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or not they are adherents of this sect. The only Islamist organisation that is currently represented in Kazakhstan is *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (HT). This is not a Wahhabi sect in the strict sense of the term.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)

Hizb ut-Tahrir (transliterated in various forms and usually translated as the Liberation Party) is a transnational Islamist organization. Initially, Uzbekistan was the primary focus of HT activities in Central Asia (see Uzbekistan entry). HT

operates clandestinely, since it is banned in all the Central Asian states. Since the late 1990s it has been spreading beyond the borders of Uzbekistan and now has some adherents in Kazakhstan. Some commentators suggest that it attracts followers mainly from the Uzbek minority. Since 2001, at least two dozen HT members have been arrested in Kazakhstan; some have been given prison sentences of up to four years.

Shirin Akiner

Kenya

Capital: Nairobi

Population: 32 m

Kenya achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1963, and was proclaimed a republic the following year. In the 1960s the ruling **Kenya African National Union (KANU)** effectively became the sole legal party, with its status as the only legal political organization embedded in the Constitution from 1982. Daniel arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta as President and KANU party leader in 1978.

By the start of the 1990s (and in line with contemporary democratic developments in much of Africa) there was mounting pressure within Kenya for KANU's monopoly on power to be ended. On May 3, 1990, former cabinet ministers Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba called a press conference to demand the introduction of multi-partyism. *Saba Saba* (seven seven), i.e. July 7, 1990, was the starting point of one week of urban riots that became the symbol of this challenge. After 18 months of mass mobilization in combination with pressure from the international community (including the suspension of multilateral aid after several revelations of high level corruption and possible involvement of State House officials in the killing of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Ouko, found murdered in February 1990, and other prominent opponents of the Moi regime), section 2(A) of the Constitution was repealed on Dec. 3, 1991, enabling the return to multi-partyism by January 1992. The multi-party system allowed discontent with the Kenyan authorities to surface in legal channels to the detriment of underground movements such as *Mwakanya* (a mainly university-based group active in the 1980s), which faded out. Among the last actions by *Mwakanya* was the issuing of a statement "Kenya Democracy Plank" after the *Saba Saba* struggles.

Initially, by August 1991, the opposition came together in an alliance known as the **Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)**. In December 1991 Mwai Kibaki resigned as Minister of Health and founded the Democratic Party (DP). Several other new political parties registered successfully. However, in spite of this new political freedom, at least six parties were denied registration, most notably the **Islamic**

Party of Kenya (IPK), led by Sheikh Khalid Salim Balala (see below). Other parties banned included the Green Party and the DEMO (Democratic Movement) of Ngonywa wa Gakonya's religious group "Tent of the Living God". Following a split in FORD over its future direction and leadership, the opposing factions registered as separate parties in October 1992; FORD-Asili, led by Kenneth Matiba, and FORD-Kenya, led by Oginga Odinga.

On Dec. 29, 1992, Kenya held its first multi-party election since 1966 and the first direct election of its President. Eight presidential candidates and 10 political parties contested the presidency and a total of 188 parliamentary seats. President Moi was declared the winner of the presidential contest with 37 per cent of the vote. KANU took just under 30 per cent of the vote in the legislative contest but, as a result of the first-past-the-post electoral system, won 100 parliamentary seats, leaving 88 for the combined opposition. There were widespread reports of electoral malpractice in favour of KANU candidates.

Following the 1992 defeat, the political opposition lost much of its momentum. KANU grew even stronger by luring opposition MPs back to the ruling party. Among the most notable defectors was Ngonywa wa Gakonya, the political and the spiritual leader of DEMO. His followers felt so betrayed that they sought to kill him. (Wa Gakonya was later to work his way back into FORD-Asili and ultimately *Saba-Saba Asili*). FORD-Kenya leader Oginga Odinga died in January 1994 and the party's leadership was taken over by Kijana Wamalwa. More wrangles over its leadership led Gitobu Imanyara and Paul Muite to leave the party. By December 1996 also Raila Odinga (Oginga Odinga's son) left the party for the National Development Party (NDP). FORD-Asili split prior to the 1997 elections into (the unregistered) *Saba-Saba Asili* (Matiba) and FORD-People led by Kimani wa Nyoike.

Besides continuing restrictions on political parties (by 1994 almost 30 parties had been denied registration), the Kenyan authorities continued to harass indi-

vidual politicians, journalists and activists. Many opposition politicians such as Raila Odinga, Paul Muite, Martin Shikuku, and Sheikh Khalid Balala, among others, were arrested during 1993 and subsequent years and kept in jail for periods ranging from a few days to several weeks. Most notorious, however, was the treatment of Koigi wa Wamwere, a former member of parliament. While in exile in Norway from 1986 he founded the Kenya Patriotic Front (KPF, which ceased to exist after the partial legalization of parties in 1991). In September 1990, Wamwere was abducted by Kenyan security agents in Uganda, and brought to Kenya. Kenyan officials, however, announced that he had been captured in a Nairobi suburb with a cache of arms. He spent two and a half years in custody only for the state to drop treason charges facing him and two others. He was released shortly after the 1992 elections only to be re-arrested (with family members) in November 1993 and after an 18-month trial was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for attempted robbery. International observers at his trial concluded that the prosecution had fabricated the evidence against him. The defence team lodged appeals in December 1995, and he was granted bail in December 1996 on medical grounds, as were his two associates. In December 1997 the Chief Justice quashed Wamwere's four-year jail sentence and dropped all charges against him and his two co-defendants. In 2002, he was elected to parliament on a NaRC ticket.

The politically motivated violence that had affected particularly the so-called opposition zones within the Rift Valley province since the end of 1991 returned by early 1993, and erupted with renewed force towards the end of that year. It was estimated that at least 1,500 Kenyans, mostly Kikuyu, were killed and 300,000 internally displaced. Allegations that the Kenyan government had promoted this violence were confirmed by the report of a parliamentary committee in 1992. Similar politically motivated clashes erupted before and after the 1997 elections.

Alongside the creation of new parties, a range of new civic organizations was established, mostly by lawyers, sometimes assisted with international donor funding, in the early 1990s. These included the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), Release Political Prisoners (RPP), and the Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION). Muite's Mwangaza Trust was deregistered but resurfaced in 1995 as Safina, "the ark" in Kiswahili, a would-be political party, led by the internationally known archaeologist Richard Leakey and Paul Muite. Safina only obtained official registration on Nov. 26, 1997, one month before the 1997 general election.

For those who could not be bought or compromised in any scandal KANU had kept the heavy stick of its Provincial Administration, General Service Unit (GSU) and other branches of its political police. Leakey, Muite and others were beaten by KANU youths, when they made an attempt to visit Koigi wa

Wamwere in September 1995 in Nakuru. In other incidents government opponents paid with their lives (e.g., Karimi Nduthu of Release Political Prisoners).

In the period following the 1992 elections, the civil society organizations, especially those that had warned the opposition parties to press for legal and constitutional changes first before going to the polls, took over the debate. On Nov. 2, 1994, the Law Society of Kenya, the International Commission of Jurists (Kenyan Chapter) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission publicly presented the draft of a model Constitution ("The Kenya We Want"), in which they proposed a more complete framework for a democratic multi-party system. With the (moral) support of the Catholic Church and of the NCCK, the umbrella organization of the Protestant Churches, the debate became the central public issue. The steering committee of the conference transformed itself into the Citizens' Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs) and Moi promised a constitutional review in his (1995) New Year's message to the people. The 4Cs, though, did not yet have a strategy on how to sustain the debate as a result of heavy wrangling with the opposition parties over supremacy over the campaign and the 4Cs time-consuming approach needed for a nation-wide debate on constitutional reform. With the pressure for reform easing, Moi, on June 1, 1995, ruled out any major changes to the Constitution. Moreover, by the beginning of that year fear and confusion had returned prominently after Moi's announcement that a revolutionary group, the **February Eighteenth Movement (FEM)**, wanted to forcefully overthrow his government through their military arm, the **February Eighteenth Revolutionary Army (FERA)** led by "Brigadier" John Odongo (see below).

From June 1995 to April 1997 the issue of constitutional reform did not feature prominently in the news. Quietly, however, progress was made with regard to civic education, in which the need for constitutional reform was one of the central issues. By the end of 1996 civil society actors, under the umbrella of the National Convention Executive Committee (NCEC) had been able to outmaneuver the opposition parties in the leadership of the reform initiative. Through regular street demonstrations they demanded substantive reforms before the elections. The confrontation culminated at the end of August when Moi accused the NCEC of preparing a "civilian coup".

The political elite – including many of those who had been at the forefront of the crusade for political reform – acquiesced in KANU's political maneuvers. Minimal reforms were agreed upon by September 1997, ending a period of turmoil. Ten new political parties were registered and three rejected. Some minimal improvements were also realized in the composition of the Electoral Commission, access to public media and in the ability of opposition parties to hold rallies. Yet the institutional bias in combination with election violence and fraud enabled KANU to win the December 1997 elections, taking 107 of the 210 elective seats in

the legislative elections while President Moi won with 40.2 per cent of the vote in a 15-way presidential contest.

After the elections, Moi and KANU insisted that the constitutional reform process should be exclusively in the hands of elected parliamentarians. Only after continued protests and protracted negotiations did KANU agree, in principle, to the inclusion of civil society groups in the reform process. The Constitutional Review Commission, headed by Yash Pal Ghai, handed in a first draft by September 2002, too late to be implemented before the 2002 elections.

After the 1997 elections, KANU's tiny majority in Parliament was quickly reinforced by roughly three dozen MPs from Raila Odinga's NDP. By June 2000 Raila Odinga and his NDP colleagues accepted places in the Kenyan government, hitherto reserved for KANU ministers only. This collaboration finally resulted in a merger of KANU and NDP in March 2002 and the rise of "New KANU". Yet this move was the beginning of the end of KANU's uninterrupted rule since independence. The main battleground became the issue of succession to President Moi. Finance Minister Simeon Nyachae left the party after angering President Moi for rightly predicting publicly that the government would go bankrupt. Nyachae left to become FORD-People's presidential candidate. His example was followed in October 2002 after the official appointment of Uhuru Kenyatta (son of Jomo Kenyatta) as KANU's flag bearer. This move angered Odinga and a number of other leading party members, who moved to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). They again formed a coalition with Kibaki (DP), Michael Wamalwa (FORD-K) and Charity Ngilu (NPK) in the **National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC)**. NaRC carried the day in the December 2002 elections by taking 125 seats, against 64 for KANU. NaRC's single presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, trounced Uhuru Kenyatta by garnering 62.3 per cent of the vote against 31.2 per cent for Kenyatta.

The new cabinet included a number of former exiled or jailed opponents of the Moi government. Torture chambers used by the Moi government were opened after the elections for the Kenyan public to witness. Also, violence erupted when members of the *Mungiki* sect (see below) who had supported Uhuru Kenyatta's candidature, harassed local residents in the Molo region. The new government cracked down upon the *Mungiki* group instantly. The coming years will tell if this dissident movement will return to its original religious roots or stick to its more recent political and banditry operations.

The incoming Kibaki government faced huge economic problems, with the coffee, tea, rice, dairy and sugar industries in total disarray, marred by mismanagement, corruption and the violent actions of desperately impoverished farmers. The tourism sector has also been hard hit, especially after the Aug. 7, 1998, bomb blast, thought to have been carried out by Muslim/*Al-Qaeda* extremists from outside the country, that destroyed the US embassy and neighboring

buildings, killing 213 people (see below). The chances of recovery for the tourism industry were further reduced when on Nov. 28, 2002, the Hotel Paradise, located some 20 km north of Mombasa and at the time crowded with Israeli tourists, was car bombed. Ten Kenyans, three Israelis and three suicide bombers were killed in the blast at the hotel. *Al-Qaeda* claimed responsibility for this suicide bombing as well for the simultaneous failed attempt to bring down an Israeli jetliner, carrying 261 tourists, as it took off from Mombasa airport.

Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK)

Sheikh Balala (born 1958), the unofficial leader of the Islamic Party of Kenya and a lecturer on Islamic religion, became popular among the (Muslim) youth and poor people due to his sermons and demonstrations against the government. He stressed the "marginalization" of the Muslim community in Kenyan society. The IPK aligned itself politically with the FORD-Kenya party in the 1992 general election and helped it to win two parliamentary seats in Mombasa. In 1993 the IPK was involved in anti-government demonstrations and clashes with the police, with numerous arrests of its supporters, and fought street battles with its rival, the **United Muslims of Africa (UMA)**. The IPK claimed that hired UMA thugs had gone on the rampage in IPK strongholds, backed by the police, to intimidate its supporters. This claim was confirmed by the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (Supkem), which in the past had spoken strongly against the IPK's programme, saying the party sought the formation of a theocratic state in Kenya. The UMA had been started by well-connected KANU politicians and had heavy government backing. The UMA was virtually dissolved by February 1994, however.

Sheikh Balala was stripped of his citizenship in November 1994 while on a visit to Germany. He returned to Kenya on July 12, 1997. On arrival, his identity card and his expired passport were confiscated. Sheikh Balala was arrested just prior to the December 1997 elections, for claiming that President Moi had rigged the election process and inciting people not to vote, and again in June 1998 on further charges of incitement, at which time he was remanded in custody for 10 weeks before being released on Aug. 21, 1998. In October 1998 the IPK caused uproar in Zambia where it planned to register a party. Balala had said that southern African countries had "adopted western styles of living and governing", making them a fertile ground to propagate Islam. Balala's comments enraged Zambia's Christian leaders.

Balala was only given back his identity card and allowed to register as a voter in 2002, after which he declared his candidature for the Green Party of Kenya in the December 2002 elections. In the end, however, he stood on a *Shirikisho* ticket and garnered only 3 per cent of the votes in Mvita constituency, just ahead of Sheikh Juma Ngao who represented what remained of the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya and stood on a FORD-People ticket.

The IPK's declining support reflected the continuing denial of registration to the IPK and the impact of events such as the bombing of the US embassy.

February Eighteenth Movement (FEM)/February Eighteenth Resistance Army (FERA)

A group of Kenyan rebels named themselves the "February Eighteenth Movement" (FEM) and its military arm the "February Eighteenth Resistance Army" (FERA) on Feb. 18, 1991, the 34th anniversary of the hanging by the British colonial government of Mau Mau freedom fighter Dedan Kimathi. From the late 1980s to early 1990s onwards young, jobless Kenyans were recruited for FEM/FERA under the pretext that they could find employment in Uganda. Instead they were trained in a camp in Sono in Mbale district, northern Uganda, preparing to overthrow the Kenyan government. Some of them went for further training in Libya and North Korea. FERA was composed of cells named after prominent dead Kenyans (e.g., Muliro, Ouko, Muge).

Patrick Kimingich Wangamati, former chairman of Webyue Town Council, was identified as the political leader of FEM. He had reportedly fled to Uganda in the wake of the murder of former Bungoma mayor, Henry Wakwabubi, in 1993. At the time of his disappearance Wangamati, in his late 50s, was a staunch FORD-Kenya supporter who, in 1992 sought the party nomination to run in Sirisia constituency.

FERA was led by a "Brigadier" John Odongo (also known by a variety of aliases), who had been living in self-imposed exile abroad since the 1960s. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation and the government-owned newspaper *Kenya Times* claimed that FERA was founded with the support of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM). Odongo had strong links with the NRM and moved up in the ranks of the National Resistance Army in 1986 in recognition of his contribution to the NRM. These sources also claimed that a high-ranking NRM official had drafted a blue print entitled "Ten ways towards the removal of Moi", on behalf of FERA. The *Kenya Times* newspaper claimed that FERA operatives had taken an oath in April 1994, shortly after the assassinations of Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, to bind their forces and those of an organization called *Mouvement Nationale Congolaise-Lumumba* to overthrow the governments of Presidents Moi of Kenya and Mobutu of Zaire.

In reply, President Museveni said that he had known Odongo since 1972 but denied that his government was supporting FERA. Revelations from FERA fighters later showed that the assurance that the Ugandan NRM would fight alongside FERA to remove the regime in Kenya was dropped after Moi agreed by mid-1991 to multi-party elections. Morale among many FERA fighters was low by mid-1992 and a number of them made use of the general amnesty announced by Moi that same year for all who had fled abroad for political reasons. They were asked to return. The Kenyan Special Branch interrogated some of them and collected information from the returnees, initially by false promises and later by torture. Thus the Kenyan government was well aware of FERA/FEM's existence and its strength, or rather weakness, by that time.

On Oct. 30, 1994, a shoot out occurred between some 30 FERA members and the police in the Mt Elgon region. The group's mission was to attack and seize more arms from the Kenyan police. According to the Kenyan government five rebels and two policemen died. The Kenyans sought and

found refugee status in Uganda.

A number of people were arrested and severely tortured between October 1994 and November 1995. Estimates are that in total some 50 Kenyans were taken to court and some 20 persons were convicted and sentenced to up to six years imprisonment. In addition, a number of Kenyans alleged to be linked to the movement never appeared before a court but were moved from one police station to another for periods ranging from a week up to several months. Almost all the people who appeared in court originated from Bungoma District in Western Province. Most of them were FORD-Kenya supporters in their early twenties. A number of student leaders and lawyers were also tortured in an attempt to make them sign confessions that they belonged to FEM/FERA. They were also questioned extensively about their alleged relations with political leaders as Paul Mute and Raila Odinga. In the end none of them was convicted. One detainee was awarded Ksh. 500,000 in compensation in May 2003 after he sued the government over his illegal detention in 1995.

President Moi officially revealed the existence of FEM/FERA in February 1995, one reason for the public disclosure being Uganda's refusal to extradite Odongo. President Moi also claimed that the guerrilla group had the backing and financial support of the Kenyan opposition, reinforcing an announcement he had made on Jan. 8 that the opposition was planning to start what he termed "urban guerrilla warfare". KANU politicians and supporters marched the streets demonstrating against Odongo and Wangamati and calling for the arrest and prosecution of opposition politicians.

The Kenyan government even implicated the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR border points were alleged to be used as bases by conspirators plotting against the Kenyan government. The refusal by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in repatriating Odongo resulted in a threat by President Moi to expel the estimated 230,000 refugees (most from Somalia and Sudan) in camps on Kenyan territory.

John Odongo and Patrick Wangamati were arrested by the Ugandan authorities and sent in March 1995 into exile in Ghana. From Ghana, Odongo continued to claim he would overthrow the Kenyan government and accused the Kenyan authorities of killing and secretly burying his men. The last heard about Odongo was in September 1999 when a Kenyan refugee in Uganda, Raphael Osumba, claiming to have started a new rebel group and to be a lieutenant and nephew of John Odongo, requested to be moved to Ghana to rejoin his uncle. However, the UNHCR rejected Osumba's request for relocation.

Patrick Wangamati returned to Kenya on Oct. 6, 1997. He was interrogated and detained for almost nine weeks, and pardoned in December 1997. He announced publicly that FERA had been officially dissolved. In 2002 he unsuccessfully sought the KANU nomination as a parliamentary candidate

Al-Qaeda and Kenya

The Arab dominated Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK, see entry) has been identified as the most radical among the Muslim community of Kenya. However, it has

worked primarily through speeches and demonstrations, reflecting the view that Kenya's potential for violent religious extremism is low, since most Kenyan Muslims are moderate and tolerant. Until the late 1990s, Kenya mainly had to deal with local Muslim Somali-Kenyan bandits, known as Shiftas, operating in the North-Eastern Province and preying primarily on the local population and tourists. Kenya has, however, since then been the victim of well-organized externally directed attacks on its soil, aimed at American or Israeli targets, but killing hundreds and wounding thousands of Kenyans.

The attackers in the bombing of the US embassy (August 1998) and the Paradise hotel (November 2002) were predominantly outside terrorists, from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who had entered the country a few months or even only days before the assault. Yet they did get support from a few Kenyans. For the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, four people were sentenced to life imprisonment by May 2001. Another 12 persons, including Osama bin Laden were indicted for these attacks in December 1998. Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, alias Abdul Karim, the alleged leader of the Kenya embassy bombing, has so far eluded capture. This alias was the one he used to marry a local teenage girl on Dec. 30, 2001, when he was teaching at an Islamic school in Lamu. On May 14, 2003, in the wake of a car bomb attack in Saudi Arabia, the Kenyan National Security Minister Chris Murungaru warned of a possible attack by *Al-Qaeda* in Kenya and released a picture of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed claiming he plies between Nairobi and Mogadishu in Somalia and might be in Kenya. Subsequently Britain and the USA issued travel bans to Kenya and the UK even banned flights to Nairobi by its airlines, fearing they might be brought down by terrorists. The US ambassador, accusing the Kenyan government of not doing enough to fight terrorism, decided to close down his embassy on June 20, 2003, over what was termed "new information concerning possible terrorist activity in Kenya".

Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan and Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam have been indicted in the 1998 bombings. Both were born in Mombasa. Sheikh Swedan was most likely captured on July 11, 2002, in Karachi and handed over to the FBI. An unnamed US intelligence official, though, could not confirm detailed reporting by the *Guardian* newspaper over this case. Fahid Msalam was mentioned by an Israeli source as one of the three suicide bombers who attacked the Hotel Paradise. In March 2003, Abikar Mohamed Ali, a trader in electrical goods carrying Yemeni and South African passports, was arrested in Mogadishu where he had been staying for about a year. He was said to be a mid-level *Al-Qaeda* operative suspected of having played a role in both the 1998 bombings and more recent attacks in East Africa. From June to September 2003 six people, all Kenyans of Arab origin, were arrested and charged by the Kenyan authorities in connection with the Paradise hotel bombing.

Al-Qaeda activities were also recorded in

September 2002 when another *Al-Qaeda* suspect from Yemen, Hassan Omar Hussein, was arrested trying to get into Kenya. He was said to be planning to use a false Kenyan identity. A Kenyan, Mubarak Salim Mubarak, was accused of helping him and was released on bail. It is feared that with *Al-Qaeda* hunted out of Afghanistan attention will be redirected towards other regions, such as the East African coastal zone.

In early 2003 Kenya joined a group of six countries identified by the USA to work in a coalition in the battle against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The new government will have to work hard to convince the world that that it is no longer possible to bribe the immigration department. It was alleged in August 1999 that this corruption had eased tremendously the work of the terrorists, some of them having left the country with Kenyan passports. The lure for financial gain had also been shown in February 1999, when Kenyan intelligence services sold off Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan to the Turkish government, after being tipped off by Israeli intelligence of his presence in the country. Rumors circulated that the Turkish government had paid a "delivery fee" of Ksh. 270 million to State House and security individuals.

Mungiki ("United People")

The origin of this religious-political movement is debated, reflecting its dual character. Some see it as essentially a revival of orthodox traditional cultural values and practices, like female circumcision, in rejection of Western culture. Others stress its political dimension and link *Mungiki* to the Mau Mau rebellion against British colonial rule in the 1950s. One of the *Mungiki* founders, Ndura Waruinge, is a grandson of General Waruinge, a Mau Mau fighter. In particular, *Mungiki*, like the Mau Mau, in the majority draws its supporters from the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest tribal group, accounting for 20 per cent of the population. Moi, in contrast, was from the Kalenjin group, and had built much of his political strategy on a policy of combining the other tribal groups against the Kikuyu, who had dominated under (Kikuyu) Jomo Kenyatta. Those Kikuyu who had become victims of state-sponsored violence under Moi, which made them lose their land and property during the clashes in the 1991-2001 period (killing some 4,000 people and displacing 600,000 others) became a huge following. Later, elements of the urban poor and non-Kikuyu are said to have joined *Mungiki*. It is estimated that by 2002 *Mungiki* had between 1.5 and 2 million dues-paying members, mostly youth between the age of 18 and 35 and some 20 per cent being women.

Mungiki took part in revenge attacks aimed at the Moi government, as well as resettling victims. In the mid-1990s members were regularly arrested and tortured by the authorities but it was only by November 1998 that *Mungiki*'s activities surfaced prominently. That month Molo MP Kihika Kimani held a rally in Nakuru where 61 alleged members of the *Mungiki* sect apologized to President Moi over their taking an illegal oath. It was Kimani who until then had been seen as the main mobilizer of Kikuyu activities in conflict areas. Also, *Mungiki* made headlines after they commenced a campaign in urban areas against drunkenness, drug addic-

tion, criminal activities, prostitution, etc.

In September 2000, 13 *Mungiki* leaders converted to the radical Shiite order of Kenyan Muslims, politically united in the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK). (Most Kenyan Muslims adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam.) In November 2001 Ndura (now Ibrahim) Waruinge was detained for a short period after declaring that the *Mungiki* would paralyze the transport system within Nairobi should police interfere with their bid to take over the management of all private taxi routes around the city to ensure that prices would remain affordable for the poor. While such efforts have been immensely successful in some cases, similar efforts in other parts of the city ended in blood baths as *Mungiki* youths clashed with entrenched cartels. It has been claimed that these takeovers were foremost instigated because they formed an important source of income for the movement as it has been for others.

The Kenyan government outlawed the sect briefly on March 3, 2002, after a gang of some 300 *Mungiki* vigilantes slaughtered 23 opponents in Kariobangi, Nairobi. Another seventeen groups, mostly linked to prominent politicians, were banned. However, *Mungiki* continued to operate widely, despite the ban. After the merger of KANU and NDP on March 8, 2002, *Mungiki* came out in support of the party and its leading group of "Young Turks" (Sunkuli, Kenyatta, Jirongo).

Scholars like Peter Kagwanja have noted the phenomenon of the *Ituika* ("break") system, an old Kikuyu ceremony last held in 1902 and banned by the British in 1935, where political power was handed over from the old to the young generation. The *Mungiki* accused the old generation of overstaying their time in power, at the expense of the next generation. The 2002 election, *Mungiki* leader Maina Njenga stated, should result in the older (Moi and Kibaki generation) handing over power to the younger (Uhuru Kenyatta) generation. Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), 41, named

kamwana (the youth) by *Mungiki*, was seen as the fulfillment of a Kikuyu prophecy that a young man would rise and support the people in their hour of need. On Aug. 20, 2002, the day of Uhuru's nomination as a presidential candidate, *Mungiki* youth came in their thousands to celebrate his candidature for the presidency. However, after Uhuru Kenyatta was accused of being the leader of *Mungiki*, Kenyatta denounced the group stating they were tarnishing his name.

Maina Njenga himself stood on a KANU ticket in Laikipia and trounced his opponent during the KANU primaries. Yet the party did not except his candidature and replaced him, possibly because of growing calls on the ruling party from both in and outside parliament to stop protecting the *Mungiki*'s unlawful activities. After the elections it was revealed that the sect had been given at least one Land Rover, out of 10 irregularly acquired army vehicles, by KANU for its 2002 campaign.

This could not prevent Uhuru's and KANU's election defeat in December 2002. Many *Mungiki* youth considered Kibaki's win a political loss and a generational loss as well (Kibaki being in his 70s). It triggered post-election violence between *Mungiki* followers and the Kibaki government. In early January 2003, *Mungiki* followers killed some thirty, mainly Kikuyu, people in Nakuru, Nairobi, and Maragua. The Kenya government issued a "shoot-to-kill" order to stop *Mungiki* followers. Hundreds of *Mungiki* followers were arrested, which forced many followers to go underground and to threaten war. After protests from human rights organizations over the "shoot-to-kill" order, the government abandoned this policy. Instead, it adopted a two-pronged strategy of punishing criminality on the one hand and rehabilitating *Mungiki* members on the other. This approach halted the orgy of bloodshed by March 2003.

Marcel Rutten

Kiribati

Capital: Tarawa

Population: 94,000

Kiribati (previously the Gilbert Islands) was granted self-rule by the UK in 1971 and complete independence as a republic within the Commonwealth on July 12, 1979. It has an executive President heading a Cabinet, and a House of Assembly of 41 members, of whom 39 are elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term, with one ex-officio member and one nominated to represent the now Fiji-based Banaban population.

A dispute over the island of Banaba, whose inhabitants had in 1980 campaigned for the separation of Banaba from Kiribati or for self-government for the Banabans on Banaba, was settled in April 1982 by an agreement providing for compensation to be paid to the Banabans, with the island remaining part of Kiribati. The original settlers of Banaba were relocat-

ed to Rabi Island in Fiji in the 1940s when their island was used for phosphate mining by the British Phosphate Commission.

The first political party, the Christian Democratic Party, was formed in September 1985 by opponents of the government's decision to extend fishing rights to the Soviet Union (this agreement being terminated in October 1986). Over the years, at least two other political parties came into existence.

Within the last two years, Kiribati has gone through dramatic political changes, which have caused a certain degree of destabilization. The election in November 2002 saw the demise of President Teburoro Tito's parliamentary dominance. His party, the *Manaeban Te Mauri* ("Protect the Manaeba") won 16 seats, the main opposition *Boutokanto Koaava* ("Pillar