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Introduction

The Congo Crisis signed the end of a first phase of Nkrumah’s foreign policy and it also had relevant effects on his internal policy. Between 1957 and 1960, the Ghanaian head of government had tried unsuccessfully to sponsor a peaceful path towards the attainment of African liberation and unity. The murder of Lumumba proved this type of approach wrong. The “neo-colonialist” forces were stronger than expected and Nkrumah had failed to counteract them. Moreover, he had also failed in avoiding the entry of the Cold War confrontation in African politics. No Pan-African platform had stopped the intervention of the East and the West in Congo, nor was it going to stop it elsewhere in Africa. Nkrumah could not even count on the UN, which had caused disappointment among the Pan-Africanist ranks for the way it dealt with the Congo crisis.398

The events in the Congo had also caused a split of the independent African states into two groups, one of “radicals” and one of “moderates”, respectively represented by the so-called “Casablanca Group” and the “Brazzaville Group” (later merged into the Monrovian one). With this split, the target of a continental government became even more difficult to be achieved than before. Moreover, through the two groups the East and the West could easily have an influence on African politics. It was exactly the opposite of what Nkrumah had planned. Instead of a united and non-aligned Africa, the Congo Crisis had produced a

divided and political-influenced one. In this new problematic context, Nkrumah had to rethink completely his strategy in Ghana and in Africa.

In 1961, the Ghanaian President decided to respond to the failures of the previous year with a more radical Pan-African policy. Considering the strength of its enemies, Ghana had to invest much more resources in the struggles for African liberation and unity. A new radical “Ministry of foreign affairs” was established to deal specifically with the African continent: the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS). The propaganda machinery had also to be developed in order to reach every corner of Africa and counteract the one of the moderate pro-Western states. Moreover, Ghana had also to invest more resources in the training of African freedom fighters in order to influence them politically. In 1961, the Ideological Institute of Winneba was finally opened to both Ghanaians and freedom fighters. In the same year, Ghana had begun also providing African nationalist with military training, a crucial turning point for Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. Even if he still supported primarily Positive Action, he was now ready even for the use of violence in order to achieve his goals. The first front where to adopt this new approach was Congo itself. There, since early 1961, the Gizenga government was provided with Ghanaian weapons and military training.399

Nkrumah’s new radical policy was not only limited to Ghana’s external affairs but also to the internal ones. The state was interested by a strong wave of radicalization which followed the so-called “dawn broadcast” of April 1961. From then on, Ghana definitely shifted to the left and it opened to the socialist bloc. The ideology of “Nkrumahism” was finally developed and spread throughout Ghana and Africa.

In this phase of radicalism, the BAA became stronger than ever, taking advantage of the high position attained in 1960. Barden strengthened also his power within the Ghanaian hierarchies, influencing the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS.400

399 For information on the provision of weapons to the Stanleyville government in exile provided by Ghana see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp-156-157. The weapons were usually sent by Ghana trough Uganda. It is also for this reason that since 1961 Uganda received a growing attention by Accra. Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012.

400 Dei-Anang described the role played by Barden and the BAA at the peak of its power: “The activities of the Bureau continued to loom large in African affairs. A.K. Barden undertook great risks in perilous journeys under various guises throughout Africa. On these missions he conveyed Nkrumah’s directives, medical
The chapter will be opened by considerations on the consequences of the Congo Crisis on Ghana’s policies and institutions. Then, it will be thoroughly described the establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat and the Ideological Institute, both instruments of the new political phase. It will be also clarified the role of the BAA in the life of both institutions. Generally speaking, the focus of the chapter will mostly be on the Bureau, the fulcrum of Ghana’s Pan-African policy which will also be described in its concrete actualization. In particular, it will be analyzed how Ghana tried to develop the UAS project and how the BAA worked for this mission. Finally, it will be described the functioning of the new propaganda machinery of the BAA, called during this two year to spread Pan-Africanism and Nkrumahism throughout the continent.


The Congo Crisis had changed significantly the political situation in Africa, leading to a break between two fronts of African states, one of “radicals” (Casablanca Group) and one of “moderates” (Brazzaville Group later merged into the Monrovia Group).\(^{401}\) The distance between the two was mainly based on their opposite vision on the recognition of the new government in Congo and on the autonomy of Katanga. “Brazzaville” and “Monrovia” sponsored Mobutu, Kasavubu and Tshombe, while “Casablanca” opposed them. Such questions reflected also a deep ideological difference between the two groups, generating a separation which lasted until the establishment of the OAU in May 1963. Ghana had to deal with this new context trying to re-launch African unity and while dealing also with the supplies, and anti-colonial documents to freedom fighters. Confidence in Barden stemmed from Nkrumah’s respect for his willingness to respond at all times to the many demands that were made on his courage and loyalty in the liberation cause”. In M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations*, p.29.\(^{401}\) The two fronts were named after the seat of the Conferences where they were established.
issue of preserving the independence of the continent from the influence of the Cold War.\(^{402}\)

The “Brazzaville Group” was formed by twelve moderate newly independent francophone countries and it was established as a result of a conference held by them at Brazzaville in December 1960.\(^{403}\) The gathering was organized to share views on the evolution of African politics – particularly in Congo – and the threat of a Soviet penetration in the continent. The invitation of both Tshombe and Kasavubu implied the sponsorship of a federalist option. The participants also legitimated the coup which had overthrown Lumumba’s government, taking a clearly pro-West position in the Cold War. Finally, the group reserved a cold attitude toward the idea of African unity and a much warmer one toward the French Community.

The news coming from Brazzaville were obviously adverse to Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. As Vincent Bakpetu Thompson wrote, with this conference: “African disunity” deepened.\(^{404}\) Ghana needed to find immediately a solution to counteract the power of the new group, since without francophone Africa no continental government could be created.

Barden was already at work. He sent observers to the conference to study the moves of Tshombe, Kasavubu, Houphouet-Boigny and the other francophone leaders, including the Tunisians and the Guineans (which had sent observers as well). He wrote to Nkrumah:

\(^{402}\) In reality, the Congo Crisis worked like a detonator to a situation which was already delicate. Prior to the explosion of the Crisis, “moderate” and “radical” States had already clarified their antithetic positions. Ghana had worked since 1957 in order to attract politically those countries which were going to gain independence. This work had been done mostly in West Africa, where Ghana could promote a proper project of African unity. Considering it in this light, the Ghana-Guinea Union was an attempt on Ghana’s side to attract other francophone countries to their political positions at the expense of moderate countries, like Houphouet-Boigny’s Ivory Coast.

\(^{403}\) The twelve members were: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. The Brazzaville Conference was following ideally the meeting of francophone African states called by Houphouet-Boigny at Abidjan in October. See V. Thompson Bakpetu, *Africa and Unity*, p.150 and W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.148. Houphouet-Boigny (together with Senghor) was playing a leading role in this group. It must be remembered that since 1959, Ivory Coast had contested the influence of radical states like Ghana and Guinea by forming the *Conseil de L’Entente*. See chapter 3 and also E.H. Kloman Jr, *African Unification Movements*, International Organisation, v.16, n°2, 1962, p.396. The Brazzaville experience can be seen as in line with the one of the Entente. Its main task was the one of organizing and coordinating the majority of the independent francophone African states which were recognizing themselves in a moderate and pro-French stance.

“There can be no doubt that much useful information which could help Ghana to reshape and formulate its policy concerning relationship with the French African Community could be gained from this conference”.  

Nkrumah made good use of Barden’s information on the Brazzaville group and he worked on a new political line in Africa. The prior goal was to re-launch African unity in order to counteract the “balkanization” of Africa. Two short-term targets had to be achieved. The first one was to push forward the UAS project, welcoming Mali into the union. The second one was to form Ghana’s own group, made of radical pro-Unity African states.

On Christmas Eve 1960, Nkrumah, Touré, and Keita announced that Mali had joined the Union of African States. The “Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union” was born. Similarly to the Ghana-Guinea Union, the announcement was made some months before the official declaration, signed in April 1961. Once again, Nkrumah counted on the impact of this news to hasten the African unity project.

His next step was to gather together all the countries that were not in line with the political stance of the Brazzaville Group in a new Pan-African platform. A Conference was called at Casablanca in January 1961. The countries that attended were: Morocco, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria (FNL), Libya and UAR. Nkrumah played immediately a leading role. 

406 Welch underlines that Touré and Keita had showed a common political stance at the time of their common militancy in the RDA. Both of them believed in a project of federation. With the UAS, their convictions met Nkrumah’s ones. See C.E. Welch, Dream of Unity, p.308-310.
407 Ibidem, p.312-313. It was to be, however, only a political declaration. The official establishment of the union was signed in April. See also the declaration of the “Union of African States” in C. Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp.176-179.
408 V. Thompson Bakpetu, Africa and Unity, p.155; Ceylon was also represented. Algeria was represented by Ferhat Abbas. Thompson Bakpetu forgets about the presence of the UAR delegation when providing the list of members. To be more exact, the countries represented at the conference were not all “radicals”. Libya later left the “Casablanca Group” and joined the “Monrovia Group”, which was formed after the Monrovia Conference of May 1961. Even Morocco was not a radical country. King Mohammed V had called the conference after Morocco’s defeat in the Mauritanian independence issue. In December 1960, the Moroccan claims for hegemony over Mauritania had been rejected at the General Assembly of the UN, leading Rabat closer to the radical African states. The Moroccan adhesion to the project was the result of a political interest more than a sincere belief in the Pan-African cause. See E.H. Kloman Jr., African Unification Movements, p.391.
role. As Kloman wrote, the “core” of the “Casablanca Group”, born after the conference, was the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, an entity clearly led by Ghana.409

Despite the efforts, Nkrumah could not be totally satisfied with the result of the “Casablanca” operation. The Conference was supposed to provide the radicals states with a common political line on African affairs. From this point of view, the target was still far from being achieved. For instance, the members disagreed on how to manage the presence of African troops in Leopoldville, even if they had agreed to adopt a common position.410 The doubts on this question were a clear signal of the weak nature of the group, since some of its members could not even be considered radicals.411

Still, Nkrumah invested all his resources to strengthen the “Casablanca Group” in the following months. Indeed, through this platform, he wanted to promote African unity and also the establishment of an African High Command.412 He also wanted to counteract the influence of the moderate African states in the continent.

In May 1961, the front of moderates became even stronger when the “Brazzaville Group” merged into the bigger “Monrovia Group”.413 The new platform, established at a conference in Monrovia, was formed by the twelve members of “Brazzaville” plus Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Libya.414 With the loss of the latter among the ranks of the Casablanca Group and with Nigeria’s adherence to “Monrovia”, the front of radicals was weaker than before. Lagos’ move was particularly critical for Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. A good relationship between Ghana and Nigeria was one of pillars of the Pan-African policy in West Africa and in the continent as a whole. Yet, recent developments had undermined this relationship.

411 Some observers at the time underlined the weakness of the foundations of the Casablanca Group. For instance, Kloman noticed how the positions of Ghana and the other states of Casablanca were distant with regard to the management of the military forces in Congo. See E.H. Kloman Jr., African Unification Movements, p.391.
412 The idea of creating an “African High Command” to be formed by the independent African states was dating back at the beginning of the Congo Crisis. Nkrumah had officially launched this idea also at the UN General Assembly in New York on 23 September 1960. See S. Obeng, (Ed. by), Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah, vol.1, p.177. See also W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, pp.137, 149, 156 and 201.
414 Libya had left the Casablanca group for the Monrovia one.
There were many reasons for Lagos’ cold attitude towards Accra. The giant West African state had always been worried of depending politically on its smaller neighbor. Nkrumah’s increasing power in the region had not calmed down Nigeria’s fears but it had rather increased them. Even before independence (October 1960), the Nigerians had already expressed their criticisms against the Ghanaian leader. In June 1960, at the IAS conference in Addis Ababa, the leader of the Nigerian delegation Alhajj Maitama Sule had spoken against those who considered themselves “a Messiah” with “a mission to lead Africa”. Moreover, he also strongly criticized Nkrumah’s suppression of almost all the British West African boards, a move considered in contradiction with his Pan-African policy. Finally, Azikiwe attacked Ghana’s support to the Action Group.

International politics led to an even harsher confrontation between Accra and Lagos, especially on their position on the Congo affair. Lagos had showed a scarce interest in this question until November 1960. However, Nkrumah’s leading role in the region and his support to the Soviet-backed government of Lumumba led Nigeria to get more involved. Thus, it obtained the control of the UN commission on Congo, with which it could work against the influence of the USSR and Ghana in Leopoldville. In the meantime, even Ghana began to show an increasing distrust on Nigeria, especially since the latter signed a defense agreement with the UK.

Nkrumah’s political rivals in Africa were growing day after day. Both the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and the “Casablanca group” were too weak to diminish the strength of moderate African states, nor were they powerful enough to restrain the influence of the old

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416 In May 1961, the West African Research Office was the only one still active. London was monitoring Nigeria and Ghana on the issue. See, for example, BNA, DO/177/2, Letter, Kennaway (British High Commission in Ghana) to Mandeville (CRO), 24th May 1961.
417 W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.80.
418 In November, the Prime Minister Balewa had told the parliament that Nigeria had no special interests in the Congo. See O. Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria, p.148.
419 Nigeria obtained in late 1960 the post of chairman of the UN Congo Conciliation Commission (Jaja Wachuku). From Nigeria’s point of view, this appointment had an enormous importance for challenging Nkrumah’s role in the Congo affairs and in West Africa. Ibidem, pp.148-149.
420 For this reason, in November 1960, Ghana had proposed the African High Command project to all the Independent African States (IAS) plus Guinea and Mali, but not to Nigeria. See W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.149 and 237.
colonial powers and the United States on the newly independent African states. Nkrumah needed to rethink his foreign policy as well as his internal policy in order to provide an adequate response to the new challenges of the African political scene. A process of radicalization invested both fields, while Ghana approached step by step the socialist bloc.

It took almost two years for this political shift to be properly implemented. The process of change within the Ghanaian state begun in 1961. It consisted in a revision of internal and external policies and in a political reshuffle both in the party and in the state. But it was only in 1962 that such a process brought a sort of internal “revolution” in Ghana.421

4.2. The “Shift to the Left” and Ghana’s Relationship with the East

The death of Lumumba and the increasing political isolation of Ghana led Nkrumah to open his doors progressively to the socialist bloc in order to find a new ally for his Pan-African policy. Such an opening towards the “reds” was also accompanied by a process of radicalization of the Ghanaian state. The former element was not the main cause of the latter, but it only favored the process. Nkrumah had already planned a progressive shift toward socialism, since he considered it part of his political project for Ghana and Africa. He was also convinced that a more radical Ghanaian state was the best solution to perform a progressive and effective Pan-African policy. This process favored also the evolution of “Nkrumahism” in a proper ideology.

The Congo affair worked like a detonator for Nkrumah’s change of perspective towards the East and the West. The balance of Ghana’s non-alignment progressively moved from a pro-West stance to a general pro-East stance. Such a process meant also a struggle

421 The CPP’s Program for Work and Happiness (1962), announced de facto the passage to a socialist society and the launch of the one-party state option (which was to be adopted, however, only in 1964). See J.S Ahlman, Living with Nkrumahism, p.204.
for powers between moderate and radicals within the CPP and the State.\textsuperscript{422} A general “shift to the left” interested Ghana since the spring of 1961.

First of all, this shift meant a different approach towards the USSR. The relationship between Ghana and the Soviet State had improved during 1960, but until early 1961 it could be hardly defined as warm. Political and economical exchanges had followed the opening of the Ghanaian embassy in Moscow in early 1960. The protagonists of this year had been Adamafio and Tettegah. Indeed, Nkrumah had sent the two Ghanaians to USSR in the summer of 1960 in order to establish better relations with Khrushchev. Their mission had been accomplished, for they brought back Khrushchev’s support to Ghana and his offer to build the Akosombo Dam in place of the Americans.\textsuperscript{423}

Adamafio and Tettegah’s mission paved the way for the improvement of the relationships between Accra and Moscow. The common defeat of the two countries in the Congo affair – symbolized by Lumumba’s murder in January 1961 - led Nkrumah and Khrushchev to come even closer. Thus, Nkrumah decided to open definitely Ghana to the Soviets by visiting USSR in a long trip throughout several socialist countries in the summer of 1961.\textsuperscript{424} The prudence which had characterized Ghana for all the period between 1957 and 1960 was abandoned. Nkrumah’s’ tour in the socialist world symbolized Ghana’s new radical approach.

It must be made clear that in no way Nkrumah was becoming a faithful servant of the Soviets. He was a non-aligned socialist leader, willing to perform an independent foreign policy in line with his Pan-Africanist principles and objectives. In the same year of the trip to the East, Nkrumah also invited to Ghana Josif Broz Tito, a man considered also a non-aligned leader far from being a friend of Moscow. The Yugoslavian President visited Accra on February 1961. During his visit, Nkrumah claimed that Ghana was related to Yugoslavia in political terms. He presented the two countries as: “sharing the same ideals, the same

\textsuperscript{422} See W.S. Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, p.162.
\textsuperscript{423} T. Adamafio, \textit{By Nkrumah’s Side}, p.90. The offer was never accepted. However, another dam project, the one of Bui, was followed by the Soviets in the ensuing years.
\textsuperscript{424} For an account of Nkrumah’s tour to Socialist countries in summer 1961 see W.S. Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, p.173-177.
concepts of the development of society and the same objective”. Holding this position, Nkrumah also participated to the Belgrade Summit in September 1961, a further attempt to join the group of the “big” nonaligned countries.

In fact, Ghana was not entering the “communist” world. Nkrumah was only trying to open the doors to the other half of the moon. At the same time, the Soviets were also considered the best supporters of the socialist path for development the Ghanaian President had planned for his country.

Still, Western powers felt threatened by Nkrumah’s moves. Since early 1961, USA and UK had begun to follow closely the evolution of politics in Ghana in order to understand to what extent Nkrumah’s government could be considered an instrument of communist penetration in Africa. Until 1960, Guinea and UAR were considered the most important agents of the Soviets in the continent. After 1961, Ghana was added to the list. The UK was particularly interested in defending its former colonial possession in West Africa from any communist threat. Thus, since 1961 anything concerning the relationship between Nigeria and Ghana was reported and observed, a sign of the British increasing distrust towards Accra. The Queen’s visit to Ghana in the same year momentarily calmed down the British fears. However, London kept the level of attention very high.

Nkrumah’s opening to the East also affected his foreign policy. This process included a first revision of the very structure of the system deputized to manage the external relations of Ghana.

425 “A speech at a Dinner in honor of President Tito, Accra, March 1, 1961”. In S. Obeng (Ed. by), Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah, vol.1, pp.295-296.
426 See W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.177-183.
427 The British file BNA, DO/177/2/"Subversive activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria” includes some documents on the development of socialism in Ghana and others concerning Ghana’s new measures to spread its political message in Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa. These documents will be used further in the thesis to describe Ghana’s new tactics towards the support to political movements in West Africa.
4.3. The Establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat

While Nkrumah was opening to the East, a general process of radicalization affected both the CPP and the Ghanaian State. The foreign policy machinery was completely reformed and aligned to the needs of a new, radical Pan-African policy. Important changes involved the Foreign Service, the BAA and the AAC.

The Bureau confirmed its increasing importance in the system to the point of reducing the power held by the Foreign Service itself. Barden was becoming the very key figure of Ghana’s Pan-African policy and the BAA agents became a constant presence in the Ghanaian embassies and high commissions in Africa. Even the appointment of ambassadors and high commissioners was now strongly influenced by the Bureau.

The Foreign Service was also revolutionized. The first relevant change was the establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS), a new Ministry of foreign affairs specifically designed for dealing with African issues. Nkrumah created the new body so to have a diplomacy completely dedicated to the continent. The project was announced for the first time on 8 April 1961. The circumstances of its launch were quite revealing. Nkrumah included the news in his famous “Dawn Broadcast”, a speech to inform Ghana of the forthcoming shift to socialism. Indeed, the President considered a new and more effective foreign policy as an integral part of his socialist revolution.

Like it had been for the BAA, the establishment of the AAS was also announced before the office was properly set up. Nkrumah needed badly a new instrument for his

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428 See for example “Building a Socialist State”, Speech made by Kwame Nkrumah to the CPP Study Group on 22nd April 1961, included in S. Obeng (Ed. by), Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah, vol.1, pp.322-335. Nkrumah did not make references to Soviet socialism, but to a socialism which could allow Ghana to achieve wellness and industrialization. From this point of view, Nkrumah’s attitude towards Socialism can be easily considered as pragmatic. For instance at pag.323: “As our party has proclaimed, and as I have asserted time and again, socialism is the only pattern that can within the shortest possible time bring the good life to the people. […] One point, however, we have to get clear at this juncture, Ghana is not a socialist state. Not only do the people as yet not own all the major means of production and distribution, but we have still to lay the actual foundations upon which socialism can be built, namely, the complete industrialization of our country. All talk of socialism, economic and social reconstruction, are just empty words, if we do not seriously address ourselves to the question of basic industrialization and agricultural revolution in our country, just as much as we must concentrate on socialist education”.

429 According to Asante, the African Affairs Secretariat “was established without any formal instrument”. From the statement of K.B. Asante, undated, included in a footnote in M. Dei-Anang, The Administration of
new Pan-African policy and he needed it also to show an immediate reaction to the failures of the Congo. He did not have time to plan the project in every detail. It was more than ever important to include it in his plan for a socialist revolution.

The AAS was also another attempt of Nkrumah to reduce the influence of the old Foreign Service in the making of Ghana’s foreign policy, a problem which dated back to Padmore’s times. The President needed a more “radical” Ministry of foreign affairs for Africa, with a staff composed mainly by “militants”. By establishing the AAS, Nkrumah sent a message to the Service. Either they followed the new political line or they had to leave their posts to others that were more dedicated to the cause. The “Dawn Broadcast” included also a passage in which Nkrumah warned the civil service for his passive attitude, just before he introduced the establishment of the Ministry of African Affairs, the future AAS:

[...] It amazes me that, up to present, many civil servants do not realize that we are living in a revolutionary era. This Ghana, which had lost so much time serving colonial masters, cannot afford to be tied down to archaic snail-pace methods of work which obstruct expeditious progress. We have lost so much time we need to do in ten years what has taken others a hundred years to accomplish. Civil Servants, therefore, must develop a new orientation, a sense of mission and urgency to enable them to eliminate all tendencies towards red tape-ism, bureaucracy and waste.⁴³⁰

Immediately after this passage, Nkrumah announced various changes in the Ghanaian State, including the establishment of the new Ministry. Such a new institution was going to take control over all the diplomatic missions in Africa, although its relationship with the other “Pan-African” institutions remained obscure. Indeed, Nkrumah announced at first the fusion of the latter with the new Ministry. Even if this hypothesis was soon discarded, it was clear that the new institutions was bound to be much more radical than a normal Ministry of foreign affairs.

In order to promote greater efficiency in the machinery of the Government, I have decided to re-organize slightly the existing ministerial set-up. In view of the increasingly important part being played by Ghana at the present time in the African liberation movement, I have decided to create a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This new Ministry will be responsible for all African matters, including the present duties undertaken by the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre. It will also liaise with the All-African People’s Secretariat and the All-African Trade Union Federation.  

The Ministry of African Affairs was meant to be an ephemeral body. Imoru Egala was appointed Minister, but his office did not last long. The Ministry was suppressed less than a month later and it was turned into the African Affairs Secretariat. The new AAS was not a proper ministry but an office attached to Flagstaff House. Thus, Nkrumah could control it even better, like he did before with Padmore’s Office. At the time, a small office to report Nkrumah on African Affairs was already working at Flagstaff House, but it was now absorbed by the AAS. 

The whole African section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was moved to the Secretariat, which begun coordinating also the Ghanaian missions in Africa. Many men were transferred from one institution to the other. Among them, there was also K.B. Asante, a man “discovered” by Padmore and already involved in the run for the post of director of the BAA. He became Principal Secretary of the AAS. Michael Dei-Anang - who had been Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1959 - was appointed head of the AAS.

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431 Obeng (Ed. by), Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah, vol.1. The All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) was the first attempt to realize a Pan-African trade union organization. It was established at the Casablanca Conference a few months before. For information on the AATUF see, for instance, E.H. Kloman Jr. African Unification Movements, pp. 393-394.
432 On Egala’s appointment see BNA, FCO/141/6735, Letter, Flack (British High Commission in Accra) to Browne (Commonwealth Relations Office), 31st May 1961. See also on the same subject: W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.199.
433 In January 1961, shortly after the Casablanca Conference, he had asked the Minister of External Affairs for an officer to deal with African Affairs at Flagstaff House. Statement of K.B. Asante, undated, included in a footnote in M. Dei-Anang, The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations, p.25.
434 Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.
The establishment of the AAS did not take place without protests. Nkrumah could have launched the project even before April but he was held back by Adjei’s opposition. The Minister of Foreign Affairs criticized the new body, as he thought that the Ministry itself could lose most of its efficiency. Moreover, Adjei tried to convince Nkrumah that two different Ministries were going to weaken Ghana’s foreign policy, since actions were no more coordinated. Even if the President eventually ignored Adjei’s criticisms, the problem remained and it was bound to influence the relationship between the AAS and the Ministry. Thanks to the Secretariat, Ghana’s African policy was now totally under Nkrumah’s control. As Thompson underlined, with the new body, revolutionary Pan-Africanism had won the day, at the expenses of a coordinated policy.

The BAA and the AAC were still entirely independent from the AAS. The Bureau had not been absorbed since it had too much political power at the time. Moreover, Barden’s Office had even different duties to perform. The Bureau was still using unorthodox methods, whereas the AAS was a radical, yet “orthodox” institution. From that moment, the AAS had begun supporting the “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana, while at the time it tried to solve diplomatically every incident caused by them in Africa. The relationship between the AAS and the BAA is one of the crucial aspects of the history of Ghana’s Pan-African policy since 1961.

The Secretariat became the main protagonist of the following years. With its establishment, Ghana’s Pan-African policy could be performed through an institution completely dedicated to the continent and its needs. However, the establishment of the AAS was only one element of a wider institutional reform in Ghana. Nkrumah’s intervention was planned to cover even other aspects, starting from the educational system.

437 The UK High Commission in Accra had received some information on the AAS’s establishment by K.B. Asante. According to the new Principal Secretary of the Secretariat: “In the event it had not proved possible for the African Affairs Secretariat to swallow the Bureau of African Affairs, no doubt because of the strong political pressures involved”. In BNA, FCO/141/6735, Letter, Flack (British High Commission in Accra) to Browne (Commonwealth Relations Office), 31st May 1961.
438 Michael Dei-Anang’s categorization is radically different. He included the AAS as part of the groups of institutions following “Un-orthodox” diplomatic lines. See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations*, p.25. However, he does not explain in details the reasons for this choice.
4.4. Spreading “Nkrumahism” in Ghana and in Africa: the Ideological Institute of Winneba

Part of Nkrumah’s reforms was the investment in the project of an ideological school at Winneba, which dated back to the times of the African Affairs Committee. The President decided for the immediate opening of the Institute in order to train in political activity and administration Ghanaian party members and civil servants and also freedom fighters from others parts of Africa. Thanks to the ideological school, the Nkrumahist ideology could be absorbed by the Ghanaian State and spread out to the whole continent. In this sense, the Institute can be considered at the same time as a “Pan-African” institution and a political instrument used by Ghanaian “radicals” to assess their position in the country. In the following years, the BAA made good use of the Institute to influence diplomatic appointments and, broadly speaking, the whole ideological orientation of Ghana’s Foreign Service.

In 1960, the idea of a party school at Winneba had been very far from being actualized. After the meetings of the committee, the only reference to it had been Nkrumah’s speech at the PAPSA in April.\textsuperscript{439} With the opening of the new political phase, Nkrumah decided to re-launch the project, which was now crucial for actualizing the radicalization of the country and spread the Pan-Africanist ideology in the continent. On 18\textsuperscript{th} February 1961, the Ghanaian President announced the establishment of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba and he inaugurated its first course.\textsuperscript{440} The decision of opening the Institute had been so quick that the actual building was not yet ready. Thus, the first course took place outside its perimeter.

In the opening speech, Nkrumah made it clear that the Institute was meant to change dramatically both the State and the party. He also referred to it as a new weapon for the African liberation and unity struggles. Indeed, a young generation of African nationalists

\textsuperscript{439} Opening Session, speech of Kwame Nkrumah, 7\textsuperscript{th} April 1960 in Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa, Community Centre, Accra Ghana, 1960, p.4.

\textsuperscript{440} The fact that the Institute was named after Nkrumah himself is worth noting. In this period, the cult of personality became increasingly visible. Few years later, a statue of the President was also placed in front of the Institute.
trained at the Institute could follow Ghana’s political model and strengthen the Pan-African front in the continent.\textsuperscript{441} The references to the Congo Crisis as an acceleration factor for the opening of Winneba’s Institute are also worth noting. Quoting from the speech:

\begin{quote}
From my days in London up to the present, I have never once stopped shouting to all Africa about African unity. The sad episode in the Congo more than justifies my fears; the unwisdom to stand alone, each by itself, in the face of this fierce onslaught by the new colonialists, who are equally (if not more) dangerous and merciless in their come-back endeavors. When, therefore, I have come to this town of Winneba to lay the foundation stone of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute and to inaugurate the first course in ideological training accommodated in temporary premises, I see a beam of hope shooting across our continent, for the things which will taught in the institute will strengthen African youth and manhood and inspire it to scale great heights; and the men and women who will pass through this institute will go out not only armed with analytical knowledge to wage the battle of African socialism, but will also be fortified with a keen spirit of dedication and service to our motherland.\textsuperscript{442}
\end{quote}

After presenting the sections of the Institute (Ideological Education Training Centre and the Positive Action Training Centre), Nkrumah underlined that the school was providing the party with an ideological training never supplied before. The CPP was going to be improved thanks to the work of the Institute. In particular, the Party could serve better the

\textsuperscript{441} The BAA was already working for exporting the Ghanaian political model (mainly the CPP model). In this sense, the Institute was only a weapon to increase the efficacy of such work. It might be useful to provide one example of the policy performed by the BAA trough the work with liberation movements. It is a secret report on Nyasaland, submitted by the Ghanaian Minister of External Affairs to the Bureau of African Affairs in November 1960, in which the Bureau was informed on the recent development in the politics of the country at the time part of the Central African Federation. In the part concerning politics, the minister underlined the successes of the Ghanaian policy in influencing the Malawi Congress Party. Quoting from the text: “Dr. Banda’s position as President of the Party is supreme and unchallenged and he enjoys the fanatic adoration of the masses. There is no doubt whatsoever that he has full effective control of the party machinery. He has modelled his party on the organizational techniques he acquired from the Convention People’s Party in Ghana including the slogans, procedures at rallies, the organization of women, youth and party activists, the organization and function of the Executive and even the basic policies. These have proved very effective. […] [The Malawi Congress Party] is completely aligned in policy and practice to the stand taken by Ghana in international, particularly African affairs”. In AGPL, BAA/370, Report from the Minister of External Affairs to the Bureau of African Affairs, “Political Survey of Nyasaland”, 22\textsuperscript{nd} November 1960.

\textsuperscript{442} Kwame Nkrumah, speech for the opening of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Winneba and the first course of the institute on 18\textsuperscript{th} February 1961. In S. Obeng (Ed. by), \textit{Selected Speech of Kwame Nkrumah}, vol.1, pp.272-273.
Pan-African struggle. According to Nkrumah, the Convention People’s Party was “pitch forked by historical circumstances into the spear-head and vanguard of the gigantic struggle for the total liberation of Africa and the independence and unity of African States”.

The CPP itself was going to be a model for other nationalist parties in the continent. The Institute was called to spread nationalism, socialism and Pan-Africanism in other countries, coordinating the establishment of a united front of liberation movements. Such a front would finally lead to the establishment of a sort of continental party. Quoting from the opening speech (italics by the author):

> The Kwame Nkrumah Institute will not cater for Ghana alone. Its doors will be opened to all from Africa and the world, both seek knowledge to fit themselves for the great freedom fight against imperialism and colonialism old or new, and the consolidation of peace throughout the world for the progress of mankind. I can envisage the future possibilities of this arrangement. When African freedom fighters from all over Africa have come into this institute and quenched their thirst for ideological knowledge, they will go back fortified in the same principle and beliefs, pursue the same objectives and aims, appreciate the same values and advocate the same themes. I see before my mind’s eye a great monolithic party growing up out of this process, united and strong, spreading its protective wings over the whole Africa – from Algiers in the north to Cape Town in the south; from Cape Guardafui in the east to Dakar in the west.

Nkrumah made the aims of the Institute very clear. However, he did not mention in details the content of the ideological training that would have been provided. At the time, “Nkrumahism” was still being developed as a coherent and comprehensive ideology. First conceived by Kofi Baako, it was planned to be the sum of all Nkrumah’s ideals and principles. Quoted for the first time at the celebration for the Republic (July 1960), the

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444 Kwame Nkrumah, speech for the opening of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Winneba and the first course of the institute on 18th February 1961. *Ibidem.*
term “Nkrumahism” had not been used for the rest of the year.\footnote{W.S. Thompson, \textit{Ghana's Foreign Policy}, p. 113. In the same page, Thompson quotes an article of Evening News (1\textsuperscript{st} July 1960) devoted to “Nkrumahism”. Talking about the new ideology the author of the articles states: “Nkrumahism, […] is launched today […] to the initiate Nkrumahism is a complex political and social philosophy which is still in gestation so long as the leader continues to add to the principles by words and deeds”.
} It was not even quoted at the opening speech of Winneba’s Institute or in its first course.

The Institute itself had not received clear indications on the political and organizational models to be followed. There had been no time to discuss these questions before Nkrumah ordered to start off with the courses. The development of the Institution into a solid project took all the following years with continuous changes and adaptations to the needs of Nkrumah’s internal and external policies. According to Tibor Szamuely - who was lecturer at the Institute - it was “a kind of cross between Socratic Athens, the London School of Economics and the Moscow Institute of Marxism-Leninism”\footnote{Quoted in P. Omari, \textit{Kwame Nkrumah: the anatomy of an African dictatorship}, p.121 Interestingly, the subjects taught at Winneba remind those of Kutvu, the Ideological school where Padmore had lectured on colonialism in the early 1930s. see G. Padmore, \textit{Pan-Africanism or Communism?}, p.318.} As Agyeman had rightly pointed out, the Ideological Institute “lacked a systematic foundation”\footnote{K. Agyeman, \textit{Ideological Education}, p.11.}

The managing of the Institution was in the hands of both the CPP and the BAA. Both bodies were called to work on the definition of the structure of the courses and their content. While the BAA was becoming more and more influenced by the party ideology, the CPP was increasingly linked to the office.\footnote{In September 1961, shortly after Nkrumah’s trip to the Socialist countries and some months after the “Dawn Broadcast”, the BAA was re-organized and new office duties were distributed. The first instructions for the staff of the BAA were: “You will be loyal to the President of the Republic, the nation, the government and the CPP”. See AGPL, BAA/376, circular, “General Office Instructions – All-Staff”, sent by the Director (Barden), 5\textsuperscript{th} September 1961. As a result of the process of politicization of the BAA, the staff became increasingly composed by indoctrinated members. Interviews with K.B. Asante and David Bosumtwi-Sam. The BAA became a sort of “radical wing” of the CPP.}

The Bureau had the duty to organize courses on African liberation and unity for both Ghanaians and foreigners. It was also responsible to check on the identities of all the non-
Ghanaian students enrolled at the Institute. The director Kwodwo Addison was also strictly connected with the BAA and he was constantly in contact with Barden.

The Bureau immediately started working for organizing courses at Winneba. In June, it set up a seminar involving a number of Builder Brigadiers, a proof of the increasing collaboration between the party and Barden’s Office. The first real course for freedom fighters was organized some month later, in autumn. It was a three-month course first planned in October and then moved to November. Two elements can be considered interesting about this first experimental course: the list of students invited and its contents.

The students were members of the most important parties supported by Accra, particularly those of Southern Africa. Their tuition was free and the government provided them also with flight tickets to reach Ghana. The parties involved where those politically in line with Accra. Thus, the list of students invited at the first course reveals also which parties Nkrumah favored the most. A first list included:

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450 The Bureau was constantly updated on the news concerning African freedom fighters, even those who attended the courses at the Institute. See AGPL, BAA/376, service regulation, “Clerical Officer (Records)”, sent by the Director (Barden), 15th September 1961.

451 Addison had worked for the AAPC from May 1959 to February 1961. He was a trade union leader and he also worked as Administrative Secretary of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012. He was a notorious Marxist and he had benefited from the process of radicalization of Ghana. See W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.112. According to Asante, it was due to his political convictions, more than to his skills, if he gained the post of director of the Institute. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011.

452 On 22nd June 1961, the Bureau requested 30 Brigadiers (15 young girls and 15 young boys) to the Builders Brigade for a seminar to be held at Winneba (they were then reduced to 15). The costs were completely covered by the BAA and not by the Institute, a sign of the involvement of the Bureau in the organization of the seminar. See AGPL, BAA/325, Letter, Bosumtwi-Sam (BAA) to the National Organiser of the Builders Brigadiers and Armah, 22nd June 1961. See also in the same file: Letter, Bosumtwi-Sam (BAA) to the National Organizer of the Builders Brigade and Armah, 23rd June 1961.

List of Political Organisations of Dependent African States for the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological School at Winneba, Commencing:

15th November, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United National Independence Party (UNIP)</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP)</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Congress Alliance (DCA)</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Population of Angola (UPA)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party*</td>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda People’s Congress (UPC)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP)**</td>
<td>Bechuanaland</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>South Rhodesia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)</td>
<td>Basutoland</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) In the original list, the Afro-Shirazi party name is misspelled.

(*) In the original list, the BPP is wrongly reported as Bechuanaland Congress Party.

Other parties or individuals were involved at the last minute. Some of them were invited by Accra and some others requested to participate after having received news about the course. The Kenyan KANU related to the first group. The reason for the delay of
Ghana’s offer is unknown. However, Barden sent a last-minute invitation to the course for four KANU students, providing them also with flight tickets.  

Some unsuccessful attempts were also made to involve Somali students. In this case, the initiative came from Ghana’s Ambassador at Mogadishu K. Budu-Acquah. Interestingly - as Budu-Acquah wrote to Dei-Anang - his attempts to convince Somali students to attend the course was part of a major strategy for strengthening the Ghanaian influence and for spreading Pan-Africanism in Somalia, hence reducing Nasser’s influence in the country.

Still, Barden had rejected his proposal, opening one of the first cases of clashes between the BAA and the AAS on African Affairs.

Autonomous requests came from the Sierra Leonean party All People’s Congress and also from a country linked to Ghana through men of the “Diaspora”, the British Guyana.

454 AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, draft for telegram, Barden to Executive Officer of KANU, 14th November 1961.

455 AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, Letter, Budu-Acquah to Dei-Anang, 14th November 1961. Interestingly, according to Budu-Acquah, his policy in Somalia was opposed both by the British and the Arabs of the UAR (called “adversaries”). While announcing his success in inviting the students to the course (a personal initiative, without apparently any indication from above in that respect), Budu-Acquah pled also for his transfer to Europe on the ground of his increasingly difficult position in Mogadishu. Quoting from the letter: “Although I have succeeded in arousing the forces of Pan-Africanism in this area and thus routing the Arab forces, the fact remains that I am going to be a target. At the moment, every evil that besets the British Embassy is attributed to me. The UAR, you know, has blue-booked me. I must jump clear off the scene so as to prepare myself for yet such difficult assignment. Meanwhile, I am working hard to get an agreement with the Somali Government for the abolishment of visas between our two countries. In spite of the fact that many people do not visit here from Ghana and vice-versa it will be yet another moral victory over our adversaries – the Arabs”.

456 AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Dei-Anang, 29th November 1961. Conflicts on the attribution of the duties between AAS and BAA became common in the ensuing years. As it will be showed in the next subchapter, behind this conflict there was still a deep diversity in conception between the “orthodox” AAS and the “un-orthodox” BAA. In this case, Barden limited himself to criticize Budu-Acquah for not having used the proper channels (namely the BAA, instead of the AAS). See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, Letter, Dei-Anang to Barden, 5th December 1961 and AGPL, un-catalogued /BK-Ideological Course for Political Organisations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Dei-Anang, 6th December 1961.

457 Sierra Leone’s request came after a visit of the All People’s Congress’ leader, Siaka Stevens. He wrote to Barden to propose three of their young party members for attending the course. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter (handwritten), Siaka Stevens to Barden, 30th November 1961 (and the following transcript). Barden, who showed appreciation for their request, accepted and sent them three tickets. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Siaka Stevens, 2nd December 1961. The request from Guyana came directly to Nkrumah’s office and consequently it was forwarded to Barden’s. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Iprahim (Office of the President) to Barden, 5th October 1961. However, eventough Barden had accepted the Guyanese’s requests, a plan for proper scholarship was not yet ready. It took
The course was still experimental. Barden himself considered it as “only a ‘sandwich’ course” as its first aim was to prepare the ground for a two-years one. Still, it is interesting to go through its contents in order to understand the general educational approach of the Institute and the basis for the subsequent developments. The course - finally reduced to a two-month one - was divided in three main parts: Theory, Practical and Evaluation.

In the theoretical part, there was no reference to Nkrumahism (officially adopted only after this course) nor to socialism. The reasons for this were tactical, as underlined in a note of the BAA. Indeed, most freedom fighters were coming from “dependent” countries and references to socialism could raise even more suspects on the part of the colonial authorities. The theoretical part included lessons on Nationalism, propaganda, Positive Action, the functioning of Trade Unions, local government and administration, Pan-Africanism, African Personality and Constitutional Conferences works. The political models proposed were obviously all related to Ghana. The CPP was presented as the best form of nationalist party and the same was for the Ghanaian TUC and the Pan-Africanist AATUF for what concerned trade unions.

The Practical part included an insight into the work of the CPP and the Ghanaian Institutions. It included visits to: CPP headquarters, TUC, Young Pioneers, Builders

AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Iprahim, 6th October 1961. The scholarships for the Guyana’s students were approved only for the next course scheduled. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Chinebuah to Barden, 3rd February 1962. The latter case is interesting as it shows Ghana’s will to extend its influence even outside of Africa. Indeed, by supporting the Guyanese (with scholarships), Ghana was once again strengthening the ties between countries populated by African descendants and Africa itself. From this point of view, Ghana’s link with the African Diaspora had not ended with Padmore’s death, nor it was with Du Bois’ in 1963.

According to the authors of Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa, the Ghanaian President pushed to teach at Winneba a sort of religious cult linked to the party. The students – he thought - should be “made to realize the Party’s ideology is a religion and should be carried out faithfully and fervently”. Unfortunately, as usual in this book, there is no reference to any source for this statement. See NLC, Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa, p.44. TUC stands for Trade Union Congress and it was the main trade union federation in Ghana. The AATUF stands for “All-African Trade Union Federation” and it was an attempt to create a Pan-African trade union federation. For further information on AATUF see for instance J. Kloman, African Unification Movements, pp.393-394; see also D.Z. Poe, Kwame Nkrumah’s Contribution to Pan-African Agency, p.113.
Brigade, National Council of Ghana Women and the Farmers Council. The students were also invited to participate to rallies. Finally, the most important figures of the Ghanaian State and the Party gave lectures on various aspects of ideology and administration.

In the same period, other two important ventures took place at Winneba. Two conferences were held for the Ghanaian ambassadors, the first one for those on duty in Africa and the second one for those working outside the continent. The diplomats had to be updated on the new approach of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. With the establishment of the AAS, the Ghanaian President had given more instruments to deal with African Affairs. Thus, all the ambassadors were called to be constantly informed on the developments of politics in the continent. Moreover, they were also requested to adhere to the new ideological orientation of the state. The Institute was bound to check on this orientation before any ambassador was appointed and sent to a mission. In case the candidates were not considered ideologically aligned, proper courses would re-educate them. Interestingly, the conference for Ghanaian ambassadors of non-African countries dealt, among the other things, with the functioning of the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre. The conference was meant to explain the actual functioning of the whole system of foreign policy of Ghana.

In January, with the last conference of ambassadors (4-10\textsuperscript{th} January) and the end of the course for freedom fighters (28\textsuperscript{th} January), the Institute ended its first year of activity. It had been a year of experimentation. All the data and the criticisms collected in the past year

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{462} AGPL, BAA/423, Note, “Curriculum”, undated. In order to have the best possible training for local governments, Barden also requested to the Ministry of Local Government to provide lecturers for the course. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter Barden to the Minister of Local Government, 31\textsuperscript{st} October 1961. The Minister agreed and sent two members of his staff to speak about Local Government Administration. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Addai to Barden, 11\textsuperscript{th} November 1961.
\item \textsuperscript{463} On 8\textsuperscript{th} January 1962, Barden wrote to almost all the Ministers, Party executives, and high rank civil servants to involve them as lecturers in the ongoing course. This is a further proof that the course had been scarcely organized in advance and that it could be considered an experimental one. See AGPL, un-catalogued/ BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Addai to Barden, 11\textsuperscript{th} November 1961. Some of the most important personalities of Ghana, including Ako Adjei, accepted.
\item \textsuperscript{464} AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Principal Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dei-Anang and Barden, 5\textsuperscript{th} December 1961. The letter includes the following list of the contents of the conference: a) Policy towards Africa; b) The Casablanca powers; c) Ghana’s relations with Ivory Coast and Togoland; d) Ghana’s relations with Liberia and Sierra Leone; e) The Bureau of African Affairs and African Affairs Centre; See also AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Asante to Principal Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 12\textsuperscript{th} December 1961.
\end{itemize}}
were used to plan major changes. The Institute was planned to be completely transformed into a sort of University providing two-year courses. Changes also occurred in the contents of the classes.

The BAA was directly involved in the elaboration of a new plan. In January, the National Council for Higher Education and Research (NCHER) sent Barden a draft proposal for the conversion of the Institute.\(^{465}\) The first question was the change of the name of the school - proposed by Nkrumah himself - into “Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science”.\(^ {466}\) The second and more important question was a revision of the very nature of the institution. The NCHER had analyzed criticisms and suggestions made by the students of the previous courses. On these bases, it proposed the establishment of three different levels of courses in place of the existing two: a main course on Political science, a short one for Ghanaian party members and civil servants, and a last one specifically designed for African nationalists.

The pillar of the new Institute was planned to be the two-year course in Political Science, meant to provide “sound education at the level of a University institution along the lines of institutes such as Ruskin or People’s college”.\(^ {467}\) The NCHER wanted to transform the school into a sort of University, modeling it on other famous educational institutions in the world. In the name of Positive neutralism, its model would be half a way between the West and the East. However, the Institute was not losing its character of ideological school. In the following years the name “Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute” was often used informally in place of the official one. Even after 1966, the National Liberation Council always referred to it with this name.\(^ {468}\)

\(^{465}\) AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science”, 24\(^{th}\) January 1962.

\(^{466}\) The plans for the changes in the Institute had been prepared by the National Council for Higher Education and Research (NCHER). The Council wrote to Barden in January just to have his endorsement on the plan to be submitted to Nkrumah. See AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Adu (Secretary of NCHER) to Barden, 24\(^{th}\) January 1962.

\(^{467}\) Ibidem.

\(^{468}\) See for example the files of the NLC administration (dating after the coup, in February1966): PRAAD, RG3/5/1635; PRAAD, RG3/5/1636; PRAAD, RG11/1/148; PRAAD, RG11/1/154; PRAAD, RG11/1/357; see also NLC, Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa, p.44, ff.
As a result of its investigations, the NCHER considered the previous courses inadequate. According to Barden, criticisms on the Positive Action course (the one organized by the BAA) were amply unjustified. Indeed, several parties had showed appreciation for the results of the course organized by the BAA, even if it was an experimental one.

The courses were re-designed according to the proposals and suggestions of both the NCHER and the BAA, in order to increase the efficiency of the Institute. The most important change was the introduction of Nkrumahism as the official ideology to be taught. It was a sign of the changing times. Indeed, during 1962, the wave of radicalization reached its peak and Ghana entered definitely into the Socialist era.

Freedom fighters, sponsored by allied parties, were invited to attend the new courses, without having to pay for any tuition. The new courses were finally defined and they comprehended everything concerning the state administration, the functioning of the party machinery, communication, and economics. The subjects taught at the Institute were now very similar to the ones granted by political institutes in the socialist world.

Important changes involved also the staff of the Institute. The NCHER had particularly criticized the lack of graduate teachers in 1961. Thus, it proposed the enrollment of three resident tutors, preferably Ghanaians and graduates. Only in case this solution was not possible, they suggested hiring socialist foreigners. Barden added an important detail to the NCHER’s observations. According to him, any Ghanaian lecturer

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469 AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science”, 24th January 1962.
470 AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Adu (NCHER), 1st February 1962.
471 The Secretary-General of the Democratic Congress Alliance of Gambia, Garba-Jahumpa, wrote to Barden shortly after the Positive Action course was finished to thank him for the “valuable training received” by his party members. He also underlined that they were “making very good use of these comrades” for the independence struggle. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Garba-Jahumpa to Barden, 12th February 1962. See also the answer: AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to Garba-Jahumpa, 20th February 1962. It is interesting to underline that Garba-Jahumpa was one of the participants in the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress. It is once again a case of a political contact dating from the time of Padmore’s activity.
472 Diploma courses comprehended the following subjects: Nkrumahism (theory and practice), Economics, Political institutions, constitutional law, African studies, leadership, communication techniques, office management.
473 AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science”, 24th January 1962.
had to be ideologically aligned. Such a characteristic was even more important than owning a graduate degree:

I do not wholly agree that the tutorial staff should be strictly recruited from the graduate cadre only, as very few graduates in Ghana today have any idea of the fundamental concept of Nkrumahism on which the party machinery is based. Nor are there any known graduates who have identified themselves with the nationalist organizations abroad and who have appreciation of the material required to assist these organizations in their liberation struggle. I consider the best means of recruiting tutorial staff for the School would be to look out for persons with reasonable background education who are loyal to the party have made a proper study of Socialism as related to Nkrumahism and who understand the African liberation struggle.\textsuperscript{474}

In line with this plan, Barden proposed to send some indoctrinated Ghanaians to USSR or Yugoslavia in order to train them as tutors for the Institute.\textsuperscript{475} According to the NCHER, the main problem with Barden’s plan was the lack of candidates. Indeed, few Ghanaian graduates had “identified themselves with this ideological form of activity [Nkrumahism]”.\textsuperscript{476}

The lack of Ghanaian personnel eventually led the institution to hire foreigners from socialist countries like the GDR.\textsuperscript{477} For this reason, the influence of the East on the Institute increased considerably through the years.

After all the changes made in early 1962, the Institute had been transformed. It was now ready to spread Nkrumahism both in Ghana and abroad. The BAA had been a fundamental for the evolution of the institution and the Institute itself became one of

\textsuperscript{474} AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Adu (NCHER), 1\textsuperscript{st} February 1962.
\textsuperscript{475} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{476} AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Adu (NCHER) to Barden, 3\textsuperscript{rd} February 1962.
\textsuperscript{477} The NCHER had proposed socialist tutors coming from both the East and the West (for instance British ones). AGPL, BAA/423, Draft Memorandum, “Development of the Kwame Nkrumah Institute, Winneba, as the Institute of Political Science”, 24\textsuperscript{th} January 1962. Barden, ironically, commented on the last point: “I do not know the sort of “Socialism” practised in the United Kingdom which makes you to suggest that we might draw tutors from that country”. AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Barden to Adu (NCHER), 1\textsuperscript{st} February 1962. The NCHER replied: “I imagine that it is possible, even in the United Kingdom, to find a sincere socialist who would sympathize with the ideology embodied in Ghanaian Nkrumahism to be an acceptable tutor”. AGPL, BAA/423, Letter, Adu (NCHER) to Barden, 3\textsuperscript{rd} February 1962.
Barden’s instruments to influence Ghana’s internal and external policies. Thanks to Winneba’s school, the “militants” were bound to strengthen their position at the expense of the “diplomats” of the AAS. The relationship between the two institutions became a major issue in this period.

**4.5. The Confrontation between the AAS and the BAA**

The new phase of Ghana’s foreign policy led to frictions between the three institutions deputized to its performance, the new Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BAA. The Ideological Institute of Winneba became the ground were the clashes between the three Ghanaian bodies took place. The main source of friction was the management of the political “visa” issued by the Institute before several “political” diplomatic appointments. Barden increasingly extended his control over the Institute, taking also care of these appointments. Such interference in the management of the Foreign Service was resented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also by the newly established AAS.

The establishment of the AAS had already complicated the work of Ghana’s foreign policy machinery even for what concerned the “traditional” diplomacy. As Dei-Anang rightly pointed out, the presence of the AAS had strongly complicated the work of the “foreign office” which was now completely duplicated in all its forms. According to him, in this new system of “parallel agencies”, the strongest frictions were those between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat. First of all, the Secretariat was physically very close to Nkrumah’s Office and so constantly in contact with it. This fact led the Ministry to be always one step behind the AAS in every question since 1961. Secondly, the two institutions were completely different in their nature and aims and Nkrumah clearly gave more power to the Secretariat than to the Ministry. The AAS had been established by

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478 M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations*, p.28 It might be useful to recall Thompson’s comment on the issue. He wrote that with the establishment of the Secretariat a “cohesive policy was lost” and that the foreign policy machinery in Ghana was in general weakened.  
479 *Ibidem*, p.28.
Nkrumah only to solve the problems of the latter. According to Dei-Anang: “in the mind of Nkrumah, the Foreign Ministry was identified with a slow, inactive, and orthodox service incapable of reacting effectively to his needs”. The Secretariat was indeed established to be rather the opposite.

Even if considered an “unorthodox” foreign ministry, the Secretariat was still following the traditional diplomatic procedures. From this point of view, the BAA was also different from the new institution in its nature and aims. Since 1961, every mission concerning African liberation and unity was faced by the BAA and the AAS with two completely different approaches. In many cases, this fact led to clashes between the two institutions, often following diplomatic accidents caused by the BAA activities. The frictions between the AAS and the BAA became soon even stronger than the ones between the AAS and the Ministry.

The basis of the contrast between the AAS and the BAA was the increasing power of the Bureau within the Ghanaian apparatus of foreign policy. Indeed, after the Congo Crisis, Barden had succeeded in convincing Nkrumah to grant him more resources and more freedom of action. In this period, the Bureau extended also its influence on the embassies to the detriment of both the Ministry and the AAS. The net of BAA agents was getting very wide and likewise their contribution to the making of Ghana’s foreign policy in Africa was becoming quite relevant. Barden himself had proposed Nkrumah to rely more on his agents for the running of the Ghanaian embassies.

The BAA held stronger position, but it also had new duties to perform. Since 1961, Barden had to develop all the activities of the Bureau (production and distribution of Pan-African press, use of agents on the field etc.) and he also had to start working on the new tasks his office required. The most important of them was the provision of military training

480 M. Dei-Anang, _The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations_, p.29.
481 In December, the director of the BAA had proposed to Nkrumah a reform of the Ministry, presenting observations collected in his East African trip. Indeed, during this trip, Barden lamented a lack of communication between Accra and its embassies. The circulation of information was essential in order to fulfill Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. A lack of coordination with the embassies was also damaging the work of the political attaches, directly depending on the BAA. For this reason, Barden proposed the Ministry to make good use of the experience of the men of the Bureau, who had been already successful in creating a net of information in Congo and other fronts of the Pan-African struggle. See AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 1st December 1960.
to freedom fighters. Such a new strategy was the result of a clear tactical change in the Pan-African policy of the President.

At first, Nkrumah had strongly sponsored non-violence. Until 1961, Ghana did not support guerrilla warfare, unless strictly necessary. Instead, it tried to push the liberation movements towards the use of Positive Action.\footnote{According to K.B. Asante, Nkrumah’s attitude towards the use of violence was pragmatic. Even though he was generally contrasting such strategy, he was also aware than sooner or later (and the Congo Crisis was a clear signal) the “imperialists” would have driven forcefully Ghana in that direction. Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 6th September 2012.} Everything changed after the fall of Lumumba. Nkrumah had failed to create a strong Pan-African front to counteract the presence of the “imperialist” forces. It was time to find a solution to the political and military weakness of the radical forces in Africa. Even if, theoretically, Ghana kept sponsoring non-violence, Nkrumah ordered to invest more resources in the military training of African freedom fighters. The first example of this new course was Congo, where Ghana started providing arms and military trainers to Gizenga’s government. Soon after, similar initiatives followed in Southern Africa and in the Portuguese territories.

The BAA’s first task was to connect the frontline with Accra. There, agents of the Bureau constantly updated Barden on the needs of the African liberation movements in term of funds, supplies and arms. The second task of the Office was to provide military and political training to African freedom fighters. In order to achieve this target, Barden set up specific courses to be attended by men selected by their nationalist parties. The supervision of the operation was, once again, in the hands of the agents on the spot. The courses took place in secret military camps, specifically established for this purpose and known only to Barden, Nkrumah, and few others.

The first military training course in Ghana dates back to the end of 1961. In November, the first of a series of four secret camps, the one of Mankrong, was opened to secretly train the African political refugees hosted in Ghana to guerrilla warfare.\footnote{NLC, \textit{Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa}, p.6.} According to the information collected by the National Liberation Council after the coup of
February 1966, the first course began on 3 December 1961 and ended on 23 June 1962. The instructors were Russians.\textsuperscript{484}

The courses were also making use of Winneba’s structures, most of the times for teaching politics.\textsuperscript{485} No military training was usually taught at the Institute.\textsuperscript{486} However, occasionally, some students did receive such training there. The proof of this assertion can be found in a letter sent by the Bureau to the Ministry of Interior dated 10 July 1962.\textsuperscript{487} In the document, the director of the BAA was informing the Ministry of the danger represented by the freedom fighters trained at Winneba. In line with Nkrumah’s new dispositions, every African nationalist trained in military tactics and guerrilla had to be expelled from Ghana. Indeed, they were considered useless unless they reached the frontlines of the Africa liberation struggles. Moreover, they could also represent a threat for Ghana itself, in case they turned against their allies. Quoting from the letter:

The students, whose names are attached, have completed a course at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Winneba and have returned to their respective countries. The course, which was intensive, was designed to fit them for the African liberation struggle. The knowledge and experience they have acquired in military tactics and sabotage are such that we consider their re-entry into the country a security risk.\textsuperscript{488}

The same military courses were also attended by members of opposition parties supported by Ghana. This fact attracted the suspects and the hostility of the majority of Ghana’s neighboring countries. The BAA became soon one of the most infamous organizations in Africa, since it was known to be behind the military training of “terrorists”. To make the things even worse, the Bureau also increased its intelligence activities in all the “moderate” African states.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{484} NLC, \textit{Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa}, p.6.
\bibitem{485} \textit{Ibidem.}, p.4.
\bibitem{486} Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2012.
\bibitem{487} AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, Letter, Barden to the Principal Immigration Officer, Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, 10\textsuperscript{th} July 1962.
\bibitem{488} AGPL, un-catalogued/BK-Ideological Course for Political Organizations of Dependent African States, \textit{Letter}, Barden to the Principal Immigration Officer, Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, 10\textsuperscript{th} July 1962.
\end{thebibliography}
With these premises it is no mystery that the BAA came into friction with the AAS, which was still using traditional diplomatic lines. According to Michael Dei-Anang:

As the liberation struggle in Africa gained momentum, further friction developed. Within the Bureau there was the tendency to adopt the unorthodox line of diplomacy which invariably provoked foreign governments. Since it was entrusted with responsibility for the guerrilla training of freedom fighters, other governments in Africa, particularly those in neighboring territories, saw Ghana as the source of most of their domestic difficulties.489

In this context, the AAS was usually called to solve serious diplomatic accidents caused by the missions performed by the BAA. It was the case, for instance, of Ivory Coast, where the Secretariat had to work constantly to calm down the fears of Houphoet Boigny about the activities of the Sanwi in the country.490 As a result, the AAS and the BAA developed an increasing reciprocal resentment.

To make the position of the AAS even more difficult, the Bureau was usually not informing the Secretariat about its missions. Still, it was using Ghanaian embassies for transferring information or weapons.491 This fact is confirmed by both Armah and Dei-Anang.492 The latter gives an account of the consequences on the relationship with the AAS:

In my job I was constantly required to confirm with the President that he had instructed Barden to undertake certain activities in independent Africa about which I had heard from other sources. The Bureau had its own organization but was also able to use the orthodox diplomatic channels. For example, the Bureau often worked through a member of one of the established missions in Africa, who would be permitted to use the wireless transmitter but employed a separate code for communication with his headquarters. The Bureau was also able to use the diplomatic bag for the transmission of messages and supplies, but under

490 Interviews with K.B. Asante.
491 Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.
492 For Armah’s comments on the issue see K. Armah, Peace without Power, p.29.
a separate seal. The Foreign Office was thus not always in a position to censor communication between Barden and his field associates.493

The Bureau was operating independently from the foreign office, Secretariat included, and this fact contributed to the tension between Barden’s office and Dei-Anang’s one.

Meanwhile, Barden began to extend his influence on the appointments of ambassadors. This fact led the relationship between the BAA and the Foreign Service to its lowest point.494 In order to achieve this target, the director of the Bureau counted on his control of the Institute and his close relationship with Nkrumah. Thus, political appointments became common. The consequence of Barden’s policy was the increasing isolation of the BAA within the Ghanaian State. The institution was thought to be too powerful and too independent. Since 1961, Barden became surrounded by enemies both outside and inside Ghana.

One of the first and maybe the most important “political” appointment made by the Bureau in this period was the one of David Bosumtwi-Sam, former Administrative Secretary of the BAA itself. He became ambassador in Uganda in 1962 specifically to fulfill a mission requested by Nkrumah and Barden: working against the project of the East African Federation.

With the extension of his influence on diplomatic appointments, Barden reached the peak of his power. In the period 1961-1964, thanks to his agents and political attaches he was able to control several Ghanaian missions. Barden’s negative reports to Nkrumah could cause the removal of any diplomat in Africa.495 However, the strong power of Barden and his BAA revealed also the weakness of the whole system of foreign policy. Indeed, the disputes between the “parallel agencies” caused often the failures of the targets of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. Such problems particularly involved the BAA and the AAS.

494 Dei-Anang gave also an account of this fact as one of the main point of friction between the AAS and the BAA. He wrote: “A stage was even reached where certain diplomatic representatives were selected by the President from the “activists” operating within the Bureau”. *Ibidem*, p.29.
495 Interview with K.B. Asante, Accra, 4th September 2011, and interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012.
4.6. The Struggle for African Unity between 1961 and 1962

Once again, West Africa was the main battle ground for the unity project, since it was around the UAS that most of the Ghanaian strategy on the matter was based. Until the Organization of African Unity was established (May 1963), Ghana made every effort to extend its traditional area of influence. The BAA was the real protagonist of this new season of Pan-African politics.

Even after Mali had joined the UAS, the Union was still a fragile body. Touré, Keita, and Nkrumah himself were absolutely skeptical towards the idea of surrendering their sovereignty to the inter-state entity. Still, the latter kept promoting the UAS as the basis for a Continental Union Government and he kept inviting other countries to join in. The goal of Nkrumah’s unity policy between 1961-63 was to involve other African states to enlarge the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Some attempts were even made outside this region. For instance, in August 1960, Nkrumah had discussed with Lumumba the possibility of establishing a Ghana-Congo union to join the UAS.496 In early 1961, even the Malawi Congress Party had proposed Nyasaland as a new member of the Union, once it become independent.497 Such a proposal was a confirmation of the strong relationship between the party and the Ghanaian government.

In West Africa, the battle for improving the union was fought with the strongest vigor. Between 1961 and 1962, a constant work was made to attract Upper Volta towards the Union of African States. Eventually, in the summer of 1962, an attempt on the life of Nkrumah just after a journey in Upper Volta closed all the possibilities of further actions in that direction.498 A similar work was made also with other countries such as Niger and Togo. In these cases, two policies were performed by Ghana. First of all, Nkrumah worked at a diplomatic level to involve them in the union. At the same time, he also financed the opposition parties of the same countries, providing military training to their militants. In the latter case, a change of government in Niger or Togo was considered as the key to speed up

496 See W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, pp.123, 125-126, 140 and 430.
498 See W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.204-205 and 207, ff.
the process of unity. Clearly, this policy was considered subversive by the African governments involved, which accused Ghana of fomenting terrorism within their borders. In the case of Niger, the Sawaba party was still heavily supported by Accra, both financially and militarily. The presence of the party leader Djibo Bakary in Accra is confirmed in April 1961.\textsuperscript{499} Sawaba party members are reported in Ghana at least until the summer of 1965 when they were moved out of the country, just before the OAU conference.\textsuperscript{500} In the case of Togo, Nkrumah worked hard against Olympio’s government, since the Togolese President had always refused every proposal of a union with Ghana. However, according to Thompson, the relations between Togo and Ghana were more affected by reciprocal fears of subversion rather than an actual political distance.\textsuperscript{501} Indeed, ideologically speaking, Olympio was very close to Nkrumah. He, however, feared that Ghana could absorb geographically and politically Togo. For this reason, he opposed any unity project and he adhered to the “Entente”.\textsuperscript{502} But even more than Niger, Togo and Upper Volta, Ghana concentrated its efforts for unity on Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

With Houphouet-Boigny, Nkrumah kept performing a double-face policy. On one hand, he tried to improve the relations with Abidjan. For instance, he met his Ivorian counterpart in autumn 1960 trying unsuccessfully to convince him to join the Union with Guinea.\textsuperscript{503} On the other, through the Bureau he kept supporting the Sanwi, putting a strong political pressure on Abidjan. At the time, the Sanwi were hosted at the African Affairs Centre but still not active in subversive activities. After 1964, they had also begun to receive a proper military training, becoming a political weapon for Ghana against Ivory Coast.\textsuperscript{504} Clearly, such a double-face policy caused frequent incidents between the two countries.

\textsuperscript{499} AGPL, un-catalogued/AA-Office Stationery Equipment and Accommodation, Letter, Bosumtwi-Sam to the Manager of Avenue Hotel, Accra, 25\textsuperscript{th} April 1961.
\textsuperscript{500} For further information on Sawaba in Ghana see also NLC, \textit{Nkrumah’s Deception of Africa}, pp.5-7.
\textsuperscript{501} W.S. Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, p.221-222.
\textsuperscript{503} W.S. Thompson, \textit{Ghana’s Foreign Policy}, p.148.
\textsuperscript{504} NLC, \textit{Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa}, p.4.
With Nigeria, Nkrumah’s work was even harder than in the other cases. Lagos was the most important element for any plan of unity in West Africa. However, it had chosen the field of moderate African states almost immediately after its independence (1<sup>st</sup> October 1960), opposing Nkrumah’s radical Pan-Africanism. In order to put pressure on Azikiwe and Balewa, Accra had turned to the Action Group, the most important Yoruba party led by Obafemi Awolowo. In 1962, while Ghana was strengthening its relationship with the AG, the party was accused of plotting against the Nigerian government. Awolowo and his fellow party members were put on trial with the accusation of supporting the secession of the Western part of Nigeria. Even Ghana was quoted in the trial as the <i>longa manus</i> behind the AG. For the first time, a clear attack against Nkrumah was made by another African country. Evidences were also produced of the military training granted to the Action Group militants by Ghana. Between 1961-1962, Nigeria increasingly criticized Ghana’s radicalization. The Nigerian leaders even prepared a defense plan in the event of a Ghanaian invasion of Yorubaland in support to the Action Group. At the time, Nigerians were also paying attention to Ghana’s moves in the neighboring Cameroon, where Accra was active since 1959. Information on a “path” that led UPC members from the Cameroons to Ghana and then to China came to the desk of Nigerians.

Ghana was attracting the suspects of practically every neighboring country. Nkrumah reacted to this suspects investing even more resources on the BAA activities and to support opposition parties. The time was running fast and Nkrumah wanted to speed up the unity process. According to him, the more they waited, the more difficult it would have been to

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505 On the process and also on the internal political struggle in Nigeria at the time see W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, p.239-242.
506 The Nigerian press was strongly criticizing Ghana during 1961. They were particularly disapproving the despotic attitude of Nkrumah’s government showed during the year in which “the road of socialism” was launched. The titles of the Nigerian newspaper West African Pilot speaks for themselves: “Nightfall in Ghana”; “The Sun Goes Down”; “Brink of Chaos” and “Reign of Terror Dawns in Ghana”. See BNA, DO/177/2, “Subversive Activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria”, Extract of “Nigerian Fortnightly Summary”, 29<sup>th</sup> September-12<sup>th</sup> October 1961.
507 A series of documents of the Dominions Office and Commonwealth Office shows how Nigeria was cooperating militarily with the UK in the event of a Ghanaian plan of regional “subversion”. See particularly BNA, DO/177/2, “Subversive Activities by Ghanaians in Nigeria”, “Ghanaian Armed Intervention in Western Nigeria in the Event of the Latter’s Secession from the Federation”, 13<sup>th</sup> July 1961.
actualize such a project. History was going to prove Nkrumah right, as the establishment of the OAU in spring 1963 definitely crystallized the project of African unity.

In the same period, Nkrumah invested also huge resources to support African liberation. In this field, the Bureau became more and more powerful but it also became the target of criticisms by the same freedom fighters. Indeed, Barden’s management was often seen as particularly dictatorial and his strategies were judged as wrong and counterproductive. For instance, strong criticisms against Barden and his BAA came from Nelson Mandela, when describing the relations between ANC and Ghana at his trial.⁵⁰⁹

Even if Ghana was suffering several political defeats, its position among the liberation movements was still strong. Nkrumah was far from being defeated by his enemies. In this phase of radical Pan-African policy, the role of the Bureau was predominant and it conquered a leading stature in the foreign policy machinery of Ghana.

4.7. Voice of Africa and Radio Ghana in the Age of Radicalization

The last field of operation of the BAA between 1961 and 1962 was the production and distribution of Pan-Africanist press and radio programs. Since early 1961, Barden’s office improved its means of propaganda in order to support Nkrumah’s new political line. Indeed, it was essential to give visibility to Ghana’s shift towards socialism and to explain “Nkrumahism” to the African freedom fighters, considering that only few of them could attend the courses at Winneba. A plan for the production of Pan-Africanist propaganda had already been launched in 1959 by the African Affairs Committee with the projects of Radio

⁵⁰⁹ See W.S. Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, pp.222-223. For the attitude of Ghana, particularly the BAA towards ANC and PAC see S. Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: the Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1996, pp.30-34; Kofi Batsa, recalled in his autobiography the bad relationship between Mandela and Barden. He wrote: “Nelson Mandela, for example, did not get as much support, as an ANC man, from the Bureau of African Affairs, as he would have had otherwise, and eventually he told me he was being messed around so much by these conflicts and by A K Barden […] that he was going back to South Africa to fight”. In K. Batsa, The Spark, p.17.
Ghana and Voice of Africa (VOA). In the years 1961 and 1962, both the radio and the
magazine were developed and other publications were also conceived and produced.

At the end of 1960, Barden reported Nkrumah on the developments of Voice of
Africa.\textsuperscript{510} The review had a good reception. However, according to the director of the
BAA, the whole project had to be revisited in terms of quality and quantity in view of the
new political phase. First of all, he suggested raising the production – about Ten Thousand
copies - to at least Twenty Thousands. Secondly, he proposed to change completely the
contents in order to transform it in an effective political instrument. In the new phase, it was
essential to find the way to promote Nkrumah’s ideology over the others. He wrote to the
Ghanaian President [italics by the author]:

\begin{quote}
The snag in our political campaign abroad, particularly in the African States, is the lack of a
qualitative national magazine capable of projecting Ghana and its national policy and
deseminating its political ideologies and aspirations in such convincing terms \textit{as to arrest
the political thoughts and imaginations of other African countries}. Such a paper should
have as its primary objective, strong propaganda campaign in canvassing political opinions
abroad in support of Ghana’s policy of United Africa.\textsuperscript{511}
\end{quote}

Barden added also some comments on the use of propaganda in Ghana. He criticized the
weakness of the actual system since, according to him, it had proved unable to support
properly Nkrumah’s influence on African politics. The new Voice of Africa was the
solution to this problem:

\begin{quote}
It has been observed that your important policy speeches and statements setting out the
course of African destiny “die at birth”, i.e. no sooner they are broadcast[ed] and published
in local papers than they are forgotten. This is the result of luck of effective machinery to
follow them up. I consider that such speeches and statements can have a profound impact
on other African states and influence them to a considerable degree if we had a magazine of
the stature and quality capable of giving them a wide publicity by amplifying in a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{510} AGPL, BAA/370, \textit{“Report of the Activities of the Bureau – January to December 1960”}, Barden to
Nkrumah, 16\textsuperscript{th} December 1960.
\textsuperscript{511} AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30\textsuperscript{th} December 1960.
continuous and sustained manner the salient points which will appeal to other African countries. [...] it is my intention to convert the “Voice of Africa” into such a magazine.\(^{512}\)

The new Voice of Africa had to be launched immediately in order to counteract the growing political power of moderate African countries. Moreover, it had to win the competition with similar magazines in countries like UAR or Cameroon.\(^{513}\) Ghana had to prevail in this “war of propaganda” at all costs.

Nkrumah approved the plan and he granted Barden with new funds and men for strengthening VOA and the rest of the BAA propaganda machinery. The most relevant new appointment was the one of Kofi Batsa, a Ghanaian journalist known for his communist sympathies. Interestingly, Batsa had first come into contact with journalism and political radicalism through James Markham, former key figure of Padmore’s office and of the African Affairs Committee.\(^{514}\) Even if he had been politically “sacrificed” during Nkrumah’s rise, he had never lost contact with politics. When the project of the new Voice of Africa was launched, Nkrumah immediately accepted Barden’s proposal of hiring Batsa, a sign of the trust which surrounded the latter both politically and professionally.\(^{515}\) At the time, Batsa was already involved in Radio Ghana with the daily commentaries on African Affairs, the radio programs launched by the African Affairs Committee in 1959. According to Batsa himself, Adamafio was the one who put him in contact with the Bureau of African Affairs. The journalist could not refuse to take the post of editor of VOA and “almost immediately [he] was plunged into the middle of the propaganda machine which was spreading Kwame Nkrumah’s views to the whole Africa”.\(^{516}\)

Voice of Africa was re-launched as a weekly “magazine of African News and Views” on January 1961. However, already in the following issue it was transformed into a

\(^{512}\) AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30\(^{th}\) December 1960. It is interesting to observe the level of confidence that existed between Barden and Nkrumah at the time. Indeed, this letter was marked as “secret”, meaning that it was intended as a very important and private correspondence.

\(^{513}\) AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 30\(^{th}\) December 1960.

\(^{514}\) Indeed, in the late 1940s, he had spent a lot of time at the Evening News offices in the company of James Markham, who at the time worked for the newspaper as editor. K. Batsa, The Spark, p.6.

\(^{515}\) For Nkrumah’s approval to the appointment of Batsa as “Research Officer and Editor of the Bureau’s Publications” see AGPL, BAA/370, Letter, Erica Powell (Personal Secretary of Kwame Nkrumah) to Barden, 10\(^{th}\) January 1961.

monthly publication. Interestingly, as Hooker underlined, the cover showed a drawing very similar to the one depicted on Padmore’s book “Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers”, published in 1931.\(^{517}\) It was probably a tribute to the memory of the man who practically created the BAA and who contributed to the conception of Ghana’s Pan-African policy.\(^{518}\)

VOA was made primarily to promote Nkrumah’s thoughts in Africa. The cover always presented a space devoted to one of the quotations of the Ghanaian President. Interestingly, the very first article of VOA, “Birth of my Party”, was written by Nkrumah himself.\(^{519}\) References to the CPP were not uncommon, being the party presented as a model for other nationalist parties. The majority of the articles dealt with Pan-Africanism, such as, for instance, A.K. Barden’s “African Unity Now”, also published in the first issue.\(^{520}\)

At the same time, VOA was meant as well to be the voice of freedom fighters. Thus, a relevant space was devoted to articles written by members of friendly liberation movements like, for instance, the Pan-Africanist Congress. In the case of South Africa, even the ANC had articles published in VOA, but it received less space than the PAC.\(^{521}\)

Voice of Africa was now produced and distributed on a larger scale than it was before. According to Batsa, the review soon reached one hundred thousand copies.\(^{522}\) It was

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\(^{517}\) J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.22.

\(^{518}\) The most important tribute to Padmore was the establishment of the George Padmore Research Library on African Affairs in Accra. Opened officially in June 1961, the project of the Library was ready at the times of the African Affairs Committee. The issue was one of the first ever discussed by Nkrumah at the Committee meetings. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/251/African Affairs Committee, 4\(^{\text{th}}\) Meeting of the African Affairs Committee held at Flagstaff House on November, 9\(^{\text{th}}\) 1959. At the speech made by Nkrumah the day of the opening of the library, the Ghanaian President presented Padmore as one the most important figures of Ghana and Africa. See “Padmore the Missionary”, speech made by Kwame Nkrumah in the occasion of the opening of the George Padmore Memorial Library, 30\(^{\text{th}}\) June 1961 in S. Obeng, *Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah*, pp.375-379.


\(^{522}\) K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.13. During 1961, the printing system of the BAA was also improved by importing Chinese printing machines. The challenge was not only the one of printing an increasingly high number of copies of VOA. Barden wanted also to challenge Guinea and UAR on the production of materials for nationalist parties. Barden aimed to attract the sympathies of Nationalist parties by providing space to display
a remarkable achievement, but it also implied a considerable effort, since in most of the cases liberation movements were receiving VOA free of charge. Distributing the magazine on the frontline of the liberation struggles was also a difficult task, as VOA was being banned everywhere by colonial authorities. Still, according to Batsa, Voice of Africa could be delivered practically anywhere in the continent and outside it.523 Soon, VOA was also published in French, leading to an even wider distribution.524

Voice of Africa was becoming a fundamental instrument of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. Together with the Ideological Institute and the secret camps, the review was one of the most important political innovations of 1961. At the end of November, a satisfied Barden wrote to Nkrumah to describe the achievements of the review. It is interesting to notice Barden’s focus on the impact of the magazine in the East and in the West:

It is no exaggeration to say that since its appearance on the African political scene, it has been accepted (painfully though it may be to them) by the Western Imperialist countries, as the most progressive publication representing all shades of popular African nationalist views and projecting their real aspirations. In East European countries, its influence is profound.525

Kofi Batsa was doing a good job with VOA. In the meantime, the Ghanaian journalist was also contributing to the training of freedom fighters in the secret camps or abroad. As Batsa himself wrote: “Nkrumah’s all-Africa view involved practical help as well as verbal”.526 He was at the same time the chief editor of the BAA, a lecturer for the training camps, and a BAA agent. A similar profile was that of Samuel Ikoku. A Member of the Action Group of Nigeria, he had to escape from his country after his party had fallen in disgrace in 1962.

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523 K. Batsa, *The Spark*, p.13-14. Batsa wrote: “We were banned in many countries still under colonial rule, but we managed to reach most countries by one means or another. The distribution system of the Voice of Africa was in fact one of the largest and most ingenious distribution systems that could be imagined, and no frontier was safe!”.

524 One of the first references to a French version of VOA is in AGPL, BAA/325, Letter, Linguistic Secretary to Batsa, 3rd June 1961.


Considered a terrorist by the Nigerians, he moved to Ghana and he worked for Nkrumah’s government until the time of the coup.\textsuperscript{527} Being an esteemed economist, Ikoku lectured at Winneba and he became the editor of The Spark, a new political review established in 1962 and edited also by Batsa.

In the meantime, even the radio was further developed. With the establishment of the External Service of the Ghana Broadcasting System on 27 October 1961, the whole Radio distribution was widened, covering almost the entire continent. Twenty-one daily news bulletins and various news talks and newsreel were broadcasted in Portuguese, Hausa, Arabic, Swahili, French and obviously English. Nkrumah himself pronounced the opening speech of the new service called “Voice of Africa”, the same name used for the review. He particularly underlined how important it was to counteract the “imperialist” propaganda against Ghana and Pan-Africanism:

[…] The news is presented from an African standpoint […] From this station, we shall broadcast all-African news bulletins presented without concealment or distortion. Our compatriots in Africa and our friends now have the opportunity of hearing each day, in the language they understand, accurate and factual accounts of day-to-day events which may not be available to them from foreign-controlled and foreign-dominated radio stations operating in and broadcasting to their countries. From this station, commentaries and news talks will be broadcasted every day, giving Ghana’s standpoint in international and African political affairs. […] the voice which will go out will be truly African – African in content, outlook and imagination.\textsuperscript{528}

In Nkrumah’s plans, Radio Ghana had to become the means to reach every part of the continent spreading his political message for African liberation and unity. He was well aware that a “propaganda war” was mounting in Africa and that Ghana had to be ready to fight it. If Accra failed in providing its voice to Africans, the Pan-Africanist ideal would certainly be defeated.

\textsuperscript{527} He wrote a book on his experience in Ghana. It is: S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), \textit{Le Ghana de Nkrumah}.
Radio Ghana and VOA worked together on the same target. Materials coming from the review were commonly used in radio programs and African freedom fighters were requested to either write articles on VOA or talk in dedicated programs. Radio Ghana was also constantly advertised in Voice of Africa:


With the support of an effective propaganda, Nkrumah was ready to fight his battle for spreading Pan-Africanism in the continent. His enemies were growing day after day and he needed to counteract their propaganda in order to prevail politically. The BAA had proved to be the perfect instrument to deal with this task. Barden had been able to develop every aspect of propaganda production, from the contents to the distribution net. From this point of view, Nkrumah could be satisfied by the result achieved by his “Pan-African” institution.
4.8. Conclusions

After two years of work, Ghana’s Pan-African policy had finally a new, more radical shape. Nkrumah was ready to fight the battle for African liberation and unity with all the strength and the resources of the Ghanaian state. At the end of this process, the BAA had emerged stronger. To a certain extent, the Bureau was becoming even more influential than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS with regard to Ghana’s foreign policy.

Ghana had proved ready to fight for African liberation and unity on many different fronts. However, its enemies were also becoming stronger and Accra’s political isolation was constantly growing. Nkrumah had decided to radicalize the country to strengthen its political position in Ghana and in Africa. On the other hand, the move also proved to be dangerous, as the moderate countries backed by UK, France, and USA had multiplied their efforts to debunk Nkrumah’s influence on African politics. The prospects for the future development of Ghana’s Pan-African policy were problematic.

To make things worse, Nkrumah suffered a life attempt at Kulungugu in the summer of 1962. This event was bound to change definitely his approach to internal and foreign policy, leading radicalization to its final stage. The “diplomatic approach” towards African Unity was definitely abandoned only to be proposed again and unsuccessfully shortly before the coup of February 1966. The BAA increased its activities and the “war of propaganda” between Ghana and the moderate countries grew larger.

A second event also contributed to a further change of pace of Ghana’s Pan-African policy, the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (May 1963). This new body – the product of a political victory of “moderates” – soon became Ghana’s concurrent in Africa. In particular, the OAU Liberation Committee was going to compete with Ghana on the support to freedom fighters. As a result, Nkrumah became even more isolated, while other figures began to attract the sympathies of radicals in Africa.

The next chapter - which will comprehend the years 1963-1966 - will open with these two events, which marked the beginning of the last phase of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy and of his leadership as well. In this period, the political successes of the years 1957-1959 were only a distant memory.