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Hervaeus Natalis, *De secundis intentionibus*, Distinctiones I&II : critical edition with introduction and indices

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Background

1.1. INTENTIONS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT

In everyday speech, even within a philosophical context, most people would associate the word ‘intention’ with ethics or psychology. However, the treatise *De secundis intentionibus* (*Second intentions*), written by Hervaeus Natalis in the beginning of the 14th century, is not about psychology or ethics at all. It is about logic, and most 21st-century readers will need some background information if they are to appreciate the nature of the medieval debate about intentions.

The debate about first and second intentions, an important subject in philosophy from the late 13th century onwards, originated from the problem of universals, such as *species* (e.g., man) or *genera* (e.g., animal). Plato and Aristotle had already explained their opinions at great length: according to Plato, ideas or forms (exemplars of sensible objects) exist *separately from* sensible objects, and according to Aristotle, the forms of sensible objects exist *within* sensible objects. This became a specific issue in philosophy again after Porphyry had first stated his famous questions about the nature of universals in *Isagoge*: do they [sc. *genera* and *species*] exist in themselves, or only as concepts? and if they exist in themselves, are they corporeal or incorporeal? and do they exist separately from sensible objects, or do they exist in sensible objects, while being dependent on such objects?

Porphyry left these questions unanswered, saying that the *Isagoge*, an introduction to Aristotle’s *Categories*, was not a proper place for the treatment of such a difficult subject.¹ Boethius did tackle the problem in his commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and proposed a solution

1 *Porphyrii Isagoge translatio Boethii et anonymi fragmentum vulgo vocatum ‘Liber sex Principiorum’*, 1^{10–15}. ‘Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem sive subsistunt sive in solis nudis purisque intellectibus posita sunt sive subsistentia corporalia sunt an incorporalia, et utrum separata an in sensibilibus et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo (altissimum enim est huiusmodi negotium et maioris egens inquisitionis) [...]’

along Aristotelian lines: *genera* and *species* do exist in sensible and corporeal things.²

From then on the discussion was transferred into other areas. The problem was (and still is) studied from many different angles, such as those of science and theology, psychology and epistemology, ontology and metaphysics, semantics and logic. What type of object is a universal? Can we even call it an object in any other sense than as an object of thought? What does it mean to be an object of human thought? Can a universal be touched or measured? Can we know it, and if so, how? What happens in our mind when we know it, try to know it, or remember it? What is its ontological status: does it exist in the same way as other objects we can perceive, such as the tangible objects around us? Is a universal linked to individual objects, and if so, how? How do we, or should we, speak and think about universals? Do we, in thinking and speaking of them, refer to universal concepts or to individual objects? What does it 'mean' to mean something by a universal term? In referring to an object, do we refer to a (universal) essence, or to an individual nature? What consequences do the answers to these and related questions have for theological issues such as our knowledge of God, God's knowledge of things, or the Trinity? And what are the consequences of the answers to these questions for our ideas about language and reasoning? These and other related questions are still being debated in contemporary philosophy.³

During the later Middle Ages two kinds of universals were specifically discussed: intelligible species and intentions. The topic of *intelligible species* was the focus of those who were mainly interested in the process of cognition; the role of the intelligible species within that process as opposed to that of the sensible species was discussed from a psychological as well as from an epistemological and a metaphysical point of view. In some theories the intelligible species was entirely discarded as superfluous in the process of cognition.⁴

2 *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, vol. XLVIII, pars I, 161–167. The subject of universals in Pophyrus and Boethius is of course much more complicated than the outline given here. For a detailed analysis of universals in Pophyrus and Boethius, see e.g. De Libera, 'L'art des généralités,' especially Chapitre II (159 ff.).

3 See De Libera, *La querelle des universaux*, for an extensive and interesting exposé of the way in which the problem of universals has shaped and influenced the discussion about many other subjects in various disciplines since the Middle Ages.

4 Cf. Durandus de St.-Pourçain: see below, 61.

At the end of the 13th century, *intentions* became a subject of debate for those who wished to define them not primarily in terms of their role within the process of cognition, but rather in terms of their exact nature and ontological status. Some identified intentions with the things themselves,⁵ or with the intelligible species.⁶ Others identified them with either the things as known or the cognitive acts of the intellect.⁷ Especially around the beginning of the 14th century we find much discussion about the nature of *intentions*: how they come into being and into what type of being; the way in which they are related to each other, to the (human or divine) mind, to the things they are supposed somehow to represent or refer to, and to the act of cognition in and by which they are supposed to be produced or at least known; how intentions are related to the sensible and intelligible species, and to the *verbum mentis* or mental word, seen from a theological as well as an epistemological point of view;⁸ and the difference and the relation between first and second intentions. Intentions were no longer simply identified with intelligible species, acts of cognition or extra-mental things; they were redefined and subdivided, in such a way that an intention could be all those things, depending on how the term was used.⁹

Early in the 14th century, the debate acquired a new approach. One of its participants, Hervaeus Natalis, realizing the lack of clarity regarding the exact meaning and use of the term '*secunda intentio*' in the writings of both his predecessors and contemporaries, decided to make clear

5 Cf. Robert Kilwardby: 'Res enim ipsae sunt primae intentiones [...]' (*De natura theologiae*, ed. Stegmüller, 157).

6 Cf. Henry of Ghent: 'Unde et intentio non dicitur esse aliquid in re ut est extra, sed solum ut cadit in intellectus actuali consideratione considerantis unum in re ut duo intentione [...]' (Quodl. v, xii, c), and Thomas in his early period (see below, 51).

7 Cf. Radulphus Brito, 66ff.

8 For the development of the concept of the *verbum mentis* in St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, both in philosophy and theology, see Paissac, *Théologie du Verbe*, Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, I 192–194, 203, 213 (and n. 14), and Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur*, especially 179ff.

9 Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, section 2 and Radulphus Brito, section 4 of this introduction. See Knudsen, 'Intentions and impositions,' for a short overview of the sources and development of these two concepts. Knudsen says that 'in the writings of Hervaeus Natalis and Peter Aureoli the theory of intentions developed by Brito was more or less modified. But it was also attacked rather forcefully both by nominalists (especially Ockham) and by realists (especially Walter Burley)' (490). This statement would seem somewhat misleading, since Hervaeus and Auriol criticise Brito's interpretation of intentions as acts of the intellect, whereas Ockham, like Brito, also defends the point of view that intentions are acts.

what exactly the term was supposed to mean and in which science second intentions should be studied. Unlike his contemporaries, Hervaeus did not present his explanation about intentions in his commentaries on the *Sentences*.¹⁰ But not long after he had written this commentary, he composed a large treatise on the subject: *De secundis intentionibus*. Obviously Hervaeus thought the subject worthy of a much more comprehensive study than just a section in a commentary. What is more, he was the first to write such a study.

1.2. HERVAEUS NATALIS: LIFE AND WORKS

Hervaeus Natalis¹¹ was born probably in or near Morlaix in north-west Brittany (France). He entered the order of the Dominicans in Morlaix on 29 April 1276, where he started his education¹² as a student in theology. He continued his studies in Paris, where he stayed at the convent of St.-Jacques and read the *Sentences* (possibly in 1302) as a *baccalarius* before obtaining his degree as a Master of Theology in 1307.¹³ Hervaeus' literary activity was impressive. He wrote many works on theology¹⁴ and logic.

¹⁰ See 1.3.

¹¹ Hauréau (*HLF*) and Roensch (*Early Thomistic School*) together come up with the following variants of Hervaeus' name: Alveus, Arveus, Ervergius, Erveus, Harvey, Hervé, Brito, Natalis, Natalis Brito, Natalitius, Nédelec (Breton for the French 'Noël'), Nédélec, Nédélec, Nedellec, Nédéllec, Nedellac, Nedlec, Noël; Échard's variant 'de Nédellec', based upon the supposed possession by Hervaeus' family of an estate called 'Nédellec', is considered erroneous by Hauréau (308). For consistency's sake I will use 'Hervaeus Natalis' throughout.

¹² For more information about education in the Middle Ages, see e.g. Kenny/Pinborg, 'Medieval philosophical literature'. The study of theology was no easy matter: 'After (1) eight years of preparatory studies, (2) the student had to act for two years as a lecturer on the Bible (*baccalaureus biblicus*) and (3) two years as a lecturer on dogmatics, using (from the 13th century onwards) Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as the course-book (as *baccalaureus sententiarum*). Following this (4) he was supposed to attend and participate in disputations for four years' (19). For students who belonged to a religious order, such as the Dominicans to which Hervaeus belonged, the study of theology took even still longer; they were not allowed to take the arts degree and therefore took a special, longer course (see Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars*, 41 and ch. 2, and Maierù, *University Training in Medieval Europe*, ch. 1). For more information about the university in the Middle Ages, see also Hoenen et al., *Philosophy and Learning*. About Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, see also 8, n. 20.

¹³ See Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars*, for more information about life at 14th-century schools and universities in general.

¹⁴ For an account of Hervaeus' views on theology, see E. Krebs, *Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik an der Hand der bisher ungedruckten Defensa doctrinae D. Thomae*. On proofs of the existence of God, see Édouard

From 1309, he was head of the Dominican province in France and ended up as Master General of the Dominicans from 1318 until his death in August 1323, just after the canonisation of Thomas Aquinas (18 July), in the preparation of which he had taken a large part.

Among Hervaeus' numerous works are a commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* (1302–1303);¹⁵ a *Defensio doctrinae fratris Thomae*, (1307–1309), the treatise *Determinatio de intellectu et specie*;¹⁶ four *Quodlibeta maiora* (I: 1307–1308, II: 1308, III: 1309, IV: 1316–1318);¹⁷ six *Quodlibeta minora* (1307–1309); the treatise *De verbo* (1307–1309), many other *quaestiones disputatae*, many other polemic treatises directed against Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, Jacob of Metz, Geoffrey of Fontaines, Durandus of St.-Pourçain and Peter Auriol; and the treatise *De secundis intentionibus* (between 1309 and 1316).¹⁸

1.3. HERVAEUS' *DE SECUNDIS INTENTIONIBUS*: IMPORTANCE

For a long time Hervaeus Natalis did not have a reputation for being the most original or influential of medieval thinkers; he has generally

Wéber, 'La démonstration de l'existence de Dieu chez Hervé de Nedellec et ses confrères prêcheurs de Paris', and J. Santeler, *Der kausale Gottesbeweis bei Hervaeus Natalis nach dem ungedrucktem Traktat 'De cognitione primi principii'*. For his views on original sin, see R. Martin, *E Primitiis Scholae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, 233–247; *Controverse sur le péché originel au début du xive siècle*, 211–214, and C. Vollert, *The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin*. For his views on eucharistic problems, see Kenneth Plotnik, *Hervaeus Natalis O.P. and the Controversies over the Real Presence and Transsubstantiation*. On the sacraments, see Ludwig Hödl, *Die Grundfragen der Sakramentenlehre nach Hervaeus Natalis O.P.* On essence and existence and his rejection of the real distinction, see E. Hocedez, *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia*, (92)–(94); E. Allen, 'Hervaeus Natalis: An Early 'Thomist' on the Notion of Being'; and W. Senko, 'Les opinions d'Hervé de Nédellec au sujet de l'essence et l'existence'. About Hervaeus' *De iurisdictione* and *De exemptione* see also E. Elter, 'Un ouvrage inconnu de Hervé Nédellec'. Recent studies on intentions in Hervaeus' contemporaries can be found in Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, and De Rijk, *Giraldus Odonis*, vol. II.

15 Cf. A. Fries, 'Quaestiones super quartum librum Sententiarum Hervaeus Natalis O.P. vindicatae'.

16 This is part of the treatise *De quattuor materiis*, written between 1302 and 1307. The other three parts are *De esse* [or 'ente'] *et essentia* or *De materia et forma*, *De voluntate et intellectu* and *De voto religiosorum*. See Stella (129–134) for a description of the mss. containing (parts) of this treatise, and Stella (141 ff.) for a critical edition of the *Determinatio de intellectu et specie*.

17 1310 according to J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano* (269), but Guimarães (65) gives good arguments for dating it to 1316–1318.

18 See 81, n. 1.

been considered a faithful adherent of Thomas Aquinas, and of his works hardly any editions exist that are more recent than the 17th century, except for a few extracts. However, a closer look at Hervaeus' achievement in *De secundis intentionibus* will make it clear that his texts are certainly worth studying. As we shall see below, Hervaeus' approach to the study of intentions is an original one and his work contains many important elements that are not found in Thomas. Also, it appears that in the Thomistic schools from the early 14th century until the Renaissance, Hervaeus was considered a Thomist *par excellence*, and as such was often referred to by defenders as well as opponents of Thomism. This means that the direct and indirect influence of Hervaeus' specific doctrines is in need of a revaluation.¹⁹

The discussion of intentions at that time generally took place in commentaries to Aristotle's *Categories*, *De interpretatione*, *De anima*, *Metaphysics* and especially in the commentary on the *Sentences* by Petrus Lombardus,²⁰ often in question 1.23 (where Lombard discusses whether the term 'person' as related to the Trinity refers to a first or a second intention). Such a commentary on the *Sentences* was a necessary requirement in the study of theology in order to obtain the title of *Magister*, which means that many medieval philosophers wrote one (or more). We find such expositions, for instance, in the commentaries by Giles of Rome, John of Paris, William of Ware, Duns Scotus, Jacob of Metz and Durandus of St.-Pourçain.²¹ The text in Hervaeus' commentary on the *Sentences*, question 1.23, contains only a short overview of the meaning of *per-*

19 For recent research on Thomism and the importance of Hervaeus' role in it during the early 14th century and onwards, see Georg Koridze, *Intentionale Grundlegung der philosophischen logik*, 22–24, 40 ff., 60 ff., and especially 269 ff.; and 'The formation of the first Thomistic school, where he modifies John Haldane's classification of early Thomism (see Haldane, 'Thomism' and 'Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy').

20 Peter Lombard wrote his *Sentences* in the middle of the 12th century as a textbook for his theology students. The commentaries to the *Sentences* reflect a development: older commentaries such as that by Thomas Aquinas still systematically treated every point, but around 1300 the texts became less exhaustive but at the same time more voluminous and complex; they were often reworked, and commentators of this period (such as Hervaeus) more and more expressed their own thoughts instead of simply commenting on the original text. See Friedman, 'The *Sentences* Commentary'.

21 More information on the intentionality debate in this period can be found in De Rijk, *Giraldus Odonis*, vol. II, 130–163.

sona without any details on the exact meaning of the *intentio secunda*.²² But Hervaeus obviously felt the need to go into much more detail at a later stage. He may have thought that his predecessors, such as Thomas Aquinas, were insufficiently systematic on the subject; Thomas' statements about intentions are distributed over numerous and voluminous works. This could have induced Hervaeus to organise the information about intentions and turn it into a structured whole, adding his own explanations and comments as he did so. Peter Auriol's comments upon Hervaeus' work were still made within the frame of Auriol's own *Sentences* commentary.²³ Radulphus Brito wrote a *sophisma* about second intentions that contains the first systematic²⁴ exposé about the subject, but Hervaeus was the first to write a separate and lengthy treatise about second intentions.

It was Giraldus Odonis who first followed Hervaeus in writing a large treatise about intentions (in which he strongly criticises Hervaeus' thought).²⁵ So did Francisco de Prato,²⁶ who quoted Hervaeus' arguments from *De secundis intentionibus* and used them to criticise Ockham. With his treatise on second intentions Hervaeus in fact created a new genre in the medieval philosophical discourse of his time.

More importantly, however, Hervaeus' approach to the subject of second intentions also differed from his predecessors. Until then, the focus had been on the role of intentions within the process of cognition and on the exact nature and ontological status of intentions. Hervaeus by no means neglects these aspects in *De secundis intentionibus*, but his central theme²⁷ is: to what science do second intentions rightfully belong?

22 Edited in De Rijk, *Giraldus Odonis*, vol. II, Appendix c.

23 See Perler, 'Peter Auriol vs. Hervaeus Natalis,' 242.

24 See 4.3.

25 See De Rijk, *Opera Philosophica*, *Giraldus Odonis*, vol. II, which contains an edition of Giraldus' *De intentionibus*.

26 See Francisco de Prato, *Tractatus de prima et secunda intentione*, passim, and *Logica*: 'Reprobata opinione Ockham intendo ponere opinionem magistri Hervaei, quam reputo veram ...' (ed. 55 ff.; also 61, 72 ff., 100, 112, etc.). See also Rode, *Franciscus de Prato*, for Francisco de Prato, Hervaeus Natalis, and William of Ockham on rational beings, universals and categories.

27 De Rijk defines the basic theme of Hervaeus' *De secundis intentionibus* (*Giraldus Odonis* vol. II, 294) as 'the nature of second intention and its relationships to the extra-mental objects and to its counterpart, first intention', meaning that in his opinion Hervaeus' focus is on the epistemological and ontological aspects of second intentions. Though it is certainly true that Hervaeus goes into much detail about the nature of the second intention and its relation to extra-mental objects as well as to the first intention, I think that Hervaeus' basic theme in *De secundis intentionibus* is

Is there just one science they are part of? And if so, does this science cover all second intentions, or only a specific type?²⁸

Hervaeus prepares the answers to these questions by a meticulous analysis of the terms '*intentio*' and '*secunda intentio*' and their various uses in the first *Distinction* of his book, before any question is answered. After that, he only needs to refer to this analysis when answering questions and refuting objections.

As a Dominican, Hervaeus was obliged to adhere to Thomas' doctrines and defend them, or at least not contradict them.²⁹ Considering the fact that his focus in researching second intentions differed from that of Thomas, it is not surprising that there are many elements in Hervaeus' work that are not found in Thomas at all. Also, Hervaeus uses the term

the second intention insofar as it is the proper subject of logic. This offers a better explanation of Hervaeus' method: he starts with intentions in general, and by ever stricter definitions he narrows down his subject until he ends up with the second intention in the specific sense in which it constitutes the subject of logic, which is also the subject of *Dist. v*. The differences between De Rijk's (288–294) and my summary (see below, 15 ff) of *Dist. v* can be explained from this difference in viewpoint. Doyle seems to have entirely missed Hervaeus' point in this respect. In the introduction to his edition (23–24), Doyle expresses his confusion about which discipline according to Hervaeus has intentionality as such for its proper subject, but the structure of *De secundibus intentionibus* would seem to be expressly designed to peel off all the various layers of the wide concept of intentionality in general until only the logical intention remains (see below, 15).

28 See below, 15. Hervaeus was not the first to define second intentions as the proper subject of logic. Avicenna already said so in his *Philosophia prima* 1,2 (1, 10: 'Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo'). Radulphus said the same (see 4.3). But Hervaeus made this his central aim in *De secundis intentionibus*, especially in *Dist. v*, which is the longest of all five *Distinctiones*.

29 Thomas' teachings were never free from opposition, and the opposition came from within his own order as well as outside it. In 1286, as stated in the Acts of the general chapter of Paris, all Dominicans were commanded to promote and defend the teachings of Thomas, under penalty of suspension or worse. This order was reissued in 1309 and again in 1313, probably because of renewed opposition (from Durandus), but the competition between the Dominican and Franciscan orders and between Paris and Oxford (at this time the latter was beginning to rise at the cost of the position of the university of Paris) may also have played an important role. See Courtenay, *Schools & Scholars*, 150ff. and 177ff., and Koch, 'Die Jahre 1312–1317 im Leben des Durandus de Sancto Porciano O.P.', 273 and *Durandus de S. Porciano*, 2, 410–411. See Burbach, 'Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation Regarding St. Thomas', for an overview of the contents of the acts of the general chapters concerning St. Thomas. For Dominican education from 1215 until 1350, see Mulchahey, *First the Bow is Bent in Study*.

'*intentionalitas*', not found in Thomas.³⁰ In fact, the term may not have occurred in anyone else's work before Hervaeus, either. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary*,³¹ the term *intentionalitas* was used first around 1300 in a work called *De intentionibus* by Hervaeus Natalis, written circa 1300. Hervaeus does indeed use the term frequently throughout the book, but he does it in such a way as to give the impression that *intentionalitas* is a well-established, technical term in his field of study; he nowhere seems to imply that the term is his own invention. It might be worthwhile to investigate whether Hervaeus really was the first to use this term, but let us assume for the moment that he was at least *one* of the first to do so.

Though Hervaeus' name is relatively unknown among present-day Dominicans,³² the influence of his works was considerable. Hervaeus' early influence is apparent from the fact that his work was extensively used and commented upon by contemporaries and near-contemporaries such as Peter Auriol, Giraldus Odonis and Francisco de Prato. The Renaissance saw a strong revival of the interest in Hervaeus as well,³³ which is partly reflected in the large number of manuscripts of Hervaeus' *De secundis intentionibus* and *Quodlibeta* present in the libraries of the Dominican *Studia Generalia* in the 14th and 15th centuries.³⁴ The Renaissance Thomist and first literary opponent of Luther,³⁵ Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio (or Prierias) (1456–1527), considered Hervaeus to be one of the greatest Thomists, and consistently defended Hervaeus against his

30 That is, not as far as I have been able to establish. Doyle states this as a fact; see his article 'Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality' (262), and the introduction to his edition and translation of *De secundis intentionibus*, 21–22. In *Dist. II*, §153, ms. A even contains the term '*intentionabilitas*', of which I have found only one instance in all existent mss. for *Distt. I* and *II*. This variation would seem to emphasize the fact that intentionality, or intentionability as we might wish to translate it here, essentially means knowability, i.e., the ability to be the object of the act of knowing (to have *esse obiective*). Doyle did not consult ms. A, which may be the reason that he does not mention this interesting variant.

31 *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. I, OUP 1971, under 'intentionality'.

32 At least among Dutch Dominicans, as I have had occasion to ascertain in the course of this study.

33 See Tavuzzi, *Prierias* (95–97) and 'Hervaeus Natalis and the philosophical logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance', for an overview of Hervaeus' influence on the Renaissance Thomists. Tavuzzi here presents a short and accurate summary of Hervaeus' interpretation of the use of the word '*intentio*'.

34 Tavuzzi, 'Hervaeus ...', 138–139

35 Tavuzzi, *Prierias*, vii and 104 ff.

(Prierias') contemporary opponent Thomas De Vio Cajetan.³⁶ In *Apologia in dialecticam suam* (1499), Prierias presented a summary of Hervaeus' *De secundis intentionibus*.³⁷

In recent years, much research has been done on intentionality in the late 13th and the early 14th century, which has seen Hervaeus emerge as an influential author who elicited strong support as well as opposition, his influence reaching as far as the Thomism of the Renaissance. Unfortunately only a small part of his works is available in a modern edition, which makes a proper assessment rather difficult. The aim of this study is to contribute to the accessibility of Hervaeus' work by providing a critical edition of the first two of the five *Distinctiones* of *De secundis intentionibus*. The edition presented here is limited to the first two *Distinctiones* because of the size of the complete work (60 pages in the Viennese manuscript).³⁸

1.4. HERVAEUS' *DE SECUNDIS INTENTIONIBUS*

1.4.1. *Outline of De secundis intentionibus*

The complete *De secundis intentionibus* contains five *Distinctiones* or sections,³⁹ subdivided into *quaestiones disputatae*. The *quaestio disputata* in the Middle Ages was the typically scholastic style for teaching as well as

³⁶ Tavuzzi, *Prierias*, 95–97.

³⁷ According to Tavuzzi, this summary is based on the Paris edition of 1489 (*Prierias*, 38, n. 90).

³⁸ In 2008, Marquette University Press published an edition of *De secundis intentionibus* by John P. Doyle in the series *Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation*, with a short introduction and without a proper critical apparatus. Doyle's rendering of the text is not based on the existing mss, but on the 1489 edition of *De secundis intentionibus*. This 1489 edition contains many inaccuracies and is often needlessly wordy. Doyle uses the mss. Vat. Lat. 847, Wien Ö.N. 2411 and Basel B III 22 for occasional clarifications, in that order of priority; but among these, the Viennese ms. should have had priority (see my description of all known mss., 81). Some finer points have been missed in text and introduction, such as the occurrence of the term *intentionabilitas* in the ms. Avignon 300 (see 1.1, n. 30.), and the use of 'inter' (*Dist.* II, § 36) as qualifying the relation of intentionality, which seems to be in conflict with Hervaeus' emphasis on intentionality as a tendency directed from known object to knowing intellect. Still, Doyle's book can be useful for those who wish to get a general impression of Hervaeus' ideas, especially since an English translation has been added.

³⁹ See section 6 of this introduction for a list of all question titles of *De secundis intentionibus* (95).

research, in which a topic was discussed and critically examined to arrive at the truth of the matter. The written version of a *quaestio disputata* generally contained the original question, followed by arguments (including quotations from authoritative texts) for and against the various positions, again followed by an extensive explanation (*solutio*) of the final position adopted by the author. The arguments were often minutely discussed and rejected (or sometimes conceded) one by one at the end of the *quaestio*.⁴⁰

In *Dist.* 1, Hervaeus presents his opinion on first intentions⁴¹ by enumerating the different uses of ‘intention’ in general, by defining the terms ‘first intention’ and ‘second intention’ more specifically, and by contrasting first intentions with second intentions.⁴² In the next four *Distinctiones* he discusses the nature of second intentions (II), the relation between second intentions and the first intentions upon which the former are founded (III),⁴³ the mutual relations between second intentions as regards predication (IV),⁴⁴ and the science of which second intentions are the subject matter, namely logic (V).⁴⁵ The exact description of second intentions in the sense in which they, and they alone, constitute the subject of logic, and not of any other science, is his main concern throughout the work, and the central theme of *Dist.* v.

1.4.2. *Outline of the introduction to* *De secundis intentionibus I–II*

Section 2 of this *Introduction* contains a short overview of *Distt.* III–V, and in section 3 a more detailed analysis of the two first *Distinctiones* is given. Section 4 provides some background to the contents of *Distt.* I–II, more specifically about Thomas Aquinas, Radulphus Brito and their theories of cognition; section 5 contains a few concluding remarks. In section 6 the complete *tabula quaestionum* (table of contents) of *De*

40 *Quaestiones disputatae* were held frequently and had to be attended by all Bachelor students in a faculty. The proceedings were published on the basis of notes taken (*reportatio*) or in a revised version by the master (*ordinatio*). Twice a year disputes were organised which were open to a larger audience, about any topic, and these could be initiated by any member of the audience (*quodlibeta*). See Kenny/Pinborg, ‘Medieval philosophical literature’, 19–33, and especially Weijers, *La ‘disputatio’ and Begrip of tegenspraak?*

41 *Dist.* 1, §§ 1–3.

42 See tables 1 and 2.

43 Paris edition (1489), 34^b.

44 Paris edition (1489), 50^a.

45 Paris edition (1489), 72^a.

secundis intentionibus is listed, to give the reader an overview of the scope of the complete work. In section 7 the eight manuscripts in which *De secundis intentionibus* has been (either completely or partially) handed down to us are described and evaluated.