z II Inseln: '[...] Wollen befreit: das ist die wahre Lehre von Wille und Freiheit – so lehrt sie euch Zarathustra. Nicht-mehr-wollen und Nicht-mehr-schätzen und Nicht-mehr-schaffen! ach, dass diese grosse Müdigkeit mir stets ferne bleibe!' 4.111. Also, Z II Erlösung: '„Es sei denn, dass der Wille endlich sich selber erlöste und Wollen zu Nicht-Wollen würde –“: doch ihr kennt, meine Brüder, diess Fabellied des Wahnsinns! Weg führte ich euch von diesen Fabelliedern, als ich euch lehrte „der Wille ist ein Schaffender.“' 4.181.

¹³⁴ 4.181. Further in Z this position is affirmed again, Z III Tafeln 4.248-9: 'als Dichter, Räthselrath und Erlöser des Zufalls lehrte ich sie an der Zukunft schaffen, und Alles, das war –, schaffend zu erlösen. Das Vergangne am Menschen zu erlösen und alle „Es war“ umzuschaffen, bis der Wille spricht „Aber so wollte ich es! So werde ich's wollen –“ – Diess hiess ich ihnen Erlösung, Diess allein lehrte ich sie Erlösung heissen. – –'

¹³⁵ Stambaugh, J. (1985), 137.

¹³⁶ Magnus, too, associates willing backwards in this context with *amor fati*: Magnus, B. (1978), 150: 'The transformation of "it was" into a "thus I willed it" constitutes freedom from the spirit of evasion. His point, once again, is that our fate ought to be embraced with love; *amor fati*. [...] My present and future are not sealed until I choose. Then, and then alone, does my present and my future become a "fated" past. But to the extent that I "freely" will my being now and in the future, I also "freely" willed my past, "thus I willed it!" And the recognition that we are the authors of our past is to bring to the individual the simultaneous awareness of his responsibility for the present and future.'

not even certain what it would *mean*, to will backwards'.¹³⁷ At the same time, there are passages in *Z* that describe an experience of time that transcends the rational categories of forwards and backwards. One of those is *Vom Gesicht und Räthsel*, in which a complicated account of time is given:

wenn Alles schon da gewesen ist: was hältst du Zwerg von diesem Augenblick? Muss aber dieser Thorweg nicht schon – dagewiesen sein? Und sind nicht solchermaassen fest alle Dinge verknottet, dass dieser Augenblick *alle* kommenden Dinge nach sich zieht? *Also* – – sich selber noch?¹³⁸

This idea of a circular image of time, in which every moment contains all others at the same time, denotes not only how time may be put upside down (or willed in reversed order), but also how *amor fati*, if it can be situated in this context, can no longer be seen as containing a strict division between object and subject; both are two sides of one coin now.

Was geschah mir: Horch! Flog die Zeit wohl davon? Falle ich nicht? Fiel ich nicht – horch! In den Brunnen der Ewigkeit?¹³⁹

After awaking from what may be called 'some sort of experience of eternity'¹⁴⁰, Zarathustra says:

„Oh Himmel über mich, sprach er seufzend und setzte sich aufrecht, du schaust mir zu? Du horchst meiner wunderlichen Seele zu? Wann trinkst du diesen Tropfen Thau's, der auf alle Erden-Dinge niederfiel, – wann trinkst du diese wunderliche Seele – – wann, Brunnen der Ewigkeit! Du heiterer schauerlicher Mittags-Abgrund! Wenn trinkst du meine Seele in sich zurück?“¹⁴¹

The questions in this passage equate the soul to the 'drop of dew which has fallen upon all earthly things' and ask the heaven above 'when will you, heaven, abyss of noon, well of eternity, drink my soul back into you?'. The soul apparently used to be part of the heaven and is only temporarily (if this word still can be used) separated from that to which it will soon return. The relation with *amor fati* is explained as follows by Stambaugh: "The soul not only loves fate; the soul is fate. [...] [Which] is not tantamount to saying flatly soul equates fate, soul is the same thing as fate; but soul lives out fate, soul is the living occurrence of fate. This identity also characterised what Spinoza was talking about when he said that "The intellectual love of the mind toward God is the very love with which He loves himself."¹⁴²

What we find here, therefore, is the appearance of a form of *unio mystica*, resembling the 'Cosmic Stoicism' we discussed earlier. Even if we should wary of not accepting the presence of a traditional (transcendent) account of religion, it is clear that a religious element is present.

¹³⁷ Stambaugh, J. (1985), 137.

¹³⁸ *Z* III Räthsel 4.200.

¹³⁹ *Z* IV Mittags 4.344.

¹⁴⁰ Stambaugh, J. (1985), 140.

¹⁴¹ *Z* IV Mittags 4.344-5.

¹⁴² Stambaugh, J. (1985), 141. Spinoza, *Ethics*, V, prop. XXXVI. This love in Spinoza's texts is called *amor dei intellectualis*. Michel Haar formulates the same point slightly differently: Haar, M. (1996), 128: '*amor fati* is nothing but the echo of the love – both jubilant and rational – that Being has for itself.'

To conclude the section on *Z I* will quote from *Das Nachtwandler-Lied* 10, in which it is even more apparent how every moment is entangled with all other moments, making the world into a web full of loving connections (even if they also include pain), of which our souls are merely a part, being at the same time subject and object of cosmic love.

Eben ward meine Welt vollkommen, Mitternacht ist auch Mittag, – Schmerz ist auch eine Lust, Fluch ist auch ein Segen, Nacht ist auch eine Sonne, – geht davon oder ihr lernt: ein Weiser ist auch ein Narr. Sagtet ihr jemals *Ja* zu Einer Lust? Oh, meine Freunde, so sagtet ihr *Ja* auch zu *allem* Wehe. Alle Dinge sind verkettet, verfädelt, verliebt, – – wolltet ihr jemals Ein Mal Zwei Mal, spracht ihr jemals „du gefällst mir, Glück! Husch! Augenblick!“ so wolltet ihr *Alles* zurück! – Alles von neuem, Alles ewig, Alles verkettet, verfädelt, verliebt, oh so *liebtet* ihr die Welt, – – ihr Ewigen, liebt sie ewig und allezeit: und auch zum Weh sprecht ihr: vergeh, aber komm zurück! *Denn alle Lust will – Ewigkeit!*¹⁴³

We may conclude from the *Nachlass* passage of *amor fati* written in 1884 (*NL* 25[500]) that, even if *Z* does not contain any explicit references to this concept, the thought of it is present in this book.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the concept seems changed in comparison to 1881/2. It has received a more religious connotation, explicitly connected with a mysterious account of time (i.e. the eternal return, or the eternal becoming, whereby all moments contain those of the entire history), the will to power, and the innocence of creation (related to the future ideal of the sage or the *Übermensch*). Whereas we dismissed the possibility of *amor fati* as *unio mystica* earlier, the above passage reveals the aspiration to occupy a radically immanent standpoint in the relation between things. Instead, the difficulties explicitly related to *amor fati* we encountered previously, regarding maddening ‘Furien’ and a ‘schreckliche Herkunft’, are absent.

What is more, *Z* reveals that fate does not exclude creativity or productivity. This is compatible with an understanding of *amor fati* being self-referential: the genitive of *fati* could be seen as referring to the subject (in addition to the traditional account of ‘*fati*’ as being a genitive objective). Fate understood as one’s creative ‘will’ or ‘soul’ being the source of love emphasises Nietzsche’s understanding of the cosmos as an immanent given in which everything is connected, including all moments of time (‘Und sind nicht solchermaassen fest alle Dinge verknotet, dass dieser Augenblick *alle* kommenden Dinge nach sich zieht?’). Although it is impossible to change history, *Z* contains some suggestions that may point at *amor fati* containing a productive attitude to the past, mysteriously ‘willing back’ everything, thereby affirming all instances of time and cosmos including itself.

1.5 *AMOR FATI, DIONYSOS, AND NIHILISM*

The other elements left unexplained so far, the Dionysian and nihilism, appear for the first time explicitly connected to *amor fati* in the following *Nachlass* fragment of 1888.

¹⁴³ *Z IV* Nachtwandler-Lied 4.402.

¹⁴⁴ As is also claimed by Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 38.

6. *NL* 16[32] Eine solche Experimental-Philosophie, wie ich sie lebe, nimmt versuchsweise selbst die Möglichkeiten des grundsätzlichen Nihilismus vorweg: ohne daß damit gesagt wäre, daß sie bei einem Nein, bei einer Negation, bei einem Willen zum Nein stehen bliebe. Sie will vielmehr bis zum Umgekehrten hindurch — bis zu einem *dionysischen Jasagen* zur Welt, wie sie ist, ohne Abzug, Ausnahme und Auswahl — sie will den ewigen Kreislauf, — dieselben Dinge, dieselbe Logik und Unlogik der Knoten. Höchster Zustand, den ein Philosoph erreichen kann: dionysisch zum Dasein stehn –: meine Formel dafür ist *amor fati*... — Hierzu gehört, die bisher verneinten Seiten des Daseins nicht nur als nothwendig zu begreifen, sondern als wünschenswerth: und nicht nur als wünschenswerth in Hinsicht auf die bisher bejahten Seiten (etwa als deren Complementary oder Vorbedingungen), sondern um ihrer selber willen, als der mächtigeren, fruchtbareren, wahren Seiten des Daseins, in denen sich sein Wille deutlicher ausspricht.¹⁴⁵

Amor fati is presented in this passages as a 'formula', namely that of a 'Zustand' that relates in a certain way to 'Dasein'. This Dionysian state is the highest possible for a philosopher. In order to attain it one should adopt an experimental kind of philosophy (an 'Experimental-Philosophie'), one that anticipates the possibilities for nihilism, but that refuses to negate only. It rather wants to attain a 'Dionysian affirmation' of the world, an affirmation so radical that it can truly wish for the 'bisher verneinten Seiten des Daseins' (as already indicated in 1.2.3). The 'ewigen Kreislauf' indicates that the thought of the eternal return is implied in its most extreme form, whereby everything without exception ('dieselben Dinge, dieselbe Logik und Unlogik der Knoten') is willingly affirmed within the same structure and in exactly the way it appears.¹⁴⁶

What is new in this passage is also the reference to nihilism (a term first introduced in the published works in *JGB* and used most frequently in the years 1885-1888¹⁴⁷). We may understand it here as the insight that the world lacks the elements that we would traditionally need in order to affirm it: beauty, order, purpose, meaning, etc. (i.e. the 'anthropomorphisms' referred to in *FW* 109). Dionysian affirmation, i.e., *amor fati*, wants to submit itself to negation, to remain open to this absence – but only so that *through* this process full affirmation is reached. This brings us back to the 'Furien' and the 'schreckliche Herkunft': *amor fati* seems to demand something almost impossible, namely to reject and affirm at the same time.¹⁴⁸ In Yovel's words: 'It is essential to see that *amor fati*, with its celebrating assumption of immanence, runs counter to normal human psychology. Ordinary people, Nietzsche expects, will experience pure immanence as a yoke and an oppression; their natural response to it and to recurrence is pessimism and world-weariness, the depression of their vital powers – or the

¹⁴⁵ 13.492, spring/summer 1888.

¹⁴⁶ In the famous *Nachlass* passage on nihilism, the *Lenzer Heide* fragment of 1887, Nietzsche explicitly denotes the eternal return as the most extreme form of nihilism. *NL* 5[71] 12.213 '6. Denken wir diesen Gedanken in seiner furchtbarsten Form: das Dasein, so wie es ist, ohne Sinn und Ziel, aber unvermeidlich wiederkehrend, ohne ein Finale ins Nichts: „die ewige Wiederkehr“. Das ist die extremste Form des Nihilismus: das Nichts (das „Sinnlose“) ewig!

¹⁴⁷ Van Tongeren, P. (2012), 64-5.

¹⁴⁸ According to Thiele, L.P. (1991), it should be understood as a paradox, 93: 'We are confronted with a paradox. The lover negates and affirms.'

various forms of escape and self-deception current in religion and traditional philosophy (Spinoza not excepted). It takes a powerful act of defiant affirmation, a supreme “nevertheless,” to transform the oppression of immanence into its opposite, joy and celebrating power; and this requires a new and rare kind of psychology, the one which constitutes and expresses the *Übermensch*.¹⁴⁹

The “nevertheless” Yovel mentions, and the ‘new and rare kind of psychology’, must be understood in relation with what we saw in the *Nachlass* of 1884: ‘Bejahen und Gutheißßen aus einem überströmenden Gefühle von gestaltender Macht’; several texts in *Z* and also in *FW V* stress the importance of a wealth of inner (creative and fertile) forces that make possible this counter-intuitive affirmation.¹⁵⁰ This Dionysian ‘tour-de-force’ is furthermore related to the tragic. The aesthetic affirmation of pessimism developed already in *GT* now seems to reach its fullest meaning and significance. In this context the final few pages of *Göttzen-Dämmerung* (*GD*; written in 1888) are worth looking at. Its final page is a full citation of the text quoted before in *Z*'s *Von alten und neuen Tafeln* (‘wollt ihr nicht Schicksale sein und Unerbittliche: wie könntet ihr mit mir – siegen? Und wenn eure Härte nicht blitzen und scheiden und zerschneiden will: wie könntet ihr einst mit mir – schaffen?’), and the preceding pages are a homage to what Nietzsche owes the ancients (‘Was ich den Alten verdanke’).

GD Alten 4 Ich war der erste, der, zum Verständniss des älteren, des noch reichen und selbst überströmenden hellenischen Instinkts, jenes wundervolle Phänomen ernst nahm, das den Namen des Dionysos trägt: es ist einzig erklärbar als einem *Zuviel* von Kraft. [...] Denn erst in den dionysischen Mysterien, in der Psychologie des dionysischen Zustands spricht sich die *Grundthatsache* des hellenischen Instinkts aus – sein „Wille zum Leben“. Was verbürgte sich der Hellene mit diesen Mysterien? Das ewige Leben, die ewige Wiederkehr des Lebens; die Zukunft in der Vergangenheit verheissen und geweiht; das triumphirende Ja zum Leben über Tod und Wandel hinaus; das *wahre* Leben als das Gesamt-Fortleben durch die Zeugung, durch die Mysterien der Geschlechtlichkeit.¹⁵¹

This passage shows how Nietzsche regards himself as the first who fully came to understand the secret behind the phenomenon of the Greek god Dionysos: the ‘rich and even overflowing Hellenic instinct’, ‘a *too much* of power’. The Greeks possessed a ‘will to life’, one that was capable of achieving that which was described above as the difficult ‘*dionysischen Jasagen zur Welt*’, thereby affirming also the necessity of negation, ‘das triumphirende Ja zum Leben über Tod und Wandel hinaus’. What is more, this passage explains how the pain associated with

¹⁴⁹ Yovel, Y. (1989), 127. Similarly, Thiele, L.P. (1991), 101-2, writes: ‘The horror of a meaningless life first must be embraced before the innocence of a Nietzschean morality is attained. The rapture of *amor fati* is derivative of a nihilistic terror which never ceases to haunt and there are few, Nietzsche insisted, that are strong enough to transform suffering into joy, terror into rapture, and anxious uncertainty into wonder.’ Reginster, B. (2006), Nishigami, K. (1993), and Van Tongeren, P. (2012), 148-9 all emphasise the challenge of *amor fati* in the light of nihilism.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *FW* 370.3.620: ‘Der Reichste an Lebensfülle, der dionysische Gott und Mensch, kann sich nicht nur den Anblick des Fürchterlichen und Fragwürdigen gönnen, sondern selbst die fürchterliche That und jeden Luxus von Zerstörung, Zersetzung, Verneinung; bei ihm erscheint das Böse, Unsinnige und Hässliche gleichsam erlaubt, in Folge eines Ueberschusses von zeugenden, befruchtenden Kräften, welcher aus jeder Wüste noch ein üppiges Fruchthland zu schaffen im Stande ist.’

¹⁵¹ 6.158-9.

destruction and death was understood to be sacred by the Greeks: the Dionysian mysteries were part of a celebration of procreation. Suffering was celebrated as lying at the very heart of life itself: every future life *must* bring with it an amount of pain, not only because of the pains of labour, but also because all new life implies the death of something old.¹⁵² This Dionysian 'deepest instinct of life' is experienced as religious,¹⁵³ the tragic aspect of which deserves to be emphasised, so it seems: it receives extra weight as the penultimate section of *GD*, but moreover because it is taken up once again in Nietzsche's reflection on *GT* in *EH*.

EH (GT) 3 „[...] die ewige Lust des Werdens *selbst zu sein*, jene Lust, die auch noch die *Lust am Vernichten* in sich schliesst ...“ In diesem Sinne habe ich das Recht, mich selber als den ersten *tragischen Philosophen* zu verstehn [...]. Die Bejahung des Vergehens und *Vernichtens*, das Entscheidende in einer dionysischen Philosophie, das Ja-sagen zu Gegensatz und Krieg, das *Werden*¹⁵⁴

In conclusion we can say that the passage on *amor fati* of 1888 stresses its relation with tragedy and in an even stronger way with religion, even if the '*unio mystica*' seems to be less important here. The affirmation of the painful elements of the world, even of destruction, is seen as sacred in its celebration of the mystery of life's fertility and the creation of all new life. *Amor fati* in this context cannot be seen in separation from Dionysos therefore, nor from the eternal return, nihilism, and the tragic and creative affirmation of a world of emptiness and mere becoming; an affirmation reached only if one's psychology is strong, (pluralistically) rich and creative enough to affirm the negative, the painful, i.e. the necessity of death and destruction, in order to give birth.

1.6 AMOR FATI IN 1888

1888 is the year in which five of the ten *amor fati* passages can be found. Apart from the one discussed above there are four, three of which appear in published works. Two of these can be found in *EH*, the other in *Nietzsche contra Wagner* (*NW*). One from *EH* is often quoted; not only because it explicitly relates *amor fati* to 'greatness' (providing therefore an argument for those who claim that *amor fati* is either therapeutic, leading to greatness, or else the greatness itself, which makes it the effect of therapy), but also because it contrasts love to other possible attitudes towards fate, thereby illuminating again what the attitude of love requires.

7. *EH* klug 10 Meine Formel für die Grösse am Menschen ist *amor fati*: dass man Nichts anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht.

¹⁵² Stambaugh, J. (1985), 136: 'To live in a Dionysian relation to existence means to affirm the elements of creation and destruction as inherent in eternal recurrence.'

¹⁵³ Another argument for regarding the Dionysian as a religion (and a fatalistic one moreover) can be found in *GD Streifzüge* 49. 'Ein solcher *freigewordner* Geist steht mit einem freudigen und vertrauenden Fatalismus mitten im All, im *Glauben*, dass nur das Einzelne verwerflich ist, dass im Ganzen sich Alles erlöst und bejaht – *er verneint nicht mehr*... Aber ein solcher Glaube ist der höchste aller möglichen Glauben: ich habe ihn auf den Namen des *Dionysos* getauft.' 6.152.

¹⁵⁴ 6.312-3. Nietzsche associates this position with Heraclitus. Nietzsche's view on Heraclitus is considered in more detail in 2.3.

Das Nothwendige nicht bloss ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen – aller Idealismus ist Verlogenheit vor dem Nothwendigen –, sondern es *lieben*...¹⁵⁵

According to Han-Pile, opposing love to 'ertragen' ('merely bear') is an explicit reference to the Stoics, as 'the Stoic option involves the rejection of all emotions towards fate', reminding us of Ure's positon.¹⁵⁶ The opposition between loving and 'merely bear[ing]' fate is repeated, moreover, in the passage of *NW*: 'man soll es nicht nur tragen, man soll es *lieben*... *Amor fati*', providing an even stronger argument against love as merely passive resignation. Connecting this with the Dionysian attitude described in the previous section, we may arrive at an analysis of love in the passages of 1888 as a creative (and thus 'active', although not in the sense of 'choosing'¹⁵⁷) desire, different from the 'medio-passive' or agapic account argued for by Han-Pile. Although she is right that an 'erotic' interpretation is implausible because of the unattractiveness of the desired object, her account still seems to be mistaken insofar as it interprets love as a kind of divine gift, associated with 'grace'. The other *Nachlass* passage of 1888 explicitly associates the love of *amor fati* with 'willing': 'Ich will Nichts anders, auch rückwärts nicht, – ich *durfte* nichts anders wollen... *Amor fati*...'. This association between love and will indeed suggests a very active state ('Zustand'), grounded in desires rather than received in a passive, contemplative state of acceptance.¹⁵⁸

Han-Pile moreover associates the other option, 'verhehlen' (to 'conceal') with Leibniz.¹⁵⁹ This reference to idealism is interesting, as it forms a contrast to the first occurrences of *amor fati* as well (especially *NL* 15[19] and 15[20]). Whereas these allowed for and even encouraged the adoption of an ideal, this aphorism rejects ideals as 'Verlogenheit vor dem Nothwendigen'. This also seems to imply a different notion of love, one that takes more seriously the radically immanent implications of the eternal return in comparison to the first occurrences of *amor fati*. But it may fit the Dionysian affirmation of immanence described above, as that, too, excludes any 'beyond' or 'Verlogenheit'.

¹⁵⁵ 6.297.

¹⁵⁶ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 6.

¹⁵⁷ In this context it might be interesting to refer to the passage in *EH (Z)* 3 on 'inspiration': 'Hat Jemand, Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, einen deutlichen Begriff davon, was Dichter starker Zeitalter *Inspiration* nannten? [...] Mit dem geringsten Rest von Aberglauben in sich würde man in der That die Vorstellung, bloss Incarnation, bloss Mundstück, bloss medium übermächtiger Gewalten zu sein, kaum abzuweisen wissen. [...] Man hört, man sucht nicht; man nimmt, man fragt nicht, wer da giebt; wie ein Blitz leuchtet ein Gedanke auf, mit Nothwendigkeit, in der Form ohne Zögern, – ich habe nie eine Wahl gehabt. [...] Dies ist *meine* Erfahrung von Inspiration'.

¹⁵⁸ In opposition thus to Löwith, K. (1997), who sees *amor fati* as a state of 'will-lessness'. Several authors disagree with him; Reginster, B. (2006), 208-9: 'Löwith's interpretation of *amor fati* in terms of a kind of will-lessness does not sit well with Nietzsche's own characterizations of it. [...] [R]esignation certainly does not amount to the "love" in terms of which Nietzsche describes the affirmation of life'. Also Han-Pile, B. (2009), 24-5 ft. 1: 'Löwith does understand *amor fati* as a state, but one which is 'no longer a willing but a condition in which the will no longer wills anything' (Löwith 1997: 79-80). Yet to describe *amor fati* as a form of 'will-lessness' is far too Schopenhauerian and misses the point of Nietzsche's criticism of resignation entirely'.

¹⁵⁹ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 6: "still less conceal it" [...] is most likely the Leibnizean strategy sketched out above, which fallaciously minimises the reality of suffering'. 5, referring to the task of re-evaluating fate: 'Leibniz claims that on the whole our world is the best possible and offers various forms of reduction to deny or at least diminish the negativity of perceived evils.' She refers to *Theodicy* (1990) §20-30.

In discussing this *EH* passage Han-Pile also raises the question of therapy, albeit indirectly. On the 'status of these infinitives' ('ertragen', 'verhehlen', '*lieben*') she writes: 'they can be read either as prescriptive, laying out a programme, or descriptive, expanding on the content of *amor fati*.¹⁶⁰ Han-Pile's remark rightly suggests that we could read the infinitives as merely elaborating on how a 'great man' deals with necessity, excluding any reference to therapy or morality. This interpretation seems to be most in line, moreover, with all other *amor fati* passages of this year, as they all seem to describe Nietzsche's own situation more than providing the readers with pieces of advice.¹⁶¹ The *Nachlass* passage discussed in the previous section presents *amor fati* as a 'state' ('Zustand'), a certain way of relating to existence ('dionysisch zum Dasein stehn'), but does not say anything about how to achieve this state nor that we should do so. The opening sentence of the passage introduces the relevant philosophy as explicitly Nietzsche's ('Eine solche Experimental-Philosophie, wie ich sie lebe'). And to a great extent the same can be said about the other passages. Strikingly, two of the remaining three passages refer to *amor fati* as Nietzsche's 'most inner nature' ('innerste Natur'). Both of these are written in a significantly biographical tone. The first appears in *EH*, in a reflection on *Der Fall Wagner* (written also in 1888) (though in the passage quoted the reflection is on *Z*), the second is part of the Epilog of *Nietzsche Contra Wagner (NW)*, written after *EH*.

8. *EH (WA) 4* Was gar meinen Zarathustra anbetrifft, wer von meinen Freunden hätte mehr darin gesehn als eine unerlaubte, zum Glück vollkommen gleichgültige Anmaassung?... Zehn Jahre: und Niemand in Deutschland hat sich eine Gewissensschuld daraus gemacht, meinen Namen gegen das absurde Stillschweigen zu vertheidigen, unter dem er vergraben lag: ein Ausländer, ein Däne war es, der zuerst dazu genug Feinheit des Instinkts *und Muth* hatte, der sich über meine angeblichen Freunde empörte... An welcher deutschen Universität wären heute Vorlesungen über meine Philosophie möglich, wie sie letztes Frühjahr der damit noch einmal mehr bewiesene Psycholog Dr. Georg Brandes in Kopenhagen gehalten hat? — Ich selber habe nie an Alledem gelitten; das *Nothwendige* verletzt mich nicht; *amor fati* ist meine innerste Natur. Dies schliesst aber nicht aus, dass ich die Ironie liebe, sogar die welthistorische Ironie.¹⁶²

Although Nietzsche denies having ever 'suffered' from being an invisible and unappreciated philosopher ('*necessity* does not offend me, *amor fati* is my most inner nature'), it seems difficult not to see the silence on *Z* as something that affected Nietzsche personally. This passage seems far from offering his readers a therapy; it rather denotes *amor fati* as characterising Nietzsche's most intimate nature. The same goes for the next passage from *NW*; Nietzsche reflects on the 'most difficult years of his life' and comes to the conclusion that his

¹⁶⁰ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 6.

¹⁶¹ Even if Domino, B. (2012) claims that the fact that Nietzsche fails to love fate implies that he cannot be this 'great man'; 289-90: '*Ecce Homo* chronicles Nietzsche's spectacular failure to love his fate.' 284-5: 'I argue that Nietzsche's chronic failure to love his own fate in *Ecce Homo* is strategic. Specifically, his self-reported inability to love his own fate forces readers to determine whether *amor fati* is an idea worth adopting on its own terms rather than on the basis of its pedigree.' This interpretation, thought-provoking as it is, does no justice, I believe, to the seriousness with which Nietzsche writes about *amor fati*, nor to the reference to himself as a 'fate' as I will discuss below.

¹⁶² 6.363.

'inner nature' has taught him to not only accept but love these years as part of a 'greater economy'.

9. *NW* Epilog 1 Ich habe mich oft gefragt, ob ich den schwersten Jahren meines Lebens nicht tiefer verpflichtet bin als irgend welchen anderen. So wie meine innerste Natur es mich lernt, ist alles Nothwendige, aus der Höhe gesehn und im Sinne einer grossen Ökonomie, auch das Nützliche an sich, – man soll es nicht nur tragen, man soll es lieben... *Amor fati*: das ist meine innerste Natur. —¹⁶³

The last (*Nachlass*) fragment also approaches *amor fati* not so much as a morality or therapy, but rather as the way in which history can be affirmed. Nietzsche sees the manifestation of himself made possible only by the awful incidents of the past: the Germans, in particular Bismarck, Kant, Luther, even Christianity (understood here as dangerous and seductive life-negation); all of these can be affirmed because they caused their opposite in a 'higher economics of culture' (even though the events should be affirmed in themselves, and not only, as we saw in the previous section, in the light of what they effectuated). Christianity has given birth to its opposite, the 'höchste Bejahung': Nietzsche.

10. *NL* 25[7] Ich wäre nicht möglich ohne eine Gegensatz-Art von Rasse, ohne Deutsche, ohne diese Deutschen, ohne Bismarck, ohne 1848, ohne „Freiheitskriege“, ohne Kant, ohne Luther selbst... Die großen Cultur-Verbrechen der Deutschen rechtfertigen sich in einer höheren Ökonomik der Cultur... Ich will Nichts anders, auch rückwärts nicht, – ich durfte nichts anders wollen... *Amor fati*... Selbst das Christenthum wird nothwendig: die höchste Form, die gefährlichste, die verführerischste im Nein zum Leben fordert erst seine höchste Bejahung heraus – mich...¹⁶⁴

Yet even though all passages seem to have Nietzsche himself as the common denominator, suggesting a descriptive, non-prescriptive reading of *amor fati*, we should keep in mind the sentence we encountered previously: 'Aber lassen wir Herrn Nietzsche: was geht es uns an, dass Herr Nietzsche wieder gesund wurde?'¹⁶⁵ More is at stake than Nietzsche's biography. In the passages just quoted we can see how Nietzsche understands his work as part of world history. Perhaps most clearly in *NL* 25[7], of which the subsequent sentences relativise the last two thousand years to an extreme degree ('Was sind zuletzt diese zwei Jahrtausende? Unser lehrreichstes Experiment, eine Vivisektion am Leben selbst... Bloß zwei Jahrtausende!'). The Epilog of *NW*, too, regards necessity 'aus der Höhe gesehn und im Sinne einer grossen Ökonomie'; and *EH* (WA) 4 speaks about 'die welthistorische Ironie'. This last passage significantly finishes with an explicit statement regarding the impact of Nietzsche's philosophy for the future of humanity: 'Und dies in einem Augenblicke, wo eine unsägliche Verantwortlichkeit auf mir liegt [...]. Denn ich trage das Schicksal der Menschheit auf der Schulter.'¹⁶⁶ It is immediately followed by the title of the next Book: 'Warum ich ein Schicksal bin.'

¹⁶³ 6.436.

¹⁶⁴ 13.641.

¹⁶⁵ *FW* Vorrede 2 3.347.

¹⁶⁶ 6.364.

Amor fati is a description both of Nietzsche's 'most inner nature', one that dictates him to affirm the totality of history, and of a major historical event, namely that of affirmation, reached in the figure of Nietzsche. Again we may come to see 'fati' both as an objective and subjective genitive. If we understand it as object, we can see how *amor fati* denotes Nietzsche's affirmation of history, understood as a 'higher economy' in which the negative is intimately related to and brings about the positive. Fate as subject denotes Nietzsche himself; in that case the affirmative love is the outcome of a fated nature (Nietzsche). This second interpretation of *amor fati* brings us back to the notion of immanence, as the love of fate must be seen as an inevitable and historical necessity, embodied by Nietzsche but without him having had any 'choice'. The idea that *amor fati* might encompass both these possibilities at the same time can be argued for on the basis of the following *Nachlass* passage written as early as spring 1884.

NL 25[158] Dieselbe Ehrfurcht, die er, rückwärts schauend, dem ganzen Schicksal weiht, hat er sich selber *mit* zu weihen. **Ego fatum.**¹⁶⁷

Nietzsche's approach to himself as a fate, or part of fate, is not new. Already in 1879, in *Der Wanderer und sein Schatten* (WS) he rejects what he calls 'Turkish fatalism', a kind of fatalism that sees human beings as separated from fate.

WS 61 *Türkenfatalismus*. – Der Türkenfatalismus hat den Grundfehler, dass er den Menschen und das Fatum als zwei geschiedene Dinge einander gegenüberstellt [...]. In Wahrheit ist jeder Mensch selber ein Stück Fatum; wenn er in der angegebenen Weise dem Fatum zu widerstreben meint, so vollzieht sich eben darin auch das Fatum; der Kampf ist eine Einbildung, aber ebenso jene Resignation in das Fatum; alle diese Einbildungen sind im Fatum eingeschlossen.¹⁶⁸

We should view the remarks we have encountered in *Z* in a similar way therefore: 'Du Schickung meiner Seele, die ich Schicksal heisse!¹⁶⁹' and 'mein schaffender Wille, mein Schicksal'.¹⁷⁰ In the *Nachlass* of 1883 we find a comparable statement: '„Ich bin für alles Kommende ein fatum!“¹⁷¹', and in *GD* we read: 'Der Einzelne ist ein Stück fatum, von Verne und von Hinten, ein Gesetz mehr, eine Nothwendigkeit mehr für Alles, was kommt und sein wird.'¹⁷² We may even see the motto of *EH* in this light: 'Wie man wird, was man ist'.

This last quotation, 'wie man wird was man ist' can be (and has been¹⁷³) interpreted as announcing a certain prescriptive program; yet, keeping the descriptive passages of *amor fati*

¹⁶⁷ 11.55. Ôkôchi, R. (1972), whose analysis of *amor fati* resembles this one, makes this same point using the following formulation, 85: 'Das das Fatum bejahende Ego ist zugleich Fatum.'

¹⁶⁸ 2.580.

¹⁶⁹ *Z* III Tafeln 4.268-9.

¹⁷⁰ *Z* II Inseln 4.110-1.

¹⁷¹ NL 16[64] 10.521.

¹⁷² *GD* Moral 6 6.87.

¹⁷³ Schatzki, T.R. (1994) for instance, who argues that Nietzsche's naturalism is at the heart of his philosophy. 157-8: 'At a [...] deeper level, living in accordance with nature prescribes an ideal of human perfectability. Perfect is the life most in accordance with the essence (*Wesen*) of life or nature [...]. Living in accordance with the essence of life is the deepest thought animating Nietzsche's ethics.' See also Babich, B. (2003).

in mind, we should be aware that it cannot be interpreted as a traditional kind of morality. We find in *GD* an example of the difference.

GD Moral 6 [...] Und wirklich, es gab consequente Moralisten, sie wollten den Menschen anders, nämlich tugendhaft, sie wollten ihn nach ihrem Bilde, nämlich als Mucker: dazu *verneinten* sie die Welt! Keine kleine Tollheit!¹⁷⁴

Rather, if we do wish to keep open a prescriptive interpretation of *amor fati* and the *EH* motto 'wie man wird was man ist', we should remind ourselves of the project that may be referred to as 'naturalism', a program referred to already in *FW* 109: 'Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernatürlichen!¹⁷⁵ The formulation of *amor fati* as 'meine innerste Natur' may well be read in this way. If we want to see *amor fati* as containing some advice, or providing a kind of example, it will be one that goes beyond the difference between prescriptive and descriptive. In Armstrong's words: it is all about 'being capable of transfiguring and even perfecting [...] nature, *precisely through* an understanding of natural necessity and an acceptance of its own nature as "a piece of fate".¹⁷⁶ Or, as Paul van Tongeren formulates it: 'if there is some form of religiosity in Nietzsche, it has to be situated at this point, where the moral distinction between what is and what should be has been left behind.'¹⁷⁷

In order to be complete, one last element needs to be added to this account. For although the naturalistic tendency of Nietzsche's later works suggests that we should 'become who we are', that is, accept and even love the way we are while excluding any wish to change, it is argued that this prescription entails, paradoxically as it may seem, a sense of 'self-overcoming' or 'self-transformation'.¹⁷⁸ The most striking example of this almost Buddhist attitude can be found in Book I of *Z*, '*Von drei Verwandlungen*', in which a transition is introduced from camel ('Was ist schwer? so fragt der tragsame Geist, so kniet er nieder, dem Kameele gleich, und will gut beladen sein') to lion ('Freiheit sich schaffen und ein heiliges Nein auch vor der Pflicht') to the yes-saying child – not to be understood as a prescriptive device, telling us that we should 'actively' attempt to achieve, but a mere description of what happens if one allows one's spirit to follow its own path.¹⁷⁹

Unschuld ist das Kind und Vergessen, ein Neubeginnen, ein Spiel, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, eine erste Bewegung, ein heiliges Ja-sagen.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁴ 6.87.

¹⁷⁵ 3.469.

¹⁷⁶ Armstrong, A. (2013), 7.

¹⁷⁷ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 299.

¹⁷⁸ Yovel, Y. (1989) detects a similarity between Spinoza and Nietzsche on this subject, 113-4: 'Each inspires his readers to seek a rare ethical achievement – *amor dei* in Spinoza, *amor fati* in Nietzsche [...]. The very notion of moral obligation (or moral duty) has no sense in a strictly immanent system, and must, in both Spinoza and Nietzsche, make way for *self-overcoming* as the key ethical concept. Ethical achievements must have nature as their sole source, substrate, and principle. A strict naturalism goes hand in hand in both Nietzsche and Spinoza with a powerful ethical project [...] Self-overcoming does not impose external constraints upon life and the emotions, but lets life reshape and sublimate itself.'

¹⁷⁹ It is referred to in Ôkôchi, R. (1972), an article dedicated to the parallels between *amor fati* and Buddhism, as well as in Van der Braak, A. (2011), 127, which reflects on the same theme.

¹⁸⁰ *Z* I *Verwandlungen* 4.31.

What can we conclude from these last passages of *amor fati*? Three main points. One: the stress on immanence we noticed from *Z* onwards is persistently present here as well. Yet unlike the religious *unio mystica* of *Z*, and unlike the Dionysian affirmation of an eternal return of nihilistic creation and destruction, the emphasis here has been on being part of history. Regarding himself as a 'Schicksal', Nietzsche takes himself and his affirmation to be a necessary event in the great economy of history, brought about by its negating forces (Christianity); the love that follows from this fated affirmation concerns the totality of history, and includes Nietzsche as a fate belonging to it.

Secondly, the *amor fati* of 1888 dismisses any kind of idealism. This, we have seen, is different from the earlier *amor fati* passages. In *Z* we still encountered the possibility of creatively striving for the ideal of 'the sage' or the *Übermensch*, a possibility that seems to be dismissed in 1888 in favour of the affirmation of radical and grim immanence, focusing more on the past than the future. Also the *Nachlass* passage of 1881 associates love with adopting an ideal, suggesting that the object of love – i.e. of the ideal – should be as specific as possible, excluding the possibility of loving *everything*. In 1888, instead, it is precisely a version of totality that is to be affirmed, for which no distortion is allowed, nor any phantasy of a 'beyond'. As a consequence, the assumption that love may have a distorting effect, due to its artistic and creative nature, seems no longer to be an issue of importance in 1888.

Thirdly, we have explored the extent to which we can see the *amor fati* passages of 1888 as signifying a kind of therapy. We can conclude once again that it is implausible that Nietzsche ever intended *amor fati* as a kind of moral program, a set of rules of behaviour to adopt in order to attain the 'greatness' referred to in *EH*. This does not eliminate the possibility on the other hand that there is a hidden 'ethical' agenda to be detected, one that can be referred to in terms of 'naturalism'. This program then recommends that we no longer approach ourselves from the perspective of certain moral expectations that do no justice to the 'piece of fate' we are; rather, we should 'become who we are' and allow our fate to develop along its very own laws.¹⁸¹

1.7 CONCLUSION

The examination of the relevant passages containing the expression *amor fati* has offered us an overview, which now allows us to reach some preliminary conclusions concerning the differences between the early and late occurrences. Whereas *FW* 276 presents *amor fati* in a carefully tentative, even hesitant way, wishing for it as something that *may* be attained some day in the future ('Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen: — so werde ich Einer von Denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen. Amor fati: das sei von nun an meine Liebe!'; 'Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!'¹⁸²); the last few passages seem to imply that what Nietzsche wished for in 1882 became reality in 1888. Not only did Nietzsche successfully accomplish the

¹⁸¹ Admittedly, 'to allow' would be the wrong word, since it still betrays the presence of the 'old' morality of choice and self-mastery. Our language seems unfit to express what is going on.

¹⁸² 3.521.

affirmation of 'fate' ('das ist meine innerste Natur'), that is, the immanent and nihilistic history and future of the eternal return; it has been, moreover, his self-asserted fate to be himself the event of affirmation after a relatively long history ('Was sind zuletzt diese zwei Jahrtausende?') of negation.

Secondly, we have seen that the element of immanence becomes ever more prominent from Z onwards. The idea that *amor fati* is a religious concept gains credibility from Z onwards after being deemed implausible for the passages of 1881 and 1882, including the letter to Franz Overbeck in which *amor fati* is denoted a 'Gott-Ergebenheit'. But it takes different forms. In Z it is related to the experience of time, whereby the idea that each moment contains the entire history and future of the universe (a radical version of the eternal return of the same) is presented as a kind of 'mystical experience of eternity'. We are all part of a world in which everything is 'verkettet, verfädelt, verliebt', making possible an interpretation of *amor fati* in which the objective genitive of 'fati' can be seen as a subjective genitive at the same time. The idea that we merely exist as small elements of a much greater play of forces ('wills to power') was related then to the phenomena of '*unio mystica*' and 'Cosmic Stoicism', denoting the experience of the absence of boundaries between oneself and the cosmos/God. In the passages of 1888, the God Dionysos enters the stage, announcing a kind of religion that celebrates the sacredness of all birth. Only the acknowledgement of and full concurrence with the fact that with every birth comes pain and destruction can help us adopt an affirmative, Dionysian, creative attitude in the face of nihilism. The other passages of 1888, finally, introduce a kind of immanence interwoven with the fatality of history and nature. Being a fated part of both of them means on the one hand that no 'ought' can be deduced; on the other hand it also contains the paradoxical task to 'become who we are' and so turn into the innocent child of 'sanctified yes-saying'.

It follows from these observations that the *amor fati* of Z and afterwards may be more mystical, but less mysterious at the same time. The questions concerning the meaning of *amor fati* posed at the beginning of this chapter could be answered to a great extent if they were addressed to the later passages. We know what is loved (the eternal return, fated nature and history, destruction and creation, and especially immanence, which includes ourselves in the fate to be loved); we know what love is (full affirmation, grounded in our inner drives and desires), we know that it can be understood as a moral 'therapy' only in the minimal sense of returning our attention to the fated beings we are. Yet, even though all these answers raise many further questions, the earlier texts remain more problematic and obscure in comparison. The reference to ideals there and the warning not to choose totality as the object of love seem to point to a completely different, less inclusive, object to be loved. The love of oneself was discussed in section 1.2.4, but not in the sense of it being a radically immanent *fatum* as it appears to be in 1888. The exact identification of *amor's* object remains ambiguous therefore. Also, the reference to 'Wegsehen' in *FW* 276 forms a great contrast to what we read in *EH*: 'Das Nothwendige nicht [...] verhehlen – aller Idealismus ist Verlogenheit vor dem Nothwendigen'. If the texts of 1881 require selection, what does this entail? And finally, whereas the love of the later *amor fati* passages seems to unequivocally denote full affirmation, this too appears to be different in 1881 and 1882, as love is associated with aesthetic distortion there. This problematic association seems to have disappeared later on.

Pointing out these differences is not to say that the *amor fati* of the later years is of less interest, nor that it is more easily attained. But it is of interest for our purposes regarding the influence of Stoicism. For if *amor fati* is a Stoic idea from the start, would this not require that it should be the early version rather than the later that resembles Stoicism? How are we to explain that the idea of 'Cosmic Stoicism' fits the later occurrences better? Also: if the first occurrences of *amor fati* are influenced by Stoicism, could an investigation of Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism help us to develop a more cohesive account of it, avoiding an interpretation that anachronistically refers to the later texts? In short: could a study that is similar to Ure's help us come to a more refined analysis of the *amor fati* of 1881 and 1882? In order to answer these questions, I propose to examine Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism (chapters 2-4) and then focus the results of this study on the first occurrences of *amor fati* in the early 1880's (chapter 5).

Chapter 2: AMOR FATI AND STOICISM 1: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Now that an account has been given of the chronological complexities of *amor fati*, my focus turns to the possibility of a Stoic influence. Whereas several characteristics discussed in chapter 1 have turned out to be strikingly suitable for a comparison with Stoicism on a conceptual level (mainly those taken from the passages of 1884 and later), the question I wish to answer in this thesis is historical: was Nietzsche inspired by the Stoics when he introduced the concept of *amor fati*?

After listing and explaining the possible parallels between *amor fati* and Stoicism, pointed out by several commentators, I will nuance to a great extent their historical accuracy. Some were of no concern to Nietzsche himself (as his 19th Century approach to Stoicism differs from theirs); the idea that there is a kind of ‘Cosmic Stoicism’ in Nietzsche’s *amor fati* (Sellars) being one of them. Others must be nuanced due to Nietzsche’s own remarks (for instance in relation to the eternal return), or because of Nietzsche’s critique. In this regard it is necessary to look closely at the possibility of a Stoic influence on Nietzsche’s naturalism (Nabais, Schatzki). Nietzsche’s rejection of that position, particularly in *JGB* 9, will be examined in close detail.

Stoic philosophy is traditionally subdivided in three domains: logic, ethics, and physics. Their relation is most clearly elaborated in Diogenes Laertius’ third century book *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, a collection of the lives and opinions of well-known philosophers of that age: ‘Philosophy, they say [i.e. the Stoics], is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics.’¹⁸³ The three domains form a unified whole, which makes it difficult to focus on one domain without taking the others in consideration. ‘No single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together. Nor was it usual to teach them separately.’¹⁸⁴

Diogenes Laertius’ book was well-known to Nietzsche. In 1869 and 1870 he published three essays on Book VII, which presents an overview of Stoic figures and doctrines. These essays turned out to be of great importance for Nietzsche’s career: it won him an important prize which led to a full professorship in classical philology in Basel, without having written a

¹⁸³ Diogenes Laertius (1965), *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* II, tr. Hicks (hereafter *DL*), Book VII 40. There are two more comparisons; philosophy is likened to a ‘fertile field’ and to a ‘city’.

¹⁸⁴ *DL* VII 40. See also Cicero, who has his expositor of Stoicism proclaim that the Stoic system is ‘so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one... [with] such close interconnection of the parts that if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure’ (*de Finibus* III, xxii.74). See Sellars, J. (2006b), 53.

doctoral thesis.¹⁸⁵ This section will examine the historical accuracy of similarities between the three Stoic domains and Nietzsche's philosophy, pointed out in the secondary literature. Since these concern mainly Stoic 'physics' and 'ethics' and their inter-relatedness, I will limit my investigation to these. I will start discussing 'physics', keeping in mind the Stoic vision of philosophy as an interconnected whole.

2.2 THE ETERNAL RETURN AS A PHYSICAL THEORY COMPARED TO STOICISM

There are several commentators who consider Nietzsche's study of Diogenes Laertius as an early sign of a growing interest in Stoicism, reappearing in one of the most strikingly Stoic physical doctrines in Nietzsche's texts: that of the eternal return. As we have seen, Brobjer maintains that 'Stoic philosophy may have been an important influence' on Nietzsche's philosophy, in particular with respect to the eternal recurrence and *amor fati*, 'which both have a close kinship with Stoic philosophy.'¹⁸⁶ One of Bernd Magnus' essays is entitled 'The Connection Between Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, Heraclitus and the Stoics'¹⁸⁷, implying at least that there is a connection. Nabais makes the nature of this connection explicit, claiming that Nietzsche's 'idea of the Eternal Recurrence gives new life to the Stoic cosmology'.¹⁸⁸ Groff's remark sums it up: 'The joyful affirmation of all generation and destruction, for its own sake, willed over and over again, eternally – what could be more Stoic than that?'¹⁸⁹

The previous chapter contained several references to the eternal return in connection with *amor fati*. We saw how the introduction of *amor fati* in *FW* 276 is often related to the thought of the eternal return as formulated by the demon in *FW* 341. *Amor fati* first appears in the *Nachlass* of 1881, and the thought of the eternal return 'came' to Nietzsche in that year as well.¹⁹⁰ We saw how the idea that everything in this world will return eternally and in identical circles was shaped in a slightly different way in *Z*, in which every moment is understood to contain the totality of history. The radical nihilism and immanence connected to this doctrine, associated with a Dionysian affirmation of all destruction and birth, was stressed furthermore in the *amor fati* passages of 1888. But no attention has been given yet to the exact nature or function of this doctrine. To what extent should we regard it as a 'physical' theory, perhaps even a 'cosmology', which serves Nietzsche as the basis for encouraging us to adopt a certain 'moral' attitude, namely that of affirmation?

¹⁸⁵ For more on Nietzsche and Diogenes Laertius, see Barnes, J. (1986).

¹⁸⁶ Brobjer, T. (2003), 429.

¹⁸⁷ Magnus, B. (1976).

¹⁸⁸ Nabais, N. (2006), 86.

¹⁸⁹ Groff, P.S. (2004), 159. Also in Long, A.A. (2006), of which chapter 13 offers an analysis of 'The Stoics on world-conflagration and everlasting recurrence', we find the suggestion of a non-coincidental parallel between the Stoics and Nietzsche, 282: 'Nietzsche's conception of the will to power is a far cry, in some respects, from the Stoic providential succession of worlds. Yet there are more than surface similarities between the philosophies. The language of *Zarathustra* has some striking affinities with Marcus Aurelius [...]. It could be [...] that Nietzsche detected the wider Stoic resonances of everlasting recurrence'.

¹⁹⁰ See for Nietzsche's own description of this moment *EH* (*Z*) 1 3.335, quoted below; the first references to the eternal return in the *Nachlass* can be found in 1881, from *NL* 11[141] 9.494 onward.

Diogenes Laertius discusses the cosmic cyclical proceedings in the context of physics.¹⁹¹ Yet Nietzsche's doctrine can and should not be taken as a physical theory, as I will argue, nuancing the possibility of a parallel between Nietzsche and the Stoics in this respect.¹⁹² For instance, when referring to the moment in which the doctrine first occurred to Nietzsche, in *EH*, the emphasis is on the importance of affirmation, not on its accuracy as a theory of the cosmos.

EH (Z) 1 Ich erzähle nunmehr die Geschichte des Zarathustra. Die Grundconception des Werks, der *Ewige-Wiederkunfts-Gedanke*, diese höchste Formel der Bejahung, die überhaupt erreicht werden kann –, gehört in den August des Jahres 1881: er ist auf ein Blatt hingeworfen, mit der Unterschrift: „6000 Fuss jenseits von Mensch und Zeit“. Ich gieng an jenem Tage am See von Silvaplana durch die Wälder; bei einem mächtigen pyramidal aufgethürmten Block unweit Surlei machte ich Halt. Da kam mir dieser Gedanke.¹⁹³

The 'grounding concept' of *Z*, the thought ('Gedanke') of the eternal return, is not just a doctrine related to affirmation – it is itself 'the highest possible formula of affirmation'. In Stambaugh's words, 'if Nietzsche's thought is anything at all, it is something which we must experience. Nietzsche's account of his discovery of the thought of eternal return emphasises the experiential character of that thought.'¹⁹⁴ The description of the doctrine as something 'experienced' is also communicated in *FW* 341, where the doctrine is first introduced in the published works. We noticed in chapter 1.2.1 that it is brought forward as the thought experiment of imagining a 'demon' 'stealing into your loneliest loneliness', who then examines your reaction after being informed that you would have to relive your life innumerable times. Only those who have 'experienced a tremendous moment', one in which an affirmative answer was possible, might achieve being so 'well disposed' to themselves and life to 'long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal'. Indeed, the doctrine of the eternal return already functions in *FW* 341 as a 'formula of affirmation'.

The weight of the thought, hinted at in the title of *FW* 341 ('das grösste Schwergewicht') can be traced back to the text which Nietzsche refers to in *EH*, namely its 'first design' ('Entwurf') in August 1881 in *NL* 11[141]. There the thought is formulated as a 'neue Schwergewicht', one that puts 'unendliche Wichtigkeit' on 'unser[es] Wissen[s], Irren[s], uns[e]re[r] Gewohnheiten, Lebensweisen für alles Kommende'.¹⁹⁵ 'Die Frage bei allem, was du thun willst: „ist es so, daß ich es unzählige Male thun will?“ ist das *größte* Schwergewicht.'¹⁹⁶ The future of humankind is at stake, it seems, a future that is deeply connected to the possibility of incorporating truth and knowing ('in summa **abwarten**, wie weit das *Wissen* und die *Wahrheit* sich **einverleiben**

¹⁹¹ See in particular *DL* VII 137 and 142.

¹⁹² This idea is confirmed by most contemporary work on the eternal return (the amount of which is too overwhelming to do justice to in this thesis). See, just to mention one, Domino, B. (2012), 290, who claims that 'most scholars today agree that eternal recurrence is not a descriptive claim', referring to Clark, M. (1990), 245-86; Loeb, P. (2006), 171-88; Nehamas, A. (1985); and Wicks, R. (2005).

¹⁹³ 6.335.

¹⁹⁴ Stambaugh, J. (1972), xii.

¹⁹⁵ *NL* 11[141] 9.494.

¹⁹⁶ *NL* 11[143] 9.496.

können – und in wiefern eine Umwandlung des Menschen eintritt, wenn er endlich nur noch lebt, um zu *erkennen*¹⁹⁷).

The idea that the importance of the thought of the eternal return lies in its *effect* on all – mainly epistemological – habits rather than its accuracy as a physical theory is expressed once more in a note a few pages after *NL* 11[141]. Here Nietzsche explicitly takes seriously the option that the doctrine might be ‘merely a probability or possibility’ without implying any loss of significance.

NL 11[203] Wenn die Kreis-Wiederholung auch nur eine Wahrscheinlichkeit oder Möglichkeit ist, auch der *Gedanke einer Möglichkeit* kann uns erschüttern und umgestalten¹⁹⁸

This is not to say that the doctrine has no physical connotation whatsoever. As Paul van Tongeren observes in *Reinterpreting Modern Culture*, Nietzsche, ‘immediately after his experience, did try for some time to prove the truth of the vision in terms of a theory of physics.’¹⁹⁹ But even though the *Nachlass* of 1881 shows, indeed, some ‘physical speculations’, they are not abundant, and none of them found their way into the published work.

Moreover, even treating the doctrine as a physical theory, in spite of these considerations, would reveal the enormous differences in comparison to Stoic ‘physics’.²⁰⁰ The Stoics claim that the cosmos is rationally inspired, whereby the actively shaping and rational element of the world (νοῦς) is God (θεός), Zeus, fate (εἰμαρμένη)²⁰¹, and providence (πρόνοια)²⁰², all at the same time, an immanent part of the cosmos that is its ‘active principle’ (τὸ ποιοῦν), also referred to as ‘Fire’ (πῦρ τεχνικόν) or ‘Breath’ (πνεῦμα).²⁰³ It is balanced by a second principle, ‘passive matter’ (τὸ πάσχον).²⁰⁴ As can be read in Book VII of Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives*, the cosmos is perceived by the Stoics as ‘God himself, the individual being whose quality is derived from the whole of substance; he is indestructible and ingenerable, being the artificer of this orderly arrangement, who at stated periods of time absorbs into himself the whole of substance and again creates it from himself.’²⁰⁵ In *MA* we find Nietzsche explicitly formulating

¹⁹⁷ *NL* 11[141] 9.495.

¹⁹⁸ 9.523.

¹⁹⁹ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 291. He refers to *NL* 11[148] 9.498, *NL* 11[152] 9.500, *NL* 11[245] 9.534-5, *NL* 11[292] 9.553-4, *NL* 11[213] 9.525, *NL* 11[202] 9.523, summarising: ‘in an infinite time every possible state of the world, conceived of as a world of forces that never reach an equilibrium, must have occurred already, and the present situation must be a return.’

²⁰⁰ Which I will do only to a very limited extent. As Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 292 points out, the obvious reference to the doctrine of ‘will to power’, which has been interpreted as Nietzsche’s very own ‘metaphysical’ cosmology, is very problematic, as ‘most of what he says about this will to power [...] sounded far more dynamic than the idea of an eternal return would allow for. Many scholars have therefore concluded that there is at least a tension, if not a contradiction, between these two catch terms of Nietzsche’s thinking.’ Van Tongeren refers to Löwith, K. (1997), and Müller-Lauter, W. (1971).

²⁰¹ *DL* VII 135: ‘God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names.’

²⁰² *DL* VII 138: ‘The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence’.

²⁰³ *DL* VII 156: ‘Nature in their view is an artistically working fire, going on its way to create; which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath.’

²⁰⁴ *DL* VII 134.

²⁰⁵ *DL* VII 137.

the modern impossibility of still endorsing this point of view in terms of a belief that has ‘ended’.

MA I 25 Seitdem der Glaube aufgehört hat, dass ein Gott die Schicksale der Welt im Grossen leite und, trotz aller anscheinenden Krümmungen im Pfade der Menschheit, sie doch herrlich hinausführe, müssen die Menschen selber sich ökumenische, die ganze Erde umspannende Ziele stellen.²⁰⁶

This passage already introduces the relation between physics and morality which will be discussed in more depth in sections 2.3 and 2.4. But first it is helpful to add to the negative statement that there is no longer a God that governs the fate of the world – ‘all the apparent twists and turns in its path notwithstanding’ – another often-cited aphorism, namely *FW 109*, introduced already in chapter 1.2.3. Several of the assumptions accepted in Stoicism are rejected here, uncovering them as mere ‘anthropomorphisms’.

FW 109 Hüten wir uns! – Hüten wir uns, zu denken, dass die Welt ein lebendiges Wesen sei. [...] Wir wissen ja ungefähr, was das Organische ist: und wir sollten das unsäglich Abgeleitete, Späte, Seltene, Zufällige, das wir nur auf der Kruste der Erde wahrnehmen, zum Wesentlichen, Allgemeinen, Ewigen umdeuten, wie es jene thun, die das All einen Organismus nennen? Davor eckelt mir.²⁰⁷

Nietzsche rejects the application of organismic features to the world as a whole; in this same line he emphasises how mistaken it would be to morally judge the world in any way: ‘wie dürften wir das All tadeln oder loben! Hüten wir uns, ihm Herzlosigkeit und Unvernunft oder deren Gegensätze nachzusagen’.²⁰⁸ Given the Stoic attribution of both reason and providence to the cosmos, we have here a clear and indisputable rejection of the main assumptions in Stoic physics, of which the eternal return forms a significant part.

Before discussing the relation between physics and morality in more detail, which forms an important point of comparison, I will first dismiss another possible connection between Nietzsche and the Stoics concerning the thought of the eternal return. For even if there is not much in common between their doctrines with respect to function and content, it may still be the case that Nietzsche was influenced by the Stoics in introducing this thought, even if indirectly or to a limited extent only. Nabais’ claim, that the ‘discovery’ of the eternal return ‘emerges from Nietzsche’s Stoic programme in the summer of 1881’²⁰⁹, might still contain some truth.

2.3 KNOWLEDGE OF STOICISM AS THE INSPIRATION FOR INTRODUCING THE ETERNAL RETURN

Concerning the question of Nietzsche’s knowledge of the Stoics we can be certain that he was familiar with the basic outlines of their philosophy. Not only had he studied Book VII of Diogenes Laertius, we also know that his library contained the main Stoic texts of Marcus

²⁰⁶ 2.46.

²⁰⁷ 3.467.

²⁰⁸ 3.468.

²⁰⁹ Nabais, N. (2006), 93.

Aurelius, Seneca and Epictetus (the Roman period being most prominently represented, therefore).²¹⁰ We know that Nietzsche read Epictetus' *Handbook* in 1880, and refers to him every now and then. There is no evidence that he ever read his *Discourses*²¹¹, but there are references in his late *Nachlass* (autumn 1887) to Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus' *Handbook*.²¹² Although he never devoted a full lecture to the Stoics while teaching in Basel, nor seemed to have a specific interest in them, he did dedicate one of the lectures in 1870-71 to Cicero's *Academica*, in which the ethics, physics and logic of Zeno of Citium (the founder of the Stoic School) is discussed.²¹³ From the 'Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen' we know that he covered, for instance, the distinction between φαντασία ('representations') and φαντασία καταληπτικά ('adequate' or 'cognitive' 'representations')²¹⁴ (i.e., Stoic logic²¹⁵), the association of happiness with virtue²¹⁶ (i.e. ethics), and the identification of nature as fire²¹⁷ (physics).

Nevertheless, there is almost no evidence that Nietzsche thought of the Stoics when referring to the doctrine of the eternal return. Only one textual fragment can be taken as an argument for a possible Stoic inspiration, but it is as late as 1888, in *EH*. We know from the previous section that in 1881, the year in which the doctrine was 'discovered', Nietzsche was dismissive of the main Stoic principles of physics (see *FW* 109). The section in *EH* in which Nietzsche reflects on *GT* was quoted already in chapter 1.5; after stressing the crucial element of tragedy in the Dionysian affirmation of all becoming, including all creation and destruction, Nietzsche continues:

EH (*GT*) 3 [...] Vor mir giebt es diese Umsetzung des Dionysischen in ein philosophisches Pathos nicht: es fehlt die *tragische Weisheit*, – ich habe vergebens nach

²¹⁰ See *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek* (2003), 377: Mark Aurel (1866), *Selbstgespräche. Uebersetzt und erläutert von C. Cleß*, containing many 'Lesespuren'; 547-50: 15 works by Seneca, 9 of which have 'Lesespuren', and 12 belong in the same series, *Werke*, übersetzt von J.M. Moser and August Pauly (1828-1832); 214: two versions of Epictet's *Handbook*: a German translation by Gottlieb Christian Karl Link (1783), and a French edition (1870) with 'Lesespuren': *Les maxims d'Épictète philosophe stoïcien. Traduites par Dacier, mises dans un nouvel ordre et précédées d'un coup d'oeil sur la Philosophie des Grecs par Hippolyte Tampusci*.

²¹¹ See Brobjer, T. (2003), 430.

²¹² *NL* 10[150] 12.539: 'als Folge einer besonderen Gunsterweisung Gottes, der zwischen Gut und Böse zu erwählen erlaubt: das Privilegium, kein Automat zu sein; „Freiheit“ auf die Gefahr hin, sich zu vergreifen, falsch zu wählen... z.B. bei Simplicius im Commentar zu Epictet'; see also *NL* 10[151] 12.541. *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek* (2003), 558-9, too, reveals the presence of Simplicius' commentary on Epictetus in Nietzsche's library, translated by K. Enk (1867). There is a significant number of 'Lesespuren' in this book.

²¹³ *KGW* II/3.59-98; *Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen 1870-71*.

²¹⁴ *KGW* II/3.82; Cicero, *Academica* I, xi. This distinction forms the foundation of Stoic epistemology and ethics, since according to Stoic theory assenting or not is all we have within our power; and assenting to 'φαντασία καταληπτικά' guarantees our happiness (preventing us from the unwise event of assenting to untrue impressions, which lead to unnecessary passions or are themselves passions). See Sellars, J. (2006b), 68-9.

²¹⁵ Long, A.A., Sedley, D.N. (1987), I, 188: 'The 'logical part' of Stoic philosophy covers a much wider spectrum of subjects than this term would embrace today. [...] Historically, however, there is nothing strange about the Stoics' procedure. In their usage logic is the study of everything to do with rational discourse (*logos*); and this includes the phonetic and semantic aspects of language, phraseology and stylistics, analysis of sentences and arguments, and also epistemology [...], since thought and judgement are modes of rational discourse'.

²¹⁶ *KGW* II/3.80; Cicero, *Academica* I, x.

²¹⁷ *KGW* II/3.81; Cicero, *Academica* I, xi.

Anzeichen davon selbst bei den *grossen* Griechen der Philosophie, denen der zwei Jahrhunderte vor Sokrates, gesucht. Ein Zweifel blieb mir zurück bei *Heraklit*, in dessen Nähe überhaupt mir wärmer, mir wohler zu Muthe wird als irgendwo sonst. [...] Die Lehre von der „ewigen Wiederkunft“, das heisst vom unbedingten und unendlich wiederholten Kreislauf aller Dinge – diese Lehre Zarathustra’s *könnte* zuletzt auch schon von Heraklit gelehrt worden sein. Zum Mindesten hat die Stoa, die fast alle ihre grundsätzlichen Vorstellungen von Heraklit geerbt hat, Spuren davon.²¹⁸

There are several arguments to nuance the idea that this passage indicates a Stoic influence on the adoption of the eternal return. To begin with, it is Heraclitus who is mentioned first and foremost, not the Stoics. As has been pointed out by several commentators, for instance Djurić and Magnus, the reason for mentioning the Stoics could be the absence of explicit references to a theory of eternal return in Heraclitus’ fragments.²¹⁹ Hershbell and Nimis nuance this statement by adding that it was not uncommon in the 19th Century to follow the traditional attribution of the main Stoic doctrines to Heraclitus. One of the arguments to accept this line of thought, even by some today²²⁰, is Cleanthes’ legacy; he wrote a commentary on Heraclitus in four books (no certain trace of which has been preserved), and his famous *Zeus Hymn* echoes Heraclitean phrases.²²¹ In reconstructing the relation between Heraclitus and Stoicism as developed in academic history, Long points out that in 1911 R.D. Hicks had drawn attention to exponents of two extreme positions: some scholars argued for a limited influence by Heraclitus on Stoicism (calling into question the suggestion that Heraclitus had a theory of eternal recurrence); others regarded Stoicism as a ‘diluted and distorted Heracliteanism’.²²² The second position, which can be traced back to Hegel²²³, is confirmed in Nietzsche’s remark that the Stoics inherited ‘fast alle ihre grundsätzlichen Vorstellungen von Heraklit’.

The debate on this question has undergone a change since the early 20th Century. Nietzsche, like most of his contemporaries, did recognise the presence of the doctrine of the ‘worldfire’ or

²¹⁸ 6.312-3.

²¹⁹ Djurić, M. (1979), 6: ‘Heraklit hat sich nirgends für die Reversibilität des Zeitverlaufs, oder genauer für die absolute Identität aller endlichen Zeitinhalte deutlich ausgesprochen (während Nietzsche darauf größten Wert legte)’; Magnus, B. (1976), 7: ‘It is true that Heraclitus *could* have taught such a doctrine, although he did not so explicitly. His commentators and Stoic heirs certainly thought that he had taught something like a doctrine of eternal recurrence. Diogenes Laertius, for example’. See *DL IX* (the book on Heraclitus) 8: ‘it is alternately born from fire and again resolved into fire in fixed cycles to all eternity, and this is determined by destiny.’

²²⁰ Kahn, C. (1979), 5: ‘The Stoics saw Heraclitus through the deforming lens of their own system, but that system was itself based upon a deep study of his written words.’

²²¹ *DL VII* 174; cf. *DL IX* 15. Kahn, C. (1979), 5: ‘the surviving sections of his famous *Hymn to Zeus* contain elaborate echoes of Heraclitean phrasing and imagery’. Long, A.A. (1996), *Stoic Studies*, ch. 2 ‘Heraclitus and Stoicism’, 55-7, elaborates further on the question whether Cleanthes was influenced by Heraclitus or perhaps just ‘helped to promote misinterpretation of Heraclitus by trying to associate him with Stoicism.’

²²² Long, A.A. (1996), ch. 2 ‘Heraclitus and Stoicism’, 36. Hicks’ examples for the two extremes according to Long are Siebeck, who minimised Heraclitus’ influence in 1873, and Lassalle who in 1858 exaggerated it. The latter position goes back to Hegel’s *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, which ‘presented Stoicism as an unoriginal philosophy, merely drawing out a creative insight from Cynicism [...] and refining it into a theoretical system, adding a dose of physics borrowed from Heraclitus.’ Sellars, J. (2006b), 150.

²²³ Hegel, G.W.F. (1996), *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie Teil 3: Griechische Philosophie II. Plato bis Proklos*.

conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις) and of absolute determinism (εἰμαρμένη) in Heraclitus' fragments²²⁴ (although the notes for his lectures on Heraclitus reveal his awareness of the uncertainty of ἐκπύρωσις²²⁵). It is not unlikely therefore that he suspected the presence of a doctrine of the eternal return as well.²²⁶ In more recent years the tendency has rather been to see Heraclitus' impact upon the early Stoics as relatively insignificant.²²⁷ Especially the presence of ἐκπύρωσις in Heraclitus' philosophy is now seen as a 'Stoicising interpretation', betraying the influence of the Stoics on the doxographical sources of Heraclitus.²²⁸

It may be suspected, though, that Nietzsche was aware of this philological difficulty; he never explicitly attributes the doctrine of the eternal recurrence to Heraclitus, neither in his Basel lectures nor in his early (1873-4) unpublished book *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* (PHG).²²⁹ As Hershbell and Nimis rightly observe, the reference in *EH* is 'the only connection Nietzsche made between Heraclitus and the eternal recurrence'.²³⁰ Being aware of the absence of an explicit reference to the eternal return in Heraclitus therefore ('diese Lehre [...] könnte zuletzt auch schon von Heraklit gelehrt worden sein'), Nietzsche must have judged it necessary to add the Stoics as the connection between Heraclitus and himself on this thought.²³¹

We know how important Heraclitus was for Nietzsche ('in dessen Nähe überhaupt mir wärmer, mir wohler zu Muthe wird als irgendwo sonst').²³² But if the doctrine of the eternal return is more justifiably traced back to the Stoics than to Heraclitus, why would Nietzsche

²²⁴Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 34, suggest that Nietzsche followed the Stoic tradition to regard the view of ἐκπύρωσις as originating in Heraclitus. The reference to 'Weltbrande' being part of Heraclitus' views in Nietzsche's *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter* 6.1.829 is, according to Hershbell and Nimis, based on DK (Diels-Kranz) 65, but has been refuted later, among others by Kirk, G.S. (1954), 335-8. See for Nietzsche's account of the notion of εἰμαρμένη in Heraclitus the Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen, *KGW* II/4.280: 'Sehr charakteristisch ist auch, daß H. eine Ethik, mit Imperativen, nicht kennt. Alles ist ja εἰμαρμένη, auch der einzelne Mensch.'

²²⁵ See Nietzsche's remark in the *Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen* of the 'vorplatonische Philosophen' (*KGW* II/4.275-6): 'die Weltzerstörung nennen die Stoiker ἐκπύρωσις, noch nicht Heraclit'.

²²⁶ Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 35: 'Nietzsche [...] infers a necessity in Heraclitus along the lines of the Stoics. [...] Since there is no explicit reference to the eternal recurrence in Heraclitus' extant fragments, Nietzsche probably noted the three connected doctrines in the Stoics (ἐκπύρωσις, εἰμαρμένη, and Eternal Recurrence), incorrectly saw two of these in Heraclitus and therefore suspected the third corollary doctrine.'

²²⁷ See Long, A.A. (1996), ch. 2 'Heraclitus and Stoicism' for a close analysis and assessment of the possible influences on Stoicism, especially on the complicated role of Theophrastus, whose Aristotelian interpretation of Heraclitus might have formed the basis for Cleanthes' knowledge of Heraclitus.

²²⁸ Long, A.A. (2006), 260 ff. 16. Kahn, C. (1979), 135, is one of the exceptions who still argues that 'after all, Theophrastus and the Stoics understood Heraclitus correctly on this point. [...] I believe that the recent denial of cosmogony for Heraclitus will turn out to be a temporary overreaction, an exaggerated by-product of our emancipation from the authority of the Stoic and doxographical interpretations.'

²²⁹ The book that is notable, according to Young, J. (2010), 166, 'for its close identification with Heraclitus, an identification Nietzsche retained throughout his life.'

²³⁰ Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 35.

²³¹ Even if the Stoics did not entirely agree on all aspects of this doctrine; Long, A.A., Sedley, D.N. (1987), I, 308-13. 312: 'Stoics differed in their interpretations of 'the recurrence of the same things''

²³² On this importance and the details of Nietzsche's admiration, see Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979). See also Ludwig von Scheffler's moving recollection of Nietzsche's course on Heraclitus, which he attended, printed in a newspaper article on Nietzsche's life thirty years later, quoted in Wilkerson, D. (2006), 134.

refer to the Stoics so hesitantly, claiming that they only show ‘traces’ (‘Spuren’) of it? An obvious answer would be that Nietzsche adopts the Hegelian perspective and mentions the Stoics only reluctantly, admitting that they inherited from Heraclitus ‘alle ihre grundsätzlichen Vorstellungen’, but importantly differed from him otherwise. Evidence and a more detailed explanation for this idea can be found in *PHG*.

PHG 7 Übrigens [...] ist Heraklit den kahlen Geistern nicht entgangen; bereits die Stoiker haben ihn ins Flache umgedeutet und seine aesthetische Grundperception vom Spiel der Welt zu der gemeinen Rücksicht auf Zweckmäßigkeiten der Welt und zwar für die Vortheile des Menschen herabgezogen²³³

Heraclitus’ ‘aesthetische Grundperception vom Spiel der Welt’ which Nietzsche refers to is based on his reading of the famous fragment ‘lifetime (αἰών) is a child (παῖς) at play (παίζων), moving pieces in a game.’²³⁴ According to most contemporary readings, αἰών does not refer to ‘eternity’ in relation to cosmic dynamics, as it does in Nietzsche’s interpretation. Rather, in Kahn’s translation used above, it refers to an individual lifetime, and could also be translated as ‘duration’, ‘life’, or ‘vitality’.²³⁵ Nevertheless, the idea of eternity as a playing child delighted Nietzsche throughout his life, possibly also inspiring his own thought of the eternal return.²³⁶ The reference to the yes-saying child we encountered in *Z* in chapter 1.6 at least should be seen as one of many examples of contributions to Heraclitus.²³⁷

How to interpret Nietzsche’s claim that the Stoics reduced Heraclitus’ physics to a ‘gemeinen Rücksicht auf Zweckmäßigkeiten der Welt’, only ‘für die Vortheile des Menschen’ so that it turned, in the following sentences, ‘in jenen Köpfen’ into ‘ein kruder Optimismus’? The passage a few lines above the one just quoted explains more clearly how Nietzsche analyses the development into superficiality (‘ins Flache’) from Heraclitus to the Stoics.

PHG 7 Ein Werden und Vergehen, ein Bauen und Zerstören, ohne jede moralische Zurechnung, in ewig gleicher Unschuld, hat in dieser Welt allein das Spiel des Künstlers und des Kindes. Und so, wie das Kind und der Künstler spielt, spielt das ewig lebendige Feuer, baut auf und zerstört, in Unschuld – und dieses Spiel spielt der Aeon mit sich.²³⁸

²³³ 1.833; a very similar remark can be found in the Vorlesungsaufzeichnungen, *KGW* II/4.278.

²³⁴ αἰών παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, πεττεύων· παιδὸς ἢ βασιληῆ. In the Diels-Kranz system of references number 52. The translation is from Kahn, C. (1979), 71.

²³⁵ Kahn, C. (1979), 71. Hershbell and Nimis refer to Kirk in this context, who dismisses the traditional translation of αἰών as ‘time absolutely’, as well as that of ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, as this would be ‘contrary to the general trend in Heraclitus’ thought’. Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 32; Kirk, G.S. (1956), xiii.

²³⁶ Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 33: ‘Nietzsche considered fragment DK 52 an un-teleological affirmation of the whole world of becoming.’

²³⁷ *Z* I Verwandlungen 4.31: ‘Unschuld ist das Kind und Vergessen, ein Neubeginnen, ein Spiel, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, eine erste Bewegung, ein heiliges Ja-sagen.’ Several commentators, moreover, including H. Diels, have pointed out the similarity between Heraclitus and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, both being lonely and herd-avoiding truth-seekers, writing in an aphoristic and inaccessible style. Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 19.

²³⁸ 1.830.

Not only the word ‘Aeon’, but also the mentioning of ‘Spiel’ and ‘Feuer’²³⁹ make the reference to Heraclitus in this fragment undeniable. Nietzsche again associates the aesthetic and innocent play of the child and artist with the workings of the entire cosmos, involving construction and destruction (important elements of the characteristically ‘tragic’ and ‘Dionysian’ elements of the eternal return we encountered in chapter 1.5). This aesthetic worldview is opposed to morality (‘jede moralische Zurechnung’), the reference to which must be connected to ‘Optimismus’ and the ‘Zweckmäßigkeiten der Welt’ ‘für die Vortheile des Menschen’.²⁴⁰ According to Hershbell and Nimis, ‘the lasting importance of Heraclitus for Nietzsche’s philosophy was his rejection of any sort of teleology. [...] It is precisely this, in Nietzsche’s mind, that separates Heraclitus from the Stoics.’²⁴¹ Teleology, or the thought that the cosmos has a certain purpose that includes or even culminates in human practice, is part of what Nietzsche regards as ‘moral optimism’. Nietzsche dismisses the Stoic idea that there is access to absolute virtue and happiness as a certain escape and redemption from the tragic and permanently changing world. The following passage from *GT* names Socrates, but the position ascribed to him resembles Stoicism almost word for word.

GT 14 Man vergegenwärtige sich nur die Konsequenzen der sokratischen Sätze: „Tugend ist Wissen; es wird nur gesündigt aus Unwissenheit; der Tugendhafte ist der Glückliche“: in diesen drei Grundformen des Optimismus liegt der Tod der Tragödie.²⁴²

The optimism referred to in this passage implies the death of tragedy: virtue can be attained through knowledge or reason, sin follows from lack of knowledge, and virtue equals happiness. These Socratic but also Stoic doctrines presuppose the possibility of human access to a realm transcending the world of ‘Werden und Vergehen’, one that offers hope for a calm and rational kind of happiness in spite of the tragedy of a changing world. In *EH*, in the passage on *GT*, Nietzsche refers once more to ‘Sokratismus’, highlighting ‘Sokrates als Werkzeug der griechischen Auflösung, als typischer *décadent* zum ersten Male erkannt. „Vernünftigkeit“ gegen Instinkt.’²⁴³ The opposition of reason against instinct occurs also in one of the final pages of the 1873 essay *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne* (*WL*), but there it is not Socrates but ‘der stoische’ who represents ‘der vernünftige Mensch’.²⁴⁴ More on this passage will be said in section 3.2.2.

²³⁹ Which is, in Heraclitus’ world, the underlying yet immanent “substance” of the cosmos, active and passive at the same time – that which forms the world, out of which all other elements (air, water, earth) are born, and to which they shall return after every great world fire. See Kahn, C. (1979), 132–55, referring to DK 30, 31A, 90, 76.

²⁴⁰ See for a confirmation *NL* 19[114], 7.456: ‘Die Stoiker haben Heraklit in’s Flache umgedeutet und mißverstanden. [...] Die höchste Gesetzmäßigkeit der Welt, aber doch kein Optimismus bei Heraklit.’ It might be said that in a much later phase Nietzsche came to question the opposition between Heraclitean aesthetics and Stoic morality, including Heraclitus in the moral camp. *NL* 7[4] 12.259: ‘Seit Plato ist die Philosophie unter der Herrschaft der Moral: auch bei seinen Vorgängern spielen moralische Interpretationen entscheidend hinein (bei Anaximander das Zu-Grunde-gehn aller Dinge als Strafe für ihre Emancipation vom reinen Sein, bei Heraklit die Regelmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen als Zeugniß für den sittlich-rechtlichen Charakter des gesammten Werdens)’.

²⁴¹ Hershbell, J.P. and Nimis, S.A. (1979), 32.

²⁴² 1.94.

²⁴³ *EH* (*GT*) 1 6.310.

²⁴⁴ *WL* 2 1.889.

We can conclude that Nietzsche seems to add the Stoics hesitantly in the passage in *EH*, which explains why he finds in Stoicism only ‘Spuren’ of the doctrine of the eternal return. This is also the conclusion drawn by Bernd Magnus in his article ‘The Connection Between Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, Heraclitus and the Stoics’: ‘Nietzsche did indeed find only “traces” of his doctrine [...]. What was missing was the spirit from which [...] these reflections arose.’²⁴⁵ Nietzsche clearly would have preferred Heraclitus as his predecessor, but the claim that Heraclitus *could* have taught a similar doctrine is as far as he can go due to limited philological evidence. Although the Stoics do offer textual evidence of having taught a similar doctrine, they also transformed precisely these aspects which Nietzsche admired in Heraclitus: instead of defending an ‘aesthetic’ becoming, one in which destruction and construction is part of an ‘innocent play’, the Stoics turned it into a ‘moral’ and ‘optimistic’ doctrine; that is, their equation of Fire with the divine and rational principle of providence forms a strong connection with their ethical principle that rational virtue is the only condition for happiness. Obviously, this transformation is the opposite of what may have inspired Nietzsche in introducing the doctrine of the eternal return.

Even if this argument would be enough to show that Nietzsche does not consider himself as being influenced by Stoicism, it can be maintained furthermore that the passage in *EH* does not focus on possible sources of influence. Rather, the formulation of the passage depicts Nietzsche as ‘the first *tragic philosopher*’. Looking for signs of ‘tragic wisdom’ in history, he claims that he ‘could not find any sign of it, even among the *eminent Greek philosophers*’ (i.e. the pre-Socratics). In other words, Nietzsche presents the thought as exclusively his; he merely looks for similar ideas (or a similar kind of wisdom) in the past, *not* for sources of his own inspiration.²⁴⁶ It can be concluded in either case that the passage in *EH* (the only one in which a connection between the doctrine, Heraclitus, and the Stoics is made) cannot be taken as evidence that Nietzsche was influenced by the Stoics, thereby rendering implausible Nabais’ claim that the doctrine was a direct consequence of Nietzsche’s reading of Stoic texts.

2.4 PHYSICS AND ETHICS 1: AMOR FATI AND COSMIC STOICISM

Having nuanced the possibility of a conceptual or historical connection between Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return and that of the Stoics, I now turn to the relation between physics and ethics. Could it be that Nietzsche’s *amor fati* was inspired by the Stoic saying that we should ‘live in accordance with nature’ (τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν²⁴⁷), thereby bringing the ethical domain in line with that of nature’s necessity? Much has been written on the

²⁴⁵ In Magnus, B. (1976), 13.

²⁴⁶ As also Magnus, B. (1976) argues, 3: ‘there is no evidence to suggest that Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence was influenced by Heraclitus and the Stoics in the sense that Nietzsche discovered the doctrine there and elaborated it to suit his own purposes. Where Nietzsche speaks of his doctrine, in *Ecce Homo*, he merely scans the history of philosophy to establish his own genealogy.’ The same point is made by Djurić, M. (1979), 5: ‘Es handelt sich eher um eine Wahlverwandschaft als um eine tatsächliche Anleihe.’

²⁴⁷ *DL* VII 87.

function of cosmological ‘nature’ for Stoic ethics.²⁴⁸ As has been indicated in the opening of this chapter, physics and ethics form a harmonious whole together with logic in Stoicism. We know, for instance, that Chrysippus announced in his *Propositions in Physics* that ‘there is no other or more fitting way to tackle the theory of good and bad things, the virtues, and happiness than on the basis of nature as a whole and the administration of the cosmos.’²⁴⁹ Importantly for this section on Cosmic Stoicism, it should be noted that Diogenes Laertius refers to nature as ‘our own human nature as well as that of the universe’, whereby it is stressed that ‘our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.’²⁵⁰

John Sellars is correct in pointing out that the Stoics encourage dissolving ‘the boundary between oneself and the rest of Nature, identifying one’s own will with the will of the Cosmos’.²⁵¹ The physical theory of a cosmos governed by divine reason forms the basis for this moral advice. Sellars refers in this context to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, and although this point can be found most articulately in the *Discourses*²⁵², not in Epictetus’ *Handbook* (the only work of which we know for certain that Nietzsche had read), the *Meditations* offers several textual examples too.

12.30 There is one common substance, even though it is divided into countless individual bodies, each with its own particular qualities. There is one soul, even though it is divided amongst countless natures, each with its own limitations. There is one intelligent soul, though it may appear to be divided.²⁵³

9.32 You have the power to strip away many superfluous troubles located wholly in your judgement, and to possess a room for yourself embracing in thought the whole cosmos

To ‘live in accordance with nature’ seen from this perspective is to be aware that one’s soul only appears to be separated from others, and that one’s reason is a segment of Universal Reason, which is God himself. Assenting to what this reason prescribes promises to result in a certain sense of freedom and the happy capacity to embrace the totality of the cosmos, as described by Marcus Aurelius in the passage above. Pierre Hadot explains this in *The Inner Citadel* as follows: ‘what the free self wills is all of Destiny, the entire history of the world, and the entire world, as if the self were that universal Reason which is at the origin of the world, or universal Nature. At this point, the self as will and as freedom coincides with the will of

²⁴⁸ *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 676, ft. 5; Inwood, B. refers in this context to Long, A.A. (1988) and Annas, J. (1988), offering ‘representative statements of opposing views on the relevance of cosmology to Stoic ethics’. Inwood, B. (1995) has written a critical review on Annas, J. (1993), chapter 5, in which she argues that ‘cosmological nature is of subordinate importance in Stoic ethics’.

²⁴⁹ *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 675; Inwood, B. has taken this citation from Plutarchus, *de Stoicorum Repugnantia* 1035c.

²⁵⁰ *DL VII 87. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 676: ‘Both human and cosmic nature serve as the foundations and the first principles of Stoic ethics.’

²⁵¹ Sellars, J. (2006a), 166.

²⁵² See *Discourses* 2.19.26, in which Epictetus says that a true Stoic ‘is a man who desires to be of one mind with God, and never to cast blame on God or man again.’

²⁵³ See for a comparable remark betraying the attempt to attain a cosmic perspective 4.14: ‘You came into the world as a part. You will vanish in that which gave you birth, or rather you will be taken up into its generative principle by the process of change.’

universal Reason and of *logos* dispersed throughout things.²⁵⁴ Obviously, this vision of being able to embrace the totality of Destiny, conscious of being an immanent part of it, resembles at least the later occurrences of Nietzsche's *amor fati*. Hadot himself recognises this similarity in a section entitled '*Amor fati*' and claims, after quoting *EH* klug 10 and *NW* Epilog 1: "To wish for nothing other than that which is": Marcus Aurelius could have said this.²⁵⁵

To what extent can we conclude from this similarity that Nietzsche, too, saw Marcus Aurelius as an early defender, perhaps even the predecessor of his *amor fati*? For this to be the case we would expect at least some textual references in Nietzsche's work to what may be called 'Cosmic Stoicism', borrowing Sellars' vocabulary.²⁵⁶ 'Cosmic Stoicism' as opposed to 'Human Stoicism' is characterised as embodying the desire for an 'identification of one's will with fate, the will of the Cosmos'.²⁵⁷ The term 'Human Stoicism' is taken by Sellars from Nietzsche's book *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, which 'captures the anthropocentric character of this conception of Stoicism'.²⁵⁸ This type of Stoicism is portrayed as the more 'popular' one, which encourages 'an attitude of heroic endurance in the face of adversity'.²⁵⁹ The roots of this type are found in Lipsius' *De Constantia*, a 16th Century essay that is heavily influenced by Seneca, especially his Letter 107 to Lucilius where we find the maxim 'optimum est pati': 'it is best to endure'.²⁶⁰ Whereas Human Stoicism is represented by Seneca and Lipsius, 'Cosmic Stoicism', which is the more 'mature' type according to Sellars²⁶¹, has as its models Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. Sellars points out how Deleuze sees himself as a late heir of a long tradition starting with these two: 'the Stoics stand at the beginning of a tradition of immanence within Western philosophy that runs from them through Spinoza and Nietzsche to Deleuze himself'²⁶²; a tradition that importantly connects 'Cosmic Stoicism' with *amor fati* and that transcends 'Human Stoicism'.²⁶³

²⁵⁴ Hadot, P. (1998), 180.

²⁵⁵ Hadot, P. (1998), 144.

²⁵⁶ This point is made by Ure, M., in Sellars, J. (2016), 296: 'Nietzsche's [...] own ideal of *amor fati* and his doctrine of the eternal recurrence are implicitly indebted to and express a type of Stoicism, in particular what Sellars calls "cosmic Stoicism".'

²⁵⁷ Sellars, J. (2006a), 165.

²⁵⁸ Sellars, J. (2006a), 170 vt. 54: "Human Stoicism" is a shortening of "Human, all too Human, Stoicism" which (with apologies to Nietzsche) captures the anthropocentric character of this conception of Stoicism.'

²⁵⁹ Sellars, J. (2006a), 162. It is more 'popular' in the sense that this type of Stoicism is more commonly known; Sellars gives the example of *The Oxford English Dictionary* defining a Stoic as one 'who practises repression of emotion, indifference to pleasure and pain, and patient endurance.'

²⁶⁰ Sellars, J. (2006a), 163. He is right, although in this same letter the famous *Zeus Hymn* by Cleanthes is quoted, in which the immanence of human beings in the fated and divine world is emphasised and celebrated; from Seneca are the famous additional lines 'Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt'. See 3.5.

²⁶¹ Sellars, J. (2006a), 165: 'the Human Stoic remains at the level of a philosophical apprentice who understood Stoic doctrines but has not yet digested those doctrines to the point where they will transform his entire life. The Cosmic Stoic, by contrast, has fully digested those doctrines to the point where they have transformed his habitual beliefs and dispositions.'

²⁶² Sellars, J. (2006a), 158. It must be noted that Deleuze's interpretation of Stoicism is heavily influenced by Goldschmidt, V. (1953).

²⁶³ Sellars, J. (2006a), 164: 'For Lipsius and Seneca, then, Stoicism involves an ethic of heroic endurance that is quite different from Deleuze's Nietzschean and Bousquetian reading of Stoicism as an ethic of *amor fati*.'

The distinction between the two conceptions is the consequence of the main argument of Sellars' paper, which concerns Deleuze more than Stoicism itself. Deleuze's fascination for immanence and affirmation leads him to adopt and incorporate Goldschmidt's interpretation of Stoicism. According to Goldschmidt, Stoic ethics, too, has a 'physical' and a 'logical' pole, the first of which is concerned with 'the question of situating oneself within the order of causes'; the second is associated with 'willing the event, whatever it may be', which involves an 'active acceptance that implies a welcome cooperation with fate'.²⁶⁴ The logical pole inspires Deleuze to make the connection with *amor fati*, going so far as to suggest that as a type of Stoicism it offers us the only meaningful form of ethics left, namely 'not to be unworthy of what happens to us'.²⁶⁵ Sellars' effort in his paper to elucidate Deleuze's Stoicism is set up as an argument against the characterisation of Deleuze as a Stoic endowed with 'steadfastness' or 'constancy'. By pointing out that what Deleuze argues can be seen as 'Cosmic Stoicism' he concludes that 'it would be a mistake to characterise Deleuze's Stoic ethic as *constance*'; the affirmation of all of existence is 'not *constantia*; it is *amor fati*'.²⁶⁶

The difference between 'Cosmic' and 'Human' Stoicism in Sellars' account boils down to a difference in attitude towards the outer world: the 'Cosmic' Stoic wishes to embrace it, the 'Human' Stoic sees all kinds of possible dangers which he wishes to defend himself against by training to be 'heroically constant'. The two attitudes are equated by Sellars with the two types of fatalism discussed in chapter 1: the Russian (see 1.2.2) and the Turkish (see 1.6): 'Russian fatalism correlates with Cosmic Stoicism, while Turkish fatalism correlates with Human Stoicism'.²⁶⁷ Although there is much to say against this equation²⁶⁸, it does explain further how the distinction works in relation to fate: a 'Human Stoic' like a 'Turkish fatalist' finds himself in opposition to an external fate (or fortune) against which protection is required; 'Cosmic Stoicism' as well as 'Russian fatalism' involves an identification of one's will with fate, the will of the Cosmos.²⁶⁹

Even though the two attitudes towards fate are helpful for a rough characterisation of the history of Stoicism (at least with respect to Deleuze), it should be noted here that the two attitudes are not at odds in the traditional Stoic system. Rather, it is agreed upon by all Stoics that fate and providence are the same thing. We have seen this in 2.2. The implication is that

²⁶⁴ Sellars, J. (2006a), 160. He refers to Deleuze, J. (1990), 134, and to Goldschmidt, V. (1953), 99. The status of Goldschmidt's analysis of Stoicism is questionable; already in 1954 we read in a book review: 'this book is assuredly a thorough study of the Stoic documents, but [...] it is highly questionable whether there is further elucidation of some of the *actual* Stoic problems or even whether this book represents a Stoicism which ever *actually* existed.' Saunders, J.L. (1954), 677-9.

²⁶⁵ Sellars, J. (2006a), 159, 161; Deleuze, J. (1990), 149. See also the remark 'How much have we yet to learn from the Stoics...' Sellars, J. (2006a), 159, 166; Deleuze, J. (1990), 158.

²⁶⁶ Sellars, J. (2006a), 167. The characterisation of Deleuze as a Stoic out of 'steadfastness' comes from André Bernold's tribute to Gilles Deleuze, 'Suidas', published not long after his death in 1995. Sellars, J. (2006a), 157.

²⁶⁷ Sellars, J. (2006a), 165.

²⁶⁸ To begin with, there is no textual evidence whatsoever to prove that Nietzsche associates Turkish (*WS* 61) or Russian fatalism (*EH* *weise* 6) with Stoicism; also, as has been pointed out in chapter 1, it is unlikely that Russian fatalism can be seen as a reference to *amor fati*, as Sellars suggests. Rather than an attitude of joyful affirmation it is one of surrender and passive acceptance, presented as the best possible strategy to survive and redevelop strength in the situation of danger and exhaustion of the Russian soldier in this passage.

²⁶⁹ Sellars, J. (2006a), 165.

the necessary order of causes is providentially arranged by Zeus to be the best possible order.²⁷⁰ If there are nevertheless occurrences that are disappointing, a Stoic would argue first that Zeus, being the active principle of the cosmos, orders the cosmos according to its own best interests and not according to those of particular human individuals. If we still think some events are bad, we should realise that this is the consequence of our limited perspectives as individuals; adopting a cosmic perspective would be beneficial in this case.²⁷¹ But secondly, as Ted Brennan argues, Epictetus detects a certain danger in this way of reasoning, even if it is derived directly from Stoic theology: thinking of the world as something inherently 'good' may have the psychological and avoidable effect of leaving a disappointed individual filled with anger and hatred.²⁷² He therefore prefers to make the ethical point about the moral indifference of the external world and about virtue being the single moral good first, before the theological point can be secured.²⁷³

Regarding all external occurrences as morally indifferent, then, helps to exercise our virtues. In Sellars' book *Stoicism* it is even admitted that Seneca's position goes beyond the advice to merely 'endure': his *de Providentia* argues that 'adverse situations offer one an opportunity to test, practise and develop one's virtue'; the 'apparently vicious events that form part of providential fate should in fact be welcomed with open arms.'²⁷⁴ What is more, Sellars' *Stoicism* offers the description of a Stoic reconciliation between the 'Human' and 'Cosmic' perspective, even if these terms are not explicitly mentioned. Instead an apparent opposition is suggested between the 'inward-looking perspective' of 'analysing our judgements, making sure that we only assent to adequate impressions', which is 'living in accordance with our own rational nature'; and the 'outward-looking perspective' of 'widening our circle of concern to encompass Nature as a whole, realising that we are not isolated units but rather parts of a systematically integrated whole.'²⁷⁵ Supposing that the first can be identified as 'Human Stoicism' and the second as 'Cosmic Stoicism', Sellars solves the apparent tension between the two by pointing out that 'the outward-looking cosmic perspective will depend upon correct judgements about our place in Nature, and these correct judgements will only be possible if we first attend to ourselves via the inward-looking perspective.'²⁷⁶

²⁷⁰ Sellars, J. (2006b), 100-1. He mentions that Cleanthes was an exception, as he denied that fate and providence are the same thing.

²⁷¹ Sellars, J. (2006b), 101-2.

²⁷² Brennan, T. (2006), 237-8, citing Epictetus' *Discourses*, 1.22.13-16: 'Is it possible for someone who is 'harmed' and fails to get his 'goods' to be happy? It is not possible. Then how can I still do what I should towards Zeus? If I am 'harmed', and losing my 'goods', then I think he is not taking care of me. And what do I care about Him, if he can't help me? What do I care about him, if he is willing to let me get into my present situation? Then I start to hate God. All this follows once we suppose that external things are goods.' In conclusion, Brennan points out: 'The Stoics are happy to say that Zeus is good; but they do not say that any external events are good, even if they are all produced by the will of Zeus.'

²⁷³ Different, one may conclude therefore, from Chrysippus' quote from *Propositions in Physics* cited at the beginning of this section.

²⁷⁴ Sellars, J. (2006b), 102, referring to *De providentia* 4.6. *De providentia* 2.6: 'let them be harassed by toil, by suffering, by losses, in order that they may gather true strength.'

²⁷⁵ Sellars, J. (2006b), 127.

²⁷⁶ Sellars, J. (2006b), 127-8. 128: 'If we want to cultivate Marcus Aurelius' outward-looking perspective then we must first turn our attention inwards.' In addition we may point out that for the Stoics, in exercising our reason we not only choose the path of virtue and happiness, but also put to practice Zeus' will, which is also Reason. We have seen this in the quote from Hadot's *The Inner Citadel*, 180: 'the self as

Although Sellars' book *Stoicism* therefore nuances the strictness of the opposition he traces in his article between a 'Cosmic' and a 'Human' conception of Stoicism, the distinction may still add some clarity in our case, shedding light on the variety of emphases made in the rich reception of Stoicism (some of which clearly fail to do justice to the complexity of traditional Stoicism).²⁷⁷ For in spite of Sellars' and Deleuze's suggestion that Nietzsche is inspired by 'Cosmic Stoicism' 'as an ethic of *amor fati*'²⁷⁸, there is almost no textual evidence to support this claim. What is more, when Nietzsche refers to Stoicism, we rather recognise the image of 'Human Stoicism'. Tracing all references to the Stoics in Nietzsche's texts reveals only one instance of awareness of and interest in what may be seen as 'Cosmic Stoicism', that is, the idea that we are mere components of a greater totality. This reference appears in the first *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (UB 1), written and published in 1873 on David Strauss' 1872 book *Der alte und der neue Glaube: ein Bekenntniss*.

UB 1 9 Mit welcher Wucht der Ueberzeugung glaubte dagegen der antike Stoiker an das All und die Vernünftigkeit des Alls!²⁷⁹

Nietzsche contrasts the weak kind of faith that Strauss displays to the strength with which the Stoics believed in 'das All' and its 'Vernunft'. Yet the Stoics are mentioned only this once, and we cannot infer from this brief reference alone that Nietzsche agrees or concludes that we should, like the Stoics, embrace the totality of the cosmos through an identification of ourselves with Reason or any other immanent principle.

Although there are some remarks that have been taken to defend an attitude comparable to 'Cosmic Stoicism', for instance in the *Nachlass* of 1880 and 1881, these are never associated with Stoicism. On the contrary rather. *NL* 11[7], written in the spring of 1881, is a good example.

NL 11[7] Ich unterscheide aber: die eingebildeten Individuen und die wahren „Lebenssysteme“, deren jeder von uns eins ist – man wirft beides in eins, während „das Individuum“ nur eine Summe von bewußten Empfindungen und Urtheilen und Irrthümern ist, ein *Glaube*, ein Stückchen vom wahren Lebenssystem oder viele Stückchen zusammengedacht und zusammengefabelt, eine „Einheit“, die nicht Stand hält. Wir sind Knospen an Einem Baume – was wissen wir von dem, was im Interesse des Baumes aus uns werden kann! Aber wir haben ein Bewußtsein, als ob wir *Alles* sein wollten und sollten, ein Phantasterei von „Ich“ und *allem* „Nicht-Ich“. *Aufhören, sich als solches phantastisches ego zu fühlen!* Schrittweise lernen, das *vermeintliche Individuum abzuwerfen!* Die Irrthümer des ego entdecken! Den *Egoismus als Irrthum* einsehen! Als Gegensatz ja nicht Altruismus zu verstehen! Das wäre die Liebe zu den *anderen*

will and as freedom coincides with the will of universal Reason and of *logos* dispersed throughout things.' Since exercising our reason coincides with God's reason, we cannot but conclude that everything is as it should be.

²⁷⁷ See for a more nuanced analysis of the reception history of Stoicism Sellars, J. (2006b), chapter 6 'The Stoic Legacy', 135-157; Ierodiakonou, K., ed. (1998), 'Introduction. The Study of Stoicism: Its Decline and Revival', 1-22.

²⁷⁸ Sellars, J. (2006a), 164.

²⁷⁹ 1.211.

vermeintlichen Individuen! Nein! Über „mich“ und „dich“ **hinaus! Kosmisch empfinden!**²⁸⁰

In this passage Nietzsche seems to describe a situation similar to the one offered by Marcus Aurelius above: we only think we are individuals, but we are really parts of one or more ‘Lebenssysteme’ (the organismic implications of which are further examined in chapter 5). We are only ‘buds’ of one tree, and we have no idea how we may be useful for the survival of that tree. We have to learn to ‘stop feeling as if we were an “I”, for it is a mere phantasy’; we have to ‘cast off our supposed Individuum’. Still, regarding egoism as mistaken does not mean that we should take our refuge in altruism, so Nietzsche warns, since that would only imply dedicating our love to *other* individuals, whose identity is just as unclear as our own. We have to ‘feel cosmically’; an expression that is strongly reminiscent of what Sellars portrays as ‘Cosmic Stoicism’: we have to become aware of ourselves as being only an enigmatic part of a greater ‘cosmic’ system.

Yet there are no references to the Stoics directly surrounding this passage. The texts in which the Stoics are mentioned in this time frame appear in a completely different setting, one that more often than not is characterised by a certain contempt. The following passage written in the fall of 1880 (not long before the passage above) describes the Stoic aim of ‘complete happiness’, but analyses it, similarly to what we saw in *PHG*, in terms of a certain kind of optimism, even if the exact expression is left out.

NL 6[395] Die vollkommene Zufriedenheit (Epiktets, und Christus ebenso!) mit allem, was geschieht – denn alles kann er benutzen. Der Weise benutzt es als *Werkzeug*, nur für die Unweisen giebt es *Übel*. Die Consequenz wäre freilich, daß die Welt dem Weisen keine Milderung des Übels, keine Beseitigung verdankt. Er begreift *das Übel als Übel nicht* – das die Folgen der *Lehre vom freien Willen!* von der absoluten Seele!²⁸¹

The context of this passage is completely different from the one quoted above; at stake is not the relation of individuals to ‘Lebenssysteme’, but the introduction of free will in the history of philosophy. One of the consequences of introducing this concept is the corresponding appearance of evil: those who maintain that there is no free will (Epictetus is mentioned explicitly) have access to a ‘vollkommene Zufriedenheit’, capable of accepting the world as the only one possible. Everything is as it is, necessarily so in this perspective, and nothing can or should be different. Hence there is no need for redemption or resolution; evil exists for the ‘unwise’ only. Nietzsche indeed disagrees with those defending the existence of free will, but the passage below (directly succeeding the one above) problematises the suggestion that we become wise like Epictetus or Jesus. It elaborates further on the above sentence that the sage is capable of making everything ‘useful’ (‘denn alles kann er benutzen’) and turning it into an instrument (‘Der Weise benutzt es als *Werkzeug*’):

NL 6[396] Das Alterthum schließt mit einem moralischen und religiösen Quietismus – das müde Alterthum und das Individuum allmächtig und einzig sich wichtig haltend, es legt die Ereignisse aller Welt zu *seinem Heil* aus, alles was geschieht, hat für es Sinn. Es ist die *Astrologie*, auf Staaten, Naturereignisse, Umgang und den Ziegel auf dem

²⁸⁰ 9.443.

²⁸¹ 9.298-9.

Dach bezogen: alles hat nur für das Individuum einen Sinn, den dies finden kann, *davon abgesehen* ist es der Aufmerksamkeit des Weisen unwürdig. Die moralisch-religiöse Benutzung und Ausdeutung des Geschehens – *alles andere* wurde gleichgültig und verächtlich. Der wissenschaftliche Sinn *unterlag!*²⁸²

This text contains an analysis of the time in history in which the Stoics flourished: the final stage of Antiquity (i.e., Hellenism). It is characterised as one of moral and religious Quietism, out of fatigue drawn to the explanation of all occurrences in the light of the individual's well-being ('es legt die Ereignisse aller Welt zu *seinem Heil* aus'), thereby explaining further the reference to 'benutzen' in the previous passage. Thinking of Stoicism one may suspect that Nietzsche has in mind in particular the idea that all external events are indifferent to one's happiness but at the same time willed by Zeus who is also Providence; all events therefore, including the painful ones, can be taken as exercises for achieving the calm Stoic state of rational 'Zufriedenheit' as explained above. This, in Nietzsche's words 'astrological', way of thinking is taken to be dominant in all segments of the late antique society, discouraging any other perspective as 'unworthy of a wise man' ('*davon abgesehen* ist es der Aufmerksamkeit des Weisen unwürdig'). It is portrayed as a non-scientific time – a time, that is, that Nietzsche cannot simply wish to return to, given his interest in science in that period.

Nietzsche's critique of what we may see as 'optimism' in Stoic philosophy thus seems to prevent him from thinking approvingly of 'Cosmic Stoicism'. Two of the other passages surrounding *NL* 11[7] on 'kosmisch empfinden' even seem to reject Stoicism as a form of 'Human' rather than 'Cosmic Stoicism'. The first, closely following the two above both in time and in content, explicitly pictures Epictetus as a defensive kind of philosopher who has no real interest in the psychology of human beings; the second, written in the fall of 1881, is part of one of the most lengthy passages on Stoicism in Nietzsche's oeuvre. It analyses Epictetic defensiveness using words as 'coldness' and 'stone'.

NL 6[400] Das Ideal Epiktets: sich selber wie einen Feind und Nachsteller immer im Auge haben: der kriegerische Einsiedler, der ein kostbares Gut zu vertheidigen und vor Verderbniß zu wahren hat, nachdem er es errungen hat. *Nicht* auf die Menschen giebt er Acht, er *glaubt sie zu kennen*, er hat von dem Interesse des Individuellen *keine Ahnung*: sie sind die Schatten, das Wahre in ihnen sind ihre Gedanken und Triebe, welche er philosophisch rubrizirt hat. In dieser Geisterwelt lebt er und kämpft seinen Kampf. Er hat *nur* Freude als Krieger.²⁸³

NL 15[55] Ich glaube, man verkennt den Stoicismus. Das Wesentliche dieser Gemüthsart – das ist er, schon bevor die Philosophie ihn sich erobert hat – ist das Verhalten gegen den Schmerz und die Unlust-Vorstellungen [...]: *Starrheit* und *Kälte* sind der Kunstgriff, Anaesthetika also. Hauptabsicht der stoischen Erziehung, die *leichte Erregbarkeit* zu vernichten, die Zahl der Gegenstände, die überhaupt *bewegen* dürfen, immer mehr einschränken, Glauben an die Verächtlichkeit und den geringen Werth der meisten Dinge, welche erregen [...] – in summa: *Versteinerung* als Gegenmittel gegen das Leiden, und alle hohen Namen des Göttlichen der Tugend

²⁸² 9.299.

²⁸³ 9.300-1.

fürderhin der Statue beilegen. Was ist es, eine Statue im Winter umarmen, wenn man gegen Kälte stumpf geworden ist? – was ist es, wenn die Statue die Statue umarmt! [...] er ist endlich gezwungen, zu sagen: alles wie es kommt, ist mir recht, ich will nichts anders – er *beseitigt keinen Nothstand* mehr, weil er die Empfindung für Nothstände getödtet hat. Dies drückt er religiös aus, als volle Übereinstimmung mit allen Handlungen der Gottheit (z.B. bei Epictet).²⁸⁴

The second passage ends with a manifestation of awareness that the Stoics see as their highest achievement the calm acceptance of everything that passes ('alles wie es kommt, ist mir recht, ich will nichts anders') (although it is a forced position, according to Nietzsche), and that they take this as a religious expression of concordance with all doings of God. Even though these two elements remind us of *amor fati* (not wanting anything to be different) and 'Cosmic Stoicism' ('volle Übereinstimmung mit allen Handlungen der Gottheit'), it is clear that we cannot deduce any identification between the two from this passage. Concerning *amor fati* we should keep in mind that its first notes appear in the fall of 1881, shortly after the passages just quoted. As we have seen in chapter 1, interpreting these first occurrences as a version of 'Cosmic Stoicism' faces several difficulties. To these we can now add that Nietzsche explicitly dismisses what we have referred to as 'Cosmic Stoicism' as merely a façade, masking a defensive and stiffening philosophy, one that rather fits the description of 'Human Stoicism'. 'Real' Stoicism according to Nietzsche ('Ich glaube, man erkennt den Stoicismus') combats pain by extinguishing any form of sensitivity, limiting the number of external things that may influence (or endanger) the Stoic 'Gemüthsart' by strongly emphasising the 'Verächtlichkeit und den geringen Werth der meisten Dinge', until any difference between a 'Nothstand' and a normal situation is erased.

More will be said on Nietzsche's reflection of the Stoic way of dealing with 'Schmerz' in chapter 4; for now we can conclude that when Nietzsche speaks of Stoicism, even in the passages surrounding the one in which something reminiscent of 'Cosmic Stoicism' is brought forward, he seems to have in mind the Stoicism that Sellars portrays as 'Human'. There is no textual evidence to claim that Nietzsche was inspired by 'Cosmic Stoicism' when introducing *amor fati*; we can see now that he rather refers to a radically different kind of Stoicism in this period, one that he accuses of eradicating all sensitivity. As we will see in more detail in chapter 4, being able to tell the difference between a 'Nothstand' and a normal state is not only healthy, but also indispensable for the progress of science.

2.5 PHYSICS AND ETHICS 2: NATURALISM

Apart from the doctrine of the eternal return and 'Cosmic Stoicism' there is one more possibly Stoic influence on Nietzsche that needs to be nuanced: that of naturalism. Again a topic that unites physics and ethics and finds its expression in the maxim τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν²⁸⁵: we should live in accordance with nature in a way that leaves behind the 'distinction between what is and should be'²⁸⁶ by 'becoming who we are'.²⁸⁷ The aspect of determinism that

²⁸⁴ 9.652-3.

²⁸⁵ DL VII 87.

²⁸⁶ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 299.

belongs in this domain has been touched upon already at the end of chapter 1, section 1.6. As we have seen there, *amor fati* is identified in two out of the ten passages as Nietzsche's 'innerste Natur'.²⁸⁸ These passages from 1888 are consistent with the pattern in which Nietzsche sees himself as part of the fate to be affirmed ('Dieselbe Ehrfurcht, die er, rückwärts schauend, dem ganzen Schicksal weiht, hat er sich selber *mit* zu weihen. **Ego fatum.**'²⁸⁹). Nietzsche is a 'piece of fate'; and he is not an exception: 'In Wahrheit ist jeder Mensch selber ein Stück Fatum'.²⁹⁰ Could it be that Nietzsche acquired from the Stoics their paradoxical prescriptive advice to accept one's nature as fated?

There are several authors who argue that he did. Ure claims that 'Nietzsche develops a quintessentially Stoic ethic, anchored in the complete affirmation of natural necessity, and he does so on the basis of Stoic physics and cosmology.'²⁹¹ Armstrong recognises a Stoic influence on both Spinoza and Nietzsche with respect to 'the Stoic reconciliation of a naturalistic perspective with an ethical perspective', which 'appears in their common acceptance of modified versions of the Stoic doctrines of radical determinism, or "fatalism", and *amor fati*.'²⁹² Schatzki, thirdly, sees the 'anchoring element in Nietzsche's naturalistic ethics' as 'the broadly speaking ancient notion of a life according to nature, the general idea that man reaches a state of perfection when he is most in harmony with the structure, or essence, of nature.'²⁹³ That this ancient notion is in fact Stoic is affirmed in one of the following pages: 'As we have seen, for Nietzsche as for the Stoics, the good life is a life of virtue, and a life of virtue is a life in accordance with nature, meaning a life most expressive of the essence of nature. In both Nietzsche and the Stoics, moreover, a life of virtue coincides with happiness'.²⁹⁴

Donald Rutherford adds to these observations that Nietzsche's account of freedom 'is a recognizable descendent of ideas advanced by the ancient Stoics and Spinoza, for whom there is no contradiction between the realization of freedom and the affirmation of fate'.²⁹⁵ In drawing the comparison between Nietzsche and the Stoics, he claims that they similarly defend the idea that '[w]illing, or the initiation of action, is subject to natural necessity in exactly the same way as a rock's falling to the ground. Nevertheless, these philosophers maintain that human beings can be more or less effective in acting from their wills and in resisting being determined by external causes.'²⁹⁶ For Rutherford, therefore, the main points of convergence between Nietzsche and the Stoics on freedom concern their understanding of it as an ideal that is 'the condition in which an individual's power is least constrained by external things and maximally expressive of a principle of action internal to the agent herself',²⁹⁷

²⁸⁷ *EH* 6.255: 'Wie man wird, was man ist'.

²⁸⁸ *EH* (WA) 4 6.363: 'amor fati ist meine innerste Natur'; *NW* Epilog 1 6.436: '*Amor fati*: das ist meine innerste Natur.'

²⁸⁹ *NL* 25[158] 11.55.

²⁹⁰ *WS* 61 2.580.

²⁹¹ Ure, M. (2009), 76.

²⁹² Armstrong, A. (2013), 7.

²⁹³ Schatzki, T.R. (1994), 156.

²⁹⁴ Schatzki, T.R. (1994), 159.

²⁹⁵ Rutherford, D. (2011), 512.

²⁹⁶ Rutherford, D. (2011), 514.

²⁹⁷ Rutherford, D. (2011), 514.

thereby emphasising the related qualities of independence²⁹⁸, self-determination, self-governance, autonomy²⁹⁹, and the will to assume responsibility³⁰⁰, all to be attained in a world lacking the concept of free will as ‘choice’.³⁰¹

Yet the problem with his analysis, convincing as it is, is that there is no textual evidence suggesting that Nietzsche ever relates his ideal of freedom to the Stoics, let alone that he mentions the Stoics as his predecessors.³⁰² The reference to Spinoza seems more convincing in this context; the letter Nietzsche wrote to Franz Overbeck on the 30th of July 1881 expresses clearly his excitement concerning the similarities he had discovered: ‘in fünf Hauptpunkten seiner Lehre finde ich mich wieder, dieser abnormste und einsamste Denker ist mir gerade in diesen Dingen am nächsten: er leugnet die Willensfreiheit —; die Zwecke —; die sittliche Weltordnung —; das Unegoistische —; das Böse —’.³⁰³ But even if it can be argued that the absence of such a note about the Stoics does not imply that Nietzsche was not inspired by the Stoics, there is a reason why Stoic influence seems unlikely: the Stoic emphasis on the power of rationality for assenting to correct representations and so achieving the state of freedom is far from Nietzsche’s mind. Even if their strictness in upholding a truthful outlook did inspire Nietzsche to a certain degree, as I will argue in chapter 3, it remains the case that his struggle with the will to truth does not have the same association with freedom as it does in Stoicism. It must be concluded that it is at best unlikely that his thoughts on this topic are drawn from this source.

The claim that Nietzsche’s ethics of naturalism in a broader sense was adopted from Stoicism should be nuanced along the same lines: Nietzsche never explicitly connects Stoic philosophy to the plea to ‘become what one is’. The same can be said with respect to the suggestion that

²⁹⁸ Rutherford, D. (2011), 526. He refers on the topic of independence from others to *JGB* 41, 44, 201, 212, 242, 284. For more on Nietzsche’s reflection on Stoic independence, see chapter 3.3.2.

²⁹⁹ Rutherford, D. (2011), 515: ‘For the Stoics, assent is a distinctive kind of causal contribution that a rational agent (and only a rational agent) can make to the production of an action, and this contribution ensures that the action “depends on” the agent in a way that supports his being accountable for the action.’ He then continues by giving a nuanced representation of the Stoic account of freedom. For more on that, see in particular Bobzien, S. (1998), to whom Rutherford also refers. Nietzsche defends self-determination, self-governance and autonomy in a similar way (although he obviously disagrees with the Stoic confidence in the capacity of reason; see 521); 513, 514, 525-9, 532, 535.

³⁰⁰ See *GD* Streifzüge 38 6.139: ‘Denn was ist Freiheit! Dass man den Willen zur Selbstverantwortlichkeit hat.’

³⁰¹ Rutherford, D. (2011), 512, correctly formulates this as follows: ‘Most familiar are passages in which [Nietzsche] criticises a concept of freedom that represents the will as an unconditioned power of choice over which an agent exercises conscious control.’

³⁰² The only explicit references I have been able to find are *M* 546 3.316-7, in which Epictetus is praised for being a ‘Sich-Selbst-Genügende’; yet this aphorism does not reflect explicitly on the Stoic account of the freedom of the will, but rather portrays Epictetus as a brave slave defending himself against a world of ‘Verknechtung’. This reference does not contribute, therefore, to a discussion on freedom within naturalism. The other is an early note: *NL* 19[108] 7.454 ‘Wie stark die ethische Kraft der Stoiker war, zeigt sich darin, dass sie ihr Princip zu Gunsten der Willensfreiheit durchbrechen.’ It suggests a sense of admiration for the Stoics accepting the freedom to assent, within an otherwise completely determined world. But it cannot be inferred from it that Nietzsche’s account of freedom resembles it; the note is too early for that (1872) and does not exactly capture the freedom Nietzsche defends in later years which stages autonomy, responsibility, self-governance, etc.

³⁰³ *KGB* III/1.111. Although this letter cannot be taken as an argument that Nietzsche continues to agree with Spinoza on all these points; see Yovel, Y. (1989), Stambaugh, J. (1985), Armstrong, A. (2013), Rutherford, D. (2011).

human beings are ‘pieces of fate’ and to the project of ‘Vernatürlichung’ mentioned in chapter 1.6.³⁰⁴ On top of that omission we have an explicit rejection of the maxim to live in accordance with nature. *JGB* 9 opens with the words: ‘„Gemäss der Natur“ wollt ihr *leben*? Oh ihr edlen Stoiker, welche Betrügerei der Worte!’³⁰⁵ We might conclude therefore, as Groff does, that rather than openly admitting a possible resemblance (let alone a possible influence), [e]ven as a fellow ethical naturalist, Nietzsche takes pains to distance himself from their cardinal doctrines.³⁰⁶

However, this last argument deserves to be looked at with more care. For as several commentators have suggested (especially Nabais and Van Tongeren), Nietzsche’s explicit rejection of the Stoic maxim in *JGB* 9 masks a deeper layer in which this rejection seems to be annulled. In the following two sections I will carefully analyse this aphorism and disentangle the game of masks, which might be understood in terms of ‘theatre’, the topic that occupies the two preceding aphorisms *JGB* 7 and 8. I argue that even though it must be conceded that Nietzsche’s naturalism resembles Stoicism on a number of important points, it remains implausible that his standpoint was founded on Stoicism. For although a more accurate reading of *JGB* 9 discloses some parallels, it also brings to the fore a strong point of disagreement: Nietzsche detects a certain danger in the Stoic strictness with respect to their love of truth (‘*Liebe zur Wahrheit*’³⁰⁷). It is this point of criticism that not only dominates Nietzsche’s thought of Stoicism (more on which shall be said in chapter 3); it can also be argued that it is the reason for Nietzsche’s underemphasising the existing parallels concerning naturalism.

2.5.1 *JGB* 9: THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM

Nietzsche comes up with a variety of arguments discrediting the Stoic maxim that we should live in accordance with nature, the first of which is one we have come across already: Nietzsche’s account of nature could not be more sharply distinguished from that of the Stoics.

JGB 9 „Gemäss der Natur“ wollt ihr *leben*? Oh ihr edlen Stoiker, welche Betrügerei der Worte! Denkt euch ein Wesen, wie es die Natur ist, verschwenderisch ohne Maass, gleichgültig ohne Maass, ohne Absichten und Rücksichten, ohne Erbarmen und Gerechtigkeit, fruchtbar und öde und ungewiss zugleich, denkt euch die Indifferenz selbst als Macht – wie *könntet* ihr gemäss dieser Indifferenz leben?³⁰⁸

The point of *FW* 109 is repeated, namely that nature lacks all kinds of human characteristics, such as ‘purposes’ (‘Absichten’), ‘consideration’ (‘Rücksichten’), ‘mercy’ (‘Erbarmen’), and ‘justice’ (‘Gerechtigkeit’). We saw how most of these characteristics are, indeed, accepted by

³⁰⁴ *FW* 109 3.469 ‘Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernatürlichhen!’

³⁰⁵ *JGB* 9 5.21.

³⁰⁶ Groff, P.S. (2004), 152.

³⁰⁷ *JGB* 9 5.22.

³⁰⁸ 5.21-2.

the Stoics as belonging to nature ('mercy' being the only one that could be disputed³⁰⁹). Instead, nature is presented as 'wasteful beyond measure' ('verschwenderisch ohne Maass') and 'indifferent beyond measure' ('gleichgültig ohne Maass'); it is even 'indifference itself as power' ('die Indifferenz selbst als Macht'), at the same time fertile ('fruchtbar') and desolate ('öde'). These more positive descriptions announce Nietzsche's very own interpretation of nature, which can be summarized with the concept 'Wille zur Macht', a term that is introduced in *JGB* at the end of this very aphorism and that is elaborated on in the various aphorisms in the rest of the book.

The second point of criticism, which is based on the first, argues that it is impossible to take seriously the ideal of living in accordance with nature. A specific argument for this concerns the use of the word 'Maass': whereas nature lacks measure according to *JGB* 9 (that is, to be exact, it is measure-less in relation to being 'wasteful' and 'indifferent'), the suggestion is that the Stoics mistakenly recognize a 'measure' in nature („Gemäss der Natur“), and want to accept it as the moral standard.³¹⁰ Nietzsche's newly introduced account of nature cannot be taken as such, for how could it be possible to live in accordance with indifference itself?

In order to further point out this impossibility, Nietzsche opposes life to nature in the next sentence.

Leben – ist das nicht gerade ein Anders-sein-wollen, als diese Natur ist? Ist Leben nicht Abschätzen, Vorziehen, Ungerechtsein, Begrenzt-sein, Different-sein-wollen?³¹¹

Yet this formulation of the relation between life and nature, which according to Laurence Lampert constitutes the 'key issue of the whole book'³¹², provokes the reader to question whether an opposition between the two can really be Nietzsche's standpoint. Indeed, in other aphorisms of *JGB* the opposition defended here is denied. In *JGB* 36, for instance, it is suggested that, based on the hypothesis 'dass man alle organischen Funktionen auf [...] Willen zur Macht zurückführen könnte', one has acquired the right 'alle wirkende Kraft eindeutig zu bestimmen als: *Wille zur Macht*'.³¹³ This *Wille zur Macht* thus excludes any differentiation

³⁰⁹ See 4.2.6 on Nietzsche's agreement with the Stoic suspicion of 'pity'. That the Stoics do not exactly ascribe 'Erbarmen' to nature can be seen, for instance, in Seneca's *De Providentia* (in particular in 1.5 and 6.1), in which it is claimed that a good man cannot suffer evil, not because God (i.e. nature) has mercy, but because God is also Providence and does not allow for evil (as is explained in chapter 2.4); even if there are unfortunate circumstances that are the result of God's doing, it is only to the non-wise that these seem evil. A true sage can acknowledge that all external circumstances are indifferent, only virtue (i.e. the practice of adequate judgement) leads to happiness. Hardship and adversity can be seen as challenges and welcome invitations to practice good judgement. If the Stoic God has 'Erbarmen', it must be in the sense of him being stern like a father, demanding strength of his children (cf. *De Providentia* 2.6), rather than making things easier for them (as has been pointed out in 2.4).

³¹⁰ The suggestion in Nabais, N. (2006) that Nietzsche's translation of the original τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν is 'hardly' justifiable because in 'none of its various versions does the meaning "measure" appear' (95) is, in my view, mistaken; the word λόγος can be taken to indicate 'measure', related as it is to the critical capacity of reason, language, logic, and the order of the cosmos, a divine order that includes right proportions and therefore λόγος. See Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987), 188: 'Given their insistence on the rationality of nature, in general and particularly for man, with the divine *logos* immanent everywhere, the Stoics were disposed to treat logic as an integral part of their philosophy.'

³¹¹ 5.22.

³¹² Lampert, L. (2001), 35.

³¹³ 5.55.

between nature and life: when applied to the ‘Welt von innen gesehen’ (and, as the opening sentence speculates, ‘Gesetzt, dass nichts Anderes als real „gegeben“ ist als unsere Welt der Begierden und Leidenschaften’³¹⁴), it must be concluded that there is will to power ‘und nichts ausserdem’.³¹⁵ In *JGB* 188 a similar negation can be found, this time connected to a distinction between nature and morality. Although its opening sentence claims ‘Jede Moral ist [...] ein Stück Tyrannei gegen die „Natur“³¹⁶, special attention should be paid to the fact that the word ‘nature’ is between quotation marks. Towards the end of the aphorism we read about the ‘moralische Imperativ der Natur’.³¹⁷ Since the reference to nature is this time without quotation marks, it is suggested that nature, conceived properly (for Nietzsche), does have its moral imperatives and thus does not oppose morality but rather includes it – as it can be said to include life.³¹⁸

It must be conceded from the inconsistency between the several aphorisms that the second point of Nietzsche’s criticism should be put into perspective. In fact, Nietzsche’s account of nature, like the Stoic one, seems to contain a moral prescription, or a ‘Maass’.³¹⁹ Although the difficulties connected to this standpoint deserve much more attention, for now it suffices to say that it calls into question the criticism of the Stoics. Nabais suspects a hidden agenda, and interprets *JGB* 9 as a crafty and ‘subtle mechanism of rhetorical distortion’³²⁰, intended to hide a ‘nearly perfect symbiosis’ between the Stoic point of view and Nietzsche’s.³²¹ It is the ‘desperate search for differences’³²² that makes Nietzsche extend ‘this process of distortion’ to the level that ‘he himself finally becomes a victim of it as well’³²³, as the criticism can be applied to himself. Although Nabais is right to a certain degree, I will argue that he overlooks two main things: the fact that Nietzsche’s play of masks might serve another goal than the desire not to reveal an affinity with the Stoics; and the importance of Nietzsche’s criticism regarding the will to truth discussed further below.

The ‘rhetorical distortion’ Nabais speaks of contains different elements. One concerns the equation between nature and life that is denied in *JGB* 9 but affirmed in *JGB* 36 and 188; another concerns the endeavour to ‘reduce the maxim of the Portico to a pure tautology.’³²⁴ Indeed, we find this attempt in the following sentence of *JGB* 9.

³¹⁴ 5-54.

³¹⁵ 5-55.

³¹⁶ 5-108.

³¹⁷ 5-110.

³¹⁸ A point taken from Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 92: ‘As long as the opposition between morality and nature subsists, “nature” needs quotation marks. Does Nietzsche suggest that there exists no nature without any moral interpretation, as there exists no morality without a natural basis?’ Also Lampert, L. (2001) makes this point, 151-2.

³¹⁹ Even if this complicates things further: what kind of ‘Maass’ we can expect from a nature consisting of will to power? I will not be able to answer this question in this thesis.

³²⁰ Nabais, N. (2006), 95.

³²¹ Nabais, N. (2006), 94.

³²² Nabais, N. (2006), 94.

³²³ Nabais, N. (2006), 96.

³²⁴ Nabais, N. (2006), 96.

Und gesetzt, euer Imperativ „gemäss der Natur leben“ bedeute im Grunde soviel als „gemäss dem Leben leben“ – wie könntet Ihr’s denn *nicht*? Wozu ein Princip aus dem machen, was ihr selbst seid und sein müsst?³²⁵

Against this objection it can be argued, as Nabais does, that the reduction fails to do justice to the actual theory of the Stoics. Living in accordance with nature is not a principle expressing ‘was ihr selbst seid und sein müsst’; those who live in accordance with nature, who, in other words, judge their impressions reasonably and assent only to correct impressions, open up the possibility of becoming a ‘sage’ and so achieving happiness. Those who do not act in this way will never attain this calm state promised by the Stoics.³²⁶ Living in accordance with nature does make a difference to the Stoics therefore, which means that the maxim cannot be taken to be a mere tautology.

But another concern must be pointed out as well. In Nabais’ words: ‘doesn’t seeing oneself as “an ethical task,” or (in Nietzsche’s words) making “a principle out of what you are” mean the same thing as Pindar’s “become what you are”? And is this not the meaning of *amor fati*, that is, “consider yourself as a *fatum*, don’t want to be ‘other,’” as Nietzsche wrote in *Ecce Homo*?³²⁷ The concern we encountered earlier comes to the fore again: even if Nietzsche is right to criticise the Stoics for being naturalists, should he not at least be honest enough to admit that the same observation can be applied to his own philosophy?

That Nietzsche is in fact aware of being not much different from the Stoics in this respect can be read in the second half of the aphorism which starts after the words quoted above. Based on the second half of this aphorism it can be argued that Nietzsche, though explicitly claiming that it is impossible to live in accordance with nature, implicitly holds that the Stoics do precisely what was deemed impossible – thereby overruling the explicit statement and thus allowing for a position resembling that of the Stoics. To be precise, one may distinguish between two ways in which the Stoics follow nature, based on Nietzsche’s texts. The first concerns the way in which the Stoics are portrayed as philosophers exercising self-tyranny. After claiming that, ‘in truth’, the Stoics do not follow nature but impose on nature their ideal and in so doing wish to mold nature ‘in accordance with Stoicism’ (more on that below), Nietzsche writes:

– und irgend ein abgründlicher Hochmuth giebt euch zuletzt noch die Tollhäusler-Hoffnung ein, dass, *weil* ihr euch selbst zu tyrannisiren versteht – Stoicismus ist Selbst-Tyrannie –, auch die Natur sich tyrannisiren lässt: ist denn der Stoiker nicht ein *Stück* Natur?³²⁸

³²⁵ 5.22.

³²⁶ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), too, argues that the reduction to a tautology does no justice to the actual Stoic account, although he puts it in a slightly different way (223): ‘Nietzsche neglects the Stoic distinction between the particular nature of this or that (human) being and the totality of nature. And he seems not to acknowledge that the idea of the Stoic maxim is that human beings should mould their nature according to the all-encompassing nature, that they must learn to understand what is really *kata physin*, ultimately, what is according to the *koine physis*.’

³²⁷ Nabais, N. (2006), 97.

³²⁸ 5.22.

Nietzsche's argument seems to be that the Stoics mistakenly think that nature lets itself be tyrannised; since they know how to tyrannise themselves, and they regard themselves as parts of nature, their 'abgründlicher Hochmuth' makes them hopeful that nature in general allows itself to be tyrannised. This, then, is their argument for trying to force upon nature their own ideal – even though they disguise this strategy afterwards. Yet what is interesting about this reasoning is the way in which Nietzsche himself connects tyranny and nature in an aphorism already mentioned: *JGB* 188. In this text Nietzsche suggests that it is natural to allow morality or any other kind of 'Zwang' to exercise a kind of tyranny, as that is the only way in which something worthwhile can be achieved. Even more interesting is the fact that Nietzsche mentions Stoicism as a good example in this context.

JGB 188 Jede Moral ist, im Gegensatz zum *laissez aller*, ein Stück Tyrannei gegen die „Natur“, auch gegen die „Vernunft“: das ist aber noch kein Einwand gegen sie [...]. Das Wesentliche und Unschätzbare an jeder Moral ist, dass sie ein langer Zwang ist: um den Stoicismus oder Port-Royal oder das Puritanerthum zu verstehen, mag man sich des Zwangs erinnern, unter dem bisher jede Sprache es zur Stärke und Freiheit gebracht [...]. Der wunderliche Thatbestand ist aber, dass Alles, was es von Freiheit, Feinheit, Kühnheit, Tanz und meisterlicher Sicherheit auf Erden giebt oder gegeben hat, sei es nun in dem Denken selbst, oder im Regieren, oder im Reden und Überreden, in den Künsten ebenso wie in den Sittlichkeiten, sich erst vermöge der „Tyrannei solcher Willkür-Gesetze“ entwickelt hat; und allen Ernstes, die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür ist nicht gering, dass gerade dies „Natur“ und „natürlich“ sei – und *nicht* jenes *laissez aller!*³²⁹

Relating this remark to *JGB* 9 suggests that it is, in fact, not such a bizarre hope (a 'Tollhäusler-Hoffnung') to think that nature allows for a form of tyranny; 'laissez aller' appears less natural than the long coercion exercised by all kinds of morality, Stoicism being an explicit example. Especially after the conclusion of *JGB* 188 that nature (without quotation marks) contains a certain moral imperative (namely: '„Du sollst gehorchen, irgend wem, und auf lange: sonst gehst du zu Grunde und verlierst die letzte Achtung vor dir selbst“'³³⁰), we cannot but conclude that Nietzsche, like the Stoics, recognizes the adequacy of long term tyranny for the achievement of something that deserves respect ('Achtung'). What is more, in tyrannising nature the Stoics do what is natural according to *JGB* 188; in tyrannising nature (i.e. themselves) they obey the moral law of nature.³³¹ *JGB* 188 thus explicitly denies the impossibility of living in accordance with nature brought forward in *JGB* 9.

The point that the Stoics do live in accordance with nature is made, secondly, through the extended application of the above point to the domain of philosophy. The second half of the aphorism begins as follows.

In Wahrheit steht es ganz anders: indem ihr entzückt den Kanon eures Gesetzes aus der Natur zu lesen vorgebt, wollt ihr etwas Umgekehrtes, ihr wunderlichen

³²⁹ 5.108.

³³⁰ 5.110.

³³¹ A conclusion also drawn by Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 224: 'What the Stoics do perfectly illustrates what will always happen in nature because nature is will to power.'

Schauspieler und Selbst-Betrüger! Euer Stolz will der Natur, sogar der Natur, eure Moral, euer Ideal vorschreiben und einverleiben, ihr verlangt, dass sie „der Stoa gemäss“ Natur sei und möchtet alles Dasein nur nach eurem eignen Bilde dasein machen – als eine ungeheure ewige Verherrlichung und Verallgemeinerung des Stoicismus! Mit aller eurer Liebe zur Wahrheit zwingt ihr euch so lange, so beharrlich, so hypnotisch-starr, die Natur *falsch*, nämlich stoisch zu sehn, bis ihr sie nicht mehr anders zu sehen vermögt³³²

The main point of criticism expressed in this text is that the Stoics knowingly deceive themselves. The foundation of their maxim, their account of nature, is *not* an independently acquired law, but instead an interpretation that betrays the Stoic ideal and the will to force it on nature. They are ‘strange actors and self-deceivers’, staging their ideal of conforming to nature while hiding, also from themselves, the actual practice of making nature conform to their ideal, thereby falsifying nature. The last sentences of the aphorism, however, take this criticism to the level of a general observation about what happens with all kinds of philosophy as soon as they start believing in themselves.

Aber dies ist eine alte ewige Geschichte: was sich damals mit den Stoikern begab, begiebt sich heute noch, sobald nur eine Philosophie anfängt, an sich selbst zu glauben. Sie schafft immer die Welt nach ihrem Bilde, sie kann nicht anders; Philosophie ist dieser tyrannische Trieb selbst, der geistigste Wille zur Macht, zur „Schaffung der Welt“, zur *causa prima*.³³³

This final remark of the aphorism thus immediately puts in perspective the criticism of the Stoics; that is, Stoicism is introduced as only one example of a philosophy that ‘creates the world in its own image’, as ‘it can do no other’. Philosophy is defined as ‘this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power’. But pointing out that the analysis of Stoicism is applicable to all kinds of philosophy is not even the best way to nuance Nietzsche’s criticism. Things get really interesting when it is recognized that the analysis must be applied to Nietzsche himself as well. Lampert makes this point with respect to Nietzsche’s view of nature as will to power: ‘Nietzsche’s emphatic conclusion about all philosophy goads his audience to ask how the generalization he applies to others applies to him. [...] Unless we suppose that by the end of his paragraph Nietzsche had forgotten what he said at its beginning, we must conclude that Nietzsche’s first mention of the will to power is itself theatrical and self-reflexive. [...] Does Nietzsche’s philosophy “believe in itself”? It can do no other.’³³⁴

In spite of Nietzsche’s claim that the Stoic maxim ‘live in accordance with nature’ is a ‘fraud of words’, it must be concluded that the Stoics in fact set the example of how to follow nature, thereby rendering Nietzsche’s rejection of Stoicism a ‘fraud of words’. Not only is their practice of self-tyranny an expression of obedience to the moral law of nature; also their philosophy, demanding to be believed, is a good example of how all philosophy, including that of Nietzsche, follows its tyrannical course.

³³² 5.22.

³³³ 5.22.

³³⁴ Lampert, L. (2001), 36.

2.5.2 JGB 9: THE PHYSICS OF NATURALISM: HONESTY

Yet the fact that Nietzsche's criticism of Stoic philosophy is applicable to his own should not be taken as sufficient reason to conclude that Nietzsche regards his philosophy as equal to Stoicism (as Nabais does³³⁵), or, even beyond that, that he intends to hide its possible influence on his thought. One important difference should not be overlooked: the Stoics precisely lack the aspect of self-reflexivity that Nietzsche stages. Nietzsche's argument concerning honesty can and must be applied to his own philosophy; but this is a strategy that reveals in Lampert's words 'the fundamental problem of philosophy', the problem, namely, that once a philosophy starts believing in itself it becomes a tyrannical doctrine, achieving the opposite of what was intended, namely falsehood instead of truth ('Mit aller eurer Liebe zur Wahrheit zwingt ihr euch so lange, so beharrlich, so hypnotisch-starr, die Natur falsch, nämlich stoisch zu sehn').³³⁶ If falsification cannot be avoided, what use is there for honesty? What possible method is left for philosophy at all? Awareness of this problem is utterly lacking in Stoicism, which makes the Stoics lack in honesty or truthfulness in Nietzsche's eyes.³³⁷ What is more, it is this problem, which becomes visible by self-reflexively turning the will to truth on itself, that forms the key subject of the first book of *JGB* if not of *JGB* in total. The very first word of the book is 'Wille zur Wahrheit', and all aphorisms preceding *JGB* 9 revolve around the question of the value and attainability of truth.³³⁸

Nietzsche's problem with Stoicism is, as I will show in more detail now, not so much their ethics of naturalism; as we have seen, Nietzsche concurs with this approach to some degree and the playful staging of their similarities proves that he is aware of it (more on other elements of their ethics will be explored in chapter 3). The real problem lies in the Stoic theatre of possessing true knowledge of nature. If a philosopher claims to have found a law in nature, should we not be suspicious that this is, in fact, merely a consequence of his wishful thinking, a 'belief'? That this forms the main point of Nietzsche's criticism of the Stoics can be confirmed by looking more closely at the preceding aphorisms concerning the subject of theatre. *JGB* 7, 8 and 9 all discuss ancient philosophy in this context. Both Plato and Epicurus are introduced in *JGB* 7 (the central point of which is that Epicurus expressed his contempt

³³⁵ As well as Lampert, L. (2001) for instance by concluding (267) that '*Beyond Good and Evil* has argued that humanity matures by learning to live in accordance with nature', that is, by taking the Stoics as examples. He makes the exemplary role of the Stoics explicit as follows (37): 'By introducing will to power as a critique of Stoicism, Nietzsche invites its misconstrual as a critique of philosophy generally. But when all the discussions of will to power are considered, it is evident that Nietzsche's opening statement is as far as possible from critique. On the contrary, it is an elevation of philosophy to the highest possible rank: philosophy, spirited and reasoned inquiry into nature and human life, rooted in passion and supervised by a self-legislated intellectual conscience, is the highest form achieved by nature; it is the natural apex of nature, and insight into its character must be recovered if philosophy is to flourish again as it flourished among the Greeks and Romans.'

³³⁶ Lampert, L. (2001), 36.

³³⁷ Crick, N. (2011) formulates this point as follows, 112: 'The great flaw of the Stoics is that their so-called honesty was complete self-delusion; the implication is that once one comes to terms with the aesthetic nature of their illusions, a greater and more penetrating honesty is possible.' However, *JGB* makes it clear that being honest does not solve the problem but constitutes it.

³³⁸ For a more elaborate discussion of this topic see the book on *JGB* by Acampora, D. and Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 29-52.

and at the same time envy for Plato's capacity for staging: '„das sind Alles *Schauspieler*, daran ist nichts Ächtes'³³⁹) and *JGB* 8 forms the bridge between 7 and 9.

JGB 8 In jeder Philosophie giebt es einen Punkt, wo die „Überzeugung“ des Philosophen auf die Bühne tritt: oder, um es in der Sprache eines alten Mysteriums zu sagen:

adventavit asinus
pulcher et fortissimus.³⁴⁰

The translation of the small Latin poem reads 'The ass arrived beautiful and most brave'; 'asinus' literally means 'donkey', and should be seen as symbolising stupidity – in the sentence above identified with the philosopher's '„Überzeugung“' and thus to be equated with the moment in which a philosophy starts to believe in itself. It is made apparent therefore that it is useful for all philosophers who wish to be successful (like Plato, thereby surpassing Epicurus as can be read in *JGB* 7) to hide their stupidity or 'Überzeugung' by masking it in a seductive play; but even Plato, who is characterised as a very gifted actor, could not avoid the embarrassment of being exposed.

The oddity of the Stoics is that their philosophy is the opposite of Plato's: what they do is not concealing but showing off their stupidity, i.e. their unshakable belief in their own ideal; what they hide, even to themselves, is the fact that their conviction is the result of their tyrannical desire (hence Nietzsche's remark that the Stoics are 'strange actors', 'wunderlichen Schauspieler'). This oddity is the reason that, in Lampert's words, 'they [the Stoics] rank below Plato and Epicurus'; 'they don't know they're acting'.³⁴¹ In comparison to Plato, Stoicism 'was noble but more innocent, an acting school whose leading players did not realise they were living a fiction they themselves had invented'.³⁴² Yet it can be argued that Nietzsche suspects the influence of something more intricate than plain innocence.

JGB 5 Was dazu reizt, auf alle Philosophen halb misstrauisch, halb spöttisch zu blicken, ist nicht, dass man wieder und wieder dahinter kommt, wie unschuldig sie sind – wie oft und wie leicht sie sich vergreifen und verirren, kurz ihre Kinderei und Kindlichkeit – sondern dass es bei ihnen nicht redlich genug zugeht³⁴³

The lack of Redlichkeit will turn out to be Nietzsche's major complaint against the Stoics – in fact, although the tyranny of their belief had been portrayed in *JGB* 188 as a necessary ingredient for nature to develop into something more refined, it is also presented as a kind of 'stupidity', 'Dummheit'. *JGB* 188 provides the first example.

JGB 188 diese Tyrannei, diese Willkür, diese strenge und grandiose Dummheit hat den Geist erzogen³⁴⁴

³³⁹ 5.21.

³⁴⁰ 5.21.

³⁴¹ Lampert, L. (2001), 35.

³⁴² Lampert, L. (2001), 37.

³⁴³ 5.18.

³⁴⁴ 5.109.

The link between Stoicism and stupidity, then, is repeated in several other aphorisms, notably *JGB* 198 and 227. In *JGB* 198 the connection is made between stupidity and (Stoic) morality³⁴⁵; *JGB* 227 makes this connection more specifically by focusing on the virtue of honesty. The first half of this aphorism has been interpreted in several contexts as though Nietzsche's remark 'bleiben wir *hart*, wir letzten Stoiker!' betrays his ongoing appreciation of Stoicism (especially Van Tongeren, who in a chapter called 'Nietzsche's Stoicism' claims that this is one of 'several other remarks in which [Nietzsche] expresses his fascination for the Stoics'³⁴⁶; also Melissa Lane argues similarly³⁴⁷).

JGB 227 Redlichkeit, gesetzt, dass dies unsre Tugend ist, von der wir nicht loskönnen, wir freien Geister – nun, wir wollen mit aller Bosheit und Liebe an ihr arbeiten und nicht müde werden, uns in *unsrer* Tugend, die allein uns übrig blieb, zu „vervollkommen“: mag ihr Glanz einmal wie ein vergoldetes blaues spöttisches Abendlicht über dieser alternden Cultur und ihrem dumpfen düsteren Ernste liegen bleiben! Und wenn dennoch unsre Redlichkeit eines Tages müde wird und seufzt und die Glieder streckt und uns zu *hart* findet und es besser, leichter, zärtlicher haben möchte, gleich einem angenehmen Laster: bleiben wir *hart*, wir letzten Stoiker!

Even though the last sentence does imply that Nietzsche counts himself as one of the last standing Stoics, it pays off to look carefully at the following sentences when it comes to the exact connotation of Nietzsche's reference to the Stoics. Even if they may be seen as exemplary when it comes to a disciplined attitude regarding the virtue of 'Redlichkeit' (supposedly the last virtue 'we free spirits' cannot rid ourselves of, revealing in the light of the setting sun the end of western tradition as we know it and so announcing a new 'dawn'³⁴⁸), it is made apparent that this virtue is ultimately misunderstood by them. In their hands, purposefully deceiving themselves, it has turned into a 'Dummheit'. In other words, their lack of 'Redlichkeit' applied to the virtue of 'Redlichkeit' itself ('dass es bei ihnen nicht redlich genug zugeht') becomes visible.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁵ *JGB* 198 5.118: 'Alle diese Moralen, die sich an die einzelne Person wenden, zum Zwecke ihres „Glückes“, wie es heisst, [...] allesammt in der Form barock und unvernünftig – weil sie sich an „Alle“ wenden, weil sie generalisiren, wo nicht generalisirt werden darf – [...] Das ist Alles, intellektuell gemessen, wenig werth und noch lange nicht „Wissenschaft“, geschweige denn „Weisheit“, sondern, nochmals gesagt und dreimal gesagt, Klugheit, Klugheit, Klugheit, gemischt mit Dummheit, Dummheit, Dummheit, – sei es nun jene Gleichgültigkeit und Bildsäulenkälte gegen die hitzige Narrheit der Affekte, welche die Stoiker anriethen und ankurirten'. Chapter 3 will dedicate more attention to Nietzsche's stance on the Stoic dealing with affects.

³⁴⁶ Van Tongeren, P. (1999), 224.

³⁴⁷ Lane, M. (2007), 37; although her comments here concern *JGB* 230, her argument is that the word 'hart' of *JGB* 227 is picked up in this aphorism once again in the context of the discipline necessary for science; what is more, 'Nietzsche is musing here on man as part of nature, an important Stoic theme, and in homage to them he seems to have picked up, inverted or perhaps coined a Latin phrase in order to do so [referring to '*homo natura*']'.

³⁴⁸ Perhaps it is not a coincidence that it is in a book entitled *Morgenröthe* that we find explained why Redlichkeit is the 'last' virtue; see *M* 456 3.275. Also with respect to timing this is not a surprise; for more on that see 3.3 and 4.2.

³⁴⁹ I disagree in this regard with Lane, M. (2007), 39, according to whom Nietzsche's criticism of the Stoics does not include their lack of honesty. 'It is precisely their self-deception, what *Beyond Good and Evil* 5 called the fundamental lack of honesty in the philosophers of the past, which incurs Nietzsche's

[...] Unsre Redlichkeit, wir freien Geister, – sorgen wir dafür, dass sie nicht unsre Eitelkeit, unser Putz und Prunk, unsre Grenze, unsre Dummheit werde! Jede Tugend neigt zur Dummheit, jede Dummheit zur Tugend; „dumm bis zur Heiligkeit“ sagt man in Russland, – sorgen wir dafür, dass wir nicht aus Redlichkeit zuletzt noch zu Heiligen und Langweiligen werden!³⁵⁰

These sentences, seen in the context of *JGB* 9, 188 and 189, must be read as a complaint at least appropriate also for the Stoics, as it was *their* ‘Redlichkeit’ that turned into vanity (or their ‘Stolz’ as it is called in *JGB* 9), an ‘act on stage’, and therefore a stupidity. Being ‘redlich’ enough with respect to ‘Redlichkeit’ itself (something that the Stoics omitted to be) may presuppose a Stoic steadfastness at first, but immediately demands a distance from the virtue as well, as it is then that the virtue is in greatest danger of becoming a ‘Dummheit’. This is why we (or Nietzsche) cannot but be one of the ‘last Stoics’: once we see through the danger of honesty we can no longer be true Stoics and persist in thinking that we can be honest without being dishonest.³⁵¹ Even being honest with respect to our own tyranny can become a dull ‘Dummheit’, seen from this perspective.

The outcome of this complex and self-referential dialogue with the Stoics is that Nietzsche’s fascination revolves around their approach of the virtue of Redlichkeit more than their naturalism. Indeed, it might be the case that Nietzsche’s critique of their lack of Redlichkeit, described in terms of Dummheit, Schauspielerei and Selbst-Betrügerei, overpowers the similarities in the domain of the ethics of naturalism; which, as stated, provides us with at least a hypothesis for his reason to mask this similarity (even though a precise reader is invited to lay bare the different layers, which suggests a more attenuated attempt to disguise the similarity than Nabais proposes). This attention on the Stoic approach of Redlichkeit is not merely a coincidental occurrence; as I will show in the next chapter, the majority of Nietzsche’s references to the Stoics must be read in this context.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has put in perspective three possible ways in which Stoicism might have influenced Nietzsche’s conception of *amor fati*. I have shown that there are not only serious differences between the Stoic theory of the eternal return and the doctrine we find in Nietzsche’s work; I also argued that the text in *EH*, the only one in which an explicit connection with the Stoics is made, cannot be taken to prove that Nietzsche was influenced by the Stoics in this regard. Rather, it shows his admiration for Heraclitus and his dissatisfaction with the Stoic method of turning Heraclitean principles into a form of ‘optimism’. Secondly, the suggestion that Nietzsche was inspired by ‘Cosmic Stoicism’ when introducing *amor fati*

attack. Yet the Stoic cognitive stance is not in principle wedded to such self-deception. The latter is the fault of the ancient Stoa’s metaphysical commitments, not of their commitment to honesty’.

³⁵⁰ 5.162-3.

³⁵¹ Even if this argument, too, seems to bring Nietzsche and the Stoics closer to one another: they both realise that dishonesty is needed; although, again, the Stoics do not show any signs of this awareness. But then again, this could be seen simply as a confirmation of their successfully executed lie; just as Nietzsche’s plea for radical honesty might be a trick and therefore a lie.

has been nuanced. Nietzsche's way of discussing Stoicism betrays an understanding of it as 'Human' rather than 'Cosmic'. Thirdly, the idea that Nietzsche's naturalism is Stoic has been examined. Although there are, indeed, remarkable parallels between Nietzsche and the Stoics in this respect, a thorough analysis of *JGB* 9 has shown that Nietzsche is aware of these similarities but criticises the Stoics when it comes to the foundation of their theory: the claim of possessing true knowledge of nature. The lack of honesty in this regard will prove to be one of Nietzsche's major complaints against the Stoics. What is more, the way in which Nietzsche problematizes the procedure of gaining knowledge about a nature of which we are a part will have its repercussions for our understanding of *amor fati*. Chapter 5 will bring together Nietzsche's main points of critique of Stoicism, that will be further explored in the next two chapters, and the analysis of *amor fati*.

Chapter 3: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF NIETZSCHE'S REFLECTIONS ON STOICISM

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Having discussed and nuanced the several possible parallels between Nietzsche's *amor fati* and Stoic physics and ethics, I shall now examine Nietzsche's actual engagement with Stoicism. In this chapter I argue that the typical context in which Nietzsche turns to the Stoics is that of the will to truth. To be sure, this does not exclude references to ethics; yet as I will show, most of the references made in this context should also be read in relation to truth, be it the truth based on which a morality is adopted (in naturalism for instance) or the morality motivating the pursuit of the truth (related to the virtue of *Redlichkeit* as well as the management of the passions).³⁵² I therefore distance myself from those mentioned in the Introduction who claim that Nietzsche adheres to Stoicism mainly in the context of therapy as a quest for 'the best way of life'³⁵³, and concur with the main point of Melissa Lane's article 'Honesty as the Best Policy' that 'Nietzsche was engaged in an evolving and contrasting evaluation of the role of honesty in the cognitive and emotional aspects of self-fashioning in the strategies of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans.'³⁵⁴

This chapter also indicates how the explicit references to Stoicism exhibit a development in Nietzsche's thought. Even though the context of will to truth remains a constant factor shaping Nietzsche's engagement, his assessment of the Stoic strategy in this domain becomes increasingly critical from *M* onwards (1880-1881). I argue that it will be necessary to examine this development in more detail, and to include the non-explicit references to Stoicism in the investigation. Chapters 3.4, 3.5 and 4 take up this challenge. In chapter 4 I trace Nietzsche's growing discontent in the years of the writing of *M* and the first four books of *FW*, the final book of which introduces *amor fati*. The impact of this development on our understanding of the early concept of *amor fati* will be discussed in chapter 5.

³⁵² Of course there are exceptions to this rule.

³⁵³ Especially argued for by Ure, M., whose points will be elaborated on in chapter 4. But also Sellars suggests something similar, based on what I believe is a misreading of Nietzsche's early (1874) essay *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* (*UB* III). See Sellars, J. (2006b), 152, in a section that summarizes Nietzsche's points of interest concerning Stoicism: 'In his *SE* Nietzsche outlines a practical conception of philosophy as a way of life that draws an analogy between philosophy and the art of medicine'. The relevance of *UB* III for Nietzsche's relation with Stoicism is not clear however; Nietzsche refers to the Stoics not once, and the account of philosophy he offers in this essay is in no evident way a representation of Stoicism.

³⁵⁴ Lane, M. (2007), 25.

3.2 NIETZSCHE'S REFERENCES TO STOICISM IN GENERAL

The explicit references to Stoicism, the analysis of which forms the foundation for this chapter, are spread out all over Nietzsche's works; from the earliest to the latest, in the *Nachlass* and the published works.³⁵⁵ The Stoics are also mentioned in two of Nietzsche's letters.³⁵⁶ The majority of the references occur in contexts that are not primarily concerned with Stoicism. But even if some of these seem trivial, they are significant, revealing not only patterns of association but also of tone or attitude; as we have seen, a polemical tendency is not unusual. In general, it is possible to discern three different angles from which Nietzsche approaches Stoicism. There are references from a historical perspective, on occasion attempting to grasp the relevance of Stoicism in the age leading up to a world dominated by Christianity.³⁵⁷ Secondly, some references pick up on its spirit or psychological attitude, mainly in order to judge whether it deserves approval or rejection (and, as I will argue, especially in the context of the pursuit of truth).³⁵⁸ The most general introduction to this kind of reference is the following *Nachlass* passage, in which Stoicism is explicitly described as a 'moral school', to be taken as a 'place of experimentation', in which some 'Kunstgriffen der Lebensklugheit' are thoroughly exercised and thought through to the fullest degree; the results are ours to consider, Nietzsche claims.

³⁵⁵ The sum of all references is 126, including his letters and the mentioning of specific Stoics such as Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Ariston of Chios. As indicated in chapter 2, Nietzsche wrote an important essay on *DL VII* in 1869, and occasionally referred to the Stoics when teaching in Basel. He reversed Seneca's lament 'itaque quae philosophia fuit, facta philologia est' of *Epistles* 108 into a hopeful 'philosophia facta est quae philologia fuit' at the end of his inaugural lecture 'Homer und die klassische Philologie' in 1869. In a letter written on April 15th 1868 to prof. Friedrich Zarncke Nietzsche mentions some of the later authors reflecting on the Stoics as those that are closest to his heart and claims: 'Das Gebiet, in dem ich glaube leidlich bewandert zu sein, ist das einer Quellenkunde und Methodik der griechischen Literaturgeschichte; um außerdem noch einige Namen zu nennen, die mir näher stehen, so mögen hier außer Hesiod noch Plato, Theognis sammt den Elegikern, Demokrit, Epikur, Laertius Diogenes, Stobäus, Suidas, Athenäus eine Stelle finden.' The earliest reference in the *KSA* is to be found in a *Nachlass* note from 1870, one in which a sketch for 'Socrates und der Instinct' is made; *NL* 3[73] 7-79: 'Der Stoicismus als Souveränität des Bewußtseins. Das Sprüchwort'. The latest *Nachlass* note can be found in *NL* 15[29] 13.422 (spring 1888): 'der Stoicismus selbst war eine solche Hemmschuh-Moral'. The final reference in the published works is in *EH* (GT) 3 6.313: 'Zum Mindesten hat die Stoa, die fast alle ihre grundsätzlichen Vorstellungen von Heraklit geerbt hat, Spuren davon'.

³⁵⁶ The first to Franz Overbeck, November 14th 1884: 'Die unausgesetzte schmerzliche Entbehrung an allem Nothdürftigen, Tröstlichen, Stärkenden, lange zusammengedrückt durch meinen üblichen Gedulds-Stoicismus, bricht von Zeit zu Zeit heraus'. *KGB III*/1.554-5; the second to Erwin Rhode, May 19th 1887: 'In der schmerzliche Geschichte der modernen Seele [...], nimmt Taine seinen Platz ein als ein wohlgerathener und ehrwürdiger Typus mehrerer der nobelsten Qualitäten dieser Seele [...], ihres rührenden und bescheidenen Stoicismus inmitten tiefer Entbehrung und Vereinsamung.' *KGB III*/5.76-7. Nietzsche also received at least two letters in which the authors discuss Stoicism; one July 9th 1883 from Heinrich Köselitz (a younger friend and student of Nietzsche's, who is known by the name of 'Peter Gast') on the issue of Seneca and suicide (*KGB III*/2.381-2); the other by the same author, August 28th of the same year, on the resemblance between the Stoics and the church fathers (*KGB III*/2.392-5).

³⁵⁷ See for instance *JGB* 189 5.110, in which the appearance of moral fanaticism is analysed in the context of its age; Stoicism is introduced as an example: 'Von einem höheren Orte aus gesehen, erscheinen ganze Geschlechter und Zeitalter, wenn sie mit irgend einem moralischen Fanatismus behaftet auftreten, als solche eingelegte Zwangs- und Fastenzeiten [...]; auch einzelne philosophische Sekten (zum Beispiel die Stoa inmitten die der hellenistische Cultur und ihrer mit aphrodisischen Düften überladenen und geil gewordenen Luft) erlauben eine derartige Auslegung.'

³⁵⁸ The most explicit examples of which are *NL* 15[55] 9.652-3 and *FW* 306 3.544, which will be discussed in detail in this chapter and the next two.

NL 15[59] Was die Praxis betrifft: so betrachte ich die einzelnen moralischen Schulen als Stätten des Experiments, wo eine Anzahl Kunstgriffen der Lebensklugheit gründlich geübt und zu Ende gedacht wurden: die Resultate aller dieser Schulen und aller ihrer Erfahrungen gehören *uns*, wir nehmen einen stoischen Kunstgriff deshalb nicht weniger gern an, weil wir schon epikureische uns zu eigen gemacht haben.³⁵⁹

Thirdly, there are direct engagements with Stoic philosophy, as part of a dialogue on a particular topic. The most striking example of the third angle concerns the topic of 'pity', which will be discussed in detail in 4.2.6.

In this chapter I will focus mainly on the second perspective, as it is most closely linked with Nietzsche's philosophical interests.³⁶⁰ Nevertheless, examples of the first perspective reveal an important aspect of Nietzsche's approach. It betrays the influence, if only indirectly, of a Hegelian framework. Placing Nietzsche in the broader framework of the 19th Century we can see traces of the influence of the Hegelian historian Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), who developed the concept of 'Hellenism'. Being a Christian scholar he argued that the Hellenistic age should be regarded as a period of decline after Alexander the Great's death (323 BC), which paved the way for the rise of Christianity.³⁶¹ His account influenced Brandis, Ueberweg, Zeller, Erdmann, and Schwegler³⁶², many of whose works Nietzsche knew well.³⁶³ Zeller, for instance, whose work was in Nietzsche's library, explains how Stoicism should be seen as a morality of defence in reaction to political uncertainty.³⁶⁴

In comparison to the generally positive estimation of Stoicism until the 18th Century, philosophers and historians in the 19th Century developed a surprisingly negative outlook along these lines.³⁶⁵ Given the number of Nietzsche's critical remarks on Stoicism it can be argued therefore that Nietzsche was a typical representative of his age. Yet although many of the references to Stoicism betray the influence of this Hegelian approach, Nietzsche's suspicion of

³⁵⁹ 9.654-5.

³⁶⁰ This division follows from the work I have done for the Nietzsche Dictionary.

³⁶¹ Momigliano, A. (1970).

³⁶² Ierodiakonou, K. (1998), 9.

³⁶³ See *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek* (2003). His library contains the three parts of *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart* by Friedrich Ueberweg (627-8), and *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Erster Theil. Allgemeine Einleitung. Vorsokratische Philosophie* by Eduard Zeller (661). Brandis is mentioned in the same sentence as Zeller in *UB III* 8 1.417, indicating Nietzsche's familiarity with his work.

³⁶⁴ Ierodiakonou, K. (1998), 11, citing Zeller on 15.

³⁶⁵ Elements of which can still be found, for instance in the analysis of Stoicism in Bertrand Russell (1945). Schofield, M. in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 739, narrows down this negative outlook on Hellenism to its ideas on political philosophy: 'Hellenistic political philosophy has had a bad press.' He refers to lectures by Moses Finley, published in 1983, and the 'eminently serviceable general account of Greek political thought' by T.A. Sinclair 'some thirty years earlier', claiming that 'Finley and Sinclair are only echoing a long entrenched judgement which finds a classic formulation in the third volume of Zeller's great history of Greek philosophy, first published in 1852. For Zeller the Hellenistic period found the Greeks coping with a deterioration in external circumstances, and particularly with a loss of political self-determination [...], by withdrawing into the inner world of self-consciousness.' Schofield acknowledges the difficulty of 'displacing' 'the prevailing climate of opinion about Hellenistic political and social thought'; although 'many of its elements will not stand careful scrutiny', the only hope still is 'to reconstruct a convincing alternative picture', which is difficult due to the 'simple fact that most of what was written is now lost' (740).

Christianity causes him to reconsider the strengths and weaknesses visible in this time frame. Examples can be found especially in the later texts, in which Nietzsche compares Stoicism to Christianity and seems indecisive when it comes to their exact relation. In some texts Nietzsche judges Stoicism negatively as a forbearer of Christianity (cf. *NL* 11[375]: 'die stoische Selbst-Verhärtung, die platonische Sinnen-Verleumdung, die Vorbereitung des Bodens für das Christenthum...' ³⁶⁶), in others he detects a certain strength limiting the growth of Christianity. The following *Nachlass* text is an example, characterising Stoicism as a 'blocking morality' and Christianity as the ultimate sign of decadence (even if Christianity is not named explicitly).

NL 15[29] Zwei Typen der Moral sind nicht zu verwechseln: eine Moral, mit der sich der gesund gebliebene Instinkt gegen die beginnende *décadence* wehrt – und eine andere Moral, mit der eben diese *décadence* sich formuliert, rechtfertigt und selber abwärts führt... Die erstere pflegt stoisch, hart, tyrannisch zu sein – der Stoicismus selbst war eine solche Hemmschuh-Moral – die andere ist schwärmerisch, sentimental, voller Geheimnisse, sie hat die Weiber und die „schönen Gefühle“ für sich. ³⁶⁷

In both textual examples we find Stoicism portrayed as a morality dominating a certain age, more in particular one that approaches one's 'Sinnen' and 'Gefühle' in a specific manner. We can also suspect how, based on these examples: there is an element of 'Selbst-Verhärtung' involved, suggesting the 'tyrannical' rejection of affects. The opposite is the 'sentimental' type of morality, associated with art, mysteries and women. Even if the basic features of this analysis do not change, Nietzsche's evaluation of them does. This does not only happen when Nietzsche approaches Stoicism from this historical perspective; as we will see, it happens even more prominently within the second perspective, assessing the Stoic attitude to dealing with affects mostly in the context of the drive to find truth.

Within all three perspectives of Nietzsche's explicit references to Stoicism some characteristics occur repeatedly. These are (1) a lack of honesty, even dishonesty, theatre, pretension, arrogance, in combination with (2) a sense of hardness, coldness, numbness, even stupidity, which is sometimes referred to as 'masculine', being the consequence of (3) a long and persistent ascetic overpowering of the passions (self-tyranny) ³⁶⁸, out of (4) a desire for clarity, abstraction, systems, 'truth'. For all four of the characteristics many textual examples can be found; I will limit myself here to a minimum of illustrations of each, giving examples from the early as well as the later texts, thereby stressing the continuity of the type of observation at hand. ³⁶⁹ 3.2.1 discusses the first characteristic of hypocrisy; 3.2.2 covers the three others.

³⁶⁶ 13.169.

³⁶⁷ 13.422. Another example of comparison, in which in this case Epictetus is favoured, can be found in an earlier text, namely *M* 546 3.316-7: 'Von dem *Christen* unterscheidet er [Epiktet] sich vor Allem hierin, dass der Christ in Hoffnung lebt, in der Vertröstung auf „unaussprechbare Herrlichkeiten“, dass er sich beschenken lässt und das Beste von der göttlichen Liebe und Gnade, und nicht von sich, erwartet und annimmt: während Epiktet nicht hofft und sein Bestes sich nicht schenken lässt, – er besitzt es, er hält es tapfer in seiner Hand, er macht es der ganze Welt streitig, wenn diese es ihm rauben will.'

³⁶⁸ This aspect of Stoicism is importantly refuted as 'mistaken' in contemporary analyses; see for instance Long, A.A. (2006), 381-2: 'It is a complete mistake to regard Stoicism as advocating repression of emotion in every sense of the word.'

³⁶⁹ More examples can be found in the following footnotes.

3.2.1 HYPOCRISY

Of the first feature we have encountered several examples already. Stoics are described in *JGB* 9 as 'wunderlichen Schauspieler und Selbst-Betrüger'³⁷⁰ and *JGB* 5 suggests that it can be said of the Stoics 'dass es bei ihnen nicht redlich genug zugeht'.³⁷¹

As a possible source of this judgment the influence of Schopenhauer should be mentioned. Nietzsche, whose thinking is inspired by his philosophy to a large degree (see for instance *UB* III, *Schopenhauer als Erzieher*, 1874), distances himself from him from approximately 1878 onward. This distance becomes visible for the first time in *MA* I, but remains of importance throughout Nietzsche's life.³⁷² In both volumes of *Der Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (*WW*; in the second edition published in 1844) Schopenhauer dedicates a whole section to the Stoics. Already in the first volume (first published in 1819) we can see how he judges the Stoic ideal of a life without suffering as an impossibility³⁷³; the 'contradiction' ('Widerspruch') of still striving for it is expressed in the stiffness and lack of liveliness in their model of the sage.³⁷⁴ In the second volume, reflecting on this paragraph, he adds that the Stoics are in fact 'braggarts' ('Maulhelde'), only pretending to be independent from external circumstances, which they call indifferences. They are opposed here to the Cynics, whom Schopenhauer prefers because they at least put their ideal of independence into practice. He concludes that the Stoic turn to mere theory undermines their credibility.

WW II 16 Aus ihnen [die Kyniker] giengen nun die *Stoiker* dadurch hervor, daß sie das Praktische in ein Theoretisches verwandelten. Sie meinten, das *wirkliche* Entbehren alles irgend Entbehrlichen sei nicht erfordert, sondern es reiche hin, daß man Besitz und Genuß beständig als *entbehrlich* und als in der Hand des Zufalls stehend betrachte [...]. So vervollkommneten die *Stoiker* die Theorie des Gleichmuths und der Unabhängigkeit, auf Kosten der Praxis, indem sie Alles auf einen mentalen Proceß zurückführten und durch Argumente [...]. Sie hatten aber dabei außer Acht gelassen, daß alles Gewohnte zum Bedürfniß wird und daher nur mit Schmerz entbehrt werden kann; daß der Wille nicht mit sich spielen läßt, nicht genießen kann, ohne die Genüsse zu lieben [...]. Sie aber glaubten sich dadurch mit ihren Grundsätzen abzufinden, daß sie, an einer luxuriösen Römischen Tafel sitzend, kein Gericht ungekostet ließen, jedoch dabei versicherten, Das wären sammt und sonders bloße *proëgmena*, keine *agatha*; oder, Deutsch zu reden, daß sie aßen, tranken und sich einen guten Tag machten, dabei aber dem lieben Gott keinen Dank dafür wußten, vielmehr fastidiöse Gesichter schnitten und nur immer brav versicherten, sie machten sich den Teufel

³⁷⁰ 5.22.

³⁷¹ 5.18.

³⁷² See Young, J. (2010), 81-95, on Nietzsche's early discovery of Schopenhauer, its deeply felt effect, and the development of an attitude of critique based on the reading of Lange.

³⁷³ Schopenhauer, *WW* I 16: 'Es liegt vielmehr ein vollkommener Widerspruch darin, leben zu wollen ohne zu leiden'.

³⁷⁴ *WW* I 16: 'Der oben erwähnte innere Widerspruch aber, mit welchem die Stoische Ethik, selbst in ihrem Grundgedanken, behaftet ist, zeigt sich ferner auch darin, daß ihr Ideal, der Stoische Weise, in ihrer Darstellung selbst, nie Leben oder innere poetische Wahrheit gewinnen konnte, sondern ein hölzerner, steifer Gliedermann bleibt, mit dem man nichts anfangen kann, der selbst nicht weiß wohin mit seiner Weisheit, dessen vollkommene Ruhe, Zufriedenheit, Glückseligkeit dem Wesen der Menschheit gerade zuwiderspricht und uns zu keiner anschaulichen Vorstellung davon kommen läßt.'

etwas aus der ganzen Fresserei. Dies war das Auskunftsmittel der *Stoiker*: sie waren demnach bloße Maulhelden³⁷⁵

Schopenhauer's depiction of Stoicism as a philosophy that only theoretically preaches independence while at the same time allowing the enjoyment of earthly pleasures may well have inspired Nietzsche's judgement that Stoics are untruthful, using their morality only as a facade.

Besides *JGB* 9 and 5, aphorism 359 of *FW*'s Book V (written after *JGB*) provides a good example. It opens with the question 'Die Moral – wo glaubt ihr wohl, dass sie ihre gefährlichsten und tückischsten Anwälte hat?'³⁷⁶; 'Morality, where do you suppose that it finds its most dangerous and insidious advocates?' Offering an answer to this question, Nietzsche gives a description of a failed man ('ein missrathener Mensch') who is bored ('gelangweilt'), weary ('überdrüssig'), self-despising ('ein Selbstverächter'), ashamed of his own existence ('der sich seines Daseins im Grunde schämt'), and in this position makes the mistake of turning to books that are unfit for him ('Bücher auf die er kein Recht hat'; 'geistigere Gesellschaft als er verdauen kann'). This cocktail of circumstances leads to the poisonous situation of a man longing for revenge ('ein solcher durch und durch vergifteter Mensch [...] geräth schliesslich in einen habituellen Zustand der Rache, des Willens zur Rache'). A second question, making the connection between such a man and morality, follows:

FW 359 [...] was glaubt ihr wohl, dass er nöthig, unbedingt nöthig hat, um sich bei sich selbst den Anschein von Ueberlegenheit über geistigere Menschen, um sich die Lust der vollzogenen Rache, wenigstens für seine Einbildung, zu schaffen? Immer die Moralität, darauf darf man wetten, immer die grossen Moral-Worte, immer das Bumbum von Gerechtigkeit, Weisheit, Heiligkeit, Tugend, immer den Stoicismus der Gebärde (– wie gut versteckt der Stoicismus was Einer nicht hat!...), immer den Mantel des klugen Schweigens, der Leutseligkeit, der Milde, und wie alle die Idealisten-Mäntel heissen, unter denen die unheilbaren Selbstverächter, auch die unheilbar Eiteln, herum gehen.³⁷⁷

To be sure, Nietzsche does not immediately equate the miserable man described in the opening sentences of this aphorism with a Stoic. Yet in the list of things which this kind of man 'unbedingt' needs is Stoicism, portrayed as merely superficial 'moral' behaviour, a show resulting from vanity, bringing to mind the theatrical element we encountered in *JGB* 7, 8 and 9. In the sentence between brackets Nietzsche mocks Stoicism for perfectly hiding what it lacks; what exactly is left unidentified, but one may suspect it to be precisely the justice, wisdom, holiness, and virtue of the preceding sentence. Moreover, in what follows it becomes

³⁷⁵ Whether the origin of this standpoint might be traceable to Hegel (or perhaps even Kant) deserves further investigation. In any case, both *WW* I 16 and *WW* II 16 reveal how Schopenhauer's judgement of Stoicism is more than just dismissive. *WW* II 16 finishes with the following observation: 'Doch liegt Geistesgröße und Würde darin, daß man schweigend und gelassen das Unvermeidliche trägt, in melancholischer Ruhe, sich gleich bleibend, während Andere vom Jubel zur Verzweiflung und von dieser zu jenem übergehn.'

³⁷⁶ *FW* 359 3.605.

³⁷⁷ 3.606.

even clearer how Stoicism lacks 'spirit', and only hides this behind a mask or a cloak of 'wisdom'.

Man verstehe mich nicht falsch: aus solchen geborenen *Feinden des Geistes* entsteht mitunter jenes seltene Stück Menschthum, das vom Volke unter dem Namen des Heiligen, des Weisen verehrt wird; aus solchen Menschen kommen jene Unthiere der Moral her, welche Lärm machen, Geschichte machen, – der heilige Augustin gehört zu ihnen. Die Furcht vor dem Geist, die Rache am Geist – oh wie oft wurden diese triebkräftigen Laster schon zur Wurzel von Tugenden! Ja zur Tugend!³⁷⁸

Although this passage goes back to the 'missrathener Mensch' and thus appears to abandon the subject of Stoicism, there are still conclusions regarding Stoicism to be drawn. For the claim is not only that a man like him has a chance to end up being a 'Weise[n]' in the eyes of history, which is a clear reference to the Stoic 'σοφολ' (also coming back to the opposition between the 'noise' of being so and the question of its origin); it is also interesting to note how this type is reintroduced as the enemy of the spirit ('solchen geborenen *Feinden des Geistes*'): it is the fear of the spirit ('Furcht vor dem Geist') and revenge against the spirit ('Rache am Geist') that have become the roots of virtue if not virtue itself. In the final part of this aphorism the opposition between the virtue of 'wisdom' and 'Geist' is made even more explicit, as well as its strangeness in the light of the history of philosophy.

Und, unter uns gefragt, selbst jener Philosophen-Anspruch auf *Weisheit*, der hier und da einmal auf Erden gemacht worden ist, der tollste und unbescheidenste aller Ansprüche, – war er nicht immer bisher, in Indien, wie in Griechenland, *vor Allem ein Versteck?* [...] In den häufigeren Fällen aber ein Versteck des Philosophen, hinter welches er sich aus Ermüdung, Alter, Erkaltung, Verhärtung rettet, als Gefühl vom nahen Ende, als Klugheit jenes Instinkts, den die Thiere vor dem Tode haben, – sie gehen bei Seite, werden still, wählen die Einsamkeit, verkriechen sich in Höhlen, werden *weise*... Wie? Weisheit ein Versteck des Philosophen vor – dem Geiste? –³⁷⁹

Although it is not spelled out that it is the wisdom of a *Stoic* that forms his hiding place, there are plenty of hints that the Stoic is at least included in this analysis. The instincts that make the philosopher hide behind the cloak of wisdom bring to mind similar phrases related to Stoicism made in other contexts. In 2.2.3 we have seen, for instance, how the Stoics are regarded an important part of 'das müde Alterthum'³⁸⁰; and in a late *Nachlass* passage we find the explicit connection between fatigue and the wisdom of a Stoic.³⁸¹ 'Erkaltung' can be

³⁷⁸ 3.606.

³⁷⁹ 3.606-7.

³⁸⁰ *NL* 6[396] 9.299. This consideration might also betray the influence of Droysen's account of Hellenism.

³⁸¹ *NL* 7[12-3] 12.298-9: 'Die volksthümlichen Ideale, der gute Mensch, der Selbstlose, der Heilige, der Weise, der Gerechte. Oh Mark Aurel! Man muß die Augen auf haben: wenn irgend ein von Anbeginn altersschwacher Gesell immer seine Müdigkeit als Weisheit Pessimismus und Verklärung zur Schau trägt.' That the loneliness of a Stoic goes hand in hand with a lack of power moreover is shown in the following short observation: *NL* 29[17] 11.341: '2. Die Einsiedler zerfallen in Cyniker und Stoiker – worin ihr Verbrauch an Kraft – ihr Mangel an Kraft'.

recognized in the long and critical *Nachlass* fragment of *NL* 15[55], quoted at the end of 2.2.3³⁸², the reference to 'Verhärtung' we have encountered in the introduction to this chapter.³⁸³ From the references to these motivations it must be concluded that the Stoic is at least a perfect candidate for being one of those who hide their lack of spirit under the cloak of wisdom. What is more, the narrative of a Stoic concealing something sits perfectly with Nietzsche's criticism in *JGB* 9 and the preceding aphorisms: it is the 'Überzeugung' that is staged, but in spite of the bombastic impression it leaves, it cannot be anything but a covering 'Dummheit'.

The theatrical dishonesty of the Stoics is, however, not a feature occurring only in Nietzsche's post-Zarathustra texts. In the preceding book of *FW* (IV) we find in the aphorism entitled 'Stoiker und Epikureer' another reference to the Stoic need for an audience: the Stoic 'likes to act out his insensitivity before an invited audience'.³⁸⁴ But also as early as 1876 we encounter a similar judgement, although it must be conceded that the ferocity and depth of the later texts is missing.

UB IV 11 Oder wie klingen diese Sätze an unser Ohr: dass die Leidenschaft besser ist, als der Stoicismus und die Heuchelei, dass Ehrlich-sein, selbst im Bösen, besser ist, als sich selber an die Sittlichkeit des Herkommens verlieren³⁸⁵

Here, in a 1876 text entitled *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, we find the two words 'Stoicismus' and 'Heuchelei' side by side in one sentence, its implication being that it is better to feel something and be honest about it than pretending to be unaffected, holding on to the 'Sittlichkeit des Herkommens', a reference to the pride of belonging to a class. Although this passage appears in a completely different context compared to those mentioned above (one, namely, in which Wagner's ideas on the individual of the future are approvingly discussed), it does show how closely connected Stoicism and dishonesty are from the early texts on (a possible inheritance of Schopenhauer as explained above). Moreover, the fact that it is taken up again in *FW* 99, in an aphorism that again reflects upon Wagner, may be taken as another argument designating its significance (at least accounting for the fact that Nietzsche does not change his mind).³⁸⁶

³⁸² *NL* 15[55] 9.653: 'Was ist es, eine Statue im Winter umarmen, wenn man gegen Kälte stumpf geworden ist?'

³⁸³ *NL* 11[375] 13.169: 'die stoische Selbst-Verhärtung'.

³⁸⁴ *FW* 306 3.544: 'Der Stoiker [...] hat [...] gerne ein eingeladenes Publicum bei der Schaustellung seiner Unempfindlichkeit'.

³⁸⁵ 1.506.

³⁸⁶ *FW* 99 3.457. Other (later) interesting aphorisms and *Nachlass* passages revealing the association between Stoicism and dishonesty are, first, *Der Antichrist* (*AC*) 42, in which it is suggested that Paul's birthplace, being the capital of Stoicism (which is historically correct, since Paul, Chrysippus and Antipater were all from Tarsus), should warn us not to believe everything Paul says. *AC* 42 6.216: 'Nichts blieb unangetastet, Nichts blieb auch nur ähnlich der Wirklichkeit. Paulus verlegte einfach das Schwergewicht jenes ganzen Daseins hinter dies Dasein, – in die Lüge vom „wiederauferstandenen“ Jesus. [...] Einen Paulus, der seine Heimath an dem Hauptsitz der stoischen Aufklärung hatte, für ehrlich halten [...], wäre eine wahre Niaiserie seitens eines Psychologen: Paulus wollte den Zweck, folglich wollte er auch die Mittel ... Was er selbst nicht glaubte, die Idioten, unter die er seine Lehre warf, glaubten es.' Second, *NL* 4[204] 9.151: 'Die Asketen erlangen ein ungeheures Gefühl von Macht; die Stoiker ebenfalls, weil sie sich immer siegreich, unerschüttert zeigen müssen.' Third, on just Seneca: *NL* 25[347] 11.103: 'Seneca als eine Culmination der antiken moralischen Verlogenheit'.

3.2.2 HARDNESS, AND THE SUPPRESSION OF EMOTIONS FOR TRUTH

Secondly, Nietzsche regularly discusses a sense of hardness (2) in the attitude defended by the Stoics. Of this element we have seen several examples too (in particular *NL* 15[55], the 'Selbst-Verhärtung' of *NL* 11[375] and the characterisation of Stoicism as a 'Hemmschuh-Moral', 'stoisch, hart, tyrannisch', in *NL* 15[29]). One important passage that connects this characteristic explicitly with the search for truth (4), and, indirectly, with the suppression of emotions (3), is the following, written in 1885 when Nietzsche was working on *JGB*.³⁸⁷

NL 40[56] Und wenn sich Einer tausend Male widerspricht und viele Wege geht und viele Masken trägt und in sich selber kein Ende und keine letzte Horizontlinie findet: ist es wahrscheinlich, daß ein Solcher weniger von der „Wahrheit“ erfährt als ein tugendhafter Stoiker, welcher sich ein für alle Mal wie eine Säule und mit der harten Haut einer Säule an seine Stelle gestellt hat?³⁸⁸

We find a clear example here of the inflexibility of Stoic hardness (2) adopted for the sake of the truth (4), symbolised by the hard skin of a 'Säule', a pillar, which reminds us of the reference to the cold stone of a statue encountered in *NL* 15[55].³⁸⁹ What is significant in this aphorism is that the wearing of masks, rejected in the previous section, is taken up here as exemplary for Nietzsche's own attitude. We have seen in the analysis of *JGB* 9 how the use of masks is an important feature of Nietzsche's own way of writing, and how he distinguishes his multi-layered game from the stiff 'Dummheit' of the single Stoic mask of wisdom.

In *FW* 306 we find a similar description of a Stoic in terms of inflexibility, in which his hard skin is compared to that of a porcupine.³⁹⁰ A comparable case is the characterisation of Stoicism in terms of 'Bildsäulenkälte' referred to in the Introduction. This reference can be found in *JGB* as well, namely in 198, its aim being to show how Stoic hardness is directly associated with the 'Dummheit' of a tyrannical suppression of the affects (3): 'jene Gleichgültigkeit und Bildsäulenkälte gegen die hitzige Narrheit der Affekte, welche die Stoiker anriethen und ankurirten.'³⁹¹

³⁸⁷ Another example is *GM* III 24 5,399-400: 'Ich kenne dies Alles vielleicht zu sehr aus der Nähe: jene verehrenswürdige Philosophen-Enthaltbarkeit, zu der ein solcher Glaube verpflichtet, jener Stoicismus des Intellekts, der sich das Nein zuletzt eben so streng verbietet wie das Ja, jenes Stehenbleiben-Wollen vor dem Thatsächlichen, dem factum *brutum*, jener Fatalismus der „petits faits“ (ce petit fatalisme, wie ich ihn nenne) [...] – das drückt, in's Grosse gerechnet, ebensogut Ascetismus der Tugend aus, wie irgend eine Verneinung der Sinnlichkeit (es ist im Grunde nur ein modus dieser Verneinung).'

³⁸⁸ 11.656.

³⁸⁹ This might also be a parody of the etymological background of the Stoa, in Greek denoting a 'portico'. Another reference to Stoicism in this year associated with a statue, is *NL* 7[101] 9,338: 'Die Menschen welche dieses Ideal verwirklichen (Epictet) sind *nicht* in ihren Göttern vorgebildet, vielmehr *deren Gegensatz!* Die griechische Tugend wurde ein Sache des ἀγών's, man war neidisch auf einander. Die *Unbeweglichkeit* als Ideal: in der Zeit, wo man schon zu *empfindsam* geworden war und die Leiden und Umschwünge zu *groß* (Zeit des Thukydidés) Zur Statue werden: während die Tragiker die Statue (des Gottes oder Heros) hatten zu Menschen werden lassen.'

³⁹⁰ *FW* 306 3,544: 'die stoische harte Haut mit Igelstacheln'. See for a more elaborate discussion of that aphorism chapter 4.3.1.

³⁹¹ 5,118; 'nochmals gesagt und dreimal gesagt, Klugheit, Klugheit, Klugheit, gemischt mit Dummheit, Dummheit, Dummheit'.

There are comparable remarks in earlier works. The Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια³⁹² can be recognized for instance in the introduction of the 'vernünftige' man, who is contrasted to the 'intuitive' man, in the final sentences of the 1873 essay *Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralische Sinne* (WL). After stating that there are ages in which these two figures live together, both desiring 'über das Leben zu herrschen'³⁹³, Nietzsche asserts that in the age of the Greeks the 'intuitive' man was dominant, and so capable of creating a culture in which art controlled life.³⁹⁴ Importantly, both figures suffer from fear and pain; yet, the 'intuitive' man knows how to hide these sentiments in the appearance of 'ein erhabenes Glück und eine olympische Wolkenlosigkeit.'³⁹⁵ The fearful 'vernünftige' man deals with pain in a different way.

WL 2 Wie anders steht unter dem gleichen Missgeschick der stoische, an der Erfahrung belehrte, durch Begriffen sich beherrschende Mensch da! Er, der sonst nur Aufrichtigkeit, Wahrheit, Freiheit von Täuschungen und Schutz vor berückenden Ueberfällen sucht, legt jetzt, im Unglück, das Meisterstück der Verstellung ab, wie jener im Glück; er trägt kein zuckendes und bewegliches Menschengesicht, sondern gleichsam eine Maske mit würdigem Gleichmaasse der Züge, er schreit nicht und verändert nicht einmal seine Stimme. Wenn eine rechte Wetterwolke sich über ihn ausgiesst, so hüllt er sich in seinen Mantel und geht langsamen Schrittes unter ihr davon.³⁹⁶

The 'vernünftige' man, introduced explicitly as a Stoic, delivers his 'masterpiece of hypocrisy' not in happiness – as the 'intuitive' man does – but in unhappiness. This passage therefore provides not only another example of hypocrisy (1), but also the suggestion of a suppression of the passions through self-restraint (the 'sich beherrschende Mensch') (3). We find, moreover, the confirmation of an association between Stoicism and truth (4): the 'vernünftige' Mensch looks not only for 'Schutz vor berückenden Ueberfällen', but also for 'Aufrichtigkeit', 'Wahrheit', and 'Freiheit von Täuschungen'. Yet, already in this essay it is made clear that the 'Begriffe' searched for in order to find support are nothing but illusory (which can be seen,

³⁹² For more on the contemporary understanding of ἀπάθεια in relation to correct judgments, happiness and the absence of emotions (that is, those falling traditionally under the four headings of longing (ἐπιθυμία), fear (φόβος), intense pleasure (ἡδονή) and grief (λύπη), as stated by Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.14, and *DL VII 110*) Long, A.A. (2006), 380-2; Long, A.A., Sedley, D.N. (1987) Vol. I, 410-23; Brennan, T. (2006), 82-113.

³⁹³ 1.889.

³⁹⁴ WL 2 1.889: 'Wo einmal der intuitive Mensch, etwa wie im älteren Griechenland seine Waffen gewaltiger und siegreicher führt, als sein Widerspiel, kann sich günstigen Falls eine Kultur gestalten, und die Herrschaft der Kunst über das Leben sich gründen'.

³⁹⁵ WL 2 1.889: 'Weder das Haus, noch der Schritt, noch der thönerne Krug verrathen, dass die Nothdurft sie erfand; es scheint, als ob in ihnen allen ein erhabenes Glück und eine olympische Wolkenlosigkeit und gleichsam ein Spielen mit dem Ernste ausgesprochen werden sollte.' This observation is repeated throughout Nietzsche's work, most notably in *Vorrede* 5 of *FW*, where it is remarked that the Greeks are superficial out of depth. *FW Vorrede* 5 3.352: 'Oh diese Griechen! Sie verstanden sich darauf, zu leben: dazu thut Noth, tapfer bei der Oberfläche, der Falte, der Haut stehen zu bleiben, den Schein anzubeten, an Formen, an Töne, an Worte, an den ganzen Olymp des Scheins zu glauben! Diese Griechen waren oberflächlich – aus Tiefe!'

³⁹⁶ 1.890. According to Neymeyr, B. (2009), the reference to a man walking stoically in the rain is an 'offenbar autobiographisch gefärbten Schlusspartie', referring to 'eine bekannte „charakteristische Anekdote“ über den Musterknaben Nietzsche' to be found in Thomas Mann's 1947 essay 'Nietzsche's Philosophie im Lichte unserer Erfahrung'. Neymeyr, B. (2009), 68, ft. 5.

thus, as belonging to the same context as Nietzsche's dismissal of Stoic 'optimism'; see *PHG* 7, in 2.2.2).³⁹⁷ 'What is truth?', Nietzsche asks himself a few pages before, and his answer is, famously:

WL 1 Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relation, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden [...]: die Wahrheit sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind³⁹⁸

This is, therefore, an early occurrence of the argument made in *JGB* 9 (and provides a deeper understanding of the reason why the Stoic maxim is a 'Betrügerei der Worte', emphasis mine). Crick aptly formulates the main point regarding the relation between the Stoic 'hardness' (2) and its desire for a truth that cannot but be illusory (4) as follows: 'The problem of "petrification" arises only when we are not honest enough with ourselves about the illusory nature of our web of concepts. In the case of the Stoics, instead of treating their constructions artistically, as a complex fabrication of their own making, they viewed them as reflections of an underlying order.'³⁹⁹

Yet what is missing in the early references to Stoicism is precisely the complaint of 'petrification' we have encountered in the later texts. Is there no sign of what Nietzsche later dismisses as 'Bilsäulenälte', 'Selbst-Verhärtung', and 'Versteinerung'?⁴⁰⁰ Interestingly, the only allusions to a kind of 'hardness' in the early works are those that imply a sense of admiration of Stoic 'masculinity'. Two examples; one from the second of the *UnzeitgemäÙe Betrachtungen* (1874) entitled 'Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben'; the other from *M*.

UB II 5 Niemand darf es wagen, das Gesetz der Philosophie an sich zu erfüllen, Niemand lebt philosophisch, mit jener einfachen Mannestreue, die einen Alten zwang, wo er auch war, was er auch trieb, sich als Stoiker zu gebärden, falls er den Stoa einmal Treue zugesagt hatte.⁴⁰¹

M 133 Zuletzt ist ihnen [i.e. die Menschen ohne Mitleid] der Zustand der Weichherzigkeit peinlich, wie den Mitleidigen der Zustand des stoischen Gleichmüthes; sie [i.e. die Menschen ohne Mitleid] belegen ihn mit herabsetzenden Worten und meinen, dass ihre Männlichkeit und kalte Tapferkeit dabei in Gefahr sei, -

³⁹⁷ Another early reference to the Stoic passion for 'Begriffe' and 'Systeme' is the following; *NL* 8[13] 7.224: 'Worin liegt jener magische Heiterkeitszauber, den die Systeme der Philosophen, Stoiker und Epikureer durch Begriffe zu erreichen suchten?'

³⁹⁸ 1.880-1.

³⁹⁹ Crick, N. (2011), 109. As we have seen in 2.2.4.2, though, the idea that we just need to be 'more honest' is a simplification of the matter.

⁴⁰⁰ 'Bilsäulenälte'; see *JGB* 198 5.118; 'Selbst-Verhärtung'; see *NL* 11[375] 13.169: 'die stoisch Selbst-Verhärtung'; 'Versteinerung'; see *NL* 15[55] 9.653.

⁴⁰¹ 1.282. This very same sentence, in the same context, is taken up in *PHG* 2 1.812; both texts were written in 1873-4.

sie verheimlichen die Thräne vor Anderen und wischen sie ab, unwillig über sich selber.⁴⁰²

Although it may seem as if neither of the two quotes are directly concerned with the quest for truth, this is only superficially so. The first quote occurs in a context in which modernity is diagnosed as a weak age of universalism, in which philosophy, 'the most truthful of all sciences', can hardly flourish – nobody, that is, except someone resembling a Stoic, dares to 'fulfil the law of philosophy'; it is implicitly acknowledged therefore that it takes the courage and loyalty of a Stoic to hold on to the attitude of truthfulness required in philosophy.⁴⁰³ The second quote mentions courage as well. It is obvious that the danger of losing the 'masculinity' associated with 'cold audacity' and contrasted to 'softness of heart' ('Weichherzigkeit') is related to the emotion of pity ('Mitleid'), but, as I will develop in more detail in chapter 4.2.6, the way in which Nietzsche reflects on pity in *M* is not separated from thoughts on truth.

So even though there is a continuum in references to Stoic hypocrisy (1) (of which the quote from *M* above can be seen as an additional example), as well as to their suppressive self-restraint (3) for the pursuit of truth (4) (or, as Crick formulates it, as its consequence), there is some variety in the way in which their 'hardness' (2) is appreciated. The suspicion that the early texts betray a more sympathetic approach than the later texts will be confirmed in more detail in the next sections.

3.3 EARLY APPRECIATIVE REFERENCES TO STOICISM

Two more early passages deserve to be discussed that endorse Nietzsche's appreciation of the Stoic 'hardness' related to truth. The first is a casual reference that mentions Stoicism in passing, but in a less critical way than what we have seen so far. It can be found in an essay on the future of the educational institutions (*Ueber die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten (ZB)*), written in 1872, in a passage in which Nietzsche distinguishes between the sphere of things needed for existence, and that of 'Bildung', 'die hoch über jener Welt der Noth, der Existenzkampfes, der Bedürftigkeit lagert.'⁴⁰⁴ This last perspective can be attained, it is suggested, through a 'stoisch-engen Umschränkung' of one's needs.

ZB IV Mancher wird, bei einer stoisch-engen Umschränkung seiner Bedürfnisse, sehr bald und leicht in jene Sphäre sich erheben, in der er sein Subjekt vergessen und gleichsam abschütteln darf, um nun in einem Sonnensystem zeitloser und unpersönlicher Angelegenheiten sich ewiger Jugend zu erfreuen.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰² 3.127.

⁴⁰³ The sentences preceding the remark on Stoicism read as follows; *UB* II 5 1.282: 'In welche unnatürlichen, künstlichen und jedenfalls unwürdigen Lagen muss in einer Zeit, die an der allgemeinen Bildung leidet, die wahrhaftigste aller Wissenschaften, die ehrliche nackte Göttin Philosophie gerathen! Sie bleibt in einer solchen Welt der erzwungenen äusserlichen Uniformität gelehrter Monolog des einsamen Spaziergängers, zufällige Jagdbeute des Einzelnen, verborgenes Stubengeheimniss oder ungefährliches Geschwätz zwischen akademischen Greisen und Kindern.'

⁴⁰⁴ 1.714.

⁴⁰⁵ 1.714.

The 'restriction of one's needs' (3) is, in other words, not only straightforwardly associated with Stoicism (the restriction should be 'Stoically narrow'), it is also and importantly a strategy approved of when it comes to the achievement of the sphere of 'Bildung', related in this sentence to 'solar systems' of 'timeless and impersonal matters', which remind us of Platonic ideas and mathematical issues (4).

Secondly, in a long passage in the *Nachlass* of the summer of 1875 Nietzsche reflects on Dühring's book *Der Werth des Lebens*. Although he does not object to his negative analysis of Stoicism (nor of that of Epicureanism, for both of which it is claimed that only one kind of conscious affect is taken as the principle for judgement), he does to the conclusions drawn from it.

NL 9[1] Die Systeme der Alten nahmen nur eine Art [Erregungen die in's Bewusstseins treten] heraus und machten sie zum ausschließlichen Maaß der Beurtheilung: die Epikureer die Empfindung, die Stoiker das abstrakte Bewusstsein. So gelangten sie in der Praxis zu falschen Maximen. [...] [Die Stoiker] erkünstelten einen Triumph über Empfindung und Affekt, geriethen in Affektation und richteten sich so äußerlich nach der Schablone der Katechismus, ohne innerlich gesiegt zu haben: Grimasse und Schauspielerei⁴⁰⁶

We recognize once again the theme of Stoic theatre and dishonesty (1) (like the Epicureans, the Stoics arrived at a practice of 'falschen Maximen'; but only the Stoics feigned ('erkünstelten') a triumph over affects, lapsed into hypocrisy ('geriethen in Affektation') resulting in grimaces and acting ('Grimasse und Schauspielerei')). It may well be the case that Schopenhauer has been the source for this judgement, as Dühring was known for his teachings on Schopenhauer and his disagreement with him later.⁴⁰⁷ On the following page Dühring explicitly connects this attitude to asceticism, after which it is dismissed as an attitude destroying everything of value for life (referring back to the title of the book).⁴⁰⁸ Yet Nietzsche raises several points of disagreement to this analysis, two of which I will quote. One reveals a more appreciative understanding of asceticism; the other makes clear how Nietzsche favours rather than dismisses a degree of abstraction from affects.

Zweitens fühlt [Dühring] nichts von dem allgemein helfenden und für Alle wirksamen Pathos des Asketenthums.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ 8.137. This is a direct quote from Dühring's *Der Werth des Lebens*; Drittes Capitel, 1.

⁴⁰⁷ See Venturelli, A. (1986), 107-39. Already in 1868 Nietzsche showed interest in Dühring, as a letter to Gersdorff reveals in which Nietzsche refers to Dühring as the man 'der immer schöne Collegien hat zB über Schopenhauer und Byron, über Pessimismus etc.' (KGB I/2.258)

⁴⁰⁸ 8.138: 'Von den Leidenschaften abstrahiren führt einerseits zur Askese, andererseits zum wohlberechneten matten Sinnengenuß; da wird alles, was dem Leben Werth ertheilt, vernichtet. Der Mensch sinkt im zweiten Falle unter das Thier, im ersten wird er zum widerwärtigen Ungeheuer'.

⁴⁰⁹ 8.139. This is the second of a list of three objections against Dühring's analysis that an individual ascetic is a danger to the common fate of humanity. Nietzsche's more complete reaction is: 'Da ist nun alles verkehrt! Erstens nimmt er überall an, daß die Asketen gerade als Egoisten Asketen sind, daß nur das individuelle Loos sie zum Haß gegen das Dasein bringt. Zweitens fühlt er nichts von dem allgemein helfenden und für Alle wirksamen Pathos des Asketenthums; in seiner höchsten Gestalt ist es ja gerade der Tod und das Leiden für Alle. Drittens verwechselt er Blasirtheit und Ekel mit jener Abwendung vom Leben.' NL 9[1] 8.139.

Dühring ist besonders über die erwähnte Affektlosigkeit wüthend; wenn nun aber jemand dem Pathos entsagt und ganz ἦθος zu werden versteht, so gilt das *uns* viel höher und die Möglichkeit eines solchen Verhaltens ist gerade für uns ein Objekt der Sehnsucht.⁴¹⁰

In both statements we must conclude that Nietzsche, rather than concurring with Dühring's rejection of asceticism and the suppression of affects, defends the 'Pathos des Asketenthums', even if the second comment explicitly prefers the achievement of 'ἦθος', 'moral character', over 'πάθος' (whereby the distinction in this case seems to boil down to the presence or absence of some form of rational reflection⁴¹¹).

At the same time it is well known that Nietzsche's thoughts on asceticism cannot be reduced to a simple appreciation of its use.⁴¹² It can be argued that the complexity of his account finds its origin in his engagement with Dühring in this period. In the final survey ('Schluss-Betrachtung') of *Der Werth des Lebens* we find Nietzsche to a certain degree even agreeing with Dühring's position against asceticism, connecting it to what will be one of his central themes in the later works: 'Rache' (as for instance in Book V of *FW*; see *FW* 359 in section 3.2.1).

NL 9[1] Hat jemand genug an sich gelitten, sich selbst genug verletzt, in Sündhaftigkeit – so beginnt er gegen sich das Gefühl der Rache zu spüren: seine eindringende Selbstbetrachtung und deren Resultat Selbstverachtung ist das Resultat. Bei manchen Menschen selbst *Askese*⁴¹³

This connection clearly contradicts the appreciative tone we have just encountered. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the solution to the problem of 'Rache', which finds its origin in 'Selbstverachtung' ('self-contempt'), should be sought in the rejection of asceticism. Quite the opposite seems to be the case, as Aldo Venturelli rightly points out.⁴¹⁴

Der Asket hat nämlich den Geist der Rache nur überwunden, weil er ihn bis in seine Tiefen gekannt und erlebt hat als die geheimste Erfahrung seiner Seele [...]. [D]er Asket – und jeder wahre Philosoph war für Nietzsche ein Asket – [muß] mit immer größerer

⁴¹⁰ 8.140.

⁴¹¹ The classical distinction in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* between three kinds of persuasion (pathos, ethos, logos) seems not to be what Nietzsche has in mind here. Rather, the opposition between reason and affect is staged.

⁴¹² See for the most extensive reflection on asceticism *GM* III: 'Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?'; and for an elaborate reflection on Nietzsche's general approach to asceticism the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* (2004) article 'Askese'; 155-73. See also section 5.4.

⁴¹³ The more complete text is as follows. NL 9[1] 8.180: 'Selbsterkenntniß entspringt aus Gerechtigkeit gegen sich; und Gerechtigkeit ist im Grunde Rachegefühl. Hat jemand genug an sich gelitten, sich selbst genug verletzt, in Sündhaftigkeit – so beginnt er gegen sich das Gefühl der Rache zu spüren: seine eindringende Selbstbetrachtung und deren Resultat Selbstverachtung ist das Resultat. Bei manchen Menschen selbst *Askese*, das heißt *Rache an sich* in Thätlichkeit des Widerwillens und Hasses.'

⁴¹⁴ The implication of a possible differentiation between a 'healthy' and a 'sick' kind of asceticism is confirmed in the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* (2004) article on 'Askese'; 156.

Klarheit den Abgrund der Erkenntnis und der Moral wahrnehmen, die disharmonische Grundlage jeder Existenz.⁴¹⁵

The ascetic man, in other words, can only overcome the 'Geist der Rache', which is connected to asceticism, by getting to know the nature of his asceticism 'in seine Tiefen' and living it as the most secret experience of his soul.

This double aspect of asceticism can be recognized in the first book of *MA I* ('Von den ersten und letzten Dingen').⁴¹⁶ Examining this book not only provides an explanation for Venturelli's remark that the ascetic man has to see through 'den Abgrund der Erkenntnis und der Moral'; it also reveals how Nietzsche assesses the philosophical positions of both Dühring and Schopenhauer in this context. Moreover, and importantly for the purpose of this chapter, *MA I* book 1 must be seen as a significant text for the analysis of Nietzsche's early engagement with Stoicism. It is rejected as a philosophy putting forward mistaken metaphysical assumptions concerning 'Erkenntnis und Moral', but at the same time embraced when it comes to finding the appropriate attitude of 'Affektlosigkeit', in line with the early appreciative references to Stoic masculinity. Nietzsche's double standpoint concerning asceticism is comparable, then, to his assessment of Stoicism. Chapter 4 will examine Nietzsche's changing evaluation of Stoicism from *M* onwards.

3.4 A STOIC REJECTION OF STOICISM; THE REMARKABLE CASE OF *MA I* BOOK 1

As Venturelli explains, Nietzsche's early engagement with Dühring should be understood in the context of his growing dissatisfaction with Schopenhauer. Nietzsche makes it explicit in a remark immediately preceding the 'Dühring-Exzerpt' that he is interested in Dühring as a possible antithesis of Schopenhauer; Dühring's 'optimism' and 'Wirklichkeitsphilosophie' enable him 'zu sehen, was ich an Schopenhauer habe, was nicht.'⁴¹⁷ In *MA I* 26 Schopenhauer's metaphysical philosophy is explicitly opposed to the new age of science and 'Aufklärung'.

MA I 26 auch in unserem Jahrhundert bewies Schopenhauer's Metaphysik, dass auch jetzt der wissenschaftliche Geist noch nicht kräftig genug ist [...]. Viel Wissenschaft klingt in seine Lehre hinein, aber sie beherrscht dieselbe nicht, sondern das alte, wohlbekannte „metaphysische Bedürfniss“.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁵ Venturelli, A. (1986), 28.

⁴¹⁶ Admittedly, the final few aphorisms of Book 3 of *MA I* ('das religiöse Leben') are explicitly dedicated to asceticism, in the context of religion, whereas Book I does not have one reference. Yet for our purposes Book I is of more interest, since it embraces an implicit kind of asceticism, in the form of a Stoic kind of ἀπάθεια.

⁴¹⁷ *NL* 8[4] 8.129 'Pläne aller Art: [...] 3) Dühring, als den Versuch einer Beseitigung Schopenhauer's durchzustudieren und zu sehen, was ich an Schopenhauer habe, was nicht. Hinterdrein noch einmal Schopenhauer zu lesen.'

⁴¹⁸ 2.47. Its final sentences make explicit Nietzsche's affinity with 'Aufklärung': 'erst nachdem wir die historische Betrachtungsart, welche die Zeit der Aufklärung mit sich brachte, in einem so wesentlichen Punkte corrigirt haben, dürfen wir die Fahne der Aufklärung – die Fahne mit den drei Namen: Petrarca, Erasmus, Voltaire – von Neuem weiter tragen.'

Yet, Venturelli also correctly points out that the same strategy is used in the opposite direction.⁴¹⁹ Nietzsche's observation in the Dühring-Exzerpt that the scientific method defended by Dühring lacks logical rigour is made explicit in *MA I 32*; its opening sentence contains an explicit reference to *Der Werth des Lebens*. As a result, the 'Vollendung' of the Schopenhauerian metaphysics appears to be a more complex and even tragic⁴²⁰ process than Dühring is able to acknowledge, as will be explained in more detail in the next section.

MA I 32 Alle Urtheile über den Werth des Lebens sind unlogisch entwickelt und desshalb ungerecht. Die Unreinheit des Urtheils liegt erstens in der Art, wie das Material vorliegt, nämlich sehr unvollständig, zweitens in der Art, wie daraus die Summe gebildet wird, und drittens darin, dass jedes einzelne Stück des Materials wieder das Resultat unreinen Erkennens ist und zwar diess mit voller Nothwendigkeit.⁴²¹

Nietzsche's statement that any judgement concerning the value of life is 'unlogisch entwickelt' must be seen as part of his project of examining the possibilities of human judgement in general, executed in this book with respect to 'the first and last things'. In the above text it is claimed that any judgement of the value of life is necessarily unjust because (1) we simply do not have a complete overview of the totality we wish to judge; (2) our method of summing up the pieces in order to gain an idea of the totality cannot be appropriate; (3) even the knowledge we think we possess of the pieces is insufficient. Nietzsche goes on suggesting that the solution is to refrain from judgements altogether ('Vielleicht wird aus alledem folgen, dass man gar nicht urtheilen sollte'); yet, as he infers immediately: 'wenn man aber nur *leben* könnte, ohne abzuschätzen, ohne Abneigung und Zuneigung zu haben!⁴²²

The core of *MA I*'s project forms precisely this disharmony between the human necessity to judge, as it is essential to life, and the acknowledgement of the impossibility to make correct judgements ('Wir sind von vornherein unlogische und daher ungerechte Wesen *und können* diess erkennen'⁴²³). The appearance of this disharmony is inevitable after the strict and consistent application of the scientific method, which surpasses Dühring's superficial use of it. This method, which is referred to in the very first aphorism of *MA I* as a kind of philosophy that 'gar nicht mehr getrennt von der Naturwissenschaft zu denken ist'⁴²⁴, is applied not only to the judgement of the value of life, but to all metaphysical assumptions. Being a atypically

⁴¹⁹ Venturelli, A. (1986), 113: 'Nietzsche [ist] einerseits mit Dühring über die Nothwendigkeit einer wissenschaftlichen Grundlage der Philosophie einig [...], andererseits aber neigt [er dazu], gerade in diesem Bereich Schopenhauers Lehre wieder aufzunehmen. Wenn Schopenhauers Metaphysik jeden Wert verloren hat, wenn die Erkenntnis nur allein Triebe und Gemütsbewegungen als Grundlage der logischen Urtheile und der moralischen Werte anerkennt, dann kann Schopenhauer doch noch gegen Dühring verwendet werden, um hervorzuheben, daß die „Vollendung der Metaphysik“ ein viel komplexerer Prozeß ist als die Wirklichkeitsphilosophie vermuten läßt.'

⁴²⁰ See *MA I 34* 2.53-5: 'Aber wird so unsere Philosophie nicht zur Tragödie?'

⁴²¹ 2.51.

⁴²² *MA I 32* 2.52.

⁴²³ *MA I 32* 2.52.

⁴²⁴ *MA I 1* 2.23.

modern project, it unmask metaphysical truths as human, all too human fictions, including all presuppositions made in language, logic, and mathematics.⁴²⁵

Some of the metaphysical assumptions uncovered by this method are typically Stoic. The loss of faith in a God governing the cosmos, brought forward in *MA I 25*, was discussed already in section 2.2.⁴²⁶ Also the belief in the laws of nature is dismissed in *Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche 9 (VM, MA II)*; it is a word denoting superstition (‘„Naturgesetz“ ein Wort des Aberglaubens’) and unmasked as a final shelter of mythological reverie (‘ein letzter Zufluchtswinkel der mythologischen Träumerei’).⁴²⁷ In *MA I* the same point is made, here explicitly considering our faith in laws a long-standing human characteristic.

MA I 19 der Glaube an Dinge [ist] mit unserem Wesen von Alters her verknotet [...]. – Wenn Kant sagt „der Verstand schöpft seine Gesetze nicht aus der Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser vor“, so ist diess in Hinsicht auf den *Begriff der Natur* völlig wahr⁴²⁸

Although the Stoics are not mentioned explicitly in this analysis, it can be argued that the argument made in *JGB 9* – that the Stoics misinterpreted nature by forcing their Stoic view upon it – finds its origin in these texts. In *MA I 8* a comparison is made between the reading of nature and the reading of the bible. The conclusion is that the reading of nature is in a state even worse than that of the bible.

MA I 8 Pneumatische Erklärung der Natur. – Die Metaphysik erklärt die Schrift der Natur gleichsam *pneumatisch*, wie die Kirche und ihre Gelehrten es ehemals mit der Bibel thaten. Es gehört sehr viel Verstand dazu, um auf die Natur die selbe Art der strengeren Erklärungskunst anzuwenden, wie jetzt die Philologen sie für alle Bücher geschaffen haben [...]. Wie aber selbst in Betreff der Bücher die schlechte Erklärungskunst keineswegs völlig überwunden ist und man in der besten gebildeten Gesellschaft noch fortwährend auf Ueberreste allegorischer und mystischer Ausdeutung stösst: so steht es auch in Betreff der Natur – ja noch viel schlimmer.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁵ The most explicit example is probably *MA I 11 2.31*: ‘Auch die *Logik* beruht auf Voraussetzungen, denen Nichts in der wirklichen Welt entspricht, z.B. auf der Voraussetzung der Gleichheit von Dingen, der Identität des selben Dinges in verschiedenen Punkten der Zeit: aber jene Wissenschaft entstand durch den entgegengesetzten Glauben (dass es dergleichen in der wirklichen Welt allerdings gebe). Ebenso steht es mit der *Mathematik*’. On the deceptiveness of language the most famous passage is *WL*, as discussed in section 3.2.2. *WL 1 1.878*: ‘Was ist ein Wort? Die Abbildung eines Nervenreizes in Lauten.’

⁴²⁶ *MA I 25 2.46*: ‘Seitdem der Glaube aufgehört hat, dass ein Gott die Schicksale der Welt im Grossen leite und, trotz aller anscheinenden Krümmungen im Pfade der Menschheit, sie doch herrlich hinausführe, müssen die Menschen selber sich ökumenische, die ganze Erde umspannende Ziele stellen.’

⁴²⁷ *VM 9 2.384*: ‘„Naturgesetz“ ein Wort des Aberglaubens. – Wenn ihr so entzückt von der Gesetzmässigkeit in der Natur redet, so müsst ihr doch entweder annehmen, dass aus freiem, sich selbst unterwerfendem Gehorsam alle natürlichen Dinge ihrem Gesetze folgen – in welchem Falle ihr also die Moralität der Natur bewundert –; oder euch entzückt die Vorstellung eines schaffenden Mechanikers, der die kunstvollste Uhr, mit lebenden Wesen als Zierrath daran, gemacht hat. – Die Nothwendigkeit in der Natur wird durch den Ausdruck „Gesetzmässigkeit“ menschlicher und ein letzter Zufluchtswinkel der mythologischen Träumerei.’

⁴²⁸ 2.41.

⁴²⁹ 2.28-9. This text is strongly reminiscent of a text in *JGB*, in the same book as *JGB 9*. *JGB 22 5.37*: ‘Man verberge es mir als einem alten Philologen, der von der Bosheit nicht lassen kann, auf schlechte

It is not difficult to imagine how the Stoics must be included in the complaint in this text against bad interpretations, given their doctrine of a cosmos governed by a living and actively shaping principle which is sometimes referred to as 'πνεῦμα'.⁴³⁰

An even more explicit case is *MA I 31*. This aphorism also discusses 'nature', yet this time not only on a cosmic level but also in relation to humanity. Nietzsche's project of uncovering all metaphysical presuppositions as mere fictions also applies to some of the presuppositions in the domain of ethics. The idea that human nature might become fully rational one day, which is the main focus of this aphorism, cannot but be an implicit reference to the Stoics; as we know, their philosophy distinctively defends the idea of a rationally governed cosmos and suggests that obeying reason will bring us closer to divine Reason.

MA I 31 Es sind nur die allzu naiven Menschen, welche glauben können, dass die Natur des Menschen in eine rein logische verwandelt werden könne; wenn es aber Grade der Annäherung an dieses Ziel geben sollte, was würde da nicht Alles auf diesem Wege verloren gehen müssen! auch der vernünftigste Mensch bedarf von Zeit zu Zeit wieder der Natur, das heisst seiner *unlogischen Grundstellung zu allen Dingen*.⁴³¹

Those who believe, like the Stoics, that human nature might become fully rational one day, are claimed to be 'allzu naiven Menschen'. Again, the underlying argument is that human nature is completely misunderstood. The misinterpretation is founded on the metaphysical standpoint that all of nature, including that of humanity, is essentially rational. And apart from the fact that the assumption is wrong, it is not even desirable to have only rational people according to Nietzsche; what losses would we see! Losses, it might be argued, that concern the multiplicity of possible interpretations.

In short, Stoicism does not escape from the scientifically inspired method of unmasking metaphysical assumptions as human, all too human fictions – both when it comes to their physics and ethics. And yet, there is a surprising element of Stoicism that appeals to Nietzsche in this very process. In *MA I 3* we find the first example of a subtle sign of admiration. We have seen in section 3.2.2 how Stoicism is associated with masculinity. As I will argue shortly, it is precisely the attitude of endurance, rational restraint and self-control, associated with asceticism and Stoicism, that Nietzsche deems necessary for his project.

MA I 3 Schätzung der unscheinbaren Wahrheiten. – Es ist das Merkmal einer höhern Cultur, die kleinen unscheinbaren Wahrheiten, welche mit strenger Methode gefunden wurden, höher zu schätzen, als die beglückenden und blendenden Irrthümer, welche metaphysischen und künstlerischen Zeitaltern und Menschen entstammen. [...] [D]as mühsam Errungene, Gewisse, Dauernde und deshalb für jede weitere Erkenntniss noch Folgenreiche ist doch das Höhere, zu ihm sich zu halten ist männlich und zeigt

Interpretations-Künste den Finger zu legen: aber jene „Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur“, von der ihr Physiker so stolz redet, wie als ob – besteht nur Dank eurer Ausdeutung und schlechten „Philologie“.

⁴³⁰ For more on the Stoic cosmology see section 2.2. The understanding of the active principle in terms of πνεῦμα can be found, for instance, in *DL VII* 156, but also in Aetius 1.7.33, and Alexander, *De Mixtione*, 225,3-10. For more on this subject see *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999). In particular chapter 17 on Stoic psychology (by A. A. Long) is insightful; 560-83.

⁴³¹ 2.51. The implicit reference to the maxim of living in accordance with nature is picked up again in *MA I 34*, to be discussed in the next section.

Tapferkeit, Schlichtheit, Enthaltbarkeit an. Allmählich wird nicht nur der Einzelne, sondern die gesammte Menschheit zu dieser Männlichkeit emporgehoben werden⁴³²

Again the truths which are gained using a demanding and strict epistemic method are opposed to the 'Irrthümer' of metaphysics. But if we were to situate Stoicism in this context it would be possible to relate it to both sides of the coin: on the one hand, as we saw, Stoicism wrongly defends many of the metaphysical presuppositions that should be replaced by 'little, simple truths' ('kleinen unscheinbaren Wahrheiten'); on the other hand, the Stoic attitude of ascetic and masculine perseverance is helpful precisely for the process of overcoming metaphysics. What we find is, therefore, an example of a rejection of Stoicism from a point of view that may be inspired by Stoicism.

3.5 THE ADOPTION OF A STOIC ATTITUDE IN RESPONSE TO THE TRAGEDY OF PHILOSOPHY

For a closer examination of this phenomenon it is necessary to have a closer look at *MA I 34*, the final aphorism of Book 1 of *MA I*, in which many more appreciative remarks are found on Stoicism (even if all of these are implicit). As we will see, the Stoic attitude of calm endurance is useful not only for the execution of the philosophical task; Nietzsche also considers the benefit of this attitude in the tragic aftermath of the process. *MA I 34* opens with the suggestion alluded to above that the 'Vollendung' of metaphysics appears to be a more complex and tragic process than Dühring can acknowledge.

MA I 34 Aber wird so unsere Philosophie nicht zur Tragödie? Wird die Wahrheit nicht dem Leben, dem Besseren feindlich?⁴³³

The tragedy of truth becoming inimical to life is the consequence of the philosophical critique executed in this book against 'den ersten und letzten Dingen'. For the result of this process – which, as we have just seen, prefers 'little, simple truths' to great metaphysical 'Irrthümer' – is that our human constitution is not suited for truth at all. As stated clearly in *MA I 32*: 'Wir sind von vornherein unlogische und daher ungerechte Wesen und können diess erkennen'.⁴³⁴ This contradictory and appalling outcome is also implied in Venturelli's remark that an ascetic philosopher '[muß] mit immer größerer Klarheit den Abgrund der Erkenntnis und der Moral wahrnehmen, die disharmonische Grundlage jeder Existenz'.⁴³⁵

The last four aphorisms of Book 1 prove Nietzsche's awareness that leaving behind metaphysical truths is inimical to our human needs; this insight will be further examined in *M* and *FW*. Three of these four aphorisms have the term 'nothwendig' in their titles, connected to our human, all too human needs: the illogical is 'nothwendig' (*MA I 31*; 'der vernünftigste Mensch bedarf von Zeit zu Zeit wieder der Natur, das heisst seiner *unlogischen Grundstellung zu allen Dingen*'); it is 'nothwendig' to be unjust in ascribing value to life (*MA I 32*); and it is

⁴³² 2.25.

⁴³³ 2.53.

⁴³⁴ *MA I 32* 2.52.

⁴³⁵ Venturelli, A. (1986), 28.

'nothwendig' to have mistaken perspectives on life (*MA I 33*; '*Der Irrthum über das Leben zum Leben nothwendig*'⁴³⁶). Hence Nietzsche's ultimate question posed in *MA I 34*:

MA I 34 Eine Frage scheint uns die Zunge zu beschweren und doch nicht laut werden zu wollen: ob man bewusst in der Unwahrheit bleiben könne? oder, wenn man diess müsse, ob da nicht der Tod vorzuziehen sei?⁴³⁷

The anti-metaphysical process comes down to an impossible dilemma: living with the knowledge that all our knowledge is founded on untruth, and necessarily so – or death.

This is not to say that Nietzsche is not also optimistic regarding the outcome of his project, albeit tentatively at this stage. The Stoic attitude of calm and rational acceptance plays a significant part in the search for a proper response to this dilemma. Already in *MA I 27* the whole process is labelled a 'wirklich befreiende philosophische Wissenschaft'⁴³⁸; and more signs of confidence can be found in *MA*'s second Book, called 'Zur Geschichte der moralischen Empfindungen'. It is concerned with the same project of revealing metaphysical 'Irrthümer', but focused now on the history of morality. The scientific method introduced in Book 1 receives the connotation of a 'psychological observation' in Book 2; its first aphorisms address the question of the effect of this kind of examination: will it reduce one's suffering?⁴³⁹ In the first aphorism the answer is a straightforward 'yes'.

MA I 35 Vortheile der psychologischen Beobachtung. – Dass das Nachdenken über Menschliches, Allzumenschliches – oder wie der gelehrtere Ausdruck lautet: die psychologische Beobachtung – zu den Mitteln gehöre, vermöge deren man sich die Last des Lebens erleichtern könne [...] und sich dabei ein Wenig wohler fühlen könne: das glaubte man, wusste man – in früheren Jahrhunderten.⁴⁴⁰

The addition of 'wusste man' makes it explicit that Nietzsche agrees with those who used to believe that psychological inspection leads to a relief of the burdens of life – a belief that is

⁴³⁶ *MA I 33* 2.52.

⁴³⁷ 2.53-4. The weight of this dilemma is further clarified in *MA I 34* 2.54: 'Das ganze menschliche Leben ist tief in die Unwahrheit eingesenkt; der Einzelne kann es nicht aus diesem Brunnen herausziehen, ohne dabei seiner Vergangenheit aus tiefstem Grunde gram zu werden, ohne seine gegenwärtigen Motive, wie die der Ehre, ungereimt zu finden und den Leidenschaften, welche zur Zukunft und zu einem Glück in derselben hindrängen, Hohn und Verachtung entgegenzustellen.'

⁴³⁸ *MA I 27* 2.48.

⁴³⁹ This question is wrongly taken to be the main question addressed in *MA* by Michael Ure, who attempts to explain Nietzsche's interest in the Stoics in this book in psycho-analytical terms only, disregarding the difficulty of knowledge as inimical to life informing it. Ure, M. (2008), 131: 'Nietzsche aims to incorporate his insights about the complex psycho-dynamics that ensue from the loss of narcissistic plenitude into a therapeutic philosophy. He thus sets the parameters of his morality of insight by combining Stoicism's therapeutic model of practical reason with his grasp of the narcissistic pathologies that afflict human beings.' This mistaken assumption is based on a (mis)reading of *MA I 33* and 34. In Ure's analysis of Nietzsche's reflection on Stoicism in Sellars, J. (2016) we still find a lack of attention to Nietzsche's awareness of a disharmony between philosophy as 'eliminating metaphysics' and the human condition. 292: 'Nietzsche clearly believes that by using philosophy to eliminate such metaphysical "opinions" he might free mankind from emotional disturbances'. Ure refers in this context to *MA I 27* only.

⁴⁴⁰ 2.57.

defended by the Stoics.⁴⁴¹ Yet the next aphorism immediately nuances this statement, recalling the insight into the appeal of errors against painful truths; 'überhaupt die Dumpfheit auf diesem Gebiete hilft der Menschlichkeit vorwärts.'⁴⁴² Anyone suggesting that there is a truth which is conveniently beneficent for humanity must be regarded with suspicion. In the next two aphorisms Nietzsche seems to settle the question therefore; not by deciding whether or not psychology will have a therapeutic effect, but by claiming that it is necessary to continue making psychological observations for the sake of science itself.⁴⁴³

Book 2 still ends with some hopeful thoughts, again invoking the Stoic faith in the liberating power of reason. It may be painful at first to acknowledge the truths uncovered ('Diess Alles einzusehen, kann tiefe Schmerzen machen'), but the few individuals who will be able to persevere might stand at the beginning of an important change in humanity.

MA I 107 In solchen Menschen, welche jener Traurigkeit *fähig* sind – wie wenige werden es sein! – wird der erste Versuch gemacht, ob die Menschheit aus einer *moralischen* sich in eine *weise Menschheit umwandeln könne*.⁴⁴⁴

The stress on the importance of wisdom may already bring to mind the possibility of a Stoic influence. The suggestion is even stronger in the following sentence, in which emotions like hatred and love are promised to grow weaker (or 'cool down', as it is phrased in *MA I 38*⁴⁴⁵) under the influence of this knowledge. The effect of knowledge, planting the seeds of the new habit of understanding ('des Begreifens'), will weaken the inherited habits of mistaken

⁴⁴¹ Most clearly in their assertion that forming correct judgements is the only action within our power; the more attention we pay to our own reasoning the closer we will get to the ideal of the happy sage. It should be mentioned, though, that further in this aphorism it is La Rochefoucauld who is mentioned; Nietzsche praises his 'Kunst der Sentenzen-Schleiferei'; 2.58. Although it can be argued that La Rochefoucauld opposes many of the Stoic doctrines, especially those of Seneca (see Sellars, J. (2016), 213-5), not only his style of writing maxims about the human psychology clearly belongs in the tradition of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, La Rochefoucauld is also heavily influenced by Stoicism, as it was very fashionable in 17th Century France. See La Rochefoucauld, F. (2007), xvi-xvii.

⁴⁴² *MA I 36* 2.58-9: 'Einwand. – Oder sollte es gegen jenen Satz, dass die psychologische Beobachtung zu den Reiz-, Heil-, und Erleichterungsmittel des Daseins gehöre, eine Gegenrechnung geben? [...] Wenn man [...] einen Abscheu davor empfindet, den Motiven ihres Handelns anzweifelnd nachzuspüren, so hat zwar nicht die Wahrheit, aber die Wohlfahrt der menschlichen Gesellschaft ihren Nutzen dabei: der psychologische Irrthum und überhaupt die Dumpfheit auf diesem Gebiete hilft der Menschlichkeit vorwärts'.

⁴⁴³ *MA I 38* 2.61: 'Inwiefern nützlich. – Also: ob die psychologische Beobachtung mehr Nutzen oder Nachtheil über die Menschen bringe, das bleibe immerhin unentschieden; aber fest steht, dass sie nothwendig ist, weil die Wissenschaft ihrer nicht entrathen kann.'

⁴⁴⁴ 2.105.

⁴⁴⁵ *MA I 38* 2.62: '[S]ollten wir, die *geistigeren* Menschen eines Zeitalters, welches ersichtlich immer mehr in Brand geräth, nicht nach allen löschenden und kühlenden Mitteln, die es giebt, greifen müssen [...]?' The idea that the scientific approach is seen by Nietzsche as having a 'cooling' effect on the 'hot' emotions present in society is repeated and confirmed in *MA I 244* 2.204: 'Man hat dem Christenthum, den Philosophen, Dichtern, Musikern eine Ueberfülle tief erregter Empfindungen zu danken: damit diese uns nicht überwuchern, müssen wir den Geist der Wissenschaft beschwören, welcher im Ganzen etwas kälter und skeptischer macht und namentlich den Gluthstrom des Glaubens an letzte endgültige Wahrheiten abkühlt'.

estimations based on (and feeding into) passions such as love and hatred; read together with the sentence quoted above we must see this growth of knowledge as a form of 'wisdom'.⁴⁴⁶

Mag in uns die vererbte Gewohnheit des irrthümlichen Schätzens, Liebens, Hassens immerhin fortwalten, aber unter dem Einfluss der wachsenden Erkenntnis wird sie schwächer werden: eine neue Gewohnheit, die des Begreifens, Nicht-Liebens, Nicht-Hassens, Ueberschauens, pflanzt sich allmählich in uns auf dem selben Boden an⁴⁴⁷

This hopeful insight reached at the end of Book 2 mirrors some of the conclusions drawn in *MA I 34*, the final aphorism of Book 1. In this aphorism more quiet allusions to Stoicism can be traced, the first of which concerns the hope of developing a more composed and rational attitude as well. In addition to the suggestion of *MA I 107* we read here how the growth of knowledge can only be made possible by adopting a Stoic attitude. It reflects on the devastating insight that philosophy might turn into a 'tragedy'; instead of being seized by despair on a personal level and persuaded to destruction theoretically ('Ist es wahr, bliebe einzig noch eine Denkweise übrig, welche als persönliches Ergebniss die Verzweiflung, als theoretisches eine Philosophie der Zerstörung nach sich zöge?'⁴⁴⁸), a Stoic temperament is advisable.

MA I 34 Ich glaube, die Entscheidung über die Nachwirkung der Erkenntnis wird durch das *Temperament* eines Menschen gegeben: ich könnte mir eben so gut, wie jene geschilderte und bei einzelnen Naturen mögliche Nachwirkung, eine andere denken, vermöge deren ein viel einfacheres, von Affecten reineres Leben entstände, als das jetzige ist: so dass zuerst zwar die alten Motive des heftigeren Begehrens noch Kraft hätten, aus alter vererbter Gewöhnung her, allmählich aber unter dem Einflusse der reinigenden Erkenntnis schwächer würden.⁴⁴⁹

Nietzsche acknowledges a variety of possible reactions to the insight that knowledge is inimical to our human constitution, depending on 'temperament'. It is suggested that a nature whose life is 'much more modest, purified from affects'⁴⁵⁰ might react more calmly and rationally, implying that this is the only possible way of continuing the project. In line with this, the title of this aphorism is '*Zur Beruhigung*' – reminiscent of the Stoic ideal of *ἀπάθεια*. But it is also *because* of the purifying ('reinigenden') effects of knowledge that the passions ('die alten Motive des heftigeren Begehrens') lose their strength and weaken, as we also saw in *MA I 107*; it must be concluded that Stoic calmness is adhered to both as the condition for and the effect of a painful yet purifying knowledge.

⁴⁴⁶ I agree therefore with the remark made by Ure, M. (2008), 126: 'In his reference to a future simpler life in which our cravings or greed will be weaker than they are at present, Nietzsche unmistakably describes as the aim of *Bildung* the realization of a cheerful Stoicism.'

⁴⁴⁷ 2.105.

⁴⁴⁸ 2.54.

⁴⁴⁹ 2.54.

⁴⁵⁰ In *WS 88*, 2.593 Nietzsche even seems to commit himself to the ideal of 'overcoming' passions: 'die Stimmung des von Herzensgrund bewegten, geistig freudigen, hellen und aufrichtigen Menschen, der die Leidenschaften überwunden hat. Diess wird die Lehre vom besten Stile sein: er entspricht dem guten Menschen.' See also *WS 53*, 2.576 '*Ueberwindung der Leidenschaften*. – Der Mensch, der seine Leidenschaften überwunden hat, ist in den Besitz des fruchtbarsten Erdreiches getreten'.

Clearly, the Stoic doctrine that not the things themselves but our opinions or reactions are threatening or disturbing shapes this argument.⁴⁵¹ The characteristics of a 'good temperament', which is one of balance, calmness, and cheerfulness or 'Heiterkeit' (consisting of what the Stoics call 'εὐπάθεια'⁴⁵²) bring to mind even more Stoic features touched upon in *MA I* 34.

Freilich gehörte hierzu, wie gesagt, ein gutes Temperament, eine gefestete, milde und im Grunde frohsinnige Seele, eine Stimmung, welche nicht vor Tücken und plötzlichen Ausbrüchen auf der Hut zu sein brauchte und in ihren Aeusserungen Nichts von dem knurrenden Tone und der Verbissenheit an sich trüge, – jenen bekannten lästigen Eigenschaften alter Hunde und Menschen, die lange an der Kette gelegen haben.⁴⁵³

Instead of being afraid of one's own eccentricities, or of sudden outbursts, betraying a tone of sullenness and bottled-up anger, the person with the desired temperament possesses a steady and constantly cheerful character. Nietzsche opposes this kind of attitude to people who 'have been chained up for a long time.' This lack of freedom reminds us of the Stoic concept of 'freedom' in the normative sense, referred to as 'ἐλευθερία'.⁴⁵⁴ The state of all human beings is famously compared by the Stoics to that of a dog chained to a cart; only the free man is capable of turning this situation to his advantage by adopting a calm attitude of acceptance.⁴⁵⁵ It could be argued that this argument concerning freedom also lingers in Nietzsche's mind in the following sentences: 'ein Mensch, von dem in solchen Maasse die gewöhnlichen Fesseln

⁴⁵¹ See also further in *MA I* 141, 2.136 'Und doch ist dieses Leiden am Natürlichen in der Realität der Dinge völlig unbegründet: es ist nur die Folge von Meinungen über die Dinge.' This famous Stoic doctrine can be found in Epictetus' *Encheiridion* ch. 5a: 'People get upset not by what happens but by their opinions on what happens.' Boter, G. (1999), 282; and in Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* 8.47: 'If you suffer distress because of some external cause, it is not the thing itself that troubles you but the judgement about it'.

⁴⁵² See *DL VII* 116; see Brennan, T. (2006), 97-100; 110-11 for more on the 'εὐπάθεια'; there are three kinds, volition, caution and joy, all being impulses that are 'true, knowledgeable, attributions of goodness and badness to the only things that are truly good and bad'. See also *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), 701; 723.

⁴⁵³ 2.54-5. The image of the aggressive chained dog is later used by Nietzsche to depict Dühring. *NL* 18[55] 10.581: 'Dühring – ein Mensch der durch sich selber von seiner Denkweise abschreckt und als ewig kläffender und beißlustiger Kettenhund vor seine Philosophie sich hingelegt hat.'

⁴⁵⁴ The distinction made in Rutherford, D. (2011) might be useful in this respect; 514: 'The surviving texts of the ancient Stoics offer evidence of two distinct notions of freedom. One is part of a general theory of agency, which defends the will's freedom as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. The other is a normative ideal that plays a prominent role in later representations of Stoic ethics, particularly that of Epictetus.'

⁴⁵⁵ Hippolytus, *Refutation of all heresies* 1.21 (*SVF* 2.975): 'They too [Zeno and Chrysippus] affirmed that everything is fated, with the following model. When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow it is pulled and follows, making its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow it will be compelled in any case. So it is with men too: even if they do not want to, they will be compelled in any case to follow what is destined.' Long, A.A., Sedley, D.N. (1987), Vol. I, 386. See also Seneca (1917-1925), *Epistle* 107: 'Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt'; the wise man knows that he is fated and is capable of allowing fate to govern him; the vicious man refuses to accept that he is fated, and precisely this resistance makes him unfree. The poems 'Scherz, List und Rache' in *FW* confirm the thought that Nietzsche at least on some occasions associates the unfreedom of chains with Seneca. 34 reads 'Seneca et hoc genus omne. Das schreibt und schreibt sein unsausstehlich weises Larifari, Als gält es primum scribere, deinde philosophari.' 32 reads: 'A. Er steht und horcht: was konnt ihn irren? Was hört er vor den Ohren schwirren? Was war's, das ihn niederschlug? B. Wie Jeder, der einst Ketten trug, Hört überall er – Kettenklirren.' 3.360-1.

des Lebens abgefallen sind, [...] [muss] auf Vieles, ja fast auf Alles, was bei den anderen Menschen Werth hat, ohne Neid und Verdruss verzichten können⁴⁵⁶; the liberation from the 'Fesseln des Lebens', thus, may go hand in hand with the liberating judgement that all things that are valuable to others are in fact without value. This insight is at least for the Stoics the foundation for a 'gefestete, milde und im Grunde frohsinnige Seele' who has averted the danger of 'Tücken und plötzlichen Ausbrüchen' or of 'knurrenden Tone' and 'Verbissenheit'; it may be presumed that Nietzsche implicitly expresses his agreement with this connection here.

Also the conclusion of *MA I 34* picks up on elements reminiscent of a Stoic account of freedom. The final sentences of *MA I 34* describe how the person with the desired temperament happily communicates the joy of his condition ('Die Freude an diesem Zustande theilt er gerne mit'), even if he has nothing more to convey ('er *hat* vielleicht nichts Anderes mitzutheilen') – which lends itself to another case of 'Entbehrung' and 'Entsagung' ('worin freilich eine Entbehrung, eine Entsagung mehr liegt'), both terms immediately calling to mind Stoic self-restraint, as we saw earlier. The final sentence of *MA I 34* reads:

Will man aber trotzdem mehr von ihm, so wird er mit wohlwollendem Kopfschütteln auf seinen Bruder hinweisen, den freien Menschen der That, und vielleicht ein Wenig Spott nicht verhehlen: denn mit dessen „Freiheit“ hat es eine eigene Bewandtniss.⁴⁵⁷

The 'free man of action' referred to in this sentence may be seen as opposed to the 'Stoic' man, who shakes his head in disagreement, superior in his insight in the real state of affairs concerning freedom. Even if we saw how in *MA I 31* the Stoic doctrine of the importance of reason was dismissed, this sentence may well be seen as a gesture of sympathy towards the Stoic account of freedom: instead of defending an idea of freedom as 'choice' they regard it mainly as the liberating result of self-restraint concerning the valuing of things.

Two more textual arguments can be given for the presence of Stoicism *MA I 34*, both confirming Nietzsche's hopeful turn to Stoicism in order to face the devastating conflict between knowledge and life. The first concerns the expectation of another effect of knowledge's purification: one finally 'lives with others and with oneself as if 'in nature', 'being as a witness to what was threatening before'. This remark obviously brings to mind the Stoic maxim to 'live in accordance with nature'. The effect of this kind of knowledge is that the desire to interpret ourselves as 'more than nature' will no longer stand in the way of acknowledging that, indeed, we *are* nature and nothing more.

Man lebte zuletzt unter den Menschen und mit sich wie in der *Natur*, ohne Lob, Vorwürfe, Ereiferung, an Vielem sich wie an einem Schauspiel weidend, vor dem man sich bisher nur zu fürchten hatte. Man wäre die Emphasis los und würde die Anstachelung des Gedankens, dass man nicht nur *Natur* oder mehr als *Natur* sei, nicht weiter empfinden.⁴⁵⁸

Even if this statement must be read together with *MA I 31*, the aphorism that explicitly goes against the Stoic idea that nature is rational, it still conveys an appreciative view of the Stoic

⁴⁵⁶ *MA I 34* 2.55.

⁴⁵⁷ 2.55.

⁴⁵⁸ 2.54.

maxim. What is more, we could see traces of it returning in Nietzsche's account of naturalism discussed in chapter 2.5. The remark we have come across in *FW* 109 ('Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernatürlichen!'⁴⁵⁹) has a precedent in the *Nachlass* of the summer of 1881, quoted below; but may actually originate in *MA* I.

NL 11[21] Meine Aufgabe: die Entmenschung der Natur und dann die Vernatürlichung des Menschen, nachdem er den reinen Begriff „Natur“ gewonnen hat.⁴⁶⁰

Clearly Nietzsche sees parts of the Stoic doctrine of nature as belonging to the metaphysics that needs to be overthrown; yet the basic idea of regarding humanity as immanently belonging to nature continuously appeals to Nietzsche, and might even be seen as the outcome of the anti-metaphysical process.

The second aspect of Stoicism to be pointed out in this text is the 'fearless' standpoint of looking at humankind from 'above', or from a distance as a mere 'observer' ('an Vielem sich wie an einem Schauspiel weidend'). This aspect, different from Stoic naturalism, will not continue to be of interest to Nietzsche; more details will follow in the next chapter. In this text it is still positively connected to the overcoming of a certain fear, in combination with the Stoic logic of ascetic abstinence.

Vielmehr muss ein Mensch, von dem in solchem Maasse die gewöhnlichen Fesseln des Lebens abgefallen sind, dass er nur deshalb weiter lebt, um immer besser zu erkennen, auf Vieles, ja fast auf Alles, was bei den anderen Menschen Werth hat, ohne Neid und Verdruss verzichten können, ihm muss als der wünschenswertheste Zustand jenes freie, furchtlose Schweben über Menschen, Sitten, Gesetzen und den herkömmlichen Schätzungen der Dinge *genügen*.⁴⁶¹

The first sentence again stages the 'Stoic' man with the constant and cheerful character; it is stated that this man continues to live only so as to know better. For that he must 'without envy or vexation be able to forego much'; the most desirable condition to him should be 'that free, fearless hovering over men, customs, laws and the traditional evaluations of things'. This expression is strongly reminiscent of Marcus Aurelius' following observation.

7.48 One who would converse about human beings should look on all things earthly as though from some point far above, upon herds, armies, and agriculture, marriages and divorces, births and deaths, the clamour of law courts, deserted wastes, alien people of every kind, festivals, lamentations, and markets, this intermixture of everything and ordered combination of opposites.⁴⁶²

A fearlessly detached outlook on human affairs cannot be achieved without a certain amount of 'Gleichgültigkeit': it is of vital importance, so both Nietzsche and Marcus Aurelius suggest, to stop thinking of things, or other people (or other people's opinions) as valuable if we wish to

⁴⁵⁹ 3.469.

⁴⁶⁰ 9.525.

⁴⁶¹ 2.55.

⁴⁶² Marcus Aurelius (2011), 64-5.

learn.⁴⁶³ In the *Nachlass* one can find several places in which this idea is prominent: the less we are emotionally attached to things, the more knowledge we will gain. More on this Stoic connection between knowledge and emotional detachment will follow in chapter 4.

3.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter the first steps have been taken to analyse Nietzsche's reflection on Stoicism. Starting with a broad overview of the contexts in which Nietzsche habitually turns to the Stoics (a distinction was made between a Hegel-inspired historical perspective, one that assesses Stoicism psychologically, and finally one that enters into a dialogue with Stoicism on a particular topic), the next step involved an analysis of the four most distinctive characteristics of Stoicism emerging from Nietzsche's comments. We observed how the Stoics are continuously depicted as (1) 'Schauspieler', 'Selbst-Betrüger', proposing a philosophy of 'Heuchelei' (possibly inspired by Schopenhauer); (2) defending an attitude of stone-like 'hardness', (3) by suppressing one's emotions through 'self-tyranny' especially (4) in the context of pursuing knowledge.

Yet we also saw how Nietzsche's assessment of these typically Stoic features is not consistent throughout his texts. Especially the characteristic of 'hardness' is in earlier texts still appreciatively framed in terms of 'masculinity', while it receives in later texts connotations of 'petrification'. In the final part of this chapter the remarkable case of *MA I* has been discussed in this context. Although there are no explicit references, the presence of Stoicism is undeniable – both as subject of critique and a source of inspiration. The project of unmasking all metaphysical claims as human, all too human fictions (in which Nietzsche dismantles Schopenhauer's metaphysics using Dühring's scientific method) includes a radical critique of Stoic metaphysics. On the other hand Stoicism is adhered to in the face of the devastating effects of this project. Its outcome, the fearful dilemma between knowledge and life, pushes Nietzsche in the direction of a calming philosophy such as Stoicism. Not only is the Stoic attitude of ascetic calmness deemed necessary in order to fulfil the difficult task at hand; Nietzsche also maintains that its ultimate effect will be the development of the Stoic lifestyle of wisdom: those who succeed will end up living cheerfully with themselves as in nature, hovering fearlessly above humankind, and maintaining a certain distance from rumours surrounding them. Stoicism appears in *MA I* to be the perfect kind of philosophy in the difficult situation of a scientific philosophy exposing itself to be hostile to life.

⁴⁶³ The suggested attitude is recollected in *MA I*'s 1886 Vorrede, and explicitly connected to 'freie Geister' as well. *MA I* Vorrede 4 2.18: 'Man lebt, nicht mehr in den Fesseln von Liebe und Hass, ohne Ja, ohne Nein, freiwillig nahe, freiwillig ferne, am liebsten entschlüpfend, ausweichend, fortflatternd, wieder weg, wieder empor fliegend; man ist verwöhnt, wie jeder, der einmal ein ungeheures Vielerlei *unter* sich gesehen hat, – und man ward zum Gegenstück Derer, welche sich um Dinge bekümmern, die sie nichts angehn. In der That, den freien Geist gehen nunmehr lauter Dinge an – und wie viele Dinge! – welche ihn nicht mehr *bekümmern*...' A passage in *GM* confirms that an attitude of refraining from a yes or no is related to Stoicism. *GM* III 24 5.399-400: 'Ich kenne dies Alles vielleicht zu sehr aus der Nähe: jene verehrenswürdige Philosophen-Enthaltbarkeit, zu der ein solcher Glaube verpflichtet, jener Stoicismus des Intellekts, der sich das Nein zuletzt eben so streng verbietet wie das Ja, jenes Stehenbleiben-*Wollen* vor dem Thatsächlichen, dem factum brutum, jener Fatalismus der „petits-faits“.'

Chapter 4: *INCREASING DISSATISFACTION WITH STOICISM*

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 3 has provided a general analysis of the way in which Stoicism is addressed by Nietzsche throughout his philosophical life. Its final part has dedicated some special attention to *MA I* as a remarkable text showing how Nietzsche criticises Stoicism yet also adopts elements of it. We also saw that the feature of ‘masculinity’ approved of in the early works slowly turns into the criticism of ‘petrification’ in later texts. This chapter will investigate the process behind this shift. What development in Nietzsche’s thought leads him to change his judgement of Stoicism? I will argue that the main change takes place in the years between the writing of *MA* and *FW*, that is roughly between 1876 and 1882. The account presented in this chapter is also of importance for our understanding of *amor fati* in *FW* Book IV. Its impact on our interpretation of this notion will be elaborated on in chapter 5.

In opposition to most other commentators, who tend to neglect any change in Nietzsche’s thought on Stoicism⁴⁶⁴, I argue that Nietzsche’s moral-psychological engagement with Stoicism in this period is shaped by one main question: what role should be given to emotions in the pursuit of knowledge (in the broadest sense of ‘Wissenschaft’, not just limited to the ‘natural sciences’) and in the striving for health? Already in *MA I* we observed Nietzsche realising that knowledge might be inimical to life. How far can and should we go in the pursuit of knowledge and truth? What is to be sacrificed – should we go so far as to sacrifice our lives? Some passages suggest an affirmative answer to this.⁴⁶⁵ In those passages, health is treated as secondary, even only instrumental, to knowledge. Other texts show how Nietzsche’s interest in health is genuine and prioritized (obsessed as he is in that time with his own sickness⁴⁶⁶). Nietzsche’s interest in different diets, and the exercises he finds in late antiquity, Stoicism included, underscores this preoccupation.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁴ Especially Ure, M. (2008); but also Ure, M. (2009), 60-84 (although in this article, as has been noticed in 1.2.3, he does recognize Nietzsche’s growing hostility toward the Stoics in *FW*). Also, Nymeyr, B. (2009) does not differentiate within Nietzsche’s oeuvre. It mainly discusses Nietzsche’s explicitly negative remarks on Stoicism. An exception has to be made for Marco Brusotti, whose 1997 work *Die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis* works out in great detail what I merely indicate in this chapter: a shift from *MA I* to *FW* regarding the role of emotions in the pursuit of knowledge. Brusotti, M. (1997), 453: ‘Den Ernst, der noch in *Morgenröthe* zur Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis wesentlich gehörte, lehnt Nietzsches fröhliche Wissenschaft eindeutig ab. Als fröhliche Wissenschaft ist die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis keine Leidenschaft der Redlichkeit mehr.’

⁴⁶⁵ See section 4.2.3 on the expression ‘was liegt an mir?’; especially *M* 494 3.291 is a good example of Nietzsche showing his willingness to sacrifice himself for science.

⁴⁶⁶ See Young, J. (2010), 277-81.

⁴⁶⁷ More on this will be said in section 4.2.4 on ‘the nearest things and emotional openness’.

Nietzsche's approach to passions and emotions, for both health and knowledge, shifts in these years. The change is indicated by Nietzsche himself as he reflects on his development in the new *Vorreden* of 1886. The differences between *MA I* and *FW* are presented in a language that suggests an implicit allusion to the Stoic attitude. We have seen how Stoicism is associated with emotional calmness and stability, distanced rationality, and a form of cold, stone-like inflexibility, especially in the later years. In analysing the years of writing *MA* and *M* similar characterisations are used; yet this distanced attitude is said to develop into one that is 'warmer', more emotional – and less Stoic therefore.

The 1886 *Vorrede* of *FW*, for instance, describes the early phase as a first reaction to sickness. The stiffness and detachment indicate a necessary yet passing phase, indispensable as a means to gain health. By the time Nietzsche starts writing *FW*, a new, more hopeful stage begins.

*FW Vorrede 1 [...] Dies ganze Buch ist eben Nichts als eine Lustbarkeit nach langer Entbehrung und Ohnmacht, das Frohlocken der wiederkehrenden Kraft, des neu erwachten Glaubens an ein Morgen und Uebermorgen, des plötzlichen Gefühls und Vorgefühls von Zukunft, von nahen Abenteuern, von wieder offenen Meeren, von wieder erlaubten, wieder geglaubten Zielen. Und was lag nunmehr Alles hinter mir! Dieses Stück Wüste, Erschöpfung, Unglaube, Vereisung mitten in der Jugend, dieses eingeschaltete Greisenthum an unrechter Stelle, diese Tyrannei des Schmerzes überboten noch durch die Tyrannei des Stolzes, der die Folgerungen des Schmerzes ablehnte – und Folgerungen sind Tröstungen –, diese radikale Vereinsamung als Nothwehr gegen eine krankhaft hellseherisch gewordene Menschenverachtung, diese grundsätzliche Einschränkung auf das Bittere, Herbe, Wehethuende der Erkenntniss [...]!*⁴⁶⁸

We read how a 'radical isolation' was adopted by Nietzsche as a kind of 'self-defence' against a sickness described as 'contempt for people that had become pathologically clairvoyant'. As we will see in this chapter, both 'isolation' and 'self-defence' are used in *M* to indicate a Stoic attitude; also Stoicism as a form of 'therapy' will turn out not to be unusual.⁴⁶⁹ The phase is described further as a cooling down characterised as 'Vereisung', again a possible allusion to the 'cooling' effect of Stoicism.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, the use of the word 'tyranny' reminds us of Nietzsche's remark in *JGB* 9 and 188 that Stoicism is (self-)tyranny (see section 2.5.1); also the addition of 'des Stolzes' seems to be an implicit reference to the Stoic pride alluded to in *JGB* 9. The fact that this new *Vorrede* was written not long after finishing *JGB* makes this suggestion even more plausible. In the last sentence we find, finally, the addition of a 'limitation in principle to what was bitter, harsh, painful to know', which is a clear reference to the painful process executed in *MA*, for which a Stoic attitude was welcomed as we have seen.

Another element of Stoicism can be added, one that has not been mentioned yet: the standpoint regarding hope.

⁴⁶⁸ 3.346.

⁴⁶⁹ As stressed in the titles of Ure's publications. However, Ure works out Nietzsche's references to Stoicism as a cure only, whereas this text suggests that the Stoic attitude can be seen as the symptom of a sickness as well. An exception has to be made for his newest publication in Sellars, J. (2016), 296: '[Nietzsche] comes to view [Stoicism] as a pathology disguised in a philosophical cure.' See also 300.

⁴⁷⁰ See section 3.5, in which *MA I* 38 and *MA I* 244 are mentioned as examples.

FW Vorrede 1 [...] „Fröhliche Wissenschaft“: das bedeutet die Saturnalien eines Geistes, der einem furchtbaren langen Drucke geduldig widerstanden hat – geduldig, streng, kalt, ohne sich zu unterwerfen, aber ohne Hoffnung –, und der jetzt mit Einem Male von der Hoffnung angefallen wird, von der Hoffnung auf Gesundheit, von der *Trunkenheit* der Genesung.⁴⁷¹

Clearly, the writing of *FW* marks the beginning of a new, hopeful time, in which new futures become visible, with newly permitted goals (as stated in the previous quote). Nietzsche changes his mind on hope in the years between *MA* and *FW*. This becomes visible not only from Nietzsche's own remark in the above quote (in which the characteristics of the past attitude are again reminiscent of Stoicism: 'patiently, severely, coldly, without yielding'), but also in *MA* I and *FW* themselves.⁴⁷² It can be argued that Nietzsche's evaluation runs parallel yet opposed to his evaluation of Stoicism. That is, in the early stages, in *MA* and *M*, Nietzsche shows signs of admiration for Stoicism and considers hope dangerous, whereas in the new *Vorrede* of *FW* (and in other passages in *FW* as well⁴⁷³), Nietzsche explicitly rejects the Stoic attitude, shows a more refined and benign attitude towards the passions, and revokes his earlier rejection of hope. In *MA* I we read:

MA I 71 [...] die Hoffnung: sie ist in Wahrheit das übelste der Uebel, weil sie die Qual der Menschen verlängert.⁴⁷⁴

In *M* we find how the rejection of hope is considered typical for a Stoic, who is, as is suggested in the previous aphorism, mainly interested in diminishing suffering ('Qual').

M 546 [...] Von dem *Christen* unterscheidet er [Epiktet's idealer Mensch] sich vor Allem hierin, dass der Christ in Hoffnung lebt, in der Vertröstung auf „unaussprechbare Herrlichkeiten“, dass er sich beschenken lässt und das Beste von der göttlichen Liebe und Gnade, und nicht von sich, erwartet und annimmt: während Epiktet nicht hofft und sein Bestes sich nicht schenken lässt, – er besitzt es, er hält es tapfer in seiner Hand, er macht es der ganzen Welt streitig, wenn diese es ihm rauben will.⁴⁷⁵

Epictetus is contrasted to the Christian, who lives in the hope of divine love and mercy, and who regards the best things in life as a gift received from an external God. Epictetus does not accept the thought of 'his best' being offered to him from outside. He already possesses it and holds on to it in an attitude of brave defensiveness. Epictetus is thus associated with a denunciation of hope; it is this characteristic that marks 'vor Allem' the difference between him and a Christian. The renunciation of Nietzsche's aversion towards hope in the *Vorrede* of *FW* implies therefore that he may likewise renounce his admiration for Stoicism.

⁴⁷¹ 3.345.

⁴⁷² See Brusotti, M. (1997), 449, ft. 128.

⁴⁷³ E.g. at the end of Book III, *FW* 268 3.519: 'Was macht heroisch? – Zugleich seinem höchsten Leide und seiner höchsten Hoffnung entgegengeh'n'; or at the beginning of Book IV, its Motto 3.521: 'Der du mit dem Flammenspeere/Meiner Seele Eis zertheilt,/Dass sie brausend nun zum Meere/Ihrer höchsten Hoffnung eilt'. According to Brusotti, M. (1997), 127, *amor fati* belongs 'zur höchsten Hoffnung seiner [Nietzsches] Seele.'

⁴⁷⁴ 2.82.

⁴⁷⁵ 3.317.

Importantly, it might be added that the above equation of *FW* with ‘saturnalia’ already suggests that *amor fati* is not Stoic. ‘Saturnalia’ refers to the old Roman festival of light, leading to the winter solstice – but also to king Saturn, who was allegedly regarded by the Romans as the original ruler of the Capitulum, and the first king of Latium. This is interesting because king Saturn is said to have been received in Rome by another king, Janus, after whom the fourth book of *FW* is named ‘St. Januarius’: the celebration of a new year. There is, therefore, an interesting link between the saturnalia and January. *FW*, and Book IV in particular, clearly demarcates something new: a new year, the return of light, the coming of spring, the sense of a new future, and the presence of hope. Since it is in the opening aphorism of Book IV that *amor fati* is introduced, and since Stoicism is associated rather with a lack of hope, we may suspect this to be an important indication that *amor fati* is not Stoic, but rather anti-Stoic.

The case of hope is only one of many designating a transition from 1876 to 1882, described in terms of a shift from a Stoic-like cold attitude of restraint and emotional calmness to one that is warmer, more emotional, more hopeful, more ‘open’. In the following sections I will reveal in more detail how this shift occurs, focusing on ‘openness/closedness’ and the question of the role of emotions in connection with the concerns for knowledge and health.

4.2 MORGENRÖTHE

M, written between January 1880 and March 1881, is known as one of Nietzsche’s most neglected works. Possibly because it is, as Keith Ansell-Pearson argues, a book in which a ‘philosophy of modesty’ is presented.⁴⁷⁶ This emphasis on modesty seems to be rather un-Nietzschean, especially if compared to the fierce and often aggressive tone of his later works, which have received considerably more attention than *M*. Ansell-Pearson argues moreover that the book is ‘best to be read’ as an ‘Epicurean-inspired critique of the present and an exercise in moral therapy.’⁴⁷⁷ He thereby starts the tradition to which Michael Ure also belongs, defending a reading of Nietzsche’s Middle Period that emphasises its ‘therapeutic’ aspects aiming at ‘self-cultivation’; although his focus is on the Epicurean rather than the Stoic type of exercise.

M’s subtitle ‘Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurtheile’ indicates that Ansell-Pearson is right in his analysis of *M* as a book focusing on morality; Nietzsche does indeed set himself the task of reflecting upon ‘moral prejudices’.⁴⁷⁸ *EH* indicates further that *M* is the work that started Nietzsche’s campaign against morality. The section on *M* opens with the remark: ‘Mit diesem Buche beginnt mein Feldzug gegen die Moral’⁴⁷⁹ and ends as follows: ‘Mit der „Morgenröthe“ nahm ich zuerst den Kampf gegen die Entselbstungs-Moral auf’.⁴⁸⁰ However, even if *M* is a work concerned with morality and moral prejudices, mainly of ‘Entselbung’, this does not mean that the historical-physiological project started in *MA*, the unmasking of all kinds of

⁴⁷⁶ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 180. That *Morgenröthe* is one of Nietzsche’s most neglected works is also emphasised in the Introduction to the translation by Hollingdale (1997), vii.

⁴⁷⁷ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 179.

⁴⁷⁸ See for a more substantial analysis of the role of morality in *Morgenröthe*: Hollingdale (1997), xxvi – xxxiv.

⁴⁷⁹ *EH* (M) 1 6.329.

⁴⁸⁰ *EH* (M) 2 6.332.

metaphysical (and moral) truths, ends here – on the contrary. Although I agree with much of what Ansell-Pearson has to say about *M*, I will nuance the presupposition that Nietzsche is *only* concerned with a therapy aimed at human flourishing. Truth and the desire to pursue knowledge continue to be of great importance and even gain more importance, as also Marco Brusotti insists.⁴⁸¹

Moreover, I take *M* to be a work in which a *transition* becomes visible. As Nietzsche himself remarks, spirits who do not change their minds will pass away; in his words, a ‘snake that cannot cast its skin perishes’.⁴⁸² Another passage of the late (1886) *Vorreden*, this time of *MA*, describes Nietzsche’s transition in a way that is comparable to what we saw in the *FW Vorrede* of the introduction.

MA I Vorrede 5 [...] Ein Schritt weiter in der Genesung: und der freie Geist nähert sich wieder dem Leben, langsam freilich, fast widerspänstig, fast misstrauisch. Es wird wieder wärmer um ihn, gelber gleichsam; Gefühl und Mitgefühl bekommen Tiefe, Thauwinde aller Art gehen über ihn weg. Fast ist ihm zu Muthe, als ob ihm jetzt erst die Augen für das *Nahe* aufgingen. Er ist verwundert und sitzt stille: wo *war* er doch? Diese nahen und nächsten Dinge: wie scheinen sie ihm verwandelt! welchen Flaum und Zauber haben sie inzwischen bekommen! Er blickt dankbar zurück, – dankbar seiner Wanderschaft, seiner Härte und Selbstentfremdung, seinen Fernblicken und Vogelflügen in kalte Höhen. Wie gut, dass er nicht wie ein zärtlicher dumpfer Eckensteher immer „zu Hause“, immer „bei sich“ geblieben ist! er war *ausser* sich: es ist kein Zweifel. Jetzt erst sieht er sich selbst –, und welche Ueberraschungen findet er dabei!⁴⁸³

This passage describes a step further in the process of healing already introduced in the *FW Vorrede*; slowly and mistrustfully at first the free spirit approaches life again. The transition from sickness to health is described in terms of temperature, colour and feeling: it gets warmer, winds of dew chase away the frost, colours brighten, feelings, also of sympathy, deepen – hinting at the shift concerning the importance of passions introduced earlier. Whereas *MA*, as we have seen, takes the ‘cooling down’ of emotions as its main concern, *M* adopts a far more subtle position towards the passions. As Brusotti rightly claims: ‘In *Morgenröthe* [...] erscheint diese Überwindung der Leidenschaften nicht mehr als die wünschenswerteste Stimmung. Als Nietzsche die Leidenschaftlichkeit des Erkennenden aufwertet, beginnt er im Grunde seine Hochschätzung der späteren griechischen Philosophien zu relativieren.’⁴⁸⁴ I fully endorse the connection in Nietzsche’s texts between the changed evaluation of emotions and of the late Greeks philosophers, including the Stoics. I moreover

⁴⁸¹ Brusotti, M. (1997).

⁴⁸² *M* 573 3.330: ‘*Sich häuten*. – Die Schlange, welche sich nicht häuten kann, geht zu Grunde. Ebenso die Geister, welche man verhindert, ihre Meinungen zu wechseln; sie hören auf, Geist zu sein.’

⁴⁸³ 2.19.

⁴⁸⁴ Brusotti, M. (1997), 138. Brusotti cites an aphorism in *MA II* that we have come across already in section 3.5; in *WS* 88, 2.593 Nietzsche explicitly seems to commit himself to the ideal of ‘overcoming’ emotions: ‘die Stimmung des von Herzensgrund bewegten, geistig freudigen, hellen und aufrichtigen Menschen, der die Leidenschaften überwunden hat. Diess wird die Lehre vom besten Stile sein: er entspricht dem guten Menschen.’

think Brusotti is right in pointing out that this shift should be seen in connection with Nietzsche's shift in understanding the drive for knowledge, the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis'.

Another element of the transition that takes place in *M* is a new discovery of the 'nearest things': 'Fast ist ihm zu Muthe, als ob ihm jetzt erst die Augen für das *Nahe* aufgingen.' This discovery will prove to be of great importance for the understanding of *amor fati*. As I will argue in chapter 5, the *fatum* to be loved is intimately connected to the nearest things and the discovery of the 'self' that is introduced in this *Vorrede* passage: 'Jetzt erst sieht er sich selbst'. The analysis of *M* reveals that Nietzsche both picks up on the theme of the nearest things, and continues what he started in *MA I*: a 'hovering above' humanity in order to adopt a more or less 'objective', i.e. detached, point of view. The *Vorrede* passage does not seem to allow for these two points of view to be adopted at the same time, which indicates again that *M* should be seen as a book of transition. Nietzsche seems to go back and forth, like a 'wanderer'. The *Vorrede* passage touches upon this theme of 'wandering' as well: the free spirit, looking back, is 'dankbar seiner Wanderschaft, seiner Härte und Selbstentfremdung, seinen Fernblicken und Vogelflügen in kalte Höhen.' As I will argue below, *M* is the work in which Nietzsche (modestly as Ansell-Pearson suggests) is taking all kinds of detours in order to investigate the matters of morality. These detours imply 'Selbstentfremdung', 'Härte', 'Fernblicken und Vogelflügen in kalte Höhen', all invoking Stoicism, but slowly developing into an attitude in which the 'nächste Dinge' appear changed.

In what follows I will highlight two main shifts therefore. The first concerns the passions. Like Brusotti, I will argue that *M* is different from *MA I* in its attitude to emotions, although the main difference is only small: *M* no longer considers the effects of the scientific endeavour as 'cooling' and 'liberating', but the need for a certain calmness remains. Following Brusotti, I will argue that Nietzsche comes to understand the drive for knowledge more and more as a 'Leidenschaft' that we cannot dispense with, problematic as it is. This analysis will also put in perspective the accounts of Ure and Ansell-Pearson, who insist that Nietzsche is mainly involved with a therapy of self-cultivation. Secondly, I will deal with the two seemingly opposite attitudes just mentioned: the one 'flying above' humanity, looking at the things below from a cold distance, detached from one's closest surroundings, the other warmly rediscovering the 'nearest' things. I will argue for a connection between the first attitude and Stoicism, as well as for one between non-Stoic emotional 'openness' and the new appreciation of oneself and the nearest things.

Thirdly, then, I will focus on one aspect of Nietzsche's analysis of morality prominent in *M*: pity. I will argue that the way in which Nietzsche turns to Epictetus in this regard throws into relief the development sketched above. Many authors have dealt with this topic, but I will take as my main source of inspiration the analyses by Martha Nussbaum, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Michael Ure, all of which I will critically evaluate.

4.2.1 EMOTIONS AND SCIENCE

Whereas in *MA I* we have seen a double movement concerning the relation between the emotions and knowledge (Stoic calmness as a kind of preparation for facing a devastating

truth, and knowledge itself as having a ‘cooling’ and ‘liberating’ effect), in *M* the second of these options disappears. Instead, we find in the following aphorism how the drive for knowledge is presented as a ‘new passion’, one that has become so dominant that happiness without it is no longer conceivable.

M 429 *Die neue Leidenschaft*. – [...] unser *Trieb zur Erkenntniss* ist zu stark, als dass wir noch das Glück ohne Erkenntniss oder das Glück eines starken festen Wahnes zu schätzen vermöchten; es macht Pein, uns solche Zustände auch nur vorzustellen! Die Unruhe des Entdeckens und Errathens ist uns so reizvoll und unentbehrlich geworden, wie die unglückliche Liebe dem Liebenden wird: welche er um keinen Preis gegen den Zustand der Gleichgültigkeit hergeben würde; – ja, vielleicht sind wir auch *unglücklich Liebende!*⁴⁸⁵

Of great interest in this fragment is the term ‘Unruhe’; it is clear that the practice of discovering and hypothesising (‘Entdeckens und Errathens’) is no longer understood as calming and liberating.⁴⁸⁶ A comparison with unhappy love seems more in place: like an unfortunate lover the searcher for knowledge cannot live without the thrill of his passion anymore⁴⁸⁷ – what is more, humanity might perish because of it, and even that thought does not scare him:

Vielleicht selbst, dass die Menschheit an dieser Leidenschaft der Erkenntniss zu Grunde geht! – auch dieser Gedanke vermag Nichts über uns!⁴⁸⁸

Interestingly though, Nietzsche turns to Marcus Aurelius as one of those who has contributed to the seductive promise of knowledge as the remedy for suffering (a thought that he has clearly come to disbelieve at this point), *and* he turns to him in order to take away the unnecessary elements of suffering that stand in the way of pursuing knowledge.⁴⁸⁹ *M* 450 mentions Marcus Aurelius as an example of the first instance. The description is of ‘leidenschaftliche Geister’, who are seduced by the promise of knowledge reducing suffering

⁴⁸⁵ 3.264.

⁴⁸⁶ Brusotti, M. (1997) concludes similarly, 228: ‘Nietzsches Einstellung zu den Leidenschaften hat sich in *Morgenröthe* geändert: Die *Apatheia* gegen Schmerz und Leidenschaften betrachtet er als eine Illusion. Der leidenschaftlich Erkennende strebt keine allgemeine Seelenruhe an, seine Leidenschaft ist als solche unruhig, und er bejaht diese Unruhe.’

⁴⁸⁷ See for a comparable thought *M* 327 3.232: ‘*Eine Fabel*. – Der Don Juan der Erkenntniss [...] hat Geist, Kitzel und Genuss an Jagd und Intriguen der Erkenntniss – bis an die höchsten und fernsten Sterne der Erkenntniss hinauf! – bis ihm zuletzt Nichts mehr zu erjagen übrig bleibt, als das absolut *Wehethuende* der Erkenntniss, gleich dem Trinker, der am Ende Absinth und Scheidewasser trinkt.’ To be further discussed in section 4.2.3.

⁴⁸⁸ 3.265. See also *M* 459 3.276: ‘*Die Grossmüthigkeit des Denkers*. – [...] Gerade darin glänzt die schönste Tugend des grossen Denkers: die Grossmüthigkeit, dass er als Erkennender sich selber und sein Leben unverzagt, oftmals beschämt, oftmals mit erhabenem Spotte und lächelnd – zum Opfer bringt.’

⁴⁸⁹ That Nietzsche’s attitude towards Marcus Aurelius is one of admiration more than of criticism is confirmed by the following fragment of a letter to Ferdinand Laban, written the 19th of July 1881; *KGB* III/1.106-7: ‘Denn zuletzt, lieber Herr, sind wir Beide doch wohl Einer Meinung, über diesen Einen Punkt: daß [...] wir *auch jetzt noch* so stolz und darüber-hinsehend leben können, wie jener herrliche römische Kaiser, in dessen Verehrung wir Beide *einmüthig* sind (lesen Sie doch zum Beweise dafür meine jüngst erschienene ‚*Morgenröthe*‘ [...]).’

and are therefore doomed: they will end up being fantasists or, in the most fortunate case, poets, while knowledge itself will never be attained.

M 450 Die Lockung der Erkenntniss. – Auf leidenschaftliche Geister wirkt der Blick durch das Thor der Wissenschaft wie der Zauber aller Zauber; und vermuthlich werden sie dabei zu Phantasten und im günstigen Falle zu Dichtern: so heftig ist ihre Begierde nach dem Glück der Erkennenden. Geht es euch nicht durch alle Sinne, – dieser Ton der süßen Lockung, mit dem die Wissenschaft ihre frohe Botschaft verkündet hat, in hundert Worten und im hundert-ersten und schönsten: „Lass den Wahn schwinden! Dann ist auch das ‚Wehe mir!‘ verschwunden; und mit dem ‚Wehe mir!‘ ist auch das Wehe dahin.“ (Marc Aurel.)⁴⁹⁰

Yet *M 424* shows how it remains of importance for Nietzsche to be calm, strong and balanced (the opposite of the ‘leidenschaftliche Geister’ in the above passage) in order to be a scientist: looking for truth should not entail looking for cures. Again the point is made that knowledge does not have the calming and therapeutic effect it was still considered to have in *MA*, but the opposite analysis, that we have to be calm and composed to successfully search for truth, still stands.

M 424 Für wen die Wahrheit da ist. – Bis jetzt sind die Irrthümer die *trostreichen* Mächte gewesen: nun erwartet man von den erkannten Wahrheiten die selbe Wirkung und wartet ein Wenig lange schon. Wie, wenn die Wahrheiten gerade diess – zu trösten – nicht zu leisten vermöchten? – Wäre diess denn ein Einwand gegen die Wahrheiten? [...] Vielleicht folgt aus alledem der Satz, dass die Wahrheit *als Ganzes* und Zusammenhängendes nur für die zugleich mächtigen und harmlosen, freud- und friedenvollen Seelen (wie es die des Aristoteles war) da ist, ebenso wie diese wohl auch nur im Stande sein werden, *sie zu suchen*: denn die anderen suchen *Heilmittel* für sich, mögen sie noch so stolz über ihren Intellect und dessen Freiheit denken, – sie suchen *nicht* die Wahrheit.

In this aphorism Nietzsche takes Aristotle as an example; but when it comes to the strategies we should adopt for becoming like Aristotle (that is: a ‘zugleich mächtigen und harmlosen, freud- und friedenvollen Seelen’), Nietzsche turns to Marcus Aurelius (and other Stoics, Epictetus in particular). The expression distinctive of Marcus Aurelius ‘let delusion vanish!’ returns prominently in the following aphorism, for instance.

M 54 Die Gedanken über die Krankheit! – Die Phantasie des Kranken beruhigen, dass er wenigstens nicht, wie bisher, *mehr* von seinen Gedanken über seine Krankheit zu leiden hat, als von der Krankheit selber, – ich denke, das ist Etwas! Und es ist nicht Wenig! Versteht ihr nun unsere Aufgabe?⁴⁹¹

Nietzsche famously claims, much later, in *GM III*: ‘Die Sinnlosigkeit des Leidens, *nicht* das Leiden, war der Fluch, der bisher über der Menschheit ausgebreitet lag’, again invoking Marcus

⁴⁹⁰ 3.273. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 6.7: ‘Do away with the judgment, and the notion ‘I have been harmed’ is done away with; do away with that notion, and the harm itself is gone.’ Brusotti, M. (1997), 225 ft 23: ‘Die Sentenz ist in Nietzsches Handexemplar zweimal angestrichen.’

⁴⁹¹ 3.57.

Aurelius' insight.⁴⁹² Already in *M* and *WS* we find Nietzsche analysing Christianity as a form of therapy that only temporarily eases the pain, by offering an interpretation of suffering as *punishment*⁴⁹³, but that in the long run creates a suffering that is even worse, as Nietzsche observes in his age.

M 52 *Wo sind die neuen Ärzte der Seele?* – Die Mittel des Trostes sind es gewesen, durch welche das Leben erst jenen leidvollen Grundcharakter, an den man jetzt glaubt, bekommen hat; die grösste Krankheit der Menschen ist aus der Bekämpfung ihrer Krankheiten entstanden, und die anscheinenden Heilmittel haben auf die Dauer Schlimmeres erzeugt, als Das war, was mit ihnen beseitigt werden sollte. Aus Unkenntniss hielt man die augenblicklich wirkenden, betäubenden und berausenden Mittel, die sogenannten Tröstungen, für die eigentlichen Heilkräfte [...]. [W]o ist Der, welcher endlich auch einmal die Gegenmittel gegen diese Leiden ernst nimmt und die unerhörte Quacksalberei an den Pranger stellt [...]?⁴⁹⁴

The 'new physicians of the soul' in this aphorism are presented with the task to 'take seriously the antidotes to these sufferings and put in the pillory the unheard-of quack-doctoring'. As Nietzsche makes clear, the reason why this dangerously unhealthy type of Christian remedy has grown so dominant is *ignorance* ('Unkenntnis'). It is about time, he suggests, to investigate the historical and psychological processes underlying this major medical error. Unmasking the Christian interpretation of suffering in terms of punishment seems to amount to doing exactly what he proposes in *M* 54: the taking away of the painful *thoughts* on the suffering, the thoughts that have increased the suffering to a great extent, so that only the original suffering remains. Taking away the thoughts on suffering, then, comes down to the calming down of a *phantasy*.

The main aim of this text is the unmasking of certain phantasies, therefore; a project that must be seen as in continuity with the historical-physiological endeavour executed in *MA*.⁴⁹⁵ Admittedly, the difference between *MA* I and *M* on the relation between knowledge and the calming down of emotions is remarkably small. I believe that Brusotti's analysis, 'Die Therapie des Gefühlslebens koexistiert mit der Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis'⁴⁹⁶, hits the mark more closely than Ansell-Pearson's suggestion that *M* is merely an 'exercise in moral therapy', or Ure's idea that Nietzsche 'understood himself as developing a *new philosophical therapy*'.⁴⁹⁷ Rather, it is clear that Nietzsche increasingly comes to understand the drive for knowledge as a 'Leidenschaft' that brings with it a certain amount of 'Unruhe'. Therefore, in order to prevent himself from ending up as one of the 'leidenschaftliche Geister', who instead of looking for knowledge attempt to discover cures, Nietzsche emphasises that for all the other

⁴⁹² *GM* III 28 5-411.

⁴⁹³ *M* 78 3-76-7: 'Sodann gab es in im Alterthum wirklich noch Unglück, reines, unschuldiges Unglück; erst im Christenthum wird alles Strafe, wohlverdiente Strafe'.

⁴⁹⁴ 3-56. See also *WS* 78 2-587: '*Der Glaube an die Krankheit, als Krankheit*'.

⁴⁹⁵ Moreover, this project is not just Nietzsche's; it carries the mark of modernity. See *M* 429 quoted above and section 3.4 and 3.5 on the influence of Dühring's positivism.

⁴⁹⁶ Brusotti, M. (1997), 229.

⁴⁹⁷ Ure, M. (2009), 60.

‘Leidenschaften’ a certain calmness must be attained.⁴⁹⁸ Let’s not forget that it is Aristotle, a philosopher known for his scientific approach, and not, as one may have expected, one of the Stoics, who is chosen as the example in *M* 424.

There are more references in *M* containing typically Stoic strategies to calm down. They can all be seen as merely different formulations of the idea that it is our phantasies, our opinions, that bring about unwelcome restlessness.⁴⁹⁹ *M* 82 is one example. Nietzsche opposes Luther, who attempts to force us to take up a certain opinion regarding our life, to an anonymous ‘Höheren und Bedachtsamen’ who claims instead:

M 82 [...] „Es steht bei uns, über Diess und Das keine Meinung zu bilden und so unsrer Seele die Unruhe zu ersparen. Denn die Dinge selbst können ihrer Natur nach uns keine Urtheile *abnöthigen*.“⁵⁰⁰

That this anonymous person is in fact Marcus Aurelius is confirmed in the following quote from his *Meditations*.

6.52 It is possible to form no opinion on this matter and not be troubled in one’s mind; for things themselves are not of such a nature that they can create judgments within us.

But not only Marcus Aurelius is seen as the exemplary philosopher to help us adopt a more ‘objective’ standpoint, undisturbed by opinions. Also Epictetus’ advice is worth adhering to. In the following aphorism Nietzsche encourages the reader (‘du’) to always remain a spectator, adopting a third-person perspective concerning all our inner movements, be they comic or tragic; if we succeed in creating a ‘third eye’, we will always have a little portal to joy and a refuge.

M 509 *Das dritte Auge*. – [...] Werde klug und suche die Tragödie und Komödie dort, wo sie besser gespielt wird! Wo es interessanter und interessirter zugeht! Ja, es ist nicht ganz leicht, dabei eben nur Zuschauer zu bleiben, – aber lerne es! Und fast in allen Lagen, die dir schwer und peinlich fallen, hast du dann ein Pfortchen zur Freude und eine Zuflucht, selbst noch, wenn deine eigenen Leidenschaften über dich herfallen. Mache dein Theater-Auge auf, das grosse dritte Auge, welches durch die zwei anderen in die Welt schaut!⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁸ Brusotti, M. (1997), 273. As the analysis of *FW* will show, this way of approaching suffering will be dropped not long after the moment of these writings.

⁴⁹⁹ See also *M* 449 3.272: ‘Dem und Jenen, dessen Kopf *durch Meinungen verstört ist*, helfen’, and *M* 563 3.328: ‘Nicht *die Dinge*, sondern die Meinungen *über die Dinge, die es gar nicht giebt*, haben die Menschen so verstört!’

⁵⁰⁰ 3.78.

⁵⁰¹ 3.297. See also *NL* 7[291] 9.379: ‘Wie ein Drama sein Inneres leiden sehen ist ein höherer Grad als nur leiden.’ And *M* 497 3.293: ‘das *reine, reinmachende Auge*, das [...] auf die Welt wie auf einen Gott blickt’. Epictetus, *Encheiridion* ch. 17: ‘Remember that you are an actor in a play the character of which is determined by the playwright: a short play, if he wants it to be short; a long play, if he wants it to be long; if he wants you to play a beggar’s role, remember to play this role properly too; and in the same way if he wants you to play a cripple, an official, a private person. For this is yours to do: to play well the role that is assigned to you; but picking it out is the task of someone else.’ Boter, G. (1999), 294.

The next aphorism, also acquired from Epictetus, takes the idea of a distanced position towards our own sufferings even more seriously. Here the ‘third eye’ is connected to the more objective standpoint of those who view their suffering as if it belongs to others, thereby reaching a more detached, calmer and rational perspective.

M 137 Warum das „Ich“ verdoppeln! – Unsere eigenen Erlebnisse mit dem Auge ansehen, mit dem wir sie anzusehen pflegen, wenn es die Erlebnisse Anderer sind, – diess beruhigt sehr und ist eine rathsame Medicin. [...] Gewiss ist [...] jene [...] Maxime der Vernunft und dem guten Willen zur Vernünftigkeit gemässer, denn wir urtheilen über den Werth und Sinn eines Ereignisses objectiver, wenn es an Anderen hervortritt und nicht an uns: zum Beispiel über den Werth eines Sterbefalles, eines Geldverlustes, einer Verleumdung.⁵⁰²

It is striking in this aphorism how Nietzsche again regards the calming effect (‘dies beruhigt sehr’) as the desired outcome; viewing one’s own sufferings from a distance is ‘eine rathsame Medicin’. What is more, adopting this perspective is more in accord with reason and the will to rationality (‘der Vernunft und dem guten Willen zur Vernünftigkeit gemässer’), because it entails a greater degree of objectivity. Reading these aphorisms, therefore, leads us to conclude that Nietzsche is to a large extent still inspired by Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus when it comes to the acquisition of a calm, detached, rational standpoint, one that is more suitable to perform the steps necessary in order to find ‘truth’ instead of mere cures, in line with Nietzsche’s apparent example in this matter; Aristotle.

4.2.2 SELF-RESTRAINT AND OBJECTIVITY

However, the strategies as discussed above entail a sense of disengagement with one’s feelings. The adoption of a ‘third eye’, the idea of viewing one’s own emotional fluctuations from the perspective of a spectator in the theatre or a complete stranger, implies a sense of disentanglement (‘er war *ausser sich*’⁵⁰³) that will turn out to be completely different from the warm rediscovery of ‘nearest things’ that follows later. In particular, the kind of emotional ‘openness’ of the latter is absent in the aphorisms revealing admiration for Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. I will begin therefore by analysing the texts in which the Stoic attitude of self-restraint is interpreted as brave and modest solitude and independence, necessary for acquiring an objective standpoint of hovering above humanity. I will dedicate a special section afterwards to the Stoically inspired expression ‘was liegt an mir?’, claiming that this exclamation highlights the climax of rational restraint and a neglect of the importance of the

⁵⁰² 3.130. The Epictetus-text that has clearly been used as its inspiration is *Encheiridion* ch. 26: ‘The will of nature can be learnt from the things in which we do not differ from each other. For instance, when someone else’s slave breaks a cup, our immediate reaction is, “It is just one of those things that happen.” Realize, then, that when your own cup is broken, you must react in the same way as when someone else’s cup was broken. Transfer this to more important things as well. Someone else’s child or wife has died? There is nobody who would not say, “That’s life.” But when someone’s own child dies, he immediately goes, “Alas!” and “Poor me!” But we should remember how we feel when we hear such things about others.’ Boter, G. (1999), 304.

⁵⁰³ *MA I Vorrede* 5 2.19.

self. The subsequent section then will point out how these texts sit uneasily with the growing importance of emotions expressed in other aphorisms, marking the transition to *FW*.

M 497 adds to the objective perspective of a stranger and the third eye of the spectator the possibility of adopting a ‘purifying eye’.

M 497 Das reinmachende Auge. – Von „Genius“ wäre am ehesten bei solchen Menschen zu reden, wo der Geist, wie bei Plato, Spinoza und Goethe, an den Charakter und das Temperament nur *lose angeknüpft* erscheint, als ein beflügeltes Wesen, das sich von jenen leicht trennen und sich dann weit über sie erheben kann. [...] [Sie] haben das *reine, reinmachende Auge*, das nicht aus ihrem Temperament und Charakter gewachsen scheint, sondern frei von ihnen und meist in einem milden Widerspruch gegen sie auf die Welt wie auf einen Gott blickt und diesen Gott liebt.⁵⁰⁴

The spirit of a genius (examples of which are Plato, Spinoza and Goethe, all of whom Nietzsche admires at this point) is described as a ‘winged being’ that seems to be only ‘loosely attached’ to temperament and character; it can detach itself effortlessly, and rise high above them. It seems therefore that in order to look at the world as they do (seeing and loving it as if it were God), one has to free one’s spirit and associate oneself with its position not as the consequence of, but ‘in mild opposition’ to temperament and character. This purified (and purifying) position, distanced from one’s more emotional self, is not something given; it must be *lernt* according to the last sentences of the aphorism.

Auch ihnen ist aber dieses Auge nicht mit Einem Male geschenkt: es giebt eine Übung und Vorschule des Sehens, und wer rechtes Glück hat, findet zur rechten Zeit auch einen Lehrer des reinen Sehens.

What, one may wonder, will be the appropriate procedure in order to learn ‘pure seeing’, and who will be those teachers? The following aphorism hints at two possible answers to the last question: Plato and the Stoics. What is more, it gives a very clear indication of what is needed in order not to lose one’s ‘Vernunft’: one has to flee from experiences.

M 448 Die Wirklichkeit ehren. – [...] Wozu können uns also die Erlebnisse fortreißen! Was sind unsere Meinungen! Man muss, um sich nicht zu verlieren, um seine *Vernunft* nicht zu verlieren, vor den Erlebnissen flüchten! So floh Plato vor der Wirklichkeit und wollte die Dinge nur in den blassen Gedankenbildern anschauen; er war voller Empfindung und wußte, wie leicht die Wellen der Empfindung über seiner Vernunft zusammenschlugen. – So hätte sich demnach der Weise zu sagen: „ich will die *Wirklichkeit* ehren, aber ihr den Rücken dabei zuwenden, *weil* ich sie kenne und fürchte“?⁵⁰⁵

Plato, a very sensitive man, decided to turn his back on reality, not out of a sense of disdain but out of respect. Nietzsche analyses Plato’s decision to see reality only in pallid mental pictures as the consequence of his sensitivity: how easily are we carried away by our experiences! How easily are we seduced into adopting all kinds of opinions, one of the main dangers pointed out

⁵⁰⁴ 3.292-3. A position reminding us of Spinoza’s *amor dei intellectualis*.

⁵⁰⁵ 3.271.

by Marcus Aurelius! The only way to pay respect to reality, to practice a rational ‘pure seeing’ must be to flee from confusing experiences. However, the consequence of honouring reality in this way (*‘Die Wirklichkeit ehren’*) is to abstract from the nearest things and persons in the world⁵⁰⁶ – implying an opposite stance therefore to the one we will discuss later on.

M 512 Gegen die Sachen muthig. – Wer seiner Natur nach gegen Personen rücksichtsvoll oder ängstlich ist, aber seinen Muth gegen die Sachen hat, scheut sich vor neuen und näheren Bekanntschaften und beschränkt seine alten: damit sein Incognito und seine Rücksichtslosigkeit in der Wahrheit zusammenwachsen.⁵⁰⁷

Ruthlessness with regard to truth grows together with a sense of Incognito and a shunning of new acquaintances. As Nietzsche explains in other aphorisms: ‘Wenn immer ein Anderer um uns ist, so ist das Beste von Muth und Güte in der Welt unmöglich gemacht’⁵⁰⁸; and ‘„Die Hälfte unserer Tugend“ nehmen uns die Götter, wenn sie uns das Incognito nehmen und uns berühmt machen.’⁵⁰⁹ The elements necessary to be courageous in the face of truth will be taken away from the brave truth-seeker if he is deprived of the calmness of his solitary existence. The distraction, for example, of hearing what other people have to say about him has the potential of annihilating even the strongest man, so Nietzsche argues in a way that is reminiscent of Marcus Aurelius once more:

M 522 Die Weisheit ohne Ohren. – Täglich zu hören, was über uns gesprochen wird, oder gar zu ergübeln, was über uns gedacht wird, – das vernichtet den stärksten Mann. [...] Kurz, bringen wir der allgemeinen Verträglichkeit das Opfer, horchen wir nicht hin, wenn über uns geredet, gelobt, getadelt, gewünscht, gehofft wird, denken wir auch nicht einmal daran!⁵¹⁰

To avoid all these devastating distractions it is vital to cherish one’s solitude. Several aphorisms in *M* are dedicated to solitude; *M 443* for instance reveals how Nietzsche regrets a neglect of attention to its importance in all education: ‘Allmählich ist mir das Licht über den allgemeinsten Mangel unserer Art Bildung und Erziehung aufgegangen: Niemand lernt,

⁵⁰⁶ And this seems to be the natural thing to do for a thinker: *M 440 3.269*: ‘*Nicht entsagen!* – Auf die Welt verzichten, ohne sie zu kennen, gleich einer *Nonne*, – das giebt eine unfruchtbare, vielleicht schwermüthige Einsamkeit. Diess hat Nichts gemeinsam mit der Einsamkeit der *vita contemplativa* des Denkers: wenn er sie wählt, will er keineswegs entsagen; vielmehr wäre es ihm Entsagung, Schwermuth, Untergang seiner selbst, in der *vita practica* ausharren zu müssen: auf diese verzichtet er, weil er sie kennt, weil er sich kennt. So springt er in *sein* Wasser, so gewinnt er *seine* Heiterkeit.’

⁵⁰⁷ 3.298. For a very similar aphorism, see *M 441 3.269*: ‘*Warum das Nächste uns immer ferner wird.* – Je mehr wir an Alles, was war und sein wird, denken, um so bleicher wird uns Das, was gerade jetzt ist. Wenn wir mit Gestorbenen leben und in ihrem Sterben mitsterben, was sind uns dann noch die „Nächsten“? Wir werden einsamer, – und zwar *weil* die ganze Fluth der Menschheit um uns rauscht. Die Gluth in uns, die allem Menschlichen gilt, nimmt immer zu – und *darum* blicken wir auf Das, was uns umgiebt, wie als ob es gleichgültiger und schattenhafter geworden wäre. – Aber unser kalter Blick *beleidigt!*’

⁵⁰⁸ *M 464 3.279.*

⁵⁰⁹ *M 466 3.280.*

⁵¹⁰ 3.301. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 1.5: ‘From my tutor, [...] to endure hardship, and have few needs; to do things for myself and not meddle in the affairs of others; and to turn a deaf ear to slander.’ See also, for the same point made from the other perspective, *M 528 3.303* ‘*Seltnerer Enthaltksamkeit.* – Es ist oft kein geringes Zeichen von Humanität, einen Andern nicht beurtheilen zu wollen und sich zu weigern, über ihn zu denken.’

Niemand strebt darnach, Niemand lehrt – *die Einsamkeit ertragen*.⁵¹¹ *M 485* furthermore makes it explicit again that solitude allows for adopting the ‘distanced perspectives’ needed in order to ‘think well of things’:

M 485 Ferne Perspectiven. – A: Aber warum diese Einsamkeit? – B: Ich zürne Niemandem. Aber allein scheine ich meine Freunde deutlicher und schöner zu sehen, als zusammen mit ihnen [...]. Es scheint, ich brauche die fernen Perspectiven, um gut von den Dingen zu denken.⁵¹²

These reflections on the constructive effects of solitude relate closely to Nietzsche’s admiration for Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. In line with the emphasis on modesty in Ansell-Pearson’s approach, Nietzsche recognizes in Epictetus a style of living that fits his needs perfectly: the unwearied glance turned inward instead of outward, the courage that this attitude requires, and the contempt for display and vainglory – not only because fame would distract the thinker and influence his thoughts to the extent that he will no longer be able to reflect independently, but also because he wishes to ‘spoil no one’s good humour’; a human being who lives like Epictetus is ‘not fanatical’, does not impose himself on others, but is in possession of a mild and humorous kind of humaneness instead.

M 546 Slave und Idealist. – Der Epiktetische Mensch wäre wahrlich nicht nach dem Geschmacke Derer, welche jetzt nach dem Ideale streben. Die stete Spannung seines Wesens, der nach Innen gewendete unermüdliche Blick, das Verschlussene, Vorsichtige, Unmittheilsame seines Auges, falls er sich einmal der Aussenwelt zukehrt; und gar das Schweigen oder Kurzreden: Alles Merkmale der strengsten Tapferkeit [...]! Zu alledem ist er nicht fanatisch, er hasst die Schaustellung und die Ruhmredigkeit unserer Idealisten: sein Hochmuth, so gross er ist, will doch nicht die Anderen stören, er gesteht eine gewisse milde Annäherung zu und möchte Niemandem die gute Laune verderben, – ja er kann lächeln! Es ist sehr viel antike Humanität in diesem Ideale!⁵¹³

What is more, Nietzsche pictures Epictetus’ ‘ideal man’ in this aphorism as ‘der Stille, Sich-Selbst-Genügende’. Let me point out two more characteristics of the Stoic example for Nietzsche, the first of which is independence. As we have seen, solitude is seen as necessary for gaining a more objective standpoint; but it is of value only if it leads to the (re-)discovery of the independent perspective that has been described above in terms of a ‘third eye’, even a ‘purifying eye’. The connection between solitude and the (re-)discovery of this perspective, which is presented poetically below as ‘the water out of the well of oneself’, is made as follows:

M 491 Auch desshalb Einsamkeit! – A: So willst du wieder in deine Wüste zurück?. – B: Ich bin nicht schnell, ich muss auf mich warten, – es wird spät, bis jedesmal das Wasser aus dem Brunnen meines Selbst an’s Licht kommt, und oft muss ich länger Durst leiden, als ich Geduld habe. Desshalb gehe ich in die Einsamkeit, – um nicht aus den

⁵¹¹ 3.270. See also *M 453* 3.274, in which Nietzsche mentions the existence of an ‘Einsamkeitslehre’. Hutter, H. (2006) has dedicated two chapters to this topic.

⁵¹² 3.288.

⁵¹³ 3.316.

Cisternen für Jedermann zu trinken. Unter Vielen lebe ich wie Viele und denke nicht wie ich⁵¹⁴

But of equal importance in the process of finding the right perspective is the practical realization of an independent lifestyle. The passage quoted above, *M* 546, pictures Epictetus as an independent, ‘Sich-Selbst-Genügende’, unconcerned as he is with, for instance, a Christian kind of hope. The relation between the renunciation of hope and the Stoic attitude of self-sufficiency has already been explored at the beginning of this chapter. But there are more things an independent thinker should be free from; he should not be bothered by fame, as we have seen, nor by other people’s opinions; status and wealth should be avoided⁵¹⁵, like luxury⁵¹⁶, alcohol, women, papers, and meals in the company of eager people eating noisily.⁵¹⁷ But most particularly, he should not be restrained by any kind of office, which comes with a prescribed schedule.

M 500 *Wider den Strich*. – Ein Denker kann sich Jahre lang zwingen, wider den Strich zu denken: ich meine, nicht den Gedanken zu folgen, die sich ihm von Innen her anbieten, sondern denen, zu welchen ein Amt, eine vorgeschriebene Zeiteinteilung, eine willkürliche Art von Fleiss ihn zu verpflichten scheinen. Endlich aber wird er krank⁵¹⁸

Rather, Nietzsche’s ideal is to be as anonymous and free as a bird (again implicitly alluding to the idea of a distanced, flying, ‘higher’ and therefore ‘truer’ perspective), living ‘cheaply’.⁵¹⁹ Connected perhaps with this ideal of independence is, secondly, the notion that one should not think too greatly of oneself. It may also be a consequence of the practice of looking upon oneself from the ‘third eye’, from ‘ferne Perspektiven’; in any case, *M* contains several occurrences in which a contempt for ‘exceptionality’ is expressed; one of those being the following.

⁵¹⁴ 3.290.

⁵¹⁵ *M* 206 3.183: ‘Arm, fröhlich und unabhängig! – das ist beisammen möglich; arm, fröhlich und Sklave! – das ist auch möglich’. The *Vorstufe* of this aphorism reveals Epictetus as Nietzsche’s model. See also *NL* 7[91], 9.335: ‘Ich bin *passionirt für die Unabhängigkeit*, ich opfere ihr alles – wahrscheinlich weil ich die abhängigste Seele habe und an allen kleinsten Stricken mehr gequält werde als andere an Ketten.’

⁵¹⁶ *NL* 6[341] 9.283: ‘Das *Bedürfnis* <nach> *Luxus* scheint mir immer auf eine tiefe innerliche *Geistlosigkeit* zu hindeuten’.

⁵¹⁷ *NL* 7[95] 9.336: ‘eine nicht das Auge beleidigende Unabhängigkeit, ein gemilderter und verkleideter Stolz, ein Stolz, welcher sich abzahlt an die Anderen, dadurch daß er nicht um ihre Ehren und Vergnügen konkurriert und den Spott aushält. Dies soll meine Gewohnheiten veredeln: nie gemein und stets leutselig, nicht begehrlig aber stets ruhig strebend und aufwärts fliegend; einfach, ja karg gegen mich, aber milde gegen Andere. Ein leichter Schlaf, ein freier ruhiger Gang, kein Alkohol, keine Fürsten, noch andere Berühmtheiten, keine Weiber und Zeitungen, keine Ehren, kein Umgang außer dem der höchsten Geister und ab und zu des niederen Volkes [...], die bereitesten Speisen, welche uns nicht in das Gedränge begehrligen und schmatzenden Gesindels bringen, womöglich selbst bereitete oder der Bereitung nicht entbehrende.’ See also *NL* 7[97], 9.337.

⁵¹⁸ 3.294.

⁵¹⁹ *M* 566 3.329: ‘*Wohlfeil leben*. – Die wohlfeilste und harmloseste Art zu leben ist die des Denkers: denn, um gleich das Wichtigste zu sagen: er bedarf gerade der Dinge am meisten, welche die Anderen geringschätzen und übriglassen’. Some commentators, e.g. Brusotti, claim that this attitude is inspired by Diogenes of Sinope. See also *NL* 6[341] 9.283-4.

M 488 [...] Wenn wir es der Stimme anhören, dass wir ausgewählt, vorgezogen werden! Ach, ich bin nicht dankbar für dieses Auswählen, ich merke, dass ich es Dem nachtrage, der mich so auszeichnen will [...]! Will ich doch schon zusehen, mit mir mich selber zu ertragen!⁵²⁰

The reason for Nietzsche's lack of gratitude is 'Ungerechtigkeit', which is mentioned earlier in the aphorism. And it is not just the case that Nietzsche confesses to a personal feeling of discomfort when treated, unjustly, as an exception: M 542 and 544 express, each in their own way, dissatisfaction with the way in which older thinkers (M 542) and younger philosophers, women and artists (M 544) indulge in phantasies of being so exceptional that they can take things more easily, promulgating instead of properly demonstrating ('*sich es leichter zu machen* und als Genie mehr zu decretiren, als zu beweisen'):

M 542 [...] die *Müdigkeit*. Als deren gefährlichstes Kennzeichen mag wohl der Genieglawe bezeichnet werden, welcher erst um diese Lebensgränze grosse und halb-grosse Männer des Geistes zu überfallen pflegt: der Glaube an eine Ausnahmestellung und an Ausnahmerechte.⁵²¹

M 544 [...] ihr feinerer Ehrgeiz möchte gar zu gerne sich glauben machen, dass ihre Seelen Ausnahmen seien, nicht dialektische und vernünftige Wesen, sondern – nun zum Beispiel „intuitive Wesen“, begabt mit dem „inneren Sinn“⁵²²

It is, in other words, a sign of fatigue ('*Müdigkeit*') or refined ambition ('feinerer Ehrgeiz') to think of oneself as an exception; thinkers who, like Socrates, rejoice over the recent invention of *rational* thinking ('das Jauchzen über die neue Erfindung des *vernünftigen* Denkens'⁵²³) do not allow for this kind of weakness. Instead, it seems therefore, thinking rationally denotes that one refrains from viewing oneself as an exception.⁵²⁴

4.2.3 'WAS LIEGT AN MIR?'

So far, we have come across several techniques for adopting an attitude of calm detachment in order to think properly: we should avoid all kinds of external distractions, other people's voices, fame, an office; instead we should maintain a perspective as Stoically independent and objective as possible, distanced, purified from mere opinions and sentimental experiences. We are warned in particular against thinking of ourselves as exceptions; in order to continue thinking in a strictly rational manner, it should be considered dangerous to think of oneself as different from others. The expression 'was liegt an mir?', Stoically inspired as well as I will show shortly, can be seen as the climax of this serious line of thought aimed at the pursuit of

⁵²⁰ 3.289.

⁵²¹ 3.310.

⁵²² 3.315.

⁵²³ M 544 3.314.

⁵²⁴ This suggestion may be related to M 442 3.269: '*Die Regel*. – „Die Regel ist mir immer interessanter, als die Ausnahme“ – wer so empfindet, der ist in der Erkenntniss weit voraus und gehört zu den Eingeweihten.'

knowledge; ultimately though, it is thinking in this way that will lead to the petrification introduced in chapter 3.2.2.

As I have already indicated, *M* should be seen as a transitional work. In *FW* a completely different tone can be found, also in relation to this expression. The shift from *M* to *FW* becomes apparent in the following aphorism:

FW 332 Die böse Stunde. – Es hat wohl für jeden Philosophen eine böse Stunde gegeben, wo er dachte: was liegt an mir, wenn man mir nicht auch meine schlechten Argumente glaubt! – Und dann flog irgend ein schadenfrohes Vögelchen an ihm vorüber und zwitscherte: „Was liegt an dir? Was liegt an dir?“⁵²⁵

In order to understand where the comical tone comes from, I believe we should turn to *FW 107*, in which it is explained that we should adopt an artistically distanced perspective and laugh at ourselves sometimes, otherwise we will just not survive our own constant seriousness.

FW 107 Unsere letzte Dankbarkeit gegen die Kunst. – [...] Wir müssen zeitweilig von uns ausruhen, dadurch, dass wir auf uns hin und hinab sehen und, aus einer künstlerischen Ferne her, *über* uns lachen oder *über* uns weinen; wir müssen den *Helden* und ebenso den *Narren* entdecken, der in unsrer Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis steckt, wir müssen unsrer Thorheit ab und zu froh werden, um unsrer Weisheit froh bleiben zu können!⁵²⁶

These aphorisms from *FW* seem to promote viewing ourselves from a distance – and yet, the original expression ‘was liegt an mir?’ is the consequence of a distanced self-reflection as well, connected to the rejection of ‘Ausnahme-denken’. The differences between the two are obvious: the ‘was liegt an mir?’ in *M* is the outcome of a serious kind of self-reflection, one that is intimately connected with what in the above aphorism is called the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’; the self-reflection in *FW*, the comical one, puts in perspective precisely the seriousness of the philosopher who questions himself and his work. *FW 332* describes the moments of self-relativisation expressed in ‘was liegt an mir?’ as ‘eine böse Stunde’; all philosophers have faced such a bad hour of despair, but it is in these times exactly that we should imagine some birds laughing at us.⁵²⁷

It is, however, only in *FW* that we encounter this kind of light-hearted self-relativisation. *M* might, in retrospect, be exactly the representation of the ‘böse Stunde’ that Nietzsche refers to; for it is in this book and its *Nachlass* notes that the highest number of ‘was liegt an mir?’ occurrences can be found. The following *Nachlass* fragment of the autumn of 1881 confirms this. Written about half a year after the publication of *M*, it shows how it was in times of ‘Noth’ and ‘Sturm’ (a ‘böse Stunde’ indeed) that the Stoics invoked this expression.

⁵²⁵ 3.558.

⁵²⁶ 3.464-5.

⁵²⁷ Brusotti, M. (1997), too, associates the seriousness and gravity that belongs to ‘Redlichkeit’, opposed to the comic perspective, with Stoicism, even though he does not relate it to self-reflection; 452: ‘Macht die Redlichkeit aus den Erkennenden „im letzten Grunde schwere und ernsthafte Menschen und mehr Gewichte als Menschen“ (FW 107 zit.), so können sie sich durch das Komische und seine „Schelmenkappe“ ihre „Freiheit über den Dingen“ bewahren. Erlöst vom schweren Ernst, von der *gravitas* der stoischen Philosophen, lernen sie dann zu „schweben“ und zu „spielen“ (ebd.).’

NL 15[59] Der Stoicism z.B. zeigte, daß der Mensch sich willkürlich eine härtere Haut und gleichsam eine Art Nesselsucht zu geben vermöge: von ihm lernte ich mitten in der Noth und im Sturm sagen: „was liegt *daran*?“ „was liegt an mir?“⁵²⁸

The thought is not only intimately related to the serious and distanced standpoint of self-relativisation as sketched in the previous section; it can even be seen as the manifestation of a further step: if it is knowledge we are truly after, then we should be prepared to not only abstract from, but even sacrifice ourselves – what do we matter, ultimately, if the pursuit of knowledge is at stake? We may drop our sentimental interest in ourselves now, so one of the *Nachlass* fragments reads, and it is time to direct our scientific desire to things *outside of us*.

NL 7[158] Das leidenschaftliche Interesse für uns verlieren und die Leidenschaft außer uns wenden, gegen die Dinge (Wissenschaft) ist jetzt möglich. Was liegt an mir!⁵²⁹

The following aphorism from *M*, not coincidentally perhaps the last of the entire book, describes the same longing for further, new discoveries, which will be revealed not by us, but by the next generation of ‘aeronauts of the spirit’: we, like our teachers and predecessors before us, will have to come to a stop at some point. But what do we matter if the search for knowledge will continue and will reveal things beyond our own final discoveries?

M 575 *Wir Luft-Schifffahrer des Geistes!* – [...] Alle unsere grossen Lehrmeister und Vorläufer sind endlich stehen geblieben, und es ist nicht die edelste und anmuthigste Gebärde, mit der die Müdigkeit stehen bleibt: auch mir und dir wird es so ergehen! Was geht das aber mich und dich an! *Andere Vögel werden weiter fliegen!* [...] Und wohin wollen wir denn? Wollen wir denn *über* das Meer? Wohin reisst uns dieses mächtige Gelüste, das uns mehr gilt als irgend eine Lust?⁵³⁰

I believe it is no accident that this aphorism again starts from a bird-perspective. We have come across several observations related to birds, not just in the *FW* passage quoted above, but also in *M*. The bird is a perfect image of Nietzsche’s ideal life, so it seems; its independence, its anonymous ‘Incognito’ life, its modesty and of course the far perspectives (‘ferne Perspektiven’) it can obtain by simply flying away (‘Zu leben als ein Vogel, der kommt und fortfliegt und keinen Namen im Schnabel trägt!’⁵³¹) – all inspire Nietzsche up to the very last aphorism of *M*. Another element connected to this position is courage. The sentence opening this last aphorism characterises birds as ‘kühnen Vögel, die in’s Weite, Weiteste hinausfliegen’⁵³², hinting at their courageous activity of discovering further perspectives. The expression ‘Was

⁵²⁸ 9.655.

⁵²⁹ 9.349. Clearly, this fragment forms a direct and very strong counter-argument to Ansell-Pearson and Ure’s interpretation of *M* as a mere exercise in self-cultivation, as also Brusotti, M. (1997) concedes, 211: ‘Nietzsche scheint tatsächlich im Zweifel zu sein, ob das Interesse für die eigene Person wünschenswert ist oder nicht.’ (NL 7[200] 9.358: ‘Was ich an mir vermisste: jenes tiefe Interesse für mich selber.’) See also NL 7[45] 9.326: ‘„Was liegt an mir!“ ist der Ausdruck der wahren Leidenschaft, es ist der äußerste Grad, etwas außer sich zu sehen.’

⁵³⁰ 3.331.

⁵³¹ M 470 3.282. See also in this context M 574 3.331 ‘*Nicht zu vergessen!* – Je höher wir uns erheben, um so kleiner erscheinen wir Denen, welche nicht fliegen können.’

⁵³² M 575 3.331.

liegt an mir?’ is woven into this whole field by the following aphorism entitled ‘The final argument of the brave’:

M 494 Letztes Argument des Tapferen. – „In diesem Gebüsch sind Schlangen.“ – Gut, ich werde in das Gebüsch gehen und sie tödten. – „Aber vielleicht wirst du dabei das Opfer, und sie werden nicht einmal das deine!“ – Was liegt an mir!⁵³³

‘I’ am not important if it comes to the discovery and conquering of new and dangerous elements like snakes; I may be sacrificed, but what do I matter! The expression ‘was liegt an mir?’, as the expression of true ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, will be the motto of a higher and more magnanimous inspiration for science; it will stand ‘over the door of the thinker of the future’ as an encouraging and comforting dictum.⁵³⁴ And there are more allusions to the serious dangers of science to be found. Let me come back to *M 429*, the aphorism on the ‘neue Leidenschaft’ mentioned earlier. Its last sentences are of importance to us in this context.

M 429 [...] Vielleicht selbst, dass die Menschheit an dieser Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis zu Grunde geht! – auch dieser Gedanke vermag Nichts über uns! [...] Sind die Liebe und der Tod nicht Geschwister? Ja, wir hassen die Barbarei, – wir wollen Alle lieber den Untergang der Menschheit, als den Rückgang der Erkenntnis! Und zuletzt: wenn die Menschheit nicht an einer *Leidenschaft* zu Grunde geht, so wird sie an einer *Schwäche* zu Grunde gehen: was will man lieber? Diess ist die Hauptfrage. Wollen wir für sie ein Ende im Feuer und Licht oder im Sande? –⁵³⁵

This aphorism reveals the presence of not just one, but three great dangers facing humanity: the danger of barbarism (that is, the regression of knowledge), the danger of perishing out of weakness (a possible consequence of the barbaric regression of knowledge), and the danger of perishing out of a passion (the passion for knowledge being the only plausible possibility). If humanity will perish anyway, the suggestion implicit in the text is that a death of fire and light (resulting from the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’) is more desirable than one of weakness, described here in terms of becoming soft and formless like sand.

The exclamation ‘was liegt an mir?’ must therefore be understood as aiming to inspire us to persevere in our pursuit for knowledge, even in the face of the ‘Noth’ and ‘Sturm’ of a certain death. The choice is not between perishing and surviving, so it seems, but between dying in a strong or weak manner. Having dedicated our life to knowledge, we thereby have chosen the danger of light and fire, threatening to burn us, but also, apparently, to make us ‘hard’ – or at least *not* weak and soft like sand. So let me focus now on the *effect* of all the processes leading

⁵³³ 3.291.

⁵³⁴ *M 547* 3.318: ‘[...] Daraus ergibt sich, dass im Grossen und Ganzen die Wissenschaft [...] mit einer höheren und *grossmüthigeren* Grundempfindung fürderhin getrieben werden muss. „Was liegt an mir!“ – steht über der Thür des künftigen Denkers.’ See also *NL 7*[102] 9.338 ‘Es ist mein Fleiß und mein Müsiggang, meine Überwindung und mein Nachhängen, meine Tapferkeit und mein Zittern, es ist mein Sonnenlicht und mein Blitz aus dunklem Wolkenhimmel, es ist meine Seele und auch mein Geist, mein schweres ernstes granitenes Ich, das aber wieder zu sich sprechen kann „was liegt an mir!“ and *NL 7*[126] 9.344 ‘Dieser Gang ist so gefährlich! Ich darf mich selber nicht anrufen, wie ein Nachtwandler, der auf den Dächern lustwandelt, ein heiliges Anrecht hat, nicht bei Namen genannt zu werden. „Was liegt an mir!“ dies ist die einzige tröstende Stimme, die ich hören will.’

⁵³⁵ 3.265.

up to the expression ‘was liegt an mir?’: ultimately, it seems, abstracting from the nearest things, including one’s own experiences, and shifting the focus to things *outside* of us, leads to a hardening (‘eine härtere Haut’⁵³⁶) that can be equated with petrification. The following aphorism at least suggests something similar; it offers the prospect of how the lover of knowledge, suffering from his own love, will end up being fossilized.

M 327 Eine Fabel. – Der Don Juan der Erkenntniss: er ist noch von keinem Philosophen und Dichter entdeckt worden. Ihm fehlt die Liebe zu den Dingen, welche er erkennt, aber er hat Geist, Kitzel und Genuss an Jagd und Intriguen der Erkenntniss – bis an die höchsten und fernsten Sterne der Erkenntniss hinauf! – bis ihm zuletzt Nichts mehr zu erjagen übrig bleibt, als das absolut *Wehethuende* der Erkenntniss, gleich dem Trinker, der am Ende Absinth und Scheidewasser trinkt. So gelüftet es ihn am Ende nach der Hölle, – es ist die letzte Erkenntniss, die ihn *verführt*. Vielleicht, dass auch sie ihn enttäuscht, wie alles Erkannte! Und dann müsste er in alle Ewigkeit stehen bleiben, an die Enttäuschung festgenagelt und selber zum steinernen Gast geworden, mit einem Verlangen nach einer Abendmahlzeit der Erkenntniss, die ihm nie mehr zu Theil wird!⁵³⁷

The Don Juan of knowledge pictured in this aphorism – a figure Nietzsche seems to identify himself with – does not love the things he knows, but has a limitless appetite for and enjoyment of the chase and intrigues of knowledge; he persists in his hunt until there is nothing left for him except what is hurtful. This kind of lover will not end his pursuit, even if there is nothing left for him to take in but the strongest and most dangerous spirits⁵³⁸; in the end he even ‘lusts after hell’. The effect of this continuous lack of satisfaction is petrification: the Don Juan of this fable will have to ‘stand transfixed to disillusionment’ in all eternity; he has himself become a ‘stone guest’.⁵³⁹

On the one hand, it seems that this ultimate consequence of the desire for knowledge is appealing to Nietzsche. Not only does it fit well with his dismissal of the idea of perishing like sand, it moreover explains this enigmatic aphorism:

M 541 Wie man versteinern soll. – Langsam, langsam hart werden wie ein Edelstein – und zuletzt still und zur Freude der Ewigkeit liegen bleiben.⁵⁴⁰

One might say that a certain Epicurean calmness, even joy, is attached to this attitude: it breathes an atmosphere of calm and peaceful acceptance or *ἀταραξία*; moreover, the allusion to the gems indicates that the petrification is thought of as a noble process. And yet, there are

⁵³⁶ *NL* 15[59] 9.655.

⁵³⁷ 3.232.

⁵³⁸ See also *M* 460 3.277: ‘*Seine gefährliche Stunden ausnutzen.* [...] Solange sich uns die Wahrheiten nicht mit Messern in’s Fleisch schneiden, haben wir in uns einen geheimen Vorbehalt der Geringschätzung gegen sie’. See moreover the remark in the late *Vorrede 1* of *FW* quoted at the beginning of this chapter: ‘diese grundsätzliche Einschränkung auf das Bittere, Herbe, Wehethuende der Erkenntniss.’ 3.346.

⁵³⁹ The reference to a ‘steinernen Gast’ may be a playful inside joke referring to his friend Peter Gast, a pseudonym invented by Nietzsche for his friend Heinrich Köselitz, possibly referring to the ‘stone guest’ who carried the Don in Mozart’s *Don Giovanni* off to hell. Nietzsche allegedly considered this pseudonym to be of help for Köselitz’s career as a composer. See Young, J. (2010), 214.

⁵⁴⁰ 3.309.

also texts that point in an opposed direction. It seems that the process described thus far, of denying oneself all kinds of human experiences, of relativising one's own importance, even of willingly succumbing to a process of petrification – the process that will be labelled asceticism in *GM* – has now been thought through to its ultimate limits; that is, there is no step beyond becoming eternally stone-like out of desire for knowledge. What is more, the question arises whether the process just described is truly what is required to gain knowledge. Does knowledge demand an attitude of patience and restraint before it surrenders itself to its Don Juan? *M 539* is one of the clearest (though not the earliest) examples of a serious questioning of the nature of knowledge – more particularly, of the relation between knower and knowledge.

M 539 *Wisst ihr auch, was ihr wollt? – Hat euch nie die Angst geplagt, ihr möchtet gar nicht dazu taugen, Das, was wahr ist, zu erkennen? Die Angst, dass euer Sinn zu stumpf, und selbst euer Feingefühl des Sehens noch viel zu grob sei? Wenn ihr einmal merktet, was für ein Wille hinter eurem Sehen waltete? [...] Immer voller geheimer Vorbestimmungen, wie die Wahrheit beschaffen sein müsse, dass ihr, gerade ihr sie annehmen könntet! Oder meint ihr, heute, da ihr gefroren und trocken wie ein heller Morgen im Winter seid und euch Nichts am Herzen liegt, ihr hättet bessere Augen? Gehört nicht Wärme und Schwärmerei dazu, einem Gedankendinge *Gerechtigkeit* zu schaffen? – und das eben heisst *Sehen*!⁵⁴¹*

At issue is the fear that one's senses might be far too coarse to grasp the truth; Nietzsche seems to ask his readers ('ihr') if they, too, are conscious of the secret preconceptions they have concerning the way truth would have to be constituted for *them* to be able to take it on. 'You' may be 'frozen and dry' like a 'bright morning in winter' – a cold and rational position to be in, with nothing 'weighing on your heart'⁵⁴² – but would that really make your eyes more suitable for seeing the truth? Are not, instead, warmth and enthusiasm needed to do justice to an object of thought? Is that not what it is truly like to *see*? Might it not be the case that truth presents itself in a way adapted to the way you feel? When you are tired you will bestow on things a pale and tired coloration; when you are feverish you will turn them into monsters, according to this same aphorism.⁵⁴³ So is it not a mistake to think that truth will be attained only when you have achieved, finally, the cold and emotionless outlook inspired by Stoicism? Should you not fear constantly encountering your own ghost in the process of chasing truth, the ghost that is the veil behind which truth keeps hiding itself from you ('Fürchtet ihr nicht in der Höhle jeder Erkenntniss euer eigenes Gespenst wieder zu finden, als das Gespinnst, in welches die Wahrheit sich vor euch verkleidet hat? Ist es nicht eine schauerliche Komödie, in welcher ihr so unbedachtsam mitspielen wollt?')⁵⁴⁴?

⁵⁴¹ 3.307-8.

⁵⁴² To be read, I believe, in connection to the petrification described in *M 327*, and as the result of the process of 'light and fire' of *M 429*. The images are not entirely consistent, but I believe they can be read as different attempts to describe in physical terms one and the same process, namely that of self-sacrifice in the name of science.

⁵⁴³ *M 539* 3.308 'Eure körperliche Ermattungen werden den Dingen matte Farben geben, eure Fieber werden Ungeheuer aus ihnen machen!'

⁵⁴⁴ 3.308; Colli and Montinari's commentary, together with Brusotti's interpretation, suggest once again how this growing awareness of and disgust at the comedy of knowledge should not be taken to mean that Nietzsche's 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' diminishes. 14.226: '*Rs* [*Reinschrift*] am *Schluß gestrichen*:

It is at this point that the clearest signs of a change in Nietzsche's thought can be perceived, one that explains not only why there is attention to the 'nearest things' in *M*, but also why there is a growing sense of critical distance towards the Stoics. The following aphorism reveals, for instance, how the 'comedy' (as it is called in both the above and the following quote) of the chase between the lover and its object, knowledge, begins to cause misery and disgust: if we have only our own human eyes as instruments for chasing the truth (the possibility of *M* 497 of a 'reine, reinmachende Auge' clearly being abandoned at this point), who will guarantee that these are suitable for knowledge at all? Perhaps the only knowledge we will obtain concerns our own organs – which is equal to saying that true knowledge, of things outside of us, is out of reach. We can see the parallel with Don Juan more clearly at this point; we might end up as 'unglücklich Liebende' indeed.⁵⁴⁵

M 483 *Überdruss am Menschen*. – A: Erkenne! Ja! Aber immer als Mensch! Wie? Immer vor der gleichen Komödie sitzen, in der gleichen Komödie spielen? Niemals aus anderen, als aus *diesen* Augen in die Dinge sehen können? Und welche unzählbaren Arten von Wesen mag es geben, deren Organe besser zur Erkenntnis taugen! Was wird am Ende aller ihrer Erkenntnis die Menschheit erkannt haben? – ihre Organe! Und das heisst vielleicht: die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnis! Jammer und Ekel! – B: Das ist ein böser Anfall, – *die Vernunft* fällt dich an! Aber morgen wirst du wieder mitten im Erkennen sein und damit auch mitten in der Unvernunft, will sagen: in der *Lust* am Menschlichen. Gehen wir an's Meer! –⁵⁴⁶

In this aphorism an attempt is made by B to offer A some consolation; B analyses the situation A is in as one that will pass. It is only an 'attack by reason', but tomorrow, when A will be absorbed by the practice of gaining knowledge again, he will no longer be aware of its problematic situation (that is, 'in der Unvernunft', 'in der Lust am Menschlichen'). The last sentence, 'let us go down to the sea', is again a reference to Epicurus: the calm and idyllic sight of the sea will lead to the typically Epicurean ataraxic attitude of calm endurance, as expressed in the vision of the gems as well.

But the Epicurean calmness will not turn out to provide consolation for long. The question on the agenda is: should we persist in the same direction, continuing the Stoic path of calm rationality to be summarized as 'was liegt an mir?', and ignoring in an Epicurean fashion the impossibility of this approach – or should we, in the name of knowledge, change our strategies, and abandon the path of restraint and petrification developed so far? As Nietzsche makes clear

Und doch! Ich will, ich muß mitspielen – was soll ich antworten! Nichts als immer wieder das Eine: Was liegt an mir! Was liegt an mir!' Brusotti, M. (1997), 307: 'Die Tapferkeit und die stoische Aufopferung der Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis, wie sie sich in Nietzsches Leitspruch ausdrücken, erfahren nun eine besondere Wendung. Er richtet hier sein „was liegt an mir!“ insbesondere gegen den Unmut, den die Einsicht in die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnis auslöst.'

⁵⁴⁵ *M* 429 3.264.

⁵⁴⁶ 3.287; see for an interesting commentary on this aphorism, in which again the connection with Stoicism becomes apparent, Brusotti, M. (1997), 308: '„B“ hat auch dessen verbissenen Stoizismus hinter sich gelassen [...]. „B“ stellt einen sonderbaren Gegensatz zwischen Erkenntnis und Vernunft auf: Vernünftig sei zuletzt nur die vernichtende Einsicht in die Erkenntnis als Unvernunft. Er gibt damit zu, daß allein „A“'s radikale Einsicht vernünftig ist [...].'

in a *Nachlass* fragment written in the autumn of 1880 on Schopenhauer: maybe the best way to proceed is to choose the second option and *avoid* a hardening.

NL 6[381] Ich finde Schopenhauer etwas oberflächlich in seelischen Dingen, er hat sich wenig gefreut und wenig gelitten; ein Denker sollte sich hüten, *hart zu werden*: woher soll er dann sein Material bekommen?⁵⁴⁷

As already indicated, *M* is a book of transition, of wandering – so it seems that *both* positions are in play in this book; the Stoically distanced one, and the warmer, more open one, in which emotions like joy ('freuen') and suffering ('litten') are welcomed because they provide the thinker with substance ('Material'). So let me now proceed by turning to the anti-Stoic tendency in *M*: a warm attention to the nearest things.

4.2.4 THE NEAREST THINGS AND EMOTIONAL OPENNESS

The attention to the nearest things does not start in *M*, but already in *MA*, especially in *WS*. But the nature of this attention changes between *MA* and *M* – or, to be more precise, within *M* – as a result of the process just described. Only the transformed, renewed interest forms an opposition to the Stoic focus on emotionlessness as I will show. My aim in this section is to give an explanation of the *Vorrede* passage of *MA* I already quoted in the introduction to this chapter.

MA I *Vorrede* 5 [...] Fast ist ihm zu Muthe, als ob ihm jetzt erst die Augen für das *Nahe* aufgingen. [...] Diese nahen und nächsten Dinge: wie scheinen sie ihm verwandelt! welchen Flaum und Zauber haben sie inzwischen bekommen!⁵⁴⁸

The meaning of the nearest things in *WS* cannot be separated from the project of *MA*, namely to unmask the metaphysical, moral and religious truths as only 'human, all too human' projections. *WS* 6 reconstructs the order of events as follows: our focus has always been on the nearest things, but it has been diverted, purposefully, by priests and teachers, to what the first Book of *MA* I called the 'first and last things'⁵⁴⁹; leading not only to a lack of knowledge, but also an accumulation of defects.

WS 6 [...] die *allernächsten Dinge* [werden] von den Meisten sehr schlecht gesehen, sehr selten beachtet [...]. Und ist diess gleichgültig? – Man erwäge doch, dass aus diesem Mangel sich *fast alle leiblichen und seelischen Gebrechen* der Einzelnen ableiten: [...] *im*

⁵⁴⁷ 9.295; see also in this context NL 15[55], 9.652-3, in which Nietzsche explicitly criticises the Stoic process of 'Versteinerung'.

⁵⁴⁸ 2.19.

⁵⁴⁹ *WS* 6 2.542: 'Priester und Lehrer, und die sublime Herrschsucht der Idealisten jeder Art, der gröberen und feineren, reden schon dem Kinde ein, es komme auf etwas ganz Anderes an: auf das Heil der Seele, den Staatsdienst, die Förderung der Wissenschaft, oder auf Ansehen und Besitz, als die Mittel, der ganzen Menschheit Dienste zu erweisen'. According to Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 192, the shift to devoting attention to nearest things is inspired by Epicurus.

*Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten unwissend zu sein und keine scharfen Augen zu haben – das ist es, was die Erde für so Viele zu einer „Wiese des Unheils“ macht.*⁵⁵⁰

‘Nearly all the bodily and spiritual infirmities’ of the individual are derived from the lack of attention to the nearest things, the smallest and most common ones. It is the main reason why so many people regard the world as a ‘vale of tears’. It follows therefore that if we wish to diminish our suffering and augment our knowledge, we will have to first execute Nietzsche’s project of dismantling religious and metaphysical theories, for it is these theories that have diverted our concentration. Understanding them as not representing a higher truth but as human phantasies will release some new energy, that should be redirected towards the nearest things. The very last aphorism of *WS* describes the state of the free spirit accordingly, released as he is from the chains of the ‘schweren und sinnvollen Irrthümer der moralischen, der religiösen, der metaphysischen Vorstellungen’.

WS 350 [...] Nun stehen wir mitten in unserer Arbeit, die Ketten abzunehmen und haben dabei die höchste Vorsicht nöthig. Nur dem veredelten Menschen darf die Freiheit des Geistes gegeben werden; ihm allein naht die Erleichterung des Lebens und salbt seine Wunden aus; er zuerst darf sagen, dass er um der Freudigkeit willen lebe und um keines weiteren Zieles willen; und in jedem anderen Munde wäre sein Wahlspruch gefährlich: Frieden um mich und ein Wohlgefallen an allen nächsten Dingen. –⁵⁵¹

Only the ‘noble’ human, introduced in 3.5, will be able to say that he can live for ‘Freudigkeit’ and nothing else; only he can adopt the (Christian-inspired) ‘Wahlspruch’ ‘Peace around me and goodwill towards all the nearest things’. It thus seems that an important result of the unmasking procedure is the focus on nearest things, which will simultaneously relieve the free spirit’s initial suffering (‘salbt seine Wunden aus’). It is no wonder in this context to find Nietzsche himself, struggling as he is with physical discomfort, turning to all kinds of exercises belonging in the same sphere. He even refers in his fragments explicitly to the method of the ancients.⁵⁵²

How, then, can we account for the expression in the *Vorrede* quoted above that the nearest things are ‘newly discovered’ and changed? First, it should be recalled that one of the main differences between *MA* and *M* is that Nietzsche leaves behind the idea that gaining (historical-psychological) knowledge about the first and last things will lead automatically to a

⁵⁵⁰ 2.542.

⁵⁵¹ 2.702.

⁵⁵² *NL 10*[B36] 9.420: ‘Heißes Wasser, im Freien und im Gehen geistig arbeiten, reinliche und sparsame Gewohnheiten, Vormittag in freier Luft; Zeiteintheilung von soldatischer Strenge. Abendliche Abrechnung im Geiste der antiken Philosophen.’ See also a letter to Overbeck, 11. July 1879: ‘Meines Tageseintheilung, Lebens- und Nahrungsweise brauchte sich kein Weiser der Alterthums zu schämen: alles *sehr einfach* und doch ein System von 50 oft sehr delikaten Rücksichten.’ *KGB II*/5.425. Nietzsche’s reference to an *abendliche Abrechnung* is taken either from Seneca, *De Ira* 36: ‘This was the habit of Sextius, so that at the day’s end, when he had retired to his nightly rest, he questioned his mind: ‘What bad habit have you put right today? Which fault did you take a stand against? In what respect are you better?’ Anger will abate and become more controlled when it knows it must come before a judge each day. Is anything more admirable than this custom of examining the whole day?’ or from Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.10.2-3 ‘Allow not sleep to close your wearied eyes, until you have reckoned up each daytime deed: ‘Where did I go wrong? What did I do? And what duty’s left undone?’

sense of relief. We have seen how *M* recognizes the drive for truth as one that goes hand in hand with ‘Unruhe’; Nietzsche is no longer convinced that his project will result in ‘peace around him’ and ‘goodwill towards all the nearest things’. If there will be attention for the nearest things after the unmasking of metaphysics, it will not be so peacefully so.

This realization can be connected to the process accounted for above: the Stoic attitude of looking for a ‘hovering’ objectivity, lonely and disengaged from one’s emotions, attempting to adopt ‘ferne Perspektiven’ out of a hunger for truth, ultimately results in extreme self-relativisation and petrification. Moreover, we have seen that this attitude will *not* lead to a truer outlook on things; slowly the insight matures that we will never be able to escape our ‘human all too human’ perspective. This insight causes disappointment, as can be read in an aphorism in *M* in which our outlook is compared to a prison⁵⁵³; but it also leads to the awareness that if we wish to proceed in our quest for knowledge it is vital that we investigate our own psychological constitution – not in a distanced and cold manner, but instead by making our own emotional world, necessarily responsive to our environment, an indispensable part of the procedure.

The aphorisms *M* 117, 118 and 119 form an important sequence in this context. *M* 117 not only equates our limited outlook on the world with a prison, but also emphasises that it is with our limited senses that we measure the world, indicating that an objective stance is out of reach. Our measuring is erroneous from beginning to end.

M 117 *Im Gefängniss*. [...] Nach diesen Horizonten, in welche, wie in Gefängnismauern, Jeden von uns unsere Sinne einschliessen, *messen* wir nun die Welt, wir nennen Dieses nah und Jenes fern, Dieses gross und Jenes klein, Dieses hart und Jenes weich: diess Messen nennen wir Empfinden, – es sind Alles, Alles Irrthümer an sich!⁵⁵⁴

M 118, called ‘Was ist denn der Nächste!’, argues that we will never have access to another person – the nearest in this context referring not to things but human beings. What really happens is that we perceive some changes *in us*; these changes are attributed to our neighbours, leading to the wrong idea that we actually know what others feel.⁵⁵⁵ This line of thought suggests that it is ourselves and our own psychological movements that we should take seriously, more than the things we think belong to the outside world. *M* 119 then questions the knowledge we have of our inner movements; as it appears, these too remain largely hidden, leaving us with even less hope of developing any kind of knowledge.

M 119 *Erleben und Erdichten*. – Wie weit Einer seine Selbstkenntniss auch treiben mag, Nichts kann doch unvollständiger sein, als das Bild der gesammten *Triebe*, die sein Wesen constituiren. Kaum dass er die gröbereren beim Namen nennen kann: ihre Zahl

⁵⁵³ *M* 117 3.110: ‘*Im Gefängniss*. – Mein Auge, wie stark oder schwach es nun ist, sieht nur ein Stück weit, und in diesem Stück webe und lebe ich, diese Horizont-Linie ist mein nächstes grosses und kleines Verhängniss, dem ich nicht entlaufen kann.’

⁵⁵⁴ 3.110.

⁵⁵⁵ *M* 118 3.111: ‘Wir begreifen Nichts von ihm, als die *Veränderungen an uns*, deren Ursache er ist, – unser Wissen von ihm gleicht einem hohlen *geformten* Raume. Wir legen ihm die Empfindungen bei, die seine Handlungen in uns hervorrufen, und geben ihm so eine falsche umgekehrte Positivität.’

und Stärke, ihre Ebbe und Fluth, ihr Spiel und Widerspiel unter einander, und vor Allem die Gesetze ihrer *Ernährung* bleiben ihm ganz unbekannt.⁵⁵⁶

We are only superficially familiar with our drives – that is, we only know a drive if it distinguishes itself from the others, articulating itself more prominently. But, importantly, we would be mistaken if we thought of ourselves as observing our own drives from a neutral, rational point of view, as it would seem from the above lines. Instead, as Nietzsche continues, it is a *drive* that makes us interpret in a certain way; it is *through* a drive that we interpret the world – and our drives are part of the world. *M* 119 uses the example of sleep: even though our nightly movements do not differ much from one night to another (the only difference in ‘text’ consisting of our motions of the blood and intestines, the pressure of the arm and bedclothes, the sounds made by church bells, etc.), our dreams, that is, our interpretations of their causes, vary widely.

Dass dieser Text, der im Allgemeinen doch für eine Nacht wie für die andere sehr ähnlich bleibt, so verschieden commentirt wird, dass die dichtende Vernunft heute und gestern so verschiedene *Ursachen* für die selben Nervenreize sich *vorstellt*: das hat darin seinen Grund, dass der Souffleur dieser Vernunft heute ein anderer war, als er gestern war, – ein anderer *Trieb* wollte sich befriedigen, bethätigen, üben, erquicken, entladen, – gerade er war in seiner hohen Fluth, und gestern war ein anderer darin.⁵⁵⁷

It is a drive that obtains the role of a ‘prompter’, informing the ‘dichtende Vernunft’ to interpret the ‘text’ in a certain way, so as to gratify or discharge itself. Nietzsche goes on to argue that the condition of sleep may offer a greater freedom of interpretation, but that there is no essential difference between waking and dreaming: during the day, too, our drives are actively interpreting our bodily stimuli in a variety of ways.⁵⁵⁸ The last lines of the aphorism explicitly state that *all* our experiences may consist of ‘Erdichtungen’.

Was sind denn unsere Erlebnisse? Viel *mehr* Das, was wir hineinlegen, als Das, was darin liegt! Oder muss es gar heissen: an sich liegt Nichts darin? Erleben ist ein Erdichten? –⁵⁵⁹

The consequence of this inference is serious: if our view of the world is necessarily and completely determined by the workings of our drives, then the whole Stoic exercise of attempting to find the ‘third eye’ perspective, or to look at the world from a ‘pure’ and ‘purifying eye’ must be abandoned. It is here that we find the greatest opposition in *M*; on the one hand, Nietzsche is clearly attracted to the Stoic exercise of finding a depersonalised and distanced perspective; on the other, the above aphorisms leave no room for doubt that the Stoic approach is impracticable, as it wrongly presupposes the possibility of a position free from any drive. As it turns out, even our coldest and most neutral attitude towards the world is determined by a certain drive.

⁵⁵⁶ 3.111.

⁵⁵⁷ 3.113.

⁵⁵⁸ *M* 119 3.113: ‘muss ich aber ausführen, dass unsere Triebe im Wachen ebenfalls nichts Anderes thun, als die Nervenreize interpretiren und nach ihrem Bedürfnisse deren „Ursachen“ ansetzen? dass es zwischen Wachen und Träumen keinen *wesentlichen* Unterschied giebt?’

⁵⁵⁹ 3.114.

This inference leads to a completely altered approach toward the pursuit of knowledge, one that requires much more attention to our own drives and that as a result changes the appearance of the ‘nearest things’. The *Nachlass* fragment on Schopenhauer quoted above reveals how Nietzsche comes to distance himself from the ideal of petrification and maintains instead that our *joy* and *suffering* provide us with the material we need.⁵⁶⁰ Consequently, if knowledge does not require restraint but rather a better appreciation of our drives, we will have to take *ourselves* as the main object of investigation. We should not close ourselves off from our own feelings, opinions and experiences – rather, these will become the main pillar of every scientific investigation. Hence Nietzsche’s allusions to treating ourselves as our own *experiment*⁵⁶¹ – a thought that will become more powerful in *FW* – and his explicit contempt for thinkers like Kant and Schopenhauer whose thoughts do not also ‘constitute a passionate history of their souls’.

M 481 Zwei Deutsche. – Vergleicht man Kant und Schopenhauer mit Plato, Spinoza, Pascal, Rousseau, Goethe in Absehung auf ihre Seele und nicht auf ihren Geist: so sind die erstgenannten Denker im Nachtheil: ihre Gedanken machen nicht eine leidenschaftliche Seelen-Geschichte aus, es giebt da keinen Roman, keine Krisen, Katastrophen und Todesstunden zu errathen, ihr Denken ist nicht zugleich eine unwillkürliche Biographie einer Seele [...] – ich denke, wie billig, nicht an grobe „Ereignisse“ von Aussen, sondern an die Schicksale und Zuckungen, denen das einsamste und stillste Leben verfällt, welches Musse hat und in der Leidenschaft des Denkens verbrennt.⁵⁶²

A great thinker is one who ‘burns with the passion of thinking’; quite literally, if we compare this text to the subsequent one, in which Nietzsche describes the types of men he seeks company with.

M 482 Seinen Umgang suchen. – Suchen wir denn zu viel, wenn wir den Umgang von Männern suchen, welche mild, wohlschmeckend und nahrhaft geworden sind wie Kastanien, die man zur rechten Zeit in’s Feuer gelegt und aus dem Feuer genommen hat?

True thinkers are those who agree to undergo a process of an inner burning, one that will seem to happen naturally when it is understood that our drives provide at the same time the condition for and the object of knowledge, and who come out ‘mild, agreeable to the taste and nutritive’.

In line with this anti-Stoic tendency, moreover, *M 553* discloses how the notion of philosophy itself changes. In *M* philosophy is understood both as a practice of ascetic withdrawal in order to obtain the most objective and neutral position, relativising and abstracting from all personal

⁵⁶⁰ *NL 6[381] 9.295:* ‘Ich finde Schopenhauer etwas oberflächlich in seelischen Dingen, er hat sich wenig gefreut und wenig gelitten; ein Denker sollte sich hüten, *hart zu werden*: woher soll er dann sein Material bekommen?’

⁵⁶¹ *M 501 3.294:* [...] ‘Wir dürfen mit uns selber experimentiren! Ja die Menschheit darf es mit sich! Die grössten Opfer sind der Erkenntniss noch nicht gebracht worden, – ja, es wäre früher Gotteslästerung und Preisgeben des ewigen Heils gewesen, solche Gedanken auch nur zu *ahnen*, wie sie unserem Thun jetzt voranlaufen.’

⁵⁶² 3.285-6.

elements, and a personal search for the right diet, broadly conceived. Regarded as both the expression and the investigation of certain drives, philosophy thus reveals a renewed interest in the ‘nearest things’. It becomes increasingly clear, that is, that our drives stand in an intimate and complex relation to their environment.

M 553 Auf Umwegen. – Wohin will diese ganze Philosophie mit allen ihren Umwegen? Thut sie mehr, als einen stäten und starken Trieb gleichsam in Vernunft zu übersetzen, einen Trieb nach milder Sonne, heller und bewegter Luft, südlichen Pflanzen, Meeres-Athem, flüchtiger Fleisch-, Eier- und Früchtenahrung, heissem Wasser zum Getränke, tagelangen stillen Wanderungen, wenigem Sprechen, seltenem und vorsichtigem Lesen, einsamern Wohnen, reinlichen, schlichten und fast soldatischen Gewohnheiten, kurz nach allen Dingen, die gerade mir am besten schmecken, gerade mir am zuträglichsten sind? Eine Philosophie, welche im Grunde der Instinct für eine persönliche Diät ist? Ein Instinct, welcher nach meiner Luft, meiner Höhe, meiner Witterung, meiner Art Gesundheit durch den Umweg meines Kopfes sucht?⁵⁶³

Since it has been established that philosophy should not disregard, but on the contrary take very seriously one’s personal wishes, experiences, emotions, and taste (philosophy being itself nothing other than the expression of a drive; the drive only taking a ‘detour through the mind’), it follows that the ‘nearest things’ gain a renewed interest, the taste for which is particularly revealing. No longer are they of interest merely because they ensure the health and solitude of the thinker as the effect of an unmasking scientific process, as in *WS*; they become of central interest from now on, going hand in hand with a growing appeal to ‘openness’. It is in this way that we should understand the remark in the *MA I Vorrede* that the nearest things are ‘changed’ and ‘newly discovered’, ‘als ob ihm jetzt erst die Augen für das *Nahe* aufgingen’.

4.2.5 THE NECESSITY OF THE STOIC PHASE

We might compare this development, finally, to the process of ‘changing skin’ I referred to in section 4.2. Only if one develops a ‘second nature’, as a protection and firm boundary between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, can one’s ‘first nature’ grow mature.

M 455 Die erste Natur. – So wie man uns jetzt erzieht, bekommen wir zuerst eine *zweite Natur*: und wir haben sie, wenn die Welt uns reif, mündig, brauchbar nennt. Einige Wenige sind Schlangen genug, um diese Haut eines Tages abzustossen: dann, wenn unter ihrer Hülle ihre *erste Natur* reif geworden ist. Bei den Meisten vertrocknet der Keim davon.⁵⁶⁴

It can be argued therefore that the development of the Stoic ‘thick skin’⁵⁶⁵ is a necessary phase in a process in which slowly but steadily one’s ‘first nature’ ripens into a more open, warmer,

⁵⁶³ 3.323.

⁵⁶⁴ 3.275. Brusotti, M. (1997), 217, claims that this is a classical theme, to be found in Cicero, *de Finibus*, V, xxv.74. He is right, although the meaning and context of both texts differ significantly.

⁵⁶⁵ *FW* 306, 3.544: ‘die stoische harte Haut mit Igelstacheln’. Also to be compared with the famous idea of the Stoic ‘citadel’, to be found in Marcus Aurelius *Meditations* 8.48, and referred to in *M 471* 3.282: ‘Eine andere Nächstenliebe. – Das aufgeregte, lärmende, ungleiche, nervöse Wesen macht den Gegensatz zur

and more welcoming stance towards his own feelings, whether of pain or pleasure. *FW* in particular shows a deepened awareness of the importance of passions related to science⁵⁶⁶; but as it appears, the phase of emotionless self-restraint has been indispensable to make the transition. In the following aphorism we find Nietzsche reflecting upon this process in terms of sickness and recovering (pointing forward to his later *Vorreden*) in a way that reveals its undeniable importance.

M 114 Von der Erkenntniss des Leidenden. – Der Zustand kranker Menschen, die lange und furchtbar von ihren Leiden gemartert werden und deren Verstand trotzdem dabei sich nicht trübt, ist nicht ohne Werth für die Erkenntniss, – noch ganz abgesehen von den intellectuellen Wohlthaten, welche jede tiefe Einsamkeit, jede plötzliche und erlaubte Freiheit von allen Pflichten und Gewohnheiten mit sich bringen. Der Schwerleidende sieht aus seinem Zustande mit einer entsetzlichen Kälte *hinaus* auf die Dinge: [...] ja, er selber liegt vor sich da ohne Flaum und Farbe. Gesetzt, dass er bisher in irgend einer gefährlichen Phantasterei lebte: diese höchste Ernüchterung durch Schmerzen ist das Mittel, ihn herauszureissen: und vielleicht das einzige Mittel.⁵⁶⁷

Sick people (Nietzsche included, solely perhaps) have a certain value for the acquisition of knowledge: not only does the situation of solitude and liberation from duties bring ‘intellectual benefit’ (reminding us of the pleas for solitude and independence encountered earlier), a cold and colourless image of oneself is attained as well. This position, ‘looking out at things with a terrible coldness’, has fulfilled its sobering role – liberating the patient from the perilous world of phantasy he has lived in hitherto. This world of phantasy can be connected with the project of *MA*, in which the world of religion and metaphysics is understood as one of phantasy – and to *M 54*, in which the calming of the invalid’s phantasy is presented as a first but important step toward recovering. Importantly, though, whereas the sick man regards himself without ‘Flaum und Farbe’, the recovering man, throwing off his second nature and retrieving his first nature matured, reflects upon his earlier situation in the way we have encountered above: the ‘nearest things’ have gained ‘Flaum und Zauber’.⁵⁶⁸

This warmer outlook on oneself, with the ripened understanding concerning the indispensable importance of our drives, the necessary openness to one’s emotions and environment that comes with it, also and especially for the pursuit of knowledge, will become of utmost

grossen Leidenschaft: diese [...] lässt den Menschen nach Aussen hin kalt und gleichgültig blicken und drückt den Zügen eine gewisse Impassibilität auf. [...] sie blicken gleichsam aus den Fenstern ihrer Burg hinaus, die ihre Festung und eben dadurch ihr Gefängniss ist: – der Blick in’s Fremde, in *das Andere* thut ihnen so wohl! My analysis of *M 455* differs, therefore, from the usual interpretation of the second skin as the result of what we are taught by social institutions. I see it here, instead, as the result of petrification in the difficult search for knowledge, a search that is regarded as more useful for society than what follows from it: the phase of self-experimentation and the stimulation of pain and joy in *FW*.

⁵⁶⁶ *FW 12 3,383-4*: ‘Vom Ziele der Wissenschaft. – Wie? Das letzte Ziel der Wissenschaft sei, dem Menschen möglichst viel Lust und möglichst wenig Unlust zu schaffen? [...] Aber sie könnte auch noch als die *grosse Schmerzbringerin* entdeckt werden! – Und dann würde vielleicht zugleich ihre Gegenkraft entdeckt sein, ihr ungeheures Vermögen, neue Sternwelten der Freude aufleuchten zu lassen!’

⁵⁶⁷ 3.104-5.

⁵⁶⁸ *MA I Vorrede 5 2.19*: ‘Er ist verwundert und sitzt stille: wo *war* er doch? Diese nahen und nächsten Dinge: wie scheinen sie ihm verwandelt! welchen Flaum und Zauber haben sie inzwischen bekommen! [...] er *war* *ausser* sich: es ist kein Zweifel. Jetzt erst sieht er sich selbst’.

importance for *FW*. What is more, it goes together with an increasingly critical attitude towards Stoicism. But before we go into that, let me focus on one aspect left out of the discussion so far: pity.

4.2.6 PITY

The theme of pity is of relevance for the discussion in at least two respects. One: it is in relation to this topic that Nietzsche most explicitly turns to the Stoic tradition, in particular, in *M*, to Epictetus. Two: since pity, the German word used by Nietzsche being *Mitleid*, cannot be seen separately from the theme of suffering, the significant shift of thought between *M* and *FW* can be made even more apparent on the basis of this theme – in accordance with the transition from Stoic restraint to emotional openness as sketched above. I will do so below by critically evaluating an interesting article by Primavera-Lévy on Nietzsche's interpretation of suffering.⁵⁶⁹

The discussion of pity in *M* should be placed in the context of what in *EH* is proclaimed to be *M*'s main theme: the reflection on moral prejudices, especially concerning the self and its boundaries ('Mit der „Morgenröthe“ nahm ich zuerst den Kampf gegen die Entselbstungs-Moral auf⁵⁷⁰). *M* 139 shows how Nietzsche explicitly opposes the morality of Stoicism to the morality of pity:

M 139 *Angeblich höher!* – Ihr sagt, die Moral des Mitleidens sei eine höhere Moral, als die des Stoicismus? Beweist es! aber bemerkt, dass über „höher“ und „niedriger“ in der Moral nicht wiederum nach moralischen Ellen abzumessen ist: denn es giebt keine absolute Moral.⁵⁷¹

Although in these lines it is observed only that it is not possible to evaluate moralities, because there is no 'absolute' morality with which to measure them, other aphorisms clearly reveal Nietzsche's preference for an anti-pity morality such as Stoicism. And as indicated in the *EH* passage, one of the main reasons to mistrust pity is its implied morality of 'selflessness'. In line with what we have seen Nietzsche defending in the above sections, there is something wrong with being 'open' to the influence of foreign voices on our own thought and sentiment (see e.g. the several aphorisms on practicing solitude, in particular *M* 485 and 491). The more we allow ourselves to be distracted by others, in this case by their suffering, the less we are in touch with our 'self' and our own thoughts. We have seen how Nietzsche is initially in agreement with the Stoic defence of independence; a morality of pity would not be suitable in that context.

It is undisputed that Nietzsche draws on Stoicism in his attack on the morality of selflessness and pity; yet comparing several commentators on this topic reveals a variety of interpretations of why exactly Nietzsche disapproves of pity and, secondly, what elements in these arguments

⁵⁶⁹ Primavera-Lévy, E. (2011), 130-55.

⁵⁷⁰ *EH* (*M*) 2 6.332. Nevertheless we should keep in mind that there is not one explicit reference to 'Entselbung' in *M*.

⁵⁷¹ 3.131.

are taken from the Stoics.⁵⁷² In this section, I will critically engage with the analyses provided by Keith Ansell-Pearson, Michael Ure and Martha Nussbaum.⁵⁷³ According to Nussbaum, Nietzsche's objection to pity must be seen as part of Nietzsche's project 'to bring about a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-formation'.⁵⁷⁴ Ansell-Pearson claims that he agrees with her⁵⁷⁵, but he seems to have missed an important aspect of Nussbaum's article: whereas Ansell-Pearson's focus is exclusively on *M*, Nussbaum's article is part of a book on *GM*, which explains why many of her arguments are taken from this much later text. She is right that *GM*, like *M*, argues against a morality dominated by pity; yet she disregards the fact that in *GM* it is no longer the Stoics who represent the main inspiration for this standpoint. On the contrary; as I will show in more detail below, Nietzsche's understanding and evaluation of suffering changes in and after *M* – as does his evaluation of Stoicism. Hence, Nussbaum is right that Nietzsche consistently contests a morality of pity throughout his life, but his arguments for this standpoint change. Her claim that Nietzsche's project as a whole is to be seen as a 'revival of Stoic values' is therefore mistaken.

What is Nietzsche's objection to pity in *M*? Pity is seen as part of the detested morality of 'Entselbung', but by what moral standard does Nietzsche evaluate it? Is its morality a threat to our happiness or is it a danger to the development of knowledge? Arguments against pity of both kinds can be found. What is more, these arguments seem to contradict each other concerning the meaning and importance of suffering, a contradiction that has gone unnoticed by all commentators: arguments against pity as an unhealthy type of morality depict this morality as 'dangerous', 'destructive', leading to an avertable increase of pain and suffering, whereas arguments against pity as a threat to the pursuit of knowledge underscore the irrelevance of pain and suffering. Is suffering to be averted, as the morality arguments have it, or is it to be ignored as implied in the arguments concerning knowledge?

4.2.6.1 PITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO KNOWLEDGE

Both types of arguments are presented in *M* in roughly the last twenty aphorisms of Book II. Interestingly, the aphorisms that take the importance of knowledge as their main focus are ignored by Nussbaum and Ure (and to a large extent by Ansell-Pearson as well). They are of great importance, however; for our analysis of Nietzsche's changing thoughts on Stoicism, but also as a significant part of Nietzsche's reflection of pity. An early indication that Nietzsche objects to losing sight of the boundary between 'me' and the 'other' in connection with knowledge is to be found in *VM*.

VM 37 Der Betrug in der Liebe. – [...] man will, dass unser Bild, welches von der Vergangenheit her uns anstrahlt, uns belüge, unserm Dünkel schmeichele, – wir arbeiten fortwährend an diesem Selbstbetrüge. – Und nun meint ihr, die ihr so viel vom

⁵⁷² Ure, M. (2008) does not make mention of a Stoic background in his analysis of Nietzsche's thoughts on pity, ch. 6 'The Irony of Pity', 185-206.

⁵⁷³ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 179-204; Ansell-Pearson, K. (2010), 137-163; Ure, M. (2008); Nussbaum, M. (1994), 139-67.

⁵⁷⁴ Nussbaum, M. (1994), 140.

⁵⁷⁵ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 185-6.

„Sich selbst vergessen in der Liebe“, vom „Aufgehen des Ich in der andern Person“ redet und röhmt, diess sei etwas wesentlich Anderes? Also man zerbricht den Spiegel, dichtet sich in eine Person hinein, die man bewundert, und genießt nun das neue Bild seines Ich, ob man es schon mit dem Namen der anderen Person nennt, – und dieser ganze Vorgang soll *nicht* Selbstbetrug, *nicht* Selbstsucht sein, ihr Wunderlichen! Ich denke [...] dass sie in der Schatzkammer der Erkenntniss einen *Diebstahl* verüben: woraus sich ergibt, vor welchem Vergehen der Satz „erkenne dich selbst“ warnt.⁵⁷⁶

Although Ure argues anachronistically that this aphorism should be seen as part of Nietzsche's psycho-analytic theory⁵⁷⁷, he is right in so far as he understands Nietzsche's objection to love to be an obstruction to (self-)knowledge. This aphorism compares the way in which we attempt to forget our own past to the self-forgetfulness in loving and losing ourselves in another person: the two situations are similar to the extent that they expose 'a theft from the treasury of knowledge'. Both uncover a transgression against the famous maxim from Delphi: 'know thyself', implying that we should refrain from depriving ourselves of *knowledge*.

In a similar manner, *M* 137 objects to approaching the suffering of others as if it were our own (i.e., *Mitleid*) as 'not objective', not fitting with 'der Vernunft und dem guten Willen zur Vernünftigkeit'. That this aphorism has not been taken up in any analysis is even stranger, given the fact that it is directly inspired by Epictetus.⁵⁷⁸ It warns against the adoption of a first person perspective in matters of misery and bad luck, as it comes 'mit seiner Übertreibung und Ausschweifung'. The maxim of *Mitleid* will lead to the situation that we 'freiwillig' burden ourselves 'mit einer doppelten Unvernunft'.⁵⁷⁹

We find a comparable situation in *M* 134; that is, Nietzsche warns against pity in a strikingly Stoic manner – referring to it as a dangerous passion – yet without being recognized as such by Ure or Nussbaum (only Ansell-Pearson makes mention of it, but ignores its Stoic nature⁵⁸⁰). Nietzsche argues against pity here by depicting it as an affect that is, like all other affects, potentially harmful.

M 134 *In wie fern man sich vor dem Mitleiden zu hüten hat.* – Das Mitleiden [...] ist eine Schwäche, wie jedes Sich-verlieren an einen *schädigenden* Affect. [...] An sich hat es so wenig einen guten Charakter, wie irgend ein Trieb: erst dort, wo es gefordert und gelobt wird – und diess geschieht dort, wo man das Schädigende in ihm nicht begreift, aber eine *Quelle der Lust* darin entdeckt –, hängt sich ihm das gute Gewissen an, erst dann gibt man sich ihm gern hin und scheut nicht seine Kundgebung. Unter anderen

⁵⁷⁶ 2.397-8.

⁵⁷⁷ Ure, M. (2008), 142: in this aphorism he takes Nietzsche to be saying that 'our fear of narcissistic suffering [...] establishes a taboo against seeing ourselves and thus an inner resistance to self-analysis'.

⁵⁷⁸ See the end of 4.2.1. Only Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011) refers to this aphorism, 185; but his point there is that Nietzsche warns us against 'fantasizing' not because it would stand in the way of an objective and rational point of view, but because of the danger that it 'will serve only to destroy us'.

⁵⁷⁹ 3.130.

⁵⁸⁰ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 187: '*Mitleid* is an affect which, like any other, needs to be brought under control and sifted by reason; otherwise it is as dangerous as any other affect.' Unfortunately, he uses for this argument a reference to *WM* and fails to recognize the Stoic tendency.

Verhältnissen, wo begriffen wird, dass es schädigend ist, gilt es als Schwäche: oder, wie bei den Griechen, als ein krankhafter periodischer Affect⁵⁸¹

The Greeks, as opposed to thinkers in Nietzsche's age, were capable of understanding pity correctly as a drive like all other drives – that is, as a potential weakness or disease, to be approached with care and intelligence. Although it is not explicitly specified here that the danger involves a privation of rationality, the last few lines of the aphorism do make apparent that a rational man like a physician should be on his guard: pity 'lähmt ihn in allen entscheidenden Augenblicken und unterbindet sein Wissen'.

M 146 is even more explicit in regarding pity as a hindrance to the development of knowledge. This aphorism is picked up only by Ansell-Pearson in 'For Mortal Souls', and he seems to acknowledge here – in contrast to other texts, for instance in 'Beyond Compassion' – that knowledge is of major importance to Nietzsche; also as an argument against pity.⁵⁸² It is stated in this text that hurting others for the advancement of knowledge is unavoidable; we will inevitably hurt ourselves in the process as well. It is of a 'higher and freer viewpoint and posture' to neglect the pain inflicted on ourselves and others, to 'transcend our own pity' ('über unsrer Mitleid hinweg') and 'pursue more distant goals'. In other words: giving in to pity and evading possible pain for us and others obstructs the achievement of a higher aim: the development of knowledge.⁵⁸³

In all these aphorisms in *M* (137, 134, 146) the adoption of Stoicism can be recognized, in line with what I have outlined before: they imply an attitude of solitude and calm rationality, cold and undisturbed by dangerous affects, avoiding the distraction of alien voices, attempting to be appreciative of one's own sense of reason, and as much in tune with a true outlook on the world as possible. Yet, the last aphorism, *M* 146, might be seen as in line with the changed perspective as well. As we have seen, Nietzsche comes to realise that knowledge is not attainable by simply adopting an attitude of Stoic restraint; since all knowledge is constrained by our human perspectives, we cannot but embrace our emotions in the process. These include painful ones as well. Therefore, we might see the proposal in this aphorism to deem suffering as unimportant and a necessary sacrifice for knowledge as part of the second, less Stoic attitude: 'die Erkenntniss zu fördern, auch trotz der Einsicht, dass unsere Freigeisterei zunächst und unmittelbar die Anderen in Zweifel, Kummer und Schlimmeres werfen wird.'⁵⁸⁴ As we will see later, the attitude that deems suffering a necessary sacrifice to be made for

⁵⁸¹ 3.127-8.

⁵⁸² Ansell-Pearson, K. (2010), 145: 'it now concerns us as searchers of knowledge – and a new fearlessness is required as we embark on this search free of 'the prejudices of morality'. [...] We are in the process of becoming creatures that exist largely to know and who seek to conquer the elevation offered by 'morality'. On 146 he explicitly refers to *M* 146.

⁵⁸³ *M* 146 3.137-8: '[...] höher und freier scheint es mir gedacht, auch über diese nächsten Folgen für den Anderen hinwegzusehen und entferntere Zwecke unter Umständen auch durch das Leid des Anderen zu fördern, – zum Beispiel die Erkenntniss zu fördern, auch trotz der Einsicht, dass unsere Freigeisterei zunächst und unmittelbar die Anderen in Zweifel, Kummer und Schlimmeres werfen wird. [...] Sind wir denn ohne Mitleid? Aber wenn wir auch über unser Mitleid hinweg gegen uns selber den Sieg erringen wollen, ist diess nicht eine höhere und freiere Haltung und Stimmung, als jene, bei der man sich sicher fühlt, wenn man herausgebracht hat, ob eine Handlung dem Nächsten wohl oder wehe thut?'

⁵⁸⁴ *M* 146 3.137. On the other hand, this expression can also be seen as in line with the self-relativising attitude of the expression 'was liegt an mir?'.

knowledge, will become gradually more important for Nietzsche, overpowering the second argument against pity, namely that it causes suffering.

The arguments regarding pity as a morality causing preventable pain are fully in line with Stoicism again, as we shall see in the following section. We should bear in mind that for the Stoics there is no fundamental difference between possessing the virtue of rationality and being happy: being rational amounts to happiness, regardless of all other circumstances. For Nietzsche, as we have seen, this equation increasingly fails to apply. Yet, when attacking the morality of pity in *M*, he does seem to draw on both arguments at the same time: pity is not rational (it stands in the way of gaining knowledge, and, distancing himself from the Stoics, all suffering associated with the gaining of knowledge should be seen as a worthy sacrifice), and it amounts to suffering.

The inconsistency might be solved by pointing out that there is a difference between pain resulting from the striving for knowledge and other, more external, causes of suffering; yet, there is no indication in Nietzsche's text of a distinction between two kinds of suffering, implying that we should welcome the one and prevent the other. Instead I believe we can only properly understand this issue by seeing it as part of the shift between *M* and *FW*. Whereas *M* adopts a Stoic perspective to a large extent – claiming that we should be as calm, emotion-free, and self-sufficient as possible in order to achieve a rational outlook on the world and so to prevent unnecessary suffering – the transition from *M* to *FW* shows a growing awareness that a kind of welcoming of emotions and suffering is necessary in order to learn. It is because of this transition that the arguments against pity as a source of suffering slowly but steadily disappear from Nietzsche's texts, as Martha Nussbaum correctly notices (even though she draws the wrong conclusion from it).

4.2.6.2 PITY AS A DANGEROUS MORALITY

The arguments against suffering are most clearly summarized in *M* 134: 'Das Mitleiden [...] vermehrt das Leiden in der Welt'.⁵⁸⁵ Ansell-Pearson, Nussbaum and Ure have paid considerably more attention to this line of reasoning, yet their interpretations differ widely. As we have seen, Ure merely highlights the psycho-analytic elements of Nietzsche's analysis, arguing that the morality of pity is seen as a sign of immature narcissism.⁵⁸⁶ Ansell-Pearson's 'Beyond Compassion' enumerates three concerns on the basis of which Nietzsche critically evaluates the morality of pity. Although they are introduced as enquiries aiming to 'gain some genuinely reflective insight into the affect of pity'⁵⁸⁷, all three involve a warning against some kind of danger. Clearly, more is at stake for Nietzsche than merely a neutral understanding of pity; moreover, the three points seem to amount to one and the same argument, namely that the

⁵⁸⁵ *M* 134 3.127-8.

⁵⁸⁶ Ure, M. (2008), 185: 'This chapter examines Nietzsche's critique of *pitié*/*Mitleid*, and demonstrates that he treats this as another pathology of narcissism. Boldly stated, he argues that as a psychological transaction *Mitleid* satisfies the ego's desire to assuage its loss of narcissistic plenitude.' That this attitude is considered by Nietzsche as a dangerous one is argued for on 196: 'it is, as Nietzsche underscores, a damaging and enervating means of doing so because it creates an addiction [...]. The psychological consequence of this addiction to envy is *melancholia* [...].'

⁵⁸⁷ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 185.

morality of pity endangers our individuality: (a) describes how ‘the imperatives of philosophies of universal love and compassion will serve only to destroy us’; (b) states that ‘modern society is in danger of providing a single moral-making morality that amounts to a tyrannical encroachment on the requirements of individual self-cultivation’; (c) defends the thesis that a ‘culture of compassion could be a very destructive culture’.⁵⁸⁸

Ansell-Pearson is still right that Nietzsche bases his warnings on certain assumptions concerning pity. Two are important here. One: Nietzsche fights against the Schopenhauerian interpretation of pity. He wishes to unmask it as a phantasy, especially in *M* 133 and 142. The thought that we are all ‘mystically’ united in our suffering, and that we possess a special kind of ‘subtle, penetrating understanding of suffering’⁵⁸⁹, proves for Nietzsche that Schopenhauer ‘lacks adequate experience in the realm of the moral’.⁵⁹⁰ In *M* 138 Nietzsche defends the position that there is something degrading in suffering and something elevating and productive of superiority in pity, which in an anti-Schopenhauerian way ‘separates these two sensations from one another to all eternity’.⁵⁹¹ In *M* 133 Nietzsche provides a completely different analysis of pity, arguing that it is a word covering many motives for action, all of which have to do with ourselves and our own well-being more than the interests of the victim in need of help.⁵⁹² But in *M* 134 it becomes clear why even adopting the correct interpretation of pity as guidance for a true moral life is discouraged by Nietzsche:

M 134 [...] Wer einmal, versuchsweise, den Anlässen zum Mitleiden im praktischen Leben eine Zeitlang absichtlich nachgeht und sich alles Elend, dessen er in seiner

⁵⁸⁸ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 185; 185; 187. Ansell-Pearson refers to *M* 132, 134 and 147.

⁵⁸⁹ Schopenhauer most extensive text on compassion is in *Über die Grundlage der Moral*, 1840 (1979), where he claims that compassion is the foundation of all moral action. This foundation is ultimately metaphysical, as the experience of participation in the suffering of another cannot be proven based on empirical evidence. § 22, ‘*Metaphysische Grundlage*’, 163: ‘Das, was bis hierher Erklärungsgrund war, wird jetzt selbst unser Problem, nämlich jenes jedem Menschen angeborene und unvertilgbare natürliche Mitleid, welches sich uns als die alleinige Quelle *nicht-egoistischer Handlungen* ergeben hat: diesen aber ausschließlich kommt moralischer Wert zu.’ 168: ‘Gehört demnach Vielheit und Geschiedenheit allein der bloßen *Erscheinung* an, und ist es Ein und das selbe Wesen, welches in allem Lebenden sich darstellt; so ist diejenige Auffassung, welche den Unterschied zwischen Ich und Nicht-Ich aufhebt, nicht die irrige’.

⁵⁹⁰ *M* 133 3.126: ‘Dass dagegen das Mitleiden *einartig* mit dem Leiden sei, bei dessen Anblick es entsteht, oder dass es ein besonders feines durchdringendes Verstehen für dasselbe habe, diess Beides widerspricht der *Erfahrung*, und wer es gerade in diesen beiden Hinsichten verherrlicht hat, dem *fehlte* eben auf diesem Bereiche des Moralischen die ausreichende Erfahrung.’

⁵⁹¹ *M* 138 3.131: ‘Aus dem Allen folgt, dass, selbst für den günstigsten Fall, im Leiden etwas Erniedrigendes und im Mitleiden etwas Erhöhendes und Überlegenheit-Gebendes liegt; was beide Empfindungen auf ewig von einander trennt.’

⁵⁹² *M* 133 3.125: ‘Die Wahrheit ist: im Mitleid – ich meine in dem, was irreführender Weise gewöhnlich Mitleid genannt zu werden pflegt, – denken wir zwar nicht mehr bewusst an uns, aber *sehr stark unbewusst* [...]. Der Unfall des Andern beleidigt uns, er würde uns unserer Ohnmacht, vielleicht unserer Feigheit überführen, wenn wir ihm nicht Abhülfe brächten. Oder er bringt schon an sich eine Verringerung unsrer Ehre vor Anderen oder vor uns selber mit sich. Oder es liegt im Unfalle und Leiden eines Anderen ein Fingerzeig der Gefahr für uns [...]. Diese Art Pein und Beleidigung weisen wir zurück und vergelten sie durch eine Handlung des Mitleidens, in ihr kann eine feine Nothwehr oder auch Rache sein.’

Umgebung habhaft werden kann, immer vor die Seele stellt, wird unvermeidlich krank und melancholisch.⁵⁹³

Nietzsche thus argues that the presuppositions of the Schopenhauerian analysis of pity are false; yet, even accepting the correct account of pity as the main imperative for good action will not take us far: we will prevent much suffering by not giving in at all to the desire of being open to the suffering of others.⁵⁹⁴

Secondly, Nietzsche attempts to show that the view of pity being the essence of morality is a temporary approach, dominant in some ages but not in all. *M* 131, as well as *M* 132 and 133⁵⁹⁵ emphasise how the understanding of pity as constitutive of morality is relatively new. *M* 131, entitled ‘*Die moralische Moden*’, stages Epictetus as a moral thinker who would be perceived as immoral in this time.

M 131 *Die moralischen Moden*. – Wie sich die moralischen Gesamt-Urtheile verschoben haben! Diese grössten Wunder der antiken Sittlichkeit, zum Beispiel Epiktet, wussten Nichts von der jetzt üblichen Verherrlichung des Denkens an Andere, des Lebens für Andere; man würde sie nach unserer moralischen Mode geradezu unmoralisch nennen müssen, denn sie haben sich mit allen Kräften für ihr ego und gegen die Mitempfindung mit den Anderen [...] gewehrt.⁵⁹⁶

Again, this analysis of changing attitudes to pity might be neutral in itself, but on other occasions Nietzsche clearly shows that the contemporary approach to morality is dangerous: it leads to a socialist type of civilization. As Ansell-Pearson correctly analyses: ‘market-driven atomization and de-individuation can readily lead to a form of communitarian tyranny. We are today creating a society of “universal security” but the price being paid for it is, Nietzsche thinks, much too high: “the maddest thing is that what is being effected is the very opposite of universal security”’.⁵⁹⁷ *M* 174 returns to a notion we have encountered before: making pity – or sympathy – the essence of morality will eventually turn man into *sand*:

M 174 [...] Sind wir denn bei einer solchen ungeheuren Absichtlichkeit, dem Leben alle Schärpen und Kanten abzureiben, nicht auf dem besten Wege, die Menschheit zu *Sand* zu machen? Sand! Kleiner, weicher, runder, unendlicher Sand! Ist das euer Ideal, ihr Herolde der sympathischen Affectionen?⁵⁹⁸

The morality of pity is, so Nietzsche argues in *M* 174, a morality of timidity (‘Furchtsamkeit’); it confiscates a great deal of the pleasure human beings would have taken in themselves, it

⁵⁹³ 3.128. *M* 136 3.129 describes the only possible occasion in which pity might lead to happiness, namely for people such as the Indians, who suffer from suicidal disgust with existence after a long and thorough investigation of human suffering.

⁵⁹⁴ See also, regarding the diminishing of the suffering of others, *M* 144 3.136, entitled ‘*Die Ohren vor dem Jammer zuhalten*’: ‘Wir können weder *hülfreich* noch *erquicklich* für sie sein, wenn wir das Echo ihres Jammers sein wollen, ja auch wenn wir immer nur nach ihm hin unser Ohr richten’.

⁵⁹⁵ *M* 132 3.124-5: ‘diess ist der *moralische Grundstrom* in unserem Zeitalter; Mitempfindung und sociale Empfindung spielen dabei in einander über’; *M* 133 3.127: ‘die Mitleidigen *gut* zu nennen, ist Nichts, als eine moralische Mode, welche ihre Zeit hat’.

⁵⁹⁶ 3.122.

⁵⁹⁷ Ansell-Pearson, K. (2011), 189. The quote is from *M* 179.

⁵⁹⁸ 3.155.

makes them small and adaptable, interchangeable, meaningless. In *M* 174 we find Nietzsche wondering therefore whether one is really of more use to another if one immediately leaps to his side and helps; would it not be better to ‘create something out of oneself that the other can behold with pleasure: a beautiful, restful, self-enclosed garden perhaps, with high walls against storms and the dust of the roadway but also with a hospitable gate’?⁵⁹⁹

This analysis of the danger of the morality of pity, that it might be better – for others, for oneself, and for the culture as a whole – not to constantly focus on the suffering of others, but to keep one’s concentration on oneself, creating ‘a garden out of ourselves’, continues to be of importance for Nietzsche. Yet, in *GM* it is no longer the threat of suffering that Nietzsche warns against, but the threat of ‘nausea’, the will to ‘nothingness’, culminating in the diagnosis of ‘nihilism’ for western culture.⁶⁰⁰ A reason for this change might be that Nietzsche’s analysis of the meaning of suffering has changed in the meantime, as Primavera-Lévy argues. In *M* Nietzsche still makes explicit use of the example of Epictetus, arguing that pity amounts to suffering and that the Stoic morality against ‘Entselbung’ is to be preferred.⁶⁰¹

4.2.6.3 THE STOIC ATTITUDE TO WHAT IS ‘INDIFFERENT’

It is significant, though, that in his acceptance of Epictetus as an example against adopting the dangerous morality of ‘Entselbung’ or pity, Nietzsche does not refer to the most famous Stoic argument against suffering. In Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius and Seneca one finds many examples of the Stoic procedure to prevent suffering: suffering is the consequence of the mistaken assumption that what you have in your life will be with you forever and is of relevance to your happiness. The example one finds in Epictetus’ *Encheiridion* is the attachment to a favourite cup or one’s wife: we have to remind ourselves every day that these

⁵⁹⁹ *M* 174 3.155: ‘Inzwischen bleibt selbst die Frage unbeantwortet, ob man dem Anderen *mehr nützt*, indem man ihm unmittelbar fortwährend beispringt und *hilft* [...] oder indem man aus sich selber Etwas *formt*, was der Andere mit Genuss sieht, etwa einen schönen, ruhigen, in sich abgeschlossenen Garten, welcher hohe Mauern gegen die Stürme und den Staub der Landstrassen, aber auch eine gastfreundliche Pforte hat.’

⁶⁰⁰ *GM* Vorrede 5 5.252: ‘Es handelte sich in Sonderheit um den Werth des „Unegoistischen“, der Mitleids-, Selbstverleugnungs-, Selbstopferungs-Instinkte, welche gerade Schopenhauer so lange vergoldet, vergöttlicht und verjenseitigt hatte, bis sie ihm schliesslich als die „Werthe an sich“ übrig blieben, auf Grund deren er zum Leben, auch zu sich selbst, *Nein sagte*. Aber gerade gegen *diese* Instinkte redete aus mir ein immer grundsätzlicherer Argwohn, eine immer tiefer grabende Skepsis! Gerade hier sah ich die *grosse* Gefahr der Menschheit, ihre sublimste Lockung und Verführung – wohin doch? In’s Nichts? – gerade hier sah ich den Anfang vom Ende, das Stehenbleiben, die zurückblickende Müdigkeit, den Willen gegen das Leben sich wendend, die letzte Krankheit sich zärtlich und schwermüthig ankündigend: ich verstand die immer mehr um sich greifende Mitleids-Moral, welche selbst die Philosophen ergriff und krank machte, als das unheimlichste Symptom unsrer unheimlich gewordenen europäischen Cultur, als ihren Umweg zu einem neuen Buddhismus? zu einem Europäer-Buddhismus? zum – *Nihilismus?*...’ See also *GM* III 14 5.368.

⁶⁰¹ See also *M* 516 3.299: ‘*Seinen Dämon nicht in die Nächsten fahren lassen!* – Bleiben wir immerhin für unsere Zeit dabei, dass Wohlwollen und Wohlthun den guten Menschen ausmache; nur lässt uns hinzufügen: „vorausgesetzt, dass er zuerst *gegen sich selber* wohlwollend und wohlthuend gesinnt sei!“ Denn *ohne Dieses* – wenn er vor sich flieht, sich hasst, sich Schaden zufügt – ist er gewiss kein guter Mensch. Dann rettet er sich nur *in die Anderen*, vor sich selber’.

are mortal and can be broken.⁶⁰² Doing so will make us less shocked when we eventually lose them. Moreover, the only source of happiness for the Stoics is our virtue; even in the midst of loss and pain, they argue that we will be able to find a certain calmness, even happiness, as long as we stay rational and accept that everything happens in ‘accordance with nature’.

Only Nussbaum draws on this typically Stoic argument of the indifference of external things. What is more, she takes it to be the one that Nietzsche is most attracted to.⁶⁰³ The first two of the six arguments against pity she distinguishes in Nietzsche’s texts have the Stoic values of self-command as their pillars: the first discusses the weakness and insufficiency revealed in the nature of the pitied, the second of the pitier. Her main point is that pity indicates for Nietzsche, both for the pitied and the pitier, a recognition of dependency: we only pity someone if we feel that something of importance has been taken away. According to Nussbaum, a significant line of arguing to be found in Nietzsche’s texts is therefore that the things we implicitly think are important in pitying someone (as Nietzsche himself sums up in *M* 137, ‘a death, a money-loss, a slander’) should be considered differently: a morality of pity should be avoided because it encourages us to become dependent on external things, which undermines our strength and independence.

Yet, her analysis goes wrong when she claims that for Nietzsche both the Stoic values of self-formation *and* self-command are taken up as main arguments against pity.⁶⁰⁴ As we have seen, the value of self-formation is indeed of importance to Nietzsche. Focusing on oneself and turning oneself into a garden are of value because doing so will liberate us from a great deal of pain. But when it comes to self-command, Nietzsche tentatively explores this argument in *M* and comes to reject it completely in *FW*. The argument, as I have indicated above, concerns the intensity with which we care about external things. In Nussbaum’s account, the Stoics suggest that we should care as little as possible. Nussbaum does not take this attitude to be worthy of adopting; in fact, she dismisses it as fearful and weak: ‘There is a strength in the willingness to form attachments that can go wrong and cause deep pain, in the willingness to invest oneself in the world in a way that opens one’s whole life up to the changes of the world, for good and for bad. [...] The Stoic, by contrast, looks like a fearful person, a person who is determined to seal himself off from risk, even at the cost of loss of love and value.’⁶⁰⁵ At the same time she accuses Nietzsche of adopting a similar attitude of self-command. Nietzsche is for her ‘an armchair philosopher of human riskiness’, who wishes to ‘have it both ways: to play-act at romantic risk-taking while retaining Stoic hardness’.⁶⁰⁶ The hints at risk-taking she finds in Nietzsche, citing a passage from *Z II* ‘Von den berühmten Weisen’, are dismissed as mere ‘play-acting’. Nietzsche lacked true insight into suffering: ‘he really doesn’t see what the life of

⁶⁰² Epictetus, *Encheiridion* ch. 3 ‘With all the things that attract you or that are useful or that are appreciated remember to say what kind of a thing it is, starting from the smallest things. If you are fond of a jug, say, “I am fond of a jug”; for if it gets broken, you will not be upset. If you kiss your child or wife, say that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset.’ Boter, G. (1999), 280.

⁶⁰³ Nussbaum, M. (1994), 157: ‘it is obvious that the important arguments in the attack on pity all revolve around the question of weakness and need’.

⁶⁰⁴ Again, based on a reading of *GM* but applied, wrongly, to Nietzsche’s complete oeuvre.

⁶⁰⁵ Nussbaum, M. (1994), 160.

⁶⁰⁶ Nussbaum, M. (1994), 161.

a beggar is, what it is really like to lose your only child, what it is really like to love someone with all your heart and be betrayed.⁶⁰⁷

However, Nussbaum entirely misses the growing distance with regard to Stoic stiffness and independence to be observed in *M* and *FW*. What we read there shows, rather, how suffering and vulnerability become of increasing importance to Nietzsche.

4.2.6.4 SUFFERING

As I have indicated above, we can detect in Nietzsche's anti-pity texts two opposite attitudes with respect to suffering. On the one hand, there are arguments presupposing that suffering is to be averted; on the other hand, especially in *M* 146, we have seen how suffering is to be neglected, unimportant as it is compared to the higher aim of knowledge. We have also seen how the arguments against suffering are, to a large extent (except for the Stoic anti-vulnerability-approach, that has not been explicitly addressed by Nietzsche) adopted from Epictetus; the arguments to ignore suffering on the other hand show a growing distancing from Stoicism.

This line of reasoning fits the interesting analysis of Nietzsche's interpretation of suffering recently provided by Primavera-Lévy remarkably well. According to her, Nietzsche's thought on pain and suffering should not be understood in separation from the medical achievements made in the 19th Century. Because of the production of several narcotics, among them morphine, the question to what extent suffering really was necessary gained renewed interest in the 19th Century and led to a discussion on the meaning of suffering.⁶⁰⁸ She distinguishes between two interpretations of 'Schmerz' that are at work in Nietzsche's philosophy but are essentially at odds: the one is part of a heroic vitalism, a kind of interpretation initiated by Hippokrates and Galenus, and taken up by Kant and Fichte, approaching suffering as a necessary ingredient for health; the other is part of an 'epistemological critique', and aims to 'de-substantiate' pain. It is inspired by Dumont, and regards 'Schmerz' as the outcome of interpretation: it is not substantive (as it is in the first account) but relative, and always the outcome of a process of the mind.⁶⁰⁹

This second interpretation of pain, as a 'Gehirnprodukt' and the outcome of a process of interpretation, can be read in connection with Nietzsche's analysis of pity as a preventable cause of suffering in *M* (we have seen an instance of the reduction of suffering through a different interpretation in 4.2.1, where Nietzsche draws on Marcus Aurelius and claims that

⁶⁰⁷ Nussbaum, M. (1994), 161.

⁶⁰⁸ Primavera-Lévy, E. (2011), 132.

⁶⁰⁹ According to Primavera-Lévy, E. (2011) this interpretation remains of value for Nietzsche throughout his life and can be connected to the development of the doctrine of *Wille zur Macht*. See 151. For an earlier reference, see 146-7: 'Schmerz wird nicht als unmittelbare Gegebenheit betrachtet, sondern als Wirkung eines vorausgehenden Werturteils des Central-Organ, das die Verschiebung der Kräfte wahrnimmt, rechnet und Schlussfolgerungen zieht. [...] Das Gefühl Schmerz, so plötzlich sein Auftauchen auch erscheinen mag, ist gesättigt mit einer „Unsumme von Werthschätzungen und Irrthümern“, metaphysischen Überzeugungen, persönlichen Erinnerungen sowie mit genetisch verankerten Annahmen und Werturteilen einer archaischen Menschheitsperiode und der tierischen Vorgeschichte (Nachlass 1881, 11[334], KSA 9.572).'

taking away the phantasy accompanying pain amounts to taking away an important part of the pain itself⁶¹⁰). The first interpretation of pain, on the other hand, becomes increasingly prominent in *FW*; it regards suffering as a necessary ingredient for growth that should not be resisted but welcomed. This heroic outlook appreciates the value of suffering for life and other higher goals (such as knowledge – which makes possible the interpretation of *M* 146 as an early instance of this approach). It can be observed that the increasing importance of this interpretation of suffering goes together with the rejection of Stoicism.

The most explicit formulation of the heroic kind of suffering we find in *FW* 48, entitled ‘*Kenntniss der Noth*’. It starts out as a comparison between Nietzsche’s own age and ‘*einem Zeitalter der Furcht – dem längsten aller Zeitater*’, with respect to ‘*Kenntniss der Noth*’: our age, according to Nietzsche, can be characterised as one that lacks this knowledge, making us ‘*Stümper und Phantasten zugleich*’.⁶¹¹ He distinguishes between ‘*Noth der Seele*’ and ‘*Noth des Leibes*’ and claims, with respect to the second, that in previous ages men were used to practice the mechanics of pain.

FW 48 [...] Damals machte ein Mann seine reiche Schule körperliche Qualen und Entbehrungen durch und begriff selbst in einer gewissen Grausamkeit gegen sich, in einer freiwilligen Uebung des Schmerzes, ein ihm nothwendiges Mittel seiner Erhaltung; damals erzog man seine Umgebung zum Ertragen des Schmerzes, damals fügte man gern Schmerz zu⁶¹²

But also with respect to the suffering of the soul Nietzsche sees a lack of experience in his age, which has the following consequence:

man hasst jetzt den Schmerz viel mehr, als frühere Menschen, und redet ihm viel übler nach als je, ja, man findet schon das Vorhandensein des Schmerzes *als eines Gedankens* kaum erträglich und macht dem gesammten Dasein eine Gewissenssache und einen Vorwurf daraus.⁶¹³

Hence Nietzsche’s conclusion: ‘*Nun! Das Recept gegen „die Noth“ lautet: Noth*’; the solution for today’s pessimism is a conscious accumulation of pain as a kind of training. This notion of suffering as a substantive quantity necessary for healthy life can be traced back, among others, to Kant. From his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* Primavera-Lévy quotes: ‘*Der Schmerz ist der Stachel der Tätigkeit, und in dieser fühlen wir allererst unser Leben; ohne diesen würde Leblosigkeit eintreten.*’⁶¹⁴ The value of this type of suffering is based, thus, on its status as the indicator of vitality. What is more, a lack of ‘*Reiz*’, the painful stimulus leading to

⁶¹⁰ *M* 54 3.57. In this context we might also understand the famous expression ‘*Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen.*’ *M* 103 3.92.

⁶¹¹ *FW* 48 3.413.

⁶¹² 3.413.

⁶¹³ 3.414. This is what Nietzsche accuses Schopenhauer of doing; see the quote of *GM* Vorrede 5 in a footnote at the bottom of section 4.2.6.2.

⁶¹⁴ Kant, I. (1798), *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, 147; quoted by Primavera-Lévy, E. (2011), 134-5.

action, leads to a passive, even morbid state, associated with moral and mental lethargy ('Trägheit') by both Kant and Nietzsche.⁶¹⁵

In the *Nachlass* fragments written in the time of *FW* we can see the connection both between the addition of pain and a kind of heroism, and between a lack of heroism and 'Trägheit'; moreover, Nietzsche comes to evaluate the Stoics explicitly by these criteria.

NL 12[140] *Heroismus* ist die Kraft, Schmerz zu leiden und zuzufügen.

NL 12[141] Der *Stoicismus* im gefaßten Ertragen ist ein Zeichen gelähmter Kraft, man stellt eine Trägheit gegen den Schmerz auf die Wage – Mangel an Heroismus, der immer kämpft (nicht leidet) der den Schmerz „freiwillig aufsucht“.⁶¹⁶

The Stoics do not seek pain; they rather do everything to reduce it. The longest fragment on Stoicism in the *Nachlass* of 1881 reproaches the Stoics on a similar basis.

NL 15[55] [...] Diese Denkweise ist mir sehr zuwider: sie unterschätzt den Werth des Schmerzes (er ist so nützlich und förderlich als die Lust), den Werth der Erregung und Leidenschaft, er ist endlich gezwungen, zu sagen: alles wie es kommt, ist mir recht, ich will nichts anders – er beseitigt keinen Nothstand mehr, weil er die Empfindung für Nothstände getödtet hat.⁶¹⁷

Different from the anti-suffering argument against pity, Nietzsche here regards 'Schmerz' as something *valuable*. It is 'as useful and advantageous' as 'Lust'. This reasoning is new – it can be found neither in *MA* nor in *M*. Whereas in these texts the Stoic 'calming' and 'cooling' effect on the emotions is valued, here it becomes apparent that the growing appreciation of pain goes hand in hand with an increasing dissatisfaction with Stoicism. As we have seen, the cure against the 'Noth' of pessimism and weakness is found in *FW* 48 in the courageous search for more 'Schmerz', that is – 'Noth'; yet the Stoics with their tricks of '*Starrheit*' and '*Kälte*' do everything to avoid the feeling of pain (again described in terms of '*Trägheit*'), which leads to an insensitivity to 'Noth': the Stoics are no longer able to even detect the difference between 'Noth' and non-'Noth'.

It should not come as a surprise therefore that the arguments against pity change along similar lines. As Primavera-Lévy rightly claims: Nietzsche characterises 'die Vermeidung von Schmerz, die sich u.a. im Mitleid zeigt, als Verneinung des Lebens'⁶¹⁸ – that is to say, he does so *after* the writing of *M*; in *M*, as we have seen, it is precisely the 'Vermeidung von Schmerz' that is used as an argument against adopting the morality of pity (except, as we have seen, in *M* 146). Particularly in *Z* pity is rejected as a sign of weakness; according to this text, life can be measured by the way suffering is handled – if welcomed it signifies strength, if regarded with fear it indicates weakness. Nietzsche continuously argues against pity therefore, but in a way that increasingly values suffering and discredits Stoicism.

⁶¹⁵ Primavera-Lévy, E. (2011), 135: 'Ein Mangel an Reizung, und diese ist in den Bildungstheorien fast immer als schmerzlicher Reiz kodiert, ist gleichbedeutend mit einem passiven bis morbiden Zustand und wird mit moralischer und mentaler Trägheit assoziiert.'

⁶¹⁶ 9.600.

⁶¹⁷ 9.653.

⁶¹⁸ Primavera-Lévy, E. (2011), 136.

It follows that Nietzsche's project is not an undifferentiated bringing about of a revival of Stoic values, as Nussbaum argues; rather, Nietzsche agrees with Nussbaum that there is, indeed, a sense of fearfulness, stiffness, and lack of courageous riskiness in the Stoic approach to suffering. I will argue in the following section on *FW* that the new appreciation of suffering and other emotions should not be separated from Nietzsche's principal desire to pursue knowledge. I will argue that Nietzsche's courage for risk-taking becomes increasingly prominent in *FW*.

4.3 DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT

Recalling the status of *M* as a work of transition, consider the following aphorism.

M 540 *Lernen*. – [...] [Es ist] nicht so leicht, zu *lernen*, und nicht nur die Sache des guten Willens; man muss lernen *können*. Bei einem Künstler stellt sich dem oft der Neid entgegen, oder jener Stolz, welcher beim Gefühl des Fremdartigen sofort seine Stacheln hervorkehrt und sich unwillkürlich in einen Vertheidigungszustand, statt in den des Lernenden, versetzt. An beidem fehlte es Raffael, gleich Goethe, und desshalb waren sie *grosse Lerner*⁶¹⁹

Rafael and Goethe are honoured by Nietzsche as '*grosse Lerner*'; other artists are hindered in the process of learning because of their 'envy' or 'that pride which puts forth its sting as soon as it senses the presence of something strange'. The opposition between the state of learning and a 'Vertheidigungszustand' does not fit well with the admiring remarks we have also encountered in *M* of the Stoic attitude of defensive solitude, for instance in aphorisms on Epictetus.⁶²⁰ We have seen there that Epictetus' attitude of calm and defensive detachment is taken as exemplary in the search for a neutral and emotion-free position, to be adopted in the process of pursuing knowledge. I will argue in what follows that the opposition between (Stoic) defensiveness and the attitude of openness to sensations including pain required for learning becomes ever more important in *FW*, leading to a complete rejection of Stoicism as an inadequate attitude for learning.⁶²¹

The most explicit formulation of this position is found in *FW* 305, where Nietzsche accuses those 'moralists' ('Morallehrer') who 'command man first and foremost to take control of himself'⁶²² (referring to the Stoics and Epicureans, as the subsequent aphorism called 'Stoiker

⁶¹⁹ 3.309.

⁶²⁰ See, for instance, *M* 546 3.316-7: 'der Stille, Sich-Selbst-Genügende [...] der sich nach Aussen hin für sich selber wehrt'.

⁶²¹ This observation is also made by Ure, M., in Sellars, J. (2016), 298: 'Stoicism's extirpation of the passions, [Nietzsche] implies, retards species' learning.' The evolutionary perspective that Nietzsche adds to this argument is worked out in chapter 5.

⁶²² An earlier reference to this notion of Stoic self-control, which Nussbaum understands as 'self-command', can be found in *M* 251 and *M* 242. *M* 251 3.205: '*Stoisch*. – Es giebt eine Heiterkeit des Stoikers, wenn er sich von dem Ceremoniell beengt fühlt, das er selber seinem Wandel vorgeschrieben hat, er geniesst sich dabei als Herrschenden.' *M* 242 3.202: '*Unabhängigkeit*. – Unabhängigkeit (in ihrer schwächsten Dosis „Gedankenfreiheit“ benannt) ist die Form der Entsagung, welche der Herrschsüchtige endlich annimmt, – er, der lange Das gesucht hat, was er beherrschen könnte, und Nichts gefunden hat, als sich selber.' The subtle criticism, which Nietzsche further develops in *FW*,

und Epikureer' shows) of being unable to learn. The argument begins with the diagnosis that these teachers afflict their student with a peculiar disease, 'nämlich eine beständige Reizbarkeit bei allen natürlichen Regungen und Neigungen und gleichsam eine Art Juckens.'

FW 305 [...] Was auch fürderhin ihn stossen, ziehen, anlocken, antreiben mag, von innen oder von aussen her – immer scheint es diesem Reizbaren, als ob jetzt seine Selbstbeherrschung in Gefahr gerathe: er darf sich keinem Instincte, keinem freien Flügelschlage mehr anvertrauen, sondern steht beständig mit abwehrender Gebärde da, bewaffnet gegen sich selber, scharfen und misstrauischen Auges, der ewige Wächter seiner Burg, zu der er sich gemacht hat. Ja, er kann *gross* damit sein! Aber wie unausstehlich ist er nun für Andere geworden, wie schwer für sich selber, wie verarmt und abgeschnitten von den schönsten Zufälligkeiten der Seele! Ja auch von aller weiteren *Belehrung!* Denn man muss sich auf Zeiten verlieren können, wenn man den Dingen, die wir nicht selber sind, Etwas ablernen will.⁶²³

The 'Morallehrer' leave their student over-sensitive and defensive, afraid of anything 'endangering his self-control'. He may no longer 'entrust himself to any instinct or a free wing-beat', he is rigidly 'armed against himself', being 'the guardian of his fortress' (reminding us of the Stoic 'citadel'). But of greatest concern is the fact that he is 'cut off from the most beautiful fortuities of the soul', of any 'further *instruction*'. For it is only if we 'lose ourselves from time to time' that we are able to 'learn something from things we ourselves are not'.⁶²⁴

For a more elaborate analysis of *FW*'s relation to Stoicism I will return to the question set out at the beginning of this chapter: what role should be given to emotions in the process of science and in the striving for health? As indicated before, the question remains of importance to Nietzsche but its answer undergoes a shift. We have seen how *MA* and *M* are sympathetic towards the Stoic strategies of calming down one's emotions; even the idea of completely extinguishing them receives some appreciative comments. In *M* we noticed a growing awareness of the importance of emotions, passions, drives, even suffering; *FW* continues this line of thought, resulting in an explicit rejection of the Stoic ideal of *ἀπάθεια*. The return in *FW* to the 'warmth' of 'hopeful' perspectives that include the 'rediscovery of the self' and the 'most beautiful fortuities of the soul', as well as finding the 'nearest things' endowed with 'Zauber und Flaum', allow for a next phase in the pursuit of knowledge and indicate the return of health at the same time.⁶²⁵

escapes Nussbaum's attention; see Nussbaum, M. (1994), 151: 'This sense of power and sufficiency is at the other remove from the feelings of the pitier [...]. It is this that Nietzsche puts in the place of pity.'

⁶²³ 3:543.

⁶²⁴ A similar point is made in *FW* 294 3:534-5: '*Gegen die Verleumder der Natur*. – Das sind mir unangenehme Menschen, bei denen jeder natürliche Hang sofort zur Krankheit wird, zu etwas Entstellendem oder gar Schmähhlichem, – *diese* haben uns zu der Meinung verführt, die Hänge und Triebe des Menschen seien böse; *sie* sind die Ursache unserer grossen Ungerechtigkeit gegen unsere Natur, gegen alle Natur! [...] *Daher* ist es gekommen, dass so wenig Vornehmheit unter den Menschen zu finden ist: deren Kennzeichen es immer sein wird, vor sich keine Furcht zu haben, von sich nichts Schmähhliches zu erwarten, ohne Bedenken zu fliegen, wohin es uns treibt – uns freigebozene Vögel!' The reference to the bird's perspective fits the ideal of a free and fearless curiosity considered in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

⁶²⁵ See 4.1 for the references to *FW* Vorrede 1 and section 4.2 for the reference to *MA* I Vorrede 5.

4.3.1 EMOTIONS, PAIN AND SCIENCE

FW thus continues the story of the growing appreciation of openness. Armstrong aptly formulates Nietzsche's rejection of Stoicism along these lines as follows: 'In denying value to stimulation, suffering, and passion, Stoicism also denies what is for Nietzsche a fundamental condition for growth in activity and joy; namely, openness to being affected. Insofar as Stoic ethics advocates withdrawal, endurance, and indifference toward the world, it closes the door to valuable sources of stimulation and struggle'.⁶²⁶ Although the importance of openness for the development of knowledge is left out of her account, she is right in stressing Nietzsche's growing dissatisfaction with a Stoic attitude, its consequence being indifference and stone-like insensitivity. As we have seen in *NL* 15[55], discussed in section 4.2.6.4 above, Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of not being able to differentiate between 'Noth' and non-'Noth', and of ignoring the fact that Schmerz is 'so nützlich und förderlich als die Lust'.⁶²⁷

The most explicit aphorism putting forward this complaint is *FW* 306. This aphorism is to be found in book IV, which opens with *FW* 276 on *amor fati*, as we have seen in chapter 1. First a comparison is drawn between an Epicurean and a Stoic approach.

FW 306 *Stoiker und Epikureer*. – Der Epikureer sucht sich die Lage, die Personen und selbst die Ereignisse aus, welche zu seiner äusserst reizbaren intellectuellen Beschaffenheit passen, er verzichtet auf das Uebrige – das heisst das Allermeiste –, weil es eine zu starke und schwere Kost für ihn sein würde. Der Stoiker dagegen übt sich, Steine und Gewürm, Glassplitter und Skorpionen zu verschlucken und ohne Ekel zu sein; sein Magen soll endlich gleichgültig gegen Alles werden, was der Zufall des Daseins in ihn schüttet.⁶²⁸

An Epicurean selects 'die Lage, die Personen und selbst die Ereignisse' that suit his 'äusserst reizbaren intellectuellen Beschaffenheit' (which could be the effect, one may suspect, of the possibly Epicurean 'Morallehrer' mentioned in *FW* 305). In opposition, a Stoic attempts to swallow everything, including the most painful objects. Clearly, Nietzsche prefers the Epicurean way of proceeding. Further in the aphorism we read why: it is the more appropriate attitude for those who are engaged in 'the work of the spirit', that is, of being a thinker: 'Wer [...] einigermaassen absieht, dass das Schicksal ihm einen langen Faden zu spinnen erlaubt, thut wohl, sich epikureisch einzurichten; alle Menschen der geistigen Arbeit haben es bisher gethan!'⁶²⁹

However, we may argue that Nietzsche contradicts here what he said about the Stoics in *M* 485, 546, and 552; for as we have seen there, the Stoics, too, were taken to be selective with respect to 'Lage', 'Personen' and 'Ereignisse'. The pieces of advice on solitude etc. encountered in these aphorisms, discussed in section 4.2.2, are remarkably similar to for instance *FW* 331

⁶²⁶ Armstrong, A. (2013), 20. Ure, M., in Sellars, J. (2016), writes similarly, 297: 'If Stoic joy (*gaudium*) is a purely internal state, a fortress heavily defended against the "gifts of chance," Nietzschean joy is an incorporation or mediation of "external" goods, which requires an openness to chance, registered by passions, fear and hope.'

⁶²⁷ *NL* 15[55] 9.653.

⁶²⁸ 3.544.

⁶²⁹ 3.544.

and 338. *FW* 331 argues that a thinker should keep himself deaf from the screaming voices of the market: allowing its noise to enter his head will make him ‘go to pieces from impatience and headaches’.⁶³⁰ Instead, a thinker has to be able to find and select ‘seine Stille’. *FW* 338 even encourages the adoption of ‘a skin of at least three hundred years between you and today’, reminiscent of the Stoic ‘citadel’:

FW 338 [...] so will ich doch meine Moral nicht verschweigen, welche zu mir sagt: Leben im Verborgenen, damit du dir leben *kannst!* Leben *unwissend* über Das, was deinem Zeitalter das Wichtigste dünkt! Lege zwischen dich und heute wenigstens die Haut von drei Jahrhunderten! Und das Geschrei von heute, der Lärm der Kriege und Revolutionen, soll dir ein Gemurmel sein!⁶³¹

This formulation of Nietzsche’s ‘Moral’ is remarkably similar, therefore, to what he claimed to be Stoic advice in *M*. On the other hand, it is clear that pointing to the selectivity of the Stoics in *M* does not capture the difference between the Stoics and the Epicureans brought forward in *FW* 306. Crucial in *FW* 306 is the metaphor of digestion. We read how a Stoic wants to ‘swallow stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea’, whereas an Epicurean is more selective in that respect; a diet like this would be easily ‘too strong and heavy’ for his stomach.

The metaphor of metabolism becomes increasingly meaningful for Nietzsche in 1881. Wilhelm Roux’s book *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus. Ein Beitrag zur Vervollständigung der mechanischen Zweckmäßigkeitstheorie*, which he read that year, has been of great influence.⁶³² More on Nietzsche’s analysis of humanity in terms of an organic struggle and the importance of ‘Einverleibung’ will follow in chapter 5. For now it suffices to show that the difference between Stoics and Epicureans constitutes their (intellectual) diets more than their environmental choices. We have already seen examples in *M* of an unhealthy diet connected to the desire of knowledge, analysed in terms reminiscent of Stoicism (possibly early occurrences of Roux’s influence). In 4.2.3 for instance we encountered the example of Don Juan, who so much desired hunting knowledge that he ended up chasing ‘das absolut *Wehethuende* der Erkenntniss, gleich dem Trinker, der am Ende Absinth und Scheidewasser trinkt’; the longed for ‘Abendmahlzeit der Erkenntniss’ never came. Interestingly, we have also seen that the effect of this type of desire leaves its victim petrified: Don Juan is ‘selber zum steinernen Gast geworden’.⁶³³ This is remarkably similar to the effect described in *FW* 306; the Epicurean chooses to be selective in his diet precisely to prevent this.

Ihnen wäre es nämlich der Verlust der Verluste, die feine Reizbarkeit einzubüssen und die stoische harte Haut mit Igelstacheln dagegen geschenkt zu bekommen.

⁶³⁰ *FW* 331 3.558: ‘Das ist nun freilich ein böses Zeitalter für den Denker: er muss lernen, zwischen zwei Lärmen noch seine Stille zu finden, und sich so lange taub stellen, bis er es ist. So lange er diess noch nicht gelernt hat, ist er freilich in Gefahr, vor Ungeduld und Kopfschmerzen zu Grunde zu gehen.’

⁶³¹ 3.568.

⁶³² See for more on Nietzsche’s reading of Roux Müller-Lauter, W. (1999), ch. 9 ‘The Organism as Inner Struggle: Wilhelm Roux’s Influence on Nietzsche’, 161–82.

⁶³³ *M* 327 3.232.

The effect of the Stoic diet is what the Epicureans – and Nietzsche – object to: they would never ‘forfeit their subtle sensitivity in exchange for a hard Stoic skin with porcupine spines’.

Why is sensitivity so highly valued by Nietzsche in *FW*? Apart from the fact that the 1886 *Vorrede* of *FW* indicates its significance for the return of health, we know that an amount of sensitivity is required in the process of pursuing knowledge; it is a consequence, as we have seen, of the discovery of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ itself being a drive. *FW* 333 offers a more nuanced account of the position of drives in the development of knowledge, in opposition to Spinoza who defines ‘intelligere’ (understanding or knowing) as something fundamentally distinct from ‘ridere’ (laughing), ‘lugere’ (lamenting) and ‘detestari’ (despising), all of which are drives obstructing the process of knowledge.⁶³⁴

FW 333 *Was heisst erkennen*. [...] Bevor ein Erkennen möglich ist, muss jeder dieser Triebe erst seine einseitige Ansicht über das Ding oder Vorkommniß vorgebracht haben; hinterher entstand der Kampf dieser Einseitigkeiten und aus ihm bisweilen eine Mitte, eine Beruhigung, ein Rechtgeben nach allen drei Seiten, eine Art Gerechtigkeit und Vertrag [...]. Wir, denen nur die letzten Versöhnungsszenen und Schluss-Abrechnungen dieses langen Processes zum Bewusstsein kommen, meinen demnach, intelligere sei [...] etwas wesentlich den Trieben Entgegengesetztes; während es nur ein gewisses Verhalten der Triebe zu einander ist.⁶³⁵

Again we read how Nietzsche regards the achievement of ‘knowing’ not as the consequence of an emotion-free, purely rational project; it is rather the latest phase of a very emotional process. Since each drive has a certain approach towards an external object, seeing it as something laughable, lamentable or contemptible, the drives fight over which view should be dominant – and it is through this fight, that makes the other drives felt, that we become aware of them; we have seen a similar analysis in *M* 117, 118, and 119 discussed in section 4.2.4. Only after the accomplishment of a contract, a reconciliation between the drives, that is, after the emotional phase has come to an end, we can say that we may know an object (or perhaps better: we have achieved a more refined understanding of our drives). The assumption that knowing is a calm activity is clearly mistaken.

If science is to be understood, then, as the practice of gaining knowledge, it follows that it should entail the encouragement of our drives. The more we stimulate our drives to develop different views, the greater our amount of knowledge will be. In this context we should also read *FW* 12, on the painful aim of science. Science as it has been understood thus far only emphasises its rational, cooling effect, but now that we have come to comprehend its true nature, we should abandon this thought.

FW 12 *Vom Ziele der Wissenschaft*. – Wie? Das letzte Ziel der Wissenschaft sei, dem Menschen möglichst viel Lust und möglichst wenig Unlust zu schaffen? Wie, wenn nun Lust und Unlust so mit einem Stricke zusammengeknüpft wären, dass, wer möglichst viel von der einen haben *will*, auch möglichst viel von der andern haben *muss* [...]? [...]

⁶³⁴ *FW* 333 3.558: ‘Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere! sagt Spinoza, so schlicht und erhaben, wie es seine Art ist.’

⁶³⁵ 3.558-9.

In der That kann man mit *der Wissenschaft* das eine wie das andere Ziel fördern! Vielleicht ist sie jetzt noch bekannter wegen ihrer Kraft, den Menschen um seine Freuden zu bringen, und ihn kälter, statuenhafter, stoischer zu machen. Aber sie könnte auch noch als die *grosse Schmerzbringerin* entdeckt werden! – Und dann würde vielleicht zugleich ihre Gegenkraft entdeckt sein, ihr ungeheueres Vermögen, neue Sternenwelten der Freude aufleuchten zu lassen!⁶³⁶

The most familiar working of science so far has been to ‘deprive man of his joys and make him colder, more statue-like, more stoic’. This we have seen in *MA* and *M*. But since we have understood that this view does not represent the most fruitful kind of science, we will have to reinvest in our emotions – the happy as much as the painful ones. In this sense science may now be discovered as ‘die *grosse Schmerzbringerin*’, which goes hand in hand with ‘ihr ungeheueres Vermögen, neue Sternenwelten der Freude aufleuchten zu lassen’. For the Stoics were right at least in this regard: it is not possible to stimulate ‘Lust’ at the cost of ‘Unlust’; if we are to have emotions, we will have to have them all.

Und so steht es vielleicht! Die Stoiker glaubten wenigstens, dass es so stehe, und waren consequent, als sie nach möglichst wenig Lust begeherten, um möglichst wenig Unlust vom Leben zu haben⁶³⁷

Now we can see even more clearly how Nietzsche comes to a divergent understanding with regard to the meaning and importance of emotions compared to the Stoics. In contrast to their attitude of defensiveness, the stiff avoidance of the sensation of pain (and joy) which ends up in ‘Versteinerung’, Nietzsche comes to realise that sensitivity in general will bring us further in the pursuit of knowledge.

4.3.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DANGER

At the same time we must formulate the following problem. On the one hand we see how Nietzsche rejects the Stoic attitude of ‘swallowing stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea’ because of its petrifying effect; on the other we have also seen that this effect occurs after the painful pursuit of knowledge, which Nietzsche wishes to continue while insisting even stronger on its painful aspects. How, in other words, will Nietzsche accomplish avoiding petrification in the future while adding even more painful elements to his diet?

FW 318 offers the first clues for a possible answer, developed in more detail in chapter 5 – as I will argue there, *amor fati* might be understood precisely as a strategy addressing this difficult situation. *FW* 318’s title ‘*Weisheit im Schmerz*’, which also suggests an implicit dialogue with the Stoics, defines the use of ‘Schmerz’ in two ways. First it is said that being sensitive to its messages (informing us of the presence of ‘Noth’, to which the Stoics are said to have become

⁶³⁶ 3,383-4.

⁶³⁷ 3,383. See also *FW* 338 3,567, stating that this equation not only applies to ‘Lust’ and ‘Unlust’ but also to ‘Glück’ and ‘Unglück’: ‘das Glück und das Unglück sind zwei Geschwister und Zwillinge, die mit einander gross wachsen oder, wie bei euch, mit einander – *klein bleiben!*’

insensitive in *NL* 15[55]) gives us the chance to make sure we will be safe, averting a certain death.

FW 318 *Weisheit im Schmerz*. – [...] Ich höre im Schmerze den Commandoruf des Schiffscapitains: „zieht die Segel ein!“ Auf tausend Arten die Segel zu stellen, muss der kühne Schifffahrer „Mensch“ sich eingeübt haben, sonst wäre es gar zu schnell mit ihm vorbei, und der Ozean schlürfte ihn zu bald hinunter.

We have seen, in section 4.2.3, that the continuance of one's life had become of minor importance under the domination of the Stoic attitude. Being awake to the subtle indications hidden in 'Schmerz' that one's life might be in danger has prevented many unwelcome deaths in the past and will continue to do so; it reintroduces the awareness that the self and survival is important. A Stoic would ignore these signals, it is suspected, and would stubbornly continue his quest for knowledge, stiffly choosing death over 'adjusting the sail'. At the same time, secondly, 'Schmerz' gives the opportunity for humanity to grow, this time not by obeying to its message of self-protection, but by adding even more pain to the situation.

– Es ist wahr, dass es Menschen giebt, welche [...] nie stolzer, kriegerischer und glücklicher dreinschauen, als wenn der Sturm heraufzieht; ja, der Schmerz selber giebt ihnen ihre grössten Augenblicke! Das sind die heroischen Menschen, die grossen *Schmerzbringer* der Menschheit: jene Wenigen oder Seltenen, die eben die selbe Apologie nöthig haben, wie der Schmerz überhaupt, – und wahrlich! man soll sie ihnen nicht versagen! Es sind arterhaltende, artfördernde Kräfte ersten Ranges: und wäre es auch nur dadurch, dass sie der Behaglichkeit widerstreben und vor dieser Art Glück ihren Ekel nicht verbergen.⁶³⁸

The welcoming attitude to pain and especially dangers (storms etc.) indicates the existence of 'heroischen Menschen'; people for whom the greatest moments originate in pain, and who then become the '*Schmerzbringer* der Menschheit'. We recognize here the importance of the addition of the heroic kind of pain as developed along the lines of Primavera-Lévy; pain is not something to be avoided, but a necessary ingredient for growth: people who are strong enough not only to take in pain but also as '*Schmerzbringer*' to provoke their fellow human beings should be seen as 'arterhaltende, artfördernde Kräfte ersten Ranges', 'if only because they resist comfort and do not hide their nausea at this type of happiness'.⁶³⁹ It moreover fits the description of 'Wissenschaft' of *FW* 12 quoted above; 'Wissenschaft' could be such a '*Schmerzbringer*', as it is understood now by Nietzsche as a practice that stimulates rather than silences the passions.

The importance of 'Schmerz', therefore, is that it both increases the amount of knowledge, at least specifically related to one's very own situation, for instance in the case of a dangerous situation, and stimulates the development of oneself and humanity. Yet it should be noted that the two effects reinforce each other. It is only if one has sufficient knowledge of one's own constitution that one knows when adding pain will lead to growth, and in what cases it will

⁶³⁸ 3.550.

⁶³⁹ A static kind of happiness that lacks a vision for the future, as Nietzsche observes in a late *Nachlass* fragment: *NL* 34[75] 11.443: 'Es ist merkwürdig, wie die Stoiker und fast alle Philosophen kein Blick für die Ferne haben.'

lead to death – so knowledge is required for the enhancement of humanity; and, vice versa, the stimulation of all passions, i.e., the enhancement of a human being, is required for the pursuit of more knowledge. We should, in this context, keep in mind that Nietzsche slowly but steadily develops the insight that the content of all knowledge redirects us to our human, all too human perspectives. The clearest expression of this awareness is *M 483*, quoted already in section 4.2.3.

M 483 [...] Niemals aus anderen, als aus *diesen* Augen in die Dinge sehen können? [...] Was wird am Ende aller ihrer Erkenntniss die Menschheit erkannt haben? – ihre Organe!⁶⁴⁰

It is, in other words, important both for the development of knowledge and the enhancement of oneself and humanity that an element of danger is kept in place. Nietzsche concludes:

FW 283 *Vorbereitende Menschen.* – [...] Denn, glaubt es mir! – das Geheimniss, um die grösste Fruchtbarkeit und den grössten Genuss vom Dasein einzuernten, heisst: gefährlich leben! Baut eure Städte an den Vesuv! Schickt eure Schiffe in unerforschte Meere!⁶⁴¹

The danger of living ‘on the slopes of Vesuvius’ and sending your ships ‘into uncharted seas’ is the only way in which ‘the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment’ can be ‘harvested’, formulations indicating the state of human beings who are ‘more fruitful, more endangered, happier’ (‘gefährdetere Menschen, fruchtbarere Menschen, glücklichere Menschen!’). They are preparatory for a new age, one that ‘will carry heroism into the search for knowledge’ (‘jenes Zeitalter, das den Heroismus in die Erkenntniss trägt’), emphasising once again the interconnectedness of greatness and knowledge. We can thus formulate a preliminary answer to the problem sketched above as follows. Although Nietzsche’s project of increasing knowledge involves, indeed, an intensification of pain and suffering by living in danger, it simultaneously amounts to a more refined understanding of one’s limitations, which limits the chances of perishing – it is a matter of *knowing* when to ‘adjust the sail’. Precisely this knowing is, again, the outcome of the project of the pursuit of knowledge, which amounts to living dangerously, and heroically exercising both the painful and the joyful passions. Nietzsche’s age lacks this knowledge (see *FW 48*: ‘Das Recept gegen „die Noth“ lautet: *Noth*⁶⁴²), but so do the Stoics, which is, according to Nietzsche, the result of their petrifying diet.

Dealing with pain and suffering is therefore a subtle game of constant self-observation: which cases must be considered too dangerous, causing death or Stoic petrification, and should be avoided by ‘adjusting one’s sail’; and which must be welcomed instead, as chances to take both knowledge and humanity to a next level? Nietzsche sometimes refers to this game as an ‘experiment for the knowledge-seeker’ or as a ‘dance’ or ‘play’; all these expressions we find in *FW 324*.

FW 324 *In media vita.* – [...] Von Jahr zu Jahr finde ich [das Leben] [...] wahrer, begehrenswerther und geheimnisvoller, – von jenem Tage an, wo der grosse Befreier

⁶⁴⁰ 3.287. More on this topic will follow in chapter 5.

⁶⁴¹ 3.526.

⁶⁴² 3.413.

über mich kam, jener Gedanke, dass das Leben ein Experiment des Erkennenden sein dürfe – und nicht eine Pflicht, nicht ein Verhängniss, nicht eine Betrügerei! – Und die Erkenntniss selber: mag sie für Andere etwas Anderes sein, zum Beispiel ein Ruhebett oder der Weg zu einem Ruhebett, oder eine Unterhaltung, oder ein Müssiggang, – für mich ist sie eine Welt der Gefahren und Siege, in der auch die heroischen Gefühle ihre Tanz- und Tummelplätze haben. „Das Leben ein Mittel der Erkenntniss“⁶⁴³

Understanding life as an experiment for the knowledge-seeker is, for Nietzsche, a ‘great liberator’. Ever since this thought ‘overcame him’, life appeared to him ‘truer, more desirable and mysterious’, reminding us of the formulations of the late *Vorreden* indicating a return of strength, joy and health.⁶⁴⁴ Knowledge is to Nietzsche a ‘world of dangers and victories’, in which ‘heroic feelings have their dance- and playgrounds’. A similar type of formulation we find in *FW* 319, in which it is made clear that we must from now on view ourselves as our own ‘experiments’ and ‘guinea-pigs’.

FW 319 [...] wir Anderen, Vernunft-Durstigen, wollen unseren Erlebnissen so streng in’s Auge sehen, wie einem wissenschaftlichen Versuche, Stunde für Stunde, Tag um Tag! Wir selber wollen unsere Experimente und Versuchs-Thiere sein.⁶⁴⁵

The effect of this new perspective on the relation between life, knowledge, danger, pain and suffering is that life appears as a place of experiment, constantly testing and challenging one’s limits; but it can appear this way only after developing enough understanding of one’s own ‘Organe’ and the workings of knowledge in general to have gathered the health, energy and courage to continue without perishing or petrifying. What is more, the old perspectives on suffering now appear in a different light. Whereas pain used to indicate something to be simply averted or diminished (a position still defended in *M* along the lines of Primavera-Lévy), it can now be conceded that those who defended this view perhaps purposively exaggerated its unbearableness.

FW 326 *Die Seelen-Aerzte und der Schmerz*. [...] Was haben die Moralprediger vom inneren „Elend“ der bösen Menschen phantasirt! Was haben sie gar vom Unglücke der leidenschaftlichen Menschen uns *vorgelogen!* – ja, lügen ist hier das rechte Wort: sie haben um das überreiche Glück dieser Art von Menschen recht wohl gewusst, aber es todtgeschwiegen, weil es eine Widerlegung ihrer Theorie war, nach der alles Glück erst mit der Vernichtung der Leidenschaft und dem Schweigen des Willens entsteht! Und was zuletzt das Recept aller dieser Seelen-Aerzte betrifft und ihre Anpreisung einer harten radicalen Cur: so ist es erlaubt, zu fragen: ist dieses unser Leben wirklich schmerzhaft und lästig genug, um mit Vortheil eine stoische Lebensweise und

⁶⁴³ 3.552-3. Brusotti, M. (1997), 455, connects this aphorism explicitly with *amor fati*: ‘Auch den Gedanken vom *amor fati* arbeitet er im Rahmen seiner Auffassung des Lebens als Mittel der Erkenntnis aus, und dieser Gedanke ist selbst – so muß man schließen – ein Ausdruck der Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis.’ For more on this connection, see section 5.3.2.4.

⁶⁴⁴ See section 4.1, 4.2, and 4.2.4. We are also reminded of the description of ‘zwei Glückliche’, portrayed in *FW* 303 3.542. The second of the two lives the life of danger described above, and claims: ‘Ich weiss mehr vom Leben, weil ich so oft daran war, es zu verlieren’.

⁶⁴⁵ 3.551. Also the expression ‘Nierenprüfer’ is relevant in this context; it appears in *FW* 308 3.545: ‘für dich Nierenprüfer, der du ein *Wissen um das Gewissen* hat!’ and in *FW* 335 3.560: ‘*Hoch die Physik!*’, in the context of self-knowledge.

Versteinerung dagegen einzutauschen? Wir befinden uns *nicht schlecht genug*, um uns auf stoische Art schlecht befinden zu müssen.⁶⁴⁶

Thinking about the soul-doctors and preachers of morals who hold that happiness arises only with the annihilation of passions and the silencing of the will immediately brings the Stoics to mind: they might be the instigators of the attitude of contempt regarding all 'Hänge und Triebe'.⁶⁴⁷ The question with which the aphorism ends, 'is our life really so painful and burdensome that it would be advantageous for us to trade it for a fossilized Stoic way of life?', must now be answered with an unequivocal *no*. Not only is our life, even without Stoicism, full of tricks to extract the thorn of pain and unpleasantness⁶⁴⁸, we have also seen that the taking away of 'Unlust' will go hand in hand with the loss of many kinds of 'Lust' – which would be a true impoverishment. There is no 'Grösse' in the mere endurance of pain (even women and slaves can do it, as we read in *FW* 325 entitled '*Was zur Grösse gehört*'), which makes this attitude weak in comparison to the heroic one; but first and foremost, there is no '*Vortheil*' in this kind of approach of suffering. Only the heroic stance has the potential to take us to a higher level – in the development of knowledge as well as in the enhancement of the human kind.

4.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have traced in detail the shift between *MA* and *FW* regarding Nietzsche's appropriation of the Stoic 'Kunstgriffen'. The question what role Nietzsche envisions for emotions has been answered in the context of health and the pursuit of knowledge.

Nietzsche starts out in *MA* and *M* defending an attitude of independent solitude, avoiding distraction by all kinds of external influences and affects. In order to find a neutral, 'objective' (emotionless, depersonalised) outlook on things, adopting a 'third eye perspective' along the

⁶⁴⁶ 3.554.

⁶⁴⁷ See *FW* 294 3.534-5: '*Gegen die Verleumder der Natur*. – Das sind mir unangenehme Menschen, bei denen jeder natürliche Hang sofort zur Krankheit wird, zu etwas Entstellendem oder gar Schmähhlichem, – diese haben uns zu der Meinung verführt, die Hänge und Triebe des Menschen seien böse; sie sind die Ursache unserer grossen Ungerechtigkeit gegen unsere Natur, gegen alle Natur!'; the following aphorism makes an explicit connection with Paulus, who, as we have seen in chapter 3 (*AC* 52, 6.215: 'Paulus, der seine Heimath an dem Hauptsitz der stoischen Aufklärung hatte'), is seen by Nietzsche as being heavily influenced by Stoicism: *FW* 139 3.488-9: '*Farbe der Leidenschaften*. – Solche Naturen, wie die des Apostel Paulus, haben für die Leidenschaften einen bösen Blick; sie lernen von ihnen nur das Schmutzige, Entstellende und Herzbrechende kennen, – ihr idealer Drang geht daher auf Vernichtung der Leidenschaften aus'.

⁶⁴⁸ *FW* 326 3.554: 'Man schweigt dagegen geflissentlich davon, dass es gegen den Schmerz eine Unzahl Linderungsmittel giebt, wie Betäubungen, oder die fieberhafte Hast der Gedanken, oder eine ruhige Lage, oder gute und schlimme Erinnerungen, Absichten, Hoffnungen, und viele Arten von Stolz und Mitgefühl, die beinahe die Wirkung von Anästheticis haben: während bei den höchsten Graden des Schmerzes schon von selber Ohnmachten eintreten. Wir verstehen uns ganz gut darauf, Süßigkeiten auf unsere Bitternisse zu träufeln, namentlich auf die Bitternisse der Seele; wir haben Hülfsmittel in unserer Tapferkeit und Erhabenheit, sowie in den edleren Delirien der Unterwerfung und der Resignation. Ein Verlust ist kaum eine Stunde ein Verlust: irgendwie ist uns damit auch ein Geschenk vom Himmel gefallen – eine neue Kraft zum Beispiel: und sei es auch nur eine neue Gelegenheit zur Kraft!'

lines of Epictetus' advice, it is imperative to find places of silence and to withdraw in one's own 'citadel'. This attitude culminates in the idealization of the position of a bird's 'hovering above the human kind' in *M*, disconnected from one's first person desires, and even relativising one's individuality by objecting to the thought of being an 'Ausnahme' and adopting the Stoic expression 'was liegt an mir?'. At the same time we have seen that *M*, as a work of transition, shows a growing awareness that truth will not be achieved by adopting a cold and neutral attitude, which ultimately leads into petrification. Slowly the idea becomes prominent that the desire for truth is itself a drive (the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis'), colouring the outside world in its own way. Taking this idea seriously then leads to an increasing interest in the relation between the drives and emotions and their 'external' objects, which includes a renewed and warmer concern for 'the nearest things'. In Armstrong's words: "openness towards pain and suffering, perceived as necessary for growth and production" is the mark of healthy, strong natures that enjoy an excess of life, that are strong enough to be open to the contingencies of the world, that are strong enough to be porous rather than hard. In this light, Stoic insensitivity, detachment, and self-control no longer seem to be valuable attributes, to represent heroism or strength. On the contrary, they appear as signs of weakness, as forms of self-protection that express a fear of the world and its contingencies."⁶⁴⁹ In *FW* the openness to and interest in the outside world is concentrated on the concept of *danger* – it is in being sensitive to situations of 'Noth' that one can develop new sentiments, which lead both to the expansion of knowledge and the empowering of the human race.

The stance to emotions, then, ranges from an encouragement of 'cooling' in order not only to prepare for facing the truth, but also to make sure that our reaction to it is as calm as possible (*MA*), to the conviction that it is only by stimulating our passions, including pain and joy, that we will be able to see our knowledge grow (*FW*), the capacity of which is also indicative of the returning of health (see the 1886 *Vorreden*). In between we have seen how *M* encompasses elements of both; in the section on *Mitleid* we came across the double interpretation of suffering as outlined by Primavera-Lévy. Whereas *M* approaches suffering as something that we should prevent by changing our interpretation of it, it also contains the first signs of the position that becomes dominant in *FW*: heroically inflicting pain is a sign of 'Grösse', and it is the only path open to us for the advancement of knowledge.

This development regarding the evaluation of passions in health and the pursuit of knowledge runs parallel to Nietzsche's judgement of Stoicism. Although *MA* reveals how Nietzsche dismisses the Stoic metaphysics, it also betrays the willingness to adopt a Stoic attitude precisely in the aftermath of this devastating process. Yet, the crisis of the will to truth being inimical to life itself deepens in *FW*, and brings with it the realisation that a Stoic attitude is useful neither for the pursuit of knowledge nor for an enhancement of the individual, and, ultimately, the humanity of the future. Nietzsche therefore comes to categorically reject the Stoic 'ἀπάθεια'.

⁶⁴⁹ Armstrong, A. (2013), 20. She refers in this context to Siemens, H.W. (2001), 73.

Chapter 5: AMOR FATI AND STOICISM 2: THE DIALOGUE WITH THE STOICS IN 1881

5.1 INTRODUCTION: SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM TO THE YEAR 1881

This chapter brings together two lines of argumentation. On the one hand, it is a follow-up of chapter 1 on the concept of *amor fati*; as I have argued there, its meaning undergoes a change between 1881 and 1888. The differences concern both the love and its object. In this chapter I will elaborate in detail on the concept as it is developed in 1881, since it is in the texts of this year that the notion is introduced and many references to the Stoics can be found. In particular I will focus on Book IV of *FW*. This Book, written in the first months of 1882⁶⁵⁰, contains the aphorism evaluating Stoics and the Epicureans (*FW* 306), and opens with the aphorism on *amor fati* (*FW* 276), its first and only published occurrence of this time. On the other hand, this chapter takes up the thread of chapter 3 and 4. Since we have seen how Nietzsche's Middle Works increasingly criticise the Stoic stance towards emotions, it becomes more and more questionable that *amor fati* is positively influenced by the Stoics. But should we infer from it that Stoicism plays no role of significance at all? Nietzsche might still have been influenced negatively.

A comparison between the two most important aphorisms in Book IV for our thesis, *FW* 276 and *FW* 306, leads to a nuancing of the question concerning the relation between *amor fati* and Stoicism. The last sentence of *FW* 276 reads: 'Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!'.⁶⁵¹ It suggests that *amor fati* is connected to an attitude of yes-saying only; one that Nietzsche aspires to adopt but is somehow not able to now. However, looking at *FW* 306, we have perceived how Nietzsche mocks the Stoic attitude of 'Ja-sagen', described as the attempt to eat 'stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions'. We should be selective like the Epicureans, Nietzsche maintains, and we should drop the Stoic exercise of trying to make our stomach 'gleichgültig' towards everything 'der Zufall des Daseins' might throw at us. If Nietzsche does not have the Stoic kind of insensitivity in mind, then what does the 'Ja-sagen' at the end of *FW* 276 entail?

I will begin this chapter by approaching from a different angle the intimate relation between the pursuit of knowledge and the enhancement of humanity. The *Nachlass* fragments of 1881, influenced by a reading of Lange and Roux⁶⁵², show that Nietzsche perceives the individual as a final stage of a long development: an individual starts out as a mere functional part of a larger whole, a mere 'organ' in a social organism, whose growing independence is determined in

⁶⁵⁰ Young, J. (2010), 326.

⁶⁵¹ *FW* 276 3-521.

⁶⁵² On Lange's influence on Nietzsche see Young, J. (2010), 89-91. On Nietzsche's reading of Roux, see Müller-Lauter, W. (1971), ch. 9 'The Organism as Inner Struggle: Wilhelm Roux's Influence on Nietzsche', 161-82.

terms of digestion and ‘Einverleibung’, terms that are also relevant in the context of science (5.2). This analysis, then, is necessary in order to reach a more refined understanding of *amor fati* (5.3): I will argue that it amounts to the appropriation of that which meets the the aim of developing into a new (kind of) individual without leading to death or petrification. We have seen at the end of chapter 4 that the notion of danger is of increasing importance in *FW*. We will see in this section how it influences the meaning of *amor fati* as well, turning it into a concept that combines elements of the dangerous desire for truth and the importance of art as a counterbalance.

Then, after the completion of a thorough assessment of the 1881/1882 concept of *amor fati*, I will return to the question concerning its affinity with Nietzsche’s thought on Stoicism (5.4). I will compare the limited ‘Ja-sagen’ of *amor fati* once more to Nietzsche’s analysis of the Stoic exercise of extreme openness. In this section I will give a more detailed account of the remark of *FW* 276, ‘Wegsehen sei meine einzige Verneinung!’, relating it to what Nietzsche takes to be the explicitly ‘negative’ virtues of ‘Verneinen und Sichversagen’⁶⁵³, which can be attributed to his evaluation of Stoicism in *FW*. I will then come to the final conclusion of my thesis: the notion of *amor fati* can only be thought of as influenced by Stoicism in a negative sense.

5.2 THE CONTEXT OF *FW*: SCIENCE AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF HUMANITY

In section 4.3 we noticed how a number of arguments need to be taken together in order to understand why exactly Stoicism is rejected in *FW*. First; Nietzsche is more and more convinced that in order to learn it is pivotal to involve and stimulate passions and ‘Triebe’, the painful as much as the joyful ones. He explicitly agrees with the Stoics in *FW* 12 that the two kinds are interconnected and cannot be enhanced independently, but he concludes that science may be discovered, not for its traditional power to make man ‘kälter, statuenhafter, stoischer’, but as the ‘grosse Schmerzbringerin’.⁶⁵⁴ In line with this observation, he detects in Stoicism a lack of heroism: in order to deal with the painful process of science and even add more pain one has to possess an un-Stoically heroic strength. Secondly; Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of a lack of sensitivity. The characterization of Stoicism in terms of ‘Versteinerung’ and a ‘harte Haut’ has been discussed in detail. This insensitivity forms an obstacle to the process of science: the more one develops the Stoic insensitivity, the less one is inclined to encourage the passions – if only because one has become incapable of experiencing their influence. As a way out of this impasse Nietzsche recommends living ‘in danger’: ‘gefährlich leben! Baut eure Städte an den Vesuv! Schickt eure Schiffe in unerforschte Meere!’⁶⁵⁵ After all, as we have seen; the ‘Recept gegen „die Noth“ lautet: *Noth*’.⁶⁵⁶ Thirdly, Nietzsche argues that the aim of living dangerously is not only more knowledge but also the enhancement of humanity, so that it eventually awaits a greater and stronger future.

The last summarizing point to make on 4.3 is that Nietzsche’s judgement of Stoic insensitivity is framed in terms of a diet. In *FW* 306 the Epicureans are preferred to the Stoics, who are

⁶⁵³ *FW* 304 3.543.

⁶⁵⁴ *FW* 12 3.384.

⁶⁵⁵ *FW* 283 3.526.

⁶⁵⁶ *FW* 48 3.414.

unselective in what they take in and end up having a stomach indifferent to external influences. In order to avoid this unwelcome result, Nietzsche advocates following the Epicurean diet of selectivity. At the same time this should be read in its context: Nietzsche does not advise one merely to be protective of one's sensitive nature, for it should be challenged as well. Only in the process described in 4.3.2 of a 'dance', a 'play', and dangerous 'self-experiment' can we expect the enhancement of both knowledge and humanity.

I will first develop a more thorough analysis of Nietzsche's thoughts on the relation between the physical constitution of human nature (in which the increasing importance of the stomach will be emphasised) and its relation to the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis', knowledge, science and truth. As it turns out, important texts on this subject can be found in the *Nachlass* of 1881, the period in which the first occurrences of *amor fati* appear. Exploring the main arguments in these texts (related to aphorisms in *FW*) will therefore lead to a more advanced account of the field in which *amor fati* functions.

5.2.1 SCIENCE AND THE ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The *Nachlass* of 1881, in particular book 11, contains some very interesting thoughts on the physical, that is, 'organismic' constitution of humanity, implementing Roux's terminology.⁶⁵⁷ Nietzsche develops several speculative narratives of the historical developments of humanity, and so reaches a different outlook on its future. These narratives are rarely taken up in the published works, but they may have served as a heuristic model for diagnosing the modern age. Nietzsche seems to be engaged in particular with the question of egoism versus altruism. Spencer's account of altruism, which is one of Nietzsche's critical targets in these texts, results in a 'loss of individuality and diversity, and a levelling assimilation of all to all' (an observation already explored in the section on pity; see 4.2.6.2).⁶⁵⁸ In this light, Nietzsche examines the possibilities and limitations of individual sovereignty, understood as the power to exercise the freedom of self-determination. One of the strategies Nietzsche uses in this context is to approach the domain of altruism not as the result of individuals interacting, but as a stage preceding the development of egoistic individuals: 'Der Egoism ist etwas Spätes und immer noch Seltenes: die Heerden-Gefühle sind mächtiger und älter.'⁶⁵⁹

The following passage makes apparent how Nietzsche develops an understanding of individuality as the very late outcome of a long process: all individuals used to be a functional part of a social organism, changing into more or less independent entities. Nietzsche describes how individuals started out as mere organs, working in order for the larger organisation to survive and become powerful, and so developing the instincts that belong to its function. Slowly, the organisation breaks down and a process of individualization takes place.

⁶⁵⁷ M III I from early 1881; 9.441-575.

⁶⁵⁸ See H.S. Siemens' paper given in September 2015 during the yearly FNS Conference at Hull University. The texts he referred to are *NL* 11[46] 9.458-9 and 11[40] 9.455-6. For more on Nietzsche's reading of Spencer see Moore, G. (2002), 1-20.

⁶⁵⁹ *NL* 11[185] 9.513.

NL 11[182] [...] Er verwandelt sich zum Organ im Dienste seiner Gesellschaft durchaus und macht von allen Eigenschaften nur den dadurch *eingeschränkten* Gebrauch: **richtiger**: er *hat* jene anderen Eigenschaften noch nicht und *erwirbt sie erst als Organ des Gemeinwesens: als Organ bekommt er die ersten Regungen der sämtlichen Eigenschaften des Organischen*. Die Gesellschaft erzieht erst das Einzelwesen, formt es zum Halb- oder Ganz-Individuum vor, sie bildet sich **nicht** aus Einzelwesen, nicht aus Verträgen solcher! [...] Also: der Staat unterdrückt ursprünglich *nicht* etwa die Individuen: diese existieren noch gar nicht! Er macht den Menschen überhaupt die Existenz möglich, als Heerdenthiere. Unsere *Trieb Affekte* werden uns da erst *gelehrt: sie sind nichts Ursprüngliches!* Es giebt keinen „Naturzustand“ für sie! Als Theile eines Ganzen nehmen wir an dessen Existenzbedingungen und Funktionen Antheil und *einverleiben uns die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen und Urtheile*. Diese gerathen später mit einander in Kampf und Relation, wenn das Band der Gesellschaft zerfällt: er muß in sich die Nachwirkungen des gesellschaftlichen Organismus *ausleiden*, er muß das Unzweckmäßige von Existenzbedingungen Urtheilen und Erfahrungen, die *für ein Ganzes* paßten, abbüßen und endlich kommt er dahin, *seine Existenzmöglichkeit als Individuum* durch Neuordnung und Assimilation Excretion der Triebe in sich zu schaffen. Meistens gehen diese *Versuchs-Individuen* zu Grunde.⁶⁶⁰

When the ties within the societal organisation break down ('wenn das Band der Gesellschaft zerfällt'), the organs serving the life-interests of the organism, i.e. the individuals-to-be, have to develop their own independence and inner organisation. They have learned ('einverleibt') about the organism they used to be part of, which is useful for the process of becoming organisms themselves. They have to select which experiences, life conditions and judgments are still useful for them, and which are not. They have to *reorganise* their own inner dynamics of impulses, passions, experiences, judgments, adopting new ones and pushing out old and redundant ones. Not surprisingly, Nietzsche adds that only few of these '*Versuchs-Individuen*' survive this process.

Nietzsche's defence of egoism as opposed to a dangerous kind of altruism can be related to our question concerning the relation between the future of humanity and the importance of scientific thought. The role of science is explored in these passage both on the level of human society and species ('Gattung'), and of the individual. It is understood first as a general practice of judgment, that is: the acknowledgement of certain interpretations of reality as 'true' by the community. In particular, Nietzsche continues the project of *MA* to show that what is usually understood as truth is merely the successful outcome of a long process of coping with the world. This process merely selects the interpretations of the structure of the world that are successful, allowing the 'Gattung' to survive.

NL 11[156] Im Grunde ist die Wissenschaft darauf aus, festzustellen, wie *der Mensch* – **nicht** das Individuum – zu allen Dingen und zu sich selber empfindet, also die Idiosyncrasie Einzelner und Gruppen *auszuscheiden* und das *beharrende* Verhältniß festzustellen. Nicht die Wahrheit, sondern *der Mensch* wird erkannt und zwar innerhalb aller Zeiten, wo er existirt. D.h. ein Phantom wird *construirt*, fortwährend

⁶⁶⁰ 9.511. 14.645: 'Dieses Fragment [ist] entstanden im Zusammenhang mit Ns Lektüre von Wilhelm Roux, Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus.'

arbeiten alle daran, um das zu finden, worüber man *übereinstimmen muß*, weil es zum Wesen des Menschen gehört. [...] Die Wissenschaft setzt also den Prozeß nur *fort*, der das Wesen der Gattung *constituirt* hat, den Glauben an gewisse Dinge endemisch zu machen und den Nichtglaubenden auszuschneiden und absterben zu lassen. Die erreichte *Ähnlichkeit* der Empfindung (über den Raum, oder das Zeitgefühl oder das Groß- und Kleingefühl) ist eine Existenzbedingung der Gattung geworden, aber mit der Wahrheit hat es nichts zu thun.⁶⁶¹

The practice of science is connected explicitly in this passage with the survival for the ‘Gattung’; **nicht** das Individuum’. It is the continuation of a long process, one that determines what can and cannot be agreed upon. This analysis may be read in connection with what we saw in the *Nachlass* passage quoted above: ‘Als Theile eines Ganzen nehmen wir an dessen Existenzbedingungen und Funktionen Antheil und *einverleiben uns die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen und Urtheile*.’ It is emphasised again that parts within this constitution (for instance ‘das Individuum’) that have deviating beliefs are set apart and are ultimately left to die.

Yet there are also passages that reveal the use of science on the level of the individual: it can be used by individuals (the ‘*Versuchs-Individuen*’) to understand better their unique conditions of existence.

NL II[290] Der letzte Nutzen der Erkenntniß und Wissenschaft ist, die Loslösung neuer Eier vom Eierstocke zu ermöglichen und immer neue Arten entstehen zu lassen: denn die Wissenschaft bringt die Kenntnisse der Erhaltungsmittel für neue Individuen. – Ohne Fortschritte der Erkenntniß würden neue Individuen immer schnell zu Grunde gehen, die Existenzbedingungen wären zu schwer und zufällig.⁶⁶²

Knowledge and science contribute to the development of new species. They must be plural, for Nietzsche regards it as his ‘Tendenz’ to envision ‘*möglichst viele wechselnde verschiedenartige Organismen, die zu ihrer Reife und Fäulniß gekommen ihre Frucht fallen lassen*’.⁶⁶³ Only with the knowledge established in the former organisation can a deviant individual, a species to be, attempt to stand on its own, hoping to further its own organisation independently and creating its own version of the ‘truth’. Understanding that the ‘truth’ valued in the former constitution of the organism served its ‘Existenzbedingungen’ is of great value to the individual in this process: the knowledge yielded by ‘Wissenschaft’ in the service of the ‘Gattung’ provides insight into the necessary functions of organic life that can be used to secure the unique conditions of existence of an individual. Without this knowledge the newly developed ‘Existenzbedingungen’ would be ‘zu schwer und zufällig’, unfitting to organic needs and leading to a certain death.

⁶⁶¹ 9.500-1. See also NL II[286] 9.551: ‘Den *Erfolg* und den *Mißerfolg* als Beweise und Gegenbeweise gegen den Glauben betrachten ist menschlicher *Grundzug*: „was *gelingt*, dessen Gedanke ist *wahr*“.’

⁶⁶² 9.552.

⁶⁶³ NL II[222] 9.527. He opposes this ‘Tendenz’ to that of contemporary philosophers: ‘Aus dem Geiste der Funktion heraus denken jetzt die Philosophen darüber nach, die Menschheit in Einen Organism zu verwandeln – dies ist der Gegensatz *meiner* Tendenz.’

This line of reasoning may explain why Nietzsche regards himself as a unique figure in the history of philosophy. The outcome of the process described in chapter 4 with respect to the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ is that Nietzsche redirects the pursuit of truth to the exercise of one’s ‘Triebe’. This exercise, understood as a dangerous ‘game’, inevitably leads to an increase in knowledge about these ‘Triebe’. Nietzsche, now possessing a new kind of self-knowledge, could therefore be seen as the first individual (or ‘*Versuchs-Individu*’, if we fully apply the narrative to Nietzsche’s case) who understands the relation between knowledge and survival in this way. He is thus one of the first individuals who knows himself well enough to understand what may kill him and what not.

Importantly, the way in which Nietzsche connects science to the process of becoming an independent individual forms a direct link to *amor fati*. As I will explain in more detail in 5.3, the notion of *love* should not be seen independently of the terms ‘digestion’ and ‘internalization’, that is, ‘Einverleibung’. The process of accepting and refusing outlooks on the outside world in order to demarcate the identity of the individual is described in terms of taste, nourishment, and greed. In the passage quoted earlier we see Nietzsche summing up:

NL 11[182] Ein starker freier M<ensch> empfindet gegen alles Andere die *Eigenschaften des Organismus*

- 1) Selbstregulierung [...]
- 2) [...] *Habsucht* Aneignungslust Machtgelüst
- 3) Assimilation an sich [...] Einverleiben von Urtheilen und Erfahrungen
- 4) Sekretion und Excretion: in der Form von Ekel Verachtung der Eigenschaften an sich, die ihm *nicht mehr* nützen [...]
- 5) metabolische Kraft [...]
- 6) Regeneration⁶⁶⁴

These are all processes whereby the organism regulates its needs in relation to its environment so as to secure its existence. Clearly, both appropriation and excretion are involved, as well as the (re)organisation of what is appropriated. The passage below illustrates how the desire for knowledge is understood by Nietzsche as a possible transformation of the desire for or the hunting of property and nourishment.

NL 11[47] Der Eigenthumstrieb – Fortsetzung des *Nahrungs-* und *Jagd-Triebs*. Auch der Erkenntnißtrieb ist ein höherer Eigenthumstrieb.⁶⁶⁵

Whereas the desire for property is a ‘continuation’ (‘Fortsetzung’) of the appropriative drive, the drive for knowledge is a ‘higher’ form: a sublimation.⁶⁶⁶ This indicates that the ‘Erkenntnißtrieb’ Nietzsche discusses could be understood as an expression of the underlying drives of ‘Habsucht’; it could in this way be connected to the narrative of ‘*Versuchs-Individuen*’.

⁶⁶⁴ 9.509-10.

⁶⁶⁵ 9.459.

⁶⁶⁶ See for instance NL 11[105] 9.478-9: ‘Die Menschen sehen die kleinen sublimirten Dosen nicht und leugnen sie: sie leugnen z.B. die Grausamkeit im Denker, die Liebe im Räuber.’

Now that we have explored in more detail the way in which science plays a significant part in the dangerous process of a developing individual, two more aspects need to be developed before we turn to *amor fati*. One: Nietzsche dedicates several passages to the consideration that the acceptance ('Einverleibung') of new outlooks on reality is not an easy process. It is related, as we have seen, with danger – more specifically with the danger of perishing. I will therefore explain, secondly, what practice is essential according to Nietzsche to make sure one does not perish in this process: art. As we have seen in chapter 1, the occurrence of *amor fati* in *FW* 276 has a strong aesthetic component, which makes a closer examination of the relation between art and science even more pressing. The next section will thus show how art and science are seen by Nietzsche as intimately connected strategies for new individuals (like himself).

5.2.2 THE DANGER OF APPROPRIATING KNOWLEDGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ART

The references to the presence of danger so far (the importance of which has first been explored in the final sections of chapter 4 on *FW*) do not denote the same kind of danger. There is the danger for individuals attempting to understand and meet their own 'Existenzbedingungen', who develop new kinds of judgements etc., but are excluded from the community and left to die. This danger is real because of the fragility of these individuals-to-be; as they are still experimenting and searching they are not yet able to function on their own. Two other forms of danger can be distinguished. Both of these we have encountered before and they are closely related, to each other and to the practice of pursuing truth. The first concerns the only method we possess to increase our knowledge, after realising the insufficiency of adopting a purely (Stoic-like) 'objective' point of view. In line with what we saw in chapter 4, most passages of the 1881 *Nachlass* deny that the pursuit of knowledge can be the consequence of adopting a rational and emotion-free standpoint. The accurate method is rather the accumulation of perspectives, that is: the exercise of seeing things from a variety of different standpoints, different 'pairs of eyes', all of which have to be personal⁶⁶⁷ (although Nietzsche seems still to be equivocating in these notes⁶⁶⁸). This exercise not surprisingly has a certain disturbing effect on the organisation of drives and sensations within the individual; it

⁶⁶⁷ *NL* 11[65] 9.466: 'Aufgabe: die Dinge *sehen, wie sie sind!* Mittel: Aus hundert Augen auf sie sehen können, aus *vielen* Personen! [...] *Viele* Nächste und aus *vielen* Augen und aus lauter persönlichen Augen sehen – ist das Rechte. Das „Unpersönliche“ ist nur das *geschwächt*-Persönliche, Matte [...].'

⁶⁶⁸ One can still find remarks in this *Nachlass* book that remind us of the more 'Stoic' approach to truth we have investigated in chapter 4, namely the attempt to adopt a neutral standpoint, undisturbed by affects as well as alien voices, focused on our 'indifference' towards the object of knowledge; see for instance *NL* 11[10] 9.443-4: 'Das Erkennenwollen der Dinge, wie sie sind – das allein ist der *gute* Hang: nicht das Hinsehen nach Anderen und das Sehen mit anderen Augen – das wäre ja nur ein *Ortswechsel* des egoistischen Sehens! Wir wollen uns von der großen Grundverrücktheit heilen, *alles nach uns zu messen* [...]; Selbsthaß und alle Affekte sind fortwährend thätig mit diesem kurzen Sprunge; als ob *alles zu uns hinstrebe*. [...] Vermehrung der Gleichgültigkeit! Und *dazu Übung*, mit *anderen* Augen sehen: Übung, ohne menschliche Beziehungen, also *sachlich* zu sehen! [...] Die *Leidenschaft für das* trotz allen Personen-Rücksichten, trotz allem „Angenehmen“ und Unangenehmen „*Wahre*“ ist die höchste – darum *Seltenste* bisher!'; see also *NL* 11[110] 9.480: 'Die Gleichgültigkeit! Ein Ding geht uns nichts an, darüber können wir denken, wie wir mögen, es giebt keinen Nutzen und Nachtheil für uns – *das* ist ein Fundament des wissenschaftlichen Geistes.'

takes up all their energy. This effect constitutes the first type of danger involved in pursuing truth: it points at the threat of perishing out of exhaustion.

NL 11[119] „Wissenschaft“ angeblich [...] beim reinen Schweigen des „Willens“! In Wahrheit sind *alle unsere Triebe* thätig [...]: ein Trieb regt den anderen an, jeder phantasirt und will *seine* Art Irrthum durchsetzen [...] Es ist eine Jagd. Je mehr Individuen einer in sich hat, um so mehr wird er allein Aussicht haben, eine Wahrheit zu finden – dann ist der Kampf *in* ihm: und *alle* Kräfte muß er dem einzelnen Phantasma zu Gebote stellen und später wieder einem anderen entgegensetzen: große Schwungkraft, großen Widerwillen am Einerlei, vielen und plötzlichen Ekel muß er haben.⁶⁶⁹

NL 11[73] Wir können weder des Bösen noch der Leidenschaft entbehren [...]. Selbst zum Erkennen brauche ich alle meine Triebe [...]. Alle großen Menschen waren durch die Stärke ihrer Affekte groß. [...] Gewiß sind sie oft Anlaß, daß man zu Grunde geht – aber dies ist kein Argument gegen ihre *nützlichen* Wirkungen im Großen.⁶⁷⁰

Reading these two passages together gives a clear indication of what danger we will encounter if all our drives are stimulated for the attainment of just ‘eine Wahrheit’: the process of drives fighting for their own fantasy and error, searching for arguments and means to become dominant, confronting and contesting each other with their perspectives, culminates in great feelings of turbulence. Because of the great amount of emotional restlessness there is the constant danger of perishing; great men derive their greatness from the ‘Stärke ihrer Affekte’, but these are also the ‘Anlaß, daß man zu Grunde geht’.

This type of danger, to perish because of the overwhelming strength of all the ‘Leidenschaft’, ‘Triebe’, and ‘Affekte’ in play, is taken up in Book IV of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. Like FW 333 (in which ‘jene gewaltige plötzliche Erschöpfung, von der alle Denker heimgesucht werden’ is mentioned⁶⁷¹), FW 309 explicitly discusses the turbulence that is the consequence of the development of science:

FW 309 *Aus der siebenten Einsamkeit*. — Eines Tages warf der Wanderer eine Thür hinter sich zu, blieb stehen und weinte. Dann sagte er: „Dieser Hang und Drang zum Wahren, Wirklichen, Un-Scheinbaren, Gewissen! Wie bin ich ihm böse! Warum folgt *mir* gerade dieser düstere und leidenschaftliche Treiber! Ich möchte ausruhen, aber er läßt es nicht zu. [...] Ich muss den Fuss weiter heben, diesen müden, verwundeten Fuss: und weil ich muss, so habe ich oft für das Schönste, das mich nicht halten konnte, einen grimmigen Rückblick, — *weil* es mich nicht halten konnte!“⁶⁷²

⁶⁶⁹ 9.483-4.

⁶⁷⁰ 9.469.

⁶⁷¹ FW 333 3.559: ‘jetzt erst dämmert uns die Wahrheit auf, dass der allgrösste Theil unseres geistigen Wirkens uns unbewusst, ungefühl verläuft; ich meine aber, diese Triebe, die hier mit einander kämpfen, werden recht wohl verstehen, sich *einander* dabei fühlbar zu machen und wehe zu thun -: jene gewaltige plötzliche Erschöpfung, von der alle Denker heimgesucht werden, mag da ihren Ursprung haben (es ist die Erschöpfung auf dem Schlachtfelde).’

⁶⁷² 3.545-6.

The constant desire for what is true and real wears the ‘Wanderer’ out. It is difficult not to stop and pause, but the desire drags him along, he *has* to continue. Even the beautiful perspectives he discovers during the process cannot be appreciated for long, for they may be beautiful but they are still *untrue*. In the *Kommentar* by Colli and Montinari on *FW* 309 we read how Nietzsche can be identified with this ‘Wanderer’: in the Vorstufe to this passage, that almost literally mirrors the aphorism above, Nietzsche writes in the first person and admits that he suffers from his desire for the truth. Moreover, he quotes the famous Stoic exclamation that originates in Cleanthes’ Hymn: ‘Lead me, Zeus, and you, Fate, wherever you have assigned me. I shall follow without hesitation; but even if I am disobedient and do not wish to, I shall follow no less surely.’

14.268 In meiner Seele ist ein düsterer und leidenschaftlicher Hang für das Wahre. Ach, ich habe oft die Erholung so nöthig! Wer wird so verführt wie ich, zu verweilen! [...] Aber ein unüberwindlicher Zug treibt mich, und ich folge, oft wie geschlagen. [...] „Schicksal, ich folge dir“ und wollte ich nicht, ich würde es müssen unter Schlägen seufzend. Das rührt mich zu Thränen.

This citation hints at a warm appreciation and understanding of the Stoic prayer to follow fate, even though we sometimes feel imprisoned by it. Later on (in 5.4) I will come back to this remarkable link with Stoicism, and, put in the right context, it will become clear to what extent it may be revealing of the Stoic influence on *amor fati*. But first more needs to be said on the strategies Nietzsche adopts in order to continue the process of science, in connection with the second type of danger to be distinguished: the threat of the ‘Einverleibung’ of truth itself.

The following passage reveals how Nietzsche explains the origin of the disquieting character of pursuing truth in familiar terms: it may be almost impossible to *find* ‘eine Wahrheit’, it is of even greater difficulty to *absorb* what has been discovered, given the radical incompatibility between its nature and our organic constitution. This incompatibility can thus be seen as the second type of danger to be distinguished:

NL 11[162] Damit es irgend einen Grad von Bewußtsein in der Welt geben könne, mußte eine unwirkliche Welt des Irrthums – entstehen [...] – doch kann dieser Irrthum nicht anders als mit dem Leben vernichtet werden: die letzte Wahrheit vom Fluß der Dinge verträgt die *Einverleibung* nicht, unsere **Organe** (zum *Leben*) sind auf den Irrthum eingerichtet.⁶⁷³

The ultimate kind of ‘truth’ to be acknowledged by human beings, which is a negative result of the critique of substance, is described in this passage as ‘die letzte Wahrheit vom Fluß der Dinge’. It is further elaborated on in *FW* 110. There it is presented as the opposite of the ‘Irrthum’ ‘dass es dauernde Dinge gebe, dass es gleiche Dinge gebe, dass es Dinge, Stoffe, Körper gebe, dass ein Ding Das sei, als was es erscheine’.⁶⁷⁴ It is clear for Nietzsche that letting

⁶⁷³ 9.503-4.

⁶⁷⁴ *FW* 110 3.469. In this aphorism it is described how the drive for truth is a relatively young drive; ‘Der Intellekt hat ungeheure Zeitstrecken hindurch Nichts als Irrthümer erzeugt’. Some of these ‘Irrthümer’ proved to be life-enhancing and became part of the ‘menschlichen Art- und Grundbestand’. It was only after the development of the drive to truth into a ‘lebenserhaltende Macht’ that it became clear that the

go of all these erroneous beliefs would be the opposite of what our organs require, constituting an endangering threat for their survival: if we would force ourselves to swallow this ‘truth’, ‘so geht der Mensch zu Grunde’.

So, taking the three dangers together, we arrive at a picture of an individual suffering from a devastating and dangerous desire for truth that nevertheless provides the only path towards humanity’s enhancement: not only does the pursuit of truth demand the disturbing and exhausting involvement of all ‘Affekte’ and ‘Triebe’ in order to increase the number of perspectives on things outside; when finally some knowledge is gained (that is, when ‘eine Mitte, eine Beruhigung, ein Rechtgeben nach allen drei Seiten, eine Art Gerechtigkeit und Vertrag’ is attained, as described in *FW* 333⁶⁷⁵), it will be unlikely that its result is easily ‘einverleibt’, given the ultimate incompatibility between the nature of this truth and our organic constitution, which is in need of all kinds of stable ‘Irrthümer’ in order to survive. The attempt to incorporate this ‘truth’ in spite of its hostile nature is referred to in *FW* 110 as ‘die letzte Frage um die Bedingung des Lebens’: ‘Inwieweit verträgt die Wahrheit die Einverleibung? – das ist die Frage, das ist das Experiment.’⁶⁷⁶

Apart from the explanation of the inevitable dangers associated with science, the above passage also suggests how to deal with it: we have to view erring and gaining knowledge as two distinct phases, like the low and rising tide or night and day:

NL 11[162] Leben ist die Bedingung des Erkennens. Irren die Bedingung des Lebens und zwar im tiefsten Grunde Irren. Wissen um das Irren hebt es nicht auf! Das ist nichts Bitteres!

[...] Um des Erkennens willen das Leben lieben und fördern, um des Lebens willen das Irren Wähnen lieben und fördern. Dem Dasein eine ästhetische Bedeutung geben, *unseren Geschmack an ihm mehren*, ist Grundbedingung aller Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß.

So entdecken wir auch hier eine Nacht und einen Tag als Lebensbedingung für *uns*: Erkennen-wollen und Irren-wollen sind Ebbe und Fluth. Herrscht *eines* absolut, so geht der Mensch zu Grunde; und *zugleich die Fähigkeit*.⁶⁷⁷

Since we need to err in order to live, and since we need to live in order to gain knowledge, we therefore need to find a way to accept and even further our errors paradoxically for the sake of knowledge. Even if we cannot as knowers affirm errors, we also cannot live as knowing living beings without the low tide of believing in our errors: ‘Wir haben zeitweilig die Blindheit nöthig und müssen gewisse Glaubensartikel und Irrthümer in uns unberührt lassen – so lange sie uns im Leben *erhalten*.’⁶⁷⁸ In this passage the phase of temporary blindness is described in

insights yielded by this drive are in conflict with the age-old ‘Irrthümer’. This conflict becomes visible only now, for the first time, in a ‘thinker’ (3.471). For more on this aphorism, see 5.3.2.4.

⁶⁷⁵ 3.558.

⁶⁷⁶ *FW* 110 3.471.

⁶⁷⁷ *NL* 11[162] 9.504.

⁶⁷⁸ *NL* 11[217] 9.526; see also *NL* 11[171] 9.506-7: ‘Ich erkenne etwas Wahres nur als Gegensatz zu einem wirklich lebendigen Unwahren: so kommt das Wahre ganz kraftlos, als Begriff, zur Welt und muß sich durch *Verschmelzung mit lebendigen Irrthümern* erst *Kräfte* geben! Und darum muß man die Irrthümer

aesthetic terms: the condition for the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß’ is to give life an aesthetic meaning, to ‘enhance our taste for it’.

FW 107 picks up on this *Nachlass* fragment, and explains why art is the only way to affirm error or blindness: it is equated to ‘der gute Wille zum Scheine’. Art makes ‘Schein’, in its multidimensional meaning of ‘shine’, ‘appearance’ and ‘falsehood’, bearable: ‘Als ästhetisches Phänomen ist uns das Dasein immer noch *erträglich*’.⁶⁷⁹ *FW 107* further describes the dynamics of the low and rising tide of going back and forth between art and science as follows.

FW 107 Unsere letzte Dankbarkeit gegen die Kunst. – Hätten wir nicht die Künste gut geheissen und diese Art von Cultus des Unwahren erfunden: so wäre die Einsicht in die allgemeine Unwahrheit und Verlogenheit, die uns jetzt durch die Wissenschaft gegeben wird – die Einsicht in den Wahn und Irrthum als in eine Bedingung des erkennenden und empfindenden Daseins –, gar nicht auszuhalten. Die Redlichkeit würde den Ekel und den Selbstmord im Gefolge haben. Nun aber hat unsere Redlichkeit eine Gegenmacht, die uns solchen Consequenzen ausweichen hilft: die Kunst, als den guten Willen zum Scheine. [...] Wir müssen zeitweilig von uns ausruhen, dadurch, dass wir auf uns hin und hinab sehen und, aus einer künstlerischen Ferne her, über uns lachen oder über uns weinen; wir müssen den Helden und ebenso den Narren entdecken, der in unsrer Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß steckt, wir müssen unsrer Thorheit ab und zu froh werden, um unsrer Weisheit froh bleiben zu können!⁶⁸⁰

This aphorism makes apparent once more what danger is involved in being a scientist: the virtue of ‘Redlichkeit’, which reveals that errors are necessary for our existence, would have disgust and even suicide as its consequence; not only because it implies the stimulation of all Triebe and Affekte (see *FW 333*), but also because as knowers we cannot affirm errors: our knowledge is inseparable from truth as highest value. It is thanks to ‘Redlichkeit’s’ counterforce, art, that this destructive element is kept in check. Art is a way of taking a rest from ourselves – giving in, thus, to the desire expressed in *FW 309*: ‘Ich möchte ausruhen’. And the way to proceed is described in terms of laughter. We should look at ourselves from an artistic distance and laugh and cry at our own folly. Our passion for knowledge (‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß’) contains ‘heroes’, but also ‘fools’ – and we must be cheerful (‘froh’) about our folly in order to remain cheerful about our wisdom. We have encountered an important example of this in chapter 4.2.3: the serious self-reflection present in the Stoic expression ‘was liegt an mir?’ had been taken up in a comic perspective, the perspective of laughing birds, in *FW 332*.

The relation between art and science is, however, developed along different lines as well. The function of art is not merely to be a counterbalance for the stringent practice of science, nor a

leben lassen und ihnen ein großes Reich zugestehen. – Ebenso: um individuell leben zu können, muß erst die Gesellschaft hoch gefördert sein und fort und fort gefördert werden – der Gegensatz: im Bunde mit ihr bekommt das Individuelle zuerst einige Kraft. – Endlich erscheint in Punkt, wo wir über das Individuelle und Idiosynkratische hinauswollen: aber nur im Bunde mit dem Individuum, dem Gegensatz, können wir diesem Streben Kräfte verleihen.’ See also *FW 1 3.369-72*.

⁶⁷⁹ *FW 107 3.464*.

⁶⁸⁰ 3.464-5.

necessary preparation for its workings; it can also be taken to be science's *purpose*. In the summer of 1881 Nietzsche writes:

NL 11[23] NB! Die Wissenschaft lieben, ohne an ihren Nutzen zu denken! Aber vielleicht ist sie ein Mittel, den Menschen in einem unerhörten Sinne zum Künstler zu machen! Bisher sollte sie *diene*n. – Eine Reihenfolge schöner Experimente ist einer der höchsten Theatergenüsse.⁶⁸¹

A similar thought can be recognized in FW 335.

FW 335 *Hoch die Physik!* [...] Wir aber wollen *Die werden, die wir sind*, – die Neuen, die Einmaligen, die Unvergleichbaren, die Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden, die Sich-selber-Schaffenden! Und dazu müssen wir die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt werden: wir müssen *Physiker* sein, um, in jenem Sinne, *Schöpfer* sein zu können, – während bisher alle Werthschätzungen und Ideale auf *Unkenntniss* der Physik oder im *Widerspruch* mit ihr aufgebaut waren. Und darum: Hoch die Physik! Und höher noch das, was uns zu ihr *zwingt*, – unsre Redlichkeit!⁶⁸²

The passage written in the summer of 1881 suggests that science must be pursued for its own sake but can also be a means for human beings to become artists – artists even in an ‘unheard of’ sense. FW 335 speaks about ‘us’: we want to be our own creators, that is: we want to give ourselves our own laws, so that we become who we are, the new, unique, incomparable ones. We are strongly reminded of the function we saw Nietzsche ascribing to science before: the development of new individuals and new species. As we can see now, this development not only demands the furthering of science and the ‘Einverleibung’ of new and more truthful perspectives. It also demands the development of a certain creativity. All evaluations and ideals developed so far have been built, according to Nietzsche, upon a lack of knowledge of physics or in opposition to it. New ideals and evaluations have to be created, based upon a solid knowledge of our physical condition, on all that is ‘necessary or lawful’, and therefore on the outcome of our ‘Redlichkeit’. Aesthetics, thus, is important to prepare our organs for the destructive workings of science; yet, it is also for the sake of the creation of our new identity (becoming ‘die Sich-selber-Schaffenden’) that science needs to be promoted.

This conclusion might seem circular. The function of art is to help develop science, and the function of science is the artistic creation of new individuals. Nietzsche summarizes this double relation in terms of a process, entitled ‘Kur des Einzelnen’. In order for the individual to develop enough strength to one day create a whole new species, away from the organisation it belonged to before, it has to take the following six steps:

NL 11[258] Zur „Kur des Einzelnen.“

- 1) er soll vom Nächsten und Kleinsten ausgehen und die ganze Abhängigkeit sich feststellen, in die hinein er geboren und erzogen ist
- 2) ebenso soll er den gewohnten Rhythmus seines Denkens und Fühlens, seine intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Ernährung begreifen

⁶⁸¹ 9.451.

⁶⁸² 3.563-4.

The first two steps summarize what we have seen in 5.2.1. An individual starts out as an organ, part of a social organism, and develops the instincts and intellectual judgments, its taste, within that context. The first task of an individual is therefore to understand and define these elements, starting from the nearest and smallest, using the virtue of 'Redlichkeit' to honestly determine its 'intellectual taste'.

3) Dann soll er *Veränderung* aller Art versuchen, zunächst um die Gewohnheiten zu brechen (vielen Diätwechsel, mit feinsten Beobachtung)

4) er soll sich geistig an seine Widersacher einmal anlehnen, er soll ihre Nahrung zu essen versuchen. Er soll *reisen*, in jedem Sinne. In dieser Zeit wird er „unstät und flüchtig“ sein.

Von Zeit zu Zeit soll er über seinen Erlebnissen *ruhen* – und verdauen.

The third step is to practice changes of all kinds. In order for the individual to become independent, it has to try out different diets. It has to break away from what it normally absorbs, and try out different kinds of nutrition, even of the kind it normally finds repulsive. We noticed how the drive for knowledge (the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis') forces us to stretch the boundary of what we would normally consider 'edible', and how a dangerous internal battle, between life-enhancing 'Irrthümer' and a life-threatening 'Wahrheit', cannot be avoided. Even though this passage does not explicitly mention the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis', we cannot but understand it as part of the procedure: at the end of section 5.2.1 the 'Erkenntnißtrieb' was presented as a sublimation of an 'Eigenthumstrieb', a 'Fortsetzung des *Nahrungs- und Jagd-Triebs*'.⁶⁸³ The 'Diätwechsel', in other words, concerns the incorporation of different forms of knowledge as well.

We also analysed the aesthetic strategy Nietzsche adopts for dealing with the inevitable struggle: we should allow our organs to sometimes take time and adjust. The fourth step mirrors this strategy. After the phase of 'Einverleibung' it is time to rest and to digest what has been taken in.

5) Dann kommt das Höhere: der Versuch, ein Ideal zu *dichten*. Dies geht dem noch Höheren voraus – eben dies Ideal zu leben.

6) Er muß durch eine Reihe von Idealen hindurch.⁶⁸⁴

The last two steps suggest again that the (aesthetic) creation of a new species is at stake. This process cannot be executed without the adoption of an ideal. It is not easy to create ('dichten') an ideal – but it is an even higher task ('dem noch Höheren') to live up to it. And not just to one ideal; an ambitious individual cannot escape going through several ideals. It remains unclear what exactly these ideals are: they could be identified as belonging to the past, but could also signify future ideals, ideals we have not even heard of yet.

Nietzsche briefly mentions what he has in mind in terms of the outcome of this whole process in *FW* 113, combining again the scientific and artistic forces, and foreseeing how a higher organic system will go beyond the by that time old-fashioned types of scholars, physicians, artists and law-givers:

⁶⁸³ *NL* 11[47] 9.459.

⁶⁸⁴ 9.539.

FW 113 [...] Und wie ferne sind wir noch davon, dass zum wissenschaftlichen Denken sich auch noch die künstlerischen Kräfte und die practische Weisheit des Lebens hinzufinden, dass ein höheres organisches System sich bildet, in Bezug auf welches der Gelehrte, der Arzt, der Künstler und der Gesetzgeber, so wie wir jetzt diese kennen, als dürftige Alterthümer erscheinen müssten!⁶⁸⁵

5.3 AMOR FATI

We have a clearer idea of the context in which we must place and understand the concept of *amor fati* against the background of the relation between science and the enhancement of humanity in *FW*. The context of the heuristic model in the *NL* fragments of the summer of 1881 together with some of the aphorisms of Book IV of *FW* can be summarized now in terms of the following three main aspects: 1. Nietzsche is concerned with the future of humanity, and analyses its development in physiological/organismic terms, whereby an individual (a new species to be) has to slowly develop new conditions of existence, distancing itself from the social group and the 'Gattung' it used to be part of (by way of a refined and thoughtful egoism); 2. the dangerous and disturbing desire and search for knowledge, or truth, hostile as it is to the life-conditions of the individual, plays a key role in this development; 3. aesthetic taste and art, too, are of major importance: without the 'night' or the 'Ebbe' of art and laughter the individual knower would have no chance of survival; moreover, the creation of ideals, related to what the new individuals should look like is an aesthetic process. In this section the meaning of *amor fati* will be analysed against this background, discussing the meaning of *amor* and *fati* independently.

Stern, as we have seen in chapter 1, is one of very few commentators who attempts to understand the concept in the context of *FW*. He does not include the *Nachlass* in his analysis, but he nevertheless arrives at a more convincing interpretation than most others. In section 5.3.2, in which the notion of fate is discussed, I will offer four possible interpretations of *amor fati*, the first of which will be his. In two respects in particular I think Stern's account does a better job than others. First, he does not assume that *amor fati* is a notion that has the same function and meaning for Nietzsche throughout his life. In chapter 1 we have seen how the textual occurrences of *amor fati* in 1881 differ significantly from those in later years. Stern's account is to be preferred furthermore because it does not interpret *amor fati* as a therapeutic device intended to make us all happily affirm our personal fates. As we have just seen, the problem that Nietzsche faces in this period is the appropriation, endurance and furthering of a truthful yet life-threatening outlook on life, to be adopted only by the individual who possesses (and is possessed by) the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis'. We must therefore dismiss all accounts (and there are quite a few as we have seen in chapter 1) of *amor fati* that take it to be a therapeutic attitude we should all adopt.

I will first develop an account of 'love', opposing it to the analysis of Béatrice Han-Pile, whose article defends an interpretation of *amor* as agapic. Secondly, I will focus on what should be understood as the object of love. In distinguishing four different possible accounts, I will not

⁶⁸⁵ 3.474.

only point out why I think Stern is ultimately wrong; in the fourth account I will come back to the context of science and the development of a higher life-system that I developed in the previous sections.

5.3.1 AMOR

The aphorism in which *amor fati* is introduced in the published works, the opening of Book IV called ‘Sanctus Januarius’, I will quote in full again.

FW 276 Zum neuen Jahre. — Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken. Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Heute erlaubt sich Jedermann seinen Wunsch und liebsten Gedanken auszusprechen: nun, so will auch ich sagen, was ich mir heute von mir selber wünschte und welcher Gedanke mir dieses Jahr zuerst über das Herz lief, — welcher Gedanke mir Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit alles weiteren Lebens sein soll! Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen: — so werde ich Einer von Denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen. Amor fati: das sei von nun an meine Liebe! Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen. *Wegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung! Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!⁶⁸⁶

The first sentence, ‘Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken’, shows how Nietzsche seems to be surprised to find himself alive still.⁶⁸⁷ One way to understand this ‘noch’ is to remind ourselves of *FW 110*, in which Nietzsche defines what it is to be like to be a ‘thinker’: ‘Der Denker: das ist jetzt das Wesen, in dem der Trieb zur Wahrheit und jene lebenerhaltenden Irrthümer ihren ersten Kampf kämpfen’: living for knowledge conflicts with life itself.⁶⁸⁸ We have already seen several times, for instance in *FW 107*, that this conflict is dangerous; it could easily lead to (self-)destruction. It is not surprising therefore to see the thought of death recurring in an aphorism following 276 closely: 278 is titled ‘Der Gedanke an den Tod’. The opening of Book IV, ‘Sanctus Januarius’, thus expresses a sense of wonder. As we have seen at the beginning of chapter 3, ‘Sanctus Januarius’ denotes for Nietzsche the beginning of an unexpected new phase, one that is associated with spring, new life, hope, and the return of light after a long period of sickness and struggle.

The thought that ‘first touched his heart this year’ is one that he hopes will provide him with ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit’ for the rest of his life. Again, the notion of danger is present: the thought of *amor fati*, the thought that takes the shape of a wish, is to protect Nietzsche from too much danger in the future.

Han-Pile argues that Nietzsche’s understanding of *amor* has to be agapic as a solution to the problem sketched in chapter 1: if fate is not intrinsically lovable, how can we be summoned to

⁶⁸⁶ 3,521.

⁶⁸⁷ Stern is right, I believe, when he remarks that this sentence is rarely taken seriously as informative for the meaning of *amor fati*. Stern, T. (2013), 155.

⁶⁸⁸ *FW 110* 3.471.

love it? She denies that the love of *amor fati* must be identified as a certain reaction to loveable characteristics (which would be typical for the erotic type of love, famously pictured by Plato as an immediate response to beauty⁶⁸⁹). Rather, it is *through* loving an object (fate, in this case) that it becomes loveable, or 'valuable' in Han-Pile's words.⁶⁹⁰ Importantly, *amor* unfolds in her view independently of the subject's desires and needs, for it would be unlikely to desire a fate that contains so many features at odds with one's needs; moreover, this type of love cannot be taught or learned. Hence Han-Pile proposes to understand *amor* as 'a secularised version of grace'⁶⁹¹: agapic love, similar to a 'divine gift', transforms the object not by means of an active engagement of the subject, but rather in a 'mediopassive mode'.⁶⁹²

We have seen in chapter 1 that there are several problems with Han-Pile's account, the most important of which is the lack of textual references to back up her interpretation. She refers to the letter by Nietzsche to Overbeck written in the summer of 1882, in which he speaks of *amor fati* as a 'Gott-Ergebenheit'. She concludes from it that 'the proper attitude to *amor fati* is one of *surrender*, not of erotic pursuit.'⁶⁹³ I will come back to the problem of 'Gott-Ergebenheit' in section 5.3.2.3, and will show that it is not at odds with an erotic reading of love. And then there is only one more textual argument in Han-Pile's article: she quotes a very early passage in *UB* III saying that 'it is impossible to teach love'.⁶⁹⁴ Strangely enough she leaves out of the discussion the numerous remarks on love to be found in *FW* and its *Nachlass*, written in the same time-period as the first occurrences of *amor fati*. Importantly, there is an aphorism in Book IV that has a title suggesting the opposite of the *UB* III quote: '*Man muss lieben lernen*'.⁶⁹⁵ In what follows I will therefore examine in more detail the references to love in these texts, arguing that they undoubtedly reveal an erotic type of love that moreover reflects the context of the danger of being a 'thinker' explored above.

5.3.1.1 AMOR AS THE EROTIC RESPONSE TO BEAUTY

Yet, Han-Pile is correct in pointing out that interpreting Nietzsche's idea of love in *amor fati* as erotic requires some argumentation: we have seen remarkably few textual examples in which fate was considered attractive. Loving fate was compared to loving 'Furien' in *NL* 16[22], and endowed with a 'schreckliche Herkunft' in *NL* 15[20]. On the other hand, the frequency with

⁶⁸⁹ Although it should be noted that Nietzsche's approach to love is far from an exact copy of Plato's reference to it in his *Symposium*; as we will see further on, one of the main differences concerns Nietzsche's turn away from the transcendent (cf. the divine 'Form' of Beauty in *Symposium* 211e) to the physiological processes informing all judgements of beauty. See for instance *GD* Streifzüge 19-20 6.123-4.

⁶⁹⁰ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 4: 'In a nutshell, erotic love is motivated by the perceived value of its object: we love someone or something *because we value them*. By contrast, agapic love bestows value on its object, and this regardless of the value previously attributed to it: we value someone or something *because we love them*.'

⁶⁹¹ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 19: 'like grace (which, in the Lutheran tradition Nietzsche was raised in cannot be secured by works either), love happens (or not) to us from the outside [...]. [A]mor fati is meant to change our *relation* to our (unchanged) past, and more generally to time, in such a way that neither revenge nor despair can hold sway on us anymore.'

⁶⁹² Han-Pile, B. (2009), 10.

⁶⁹³ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 9.

⁶⁹⁴ Han-Pile, B. (2009), 9. She refers to *UB* III 6 1.385: '[...] weil es unmöglich ist, Liebe zu lehren'.

⁶⁹⁵ *FW* 334 3.559-60.

which Nietzsche associates love and beauty, which unavoidably invokes the erotic account of love, has escaped Han-Pile's attention. *FW* 334 for instance, entitled '*Man muss lieben lernen*' as indicated above, describes in great detail how the love of initially unattractive things is the result of a process of 'learning': the efforts of 'unseren guten Willen, unsere Geduld, Billigkeit, Sanftmüthigkeit' are rewarded 'indem das Fremde langsam seinen Schleier abwirft und sich als neue unsägliche Schönheit darstellt'.⁶⁹⁶ The process of learning, which precedes the appearance of beauty, which in its turn evokes love, is compared to the process of learning to listen to unfamiliar music.

FW 334 – *Man muss lieben lernen*. So geht es uns in der Musik: erst muss man eine Figur und Weise überhaupt *hören lernen*, heraushören, unterscheiden, als ein Leben für sich isolieren und abgrenzen; dann braucht es Mühe und guten Willen, sie zu *ertragen*, trotz ihrer Fremdheit, Geduld gegen ihren Blick und Ausdruck, Mildherzigkeit gegen das Wunderliche an ihr zu üben: – endlich kommt ein Augenblick, wo wir ihrer *gewohnt* sind, wo wir sie erwarten, wo wir ahnen, dass sie uns fehlen würde, wenn sie fehlte; und nun wirkt sie ihren Zwang und Zauber fort und fort und endet nicht eher, als bis wir ihre demüthigen und entzückten Liebhaber geworden sind, die nichts Besseres von der Welt mehr wollen, als sie und wieder sie. – So geht es uns aber nicht nur mit der Musik: gerade so haben wir alle Dinge, die wir jetzt lieben, *lieben gelernt*.⁶⁹⁷

Loving requires learning: first we need to *hear* a melody, to discriminate it, to isolate it from the rest. Then we must be patient and have a 'guten Willen'; for it is only in enduring the music, listening to it again and again, practicing mildness with respect to its strangeness, that one can learn to first become *used* to it. If we reach that point, we start expecting it, and we would miss it if it were not there. In that way the music continues to exercise its force ('Zwang') and magic ('Zauber'), just for as long as it takes to uncover its beauty and make us its lovers. And once we are, we would not want anything more from the world than this again and again ('nichts Besseres von der Welt [...] als sie und wieder sie'). This formulation reminds us of the notion of the eternal return, introduced in *FW* 341: 'die Frage bei allem und Jedem „willst du dies noch einmal und noch unzählige Male?“'.⁶⁹⁸ Connecting *FW* 334 and *FW* 341 thus suggests that in order to answer the demon's question affirmatively it is necessary to *learn to love*; that is: to slowly become familiar with things that are alien ('fremd').

The emphasis on learning in *FW* 334 takes us back to *FW* 276, in which *amor fati* was described in similar wordings: 'Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen'. *Amor fati*, being a form of love, must thus be seen as the result of a process of learning, which means that it first requires the slow and patient endurance of a 'Fremdheit', which results in seeing fate as 'nothwendig' (it would be missed if it 'fehlte'); only then can it be seen as 'beautiful'. This connection between love and beauty clearly points to the erotic type of love rather than the agapic.

Another aphorism in *FW* IV, *FW* 299, provides some further suggestions of how to learn to see 'das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne'. It may be read as a complementing strategy

⁶⁹⁶ *FW* 334 3.560.

⁶⁹⁷ 3.559-60.

⁶⁹⁸ 3.570.

to the ‘guten Willen’, ‘Geduld’, ‘Billigkeit’, and ‘Sanftmüthigkeit’ of *FW* 334: what further means do we have ‘uns die Dinge schön, anziehend, begehrenswerth zu machen, wenn sie es nicht sind?’. This is the question which guides the rest of the aphorism, and Nietzsche adds, in a way that differs from *FW* 334: ‘ich meine, sie sind es an sich niemals!’. The strategies developed in the rest of the text are inspired by methods adopted by physicians and artists.

FW 299 *Was man den Künstlern ablernen soll.* – Welche Mittel haben wir, uns die Dinge schön, anziehend, begehrenswerth zu machen, wenn sie es nicht sind? – und ich meine, sie sind es an sich niemals! Hier haben wir von den Aerzten Etwas zu lernen, wenn sie zum Beispiel das Bittere verdünnen oder Wein und Zucker in den Mischkrug thun; aber noch mehr von den Künstlern, welche eigentlich fortwährend darauf aus sind, solche Erfindungen und Kunststücke zu machen. Sich von den Dingen entfernen, bis man Vieles von ihnen nicht mehr sieht und Vieles hinzusehen muss, *um sie noch zu sehen* – oder die Dinge um die Ecke und wie in einem Ausschnitte sehen – oder sie so stellen, dass sie sich theilweise verstellen und nur perspectivische Durchblicke gestatten – oder sie durch gefärbtes Glas oder im Lichte der Abendröthe anschauen⁶⁹⁹

There are several methods for seeing things as beautiful; like the physicians we could mix ill-tasting drinks with sugar and wine, and like the artists we could constantly change our perspectives, looking at things from a distance, from another angle, or in a certain light. Making things beautiful is a matter of manipulation and change therefore; but although there is no explicit connection with love in this aphorism, the suggestion is implicitly there that by making things attractive (‘schön, anziehend, begehrenswerth’) we may end up loving them. What is more, this aphorism finishes with the suggestion, in line with *FW* 341 (‘Oder wie müsstest du dir selber und dem Leben gut werden, um nach Nichts mehr zu verlangen, als nach dieser letzten ewigen Bestätigung und Besiegelung?’), that these strategies can and should be applied to our lives:

das Alles sollen wir den Künstlern ablernen und im Uebrigen weiser sein, als sie. Denn bei ihnen hört gewöhnlich diese ihre feine Kraft auf, wo die Kunst aufhört und das Leben beginnt; *wir* aber wollen die Dichter unseres Lebens sein, und im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst.⁷⁰⁰

We must be wiser than the artists, Nietzsche claims here, because they apply these strategies only to their art, whereas we want to apply them to our lives, becoming the ‘Dichter unseres Lebens’. This reminds us of the importance of the aesthetic forces explored in 5.2.2: we may read these final sentences as consistent with *FW* 335, in which it is said that ‘we’ wish to become ‘Die [...], die wir sind, – die Neuen, die Einmaligen, die Unvergleichbaren, die Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden, die Sich-selber-Schaffenden!’. It seems, therefore, that the strategies of making things beautiful so as to love them, as presented in *FW* 229 and 334, can be placed in the context of aesthetic self-cultivation.

⁶⁹⁹ 3.538.

⁷⁰⁰ 3.538.

5.3.1.2 AMOR AS GREED

Another clue to the interpretation of love as erotic is given by the references to love in *FW* and its *Nachlass*, which betray an intimate link with greed or 'Habsucht'. In *FW* 14, for instance, we read:

FW 14 *Was Alles Liebe genannt wird.* – Habsucht und Liebe: wie verschieden empfinden wir bei jedem dieser Worte! – und doch könnte es der selbe Trieb sein, zweimal benannt, das eine Mal verunglimpft vom Standpuncte der bereits Habenden aus, in denen Trieb etwas zur Ruhe gekommen ist und die nun für ihre „Habe“ fürchten; das andere Mal vom Standpuncte der Unbefriedigten, Durstigen aus, und daher verherrlicht als „gut“. Unsere Nächstenliebe – ist sie nicht ein Drang nach neuem *Eigenthum*? Und ebenso unsere Liebe zum Wissen, zur Wahrheit und überhaupt all jener Drang nach Neuigkeiten?⁷⁰¹

Love and greed could be 'der selbe Trieb', 'zweimal benannt', and appearing in two situations. First there is the case of those already having: in them the instinct is 'etwas zur Ruhe gekommen', which makes them start to fear for 'ihre „Habe“'. Secondly, Nietzsche speaks of love from the standpoint of 'der Unbefriedigten, Durstigen'. Their love is a craving for new possessions. Two situations from our daily life are brought up and 'translated' in the light of the equation between love and greed: is not our love of our neighbours 'ein Drang nach neuem *Eigenthum*'; and 'ebenso unsere Liebe zum Wissen, zur Wahrheit'? Moreover, further in the aphorism Nietzsche 'translates' the love we feel for those who suffer into 'die in ihm erweckte Begierde nach neuem Besitz'. Also sexual love betrays the same drive for possession: it 'verräth sich [...] als Drang nach *Eigenthum*: der Liebende will den unbedingten Alleinbesitz'.⁷⁰²

Although this aphorism seems to pose the relation between 'Habsucht' and 'Liebe' as a question, and although Nietzsche says here that the two notions *could* ('könnte') be two names for one and the same concept, several *Nachlass* fragments lack this careful hesitation. One of them is the following.

NL 11[134] [...] Ein solches Wesen assimilirt sich das Nächste, verwandelt es in sein *Eigenthum* (*Eigenthum* ist zuerst Nahrung und Aufspeicherung von Nahrung), es sucht möglichst viel sich einzuverleiben, nicht nur den Verlust zu *compensiren* – es ist **habsüchtig**. [...] „Liebe“ ist Empfindung für das *Eigenthum* oder das, was wir zum *Eigenthum* wünschen.⁷⁰³

The first thing to notice in this text is the fact that 'Liebe' is within quotation marks. This indicates that what we usually understand as 'love' may conceal a variety of drives (contrary to Han-Pile's account of a love independent from our drives). It can be translated along the organismic lines of what we saw in 5.2, into 'Empfindung für das *Eigenthum* oder das, was wir zum *Eigenthum* wünschen': a new individual develops through assimilation, and the lust for obtaining new things to be 'einverleibt' is identified as 'Habsucht' and 'Liebe'. We moreover recognise what we noticed in *FW* 14: love's object is twofold. In the situation of a lack of

⁷⁰¹ 3.386.

⁷⁰² 3.386-7.

⁷⁰³ 9.490-2.

possession, comparable to ‘hunger’, it is that which is ‘desired as possession’; secondly, in the situation in which one possesses, one loves what one has.

When we furthermore connect both *FW* 14 and *NL* 11[134] to *FW* 334 and *FW* 299, we may observe first that the idea of love as ‘Habsucht’ seems absent in those texts. Love appears rather as the result of the hard work of familiarizing and making beautiful what is unattractive at first. Still, an important element connecting love as the response to beauty with love as ‘Habsucht’ is ‘knowledge’.

Knowledge as a possible object of love is introduced in *FW* 14, where it is understood as an example of ‘Eigenthum’. And many other texts point to a comparable connection between this kind of love and the desire for knowledge, the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. We have already seen in 5.2.1 how the drive for knowledge is related to the drive for ‘Eigenthum’, an ‘Eigenthumstrieb’ that is moreover the ‘Fortsetzung des Nahrungs- und Jagd-Triebs’⁷⁰⁴, revealing how love, ‘Habsucht’, greed and the drive for knowledge are connected for Nietzsche. Other *Nachlass* fragments are comparable; the following for instance shows how Nietzsche challenges the idea that love is unrelated to ‘Gerechtigkeit’ and ‘Vernunft’:

NL 12[75] Ich wehre mich dagegen, Vernunft und Liebe, Gerechtigkeit und Liebe von einander zu trennen, oder gar sich entgegenzustellen und der Liebe den höheren Rang zu geben! Liebe ist comes, bei Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, sie ist die Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit – die *aesthetische Seite* der Gerechtigkeit und Vernunft, ein Nebenrieb.⁷⁰⁵

Love is ‘Besitzlust’, ‘Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen’; and again it seems that love can be dedicated to objects – objects of knowledge this time – that are to be obtained and those that are one’s property already, be it perhaps not ‘ganz’, not completely, or not ‘in ihrer ganzen Schönheit’. Love is described as ‘comes’, a ‘companion’, as a ‘Nebenrieb’ of the practice of justice and reason. As its ‘aesthetic side’ it represents the joy of the process of complete appropriation, and so it is the joy of truthfully acknowledging, i.e. knowing, something.

This idea of love as the ‘aesthetic side’ of justice and reason reintroduces the notion of love as identified with the erotic response to beauty in 5.3.1.1. Based on the texts discussed so far, we may suspect at this point the presence of a complex pattern regarding the connections between love, ‘Habsucht’, knowledge and beauty. First, it seems that there are rare individuals who possess a desire for knowledge, the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. This desire, which could be understood as a form of love aimed at a specific ‘Eigenthum’, is a drive to incorporate, ‘eat’,

⁷⁰⁴ *NL* 11[47] 9.459.

⁷⁰⁵ 9.589. See also, for a lively example of how loving entails listening and judging carefully, and not, as one would expect, overlooking imperfections; *NL* 15[33] 9.646: ‘Was wir lieben, soll an sich selber keine Flecken finden –: so will es der Egoismus dieser feinsten Besitzlust, welche Liebe heißt. Gesetzt, man ist der Liebhaber einer Sängerin, mit was für ängstlichen Ohren hört man da sie vor irgend welchen Zuhörern singen! Man urtheilt fein und überfein, keineswegs voreingenommen, verliebt, verklebt: vielmehr entgeht uns keiner ihrer kleinsten Fehler, kein noch so flüchtiges Ausgleiten oder Ausbleiben; wir wissen, wenn auch die Zuhörer jubeln und klatschen, daß für die Sängerin selber nicht Alles so klang und lief, wie ihr feinstes Gewissen es verlangt hat’.

particular things that are outside us.⁷⁰⁶ Yet it is clear that some of the desired things resist being appropriated, as they are unattractive. This is the case for 'fate', as we have seen, and also for 'knowledge'. *FW* 334 and *FW* 299 provide us with strategies of how to deal with those. *FW* 334 takes 'music' as its main example, but in such a way that it may very well be extended to knowledge in general. Part of the process is the '*hören lernen, heraushören, unterscheiden, als ein Leben für sich isolieren und abgrenzen*'; all necessary in any process of knowledge. Whereas *FW* 334 suggests to have an attitude of patient 'good will' in order for the unfamiliar object to reveal its beauty, *FW* 299 adds several beautifying tactics. Once we have come to see the beauty in what was regarded unattractive we may come to familiarize what was unfamiliar before; in that stage we come to see love as the '*Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit*'.

What is more, this process of coming to love and to own what was unattractive and unfamiliar at first is closely connected to the aesthetic process of becoming the '*Dichter unseres Lebens*' (*FW* 299). Nietzsche subtly connects *FW* 334 to *FW* 335, the aphorism quoted in 5.2.2 in which science was presented as the condition for being self-creators: '*dazu müssen wir die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt werden: wir müssen Physiker sein, um, in jenem Sinne, Schöpfer sein zu können*'. *FW* 334 finishes with a remark on loving oneself ('*Auch wer sich selber liebt, wird es auf diesem Wege gelernt haben*'); *FW* 335 opens with the difficulty of knowing oneself: '*der Spruch „Erkenne dich selbst!“ ist [...] beinahe eine Bosheit*'.⁷⁰⁷ *FW* 299, which as we saw focuses on self-cultivation as well, may serve in this context as consolidating the connection between *FW* 334 and *FW* 335. Becoming the '*Dichter unseres Lebens*' requires the beautification '*im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst*': loving ourselves (*FW* 334) and knowing ourselves (*FW* 335) are both part of an aesthetic process of self-cultivation in which the familiarization of the unfamiliar plays a significant part.

Yet, not surprisingly perhaps, the difficulty with the connection between love and knowledge is precisely the aesthetic distortion that comes with love. *FW* 59, in line with *FW* 299, discusses the possibility that love has a certain distorting effect on the process of familiarization:

FW 59 *Wir Künstler!* – Wenn wir ein Weib lieben, so haben wir leicht einen Hass auf die Natur, aller der widerlichen Natürlichkeiten gedenkend, denen jedes Weib ausgesetzt ist; gerne denken wir überhaupt daran vorbei [...] – wir sind beleidigt, die Natur scheint in unsern Besitz einzugreifen und mit den ungeweihtesten Händen. Da macht man die Ohren zu gegen alle Physiologie und decretirt für sich insgeheim „ich will davon, dass der Mensch noch etwas Anderes ist, ausser Seele und Form, Nichts hören!“

Love in this context jeopardises the strict preference for science (*FW* 335: '*Hoch die Physik!*') characteristic of the '*Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis*' and '*Redlichkeit*'. It precludes the lover from keeping his eyes open for what is termed '*Natur*' or '*Physiologie*'. Nature is seen as a hated force ('*so haben wir leicht einen Hass auf die Natur*') attempting to interfere with our object of love, our property ('*Besitz*'); it is an unwelcome intruder. The lover is a dreamer – what is more, he is a *day-dreamer*:

⁷⁰⁶ See *NL* 11[134] 9.490: 'Ein solches Wesen assimilirt sich das Nächste'.

⁷⁰⁷ *FW* 335 3.560.

[...] so *verhehlte* er [der Verehrer Gottes] sich die Natur und Mechanik, so gut er konnte und lebte im Traum. Oh diese Menschen von ehemals haben verstanden zu *träumen* und hatten nicht erst nöthig, einzuschlafen! – und auch wir Menschen von heute verstehen es noch viel zu gut, mit allem unseren guten Willen zum Wachsein und zum Tage! [...] wir Nachtwandler des Tages! Wir Künstler! Wir Verhehler der Natürlichkeit!⁷⁰⁸

Lovers, Nietzsche included, are strongly inclined to close their eyes and conceal the nature of the ones (and things) they love. They dream during the day, yet trick themselves into thinking that they are awake. Love can thus be a dangerous obstruction in the process of the pursuit and appropriation of knowledge, linked to daylight in 5.2.2. The day is meant to be dedicated to ‘Redlichkeit’, the time in which we are alive to the life-threatening realisation that ‘reality’ or truth is ultimately out of reach (as we have seen in *MA I* Book 1). At the same time we must still strive to gain knowledge about the illusions informing our perception of ‘reality’; out of ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, but also because the illusions teach us about our own organismic organisation. Daytime is when the difficult process of developing this knowledge takes place, the fight between the ‘lebenerhaltenden Irrthümer’ and the ‘Trieb zur Wahrheit’. Night is the time to rest, and to adopt an aesthetic perspective. The danger raised in this aphorism is that love may get these two phases, night and day, dream and knowledge, mixed up, by over-aestheticising, distorting and neglecting parts of nature. Lovers are dreamers, but their dreams should be dreamt during the night, not in daytime.

We cannot but conclude that love must be intimately connected with the aesthetic process of concealment and distortion. The above aphorism is titled ‘*Wir Künstler!*’ and the same expression significantly returns at the end. Love is thus not only important for the process of learning and gaining knowledge, but also for art, its counter-force. This is of course of great relevance for our understanding of *amor fati*: in *FW* 276, an element of art, or aesthetics, is clearly present as well. This implies that the love at stake here is one that not only initiates the process of knowledge out of a sense of ‘hunger’, but also results from the process of learning as described in *FW* 334, and from the process of beautifying in *FW* 299. As a ‘Nebetrieb’ of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ it accompanies and furthers the pursuit of knowledge, but also threatens to obstruct this procedure through an aesthetic appreciation and possible distortion of ‘Natur’.

5.3.2 FATUM

In the previous section we have seen that the notion of love is deeply tied up with the process of pursuing and appropriating knowledge as developed earlier. Being the term that covers several erotic desires it both stimulates and potentially distorts, aesthetically, the difficult and dangerous process of identifying and incorporating knowledge. It thereby forms a connection between the two sides of this process, its night and day, its ‘Ebbe’ and ‘Fluth’. This characteristic makes the word ‘love’ alone seem to have the power to disclose all elements at play in this difficult process. Importantly, *FW* 276, being the main entrance for our

⁷⁰⁸ 3.422-3.

understanding of *amor fati*, contains references to both elements of art and science as well: opening with the Cartesian connection between being and thinking (“Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum”), it is clear that the thought of *amor fati* is meant as a kind of protection against the threat of perishing in the pursuit of knowledge; moreover, *amor fati* is presented as the wish to ‘learn to see as beautiful that which is necessary’, so becoming ‘one of those who make things beautiful’; clearly revealing the importance of art and aesthetics.⁷⁰⁹

Yet the investigation of this chapter (and of this whole thesis) concerns not just the meaning of love, but the meaning of the love of *fate*. What should we understand ‘*fate*’ to be? Filling in ‘*fate*’ as the object of love described in *FW* 334 would at least result in the following picture: it is that which is alien initially, but for which we must put some effort into exercising ‘Mühe und guten Willen’, ‘Geduld’, and ‘Mildherzigkeit’ in order to make it reveal its beauty (perhaps adding some of the strategies of *FW* 299), so that we end up being its lovers. In connection with *FW* 14 and the *Nachlass* passages discussed above on the connection between love and knowledge we may add that fate, too, might be appropriated.

But before analysing the meaning of fate any further I first evaluate Chouraqui’s account, arguing that he is right in saying that *fatum* must be considered ‘local’. I will then distinguish between four possible interpretations of fate which result in four different interpretations of *amor fati*. The first is represented by Tom Stern; the fourth returns to the account of individuality and science developed at the beginning of this chapter. I will make clear for each interpretation what can be said in favour of it, and what its weaknesses are.

Frank Chouraqui’s article ‘Nietzsche’s Science of Love’, published in 2015, argues that the object of love (his account of love I will not include in the discussion⁷¹⁰) must be considered as ‘local’. That is; the fate referred to in *amor fati* is not a cosmic totality – or at least not in 1881. As we have seen in chapter 1, the 1888 occurrences of *amor fati* do seem to be involved with a kind of totality, which does not escape Chouraqui’s attention. He writes: ‘In this, his first formulation of *amor fati*, Nietzsche insists on [one thing] that will later vanish from his thought: the necessary is presented as “*what is necessary in the things*,” that is to say, it is a *certain portion* of what Nietzsche calls “the things”, i.e. reality. [...] In this [...] characterization, *amor fati* appears as a local form of affirmation, it is attached to some things in particular, not to any “fate” in general.’⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁹ The importance of the combination of art and science is emphasised regularly and in many different ways in *FW*; it is introduced in the very first aphorism, and the 1882 book-motto from Emerson reveals its centrality as well: ‘Dem Dichter und Weisen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Erlebnisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.’ As Brusotti, M. (1997) rightly remarks, 382-3 ft. 6: ‘Emerson hatte eigentlich geschrieben: „Dem Poeten, dem Philosophen wie dem Heiligen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Ereignisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.“ (*Versuche*, S. 9, mehrmals angestrichen [...]).’ Nietzsche thus slightly but significantly changed the wording of Emerson; according to Brusotti this is informative for our understanding of *amor fati*: ‘Schon im Motto kündigt sich der fundamentale Gedanke des *amor fati* an. Nur wer – wie Nietzsche es in seiner Schrift vorexerziert – zugleich Dichter und Weiser ist, ist des *amor fati* fähig. Diese Haltung krönt die Einheit von Dichtung und Weisheit.’

⁷¹⁰ The reason for this omission is not that I am not sympathetic to his account, which defends love as an ontological force transcending object and subject – but I simply think that this notion of love is absent in the writings of 1881.

⁷¹¹ Chouraqui, F. (2015), 272.

Chouraqui's account of the fate to be loved is right, I think. That is: in all three passages that make mention of *amor fati* in 1881 it is clear that the love is not directed at a totality:

FW 276 Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen⁷¹²

NL 15[20] Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst! „Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“⁷¹³

NL 16[22] „Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist!“⁷¹⁴

The *FW* passage speaks about 'das Nothwendige an den Dingen', implying that there is a necessity *about* things – not that things are entirely necessary. It might also refer to a particular way of seeing things, as the interpretation of things as being necessary (after all, we can learn to see them as beautiful as well). *NL* 15[20] distinguishes between what is and is not 'nöthig', saying that 'das Nöthige' should come first; and 16[22] expresses the wish to love only that which is necessary, implying that a selection needs to be made. I agree therefore with Chouraqui that *amor fati* in 1881 is the love for a necessity that is a *part* of reality, not its totality. The analysis of *amor* in 5.3.1.2 provides us with yet another argument for the 'locality' of *fatum*. If the interpretation of love as 'greed' can be applied to *amor fati*, then the object of love cannot but be limited, since only portioned objects can be appropriated and digested. As I will argue in more detail in the fourth part of this chapter, this idea also forms the basis of Nietzsche's criticism of the Stoics:

FW 306 [...] Der Stoiker dagegen übt sich, Steine und Gewürm, Glassplitter und Skorpionen zu verschlucken und ohne Ekel zu sein; seine Magen soll endlich gleichgültig gegen Alles werden, was der Zufall des Daseins in ihn schüttet⁷¹⁵

The Stoics, according to Nietzsche, mistakenly think they have to take in everything, including elements that our stomach cannot stand: stones, worms, glass shards and scorpions. This, clearly, is not what Nietzsche has in mind as a correct representation of *amor fati*. Continuing the recurrent awareness of a contradiction between our organic constitution and forms of knowledge, it is maintained that our stomach cannot cope with particular elements or perspectives, and the necessity loved must therefore be a selective limitation, a 'local' one.

How to determine what is necessary in things, what to incorporate and what not? *FW* 109 provides us with at least one clearly negative answer. It resolutely dismisses the option of selecting necessity as opposed to chance.

FW 109 *Hüten wir uns!* [...] Hüten wir uns, zu sagen, dass es Gesetze in der Natur gebe. Es giebt nur Nothwendigkeiten: da ist Keiner, der befiehlt, Keiner, der gehorcht, Keiner, der übertritt. Wenn ihr wisst, dass es keine Zwecke giebt, so wisst ihr auch, dass

⁷¹² 3.521.

⁷¹³ 9.643.

⁷¹⁴ 9.664.

⁷¹⁵ 3.544.

es keinen Zufall giebt: denn nur neben einer Welt von Zwecken hat das Wort „Zufall“ einen Sinn.⁷¹⁶

We read how Nietzsche excludes both the possibility of purposes in nature ('Zwecke') and their opposite: chance ('Zufall'). There are only necessities – meaning that this aphorism leaves no room for a clear-cut distinction between what is necessary and what is not. Again we need to ask: if everything is necessary, and if there is no fundamental distinction to be found in Nietzsche's analysis of nature between the necessary and the non-necessary, how should we understand the 'local' fatalism implied in *amor fati*? How should we, in short, make sense of *fatum*?

5.3.2.1 STERN'S ACCOUNT: LOVE OF THE NECESSITY TO ERR

The recent article by Tom Stern can shed some light on the matter. His suggestion is not to take the mentioning of necessity as a characteristic of nature, the world, or a totality. Instead, the 'Nothwendigkeit' mentioned is one related to *us*, to what *we* need. '[We] find, in *The Gay Science*, plenty of discussion of what is necessary *for us*. [...] In fact, they are surprising and completely general claims about what all humans must do, if they are to survive at all. The basic message is: if we are to survive, we must use our cognitive abilities; but our cognitive abilities are necessarily entwined with error. Living means thinking, thinking means erring.'⁷¹⁷ The necessity to be loved is therefore described as follows: 'The point is, as we know, a very familiar one from *the Gay Science*: to be alive, we have to think; but to think is to err – and we don't get any choice about that. [...] Taking this 'muss' seriously, my suggestion is that loving what's necessary for us means loving that we get it wrong – that we misrepresent, simplify and misconstrue.'⁷¹⁸

Our lives are deeply and necessarily bound up with error; this erring is an inevitable necessity; therefore, to love fate is to love to err. It is not surprising, then, to see Stern focusing strongly on the aesthetic elements within Nietzsche's thought: 'What he recommends is the artistic appropriation of these errors at a second-order level – to make these errors beautiful.'⁷¹⁹ The artistic appropriation of the errors has to take place on a 'second-order level' because it is not the errors themselves that are the object of love; rather, it is *the fact that we cannot avoid making errors that is our fate*. Since we have to make errors, let's do so in a loving, beautifying way; so Stern proposes.

On the one hand, Stern's case could have been made stronger if he had included the *Nachlass* in his research. We have already come across the following note, which encourages us to love our making errors, precisely as Stern suggests:

⁷¹⁶ 3.468.

⁷¹⁷ Stern, T. (2013), 153.

⁷¹⁸ Stern, T. (2013), 155.

⁷¹⁹ Stern, T. (2013), 157.

NL 11[162] [...] Leben ist die Bedingung des Erkennens. Irren die Bedingung des Lebens und zwar im tiefsten Grunde Irren. Wissen um das Irren hebt es nicht auf! Das ist nichts Bitteres!

Wir müssen das Irren lieben und pflegen, es ist der Mutterschooß des Erkennens. [...]

Um des Erkennens willen das Leben lieben und fördern, um des Lebens willen das Irren Wähnen lieben und fördern. Dem Dasein eine ästhetische Bedeutung geben, *unseren Geschmack an ihm mehren*, ist Grundbedingung aller Leidenschaft der Erkenntniß.⁷²⁰

On the other hand, if Stern had included this *Nachlass* text, he would have come to a slightly different conclusion. This text indeed tells us to love the erring; but not because, as Stern argues, it is the only way in which to use our cognitive abilities, and hence to survive – rather, because it is the condition for life and life is the condition for knowledge. Erring is a necessity: yet, not just in order to live, but in order to *learn*. The importance of knowledge is underestimated in Stern’s article. Stern himself seems to acknowledge this imperfection, since he finishes his article as follows: ‘But the sentiment remains: this is not a love of *necessity* at all, but rather a love of an artistic representation of one particular necessity, beautified by manipulation. We originally asked [...] why we should prefer *amor fati* to wishful thinking; what we have here looks like wishful thinking after all.’⁷²¹

In other words, Stern’s contribution to the debate is valuable for redirecting the focus of *fatum* to us and our needs, away from the metaphysical structure of the universe. But the weakness of his analysis is that he takes *fatum* to be connected with our erring only, neglecting the importance and problematic nature of knowledge for Nietzsche in this phase. The outcome of his proposal would be that Nietzsche wishes for himself to only learn to err as beautifully as possible (a kind of ‘wishful thinking’ indeed) – an outcome that hardly reflects what Nietzsche has in mind, given his attempt to endure the battle within himself, as a thinker, between the life-saving errors and the passion for truth.

However, this is not the only weakness of Stern’s account. In order to really grasp the meaning of *amor fati*, it is of great importance to include in the discussion all references to *amor fati* made in this period. Below the other two passages containing an explicit reference in full again, after which I will list three more weaknesses in Stern’s approach.

NL 15[20] Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst! „Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“ – *amor fati* dies wäre meine Moral, thue ihm alles Gute an und hebe es über seine schreckliche Herkunft hinauf zu dir.⁷²²

NL 16[22] „Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist! Ja! Amor fati sei meine letzte Liebe!“ – Vielleicht treibst du es so weit: aber vorher wirst du erst noch der Liebhaber der Furien sein müssen: ich gestehe, mich würden die Schlangen irre

⁷²⁰ 9.504.

⁷²¹ Stern, T. (2013), 161.

⁷²² 9.643.

machen. – „Was weißt du von den Furien! Furien – das ist nur ein böses Wort für die Grazien.“ – Er ist toll! –⁷²³

To begin with, the last passage clearly pictures the love of fate as an immensely difficult task. In the dialogue constructed, the voice representing the wish to only love that which is necessary is told that he must be the lover of ‘the Furies’ first. And being their lover would mean to endure their maddening snakes. *FW* 276, too, pictures *amor fati* as something difficult: it is connected with something to be achieved in the future (‘ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!’); and moreover as something to be *learned* (‘Ich will immer mehr lernen...’). In Stern’s account, the difficulty of achieving *amor fati* seems to be overlooked. What is the difficulty in loving to err? Is it a matter of accepting the fact that we cannot escape our own errors? Why would Nietzsche compare that to the loving of ‘Furies’? Is the loving of errors not rather, as Stern himself seems to suggest, an easy way out – a kind of ‘wishful thinking’, that completely disregards the struggle related to being a thinker?

Secondly, Stern’s interpretation fits badly with the analysis of *amor* given in the previous sections. If *amor* is a sublimation of the drive for property, the urge to make something one’s own, and to aesthetically incorporate it – then it becomes utterly unclear how ‘the necessity to err’ can be seen as its object. How can we make sense of appropriating the necessity to err? A solution to this problem would be to focus on the errors themselves, instead of the second-order fact that we cannot live without them. This solution will be explored as the next possible interpretation of *amor fati*, below.

But before that a third, related, objection to Stern’s account needs to be raised. If the necessity to be loved is the inevitability of erring, then how can we explain the expression in *FW* 276 ‘Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen’? *FW* 276 speaks about the necessity ‘of things’, implying that the necessity to be loved is one that is somehow attached to ‘things’. To understand the necessity to err as one that can be discovered ‘in things’ seems unlikely.

5.3.2.2 LOVE OF ERRORS

The second possible way to understand *fatum*, therefore, would be to shift from the second-order level to the first-order, and to see what happens if we would understand *fatum* as the errors themselves. In that interpretation, loving fate would be something like: learning more and more to see the necessity of things – thus, the necessary but erroneous views on things – as beautiful. This interpretation would solve the last two problems detected in Stern’s analysis: we can give an explanation of *fatum* as mistaken views on the world being appropriated and aesthetically distorted, that is, as a clearly identifiable object of love; and we can explain now why Nietzsche speaks of ‘das Nothwendige an den Dingen’. Moreover, the following passage from the *Nachlass* seems to support this interpretation of fate:

NL 11[286] [...] *Gewohnheit und unbedingter Glaube*, daß es so sein muß wie es ist, ist Fundament alles Wachsthums und Starkwerdens. – Unsere ganze Weltbetrachtung ist

⁷²³ 9.664.

so entstanden, daß sie durch den *Erfolg* bewiesen wurde, wir können mit ihr *leben* (Glaube an Außendinge, Freiheit des Wollens). [...] Wenn wir alles *Nothwendige* in unserer jetzigen Denkweise feststellen, so haben wir nichts für das „Wahre an sich“ bewiesen, sondern nur „das Wahre für uns“ d.h. das Dasein-uns-Ermöglichende auf Grund der Erfahrung – und der Prozeß ist so alt, daß Umdenken unmöglich ist. Alles *a priori* gehört hierher.⁷²⁴

This passage explicitly connects the erroneous perspectives on the world with the ‘*Nothwendige*’ (its emphasis, importantly, being Nietzsche’s), unfolding once more how we depend on certain ways of viewing the world – namely: the mistaken view that there are ‘things outside of us’, ‘Außendinge’, and that there is ‘freedom of will’. Believing that there is truth in these erroneous concepts only shows that these are ‘true for us’, not that they are true ‘in themselves’; we have long denied any relation between the specific conditions of our existence and our perception of truth. Yet this perception forms the basis for all our growth and strength (‘*Gewohnheit und unbedingter Glaube, daß es so sein muß wie es ist, ist Fundament alles Wachstums und Starkwerdens*’). It is the condition for our existence based on experience, comprising all ‘a priori’ thinking. ‘Umdenken’ is impossible, says Nietzsche here, it would go against the most fundamental conditions of our living.

So, *loving* these necessary yet mistaken perspectives on life, not only believing in them as if they could not have been different, as formulated here, but also *incorporating* them through a further aesthetic adaptation to our taste – yes, that would make us stronger. It would explain why Nietzsche speaks about *amor fati* as the thought that gives him ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit’ in *FW* 276, against the danger of allowing the life-threatening desire of knowledge to play its conflicting part. But it would also suggest that *amor fati* opposes the project of unmasking our ‘Weltbetrachtung’ as illusionary and only successful because it enables us to live, and of developing new perspectives, even if they initially resist our organismic constitution. Given the number of passages on this project, it does not seem plausible that Nietzsche gives up his ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ for this interpretation of *amor fati*.

Let me formulate a related difficulty, comparable to what we perceived in Stern’s interpretation: it cannot account for the difficulty involved in loving fate. Again we face the problem of interpreting the sentence ‘vorher wirst du erst noch der Liebhaber der Furien sein müssen’: what aspect of loving mistaken views can be so horrific that it is comparable to the loving of ‘Furien’? Loving the erroneous view of things being necessary is something we would do naturally, it seems – so why make a mission of it? This question becomes even more pressing if we recognize that the mistaken views to be loved have been developed and appropriated during the last centuries. What would be the merit of beginning to love something that has been ours for so long? And what is the point of aesthetically distorting these views, if they are mistaken to begin with?

We have now discussed two possible interpretations of *amor fati*, both of which take the necessity of erring as their starting point. Their main problem is that the aesthetic aspect acquires too much attention at the expense of the desire for (new) knowledge. Since it is only the erroneous perspectives that are loved, we are strongly reminded of the dreamers of *FW* 59:

⁷²⁴ 9.551.

‘Wenn wir ein Weib lieben, so haben wir leicht einen Hass auf die Natur [...]. Da macht man die Ohren zu gegen alle Physiologie [...].’ In other words: the loving of our errors closes our eyes to ‘nature’ or ‘physiology’, which hardly represents Nietzsche’s project.

5.3.2.3 LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE

The third and fourth interpretation of *amor fati* I will consider now mirror the first and second. Instead of focusing on erring, they take ‘knowledge’ as their starting point. Since developing and incorporating newly developed insights in our lives is a difficult task, the idea is that this perspective might provide a solution for the main problems found in the first and second interpretation. I begin with the possibility of loving a first-order level of knowledge, that is: loving knowledge itself instead of the drive for knowledge (which will be explored fourthly).

We may, at this point, distinguish between three phases in the process of developing new knowledge in Nietzsche’s texts. The first is negative: it represents the attempt to rid the world of illusionary (metaphysical) presuppositions. This is the main aim of *MA I* Book 1 as we have seen, which may result in a nature that is ‘ganz entgöttlicht’, as articulated in *FW* 109.⁷²⁵ This phase fits Nietzsche’s understanding of ‘truth’ in the *Nachlass* passage above, where it is defined negatively in terms of the mistaken belief in ‘Außendinge’ and ‘Freiheit des Wollens’. This formulation is comparable to *FW* 110 in which the ‘irrhümliche Glaubenssätze’ are ‘dass es dauernde Dingen gebe, dass es gleiche Dinge gebe, dass es Dinge, Stoffe, Körper gebe, dass ein Ding Das sei, als was es erscheine’.⁷²⁶ Nietzsche always merely tentatively describes ‘die letzte Wahrheit’ as ‘Fluß der Dinge’ as a positive formulation of a negative result, rejecting substance, being and unity. Of particular importance is the realisation that what we have understood as ‘truth’ for so long merely fits our organismic constitution and has in this way guaranteed our survival.⁷²⁷

The second and third steps in the pursuit of knowledge may be connected to the two kinds of love distinguished earlier. The first follows from the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ and represents the painful desire to explore new perspectives, especially those that are unfitting to our organismic constitution; all our ‘Triebe’, including the negative, have to be engaged in this endeavour (as *FW* 333 made clear, see 5.2.2 and 4.3). The knowledge in this stage is the object of desire, and is still out of reach. We may connect this stage to what we read in *FW* 334: it requires the exercise of patience and good will before we can see the beauty of what is still unfamiliar. In the third stage, in which love is directed not at a desired object, but rather at something we possess (it is ‘Empfindung für das Eigenthum’⁷²⁸), some form of knowledge has been attained. At this stage it is necessary to familiarize it to the fullest until it is ‘einverleibt’.

⁷²⁵ *FW* 109 3.469: ‘Wann werden wir die Natur ganz entgöttlicht haben! Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu *vernaturlichen*!’

⁷²⁶ 3.469.

⁷²⁷ *NL* 11[162] 9.504. We are also reminded of the different levels of errors that we see Nietzsche distinguishing in the following passage: *NL* 11[156] 9.501-2: ‘Die Gattung ist der gröbere Irrthum, das Individuum der feinere Irrthum, es kommt *später*. [...] So lernt es: wie alle *genießende* Erkenntniß auf dem groben Irrthum der Gattung, den feineren Irrthümern des Individuums, und dem feinsten Irrthum des schöpferischen Augenblicks beruht.’

⁷²⁸ *NL* 11[134] 9.492.

We can connect it to *NL* 12[75] discussed above, in which love was defined as ‘die *aesthetische Seite* der Gerechtigkeit und Vernunft, ein Nebentrieb.’⁷²⁹

If we take the two last stages as guides for our next interpretation, *amor fati* can be understood first as the initial desire. In that case, *amor fati* closely resembles if not coincides with the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. ‘Leidenschaft’ would have to be the drive underlying *amor*, and *fatum* may be the term denoting ‘Erkenntnis’. At first sight it is not strange to equate *amor fati* with the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’: both notions play a central role in Nietzsche’s philosophy, signify an important passion, and are closely linked with the process of acquiring knowledge. What is more, this option seems to be confirmed by the way Nietzsche writes about *amor fati* in the letter to F. Overbeck, dated June 5th 1882:

Übrigens bin ich von einer fatalistischen „Gottergebenheit“ – ich nenne es *amor fati* – dass ich einem Löwen in den Rachen laufen würde, geschweige denn – ⁷³⁰

This fragment is comparable with the *Nachlass* passage in which *amor fati* is associated with the love of ‘Furien’; here the danger is described as walking in a lion’s mouth. The love of fate is a ‘fatalistischen Gottergebenheit’, a kind of fatal yet ‘divine’ (the quotation marks are Nietzsche’s, as we have seen in chapter 1) devotion that provides him with the courage not only to walk into the mouth of a lion, but also... The sentence breaks off, but the suggestion ‘chase a horrific truth’ is not, I think, far from Nietzsche’s mind. *Amor fati* is thus possibly identified here with the will to truth, a kind of devotion that encourages the fated thinker to follow through his dangerous project. Clearly, this type of *amor fati* cannot be interpreted in terms of an agapic kind of love, as Han-Pile suggests. The connotation of the devotion as ‘divine’ should be taken with some irony, and it still seems to function like any erotic desire drawn to a certain object, even if it is a perilous one – initially.

On the other hand, *amor fati* is presented in *FW* 276 as a means to protect oneself from too much danger – and as we have seen, the danger at hand is caused precisely by the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. So if *amor fati* were the equivalent of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain why this would be the thought that offers ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit alles weiteren Lebens’ and constitutes a threat to life at the same time. Moreover, this interpretation of *amor fati* cannot explain the references to beauty in *FW* 276; after all, the focus should be on *knowledge*, which does not allow for a beautified version. Nor is it clear why this type of love should be learned, as it rather seems a spontaneous and inescapable force.

But *amor fati* can also be seen as that which helps to continue the process of acquiring knowledge, the third of the stages distinguished above. As such it is of assistance in slowly getting used to the strangeness of what has been judged ‘truth’ and adapting it, aesthetically, to our taste. In that way it could be the ‘Nebentrieb’ that accompanies and furthers the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’.

Yet, the first question that comes to mind when thinking through the idea of *fatum* as truth, in both accounts, is: what is the relation between ‘truth’ (or ‘Erkenntnis’) and ‘necessity’? Why

⁷²⁹ 9.589.

⁷³⁰ *KGB* III/1.199–200.

present the love of truth as the love of a *necessity*? Again we are confronted with the question we encountered earlier: since *FW* 109 precludes the use of any distinction between what is and is not necessary ('Es giebt nur Nothwendigkeiten'⁷³¹), what meaning of the 'necessary' do we have left? How to make the distinction between what is and is not necessary, and hence between what is and is not the object of love?

One possible solution for this problem might be found in *FW* 242, in which it is stated that the source of knowledge is never external. This solution can be applied only to *amor fati* seen in the second instance, namely as the drive to incorporate truth:

FW 242 *Suum cuique*. – Wie gross auch die Habsucht meiner Erkenntniss ist: ich kann aus den Dingen nichts Anderes herausnehmen, als was mir schon gehört, – das Besitzthum Anderer bleibt in den Dingen zurück. Wie ist es möglich dass ein Mensch Dieb oder Räuber sei!⁷³²

Learning, according to this aphorism, is to take 'from the things' that which already belongs to us – more is simply impossible, since 'the property of others' remains out of reach. This may again underscore the closeness, if not the inextricability, between what is considered 'truth' and the organismic dynamics informing this judgement.⁷³³ Knowledge is clearly approached in this context as something we already possess, and one could maintain that it is related to necessity as follows: what belongs to us is inevitable as a kind of 'fate' betraying the necessity of our own 'Physik'. One might argue therefore that there is a parallel between two sentences, one from *FW* 242, the other from *FW* 276:

FW 242 [...] ich kann aus den Dingen nichts Anderes herausnehmen, als was mir schon gehört⁷³⁴

FW 276 [...] Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen⁷³⁵

If there is nothing that can be taken from things other than that which already belongs to us, then it might be the case that 'das Nothwendige an den Dingen' must be seen as that which is necessarily ours already. The love of fate, seen from this perspective, means: the love of the knowledge of things, which we already and necessarily possess.

This interpretation underscores once again that the process of developing new perspectives on 'truth', the second of the three steps distinguished above, is full of danger: since what is regarded as 'truth' is dependent on one's 'Physik', adopting a different outlook on truth would be life-threatening. The expressions in the other *amor fati* passages can be accounted for in this way: both 15[20] 'Zuerst das Nöthige' and 16[22] '„Ja! Ich will nur das noch lieben, was nothwendig ist! [...]“' can be taken to mean that we should love the knowledge we own first, *before* returning to the second phase of acquiring new perspectives on 'truth'.

⁷³¹ 3.468.

⁷³² 3.514.

⁷³³ See also *FW* 307, discussed in the next section.

⁷³⁴ 3.514.

⁷³⁵ 3.521.

This analysis also fits within the description of love encountered earlier: ‘Liebe ist [...] Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit’.⁷³⁶ Loving fate would then be the exercise of possessing knowledge *in full*, and with joy instead of disgust or fear (since love promises to eventually change ‘Furien’ into ‘Grazien’ – which also provides the argument for seeing it as a difficult process that demands learning). Through the exercise of love, our knowledge becomes adapted to our physical and organic constitution. Moreover, the process of ‘Einverleibung’ does, as we have seen, make us stronger: instead of exposing ourselves to the danger of acquiring further outlooks, we are forced to focus on the knowledge we possess and to familiarize it. This way we can understand the thought of *amor fati* as offering ‘Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit’.

At the same time this analysis of *amor fati* reintroduces the idea of *fatum* as closely related to ourselves and our ‘Physik’. If the ‘truth’ to be loved after being aesthetically ‘einverleibt’ is one that is inextricably linked with our organismic constitution, then what we end up loving is not only this knowledge, but also ourselves. This insight introduces the fourth possible interpretation of *amor fati*, namely the love of the physical constitution underlying the knowledge to be loved; in Nietzsche’s case, not only the drives belonging to the second step which generate new insights, but also the painful but necessary presence of ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ which underpins the whole process.

5.3.2.4 LOVE OF THE ‘LEIDENSCHAFT DER ERKENNTNIS’

Several texts further support the idea of an intimate connection between a judgement concerning truth and falsehood and the drives. *FW* 307 reinforces the idea of a link between *FW* 242 and *FW* 276 discussed in the previous section. It explicitly states that there is nothing ‘Willkürliches und Unpersönliches’ in the exercise of criticism; rather, accepting something as true while rejecting what was previously ‘loved’ as a truth is ‘ein Beweis davon, dass lebendige treibende Kräfte in uns da sind’.

FW 307 *Zu Gunsten der Kritik*. – Jetzt erscheint dir Etwas als Irrthum, das du ehemals als eine Wahrheit oder Wahrscheinlichkeit geliebt hast: du stösst es von dir ab und wählst, dass deine Vernunft darin einen Sieg erfochten habe. Aber vielleicht war jener Irrthum damals, als du noch ein Anderer warst – du bist immer ein Anderer –, dir ebenso nothwendig wie alle deine jetzigen „Wahrheiten“, gleichsam als eine Haut, die dir Vieles verhehlte und verhüllte, was du noch nicht sehen durftest. [...] Wenn wir Kritik üben, so ist es nichts Willkürliches und Unpersönliches, – es ist, wenigstens sehr oft, ein Beweis davon, dass lebendige treibende Kräfte in uns da sind, welche eine Rinde abstossen.⁷³⁷

The idea of an ‘Irrthum’ which was previously ‘geliebt’ ‘als eine Wahrheit oder Wahrscheinlichkeit’ is significant: it confirms the idea of the possibility of love directed at a form of truth or knowledge as presented in the previous section. On the other hand, it is the necessity of being this way and no other that renders this judgement necessary (‘jener Irrthum

⁷³⁶ *NL* 12[75] 9.589.

⁷³⁷ 3.544-5.

[war] [...] dir ebenso nothwendig wie alle deine jetzigen „Wahrheiten“). *Amor fati* seen in this light might thus also concern the necessity of the ‘lebendige treibende Kräfte in uns’.

Other texts have been discussed which underscore the intimate connection between scientific judgements and the underlying drives. In section 5.2.1 Nietzsche’s extraordinary position was explained, as he understands himself as the first to realise that the pursuit of truth amounts to the exercise of one’s ‘Triebe’. We saw then that this exercise inevitably leads to an increase at least in knowledge about *them* (as there is only limited hope for any other kind of knowledge):

M 483 [...] Niemals aus anderen, als aus *diesen* Augen in die Dinge sehen können? [...] Was wird am Ende aller ihrer Erkenntniss die Menschheit erkannt haben? – ihre Organe!⁷³⁸

This insight explicitly redirects the knowledge acquired in the three steps discussed in the previous section to the organismic constitution informing it, claiming that the only possible object of knowledge is our ‘Organe’.

This text can thus be taken as a strong suggestion that these ‘Organe’ may be the intended object of *amor*. Nothing of the knowledge we have gathered so far reveals anything of ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ itself (nor is it the result of a rational exercise of ‘Vernunft’, as stated in *FW* 307).⁷³⁹ It is insightful only with respect to the way in which our judgements originate, necessarily, from our bodily constitution. This implies that the whole procedure is governed by a form of self-reference: the knowledge resulting from the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ discloses nothing but itself and its organismic workings.⁷⁴⁰ The fourth option of *amor fati* thus mirrors the first in this way: it interprets *fatum* as the second-order necessary drive to truth, that is, the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. It aims, in other words, to love not just any outcome of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’, but specifically that of the drive itself, with the self-referential complexity involved in its process.

The most apparent advantage of this approach is that the possibility of fate denoting Nietzsche’s physical constitution is confirmed in the acclamation we have encountered before:

14.268 In meiner Seele ist ein düsterer und leidenschaftlicher Hang für das Wahre. Ach, ich habe oft die Erholung so nöthig! [...] Aber ein unüberwindlicher Zug treibt mich, und ich folge, oft wie geschlagen. Ich sehe das Schönste oft mit einem grimmigen Rückblick und bin ihm böse wie einem Verführer: und meine Redlichkeit peinigt mich wegen dieser Art von Rache. „Schicksal, ich folge dir“ und wollte ich nicht, ich würde es müssen unter Schlägen seufzend. Das rührt mich zu Thränen.

⁷³⁸ 3.287.

⁷³⁹ This follows directly from what we have seen in *WL* 1 (‘die Wahrheit sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind’), discussed in 3.2.2.

⁷⁴⁰ Which may explain why *FW* 335 3.560-4, ‘*Hoch die Physik!*’ opens with a remark on self-knowledge, claiming that all ‘Nierenprüfer’ know that ‘,Jeder ist sich selber der fernste‘. Nevertheless, later in the aphorism it is argued that we have to become ‘die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt’, which means that we have to be ‘*Physiker*’. Yet we know now that being ‘*Physiker*’ does not reveal anything new about the world, and all the more about our ‘Nieren’.

This remark reveals how Nietzsche sees the painful drive for truth as a kind of ‘fate’, a ‘Schicksal’. The necessity that becomes apparent in the ‘Zug’, and in ‘ich würde es müssen’, is represented in *FW* 309 – the aphorism of which the statement above is a ‘Vorstufe’.

FW 309 [...] Ich muss den Fuss weiter heben, diesen müden, verwundeten Fuss: und weil ich muss, so habe ich oft für das Schönste, das mich nicht halten konnte, einen grimmigen Rückblick, — weil es mich nicht halten konnte!⁷⁴¹

Even though the things Nietzsche encounters in his unstoppable search for truth are ‘das Schönste’, the ‘Hang für das Wahre’ prevents him from stopping and resting there. He ‘must’ lift his foot for another step, even if it is tired and hurt. The reaction of frustration is understandable: we have seen how beauty is the ultimate way to escape from the threat of the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. But since the drive will not accept anything short of truth (‘Dieser Hang und Drang zum Wahren, Wirklichen, Un-Scheinbaren, Gewissen’), the possibility of stopping and resting is excluded. The drive to continue is an inescapable yet painful fate.

This option of equating *fatum* with this ‘Schicksal’ thus reveals a picture of *amor fati* as the wish to fully appropriate the fact that a necessary drive within, a drive that opposes other drives, a drive to know, has become dominant in our organismic constitution. This image fits within the pattern of several other aphorisms as well. To begin with, it explains the very first line of *FW* 276: ‘Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, denn ich muss noch denken.’ This connection between life and thinking might well be an indication that, given Nietzsche’s ‘Physik’, it is impossible for him *not* to think when he is alive. Thinking, in other words, is his fate.⁷⁴² But it is also compatible with *FW* 110, which contains a definition of a thinker in organismic terms.

FW 110 [...] der Denker: das ist jetzt das Wesen, in dem der Trieb zur Wahrheit und jene lebenerhaltenden Irrthümer ihren ersten Kampf kämpfen, nachdem auch der Trieb zur Wahrheit sich als eine lebenerhaltende Trieb *bewiesen* hat.⁷⁴³

The fact that Nietzsche finds himself to be alive still in the opening of *FW* Book IV is evidence of the fact that, in him, the ‘Trieb zur Wahrheit’ has become a ‘lebenerhaltende Trieb’. For a long period this ‘Trieb’ has been very weak, because it appeared ‘dass man mit ihr nicht zu leben vermöge’; ‘unser Organismus war auf ihrer Gegensatz eingerichtet’.⁷⁴⁴ Again, we may see it as Nietzsche’s fate to be the first organism in which this drive for knowledge has not been the cause of death. His fate is determined by this drive.

Moreover, this account fits well with the idea of love being directed at a form of self-cultivation. As we have seen in both sections on love, 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2, the practices of love as

⁷⁴¹ 3.546.

⁷⁴² As is Brusotti, M. (1997)’s point when he says, referring to the motto of Book IV: ‘Das Denken ist für ihn diesem „liebvollsten Muss“ geworden, und der *amor fati* ist die Liebe zu allem Notwendigen’. 449. One of the sentences of the motto is the following: ‘Frei im liebvollsten Muss’; 3.521. Immediately after the motto we read the opening lines of *FW* 276: ‘Noch lebe ich, noch denke ich: ich muss noch leben, den ich muss noch denken.’

⁷⁴³ 3.471.

⁷⁴⁴ 3.471.

developed in the cluster of aphorisms *FW* 299, 334, 335, and 341 all point to a certain attitude towards oneself. *FW* 334 finishes with a remark on the love of the self; the opening of *FW* 335 mentions self-knowledge, suggesting that the two are related (which they clearly are in this account). *FW* 299, on the beautifying strategies, claims it is wisest to apply these to the ‘Kleinsten und Alltäglichen zuerst’ (which reminds us of the remark in *NL* 15[20] ‘Zuerst das Nöthige’⁷⁴⁵), in order to in this way become ‘Dichter unseres Lebens’.⁷⁴⁶ *FW* 341 contains the famous ideal of being ‘gut’ with ‘dir selber und dem Leben’. *FW* 290, discussed in 1.2.4, claims that one thing is needful, namely that ‘der Mensch seine Zufriedenheit mit sich *erreiche*’.⁷⁴⁷ Even *FW* 14, the aphorism in which love and greed are claimed to be the same drive named twice, contains a remark on the love of oneself.

FW 14 *Was Alles Liebe genannt wird.* – [...] Wir werden des Alten, sicher Besessenen allmählich überdrüssig und strecken die Hände wieder aus [...]. Unsere Lust an uns selber will sich so aufrecht erhalten, dass sie immer wieder etwas Neues *in uns selber* verwandelt, – das eben heisst Besitzen. Eines Besitzes überdrüssig werden, das ist: unserer selber überdrüssig werden.⁷⁴⁸

Our property is part of who we are, it is suggested. If we become tired of our property, we become tired of ourselves. The importance of the reference to ‘ourselves’ as the object of greed (‘Lust an uns selber’), even if our desire seems fixated on something outside us, is that in loving ourselves we end up changing constantly, hungry for new possessions. The dynamics of constant alteration are described in further detail in *FW* 295, an aphorism that clearly belongs in the same group as those discussed before.

FW 295 *Kurze Gewohnheiten.* – Ich liebe die kurzen Gewohnheiten und halte sie für das unschätzbare Mittel, *viele* Sachen und Zustände kennen zu lernen [...]; meine Natur ist ganz für kurze Gewohnheiten eingerichtet [...]. Immer glaube ich, *diess* werde mich nun dauernd befriedigen – auch die kurze Gewohnheit hat jenen Glauben der Leidenschaft, den Glauben an die Ewigkeit – und ich sei zu beneiden, es gefunden und erkannt zu haben [...]. Und eines Tages hat es seine Zeit gehabt: die gute Sache scheidet von mir, nicht als Etwas, das mir nun Ekel einflösst – sondern friedlich und an mir gesättigt, wie ich an ihm, und wie als ob wir einander dankbar sein müssten und uns so die Hände zum Abschied reichen.⁷⁴⁹

In this aphorism Nietzsche claims that he loves ‘brief habits’; also (and in line with *FW* 14) that his nature is ‘suited’ for these habits: loving brief habits is the consequence of loving one’s nature as a thinker. The aphorism following *FW* 295 further explains that the nature of a ‘thinker’ is opposed to a ‘festen Ruf’ (‘Die Gesinnung des Erkennenden als im Widerspruch mit

⁷⁴⁵ *NL* 15[20] 9.643: ‘Zuerst das Nöthige – und dies so schön und vollkommen als du kannst! „Liebe das, was nothwendig ist“’.

⁷⁴⁶ This remark follows the observation in *FW* 299 3.538 that to give style to one’s character is ‘eine grosse und seltene Kunst! Sie übt Der, welcher Alles übersieht, was seine Natur an Kräften und Schwächen bietet, und es dann einem künstlerischen Plane einfügt’, thereby like in *FW* 335 suggesting that knowledge of oneself precedes aesthetic self-cultivation.

⁷⁴⁷ *FW* 290 3.531.

⁷⁴⁸ 3.386.

⁷⁴⁹ 3.535.

dem „festen Rufe“⁷⁵⁰); that is, to a calling that lasts for a lifetime.⁷⁵¹ This statement makes clear once more that what is at stake in this set of aphorisms is coming to terms with being a thinker. Reading the texts together as I propose suggests that loving oneself as a thinker means to be engaged in this circle of (self-)possession and (self-)satisfaction, which results in the constantly changing desire for new possessions, new habits, new perspectives, even those that are painful, as *FW* 309 made clear.

This picture can be understood perfectly, moreover, against the background of the *Nachlass* texts explored in the first sections of this chapter (see especially 5.2.2). The constant change of the thinker is identified as a ‘Kur des Einzelnen’ in *NL* 11[258]. The importance of science for the development of new individuals for the future of humanity, though not taken up literally in *FW*, clearly plays an important role in the development of Nietzsche’s thinking in the published texts.

NL 11[258] Zur „Kur des Einzelnen.“

- 1) er soll vom Nächsten und Kleinsten ausgehen und die ganze Abhängigkeit sich feststellen, in die hinein er geboren und erzogen ist
- 2) ebenso soll er den gewohnten Rhythmus seines Denkens und Fühlens, seine intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Ernährung begreifen
- 3) Dann soll er *Veränderung* aller Art versuchen, zunächst um die Gewohnheiten zu brechen (vielen Diätwechsel, mit feinsten Beobachtung)
- 4) er soll sich geistig an seine Widersacher einmal anlehnen, er soll ihre Nahrung zu essen versuchen. Er soll *reisen*, in jedem Sinne. In dieser Zeit wird er „unstät und flüchtig“ sein.
Von Zeit zu Zeit soll er über seinen Erlebnissen *ruhen* – und verdauen.
- 5) Dann kommt das Höhere: der Versuch, ein Ideal zu *dichten*. Dies geht dem noch Höheren voraus – eben dies Ideal zu leben.
- 6) Er muß durch eine Reihe von Idealen hindurch.⁷⁵²

The first step, the determination of ‘die ganze Abhängigkeit’ in which one is ‘geboren und erzogen’, may be understood now as being parallel to the first of the three steps of scientific endeavour as explained in the previous section. The ‘Abhängigkeiten’ may then be identified as those perspectives that ensure the survival of the individual (who used to be part of a greater ‘Gattung’, as we have seen in 5.2.1), even though we know now that they are ‘Irrthümer’. *NL* 11[286] confirms how we are born and raised within the realm of these perspectives: ‘Wenn wir alles *Nothwendige* in unserer jetzigen Denkweise feststellen, so haben wir nichts für das „Wahre an sich“ bewiesen, sondern nur „das Wahre für uns“ d.h. das Dasein-uns-Ermöglichende auf Grund der Erfahrung.’⁷⁵³ The second of the six steps of the ‘Kur’ continues this line, suggesting that ‘sich feststellen’ and ‘begreifen’ also comprises ‘den gewohnten

⁷⁵⁰ *FW* 296 3.537.

⁷⁵¹ This is not to say, though, that the thinker does not hope for his newly found habit to last an eternity: ‘auch die kurze Gewohnheit hat jenen Glauben der Leidenschaft, den Glauben an die Ewigkeit’. We may therefore suspect that the question of the demon in *FW* 341 concerns this kind of love rather than the doctrine of a world returning in eternally identical circles. This may be seen as yet another argument against the idea that the eternal return belongs to the domain of ‘physics’, as I argued in 2.2.

⁷⁵² 9.539.

⁷⁵³ 9.551

Rhythmus seines Denkens und Fühlens, seine intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Ernährung'. The importance of these steps is again the self-referential character of the investigation of all our presuppositions concerning truth; as we have seen already in chapter 4, this whole procedure culminates in a deepened awareness and understanding of one's own 'Physik', framed in terms of metabolism.⁷⁵⁴

In order, then, to increase the number of perspectives through the enhancement of all our drives (the second step of the three distinguished in 5.3.2.3), one has to undergo 'Veränderung aller Art', break with 'Gewohnheiten', and accept 'vielen Diätwechsel'. Connecting this passage with *FW* 296 suggests that this constant change of 'Gewohnheiten' is typical for a thinker; *FW* 14 suggests that it is the consequence of the love of oneself that we may now come to see as the effect of the full 'Einverleibung' of the 'possession' that one is to oneself at this point. This means that the dangerous phase of opening up life-threatening perspectives is the consequence of being a thinker, but may at the same time be the consequence of the effect of self-satisfaction and self-love. The danger of this phase is characterised once again in terms of diet: 'er soll sich geistig an seine Widersacher einmal anlehnen, er soll ihre Nahrung zu essen versuchen'. We may recall *FW* 334's observations on love, in which the practices of good will and patience are recommended in order to change something strange into something familiar. But an important part of the attempt to absorb new perspectives is 'ruhen – und verdauen'. This can be connected to the third of the three phases explored in the previous section, in which the gained insights are fully appropriated; we are reminded in this stage of *NL* 12[75], in which love was defined as the 'Freude an der Sache, Lust an ihrem Besitz, Begierde sie ganz zu besitzen und in ihrer ganzen Schönheit'.⁷⁵⁵

This whole procedure (of which the final steps are the creation and adoption of ideals) must be understood against the background of Nietzsche's intricate reflection on the relation between science and the enhancement of humanity. It is not difficult to see at this point how the three stages may form a cyclical process, changing not only the perspectives of the subject in a constant movement, but also changing its inner constitution. In this way, the individual thinker may end up being one of those *Versuchs-Individuen* who, by engaging in this process, may stand at the beginning of a new species. After all, we have seen how in *NL* 11[290] it is claimed that the 'letzte Nutzen der Erkenntniß und Wissenschaft ist, die Loslösung neuer Eier vom Eierstocke zu ermöglichen und immer neue Arten entstehen zu lassen'; and this is the case, because 'die Wissenschaft bringt die Kenntnisse der Erhaltungsmittel für neue Individuen. – Ohne Fortschritte der Erkenntniß würden neue Individuen immer schnell zu

⁷⁵⁴ In line with *FW* 59 3.423, in which it was stated that the love of one's 'Physik' is rejected out of the sentiment '„ich will davon, dass der Mensch noch etwas Anderes ist, ausser Seele und Form, Nichts hören!“, we can find in *NL* 14[18] 9.627-8 another example of fate being a necessary part of our organismic constitution that we have neglected because it was considered too 'plain': 'Es ist eine Haupterkenntniß, daß bei der Werthschätzung aller Dinge der Mensch allem *Gewöhnlichen* und noch mehr allem schlechthin *Unentbehrlichen* einen niederen Werth gab. Das Gewöhnliche war dem Ungemeinen entgegengesetzt, als das „Gemeine“ --: das Unentbehrliche als ein Zwang dem, was der freie Mensch sich willkürlich verschaffen kann oder nicht kann, dem Überflüssigen, Luxushaften des Lebens. So wurde alles, was *nöthig* ist und alles, was *üblich* ist, zum Geringen: alles Fatum wurde Gemeinheit.' This remark can be seen as in line with what we have seen in section 4.3 on the 'nearest things' having gained new 'Zauber und Flaum': what was considered uninteresting now reveals itself as carrying great significance: we understand ourselves better.

⁷⁵⁵ 9.589.

Grunde gehen, die Existenzbedingungen wären zu schwer und zufällig.⁷⁵⁶ We are now in the position to fully grasp the implications of this statement: only a thinker, in whom the drive for truth has become 'lebenserhaltend', can experiment with different perspectives without perishing, and slowly change its inner organismic constitution, and the belonging 'Existenzbedingungen' in this way.

What, then, is *amor fati*? *Amor fati* seen from this angle constitutes the love of the fated being that one is, namely a *thinker*. To love being a thinker begins with being grateful for being alive still, as we can read in the opening of *FW* 276; being a thinker, after all, means being endowed with a life-threatening drive to truth (hence the 'schreckliche Herkunft' in *NL* 15[20] and the 'Furien' in *NL* 16[22]). But now that the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' is understood as the drive that reveals its very own organismic workings and nothing else, the love of this drive means the full incorporation of it in one's physical constitution. The result of this love is not static. Rather, it finds its expression in the cyclical exercise of the 'brief habits' as we read in *FW* 295, the constant search for new perspectives, and the time needed to incorporate them fully ('verdauen'). Once these phases are completed, the desire for new properties and new perspectives presents itself again (*FW* 14). *Amor fati* can be seen as the 'Grund, Bürgschaft und Süßigkeit alles weiteren Lebens', because it provides Nietzsche with the security of not perishing in an untimely manner, while at the same time giving him direction and purpose. Loving oneself as a thinker in this way might be the first step in the direction of a new future for humanity.

We therefore have to understand the 'Kur' of *NL* 11[258] not in the traditional sense of a therapy. Rather, it is a way of being that enables the individual to be a thinker without perishing, while at the same time providing the prospect of a future for the human species. As a consequence, loving the fated inner constitution results not in the acceptance of something unchangeable; instead, it sets in motion a cyclical process opening up new possibilities. As *FW* 319 formulates it: 'Aber wir, [...] Vernunft-Durstigen, [...] wollen unsere Experimente und Versuchs-Thiere sein.'⁷⁵⁷

5.4 'WEGSEHEN' VERSUS STOICALLY 'NEIN-SAGEN'

Thus far, four possibilities of *amor fati* are explored, all with their individual advantages and weaknesses. All share at least one advantage, inspired by Stern and Chouraqui, namely that of accounting for the 'locality' of fate. None contains a reference to metaphysical cosmology. The main imperfection of the first two, their inability to account for the difficulty of loving fate, which is related to their focus on merely error and art and their neglect of the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis', is solved in the third and fourth interpretation. Taken together these may form an interesting and convincing account of *amor fati* as developed in 1881.

Now that we have developed a more detailed account of what *amor fati* could mean to Nietzsche in 1881, it is time to return to the original question: to what extent can we say that the introduction of *amor fati* is influenced by Stoicism? Understanding *amor fati* in terms of

⁷⁵⁶ 9.552.

⁷⁵⁷ *FW* 319 3.551.

Nietzsche's organismic narrative as attempted in the previous sections shows how *amor fati* cannot be Stoic in several respects. First, we have seen that *amor fati* falls short of total affirmation in the texts of 1881, and that love is associated with 'Habsucht', nourishment, and incorporation ('Einverleibung'). The accusation in *FW* 306 that a Stoic 'trains himself to swallow stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea' points out that the Stoic strategy is opposite to *amor fati*. We may even suspect that the idea of a careful exercise regarding what to incorporate and what not in the process of becoming a new individual is developed precisely in the context of the increasing dissatisfaction with Stoic insensitivity and 'Versteinerung'; after all, we have seen in section 4.3 how sensitivity is indispensable in this process. If we accept this line of reasoning, we must conclude that *amor fati* should be considered not just non-Stoic but even anti-Stoic; it may be developed as a strategy for 'knowers' to protect themselves from the effects of Stoicism.

Secondly, we can formulate more clearly at this stage why the reference to Cleanthes' Hymn in 14.268 should not be taken to be an indication that Nietzsche implements Stoicism, or that Stoicism is a serious inspiration for *amor fati*. When mentioning the passage of 14.268 Brusotti is right to refer to *M* 195, in which a part of Cleanthes' Hymn is cited explicitly.

M 195 [...] Zu entdecken, dass unser Leben der Erkenntniss *geweiht* ist; dass wir es wegwerfen würden, nein! dass wir es weggeworfen hätten, wenn nicht diese Weihe es vor uns selber schützte; jenen Vers sich oft und mit Erschütterung vorsprechen:

„Schicksal, ich *folge* dir! Und wollt' ich nicht, / ich *müsst'* es doch und unter Seufzen thun!“⁷⁵⁸

Brusotti's comment on this text is that Nietzsche changes 'die stoische Fügung in das Schicksal in einen leidenschaftlichen und aufopferungsbereiten Fatalismus, der die dominierende Leidenschaft selbst als ein über ihm waltendes Schicksal empfindet. [...] Nietzsche, der sich diesen „Vers“ „oft und mit Erschütterung“ vorspricht, ist jemand, dessen „Leben der Erkenntnis *geweiht* ist“ und der nur wegen dieser „Weihe“ (ebd.) vom Selbstmord absieht. Die Leidenschaft selbst ist zu seinem Schicksal geworden’.⁷⁵⁹ This interpretation is in agreement,

⁷⁵⁸ 3.168. Brusotti, M. (1997) reemphasises the tragic character of the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' by pointing out that danger is present either way. On the one hand, the drive to knowledge is life-threatening as we have seen. On the other, the option of living a life without this drive is so unattractive that 'wir es wegwerfen würden, nein! dass wir es weggeworfen hätten'. Nietzsche thereby seems to anticipate *FW* 324 3.552, in which 'der grosse Befreier' is presented as 'jener Gedanke, dass das Leben ein Experiment des Erkennenden sein dürfe'. We may even suspect that he anticipates *amor fati* as understood in the previous section.

⁷⁵⁹ Brusotti, M. (1997), 207-8. 208 ft. 394 indicates moreover that *M* 195 does not mention the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' explicitly, but 'wenn Nietzsche sich 1880 Kleanthes' Verse zum ersten Mal notiert, kennzeichnet er sie als Ausdruck seines „düstere[n] und leidenschaftliche[n] Hang[s] für das Wahre“ (KSA 14, S. 268).' The suggestion that follows, namely that the 'Herausgeber der KSA' may have been mistaken in their assumption that 14.268 belongs to *FW* 309 (as it would make more sense to see it connected to *M* 195) does not seem farfetched, therefore. Moreover, Brusotti, M. (1997), 207, compares this Nietzschean way of adopting and changing the Cleanthes' hymn to what we have seen earlier in relation to the Stoic expression 'was liegt an mir?': 'Und nicht nur im Fall des Wahlspruchs „was liegt an mir!“ wird so aus der stoischen Fügung in die *heimarmene* leidenschaftliche Tapferkeit. Auf ähnliche Weise eignet sich Nietzsche auch einige Verse aus dem Hymnus auf Zeus von Kleanthes an'.

therefore, with the suggestion developed above that *amor fati* has the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ as its proper object.⁷⁶⁰

M 195 is thus recognised as an early version of *amor fati*⁷⁶¹, but it is denied that there is an actual form of Stoicism involved: ‘Diese fatalistische Ergebung in eine Leidenschaft ist nur scheinbar stoisch.’⁷⁶² We are in the right position now to see why. Chapter 1 and 2 show that this interpretation of ‘Schicksal’ is completely different from the Stoic, all-encompassing one. What is more, keeping in mind the fact that for the Stoics ‘fate’ should be seen as rational and devoid of any kind of sentiment, the idea of a ‘Leidenschaft’ being a ‘Schicksal’ goes beyond any possible kind of Stoic philosophy. Chapter 4, moreover, reveals that the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ involves a great amount of danger, not least because it requires the conscious and heroic infliction of pain, elements which we have seen Nietzsche describing as utterly un-Stoic.

Thirdly, the account of *amor fati* just offered pays only little attention to the final sentences of *FW* 276: ‘Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen. Wegsehen sei meine einzige Verneinung! Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein!’⁷⁶³ Although we have seen in chapter 1 that the allowance of ‘wegsehen’ still present in 1881 disappears in the later *amor fati* passages, we have not yet addressed the question of what ‘Ja-sagen’ entails. We know how *FW* 276 has a significantly future-oriented atmosphere, different from all other *amor fati* texts. Yet if Nietzsche envisions himself being ‘irgendwann’ ‘nur noch ein Ja-sager’, how does this relate to his dismissal of the Stoic attitude of full incorporation? The Stoics seem to possess exactly the attitude Nietzsche hopes for himself to achieve one day; how to explain why the Stoic attitude is not presented as Nietzsche’s ideal?

As a final argument why *amor fati* cannot be Stoic, I will point out how ‘wegsehen’ should be analysed in opposition to the ‘Krieg gegen das Hässliche’, to ‘anklagen’, which includes ‘die Ankläger anklagen’. Even if ‘wegsehen’ is presented in *FW* 276 as a form of ‘Verneinung’, it is clear that *FW* distinguishes between several forms of ‘Verneinung’. Moreover, the Stoic attitude of attempting to incorporate even dangerous objects such as stones, worms, glass shards and scorpions, cannot be simply equated with ‘Ja-sagen’. In their ‘training’ (‘Der Stoiker [...] übt sich’) they ascetically deny themselves the satisfaction of certain drives, if only the desire for incorporating other, more desirable objects. With this in mind I shall argue in line with sections 3.3 and 3.4 that Nietzsche’s analysis of asceticism, which is associated with both ‘Ja-’ and ‘Nein-sagen’, reveals how he comes to understand Stoic asceticism as the kind of ‘Nein-sagen’ that he wishes to distance himself from.

⁷⁶⁰ Moreover, as Brusotti, M. (1997), 208 ft. 394 again rightly points out, *M* 270 3.212 provides further proof for seeing the ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’ as ‘Schicksal’, as it describes the ‘gierige Sehnsucht der Erkenntniss’ as ‘ein Gesetz über [ihm] waltend’.

⁷⁶¹ Brusotti, M. (1997), 455, referring to *M* 195: ‘Der *amor fati* entwickelt sich aus dem Fatalismus des leidenschaftlich Erkennenden, wie ihn *Morgenröthe* beschrieben hat.’

⁷⁶² Brusotti, M. (1997), 455 ft. 139.

⁷⁶³ 3.521.

5.4.1 ASCETICISM

According to the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* article on ‘Askese’, Nietzsche’s texts reveal a distinction between two kinds of asceticism. The first, a positive kind, is empowering (‘solche Askese ist nicht daseinsfeindlich oder widernatürlich, sondern eine Prozedur, um sich (oder den eigenen Willen) zu stärken’), the second results in a weakening of life forces (‘die Entwertung des Lebens, der Instinkte und des Leibes aus der Sicht des höheren Ideals’⁷⁶⁴). In section 3.3, on Nietzsche’s early appreciative remarks on Stoicism, we already encountered such a distinction. In that section it was argued that Nietzsche distances himself from Dühring’s conclusion that the Stoic ‘Triumph über Empfindung und Affekt’ leads to an unwelcome kind of asceticism; according to Nietzsche, Dühring overlooked the ‘allgemein helfenden und für Alle wirksamen Pathos des Asketenthums.’⁷⁶⁵ On the other hand we noticed how already in these texts the connection was made between a weakening kind of asceticism and ‘Rache’:

NL 9[1] [...] Hat jemand genug an sich gelitten, sich selbst genug verletzt, in Sündhaftigkeit – so beginnt er gegen sich das Gefühl der Rache zu spüren: seine eindringende Selbstbetrachtung und deren Resultat Selbstverachtung ist das Resultat. Bei manchen Menschen selbst *Askese*, das heißt *Rache an sich* in Thätlichkeit des Widerwillens und Hasses.⁷⁶⁶

Although the earlier texts by Nietzsche do not yet disclose the possibility of an explicit connection between Stoicism and this analysis of asceticism as ‘Rache’, we have seen in section 3.2.1 that *FW* 359 does connect the two: only a man possessed by the ‘Wille zur Rache’ needs ‘das Bumbum von Gerechtigkeit, Weisheit, Heiligkeit, Tugend, immer den Stoicismus der Gebärde.’⁷⁶⁷ There are several more implicit textual indications in *FW* IV and related texts that proclaim an association between asceticism, revenge, and Stoicism.⁷⁶⁸ What is more, these texts must be read as negative examples of what Nietzsche envisions in *FW* 276.⁷⁶⁹ The ascetic ‘Nein-sagen’ associated with Stoicism should be interpreted as the opposite of the ideal of ‘Ja-sagen’, and significantly different from ‘wegsehen’.

The first textual clue that Nietzsche regards Stoicism as an unhealthy kind of asceticism is historically influenced.⁷⁷⁰ As Orsucci reveals, the works Nietzsche reads in 1880 impact his

⁷⁶⁴ *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch* (2004), 156.

⁷⁶⁵ 8.139.

⁷⁶⁶ 8.180.

⁷⁶⁷ *FW* 359 3.606.

⁷⁶⁸ One of those may be the following, even if it mentions neither Stoicism nor revenge: *M* 331 3.234: ‘Recht und Gränze. – Der Asketismus ist für Solche die rechte Denkweise, welche ihre sinnlichen Triebe ausrotten müssen, weil dieselben wüthende Raubthiere sind. Aber auch nur für Solche!’

⁷⁶⁹ And not only of *FW* 276, but also of several of the passages of the *Nachlass* on *amor fati*. *NL* 12[75] 9.589, for instance, seems to oppose the difficult love of the past, emphasised in *NL* 15[20], to a revengeful approach: ‘Gegen die Vergangenheit gerecht zu sein, sie wissen wollen, in aller Liebe! Hier wird unsere Vornehmheit auf die höchste Probe gestellt! Ich merke es, wer mit rachsüchtigem Herzen vom Christenthum redet – das ist gemein!’ Here the love of ‘Vergangenheit’, and the desire to get to know it, is opposed to a ‘rachsüchtigem Herzen’.

⁷⁷⁰ As can also be read in *Nietzsche Wörterbuch* (2004), 156: ‘Sie [die negativ bewertete Bedeutung für Askese] entstammt hauptsächlich der christlichen Tradition, z.T. aber auch der Stoa und dem Brahmanismus.’

understanding of early Christian asceticism. He follows Lecky and Hellwald⁷⁷¹ in their assumptions that Christian asceticism has oriental roots. We read for instance in a *Nachlass* note of spring 1880: ‘Europa hat einen Exceß von orientalischer Moralität in sich wuchern lassen, wie die *Juden* ihn ausgedacht und ausempfunden haben.’⁷⁷² The oriental and Semitic background in Christian asceticism is traced also to the Stoic forms of ‘Selbst-Tyrannei’, and already in the *Nachlass* of this same year we read ‘*Orient* [...] Stoicism ist semitisch’.⁷⁷³ The late *Nachlass* fragments contain the most explicit analyses of Stoicism in terms of ‘Semitic’ and ‘Arabic’ asceticism. An example:

NL 11[294] Insgleichen für den Stoicismus, der wesentlich das Werk von Semiten ist (– die „Würde“ als Strenge, Gesetz, die Tugend als Größe, Selbstverantwortung, Autorität, als höchste Personal-Souveränität – das ist semitisch: der Stoiker ist ein arabischer Sheik in griechische Windeln und Begriffe gewickelt.⁷⁷⁴

This type of asceticism is denoted by Nietzsche as a sick kind; the details of its ‘Entartung’ are worked out in detail in *GM* III (‘Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?’) and briefly touched upon in a *Nachlass* passage from spring/summer 1883:

NL 7[42] Das *Gute* zu betrachten, wie es als *Zeichen der Entartung* auftritt – als religiöser Wahnsinn z.B. als Philanthropie usw.: überall wo der gesunde Egoismus nachläßt und Apathie oder Ascese erstrebt werden. Der „Heilige“ als Ideal leiblicher Verkümmern, auch die ganze Brahman-Philosophie ein Zeichen der Entartung.⁷⁷⁵

This association of Stoicism as an oriental, Semitic and Arabic (influenced, one may suspect, by ‘Brahman-Philosophie’) kind of weakening, then, finds a published manifestation already in *FW* 306.

FW 306 [...] Der Stoiker dagegen übt sich, Steine und Gewürm, Glassplitter und Skorpionen zu verschlucken und ohne Ekel zu sein; [...] – er erinnert an jene arabische Secte der Assaua, die man in Algier kennen lernt⁷⁷⁶

The ‘Arabian sect of the Assua that one encounters in Algiers’ clearly belongs in the same category as all the other references above. What is more, the ‘Verneinung’ that Nietzsche objects to in this kind of asceticism is further illuminated in *FW* 304. We have seen in 4.3 how *FW* 305 points out that there is something wrong with ‘those moralists who command man first and foremost to take control of himself’; they leave their students ‘impoverished and cut

⁷⁷¹ Orsucci, A. (1996), 171-3. He refers to Lecky’s (1879) *Sittengeschichte Europas* and Hellwald’s (1875) *Culturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart*. He also mentions the influence of Spencer on Nietzsche’s interest in asceticism.

⁷⁷² NL 3[128] 9.88-9.

⁷⁷³ NL 1[130] 9.33.

⁷⁷⁴ 13.114. See for a comparable comment NL 6[7] 12.236: ‘Zur Psychologie der Philosophen. Wie es Einem zu Muthe ist bei langem Verweilen in abstractis; die abkühlende Wirkung, die Plato empfand; die hypnotisirende, welche vielleicht die Inder empfanden und suchten. Ob nicht das Verlangen ins Om im Grunde das Verlangen des Fakirs ist, durch alle möglichen Mittel gefühllos zu werden; ebenso bei der Stoa? – Nebeneinander sinnliche derbste Lustbarkeit und speculative Träumerei.’

⁷⁷⁵ 10.256.

⁷⁷⁶ 3.544.

off from the most beautiful fortuities of the soul! Indeed from further *instruction!*.⁷⁷⁷ The preceding aphorism *FW* 304 introduces the topic of ‘Selbst-beherrschung’ as ‘Sich-versagen’ as follows.

FW 304 *Indem wir thun, lassen wir.* – Im Grunde sind mir alle jene Moralen zuwider, welche sagen: „Thue diess nicht! Entsage! Ueberwinde dich!“ [...] Aber ich will nicht mit offenen Augen meine Verarmung anstreben, ich mag alle negativen Tugenden nicht, – Tugenden, deren Wesen das Verneinen und Sichversagen selber ist.⁷⁷⁸

This text does not imply that ‘Ja-sagen’ is all we should do; the negative must also have its place. The difference between Nietzsche’s ‘placitum’ (‘so gefällt es mir, so lautet *mein* placitum’) and that of the moralists who recommend ‘Selbstbeherrschung’ (of which the Stoics and the Epicureans provide the best example in *FW* 306) is that they have eyes only for what is *not* welcome: ‘das Verneinen und Sichversagen’; Nietzsche, on the other hand, focuses on the positive, the goal, that for which the ‘Entsagung’ is exercised. The elements that have to be denied will disappear in a natural way ‘ohne Hass und Widerwillen’, so Nietzsche asserts.

FW 304 [...] ich bin dagegen jenen Moralen gut, welche mich antreiben, Etwas zu thun und wieder zu thun und von früh bis Abend, und Nachts davon zu träumen, und an gar Nichts zu denken als: diess gut zu thun, so gut als es eben mir allein möglich ist! Wer so lebt, von dem fällt fortwährend Eins um das Andere ab, was nicht zu einem solchen Leben gehört: ohne Hass und Widerwillen sieht er heute Diess und morgen Jenes von sich Abschied nehmen, den vergilbten Blättern gleich, welche jedes bewegtere Lüftchen dem Baume entführt⁷⁷⁹

This resembles what we saw Nietzsche describing as ‘kurze Gewohnheiten’ in section 5.3.2.4: ‘Immer glaube ich, *diess* werde mich nun dauernd befriedigen [...]. Und eines Tages hat es seine Zeit gehabt: die gute Sache scheidet von mir, nicht als Etwas, das mir nun Ekel einflösst – sondern friedlich und an mir gesättigt, wie ich an ihm, und wie als ob wir einander dankbar sein müssten und uns *so* die Hände zum Abschied reichen.’⁷⁸⁰ But more importantly, it reminds us of the final sentences of *FW* 276: ‘Ich will keinen Krieg [...] führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen’: Nietzsche’s main point is that the best kind of rejection takes place in the light of the affirmation of something else, something higher; only then is ‘Ekel’, ‘Hass’, ‘Widerwillen’ and ‘Krieg’ circumvented.

This should not be taken to mean that Nietzsche rejects ‘Entsagung’ tout court. There is a subtle difference between ‘Entsagung’ out of a positive aim and one that is merely negative. *FW* 27 explains how ‘Entsagung’ can be an indication that one is a ‘Ja-sager’ still.

FW 27 *Der Entsagende.* – Was thut der Entsagende? Er strebt nach einer höheren Welt, er will weiter und ferner und höher fliegen, als alle Menschen der Bejahung, – *er wirft Vieles weg*, was seinen Flug beschweren würde, und Manches darunter, was ihm nicht unwerth, nicht unliebsam ist: er opfert es seiner Begierde zur Höhe. Dieses Opfern,

⁷⁷⁷ 3.543.

⁷⁷⁸ 3.542-3.

⁷⁷⁹ 3.542-3.

⁷⁸⁰ *FW* 295 3.535.

dieses Wegwerfen ist nun gerade Das, was allein sichtbar an ihm wird: darnach giebt man ihm den Namen des Entsagenden [...]. Ja! Er ist klüger, als wir dachten, und so höflich gegen uns – dieser Bejahende! Denn das ist er gleich uns, auch indem er entsagt.⁷⁸¹

In this aphorism we find Nietzsche identifying himself as one of those who defend ‘Entsagung’, but only insofar as it is the expression of the ‘striving for a higher world’, that is, of ‘affirmation’ (‘dieser Bejahende!’).⁷⁸² *FW* 307 makes this same point in yet another way: ‘Wir verneinen und müssen verneinen, weil Etwas in uns leben und sich bejahen will, Etwas, das wir vielleicht noch nicht kennen, noch nicht sehen!’⁷⁸³ The fact that this aphorism immediately succeeds the one on Stoicism suggests that its procedure betrays the opposite course: as it is described in *FW* 305, such a ‘Morallehrer’ ‘steht beständig mit abwehrende Gebärde da, bewaffnet gegen sich selber, scharfen und misstrauischen Auges’. There is no expectation of a greater future or a higher world here; the motivation for ‘Entsagung’ is merely out of a defensive fear that ‘seine Selbstbeherrschung in Gefahr gerathe’.⁷⁸⁴

5.4.2 ‘WEGSEHEN’

The non-Stoic affirmation that Nietzsche validates in these aphorisms, finally, could be read as a subtle elaboration on *FW* 276’s *amor fati*. It is revealing not so much for the meaning of love or the scope of fate, but of the form its affirmation takes. We know that *FW* 276 projects total affirmation in the future; Nietzsche wishes to become ‘ein Ja-sagender’ only ‘irgendwann’ and for now still allows for ‘Verneinung’ in the form of ‘wegsehen’. This type of negation is elaborated on in *FW* 321, in an aphorism that reemphasises that there is a difference between engaging directly with the negative, such as the improvement or punishment of others, characterised as ‘Ringen [...] im directen Kampfer’, and the positively inspired affirmation of our own ‘Zufriedenheit’. Focusing on ourselves, ‘raising ourselves that much higher’ and ‘stepping aside’, away from the ‘darkening’ effect of being like those who ‘punish and are dissatisfied’; that is Nietzsche’s ‘new caution’. ‘Let us look away!’

FW 321 *Neue Vorsicht*. – Lasst uns nicht mehr so viel an Strafen, Tadeln und Bessern denken! Einen Einzelnen werden wir selten verändern; und wenn es uns gelingen sollte, so ist vielleicht unbeschens auch Etwas mitgelungen: wir sind durch ihn verändert worden! Sehen wir vielmehr zu, dass unser eigener Einfluss auf alles Kommende seinen Einfluss aufwiegt und überwiegt! Ringen wir nicht im directen Kampfer. [...] Sondern erheben wir uns selber um so höher! [...] Nein! Wir wollen nicht

⁷⁸¹ *FW* 27 3.400.

⁷⁸² A similar attitude can be found in terms of ‘Schwangerschaft’ in *M* 552 3.322: ‘Die idealische Selbstsucht. – Giebt es einen wehevolleren Zustand, als den der Schwangerschaft? Alles, was man thut, in dem stillen Glauben thun, es müsse irgendwie dem Werdenden in uns zu Gute kommen! Es müsse seinen geheimnissvollen Werth, an den wir mit Entzücken denken, erhöhen! Da geht man Vielem aus dem Wege, ohne hart sich zwingen zu müssen! Da unterdrückt man ein heftiges Wort, man giebt vernöhnlich die Hand: aus dem Mildesten und Besten soll das Kind hervorwachsen.’

⁷⁸³ 3.545.

⁷⁸⁴ 3.543.

um seinetwillen selber dunkler werden, gleich allen Strafenden und Unzufriedenen!
Gehen wir lieber bei Seite! Sehen wir weg!⁷⁸⁵

FW 290 moreover, discussed in sections 1.2.4 and mentioned in 5.3.2.4, takes the aim of attaining 'Zufriedenheit mit sich' one step further; here, the connection is made explicitly between a lack of self-satisfaction and 'Rache'. The implicit connection with *FW* 276 can be found in the association between attaining self-satisfaction, 'wegsehen', and ugliness: those who are unhappy with themselves cannot hide this and become ugly. Clearly, this is a reference to the aesthetic aspect of *amor fati* in *FW* 276 and, more specifically, to the sentence 'Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Hässliche führen.'

FW 290 Denn Eins ist Noth: dass der Mensch seine Zufriedenheit mit sich *erreiche* [...]!
Wer mit sich unzufrieden ist, ist fortwährend bereit, sich dafür zu rächen: wir Anderen werden seine Opfer sein, und sei es auch nur darin, dass wir immer seinen hässlichen Anblick zu ertragen haben. Denn der Anblick des Hässlichen macht schlecht und düster.⁷⁸⁶

In line with Brusotti we must conclude therefore: 'Von den mit sich Unzufriedenen (vom Häßlichen) will Nietzsche hingegen wegsehen. [...] Mit sich zufrieden sein, sich an anderen nicht rächen, von einigen aber wegsehen – all das gehört zu *amor fati*.'⁷⁸⁷ But beyond this we must also conclude that there is an indirect association between Stoic asceticism, with its 'negativen Tugenden', 'deren Wesen das Verneinen und Sichversagen selber ist',⁷⁸⁸ and the kind of 'Entsagung' Nietzsche rejects. This association, then, cannot but indicate that the combination of affirmation and 'wegsehen' wished for in *FW* 276 is utterly different from what Nietzsche regards as Stoic 'Ja-' and 'Nein-sagen'.

We have thus found yet another argument against the idea that *amor fati* is in any way Stoic. The image of *FW* 306 of a Stoic who 'trains himself to swallow stones and worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea' is clearly not the ideal of affirmation in *FW* 276. The interpretation of *amor fati* in terms of organismic metabolism and digestion ('Einverleibung') as presented in the previous sections already forecloses an identification with the Stoic attempt to incorporate *everything*. But also the allowance in *FW* 276 of one type of 'Verneinung', namely 'wegsehen', opposes what Nietzsche clearly characterises as the Stoic, ascetic type of 'Verneinen': a direct 'Krieg' against what cannot be accepted. The indirect association, developed in later works, between Stoicism, asceticism and revenge seems to be present in *FW* IV as well, be it still in a more submerged manner.

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that there can only be a negative answer to the main question of this thesis: is *amor fati* influenced by Stoicism? After tracing Nietzsche's growing dissatisfaction

⁷⁸⁵ 3:551-2. Interestingly, this aphorism is future-oriented like *FW* 276.

⁷⁸⁶ 3:531.

⁷⁸⁷ Brusotti, M. (1997), 470.

⁷⁸⁸ 3:542-3.

with Stoicism in the years of writing *M* and *FW*, it has become evident that the first appearance of *amor fati* should be understood in the same context. This context is dominated by a focus on the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis', the desire for knowledge that painfully reveals how all truths are indicative merely of our physiological constitution; furthermore on the question of what role danger and emotions, including pain and suffering, have in the pursuit of knowledge, and the prospect of the enhancement of humanity by adopting an organismic understanding of the human species.

After a thorough analysis of the texts of 1881/1882 we may come to understand *amor fati* as a concept comprising several complicated lines of thought. When discussing 'love' we arrived at the conclusion that it must be an erotic concept, as opposed to the 'agapic' account by Han-Pile. Nietzsche develops some lines of thought closely connected to his ideas on the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis': love, which comprises several desires, must be seen as a greedy reaction to beauty, one that also constitutes the joy of full appropriation. Yet in order to love something as unattractive as fate it is imperative to make use of several strategies to make it beautiful. This aspect of love is directed at knowledge, but also at fate – and oneself, making possible the association between love, self-cultivation and *amor fati*.

Fate, then, cannot be taken to denote a metaphysical characteristic of the totality of the universe. Rather, as Chouraqui and Stern argue, it is 'local', and related to ourselves and 'what we need'. Although Stern's account of fate as the necessity to err is mistaken, as well as the account of fate as the erroneous perspectives themselves, the third and fourth accounts of fate as knowledge and the desire for knowledge may shed some new light on the complex meaning of *amor fati*. It can and must be situated in the context of the *NL* passages on the organismic understanding of 'Versuchs-Individuen' who attempt to distance themselves from the 'Gattung' they used to be part of, by investigating and slowly rearranging their 'Existenzbedingungen'. The 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' is an extraordinary drive, revealing itself to be precisely that, a drive; the suggestion is therefore that by loving knowledge we end up loving that which precedes all knowledge: our drives, and the drive for knowledge in particular. In this sense, *amor fati* can be understood only in the context of coming to terms with being a thinker. Being a thinker means possessing this life-threatening drive for truth. Loving oneself is thus the equivalent of its full appropriation, the result of which is the constant change of 'kurze Gewohnheiten' in a permanent and cyclical process of self-experimentation. This is the only path towards the development of a new and stronger species.

This model of *amor fati* can be understood only against the background of a newly developed understanding of the meaning of knowledge; as we have seen, this development goes hand in hand with a growing disagreement with the Stoic perspective. Not only is the love of *amor fati* based on a kind of diet distinguished from the Stoic lack of selectivity, but it is also opposed to the Stoic demand for insensitivity and 'Versteinerung'. We may even suspect that *amor fati* seen from this perspective is developed against these threats. It may be not only non-Stoic therefore, but even anti-Stoic. What is more, the reference to Cleanthes' Hymn in both *M* 195 and the Vorstufe of *FW* 309 reveals a radically non-Stoic appreciation of a Stoic expression. The reference to the 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' as 'Schicksal' is as far away from Stoicism as it can be. Thirdly, the references to 'Verneinung' in Book IV of *FW* can be read as early instances of what later becomes a common association between (oriental) Stoicism and a

weakening kind of asceticism, out of 'Rache'. The 'Wegsehen' that is still allowed in *FW* 276 is unlike any Stoic attitude of asceticism. This association between Stoicism and the decadent form of asceticism invalidates any possibility of a positive connotation between *amor fati* and Stoicism therefore.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This thesis investigates Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism, and whether there is evidence for Stoicism influencing Nietzsche's conception of *amor fati*. Although secondary literature has made it seem plausible that *amor fati* carries traces of Stoicism, pointing to the conceptual parallels between the love of fate and life 'in accordance with nature', this historical study shows that this claim is unlikely at best.

The outcomes of this research are important both for a better understanding of the Nietzschean Stoa-reception and for a more complete understanding of *amor fati*. With respect to the first, this thesis has uncovered certain patterns that may potentially turn out to be relevant for other cases of Nietzsche's reception. Although he is notoriously inconsistent when it comes to explicit analyses of several philosophers and philosophies, combining remarks of sympathy with fiercely critical ones, this study shows that Nietzsche's Stoa-reception conceals a certain logic. Summarizing, it has the following four characteristics.

First, this thesis shows that Stoicism is of importance to Nietzsche in a variety of ways. In chapter 3 three kinds of perspectives on Stoicism are distinguished: Stoicism is discussed as a certain school in late Antiquity with a historical role to play, especially in relation to Heraclitus and Christianity; Stoicism is perceived as a (moral) school arguing for the benefits of a certain attitude, especially concerning emotions, the advantages of which can and should be examined for Nietzsche's age; and finally, the Stoics (Epictetus in particular) are approached as partners in a dialogue on a certain topic: pity, in this case. Related to these perspectives we have observed moreover how the different elements within Stoicism are addressed selectively: Nietzsche picks out the aspects of Stoicism that are of interest to him and ignores the rest. We have seen this in chapter 3 as well, where we noticed how Nietzsche rarely discusses Stoic logic, but pays substantial attention to Stoic ethics, which involves in particular the attitude to emotions. We have also seen that the context in which Nietzsche adheres to this strategy is one that is utterly un-Stoic; the context of exposing all metaphysical and moral assumptions as merely human, all too human fictions and projections rather betrays his identity as a modern thinker.

Secondly, some (but not all) of the recurrent characteristics Nietzsche ascribes to the Stoics within these perspectives are in line with the general approach of 19th Century scholars to Stoicism. That is, under influence of especially Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Zeller, Stoics were perceived as dishonest philosophers, putting forward an ineffective and petrifying strategy for dealing with emotions. It was assumed that as a philosophical school Stoicism could only thrive in a decadent and insecure age. Yet, as we have seen, Nietzsche's suspicion towards Christianity as a doctrine of decadence causes him to reconsider what these scholars took to be the weaknesses of Stoicism. Nietzsche speculates in 1888 that Stoic asceticism may be regarded as a 'Hemmschuh-Moral', which, in slowing down the rise of Christianity, must be regarded as something admirable. What is more, the early texts, too, contain passages revealing an appreciation of the Stoic strategies for withdrawal and calming down.

Thirdly, there is a development in Nietzsche's assessment, outlined in chapters 3 and 4. I have described how Nietzsche's accusation that the Stoic suppression of emotions results in a form of petrification (*FW* 306) is the outcome of a process that starts out more sympathetically; earlier texts (cf. *UB* II 5 and *M* 133) associate Stoicism with 'masculinity' and 'loyalty', characteristics that disappear from Nietzsche's texts from approximately 1880 onwards. This development should be placed in the context of a growing awareness of a conflict between the will to truth and life itself. The more Nietzsche becomes aware of the value of drives and emotions for the pursuit of knowledge, the less attractive the Stoic therapy of calmness becomes for him. This thesis, therefore, offers a correction of the widely accepted assumption (adopted by Martha Nussbaum, Michael Ure and Keith Ansell-Pearson) that Nietzsche adheres to Stoicism mainly in the context of finding a therapy for happiness. Also in texts written after 1881, especially in *GM* and *JGB*, the context in which Nietzsche engages with Stoicism is epistemological rather than therapeutic; again the Stoic dishonesty and ineffective and petrifying method is discussed (whereby *GM* III explicitly memorises how Nietzsche was previously drawn to this strategy⁷⁸⁹).

Fourthly, in order for the above development to be traced, some sensitivity was needed in order to discern the implicit references to Stoicism. It is possible in this regard to distinguish between three different kinds of references; 1. those that explicitly mention 'Stoicism' or refer to one of the Stoics by name – some clearly in a critical tone, others more appreciatively; 2. those that refer to Stoicism in an implicit manner, by only mentioning or discussing typically Stoic notions; 3. those that consider ideas, concepts or doctrines that are strongly reminiscent of Stoicism. A good example of the second kind of references is *MA* I book 1, the final aphorisms of which contain several formulations that are reminiscent of Stoic notions. Interestingly, these allusions can be found in the same book that explicitly rejects several of the traditional Stoic doctrines. This suggests not only that Nietzsche is very selective in his approach of Stoicism, as we noticed already; it also implies that Nietzsche's reception of Stoicism contains a combination of explicit rejection of (certain aspects of) Stoic doctrines and implicit but operational appropriations of modified versions of (other aspects of) Stoicism. The suspicion that Nietzsche is selective also in his ways of evaluating Stoicism is confirmed in two examples of the third kind we have come across: the doctrine of the eternal return and the case of 'Cosmic Stoicism'. Although all explicit references to Stoicism surrounding these doctrines imply that Nietzsche did not associate them with Stoicism (as is the case explicitly for the eternal recurrence in chapter 2.2 and 2.3, where we saw how Nietzsche distances himself from Stoicism in *EH* (GT) 3, and more implicitly for 'Cosmic Stoicism' in chapter 2.4), the possibility that Nietzsche implicitly takes over some modified forms of Stoicism for his own purposes while explicitly denying or hiding this strategy cannot be excluded. The similarities between Stoicism and Nietzsche's immanent and deterministic worldview may be coincidental and traceable to other sources (Heraclitus, for instance), but may also betray a silent and selective adoption of Stoicism. This possibility, even if we can only speculate, may be investigated further as an approach exemplifying Nietzsche's peculiar form of reception.

⁷⁸⁹ *GM* III 24 5.399-400: 'Ich kenne dies Alles vielleicht zu sehr aus der Nähe: jene verehrenswürdige Philosophen-Enthaltsamkeit, zu der ein solcher Glaube verpflichtet, jener Stoicismus des Intellekts, der sich das Nein zuletzt eben so streng verbietet wie das Ja, jenes Stehenbleiben-*Wollen* vor dem Thatsächlichen, dem factum brutum, jener Fatalismus der „petits-faits“.'

Although it cannot be proven that Nietzsche was or was not inspired by Stoicism when writing down the words '*amor fati*' for the first time in 1881, it is established in this thesis that this moment takes place in a period in which Nietzsche is disappointed in Stoicism. The background of Nietzsche's disappointment is, I claim, the same that informs the coining of the words '*amor fati*'. It involves Nietzsche's growing awareness of the will to truth as a '*Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis*'. Possessed with this unusual passion Nietzsche comes to consider himself as the first individual who can experiment with new perspectives without perishing. This dangerous experiment should be seen as a first step towards a future of new species. Importantly, it requires a heroic endurance of pain and suffering for the sake of extending the boundaries of knowledge, and therefore dismisses the Stoic strategy of cooling down painful passions.

Finally, *amor fati* should not be considered as a static concept. It undergoes a significant development from 1881/1882 to 1888. Both the meaning of *amor* and of *fatum* change: whereas *amor* in 1888 is associated with total affirmation, it has connotations of greed and erotic desire in 1881/1882. *Fatum* is a concept of totality in 1888, and explicitly includes the history of the universe in which Nietzsche sees himself playing a decisive role. In affirming totality he thereby affirms himself as a piece of fate. In 1881/1882, *fatum* should rather be seen as a 'local' phenomenon. *Amor fati* as it is introduced in *FW* 276 falls short of total affirmation and is presented as something not easily achieved, but holding the promise of complete affirmation for the future. The *amor fati* of 1881/1882 should be situated in the context of Nietzsche's growing interest in physiology, I claim. Since Nietzsche approaches the '*Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis*' as organismically related to the enhancement of the human species, *amor fati* must be seen not as a therapy designed for all human beings in order to become happy, but as one that is helpful only for those few who, like Nietzsche, struggle to come to terms with being a 'thinker'.

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KGW II/4.278 69 *ft*
KGW II/4.280 67 *ft*
- ALEXANDER**
- De Mixtione* 225, 3-10 112 *ft*
- CICERO**
- Academica* I, x. xi 66 *ft*
Aetius 1.7.33 112 *ft*
De finibus III, xxii.74 61 *ft*

De finibus V, xxv.74 150 *ft*
Tusc. Disp. 4.14 104 *ft*

DIOGENES LAERTIUS

DL VII 40 61
DL VII 87 71, 72, 79
DL VII 110 104 *ft*
DL VII 116 117 *ft*
DL VII 134, 135, 137, 138 64
DL VII 156 64, 112 *ft*
DL VII 174 67 *ft*
DL IX 8, 15 67 *ft*

EPICTETUS

Encheiridion 3 159-60
Encheiridion 5a 117 *ft*
Encheiridion 17 132 *ft*
Encheiridion 26 133 *ft*
Discourses 1.22.13-16 75 *ft*
Discourses 2.19.26 72
Discourses 3.10.2-3 146 *ft*

HERACLITUS

DK 52 69

HIPPOLYTUS

*Refutations of all
heresies* 1.21 117 *ft*

KANT

*Über die Grundlage der
Moral* 157 *ft*
*Anthropologie in
pragmatischer Hinsicht,*
147

PLUTARCHUS

De Stoicorum 72
Repugantiis 1035c

MARCUS AURELIUS

Meditations 1.5 135 *ft*
Meditations 4.14 72 *ft*
Meditations 6.7 130 *ft*
Meditations 6.52 132
Meditations 7.48 119
Meditations 8.47 117 *ft*
Meditations 8.48 150 *ft*
Meditations 9.32 72
Meditations 12.30 72

SCHOPENHAUER

WW I 16 99 *ft*
WW II 16 99-100

SENECA

Epistles 107 73, 117 *ft*
Epistles 108 96 *ft*
De Providentia 1.5 83 *ft*
De Providentia 2.6 75 *ft*, 83 *ft*
De Providentia 4.6 75 *ft*
De Providentia 6.1 83 *ft*
De Ira 36 146 *ft*

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SUMMARY IN DUTCH

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de relatie tussen Nietzsches kennis van en opvatting over de Stoa en de betekenis van zijn concept *amor fati*. Veel commentatoren beweren dat de formule *amor fati*, die voor het eerst bij Nietzsche voorkomt (in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*), is geïnspireerd op de stoïsche leer.⁷⁹⁰ Nietzsche schrijft in *Ecce Homo* dat de liefde voor het lot een teken van ‘grootheid’ is: ‘dat je van niets wil dat het anders is, niet vóór je, niet achter je, in alle eeuwigheid niet’.⁷⁹¹ In Epictetus’ *Encheiridion* (ofwel het Handboek) vinden we het beroemde advies ‘Verlang niet dat alles zoo geschiede als gij wenscht, maar geef er u bij neer dat alles geschiedt zooals het geschiedt en gij zult rust in uw gemoed vinden.’⁷⁹² Dit advies kent ook een andere, veelvoorkomende formule, o.a. gebruikt in Seneca’s brieven aan Lucilius: ‘Je moet leven volgens de natuur’.⁷⁹³ Nietzsche lijkt, net als de Stoïcijnen, een leer te verdedigen van determinisme gekoppeld aan een normatieve theorie waarin een houding van acceptatie wordt aangemoedigd.

Behalve *amor fati* is er nog een andere doctrine die een belangrijke rol inneemt in Nietzsches gedachtegoed en opvallende gelijkenissen vertoont met de stoïsche theorie: de eeuwige wederkeer. Nietzsche lijkt aan te nemen dat de wereld zoals we die kennen zich al ontelbare keren op deze manieren heeft gemanifesteerd, en dat nog evenzovele malen zal doen. *FW* 341: “Dit leven, zoals je het thans leeft en geleefd hebt, zul je nog eens en ontelbare malen moeten leven [...]”.⁷⁹⁴ Door vele commentatoren wordt de leer van de eeuwige wederkeer gezien als een verlengstuk van *amor fati*: degene die in staat is om het idee te omarmen van een eeuwige wederkeer zou ook het ideaal van liefde voor het lot hebben bereikt. In de overgeleverde teksten over stoïsche kosmologie vinden we een vergelijkbare leer van eeuwig terugkerende kosmische cirkels. Volgens de Stoïcijnen wordt het einde en begin van elk kosmisch jaar gemarkeerd door een grote ‘wereldbrand’ (ἐκπύρωσις), waarna de geschiedenis zich herhaalt. Deze leer bevestigt het determinisme en het bestaan van het lot, en ontkracht het bestaan van een vrije wil; zo onderschrijft het de naturalistische leer van acceptatie (‘je moet leven volgens de natuur’). De mens wordt daarin gezien als een immanent onderdeel van een goddelijk en rationeel geïnspireerde kosmos. Hoewel Nietzsche zich distantieert van het idee van een Ratio of Logos die de kosmos bestuurt, wordt ook zijn perspectief op mens en wereld gekenmerkt door een vorm van immanentie (waarbij ‘wil tot macht’ genoemd wordt als overkoepelend

⁷⁹⁰ Ure, M. (2008), Brobjer, T. (2003), Nabais, N. (2006), Groff, P.S. (2004), Sellars, J. (2006a).

⁷⁹¹ *EH* klug 10 6.297: ‘Meine Formel für die Grösse am Menschen ist *amor fati*: dass man Nichts anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht.’ Vertaling van Hawinkels, P. (2005).

⁷⁹² Epictetus, *Encheiridion*, ch. 8, in de vertaling van Scheurleer, D.F. (1939).

⁷⁹³ *DL* VII 87: ‘τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν’; Seneca, *Brieven aan Lucilius* 5: ‘Wat de filosofie in het vooruitzicht stelt, is op de eerste plaats gevoel voor verhoudingen [...]. Het is immers onze opdracht volgens de natuur te leven’. Vertaling van Verhoeven, C. (1980).

⁷⁹⁴ *FW* 341 3.570: ‘„Dieses Leben, wie du es jetzt lebst und gelebt hast, wirst du noch einmal und noch unzählige Male leben müssen [...]“’. Vertaling van Hawinkels, P. (2009).

mechanisme). Deze overeenkomsten hebben verschillende commentatoren doen vermoeden dat *amor fati* en de eeuwige wederkeer een verwantschap hebben met het Stoïcisme.

Er zijn echter redenen om de aanname van een stoïsche inspiratie in twijfel te trekken. De twee belangrijkste betreffen onze kennis van *amor fati* en Nietzsches receptie van de stoïsche leer. Beide zijn niet uitputtend onderzocht in de secundaire literatuur. *Amor fati* blijkt bij nadere bestudering een veel complexer concept dan gedacht. Er zijn slechts tien tekstaanduidingen; vier in de gepubliceerde werken (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, en twee in *Ecce Homo*); één in een brief; vijf in de *Nachlass*. De kleine hoeveelheid tekstaanduidingen bemoeilijkt het vinden van de juiste interpretatie. Tussen de eerste vier verschijningen in 1881/1882 en de laatste vijf in 1888 maakt Nietzsche bovendien zijn grootste filosofische ontwikkeling door. Het is aannemelijk dat de betekenis van *amor fati* een verandering ondergaat, maar die mogelijkheid is alleen door Tom Stern uitgewerkt.⁷⁹⁵ In dit proefschrift heb ik verschillen gevonden ten aanzien van de twee componenten van het concept: zowel de betekenis van ‘amor’ als die van ‘fatum’ ondergaat een verandering in de tussenliggende jaren. Om te concluderen dat Nietzsche is geïnspireerd door de Stoïcijnen bij de introductie van de formule moet aangetoond worden dat de 1881/2 *amor fati*-verschijningen sporen vertonen van de stoïsche leer. Zoals verder beargumenteerd zal worden lijkt er echter sprake van het omgekeerde: de betekenis van *amor fati* in 1888 vertoont meer overeenkomsten met de Stoa dan die van 1881/2.

Ten tweede wordt er in de secundaire literatuur over Nietzsches relatie met de Stoa nauwelijks aandacht besteed aan het verschil tussen het hedendaagse perspectief en dat van de 19^e eeuw. Er zijn bijvoorbeeld passages die suggereren dat Nietzsche zich aansluit bij de negatief georiënteerde opvattingen over de Stoa van Hegel en Schopenhauer. Mogelijk beïnvloed door o.a. Eduard Zeller, die de lijn van Hegel doorzette, zijn er teksten waarin de Stoa wordt opgevat als een school die floreerde in een tijd van verval en achteruitgang (zoals het Hellenisme werd gekarakteriseerd). De houding die gepropageerd wordt door de Stoïcijnen verdient zeker geen navolging in deze traditie. Nietzsche noemt de stoïsche aanpak van de affecten expliciet een ‘kille, standbeeldachtige onverschilligheid’⁷⁹⁶, beticht ze van een ascetische hardheid die het ze onmogelijk maakt de vruchten te plukken van hun passies (‘Voor hen was het namelijk het grootst denkbare verlies [...] de stoïcijnsse harde huid, met egelstekels, cadeau te krijgen’⁷⁹⁷), en verwijt ze dat ze leugenachtig en arrogant zijn (‘Seneca als een hoogtepunt van de antieke morele leugenachtigheid’⁷⁹⁸). Hoe anders is dat in onze eeuw! Vooral in Engeland lijkt de stoïsche leer als therapie een opmars te beleven. In november van 2015 werd de vierde ‘Stoic Week’ georganiseerd, waarin een ‘Stoic Week Handbook’ alle deelnemers in staat stelde om elke dag stoïsch geïnspireerde oefeningen te doen. Het doel: meer geluk, mentale kalmte en balans, en een vermindering van negatieve emoties. 2.500 mensen hebben deelgenomen, en de overwegend positieve resultaten zijn online te vinden.⁷⁹⁹ Het kan daarom vooralsnog niet uitgesloten worden dat de grote verschillen tussen onze

⁷⁹⁵ Stern, T. (2013).

⁷⁹⁶ *JGB* 198 5.118: ‘Bilsäulenkalte’. Vertaling van Graftdijk, T. (2006).

⁷⁹⁷ *FW* 306 3.544: ‘[Es] wäre [...] der Verlust der Verluste [...] die stoische harte Haut mit Igelstachen [...] geschenkt zu bekommen’. Vertaling van Hawinkels, P. (2009).

⁷⁹⁸ *NL* 25[347] 11.103: ‘Seneca als eine Culmination der antiken moralischen Verlogenheit’. Mijn vertaling.

⁷⁹⁹ <http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/stoicismtoday/>.

opvattingen van de Stoa en die van de 19^e eeuw een rol hebben gespeeld in de betwijfelbare aanname dat *amor fati* stoïsch is.

Om de relatie tussen *amor fati* en Nietzsches receptie van de Stoa te kunnen bepalen zijn dus beide sub-onderzoeken noodzakelijk: wat is de exacte betekenis van *amor fati*, en hoe verschuift de betekenis van het concept precies? En: wat betekende de Stoa voor Nietzsche; welke bronnen had hij, en hoe werden die geëvalueerd? Ook bij de tweede subvraag moet rekening worden gehouden met een verschuiving in Nietzsches denken. Zoals ik aantoon in hoofdstuk 4 maakt Nietzsche een ontwikkeling door tussen ongeveer 1876 (toen hij *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* schreef) en 1882 (ten tijde van *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*): hoewel hij vanaf het begin de metafysische principes van de Stoa afkeurt, lijkt hij in 1876 geïnteresseerd te zijn in de ‘Kunstgriffen’ van de late Stoïcijnen (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius) voor een kalm gemoed dat vrij is van sterke emoties. In de jaren erna raakt Nietzsche echter steeds meer overtuigd van het belang van emoties, met name voor het proces van waarheidsvinding en wetenschap. In *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* Boek IV komt het tot een expliciete afwijzing van de stoïsche methode. Aangezien ook *amor fati* wordt geïntroduceerd in dit Boek, zal mijn belangrijkste conclusie zijn dat de introductie van *amor fati* niet ingegeven kan zijn door een acceptatie van de stoïsche leer. Ik ga zelfs nog een stap verder door te beargumenteren dat *amor fati* gefungeerd heeft als een alternatief antwoord op de vraag hoe om te gaan met emoties in de context van kennisvergroting. Met deze conclusie komt de afwijzing van de Stoa, en niet de omarming ervan, ten grondslag te liggen aan *amor fati*.

De opbouw van het proefschrift is als volgt. In hoofdstuk 1 worden alle tekstaanduidingen van *amor fati* één voor één onder de loep gelegd en in context geplaatst. In dit hoofdstuk zal duidelijk worden dat er een verschuiving plaatsvindt tussen 1881/2 en 1888. Hoofdstuk 2 heeft als doel de secundaire literatuur ten aanzien van de overeenkomsten tussen de stoïsche filosofie en *amor fati* te nuanceren. Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt Nietzsches receptie van de Stoa in brede zin. In dit hoofdstuk wordt duidelijk dat er een verschil is in toon tussen de teksten rond 1876 en die van latere datum. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat dieper op dit verschil in en analyseert de subtiele verschuiving in Stoareceptie tussen *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, Morgenröthe*, en *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. Hoofdstuk 5 keert terug naar het vraagstuk van *amor fati*, en plaatst de eerste vier tekstaanduidingen van *amor fati* in de context van het groeiende belang van een evolutionair-fysiologisch perspectief voor de vraag naar kennis en waarheid. Er wordt zo een totaal ander licht geworpen op de betekenis van *amor fati*. Uit deze interpretatie volgt de conclusie dat *amor fati* geen stoïsche formule kan zijn.

De verschuivingen in betekenis zoals uiteengezet in **hoofdstuk 1** betreffen zowel ‘amor’ als ‘fatum’. In de tekstaanduidingen vanaf 1884 wordt duidelijk dat de liefde voor het lot een totale affirmatie betreft, waarbij Nietzsche zijn affirmatieve filosofie presenteert als tegenwicht tegen de Christelijke afkeer van het leven. De betekenis van ‘lot’ is gerelateerd aan de eeuwige wederkeer en omvat de gehele geschiedenis. Omdat de genitivus van *fati* geïnterpreteerd kan worden als een genitivus objectivus (liefde voor het lot), maar ook als een genitivus subjectivus (liefde van het lot), lijkt er in de latere passages sprake te zijn van een immanent spel van liefde van en tot het lot; Nietzsche, die schrijft dat *amor fati* zijn ‘meest innerlijke natuur’ is, draagt het lot de verpersoonlijking van affirmatie te zijn na een lange periode van Christelijke negatie. In *amor fati* wordt dan alles, zelfs het Christendom, geaffirméerd, waarbij Nietzsches eigen lot

zowel het subject als onderdeel van het object van affirmatie vormt. Deze immanente alomvattendheid laat zich echter niet teruglezen in de passages van *amor fati* in 1881/2. In die teksten wordt *amor fati* geportretteerd als de weg naar een toekomstig ideaal dat nauwelijks te bereiken is. 'Liefde' is in deze teksten geen synoniem voor 'affirmatie', maar lijkt eerder de betekenis te hebben van een erotisch verlangen naar schoonheid. Ook 'lot' mist de kosmische dimensie van de latere teksten. Eerder lijkt er sprake van een opdracht de onaantrekkelijke dingen in het leven te leren liefhebben met behulp van esthetische strategieën.

Opvallend is dat alleen de latere betekenis van *amor fati* gelijkenissen vertoont met de Stoa, vooral met 'Cosmic Stoicism' zoals het in een artikel van John Sellars genoemd wordt.⁸⁰⁰ In **hoofdstuk 2** nuanceer ik zijn bewering dat er een duidelijke verwantschap bestaat tussen *amor fati* en dit type Stoïcisme, dat zich ten doel stelt de grenzen tussen het individu en de kosmos op te heffen. Ik laat zien dat Nietzsches teksten nergens uiting geven aan bewondering voor dit aspect van de stoïsche leer, en zeker niet in 1881/2. Ook wordt in hoofdstuk 2 de aanname weerlegd, gemaakt door verschillende commentatoren, dat de doctrine van de eeuwige wederkeer kenmerken draagt van de stoïsche kosmologie. Ook al was Nietzsche zich bewust van overeenkomsten tussen zijn idee en dat van de Stoïcijnen, hij laat duidelijk blijken dat die slechts oppervlakkig zijn en dat hij liever geassocieerd wordt met Herakleitos. Ten derde wordt in dit hoofdstuk de vraag beantwoord in hoeverre Nietzsches zogenaamde naturalisme verwantschap heeft met de stoïsche formule dat je moet 'leven volgens de natuur'. *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* 9 ("Naar de natuur" willen jullie *leven*? O nobele Stoïcijnen, welk een bedriegerij in woorden!⁸⁰¹) wordt in detail geanalyseerd: er zijn inderdaad parallellen te trekken tussen een Nietzscheaans en een stoïsch naturalisme, maar Nietzsche heeft grote bezwaren tegen het gebrek aan eerlijkheid in de stoïsche aanspraak op kennis van de natuur.

Hoofdstuk 3 opent met een globale beschrijving van Nietzsches kennis van en verhouding tot de Stoa, en onderscheidt vervolgens drie benaderingswijzen. De Stoa wordt ten eerste opgevat als een school die bloeide ten tijde van het Hellenisme. Nietzsche betreft bij zijn historische analyse vooral Herakleitos en het Christendom, waarbij hij vaststelt dat de Stoa een 'veroppervlakkiging' is van Herakleitos, maar toch genoeg kracht in zich had om de decadentie van het Christendom te remmen⁸⁰² (hoewel er ook passages zijn waarin de Stoa als een voorloper van het Christendom wordt neergezet⁸⁰³). Ten tweede benadert Nietzsche de stoïsche houding als een strategie om met pijn en emoties om te gaan. Ten derde ziet Nietzsche met name Epictetus als een gesprekspartner over een specifiek onderwerp: medelijden. Aan dit onderwerp wordt in hoofdstuk 4 meer aandacht besteed. Hoofdstuk 3 wijdt verder uit over de verschillende typeringen in Nietzsches teksten behorend bij het tweede perspectief. De Stoa wordt geassocieerd met oneerlijkheid en arrogantie, een verlangen naar helderheid van systemen en abstracties, en een harde en kille houding van tyrannieke zelf-onderdrukking en ascese, met totale gevoelloosheid ten gevolge. Tegelijk zien we dat de 'hardheid' van latere teksten in de vroegere teksten meer positief wordt gepresenteerd als

⁸⁰⁰ Sellars, J. (2006a).

⁸⁰¹ *JGB* 9 5.21: „Gemäss der Natur“ wollt ihr *leben*? Oh ihr edlen Stoiker, welche Betrügerei der Worte! Vertaling van Graftdijk, T. (2006).

⁸⁰² *NL* 15[29] 13.422: 'der Stoicismus selbst war eine solche Hemmschuh-Moral'.

⁸⁰³ *NL* 11[375] 13.169: 'die stoische Selbst-Verhärtung, die platonische Sinnen-Verleumdung, die Vorbereitung des Bodens für das Christenthum...'

‘mannelijkheid’. Deze positieve connotatie vinden we ook, zij het impliciet, terug in het eerste boek van *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I*, waarin gezocht wordt naar kalmerende middelen om de tragedie het hoofd te bieden van een filosofie die zich tegen het leven keert. Het is dan ook in dit boek dat we een expliciete afwijzing zien van de stoïsche metafysica, maar wel met behulp van een stoïsche houding van uitgebalanceerde kalmte. Een stoïsche afwijzing van Stoïcisme, dus.

Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft vervolgens de ontwikkeling van Nietzsches evaluatie van de Stoa in *Morgenröthe* en *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. Nietzsche wordt beheerst door wat hij gaat begrijpen als een passie: de ‘Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis’. Deze passie heeft in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I* het pijnlijke inzicht blootgelegd dat alle strategieën om tot waarheid te komen slechts ‘menselijk, al te menselijk’ zijn. Om met deze tragedie om te gaan zoekt Nietzsche naar een kalmerende filosofie en lijkt die inderdaad in de Stoa te hebben gevonden. Toch komt hij in de loop van het schrijven van *Morgenröthe* en *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* tot de conclusie dat het kunnen omarmen van pijn en emoties juist een teken van gezondheid is (een ontwikkeling die zichtbaar wordt in Nietzsches analyse van medelijden in *Morgenröthe*); en bovendien dat alle emoties nodig zijn voor het vergroten van onze kennis (precies omdat al onze kennis ‘menselijk, al te menselijk’ is). Nietzsche wijst de stoïsche ‘Kunstgriffen’ in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* Boek IV radicaal van hand als een armzalige houding waarin het potentieel van de passies wordt afgeknepen door kille verstening.

In **hoofdstuk 5** beantwoord ik de vraag naar de relatie tussen Nietzsches Stoa-receptie en de betekenis van *amor fati*. Een belangrijk nieuw element in het denken van Nietzsche in 1881 wordt betrokken bij de analyse: het evolutionaire fysiologische gedachtegoed, geïnspireerd door Friedrich Albert Lange en Wilhelm Roux. Hun werk zet Nietzsche aan tot een fysiologische duiding van de mens, waarbij de processen van vertering (van niet alleen fysiek maar ook geestelijk voedsel) worden betrokken op de toekomst van een heel nieuwe soort. De mens, zo speculeert Nietzsche in de *Nachlass* van 1881, kan zich alleen ontwikkelen als een individu zich losmaakt uit de massa. Zo’n ‘Versuchs-Individu’ moet experimenteren met nieuw soort voedsel; alleen zo kan er in de innerlijke fysiologische processen een verandering optreden die kan leiden tot de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe soort. Ik beargumenteer in dit hoofdstuk dat *amor fati* geplaatst moet worden in deze context. ‘Liefde’ moet gelezen worden in termen van ‘hebzucht’, ‘honger’, en ‘appropriatie’; ‘lot’ moet begrepen worden als het intieme spel tussen ‘voedsel’ (waartoe ook kennis behoort) en de fysiologische driften die het voedsel uitkiezen en verteren (waarbij ‘schoonheid’ of ‘aantrekkingskracht’ van belang zijn). *Amor fati* kan dan zeker niet worden gezien als een therapeutische houding van kosmische acceptatie, zoals bij de Stoa; eerder gaat het om het doordenken en doorleven van Nietzsches evolutionair-fysiologische identiteit als ‘denker’.

Na deze analyses moet geconcludeerd worden dat Nietzsche niet geïnspireerd was door de Stoïcijnen toen hij de term *amor fati* introduceerde. Eerder lijkt het tegenovergestelde aan de hand: na een proces van toenemende teleurstelling over de stoïsche ‘Kunstgriffen’ wordt de formule *amor fati* geïntroduceerd als een alternatieve strategie van selectie en appropriatie.

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Hedwig Lambertha Johanna Gaasterland werd op 26 mei 1983 geboren in Eindhoven. In 2001 behaalde ze haar gymnasiumdiploma aan s.g. Augustinianum te Eindhoven. Aansluitend studeerde ze Griekse en Latijnse Talen en Culturen en Wijsbegeerte in Leiden. In beide studies behaalde ze een Bachelordiploma in 2007. Ze was bestuurslid bij de culturele studentenvereniging Prometheus in 2002-2003, en organiseerde in 2006 lustrum- en tourneeactiviteiten bij Collegium Musicum. In 2007 begon ze aan de Researchmaster 'Rationality' in Leiden, die ze in 2011 *cum laude* afrondde. In die periode verbleef ze ruim een halfjaar in Leuven, was ze student-assistente bij Prof. dr. Pauline Kleingeld, en werkte ze parttime als docent aan het Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte in Amsterdam. In februari 2012 begon haar PhD-onderzoek, gesubsidieerd door OIKOS. In 2013 ontwierp en doceerde ze het Mastercollege 'Stoic Images. Assessing the Sources' met Prof. Frans de Haas, en in 2014 ontwikkelde en doceerde ze het Mastercollege 'Nietzsche and Antiquity'. Ze presenteerde haar onderzoek tijdens verschillende OIKOS-activiteiten, o.a. in Athene, en participeerde in verschillende congressen, o.a. georganiseerd door de FNS (Friedrich Nietzsche Society), in Cork (2013) en Scarborough (2015). In 2015 werkte ze twee maanden met Prof. Keith Ansell-Pearson, Warwick University. Van juni 2014 tot september 2015 was ze voorzitter van de PhD Council van de OZSW (de Nederlandse Onderzoeksschool Wijsbegeerte). Vanaf september 2016 is ze als trainee bij het Onderwijstraineeship verbonden als docente klassieke talen bij het Johan de Wittgymnasium in Dordrecht. In juni 2016 trouwde ze met dr. Michiel Meijer.