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Hervaeus Natalis, *De secundis intentionibus*, Distinctiones I&II : critical edition with introduction and indices

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De secundis intentionibus I–II

3.1. WHAT IS AN INTENTION?

Hervaeus' book starts with the question whether a first intention is an intelligible species. Before any questions about intentions can be answered, the notion of first intention, or rather the notion of intention, must be clarified. This is what Hervaeus sets out to do in his answer to the first question of his *De secundis intentionibus*,¹ where he presents three important distinctions.

One distinction² is that between *esse subiective* and *esse obiective*: between being in the intellect as in its underlying subject, in the way that species and acts of understanding are in the intellect, and being in the intellect as the direct object of the intellect, or as that which follows the thing insofar as it has objective being in the intellect. If something has objective being, this means that the thing is the object of an act of knowing. Hervaeus makes an important point here: he says that an object that is known by the intellect exists subjectively outside the intellect, and objectively in the intellect. This would mean that according to its objective being an object is not really different from the externally existing object. Thus, there is no multiplication of entities, nor is there anything between the intellect and the known thing; the known thing *is* the externally existing thing. Hervaeus compares knowing to seeing: when someone knows a horse, we say that the horse is in that person's intellect objectively; similarly, when someone sees a house, we can say that the house is in that person's sight.³ We could add that, if this does not mean that there are two houses, one of which exists externally, while

¹ *Dist.* I, § 14–23.

² *Dist.* I, § 21–23.

³ *Dist.* I, § 22: 'Et sic quando intellectus intelligit bovem vel equum vel quodcumque aliud, dicitur bos vel equus esse obiective in intellectu vel quodcumque aliud quod intelligitur; sicut etiam quando aliquis habet ante conspectum suum totam unam domum ut visam, dicitur quod talis habet in conspectu suo domum totam.'

the other exists in our vision and has a certain diminished being, this implies that there would not be two objects either, one of which exists externally and the other in our intellect with a diminished (objective) being.

Another distinction⁴ is that between *esse intentionale essentialiter* or *denominative*: between ‘intention’ or ‘intentional being’ taken essentially or denominatively. According to Hervaeus intentions as pertaining to the knowing subject are ‘real’ intentions or ‘essential’ intentions. The intention as pertaining to the known thing, namely that thing of which the intention *is* an intention, is named ‘intention’ after the essential intention, and is called an intention denominatively only. Hervaeus explains this by giving an example: the quality of whiteness is essentially a quality, but a white body, which has the quality of whiteness, has this whiteness only denominatively or in a derived sense. In the same way, we can call the intention as pertaining to the known thing an intention only in a derived sense, that is, denominatively.

However, in the first place Hervaeus distinguishes between different meanings of the term *intention*.⁵ The term ‘intention’, he says, is used in several ways, and not all of them apply to the intelligible species. For Hervaeus, the answers to questions such as ‘what is an intention?’ and ‘is an intelligible species a first intention?’ depend upon what type of intention we have in mind. Since Hervaeus’ definitions and subdivisions of these different kinds of intentions are rather complicated, it might be helpful to consult tables 1 (p. 24) and 2 (p. 25) while reading the following explanation.

The first division concerns the type of intention. Hervaeus starts by discerning three types in which the word ‘intention’ is used. The first subdivision is that between intention as pertaining to the will, or intention as pertaining to the intellect. The intention as pertaining to the will is subdivided into an act of the will and the object of that act. The intention as pertaining to the will is not discussed further in *De secundis intentionibus*, since it does not belong to logic, and Hervaeus is primarily concerned with the intention as the proper subject of logic here.⁶

4 *Dist.* 1, § 19–20.

5 *Dist.* 1, § 14–18.

6 See 9 and 15 ff. Hervaeus’ *De intellectu et voluntate* is a treatise about the will, in which he attacks Henry of Ghent. For an analysis of this treatise, see Schöllgen, *Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Heinrich von Gent und Hervaeus Natalis*.

The intention as pertaining to the intellect is subdivided into the intention as pertaining to the knowing subject and the intention as pertaining to the known thing. The former is explained further: the intention as pertaining to the knowing subject is that which brings the intellect to the knowledge of something by means of representation. In this sense, the word ‘intention’ can refer to both an intelligible species and an act of the intellect. When the human mind knows a thing, it does so by means of a representation of that thing, for instance an intelligible species, and by means of the act of knowing that thing. Both the intelligible species and the act are called intentions as pertaining to the knowing subject, which in this example would be the human mind. The intention as pertaining to the known thing is the known thing itself insofar as the act of the intellect tends towards it (or relates to it) as a known thing; in the example it is the table, insofar as the intellect relates to it in the act of knowing it. In the latter sense, ‘intention’ can be taken formally and abstractly, which means that the word refers to the *terminus* or the end point of this tendency of the intellect (that same table), or to the tendency itself, which is a relation of the known thing (the table) to the act of knowing it. ‘Intention’ can also be taken concretely and materially. In this sense, the word refers to that which is known as it is, namely the known thing itself.⁷

Hervaeus’ interpretation of ‘intention’ is rather more complicated than that of either Thomas Aquinas or Radulphus Brito, as we shall see below. The following table contains an overview of Hervaeus’ divisions of the concept of intention as stated in his first division:

7 See the table 1 on 24.

Table 1. Intentions according to Hervaeus Natalis

A. <i>Intentio voluntatis</i> , pertaining to the will	A.1. Act of volition towards an end
	A.2. Object/end of the act of volition, <i>res intenta</i> or 'intended' thing
B. <i>Intentio intellectus</i> , pertaining to the intellect	B1. <i>Ex parte intelligentis</i> , pertaining to a knowing subject: <i>illud quod per modum alicuius repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei</i> , that which brings the intellect to the knowledge of some thing by way of representation: for instance, an intelligible species, a concept of the mind, or an act of the intellect. These are <i>res verae</i> , real things
	B.2. <i>Ex parte rei intellectae</i> , pertaining to the known thing: <i>res ipsa quae intelligitur inquantum in ipsam tenditur intellectus sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum intelligendi</i> , the known thing itself insofar as the act of the intellect 'tends' or relates to it as to some known thing through the act of knowing
	B.2.a. <i>Formaliter in abstracto</i> or <i>abstractive</i> , formally and abstractly: <i>terminum ipsius tendentiae sive ipsam terminationem, quae est quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi</i> , the term of this tendency or the tendency itself which is a relation of the known thing to the act of knowing. Both as a first and second intention, it is a <i>habitudo ad actum intelligendi</i> , a relation to the act of knowing, and therefore an <i>ens rationis</i> , a rational being
	B.2.b. <i>Materialiter in concreto</i> or <i>concretive</i> , materially and concretely: <i>illud quod intelligitur quicquid sit illud</i> , that which is known as it is. – As a first intention, it is a <i>res vera</i> , a real thing – As a second intention, it is an <i>ens rationis</i> , a rational being (such as a species)

Based on the information in this table first and second intentions can be subdivided in the following way:

Table 2. First and second intentions according to Hervaeus' divisions

1. <i>Intentio prima</i>	1.a. <i>Ex parte intelligentis</i> , intention as pertaining to a <i>knowing subject</i> ; for instance, a species or an act of a knowing subject concerning a concrete thing. Such intentions are real things and have real being	
	1.b. <i>Ex parte rei intellectae</i> , intention as pertaining to the <i>known thing</i>	1.b.1. Taken <i>formally and abstractly</i> : the relation (or tendency, or intentionality) from the known thing, e.g., the concrete object <i>man</i> , to the act of the intellect, and therefore a rational being 1.b.2. Taken <i>materially and concretely</i> : a concrete object such as <i>man</i> , which has real being
2. <i>Intentio secunda</i>	2.a. <i>Ex parte intelligentis</i> , intention as pertaining to a <i>knowing subject</i> , such as concepts or acts of the intellect representing something in a universal way. These acts and concepts are real things and have real being	
	2.b. <i>Ex parte rei intellectae</i> , intention as pertaining to the <i>known thing</i>	2.b.1. Taken <i>formally and abstractly</i> : the relation of reason (or tendency, or intentionality) from the known thing, e.g., <i>universality</i> , to the act of the intellect, and therefore a rational being 2.b.2. Taken <i>materially and concretely</i> : a rational being, for instance, a relation of reason such as 'universality', taken as a known thing (not taken as a relation)

In this table the different types of intention have been rearranged according to *intentio prima* versus *intentio secunda*, instead of *intentio ex parte intelligentis* versus *intentio ex parte rei intellectae*. In the course of *De secundis intentionibus* we will see how Hervaeus classifies the different types of being under different sciences, finally arriving at the subject of logic in particular. Logic does not consider first intentions (items 1.a and 1.b), or things that have real being (1.a, 1.b.2 and 1.a), because it deals with rational beings only. Not with all rational beings, though; logic does

not consider intentions *ex parte intelligentis*, only intentions *ex parte rei intellectae* (2.b) and more specifically in the concrete an material sense of the term⁸ (2.b.2). In *Dist.* v, Hervaeus will further define what is the subject of logic.⁹

These distinctions and divisions are not easy to grasp all at once, but they constitute the backbone of Hervaeus' *De secundis intentionibus*. Once they are understood, the answers to all questions in his book are less difficult to follow, including the answer to the question whether second intentions are the proper subject of logic, and more specifically which type of second intention would be the proper subject of logic and logic alone.

The remainder of *Dist.* i is devoted to a further explanation of first intentions, discussed in five questions. *Distt.* ii–v are reserved for the attributes of second intentions. Given Hervaeus' main interest in second intentions as the proper subject of logic, it is not surprising that by far the greater part of his book is devoted to second intentions, as the title indicates.

3.2. FIRST INTENTIONS

3.2.1. *Is a first intention an intelligible species?*

After his extensive explanation of the divisions of intentions, Hervaeus finally addresses the question which gave rise to it: the issue of identifying the intelligible species with the first intention. In Hervaeus' time, not everyone accepted the existence of the intelligible species. For instance, Durandus of St-Pourçain considered it an unnecessary item in the process of cognition and denied its existence.¹⁰

But Hervaeus thinks differently: according to him, intelligible species do exist. In his explanation, he provides an answer to the question whether intelligible species are first intentions, rather than the original question (are first intentions intelligible species?).¹¹ His answer is that

8 'Sed secunda intentio, sive ens rationis, est subiectum primo et per se alicuius scientiae, puta logicae, accipiendo secundam intentionem concretive, quia omnes ponunt subiectum primo et per se logicae ens rationis et intentiones quae distinguuntur contra esse reale' (*Dist.* iii, ed. 46^b, my italics).

9 See 15 ff, where the contents of *Dist.* v are summarized.

10 See below, 61 ff.

11 Interestingly, the Paris edition does not agree with the mss. here, but formulates the

intelligible species are a type of first intention, but not just any type of first intention: as we have seen, an intelligible species is a first intention, provided we take the intention either as pertaining to a knowing subject or as pertaining to the known thing, taken materially and concretely.¹² More specifically, the intelligible species is a first intention because it is the first representation of a thing in the intellect. However, not only intelligible species are first intentions: all intelligible things can be first intentions, because they have the two properties that are Hervaeus' criteria for being first intentions: they are things signified by names of the first imposition¹³ and can be foundations of second intentions, just as the intention of *man* is based upon existing men; therefore it is obvious that, apart from intelligible species, many other things can be first intentions as well.

As is usual in medieval *quaestiones disputatae*, Hervaeus not only states his own answer to the question, but he starts his treatment of each question with a number of objections to his own opinion, which he subsequently rejects. He first mentions two objections that partly coincide with his own answer to the question. In his refutation of these two arguments Hervaeus states that these answers are at best partly correct, and are not sufficiently proved.

First,¹⁴ several opponents argue that (a) the first intention is an intelligible species because (b) that which is an intention, and before which there is no other intention, is a *first* intention. This applies to the intelligible species, which therefore must be a first intention.

The statement that an intelligible species is an intention (a), is explained by its defendant in three ways. (1) The intelligible species has intentional being, since it is an intention of sensible things. (2) A species must have either real or intentional being. If it has real being, two opposites would exist at the same time (such as the species of two *contraria*, for instance white and black, simultaneously existing in the same sense

question as Hervaeus answers it: *Primus utrum species intelligibilis sit prima intentio* (see 95).

12 *Dist. 1*, § 24–31. See also 23 ff. for Hervaeus' explanation of the opposites *formally-materially* and *abstractly-concretely*.

13 The term '*impositio*' occurs several times in *Dist. 1* (not in 11). 'Imposition' here means 'name-giving': a word of first imposition is a conventional sign of an extralinguistic entity (such as '*man*'), and a word of second imposition is a conventional sign of a linguistic entity (such as '*verb*'). Cf. the distinction between a first intention, which is a natural sign of an extra-mental entity (*man*) and a second intention, which is a natural sign of a first intention (*species*). See also 5, n. 9.

14 *Dist. 1*, §§ 3–8.

organ), which is not possible; therefore it must have intentional being. (3) Again, contrary to a real being, a species only exists in the mind, and therefore it must be an intentional being. These three arguments are supposed to prove that an intelligible species is an intention.

As to the second part of the objection, *viz.* that nothing in the intellect comes before the intelligible species (b), the opponent states that only the substance of the knower and the *potentia intellectiva*, and maybe some sort of *habitus*, come before the intelligible species in the intellect; neither of which is an intention. Therefore, the intelligible species is not only an intention, but a *first* intention.

Hervaeus answers¹⁵ that the intelligible species is a first intention as pertaining to the knowing subject, but not as pertaining to the known thing. The proof of the first part of the argument (1) is not conclusive for the intention as pertaining to the known thing, says Hervaeus. Nor does the second proof of the first argument apply.¹⁶ Species in the sense organs or in the intellect are not contrary in their real being; only the things of which they are intentions are contrary in this way. For example, something black and something white are contrary and cannot be in the same subject at the same time, but the two species of black and white can very well intentionally be in the same subject (in the mind) at the same time. This is not because black and white *are* intentions that exist in the same subject, but because they *have* intentions that exist in the same subject. Hervaeus refers to his third division: something is said to have intentional being not because it is itself an intention, but because its intention brings the intellect to an act of cognition.

The second part of the objection (b) is conceded by Hervaeus¹⁷ in that no intention pertaining to the knowing subject comes before the intention that is a species; we can say that the species is a first intention as pertaining to a knowing subject, but we cannot say that it is the intention we are speaking of here, namely the intention as pertaining to the known thing.

The second opposing argument¹⁸ is that if an intelligible species is an intention at all, it must be a first intention (based on what is said in the first objection). And it must be an intention: since only things belonging to one of the ten categories can have real being, and the intelligible

¹⁵ *Dist.* 1, § 32.

¹⁶ *Dist.* 1, § 33.

¹⁷ *Dist.* 1, § 34.

¹⁸ *Dist.* 1, § 9.

species does not belong to one of the categories, it cannot have real being. Therefore, it must have intentional being, and it must be an intention.

Hervaeus refutes this by saying¹⁹ that a species in the intellect belongs to the category of *habitus* or *dispositio* because it bears a relation to something, which means that it has real being, not rational being.

Hervaeus also mentions three arguments against the intelligible species being an intention, which are genuine objections to his own opinion:

First,²⁰ an intelligible species does have real being, because it has a real efficient cause: the real thing of which it is a species. Therefore, it cannot be an intention.

Second,²¹ the intelligible species is the cause of an act of the intellect. Something which is the cause of a real act must be a real being. Therefore, the intelligible species cannot be an intention.

Third,²² species in the sense organs have real being, independent of the act of the intellect. But an act of the intellect cannot have a lesser being than an act of the senses, which means that the intelligible species cannot have a lesser being than the species in the sense organs. Therefore, the intelligible species has real being and not intentional being, and cannot be an intention.

Hervaeus combines his rejection of these three arguments to the contrary,²³ in accordance with one of the distinctions he has made between intentions: these arguments simply do not prove anything against intelligible species being first intentions as pertaining to the knowing subject, because that type of intention is perfectly compatible with real being.

3.2.2. *Is a first intention nothing but an act of the intellect?*

In *quaestiones disputatae* the objections were not always made by real opponents, but could also be brought up by the defender of the position, simply to give himself an opportunity for presenting further clarifications and details. However, the question whether intentions are mere acts of the intellect or something more than that was much debated in this period, and there is little doubt that one of the opposing opinions which Hervaeus explains and rejects with great care here is that of a real

¹⁹ *Dist.* 1, § 35.

²⁰ *Dist.* 1, § 10.

²¹ *Dist.* 1, § 11.

²² *Dist.* 1, § 12.

²³ *Dist.* 1, § 36.

adversary, namely Radulphus Brito. The divisions mentioned above already indicate that Hervaeus will deny that intentions are no more than acts.

3.2.2.1. *Hervaeus' own answer*

After stating the objections to the view that intentions are mere acts of the intellect, Hervaeus proceeds to give his own opinion.²⁴ He starts with a discussion about the intention itself and goes on to discuss the order between intentions.

3.2.2.1.1. *Intention*

An intention as pertaining to a knowing subject (*intentio ex parte intelligentis*), as we have seen in 3.2. *First intentions*, can be anything that by representation leads the intellect into cognition; this also includes acts of knowing. If we consider intentions as pertaining to the known thing (*ex parte rei intellecta*), a concrete intention is the known thing insofar as it is the formal object of the intellect and also its relation to the act of knowing. The known thing in itself, without any addition, is not an intention at all, neither first nor second: in that case, the definition of 'man' or 'stone' would include being an intention, which is untrue.²⁵

Thus, for a known thing to be an intention something – namely intentionality – must be added to that thing. That intentionality is either 1. the relation of the known thing to the act of the intellect; or 2. the act of the intellect; or 3. the relation of the act of the intellect to the known thing. Hervaeus considers the first option to be the most probable. The second cannot be true, because this form of intentionality is an abstract intention, not part of the thing as it exists outside the mind, thus the intentionality cannot be an act of the intellect, which act is a real being; nor can it be the relation of this act to the intelligible being,²⁶ which would be the third option.

Hervaeus adds another proof: the second concrete intention is founded upon the first intention. But the second intention can only be based upon a known thing insofar as that thing is in the intellect objectively (*objective*, as the object of the act of knowing). Therefore, the intentionality by virtue of which a first intention is called an intention adds to the known thing nothing but this being in the intellect objectively, i.e.,

²⁴ *Dist. 1*, §§ 58–73.

²⁵ *Dist. 1*, § 58.

²⁶ *Dist. 1*, § 59–60.

having a relation to the act of the intellect.²⁷ So, according to Hervaeus an abstract intention is a relation (*habitus*) from the known object (*res intellecta*) to the act of knowing; it is a rational relation (*habitus rationis* or an *ens secundum rationem*), and cannot be an act of the intellect.²⁸

3.2.2.1.2. *Order*

Next, Hervaeus explains the order (*ordo*) of intentions. For those who simply say that the first intention is the known thing and the second intention is the act of the intellect, this is easy: for every act of knowing the known thing is the first and the act is the second intention. But since Hervaeus does not agree with this he needs another explanation.²⁹

He tells us that the abstract intention (first and second) is the intentionality of the known thing, which is the relation of the known thing to the act of the intellect. This intention is therefore defined according to the diverse acts of the intellect, or in other words, according to the order of the intelligible things in their relation to the intellect. These things taken concretely are concrete intentions.³⁰

Does this division in the order of knowing arise from the nature of those things, or is it imposed by our intellect? Hervaeus agrees with his opponents that for things as relating to the intellect there is an order of being known: we cannot know a thing as having a relation to the act of the intellect unless we first know the act of the intellect to which the thing has this relation. This difference in order of being known makes it clear that the intentionality of a thing, i.e., its having a relation to the act of the intellect, cannot be identical with the act of the intellect itself.³¹

The objections to Hervaeus' opinion, traditionally located at the beginning of the question, roughly amount to the same: the second intention is founded upon the act of the intellect, and since the foundation of a second intention must be a first intention, this act must be a first intention. Also, an intention is a tendency of the intellect towards the known thing. But this tendency is the act of the intellect, so intentions are acts of the intellect.³²

Hervaeus replies that a second intention is not founded upon the act of the intellect, but upon the known thing as it is in the intellect objectively.

27 *Dist.* 1, §61.

28 *Dist.* 1, §64.

29 *Dist.* 1, §65.

30 *Dist.* 1, §66.

31 *Dist.* 1, §§67–73.

32 *Dist.* 1, §§37–43.

And if we say that intentionality is a tendency of the intellect, we do not mean that this tendency is the act of the intellect itself, but that the intentionality is the relation of the known thing to this tendency.³³

3.2.2.2. *Two other opinions*

According to the first adversary,³⁴ the first intention is the thing which is known (e.g., a man or an animal), so that being a first intention does not add anything to the thing that is known; the second intention is the act of knowing that thing.

Hervaeus disagrees with this for the following reason: if we say ‘an animal is a first intention’, this is either an essential or an accidental predication (*praedicatio per se* or *per accidens*). If the predication is accidental, the definition of the predicate includes something which is not included in the definition of the subject. It cannot be an essential predication, because in that case the definition of animal would include ‘being a first intention’ (first mode of predication), or the definition of the predicate would also have to include something other than the definition of the subject, such as a passion or a property, the cause of which would be included in the subject. Therefore, in both cases the definition of a first intention would add something to the definition of an animal, so that the position does not hold.³⁵

Hervaeus then attacks his second opponent.³⁶ Though Hervaeus does not tell us who would have held such an opinion it is quite probable that he is referring to Radulphus Brito, who was his contemporary and who defended a very similar position, as we shall see below.³⁷

According to this opinion the first intention taken abstractly is the first (or absolute) act of the intellect, in which the thing is known absolutely, which means that it is known separately from other things. The second intention is the second or respective act of the intellect, in which the thing is known with respect or in relation to other things. The first

33 *Dist.* 1, §§ 74–81.

34 I have not been able to identify the author of this first opinion so far.

35 *Dist.* 1, §§ 44–46.

36 §§ 49–57.

37 See 66. This identification was first pointed out by Pinborg in ‘Zum Begriff der intentio secunda’, 54, and later in ‘Radulphus Brito on Universals’, 58. In the latter article (130–132) Pinborg has edited a few pages of the text from Hervaeus’ *Dist.* 1, q. 2, where Hervaeus refutes this anonymous opinion. Pinborg’s edition is based on the Paris edition (1489).

intention taken concretely is the thing as known absolutely, and the second intention is the thing as known respectively. The second intention is founded upon the first intention, taken concretely.³⁸

Hervaeus refutes this opinion on three points. He states that in this position the second intention taken concretely is not explained correctly (1), that first and second intentions taken abstractly are not explained correctly (2), and that the explanation of the way in which the second intention is founded on the first intention does not hold (3).

The first point (1) is explained as follows. According to these people, says Hervaeus,³⁹ a second concrete intention is the thing known *ut in pluribus* (with respect to many things) and such a cognition of the thing is a respective cognition. Is the relation of the thing to its *plura* a real relation, existing independently of the mind, or a rational relation, dependent on the operation of the intellect? If it is a real relation we have a real relation which is a second concrete intention, the cognition of which is a second abstract intention. In this way, understanding a father in his being a father (*in eo quod pater*) would be a second intention. But it would be absurd to assume that a thing according to its real being (*esse reale*) is a second intention, for then it would follow that real sciences studying things under a certain aspect would in fact study second intentions, which is not true.

Nor could the above-mentioned second concrete intention be a rational relation; for just as the known thing in its relation to its *plura* is a second intention, so the abstract thing would be a second intention, and many more things would be a second intention. Therefore, it is not possible that only the thing known *ut in pluribus* (taken in its relation to other things) is a second intention and nothing else.⁴⁰

Regarding the second point (2) Hervaeus argues that first and second abstract intentions are not well understood by his opponents. He uses two arguments to prove this.

First, they say that, because absolute cognition of a thing comes first and the respective cognition of a thing comes only later, the first and absolute cognition is called a first intention and the second and respective cognition is called a second intention. Hervaeus rejects this

³⁸ *Dist. 1*, § 49–50.

³⁹ *Dist. 1*, § 53.

⁴⁰ *Dist. 1*, § 53.

as follows: if we could call abstract intentions first and second intentions simply because they are two kinds of cognitions with a certain order, it would follow that we would also have a first and second intention with respect to the cognition of things in their real being (*esse reale*), e.g., '*calidum*' in the sense of '*calidum*' (warm) and '*calefactivum*' (warming) respectively. This is false, since in both cases the cognition of '*calidum*' is a first, and not a second intention.⁴¹

Second, a second intention must be founded upon a first intention. But if the first act is a first intention and the second act a second intention, this cannot be true: the second act cannot be founded on the first, since the two acts do not exist simultaneously.

Against this it could be argued, says Hervaeus, that the second abstract intention (the second act of the intellect) is founded upon the first concrete intention, i.e., upon the thing known in the first act. But that would seem insufficient. In the first place, a concrete intention must be founded upon a concrete intention and an abstract intention must be founded upon an abstract intention. In the second place, an act of the intellect can have only two foundations, namely the subject in which it occurs and the object which it is about. However, the second act has neither the same subject nor the same object as the first act; otherwise a thing *ut in pluribus* and a thing *secundum se absolute accepta* would both be the objects of that second act. In the third place, from this position it would follow that if a known thing in a first cognition were the foundation of a second act, this would be the thing *secundum se*, or the thing as known. Both are impossible according to this same theory, since the object of the second act is neither the thing known *secundum se*, nor the thing known absolutely, but the thing known *ut in pluribus*.⁴²

Regarding the third point (3) it is said that a second abstract intention is a second act of the intellect, and that a second concrete intention is the thing known *ut in pluribus*. But no foundation, says Hervaeus, is given for the relation '*ut in pluribus*'; nor is it explained whether a thing serving as a foundation of a second intention, is a foundation, either in its real being or in its mental being. If the latter, it is not shown in what way this could be the case.⁴³

41 *Dist. 1*, § 54.

42 *Dist. 1*, § 55–56.

43 *Dist. 1*, § 57.

3.2.3. *Do words that refer to
particular things indicate first intentions?*

Another problem with intentions is whether words referring to particular things indicate first intentions. Hervaeus reformulates the problem: is it only universals, such as man, that are first intentions, which implies that particulars such as Socrates and Plato cannot be first intentions?⁴⁴

Hervaeus first mentions an opinion according to which Socrates, a particular, cannot be an intention. There are three kinds of names: names that do not signify intentions, such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’; names that signify first intentions or universal things, such as ‘man’ or ‘stone’; and names that signify second intentions, such as ‘universal’ or ‘subject’. Names from the second and third categories signify intentions because their significates exist only in the mind. This does not apply to ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’, and therefore these names do not signify intentions.⁴⁵

Hervaeus refutes this opinion⁴⁶ on the basis of his division between *intentio ex parte intelligentis* and *intentio ex parte rei intellectae*.⁴⁷ Socrates, or any other particular, can be an intention as pertaining to the known thing (*ex parte rei intellectae*) and concretely, to the thing itself including the intentionality attributed to that thing, where the thing is the possible term (*terminus*) of an act of knowing. Socrates can be

⁴⁴ *Dist.* 1, §87.

⁴⁵ *Dist.* 1, §87. A similar position was held by Henry of Ghent: ‘Circa primum igitur horum [sc. nominum] sciendum quod nomen quoddam significet rem puram, quoddam vero significat intentionem puram, quoddam vero significat medio modo se habens, aliquod scilicet quod quodammodo res est et quodammodo intentio. Rem puram significant nomina rerum singularium; singularia enim sunt res purae et nullo modo intentiones, quia solummodo habent esse a natura et nullo modo a consideratione rationis, ut sunt iste homo, iste lapis. Unde cum nomina eis fuerint imposita secundum quod Petrus vel Paulus est nomen istius hominis, illa appellantur simpliciter nomina rerum. Universalia autem rerum singularium et sunt quodammodo res et quodammodo intentiones; res inquantum illam naturam repraesentant quae habent esse in singularibus, intentiones vero inquantum habent ratione abstracti in consideratione intellectus propter quod nomina eis imposita, sunt quodammodo nomina rerum et quodammodo intentionum, sed primarum. Intentionum enim quaedam sunt primae, quaedam vero secundae. Et sic quodlibet universale reale inquantum habet ratione abstracti est intentio praedicabilis, quia extra singularia non est nisi in consideratione intellectus. Cetera vero quae per considerationem intellectus considerantur sive operantur et circa universalis et circa particularis sive mediate sive immediate, sunt intentiones purae. Propter quod nomina eis imposita vocantur nomina intentionum, sed secundarum’ (*Summa quaestionum ordinaria*, f. 64^v H–I).

⁴⁶ *Dist.* 1, §88.

⁴⁷ See table 1, B.1 and B.2 (24).

called an intention after this intentionality of which he is the foundation; therefore, he can be an intention in a denominative sense. Socrates can be a first intention, like all things that can be understood universally. Thus, Socrates belongs to the first category, and as such he is a first intention in a concrete and fundamental sense, though not insofar as he is objectively in the intellect. Again, that which is a foundation of a second intention is a first intention. Socrates is the foundation of a second intention, namely the intention of particularity; which means that Socrates is a first intention. It is true that Socrates' particularity is independent of the intellect, but the predicability of this particularity is dependent on the intellect, and is therefore intentional. Thus, says Hervaeus, we should answer the question in the following way: if we interpret 'intention' abstractly and as pertaining to the known thing, neither Socrates nor man is a first intention; the same is true if we interpret 'intention' concretely and including the intention denominatively (indirectly, in a derived sense). But if we interpret the first intention as that after which the intentionality is denominated, then Socrates and man are first intentions, because they can both be the term of an act of the intellect.⁴⁸

One of the arguments against Plato or Socrates being first intentions is that a first intention is the foundation of a second intention, and Plato is not a foundation of a second intention because he is numerically one (*unum numero*), which does not apply to second intentions.⁴⁹ Hervaeus answers that terms that signify things in particular, signify not only 'being numerically one', but also 'being predicable of something that is numerically one', and 'being part of a species as a subject'; and this applies to second intentions as well.⁵⁰

In another objection it is stated that, just as a second intention is founded upon a first intention, a first intention must in turn be founded upon something else. It cannot be founded upon a universal because this is itself an intention, so it must be founded upon a particular. And this means that a particular is not a first intention, because it is the foundation of a first intention.⁵¹ Hervaeus answers that that which is called an intention in a concrete sense is not necessarily founded on something else (otherwise, we would have an infinite regress). Therefore, man or

48 *Dist.* 1, §§ 90–97.

49 *Dist.* 1, § 82. Cf. the position mentioned in § 87.

50 *Dist.* 1, § 99.

51 *Dist.* 1, § 84.

Socrates can be a first intention in a concrete sense, as the thing itself which is called ‘man’ insofar as it is denominated from the corresponding intentionality.⁵²

3.2.4. *Are privations, negations and figments first intentions?*

Much has been said about ‘positive’ entities so far, either universal or particular. But what about ‘negative’ entities such as privations and negations, for instance blindness or being-not-a-man (*esse non-homo*)? And what about entities that are not even real (also called fictions), such as chimeras and mountains of gold? Hervaeus starts with the argument about privations and negations, without distinguishing between the two.

Some people, says Hervaeus, hold that privations and negations are not extra-mental things. And because only extra-mental things (which means only positive things or acts) can be first intentions, privations such as blindness are not first intentions.⁵³

Hervaeus does not agree with this; he explains that in ‘being a man’ or ‘being not-a-man’, or ‘this man is blind’ or ‘this man is not-seeing’, a real being is denied of a subject; in other words, we have a negation of a real being. And a negation of a real being is just as much a first intention as the real being which is being denied.⁵⁴

Hervaeus further argues that privations and negations belong to the same category of being as their positive counterparts, and like the latter are not intentions, taking *intentio* in the sense of intentionality (*ipsa intentionalitas*). This is because being an intention, being intentionality or being a rational entity (*esse intentionem*, *esse intentionalitatem* or *ens rationis*) are not part of the definition of privations such as blindness, any more than they are part of positive beings such as the whiteness of a body. But a privation or negation of a thing that has real being (*esse reale*) is a first intention, provided that we consider the privation or negation to be the known thing (*illud quod intelligitur*), the possible ending point or *terminus* of an act of understanding. This is called an intention, though in a negative sense and denominatively only.⁵⁵

As for figments of the imagination, these are imagined objects, created by the intellect. It may be said that fictions do not have real being, because

52 *Dist.* 1, § 100.

53 *Dist.* 1, § 101–103.

54 *Dist.* 1, § 112–114.

55 *Dist.* 1, § 105, 111.

they have no being without the act of the intellect. Because they do not have real being, they are only in the mind and must therefore be second intentions.⁵⁶ Against this Hervaeus argues that we should distinguish between two interpretations of ‘not being’ of a thing except by the act of the intellect: the definition of this type of being may or may not contain the notion of an intelligible relation to the intellect. In the latter case, we do not have a second intention, and this applies to a chimera.⁵⁷ Alternatively, we could say – which is better, says Hervaeus – that it is true that something which only has being depending on the act of the intellect, and only as long as the act of the intellect is in existence and posits its being, is a second intention. But a chimera is no such thing, since it has no being at all, regardless of the (temporary) existence of any act of the intellect by which it is conceived. Being a fiction is a second intention, but being a mountain of gold is simply impossible and false.⁵⁸

In his own explanation Hervaeus first distinguishes between *esse figmentum* (being an imagined object) and *esse montem aureum* (being a golden mountain). The definition of the first includes rational being (*esse rationale*), whereas the definition of the second does not, so that a golden mountain is not a second intention. But is it a first intention? This again depends upon how we take ‘*intentio*’. A figment such as a golden mountain consists of parts that can be called first intentions if we take the intention *ex parte rei intellectae*, using the word ‘*intentio*’ denominatively. Since the being of a combination follows the being of its constituent parts (even if, as in this case, the combination is impossible and has no real being), a golden mountain is a first intention in a denominative sense. The same is true for a proposition expressing an impossible combination, such as ‘man is an ass.’⁵⁹

56 *Dist.* 1, § 115–118.

57 *Dist.* 1, § 125. It is interesting that Hervaeus does not distinguish between golden mountains and chimeras or goatstags. Doyle (‘Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality’, 280) explains how Suarez ‘will later distinguish a golden mountain as possible from chimerae and goatstags, which will be impossible inasmuch as their parts would be mutually contradictory’.

58 *Dist.* 1, § 126. In his refutation of the objections (§§ 126–130) Hervaeus argues that figments are not second intentions, rather than answering the question whether they are first intentions.

59 *Dist.* 1, §§ 120–124.

3.3. SECOND INTENTIONS

3.3.1. *Is a second intention the very act of knowing?*

After the five questions about first intentions, Hervaeus now addresses his true subject, also indicated by the title of his book: second intentions. His first question is: are second intentions cognitive acts?

The question about identifying intentions with acts of the intellect has already been considered with respect to first intentions.⁶⁰ Hervaeus answers the question for second intentions as well, and though he uses slightly different arguments his answer is not surprising. There are three reasons why acts of the intellect are not second intentions. The first is that an act of the intellect is a real being, belonging to one of the ten categories, whereas a second intention is a rational being and does not belong to a category.⁶¹ The second reason is that second intentions which are abstractions from particulars – called universals – do not exist separately from the particulars from which they are abstracted. But acts of the intellect do exist separately from individual objects, which means that second intentions which are universals are not acts of the intellect.⁶² The third reason is that a universal by predication, in the way that ‘man’ is said to be a universal with respect to Socrates and Plato, is a second intention and not an act of the intellect. We can subdivide acts of the intellect as follows. In one sense the act is in the intellect as in a subject and is that by which something is known; this is not a universal by predication. In the other sense, an act of the intellect is an object of the intellect, which is a universal by predication; this universal is in the intellect objectively. Therefore, a second intention which is a universal is not an act of the intellect, but it follows the act of the intellect, just as it follows other things insofar as they are in the intellect objectively.⁶³

So we see, says Hervaeus, that no second intention, whether taken abstractly or concretely, is an act of the intellect: every abstract intention, first as well as second, is the relation between the thing as known and the act of knowing, and therefore cannot be identified with the act of knowing. Nor is a concrete intention (the thing as known) an act of

60 *Dist.* I, q. 2.

61 *Dist.* II, § 19.

62 *Dist.* II, § 21–22.

63 *Dist.* II, §§ 22–25.

knowing, since the act follows the thing insofar as it is known, or the thing insofar as it is in the intellect objectively.⁶⁴

Hervaeus again explicitly rejects two other opinions here. According to the first opinion first and second intentions considered as intentionalities (*intentionalitates*) are supposed to be acts of the intellect, and as concrete things (*concreta*) they are supposed to be the things as they are known.⁶⁵ Hervaeus refutes this by referring to his discussion of the second question of the first *Distinctio*,⁶⁶ where he rejects an opinion similar to that of Radulphus Brito.⁶⁷

According to the other opinion a thing as known is a first intention, and the act of the intellect is a second intention. This opinion differs from the first (and from that of Radulphus Brito) in that here no distinction is made between abstract and concrete intentions, as Radulphus does. According to this opinion, we can interpret the act of the intellect as a real act, and in this sense the act is not a second intention or another rational being. In another sense, the act is the thing known in a certain way. Just as we can say of the picture of a man that it is a man, not a man as such (*simpliciter*) but a man in a diminished and specific sense (*diminutive et secundum quid*), we can also say that the act of knowing a man is a man in a diminished and specific sense, and that the act is endowed with rational being exactly because this act is a man in this diminished sense. In fact, it is said that all really existing things are first intentions (substances as well as accidents), which applies to the acts of the intellect; but the act of the intellect is also a second intention in a diminished sense, because this act can be called the known thing in a diminished sense. According to this opinion, being a first intention does not add anything really or rationally to the nature of the known thing.⁶⁸

For his rejection of this opinion Hervaeus refers us to his divisions in *Dist.* I, §§ 14–23, and his refutation of these two opinions in *Dist.* I, §§ 44–57.⁶⁹

64 *Dist.* II, § 27.

65 *Dist.* II, §§ 13–14.

66 *Dist.* II, §§ 13–14.

67 See above, 68 ff.

68 *Dist.* II, §§ 15–18.

69 See also tables 1 and 2, and *Dist.* II, § 58.

3.3.1.1. *Objections*

The importance of the issue whether an intention is an act of knowing is already clear from the fact that Hervaeus discusses it separately for first and second intentions. It is also indicated by the number of objections which Hervaeus finds it necessary to enumerate and reject here.

One opponent says, again, that a second intention must be an act of the intellect. This is because a second intention is a rational being which must be either an act, or a rational potentiality (*potentia rationali*). It cannot be a potentiality, since this belongs to the category of quality and is therefore a real being; and a second intention is not a real being. Therefore, a second intention must be an act.

Hervaeus answers that a rational being, besides being an act or a potentiality, can also be that which follows a thing insofar as it is in the intellect objectively; this is a second intention. Besides, the argument against the potentiality of a rational being (namely, that it belongs to the category of quality) also applies to its being an act, since acts belong to that same category. Therefore, both possibilities would be excluded by this argument.⁷⁰

Another objection is that a thing without which there is no second intention in the apprehension must be the second intention itself, and that must be an act. This is argued twice: first, whatever remains without an act is a real thing; second intentions are not real things. Thus, a second intention cannot remain without an act, and therefore it must be an act. Second, without an apprehension, nothing remains in the apprehension. Without the act of apprehending, no apprehension remains; therefore, without the act of the intellect, no second intention (nor anything else) remains in the apprehension. Hervaeus answers that it does not follow that that without which no second intention remains in the apprehension must itself be a second intention. We must divide the exclusion of the act of the intellect into its being and its being understood. In the first sense, the act of the intellect does not remain in the apprehension; in the second sense, the act of the intellect is not understood. In this second sense many things can remain in the apprehension without the act, because many things can be understood and remain in the apprehension without the act of the intellect being understood.⁷¹

70 *Dist.* II, §§ 4, 29.

71 *Dist.* II, §§ 5, 30–32.

A third objection is that a rational being is either a being or it is not a being. The latter option – it is not a being – is impossible, because then a being would not be a being; therefore, it must be an act. And since a second intention is a rational being, it must be an act. Hervaeus answers that a rational being is a being and not an act, but it is not a being as such (*esse simpliciter*), because then it would be a real being. Instead, it is a being in a certain respect (*esse secundum quid*), just as a potential being.⁷²

In the fourth objection it is said that anything that is one object formally understood is really and rationally one, because a rational difference creates a division between formal objects and because a real difference makes a rational difference. This applies to second intentions and acts of the intellect, for anything that is one formal object of some science is one formal object of the intellect. The act of the intellect and the second intention are one object of logic; therefore, they are one formal object of the intellect. Thus, they are rationally and really one. Hervaeus replies that logic is not about the act of the intellect as its first object in itself, but only insofar as the act is the cause of its subject and insofar as second intentions depend upon the act of the intellect, because a second intention follows a thing only insofar as it is in the intellect objectively.⁷³ Here he anticipates the discussion about the subject of logic in *Dist. v*.

In the fifth objection it is said that '*praedicabile*' and '*praedicatum*' are rational beings. But these are acts of the intellect, since '*praedicare*' is an act of the intellect. Therefore, these rational beings are acts of the intellect. Hervaeus answers that 'being understood' or 'rational being' can be taken in two ways, namely as the act of understanding, or as that which follows the thing insofar as it is in the intellect objectively. Second intentions are to be taken in the latter sense, not in the first, which means they are not acts of the intellect.⁷⁴

In the sixth objection it is said that what is not in a specific category must be a rational being and a second intention. Since the act of the intellect is not in a specific category, it must be a rational being and a second intention. Hervaeus answers that the act of the intellect belongs to the third type of the category of quality, namely passion.⁷⁵

⁷² *Dist. II*, §§6, 33–34.

⁷³ *Dist. II*, §§7, 35.

⁷⁴ *Dist. II*, §§8, 36.

⁷⁵ *Dist. II*, §§9–10, 37.

3.3.2. *Is a second intention something
really existing in the intellect as in a subject?*

Hervaeus first mentions two other opinions in which second intentions are called intelligible species or concepts of the mind, respectively. These two opinions agree that second intentions are real things existing in the intellect as in a subject, but not existing in a category, because their being is not perfect enough for that. Hervaeus rejects this, arguing first that, just as spiritual substances are no less perfect beings than corporeal substances, likewise spiritual accidents (such as a concept of the mind) are no less perfect than corporeal accidents; therefore, their being is perfect enough to exist in a category. Second, Hervaeus argues that concepts of the mind and intelligible species are not second intentions, because second intentions are indeed deficient in their being, whereas these concepts and species are not. The reason for this is that universals are not really separated from the individuals; man in general is not really separated from individual men. Species and concepts, however, are really separated from the individuals. Also, species or concepts are not universals by predication but by representation; here, Hervaeus refers to his divisions in *Dist.* I, where he said that species and concepts are *intentiones ex parte intelligentis*, intentions pertaining to a knowing subject, which bring the intellect to knowledge of a thing by way of representation.⁷⁶ Universals by representation are not second intentions existing objectively in the intellect; they are in the intellect as in a subject.

However, intelligible species and concepts of the mind are not second intentions, which according to Hervaeus do not belong to any category. Also, second intentions are not really separated from their individuals, whereas intelligible species and concepts of the mind are. A second intention taken as a universal by representation, namely as an intelligible species or a concept, is in the intellect as in a subject, but then we would be taking the second intention as pertaining to a knowing subject. Here, however, we speak about the intention as pertaining to the known thing, which is a universal by predication, and as such a second intention is in the intellect objectively only.⁷⁷

One could argue that a second intention is a real being that exists in the intellect as in a subject, because an abstract being, which is a second intention, originates from the agent intellect and the phantasms which

⁷⁶ See table 1 on 24.

⁷⁷ *Dist.* II, §§ 45–54.

exist in the possible intellect as in a subject; therefore, this abstract being is a real being existing in the intellect as in a subject. But Hervaeus answers that an abstract being can be interpreted in two ways. In one sense, it is indeed a real being existing in the intellect as in a subject and separately from individuals, just as concepts or acts of the intellect. In this sense it is not a second intention. In the other sense it is a second intention, for instance when 'man' says something abstract about Plato or Socrates; in that case it is a second intention with respect to its abstractness. But in this sense it is not in the intellect as in a subject, but only objectively.⁷⁸

Another argument could be that, since in every real action presupposing a subject a real form or act is acquired in that subject and the intellect causes universality in things (according to the Arab philosopher Averroës), in this real action, too, a real form or a real act is acquired in the presupposed subject. This subject cannot be an extra-mental thing, for these things cannot contain a universal. Hence, universality is a thing that is acquired in the intellect as in a subject by the second action that causes universality. Hervaeus replies that the type of universal that is caused by the intellect in a real action, such as a mental concept or a species, is a universal by representation, existing in the intellect as in a subject; it is not a second intention as pertaining to a knowing subject. Yet, a universal by predication, which is objectively in the intellect, is not caused by a real action and nothing real is acquired by the intellect in this act.⁷⁹ Though we can say that a concept interpreted as the known thing does exist in the intellect as in a subject, it is not true that the concept or the known thing are second intentions.⁸⁰

3.3.3. *Is a second intention something really existing outside the mind?*

After a recapitulation of the division between intentions *in abstracto* and *in concreto*,⁸¹ Hervaeus tells us that second intentions, taken concretely or abstractly, do not exist outside the mind.⁸² This has already become clear from his more elaborate explanation of intentions *ex parte rei intellectae*,

78 *Dist.* II, §§ 39, 55.

79 *Dist.* II, §§ 40, 56–57.

80 *Dist.* II, §§ 41, 58.

81 *Dist.* II, § 65.

82 *Dist.* II, §§ 66–78; §§ 79–85.

since both abstract and concrete intentions are *habitudines* and therefore *entia rationis tantum*.⁸³

In the final section⁸⁴ Hervaeus explains the difference between the objectively existing intention and what is absolutely nothing (*omnino nihil*). For something to differ from absolutely nothing it is sufficient for that something to represent some real entity, as privations and negations do.⁸⁵ Second intentions have only *esse rationis*,⁸⁶ but they do suppose a real entity that is either the act of understanding or the real thing that must ultimately be the foundation of that act. Finally, Hervaeus tells us that *omnino nihil* can indeed be understood, because we can understand something, e. g. *homo* or *omnino nihil*, without in the same act understanding it as being white or being an *ens* or an *ens rationis*, respectively.

3.3.4. *Is a second intention a mere rational relation?*

Hervaeus first explains that some rational beings or (concrete) second intentions are privations, as abstractions (*abstractum*), such as man considered separately from Socrates or Plato. These are not relations at all. But if the second intention is something positive, such as *genus* or a *species*, it is a certain type of relation (Hervaeus uses the term *habitus* for ‘relation’) from the known thing to the understanding intellect. This is not a real relation, since it is not a real thing existing in a category; yet, this *habitus* is more similar to relation than to any of the other categories, because an *ens rationis* is most similar to that which is the least real. But not all second intentions are *habitudines*, because some are privations, as we have seen.⁸⁷

One could argue that second intentions or rational beings are not mere rational relations: like all categories, the category of relation is about real beings. The other categories are not about rational beings, which means that the category of relation is not either. Therefore, a second intention cannot be a rational relation. But Hervaeus says that although the *habitudines* of which he is speaking are not relations existing in the

83 See above, 26 ff. By the *intentio ex parte intelligibilis* in § 66, Hervaeus must mean the *intentio ex parte rei intellecta* he has defined in the first *distinctio* (see table 1 and 2).

84 *Dist. II*, §§ 86–97.

85 *Dist. II*, § 91.

86 *Dist. II*, § 92.

87 *Dist. II*, §§ 111–119.

category of relation, they still have more affinity with this category than with any other.⁸⁸

3.3.5. *Is the relation of the known thing to the intellect a mere second intention?*

Hervaeus replies that the relation of a known thing to the intellect is indeed a second intention, provided we take this second intention concretely. For in that case we are speaking of the relation of the known thing to the intellect, and this relation can be only a second intention. If we take the intention abstractly, i.e., as the intentionality, then it is not just a first or a second intention, but both a first and second intention.⁸⁹

In one of the objections it is said that the relation of the known thing to the intellect is not a second intention: that which is common to first and second intentions cannot be said about the second intention only. Moreover, the intentionality according to which something is called a first or a second intention is a *habitus* or a relation of the known thing to the intellect only insofar as it is the term or the ending point of the tendency of the intellect towards this known object. Hervaeus replies that this is true; this relation is not only a second intention.⁹⁰

Another objection uses an argument regarding the object of logic.⁹¹ It states that the logician studies second intentions, but not relations of the known thing to the intellect. Predicables such as genus and species are not relations of the known thing to the intellect, but relations between known things. Therefore, second intentions are not relations of the known thing to the intellect. Hervaeus replies that the minor is untrue: logic is about relations of the known thing to the intellect, for a predicable is a relation not only to the subject, but also to the act of the intellect in which one thing is predicated of another thing.⁹²

3.3.6. *Is only the relation of the known thing to the intellect a second intention?*

This final question of the second *Distinctio* is again answered in accordance with the well-known divisions between intentions. If we take the

88 *Dist.* II, § 105, 120.

89 *Dist.* II, §§ 132–133.

90 *Dist.* II, §§ 125, 137.

91 *Dist.* II, §§ 125, 137.

92 *Dist.* II, §§ 137, 141.

intention abstractly, in the sense of intentionality, then the intention is a *habitus* or relation of the known thing to the intellect, and this relation is the only intention in this sense of the word 'intention'. If we take the intention concretely, then the above-mentioned relation is not a first intention, because the relation is a rational being, whereas the concrete intention is a real being; however, it can be a second intention insofar as it can be the term or the object of the act of knowing. Yet this relation is not the only second concrete intention; it is not only the relation of the known thing to the intellect that is a second intention, but a relation of one known thing to another (genus, species) or to a privation (for example, an abstract being such as man) is a second intention as well.⁹³

It is not true that only the relation of the known thing to the intellect is a second intention, says Hervaeus; a thing can very well have a relation to something different from a knowing subject. For instance, a genus can have a relation to a species insofar as they are both in the intellect objectively (that is, as second intentions).⁹⁴

93 *Dist.* II, §§ 148–153, 156–159.

94 *Dist.* II, §§ 143, 161.

