The pastoral poor: hazard, crisis and insecurity in Fulbe society in Central Mali

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE PASTORAL POOR: HAZARD, CRISIS AND INSECURITY IN FULƁE SOCIETY IN CENTRAL MALI

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Arannde ɓuri welde, arannde yimɓe maayataa, daabaaji mbaatataa, jooni ɓuri nyaw (In the past it was better, people did not die, animals did not die, now there is much more illness) Kumboore, Serma, December 1990.

Mɪn laatii hono daabaaji (We have become like animals) Hammadu Iisa, Serma.

Hannde yaage walaa (There is no shame any more) Hadjara Aamadu, Serma, November 1991.

Solla warataa ɓii jawngal (Dust does not kill a small guinea-fowl) Fulfulde proverb.

Fulɓe society in Central Mali, as any society in the Sahel, has extensive experience of poverty (cf. Iliffe 1987). Regular droughts occur in the arid environment in which the people live and the region has experienced wars through its history. Insecurity, not only regarding the production of food, but also with respect to the market process, and social and medical care, is a constant factor for Fulɓe pastoralists in the Hayre, Central Mali. It may even be the most important factor in the structuring of their lives (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995, Van Dijk this volume).

The results of these insecurities and crisis situations can lead to social change. As Shipton stated: "[a crisis situation] ... reveals ordinarily hidden sides of human beings, or society, but it changes them at the same time as values and social affiliations shift" (Shipton 1990: 354). The insecurities resulting from a crisis are internalised by society. They are reflected in socio-cultural institutions, in the organisation of daily life and in the ideas people have about the past and the future. People create new alliances, develop new beliefs, or reconstruct their lives and redefine their expectations. For many people, problems of severe social and existential insecurity are the outcome. These experiences may compel people to redefine their situation and to create new living conditions which result in cultural and social changes, i.e. to a redefinition of history, of expectations for the future, and finally of social and individual identities. The quotations above confirm that some pastoral Fulße do indeed have different ideas about themselves today. For them crisis has led to a definite shift in their culture.

However, the effects of crisis situations are not just social and cultural phenomena at the level of society. They have a differential effect on various categories of (poor) people. They depend, among other things, on the way in which social security arrangements and social care are organised, and on the symbolic, social and material resources an individual is able to mobilise in order to deal with calamities. The compound effects on individuals and sub-groups within a society may give rise to redefinitions of history, expectations of the future, and social and individual identities, which may redirect social and cultural transformations already under way.

This chapter focuses on the effects of recurrent crises and the particular responses of the pastoral Fulße in Central Mali.[1] It analyses the effects of (recurrent) crisis on the level of society and

[1] The field research on which this paper is based was carried out by Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk between March 1990 and February 1992. The research was financed by the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research in the Tropics (WOTRO, grant W 52-494). Data used in this paper were collected by both researchers I want to thank Han van Dijk and Anneke Breedveld for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. I concentrate on the pastoral groups because they were hit hardest by the drought, but also because I simply know their situation best

on the level of the poor individual. An important theme running through the chapter is the feeling of social and existential insecurity and the ways in which these are expressed. It concentrates on the poor and the sick, the prime victims of a crisis, more specifically on their perceptions of poverty and illness, and on the social and existential insecurities they face today, and the way they cope with their situation.

The methodological difficulties of studying these problems are numerous. The experience of crisis cannot simply be asked about. People will not easily talk about their misery and about feelings of insecurity. As Hastrup (1995: 119) puts it: "There is no meaningful way to articulate the continuous experience of starvation". It is often through silence that people express their misery, and by the topics they do not want to talk about. For a large part, this chapter deals with matters that do not obviously appear in my notebook and that were not voiced directly. It deals with the silence, with the hidden side of society.[2]

First, I will discuss the way in which crisis situations have been treated in the literature on pastoral societies in general and on the Fulße in particular. I will then consider the impact of crisis and calamities on Fulße society. After a discussion of pastoral society and its embeddedness in Fulße society, I turn to the pastoralists' perceptions and expressions in society of poverty, illness and death. In the final discussion, I will try to analyse how the crisis is internalised in society and which cultural changes have been induced by recent droughts.

Coping with crisis: an overview of the literature

The study of periods of hardship has received relatively little attention in social science research (Torry 1979, Dirks 1980, Shipton 1990, Hastrup 1993). Existing studies hardly touch upon problems of social and existential insecurity, or deal with cultural norms surrounding poverty and illness, and the way these influence cultural change. This is a void in the social sciences because all

[2] Elsewhere I elaborate on the methodological aspects of this kind of fieldwork (see De Bruijn 1998).

human experience should be studied (Hastrup 1993) In the crisis literature we are informed about adaptation, coping strategies, and human suffering is most often translated into statistics. Those studied are the winners not the losers, the poor or the people who did not make it. The experience of the latter is probably hidden from the social scientist, and he or she may not want to know about them. However, given the present situation of many societies in Africa, there is no excuse for excluding crisis situations and insecurities and the resulting existential and social insecurity from the humanities and the study of processes of cultural change.

The impact of crisis on Fulɓe society has not received much attention. Yet, they are one of the largest groups living in the risk-prone environment of the Sahel, and they, especially the pastoral groups, were among the major victims of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s (Glantz 1987, O'Connor 1991, Bovin 1990, Whyte 1984, 1990, Sutter 1987). The studies that exist on the Fulɓe have the same bias as general crisis studies. They concentrate on adaptation and the coping strategies of the (relative) winners. The response to the droughts is formulated first in different alternatives into which pastoralists are pushed to work, i.e. as beggars, herbal medicine sellers, labourers, etc. (Bovin 1990), or herders for outsiders (Whyte 1990, Bassett 1994, cf. Shipton 1990).

Some authors stress the differential impact on various groups of society manifested in the growing inequality and the increasing numbers of poor (cf. Horowitz & Little 1987, Starr 1987, Baxter & Hogg 1990). Sutter (1987) who observed this process among the Fulɓe in Senegal not only relates it to droughts but also to economic changes due to development interventions (cf. Mortimore 1989: 66). This inequality may also be the result of the fact that, in the past, pastoral societies dealt with poverty by developing social hierarchies (cf. Iliffe 1987) However, Starr (1987), who describes the Tuareg in Niger, mentions that the old mechanisms fail to take care of the poor today. The importance of the vertical bonds between the different layers of society has decreased as a result of colonial interventions. Consequently their function in poverty relief, or mutual help, has declined in significance. Redistribution, the giving of loans and gifts, takes place between relatively rich

people only and leads to a further exclusion of the poor. Furthermore she argues that the economic advantages of the market economy were not equal for all social groups in Tuareg society.

These authors interpret impoverishment as irreversible, while others disagree. Spittler (1992) concludes the opposite for another group of Tuareg in Niger. He states that though redistribution channels may be defunct for a certain period, or only function to a limited extent, they will surely be revived. He interprets their existence as part of the moral obligation people have towards one another. Although the practical importance of these obligations may be very limited, they are worthwhile for the continuity of the community. Bovin (1990: 48) also observes a revival instead of a breakdown of the redistributive mechanisms among the Woɗaaɓe in times of scarcity. Whyte (1990) adds that such a development is only possible if certain basic livestock capital is available. Rahmato (1992), writing about poverty in Ethiopia among peasants, states that the poor especially rely on co-operative institutions because it is there that social bonds are created that will help them to survive during times of scarcity (cf. Shipton 1990).

Brown (1991) compares three different ethnic groups who survived the crisis in Chad and relates their responses to individual strategies. According to her, the chances of surviving a crisis or of avoiding becoming one of the poorest depends on a person's attitude, personal skills and knowledge. These personal characteristics may be labelled symbolic capital, by which is meant one's personal (social, political and economic) history in society, for instance the networks a person participates or has participated in, the number of people one can mobilise, one's status, and the social prestige one has in society (Bourdieu 1990: 112-121). A person's symbolic assets can be transformed into help relations, recruitment of labour, i.e. access to social resources so that this symbolic capital is transformed into material capital (Bourdieu 1990: 119), and may provide people with a living. Brown (1991) focuses on differences in gender and makes it clear that women and men have different opportunities depending on the culture to which they belong.

In areas like the Sahel it might be expected that cultures would have developed a response to cope with crisis situations. This is something at which Spittler (1992) hints, e.g. the eating habits, but also the way the distribution takes place. Shack (1971), writing on the Gurage in Ethiopia, refers to the effect of certain foods or eating habits. For instance an abstinence from food when there is enough e.g. during certain rituals, would be a way to train for periods of real food shortage. De Boeck (1994) in an analysis of hunger among the Aluund in Zaire also found some food habits related to periods of scarcity. Rejecting particular foods, which is taboo in 'normal' times, is a way of maintaining social identity during a crisis situation (Spittler 1992). Another field of experience in which the difficult situation is articulated may be the absence of ceremonies and rituals, or at least their postponement (cf. Firth 1959, Spittler 1992). Insecurity about food supply can also be expressed in ritual, for instance exaggerating food intake during ceremonies (Shack 1971), or in language and idiom (De Boeck 1994). These are all examples of ways in which the link between food and crisis can be part of a culture.

Another area in which the crisis may find expression in a culture is in religious change. Among the Songhay for example, fundamental Islam (Wahabbiya) finds more followers in or after a crisis situation (Niezen 1990). As Rahmato (1992. 66) remarks, the turn to fundamentalism or another religion has more to do with the social benefits people expect from their change than with their changes in belief. This religious change or the intensification of religious experience is also related to a person's situation in a crisis. As Shipton stated (1990: 356) "hunger does not kill, it is sickness that kills".[3] Incidences of illness will augment during crises especially among the poor and they will consequently use more services related to health, such as possession cults or the services of Islamic healers. Gibbal (1994) mentions the frequency with which poor Fulße families make use of possession cults in case of illness in the Inner Delta of the river Niger .

[3] Poverty and illness go together Lack of means will result in a bad health service which will also be too costly for the poor (Randall 1993 285, 293) Problems of health have their origins in a political and economic situation (Scheper-Hughes 1992 146)

The expression of a crisis is often not very direct, people are silent about it. As Hastrup (1995: 99-122) argues there are other expressions for coping with constant forms of misery or starvation. She explains this with the help of the situation of shanty-town people in North Brazil as described by Scheper-Hughes (1992). In the absence of a way to cope with hunger and their feelings of powerlessness, people transform their condition into a medical problem, which has, at least potentially, a solution within the medical world. Another case she uses is the constant misery Icelandic people have had to face in their history. It was a misery they could not name. Narratives on their history, consisting of myths and sagas, can be read as a commentary on their situation. Hastrup calls this complex a 'uchronia', an ideal past which obscures the reality, but which is helpful in dealing with the present.

As this short review of the literature reveals, a crisis changes society, it furthers inequality and leads to an absence of group rituals and to an increase in personal rituals. The experience of the crisis may lead to fundamental changes in religion, in eating habits, daily discourse, ideological complexes, etc. These changes are not restricted to the deprived, although they will be among the first to change. Most authors interpret such processes as transient, expecting things to return to normal after the crisis. However, the fundamental and seemingly definite shifts to Wahabbiya Islam in some areas of West Africa, the changes in ceremonies, the progressive destruction of the ecological environment, and the traumatic experiences of war-, epidemic-, and drought-victims reported for other crisis situations make such a conclusion highly premature. There are no psychologists or social security institutions to look after the traumatised, the poor and the ill after calamities, and their experiences will inevitably change their cultures. The focus on societal level in the literature may be at the basis of this misinterpretation. 'After' the crisis, institutions will be reinstalled in name and probably in structure, although this may only be an idiom of society obscuring a transformed reality beneath it (cf. Bourdieu 1977). An idiom which is even more firmly established in times of crisis to obscure reality as was argued by Hastrup.

Impoverishment among the Fulɓe in the Hayre

Fulɓe society in the Hayre, Douentza district, Central Mali (see map 11.2), is divided into a social hierarchy consisting of endogamic social categories: political and Islamic elites, pastoralists, castes, merchants and former slave groups. This chapter is mainly about the groups defining themselves as pastoralists.

In reality they are agro-pastoralists for whom cultivation is a minor and low status activity, yet necessary in their struggle to survive. Their social and material well-being were severely affected by the droughts of the 1980s. This is a result and continuation of a process of political and economic marginalisation of pastoral groups in their own society and in the national economy of Mali (see De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1993, 1994, 1995). In this chapter the focus is on the present-day situation of the pastoral groups. The data presented were gathered in a group of pastoral settlements around a hamlet of sedentary cultivators, who belong to a group of former slaves.

The droughts of the 1980s led to a loss of 75 per cent of the livestock in the area. Many pastoral families lost almost all their cattle. Over the following years only 1988 and 1992 experienced a good rainy season. In all other years a very diverse pattern of rainfall existed across the region and sometimes another calamity such as a plague of locusts occurred. Harvests varied enormously over a span of 10 kilometres. Consequently the herdsmen were not able to rebuild their herds, and most people entered a cycle of progressive impoverishment. Some herdsmen were lucky and survived the drought better. They had opportunities to reconstitute their herds, which led to an increase in inequality between different families within the pastoral group. The results of a wealth-ranking exercise held in 1992 among the inhabitants of the cattle camps confirm this tendency (for the methodology see Grandin 1988). Two families possessed more than 200 head of cattle and were classified as rich. One family owned 50 head of cattle and there were 22 families (36%) owning between five and 30 head of cattle. The rest, almost 60 per cent of the pastoral families, owned less than five head of cattle, or they owned only sheep or goats, or nothing at all.

When combining this number of animals with the fact that even a good harvest in this region means no more than a stock of millet for 6-8 months, it seems justified to conclude that the majority of the families can be labelled poor by both indigenous and international standards. The consequence of this situation was a constant food shortage for many families. They filled this gap by abstaining from food intake, by adding more water to millet porridge, by only partly grinding millet; all these techniques meant having 'more' food. People also ate all available kinds of bush products, but they would never eat locusts, or other taboo animals.

Many families experienced chronic malnutrition and starvation. According to a 1981 health survey in the Douentza-Booni area the health situation was very bad with water being the main source of illness. A frequently diagnosed illness is syphilis. More than half of the adult population suffers from a chronic variant, which undermines the basic health situation on top of all the other hazards. The child mortality rate is very high: 50 per cent of children die before they are 5 years old and 12 per cent die before they are 1 year old (Gallais 1994: 129-132). Van den Eerenbeemt (1985) found a child mortality rate of 35 per cent for pastoral and cultivating groups of Fulɓe in the Seeno-Manngo, south of the Hayre. This was confirmed by Hill & Randall (1984) who recorded a child mortality rate of 37 percent among the Seeno-Manngo Fulɓe. In the Inner Delta to the west the child mortality rate was found to be 50 per cent (Van den Eerenbeemt 1985). This situation will certainly not have improved after the droughts of the 1980s. A survey I held among pastoral women revealed a mortality rate for children under 5 years old of 35 per cent.[4] This percentage may be higher in reality because women may not count all their deceased children. The mortality rate among adults was also high. In 1976 the average life expectancy at birth was 39 years in the region of Mopti (Harts-Broekhuis & de Jong 1993). Moreover within the Mopti region Douentza seems to be the poorest district. We witnessed many deaths of young people: women who had just given birth and young men who fell ill when on migration. There

4 The sample was far too small to draw general conclusions It is however an indication of the health situation

were very few old men as many of them died after the 1985 drought. When we returned to the Hayre in December 1995 we were struck by the high number of deceased persons among our acquaintances.

Poverty and illness struck all the people at the camp where we did our fieldwork but some groups can be classified as more vulnerable: young children, old people, the very poor (± 60% of the families, according to the previously mentioned wealth-ranking exercise), and migrating young men.

The poor in Fulße society

Perception of poverty

The Fulße talk about poverty in two related idioms. One is based on the social hierarchy and is narrowly related to ideas about nobility. The second is based on Islam.

The social hierarchy of Fulße society was established in the nineteenth century under the influence of the Maasina empire, the Islamic Fulße empire in the Inner Delta of the Niger. The social hierarchy established at this time and its related norms and values are still very important to understanding the Fulße in the Hayre today. The different status groups in present-day Fulße society are the political and Islamic elite, the pastoralists, the castes, the merchants, and the former slave groups. The main division between these groups was and still is between the nobles (elites and pastoralists) and the non-nobles (the other groups) and more markedly between the free and the non-free (slaves). The actual discourse on nobility is related to the significance of certain assets in the past. Power includes having control over people, Islam and cattle, and is always defined in the opposition between the free and non-free (nobles and slaves). Although at present former slaves may be wealthier than the nobles, nobility is still associated with wealth which is symbolised by cattle. In the past only the nobles possessed cattle and the elite provided other people with wealth by the division of the booty. Islam is also considered the domain of the nobles. Previously the slaves were pagans (only pagans could

be made slaves) and so the noble to non-noble divide was translated into Muslim to non-Muslim. This does not mean that slaves were not converting to Islam. Nobody could deny them this freedom, but in the eyes of the nobles they never became good Muslims. The division between noble and non-noble is also related to behavioural codes defined by custom, for example feelings of *yaage* (shame), implying all kinds of behavioural norms between certain groups of people. Being noble involves behaving according to these rules and slaves were said not to know these codes in the past. These rules are still considered to be a virtue of pastoralists and the elites more than of former slaves. Slaves and nobles were also divided by their work with slaves doing the hard work.

Another aspect of nobility is 'having people (*yimße*)'. Power was related to having a lot of followers, so a chief in the past had to maintain good contacts with the various lineages. This idea of having a large family and of having people to rely on is still part of the social identity of a noble. Without people and without family one cannot live. People who live with their family and who have a large lineage are in theory the more likely survivors. Again slaves are worse off. They belonged to the family of their master and did not have kinship ties of their own, so they did not 'have people'. Now their genealogies are still not very deep because of their only recent emancipation, and the size of their families is limited. This characteristic of social identity is in contrast with the idea of individuality that is so highly developed among the pastoralists.

Poor people have no wealth, and they are forced to enter non-noble work. The state of being poor negates nobility. It lowers one to the status of a slave and leads to a loss of dignity which means that one can no longer behave according to the ideal of *yaage*. The fact that one has no wealth and no cattle is inevitably endangering the noble status. As some women explained, the decline in quantities of milk, i.e. the decline in number of animals, destroyed the identity of the Fulße. The real poor also lack all kinds of support. They have no people. Thus being poor is contradictory to being a noble Pullo. Widespread poverty may endanger the existence of society (the pastoral as well as the elite's sub-society) as such. The poor are therefore looked upon as being of another

order. This perception of poverty may not be strange to other societies in West Africa. Iliffe (1987: 460) for example, argued that in many savannah societies in West Africa the poor were regarded as a disdained species, because wealth was in general highly valued.

The climatological circumstances in which most pastoral people live, the pastoral pursuit itself (the nature of cattle) and the established social hierarchy make poverty and the existence of a group of poor unavoidable in pastoral societies (Iliffe 1987). This fact is recognised by the Fulße, and they accept poverty to a certain extent. They attribute being poor to the will of Allah. Wealth is linked to His benevolence or *barke*, the divine force: 'One day Allah makes you rich and another day he makes you poor'. A Pullo cannot avoid this and has to accept it. This idea implies that being rich is accepted as the other side of the coin. Consequently, inequality between people is more or less accepted with reference to an Islamic idiom and an idiom based on social hierarchy. However, this does not imply an elaborate system of help in society, nor does this acceptance prevent feelings of jealousy between rich and poor.

Being Muslim is closely related to ideas about nobility. However the Islamic idea of charity, i.e. that the poor should be helped, which is given form through the institutions of *zakat* and *sadaka*, does not overrule the idea that being poor is shameful. For the Fulße this Islamic charity is only meant for the real poor, i.e. the *miskiine* people who have no labour power, are not in good health, and thus cannot work for themselves. However, this does not go for the *talka*, people who are impoverished in the material sense but who are still healthy and able to work for themselves. The Islamic ideas do not take away the existential insecurity which the poor may feel, nor do they compensate for their loss of social identity. However, they imply a certain attitude towards the sick who are considered unable to work, and who are part of the group of the *miskiine*. As a result the *miskiine* are perceived in a different way to the *talka*.[5]

[5] These terms are derived from Arabic and can be found in other languages as well For example the Tuareg of Niger call the poor the *tilleqqawen*, he people without power and material wealth (Spittler 1992: 231) The Fulbe would label these people *miskiine*, their word *talka* is a more general word for the poor. In the case of these Tuareg a difference is also made between people who are poor but still have strength, and the people who are poor and have no strength, but Spittler gives no different terminology for them People without wealth but with strength will not make an appeal for help from relations (Spittler 1992: 232).

Thus Fulße society in the Hayre does not permit the poor a social identity other than that of a 'slave'. Poverty is in all its expressions the negation of nobility. Nobility and related values do not have an independent existence apart from their counterpoint, the former slaves and also the poor.

Social security and poverty relief

In the past social hierarchies may have functioned as a safety net for the poor. Today the reciprocal relations that exist between the elite and pastoral groups and between nobles and non-nobles, which still figure in the oral traditions in the area, have almost disappeared. This may be the result of economic and political changes which drew the elites towards modern administration and away from the herdsmen and made them less dependent on pastoral groups. This means that in times of scarcity, help relations are no longer very prominent, a process also described by Starr (1987) for the Tuareg (see above). On the other hand some elite families do still ask for food from their former slaves and their herdsmen. In the past this was the return gift for the division of the booty. Someone who stands up against the will of the elite runs the risk of being struck by the evil eye. Only individuals with whom the elite have a good relationship receive assistance from them in administrative affairs and material support.

Former slaves are no longer subordinated to the herdsmen in economic terms, although they are still socially inferior according to the way status is defined in society. In many cases the herdsmen receive more help from former slaves than vice versa. Some impoverished herdsmen integrate into *riimayße* communities, or the other way around. Variations to this help relation along vertical bonds have appeared, for example pastoral families now integrate into cultivator families in the south of Mali (cf. Azarya 1993). Herding on contract may be seen as an alternative way of earning

an income, but it is by definition a relation of dependency. Pastoralists herd the cattle of the elite or of former slaves. This has become a substantial element in the economy of their families. On the Seeno-Gonndo (near Bankass) or on the Bandiagara plateau many impoverished Fulße families are in a process of Dogonisation (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1988, 1998).

Extensive gift networks do not exist. The loan of cattle to relatives as is reported in other Fulße literature (Bovin 1990, Whyte 1990) is absent among the pastoralists in the Hayre (see van Dijk 1994). Gift relations exist between close-kin, between neighbours, and between friends. However, the quantities given are very small and do not exceed more than a day's meal, and in most cases much less. This observation was also made by Spittler for the Tuareg (1992: 233). These gift relations can hardly function as poverty relief. Nevertheless small quantities may sometimes mean the difference between death and survival.

Sutter (1987: 203) reports that gifts of milk between households to relatives, friends and neighbours are a fundamental element of the redistributive networks still in operation among the Fulße in the Ferlo, Senegal. In the Hayre, however, these gift exchanges came under pressure because of the consequences of persistent scarcity. This was explicitly expressed by some people who said that the poor had to look after themselves, as they did not have sufficient means to help them. The obligation to help the poor is only limited to a group of very closely related kin.[6] In other cases it is shameful to ask for help, because this may be interpreted as begging which indicates a loss of nobility (cf. Spittler 1992: 233). This attitude of the Fulße is illustrated by the reaction of people to the behaviour of a former female slave who runs a small shop in the core hamlet where all pastoralists come during the day. She helps many poor people by giving them work or by simply giving them food. For

[6] This attitude is not specific to the Fulße in Mali. Similar processes take place among other groups of pastoralists (cf. Baxter & Hogg 1990). Among the Isiolo Boran this attitude may prevail, 'prolonged drought [means that] many pastoralists can no longer make ends meet and, unless helped by wealthier pastoralists, are forced out of the pastoral sector, and/or become absorbed by neighbouring tribes' (Hogg 1985: 42). Holy (1980) found a tendency among the Berti in Sudan that forced many of them into labour for the richer members of society, leading to a structural differentiation between rich and poor. Cutler (1986) found that credit and gift networks collapse in a situation of famine.

this poverty relief she was considered a fool, or even blamed by other members of society.

The only form of asking for a gift which is not against the norms of nobility is doing so very directly. This type of request can be heard all day in Fulße camps and is called *eelude*. It concerns again only very small gifts, like a colanut, a little milk, a little tea, i.e. nothing to provide substantial alleviation of the needs of the poor. When people ask directly, the asked person can hardly refuse to give. It is an appeal to the idea of nobility. The nobility of the person in question gives him or her rights to the gift.

Because there is less to share in times of crisis, people are very reluctant to give even the smallest things. To avoid feelings of shame, people simply deny owning things, they hide their goods in calabashes, or in the corner of a hut. This hiding of possessions is also part of the Fulße culture. People are very reluctant to show their wealth. Even the richest people wear worn-out clothes. And someone who has many animals leaves them in the bush with a herdsman who nobody knows, at least in theory. However, not giving or refusing to give may not only result in feelings of shame, but also in the person becoming the subject of harsh gossip (*hururuy*), which can bring evil to the person.[7] Conversely people who ask too much may also become the object of gossip and slander. Another consideration in gift giving and its associated inequality is jealousy (*haasidaare*), again leading to slander which endangers the person at the centre of it.

That the idea of sharing is not very common in Fulße society may also be concluded from taboos around food and eating. They always eat in a sheltered place so that they cannot be observed, and in separate groups according to age, social status, and kin relations. Breaking with this tradition leads to feelings of shame and to gossip. During rituals eating is also a hidden phenomenon and it is considered inappropriate to eat a lot. This is again sanctioned by feelings of shame.

On the other hand sharing is an integral part of the Islamic tradition and institutionalised in *zakat* and *sadaka*. At a pastoral

[7] Harsh gossip may be compared with the evil eye (cf. Spittler 1992: 237-238).

community level, these institutions are taken seriously The only problem is that there there is virtually nobody who has enough harvest, let alone cattle, to pay a substantial amount in goods or money to provide for the poor. Furthermore people refuse to give the *zakat* first to the marabout or the Imam who will divide it among the poor and needy. Instead they divide it themselves among the people towards whom they have an obligation to give, e.g. an old aunt, their mother, or the Islamic scholar who made some charms for them (De Bruijn 1994).

The division of Islamic gifts is mainly among the *miskiine*, i.e. the old people, the children, the handicapped and the sick. In times of scarcity even this group of poor may be denied access to help and gift relations, at least less so than in times of abundance. Old people said that they did not receive the help they expected on the basis of their experiences in the past. This situation may also be inherent in the position of old people in pastoral Fulße society. As Stenning described for the Woɗaaße in Nigeria: "An old man is regarded as of little use. He may help in making rope but he has no voice in planning the movements of cattle of the household. Old people in this situation spend their last days on the periphery of the homestead, on the male and female sides respectively. This is where men and women are buried. They sleep over their own graves for they are already socially dead" (Stenning 1962: 99). For the Fulße in the Hayre, this view of old people is counterbalanced by Islamic concepts of *barke*. Old people have a lot of *barke* and must be respected.

It seems that the gift relations discussed are not meant to alleviate poverty or to be institutionalised help relations. Notwithstanding the fact that they are part of the discourse on wealth and poverty, they serve mainly to ease all kind of tensions and can impose limits on selfishness. In fact these gifts only stress existing inequalities. Spittler came to the same conclusion for the Tuareg of Niger. After a description of all gift relations in society, he concluded that these relations do not lead to any levelling of wealth between the members of society, because there are so many barriers to the giving of gifts: "*on restreint le cercle de ceux qui peuvent légitimement prétendre à de l'assistance; la nature et la quantité des biens distribués rend une redistribution substantielle invraisembable, fierté et honte du receveur potentiel limitent l'acceptation de l'aide; le fait que le donneur potentiel dissimule ou taise ses biens limite l'accord de l'aide*" (Spittler 1992: 230). According to Spittler the relevance of this elaborate network of reciprocity, although it does not have much body, is a way of continuing social relations in an endogamic group where people are very closely related, and of preserving a moral order for when times improve. For the Fulße this moral order then would only be relevant for a few people, namely direct kin. A more important function of this constellation of gift institutions among the Fulße seems to be the stress it puts on norms and values related to nobility and to wealth or cattle, the core of the pastoral ideology, rather than poverty relief.

There are many restrictions on the asking, and the receiving of help. Being too dependent on others for help means a loss of social and in some cases individual esteem, or identity. The poor can rely on a very narrow group of kin and relatives, and in most cases they are not offered a real way out of their poverty. Consequently the poor depend on their own skills and they will search for support outside the community. In the next section we will see that they try to do this in such a manner that it enables them to behave as a good noble, which means avoiding feelings of shame. They choose options that fit in the framework of their culture and within the definition of nobility and its related values. When this is no longer possible they face a very difficult situation.

The poor: social and existential insecurity

An increasing number of poor people in the Hayre are confronted with a crisis: in the first place their state of poverty is not really accepted by the norms and values of society, i.e. nobility and its related assets, Islam, wealth, *yimße,* and secondly a substantial social security network is lacking, a situation made even worse when most people are destitute. Poverty then may be a traumatic experience. It may lead to the loss of social and individual identity,[8] or to ex-

[8] Rahmato (1992 12) differentiates between self-esteem and social esteem He states that the poor may lose their social esteem, but that this does not automatically lead to a loss of

clusion from society by 'self-chosen' migration or by death. Of course the ways in which the poor experience their situation are diverse and depend on their social and symbolic capital. Some will manage to maintain their social identity and control their situation, others leave society and survive on newly-established networks, again others migrate to the South or to towns.

The opening statements of this paper provided some insight into the perception the poor have of their situation. They see it as miserable, a situation which makes them less worthy than in the past. Young women evaluated their situation in a particular way. They reminded me all the time that the quality of the food today made them ugly and skinny. Their hair was no longer as thick as it was in the past. According to them the main ingredient that was lacking in their diet was milk. Several diseases were also ascribed to the lack of milk. Many old people referred to the gap which existed between them and the younger generation. They said that younger people no longer behaved according to the norms and values of society, they no longer helped their old folk, and they preferred modern life to herding their (non-existent) cattle. All these expressions refer to a past that was better, a glorious past, in which cows gave a lot of milk, when there was enough grass and millet grew in abundance. These references to the past do not mean that it was better in a material sense, but may be an expression of their concern with insecurity and their anxiety about the present and the future. Feelings of insecurity express their concern with both the continuity of society and their individual well-being. The proverb *solla waratаа ɓii jawngal* (dust does not kill a small guinea-fowl, i.e. everybody can withstand some difficulties) is an example of the way they perceive their struggle for life. They should overcome crises. But what happens if they cannot and if it becomes too difficult?

self-esteem. "There is of course nothing ennobling or uplifting about destitution, and the poor are more conscious of this than others. Moreover survival strategies may lead the poor to engage in income-earning activities which may be viewed with low esteem by their fellow peasants, but that does not necessarily translate into loss of self-respect on the part of the lowly. In fact, the poor frequently make up for their poverty in their imagination by means of positive and occasionally highly flattering self-evaluations. One should therefore make a distinction between loss of self-esteem and loss of social esteem, the latter occasioned by the response of one's neighbours to one's acts of survival"

The strategies of the poor are diverse.[9] Of central concern for all the destitute and for the richer members of society is their social status. A pastoralist will always try to adhere as far as possible to the rules and prescriptions that define his or her nobility. They try to combine material survival with social and mental survival.

A person's social history is important for the understanding of how a poor family or a poor person survives and makes choices. More credit is given by other members of society to poor people who are members of an important lineage, or who were rich in the past. Their past prestige reflects on them today. However, this does not mean that society takes care of them. One's social history also provides valuable social networks (social capital). For instance in town the poor will mostly work with families of their elite or former slave groups, or they may herd the cattle of befriended cultivators. Although this work is humiliating, the fact that these people move out of the pastoral group (sometimes seasonally, sometimes permanently) and perform work outside their direct cultural orbit, but within Fulɓe society at large, makes their position more acceptable.

Islam provides the poor with legitimate means of survival in the form of Islamic knowledge and social or religious networks. Almost all the poor rely heavily on Islamic rules and ideas to deal with their feelings of existential security. Being a pious Muslim seems a good subsitute for wealth in the construction of their identity. Studying the Koran is also an alternative occupation for men who no longer see the use of working on the land, or herding cattle for others. But knowledge of the Koran also literally helps them to survive, for instance as a means of earning money as an Islamic specialist who heals, makes charms, etc., or by saying Islamic prayers as many old women do. For old women this seems to be an acceptable way of asking for help.

A religious network, relations through Islam, and friends of an Islamic scholar in the family prove to be very helpful for some people. Moving to another village is not difficult for them, because of Muslim friends living there. These networks also transgress

[9] For extensive descriptions of these strategies, see De Bruijn 1994, 1995, *a* & *b*, Van Dijk 1994, De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995, De Bruijn *et al* 1997.

ethnic borders. Islamic norms provide a way of asking for help and Islamic scholars or rich Muslims can not refuse to help these people.

Although the poor engaged in practices as described above do survive, and although they try to convince themselves that they do so within the normative framework of their society, reality often confronts them with different feelings. Old people (especially the poor) and the relatively wealthy adhere strictly to the ideal of being noble. This may lead to a situation of paralysis. They live in a world of ideas that no longer fits reality, which makes them miserable and may produce enormous psychological problems — which we can label existential insecurity — especially when they lose people around them and their wealth. Some become insane, others die out of misery. There are many young men who become mentally disturbed, and wander aimlessly from place to place with nobody knowing their whereabouts. Old people, mainly women are often destitute. Some of these elderly people are also mentally disturbed or depressive and many are chronically ill.

For many pastoralists these 'strategies' are no options and they leave society. Often they go at night and without consulting anyone. Most are young men who migrate southward. Often they leave their old mother behind, sometimes even their own family. These men migrate definitively. Others make a less drastic turn and maintain contact with their 'home village' for some time. But in the long term they will also migrate further and eventually no one hears anymore from them. These people may start a new life as a herder or a cultivator in a rural area or they move to town where they live on the periphery of society.[10]

The people who leave their home area have difficulty keeping to their identity. The most difficult thing to accept for the migrating poor is the fact that there is no longer anyone from their family to take care of them. This is worse even than the loss of cattle because it indicates that they have indeed been excluded from society, that

[10] Sudden migration is not new among the Fulbe. Poverty has always been one of the reasons for migration We heard about some cases of young men who left in the 1980s and who have become very rich as cattle traders or as Islamic scholars in town, but some also as herders Other reasons for migration are conflicts, or simply the search for adventure

they are without *yimɓe*. However, in the norms and values of society it is an accepted course of events for the poor.

The sick

The poor have few channels through which to express or to deal with the insecurities within their own society. Young men who are the herd managers experience a fundamental conflict between norm and reality. As a result we know very little about the way in which they handle these situations. Women seem to survive better, in the sense that they rarely become insane and they are not forced to migrate.

Women have different ways of expressing existential insecurity. They often referred to illnesses that afflict them today, as a consequence of a past crisis. This was also the case for old people. Being sick can provide an outlet for their feelings of existential insecurity. Gender differences in coping with crisis can partly be explained by the perception of illness in Fulɓe society.

Illness is part of life, but the definition of illness is extremely varied. An important distinction is made between the different ways in which one can become ill. Almost everybody defined him or herself as ill, in most cases referring to headaches, stomach-aches, pain in the knees, and diarrhoea. These are actually either illnesses we know as syphilis and rheumatism, or illnesses resulting from weakness and chronic starvation. Fever was frequently mentioned as illness and in most cases referred to malaria. Lack of hygiene and the hazards imposed by their physical environment played an important role, especially in children's illnesses. This category of illnesses can be cured with the help of 'traditional' medicine, known by many old men and women and some younger male specialists in herbal healing.

Other illnesses were more difficult to classify. They seemed to have an important psychological component, i.e. mental illness or psychological problems. For the Fulɓe these illnesses are caused by ghosts (*jinnaaji*), by the consequences of jealousy (*haasidaare*) or the evil tongue (*hururuy*), by 'black magic', by birds (*pooli*), by the wind (also associated with ghosts) (*henndu*), or by witches

(*sukunyaaße*). They are connected to the invisible world, a world which ordinary people cannot enter, but they are also caused by individuals who want to do evil to others, e.g. by 'black magic', *sukunyaaße* are transformed people often from another ethnic group. This category of illnesses may therefore be seen as resulting from the disturbance of relations with the outside/invisible world and from a distortion of the social order (i.e. relations between individuals and between ethnic groups). Healing these afflictions is the domain of Islamic specialists (*moodibaaße*), or specialists of herbs and magic practices (*bonngobi*), or Dogon and Songhay healers. These specialists have the task of restoring harmony in relationships inside society and with the outside invisible world. Sick people will only go to these specialists when they are supported by their kin (*yimße*) or when they are wealthy enough themselves. So curing illness is different for poor and rich people in society (see De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995: 446-455).

There is a category of illnesses, caused by ghosts, witches, etc., which correlates with gender. It is mostly women who are subject to these illnesses. A clear example is *henndu* (wind) which is also linked to *jinnaaji*. Susceptibility to this illness is inherited via the female line. *Pooli* is a childhood illness, but women are also regularly tormented by it.

Alongside these two explanations, illness has to do with people's inability to cope with difficult situations, their state of mental or existential insecurity, or from the loss of too many people (parents who die young, loss of young children, loss of friends, misery surrounding people), all of which are traumatic experiences. The loss of norms and values as a result of crisis may also lead to physical illness (cf. Tinta 1993: 217). This is illustrated by the remarks of old women that if their sons would return they would be less ill than they were, or that the lack of milk made them ill, which refers to the lack of care they experience. For these women, illness is a consequence of lack of care and of social breakdown. In fact they express the feeling that they no longer have people to rely upon, that they are lacking *yimße*. If an ill person is cared for, it shows that he or she has assets, either *yimße* or wealth (the latter is related to nobility).

The experience of social or existential insecurity mainly leads to psychological complaints. This is how we would categorise *pooli* and *henndu*, which are mainly female complaints, although a physical problem is often the underlying cause. It is the combination of illness with social and existential insecurity which leads people to develop psychological complaints. Thus, especially for women, falling ill may be an expression of the constraints and tensions emanating from the difficult situation they find themselves in. This seems no option for men, when they can no longer cope with the situation they are forced to leave society or they become insane.

Nevertheless, being ill in itself does not endanger one's social and existential security in society. On the contrary being ill may reinforce one's social identity: the sick person enters a circuit of healers, who are all representing aspects of Fulße cultural norms and values; being seriously ill is in itself part of being a Pullo. Searching to cure an illness can be a demonstration to society that one is wealthy (by visiting an important *moodibo*) or that one has a lot of support, implying that one has *yimße*. These are both important assets for a noble Pullo. Visiting a healer of another ethnic group may also carry prestige. However, if one has neither wealth nor *yimße*, the situation becomes difficult.

Death

The ways in which the pastoral Fulße perceive death and experience the death of their relatives, their children and their friends highlight the fact that for them life is insecure in all its consequences. This insecurity is bundled into the experience of death and probably also of birth which is so closely related to death. The Fulße live in the 'neighbourhood of death' (*vivre dans le voisinage de la mort*) (Spittler 1992: 310), which reinforces the existential insecurities people face from day to day and from year to year.

The Fulße do not talk about the dead and there is little public mourning. The dead are buried as quickly as possible and ephemeral condolences are made afterwards, all in silence. Only the Imam

and the men present pray at an adult's grave. A woman who expresses her grief by crying is urgently requested to stop by other women. The death of a child under the age of five is surrounded by even less ceremony. For a relative outsider it is very difficult to even notice such a death. Children are buried in a special graveyard, and no condolences are paid. The children simply disappear from daily talk as if they never existed and finally are no longer mentioned in the number of children a woman has.

The explanation people give to death is not directly related to the way they interpret illness. Death comes when it is time: *saatu makko wari* (his or her time has come), and it is attributed to the will of Allah. So if one has to die, this simply happens and it is not considered to be directly related to the illness one had before death. The death of young children is often attributed to the fact that a child was too beautiful to live on earth. This and the silence around death may be a way for the Fulße to cope with the high number of people dying, young women in or just after childbirth, small children, adolescents who migrate, and many old people. If all these deaths were to be seen as a consequence of illness, i.e. as a disturbance of relations with the outside world and as a result of the breakdown of social order, this would endanger the existence of society as a moral community, especially in times of crisis when the death rate increases.

This 'simple' explanation and the silence that surrounds death was difficult for me to accept. I found it unbelievable that people were so hard, or seemingly emotionless. There had to be another side to this aspect of life. The rational explanation that people could not do otherwise because of the danger of disruption of their society is still questionable although it may be a valid one. Probably experiencing it oneself is the only way to understand what is going on (see Rosaldo 1987).[11] Some people, however,

[11] The absence of extensive funeral rites may have made me more aware of the grief and emotions which individuals must experience. The study of death does not usually go into this aspect of death, when it is only limited to the description of funerals and when it only tries to order the basic emotions of death in institutional forms of society (Rosaldo 1987). Of course I did not experience the numerous deaths which people who are part of Fulbe society experience, but to a certain extent the experiences were similar: living in this society I witnessed the death of two good friends and many children. Moreover, many people told me about the relatives, friends and children they had lost. The sick were literally part of my life, and I was ill myself several times, even going through so-called Fulbe illnesses.

showed me that, also for them, the death of beloved friends or family was difficult to accept. It was impossible for them to express their feelings of sorrow in the public sphere surrounding death. For these people the many deaths with which they are confronted forced them into existential questions, into silent grief, and even trauma. It is difficult to explain how this takes form because people are silent about it. I will present two examples of desperate people.

Umu died a few weeks after she gave birth to her third daughter. Her husband left her a couple of months before because he wanted to marry another woman. When Umu fell ill, as a consequence of an infection and weakness after the hardships of the dry season and pregnancy, her husband was worried. He told us afterwards that he still loved her. When she died he went out of his mind with grief. He cared very much for her, but during her death and her burial he could not express his grief. We met him one night in the bush wandering around on his camel, with sad eyes and very silent. The next day he came to us privately in tears to ask for a feeding bottle for his small daughter, for whose life he feared too.

Another day I visited Jeneba, a mother of seven sons. I did not know her very well, so I did not notice that her youngest son was not there. She asked me, full of grief, why did I not mention that her child of two was not there. Why did I not ask about him? He had died a few days before. She wanted me to break the silence.

Why do all these young people, old men and women die? The number of deaths is increasing as was stated by Kumboore at the beginning of this article. I had intense experiences related to death mostly in the second part of my fieldwork and only at the end did I start to become aware of the silence surrounding it with its possible implications for the people. The self-control, or the repression of emotions, which people show during these essential experiences in their lives, may lead to psychological problems and mental disturbances for women and to plain full-blown insanity in men. However, at this stage, I do not feel capable of making any conclusive statements on this topic.

Discussion

In this chapter I have tried to explore cultural expressions of crisis situations which are so 'normal' for people in the arid zones of West Africa. The recurring insecurities with which people and societies are confronted have led to a specific 'organisation' of society, which is reflected in the way people perceive life itself. I have illustrated this by showing how the Fulɓe perceive and confront poverty, illness and death. My argument is that the crisis/insecurity perspective as a starting point for an analysis of the organisation of society and cultural change may lead us to a different view on Fulɓe society. It also opens new dimensions for the analysis of cultural change. This perspective leads us to direct research to the interplay between the individual and social level, and it forces us to focus on other institutions in society than those which we normally study, such as poverty relief, illness, and social security mechanisms. It encourages us to direct attention more to action than to structure, and to the periphery of society rather than to its core. This type of research however raises important methodological problems: the researcher will mainly be confronted with silence, with a negation of the situation, with subjects that are not openly discussed in daily discourses. Yet socio-cultural changes seem to be faster and more fundamental in these domains. In this discussion, I will elaborate on the cultural changes which took place among the Fulɓe in the Hayre, analyse how the Fulɓe organise their society around crisis, and comment on their silence.

Living in a situation of recurrent crisis leading to unremitting deprivation influences the people in the Hayre profoundly; not only in daily practice, in the sense that they are more frequently ill than in the past, that they eat differently, that they are entering new social relations and adhering more strongly to Islam, but also in their mental well-being. When an old woman is not cared for by her own children, when one's lineage falls apart, and when one's dearest die or migrate, the vision one has of one's own life changes deeply. Consequently, past experiences are differently interpreted, influencing ideas and expectations of the future. "People decide on the basis of a wide range of past experiences, rather than on a vision on the future, while these recollections of the past depend to a great extent on our intellectual concerns in the present" (Ortiz 1980: 188). However, ideas about the past may also lead to the development of a 'uchronia', an image of a more prosperous past which leads people to live mentally in the past, thus obscuring the reality of the present. Old women and some relatively rich families are exemplary. However, this is not a general cultural phenomenon. Other people deny their history by entering new social relations and exploring Islamic values in a different manner. Still, they are silent about their misery.

These changes in people's minds with regard to their vision of 'self', of their culture and society may not appear directly in the way they express themselves. The idiom of society may stay the same, though expressing a totally different reality. The discourses of coping with the situation of recurring insecurity — the most prominent in the Fulɓe society being the discourse on nobility — adopt a new and different meaning. In the minds of the Fulɓe, the poverty of today stands in sharp contrast to their wealth in the past associated with nobility. It is difficult to accept poverty and this results in real problems of identity maintenance for people. Within this discourse, the poor opt for a way out by stressing the values of Islam to the detriment of pastoral values and social Fulɓe values (*yimɓe*). The content of this last category is also changing. *Yimɓe* may no longer be only kin, but also people from other ethnic groups or from an Islamic network.

Hence it cannot be said that after a crisis people return to a normal life, i.e. the life they lived before the crisis, in which they pick up old social relations and institutions 'as if nothing happened', as was suggested by Spittler and Rahmato. The changes in the individual's minds and in social relations have been too profound and fundamental. Accelerated cultural change is the inevitable outcome of these processes.

Institutions in society also change as a consequence of crisis situations. It was shown, however, that the institutions concerning the poor and the sick, the perception of illness and poverty, and social coping mechanisms are influenced by the fact that poverty is a recurrent phenomenon, and that society needs an outlet for the

problems people encounter in such [illegible] of society may be the importance of the discourse on nobility, related norms and values for human behaviour which are part of the definitions of social and individual identities. The control which this discourse has on the members of society is immense. It leaves people little room to look for alternatives, other than in the realm of discourse. People who can no longer keep to these values are forced out of society, which seems to be the only way to escape this control.

The discourse on nobility also gives people an excuse for not concerning themselves with the poor. There is no outspoken obligation to help the poor, who must look after themselves. However, this does not explain why the Fulɓe have developed this attitude. It cannot be totally explained but we have to raise the question. In the literature two possible explanations on a societal level can be found. One was given by Dupire, who links the absence of extended gift networks in a nomadic culture to the necessary mobility and flexibility. If people are mobile it is impractical to built up extensive gift networks (Dupire 1970: 35). Another reason may be that in a highly insecure environment the risks are the same for everyone, a so-called co-variance of risk. Sharing in such situations is unlikely to occur (Platteau 1991, Van Dijk 1994).

Both the difficulty of facing the consequences of a crisis, and the way in which society copes with it by its high internal control, force people to be silent. 'Silence' means that people have no way out, that they have difficulties in interpreting their past and in formulating a vision of the future. An explicit expression of this is the silence around death. Death does not only threaten one's personal life, but also the very existence of society. Silence about the difficulties that one encounters is also a mechanism of self-protection. The co-variance of risks in these drought-prone areas leads to a situation in which tomorrow anyone can be a victim, and it is better to look in the first instance to one's own survival. This can be interpreted as selfishness, but it is probably the only human reaction possible.

CHAPITRE QUATORZE

MUTATIONS ET CRISE D'IDENTITÉ AU FUUTA JALOO: LA FIN DU PASTORALISME?

THIERNO BAH

Opérant sur la longue durée, des facteurs divers, à la fois politiques, sociaux et écologiques ont abouti à une série de mutations, voire à une crise d'identité chez les Fulɓe du Fuuta Jaloo. Il est particulièrement remarquable que cette région, ou l'élevage a occupé autrefois une place privilégiée dans le processus d'accumulation et de différenciation sociale, ait progressivement délaissé cette activité. Par rapport au pastoralisme, dont l'économie est fondamentalement tributaire de l'élevage, il s'agit donc de changements qui jouent sur la construction même de l'ethnicité des Fulɓe du Fuuta Jaloo. Ceux-ci, progressivement, auront perdu un paramètre important de leur mode de vie et de leur culture, pour évoluer dans des schémas nouveaux nés de la sédentarisation, puis de la globalisation opérée par le système colonial, dans le cadre territorial défini par les frontières de la Guinée, ou dans un contexte régional. Au lendemain de l'indépendance, ce cadre sera investi par le discours et les pratiques nationalitaires, qui auront tendance à reléguer les Fulɓe dans la marginalité, faisant des conquérants et aristocrates d'hier des cadets politiques.

Ces préliminaires donnent l'orientation à mon étude, qui se veut une synthèse ayant pour objet d'examiner les corrélations des facteurs écologiques, humains, économiques et politiques qui sont à l'origine de mutations diverses dans le Fuuta Jaloo. Dans cette perspective, une série de questions se posent, portant à la fois sur les liens entre le passé et le présent, sur le degré de déstructuration de la société et de l'économie traditionnelles, sur la péjoration de l'environnement, sur l'impact de la colonisation et de l'Etat postcolonial, au regard du pastoralisme et de l'identité des Fulɓe du