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CHAPTER FOUR

THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM STUDENTS AS DAKWAH ACTIVISTS AND THE ISLAMISATION OF EDUCATED MUSLIMS (1960-1990s)

In the preceding Chapter we have discussed case studies of Islamisation in the rural areas of Subang and Sumedang which were in part the result of the Soeharto regime's policies on religion, which provided the setting for this kind of social change. This chapter discusses the Islamisation at the Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung, ITB) where practicing Muslim students played a prominent role. Through the promotion of *dakwah*, they tirelessly sought to turn Islam into their moral foundation, to adopt it as their identity in their personal and social life and to entice other ITB students to observe Islam as their cultural reference.¹ They used this prominent state campus as their new centre for the promotion of a variety of Islamic discourses and activities. This initiative knitted Muslim students from various backgrounds into solid *dakwah* networks, which inspired the flourishing of *Dakwahism* at the ITB and promoted deepening Islamisation among the educated class in Muslim society at secular campuses and beyond. Robert W. Hefner describes this transformation as an effort to turn away from the old-fashioned "scholastic arguments of the Traditionalist scholars (*ulama*) and the harshly exclusive styles of the Modernist elite."² This transformation also marks an important development in *dakwah* leadership and organisation and mirrors the wider context of social change in urban West Java.

¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009; Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

² Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123.

Socio-Political Context

The Coalesce of 'Santris' on Secular Campuses and their Search for Piety

As Hefner observed, after Indonesia's independence (1945), middle class³ practicing Muslim students began to coalesce in large cities⁴ and they started to pursue tertiary education at universities. They originated particularly from the Modernist group.⁵ Despite their differences in religious orientation, once they entered university they were unified by their desire to attend classes that would not interfere with their performance of the five daily prayers. They wanted to be pious Muslim students. However, in the 1950s devout Muslim students could not easily perform their religious duties at the ITB. By 1960, when the number of these students had increased, they started to fight for their right to practice their religion through the establishment of the Salman Mosque. As we will see, the ITB community was polarised by the conflict between secular education and religion that crystallised around the issue of the Friday prayers which must be performed in congregation.⁶ Due to the Salman Mosque's instrumental role in the resurgence of *dakwah* on campuses since the early 1970s, the phenomenon came to be known as the 'Salman Movement.'⁷

³ For a study on the politics of the middle class in Indonesia see Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1993). This book contains a collection of translated papers that were presented at Monash University during a conference entitled *The politics of middle class Indonesia*, organised by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, held in June 1986.

⁴ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123. See also Robert W. Hefner, 'Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', *Indonesia* Vol. 56 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1-35.

⁵ Aswab Mahasin, 'Kelas Menengah Santri: Pandangan dari Dalam', in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia*, p. 153.

⁶ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁷ The expression 'Salman Movement' was introduced by Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), p. 308. Hefner also uses the expression in *Civil Islam*, p. 123.

Much like earlier modern Muslim movements, the Salman Movement aspired to imbue social life with Islam.⁸ There are, however, obvious differences between the Salman Movement and its predecessors. Muslim movements that emerged in the early part of the twentieth century (e.g. Modernism) generally aimed at the purification of the faith, with some movements employing Islam as an ideological means for political identification towards this end.⁹ By contrast, although there was a certain degree of political motives, the Salman Movement was primarily concerned with cultural-intellectual issues and focused mainly on faith and piety, education, leadership, and aimed to turn ITB students from less devoted Muslims into practicing Muslims.¹⁰

This quest for piety was rooted in the simple demand to be able to perform obligatory prayers. Students and academic staff members who came from practicing Muslim families began to face problems in performing their daily prayers because there was no place designated for them to pray. This was problematic particularly on Friday, since Muslim students who attended the Friday noon prayers had to forego classes to do so.¹¹ Thus, the desire for a mosque to pray was essentially a demand for the reconciliation between the students' freedom of religion and their right to education, which conflicted due to the status quo.¹² For students like Imaduddin Abdulrahim, popularly known as Bang Imad, the issue was not that simple, however. For him the main question was why classes were held on Fridays at all when everybody knew that Muslims had to attend congregational prayers on Fridays.¹³ This question related to the dominant culture and ideology of the vast majority of the ITB community.

Professor Van Roemont, an expert on Islamic architecture who taught at the ITB in the 1950s, saw that his student, Ahmad Noe'man, a

⁸ Rifki Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung Indonesia* (The ANU Press, 1995), p. 21.

⁹ *Idem.*

¹⁰ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009; Interview with Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹¹ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. See also: Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 33.

¹² Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹³ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 24.

practicing Muslim of Muhammadiyah background from Garut, West Java, regularly performed his prayers in places around the campus grounds. The lack of a designated prayer space became progressively more problematic due to the increasing admission into ITB of students from Islamic backgrounds. The problem crystallised when classes continued without the attendance of the students who had to leave for Friday prayers. Van Roemont eventually sympathised with Noe'man and he discussed the situation with him. Van Roemont realised the needs of the Muslim students and he had no objections allowing them to leave class to go to the mosque in Cipaganti or the Grand Mosque at the town square in Bandung.¹⁴ At the time, roadside mosques were hard to find. Larger mosques were located miles away from the ITB campus in villages, meaning that students had to miss classes travelling to and from the mosque. This was compounded by derisive 'secular' students deriding them by asking them to 'convey their regards' to God.¹⁵

It was against this backdrop that some Muslim students proposed the building of a campus mosque but failed to obtain support from the ITB Rector, Professor Otong Kosasih.¹⁶ The rector argued that allowing its construction discriminated against students of other faiths, who would likely seek similar concessions. The disappointed students, reading between the lines, suspected that the rector was reluctant to allow religion to intrude on the secular ITB environment. Meanwhile, the political climate was also not in favour of Islam thanks to the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) rebellion in West Java and Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) action in West Sumatra. The alleged involvement of the leaders of the Modernist party, Masyumi, in the PRRI revolt had caused friction between them and Soekarno.¹⁷ Thus, the combination of a strongly secular culture and an unfavourable national political atmosphere contributed to the sustained marginalisation of practicing Muslims within the campus student body.

Despite these circumstances, the students persisted in their ambition to build a mosque. A mosque committee was formed on 17

¹⁴ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹⁵ *Idem*. In the end Prof. van Roemont became one of the first supporters of the initiatives for the construction of the ITB Salman Mosque.

¹⁶ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹⁷ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 299-301.

April 1960, with T.B. Soelaiman¹⁸ appointed as its chairman and Bang Imad as his deputy.¹⁹ On 27 May, 13 students held their first Friday prayers on campus using part of the grand auditorium which, up till then, 'secular' students had used for social but non-religious gatherings. The Muslim student congregation eventually grew to fill the whole auditorium. 'Secular students' respected this venue's use for prayers and decided not to desecralise it by organising their parties in the same spot and they started to seek other venues for their entertainment. The interesting situation thus arose where 'secular tolerance' displayed by 'secular students' proved to initiate the early phase of an Islamisation process on the campus they themselves did not desire.²⁰

However, this tolerance did not quite pave the way for the construction of a mosque, with the secular campus bureaucracy proving the main obstacle. Practicing Muslim students did not have much bargaining power in their encounters with the campus authorities, which were comprised mostly of members of the Sundanese educated class. The rector, born in Majalaya, Bandung, was himself a member of this class and cared little for the students' religious needs. From a cultural perspective, this was no surprise since, at the time, wealthy educated Sundanese were generally secular people. The students from practicing Muslim families and others perceived this insensitivity towards religion as a violation of their rights, and it only strengthened their resolve in their struggle for the mosque's construction. Surprisingly in view of his nationalist inclinations, President Soekarno supported the proposal for a campus mosque on 28 May 1964.²¹ Because of this, the rector of the ITB and its 'secular' students had no option but to support the project.²² The endorsement Soekarno gave to the mosque committee opened the gate for many students from a wide political spectrum to support the plan, among them Purwoto Handoko, Chairman of the ITB Student Council; Doddy A. Tisna Amidjaja, ITB Rector (1969-76), and people who became important in Indonesian

¹⁸ T.B. Soelaiman is the son of T.B. Sjaib Sastradiwirja, a Masyumi activist and a founder of Masjid Agung Al-Azhar Jakarta. See www.kalamsalman.org.

¹⁹ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 25.

²⁰ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

²¹ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

²² Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

Islam much later like Ahmad Zuhail, later the Minister for Research and Technology; and Muslimin Nasution, then the Chairman of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI). Because of Soekarno's endorsement, support even came from the wealthy Aburizal Bakrie, Erna Walnono (later known as Erna Witoelar) and Dedi Panigoro who were not particularly known as practicing Muslims. Through their fundraising activities they were instrumental in helping the construction of the Salman Mosque.²³

It is unclear why these secular students changed their minds but this was perhaps due to the fact that at that time, Soekarno's influence was still formidable among the students as well as among the campus bureaucrats. The atmosphere of respectful tolerance on the campus was also a contributing factor which was showcased with the secular students coming to support the mosque project. A former Salman activist, Sakib Machmud, stated "ITB students with a secular background, known as the 'dance group', were involved in fundraising for the mosque; we needed their participation because they knew where to get funds."²⁴ Only three years later, the mosque project was realised and it was finally used for the first time in 1972.²⁵

While the role of students from an 'Islamic' background from rural areas in the Salman Movement is significant, they never pretended to promote Islamism as a political ideology.²⁶ Initially, they wanted to fulfil their religious obligations (prayers).²⁷ The presence at ITB of many practicing Muslim students in the 1950s and the 1960s, including student leaders Ahmad Sadali and Ahmad Noe'man from Garut, T.B. Soelaiman from Sumedang, Imaduddin Abdulrahim from Medan, Sakib Machmud from Java, and A.M. Lutfi from Cirebon, had a profound impact on campus social and cultural life in the course of championing the construction of the Salman mosque.²⁸ The mosque was the second to be built on a secular campus in Indonesia after the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque on the grounds of the University of Indonesia in

²³ Nashir Budiman and Ziauddin Sardar, 'Salman: Masa Lalu, Kini dan Mendatang', www.Kalamsalman.org, 10 November 2008.

²⁴ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

²⁵ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009 and Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

²⁶ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009.

²⁷ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

²⁸ *Idem*.

Salemba in Jakarta.²⁹ Its great symbolic significance and function as a centre of leadership saw it inspire Islamic *dakwah* and piety as well as intellectualism and activism on secular campuses in the following decades, particularly across Java.

Neutralising the Dominance of Secular Students

In the 1950s and early 1960s, practicing Muslim students were “the weaker of the factions in the student body” *vis-a-vis* secular nationalist student factions that were the predominant players at national universities around the country.³⁰ The perception of this ‘campus political’ imbalance perhaps served as another impetus towards the emergence of the Salman Movement. Its main actors were students affiliated, directly or otherwise, with Muslim student organisations such as Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, The Association of Muslim Tertiary Students) and Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Muslim Students). They had become politicised during the power transfer from the Soekarno regime to that of Soeharto. At the time, left-wing student groups had already lost their credibility because of the 30 September 1965 ‘coup’ attempt.

The national student political scene was reflected on the ITB campus with Muslim student activists being greatly outnumbered by ‘secular’ students. It was feared that the secular students would dominate the Student Council and therefore practicing Muslim students constructed a campus mosque not only primarily for religious purposes but later also in part to neutralise the dominance of secular students.³¹ In its construction, the motive of the practicing Muslim students, who only dreamed of having a mosque in which to perform their prayers,³² became integrated with the political motivations of former HMI/PII activists, who wished to build a mosque-based social movement. It is important to note that the latter’s motivations coincided with the interests of senior Muslim politicians who were also former Masyumi activists such as Mohammad Natsir, Mohamad Roem, Zainal Abidin

²⁹ *Idem*.

³⁰ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123. Also, Interview with Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

³¹ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

³² For instance, Ahmad Noe’man who originates from a Muhammadiyah family in Garut, West Java.

Ahmad, Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. Although they had already been side-lined or had left the political arena because they were disappointed with Soeharto's New Order regime, they still maintained ties with, and were even active in, the cadre formation of Islamic students in order to create a generation of young Muslims who could carry on their struggles.³³

The Salman Movement was in part realised because practicing Muslim students on campus were politically dissatisfied with the Soeharto regime. Notwithstanding the importance for the Movement of this dissatisfaction as a political impetus, its religio-cultural and intellectual motivations were also important.

Leadership Inspiration, Intellectual and Religious Vision

Soekarno's Inspiration: Seeking the Fire of Islam

Readers should note that when the Salman Movement came up in the end of the 1950s and continued to grow up to 1965, Indonesia embraced the politics of Guided Democracy in which Soekarno himself was the principal actor.³⁴ Ricklefs observes that:

He (Soekarno) offered Indonesia something to believe in, something which many hoped would give them and their nation dignity and pride. Other powerful forces turned to him for guidance, legitimacy and protection.³⁵

As we have seen above, Soekarno inspired Salman Movement's activists to turn to him for support for the construction of the Mosque on the secular ITB campus. That they succeeded may be seen as one example of the validity of Ricklefs's notion as mentioned above.

The process to obtain the President's consent started when a delegation of the Salman Mosque Construction Foundation (Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, YPM), including Prof. T.M. Soelaiman, Ahmad Sadali and Ahmad Noe'man, met with President Soekarno in the State

³³ Endang Saefuddin Anshari, Sakib Machmud, Hasan Sutanegara, A.M. Lutfi, Miftah Faridl, Rudy Syarif Sumadilaga, Yusuf Amir Feisal and others were also among the early Salman Mosque activists who had been fostered by senior politicians. Lutfi, 'Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia', pp. 158-159.

³⁴ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 294-321.

³⁵ *Idem*, p. 294.

Palace in Jakarta on 28 May 1964. During the breakfast meeting, the President was attended by his Minister of Religious Affairs, K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri.³⁶ Soekarno asked the delegation to explain their proposal and he was satisfied with the arguments it presented to him. After having inspected Ahmad Noe'man's drawings of the mosque, Soekarno asked why there was neither a dome nor any pillars inside. Noe'man explained that a dome was merely an accessory without a clear function and might even be seen as an extravagance. According to Noe'man, the ITB Mosque had no intention to build a dome. He quoted verse 170 from the Chapter of The Cow (al-Baqarah) in the Quran, which criticises the behaviour of those who were adamant to blindly imitate the tradition of their ancestors. Concerning the pillars, he explained that they would impede the line formation (*saf*) during congregational prayers and should therefore not be included. Soekarno agreed and immediately signed the blueprint, naming it 'Salman Mosque' after consulting K.H. Saifuddin, who was seated next to him.³⁷ The name of Salman Al-Farisi, one of the close companions of the Prophet Muhammad and a brilliant strategist and contemporary technocrat, inspired Soekarno to suggest the students to use this name for their mosque. The complex use of strategy, Soekarno as strategist for independence, the students using him for their strategy and Salman as strategist under Muhammad gave enough impetus to use this name for the ITB campus mosque which was also the more fitting because Soekarno himself was a graduate of this same institution and Salman was a technocrat in his time.

Apart from discussing the mosque's structural aspects, the YPM ITB delegation also engaged in discussions with Soekarno on Islamic thought. They convinced Soekarno that the orientation of the mosque to be built on campus would resonate with his conviction that what needed to be taken from Islam was its 'fire', not its 'ashes'.³⁸ Soekarno's idea about the 'fire of Islam' was greatly inspired by L. Stoddard, a

³⁶ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

³⁷ *Idem*.

³⁸ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. "Fire" and "ashes" are used to distinguish between the values of Islam, which are eternal, and its symbols, which are temporary and contextual.

Western scholar who wrote *The New World of Islam* and *The Rising Tide of Colour*.³⁹

During polemics with Muslim intellectuals such as A. Hassan and Mohammad Natsir, Soekarno expressed his admiration for the Turkish State which had implemented Kemal Attaturk's secular, modernised conception of Islam.⁴⁰ Soekarno desired to separate religion from the State while retaining the 'fire' of Islam as its driving force. His opponents in their turn, sought to formally embed religious principles and laws the formation of the State. The debate also involved other intellectual circles and split into nationalist and Islamist camps. As we know now, the debate was never settled to the satisfaction of either camp and came to a dead end in the Constitutional Assembly in 1955 when the foundations of the state were argued.

Soekarno thus found that the initiators of the mosque project appreciated the importance of the "fire of Islam", which had been his obsession since the 1930s. At the same time, the mosque to be built on the grounds of his very own *alma mater* would deliver a progressive message as symbolised by its unconventional architectural style, and would be a token of an open nationalist spirit rather than that an exclusively Islamic one. It was against this backdrop that Soekarno sanctioned the plan to construct the Salman Mosque, as mentioned above. No huge leap of political imagination was required to guess at the strategy behind his approval. Over time, however, dynamics developed that pushed the mosque in the direction of Islamic visions *a la* Mohammad Natsir rather than those of Soekarno's. Its construction was halted after Soeharto took over from Soekarno "because the New Order Government mistrusted Islam" at that time.⁴¹

Although by that time unfinished, the mosque could already be used as a venue for activities conducted by Muslim student activists. It had library facilities and hosted meetings, lessons on classical music appreciation, martial arts and sports, Islamic training, student Quranic

³⁹ *Idem.* L. Stoddard's *New World of Islam* was translated into Indonesian (*Dunia Baru Islam*) and published in January 1966 by a committee chaired by Lieutenant General H.M. Muljadi Djojmartono. President Soekarno wrote short introductory remarks to the Indonesian edition.

⁴⁰ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 103.

⁴¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

studies and *subuh* religious classes (after dawn prayers).⁴² It was the first mosque to organise these *subuh* classes featuring specially-invited speakers. However, only small numbers of students regularly attended these classes. Seeking more participants, Salman activists intentionally brought in female students from the Universitas Pasundan and Universitas Padjadjaran campuses. This succeeded in baiting more students to the early morning classes because “boys usually like to come to places where there are many girls.”⁴³ Towards the same end, the classes were pushed forward to 7 a.m.

Natsir was extremely committed to maintaining secure relationships with the young Muslim intellectuals who were engaged in the Salman Movement. Along with other senior public Muslim figures, he made a point of visiting Bandung to deliver talks during the mosque’s morning classes. During these visits he would also attend dialogue sessions with student activists in A.M. Lutfi’s house, where they felt safe from police raids – which had happened on other occasions in Indonesia - and avoided being suspected of conducting subversive Islamic activities.⁴⁴ Often, Imaduddin was asked to lead the congregational prayers because of his melodious voice and superb recitation of the Quran.⁴⁵

M. Natsir’s Crucial Role: Modernist Appropriation of Public Space

Having failed in rehabilitating the Masyumi in 1966, Natsir, the main figure of Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), withdrew from the political stage and initiated activities in *dakwah* and education by founding the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII, later to be called Dewan Dakwah) in May 1967.⁴⁶ Within a short time, Natsir and his DDII were pulling the wagon of Muslim groups who were frustrated with Soeharto’s New Order Regime, which they perceived as having become increasingly detached or even hostile to Islam.⁴⁷ The DDII became

⁴² Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁴³ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁴⁴ Lutfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, p. 159.

⁴⁵ *Idem*, p. 158.

⁴⁶ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 334.

⁴⁷ Indications of the Soeharto regime’s hostility towards political Islam were: *First*, apart from rejecting the rehabilitation of the Masyumi, Masyumi figures were also banned from leading the Partai Muslimin Indonesia

increasingly influential because of the financial and other support it received from the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami of which Natsir had been chairman.

Natsir's actions also inspired Muslim students in engendering new forms of Muslim movements, which remained aloof of practical political currents and rather regarded university campus environments as home to intellectual communities.⁴⁸ Natsir and the Muslim students' interests coincided because Natsir had recognised the possibility of appropriating the religious space of the mosque as a venue insulated from political interference. Therefore, through the Dewan Dakwah, Natsir started to actively initiate the construction of mosques in campus environments.⁴⁹ Like Natsir, Muslim students also recognised the relative freedom from state intervention which mosques enjoyed and which made them potentially the social movements' prime loci.

(Indonesian Muslims Party, PARMUSI), 'created' by Soeharto to replace the Masyumi; *Second*, in October 1970, the government unilaterally announced its installation of PARMUSI functionary Djaelani Naro as general chairman of the PARMUSI, which up to then had been led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo. Dispute could not be avoided. In the end, Soeharto appointed M.S. Mintaredja (state minister) as the new general chairman. Muslim groups considered this a concerted effort by the Soeharto regime to control political Islam. See, for instance, Solihin Salam, *Sedjarah Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Jakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan Islam, 1970), and K.E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1970); *Third*, Soeharto became increasingly close to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that was dominated by Chinese-Catholic and secular figures who, in fact, had helped to topple Soekarno's regime and had paved the way for Soeharto to enter the stage of power. The CSIS was founded in 1971 as a New Order think tank and was led by Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani – both Soeharto's private assistants. The institution formulated various New Order policies including the policy in countering the influence of Muslim groups. See, for instance, R.E. Elson, *Soeharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 146.

⁴⁸ This was also connected with the policy of 'depoliticizing' the campus implemented by the New Order regime through Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus-Badan Koordinasi Kampus (NKK-BKK, Normalisation of Campus Life-Campus Coordination Body). This policy sought to free the campus from practical politics after the period of student political upheavals from 1974-1978.

⁴⁹ Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), pp. 124-127.

Excepting the ITB and University of Indonesia (UI), until the earlier period of the New Order secular campuses lacked permanent mosques. Although the Salman Mosque was only established in 1972 as the result of efforts having been made since 1960, a temporary prayer facility had been available for prayers and other religious activities since the mid-1960s. Having taken two years to construct, the University of Indonesia's Abdul Rahman Hakim (ARH) Mosque opened in 1968. However, the Salman Mosque issue resonated louder than that of the mosque at the UI in Jakarta due to the firm and courageous leadership of Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his friends. The University of Indonesia, however, became the centre for religious and political activism of the Tarbiyah movement's young leaders later in the 1990s.

Nurcholish Madjid's Influence: Cultivating Monotheism

The influence Natsir's charismatic leadership had on the likes of Imaduddin, Faridl, Lutfi, Saifuddin Anshari, Sadali, Noe'man, and Sakib was undeniable. However, these Muslim activists were also important HMI figures with close ties to Nurcholish Madjid, the General Chairman of the Muslim Student Association (HMI) whose reformist thoughts provoked controversy and were challenged by many ex-Masyumi leaders affiliated with the DDII.⁵⁰ They were the main opponents of Nurcholish's call for Islamic reform in the 1970s. Strong opposition to Nurcholish came from H.M. Rasjidi, Abdul Qadir Jaelani, and Endang Saifuddin Anshari.⁵¹ Apart from these figures, others greatly appreciated his thoughts. Imaduddin even compiled materials for his Mujahid Dakwah Training (Latihan Mujahid Dakwah, LMD) by adapting the Nilai-nilai Dasar Perjuangan Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Fundamental Values of Struggle of the Islamic Student Association, NDP-HMI) formulated by Nurcholish, Saefuddin Anshari, and Sakib Machfud during its 1968 congress in Malang, East Java.⁵²

Imaduddin's close relationship with Nurcholish began with the 1966 Congress of the HMI when he was appointed head of Lembaga

⁵⁰ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁵¹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 34.

⁵² Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. NDP-HMI is a HMI must-read text for students who wanted to join the Islamic Student Association. See Yudi Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20* (Bandung: Mizan 2005), p. 534.

Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI, the Predication Body of Muslim Students) and Nurcholish elected as HMI Chairman.⁵³ Admiring Nurcholish for his honest and modest character, Imaduddin even named his daughter 'Nurcholishah'.⁵⁴ Their relationship deteriorated when Nurcholish called for Islamic reforms, urging Muslim intellectuals to consider secularisation. Imaduddin could not appreciate that and it led to misunderstanding between them. Their relationship was restored, however, when both pursued their PhDs in America and occasionally met to discuss issues related to Islam and the Indonesian *ummah*.⁵⁵ In addition, when Imaduddin became involved in the formation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), he invited Nurcholish to join the meetings. Nurcholish was also Imaduddin's friend whom he asked for support when in need, and who provided him with constructive input.⁵⁶ Imaduddin once even declared that he would be in the forefront to support him if Nurcholish ever sought the presidential office.⁵⁷

Regardless of their differences in Islamic thought, for both the oneness of God (*tauhid*) was at the centre of their religious belief. This means that even if Nurcholish was in favour of secularist and other modern not necessarily Muslim ideas, the notion of *tauhid* was never contested. In this particular aspect, all agreed. It was only in the issue of to what extent *tauhid* could be maintained in modern outlooks that ideas differed. Muslim intellectual and Nurcholish friend and colleague, Dawam Rahardjo, states that with his ideas about secularisation, Nurcholish believed in the centrality of the man-God relation in all aspects of life. In order to reach a situation of political secularisation, Nurcholish was convinced that "in order to keep the man-God relationship central a radical devaluation of existing social structures

⁵³ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, pp. 158-159.

⁵⁴ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009 and Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁵⁵ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. See also Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 47.

⁵⁶ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, pp. 51-55.

⁵⁷ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

was needed”,⁵⁸ but not necessarily religious ones. Dawam also notes that Nurcholish’s thought about *tauhid* was in essence the same as that of Imaduddin’s because both shared the notion of *tauhid uluhiyya* (the unity of God).⁵⁹ Another strong correspondence is Imaduddin’s thought that it is imperative for all Muslims to liberate themselves from any reliance upon others except Allah.⁶⁰ Imaduddin agreed with Nurcholish who argued that in this world there is nothing sacred except Allah and the Quran. He said that he did not oppose Nurcholish’s reform ideas.⁶¹ While true that he disagreed with Nurcholish’s use of Western concepts in his description of Islam, for Imaduddin it was simply a question of terminology. Therefore it is safe to claim that Imaduddin and Nurcholish Madjid shared the same fundamental intellectual and religious vision. Imaduddin’s intellectual vision became the buttress for the Salman *dakwah* movement’s intellectual diversity in the years to come.

The Training of Muslim Students to be *Dakwah* Activists

Only at the end of 1972 was the Salman mosque finally declared finished and ready to be used for Friday prayers for the first time. In 1974, the Salman mosque initiated the LMD, set up by Imaduddin and his associates, and which proved a phenomenal success. Imaduddin had earlier been mentored by Mohammad Natsir in the group called Panitia Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Hajj Committee) and the PHI entrusted him with the coordination of youth training and development.⁶² Imaduddin was thus a central figure in LMD training. A mentor in the

⁵⁸ M. Dawam Rahardjo, ‘Islam Kemodernan: Catatan atas Paham Sekularisasi Nurcholish Madjid’, in Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 2006), p. 26.

⁵⁹ Rahardjo, ‘Tauhid Uluhiyyah Tokoh Muslim Modernist dari Salman’, in Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, pp. 133-142.

⁶⁰ Imaduddin Abdulrahim, *Kuliah Tauhid* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembina Sari Insan- YAASIN, 1990), pp. 35-52.

⁶¹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 34.

⁶² It was called the PHI group because initially their training schedules took place in the PHI building on Jalan Kwitang, Central Jakarta. See, Luthfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, in Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 161.

early training, he also compiled training materials⁶³ which contained the NDP-HMI modified *tauhid* doctrine mentioned previously.⁶⁴

During the LMD, participants were isolated from contacts with the outside world for three to five days, during which time their faith was further buttressed with basic Islamic teachings on theology (*aqida*) and introductions to the sources of Islam, the Quran and *Sunnah*.⁶⁵ The training was intense and lasted whole days, starting one hour before early morning prayers. At night, the participants had to rise in order to perform nightly prayers and at the closing of the training session, they had to take their vows by uttering the *shahadat* in front of their trainer without paying allegiance to a specific doctrine, as was the tradition of the Ikhwanul Muslimin of Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood, hence forth Ikhwan).⁶⁶

From 1974 to 1989, the Salman Mosque organised 71 LMD training sessions, not only in Bandung but also in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and in other cities.⁶⁷ Muslim student activism gradually developed a new culture among the mosque-based youth movement. LMD activities represented the height of this new culture. This was so because they involved activists from campuses all over Indonesia so that in a matter of just a few years a network of LMD alumni was created which facilitated *dakwah* dissemination. The success of the training program caused the use of the mosque to shift from that of a space traditionally used for ritual worship to a centre for faith, piety, intellectualism and activism. In the early 1980s, the Salman Mosque offered pre-university training and mentoring sessions which attracted thousands of Senior High School students from Bandung and sought to equip them with the intellectual and leadership skills needed at university. In fact, this mentoring served practically as a sort of recruitment mechanism for future university activists. In addition, upon their return, the alumni of the pre-university training and mentoring

⁶³ *Salman Review*, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, edition 02/2009, p. 7.

⁶⁴ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 22 July 2009.

⁶⁵ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 33.

⁶⁶ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁶⁷ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*. See also Abdul Aziz (ed.), *Gerakan Kontemporer Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989), p. 267.

sessions became mentors at their schools and they got involved as activists in universities and society in following years.⁶⁸

Over time in and around Bandung, interest in Islamic piety, Muslim lifestyles and fashion, and publications increased following the increased mosque attendance. This had a profound impact on campuses and society across Bandung by the 1980s, laying the ground for what was arguably the Salman movement's greatest contribution, enhancing faith and devotion, intellectualism and activism.⁶⁹ The LMD quickly came to involve activists from other secular universities so that in a short time, it became an integral part for the formative training of Muslim student cadres attached to campus mosques all over Indonesia. It is important to mention here that the ITB Salman Mosque not only took the lead in the campus *dakwah* movement, but also sparked the construction of campus mosques all over Indonesia.⁷⁰ In the course of the 1970s-1980s, the mosque's activities thus established a foundation for the enhancement of the observation of Islamic duties among the educated class of Muslim society. This was in response to a call mounted by senior Modernist leaders for the revival of Islam in the fifteenth century A.H.⁷¹

Coinciding with the growth of the DDII in supporting campus mosques,⁷² religious activism also responded to the warm reception by Muslim students at other secular state universities. This gave the impetus for the formation of pockets of students who had become

⁶⁸ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

⁶⁹ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁷⁰ *Salman Review*, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, edition 02/2009, p. 7.

⁷¹ Abdulrahim, *Kuliah Tauhid*, pp. xiv and 12.

⁷² DDII-supported campus mosques included: Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim on the campus of Universitas Indonesia (UI), Salemba Jakarta; Sultan Alauddin Mosque on the campus of Universitas Muslimin Indonesia (UMI), Ujung Pandang; Islamic Centre Al-Quds, Padang; Fatahillah Mosque near the campus of UI Depok; Al-Hijri Mosque on the campus of Universitas Ibnu Khaldun, Bogor; Al-Taqwa Mosque on the campus of IKIP Rawamangun, Jakarta; Islamic Centre Shalahuddin, Yogyakarta; Islamic Centre Ibrahim Mailim in Surakarta; Islamic Centre Darul Hikmah near the campus of Universitas Lampung in Bandar Lampung; Islamic Centre Ruhul Islam, Magelang; Sultan Trengganu Mosque, Semarang; Al-Furqan Mosque on the campus of IKIP Bandung; IKIP Mosque Malang; Campus Mosque of the Institut Teknologi Surabaya (ITS) Surabaya; Campus Mosque of the Al-Ghifari Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), See: Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 127.

'enlightened' because of the religious studies they conducted on their campuses. Their consciously having taken the road of a return to Islam, as opposed to students who decided not to follow this kind of education, formed the basis of a distinguishing identity. As a result of campus *dakwah*, the headscarf (*jilbab*), which initially was donned on the successful completion of a student's Islamic training, obtained greater significance symbolising the Muslim woman's new Islamic identity. In the Salman Mosque, this first appeared in the mid-1970s. Since then, more Muslim women, especially students, have started to wear the *jilbab*. This new trend spread to other universities along with the *dakwah* model's expansion.

Since the mid-1980s, Muslim observance increased and came to be markedly more visible.⁷³ Progress on secular campuses and schools expanded in subsequent years, going beyond the campus environment and into wider society. The increase in piety among the public was indicated by the rise in mosque attendance whether for regular, Friday or *tarawih* prayers, the rapid building of prayer houses and increased payment of the Muslim tithe.⁷⁴ There was simultaneously an obvious heightened interest in travelling to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage (*hajj*), the fifth pillar of Islam. In the following years, the number of Islamic educational institutions such as *madrasah* and *pesantren* mushroomed all over West Java.⁷⁵ Parents were no longer reluctant to send their children to Islamic schools. This phenomenon occurred in a context where Muslims sought moral support and a moral framework in the midst of rapid social change.⁷⁶ In Bandung, numerous outlets opened selling Muslim dress and halal food and beverages. Stickers with Islamic slogans were posted on walls, cars and in student

⁷³ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009.

⁷⁴ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010. This Islamisation became a major trend in Java. See Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 356.

⁷⁵ See an example of this increase in Cianjur, West Java, as cited in *Rekapitulasi Pertumbuhan Lembaga Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur 1990-2010* (Cianjur: Kementrian Agama Kabupaten Cianjur, May-July 2010).

⁷⁶ Robert W. Hefner, 'Islam and Nation in the Post-Soeharto Era', in Adam Swartz and Adam Paris (eds.), *The Politics of post-Soeharto Indonesia* (New York: Council of Foreign Relation, 1999), pp. 42-44.

dormitories and so forth.⁷⁷ Mizan, a prominent printing and publishing house in Bandung, began to publish Islamic books that were attractive, with elegant cover designs, different from the plain, old-fashioned ones.⁷⁸ In short, Islam's upsurge changed Bandung social life as more people abided to the rules of Islam by going to mosques, dress the Islamic way, attend Islamic schools and perform the *hajj*.

Campus Activists' Radicalisation

As stated in Chapter Three, despite the propagation of a more Islamic lifestyle, especially among those considered nominal Muslims, the overall political atmosphere during this time was not in favour of political Islam. For Muslim activists, keeping a low profile was the only way to avoid a crackdown on their *dakwah* activities by intelligence personnel. During these years, Soeharto and the issue of corruption became the targets of student rallies.⁷⁹ Student opposition peaked in 1978 when they rejected Soeharto's re-election. The political upheaval saw security forces seal off the ITB campus following the student's rejection of Soeharto's re-election. The army occupied the Salman Mosque dormitory and for several months, Salman Mosque activities came to a halt. Consequently the regime became the focus of heated opposition from a wide variety of student movements, including those engaged in Muslim activism on campus and outside the universities' premises, and particularly within *usroh* circles.⁸⁰ Campus mosques have

⁷⁷ For instance, 'I am proud to be a Muslim'; 'Islam is my religion'; or 'Islam is the religion of peace.' Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

⁷⁸ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009.

⁷⁹ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 346.

⁸⁰ *Usroh* literally means 'nuclear family or cell' and is considered effective for the development and the formation of cadres under the repressive New Order circumstances. It is worth noting that during the 1970s, the concept of *usroh* was not exclusively used in campus *dakwah* circles. The term was also officially used by DI/TII groups in the early 1980s. The *usroh* model was also widespread among NII (Islamic Indonesian State) followers. Thus, everything that goes in the direction of radical expression using the *usroh* model was immediately suspected of plotting against the State. This was the more so since the police had apprehended members of the *usroh* group of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who were suspected of scheming to create an Islamic State and who considered the leader of Darul Islam, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, as their primary source of political

been used as bases for religio-political student movements ever since, which is a new phenomenon in Indonesian history.⁸¹ It has to be noted, however, that the Salman Movement kept focusing on the religious, intellectual and cultural dimensions of *dakwah*. It was only after the Soeharto regime imposed severe restrictions on campus politics in 1978, which caused many student activists to join mosques as the only safe venue for their activism, that campus *dakwah* became “a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration.”⁸²

It is not surprising that this quickly drew public attention, and also came to Soeharto’s notice. The New Order regime suspected that the *dakwah* movement was a repackaging of the radical political aspirations which it wanted to suppress. Moreover, Salman activists did not hide their opposition to Soeharto’s regime out of frustration over its repression and the persecution of Muslim activists.⁸³ This political scenario saw the Indonesian state adopt an increasingly repressive attitude against Islamic activism. As a result, the Salman Movement and all other mosque-based *dakwah* movements that belonged to its network were further politicised. Several of their key activities including mentoring, and the LMDs were designed with the goal of opposing the state in mind.⁸⁴

In January 1978, the Student Council was disbanded by the order of Admiral Sudomo in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, KOPKAMTIB). Daed Joesoef was appointed Minister of Education and Culture (1978-1983) and he implemented the ‘normalisation of campus life’ policy seeking the ‘de-politicalisation’ of the campuses. Although the policy has often been opposed for fear that it turns students passive and apolitical, it remains in force. Eventually, the character of the classes changed from being

inspiration. International Crisis Group, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’, *Indonesia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 3. Also Interview with Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

⁸¹ Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa*, p. 531.

⁸² Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the Solution” *Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia*, in *Kultur: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures*, Vol. 3 no 1, 2003, p. 158.

⁸³ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

⁸⁴ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

rather open to rather restricted by the implementation of the Semester Credit System (Sistem Kredit Semester, SKS), under which students only had 4 years (8 semesters) to finish their studies, failing which they would be disenrolled. The Semester Credit System policy ensured that students no longer had the time to engage in political activities outside campus giving them limited opportunities to become too much involved in the *dakwah* movement. Even though its members were still active in mentoring and training, they (of course) realised they were increasingly susceptible to state intervention.⁸⁵

In 1978, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, the foremost figure in the Salman Mosque, was detained by the police and incarcerated for 14 months for criticising President Soeharto in a speech he had delivered a Yogyakarta.⁸⁶ In his speech which he held at Gadjah Mada University in May 1978, Imaduddin stated “Anyone who prepares a grave before s/he dies resembles Pharaoh.”⁸⁷ Although Imaduddin did not explicitly mention Soeharto, the security service inferred that the statement was directed at Soeharto due to the fact that the President had made preparations for his final resting place on the Astana Giri Bangun premises on Mount Lawu, near Solo. On 23 May 1978, upon his return to Bandung, Bang Imad was arrested in his home.⁸⁸ In response to the situation unfavourable to Salman’s interests, the movement adopted a low profile. Since then LMD activities were terminated.

Imaduddin was released in July 1979 with the help of Prof. Doddy Tisna Amidjaya, the ITB Rector. Prof. Tisna came to see Admiral Sudomo and appealed for Imaduddin’s release, proposing to send him overseas to pursue his PhD. Initially Sudomo rejected the appeal because he felt Imaduddin was too critical of the government. However, he finally accepted it after being persuaded to do so by Tisna.⁸⁹ Tisna then saw Daoed Joesoef, the Minister of Education and Culture, and asked him for a PhD scholarship for Imaduddin. Daoed declined, saying that “With only a Master’s Degree he already rebelled, what might he do after having obtained a Doctorate?”⁹⁰ In 1980, with the help of

⁸⁵ Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁸⁶ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁸⁷ Lutfi, *Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia*, p. 39.

⁸⁸ *Idem*.

⁸⁹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 43.

⁹⁰ *Idem*.

Mohammad Natsir, Imaduddin, who was in the US in the 1960s, eventually returned to Iowa State University on a PhD scholarship from the King Faisal Foundation and with additional financial assistance from the Minister of Religious Affairs of Kuwait, with whom Natsir happened to be personally acquainted.⁹¹ With Bang Imad's departure, the Salman *dakwah* movement underwent a gradual shift in its ways of operation and in its orientation.

Since Bang Imad was detained and subsequently sent overseas to pursue his PhD, Ahmad Sadali assumed an important leadership role. In 1979, Salman's LMD training program resumed under the new name 'Studi Islam Intensif' (SII, Intensive Islamic Study) to avoid surveillance while member recruitment resumed. In 1981, training and mentoring activities also targeted secondary and high school students as well as elementary students with programs such as Salman Islamic Youth Family (Keluarga Remaja Islam Salman, KARISMA) and Nurturing Salman Children (Pembinaan Anak-anak Salman, PAS). Because of these activities, the Salman Movement's popularity increased among students and it succeeded in implanting its influence in society. KARISMA's way of mentoring quickly became the frontrunner in guidance activities for Islamic youth in West Java in particular and in Indonesia in general.⁹² These programs attracted thousands of students and continued throughout the decade. Even today, KARISMA still has more than 1000 members while PAS has more than 500.⁹³

Ahmad Sadali's leadership was uneventful and because of his calm character fitting to the unfavourable political situation. Ahmad Sadali and his brother Ahmad Noe'man came from Garut, West Java and had been admitted to the ITB in the 1950s. Sadali and Noe'man's father was a Modernist member of the Muhammadiyah and a religious leader in their hometown. While Noe'man was admitted to the Department of Architecture at the ITB, Sadali was admitted at the Department of Visual Arts. Sadali's intellectual and leadership visions differed from Imaduddin's as the latter adopted a tough approach while Sadali

⁹¹ *Idem*, p. 44.

⁹² *Salman Review*, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, Edition 02/2009, p. 7.

⁹³ I would like to express many thanks to Budhiana Kartawijaya who gave me an unpublished article by Sudarmono Sasmono entitled 'Salman, Sebuah Masjid dalam Sebuah Catatan Kaki', during my interview with him in Bandung, 29 October 2010.

preferred the soft touch. His vision was built on a simple combination of what was termed 'faith, reason and feeling'.⁹⁴ Hence, it is no wonder that in the 1980s Salman's *dakwah* activities had more of an intellectual and cultural bent, rather than a political one. Aside from religious classes, the 1980s saw the Salman Mosque promote social and cultural activities such as classical music, vocal group and life music performances, mountain climbing, and the like.⁹⁵ The Mosque also paid particular attention to knowledge and competence aspects rather than to political activism.

The 1980s saw interesting progress when the campus *dakwah* movement was further disseminated to other campuses across and outside Java. Campus mosques that stood out with regards to the Salman Mosque *dakwah* movement were: Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque (ARH), on the campus of the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta; al-Ghifari Mosque, on the Institut Pertanian campus in Bogor (IPB); Jamaah Shalahuddin, on the Gadjah Mada University campus in Yogyakarta; and the al-Falah Mosque in Surabaya. Because the Islamic study activities were conducted simultaneously by student activists across these locations, the campus *dakwah* movement spread out fast. During the 1980s and 1990s, the *dakwah* effort was reinforced by the establishment of Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK, Campus Islamic Propagation League) across secular universities. Salman Mosque activists who had previously been involved in the LMD played a crucial role in this reinforcement process. Within and outside Jakarta, the LMD alumni reinforced the *dakwah* movement not only through the establishment of the LDK but also by means of offering religious activities on their respective campuses, which appealed to students.

The introduction of the Salman Mosque *dakwah* movement into the UI and the IPB was a strategic step made by LMD activists. However, while it is true that former LMD activists facilitated the proliferation of the Salman *dakwah* movement, Salman did not set out to propagate a single solid and coherent notion of its Islamic ideology with which it tried to resist the New Order regime's push towards social and political hegemony.

⁹⁴ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

⁹⁵ *Idem*.

The Salman movement failed to notice that by not adopting a solid ideology of its own, it was prone to influence by other groups of *dakwah*-inspired students. These students had been trained in universities in the Middle East and were convinced of the ideology of the Ikhwanul Muslimin. Because Salman did not realise this they found themselves in competition with these graduates from the Middle East. This early 'infiltration', in its part, shaped the gradual and tangible shift in the direction and orientation of the campus *dakwah* movement in Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta, and in other parts of Java, led by graduates from Islamic universities in the Middle East, who leaned towards Ikhwanul Muslimin's ideology and movement.

In Jakarta, the ARH Mosque at the UI played a leading role in the redirection and reorientation of the campus *dakwah* model previously developed by the Salman Mosque. The ARH mosque was built in 1968 and named after a Muslim activist who was killed during the students' protest against Soekarno demanding the extermination of Indonesian Communist Party after the failed coup attempt in 1965.⁹⁶ Aay Muhammad Furkon reveals that the ARH mosque was built with DDII support. The presence of these mosques on and around campuses was achieved by courtesy of the DDII and thus strengthened DDII's *dakwah* activities.⁹⁷ Since the mid-1970s, the DDII had facilitated the Islamisation of campuses through the promotion of strategic initiatives, such as aforementioned *Bina Masjid Kampus*,⁹⁸ an integrated *dakwah* program consisting of building mosques as said above, Islamic predication and the training of *dakwah* activists. These initiatives continued from the 1980s onward. With its influence and religious resources, the DDII managed to control the Islamic discourse in the mosque, particularly during Friday prayers, after it was authorised to select preachers (*da'i*) for the Friday sermons.⁹⁹ Although LMD alumni, such as Aus Hidayat Nur and Zaenal Muttaqien, kept control over the administration of the mosque's activities, the DDII played a definite role

⁹⁶ Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa*, p. 532.

⁹⁷ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 126-127.

⁹⁸ *Idem*.

⁹⁹ Y. Setyo Hadi, *Masjid Kampus untuk Ummat dan Bangsa (Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim UI)*, (Jakarta: Masjid ARH UI dan LKB Nusantara, 2000), p. 103. See also: Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 62.

in the reproduction of Islamic discourse. With these LMD alumni and DDII mentors, the leadership of the ARH mosque pushed the *dakwah* by means of recruitment and network-building. Recruitment was carried out through various activities, such as group study meetings and discussions known as *tadabbur* and *halaqah*.¹⁰⁰ These study clubs drew the attention of great numbers of students in the following years.

From 1976 to 1980, at least six mosques were built on and around campuses in Jakarta, Depok, Bogor and Bandung with the support of the DDII.¹⁰¹ Over time, these became the centres for the expansion of the LDK. In Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta, the presence of mosques and the LDK on the universities' premises caused a significant shift in the orientation of student activities. Students grew more receptive to mosque activities, which were different from those offered by intra-campus student organisations. As a result, *dakwah* activities at universities in these three cities produced young Muslim activists and intellectuals who later became public figures and politicians, including present-day Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS) members of parliament such as Mahfudz Siddik, Muzammil Yusuf, Radzikun, Fahri Hamzah, Mustafa Kamal, Zulkiflimansyah, Priatna, Suswono, and Rama Pratama.¹⁰²

In Jakarta the LDK promoted the donning of the *jilbab* among female students. In his account, Ali Said Damanik presents an interesting case about this expression of identity.¹⁰³ Damanik cites the transformation of identity as experienced by female students at the Polytechnic Faculty at UI, as the consequence of their sustained participation in religious activities conducted by the faculty's LDK. It is said that almost none of the female students wore headscarfs when they were admitted to the faculty. Shortly before they graduated, however, almost all of them sported the *jilbab* and thus had accepted a

¹⁰⁰ *Tadabbur* is an Arabic word that means 'to contemplate'; it is a religious session which offers reflective and spiritual exercises for its participants. A *halaqa* is a discussion circle. Furkon mentions Aus Hidayat Nur and Zaenal Muttaqien as alumni of Salman LMD training programs who later became the leading figures of the ARH *halaqa* activity. See Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 131.

¹⁰¹ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 126-127. See above.

¹⁰² Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), p. 32.

¹⁰³ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, p. 179.

dress code that had been strange for them in the past.¹⁰⁴ This phenomenon was not only a matter of changing the style of dress, but rather constitutes the expression of a new Muslim female identity. This illustrates the crucial transformative role of the mosque and the LDK in 'Islamising' the female students of a secular university.

The campus *dakwah* movement grew rapidly during the late 1980s up to the 1990s because of the fertile spiritual Islamic ground as a result of the prohibition put on the students of being engaged in politics. R. William Liddle, termed this the 'Islamic turn',¹⁰⁵ with its slogan 'back to the mosque in anticipation of the fifteenth century Islamic revival'. In the 1980s and 1990s, this slogan had been popularised by mosque youth activists and grew prolifically. Large mosques such as the Al-Azhar, Cut Meutia, and Sunda Kelapa in Jakarta; Al-Istiqamah and Mujahidin in Bandung; Syuhada in Yogyakarta; and Al-Falah in Surabaya turned into new public venues for the guidance of Muslim youth through training sessions and mentoring activities adopted from the campus mosque movement. With the formation of the Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Body (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia, BKPMI, 1977), chaired by Salman Mosque figure, Toto Tasmara, Islamist ideas spread out even further through the activities of the mosque. The BKPMI also became a conduit for the ideas of Muslim movements from other parts of the Muslim world, especially that of the Ikhwan. Under Tasmara's leadership, the BKPMI even officially adopted the idea of *usroh* as developed by the Ikhwan in Egypt.¹⁰⁶

The Shift in *Dakwah* Orientation

The Leading Role of Middle East Graduates

The Soeharto regime favoured the *dakwah* movement as it did not seem to have any political agenda and because it agreed with the regime's politics of religion; to stop the comeback of Communism and Islamist

¹⁰⁴ *Idem*. A very good study of Javanese women and the *jilbab* is Nancy J. Smith-Hefner's 'Javanese women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia' in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2007): 389-420.

¹⁰⁵ R. William Liddle, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug. 1996), pp. 613-634.

¹⁰⁶ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 137.

ideologies. Political developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s seemed to oppose the regime's expectation. In late 1979, the 'normalisation of campus life' policy radicalised students activism. The *asas tunggal* campaign in the early 1980s had a major impact on Muslim activism, radicalising its politics and provoking the re-emergence of Darul Islam/NII activists. Consequently, *dakwah* activism risked being infiltrated by *jihadi* cells.¹⁰⁷ The student movement became increasingly weary of Soeharto and his cronies and their rampant corruption and they reacted by taking more radical steps. This was the more so when *dakwah* leaders like Imaduddin had become involved. This 'radicalisation' of the students increased significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because of this, the regime boosted a *dakwah* movement that was strongly devoted to religious orientations rather than to political activism. The Iranian revolution which started in 1979 caused Soeharto to fear the emergence of intellectual Muslim activists who, inspired by the Iranian revolution, had embraced an Islamic universalist and fundamentalist creed to seek revolutionary social change in Indonesia. Liddle observes:

Islamic universalism is a powerful creed on university campuses, especially at two major national universities in West Java, the Bandung Institute of Technology and the Bogor Agricultural Institute. Campus mosques at both institutions are well-known centres of Islamic study where, many believe, a new breed of religiously-devout *cum* technologically-sophisticated leaders of the *umat* is being created. The universalists have translated the writings of the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati, and still follow closely the Iranian Islamic revolution.¹⁰⁸

This socio-political background seems to have favoured religious-oriented movements such as the Tarbiyah to continue to exist and flourish and in time to replace the 'radicalised' campus *dakwah*

¹⁰⁷ From the mid-to-late-1980s, the Salman Mosque became the arena for the rivalry between former Darul Islam/NII activists and Islamists from various transnational Muslim movements. Bambang Pranggono and Toto Tasmara are known to have been among the Darul Islam/NII proponents who sought to imbue the Salman community with their vision even if their effort did not succeed. Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

¹⁰⁸ R. William Liddle, *Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics* (Australia: Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1996), pp. 75-76.

movement.¹⁰⁹ The Tarbiyah was born out of this context and was established by graduates from Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria in the early 1980s.¹¹⁰ The leaders of the Tarbiyah initiated a new phase in the history of the *dakwah* movement in Indonesia and transformed the simple *usroh* model into a Tarbiyah model, thus hijacking, or say capitalising on the existing *dakwah* resources built up by Salman activists. This meant a shift away from the model of the campus *dakwah* movement that the Salman Movement promoted towards the pattern of the Tarbiyah inspired by the method (*manhaj*) of the Ikhwan.¹¹¹ Tarbiyah activists utilised the *dakwah* network that had already been established by LMD alumni all over West Java and in Jakarta. Some Muslim figures who were involved as Tarbiyah trainers include Buya Malik Ahmad, Rahmat Abdullah, and Hilmi Aminuddin, as well as M. Daud Ali and Nurhay Abdurrahman who played important roles in activist training.¹¹² Over time, the Tarbiyah began to gain ground in the ARH. This was reflected in the ‘defection’ of former LMD activists, among others Aus Hidayat Nur from the faculty of History and Literature, who became actively involved with the Tarbiyah.¹¹³

In this shifting *dakwah* context, Salman’s pre-eminence in the campus *dakwah* movement declined in the early 1990s. Especially after the death of Ahmad Sadali, Salman Movement’s leadership weakened and failed to be consistent with the established Salman *dakwah* vision and cadre recruitment.¹¹⁴ This was not surprising since his successor, Professor Iftikar Zutalaksana, then-chairman of Salman Mosque

¹⁰⁹ This notion came up in discussions I had with Van Bruinessen in Singapore in 2011.

¹¹⁰ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 132.

¹¹¹ Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 89.

¹¹² Buya was an activist with a Masyumi and Muhammadiyah background who strongly advised the Muhammadiyah not to accept the *Asas Tunggal*, the sole socio-political ideology Soeharto promoted. Rahmat Abdullah and Hilmi Aminuddin were fresh graduates of the Islamic University of Medinah, Saudi Arabia. M. Daud Ali and Nurhay Abdurrahman had participated in DDII training sessions in the late 1960s and were appointed campus *Dakwah* coordinators in Jakarta. See Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 132. See also Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS*, p. 28.

¹¹³ Aus Hidayat Nur was a UI student. He later became a PKS activist. See Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 174.

¹¹⁴ Sasmono, ‘Salman, Sebuah Masjid dalam Sebuah Catatan Kaki.’

Construction Foundation (YPM), was not a well-trained Salman activist.¹¹⁵ The movement's most important leadership training program, Intensive Islamic Study (Studi Islam Intensif, SII), began to suffer. The SII, which had been a successful cadre recruitment mechanism until this time, received insufficient attention from the Salman leadership.

The Promotion of the Ikhwan Vision

Intense cultural exchange between Indonesian and Middle Eastern countries paved the way for intellectual exchange, especially from the Middle East to Indonesia. The introduction of the thoughts of Ikhwan's intellectuals, including Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, to campus *dakwah* activists was one such exchange. In Bandung, the early spread of the Ikhwan ideology, however, was very much the result of ties between the Salman Mosque and the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), which had been established in 1972. Imaduddin had lived for two years in Malaysia and had had intellectual exchange with ABIM's activists.¹¹⁶ His connection with international Islamic organisations, such as the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (IIFSO), in which he served as General Secretary (1977-78), and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) enabled him to become acquainted with the Ikhwan ideology.¹¹⁷ Salman activist, Hermawan Dipoyono, who Imaduddin had sent to Malaysia, stated that there, he found books authored by Qutb, Al-Banna, and Sa'id Hawwa.¹¹⁸ He took them home with him but at that time they could not be translated and published due to the regime's surveillance measures against radical Islam. It was in this political setting that activists began to organise themselves in cells, popularly known as *usroh*.

The *usroh* concept had been imported from Malaysia by another Salman activist, Toto Tasmara. In Malaysia, *usroh* had been adopted earlier because many Malaysian activists had studied at Middle Eastern universities.¹¹⁹ *Usroh* was initially a vehicle of Islamic propagation,

¹¹⁵ *Idem*.

¹¹⁶ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹¹⁷ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Fuller Collins, *Indonesia Betrayed: How Development Fails* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), p. 156.

¹¹⁹ See *usroh* on footnote 79 above.

which originated from the thought of Hasan Al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan. *Usroh* groups were formed based on religious class groups and consisted of five to eight people led by a *murabbi* (teacher), who was their more senior mentor.¹²⁰ The students realised that the government was not in favour of any radical ideas and of some of the Arabic books authored by Ikhwan members and thus the students only dared to translate part of these books and to circulate them among Salman activists and *usroh* groups.¹²¹ However, the spread of Ikhwan ideas was impeded by the covert nature of the *usroh* networks and the fact that Qutb's books could not be reproduced in full. The dissemination of Ikhwan discourse increased significantly only after the publication of the Indonesian translation of Qutb's *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts along the Road or *Petunjuk Jalan* in Indonesian) and other Ikhwan writings by the DDII's publishing house in the early 1980s.

It was under these circumstances that *dakwah* activities began to meet transnational radical thought, although its influence was not yet significant.¹²² During this era of leadership (1992-96), there was an endeavour by Tarbiyah activists to subvert Salman's *dakwah* vision. This was possible because some Salman activists at that time were affiliated with the Campus Islamic Propagation League (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) of the UI, which they had joined when still at senior high school in Jakarta before moving on to study at the ITB. Since the 1980s, the LDK of the UI has been known to be an important centre for Tarbiyah cadre recruitment. In Jakarta Tarbiyah mentors were able to manage and control the LDK of the UI and they used it as its recruitment and reproduction centre for the new generation of Muslim activists with a vision different from that of Salman's. Hilmi Aminuddin and Rahmat Abdullah are known to have been the main mentors in the Tarbiyah recruitment training sessions in Jakarta.

By the late 1980s, the Tarbiyah had consolidated its presence at the ITB. This enabled it to temporarily control Salman Movement's leadership and to modify its vision and orientation between 1992 and 1996.¹²³ One big change was the de-emphasising of Salman's intellectual and cultural commitment and a shift in emphasis to *harakah*

¹²⁰ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

¹²¹ Collins, 'Islam is the Solution', p. 156.

¹²² *Idem*, p. 156.

¹²³ Sasmono, 'Salman, Sebuah Masjid dalam Sebuah Catatan Kaki'.

(political activism) and to a *shari'ah* mind-set. The consequence of this shift was that the movement acquired a more exclusive character at the expense of its inclusive tolerance. Gender segregation, for example, was strictly observed. Salman's office hours were divided into female (*akhwat*) and male (*ikhwan*) ones.¹²⁴ Boys and girls were still able to interact or communicate but could not make eye contact. Budhiana, a former Salman activist now heading the YPM research and development department, recounted that where an *akhwat* needed her *ikhwan*'s signature for work, this was done with their faces turned away from each other.¹²⁵

Tarbiyah means education or training. This movement's vision and ideology are very much the same as those of the Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, the socio-religious movement established by Hassan Al-Banna. In the early 1980s Tarbiyah activists returned home having graduated from universities in the Middle East. They joined the *dakwah* activism organised by the LDK on campuses across Java. One important centre of Tarbiyah activism was the LDK of the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque. When the New Order regime collapsed in 1998, the Tarbiyah movement declared the foundation of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan - PK; from 2004 onwards, Prosperity and Justice Party - PKS) which the LDK supported. This political manoeuvre of the Tarbiyah movement once again underlines its difference from Salman which from the outset emphasised that it was a religious, cultural and intellectual movement and not a political one. When its alumni who were active in the PK/PKS pulled out of the Salman Movement to join – or support – the Tarbiyah movement's party, the Salman leadership firmly refused because it considered itself the property of the entire Muslim community and not of any specific Islamic party or Muslim group.¹²⁶ The leaders of the Salman Mosque rejected any political alliance and firmly maintained their commitment to remain neutral towards all Muslim political

¹²⁴ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

¹²⁵ *Idem*.

¹²⁶ According to Ahmad Nuruddin, Chairman of the Badan Pengurus Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman ITB, his side was strongly opposed to the efforts of PKS sympathisers in Salman circles who tried to drag the Salman community into politics. 'I was confrontational towards them', he said. Interview, Ahmad Nuruddin, Bandung, 6 April 2009.

forces.¹²⁷ For them, alliance to a particular party would cause Salman to take sides which would violate its inclusive vision.

What Made the Shift Possible?

Readers may want to know why the Tarbiyah was able to displace the prominent position of the Salman *dakwah* movement among campus activists. The reason is because the Salman Movement was an open-minded institution and liberal in its orientation. The Movement did not insist on a single reference or orientation of the Islamic ideology of its members because it did not have a coherent and solid ideology of its own as mentioned above. As a consequence, the Movement became a breeding ground for diverse intellectual discourses as well as various ideological orientations. Its alumni, who spread out to mosques on campuses all over Indonesia, were free to choose or promote whatever intellectual or ideological orientation on their return to their respective universities. The Salman movement's role as a centre of Muslim activism turned it into fertile soil for the reproduction of a wide range of discourses. It is true that from early on, the Salman Movement's young intellectuals had been under the guidance of Mohammad Natsir who was inclined to adopt a strict Modernist understanding of Islam. But Natsir, as Hefner emphasised, was also a more open minded intellectual than his colleague, Isa Anshari. Similarly, although Imaduddin, the most influential of all Salman leaders, had a short fuse, he was nonetheless relatively intellectually open-minded as Miftah Faridl, his close friend stressed.¹²⁸ Evidently, he displayed no hostility to Nurcholish's basic argument for Islamic reform, whereas his friends Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Abdul Qadir Jaelani were vehemently opposed to Nurcholish's thoughts. The charismatic Imaduddin showed his aptitude to act as mediator when tension among his friends mounted. When conflict arose after Nurcholish had expressed his reform ideas, Imaduddin took the initiative to reconcile Nurcholish and his opponents in his house in Bandung shortly before he left for Malaysia in the early 1970s.¹²⁹ By so doing, Imaduddin had revealed

¹²⁷ *Idem*.

¹²⁸ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹²⁹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 34.

leadership and intellectualism that configured the Salman Mosque's intellectual orientation.

At times, articulations of radical Islam indeed did surface in the Salman Movement such as passages of Ikhwan books mentioned above, but, once again, there were no strong radical tendencies as there was no solid ideological soil in which radicalism could take root. It seems that the radical tendencies that did emerge came up as a means of opposition to the New Order regime's brutal oppression of student movements. It is undeniable that the Salman Movement initiated the introduction of Ikhwan Islamist thought among Muslim student activists in Indonesia.¹³⁰ LMD training sessions, for instance, clearly emulated the *dakwah* method of the Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslimin but its training materials were not derived from the Ikhwan but were in part compiled by Imaduddin and Miftah Faridl¹³¹ while part of them were modifications of the Basic Struggle Values of the Muslim Student Association (NDP-HMI) drawn up by Nurcholish Madjid and friends as mentioned above.¹³²

No single Ikhwan figure became a fixed point of reference. The Salman Movement not only embraced aspects (adoption of *shari'ah* law, return to the core sources of Islam, the Quran and *hadith* and the instalment of Islamic social justice and so forth) of the politically-oriented discourse of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, it also appreciated the less politicised and more religious Albani, the progressive Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and the rationalist Juhaili. At the same time, Salman Mosque's publishing house, *Pustaka*, published the Indonesian translation of *Islam*, the book written by the liberal thinker Fazlur Rahman. Imaduddin, considered one of Salman Mosque's most Islamist-oriented leaders, was in fact proud of the Pakistani-born intellectual, who had fled Pakistan to settle in the USA seeking to renew his Islamic thought.¹³³ When he was in the USA to pursue his PhD in the 1980s, Imaduddin became acquainted with Fazlur Rahman at Chicago University and he invited him to deliver a lecture at his *alma mater*, the State University of Iowa. The reason for the Salman Movement's inclusive attitude is that, according to the chairman of the Salman

¹³⁰ Latif, *Inteligensia, Muslim dan Kuasa*, p. 534.

¹³¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹³² Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

¹³³ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 48.

Mosque Islamic Propagation Development Board, 'As long as it is possible from a rational point of view, we accept anybody.'¹³⁴ Thus, rather than standing for radical Islamism, on the contrary, the Salman Movement facilitated the pluralisation of Islamic thought because Salman activists realised its reality. Salman activists argue that under this condition the "Salman Movement was no longer the undivided point of orientation; there were many models and we here realised that we were no longer the only one."¹³⁵

Against this backdrop, signs of polarisation within the *dakwah* movement resurfaced in the 1980s, when Muslim activists and intellectuals failed to cope with the growing pluralisation and politicalisation within the movement. Apart from the Tarbiyah, polarisation within the *dakwah* movement gave birth to the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) and the Salafis.¹³⁶ The HTI was founded in 1983 in Bogor at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB) and it used Pesantren Alghazali in Bogor as its religious stronghold. The HTI's founding fathers are the Abdullah bin Nuh, the head of the *pesantren* and lecturer in Arabic literature at the UI, Abd al-Rahman al-Baghdadi, Hizbut Tahrir activist from Australia, and Mustafa Bin Nuh's son who studied in Jordan and who was involved in the Hizbut Tahrir movement there.¹³⁷ Al-Baghdadi later joined the teaching staff at LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab/the Institute of the Study of Islam and Arab).¹³⁸

The HTI's expansion also rode on campus *dakwah* networks that began to flourish in the course of the 1980s. HTI shares much with other campus movements in terms of its concern about leadership, fraternity, and intellectualism. It differs profoundly from other *dakwah* groups in its goal, which is the reestablishment of the world-wide

¹³⁴ Interview, Asep Zainal Aushof, Chief of the Salman Mosque's Islamic Propagation Development Board, Bandung, 07 April 2009.

¹³⁵ *Idem*.

¹³⁶ These *harakah* groups include Hizbut Tahrir, Salafiah, Ikhwanul Muslimin, Tarbiyah, Darul Arqam, and Jamaah Tabligh. See, *Tempo* magazine, 3. 4. 1993, as quoted by Rifki Rosyad (1995), p. 44.

¹³⁷ Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, pp. 100-107.

¹³⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006), p. 48.

Caliphate.¹³⁹ For the Hizbut Tahrir, the Islamic Caliphate is the ideal form of government and it considers it obligatory to fight for it. The struggle to reinstall the Caliphate is to be accomplished in three phases: *first*, build a cadre, *second* interaction with society, while the *third* phase is the takeover of power.

Initially, HTI activists joined the Tarbiyah in its use of the campus *dakwah* network, which originated in Salman's LMD in order to disseminate their ideas and to recruit members. However, competition eventually saw HTI part ways with the others. The Tarbiyah formed the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), whereas the student activists of the Hizbut Tahrir formed the Student Movement for Liberation (Gema Pembebasan). In order to organise *dakwah* on the campuses, Tarbiyah cells congregated in the Campus Islamic Propagation Board Friendship Forum (Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus Daerah, FSLDK) while HTI students gathered in the Campus Islamic Propagation Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, BKLDK).¹⁴⁰

Although some alumni from the Salman Mosque joined the HTI, there was neither cooperation nor confrontation between the two. However, politically, the Hizbut Tahrir is clearly more radical than the Tarbiyah. Nevertheless, Hizbut Tahrir activists do not resort to force to intervene with the Salman Movement and therefore the Salman Movement is careful to maintain good relations with its alumni who are active in the Hizbut Tahrir even though relations are 'limited to mere discussions.'¹⁴¹

Apart from transnational politics, Muslim activism's national political arena was extended with the return of Darul Islam underground cells. Sources close to Darul Islam's old leaders claimed that in the 1970s, the movement "had already shown signs of

¹³⁹ Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, 'Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia', Working paper. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*.

¹⁴¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Farid, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

revival.”¹⁴² For this reason, it is possible that Gen. Ali Moertopo rebuilt the Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII) organisation only to crush it later, ironically, after he initially intended to use it to counter Communism.¹⁴³ The crackdown of more than a hundred ex-Darul Islam followers only a few months before the 1977 elections hints at the proponents’ aims of the reactivation of ex-Darul Islam.¹⁴⁴ Regardless, some cells went underground due to military oppression and looked for safe shelter in campus *dakwah* movements. This specific aspect has not yet been studied in full but probably deserves more attention than it has received so far.

The picture that does emerge when we look a bit further in history is the following. In the 1970s, the Salman Mosque was in danger of being used for recruitment by DI/NII activists known under the name of Darul Islam (DI) Muda (Young Darul Islam).¹⁴⁵ This group, as its name suggests, inherited the DI/NII ideology of Kartosoewirjo who had declared the founding of the NII in May 1948 in Garut, West Java. In 1962-63, the government obliterated the group but the NII ideology did not die but was rather transmitted to a new generation that shared its dreams of an Islamic state.¹⁴⁶ They tried but failed to infiltrate the Salman Mosque which, at that time, indeed tended towards radical action.

Although they managed to recruit a number of Salman Mosque activists, they failed to prevail over the Salman Movement ideologically because of their militancy.¹⁴⁷ An ex-NII activist admitted that, in the end, “we became disappointed with the Salman Movement and were more compatible with the Shiites.”¹⁴⁸ According to one NII activist, the Shiite revolutionary spirit that had succeeded in toppling Shah Reza Pahlevi in Iran in 1979 had drawn the NII to its teachings and they had

¹⁴² International Crisis Group, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’, *Indonesia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 5.

¹⁴³ *Idem*.

¹⁴⁴ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 346.

¹⁴⁵ Interview, anonymous, a former follower of NII and former activist of the Salman Mosque, Bandung, 12 April 2009.

¹⁴⁶ Interview, Asep Zainal Aushof, The Chief of Salman Mosque Islamic Propagation Development Board, Bandung, 07 April 2009.

¹⁴⁷ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

¹⁴⁸ Interview, anonymous, a former follower of NII and former activist of the Salman Mosque, Bandung, 12 April 2009.

started to build communications with Shiite leaders in Bandung. In fact, Shiite teaching attracted activists not only from NII but also from Salman Movement backgrounds. The Salman Mosque organised studies on Shiism, and pictures of Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, started to appear on book covers and on the vehicles of student activists. The Salman Movement again revealed its open-minded character by allowing Shiite admirers (and followers) to use its forums. It even translated and published books from authors with a Shiite background, such as Ali Shariati and Murtadha Muthahari along with those from Ikhwan and Salafi backgrounds and liberal thinkers.

The Salafi Movement was born in the context of rising Shiite influence. It originated from LIPIA in Jakarta, which is a branch of the Muhammad Ibnu Saud University in Riyadh. This Saudi-funded college played the most crucial role as the agent for the ‘salafisation’ of Muslim activists. This group has been present in secular universities across Java since the early 1980s and increased its presence in the early 1990s.¹⁴⁹

In training activities conducted in the 1980s, graduates from Saudi Arabia and Egypt sometimes combined principles stemming from both Salafi “true Islamic” theology and the Ikhwan model of activism and training. This collaboration was undertaken for the promotion of *halaqah* and *daurah* at campuses. The orientation of their training program was popularly labelled “*Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj Ikhwani*.” (Salafi in belief, Ikhwan in methodology).¹⁵⁰ This brand explicitly shows the influences of two of the most important trans-national Islamist movements, the Saudi-based Salafi and the Egyptian Ikhwan, and at the same time indexes the further political and social differentiation of both groups. According to a Salman Mosque activist who later became a Salafi figure, Salafi teachings started to enter West Java in the early 1990s. The Salman Mosque itself had by that time already become mixed with various other movements so that the presence of the Salafis was not all too obvious.¹⁵¹

Distinct from Tarbiyah, HTI and the NII, the Salafi Movement is ‘a-political’ and spends all its resources to engage in the direct propagation of pure Islam, even by going from door to door. In contrast to Modernist Islamic groups who refer to the Quran and the *Sunnah* by

¹⁴⁹ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

¹⁵⁰ *Idem*. See also Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, p. 53.

¹⁵¹ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

using their own reasoning (such as the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS), or Traditionalists who refer to their religious experts (*ulama* such as the NU), the Salafis claim to understand the Quran through the interpretation of the close companions of the Prophet. Salafis are Revivalists who consider the way of life during the lifetime of the Prophet and his close companion as ideal. Hence, Salafis supplant into the present what they imagine to have been the way of life during the Prophet's time, for instance by dressing themselves as they think the close companions of the Prophet dressed and by adopting the close companions' interpretation of their morals.¹⁵²

The Salafis claim to follow the example of the Prophet by engaging in *dakwah*.¹⁵³ Like the Modernist Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, the Salafis refuse to observe religious celebrations they consider deceitfully innovative (*bid'a*) such as *mauludan* and *tahlilan*. Moreover, they reject music, which they consider prohibited by religion and they are opposed to Sufi orders. The Salafis are not a single entity. Some Salafi take an a-political stance and focus fully on *dakwah*; others take the radical road, such as Jafar Umar Thalib, who founded Laskar Jihad, which was involved in the religious conflicts in Ambon.¹⁵⁴

Although some Salman Mosque activists became Salafi, the Salman Movement has no organisational ties with them. Abu Chaidar, a Salman activist who was attracted to Salafi teachings, swiftly left Salman for the LIPIA where he immersed himself in Salafi teachings and subsequently became the most prominent Salafi teacher in West Java. He used to consider the Salman Mosque as his most ideal 'home', but nowadays, after having reached maturity, his most ideal 'house' is that of the Salafi. He was also formerly active in PERSIS' religious activities, but after having studied at LIPIA he abandoned it because, he insisted, of the deviant *aqidah* PERSIS held.¹⁵⁵ For him, PERSIS' religious teachings conform largely to the interpretation of its religious teachers and are not based on the Prophetic traditions and the understanding of his pious companions. Concerning *aqidah*, Abu Chaidar also criticised the articulation of *tauhid* as promoted by Imaduddin in his popular

¹⁵² *Idem*.

¹⁵³ *Idem*.

¹⁵⁴ Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, pp. 185-213.

¹⁵⁵ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

book *Kuliah Tauhid*.¹⁵⁶ For Abu Chaidar, Imaduddin has no background in religious training so his teaching about *tauhid* has no strong foundation. Abu Chaidar also criticises the PKS for its use of Islam for its political interests. More recently, the ITB campus for the first time witnessed the increased presence of the Salafi community on its premises, although the total number of Salafi members did not increase significantly.¹⁵⁷

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the Salman Movement is a sustained effort to promote Islamisation and to articulate Muslims' religious identity and social interests in the big cities where the new middle class was taking shape and educated generations of observing Muslims began to come to towns in pursuit of tertiary education.¹⁵⁸ This *dakwah* movement contributed to at least three achievements in the process of deepening Islamisation. The *first* was in influencing the Islamisation of the educated classes, particularly those with nominal Muslim backgrounds, at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). The movement offered a moral foundation amidst rapid social change, rampant state corruption, and moral degeneration within society through a proper understanding of the values of *tauhid*, personal devotion, and piety.

Second, by emphasising *tauhid*, the movement did not pretend to promote any single ideology. This stand, however, meant that the vision of the Salman Movement was at times diluted by intruding ideologies such as those of the Tarbiyah, Hizbut Tahrir, Salafis, Shiites and the NII. Nonetheless, it is certain that the Salman Movement stands apart and remains true to its identity. It remains part of the overall Muslim community and is not appropriated by nor allied with any specific Islamist group. However, by not adopting a particular Islamist ideology, the Salman Movement failed to keep its alumni from aligning themselves with the above models of *dakwah* activism, which were attractive to some but not all of them. But again, the Salman movement, by not aligning itself with any specific Islamist group, became home to Muslim communities from different backgrounds, accommodating a

¹⁵⁶ See Abdulrahim, *Kuliah Tauhid*.

¹⁵⁷ Interview, Ahmad Nuruddin, Bandung, 6 April 2009.

¹⁵⁸ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123.

variety of different and even opposing thoughts, and remained consistent with its vision as an open, non-sectarian, cultural-intellectual movement aloof from partisan politics.

Thirdly, with its characteristic open-minded vision, the Salman Movement was instrumental in the creation of *Dakwahism* and was instrumental in providing the setting for the expansion of various *dakwah* networks spanning Islamic activities on campuses and on senior high schools in and around Bandung. It is worth considering whether the Salman movement influenced, or was independent from, the process of deepening Islamisation across rural West Java, such as Lembang and Sumedang. If the Islamisation of these rural areas occurred independently of the Salman movement, both can be understood within the wider context of social transformation and the further and intensified Islamisation of West Java. However, as the question remains, further research is recommended in order to provide a clearer understanding of the Islamisation process of West Java. For example, if the Salman movement contributed to the Islamisation of these areas, it is still unclear how the Salman Mosque's *dakwah* networks worked towards the Islamisation process in rural West Java.