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African Liberation and Unity in Nkrumah's Ghana: A Study of the Role of "Pan-African Institutions" in the making of Ghana's foreign Policy, 1957 - 1966

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Citation

Grilli, M. (2015, November 3). *African Liberation and Unity in Nkrumah's Ghana: A Study of the Role of "Pan-African Institutions" in the making of Ghana's foreign Policy, 1957 - 1966*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/36074>

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Issue Date: 2015-11-03

Introduction

Almost sixty years after its fall - occurred in a coup d'état on 24 February 1966 - Nkrumah's government in Ghana is still unanimously considered as one of the most influential but also controversial political experiences in the history of modern Africa. Its importance lies undoubtedly in the peculiarities of its internal policies and in the influence it exerted in Africa during the crucial years of the first wave of independence. Several aspects of Nkrumah's policy led this small West African country - without any visible strategic relevance – to act as a political giant becoming the torchbearer of Pan-Africanism and socialism in the continent. Between 1957 and 1966, Nkrumah transformed Ghana into a political laboratory where he could actualize his vision, known since 1960 as “Nkrumahism”.ⁱ This vision can be summarized as the achievement of three goals: national unity, economic transformation (towards socialism) and Africa's total liberation and unity.ⁱⁱ The latter point of Nkrumah's political agenda coincided with the actualization of Pan-Africanism and will be defined in this thesis as Ghana's Pan-African policy.ⁱⁱⁱ

In line with the indications of the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, Nkrumah considered the independence of his country only as the first step towards the liberation and unification of the whole continent. Thus, he aimed to link the destiny of Ghana with that of

ⁱ Nkrumahism can be regarded as the sum of all Nkrumah's political convictions, codified into a brand-new ideology. In 1960, it was systematized for the first time by Kofi Baako (CPP member and Nkrumah's Minister). The definition of “Nkrumahism” includes references to nationalism, socialism, Pan-Africanism, African Personality and Nonalignment. See K. Agyeman, *Ideological Education and Nationalism in Ghana under Nkrumah and Busia*, Ghana Universities Press, Accra, 1988, p.7. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State*, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 257. Since 1962, the term “Nkrumahism” was officially adopted in every aspect of the Ghanaian political life. Finally, in 1964, a sort of manual of “Nkrumahism” made its first appearance. It was Nkrumah's famous “Consciencism”. K. Nkrumah, *Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution*, Heinemann, London, 1964. See also W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.113 and pp.257-258 and The Spark (edited by), *Some Essential Features of Nkrumahism*, Panaf Books, London, 1970. An interesting study about the actualization of “Nkrumahism” in the Ghanaian daily life is J.S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism: Nation, State, and Pan-Africanism in Ghana*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011.

ⁱⁱ D. Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy*, Sub-Saharan Publishers, 1988, p.15.

ⁱⁱⁱ The same definition is also used by Armah. See K., Armah, *Peace Without Power, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966*, Ghana University Press, Ghana, 2004, pp.9-10.

Africa. As he claimed in March 1957: “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is not linked with the total liberation of Africa”.^{iv} This assertion was far from being a mere rhetorical statement. Ghana became the first state in the history of Africa to endorse Pan-Africanism as one of the pillars of its foreign policy.

Since 1957, Accra was transformed into a shelter for African freedom fighters and a base from where to launch their attacks against colonial or “neo-colonial” entities. Nkrumah’s government provided African liberation movements with funds, political support and every other resource they needed, including political and military training. As a result, the nationalist parties and the Ghanaian government developed strong alliances, which assured Nkrumah with an important political return. Within the ranks of African freedom fighters, Accra could also promote the unity of the continent, envisaged as an amalgamation of radical, Pan-Africanist states.

Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore were the fathers of Ghana’s Pan-African policy, conceived after years of elaboration. Then, between 1957 and 1959 (the year of Padmore’s death) they worked to actualize this vision by drawing a complex and unique foreign policy system. As part of this system, they also set the foundations for three special “Pan-African” institutions in order to work for the liberation and unity of the continent: the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), the African Affairs Centre (AAC) and the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute.^v Hundreds of African activists, freedom fighters and political refugees

^{iv} Nkrumah, midnight pronouncement of Independence at Polo Ground, Accra, 5 March 1957, extract in K. Nkrumah, *Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah, Freedom Fighters Edition*, International Publishers, New York, 1969, p.77.

^v In this thesis, the three institutions will be defined as “Pan-African” because they were established mainly (but not only) to fulfill the targets of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. The BAA was an office created with the purpose of collecting information about the liberation movements and to support African freedom fighters in Ghana or on the battlefields. It was founded in 1957 under the name of “The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs” and was run by Padmore until his death in 1959, when it changed its name into BAA. The Bureau became a powerful body with a strong influence also on other institutions of Ghana. Under the management of A.K. Barden - Padmore’s “successor” - it acted as a sort of intelligence office, able to keep track of spies and enemies both inside and outside the state. The AAC was a hostel in Accra where hundreds of political refugees were sheltered and trained politically. The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute of Winneba - after 1962 known as Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science - can be considered both as a “Pan-African” institution and as a party school. It was established in 1961 but had been already conceived before 1959. It was designed for two main purposes. First of all, at the Institute, CPP members and civil servants were trained in ideology, economics and administration. Secondly, it provided the

were hosted, trained and financed through these three institutions. As a result, several African nationalist parties also became deeply influenced by the Nkrumahist ideology sponsored by the BAA, AAC and the Institute.

This dissertation provides a contribution to the study of the history of Ghana's Pan-African policy with a clear focus on the role played by the "Pan-African" institutions. For decades, very few sources about this subject had been available, as the great part of the archival sources on Ghana's foreign policy was destroyed or lost after the coup of 1966. The first target of this research project was to recover valuable sources in order to fill this gap and provide new elements for a deeper understanding of the functioning and the purposes of the "Pan-African" institutions. It is necessary to underline that this dissertation has no pretension to be a conclusive study on the history of the BAA, AAC, the Institute and the whole Pan-African policy of Ghana. This research topic needs further developments.

Aims of the research

Through the examination of the history of the "Pan-African" institutions and Ghana's Pan-African policy, this thesis aims to analyze four main themes.

The first analytical point concerns the nature of the Pan-Africanist and Nkrumahist ideologies and the evolution of the political message spread by Ghana among the African liberation movements. This dissertation provides an overview of the theoretical bases of Ghana's Pan-African policy as it was elaborated by Padmore and Nkrumah over years of political activity. Padmore chose Ghana as his political home only after Nkrumah had successfully put the Pan-Africanist theory into practice by establishing the CPP and by leading the Gold Coast to independence. The impact of the Manchester Pan-African

same training also to freedom fighters, in order to support the development of an African intelligentsia in the post-independence phase.

Congress was particularly profound in both of these achievements. The same political heritage was then transferred from Ghana to the liberation movements to ensure the creation of a front of Pan-Africanist parties and governments in the continent. This passage is fundamental in order to understand the rationale behind the selection of the liberation movements supported by Ghana through its “Pan-African” Institutions. Nkrumah was not willing to provide aid to any nationalist party, but only to those which would endorse Pan-Africanism and which would follow the indications of Manchester as the CPP had done before 1957. This work also attempts to describe the evolution of the Pan-Africanist ideology in Ghana and its consequences on the political message channeled from Accra to the African freedom fighters. After Nkrumahism was adopted as the official ideology of the state, only the more radical, Pan-Africanist parties were still supported by Ghana. This dissertation provides examples of the impact of the Ghanaian ideology on a number of liberation movements, trying to analyze Nkrumah’s influence in Africa during Ghana’s different political seasons.

The second theme regards the actualization of Ghana’s Pan-African policy and the functioning of the system to attain its targets. The analysis focuses specifically on the establishment of the “Pan-African” institutions and their relationship with the other bodies of the Ghanaian state. Even in this case, Nkrumah and Padmore’s past experiences proved fundamental to put the basis of the BAA, the AAC and, indirectly, of the Institute.^{vi} At the time, the Ghanaian Prime Minister and the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist considered the Foreign Service unsuited for dealing with anti-imperialist activities. Thus, they decided to recreate in Ghana the same model of anti-colonial agencies where they had worked in the past. As a result, they established two parallel systems of foreign policy. As Michael Dei-Anang explained in his memories, one was meant to work on “orthodox diplomatic lines”, the other one on “unorthodox” ones.^{vii} While the Foreign Service was part of the first

^{vi} The Institute was conceived for the first time in the fall of 1959 shortly after Padmore’s death. However, it was most probably an early idea of both Nkrumah and Padmore.

^{vii} Michael Dei-Anang was the first one to use the definition of orthodox and unorthodox diplomatic lines when referring to Ghana’s Foreign Service. He introduced this distinction in order to underline the different approaches between the traditional diplomacy and the institution specifically devoted to the attainment of Ghana’s Pan-African policy. He himself defined the institution he was running, the African Affairs Secretariat

system, the Office of the Adviser on African Affairs - after 1959 known as the Bureau of African Affairs - was the most important among the “unorthodox” institutions. Even the AAC and the Institute can be ideally inscribed in this category although they were not actually offices dealing with foreign affairs. Still, they were contributing to the fulfillment of specific targets of Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. This thesis aims to describe in detail the functioning of this system of “parallel agencies” with a clear focus on the Bureau and its predecessor, the men who run the institutions and their special relationship with Nkrumah. This dissertation also presents cases of strong clashes between the two parallel systems of foreign policy. The main reason for their hostility is to be found in the different nature of the two types of institutions. The first type was modeled on British institutions and run by “moderate” civil servants, the second one on anti-colonial offices of the 1930s and 1940s and run by “radical” activists. Their diverse natures also reflected on their different approaches to foreign policy. The “unorthodox” methods of the Bureau often caused diplomatic accidents that the Ghanaian diplomats had to solve. Moreover, the Bureau itself controlled some of the embassies and high commissions through a net of agents and political attaches. The power of the director of the BAA over the Foreign Service reached the point where he could influence the appointment of diplomats. This dissertation tries to explain in detail these aspects by providing evidences of several cases of conflict between the two systems.

The third theme of the thesis consists of an analysis of the means used by the “Pan-African” institutions to spread Nkrumah’s message in Africa through the net of freedom fighters supported by Ghana, and of an attempt to quantify the political return of this operation for Nkrumah’s government. Thanks to the channels established with the liberation movements, the institutions contributed to the expansion of Pan-Africanism and

(AAS - est. 1961), as part of Ghana’s unorthodox system together with Padmore’s Office (later known as the Bureau of African Affairs). See M. Dei-Anang, *The Administration of Ghana’s Foreign Relations, 1957-1966: A Personal Memoir*, 1975, pp.14, 29 and 31. Kwesi Armah, at the time a key figure of the diplomatic corps of Ghana, included Dei-Anang’s definition in his book. He defined the Bureau of African Affairs as an institution which operated “outside the orthodox government machinery”. See K. Armah, *Peace without Power*, pp.27-29. Even if the author of the thesis finds Dei-Anang’s definition as more than appropriate, he prefers to consider the AAS as being halfway between the two categories.

Nkrumahism in the continent. The first way to influence politically the African freedom fighters was through the Ghanaian propaganda machinery. This dissertation offers new materials concerning the functioning of Radio Ghana and also the production of political press to be distributed in the whole continent. The second and most important way to influence politically the African liberation movements was through political and military training offered directly in the Ghanaian territory. The outstanding unpublished documentations of the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs supplies new information about the presence of African students and freedom fighters in Ghanaian schools and institutes of higher education (including the Ideological Institute). The dissertation provides also useful elements to understand which type of courses were provided to freedom fighters and other African students and how the contents of the lectures changed with the evolution of the ideology in Ghana.

The forth and last theme of this thesis is the reaction of moderate African countries and the Western world to Ghana's radical foreign policy and its consequences on the achievement of the missions of BAA, AAC and the Institute. With regard to the West, by examining specifically the role played by Great Britain, the dissertation provides an analysis of the impact of the Cold War on Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. The thesis offers a detailed analysis of the involvement of Ghana in crucial questions such as the Congo Crisis or the fight against the apartheid regime of South Africa. The former scenario was a crucial one for the evolution of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy, since after the failures suffered at Leopoldville in 1960, Nkrumah had to reconsider its strategy in the African continent. With the Congo crisis, Ghana was definitely involved in the Cold War, and its position in Africa was influenced accordingly. Another important question concerning the relationship between Ghana and the Western world was the impact of the "subversion" issue. Nkrumah often paid the political price of supporting opposition parties by being ostracized in Africa by moderate governments. Indeed, the latter – backed by the West – worked for diminishing Nkrumah's influence in the continent. In this context, the Bureau was often described as one of the most powerful sources of "subversion" in the continent. It

was also considered – together with the AAC and the Institute – as an instrument for the penetration of the communist countries in Africa.

Sources

For decades, scholars did not have sufficient archival materials to provide an in-depth investigation on the history of the “Pan-African” institutions. Indeed, after the coup of February 1966, most of the documentation concerning Ghana’s foreign policy was destroyed.^{viii} Few documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the African Affairs Secretariat and the Office of the President survived the coup, whereas the whole archives of the African Affairs Centre and the Ideological Institute got lost. On the contrary, the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs was kept intact but it was immediately seized by the National Liberation Council (NLC), the military government which overthrew Nkrumah. Only in the late 1980s, the archive of the Bureau was “re-discovered”. Back in 1966, the NLC used part of the materials of the BAA to prepare two booklets to discredit the former government. They were: *Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa* and *Nkrumah’s Deception of Africa*.

For years, the only known sources for studying the history of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute have been the two NLC publications. Both of them include a collection of documents and information relating to the activities of the three “Pan-African” institutions. The books present only materials on Nkrumah’s “subversive” activities. They make very few references to the actual history of the three institutions and their relationships with

^{viii} Scott W. Thompson, probably the most important historian who has ever worked on Nkrumah’s foreign policy was an eye-witness of the destruction of most of the archival materials of Ghana concerning African Affairs just after the coup. Thompson himself explained which was the fate of much of the diplomatic materials held at Flagstaff House (the seat of the Presidency and the African Affairs Secretariat) immediately after the coup. In a specific appendix on sources at the end of his *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, Thompson pointed out in detail which type of sources were still available after February 1966 (some of them were taken out of Ghana by Thompson himself) and which ones he used for his study. See S. Thompson, *Ghana’s Foreign Policy*, pp. 441-443.

other bodies of the Ghanaian government. Moreover, these booklets also present a purely ideological vision of the nature of the “Pan-African” institutions, failing to provide any proof for their statements. According to the authors, the Bureau, the Centre and the Ideological Institute were merely instruments of an alleged plan of Kwame Nkrumah to rule Africa. His Pan-Africanist rhetoric was presented as a cover for such a plan. The documentation was specifically selected to attack the former government, leaving other useful information out. The clear political operation makes the historian wonder about the evident limitations of relating only on these sources.

Still, even Thompson— the author of the most comprehensive study on Ghana’s foreign policy, published in 1969 – relates to the information collected by the NLC in his analysis of the functioning of BAA, AAC and the Institute.^{ix} The only other sources he used were very few documents he personally collected at the time of the coup and a significant series of interviews, a kind of source which the historian must consider critically.^x Even though Thompson’s study does not focus specifically on these institutions, it can still be considered as the most comprehensive study ever written on this subject.

Soon after the coup of 1966, a series of memoirs composed by the protagonists of Nkrumah’s times begun to add fundamental information for a better understanding of the history of Ghana’s foreign policy. Books like the ones by Bing (1968), James (1977), Adamafio (1982) and Powell (1984), contributed to a first revision of the historical figure

^{ix} Reading through Thompson’s *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, the critical opinion of the author about Nkrumah’s government and the key radical figures involved in Ghanaian politics at the time emerges quite clearly. Ahlman includes him in a list of what he calls “anti-Nkrumah writers”, such as Austin, Russel Warren Howe, Bretton and Peter Omari. In Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism*, p.202. See Russell Warren Howe, “*Did Nkrumah Favour Pan-Africanism?*”, *Transition* 27, 1966, pp.13-15; H.L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967; T. Peter Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship*, Africana Publishing Corporation, New York, 1970. For critical analyses on Nkrumah’s foreign policy see also A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations – The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, Westview, Boulder, 1984 and T.M. Shaw and O. Aluko, *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy*, Gower, Aldershot, 1984.

^x Most of the interviews were collected by the author immediately after the coup, featuring informants directly connected with Ghanaian politics or directly involved in the coup. Thompson himself admits that a problem of interpretation existed. He referred to the interviews as “[...]a principal and perhaps the most suspect source”, in W.S. Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy*, p.442. Still, the American author amply related to this kind of source, especially when describing the most delicate phases of policy-making of Nkrumah’s government.

of Nkrumah.^{xi} These can be considered as useful sources for the historian, since they often provide new information and they also bring new perspectives on the events. Some memoirs, such as the ones by Ikoku (1970), Makonnen (1973) and Batsa (1981), have provided for the first time an insight into the work of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute.^{xii} Fundamental details about Nkrumah's foreign policy begun to emerge from the memoirs of its protagonists, for instance Bosumtwi-Sam (2001).^{xiii} In this context, the works of Michael Dei-Anang (1975) and Kwesi Armah (2004) are particularly relevant since they are, at the same time, memoirs and studies on the history of Nkrumah's foreign policy.^{xiv} They analyzed the complexity of the system designed by Nkrumah's government to attain the targets of its foreign policy. This thesis makes ample use of these memoirs and studies.

In the last decades, other interesting studies on Nkrumah's foreign policy had been published, even after new sources became available both in Ghana and abroad.^{xv} Still, no scholar has ever tried to adopt new sources to work on a comprehensive history of the BAA, the AAC and the Ideological Institute.^{xvi} This thesis tries to introduce new elements of analysis on the subject under review, counting mainly on new archival sources but also on a critical examination of the existing bibliography.

A considerable amount of new archival materials have been analyzed. The first and most important one is undoubtedly the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs, kept at the

^{xi} Bing, G., *Reap the Whirlwind. An Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966*, McGibbon & Kee, London, 1968; C.R.L., James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, Allison & Busby, London, 1977; T. Adamafo, *By Nkrumah's Side - The Labour and the Wounds*, Westcoast & Collings, London, 1982; Powell, E., *Private Secretary /Female/ Gold Coast*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1984.

^{xii} S.G. Ikoku (Julius Sago), *Le Ghana de Nkrumah, autopsie de la 1^{re} République (1957-1966)*, François Maspero, Paris, 1971; R. Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within*, Oxford University Press, 1973, p.212; K. Batsa, *The Spark : Times Behind Me – From Kwame Nkrumah to Limann*, Rex Collings, London, 1985.

^{xiii} D. Bosumtwi-Sam, *Landmarks of Dr Kwame Nkrumah*, Ussh Graphic Designs, Accra 2001.

^{xiv} Dei-Anang's *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations* and Armah's *Peace without Power*.

^{xv} See, for instance, S.K.B Asante, *Ghana and the promotion of Pan-Africanism and regionalism*, Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, Accra 2007; R.Y. Owusu, *Kwame Nkrumah's Liberation Thought: a Paradigm for Religious Advocacy*, Africa World, Trenton, 2006; E.L Dumor, *Ghana, OAU and Southern Africa*, Ghana University Press, Accra, 1991; Z. Poe, *Kwame Nkrumah's contribution to Pan-Africanism: an Afrocentric analysis*, Routledge, New York, 2003; O. Asamoah, *Nkrumah's Foreign Policy 1951-1966*, in K. Ahrin, , *The Life And Work of Kwame Nkrumah*, African World Press, Trenton, 1993.

^{xvi} The only exception is an unpublished thesis of a Ghanaian archivist who, for the first time, catalogued part of the archive of the Bureau of African Affairs. See J.J. Mensah, *The Bureau of African Affairs in the Kwame Nkrumah Administration from 1951 to 1966*, unpublished thesis, University of Ghana, 1989.

George Padmore Library in Accra. This archive includes all the papers of the BAA which had not been removed by the NLC for preparing its booklets.^{xvii} Thanks to these documents, it has been possible to analyze the activities of the Bureau since its establishment as “The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs”, its denomination during Padmore’s activity in Ghana (1957-1959). The papers include information on the relations between the BAA and several other institutions of Ghana. Moreover, they also include unique documents of the African Affairs Centre and the Ideological Institute.

Interesting documents have been also recovered from the Accra section of the Public Records and Archive Administration Department of Ghana (former National Archives of Ghana), where few papers of the Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the African Affairs Secretariat had survived the coup.

A whole series of de-classified materials kept at the British National Archives has been analyzed as well. This type of source has proved to be particularly useful, since the British kept constant track of the activities of the three “Pan-African” institutions in order to plan counter-measures against them. Thanks to the files of the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Information Research Department and the Cabinet (including the Joint Intelligence Committee and other bodies), it was possible to provide a first overview of the role of the Western powers in influencing Ghana’s internal and external policies.

Finally, interviews with meaningful protagonists of the Ghanaian Foreign Service and the Bureau added fundamental information to understand the functioning of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute and the relations between the three institutions and the rest of the state.

^{xvii} The fate of materials removed by the NLC is still unknown. Most probably the documents were destroyed after being published.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided in five chapters, each one indicating a specific phase of the history of Nkrumah's Pan-African policy. Each passage signifies a change of approach of Nkrumah's government with regard to its Pan-African policy. Each passage also focuses on the changes in the structures of the BAA, the AAC and the Institute and/or changes of strategies with regard to their mission to support African liberation and unity.

The first chapter opens with an overview of the conception of Ghana's Pan-African policy before March 1957, in the attempt to trace the *file rouge* between Nkrumah's and Padmore's past experiences and their work in Ghana since the early 1950s. The chapter covers the period between March 1957 and December 1958. It describes the actualization of Ghana's Pan-African policy during the first phase of Nkrumah's government, a period dominated by a cautious, yet radical, foreign policy. It focuses on the establishment of the first two "Pan-African" institutions of Ghana: the Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs (also referred to, in this thesis, as Padmore's Office) and the African Affairs Centre.

Chapter Two explores the making and performance of Ghana's Pan-African policy actualized by Padmore's Office and the AAC between January and September 1959. In this period, Ghana defined for the first time its policies for the support of political refugees, African students and opposition parties, also clarifying its stand towards the use of armed struggle in the liberation process. Finally, Padmore's Office set up the basis for a proper Pan-Africanist propaganda. Generally speaking, this chapter deals with a period of changes that influenced Ghana's internal and external policies in the short and in the long period. The months under examination coincide also with Padmore's last months before his death. His imprint on his Office and the AAC was bound to last for years after his death.

The Third Chapter covers the period between September 1959 and December 1960, a crucial passage for the evolution of Ghana's Pan-African policy and the "Pan-African" institutions. During 1960, seventeen countries reached independence, leading to a revolution of the political map of the continent. Ghana had to face the different problems

emerged in this period, starting with the crisis in Congo. The “Pan-African” institutions of Ghana were reformed and their powers were strengthened in order to deal with these challenges. Generally speaking, Ghana’s Pan-African policy was radicalized. Still, despite the efforts, Nkrumah failed to achieve his targets in Congo. The fall of Lumumba signified the end of a “soft” approach towards the attainment of Pan-Africanism and it produced a further process of radicalization. This chapter describes this passage and displays the bases for further evolutions of Ghana’s Pan-African policy after 1960.

The Forth Chapter describes a period of radicalization (January 1961- August 1962). Since 1961, the Ghanaian President decided to respond to the failures of the previous year with a more radical Pan-African policy. Considering the strength of its enemies, Ghana had to invest much more resources in the struggle for African liberation and unity. A new radical “Ministry of foreign affairs” was established to deal specifically with the African continent: the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS). The propaganda machinery was also developed in order to reach every corner of Africa and to counteract that of the moderate pro-Western states. Moreover, Ghana had to invest more resources in the training of African freedom fighters with the intent to influence them politically. In 1961, the Ideological Institute of Winneba was finally opened to both Ghanaians and freedom fighters. In the same year, Ghana had begun to provide African nationalist with military training, a crucial turning point for Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy. Even if the chapter covers the whole year of 1962, the life attempt of Kulungugu (11th August ‘62) is considered as a crucial passage for the development of the events described in the next chapter.

The goal of the Fifth chapter is to outline the history of the last phase of Nkrumah’s government (1963-1966). It is a period in which Ghana’s Pan-African policy reached the peak of radicalism. The chapter explains how the political situation evolved after Kulungugu and how the missions of the BAA changed accordingly. Moreover, it describes the reaction of the West to Barden’s moves in Africa. Finally, the chapter examines the changes occurred in 1965 after Barden’s removal as the director of the BAA. This year proved to be crucial as Ghana’s foreign policy was entirely put under revision in order to

cope with the failures of the previous years. Changes occurred in both the structures and policies performed by the Bureau. Two different approaches emerged. On one side, Nkrumah made a last attempt to use diplomacy for re-launching a Continental Union Government. On the other side, he kept sponsoring revolutionary parties and he also planned a vast military intervention to solve the Southern Rhodesia question. The latter mission – which never turned into a real project - was the last of Ghana's Pan-African policy.