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African Liberation and Unity in Nkrumah's Ghana: A Study of the Role of "Pan-African Institutions" in the making of Ghana's foreign Policy, 1957 - 1966

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Citation

Grilli, M. (2015, November 3). *African Liberation and Unity in Nkrumah's Ghana: A Study of the Role of "Pan-African Institutions" in the making of Ghana's foreign Policy, 1957 - 1966*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/36074>

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Issue Date: 2015-11-03

2. Translating the Theory into Practice (January – September 1959)

Introduction

The first year and half of Nkrumah's rule can be undoubtedly considered as a period of political successes. The next step for the Ghanaian Prime Minister was to capitalize on these results and actualize Ghana's Pan-African policy. In the first months of 1959, together with Padmore he had begun to apply this policy to the African liberation struggle. The theory could be finally turned into practice.

The platform from where to start was solid. Ghana had the structures, the men and the political strength to deal with the challenges of the African political scene. Backed by Nkrumah's prestige, Padmore's Office was ready to operate on a continental scale. The New Year brought even more money, more men and more political power to deal with this mission.

This chapter will describe the making and performance of Ghana's Pan-African policy by Padmore's Office and the AAC between January and September 1959. In this period, Ghana defined for the first time its policies for the support of political refugees, African students and opposition parties. It clarified also its stand towards the use of armed struggle in the liberation process. Finally, Padmore's Office set up the basis for a proper Pan-Africanist propaganda. The chapter will examine one by one all the problems the two Pan-African institutions had to face in 1959.

The period under examination coincides also with Padmore's last months before his death.¹³³ The Trinidadian Pan-Africanist gave his most important contribution to the management of Ghana's "un-orthodox" machinery during this year. His imprint on his Office and the AAC was bound to last for years after his death. One example, which will be described in length in the chapter, is the choice of his "successor": A.K. Barden.

¹³³ Indeed, he died on the 23rd of September, 1959.

Generally speaking, this chapter will deal with a period of changes that were going to influence Ghana's internal and external policies in the short and in the long period. It was in 1959, for instance, that Ghana began to change its position towards the two superpowers, which had definitely entered into African politics. Even the relationship between Ghana, UAR, and Guinea evolved considerably in 1959 and it influenced indirectly the radicalization of the Ghanaian state. The acceleration in the implementation of Ghana's Pan-African policy was also the result of the competition between the three radical states.

The chapter will be opened by an overview of Ghana's foreign policy in Africa after the closing of the AAPC. Thanks to this introduction, it will be easier to understand the choices made by Padmore and Nkrumah in the conception and performance of Ghana's Pan-African policy in this period. Moreover, it will be possible to understand the duties Padmore's Office and the AAC had to perform.

2.1. Ghana's Foreign Policy in Africa after the AAPC

In 1959, Ghana had to face several political challenges in Africa. The process of decolonization was speeding up and the road already traced by Ghana and Guinea in Sub-Saharan Africa was to be undertaken by other African countries. At the AAPC, Ghana had announced its political position. In early 1959, the time was ripe to take a stand in each of the controversial situations that were evolving in the continent.

Just after the AAPC conference, Ghana was called to actively participate to the independence process. The entire continent was in a political turmoil and Ghana had to elaborate accurate strategies for each area of intervention.

The first area of interest was Southern Africa. At the AAPC, three questions regarding this area had been amply discussed and they were bound to evolve during 1959: the protests against the Central African Federation (CAF), the fight against the "apartheid" in South Africa and the increasingly problematic situation in the Portuguese colonies. In

1959, all these territories experienced a high degree of tension, with liberation movements growing in strength. Thus, Ghana began to play an active role in the politics of the region.

Nkrumah's Ghana was not the only actor playing against Welensky and the CAF. The AAPC had showed that the front against the Federation was strong both inside and outside its territory. The unrest within the CAF definitely mounted in 1959. The protests in Nyasaland were led by Hastings Kamuzu Banda, leader of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) and old friend and ally of Padmore and Nkrumah.¹³⁴ Welensky responded vigorously. The NAC was banned in February 1959 and Banda himself was arrested in March. These events made the situation in the Federation even worse.

At the time, Banda was probably one of Nkrumah's closest political allies. Thus, Ghana's diplomacy and the propaganda machinery were put in motion to attack Welensky and the CAF. Nkrumah had the perfect chance to weaken the Federation and at the same time to win one strong ally after Nyasaland's independence. Meanwhile, even the collaboration with liberation movements in the two Rhodesias was strengthening so as to have a united front against the white-ruled CAF.

In South Africa, the year 1959 turned out to be fundamental for the evolution of the local liberation movements. In April, a new party split out of the ANC: the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC, ideologically more radical than the ANC, was sponsored by Ghana as well as the latter. By 1959, the relationship between ANC and PAC became one of main issues to be faced by Ghana in South Africa.

In the same period, the tension grew even in the Portuguese colonies, where anti-colonial movements reinforced their ranks. At the AAPC the political evolutions of the Lusophone Empire were discussed. Holden Roberto had been invited at the conference and after its closing he stayed at the AAC as one of the first political refugees ever hosted in Ghana.

¹³⁴ Hastings Banda (1898-1997) studied and graduated in medicine both in United States and in Scotland and practiced as a doctor both in the United Kingdom and the Gold Coast/Ghana (1951-1958). In 1958, he went back to Nyasaland to play an active part in politics with the Nyasaland African Congress, known after 1959 as Malawi Congress Party. There, he won the elections in 1961 and he led his country towards independence; the NAC was first mentioned in Ghanaian documents as ANC- Nyasaland.

After the AAPC, other refugees from South Africa and from other neighboring countries were also hosted by Ghana. It was the baptism of fire for the AAC, which in the following years had to manage other waves of refugees from all over Africa.

Ghana's Pan-African policy in Southern Africa was producing the first results. However, the Ghanaians were aware of the difficulties of the liberation struggles in the region and they still did not invest all of their resources in this mission. The freedom of Southern Africa could be achieved only after implementing medium/long term projects. On the contrary, the independence process in Central Africa and West Africa was already advanced and that is where Ghana concentrated most of its strength.¹³⁵

Both the Ghanaian Foreign Service and Padmore's Office were very active in West and Central Africa. Their mission was to support independences and to attract politically the new nations. Ghana's influence in these areas was stronger than in Southern Africa and stronger was also its interest there. In particular, Accra tried to attract French and British West Africa by its side. A good relationship with these countries was fundamental in order to widen the Ghana-Guinea Union project, one the main points of Padmore and Nkrumah's agenda for the year 1959.

Padmore, Nkrumah and the new Ministers of External Affairs (Kodjo Botsio from November '58 to April '59 and his successor, Ako Adjei) worked hard in the winter 1958/59 in order to actualize the Ghana-Guinea Union. Resident Ministers were exchanged and Accra supplied Conakry with several kinds of experts and technicians.¹³⁶ In the

¹³⁵ The countries of British West Africa and French West Africa which achieved independence during 1960 were: Togo, Mali Federation (then Mali and Senegal), Dahomey, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Niger and Mauritania. Furthermore, it must be underlined that the independence of Cameroon (a country which is usually considered as part of the Central Africa) had a direct influence on West African politics. Indeed, during the last years of the 1950s a strong political battle concerned the British Cameroons (at the time part of Nigeria and divided between Northern and Southern Cameroons) which were disputed between Nigeria and the French Cameroons. Finally, after the independence of the French Cameroons in 1960, the British Southern Cameroons joined the new country in 1961, leaving Nigeria definitely. On the other hand, the Northern Cameroons became finally part of the modern Nigeria.

¹³⁶ The Ghanaian resident Ministers in Guinea during this period were: Nathaniel Welbeck (December '58 – February '59) and Ako Adjei (February to September 1959). After being resident Minister in Guinea, Welbeck was *chargé d'affaires* at Leopoldville between October and December 1960. Later he became Executive Secretary of the CPP (1962-1966). Ako Adjei was Minister of External Affairs between April 1959 and May 1961. Between May 1961 and August 1962 he became Foreign Minister. An example of the efforts of Ghana to strengthen the union was the provision of a telegraphic transmission between the two countries. This project was already in place by January 23rd 1959. The communication was obviously a major issue for

meantime, Nkrumah launched a strong political campaign to extend the borders of the Union further than those of Ghana and Guinea. This process reached its climax on May 1, 1959 with the signing of the “Conakry Declaration”. With the declaration, the “Union of Independent African States” (UAS) was officially established. The name was a clear invitation to all the states of the IAS platform to join it. Padmore and Nkrumah were directly involved in the signing of the declaration, spending almost three weeks in Guinea between April and May.¹³⁷ Through the UAS, Ghana could involve other African countries – mainly the West Africans – into a real Pan-African project.

At the same time, Ghana could also keep an eye on Guinea: since in 1959 the latter had deepened its relations with both France and USSR, Ghana was suspicious of Touré’s attitude towards them. Indeed, Paris and Moscow could influence Conakry’s approach to African liberation and unity and also the relationship between Ghana and Guinea itself.¹³⁸

Guinea signed an agreement with France on 7 January 1959. It included also Touré’s promise of keeping his country into the franc zone.¹³⁹ This fact obviously discontented Accra. The project of a monetary union within the UAS faded away. Furthermore, the strong presence of Paris into West African politics could have endangered the development of the UAS project.¹⁴⁰

As regards the USSR, Touré showed immediately a warmer attitude towards the Soviets than Nkrumah’s. Conakry signed a trade agreement with Moscow already in

the union in order to survive, considering that at the time there was no territorial continuity in the Union. See, W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.69.

¹³⁷ At Conakry, Padmore wanted to work side by side with Nkrumah for the Union but at the same time he wanted to check on the involvement of Guinea in the AAPC organization.

¹³⁸ On the attitude of Ghana towards Guinea in 1958/59 see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.67-73.

¹³⁹ *Ibidem*, p.71.

¹⁴⁰ It must be underlined that a monetary union inside the Ghana-Guinea Union was considered a fundamental step towards a true economical integration. The Guinean promise to France sounded like a delay in this project. Furthermore, it may be added that Ghana always feared the influence of France on its former colonies, as it meant a clear political control of the colonies themselves by Paris. It is in this period that the so-called “Entente” composed by Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger (all of them yet to gain independence) was established. The “Entente” was to be one of Ghana’s main obstacles to the political integration of West Africa and also a rival on the continental scene in the years to come. The Ghanaian policy with Guinea must be read as Accra’s attempt to control the relations with a relatively moderate French West Africa. See *Ibidem*, p.72.

1959.¹⁴¹ At the time, Guinea began also supporting African liberation movements and the USSR financed the operation. In line with its policy of “Positive Neutrality”, Ghana feared Moscow’s involvement. Thus, Padmore worked at the forefront to weaken the Soviet influence on Guinea. In order to achieve this target, he involved it in the AAPC organization already since its establishment. The Guinean Abdoulaye Diallo was appointed secretary of the AAPC Steering Committee. Padmore also proposed Conakry as the first seat of the Committee meeting.¹⁴² Even with the UAR, Ghana’s strategy was similar. Cairo was chosen as the location for the next session of the AAPC Steering Committee in June 1959. In that way, Nkrumah could attract Nasser closer to him and far from Kruhschev.

Both the Ministry of External Affairs and Padmore’s office had to work with the intent of widening the UAS. The countries which attracted most of the attention were: Mali (French Sudan and Senegal), Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo, Liberia and the Cameroons.¹⁴³

The Mali Federation was established in January 1959, and it originally included Senegal, French Sudan, Dahomey and Upper Volta, even though the latter two left the federation shortly after.¹⁴⁴ Right from the start, Ghana obviously considered the Mali Federation as a possible interlocutor for a West African federation project. In the meantime, in May, a sort of association of moderate pro-France African states was formed: it was the so-called “Entente Council”.¹⁴⁵ Its members were: Ivory Coast, Niger and the former Mali Federation members Upper Volta and Dahomey. Having only Guinea on its side, Ghana needed to find good allies within the ranks of those francophone countries in view of

¹⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p.100: Ghana had to wait until 1961 to have a similar treaty.

¹⁴² The Steering Committee of the All-African People’s Conference opened its first session in Conakry on April 15, 1959; in G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.138.

¹⁴³ Once again it must be remembered that the question of British Cameroons automatically pushed the Cameroons into West African politics. Furthermore, it can be also said that French Cameroons had been administered by France with a different status than the AEF (Afrique Équatoriale Française). Indeed, the French Cameroons, like the British ones, were Trust territories of the United Nations, being previously mandates of the League of Nations.

¹⁴⁴ Just after a few days from the first act of establishment of the Federation, Dahomey and Upper Volta had already withdrew from it. There is no doubt that France and Ivory Coast were involved in this decision, since the Dahomey and Upper Volta joined, shortly after, the “*Conseil de l’Entente*”, the pro-France association of states led by Abidjan.

¹⁴⁵ The association was between African states still under colonial rule but in view of independence.

independence.¹⁴⁶ One of the goals of Ghana's foreign policy in 1959 became then to establish contacts with Dakar and Bamako.¹⁴⁷

With regards to Nigeria and Ivory Coast, Ghana undertook two completely different approaches. On one side, the Ghanaians tried to attract politically the two economical giants of West Africa. Without them, indeed, the UAS project was likely to fail. On the other side, the Ghanaians tried to weaken the political strength held by Abidjan and Lagos. Indeed, the moderate attitude of the two countries was considered dangerous for Nkrumah's unification plans in West Africa.

Nigeria deserved Ghana's particular attention as it was its "sister colony". Nkrumah visited the country in February 1959 together with Kojo Botsio and George Padmore.¹⁴⁸ Over the year, they worked hard to attract Lagos on Accra's side. The main problem in achieving this target was that the two countries had already several clashes on crucial questions. First of all, Nigerian politicians did not like Nkrumah's suppression of the West African boards, which had united British West Africa for decades. Secondly, Nigeria criticized Ghana's involvement in the politics of Southern Cameroons, where Nkrumah supported the all-Cameroon option. They considered it as a violation of the sovereignty of another African state, even if not yet independent. Moreover, they considered it a threat to the territorial integrity of Nigeria. This second question needs an in-depth examination.

In 1959, Nkrumah financed the electoral campaign of Foncha, who became Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons on 1st February 1959, replacing Endeley. According to Thompson, Foncha's Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) received at least £10000 from Ghana.¹⁴⁹ Accra backed Foncha as he was pushing the two Cameroons to merge together, obviously at the expenses of Nigeria.¹⁵⁰ Most probably Nkrumah counted

¹⁴⁶ See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.72.

¹⁴⁷ It was a successful project, even if in the long period. Indeed, once the experience of the Mali Federation ended, in August 1960, Bamako was the first (and only) country to join the Ghana-Guinea Union. The name of the union became then, in 1961, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. See C.E. Welch, *Dream of Unity*, pp.306-316.

¹⁴⁸ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, AAPC conference secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959.

¹⁴⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.66-67.

¹⁵⁰ At the time, Padmore was carefully monitoring the Cameroonian situation, in both the French and the British sides. For instance, in March 1959 Padmore received a report on the Cameroons from the Ghanaian ambassador in Washington. In particular, the report was about the political situation in French Cameroon

on the political return of having a new ally in francophone Africa (French Cameroon). Moreover, he could weaken the wide and moderate Nigeria, a political threat for Ghana's radical Pan-African policy in West Africa. Nkrumah's support to Foncha led to an opened political confrontation with Lagos, bound to become worst in the following years. It can be considered as the first case in which Ghana's radical and unscrupulous foreign policy caused the resentment of another African country. Other cases followed in the subsequent years.

Similarly to the one with Nigeria, even the relationship with Ivory Coast was problematic. In 1959, Nkrumah worked to attract Abidjan to the UAS project. At the same time, however, Accra also began to support the struggle of the Ivorian separatist Sanwi Kingdom. The representatives of the Kingdom, haunted in Ivory Coast, sought refuge in Ghana in April, establishing the Sanwi Liberation Movement and the Sanwi government in exile. The "Sanwi Affair" generated the first of a series of diplomatic incidents between Accra and Abidjan. It was also one of the first cases in which Ghana supported an opposition group of another African state. Similar cases would later involve Niger, Togo and the Southern Cameroons.

Meanwhile, in Togo, Ghana supported both Olympio's party and the youth movement Juvento. His reasons were clarified soon after the independence of Lomè (27th April, 1960), when Nkrumah started to push Olympio for establishing a union between Togo and Ghana.¹⁵¹

The last West African country which particularly attracted Accra's attention was Liberia. Monrovia had lost most of its appeal in Africa during the 1930s.¹⁵² However, it was still considered a fundamental actor of the regional and continental politics. For this reason, Nkrumah worked to bring Liberia close to the Pan-Africanist positions. For its part,

(elections, transfer of power, independence) and the prospects on a referendum on the unification of the Cameroons. It confirms Nkrumah and Padmore's will to support the unification and Foncha's efforts to unite the Southern Cameroons with Douala. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK/General Correspondence with Ministry of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 24th March 1959.

¹⁵¹ The question of unity between Ghana and Togo had its roots in the division of the German Togoland after World War I and the division of the Ewe people between Togo and the Gold Coast which both supported the unity of the ethnic group. In 1956, Nkrumah could claim a first success after giving recognition (with a referendum) to the fusion between the Gold Coast and the British Togoland, renamed Volta Region.

¹⁵² See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p. 211.

the African state was not willing to join a strict political union that could endanger its political autonomy. Conakry and Accra were also radical countries, not suitable with Liberia's moderate pro-West approach. In 1959, the Liberian President Tubman launched an alternative plan for West African unity, so as not to completely close the doors to Ghana and Guinea. The plan was to establish a union of "Associated States of Africa". The details would be discussed in a dedicated conference. Both Ghana and Guinea agreed and the conference took place in Sanniquellie, Liberia, in July 1959. Even this time Padmore was involved and so was his office.¹⁵³ The Ghanaian hopes were, however, to remain unfulfilled. The result of the Sanniquellie conference was just a declaration of principles for the establishment, in a non-defined future, of "The Community of Independent African States". The final decision for this plan was postponed to a further conference to be held in 1960.¹⁵⁴

The question of Liberia closes this brief excursus of the challenges of the African scene in 1959 and Accra's responses to them. During the year, Nkrumah and Padmore started actualizing Ghana's Pan-African policy in the different African contexts. If the targets were clear – African liberation from colonialism and neo-colonialism and African unity – the means to achieve them were still different from one case to another. Ghana's foreign policy emerged at the same time as both aggressive and assertive, radical and moderate, depending on the situation where Accra was involved.

While diplomacy was called to sedate the growing fears against Ghana, the "Pan-African" institutions started working to support African liberation and unity on the field. Over the year 1959, Padmore's Office and the AAC had begun dealing with the first missions of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Nkrumah and Padmore made it clear that the two institutions were going to play a decisive role in Ghana.

The previous pages showed the complexity of the situation Ghana had to face. In the next ones, it will be possible to understand the difficulties in modeling Ghana's institutions to the needs of the struggle for African liberation and unity. Specific policies had to be re-formulated and the Ghanaian institutions – particularly the "Pan-African" ones - had to be

¹⁵³ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Sanniquellie – seat of West Africa's summit conference", p. 19.

¹⁵⁴ For the "Sanniquellie Declaration" see C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, pp.162-63.

re-modeled. The impacts of these changes were to be enormous. One by one every aspect of Ghana's Pan-African policy will be put under the scope and it will be particularly underlined the role played by Padmore's Office and the AAC in each issue.

2.2. Press and Radio as Weapons for African Liberation and Unity

The first point of Nkrumah and Padmore's agenda in 1959 was to improve Ghana's propaganda machinery. Press and radio were considered the best instruments for spreading Pan-Africanism both in Ghana and in Africa. In this period, Ghana made the first moves to build a broadcasting system to support African liberation movements and to give publicity to Nkrumah's plans for a united Africa. Moreover, Padmore's Office had begun distributing political materials throughout Africa. Even in this field, the experience of the Adviser on African Affairs proved very useful, since he already had worked for decades on the production and distribution of anti-colonial press worldwide.

In January 1959, Padmore and Nkrumah met to discuss new strategies to face the challenges of the African political scene.¹⁵⁵ Ghana needed to extend the Pan-African front, taking advantage of the turmoil in the continent. The first solution that emerged during the meeting was to develop a proper Pan-African propaganda machinery and Padmore's Office was directly involved. One of the first duties of the Office was the distribution of Pan-Africanist press, in order to extend Nkrumah's political influence worldwide. On 17 March 1959, Padmore wrote: "in January [...] the Prime Minister had instructed my office to undertake certain additional work beyond our normal functions namely: the dispatch of

¹⁵⁵ Padmore refers to a meeting with Nkrumah to discuss about the "recent developments in West Africa as well as other Independent and dependent African countries affairs" in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. As usual, this meeting was a private one. See also AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC/All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959.

newspapers to the world press, as well as certain leaders of public opinion in a number of countries in Europe, Asia and America”.¹⁵⁶

Padmore’s Office dealt also with the editing and distribution of the AAPC and IAS publications.¹⁵⁷ Through this action, Ghana could achieve two targets: supporting the AAPC and IAS platforms and spreading the Pan-Africanist principles in the whole world. Interestingly, the publications were distributed free of charge, a relevant cost but also a political benefit for Ghana. The aim of the operation was to “effect as wide publicity as possible” both to the conferences and indirectly to Ghana itself.¹⁵⁸

These publications, together with radical Ghanaian press, were also sent to the African parties that were politically close to Accra. For instance, in 1959, the Nakuru District Congress (NDC) was provided with Ghanaian newspapers and booklets.¹⁵⁹ In May, the President of the party also requested financial assistance from Ghana.¹⁶⁰ Padmore’s Office not only sent the money but also the press materials, including the “Evening News” and “Ghana News”.¹⁶¹

Through the distribution of political press - including materials of the CPP - Padmore’s Office could spread Nkrumah’s influence within the liberation movements. It was a long-term strategy. In the following years, the Office refined this policy by producing and distributing brand-new Pan-Africanist newspapers and reviews. Voice of Africa

¹⁵⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People’s Conference, Letter, Padmore to Okoh, 17th March 1959.

¹⁵⁷ Archival sources show that at least since 1959 - but perhaps even before - Padmore’s office had undertaken this duty. It is quoted, for the first time, as one of the duties of James Markham in a letter undated but linked with others which date back to February 1959. See AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued “Gabon File”, *Present Duties of Mr. Markham*, undated typescript and the following *letters* in the same file.

¹⁵⁸ On 15 September 1959, Barden (at the time Padmore’s Private Secretary) wrote to a book distributor in London: “As our office is directly responsible for the production and distribution of all documents in connection with the Conference of Independent African States held in April 1958, your letter of the 5th August 1959 addressed to the Government Printer had been passed on to us for action. [...] You may be delighted to know that in order to effect as wide publicity as possible of these documents they are issued free of charge”. See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Stevens and Brown Ltd., 15th September 1959. Another letter of Barden, dated 11th September 1959 and delivered to Addis Ababa made reference to the other responsibility of the office: “[...] our office is directly responsible for production and distribution of all documents of the All African People’s Conference”. In AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Y.M.C.A. Library, Addis Ababa, 11th September 1959.

¹⁵⁹ The Nakuru District Congress was a Kenyan nationalist party, which merged into KANU (Kenya African National Union) in 1960.

¹⁶⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BB-Secretary’s Personal Correspondence, Letter, Kuboka to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13th May 1959.

¹⁶¹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BB-Secretary’s personal correspondence, Letter, Kuboka to Padmore, 26th September 1959.

(published since 1961) and *The Spark* (published since 1962) were drawn specifically to promote the Pan-African ideals in Ghana and in Africa. Even if they were published only after Padmore's death, his imprint on them was strong.¹⁶²

Padmore's Office invested relevant resources and men in the work with medias. James Markham had a particularly important role in this field, being he responsible for press production and distribution. Padmore had chosen him in the first place for his experience in the press. As a matter of fact, even after leaving the Office in October 1959 he kept working for media production at the Ghanaian broadcasting agency.¹⁶³ Even Ras Makonnen had an important role in the production and distribution of political press. He was responsible for the collaboration between Padmore's Office and its official editor Guinea Press.¹⁶⁴ The agreement with the editor was signed in January 1959, shortly after the meeting between Padmore and Nkrumah. The Guinea Press itself provided a new employee for Padmore's Office, since he needed a man to deal with the "tremendous amount of labor" that the new duties had brought.¹⁶⁵

The press was not the only media developed in this period to spread Pan-Africanist propaganda. Since 1959, Accra invested in the famous Radio Ghana. The latter was conceived as an instrument to spread Nkrumah's thoughts and it was planned also to be a platform for African liberation movements. Important messages could be broadcasted from Ghana on behalf of the nationalist parties. For instance, in September 1959, Radio Ghana broadcasted in English and French a message presented at the congress of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) by Assi C. Adams, the President of the

¹⁶² The linking between Padmore and the future project of the publication of *Voice of Africa* (first published on January 1961) is symbolized by the drawing on the cover of the review. Indeed, the man represented on the cover of *Voice of Africa* is very similar to the one on the cover of Padmore's 1931 book (G. Padmore, *The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers*, Red International of Labour of Union Magazine for the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, 1931); G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.22.

¹⁶³ See AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Barden to Odoi, 14th July 1960 and Letter, Odoi to Barden, 20th June 1960, both of which are included in the file. See also AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Closed (BAA/1A), Letter, Barden to the Permanent Secretary of the Establishment Office, 21st April 1960.

¹⁶⁴ R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.221.

¹⁶⁵ Bannerman was hired only as a short-term assistant. In March he already left the Office to go back to the Guinea Press. This is the first document in which the name "Guinea Press" is quoted. The importance of this editor was to be great in the years to come. For information about the employment of Bannerman see AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959 and Letter, Padmore to Okoh, 17th March 1959, doc n°33, in the same file.

“National Committee for the Liberation of Ivory Coast”.¹⁶⁶ The request came to the desk of Kofi Baako - at the time Minister of Education and Information - from Padmore’s office, which was interested in backing a friendly party. The Office had also provided Assi C. Adams with flight tickets to Abidjan and back to Accra.¹⁶⁷

In the following years, several freedom fighters hosted in Accra made good use of Radio Ghana. They even produced their own programs to present the news concerning their parties and to broadcast important messages. In the long run, Radio Ghana started to broadcast in other languages than English in order to be useful for francophone and Lusophone nationalist parties and also to spread Nkrumah’s messages in the neighboring countries. The first foreign language used in Radio Ghana was French, introduced in September 1959. The reason for this choice is self-evident: one of the main targets of Nkrumah’s African policy was to draw the attention of francophone countries, especially those of West Africa. For the same reason, the most important publications of the Bureau of African Affairs were also published in French.

Ghana’s Pan-Africanist propaganda was developed thanks to the instruments set up by Padmore in 1959. Until his death in September, he worked hard to plant the seeds of this operation. As the political net of Ghana widened in the following years, the production and distribution of Pan-Africanist press increased. By 1961, Ghana was able to produce and distribute propaganda materials practically everywhere in the world.

¹⁶⁶ Barden wrote on behalf of George Padmore to both Nkrumah and Baako (Minister of Education and Information of Ghana) on the issue. See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 3rd September 1959 and Letter, Barden to Baako, 3rd September 1959, in the same file.

¹⁶⁷ AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Massoud (Air Liban), 8th September 1959.

2.3. Ghana's Support to African Liberation Movements outside the Country

Ghana's support to African liberation movements was channeled in two main directions: inside and outside Ghana. In the latter case, through Padmore's Office Ghana financed parties and movements in their own territories. They provided them with everything they needed, from money to political backing in international gatherings. In this field, even the Ghanaian Foreign Service became more active during 1959, thanks also to a first wave of radicalization which interested the Ministry of External Affairs.

Since the closing of the AAPC, Ghana had begun financing extensively African nationalist parties, selecting them among those politically in line with Ghana. The list of liberation movements supported by Ghana, which was managed by Padmore under the constant supervision of Nkrumah, grew considerably since 1957. Ghana provided the nationalist parties with funds for election campaigns (the first one was Foncha's), for travels, propaganda and even for arms, when the use of violence was considered necessary.¹⁶⁸

Ghana's support to liberation movements was managed by Nkrumah and Padmore independently from any other government or organization. Such an attitude was apparently strange, since Ghana itself had pushed the other independent African states to form a common platform for supporting African liberation. At both the IASC and the AAPC, funds for nationalist parties had been officially established. At the AAPC, a secretariat was also formed with the purpose of managing a "Freedom Fund" for African liberation movements. This secretariat was based in Accra and the most important figures of the organization were Ghanaians or Guineans.¹⁶⁹ Still, Nkrumah and Padmore never truly supported it nor the "freedom fund".¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Padmore and Foncha were in contact during all 1959. Indeed, in September, Barden was sending Nkrumah a copy of the correspondence between Padmore and the premier of the Southern Cameroons. See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Nkrumah, 9th September 1959.

¹⁶⁹ The Secretary-General of the organization was a Guinean: Abdoulaye Diallo and the Ghanaians Botsio, Addison and Du Plan were all members of the organization. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, AAPC conference secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959. Kojo Addison and Edwin DuPlan were appointed in May 1959. The former, a Marxist, became the head of the

In reality, they did not want to delegate Ghana's Pan-African policy to any country or organization, including the AAPC. Such a move could have endangered their autonomy in decisions, weakening Ghana's radical policies. For this reason, the AAPC was never provided with a real financial and political support, but instead Nkrumah and Padmore strengthened Ghana's "Pan-African" Institutions.¹⁷¹ The AAPC became soon a sort of parallel office to Padmore's one.¹⁷²

Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in 1961. The latter was a fundamental figure of the African Affairs Centre and, later, of the Bureau of African Affairs.

¹⁷⁰ In the same occasion, the secretariat presented to both Padmore and Botsio a plan to raise money for the "Freedom Fund". At the time, Ghana was still supporting such fund even by promoting it within the IAS ground. Attached to the above report on African affairs, there is a draft of a formal request for funds submitted by the AAPC and addressed to the "9 Independent African States". Interestingly, once again the IAS conference and the All-African People's Conference were depicted as part of the same struggle for African independence. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Draft of request of money for the "freedom fund", from AAPC secretariat (Painstil, Adm. Secretary) to the IAS governments, undated (c.Feb.1959). The report on African Affairs already quoted, includes some details on the establishment of the "Freedom Fund". The Secretariat wrote that Mboya had traveled to Ethiopia and Sudan in order to prepare the ground for the two states to contribute to the fund. According to Mboya, both countries had un-formally accepted and were waiting for a formal request. Up ahead in the text, the Secretariat stated that the "Freedom Fund" was meant to be financed not only by the IAS states, but also by the strongest African political parties. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter re: "Report on African affairs", AAPC Secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959. It was, however, not contributing to the fund in any way.

¹⁷¹ According to Thompson, Nkrumah's support to the AAPC was merely instrumental, as soon after its establishment, he wanted already to discharge the organization. W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.57.

¹⁷² Some of the liberation movements demanded affiliation to the AAPC, often together with a request for financial aid from Ghana. This type of dual requests were to become quite common in the ensuing years. It is the case, for instance, of the request for both affiliations to the AAPC and for financial aid submitted by the Swazi Progressive Association (SPA). See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter, Barden to Nquku (SPA), 6th January 1960, and AGPL, BAA/348, Letter, Nquku (SPA) to Barden, 5th April 1960. References to the death of Padmore in these letters led the author to the conclusion that contacts between the SPA and the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs dated back even before Padmore's death, occurred in September 1959. Padmore's Office was supporting the activities of the AAPC, while at the same time it was following its own duties and policies. For instance, in February, the AAPC secretariat demanded Padmore to be the chairman of a mass rally, organized by the CPP and the AAPC secretariat itself. On 20 February 1959, a mass rally was organized by the AAPC secretariat in order to support the case of the French Cameroons at the United Nations. Botsio and Adjei were the main speakers of the rally, which was supposed to take place in other African cities. The 20th of February was called "The Cameroons People's Day". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter Re: "Report on African affairs", AAPC secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959. During the years after the conference of Accra, the AAPC organization held a certain prestige among the liberation movements. Some of these movements referred to the AAPC to ask for help. However, in most of the cases, Ghana alone took the initiative. The AAPC was only a political platform and it could not do much to help the Liberation movements. The periodical meetings of the Steering Committee were the only occasions to spread the voice of the AAPC throughout Africa. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.65-67.

In 1959, through the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs, Ghana developed strong political relationships with several nationalist parties. This type of partnerships were not only limited to the independence processes but also to their aftermath. Indeed, Nkrumah and Padmore wanted to involve these parties in the construction of a Pan-African platform after the independence of their countries.

One of the first long-term collaborations between Ghana and a nationalist party was the one with Hastings Banda's Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), started in 1959. The NAC - already invited at the AAPC - was politically close to Ghana. Its leader, Banda, was bound to become one of Nkrumah's strongest allies in Africa, with regard particularly to its Pan-African policy.¹⁷³ The party received £ 10000 by Ghana, in April.¹⁷⁴ Kanyama Chiume, one of its key figures, was in Accra in March.¹⁷⁵ Shortly after, Padmore's Office was providing several other members of the NAC with flight tickets from London back to Nyasaland.¹⁷⁶

Another example is the one of Kenya, where Ghana strengthened ties with all the parties bound to merge into the KANU. For instance, the Nakuru District Congress (NDC) was backed by Ghana since 1959. Both Padmore and Nkrumah had a personal friendship with the most important Kenyan leader, Jomo Kenyatta, and they were both very interested in Kenyan affairs.¹⁷⁷ For this reason they tried to create contacts with all the most important Kenyan personalities.

At the time, Tom Mboya was very close to Nkrumah as well as other members of his party. He had been chairman of the All African People's Conference and he was also the founder of one of the regional parties which later formed the KANU: the Nairobi People's Convention Party (NPCP). The NPCP had been invited to the AAPC, and it was

¹⁷³ At the AAPC, the party was represented by Hastings Banda himself and Chiume. See, PRAAD, ADM/16/1/11, AAPC, "List of Official Delegates".

¹⁷⁴ *Ghana Times*, 8 April 1959, quoted in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.67. Banda's party became a strong ally of the CPP and of the Ghana state.

¹⁷⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Markham (from London) to Padmore, 23rd March 1959.

¹⁷⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Padmore to Asafu-Adjaye, 4th April 1959,.

¹⁷⁷ Padmore had met Kenyatta for the first time in Russia, in 1930. See J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.16. Nkrumah had met Kenyatta in 1945, when the latter was one of the members of the staff of the Manchester Pan-African Congress.

represented there by some of the key figures of Kenyan politics: Mboya himself, Joseph Murumbi and Peter Mbiu Koinange.¹⁷⁸ These personalities were going to play an important role in the life of Padmore's Office and in the future Bureau of African Affairs. At the time, Koinange was Padmore's main contact in East Africa since Kenyatta was in prison. Later, he became representative of the Bureau of African Affairs in East Africa.¹⁷⁹ In the same period, even Oginga Odinga –a key figure of Kenyan politics- was backed by Padmore's Office.¹⁸⁰ Between 1957 and 1959, both Oginga Odinga and Mboya were equally supported by Ghana, a situation which was going to change radically, after Padmore's death.¹⁸¹

Accra provided the liberation movements not only with money but also with political support. Ghanaian diplomats - especially the ones working at the UN – constantly raised the most problematic questions of Africa in international gatherings.¹⁸² This new attitude of the Ghanaian Foreign Service was also the result of a first wave of radicalization which interested the Ministry in 1959.

A radicalized Foreign Service meant for Nkrumah and Padmore a more powerful and effective Pan-African policy. It also strengthened their position within the Ghanaian state. This process was the result of a progressive fusion between the CPP party ranks and the Ministry. In 1959, several men of the Party were appointed ambassadors. Others gained also prominent positions in the administration. According to Thompson, this process caused an increasing dichotomy between “professional diplomats on the one hand and self-styled militant revolutionaries on the other”.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ PRAAD, ADM/16/1/11, AAPC, “List of Official Delegates”.

¹⁷⁹ For references about the contacts between Padmore and Koinange, see J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.118; The two men met for the first time in 1948 in United Kingdom, *Ibidem*, p.108. This is, once more, the proof that, in the first phase of the establishment of the political network of the office, Padmore had capitalized on personal friendships which often dated back years.

¹⁸⁰ Odinga is quoted in a telegram in which Markham was reporting the activities of African nationalist parties in London. The date is 24th March 1959. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/ BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Markham (from London) to Padmore, 24th March 1959.

¹⁸¹ Along with the rise of radicals in Ghana during the period 1960/61, Odinga emerged as their favorite ally in Kenyan politics. The “Red Dean” (as he was called, source: interview with David Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24/7/12) was to be particularly active, for instance, in the support to Freedom Fighters in Kenya.

¹⁸² The question of the Central African Federation was constantly raised by Ghanaian diplomats. On 23 March 1959, Markham, reporting to Padmore from London referred to a “Central African campaign”. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/ BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Telegram, Markham (from London) to Padmore, 23rd March 1959,.

¹⁸³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.29. According to Thompson, this process dates back to 1957.

The first big change of 1959 was the appointment of the radical Ako Adjei as Minister of External Affairs, occurred in April. The event can be undoubtedly considered as a signal of a new approach in foreign policy. After that, other political appointments in the diplomatic ground followed, and they became quite frequent.¹⁸⁴ The appointment of Alex Quaison-Sackey as the Ghanaian Ambassador to the UN marked also a clear step towards the politicization of the Foreign Service.¹⁸⁵

Ghana also supported liberation movements in international gatherings. When a party or movement was not able to send representatives to a conference or to the UN, its political requests were presented by Ghanaians, constantly in contact with Padmore's Office.

Together, the actions of the Padmore's Office and the radicalized Foreign Service provided the liberation movements with a strong support. Moreover, this policy consolidated the political position of Ghana in Africa, bringing Pan-Africanism everywhere Padmore could create contacts.

¹⁸⁴ According to Thompson, the first steps towards the substitution of the career Foreign Service officers with political appointees started during 1959. He produces some examples, without, however making references to sources other than interviews. Furthermore, a number of examples refer to the new appointees as having a low level education and a scarce sense of professionalism (e.g. T.O. Asare, ambassador in Bonn), in such way linking their affiliation to the CPP with these problems. The operation seems questionable. *Ibidem*, pp.103-106. Padmore's office was still lightly involved in the appointments. However the successor of the office, the Bureau of African Affairs had a fundamental role in the diplomatic designations in the following years.

¹⁸⁵ Alex Quaison-Sackey had been a member of the group of graduates which was trained in 1955 to be the nucleus of the Gold Coast Foreign Service, see M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.11; T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side*, p.87 and W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.19-20. Furthermore, he was a member of the CPP. He can be considered then as both a member of the civil service and a political appointee (a status similar to the one of Barden, the successor of Padmore at the Office of the Adviser). The reflections of Thompson on the appointment of Quaison-Sackey as ambassador are, at least, contradictory. He first depicts Quaison-Sackey as civil servants far from the political position endorsed by Padmore and Nkrumah. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp.19-20. Then, he presents Quaison-Sackey as a political appointee, being him a "conspicuous member of the CPP". References of his status of civil servants practically disappear. *Ibidem*, pp.103-104. In reality, Quaison-Sackey was both a professional diplomat and a party member. His appointment was made of course on the basis of his political believes, since he was responsible of endorsing the "policy of positive neutralism and nonalignment" and, in general the "Pan-African viewpoint" of Ghana. See A. Quaison-Sackey, *Africa Unbound*, p. XI.

2.4. Ghana's Support to African Freedom Fighters and Political Refugees within its Borders

Since the opening of the AAPC, Accra had begun hosting political refugees from all over Africa. It was the beginning of a long-term strategy to attract politically African freedom fighters to Ghana and to support their liberation struggles from the Ghanaian territory. The African Affairs Centre was meant to host hundreds of African nationalists, providing them with shelter and linking them with the CPP. At first, however, Accra lacked a proper plan of action for the reception of political refugees. In early 1959, Nkrumah and Padmore worked to solve the problem.

The day after the AAPC closed, Ghana was ready to open its doors to African political refugees, as part of its liberation policy. At the time, other radical states such as Guinea and the UAR were also hosting freedom fighters haunted by colonial authorities. Ghana had to win this competition with the two radical countries if it wanted to lead the African liberation process.

Accra already owned the structures to deal with this mission. The AAC had been established for hosting political refugees and providing them with ideological training.¹⁸⁶ In early 1959, it was ready to work, although it was still run with small funds.¹⁸⁷ In some

¹⁸⁶ The African Affairs Centre was made of thirteen houses plus a common hall where political gatherings were organized. Since 1959, the Centre began to offer ideological courses to the guests. Interestingly, all the houses were named after the motherlands of the freedom fighters. Later on, they were even named after the parties hosted. In August 1959, the houses (or chalets, or taycots) were named after: Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Togoland, Tunisia, U.A.R., Algeria, Nigeria, and Cameroon. See AGPL, BAA/475, Receipt of "Larmie's Studio of Painting" for painting works at the African Affairs Centre, 5th August 1959.

¹⁸⁷ The funds to run the African Affairs Centre were not much in 1959, even if the AAC was considered as an important institution for the actualization of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Makonnen wrote in his autobiography: "[...] as the grant for the running of the Centre was not large, one had to use what influence one could to get things done". In R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.213. Then he added: "[...] on the money side of things, I had to be very careful. I was only given sh. 5/- per day to feed each of the men at the centre. So I had to cater with great care, perhaps driving out into the country once a week to buy so many tons of yams or plantains". *Ibidem*, p.223. Another proof of the small funds provided to the AAC in 1959 was the situation of the sanitation system. In September, the Centre was still not provided with any. Padmore was very sensitive on how both his office and the Centre looked like in front of VIP guests. It was a matter of professionalism on the Ghanaian side. He had written to the Acting Secretary to the Prime Minister on 4 November 1958: "Needles to say, the nature of my office requires that general cleanliness should be maintained at a high level since failure to do this would create unsavory impression on the minds of

cases, the delegates of the AAPC hosted at the Centre became also the first political refugees in Ghana. Indeed, freedom fighters like Holden Roberto remained at the hostel even after the Conference had ended and they built strong relationships between their parties and the Ghanaian government.¹⁸⁸

Accra, however, was still not completely prepared to deal with the whole refugee question. A clear policy on refugees was not ready yet, so the civil service was generally unprepared to deal with the arrival of hundreds of them. The Ghanaian immigration system had to be properly instructed on the matter. Moreover, Ghana could not host any refugee since any of them could be an imperialist spy. A selection system had to be put in place in order to check on the political reliability of the freedom fighters welcomed in Ghana.

Nkrumah and Padmore had to work quickly on the definition of a proper policy on refugees. This was, of course, part of Ghana's Pan-African policy but it was also an implementation of the resolutions of the IASC and AAPC. Indeed, both the Conferences had called for the provision of political asylum to African freedom fighters. On this basis, Padmore examined the situation and he proposed a plan of action. He wrote to Botsio on 27 February 1959 to explain his position. First of all, he underlined the need for an effective policy on refugees:

distinguished visitors". In AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Ag. Secr. Of the P.M., 4th November 1959. The same cleanliness was needed at the Centre, since important African leaders could be hosted for short or long periods there. Padmore had discussed the matter with the Town Engineer of the Accra Municipal Council on 16th September 1959. The Town Engineer had asked why the Office had built latrines without permission. The Office underlined the importance of the AAC and the embarrassment which the lack of a good sanitation had brought to the AAC in the previous months. The Personal Secretary of Padmore's office wrote: "Owing to difficulties in providing accommodation for accredited political leaders and political refugees who cannot by normal civil service administrative procedure be catered for directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was decided upon by the Prime Minister that these buildings be placed at any disposal for this purpose. Incidentally no provision was made for [septic] tank latrines at the bungalows during their time of construction and as our guests, among whom are V.I.P.'s, used to complain bitterly about the nauseous odor of the toilet pans we found it incumbent upon us to safeguard the prestige of the Nation by constructing these [septic] tanks. [...] It is worthwhile mentioning here [...] the little money voted for the running of this centre [...] run as a non-paying concern [...]. I shall therefore, be grateful if you will reconsider your decision about their demolition". See AGPL, BAA/389, Letter, Barden to Town Engineer, 16th September 1959.

¹⁸⁸ Makonnen, at the time head of the AAC, wrote: "Relations with the group did not end with the conference. Often enough individuals or whole delegations stayed on in Ghana and usually at the Centre.", in R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.217.

On the basis of the Prime Minister's public declarations and Ghana's pledge embodied in the resolutions of the Conference of the Independent African States and confirmed subsequently, we have openly committed ourselves to support "by every possible mean" the struggle of the African peoples for national liberation. [...] If we are pledged to assist the struggle for national freedom in Africa, we have to deal with this whole problem of political refugees, which is an integral part of the struggle.¹⁸⁹

The next point of Padmore's message to Botsio was to analyze how Ghana could practically deal with the refugee question. The main problem was how to define a political refugee, as most of them were considered criminals by the colonial authorities of their countries. Supporting the refugees could have been considered by the same countries as interference in their internal affairs. According to Padmore, Ghana had not managed this question properly. Once more, the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs had showed a substantial distance of outlook on the implementation of Ghana's Pan-African policy. He provided Botsio with one practical case, in order to explain the mistakes of the Foreign Service.

Padmore presented the case of the Kenyan Kimiti Kamau, a man who had just requested political asylum to Ghana. His request had been rejected by Adu who did not consider him a political refugee, but a "fugitive from the law in Kenya". According to Adu, welcoming Kamau in Ghana would have been perceived by Kenya as interference in its internal affairs. Padmore strongly criticized Adu's attitude since, according to him, it was based on wrong assumptions. Kenya could not be considered an African independent state, as it was still under colonial rule. In this sense, Ghana was not only allowed, but even called to support political refugees haunted in colonial territories. In his words:

I fully subscribe to and support this policy [the support to African freedom fighters], which the imperialists may well interpret as subvention and interference. But this is purely legalistic quibbling, for when we use the phrase "non-interference in the internal affairs of other States" we mean independent sovereign States governed by the indigenous people

¹⁸⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/ BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, *Letter*, Padmore to Botsio, 27th February 1959.

[underlined in the text], not territories occupied and governed by Imperialist Powers who maintain themselves by force.¹⁹⁰

Padmore's angry tone, confirms once again how distant was his approach from the one of the Foreign Service, and in particular from Adu's.¹⁹¹ The cautious approach of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry was considered a betrayal of the principles of Ghana's Pan-African policy.¹⁹² According to Padmore, the support given to political refugees had to be considered a fundamental aspect of this policy. If Ghana failed the mission - Padmore wrote to Botsio - the African freedom fighters could turn themselves to other countries, weakening Nkrumah's position in Africa. In the same letter, he wrote:

If we are not prepared to do this [to assist political refugees], then we should let the African peoples know where we stand so that they may turn to Egypt or Moscow, or elsewhere. [...] This man Kamau has [...] found temporary refuge in Sudan. It is quite possible that he can remain there, but the very fact that he has turned to Ghana is a compliment to us and a clear indication that the African peoples south of the Sahara instinctively look to Ghana and

¹⁹⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, *Letter*, Padmore to Botsio, 27th February 1959.

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem*; Quoting from the letter: "[...] I am shocked and horrified that an African, no matter what his position, could indulge in all these legalistic arguments and Jesuistic sophistry. The struggle for African freedom is too serious a business for us to approach it on the basis of imperialist conventions. [...] I find it extraordinary that the opinion of the Permanent Secretary [Adu] should have been solicited on a matter of fundamental political policy."

¹⁹² This case is an example of the various clashes between Padmore and the civil service on the implementation of foreign policy. Padmore usually worked in collaboration with the civil service, particularly the one of the Ministry of External Affairs (and Adu was part of them, being Permanent Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs). However, as it has been underlined in the first chapter, the civil servants felt like being excluded from the policy making. It was, indeed, a precise policy of Nkrumah that of excluding them from this field. Armah explains quite well the reason behind his decision: "In order to forestall the ill-effects of the domestic power competition between the civil service machinery and the political machinery of the Cabinet and/or Ministers of the Government, President Nkrumah made it clear from the outset that top career civil servants were to administer the ministries and advise the ministers", that is not to make policy decisions. In K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.35. It is Adu himself, at the time Permanent Secretary of the Minister of External Affairs and Secretary to the Cabinet, who confirm the duty of civil servants in Nkrumah's Ghana: "the minister's responsibility is to lay down political policy, and it is the duty of the Permanent Secretary and the heads of the Division in the Ministry to execute this policy and translate it into action". In A.L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1965, p. 183, quoted in K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, p.36. However, according to Armah it was the theory, "[...] in practice, certain civil servants [...] made policy decisions". *Ibidem*, p.36. It was apparently the case with Adu himself who had been protagonist of various clashes with Padmore on policy making and implementation. This case is a perfect example of such clashes. Padmore was criticizing Adu on the ground of his resistance towards the implementation of the political line on refugees.

its Prime Minister for assistance in the hours of their troubles and distress. For this we should feel justly proud, and meet their appeals with the sympathy which we should extend as a duty.¹⁹³

In order to fulfill this duty, Ghana had to invest money and men in the assistance to political refugees. Accra could capitalize on its political appeal acquired at the All-African People's Conference, plus it had the AAC to host the freedom fighters. There was no excuse not to act quickly to open the door of Ghana to African nationalists who needed help.

Padmore's advices were not ignored. Ghana definitely opened its frontiers to political refugees and by May the first groups arrived. The AAC and the Office immediately started to deal with this question. On 19 May 1959, the Adviser on African Affairs wrote to Adu:

[...] my office [...] in addition to routine matters has to deal with the accommodation of political refugees. At the present moment, we are taking care of a dozen people from French Camerouns, Ivory Coast, the Belgian Congo, Portuguese Angola, Nyasaland and Mauretania.¹⁹⁴

The first step was made: the freedom fighters were coming. The next step was to provide them with everything they needed, so they linked themselves with Nkrumah's government and supported his Pan-African policy. Since 1959, Padmore's Office not only granted them with shelter and money but also with offices of representation for their parties. Freedom fighters on the battlefields could be constantly connected with Accra. Ghana proposed also to use its territory as the "antenna tower" of the African liberation movements by offering its radio and press to promote their struggles.

The last problem to be solved was the provision of documents to the refugees. Some of them needed passports to travel for political reasons, since the colonial authorities had refused to grant them any. Thus, they had to request documents to other African countries like Ghana, Guinea or the UAR. At the time, Ghana was well equipped in structures to host

¹⁹³ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, *Letter*, Padmore to Botsio, 27th February 1959.

¹⁹⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, *Letter*, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959.

the refugees, but it was not prepared for supplying them with documents. It took several months to have a proper legislation on the matter. Nkrumah proposed a proper solution only in October.¹⁹⁵

The question of travel documents was raised for the first time in May. Even in this case, it was a specific case that led to the definition of a proper policy on the matter. The case was the one of the famous Angolan leader Holden Roberto, one of the first freedom fighters ever hosted in Ghana.¹⁹⁶

Roberto had been invited to the AAPC as the representative of the *Uniao dos Povos de Angola* (UPA).¹⁹⁷ After the conference, he was hosted in Ghana as a political refugee.¹⁹⁸ The problem with the documents emerged some months later, when Roberto requested Padmore's Office to provide him with a passport since he had to travel to USA for political reasons.¹⁹⁹ Even though the Ghanaian authorities were called to assist the refugees with every possible means, they did not have a proper legislation on the matter so they could not grant Roberto with the document. On 9 May 1959, Padmore and Adjei - just appointed

¹⁹⁵ Only in October 1959, the Cabinet discussed a proper legislation on travel documents for political refugees. See PRAAD, ADM/13, Cabinet memorandum No. C.M. 731(59) by the Prime Minister[Nkrumah] on "Travel documents for refugees" part of Cabinet Agenda, October 1959.

¹⁹⁶ Holden Roberto (1923-2007) was an Angolan nationalist and politician. He was a member of the *Uniao dos Povos de Angola* (UPA) and then president of the same party. After leaving Ghana, he broke his political alliance with Nkrumah since he was suspected of being an American spy. As a result, Ghana turned to the MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*). Roberto founded its own party, the FNLA (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*) in March 1962. Later he fought for the independence of Angola and also against the Soviet-backed MPLA. For more information about Roberto see J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, the anatomy of an explosion (1950-1962)* [vol.1], the M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1969.

¹⁹⁷ Avriel, the Israeli ambassador in Accra, draw the attention of the conference organizers – Padmore in *primis* - to some liberation movements in Angola, the UPA in particular. See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.216. Like Lumumba, Roberto was a former Israeli contact. See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.21 (footnote); see also G.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.12 and 135. See also J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, pp.66-69. According to Marcum, Roberto was invited at the conference after a special authorization was issued by Padmore, who had the last word on the admission of freedom fighters. At the conference he was criticized for his "tribal anachronism" having him evoked the resurrection of the old Congo kingdom. It was however an outstanding occasion for him to establish relations with various nationalist leaders, like Lumumba, Kaunda, Mboya and Fanon.

¹⁹⁸ He stayed in Ghana for one year after the closing of the AAPC. See R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, p.217; He was part of the first group of the political refugees quoted in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959. While in Accra he worked at Padmore's office as a translator. See J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, p.68.

¹⁹⁹ Padmore wrote to Adjei: "he doesn't possess a passport and travel documents which are very difficult for Portuguese African citizens to obtain, especially those engaged in the struggle against colonialism. Under the circumstances, he has approached my office to see whatever the Ghana Government would grant him a passport even for a limited period so that he can proceed to the United States". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959.

Ministry of External Affairs - discussed about this question and the way they could conceive a proper policy on the provision of documents to freedom fighters.²⁰⁰ Padmore wrote to Adjei:

His request [Roberto's request for Ghanaian passport] raises another issue, one of defining our policy in circumstances such as the one under review. So apart from trying to secure a passport for Mr. Roberto, I think it will be necessary for the Cabinet to give us a ruling whether or not the Government is prepared to grant temporary passport or travel documents to political refugees engaged in such activities which we approve of. This will enable us to know what steps can be taken in future cases of the kind. [...] I think it is only fair to express my own personal views on this matter in the light of our commitments on the Africa Liberation struggle. I cannot see how we can escape our responsibilities in granting passport facilities to bonafides freedom fighters who may from time to time solicit our support in this direction.²⁰¹

Even this time, one of the first reasons to speed up the definition of the policy was the potential competition with other radical states. In this case, the rivalry was the one with Guinea, which at that time was already providing passports to African freedom fighters. In the same letter, Padmore wrote:

If [we] fail to do so [to grant passports to freedom fighters], we may find ourselves in an embarrassing position as other African countries are rendering such assistance. In the case of Mr. Roberto he has already intimated to me that if he cannot get a passport from Ghana he will seek one from Guinea and I have no doubt that President Sékou Touré will gladly issue him a passport as he generously did in the case of Mr. Chiume from Nyasaland whose British passport was temporarily lost during his visit to Conakry last April.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959.

²⁰¹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959.

²⁰² AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-General Correspondence With Ministry Of External Affairs, Letter, Padmore to Adjei, 9th May 1959. Kanyama Chiume (1929-2007) was a Malawian nationalist and politician. Member of the Nyasaland African Congress. At the time he was one of the key figure of the party. After the independence of Nyasaland, renamed Malawi, he was to become Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ghana was proceeding very slowly, giving Guinea a clear advantage. Finally, Padmore's fears became reality: Roberto submitted the request to Guinea and Touré immediately accepted.²⁰³ The lesson was clear: without a clear policy and a proper legislation on political refugees, Ghana would risk its political power.

In 1959, Padmore made a plan for every aspect of Ghana's policy on refugees. With regard to the legislation, Nkrumah proposed only in October the adoption of a proper convention. As for the many other aspects of Ghana's Pan-African policy, the practical solution for the various problems emerged only after months of work. Transforming the Pan-Africanist theory into practice was often a difficult operation.

2.5. Provision of Scholarships to African Students

The support to education in Africa was one of the main point of Nkrumah's agenda. In line with its Pan-African policy, Ghana committed itself to sustain education in Africa, a field in which colonialism had disastrously failed. Nkrumah worked to replace the colonial administration with a new radical African "intelligentsia". To attain this target, his government invested important resources to provide African students with scholarships for studying in Ghana. After the AAPC, Nkrumah and Padmore had begun working to set up a plan for granting hundreds of students with scholarships. In 1959, they put the basis for a long-term project on education.

Both Padmore and Nkrumah were well aware of the importance of the role of African students in the Pan-Africanist struggle.²⁰⁴ They knew that a well educated generation of

²⁰³ J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, pp.69; W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.76. See also R. Makonnen, pp. 216-217.

²⁰⁴ Both of them had already had various experiences with African students in United States and United Kingdom. Padmore had been a student leader in the United States in the late 1920s and he had also worked with students while in London, since 1935. Even Nkrumah had been a student leader in the United States, almost ten years after Padmore. After coming to London in 1945, he got immediately connected with the West African Students' Union (WASU) of which he became vice-president.

African technicians and intellectuals was fundamental in order to build the new nations. The struggle against colonialism was also a struggle for education.

At the time, Ghana was well equipped with schools and teachers. In line with Ghana's Pan-African policy, Padmore and Nkrumah decided to put the Ghanaian educational system at the service of other African countries. In this case, both the Minister of Education and Padmore's Office were involved.

Since 1959, Ghana had begun to provide scholarships to African students, most of whom were freedom fighters. Moreover, Accra became a hub for students with scholarships provided by other friendly countries.²⁰⁵ In the latter case, most of these countries were linked to, or part of, the socialist bloc. Ghana connected the liberation movements to these countries, and it provided the students with travel documents.

The first three Ghanaian scholarships were established in late 1958, but they were still not part of a proper "Pan-African" plan. Indeed, they were promoted directly by the UN. They were under the full control of the Ministry of Education and dedicated to students from dependent countries, both Africans and not.²⁰⁶

In the meantime, the Minister of Education and Information Kofi Baako was already at work to define a proper Pan-African policy for the support of students. In January 1959, he submitted a plan to extend the number of scholarships from three to six. Moreover, he promoted a plan to give the three new ones only to students from African dependent or

²⁰⁵ Ghana was in contact with countries - German Democratic Republic (GDR), the USSR and China - which were providing scholarships to African students. Ghana put in contact several freedom fighters with these countries and it provided them with travel documents or temporary accommodation in Accra. For instance, on 9 July 1959, Padmore wrote to the Acting Trade Counselor of the GDR's embassy in order to provide the list of students (non Ghanaian) available for benefitting from the scholarships. Interestingly, both Padmore's office and the Ministry of External Affairs had to endorse the candidatures. See AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Padmore to Ag. Trade Counc. GDR, 9th July 1959. See also AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Mwaungulu (one of the candidates), 6th August 1959.

²⁰⁶ Three scholarship of this type were issued, under request of the UN. All the information on these scholarships can be found in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Draft, Cabinet Memorandum by the Ministry of Education - "Award of Scholarships to peoples of other African states and territories by the Government of Ghana", 2nd January 1959, and Annexure to Cabinet Memorandum by the Ministry of Education on the "Award of Scholarships to[...]"; 2nd January 1959; On February 1959, Ghana received the first requests for one of the three Ghana-UN scholarships. It was submitted by an Ethiopian student, who wrote to both the General Secretary of the UN and the Government of Ghana to receive the scholarship. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Letter, Asaffa Ainalem to Padmore, 5th February 1959.

independent territories. The reason for this choice was clearly political. Quoting from the draft:

I seek the consent of my colleagues for the institution of a scheme under which scholarships can be awarded exclusively to peoples from African states and territories to undertake courses of study in institutions of higher learning in Ghana. My Colleagues will remember that recently Cabinet gave approval to a scheme to award three scholarships annually over the next three years to nationals of non-self-governing territories at the invitation of the United Nations. Although all African dependent territories are covered by this scheme, so are all other dependent territories in the world and competition may be so strong as to prejudice the chances of people from non-self-governing African territories benefiting under it as fully as *we might wish* [italics by the author]. The scheme of course, does not cover independent African states. I propose, therefore, that three scholarships each year should be offered specifically to people from Africa (be they from dependent or independent countries) on the same broad principles as those offered to non-self-governing territories under United Nations auspices.²⁰⁷

Before submitting the plan to Nkrumah, Baako wrote to Padmore in order to have his comments on the draft proposal. The Adviser on African Affairs immediately endorsed it. He also suggested some guidelines for the definition of a proper Pan-African policy on education. First of all, he proposed to focus their attention on dependent territories. According to Padmore, the freedom fighters themselves requested that help. He wrote:

In view of the greater needs of African youths in dependent territories such as Kenya, Tanganyika, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, due either to lack of higher educational facilities or to racial discrimination, I think special consideration should be given to candidates from those areas rather than the British West African dependencies (Nigeria, Sierra Leone) or the independent States (Liberia, Sudan, Ethiopia), where university colleges cater for their

²⁰⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Draft, Cabinet Memorandum by the Ministry of Education – “Award of Scholarships to peoples of other African states and territories by the Government of Ghana”, 2nd January 1959. The costs of the scheme was estimated in £G 13,500 (Ghanaian pound) over five years. The institutions involved were the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of External Affairs and finally Padmore’s Office.

nationals. My office has received a number of applications from the territories indicated above.²⁰⁸

Padmore also recommended establishing several new scholarships for lower levels of education, meeting the requests of the freedom fighters.²⁰⁹ According to Padmore, the new African nations needed primarily a technical and practical expertise, rather than higher levels of education. Thus, he promoted the creation of fifty scholarships of this kind. He wrote:

From the frequent appeals made to my office, it would seem that the most urgent need of African youths in the less advanced territories is for (a) Secondary education and (b) Technical training of a practical kind. To cater for this need, I would recommend the establishment of 50 scholarships or bursaries – 20 for secondary education and 30 for trade schools, valued each at, say, \$100 per annum. By providing such training, I feel certain that Ghana will be making a more valuable contribution to these dependencies by merely offering students from these countries a purely literary and academic education at university level.²¹⁰

This issue is interesting in many respects. First of all, it shows how Padmore had a strong impact on decisions of other ministers, even though he had “enemies” both in the Civil Service and the government. Secondly, it underlines the importance of the support to education in other African territories as part of Ghana’s Pan-African policy.

Baako’s scheme was presented together with Padmore’s suggestions and they agreed to launch it immediately. Some months later, however, the new scheme was still not properly working, despite Padmore insisted on its political significance. In June, the Office lamented that some UAR students had not received a scholarship from Ghana.²¹¹ The

²⁰⁸ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Letter, Padmore to Sarpong (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education), 11th February 1959.

²⁰⁹ Until then, all Ghanaian scholarships had been devoted to University level studies.

²¹⁰ See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BK-Scholarship Award To Independent And Dependent African States By Ghana Govt., Letter, Padmore to Sarpong (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education), 11th February 1959.

²¹¹ AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Martinson (Ministry of Education), 11th June 1959.

Ministry of Education replied that the students were not qualified for the scholarships, but Padmore protested again: no matter how, Ghana had to provide scholarships to the students. The question was not technical, it was political. Markham, on behalf of Padmore, wrote to the Ministry of Education [*italics of the author*]:

Since you have considered that the standard of the above-mentioned petitioners are below our senior secondary school level, we will suggest that this position be made clear to them, but *the doors should not be closed on them*. [...] Should it be approved to grant scholarships for secondary education to these students, we will first of all ask the External Ministry to approach the United Arab Republic Embassy on the matter. This procedure will obviate what you call *impolitic*. On the other hand if the Government cannot give them any such scholarships we shall consider the possibility of persuading the Ghana Educational Trust for some scholarship awards for them [...].²¹²

Scholarships were meant to be an instrument of foreign policy, channeling strategically the countries which could serve better the Pan-Africanist cause.

In 1959, Padmore's Office kept receiving requests for scholarships from African students, especially from non-self-governing countries. In some cases, the requests were also coming from students already abroad who had their previous scholarships suspended or that did not have a scholarship at all.²¹³ Each case was examined before providing any financial and political help.

One case might help to understand the *iter* followed by Padmore's Office in dealing with the provision of scholarships. In early 1959, a Southern Rhodesian student residing in London claimed that his scholarship had been suspended due to political reasons. Consequently, he turned to Ghana for help. Before providing the student with any aid, Padmore needed to know more about him, possibly from a reliable source. In this case, the Adviser had the perfect man for the job. His Office asked Josua Nkomo – who at the time was in London – to check on the credibility of the student and then provide a confidential

²¹² AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Martinson (Ministry of Education), 11th June 1959.

²¹³ It is the case, for instance, of a student from Bechuanaland who begged for funds for his studies in EIRE. See AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Bosele Mosieman to Padmore, 2nd January 1959. See also the reply AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Mosieman, 26th June 1959.

report.²¹⁴ Nkomo was considered absolutely trustworthy: he was Padmore's main ally in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

This type of procedure was meant to be repeated for each case involving single students not sponsored directly by anyone. As for the case of political refugees, no scholarship was granted without a crossed reference check. In case the students were backed by a liberation movement, the procedure was quicker.

Ghana's Pan-African policy on education was still at its early definition. The provision of the first scholarships was only the beginning of a wider plan. In the following years, more scholarships were issued and more educational structures were developed. After Padmore's death, a proper educational institution for freedom fighters was also established in Ghana: the "Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute". Established in 1961, the Ideological Institute was bound to be the last of the three "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana.

2.6. Support to Opposition Parties of Other African States: the Case of UPC, Sanwi, Sawaba and Action Group

Several countries in Africa had more than one nationalist group fighting for independence. Many factors contributed to the success of one instead of the others. Even in Ghana, the CPP had won the battle for freedom only after defeating all the other nationalist parties of the Gold Coast. In line with its Pan-African policy, Ghana usually supported majority groups. In some cases, however, Ghana also backed minority nationalist parties instead of the majority ones, especially when the latter were not willing to endorse Nkrumah's Pan-African agenda. Thus, since 1959, Ghana started supporting several opposition groups of other African countries, even before they achieved independence. There were two main

²¹⁴ Padmore wrote to Nkomo: "We are asking him [the Rhodesian student] to be in touch with you with the understanding that you will be in a position to give us a confidential report about him". See AGPL, BAA/390, Letter, Markham to Nkomo, 25th June 1959.

reasons for this behavior: either an opposition group was closer to Ghana's political position than the majority one, or Nkrumah had a particular opposition to the policy of the strongest faction. In both cases, the resentment of the majority parties reflected the cold relationships of their countries with Ghana before and after the independence. According to them, by backing opposition groups, Ghana supported sedition and terrorism within the borders of their countries, violating their state sovereignty. They also feared that Nkrumah was trying to weaken them in order to rule the continent.

The Ghanaians rejected these accusations by asserting they backed opposition parties as they did with any other liberation movement. As a matter of fact, they had also invited some of these groups to Ghana's independence celebration and at the AAPC. According to Nkrumah and Padmore, if a corrupt or conservative ruling class led a country, Ghana had to push for a change of leadership. For this reason, Nkrumah's government would back only those parties close to its Pan-Africanist positions, even if they were weaker than the majority ones.

In reality, there were also tactical reasons behind this choice. The majority of the opposition parties backed by Ghana were in West Africa, where Nkrumah had planned to extend the UAS project. Thus, if any of these nationalist groups could seize power - democratically but also militarily - Ghana could push harder towards West African unity. Nkrumah invested in particular in the opposition groups of Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroons and Niger. All of these states, for some reason or other, were considered obstacles towards a West African unity project. In some cases, like the one of Togo, Nkrumah had also planned to absorb the territories of the neighboring states into a single political entity. Through the victory of opposition parties, he could also extend political radicalism in other moderate states, especially the francophone ones.

Since 1959, Ghana hosted members of the opposition parties considering them "freedom fighters" as well as any other political refugee from colonial territories. Among the first refugees registered on 19 May 1959, there were also some members of minority

nationalist movements of French Cameroons and Ivory Coast.²¹⁵ Interestingly, both the countries were already run by an African self-government.²¹⁶

The Cameroonians were members of the *Union du Peuple Camerounaise* (UPC), the main opponents of Ahidjo's *Union Nationale Camerounaise* (UNC). Banned in both French Cameroons (1955) and British Cameroons (1957), the UPC had never agreed on the French-African Community project. Instead, the party endorsed a project for a Pan-African federation of African states, in fact supporting Nkrumah's thought. The ideology of the *upécistes* (as the UPC members were called) was based on socialism, anti-imperialism and Pan-Africanism.²¹⁷

The first contacts between the UPC and Ghana had been already established in 1957. At the 1957 Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference, held in Cairo in December, Felix Moumié, the UPC leader, had met Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and members of the Algerian FLN.²¹⁸ Hence, the UPC sought refuge in Ghana, Guinea and Algeria, which all provided support to its cause. The *upécistes*' ideology was well suited with Nkrumah's one. Thus, since 1958, Ghana opened its doors to Moumié and its party. At the All-African People's Conference, the UPC was the most important Cameroonian party invited and its members were hosted at the AAC.

The invitation of the *upécistes* to the AAPC caused the resentments of both the French government and the Cameroonian one. Thus, Ahidjo rejected Accra's invitation to the conference.²¹⁹ By backing the UPC, Ghana had opened one of the first confrontation

²¹⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959.

²¹⁶ Ahidjo was at the time *chef de l'état* of the French Cameroons. After independence, he became the first president of the united Cameroons. Hophouet-Boigny had been elected Prime Minister of Ivory Coast on 1st May 1959. He maintained the role of Prime Minister up to the independence (Nov. 1960). On 23rd November 1960, he became the first president of Ivory Coast.

²¹⁷ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global: From Forest Maquis to a Pan-African Accra*, *Journal of African History*, 51 (2010), pp.195-196.

²¹⁸ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global*, pp. 201-202; The AAPSO was a Soviet-backed organization which was, *de facto*, a competitor to the Ghanaian Pan-African platform.

²¹⁹ France had already been informed on July 1958 about the invitation of the UPC to the All-African People's Conference. It consequently worked for all the year to support Ahidjo in his struggle against the participation of the "insurrectional organization" to the AAPC. French authorities tried also to work within the *ensemble français* to convince other African leaders such as Sékou Touré, Bakari-Djibo and Apithy to refuse the invitation to the Accra conference as a protest against the UPC's presence. See *Ibidem*, pp. 203-204.

with another African country, Cameroon. Many other clashes that came from Ghana's support to opposition parties were going to follow this one, especially in West Africa.

Moumié divided its forces mainly between Ghana and Guinea. The UPC headquarters were moved to Conakry just after the closing of the AAPC.²²⁰ In Accra, some important *upécistes* managed a local office. Among them there were Ernest Ouandié and Moumié's father, Samuel Mekou, who was a permanent resident of the African Affairs Centre.²²¹

As a member of the AAPC director's Committee, Moumié had worked on the conference resolution on French Cameroons.²²² After the conference, the AAPC secretariat and the Ghanaian government itself supported the implementation of the resolution. Hence, they organized a series of mass rallies on 20 February 1959, the day when the French Cameroons' question was discussed at the UN. The invitation to the rallies was signed by Tom Mboya and Felix Moumié. The latter had clearly an influential role in the AAPC organization.²²³

The *upécistes* in Ghana were hosted at the AAC and they were provided with funds, clothes and other supplies. They were soon divided in two groups: the ones who had already a basic education and those who did not. The former could apply for Ghanaian scholarships, as they were "those who would someday make up the national intelligentsia". The latter were assigned to military training.²²⁴

²²⁰ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global*, p.204.

²²¹ Mekou's was the main UPC's contact in Ghana. See *Ibidem*, p. 206. His presence and his role in the party is testified by a letter, dated 7th December 1959 sent by the South Africa Defence Fund to the Bureau of African Affairs. In the letter, a member of the organization, Mary-Louise Hooper asked for Mekou's help. Hooper needed names of UPC contacts in Douala and Mekou was considered the reference name in Accra for this kind of information. See AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter, Hooper to Barden, 7th December 1959.

²²² A copy of the resolution on French Cameroons by the first committee of the AAPC was sent to Padmore's office together with a report on the political situation in Africa. Interestingly, the resolution made reference to the decisions undertaken by the IAS conference (April 1958), considered as the political forerunner of the AAPC. The resolution mainly asked for four things: a) An amnesty to the banned party members. B) The return of all those exiled from the country. c) A referendum on the reunification of the Cameroons. D) The establishment of a special UNO commission on Cameroon. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Resolution On Cameroon Adopted By The First Committee On Imperialism And Colonialism Of The All-African People's Conference", attached to "Report on African affairs", AAPC secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959.

²²³ Moumié's address to the AAPC secretariat for organizing the rally can be found in AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Report on African Affairs", AAPC secretariat to Botsio and Padmore, 9th February 1959.

²²⁴ M. Terretta, *Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global*, p.205.

With regard to military training, at first Ghana supported only the UPC's *maquis* in both British Southern Cameroons (where the UPC was called One Kamerun – OK). Only by 1960, Ghana provided proper military courses to the *upécistes*.²²⁵

Another important opposition group hosted in Ghana since 1959 was the *Comité de Défense du Sanwi*, the ex provisional government of the Sanwi Kingdom (or Krinjabo Kingdom) of the Ivory Coast. The Sanwi - a population living in the eastern part of Ivory Coast - had had clashes with the Ivorian government as they refused to join the country after independence. They claimed that the Sanwi Kingdom was originally independent from any other French possession. Thus, they demanded their own independence from France. The Provisional Government of the Sanwi Kingdom had sent a memorandum to France on 1 March 1959 in which the “Franco-Aowin” Treaty of Protection signed on 4th July 1843 was considered defunct.²²⁶ Then, the Sanwi Kingdom submitted a request of independence on the ground of the extinction of the French protectorate. The reaction of both France and the Ivorian self-government was harsh. In May, Houphoet-Boigny's government arrested the Sanwi's paramount chief, several other chiefs, and members of the Provisional Government (formed on the 19th of May).²²⁷

Being threatened by both France and Ivory Coast, the Sanwi Kingdom turned to Ghana, going back, as it claimed, to “its country of origin.”²²⁸ The Sanwi people were

²²⁵ The *marquis* were “underground resistance military camps” used by the UPC to fight against the colonial rule and Ahidjo government. They were also based in British Southern Cameroons, where the UPC was called “One Kamerun” (OK). *Ibidem*, p.191.

²²⁶ This treaty - as the Sanwi delegation underlined - was affecting only the Sanwi area and not the whole Ivory Coast. Thus, Ghana was not called to be involved in the whole affair of the Ivorian independence. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, “*Declaration sur la demand de rattachement du Sanwi à l'Etat indépendant du Ghana*” submitted by Amand Kadio Attié (President of the “Comité de Défense du Sanwi Libre”) and addressed to Nkrumah, 7th July 1959.

²²⁷ PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, Minute of a meeting between Adjei, Dzirasa, Padmore, Markham, Petterson and the Sanwi delegation on, 29th June 1959 – “The Sanwi Affair”. On the Sanwi crisis see A. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964. See also C. Boone, “Rural Interests and the Making of Modern African States”, *African Economic History*, n.23 (1995), pp.1-36; C. Boone, *Political Topographies of the African State. Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

²²⁸ PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, “*Declaration sur la demand de rattachement du Sanwi à l'Etat indépendant du Ghana*”, submitted by Amand Kadio Attié (President of the “Comité de Défense du Sanwi Libre”) and addressed to Nkrumah, 7th July 1959

indeed strongly related to the Nzima of Ghana (Nkrumah was an Nzima too).²²⁹ On 28 May 1959, the Sanwi Kingdom submitted a first request of unification of its territory to Ghana, calling *de facto* for a reunification of the Sanwi and Nzima people. The Sanwi requested political asylum to Ghana, due to the “oppression organized by the government of Mr. Houphouët-Boigny”.²³⁰

Ghana welcomed the Sanwi militants as political refugees, but it took several months before the country clarified its position about the “Sanwi affair”. Padmore’s Office began to deal with the unification proposal, while the Sanwi were hosted at the AAC. Among them, there was also Armand Attié, President of the Sanwi Committee.²³¹ In May, Padmore and Markham received a first written draft of the *Sanwi Comité*’s proposal of annexation of the Sanwi territory by Ghana. They had some months to work on it, before the Comité’s planned a vis-à-vis formal meeting with the Ghanaian authorities on the 29th of June.

Interestingly, Padmore suggested to maintain a prudential stance. Political tactics had to be taken in consideration. Ghana could not undertake a direct confrontation with the Ivory Coast only on the ground of the Sanwi’s requests. In a letter dated 23 June 1959, Padmore advised Nkrumah not to support any plan for annexation of the Sanwi area to Ghana.²³² According to him, the best approach was to grant political asylum to the Sanwi refugees, but not to endorse their demands. He suggested to support them, “providing they undertake to abide by the laws of Ghana and refrain from using Ghana as a base to further their present aims and objectives”. Only in the case the UN got also involved, Ghana could assist the Sanwi’s plans: “at this point Ghana will be able to give its support at the United Nations to their new stand for unification”.

²²⁹ The Sanwi people claim their origin from Ghana’s territory. Indeed, the Anjy people moved in the area from modern Ghana approximately in 1740.

²³⁰ The original text is in French. It is not possible to read the draft of this first request. However, it is quoted in a second draft submitted in July to the Ghanaian government by the *Comité*. See PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, “*Declaration sur la demand de rattachement du Sanwi à l’Etat indépendant du Ghana*”, submitted by Amand Kadio Attié (President of the “Comité de Défence du Sanwi Libre”) and addressed to Nkrumah, 7th July 1959. An English version of the same draft can be found in the same file.

²³¹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, p.88.

²³² PRAAD, SC/BAA/142/“The Sanwi Affair”, *Letter*, Padmore to Nkrumah, 23rd June 1959.

Although Nkrumah was already competing politically with Houphouët-Boigny, he could not risk an opened conflict with the francophone neighbor.²³³ Padmore was well aware of the dangers of such a confrontation, and this is why he suggested to dismiss the Sanwi's proposal of annexation. This case shows how scrupulous Padmore was when dealing with political refugees before any action was taken in their favor.

Nkrumah endorsed Padmore's position and he authorized his Adviser on African Affairs to present its thoughts at the meeting with the Sanwi delegation on the 29th June 1959, in Accra. In front of Ako Adjei, Markham, Attié, and the rest of the delegation Padmore explained Ghana's position.²³⁴ The Sanwi were welcomed as guests by the Ghanaian government but their requests of annexation could not be fulfilled.

Even if the Ghanaians did not satisfy their expectations, they could still take advantage of the presence of the Ivorian opposition group. In the following years, their presence alone meant a constant pressure against Abidjan. It became also a concrete threat for Houphouët-Boigny by 1964, when the Sanwi began receiving military training by Accra.²³⁵

Another important opposition party backed by Ghana just after the AAPC was the Sawaba party of Niger.²³⁶ The Sawaba (*Mouvement Socialiste Africain* – MSA - Sawaba) was born as a split of the *Parti Progressiste Nigérien* (PPN), led by Diori, the future first President of Niger.²³⁷ Having campaigned against the French-African Community in 1958, the Sawaba had been banned in 1959 and it had sought refuge in Ghana. The party leader

²³³ The rivalry between Ghana and the Ivory Coast was mainly based on different ideological positions and different approaches on the models of development (it is worth to remember the famous “bet” between the two leaders). Moreover, it implied a confrontation of the respective spheres of influence in the region. On the rivalry between the two states in 1959 see W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp. 87-89.

²³⁴ PRAAD, SC/BAA/142, Minute of a meeting between and the Sanwi delegation on 29th June 1959 – “The Sanwi Affair”.

²³⁵ NLC, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*, p.4.

²³⁶ The complete name of the Sawaba party was “*Mouvement Socialiste Africain* – Sawaba”. For a comprehensive history of the party see K., Van Walraven, *The Yearning for relief: a History of the Sawaba Movement in Niger*, Brill, 2013. References about the links between Ghana and the Sawaba party can be found also in A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, p.49.

²³⁷ Diori was also the cousin of the Sawaba party leader, Djibo Bakary.

Djibo Bakary had had contacts with Padmore since 1958.²³⁸ Indeed, he was one of the guests who attended the first anniversary celebrations of Ghana on March 1958.²³⁹

Similarly to what happened with the UPC, Nkrumah backed the Sawaba for its political affinity to the CPP. Indeed, at least since 1958, Djibo Bakary had endorsed a Pan-African position with the aim of extending his political struggle out of the Nigerien boundaries. In order to fulfill this vision, he worked in countries of French West Africa other than Niger. For instance, he worked in French Sudan where he supported a local branch of the MSA, the *Parti Soudanais Progressiste*.²⁴⁰ He also worked for the establishment of a Pan-African party in French West Africa: the *Parti du Regroupement Africain* (PRA), founded at Cotonou in July 1958, with himself as its Secretary-General.²⁴¹

Djibo Bakary strongly campaigned for the “no” vote at the referendum for the French Community on 28 September 1958. He and Sékou Touré were the only leaders of French West Africa to oppose the French Community project, campaigning instead for immediate independence. When asked how he would face Niger’s isolation in case of victory, he claimed he had friends ready to help. According to Fuglestad, those friends were probably the Ghanaians.²⁴²

After the failure of the “no” vote campaign, Djibo Bakary was forced to resign from his position of Deputy President. The Sawaba party became an opposition group and soon after it was banned in Niger (1959). Thus, Djibo Bakary turned to Ghana for help. He needed a new base for Sawaba from where to launch attacks against the new Nigerien government of Diori.²⁴³ The Ghanaians accepted immediately, confirming their close relationship with the party. Since 1959, Bakari and other members of the Sawaba were

²³⁸ At that time Djibo Bakary was not only the Sawaba leader but also head of the government. In 1957, Djibo Bakary had been elected *Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres*, that is the Deputy Prime Minister of Niger. See, F. Fuglestad, *Djibo Bakary, the French and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger*, *The Journal of African History*, Vol.14, n°2, 1973.

²³⁹ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.31.

²⁴⁰ F. Fuglestad, *Djibo Bakary*, p.320.

²⁴¹ The PRA was established as the union of all the progressive parties of Francophone West Africa that had remained outside the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA). The Sawaba gained its name (which was formerly only *Mouvement Socialiste Africain*) after the return of Djibo Bakary from Cotonou. *Ibidem*, p.321.

²⁴² F. Fuglestad, *Djibo Bakary*, p.324.

²⁴³ Diori became Prime Minister on 18 December 1958 and he later became the first president of Niger (3 August 1960).

hosted at the African Affairs Centre in two houses, named after their party.²⁴⁴ Their representative in Ghana was Yakubu Idirusu (Iddrisa).²⁴⁵ As any other opposition groups hosted in Accra, the Sawaba militants were labeled by the Ghanaian as “freedom fighters”. Their struggle in Niger was considered to all intents and purposes as a “liberation struggle”. As in the other cases, the government involved - in this case Niger - resented Ghana’s support to an opposition group of its country.

The clashes between Ghana and Niger on this question began almost immediately after Djibo Bakary’s arrival in Accra. In the early summer of 1959, the Sawaba party was already operating in Niger from its Ghanaian headquarters and Niger immediately responded to what they considered an aggression. The first reference on operations launched from Ghana is on a letter dated 26 June 1959.²⁴⁶ The letter, prepared by Padmore’s office for internal use, is a report on Sawaba’s activities in Niger. According to some members, there were spies within their ranks and they were requesting Padmore to take care of the matter. Few days before, some members of Sawaba had been arrested in Nyamei by Nigerien authorities, which had been informed by the alleged spies. Interestingly, the Nigerien authorities were already aware of Ghana’s support to the Sawaba party. They were looking for evidences of Ghana’s involvement in a Sawaba-led plot against the Nigerien government. After being tormented, and after having their pictures and fingerprints taken, the members arrested were questioned about their activities:

[...] they are first questioned whatever they know Kwame Nkrumah and Mr. Yakubu Idirusu. [...] the lorry or truck has to be thoroughly searched because the informants had made it known to them that Dr. Nkrumah used to supply members of our party some fire-arms to be delivered to Mr. Zibo Bakare [Djibo Bakary] to fight his opponent. Especially

²⁴⁴ N.L.C., *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa*, p.4. In 1959 the houses were still named after African countries. Later, the names were changed into those of the parties hosted there.

²⁴⁵ His name is quoted in a series of document, always as the representative of the party. For instance, he was the one who had to confirm the names of the Sawaba refugees at the Centre. See AGPL, BAA/475/African Affairs Committee Accounts, Ghana, “Catering expenses for French Niger refugees”. The document includes a list of the Nigerien refugees at the Centre on August 1959 (6) and the cost of food for them (£93). The name of Yakubu Idirusu is spelled in this document: “Yacubu Iddrisa”.

²⁴⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary’s Personal Correspondence, Letter (handwritten), Members of the Sawaba party to Padmore, 26th June 1959.

any lorry from Ghana in which occupants are members of our party has to be searched [...].²⁴⁷

In the following years, the Nigerian government openly attacked more and more often Nkrumah accusing him to master plots against Diori.²⁴⁸ With regard to the situation in 1959, it is not possible to confirm that Ghana was providing fire-arms to the Sawaba members. Only by 1961/1962, there are proofs of military training granted to the Nigerian nationalists by Accra.²⁴⁹

Also in 1959, Ghana began to support another party bound to become an opposition group of its country, the Nigerian Action Group (AG). Before 1959, Ghana had primarily backed Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), one of the Action Group's opponent and one of Nigeria's leading parties. During Padmore's last months, the situation changed: Ghana ceased to have a privileged relationship with the NCNC and began to support Awolowo's Action Group.²⁵⁰ Apparently, this choice was not dictated by strong ideological differences between the CPP and the NCNC; Azikiwe was still one of the strongest advocates of Pan-Africanism.²⁵¹ However, Nkrumah had not appreciated his cold attitude towards the UAS project. By backing the AG, Nkrumah wanted to criticize Azikiwe's position and to put political pressure on him and his party.

During the following years, Ghana's support to the AG became a real political alliance, especially since the Nigerian party represented the main opposition group against Balewa's government (1960-1962). Since 1959, members of the Action Group started visiting Ghana for political training and collaborations between their party and the CPP.

²⁴⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued/ AGPL, un-catalogued/BB-Secretary's Personal Correspondence, Letter (handwritten), Members of the Sawaba party to Padmore, 26th June 1959.

²⁴⁸ Diori became soon one of Nkrumah's main opponents in West Africa by denouncing Ghana's alleged plans to rule West Africa through the action of opposition parties (clearly considered terrorists). Years later, on 13th April 1965, he accused Nkrumah to be the one behind a failed assassination attempt against him. See, W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, pp. 375-376.

²⁴⁹ For information about the military training of Sawaba members in Ghana see N.L.C., *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa*.

²⁵⁰ Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987) was one of Nigeria's founding fathers. He was Premier of the Western Region of Nigeria between 1952 and 1959. Later, between 1959 and 1962, he became Balewa's main opponent.

²⁵¹ On the change of attitude of NCNC and AG towards Ghana see Thompson, W.S., *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.80. See also O. Aluko, *Ghana and Nigeria*, pp. 75 and ff.

After 1962, some AG members were hosted in Ghana as political refugees.²⁵² Some of them became also part of Ghana's Pan-African machinery. It is the case of one of the key figures of the Ghanaian Pan-African policy after Padmore's death: Samuel Ikoku.²⁵³

The cases of AG, Sanwi, Sawaba and UPC are very interesting examples of Ghana's support to opposition parties of other African countries. In the following years, Ghana backed other minority groups. Some of them were supported politically and others even militarily. Behind every choice of this type there were considerations linked to the implementations of Ghana's Pan-African policy. Nkrumah sponsored most of these parties to oppose the conservative governments that could weaken his Pan-Africanist project. It was, however, a dangerous policy. Some states considered Ghana's involvement as an aggression and thus they reacted accordingly. As regards to 1959, the situation was still relatively calm, but the clashes between Ghana and some of its neighboring states were bound to increase in the following years.

With the question of opposition parties, this excursus of Ghana's Pan-African policy in 1959 had come to an end. The last two sub-chapters will deal with the fundamental changes in the composition of the staff of Padmore's office in this period. First of all, it will be analyzed how Padmore worked for giving shape to his office in order to transform it into a radical body. Then, the crucial event of 1959 will be described: the death of George Padmore.

²⁵² In 1962, Awolowo and several militants of the Action Group were arrested and convicted for conspiracy against Nigeria (Treasonable Felony Trial). At the trial, Nigeria attacked publicly Nkrumah's policy in the region, as the Ghanaian President was supposed to be a supporter of the plot. After the first wave of arrests, several members of the AG escaped from Nigeria and were hosted in Ghana as political refugees. This fact led to an even harsher confrontation between Ghana and Nigeria. Since then, the two states began to host an increasing number of political refugees escaping from the respective country.

²⁵³ Samuel Ikoku (Julius Sago) was an AG party member and an economist. At the time of Awolowo's trial, he was already in Ghana where he remained until the fall of Nkrumah. There, he worked as a journalist (mainly at *The Spark*) and as lecturer at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba. He left an interesting account of his years in Ghana. See: S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah, autopsie de la Ire République (1957-1966)*, François Maspero, Paris, 1971.

2.7. Significant Changes in Padmore's Office: the Rise of A.K. Barden

In 1959, the new challenges of the African political scene generated changes in the structures of the "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana, especially in the composition of their staff. Padmore adapted his Office to the needs of the African liberation struggle, by proposing the creation of new posts. For instance, he introduced the figure of the French Translator, in order to deal with francophone freedom fighters. Among the new appointees, Aloysius K. Barden emerged. The Ghanaian ex-serviceman became Padmore's personal secretary and, *de facto*, his successor. After the death of the latter, he became one of the protagonists of Ghana's Pan-African policy.

Between late 1958 and early 1959, the need to intensify Ghana's Pan-African policy was strong, leading Padmore's Office to increase its duties. Thus, in November 1958, Padmore asked Nkrumah to provide fresh human resources for his Office as well as the establishment of new posts.²⁵⁴

The proposed figure of French translator was undoubtedly a fundamental one, as the office needed to strengthen its relationship with francophone governments and freedom fighters. Despite the importance of the operation, it took some months before the right man was found.²⁵⁵ Indeed, Padmore had to select carefully a skillful but also reliable man who could deal with delicate political questions. He finally found the perfect profile in Michael K.K. Tuvi, former official French translator at the All-African People's Conference. On 4

²⁵⁴ He wrote to Nkrumah on 3 November 1958: "It is clear that the work and responsibility of this office are growing from day to day. In order to cope with the ever growing work and responsibility it is absolutely important that the staff of the office should be increased from its present state". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 3rd November 1958.

²⁵⁵ In January 1959, the post was assigned temporarily to a young Ghanaian, Mr. Lomotey, who had been deported from Leopoldville in connection with some disturbances (clearly related with the delicate political situation of Belgian Congo before independence). See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. It was however a temporary solution since on 21 January Padmore was still requesting the appointment of a French Translator. In AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter (title: "*establishment proposals*"), Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. He had to be Ghanaian and its duties were to be the ones of translating from French to English plus some interpreting. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Markham to Adu, 9th March 1959. This letter was following a request of information from Adu on the duties requested to the French Translator. Adu's request was itself an answer to the previous letter of Padmore already quoted and dated 21st January 1959. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Adu to Padmore, 20th February 1959.

April 1959, Padmore wrote to Adu sponsoring the application of Tuvi to the post.²⁵⁶ The letter provides a picture of the new situation in Padmore's Office: increasingly confidential duties raised the need for a scrupulous selection of the staff. Quoting from the letter:

Security measures in my office are being tightened up and you will, no doubt, agree with me that it would be most unwise on my part to risk working with someone whom I cannot vouch for his loyalty. In the light of the prevailing circumstances, I would prefer Mr. K.K. Tuvi to any other one.²⁵⁷

The appointment of a French translator - finally occurred some months later - was only the first of the measures proposed by Padmore.²⁵⁸ He also suggested the establishment of the post of "Assistant to the Adviser on African Affairs", a reliable figure who could act in his absence. In this case, Padmore had already the right man: James Markham.²⁵⁹ He simply needed to upgrade his current status.

²⁵⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 4th April 1959.

²⁵⁷ Padmore underlined also the fact that he had chosen Tuvi since he was the French translator at the All-African People's Conference and in that occasion he had proven to be "efficient, loyal and hardworking". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 4th April 1959.

²⁵⁸ The establishment proposal of the post of French translator had been accepted already in May. The post had been included in the estimates for 1959/60. See AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Addy to Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, 18th May 1959; however, later on June, Padmore was still pushing Adu to put the establishment of the post in practice. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 17th June 1959. Adu agreed to the proposal and promised him a quick action on the matter. See *Letter*, Adu to Padmore, 18th June 1959 which can be found in the same previous file. At the end of August, Padmore's office was still waiting for the authorization. Tuvi was however confirmed as the favorite candidate. See AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Markham to Addy, 27th August 1959.

²⁵⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 3rd November 1958. Interestingly, the qualifications requested for the post practically coincided with the ones of Markham. Thus, it can be argued that Padmore wanted only to upgrade the status of the latter. The qualification was: "Must be a Ghanaian. Must have knowledge of Research work and be fully conversant with the political cultural and economic institutions in the various territories. Must know current developments in those territories with emphasis on the special problems and needs of those territories. Must have high quality of judgment and initiative. Must know how to collect independently information from all territories in Africa especially those still dependent. Must have worked in a similar capacity and must have widely travelled particularly in Africa and Asia thus giving him first-hand knowledge of the problems and conditions in those areas. Must know the working of the United Nations and its specialized Agencies especially UNESCO, NGO. And the Trusteeship Council". Quotation from AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, "Assistant to the Special Adviser on African Affairs – Qualification, Duties, Salary", undated. Markham was at the time one of the key figure of Padmore's office, acting as "Information and Research officer". Padmore did his best in order to obtain the Markham's upgrade. Both Nkrumah and Botsio agreed on the appointment in December. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 18th December 1958. As it was the case with the French translator, it took, however,

What was, however, to be the most important post created by Padmore in this period was that of Personal Secretary. In this case, the Adviser on African Affairs designed the job specifically for one of his employees: Aloysious K. Barden. This figure - at the time relatively unknown in Ghana and elsewhere - was bound to play a fundamental role in the evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy after Padmore's death. Selected and formed by Padmore himself - who had also to win resistance by elements of the civil service - he became one of the most important men of his Office and, *de facto*, his successor.

Aloysious K. Barden was a Ghanaian ex-serviceman who had been working for Padmore's Office since the summer of 1958.²⁶⁰ Recommended by an ex Officer of the British colonial army, at the time Barden was neither trained for the duties of Padmore's Office nor he had experiences in Pan-African activities, nor was he politicized.²⁶¹ Apparently, his profile did not fit in any way the one drawn by Padmore for the members of the staff of the Office. Most probably, at first, the Adviser on African Affairs selected

some months before Markham was officially upgraded. In February, Padmore was writing directly to Nkrumah as his proposals were not being processed. Even Markham had not yet been upgraded although Adu had promised an action in December. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 13th February 1959. Still in June, Markham's appointment had not been made official. Padmore was complaining with Adu about the delay. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 17th June 1959. Adu accepted the proposal. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Adu to Padmore, 18th June 1959.

²⁶⁰ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Staff list, 1958-59, typescript.

²⁶¹ At the time of the establishment of the Office, Padmore had proposed the creation of various posts, included the one of Stenographer-Secretary. Padmore had also a name to suggest, the one of S.I. Subero. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Re: "Staff for Adviser on African Affairs", Adu to Padmore, 17 January 1958. However, when the first IAS Conference was approaching, the Office was still without this post. It was necessary as the duties of the office were bound to increase in volume with the approach of the Conference. For this reason, Padmore (through Afflah Addo) asked Ivor Cummings from the Establishment Secretary's Office (ESO) to find someone for the post. In AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued "Gabon File", Letter, Afflah Addo to Cummings, 15th March 1958. Cummings, who was an ex British Colonial Officer, found an ex serviceman, Aloysious K. Barden, who was looking for a job. *Interview* with David Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24/7/12. The latter was a Ghanaian retired sergeant, who had served in the British colonial army. He was appointed in the Office as a typewriter on 13th June 1958. On 20 of August, he had not been interviewed yet for the job of stenographer-secretary. The director of recruitment and training of the ESO wrote: "[...] he has had very limited experience in an office. It will therefore be in his interest to delay the interview to enable him to overcome his deficiency in office management etc., and to acquire experience in the duties which he will be required to perform on promotion to the grade of Stenographer Secretary". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Director of Recruitment and Training of E.S.O. to Padmore, 20th August 1958. Other sources confirm that Barden was not prepared for the job of stenographer-secretary nor was he politicized. Interviews: Richter, Bosumtwi-Sam, Asante; W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

Barden only for his military experience.²⁶² He then needed to be properly trained in order to fulfill his duties.²⁶³ In few months, however, Barden proved Padmore's choice wise and he succeeded in winning his confidence.

After only few months, Padmore showed appreciation for Barden's skills, despite his lack of experience. He immediately involved the new appointee in the Office activities, including the fulfillment of confidential duties. In November '58, Padmore requested a new stenographer secretary as he wanted Barden to undertake other duties which involved more responsibilities.²⁶⁴ In January 1959, he finally proposed Barden for the new post of "Private Secretary to the Adviser", a strong position within the Office hierarchies. Padmore had appreciated the way Barden had handled confidential duties and he decided to reward him with a more powerful position. He wrote to Nkrumah:

Mr. A.K. Barden my Stenographer Secretary has [...] efficiently handled in addition to his confidential duties the general administrative work of the office. Besides enjoying his confidence and loyalty, he is painstaking, courteous and one who can always be relied upon to shoulder responsibilities. In view of the highly confidential nature of my work and after having given serious thought to the question of filling the first post above [the one of

²⁶² Barden's military experience must have played a big role in his appointment. Padmore's Office had indeed to be ready to support armed struggle where necessary (at the time, it was still not involved in any, apart from a general support to Algeria's armed struggle). A military expert was a good resource to deal with liberation movements involved in armed struggles. Barden himself was often underlining his experience in military operations. *Ibidem*. This fact is also confirmed by the interviews with K.B. Asante and David Bosumtwi-Sam.

²⁶³ The task of preparing Barden was undertaken by David Bosumtwi-Sam, who at the time was Principal Education Officer of the Ministry of Education. Interview with Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 19th July 2012. See also D. Bosumtwi-Sam, *Landmarks of Dr Kwame Nkrumah*, pp.138-39. The request to train Barden came from Ivor Cummings himself. Bosumtwi-Sam sent Barden to Tamale where he was trained for some months in English and type-writing. Source: Interview with David Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 24th July 2012; it was in this occasion that Bosumtwi-Sam met for the first time George Padmore. The paths of Barden and Bosumtwi-Sam crossed again in 1960, when the latter was appointed Executive Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs, at the time headed by Barden. Those were, actually, the requirements for being appointed at the post of stenographer secretary. In AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", "Qualifications for the positions of stenographer grade I, II and secretary", undated typescript, pp.18-19. On 27 November 1958, Barden was finally promoted. See AGPL, BAA/un-catalogued "Gabon File", Letter, Newall to Barden, 27th November 1958.

²⁶⁴ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 3rd November 1958.

Stenographer Secretary], I strongly recommend that Mr. A.K. Barden should be appointed.²⁶⁵

Padmore made it clear to Nkrumah that he had already taken a decision. He needed only to have the post officially established and he needed the authorization to increase Barden's salary. He had selected Barden on his own, without external interferences, as he already did with the other key figures of his Office (Makonnen and Markham). From Padmore's point of view, only Nkrumah could say something against Barden's appointment.

However, once again, despite his independent role, Padmore had to face criticisms and resistance from the Ghanaian Civil Service and particularly from Adu. The latter opposed the new appointments on the ground of financial matters: there was no money for unjustified expenses. According to Padmore, such an opposition was the reflection of the distance of outlook between him and the Civil Service. He believed the money to cover the new appointments was already available.²⁶⁶ He strongly complained about the delays caused by such resistances and criticized Adu's attitude on the matter, as he considered the new appointments crucial for the fulfillment of the new duties of the Office. On 13 February 1959 he wrote to Adu:

[...] there appears to be uncertainties as to the possibility of getting the staff requested for this office as proposed. This is evident from the passive manner in which my proposals are being dealt with in your office. As you are already aware my establishment proposals are not in any way revolutionary that it should be treated in the manner it is being done; it is only a request for a complement of staff consistent with the duties being carried out by this office. [...] In view of the urgent nature of this request and the extraordinary indifference in which it is being dealt with by your office, I should be extremely grateful if you would take up the matter personally [...].²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Re: "Establishment Proposals", Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959. In another letter written to Nkrumah the same day (included in the same file) Padmore repeated the same concept: "In view of the ever increasing confidential nature of my work, I am recommending the appointment of a Private Secretary [...] I intend to assign this work to Mr. A.K. Barden my present Stenographer Secretary [...] I would appreciate your immediate endorsement of these recommendations [...] I can assure you that with these new arrangements, we shall be able to keep abreast with the ever increasing demands of this office". See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Nkrumah, 21st January 1959.

²⁶⁶ AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 7th February 1959.

²⁶⁷ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Padmore to Adu, 13th February 1959.

The financial sustainability was not the only problem on the table. The Establishment Secretary Office of the Ministry of Finance, the office responsible for the matter, considered Barden's promotion unusual if compared to the normal career ladder. The secretary wrote to Adu:

You agreed in discussion that Mr. Padmore's proposal for the creation of a post of Private Secretary should not be pursued. [...] Where it is to be created the filling of the post would, of course, have to be by promotion from the grade of Stenographer Secretary, and it will be appreciated that there would be no guarantee that Mr. Barden would be considered the most suitable candidate. His promotion would involve the supersession of many officers who are his seniors.²⁶⁸

Padmore did not give up on the matter. For the rest of the year, he kept pushing both the Establishment Secretary Office and Adu's office to allow the establishment of the new posts, including Barden's. From Padmore's point of view, the bureaucracy of the Ghanaian state was still an obstacle towards the correct fulfillment of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy.

In the meantime, Barden was becoming more and more fundamental for the Office's activities. In March, Padmore wrote again to the Establishment Office to underline the outstanding role he played, pushing again for his upgrade:

Much as I appreciate that it is the normal practice of Stenographer/Secretaries to be engaged on highly confidential documents I wish to point out that the peculiar nature of my office compels Mr. Barden as a matter of necessity to work outside normal office hours but not, as needs be, as in the case of other holders of this grade.²⁶⁹

In May, with the arrival of the first political refugees to Accra, Padmore reasserted the need for Barden's appointment to a higher-level post. At the time, the latter had begun managing the accommodation of political refugees, one of the new duties of Padmore's Office. On 19

²⁶⁸ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Goble to Adu, 16th February 1959.

²⁶⁹ AGPL, un-catalogued file/"Gabon File", Letter, Padmore to Gardiner, 25th March 1959.

May 1959, Padmore wrote again to Adu to propose Barden for a new position.²⁷⁰ Interestingly, the letter shows one important detail: at the time, Barden was also in charge of the work with the intelligence. Quoting from the letter:

As the work involves high security risk, it requires a person of executive ability and absolute reliability [...] I propose that such an appointment, if and when created, be offered to my Stenographer/Secretary, in whom I have absolute confidence and who has, in fact, been carrying out such combined duties and responsibilities during the past months with commendable efficiency. This officer is also working in close co-operation with our intelligence under Mr. Kao. I am sure that the appointment will materially improve the efficient running of my office which, in addition to routine matters, has to deal with the accommodation of political refugees.²⁷¹

In June, Barden was finally appointed to the new post and likewise were Markham and Tuvi.²⁷² Padmore had needed to wait for months before the procedures succeeded. During this period, however, he put Markham, Tuvi and Barden to work on their new duties, without waiting for the confirmation of their appointments. Padmore was a pragmatic man. He considered the fulfillment of the targets of Ghana's Pan-African policy more important than formalities. He also needed his employees to be ready in case anything could happen to him.

Tragically, this moment was closer than expected. While Barden's star was rising, Padmore's was fading away. His health conditions were getting worse each month. When he died, in September, Barden emerged as the best candidate to become his "successor". At the time, he was the most powerful figure of the Office. Although contested, his succession to Padmore's position was not a surprise. Padmore himself had prepared him the ground during the months preceding his death. *De facto*, he had "created" Barden. Despite the

²⁷⁰ Padmore proposed the establishment of a new type of post in order to "combine the duties of Confidential Secretary with that of an Administrative Officer": the "Senior Executive Officer". Barden was again sponsored for the new post. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 19th May 1959.

²⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

²⁷² See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Padmore to Adu, 17th June 1959. Adu finally agreed on the appointments. See AGPL, un-catalogued file/BC-All-African People's Conference, Letter, Adu to Padmore, 18th June 1959.

resistances, Padmore had succeeded in having Barden climbing the steps of his career very quickly. He had trained the Ghanaian ex-serviceman to be a skilled employee but also a Pan-Africanist militant. From this point of view, Barden proved to be a perfect match to Padmore's needs.

Figures like Barden were bound to form the bulk of a radicalized foreign affairs machinery, a process begun just few months before Padmore's death. Since 1959, political appointments became increasingly common both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (particularly among the diplomats) and in the "Pan-African" institutions. Barden can be considered as the first of a series of radicals who gained important posts in the institutions dealing with Ghana's foreign policy.

According to Thompson, this process was far from being transparent. These radicals were often nothing but politicized "self-styled militants" selected only for their ideological dedication to the cause, largely unskilled and bound to bring Ghana to a disaster.²⁷³ Barden, in his study emerges as the typical example of one who made a quick career and gained his position only thanks to his ideological affiliation.

Such an analysis seems rather simplistic. In reality, most of the "political appointees" such as Barden or other who followed him were heavily trained. Their careers paths simply not followed the normal protocol of the civil service. Barden's career was the result of a hard and practical work in the Office, followed step by step by Padmore. In this sense, there can be no comparison, for instance, between the career of a civil servant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the career of a member of a "Pan-African" institution. Barden's path followed the peculiar nature of Padmore's Office. Once the radicalization of Ghana's state reached its peak in 1961, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba was established to form a politicized civil service. This move practically united the two existing types of carriers: the traditional one and the one of the "militants".

Barden's appointment was the last and most important act of George Padmore. Later in September 1959 he passed away. His death signified ideally both the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. Pan-Africanism had finally put its roots in Africa. Ghana was

²⁷³ W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p. 29.

ready to take up the fight for African liberation and unity, even without his presence. His imprint on Ghana's Pan-African policy was meant to last for years after his death.

2.8. Padmore's Death and Legacy

On the 23rd of September 1959 a terrible news shocked Ghana: George Padmore was dead. The Trinidadian Pan-Africanist had been first spectator and then protagonist of almost fifteen years of politics in Ghana. Nkrumah had built his foreign policy on Padmore's ideas and together they had worked to put the Pan-Africanist theories into practice. Without Padmore, the Office to the Adviser on African Affairs would have not been established. Thanks to his contribution, Ghana was now ready for the appointment with Africa's first wave of independences and the further developments of African politics of the following years. His legacy was remarkable. He had contributed to the development of Ghana's institutions and he had trained men ready to take up the Pan-African struggle, in particular A.K. Barden.

Padmore has suffered for cirrhosis of the liver for years. In early 1959, the situation deteriorated. However, he continued to commit in order to achieve the Pan-African targets of Ghana's foreign policy. He worked for the Office and he also participated to trips and conferences, including the Sanniquellie one.²⁷⁴

Padmore was aware that his health conditions were getting worse. In August, he insisted for having Barden and Markham's leaves postponed, since he had "some heavy work to deal with".²⁷⁵ In reality, he had to leave Ghana to be treated. Indeed, in early September he requested Nkrumah the authorization to travel to the UK to undergo a

²⁷⁴ The conditions of Padmore's liver worsened during the last 9 months of his life. See C. Polsgrove, *Ending British Rule in Africa*, Manchester University Press, 2009, pp.162-63. Bad medical treatments, previous history of hepatitis and an alleged consumption of alcohol are among the explanations of the deterioration of his health conditions. According to Hooker, the signs of the disease were already clear at the Sanniquellie meeting. See J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.139.

²⁷⁵ AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Padmore to Darfoor (Secretary to the Prime Minister), 22nd August 1959 and also AGPL, BAA/388, Letter, Darfoor to Padmore, 11st September 1959.

medical examination.²⁷⁶ It was to be his last trip outside Ghana. A few days after his arrival in London, he died. It was the 23rd of September 1959.

Speculations on his death aroused since the very day after. Some Ghanaians suspected he had been poisoned by “imperialist” agents. However, there was no proof to confirm such hypothesis.²⁷⁷ In any case, the fear of an external intervention is understandable since assassinations of radical African politicians were not uncommon.²⁷⁸ It is worth remembering that Padmore was known to be a Pan-Africanist but also a radical socialist.

In Ghana, the former Adviser on African Affairs was celebrated as a national hero. He was buried at Christianborg Castle, the seat of the Ghanaian government. On the 4th of October 1959, Nkrumah gave a speech at Padmore’s burial in which he underlined particularly the close political and human relationship with the dead friend. He could have not found a better ally:

When I first met George Padmore in London some fifteen years ago, we both realized from the very beginning that we thought along the same lines and talked the same language. There existed between us that rare affinity for which one searches for so long but seldom finds in another human being. We became friends at the moment of our meeting and our friendship developed into that indescribable relationship that exists between two brothers.²⁷⁹

On Radio Ghana, Nkrumah underlined Padmore’s role in the Pan-African struggle and his legacy: “one day the whole of Africa will surely be free and united and when the final tale is told, the significance of George Padmore’s work will be revealed”.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁶ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.139.

²⁷⁷ According to Hooker, Dr. Clarke, who was taking care of Padmore in his last days, did not find any sign of poisoning. *Ibidem*, p.139. Even among the Ghanaian intelligentsia the suspects circulated for a while, but they were soon abandoned. Still, according to David Bosumtwi-Sam the poisoning theory seems plausible. Interview with D. Bosumtwi-Sam, Accra, 4th September 2012.

²⁷⁸ For instance, just one year after Padmore’s death, Félix Moumié was poisoned in Genève, most probably by the French Intelligence.

²⁷⁹ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.139-140.

²⁸⁰ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*. It is a quotation from Adamafio’s *Hands off Africa!*, pp.45-47.

After his death, a debate inside and outside Ghana followed. His legacy in Ghana was discussed as well as his relationship with Nkrumah. According to some observers, his influence on the Ghanaian Prime Minister had been fundamentally negative. Indeed, Padmore was supposed to have guided Nkrumah far from the concrete achievement of Pan-Africanism. For instance, Smith Hempstone, member of the Institute for Current World Affairs who had interviewed Padmore some months before his death, wrote:

“[Padmore] seemed sincere in his views, but rather out of touch with the new generation of African nationalists, with the exception of Nkrumah, of course, to whom he was very close. I have the feeling that Nkrumah’s reliance on Padmore as an ideologue contributed to the Ghanaian leader’s failure to gain real control of the Pan-Africanist movement. By this I mean that if Nkrumah himself had taken the trouble to ascertain the thinking of the other African leaders on the subject of Pan-Africanism, rather than relying on Padmore’s interpretation of what the shape of Pan-Africanism should be, Nkrumah might have more stature that he has today.”²⁸¹

Even Scott Thompson agrees on this interpretation. According to the historian, although Padmore had guided Nkrumah with rational advices, he had ultimately misguided him by supporting his plans for an implausible project of continental unity.²⁸² As a matter of fact – Thompson underlined – the Adviser on African Affairs had been strongly criticized even by other members of the Ghanaian state.²⁸³

The American author is only partially right. It is true that Padmore was contested by some members of the Ghanaian government, the CPP and the civil service, but the reasons were others than his irrational advices on radical Pan-African policies. The real motive was merely political. Indeed, the civil service – in particular the one of the Minister of External Affairs represented by Adu – had never appreciated the independent role played by

²⁸¹ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.137. These words were written in a letter to Hooker by Hampstone on 19 April 1964. The latter described Padmore as rough and arrogant. According to Hooker: “This version of Padmore is so badly in disagreement with everyone’s accounts of his London days that one can only suppose either that the tropics did not agree with him or that Hampstone did not”. J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, p.138.

²⁸² W.S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp.22-23 and 106-107.

²⁸³ He, however, fails once again in producing sources for his statements, quoting only Robert Gardiner in saying: “That fellow seems to me to possess but one idea, and that is a wrong one”. Gardiner’s words are, in reality, a quotation themselves. *Ibidem*, p.23.

Padmore and his Office. Criticisms were coming from the Party ranks and members of the government for similar reasons.²⁸⁴ Many Ghanaians had fought against the independent status of Padmore since they thought that he held too much power, thanks to his privileged relationship with Nkrumah.

In reality, Padmore's death was a great loss for Nkrumah.²⁸⁵ Without him, he could have never planned a Pan-African policy and actualized it in Ghana. After September 1959, he was left alone to deal with the challenges of the African scene. Still, the political heritage of the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist was standing there, waiting to be enacted.

2.9. Conclusions

With the death of Padmore, almost fifteen years of work for giving shape to an effective plan to actualize Pan-Africanism was over. Thanks to the work done before 1957, the theoretical basis of this policy had been settled. Moreover, the work done by the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist between 1957 and 1959 proved fundamental to translate the theory into practice. Padmore's heritage was profound and enduring.

The Office was now ready to deal with the struggle for African liberation and unity in the next years. Moreover, Padmore had left Nkrumah with a qualified staff to support him in every move of his Pan-African policy. In particular, he trained Barden to replace him in the Office. In the next years, Nkrumah counted on the latter as he was doing on Padmore before his death.

The heritage of the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist was bound to last even after his departure. Indeed, many of the policies implemented after October 1959 were still clearly

²⁸⁴ J.R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary*, pp.128-129 and 133-134.

²⁸⁵ Thompson opposed this interpretation even from another point of view. According to him, Nkrumah himself hardly tolerated Padmore's independence. Thus, he was quite relieved by the death of his Adviser on African Affairs. According to the historian, who quoted interviews with Botsio and Markham, Nkrumah had become increasingly jealous of Padmore during 1959. Based on this assumption, Thompson described Nkrumah after the death of his Adviser on African Affairs as liberated by one of the few "restraints" that had slowed down the pace of his Pan-African plans. See W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

influenced by his ideas on African politics. Moreover, the evolution of the “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana clearly followed Padmore’s plans.

A new political season was beginning. A first wave of independences was meant to take place in the next year. After years and years of preparation, it was time to check on the efficiency of the system created by Nkrumah and Padmore to guide the independence processes towards the greater target of a continental union of African states.