

HISTORY OF LOGIC

I

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ENGLISH LOGIC IN ITALY
IN THE 14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES

ACTS OF THE 5TH EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM
ON MEDIEVAL LOGIC AND SEMANTICS

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CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	9
<i>Participants</i>	10
W. J. COURTENAY, The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy	13
O. LEWRY, Robertus Anglicus and the Italian Kilwardby	33
F. DEL PUNTA, La <i>Logica</i> di R. Feribrigge nella tradizione manoscritta italiana	53
A. MAIERÙ, Le ms. Oxford, Canonici misc. 219 et la <i>Logica</i> de Strode	87
S. EBBESEN & J. PINBORG, Thott 581 4°, or <i>De ente rationis, De definitione accidentis, De probatione terminorum</i>	111
C. H. KNEEPKENS, The Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the <i>Obligationes</i> Tract <i>Ob rogatum</i>	147
L. M. DE RIJK, Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator	167
K. H. TACHAU, The Response to Ockham's and Aureol's Epistemology (1320-1340)	185
M. MARKOWSKI, Die Anschauungen des Walter Burleigh über die Universalien	219
E. P. BOS, Peter of Mantua's Tract on <i>Appellatio</i> and his Interpretation of Immanent Forms	231
A. DE LIBERA, Apollinaire Offredi critique de Pierre de Mantoue: le <i>Tractatus de instanti</i> et la logique du changement	253
A. D. CONTI, Alcune note sulla <i>Expositio super universalialia Porphyrii et artem veterem Aristotelis</i> di Paolo Veneto: analogie e differenze con i corrispondenti commenti di Walter Burley	293
M. MUGNAI, La <i>Expositio reduplicatarum</i> chez Walter Burleigh et Paulus Venetus	305
R. VAN DER LECQ, Paul of Venice on Composite and Divided Sense	321

E. KARGER, La supposition materielle comme supposition significative: Paul de Venise, Paul de Pergula	331
H.A.H. BRAAKHUIS, Paul of Pergula's Commentary on the <i>Sophismata</i> of William Heytesbury	343
G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI, Il commento di Angelo di Fossombrone al <i>De</i> <i>tribus praedicamentis</i> di Guglielmo Heytesbury	359

Indices

Index of Manuscripts	377
Index of Names	381

PREFACE

The fifth European Symposium on Logic and Semantics in the Middle Ages was held at the Facoltà di Lettere, Università di Roma from 10 to 14 November 1980. The theme of the Symposium, English logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries, is a vast and a complex one, but also a subject which demands investigation; that it is central to the study of the history of logic in the late middle ages is now recognised. The Symposium brought to the attention of scholars the various tendencies in recent research, the growth of interest in the scholastic side of Italian learning in the 14th and 15th centuries and its place within the contemporary European context.

The papers published here deal with key moments in the process by which English logic penetrated Italy, and offer a clearer picture than has previously been available of those « barbarous Britains » so frequently the target of Humanist polemic, so influential for Italian scholastics.

The various contributions are linked around three aspects of the subject proposed for discussion: the penetration of English logic into Italy and the manuscript sources; the debate on gnoseology and semantics on both sides of the Channel and the influence of this debate within Italy; some doctrinal aspects of the influence of English logic on Pietro degli Alboini da Mantova († c. 1400), Paolo Veneto († 1429) and Paolo da Pergola († 1454).

Taken as a whole these papers offer us without doubt the most wide-ranging survey to date of the problems facing students of the relationship between English logic and Italian scholasticism at the close of the middle ages. It is hoped that the conclusions gathered together here will constitute a point of departure for further enquiry.

Finally, as editor of this volume, I would like to thank the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (C.N.R.) for the grant which made

E. P. BOS

PETER OF MANTUA'S TRACT ON « APPELLATIO »
AND HIS INTERPRETATION OF IMMANENT FORMS

It is not, I think, a matter of course, that this paper, with the title 'Peter of Mantua's Tract on *Appellatio* and His Interpretation of Immanent Forms', should be given at a conference dedicated to the role played by English logic in XIVth and XVth century Italy. For it will not be the conclusion of this paper that Peter¹ in the aforementioned tract is influenced by, or enters into discussion with, English logicians.

Nevertheless, this contribution to the conference is justified, I feel, by the consideration that a proper understanding of Peter of Mantua's theory may open the way to a fuller appreciation of the development of XIVth and XVth century Italian logic.

Some indication of Peter's importance to the history of logic in Italy is given by the numerous commentaries on, and discussions of, his works² in humanist editions of logical texts and by the frequent references to him in the margins of such works³.

Perhaps one might eventually be able to conclude that this short study bears in itself the conclusion that in his theory on appellation Peter is related to English logicians, for example, to Burleigh, Heytesbury, Billingham, Wyclif (whether directly or indirectly, whether as opponent or follower); we might bear in mind that Maierù⁴ has shown this relationship to hold for some other parts of Peter's *Logica*, and

¹ On Peter's life, see, esp., Maierù, 1974: 155-7, where the reader is referred to all relevant sources.

² See, e.g., Paul of Venice: 1971, 1978, 1979 *passim*; Bassano Politi, in: Maierù, 1972: 37, n. 119; Apollinare Offredi da Cremona, in: Maierù, 1974: 158, n. 29.

³ See, e.g. below, p. 232.

⁴ See Maierù, 1974.

that Wilson⁵ points to Peter's heavy dependence on Heytesbury's *Regule*, both in his *Logica* and in his other major philosophical treatise, viz. the *De instanti*. It is however beyond the scope of the present paper to come to final conclusions about Peter's relation to these English logicians.

First, I shall make some preliminary remarks about the text of Peter's *De appellationibus* and about the division of the treatise. I shall then discuss Peter's theory of *appellatio* itself, primarily as it is presented in the aforementioned treatise. My principal aim is to show that in his tract on appellations, Peter takes the concept of immanent forms seriously, emphasizing the part played by the verb of the proposition in which the appellating term is used. My claim is that Peter's approach to this problem is more consistent than that of his opponent, Albert of Saxony, and also than that of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, two other Parisian logicians.

Peter has divided his treatise into two parts, which correspond to the two principal elements of his theory of *appellatio*, namely, *appellatio forme* on the one hand, and, what was called by contemporary logicians *appellatio rationis*, on the other⁶. Peter does not discuss these two forms of *appellatio* as related the one to the other. In this paper I shall try to show their intrinsic relation.

The text I have used for this paper is the 1477 incunable text of Peter's *Logica*, which was printed in Padua and which is preserved in the British Library⁷. I have compared this text of the *De appellationibus* with one of the manuscripts⁸ of Peter's *Logica*, viz. MS Vaticano, *Bibl. Apost. Vat.*, lat. 2135, dated 1416⁹.

⁵ Wilson, 1960: 36-7 and, esp., p. 177 (n. 20).

⁶ See below, p. 242.

⁷ Risse, 1965 II, is wrong in saying that the British Library possesses the 1483 edition, printed in Papia. Other editions are: Venice 1480, *ib.* 1490. Another edition is preserved as: Vatican, *Bibl. Ap. Vat.* Vat. Ross. 1769. I do not know where it was printed.

⁸ The other manuscripts known to me are: Mss Mantua, *Bibl. Comm.* A ΠΙ 12, f. 1r-94v (dating 1420); Venice, *Bibl. Marc.*, L. VI, 128 (2559), f. 1-80 (dating 1424); Venice, *Padr. Red.* 457, f. 1-75 (XVth c.); MS Vaticano, *Bibl. Ap. Vat.* Vat. lat. 2189 contains two chapters of Peter's *Logica*, viz. the *De terminis officialibus* and the *De equipollentiis* (on f. 11v-13v) (see Maier, 1961: 214). Almost complete are (cf. Risse, 1979: 121): MS Oxford, *Bodl. Libr.*, Canon misc. 219, f. 58ra-126rb (a. 1393); MS Berlin, *Hamilton coll.* 525 (f. 58r-124vb) (cf. Boese, 1966: 253) (a. 1419).

⁹ Cf. Maier, 1961: 31; see also: Maierù, 1972: 34.

The 1477 incunable text is of mediocre quality. It should be emended in several places. Comparison with the Vatican manuscript indicates for example at least two interpolations in the incunable version of Peter's *De appellationibus*: one at the beginning¹⁰ and one at the end of the tract¹¹.

The work of such an important logician as Peter of Mantua deserves, I feel, a critical edition. I have the pleasure to announce that Prof. Maierù, Prof. Del Punta and I are preparing one¹².

1. Peter of Mantua on 'appellatio forme'

As has been said, Peter's tract on appellations contains two parts. This is clearly indicated both in the humanist edition and in the Vatican manuscript.

In the first part Peter discusses *appellatio forme*. This part can be divided as follows¹³:

1. His opponents' definition of *appellatio forme* (f. 17ra, l. 37 - f. 17rb, l. 5)¹⁴.
2. Peter's criticism of this definition (f. 17rb, l. 6 - f. 17rb, l. 37).
3. Three rules given by his opponents (f. 17rb, l. 37 - f. 17va, l. 7).
4. Peter's criticism of these rules (f. 17va, l. 7 - f. 17vb, l. 38).
5. An objection to Peter's criticism (f. 17vb, l. 38 - f. 18ra, l. 8).
6. Peter's reply (f. 18ra, l. 8 - f. 18ra, l. 35).
7. Some further criticism by Peter (f. 18ra, l. 35 - f. 18rb, l. 38).
8. Peter's definition of *appellatio forme* with his own comments (f. 18rb, l. 38 - f. 18vb, l. 30).

¹⁰ F. 17rb, l. 32-7 ('istud ex alio... appellat').

¹¹ F. 22ra, l. 20-33 ('unde nullus... sinonimo etc.').

¹² See the Trivial Newsletter, 1978 (nr. 1).

¹³ In this list I have omitted to mention those objections by Peter's opponents which do not substantially effect Peter's theory.

¹⁴ I thought it desirable to number the folios with Arab figures; this seems to be an easier notation, and, moreover, one that is more often used in early prints, than the combination of letters and Roman ciphers at the bottom of the incunable folios. So, I have numbered the tract on appellations: ff. 17ra-22ra. I have numbered the lines of each column on each folio 1-39. Each column of the 1477 edition contains the same number of lines.

9. First doubt followed by Peter's reply, in the form of a *questio disputata* (f. 18vb, l. 30 - f. 19ra, l. 11).
10. Second doubt, followed by Peter's reply, also in the form of a *questio disputata* (f. 19ra, l. 11 - f. 19vb, l. 8).
11. A final remark (f. 19vb, l. 8 - 25).

I shall give the division of the second part, which treats what other logicians have labelled *appellatio rationis*, below¹⁵ before discussing the subject as such.

At the very beginning of his tract on *appellatio*, Peter presents in a few lines what he calls a common view on the subject. This view holds firstly that the predicate term appellates its form, whereas the subject term does not. This common view adds, according to Peter, a statement of what should be understood by 'predicatum appellare formam'. In Peter's words, it states¹⁶:

Predicatum appellare formam est ipsum esse verificabile de pronomine demonstrante illud pro quo supponit subiectum in propositione de presenti.

This definition most probably is Albert of Saxony's¹⁷. Maierù¹⁸ indicates this, and, moreover, in the 1522 edition of Albert's *Perutilis Logica*¹⁹ reference is made in the margin to Peter's definition of *appellatio forme*. (In this very same edition, by the way, comparison is often drawn between these two logicians).

In its main features, Albert's definition follows the same lines, as that given by Peter²⁰. Peter does not mention the emphasis laid by Albert in his definition on the formal identity of, on the one hand, what is referred to by the term having *appellatio* in the original proposition, with, on the other, what is referred to by the term in the proposition in the present tense, by which the original proposition is

¹⁵ See below, p. 242.

¹⁶ F. 17rb, l. 1 - 5.

¹⁷ As is well known, Albert of Saxony taught philosophy at Paris from (at least) 24th May 1351 to 1362, before leaving for the University of Vienna (see Heidingsfelder, 1921: 7 ff.).

¹⁸ Maierù, 1972: 115.

¹⁹ Albert of Saxony, 1522: f. 16ra, l. 52 - 6.

²⁰ *Ib.*, f. 16va, l. 4 - 6.

verified. This point reappears, however, in Peter's discussion of Albert's definition²¹.

It should be noted here that Peter's opponent is certainly not Albert of Saxony alone. Most of the opponent's views and examples discussed by Peter, cannot be found in Albert's *Perutilis Logica*²². Who these other logicians are (if any), I could not determine. Maierù²³ notes that though the view discussed is Albert of Saxony's, the terminology used by Peter resembles closely that used by Marsilius of Inghen. The relationship involved, if any, seems however to be rather remote²⁴.

In the subsequent discussion, Peter says that there are two principal differences between his opponents' theory of *appellatio forme* and his own. The first difference, he says, concerns the part played by word order. The second lies in the influence exercised by the verb.

In a comparison between this definition and Peter's own definition of 'terminum appellare formam' the two major points of our author's interest come to light. Peter's own definition runs as follows²⁵:

Terminum aliquem appellare formam est ipsum significare suum formale significatum respectu alicuius verbi precedentis, vel participii, quod denotat illum terminum verificari pro materiali significato formali coniuncto pro tempore in respectu verbi.

Two preliminary remarks should be made here:

Firstly, Peter apparently understands by 'predicate term' any term which is not a subject term. I could not find a precise definition of 'predicate term' in his tracts.

Secondly, in Peter's tracts formal appellation is no longer peculiar to connotative terms. Terms belonging to Aristotle's category of substance are also said to have *appellatio*. In the tracts of the Parisian logicians John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen on

²¹ See below, p. 236.

²² For instance: Peter gives examples, in which such are terms as *homo* (first category of Aristotle), *est maior quam* (relation), *demonstratur* (appellation by a verb) etc. Those examples can not be found, as far as I see, in Albert's works (neither in those of Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, Albert's Parisian colleagues). See also below, p. 240.

²³ Maierù, 1972: 117.

²⁴ Marsilius of Inghen, 1980: 116 f.

²⁵ F. 18rb, l. 39 - f. 18va, l. 7.

the contrary, formal appellation is almost without exception attributed to connotative, and not to absolute terms²⁶.

Now, what is the discussion between Peter of Mantua and his opponents about?

Terms, and especially connotative terms, have reference to a form. Neither Peter nor his opponents, give any discussion of a possible reference to a Platonic Idea. Neither party speaks of *suppositio forme* or anything like it. For all the logicians involved, individual things are composed of matter and form, whereby the form is integrated in matter, and constitutes with it a *compositum*.

How then should a logician interpret this metaphysics? According to Peter, Albert of Saxony's interpretation is not consistent enough. The same criticism of Peter's would apply to Buridan's and Marsilius' view, which is identical to Albert's in this respect.

When a term appellates its form, Peter says, a form realised in matter is referred to, and this reference is brought about in a proposition by way of a verb. Outside a proposition, says Peter²⁷, a term can only signify its formal significate. For example: *albus*, when used outside a proposition, signifies *albedo*. *Appellatio* is *significatio* with respect to a verb. The verb causes a term to appellate to a form realised in matter or, in other words, makes a term appellate its *significatum formale* as residing in a *significatum materiale*.

Peter illustrates his theory by the following example²⁸: *tu vidisti album*. In this proposition, Peter says, the term *album* appellates its form. This appellation is brought about by the verb, which denotes that you have seen a thing which was white at the time at which you saw it²⁹.

So, the *appellatio* of the immanent form is brought about by the verb *vidisti*, but the appellating term not only stands in relation to the tense of the verb, which is signified by the substantive verb in that tense (viz. *erat*)³⁰, but also in relation to the adjectival part of this verb, viz. *videre*. So, the formal appellation is seen as a determination of the content denoted by the verb.

²⁶ See John Buridan, 1957: 343; Albert of Saxony, 1522: 16ra, l. 52 f.; Marsilius of Inghen, 1980: 116.

²⁷ F. 18va, l. 14 - 25.

²⁸ F. 18va, l. 25 - 6.

²⁹ F. 18va, l. 26 - 30.

³⁰ On *Verbum substantivum*, see, e.g., Maierù, 1972: 199. It is a *verbum secundi adiacentis*: that is: expressing existence.

The latter conclusion is the core of Peter's theory of formal appellation, and in this point can be found the intrinsic relation to his theory of the appellation of terms that are construed with and follow intentional verbs like *scire*, *significare* etc. I shall come back to this relationship later³¹.

We shall find another formulation of Peter's theory of formal appellation when we consider his reply to the first doubt³². Here it is asked whether the subject term of a proposition can have formal appellation. Thus Peter's other major point of difference with Albert's definition comes under discussion. By studying Peter's answer to this problem, the core of Peter's theory of formal appellation is brought to light.

Here follows this important part of Peter's tract³³:

Ideo dicitur quod subiectum aliquando appellat formam. Et hoc est quando postponitur verbo, vel participio. Et etiam aliquando predicatum non appellat formam, quando anteponitur verbo, saltem respectu istius verbi. Quia nullus terminus appellat formam respectu verbi aut participii sequentis. Unde in ista *album videbit nigrum* li *nigrum* appellat formam respectu illius verbi *videbit*. Quia ista propositio *album videbit nigrum* denotat quod album videbit rem cui erit iniuncta nigredo reddens istam rem nigram pro tempore pro quo album videbit istam rem. Subiectum autem non appellat formam respectu istius verbi *videbit*, sed respectu verbi substantivi istius temporis cuius est verbum a quo accipit suppositionem. Unde ista *album videbit nigrum* significat quod illud quod erit album videbit nigrum pro tempore pro quo erit nigrum. Et ideo ista propositio *album videbit nigrum* pro pluribus verificari potest ex parte illius termini *album* quam ex parte illius termini *nigrum*. Et causa est quia terminus precedens hoc verbum *videbit* supponit virtualiter respectu verbi substantivi de futuro. Quod patet resolvendo: *album erit videns nigrum*.

Eandem quoque vim habent alia verba adiectiva a parte ante sicut verba (f. 19ra) substantiva eiusdem temporis cuius sunt illa, licet (*MS*, hec *inc.*) non liceat resolvere omnia in sua participia propter penuriam vocabulorum non convertibiliter significantium. Li *nigrum* autem supponit respectu verbi adiectivi vel participii adiectivi.

Ideo ista propositio significat quod illud quod erit album vide-

³¹ See below, p. 246.

³² F. 18va, l. 30 - f. 19ra, l. 11.

³³ F. 18vb, l. 6 - f. 19ra, l. 11.

bit nigrum, non simpliciter quod erit nigrum, sed quod erit nigrum pro tempore pro quo videbitur.

It is clear from this text, firstly, that the formal appellation of a term is brought about by the verb, when the term follows the verb. This word order is evidently of secondary importance to the influence brought to bear by the tense of the verb and the adjectival part of the verb.

Secondly, the proposition *album videbit nigrum* is analysed as has been shown above³⁴. In his semantics Peter takes seriously the immanence of blackness in its appropriate matter.

Furthermore, the precise interpretation of the formal appellation of a term, which follows a verb and is construed with it, is even more clear when we take into consideration Peter's interpretation of a term's signification when this term is the subject term and precedes the verb. Peter says that the proposition *album videbit nigrum* can be verified for more referents with regard to the term *album* than with regard to the term *nigrum*. The reason is, says Peter, that the subject term appellates its form with respect to a substantive verb in the same tense as the verb, from which it draws its supposition. Peter's statement that *album* has appellation seems somewhat strange and to be in contradiction to his earlier theory that a term preceding a verb does not have formal appellation. I take it that a term preceding a verb has supposition, not appellation. In this respect, Peter's view comes close to what the three Parisian logicians, Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen in fact say, though there is a small difference, which I shall discuss in a note to this paper³⁵.

³⁴ See above, p. 236.

³⁵ The difference is that these Parisian logicians all include in some respect a verb of the present tense in their analysis of propositions with verbs in the past, or future, tense. Marsilius (1980: 130, and my comments *ad locum* on pp. 225-6) analyses, for example, *album erit nigrum* into: *quod actu habet albedinem sufficientem vel in futuro habebit albedinem sufficientem erit nigrum*. Buridan does the same (see Buridan: *Tractatus de suppositionibus*, 1957: 345 f.; *id.*, *Sophismata*, 1977: 63. See also De Rijk's comments on Buridan's theory (De Rijk, 1976: 96). Albert (1522: f. 16vb, l. 7-13) analyses the proposition *album fuit nigrum* by saying that this should have been true: *hoc est album*.

This difference between, on the one hand, Peter's view and, on the other, that of the Parisian logicians seems to lie in a detail, but is characteristic of Peter's view concerning the part played by the tense of the verb (as opposed to

The proposition is verified for fewer referents with regard to *nigrum* because the verb exercises its influence (*vis*³⁶) upon the term, which follows it, which only has supposition on account of the *adjectival* component of the verb. The influence exercised by the verb, not only by its tense, but also by its adjectival component, is decisive. The act of seeing is determined as to its content by the thing that is black.

So, in this proposition, two immanent forms are at issue. Firstly the *albedo* in *album*. But this term, preceding the verb, only has supposition. Secondly, the *nigredo* in the act of seeing.

It should be noted that Peter's example here is *album videbit nigrum*, and not: *album erit nigrum*. Peter's example is of a proposition with an adjectival verb, rather than with a substantive verb, which would be the kind of proposition usually discussed by the three Parisian logicians mentioned above. However, the latter type of proposition could also be accommodated by Peter's theory, and this can in fact be inferred from other parts of Peter's tract. Clearly, his main interest is in the adjectival verb *videre*, which denotes an exterior act of the mind.

Let us proceed to Peter's criticism of his opponents' definition of *appellatio forme*. It will become clear in the course of his criticism that his theory of physics plays a prominent role.

As has been said above, Peter considers word order to be more important than grammatical function. The three Parisian logicians did not consider explicitly the case where the subject term follows the verb. They based their theories on the normal word order of medieval Latin, viz. subject-copula-predicate³⁷.

As has been mentioned above³⁸, the second major point of Peter's criticism of Albert's definition is that there are many cases of formal appellation, where the predicate term is not verifiable with respect to a demonstrative pronoun, and where there is no corresponding proposition in the present tense, which signifies in the same way. Peter

those of the Parisian logicians). See also the text, p. 237 (see also: Marsilius of Inghen, 1980: 130, and my comments *ad locum*, p. 225-6).

³⁶ The *vis verbi* plays an important role in Peter's tracts on the properties of terms. See, e.g. his *De suppositionibus*, f. 1ra, l. 34.

³⁷ Cf. Robins, 1976: 84. In Marsilius' tract, e.g. the phrase 'a parte ante' seems to be synonymous with 'a parte subjecti'. So, correspondingly, the phrase 'a parte post' seems to be synonymous with 'a parte predicati'.

³⁸ See above, p. 234.

criticizes Albert for failing to see that formal appellation is brought about by the verb, that is, at least by the tense of the verb, but possibly also by its adiectival part. In Peter's view the verb plays the most important role.

Our author devotes more elaborate discussion to this point than to his first point of criticism concerning word order. He gives several examples of propositions which are meant to show that the analysis which Albert has in mind does not apply to all cases of formal appellation. For example this proposition, Peter says, is true³⁹: *Sortes non demonstratur*. There is appellation of a form, viz. *demonstratio*, but this proposition in the present tense is never true: *hoc non demonstratur*, where *Sortes* is indicated⁴⁰.

Though Peter's other examples are all interesting, I draw special attention to Peter's frequent use of examples originating from the domain of physics. He is interested firstly in those examples in which the notion *instans* ('moment') plays a part, and, secondly and more generally, where there is reference to topics of physics⁴¹.

First, the notion *instans*. According to Peter, it is true to say *incipit instans*. Here there is formal appellation. However, it is never true to say: *incipit hoc instans*⁴². Although it is possible that there will be a *medium instans hore*, and consequently, by hypothesis, an *instans* prior to this *medium instans*, and another *instans* following it, any determination by way of a proposition in the present tense in which it is said *incipit hoc instans* is impossible⁴³. This conclusion is in agreement with Wilson's interpretation of what Peter conceives of as *instans*⁴⁴.

That Peter's physical theory, in which the transitory character of things is emphasized, plays an important part in his semantics, is even more clear from the following examples: it is true to say, according to Peter: *aliqua propositio erit vera*, where formal appellation occurs, while it is never true to say *ipsa est vera*. For a proposition is uttered part by part: by the time that the predicate term is uttered, the subject term is no longer there. The same applies for a *vox*⁴⁵. As far as

³⁹ F. 17va, l. 8-20.

⁴⁰ Cf. Ashworth, 1974: 82.

⁴¹ For a discussion of Peter's theory of physics, see esp., Wilson, 1960: 36-7.

⁴² F. 17va, l. 30-1.

⁴³ F. 19va, l. 26-39.

⁴⁴ See Wilson, 1960: 36.

⁴⁵ F. 17vb, l. 19-25.

these propositions and sounds are meaningful entities, Peter clearly considers them as tokens, not as types. The statement: 'Omnis qualitas est gradualis' is axiomatic in Peter's physics. Qualities are successively, rather than instantaneously acquired and lost, Wilson says ⁴⁶.

It is not possible, Peter concludes, that to any true proposition in the past or future tense there should correspond a proposition in the present tense. Only in some cases this is possible. Peter is not clear in all respects, I feel. He says ⁴⁷: when a proposition consists of *termini simplices pro una et simplici re supponentes*, and when this proposition will be, or has been, true during a certain moment, in that case there is a corresponding proposition in the present tense. He probably means that, if a proposition such as the following is true: *Sortes erat homo*, this proposition was once true: *Sortes est homo*. To this kind of proposition, Albert's definition can be applied ⁴⁸. The definition of his opponents is too narrow, Peter concludes ⁴⁹.

The part played by the verb, and especially its tense, is further elaborated in the paragraph that Peter devotes to the adverb. He takes the meaning of 'adverb', which is: a determination *added to* a verb, strictly.

His opponents are wrong, Peter thinks, in considering such propositions as *Deus erit cras* ⁵⁰ as false. They think them to be false, because the proposition *hoc est cras* said of God cannot be true. Still, in the original proposition *Deus erit cras*, the predicate term is said to have appellation. No doubt, Peter has in mind Albert's interpretation ⁵¹. Any adverb like *cras* cannot be retained in its proper form, Peter says. The rule for these cases is: 'Sicut mutatur copula, ita debet mutari sua determinatio' ⁵². So, the corresponding proposition, pronounced in the future, should be this: *hoc est nunc*.

Peter's opponents try to interpret *cras* as *crastina dies* ⁵³, that is,

⁴⁶ See Wilson, 1960: 37.

⁴⁷ F. 18ra, l. 20-6.

⁴⁸ See Albert of Saxony, 1522: 16rb, l. 51-3.

⁴⁹ F. 18ra, l. 30.

⁵⁰ F. 18ra, l. 38 - f. 18rb, l. 30.

⁵¹ F. 19va, l. 14. That Peter in mind Albert of Saxony, is clear, too, in the concluding section (f. 19va, l. 8-25) of the first part of the tract, when Peter says that there is no difference in truth value between *nunc necessario Deus est* and *Deus necessario est nunc*. This is contrary to Albert's opinion (see Albert of Saxony, 1522: 16va, l. 50-62; see also below, p. 242).

⁵² F. 18rb, l. 10-1.

⁵³ F. 18ra, l. 31-8.

as a sort of thing; and, on this basis, to break the link between the adverb and the verb. In the first doubt in this part of his tract, Peter emphasizes the unity of verb and adverb. He does not accept as valid the inferences given by his opponents such as: *aliquando tu eris omnis homo, ergo tu eris omnis homo*⁵⁴. The opponents apparently find justification for separating the adverb from the verb in that they consider the adverb as independent of the verb. For the inference given, they find it legitimate to omit the adverb in the consequent, probably because the adverb precedes the verb in the antecedent. Peter however, interprets verb and adverb as an inseparable unity, even when the adverb precedes the verb. The adverb *cras* gives a specific determination to the time consigned by the verb. So, if in the analysing proposition the tense of the verb is altered, so the adverb should be changed. There should be a *constantia temporis*, as Peter expresses it⁵⁵.

Peter's semantics has a definite ontological counterpart. This is far from being unique in history of semantics. Peter's position, however, is specifically characterized by the part played by physics. This physical theory tells us that everything in nature is in continuous flux. It has been indicated above, that Peter's conception of *instans* is particularly important in his physics.

2. Peter of Mantua on 'appellatio rationis'

The second part of Peter's tract⁵⁶, which concerns what other logicians labelled *appellatio rationis*, is divided as follows:

1. Peter's definition of 'appellatio rationis' (f. 19vb, l. 29 - 36).
2. A *casus* (f. 19vb, l. 36 - f. 20ra, l. 3).
- 2.1. Three conclusions drawn by Peter (f. 20ra, l. 3 - 24).
- 2.2. Three counterarguments raised by opponents (f. 20ra, l. 24 - 20rb, l. 13).
- 2.3. Replies to the opponents' counterarguments (f. 20rb, l. 13 - f. 20va, l. 14).
3. First doubt (in the form of a *questio disputata*) (f. 20ra, l. 14 - f. 21rb, l. 4) (In f. 20rb, l. 28 - f. 21rb, l. 17 Peter gives six *suppositiones*).

⁵⁴ F. 19rb, l. 4-6.

⁵⁵ F. 19va, l. 14.

⁵⁶ F. 19vb, l. 29 - f. 22ra, l. 31.

4. *Second doubt* (in the form of a *questio disputata*) (f. 21vb, l. 4 - f. 22ra, l. 30).

Peter starts his discussion by presenting a description of the function of such intentional verbs as *scio*, *cognosco*, *intelligo* etc. He says⁵⁷:

Verba significantia actum mentis, ut 'scio', 'cognosco', 'intelligo' etc. denotant cognitionem rerum significatarum a terminis sequentibus ipsa verba per conceptum (conceptam *inc.*), vel conceptus synonymos cum illis terminis sequentibus ista verba, et hoc in recto, vel in obliquo.

To my mind, Peter interprets the function of intentional verbs in a special way, which differs, for example, from the theories of the Parisian masters mentioned above. Peter says: intentional verbs, such as 'to know' etc. indicate an act of knowledge of the things signified etc. My claim is that Peter assigns the *appellatio rationis*⁵⁸ to the verb which signifies an interior act of the mind, and not to the term that follows this kind of verb and is construed with it. Again, Peter assigns an important role to the verb⁵⁹.

I shall try to clarify Peter's conception of what others called *appellatio rationis* by an analysis of this part of his tract. Then, I shall indicate a difference in point of view with the Parisian masters Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen. Finally I shall consider the XVth century philosopher Hieronymus Pardus, who adopts to a certain extent Peter's view and who discusses three possible interpretations.

In his definition, Peter says that such verbs as 'scire', 'cognoscere', 'intelligere' etc. denote an act of knowledge. This act is what is first signified. Now, this knowledge is directed to things, and these are, as we have already been told by Peter⁶⁰, composites in which a form is realised in matter. These individual things are the objects of the act of knowledge by way of concepts belonging to the terms construed with the intentional verbs and following them. Concepts, of course, belong to the mind of the knowing subject.

First, Peter discusses this last point, which is of the utmost

⁵⁷ F. 19vb, l. 29-36.

⁵⁸ Peter does not use the term itself.

⁵⁹ See above, p. 238.

⁶⁰ See above, my p. 236.

importance to his theory. In the examples subsequent to his definition, Peter explains the notion *subordinatio*. These are his examples⁶¹.

1. *Ista propositio tu cognoscis Sortem significat quod tu cognoscis Sortem per hunc conceptum Sortes, in recto vel in obliquo.*
2. *Tu scis Sortem currere significat quod tu scis Sortem currere per conceptus quibus subordinatur ista propositio vocalis Sortes currit.*

These latter concepts apparently are the concepts *Sortes* and *cursus*.

We may conclude that in Peter's view, *subordinatio* is the primary semantic function of a term. Only by *subordinatio* to a concept does a conventional sign, be it written or spoken, have *significatio*. I conclude that in Peter's theory the form signified by a term, or, to put it in other words, the formal significate of a term is directly related to the act of knowledge when this term is construed with a verb like 'scire' etc. The formal significate is in fact a determination of the act of knowledge denoted by the verb.

In Peter's view, *significatio* is an *active* notion. Someone who uses a word with a certain signification, *knows* its meaning, and performs some action. In this respect, Peter comes close to e.g. Vincent Ferrer's theory as interpreted by Trentman⁶².

In his discussion of a *dubium* (to which I shall return below⁶³), Peter gives six *suppositiones* which lie at the core of his theory. In the first three *suppositiones*⁶⁴ it is said that the mental sign *Sortes* signifies *Sortes* who is perceived by the knowing subject. An *intentio alicuius rei*, Peter says in the third *suppositio*, is the *notitia incomplexa* of a thing.

In a conclusion to the *suppositiones*, Peter says⁶⁵:

Ideo est concludendum quod tales termini *Sortes*, *Plato* mere substantialia subordinantur conceptibus mere substantialibus nullam similitudinem extraneam et accidentalem connotantibus. Sicut iste terminus *homo* subordinatur uni conceptu simplici substantiali qui significat tantum (et: *add. inc.*) quantum hoc complexum *animal rationale*; non tamen subordinatur illi complexo, et sic de aliis.

⁶¹ F. 19vb, l. 36 - f. 20ra, l. 3.

⁶² See Vincent Ferrer, 1977: l. 36.

⁶³ See below, my p. 246.

⁶⁴ F. 20vb, l. 29 - f. 21ra, l. 6.

⁶⁵ F. 21rb, l. 17 - 27.

Somewhat later Peter says ⁶⁶:

Item, non potes scire hoc esse Sortem, nisi habeas in mente talem propositionem *hoc est Sortes*. Et ista non potest esse in mente nisi sit eius predicatum in mente. Et illud predicatum non potest esse in mente nisi significat Sortem, ut patet ex prima suppositione.

Peter emphasizes the part played by the knowing subject in a subject's knowledge of things. This is even more clear from his discussion of the first *dubium*.

Peter presents the following *casus* ⁶⁷: Let us assume, Sortes sits in front of someone; the latter perceives Sortes fully, and has a *notitia singularis* of Sortes. He does not know, however, that the person who sits in front of him is called Sortes. Now, the question is whether the proposition is true: *tu cognoscis Sortem*.

Peter answers ⁶⁸ that the observer indeed knows Sortes, though he does not know his name. For the conventional sign 'Sortes' is not subordinated to a concept that connotes a *vocatio*. The knowing subject does not know whether or not this proposition is true *hoc est Sortes*, when uttered by someone who points to Sortes. For, the observer does not know what this predicate name *Sortes* signifies. I take it that the observer only can say: 'I know: this is this'.

So, a complete act of knowledge of a thing is performed even when there is no form signified by a conventional sign. From this, and from other parts of his tract, it is clear, I think, that his theory of knowledge, which is, by the way, in line with Ockham's theory of *cognitio intuitiva* ⁶⁹, has a great impact on his semantic view.

It has been said above ⁷⁰, that in Peter's view, our knowledge is directed to composite things, in which a form is realised in matter. This form is immanent in the individual substance. Peter points out that acts of knowledge (and also acts of understanding, of signification) are directed to particular things, actually existent or not ⁷¹, and this takes place under a concept belonging to the term that refers to the thing.

⁶⁶ F. 21va, l. 26 - f. 21vb, l. 4.

⁶⁷ F. 20va, l. 14 - 20.

⁶⁸ F. 21ra, l. 27 - 33.

⁶⁹ See Ockham, 1974: 30 ff.; see also: Bochner, 1958: 271.

⁷⁰ See above, my p. 236, and 243.

⁷¹ F. 20rb, l. 16 - 9.

This view emerges in the following examples given by Peter⁷². I shall give them in full, because they concern the core of his theory.

1. From: *tu scis te esse hominem* it does not follow: *tu scis te esse animal*.
2. From: *iste terminus 'homo' significat hominem* it does not follow: *iste terminus 'homo' significat animal*.
3. From: *hec propositio 'Sortes currit' significat Sortem currere* it does not follow: *hec propositio significat aliquid*, for the reason that *Sortem currere* would signify *aliquid*⁷³.

To these interpretations, an opponent raises three objections⁷⁴, which are answered by Peter. Here, I shall omit the second objection, which is more theological in character. Nor is the third point directly relevant to our purpose.

The first objection deserves our full attention. The opponent says⁷⁵ that the term *homo* signifies *animal*, because *homo* signifies *hominem*, and in this notion, *animal* is understood. For, in the opponent's view a term's significate is anything which is understood by it.

Peter opposes this view⁷⁶. The *vis* of the verb *significare* extends both to things that are and to things that are not, but only — and this is important — by virtue of a concept previously held by the subject performing the act of signifying. Such verbs as *intelligere* and *significare* bear upon the *esse rei intellecte*, that is: upon the thing conceived of, not upon the concepts in virtue of which a thing is indicated as being understood. It is clear, I think, that Peter is primarily interested in the things that are understood, that is, of course, in as far as they are understood. The verb indicates an understanding of 'thing'. Of course, the 'things' involved are signified by a term which has a specific meaning. Peter, however, is not interested in the term as descriptive of a thing, but in the term as naming a thing, as denotative of the thing. He is interested, I think, in talking about certain things *understood*, not about *descriptions* of things as such.

⁷² F. 20ra, l. 3 - 24.

⁷³ Nor does it follow, Peter goes on to say: *hec propositio significat aliquid esse*, because this is only signified by the proposition: *aliquid est* (F. 20ra, l. 21-3).

⁷⁴ F. 20ra, l. 24 - f. 20rb, l. 13.

⁷⁵ F. 20ra, l. 24 - 31.

⁷⁶ F. 20rb, l. 13 - 28.

This distinction between describing and naming things, as introduced by De Rijk as a useful tool for the interpretation of ancient and medieval semantics, can be applied, I think, to Peter of Mantua's theory, too⁷⁷.

Peter emphasizes that a purely substantive term has *subordinatio*⁷⁸ to a purely substantive concept, that does not connote any external, or accidental, resemblance to something else⁷⁹. For instance, the conventional sign 'homo' is subordinated to a simple substantive concept (viz. *homo*), and signifies: *tantum quantum animal rationale*, but is not subordinated to the latter. The conventional term 'Sortes' is not subordinated to this concept: *vocatum Sortes*⁸⁰, nor to: *tale quale est homo*⁸¹, nor to: *iste homo huius coloris et tante quantitatis et in tali situ* etc.⁸². The conventional term 'Sortes' refers to a substance, by way of the corresponding natural sign *Sortes*⁸³. The reference is just a denotative one⁸⁴.

Accordingly, Peter concludes, that the proposition *tu cognoscis Sortem* signifies: *tu cognoscis illum qui est Sortes per intentionem, seu notitiam que est iste terminus mentalis Sortes, vel cui subordinatur talis terminus vocalis vel scriptus Sortes*⁸⁵.

Peter's *suppositiones* 4-6 summarise this part of his theory.

I conclude: in Peter's treatise, knowledge is seen primarily as knowledge acquired by a knowing subject. The part played by the subject is given emphasis. Any signification by a conventional sign is dependent on a concept in the knowing subject. Conventional signs are subordinated to concepts. Peter takes this seriously. The object of knowledge is a determination of the knowledge denoted by the verb. It can be said to be the content of this knowledge.

The cognition denoted by the verb is restricted to a determinate

⁷⁷ Cf. De Rijk, 1980: 1 ff. and: De Rijk, 1981 (forthcoming). See also below, p. 248.

⁷⁸ On the relation *subordinatio - significatio*, see also, e.g. Nuchelmans, 1980: 21, 124.

⁷⁹ F. 21rb, l. 17-22.

⁸⁰ F. 21ra, l. 9.

⁸¹ F. 21ra, l. 37.

⁸² F. 21ra, l. 24-5.

⁸³ F. 20vb, l. 31-5.

⁸⁴ See De Rijk, 1980.

⁸⁵ F. 21rb, l. 32-8.

cognition, namely the specific concept to which the term construed with the verb and following it, is subordinated in its signification⁸⁶.

Our knowledge is primarily directed to things, that is, as conceived in a specific way according to their specific form. This kind of knowledge is prior to any knowledge of descriptions, or analysis of the contents of things. So, prior to the knowledge of the contents of things, there is an act of knowledge, directed, of course, to something.

Therefore, in Peter's interpretation the *appellatio rationis* — as others call it — is in fact assigned to the verb, and the form appellated is a determination of the content denoted by the verb. So, the two kinds of *appellatio* discussed by Peter in the two parts of his tract are intrinsically related. The *appellatio rationis* is the same as the *appellatio formalis*: it is formal appellation peculiar to verbs which denote an interior act of mind.

In his definition of the function of intentional verbs, Peter has said that they denote an act of knowledge of things signified by the terms following those verbs etc.⁸⁷. I have tried to analyse the theory associated with this definition. Peter interprets *appellatio rationis* differently from John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen, who adopt the same position on this point.

Buridan does not give a definition of *appellatio rationis*⁸⁸. Albert's fifth rule in his paragraph on *appellatio* which deals with *appellatio rationis*, starts with the words⁸⁹: 'Quinta regula ponitur ab aliquibus etc.'. So, we are not sure whether or not Albert subscribes fully to the theory he presents. Let us, therefore, have a short look at Marsilius' text. In the seventh rule of his 'Appellationes'⁹⁰ Marsilius says:

Septima regula est quod terminus appellat rationem suam secundum quam suum significatum significat, qui sequitur aliquod verbum significans actum anime interiores, dummodo regatur a tali verbo tamquam terminans actum significatum per tale verbum.

From the example, added to this definition, it is clear that like Peter, Marsilius is talking here of the knowledge of things known.

⁸⁶ Cf. Nuchelmans' conclusions as to Pardus's theory, in: Nuchelmans, 1980: 64.

⁸⁷ F. 19va, l. 30 - 3.

⁸⁸ Buridan, 1977: 72b.

⁸⁹ Albert of Saxony, 1522: 16vb, 39.

⁹⁰ Marsilius of Inghen, 1980: 134.

Marsilius says: in the proposition *diligo pecuniam*, the term *pecuniam* appellates its particular notion. The sense of the proposition is: *diligo rem que est pecunia secundum istam rationem secundum quam dicitur pecunia*⁹¹. The difference in this respect between Peter of Mantua and Marsilius is not very great. However, in Peter's definition and in his associated theory, the implications are better thought out, especially concerning the part played by the act denoted by the intentional verb itself.

It is worth noting that in his *Medulla dialectices*⁹² the XVth century Spanish philosopher Hieronymus Pardus⁹³ mentions three conceptions of *appellatio rationis*.

The first is defined as follows:

Terminus sequens dictionem significantem actum anime interiorum rectus a tali dictione et terminans actum importatum per talem dictionem appellat precise suam propriam rationem.

This conception is said by Pardus to be commonly held, and can, without doubt, be attributed to Buridan⁹⁴ and Marsilius⁹⁵. Nuchelmans argues convincingly for this⁹⁶. In the example which he gives, *cognosco venientem*, the term *venientem* appellates the concept corresponding to it and denotes the man in question precisely in so far as he is approaching⁹⁷.

The second conception mentioned by Pardus⁹⁸ is not relevant to our purpose. The third one, however, is⁹⁹. Pardus says: there is a more subtle manner of formulation, which comes closer to truth, viz.

ponens appellationem ex parte de ly *cognosco*. Unde (f. 91va) si dico: *ego cognosco*, ly *cognosco* appellat indifferenter omnem cognitionem. Sed cum additur *cognosco hominem* ly *cognosco* restringitur ad certam cognitionem, puta ad cognitionem, seu ad conceptum specificum cui subordinatur iste terminus *homo* in significando.

⁹¹ *Ib.*

⁹² See the edition of 1505, f. 90v ff.

⁹³ He died 1502.

⁹⁴ Cf. Buridan, 1956: 333-5; 1977: 72 f.

⁹⁵ Cf. Marsilius of Inghen, 1980: 122-4; 134-9.

⁹⁶ See Nuchelmans, 1980: 64 (n. 59). Nuchelmans refers to his paragraph 4.2.4.

⁹⁷ *Ib.* p. 58.

⁹⁸ Pardus, 1505: f. 91rb.

⁹⁹ *Ib.*, f. 91rb-91va.

In the edition of Pardus' tract, this last mentioned definition is ascribed to 'Mantuanus', but not by Pardus himself; it is someone else's marginal gloss. The same glossator correctly quotes a definition of the function of intentional verbs. This indeed is the same definition that I have taken from Peter's own tract¹⁰⁰.

Pardus is correct, I think, in distinguishing the conception given above from Buridan's and Marsilius' views of *appellatio rationis*. The glossator to Pardus' text is to a large extent justified in ascribing the former conception to Peter of Mantua. The words themselves: 'Verba appellans cognitionem' do not occur in Peter's *Logica*, as far as I know. However, they touch the core of Peter's theory.

3. My conclusions are the following:

- 1.1. According to Peter of Mantua, a term's appellation of its formal significate, which inheres in a material significate, is determined by the verb.
- 1.2. Peter's theory of *appellatio forme* is heavily influenced by his theory of physics.
 - 2.1. Because of the notion *subordinatio* the emphasis in our knowledge of things is on the knowing subject.
 - 2.2. His theory of what contemporary logicians called *appellatio rationis* is primarily focussed on the denotative force of terms, not on their descriptive force.
 - 2.3. This theory is related to his general theory of knowledge.
3. Peter defines *appellatio*, both *appellatio forme* and, what others label *appellatio rationis*, as a function of the verb, by interpreting each as a determination of what is denoted by the verb.

¹⁰⁰ The third conception of *appellatio rationis*, Nuchelmans says (1973: 254-9; 1980: 64), goes back at least as far as Andreas de Novo Castro (c. 1360).

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APOLLINAIRE OFFREDI CRITIQUE DE PIERRE DE MANTOUE:
LE « TRACTATUS DE INSTANTI » ET
LA LOGIQUE DU CHANGEMENT

Le *Tractatus de instanti* de Pierre de Mantoue est certainement l'un des plus remarquables témoins de la diffusion de la logique anglaise dans l'Italie du XIV^e siècle et, plus particulièrement, de l'extraordinaire engouement qu'ont suscité les doctrines et les écrits de celui qui l'y a, pour ainsi dire, personnifié, l'auteur des *Regulae solvendi sophismata* de 1335 et des *Sophismata* de 1343: le mertonien Guillaume de Heytesbury¹. En nous efforçant de retracer les principaux aspects de la polémique entre le Mantouan et son cadet d'un demi-siècle, le Crémonais et médecin Apollinaire Offredi, nous pourrions donc légitimement prétendre contribuer à un important chapitre de la *Wirkungsgeschichte* des *Regulae*: celui de leur circulation et de leur mise en jeu dans la logique du XV^e siècle italien. Notre propos, toutefois, sera différent et plus limité: il consistera uniquement dans l'examen de quelques difficultés propres aux doctrines des deux maîtres et dans l'analyse de points de controverse susceptibles de retenir encore l'attention des logiciens et des linguistes.

On sait peu de choses sur la vie de Pietro Alboini, plus connu des historiens de la logique médiévale sous le nom de Pierre de Mantoue. Etudiant à Padoue jusqu'en 1392 puis lecteur en Philosophie à

¹ Sur la diffusion des oeuvres de Heytesbury en Italie, cf. C. WILSON, *William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics* (The University of Wisconsin Publications in Medieval Science 3), University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, pp. 26-7. Le *Tractatus de instanti* de Pierre de Mantoue a été récemment étudié par Th. James in TH. JAMES, *De primo et ultimo instanti Petri Alboini Mantuani*. Edited with an Introduction, Analysis and Notes, Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1968. N'ayant pu nous procurer une copie de ce travail inédit, nous ignorons encore sur quelles éditions anciennes il s'appuie. Sur l'écho rencontré par le traité de Pierre, cf. C. WILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 177, note 20.