

The following section should be included after the section "I think this is a pity... (Hart 1988:191)"

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What then is it that we would want to learn about trust? Considering the fact that this volume has as its subject "trust and co-operation" I think we would like to know, firstly, what trust means for co-operation and vice versa. Secondly, in what forms trust may arise in society and what may be the consequences for co-operation. Thirdly, how eventually trust may be enhanced.

Trust, Mistrust and Co-operation in a Senegalese Rural Community

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Interest in issues of trust has increased throughout the past few years, but publications tend to remain rather abstract and theoretical. Some of them, such as Fukuyama (1995) and Misztal (1996) have trust as their major subject. Others, such as Elster (1989) and Giddens (1995), treat trust as a major component of broader issues. Until now, however, few case studies have existed in which the concept of trust has been used as an analytical tool for explaining social phenomena. The volume of essays edited by Gambetta (1998a) 'Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations' is one of the few. Moreover, recent studies on trust mainly focus on the (post-)industrial world. The latter is no surprise considering the fact that the urge to reconsider the notion of trust in the first place emerged among economists and western sociologists. They observed that the modern world, despite the globalisation tendencies of capitalist development, did not automatically develop more openness and co-operation between the people thus connected. Instead, it was found that processes of localisation frequently led to social retreat and economic stagnation. In this light, it was all the more interesting that some societies in south-east Asia did appear to be able to successfully couple aspects of globalisation with their local cultures, ultimately leading to economic 'success' stories. Trust was welcomed as a concept that eventually could shed a light on all of these phenomena.

Africa, however, hardly emerges as a field of study among the aforementioned scholars of trust. Is this perhaps because the continent is considered less interesting, having no impressive examples of the south east Asian kind? Or is it because, from a Durkheimian perspective, one tends to think that Africa is still reigned by tradition, where trust is of no significance? For their part, most modern Africanist research leaves aside the issue of trust, despite its implicit presence in many discussions like those on the relationship between farmers and the state. See, for example, Hyden's (1980; 1983) concept of the 'uncaptured peasantry', which suggests that African peasants can always retreat from the state due to their subsistence base (for criticism of this concept see Cliffe 1987; Geschiere 1984; Kasfir 1986). Hyden (1983:17) describes the 'economy of affection' as the peasant mode of production in which the affective ties based on common descent, common residence et cetera prevail. The economy of affection may promote trust at the local level, but it hinders development on a larger scale. The relationship between state and peasantry is, however, not further elaborated from this trust-perspective. More recently, trust was also discussed for civil society. For example 'la politique du ventre' [politics of the belly] and 'l'état rhizome' [rhizome state] as developed by Bayart (1989), point to interlaced networks of factions in society, who try to get hold of power and goods. It has

been demonstrated how people try to invest their solidarity as profitably as possible, but whereas trust necessarily plays a role in people's decisions to invest, this issue is not elaborated upon². The volume *Governance and Politics in Africa*, edited by Hyden and Bratton (1992) is an exception. In the introductory chapter, Hyden outlines a general model for governance, in which trust is presented as one of the key-elements, that is, as one of the prerequisites for effective governance, the others being authority, reciprocity, and accountability. It is said that when consensus about the validity of basic norms can no longer be taken for granted, trust is insufficient to sustain effective social action, and, as a consequence, accountability becomes particularly important (1992:11). This is an interesting point of view, but when it comes to application in the African context that the theory appears to offer, the promise does not materialise. In the chapters following the introduction to this aforementioned volume, which contain case studies from different African countries, none of the contributors ever mentions 'trust' again.

I think this is a pity. In my view, research on Africa may benefit from the introduction of the notion of trust in the analysis of concrete situations, and I think that discussions on trust may be enriched by material from Africa. Giddens (1995), for example, in his convincing style sketched the differences between modern society and pre-modern ones and the role of trust in them. The resourcefulness of his analysis, however, would not be done justice if we restricted ourselves to treading in his footsteps by only contrasting these poles. Exactly those situations where the modern and the pre-modern meet and intertwine offer potentially interesting opportunities for gaining additional information about the working and importance of trust. Hart (1988), as one of the very few Africanists taking trust as a core concept, in his study of migrants in Accra, Ghana, already provided a beautiful example. He concludes that 'trust is central to social life when neither traditional certainties nor modern probabilities hold.' (Hart 1988:191). ✽

Although it is generally assumed that trust and co-operation are linked, there is no agreement as to what that linkage exactly looks like. Good (1988) went no further than to state that co-operation is a central manifestation of trust. Axelrod (1984) focuses on trust as resulting from co-operation. Most scholars, however, consider trust as a precondition for co-operation. Without trust, Luhmann argues, only very simple forms of human co-operation, which can be transacted on the spot are possible (1979:88). In more complex situations, people have to cope with events not directly visible, with factors not yet present, and with other people who cannot be fathomed entirely; outside influences may change one's position, future events may alter one's chances and possible free riders are always around. For all that, one needs trust in order to effectively engage in collective action. Gambetta (1988a; 1988b) is a strong advocate of this view of trust as a precondition for co-operation. Elster (1989) holds a slightly different view in that he emphasises that trust can best be seen as a social lubricant, which can facilitate co-operation. It has to be stressed, however, that in reviewing the different positions of authors, confusion often arises because it is not made clear whether trust is considered a driving force fostering co-operation, or merely a by-product of other more important motivations such as self-interest or adherence to norms. Undoubtedly, this lack of clarity is related to the fact that trust in itself is not visible, which makes it difficult to pinpoint.

Precisely because trust is such an elusive concept, it would perhaps help to distinguish between different types or forms of trust and to investigate how these are related to

co-operation. The problem of different types of trust and their role and significance in society is especially elaborated in connection with modernity. Luhmann works out a distinction between trust and confidence: confidence exists where there is no possibility of choice, while trust presupposes choice and as a consequence the active decision to engage. He states that when the predominant type of social differentiation shifts from stratification to functional differentiation, people are no longer placed in a fixed social setting. When structures become contingent, '[t]rust remains vital in interpersonal relations, but participation in functional systems like the economy or politics is no longer a matter of personal relations. It requires confidence, but not trust' (Luhmann 1988:102).

Giddens touches the same issue, but his emphasis is somewhat different, in that he deals with trust as part of an analysis of socio-structural changes related to modernity. In pre-modern cultures, according to Giddens, there is an overriding importance of localised trust, while in modern cultures trust relations vested in disembedded abstract systems become most important (1995:102). Abstract systems can be divided in symbolic tokens and expert systems. These are both disembedding mechanisms, in that they provide for the 'lifting out of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space' (1995:21). All disembedding mechanisms depend upon trust, whereby trust is vested, not in individuals, but in abstract capacities. It is a mistake, however, to think that in the modern world large impersonal systems increasingly colonise personal life, because the disembedding mechanisms not only lift social relations and the exchange of information out of specific time-space contexts, but at the same time provide new opportunities for their re-embedding (Giddens 1995:141-142).

Finally, given that the issue of trust as an object of study came arose because problems of social cohesion and co-operation were observed. It is noteworthy that no scholar of trust has actually developed an approach for the solution of these problems. The character and essence of trust are being studied, as are the conditions of its coming into being, and in this, of course, starting-points for solutions can be found. For example Luhmann (1979) stresses the importance of possibilities of sanction for the evolution and maintenance of trust. Others stress the importance of communication and information (Gambetta 1988b; Vickers 1987). Practically no author, however, continues his or her line of thought by elaborating ways of how trust could be enhanced in order to facilitate co-operation. In the end, Elster (1989) decides that although trust is a condition for co-operation, it is too risky to rely on, and thus it is more useful to immediately focus on co-operation, setting the issue of trust aside. Gambetta (1988a) in reviewing the contributions of the other authors of his collection concludes that trust is worthwhile to work on, but he eventually fails to explain how this may be done.

Given that, on the one hand, case studies on trust are scarce and trust has not been an issue in most African studies, it seems worthwhile to try to contribute to the discussion on trust and co-operation by investigating a concrete situation in Africa. In this chapter, I will describe a small rural community in Senegal and shall use the concept of trust to analyse local reactions to the arrival of a development project. In the first section, I will argue that traditionally trust was not only self-evident between relatives, it also was considered morally right. Recent developments, however, deeply changed local society, un-

dermining traditional hierarchies and old certainties; from a kinship-based, relatively closed social system, it developed into a more diffuse clientelistic system. The second section will describe how people responded to the arrival of a development project. It will be demonstrated that this was in a rather ambiguous way, stating trust in words and behaviour publicly, while showing feelings of deep mistrust in private. In trying to find an answer for this puzzling phenomenon, the third section will return to the description of the social system and its development over time to illustrate its consequences for the working of trust. The insights gathered will be applied to the case study in the fourth section. Finally, a more general conclusion will be drawn.

The rural community of Keur Ousmane¹: old values and new strategies in a changing environment

Keur Ousmane is situated in the central region of Senegal, just north of the Gambian border. The rural community covers a surface of 195 km², consists of 23 villages and has a population of 10,311 (Seck 1995). While Senegal as a whole is home to as many as 19 ethnic groups (Hesseling & Kraemer 1996), the community of Keur Ousmane is rather homogeneous: most of the people are Wolof (90%), and the remaining people are mainly Toucouleur. Practically everybody is Muslim.

Traditionally, the social order is based on bonds of kinship. In addition to this horizontal organisation, Wolof society is strongly hierarchically structured. A distinction can be made between the caste of the *geer*, the nobles, and the caste of the *nieenio*, to which the artisans and the minstrels belong. Both castes are still divided in *diambour*, freeborn, and *diam*, descendants from slaves. In this system, patron-client relationships were institutionalised in the relationships and codes of behaviour between the different castes. Thus, the *geer* were expected to give presents to their lower in rank; *nieenio* in their turn would praise the *geer* and would render various services at ceremonies of baptism, marriage and the like. While formally the relations between the different social categories were very unequal, several mechanisms existed to balance the relationships. The rule of generosity was one of them, and the rule that a noble should not live from the work of a lower in rank. Thus, the possession of slaves did not free the noble from the obligation to work; the slave only assisted him and for this he also received all kinds of gratification (Sylla 1994). The concept of honour was of central importance to the functioning of these mechanisms. This can best be illustrated by elaborating a characterisation of the man of honour.

Properly speaking, only a *geer* could be a man of honour; but because the category of the *geer* formed a frame of reference for other groups, the value of honour affects the whole of society. The man of honour in Wolof society wants to realise the moral and social ideal of the group he belongs to (Ly 1967). He is always conscious of the fact that he is a member of a family and, as a consequence of his birth, also of a social group, and he is conscious of the role he has to play for maintaining and continuing the respectability in which he, by consequence, participates. For checking his behaviour, his *nawle*, his social equals, are the benchmarks. One who is not of 'better birth', is supposed not to 'be better', and thus also not to 'do more'. Consequently, you are also supposed not to 'do

less'. You therefore try to be as generous, polite, courageous, proud, etc. as your *nawle*, in order to gain their respect. Sylla (1994) states that a Wolof behaves rightly, not for fear of punishment, but for fear of committing a dishonourable act. In this way, the code of honour, on the one hand, on a personal level induced a certain element of competition among *nawle*, and therewith gave rise to certain mistrust amongst one another as potential rivals. On the other hand, on an institutional level, it produced social security; the feeling that social norms would prohibit excesses and would check players against the rules, provided people with a basic feeling of trust.

These last hundred years, however, the ongoing absorption of the local community into the wider economic and political system has deeply changed local society and has not left the social system unaffected. In borrowing a classification from Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980), it can be stated that Wolof society from a (hierarchical) corporate kinship system developed into a more diffuse clientelistic system. While twenty-five years ago, the old hierarchy was still an explicit reality for the people in the community, defining the major part of social relations (see Venema 1978), people now no longer refer to it openly and deny its importance. It has to be emphasised, however, that in the background it still appears to be present. Firstly, everybody knows exactly who belongs to which caste. Secondly, prejudices towards other castes do exist, as can be illustrated by a young man (*diambour*, but his mother was *diam*), who told me that there are no differences between *geer* and *nieenio*, before adding that *nieenio*, however, never keep their word, unlike *geer*. Furthermore, in his opinion, the *nieenio*, the minstrels in particular are brought up too freely. Finally, relationships between families do not seem to have changed that much, as can be seen from the fact that the son of the village chief is still accompanied by a descendant of the former slaves of the family, when he goes to collect the taxes.

An important factor in this transformation has been the introduction of the peanut as a cash crop at the end of the nineteenth century. Traditionally, the local economy had been based on the cultivation of subsistence crops, such as millet and sorghum. During the 19th century, however, the French started to promote peanut cultivation in Senegal because they needed vegetable oil for their soap-industry. During the second half of the 19th century, the new cultivation practices caught on with the Senegalese farmers and quickly spread across the whole country. From the last decade of the century onwards the farmers in the region of Keur Ousmane also started to cultivate peanuts, and from then on, were evermore incorporated into the world economy. In the beginning the farmers often exchanged their peanuts for weapons, cloth, et cetera, but gradually cash payments took over. This transition was expedited by the obligation to pay taxes, introduced by the French after the conquest of Senegal (1887). Slowly, money also entered other spheres of the economy. Other French influences were the introduction of French-style education system and administrative structure.

In 1960, Senegal's independence brought new changes. From then onwards until the mid-eighties, the state became an important development agent in the area. Regional development organisations promoted and supported peanut and cereal cultivation (SODEVA) and the production of cotton (SODEFITEX). Village co-operatives distribute seeds and fertiliser on profitable conditions and guaranteed the commercialisation of the crops cultivated. As a consequence of structural adjustment policy, however, in 1984

New Agricultural Policy was launched, implying a restructuring or liquidation of many state development institutions. For the farmers, this meant that it became much more difficult to obtain seed and fertilisers. Devaluation in 1994 made things still worse, because the price of inputs and basic consumption goods, such as rice, rose significantly.

With the retreat of the state, NGOs became more important. Some NGOs have been working in the rural community, intervening in varying degrees and in varying areas. Other NGOs only offer infrastructure or working material, work with women groups or deploy activities for handicapped youth, or work with entire villages, in which village committees are created.

Environmental problems are manifold in the area. The expansion of peanut cultivation from the fifties onwards coupled to a substantial population growth led to an extension of the agricultural area, whereby also marginal grounds not suitable for agriculture were taken into use, and to the practical disappearance of fallow fields. The soils stripped of their vegetation are an easy victim to the rains, which can be heavy and abundant. The difficulties farmers have to obtain chemical fertilisers at a reasonable price these last years as a result of national structural adjustment policy, strengthens their tendency to augment the area under cultivation, just to obtain sufficient yield. Land pressure leads to a competition between different uses: augmentation of the area under cultivation is often at the expense of herding routes, and conflicts arise when cattle holders find their way to the water points barred, or when agriculturists see cattle entering their fields under cultivation. Finally, the pressure on the land leads to a decline of the bush, which means that it becomes more difficult to obtain firewood, wood for construction and other forest products; also the game population has been strongly diminished. It is obvious that the situation of increasing pressure on the local available natural resources, rapidly diminishing in quantity as well as in quality, would benefit from consultation and co-operation among the growing number of users. This is required to collectively change things for the good and to safeguard the local resource base for the future. Otherwise conflicts will escalate, and the natural resources will be mined until the point of no return.

Officially, the rural council is the forum to tackle these issues. In Senegal, rural councils have existed since 1974, when they were introduced in line with a national policy of decentralisation. These councils have to administer the rural communities, and do have extensive power in the management of natural resources. Legally, since 1964 all land is state property, and it is the rural council which has the right to distribute land at the level of the rural community, and to act as an arbiter in territorial conflicts. In practice, however, the council does not function properly. There are several reasons for this, but most important are the lack of education of the councillors, the dualistic nature of the legal system, and the persistency of clientelism.

The introduction of the rural council some thirty years ago had been rather sudden and people were unprepared for it. The councillors elected were not very well informed about their tasks and the laws they had to apply. What made it more difficult is that the majority of the councillors could not (and still cannot) read or write. Secondly, the modern legal system has been laid down over the traditional system in which the lineages held the land titles. Families who owned land before the reformation, continue to have a say over their land, and thus for them the old rules continue to be valid. The new rules come in when the land had not been tilled by them for a couple of years; in that case, the land

falls (back) to the state. According to the modern law, it is the criterion of being capable to till the land, which counts; what this practically means, however, is not exactly defined, and leaves room for interpretation. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on all of the consequences of the co-existence and interference of the two legal systems. What is important in the framework of this argument, however, is that the situation leads to possibilities for the rural council to choose those rules, which suit them most. On the other hand, it leads to insecurity for people within the community. It is no wonder then that most people take conflicts to the council only as a last resort, or when they are sure that they can count on the support of the most prominent councillors. Finally, the council has become an important institution of patronage. In the past patron-client relationships were institutionalised in caste-relationships. Nowadays, patron-client relationships have, however, become more diffuse with the integration of the local community in the broader framework of the state and the larger economy. Former slaves can become rich and thus a patron for less well-to-do *diambour*, political institutions such as the rural council become the new focus points in trying to build fruitful clientelistic relationships.

The arrival of the project: statements of trust and feelings of mistrust

From the above, it is evident that economic stagnation, ecological degradation and a malfunctioning rural council are main problems in the area. This was also concluded by an American NGO, which in the early nineties had started to develop a strategy to couple economic growth at the local level to a sustainable management and use of natural resources, in the same time strengthening local governmental capabilities. A project design was elaborated in which a territorial management plan was central. This plan had to be made in co-operation with the population, and was meant to encompass a problem analysis and action plan to improve the situation. A management committee, elected by the people themselves, had to manage the financial means and to supervise all activities executed in the framework of the project. Keur Ousmane was chosen as one of the first rural communities to receive the project.

The project's first steps in the community were a couple of meetings to inform the people about the activities, which would be undertaken, and to prepare them for the election of the management committee. During these meetings, impressive speeches in which partnership, co-operation and the will to work were important components were held by the project staff as well as by representatives of the village population. When I spoke to the people afterwards individually, however, many showed themselves to be rather sceptical. I was a little surprised about this, because the project seemed really promising and a large sum of money was involved, and this sceptical attitude was so sharply in contrast with the words professed in public.²

One of the first things the project staff the villagers summoned to was to create GIEs (*Groupements d'Interêt Economique*, litt. Groups of Economic Interest) in order to be eligible for financial support through the project. This in fact asked for a substantial investment on the part of the population: those who wanted to bid for a fund to establish a GIE had to pay CFA 42,000³ to obtain the necessary documents for registration at the

Chamber of Commerce. Having in mind the negative reactions to the project I had heard in the courtyards, and the always omnipresent lack of liquidity in the villages, I did not expect many people to respond to this call. But again, I was proven wrong: the people responded massively. While it had been possible to form a GIE from 1984 onwards, until the arrival of the project only one had been formed in Keur Ousmane, and it merely existed on paper. In January 1996, however, thirty had already been created. For example, the village of Keur Keba with a population of 1026 had twelve new GIEs at the end of January 1996, whereas the village of Keur Samba (301 inhabitants) had four. In the months to follow this number increased further, but at a lower rate. When I asked the people about their motivation, they said that councillors had come to their village to tell them to participate, so they had responded, but that they also confessed that they had serious doubts.

The next step consisted of the election of the management committee, whose task it would be to administer the funds and to co-ordinate the project activities at the level of the rural community. The election was a layered one: first, the members of the committee would be chosen, and from and by them the president of the committee. It had been decided by the project that the committee should be composed of representatives of different categories of the population. Thus, there would be a representative of the craftsmen, a representative of the cattle holders, a representative of the agriculturists, two representatives of the women groups, one representative of the youth association, and three representatives of the rural council. Each category had been informed beforehand and had been summoned to set candidates; the final election took place during the meeting. There were no problems, until the election of the representatives of the rural council.

What happened is that H., son of the *imam* and himself one of the councillors, put himself, as well as those who he knew would support him, forward as a candidate. This was apparently not what the councillors had decided in advance. There was some confusion among the councillors, K. stood up but then immediately sat down again, without protest. Finally, they all raised their hands as to show their approval of the candidates. Now, being in the committee, H. managed to play in such a way that in the end, he was chosen as president. This result caused some anxiety amongst the population, for it was public knowledge that H. had been involved in a project of sheep-breeding for some years, from which he had appropriated a huge amount of money. Rumours ran around the courtyards and between the walls of the houses; the majority of the population, however, soon put up with the situation because, they said, after all, the committee had been chosen democratically.

The project staff took their time in preparing their activities and time passed with a lot of meetings, but without the arrival of funds. These meetings were not well visited. The major part of the population became ever more negative in the course of time, suggested that may be the money had perhaps already been consumed in Dakar, and in the most positive case held on to an attitude of 'seeing is believing'. It was the few intellectuals of the village, some youths who had attended school and the teachers of the primary school, who seemed to keep faith and who attended the meetings. Most distrustful was an older woman who declared that she did not want to have anything to do with the project. She said: 'When you come across a hole, but you are not sure whether the animal in it is dead or not, you don't put your hand in it, do you?'

In talking to the people throughout these months, it became ever more clear to me that in the past, they had already had many negative experiences, which in my view could explain their lack of trust. For example, there was the aforementioned project for breeding sheep. Many villagers had lent their work force to feed and get water for the sheep, and in the weeks before the Islamic festival of Tabaski, the fattened cattle had been sold for good prices. However, the people, who had worked so hard, never saw any of the money; all had been taken by H. and his friends. This experience and comparable stories in which project, or in any case communal, money had simply disappeared, had made people very distrustful of anything involving money. This distrust was not directed against money as such, for example as discussed by Simmel (1978), but against people with money, or money in the hands of particular men. This is linked to the fear, and experience, that money can disappear fairly easily and uncontrollably, unlike a cow for example. That is why many people prefer project-activities in which aid is given in kind (cattle, trees, et cetera) and not in money.⁴

The feelings of distrust can be understood as a logical consequence of these past experiences. Yet why then, do the people appear not to have learned from this, and why did they choose the man who had betrayed them before? Or is it that they do not have any choice, thereby making the question whether they trust or mistrust absolutely irrelevant? This would be the case if they were trapped in a highly vertical patron-client relationship in which there was no way out. I think, this is hardly ever so. In most cases, there is some room for manoeuvre for the patron as well as for his clients. This means that the patron and his clients have to make some effort to keep the relationship going; they have to invest in trustworthiness. Clientelistic relations are not mechanical, in that the patron and the client are tied to each other in an unavoidable way, creating a sort of 'mechanical solidarity'. To know more, we will have to unravel exactly how the people are bound to each other. Still, we are left with some other phenomena to be explained. Why was there such a big gap between what the people confessed in public and what they did and said privately in their own quarters? Why did the people so massively respond to the call to create GIEs? To answer these questions, we must return to the description of the Wolof social system including its moral values, and its development over time. As Misztal (1996:25) states:

Trust cannot be fully understood and studied without the examination of institutions as repositories of a legacy of values and without addressing a practical issue of how far human beings' concepts of duties and obligations are influenced by the societal institutions which organize ways in which people are bound together.

Honour as a central concept in Wolof society and its consequences for the working of trust

As has been stated in the first section, Wolof horizontal social organisation based on kinship was traditionally crosscut by a vertical organisation based on caste and class. Integration of the different social layers was based on institutionalised patron-client relationships between the different castes. Balancing mechanisms to forego too great an

inequality and social distance between the different social categories were incorporated into fixed codes of behaviour between the castes. As has already been indicated, in these codes honour was of central importance.

Kesteloot (1983), in analysing Wolof myths and tales, observes that they frequently carry the message that if people do not pursue honour, they will endanger peace. That is to say that if one pursues honour, one will consequently pursue generosity, hospitality, politeness, introspection, self-control and that there will therefore be peace. In this context, Ly (1967) usefully distinguishes between honour as a susceptibility, a sentiment, and honour as a moral principle.² This distinction makes it clear that the code of honour can rightly be considered as a hinge joint between the individual and the social: it is the internalisation of social values *and* its manifestation.

Honour as a moral principle is the aspect of honour as treated in the above: one should behave in a honourable way in order to show oneself a worthy member of one's family and one's social group, and in order not to endanger peace and solidarity. Honour as a sentiment (*dyom*) is the more personal aspect and can be translated by 'love of self, self-respect, the sentiment that one has its dignity. Ly states that the Wolof do have a strong feeling of self-respect; every act or fact that comes to lack of respect is felt very deeply. Honour as a sentiment cannot be seen apart from the notion of shame (*gatyé*); in fact, *gatyé* is the negative aspect of *dyom*. It is no wonder that where honour is such an important value, shame is practically unbearable (and this goes as far as preferring suicide to living in shame); it means that one has lost his honour before his *nawle*, and consequently his place in society. This logic is also reflected in the sanctions inflicted upon someone who has not behaved honourably: he or she is subjected to different degrees of isolation and exclusion, depending on the gravity of his or her misbehaviour. Trust can be seen as connected with the notions of honour and shame, considering the phrase 'to betray one's trust' (cf. Elster 1989:275). This means that in trusting more is at stake than simply the possibility that expectations will not be met; it means that one *personally* will be affected and will be hurt (for an elaboration on the relation trust-friendship see Silver 1989). One will be put to shame and one's honour will be injured.

In taking the argument further, I would like to state that like honour, trust has a moral connotation in Wolof society. It is one's moral obligation to trust the other, otherwise the latter may feel that his honour is being affected. In the same way, it is one's duty not to betray one's trust, because the other will be hurt. Likewise, it also means that one has to try not to have one's trust in others betrayed, in order to save face.

Of course, the code of honour is strongly connected with the hierarchical structure in which it evolved. When the social system changes, this will most probably have repercussions for the value system. This is confirmed by Ly, who states that in breaking down the privileged position of the old aristocracy, colonialism has sped up the disparition of honour as an aristocratic moral value. In addition, the social character of honour has changed, because the family structure and the role of the extended family has changed. To this, I can add that the modern education system and the development of mass media have lessened the importance of the old stratification. The idea that not only birth but also personal achievement counts, gains importance, as does the consciousness of belonging to new categories (intellectuals, political parties, certain professions) which did not exist in the traditional order. Often, however, values change more slowly than

socio-economic reality. Particularly the feeling of *dyom*, and tied to it, the feeling of *g* continue to be strongly present, being part of Wolof cultural and ethnical identity these insights help us to understand our case?

A free ride,³ chains of honour and a sense of control

Focusing on the man who was elected president of the management committee, it is evident that he has benefited from the ambiguous blending of the old value system and possibilities offered by present developments in society. As a son of the *imam* of I Ousmane, he is covered by the status of his family and the esteem for its father, held by local society. As a politician of the biggest party at national level, he recognises himself as a member of a wider network on which he can fall back and from which he can profit.

The other villagers are in a much less advantageous situation. They see H. as a son of his father and as a member of his family, and in this quality, feel obliged to trust him; could they not, his father being the highly esteemed *imam* of the grand mosque? Yet in this traditional situation, it is very likely that they would have enforced the habitual sanction on him for his dishonourable behaviour. Now, they do not dare, because he is backed by his position in a wider network. The people find thus themselves in a highly ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the morality of honour and trust together with, of course, the hope to gain something, compel the people to involve; on the other hand, the anxiety of preserving one's honour, evolving from the same moral of honour, coupled with a feeling of mistrust, compels them to be very careful and perhaps not to get involved themselves. These contradictory motivations lead to ambivalent behaviour: they accept to trust the man and state this in public – because they feel obliged to, and because they do not want to miss a chance, hoping to gain something and while missing a chance would be shameful. In fact, however, they do not trust, which makes them hesitate to co-operate with the project. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that they want to guard themselves against the risk of losing face if their trust stated in public will be betrayed. So, they avow that they have their severe doubts against the whole undertaking.

Clearly, there are some people, which do not fit this picture. For example, the young woman who did not mince her words and the teachers who seemed to participate in the project more wholeheartedly than the other villagers. It seems that there are categories in local society who do not need to safeguard their honour, because they are already in the lowest position, such as elderly women or very poor families. They can afford to let themselves be guided by their trust or mistrust; in this case, they drop out. For the teachers, it seems that while they also are not in the position to control H. on basis of the old code of honour, they still have a feeling of being able to exert some control. They can read and write, are able to understand the project's working strategy and to check the procedure. This makes them more confident and disposed to participate.

Conclusions

In the above, I have tried to explain the ambiguous way in which the people of Keur Ousmane responded to a new project arriving in the area. On the one hand, they stated their trust in words, in answering the request to form GIEs, and in choosing H. as president of the management committee. On the other, they displayed mistrust in the project by their marginal participation and their negative statements in private. It was found that while socio-economic circumstances have strongly changed throughout the past few decades, the villagers still acted to a large degree upon the old value-system based on the code of honour. This made them show their willingness to participate in the project, but on the other hand also made them careful and hesitant to participate. Besides, there was a growing general mistrust among the population, which had been nourished by negative experiences with projects and collective activities in the past. Since these negative experiences had been concerned with betrayal of trust by people who had been considered trustworthy, it was no wonder that the arrival of the project led to confusion and activated mistrust among the population because they were asked to invest their trust again. For the moment, they tried to solve the problem by acting as usual, that is in using the code of honour as their guide. It may be concluded that the non-fitting of old values and new social realities on the one hand strengthened confusion and distrust among the majority of the villagers. On the other, it created possibilities for personal gain for a minority, such as H.

The first question concerned the relationship between trust and co-operation. On the one hand, we saw that trust and mistrust played a role in the villagers' decision to engage in the project, but that they did not guide decisions in the first place. Rather, it was the preservation of one's own and other people's honour, which motivated people's behaviour to a large extent. On the other hand, a minimum of trust seemed to be required to make people decide to participate in the project. It appears that co-operation among villagers or participation of villagers in a project may continue in a situation of growing distrust, when other incentives play a role such as personal interest or the guidance of norms. However, this is only up till a certain point; after this point, people will drop out. In this context, trust in the first sight may be characterised as a prerequisite for co-operation. After this stage, trust is merely a 'social lubricant', which may 'smooth', or facilitate co-operation, but which need not be a direct drive for people to engage in co-operation.

Let us consider the second question. Historically speaking, trust evolved as a by-product of a social order in which social norms were important to balance and control societal relations. Social codes of honour, however, more often fail to fulfil this balancing function. In this situation, the chances for potential free riders increased. Since there are apparently fellow villagers who do no longer feel obliged to behave according to the rules, confusion and mistrust grow among the population. One could say that the villagers increasingly feel that they control neither the other villagers nor the situation; traditional mechanisms of control are no longer effective, and most people feel they have no tools to handle the new situation. For the time being, they tend to stick to the old ones. The more this feeling of being out of control grows, however, the more distrust rises and the more the villagers tend to act accordingly, that is to withdraw from co-operation and

participation in collective activities. This is best illustrated by the older woman who does not want to have anything to do with the project and the intellectuals who seem to co-operate most wholeheartedly of all the villagers. The old woman practically has no means to influence at all. In contrast, the teachers feel (partially) in control, because they can read and write and thus are able to check the procedures and the like.

Especially persons who are brokers between local society and the 'outside world' run the risk of becoming distrusted by their fellow-villagers. There are several reasons for this: firstly, because they are in touch with rules and norms valuable to the outside world it is likely that they have internalised part of it, and tend not to behave according to local norms only. Secondly, as is illustrated by the local politician H., brokers have more chances to play the free rider role, because they can move more freely than their fellow-villagers, not feeling as totally dependent on the moral judgement of their local community as the others. Thus, the distrust local people develop will very likely to a large extent concern people in a broker position. It is highly probable that this distrust extends beyond these brokers. Through them, the distrust of the villagers also begins to affect those parts of the wider society with which these persons are linked, for example the national political system, a development organisation, or the state. In that case, the trust that traditionally had been vested in people via locally based institutions, is transformed into distrust with potentially severe knock-on effects on external institutions.

From the point of view of co-operation, this is a dangerous development. Firstly, because mutual distrust among the villagers indeed hampers co-operation, as can be seen from the fact that these last years participation in local collective activities has been decreased, people preferring to work on their own or with some close friends or relatives only. Secondly, because the distrust in institutions, which may develop as a consequence, is likely to be more persistent and more difficult to fight; for while it is built up indirectly, it can only be broken down indirectly. From there on, the conditions for co-operation will continue to get worse.

We may compare the above observations concerning the changes in trust relations in the local community of Keur Ousmane with the observations from Luhmann and Giddens concerning the development of trust in conditions of modernity. What is striking in Giddens' analysis is his assumption that the representatives of the expert system are trusted as representatives of that system in the first place, not as persons; confidence in the system brings people to trust its representatives. In the community described however, it seems as if the traditional organisation of trust, which one could label a 'personalised system trust', is extended towards modern abstract systems. Because for trusting abstract systems, it is personal trust that prevails: representatives of those systems seem not to be seen as continuations of the system, rather the system is seen as a continuation of the person involved. This can be illustrated by local people's attitude towards money as mentioned in section two. The villagers reveal themselves to be distrustful against money and avoid working with it, because they do not trust people with money. So, for the judgement of the value of money, money in the hands of man is more important than the quality of the money or the money-system as such. It may be interesting to further investigate how in this local context 're-embedding' of abstract systems takes place, but it goes too far to elaborate on it here.

For the moment, we may conclude that the trust present in the local community of Keur Ousmane is mainly personal trust, because confidence in the old system of local rules and norms is in steady decline, while trust in modern institutions mainly runs via persons. Trust in persons is less stable than trust in systems, while established or broken down as a direct consequence of the other's behaviour. This means that, in the situation described, the basis for co-operation is also less stable than in situations where system-based trust is more strongly developed. People may engage easily in co-operation when there is interpersonal trust, but they also may drop out easily, when there is no or very little system-based trust. This suggests that personal and system-based trust are both important for co-operation, but that they in this respect have a different function. Which form is the most needed depends on the form of co-operation desired, whether this is incidental or long-term, between few or many people et cetera. In general, however, the effectiveness of trust for co-operation ultimately depends on their combined effect, that is when personal trust is backed by system trust and vice versa.

What finally remains is our third question as posed in the introduction: how trust may eventually be enhanced in order to increase the potentiality for co-operation? It may be evident at the end of this exposition that this question remains a difficult one to answer. The above discussion clearly demonstrates that trust is indeed an elusive concept, and that its relation to co-operation is difficult to grasp. Firstly, trust plays a role in people's behaviour, but rarely constitutes the main driving force to engage in co-operation. Secondly, trust evolves as a by-product of other social processes and mechanisms, which also makes it difficult to be regulated. Thirdly, the specific linking of personal and system trust seems to have an impact on the specific possibilities of and restraints to co-operation in a given case.

We have also seen, however, that trust is important for co-operation, and as such, development agents such as the state or a NGO may wish to embark upon strengthening trust in localities such as the one described. Let us therefore try to find some starting-points for action. The observation that mistrust grew because old controlling mechanisms no longer did, points to the importance of control in the evolution of trust. While trust is often treated as qualitatively different from control, whereby trust and control are seen as two parallel tracks which do not meet, I would argue with Luhmann that (the feeling of) having some degree of control over others or over the situation is a prerequisite for trust. This means that if one wants to foster trust in order to facilitate co-operation in situations where old controlling mechanisms no longer do, it may be advisable to also focus on the fostering of new controlling mechanisms. In the case of Keur Ousmane, the literacy of the villagers for example, could make them feel more in control of modern institutions, such as the rural council or the development project, because they would be better able to check procedures and proceedings. While they can check, they may feel that they can develop confidence in these institutions. Good-working, well-checked, institutions will leave less room for potential free-riders and, as a consequence, people may begin to trust each other again.