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Title: Negotiating Islamisation and resistance : a study of religions, politics and social change in West Java from the early 20th Century to the present

Issue Date: 2015-09-09

**NEGOTIATING ISLAMISATION AND RESISTANCE:
A STUDY OF RELIGIONS, POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN WEST JAVA FROM THE EARLY 20th CENTURY TO THE PRESENT**

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus Prof. Mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op Woensdag 9 September 2015
klokke 10.00 uur

door

Chaider S. Bamualim
geboren te Kupang
in 1966

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all I would like to extend my special gratitude to Prof. M.C. Ricklefs. Without him I would not have been able to arrive at this stage. He offered me a generous fellowship, superb supervision and critical reading of my manuscript as well as warm friendship, especially when we worked together at the National University of Singapore (NUS), from April 2008 to July 2011.

Unfortunately, Leiden *mos* does not allow me to thank the people at Leiden University for their role in the completion of this dissertation. I am very thankful to A/P Michael Feener who often offered his help in times of need. This research project was funded by the Singaporean Ministry of Education for which I am extremely grateful. I am also indebted to Prof. Albert Lau and A/P Yong Mun Cheong for giving me the chance to join the Department of History from 2008 to 2011. I would like to thank Letha Kumar who helped me with the administration of my fieldwork trips.

My thankfulness and humility should go to the people of West Java for their openness and warmth. At this point I would like to make a particular mention of Hawe Setiawan who shared his in-depth understanding of Sundanese culture and society. I also thank my friends who helped me in collecting data, particularly Gaus, Hajar, Nabil and Muchtadlirin.

I am also grateful to Prof. Komaruddin Hidayat, Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Prof. Kamaruddin Amin, Prof. Amsal Bakhtiar, Prof. Bahtiar Effendy and Prof. Dede Rosada for their encouragement. I am grateful to uncle Rafiq, aunty Aloya, Nazir, Aji al-Attas, and Din Wahid for their sincere support. I am indebted to my friends at CSRC for their strong support including Irfan, Idris, Efri, Sholehudin, Haula, Sari and Risma. Special thanks to Budi Rahman, Agung Prihatna and Dayat, whose help I will never forget.

The editing work was done by Dr. Dick van der Meij. I owe much to Dick for his contribution, not only because he got this manuscript ready to be defended, but also because for his support as a friend. Thanks for our laughter in the process!

To my beloved wife and children, Ety, Diny, Zidan and Sarah: Without your love I would not have been strong enough to accomplish this work. Similar encouragement also came from my mother Aisyah and my father Saleh. They never tired to inspire me to finish the book.

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INTRODUCTION

Domestic and foreign observers as well as most Indonesians nowadays upheld the notion that Sundanese Muslims are more observant than the Javanese which suggests that Sundanese society is also more Islamic than its Javanese counterpart. This notion may be interpreted in various ways. If we look at the historical development of the West Javanese religious setting, this perception is not entirely off the mark. In the past, the Sundanese have observed their religion piously,¹ but if we adopt strict Islam as the measure to look at this development and we remove from Islam all non-Islamic elements, we may be forced to conclude that many people in West Java have only just recently turned 'real' Islamic. Before that they were Muslims but not quite as observant of 'pure' Islam as often perceived. Some of them indeed observed the performance of the five pillars of Islam but at the same time they observed *adat* practices not rooted in the Quran and the hadith.

This perception is interesting but more interesting is why it is important that the Sundanese need to be considered as being Islamic? Or why the Sundanese were, and are perceived as Islamic? In this book I attempt to show that the question can only be answered by understanding the intimate relationships between Islam and Sunda² in the way the Sundanese observe their religion. We shall see how Islam and Sunda as different cultural categories negotiate their places among Sundanese society. By doing so we may discover the elements that unite Islam and Sunda (*adat*) and what reasons - for instance fear of Communism, changing government

¹ Th. van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending tentang Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat 1858-1963* (translated from *History of Dutch missions of Christian Churches in Jawa Barat Province 1858-1963*) (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2006), p. 159.

² The term 'Sunda' is used in this book in this context to denote Sundanese *adat*, culture and religious pre-Islamic beliefs.

policies and increased Islamisation - may be responsible for the disintegration of this unity.

This study aims to show how Islamisation took place and how it was contested and negotiated. I will do so by discussing religions, Sundanese culture, *adat* and politics as important variants. This study also discusses how dramatic political changes caused religious changes and how these caused cultural, political and social changes. This means that readers will be presented with the dialectics between Islamisation and other faiths in which political contexts played important roles.

Hypotheses

This study not only analyses the negotiations and the relations between Sunda and Islam, but also intends to examine the conflicts between Islam and other faiths, especially *Aliran Kebatinan* (AK), as a unified religious system, and Christianity. This study departs from the working hypothesis that there is always a coherent dialectics between cultural categories in society on the one hand, and negotiations between the state and these cultural categories, on the other. There is a continuous and intimate negotiation process between Islamisation and the indigenous *Aliran Kebatinan*, Islam and Christianity, and Islam and Christianity in tandem against the *Aliran Kebatinan*. In this book I demonstrate when the unified religious system in West Java was threatened. I pay attention to Islam and *Aliran Kebatinan* as important parts of the religious and cultural setting of Sundanese society because the Sundanese used to think in terms of Islam, culture and *adat*. Contrarily, some Muslim Sundanese, especially Modernists, Revivalists, and Islamists, now think that when they violate Islamic norms, local norms should be replaced by Islamic ones. This put pressure on the adherents of *adat* and changed their perception to thinking that Islam, imported from Arabia, was something harmful to their identity. The findings of this research suggest that shifting political contexts cause social and cultural changes in society. These changes are the results of negotiations and adjustments necessary for the formation of a new political agenda distinct from that of the previous political set-up. In both, the state and religious leaders play a crucial role. I am convinced that a clear

picture of the political, social, and religious processes that instigate and sustain these changes is vital for understanding how these changes may lead to social integration, disintegration and conflict.

Organisation of this Book

Chapter One provides the historical background of the negotiation and dialectical relationships between Islam and other faiths and how these relationships influenced each other. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the significance of religious practices and how *adat*, mysticism and myths were well preserved within these practices ultimately shaping a distinct Sundanese religious identity. It also analyses the history of the integration, interaction and contest of Islam and other beliefs in Sundanese society. In discussing the origins of Christianity in the area, for example, I observed the formation of the Christian communities and how they flourished across West Java.

Chapter Two observes what reasons factored behind the rise of anti-Islamic sentiments and analyses how these sentiments challenged religious visions. Readers should keep in mind that anti-Islamic sentiments were not caused by fear of Islam as a faith. Rather, this negative sentiment seemed to be the consequence of reinforcing Islam as an ideology and a totalitarian way of life. Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic Union) leaders insisted on the importance of a purified tradition and thus called upon Muslims to strictly and exclusively abide to the Quran and the Prophetic tradition (*Sunnah*). In this tradition *adat* no longer had any place and thus was excluded from it. This social setting sparked signs of antagonism toward Islam especially opposition led by *Aliran Kebatinan* leaders. They condemned Muslims' intolerance that harmed the existing tradition. Despite this opposition, Islamisation continued.

Chapter Three questions how the New Order regime sought total control over society through the politics it adopted, on the one hand, and facilitated *Dakwahism* and missionarism on the other in the end causing religious and social changes. While the authoritarian regime successfully imposed a political straightjacket on society, *Dakwahists* addressed the religious and spiritual needs in society and channelled its political aspirations through social and cultural

projects. This injected a sense of urgency into both Islamisation and Christianisation, which in turn saw the increased presence of Islamic activists and Christian evangelists. What I am concerned with is how the rise of religious activism, producing Islamism and evangelism, brought about rivalry and conflict between Muslims and Christians. From the Muslim perspective, I observed the way the cultural dimension of religion increasingly became significant when the political aspects of religion dwindled. In this context I demonstrate the way politics caused religious changes and how religious changes caused social and political changes.

Chapter Four is to answer questions about the role educated Muslims played in changing society; that is how Muslim students of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) Islamised their fellow secular students and by so doing promoted a dramatic shift in the campus's sosio-religious environment. The Salman mosque was selected as a case study to explore how its *dakwah* project initiatives gained significance and ultimately succeeded in not only changing the student's world view but also that of society at large.

As Chapter Four deals largely with a more urban phenomenon, Chapter Five discusses the dialectics and contest of Islam with the *Aliran Kebatinan* in rural Lembang. It examines the process of Islamisation and answers the question of how Islam entered rural areas and built its institutions. This chapter goes back briefly to the development of Islamic institutions from the 1950s in three different villages across rural Lembang and discusses the effects of *dakwah* institutions and organisations on deeper Islamisation.

Chapter Six observes Christianity's upsurge and Muslim activists' response to it. What I emphasise in this part is that non-Sundanese and non-Muslim ethnic and religious attitudes (Chinese, Batak and Christianity) turned into reasons for tension and conflict between Muslims and Christians. It seems obvious that Muslims voiced their protests against what they called Christianisation, which involved Chinese and Batak Christians in Bekasi. I address the issue whether this conflict is primarily ethnic or religiously inspired or perhaps both. The book ends in Chapter Seven which contains the Conclusion.

Methodology

Study Focus

This study focuses on three important variants: Islam, *Aliran Kebatinan* and Christianity. Please bear in mind that you will continue to encounter these three categories in all the chapters of this book because they are at the centre of this dissertation. This study covers only a particular period of time, that is from the early twentieth century to the present, with an emphasis on the period after 1965. The book presents historical reviews in Chapters One and Two to demonstrate the continuity of and changes in the Islamisation processes. Since Muslim society consists of various different groups, I included local-level case studies which were strategically selected. Thus, to mention some examples here, I studied *Aliran Kebatinan* in Lembang, Sumedang, Subang and Kuningan. Student's increased involvement in Islam was studied in Bandung at the ITB campus. Conflicts between Islam and Christianity were observed in Bekasi. The integration of Christianity in Sundanese society was studied in Cianjur while conflicts between Islam and *Aliran Kebatinan* were studied in Sumedang and Subang.

Literature

The historical part of this study as presented in Chapters One and Two refers primarily to the works of the following leading scholars: Ricklefs, Van Bruinessen, Steenbrink, Hefner, Van Dijk, Wessing, Rinkes, Pijper, Lombard, Van den End, Lubis, Ekadjati and many others. Their observations on the issues in this book are important to understand Islamisation and its dialectical relations with *Aliran Kebatinan* and Christianity as they developed from the past into recent times. From these sources I learned how they understood the way Islam spread across West Java and how it was either accepted, confronted or opposed.

Numerous materials have been used to understand how PERSIS embraced Islam as an ideology by challenging nationalism, Christianity and *adat* to achieve "the ultimate goal of religious life

according to Islamic doctrine”³ They include Federspiel’s *Islam and Ideology* (2001),⁴ Pijper’s *Fragmenta Islamica* (1985), Noer’s *Gerakan Modern Islam* (1990),⁵ Hassan’s *Islam & Kebangsaan* (1984)⁶ and so on. PERSIS’s claim of Islam as the only true ideology, which implies the annihilation of other world visions including Sundanese syncretic *adat*, provoked anti-Islamic sentiments among Sundanese *Penghayat*, the “*abangan*” of the Sundanese. In understanding social polarisation, Ricklefs’ *Polarising Javanese Society* (2007) is a must read book. He argues that the antagonistic relationship between *abangan* and *putihan* or Javanist and *santri* dates back only to the nineteenth century (1830-1930) after the Revivalists challenged the ‘mystic synthesis’ most Javanese commonly accepted.⁷ Ricklefs’ latest publication *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java* (2012) sheds an even brighter light in understanding the political, social, cultural and religious history of Java from 1930 to the present.⁸

As this study examines the conflictual and oppositional relationship in Sundanese society, particularly between *Penghayat* and Muslims, I had to observe the function of religion in society and what the reasons are why religious communities polarise and why at certain times and under particular circumstances. Particularly relevant here is why the *Panghayat* opposed the increasing Islamic presence. Geertz’ article on “Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example” (1957) helps in analysing religion in rural Javanese society,

³ G.F. Pijper, *Fragmenta Islamica: Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di Indonesia 1900-1950*, translated by Tudjimah and Yessy Agusdin from *Studiën over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1985), p. 127.

⁴ Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (Persis), 1923-1957* (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2001).

⁵ Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990).

⁶ A. Hassan, *Islam & Kebangsaan* (Bangil: Lajnah Penerbitan Pesantren Persis, 1984).

⁷ M.C. Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions c. 1830-1930* (Singapore: Singapore University Press; Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).

⁸ M.C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its Opponent in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History c. 1930 to the present* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012).

“as simple uniformity of religious belief and practice characteristic of an earlier period,⁹” enabling a comparison with the changes as they took place in Sundanese society. In this article he discusses why belief and ritual that used to function to reinforce “the traditional social ties between individuals, through a manner in which the social structure of a group is strengthened and perpetuated through the ritualistic or mythic symbolization of the underlying social values upon which it rests” are disrupted. Geertz argues that this is because of what he observed as “an incongruity between the cultural framework of meaning and the patterning of social interaction, an incongruity due to the persistence in an urban environment of a religious symbol system adjusted to peasant social structure.”¹⁰

Hefner studied Islamisation in mountainous Pasuruan, East Java in ‘Islamizing Java?: Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’ (1987). He analysed how the Javanists, the strongest opponents to Islam, turned away from Javanism and embraced Islam after the Javanist tradition declined everywhere under the New Order.¹¹ This decline was the result of, among others, an increase in *dakwah* activities which progressively became “especially strong in the altered political climate under Soeharto, official support from the government to Islamisation and the sweeping social changes in rural society that caused Islam’s appeal increasingly became relevant for

⁹ Clifford Geertz, ‘Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example’, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 59. No. 1 (Feb., 1957), p. 36.

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 53. Geertz exemplified his thesis by presenting the story of a conflict which is illustrative. The conflict arose during a funeral ceremony between Karman, a member of Indonesian Marhaen Association (Persatuan Marhaen Indonesia; PERMAI), the *Penghayat* political party, and a Modin, a Muslim official authorised to conduct the funeral ceremony for Karman’s relative, Paidjan. The funeral was disrupted because the Modin who was a member of the Masyumi party, refused to lead the rites just after he learned that Paidjan was a PERMAI member and thus not considered to be a Muslim. After negotiation, the Modin eventually agreed to lead the funeral rite according to Islamic law after Karman agreed to produce an official letter that the deceased was a Muslim.

¹¹ Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java’, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 46. No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 533-554.

its moral depth.”¹² This study intends to provide an understanding of Islamisation in rural West Java.

Fieldwork

A leading expert on the study of Islam, H.A.R. Gibb (1895-1971), posited that: “...it is not the masses but to the leaders that we must look if we are to judge the present tendencies in religious thought.”¹³ Based on this I decided not to refer to literature only, but to go into the field and I conducted interviews with all sorts of people who were witnesses or even key players in the whole process which I am describing. By doing so I was able to talk with the respondents face-to-face. This technique is invaluable especially when one works on a specific case study for which primary and secondary sources are rare or even unavailable. It is often the case that respondents provided me with documents and archives not available in any library. The informants were moreover so kind as to advise me what relevant persons to interview on certain issues. I conducted interviews in Jakarta, Bekasi, Bandung, Lembang, Subang, Sumedang, Kuningan, and Ciparay between July 2008 and March 2011. I first went to these places in July and November 2008, and again in April and August to October following year. In 2010 I did my fieldworks from May to July and from October to November. I went to West Java again in January and March 2011 to conduct some more interviews. In addition to conducting interviews, I also attended anniversaries held by the *Penghayat* in Bandung and made personal visits to their residences to exchange thoughts.

I hope that this study gives its readers the following contributions: *First*, understanding the intimate relationships between Islam and Sunda (*adat*) and the pattern of integrations and conflicts between Islam and *Aliran Kebatinan*. *Second*, understanding the patterns of integrations and conflicts between Islam and Christianity in West Java. *Third*, discovering the importance of the dramatic political changes that occurred at the national level for the

¹² *Idem*, p. 549.

¹³ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, VKI Vol. 59. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971/1982), p. 3.

creation of the political setting for religious adjustments at local levels. By focusing on the local, this study seeks to make a scholarly contribution towards both local and national policy development, particularly in today's politically decentralised Indonesia. *Fourth*, this study confirms the Islamisation of West Java, namely as "a process of deepening commitment to standards of normative Islamic belief, practice and religious identity."¹⁴ Moreover, this study discovers the important roles played by educated Muslims, both Modernists and Traditionalists, and reveals how Islamisation took place and how it was contested and negotiated. *Fifth*, from this study I learned that in Sunda, the dynamics of religious resurgence and of social changes from below are largely determined by the regime's political programme made to sustain the rulers and to control society. In the absence of strong policies on religions, tension and conflict between people of different religions will continue to erupt, thus West Javanese society will most likely be polarised along religious, and maybe, ethnic sentiments unless the state adopts policies designed to maintain social harmony in the multicultural society of West Java.

¹⁴ See Key Analytical Terms.

CHAPTER ONE

ISLAMISATION AND OTHER FAITHS IN WEST JAVA

In its wonderful natural and cultural setting, West Java has a large diversity of religious beliefs and practices. It is predominantly the home of the Sundanese ethnic group next to the Javanese and Betawi, most of whom are Muslims while the area is also the home of Christian Batak and Chinese groups,¹ as well as other minority communities such as the Ahmadiyah, Shia and plenty of adherents of native beliefs. This religious diversity ensures a remarkable plurality among West Javanese society which has been its characteristic especially since the 18th century. Most observers of Islam in West Java would think that the Sundanese are and have always been more religiously observant than the Javanese. Although some among these observers such as, for instance, Julian Millie, argue that this generalisation “obscures the dramatic variety of understandings and conventions visible in West Java’s Islamic currents,”² this perception is understandable because it is derived from the generally accepted social identification of the Sundanese with Islam.³ A Dutch missionary, P.N. Gijsman, once related that when he first encountered the Sundanese in 1872 in Sukabumi, he had the impression that for the Sundanese, Islam was nothing but a piece of clothing. This means that, at that time, Islam was only an outward matter. After a while when he got along with them better, he became increasingly convinced that the Sundanese were really observant Muslims after all.⁴

The Islamisation of West Java is the outcome of at least three

¹ Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).

² Julian Millie, *Splashed by the saint: Ritual reading and Islamic sanctity in West Java* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009), p. 13.

³ Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, p. 159.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 159.

processes. The *first* is the transformation from the Sundanese Hindu Vaisnava realm to an Islamic polity.⁵ This shift thus enabled the transition of political power away from the Hindu Pajajaran Kingdom to the Islamic Sultanates of Cirebon and Banten in the sixteenth century.⁶ That they took Islam seriously is, for instance, evident from the fact that from the sixteenth until the eighteenth century, Banten enforced *shari'ah* ruling on apostasy and imposed the death penalty on Muslims who abandoned Islam.⁷ The *second* was that the Islamisation of West Java took place not without resistance from Sundanese society but this resistance was not all that significant. This is in contradistinction with, for instance, the Islamisation of East and Central Java that had faced tremendous challenges from its many opponents.⁸ The *third* was the relatively easy way in which the Sundanese were able to adapt Islamic doctrines and norms to their own, age-old worldview and customs.⁹

From the start, Sufi orders played an important role in this Islamisation process.¹⁰ In the nineteenth to twentieth centuries especially the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah Sufi Order (*tarekat*) expanded rapidly in West Java.¹¹ *Pesantrens* (Islamic boarding schools) along with other Islamic propagation (*dakwah*) institutions played a central role in Islamising West

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- ⁵ Robert Wessing, 'A Change in the Forest: Myth and History in West Java', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 24, 1 (March 1993), p. 3.
- ⁶ For more general information about this process, see M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, fourth edition, 2008), pp. 39ff.
- ⁷ The earliest recorded instance of the implementation of the *shari'ah* involved Sangka, an indigenous woman of royal descent who was baptised Helena van Bantam, probably in the late seventeenth century, in order to marry a Dutch Christian. Her conversion, however, was regarded as *riddah* (apostasy) in Islamic law, for which she was sentenced to death in 1704. See Mufti Ali, *Misionarisme di Banten* (Banten: Laboratorium Bantenologi, IAIN Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin, 2009), pp. 45-46.
- ⁸ Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 176-213.
- ⁹ E.S. Ekadjati (ed.), 'Sejarah Sunda', in *Masyarakat Sunda dan Kebudayaan* (Jakarta: Girimukti Pusaka, 1984), p. 82; Interview, Prof. Sobana Hardjasaputra, Bandung, 15 April 2009.
- ¹⁰ For a history of the study of Sufism in Indonesia, see Martin van Bruinessen, 'Studies of Sufism and the Sufi Orders in Indonesia', in *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (1998) pp. 192-219.
- ¹¹ Martin van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p. 200.

Java. The importance of the Islamic school tradition in Indonesia is probably most clearly stated by Geertz: ‘...The Muslim educational system is the master institution in the perpetuation of Islamic tradition and the creation of Islamic society, as well as the locus of the most serious present efforts to modernise that tradition and that society’.¹² We will come back to the last part of this quote further on in the book.

The significance of Islam manifested itself in the Sundanese’ adoption of an Islamic identity. This identity was not only Islamic but also included aspects of the pre-Islamic Sundanese self. In all, they observed and practiced the five pillars (*rukun*) of Islam, practiced *adat* and indulged in native syncretic creeds and practices. Moreover, they believed in spiritual forces. Irrespective of their background the Sundanese were tolerant towards Islamic values. Naturally, they were especially tolerant of those aspects that could easily be accommodated to Sundanese culture and identity.

Despite the overwhelming presence of Islam, this did not mean that other world religions such as Christianity never took roots in Sundanese society as well. We will see below that, since the second half of the nineteenth century, some non-Islamic Sundanese chose Christianity for a variety of economic, social and religious reasons. Of course, the impact of the presence of the Colonial power cannot be denied in this process.

Muslim Sundanese and Variety of Islamic Practices

Islamic Pillars, Mysticism and Myth

Islam is central to the life of the vast majority of the Sundanese. For them, it is an obligation to observe religion in daily life which finds its expression in their maxim “*agama kudu jeung darigama*”: Religion (Islam) should be observed as a daily obligation.¹³ This notion materialises in society. That Muslims indeed practiced the five pillars of Islam (*rukun Islam*) is evidenced, for instance, in Gijsman’s letter to Dutch Missionary Association

¹² Clifford Geertz, ‘Modernization in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case’, in Robert N. Bellah, *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 93-108.

¹³ A. Suhandi Suhamihardja, ‘Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan’, in Edi S. Ekadjati (ed.), *Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Sunda* (Bandung: Pusat Ilmiah dan Pembangunan Regional, Jawa Barat, 1984), p. 213.

(Nederlandsche Zendingsvereniging, NZV) in the Netherlands dated 30 December 1872. He observed that the Sundanese he encountered were studying Arabic, read the Quran, went to the mosque or *musalla*, fasted during Ramadan, went on the *hajj* (the pilgrimage to Mecca); performed the five pillars of Islam, paid their tithe and circumcised their sons, and celebrated Islamic festivals with passion.¹⁴ Gijsman concluded that “all these and many other things show us that the whole society is structured in accordance with Islamic patterns.”¹⁵ In other words, in many respects the Sundanese were practicing Muslims.

Most Sundanese Muslims celebrate religious ceremonies and festivals such as *slametan*, *idul fitri*, *maulud*, *isra' mi'raj*, *nisfu sha'ban night*, etcetera.¹⁶ Traditionalist Sundanese have played a pivotal role in preserving these practices which contain many remnants of a variety of local customs (collectively dubbed *adat*). They also played a leading role in transmitting Islam and in preserving Islamic traditions. One of the most important contributions of the Traditionalists is the Sufi order or *tarekat*. Across West Java there are a number of Sufi orders that have existed since the seventeenth century, namely the Qadiriyyah (seventeenth century), the Shatariyyah (seventeenth century), the Naqshabandiyah (nineteenth century)¹⁷ and the Tijaniyyah¹⁸ (twentieth century), among others. In the nineteenth century, Shaikh Abdul Khatib Sambas, the great *Qadiriyyah* teacher (*murshid*), merged the Qadiriyyah and Naqshabandiyah traditions and called it the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah (Qadiriyyah and Naqshabandiyah or TQN).¹⁹ From the early twentieth century, the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah was officially embraced and popularised by Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya thanks to K.H. Abdullah Mubarak and his successor Shaikh Shahibul Wafa Tajul Arifin, widely known as Abah

¹⁴ Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, p. 159.

¹⁵ *Idem*, p. 160.

¹⁶ Nisfu sha'ban or 15 Sha'ban night festivals is celebrated largely by Traditionalists seeking God's forgiveness and rewards. See G.F. Pijper, *Empat Penelitian tentang Agama Islam di Indonesia 1930-1950* (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1992), pp. 5-22. See also Suhamihardja, 'Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan', p. 213.

¹⁷ Nina Herlina Lubis (et al.), *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat* (Yayasan Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia Cabang Jawa Barat, 2011), pp. 50-51.

¹⁸ Pijper, *Fragmenta Islamica*, p. 2.

¹⁹ Lubis (et al.), *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat*, p. 159.

Anom.²⁰ Abah Anom died in 2010 and his confidant, Muhammad Abdul Gaos Saefulloh Maslul, popularly known as Abah Gaos, won Anom's followers' support to succeed him as a *murshid* despite some objections from others.²¹ Over time, support for Abah Gaos' leadership strengthened as evidenced among others by the great turnout of a wide range of TQN followers to the monthly *manakiban* festival sheld under his direction in either state-owned mosques or in private residences since 2005.²²

The Tarekat Shatariyah has been present in West Java since the seventeenth century after having been introduced in Cirebon and Priangan by Shaikh Abdulmuhyi (1650-1730) who died in Tasikmalaya. His grave in Pamijahan has remained a pilgrimage destination to this date and people from in and outside Java came to visit the graveyard.²³ He was succeeded by his son, Shaikh Haji Muhyiddin, who wrote a treatise entitled *Martabat Kang Pitutu* (al-'Awalim al-Sab'ah or the [Doctrine of] Seven Grades) said to contain the Sufi teachings of his father.²⁴

The Tarekat Tijaniyah was first introduced to Java in the 1920s by the Medina-born *ulama*, Ali bin Abdullah al-Tayyib al-Azhari. In his *Fragmenta Islamica*, the Dutch expert on Islam, G.F. Pijper, notes that Al-Azhari lived in Tasikmalaya and had authored a book entitled *Munyat al-Murid*.²⁵ Among his other works was the *Kitab Al-Tadhkirat al-Munirah li-ahl al-Bashirah* (Garut, 1344 H [1925-1926]), in which he attacked Islamic reformism.²⁶ K.H. Anas bin Abdul Jamil was the first *ulama* to embrace and popularise this *tarekat* in his Pesantren Buntet in Cirebon. Pijper describes

²⁰ The history of Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya is comprehensively described in Unang Sunardjo, *Menelusuri perjalanan sejarah pondok pesantren Suryalaya, pusat pengembangan tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyyah abad kedua puluh* (Tasikmalaya: Yayasan Serba Bakti Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, 1995). Lubis (et al.), *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat*, p. 162.

²¹ My own observation to recent development of the Tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya in 2013.

²² Interview, ustadz Zainal Abidin, an active member of Tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqshabandiyah [TQN] Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, Serpong, 09 November 2013.

²³ Lubis (et al.), *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat*, p. 155-156.

²⁴ <http://www.sasak.org/2010/04/23/syeikh-abdul-muhyi-1650-1730wali-allah-ulama-besar-di-jawa-barat-asli-sasak/>. Manuscripts of these treatises are preserved in the Library of Leiden University and may be found under shelf numbers Cod. Or. 7465, Cod. Or. 7527, and Cod. Or. 7705.

²⁵ Pijper, *Fragmenta Islamica*, p. 82.

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 87.

that by 1928 and until 1932 the Tarekat Tijaniyah was known to exist in various places in West Java including Cirebon, Kuningan, Ciamis, Tasikmalaya and various parts of Central Java, including Brebes, Pekalongan and Tegal.²⁷

Martin van Bruinessen, in his *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat*, observes that Sufism and Sufi orders have become an integral part of *pesantren* intellectual and religious life.²⁸ In a number of *pesantrens* in West Java, Sufi works are available and studied. Van Bruinessen encountered various important books on Sufism that have become works of reference in these Islamic boarding schools including the *Ihya' 'Ulumuddin* (Al-Ghazali), *Bidayatul Hidayah*, *Minhajul 'Abidin*, *Sairus Salikin* and *Hidayatus Salikin* (Al-Palimbani) in which elements of the *wahdat al-wujud* are apparent.²⁹

It has to be noted that there are some other *tarekats* across West Java which cannot be discussed here because it would lead away too far from the central topic of this book. Thanks to the tireless efforts of Sufi *gurus*, the *tarekats* grew and expanded over time. Most important is that all *tarekats* contributed to promoting a style of Islam that is accommodative to adjustments and modifications in order to meet local customs and the spiritual needs of the Sundanese.³⁰

Wali veneration, as practiced by *tarekat* followers in Sundanese society is perhaps the best example of how Islam was accommodated to local practices.³¹ A *wali* is a saint or a holy man. Some Muslims are convinced that a *wali* is endowed with supernatural power enabling him to offer “benefit in this world and the next.”³² *Tarekat* followers hold that one can obtain material and spiritual happiness through the visitation of places deemed sacred such as graves or caves.³³ The best examples of saint veneration practices are visits (*ziarah*) to the graves of Sunan Gunung Jati

²⁷ *Idem*.

²⁸ Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat*, pp. 19-21.

²⁹ *Idem*, pp. 162-166.

³⁰ Lubis (et al.), *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam di Jawa Barat*, p. 174.

³¹ Moh. Ali Fadillah, ‘Pengultusan Orang Suci Pada Masyarakat Sunda: Sebuah Kontinuitas Unsur Budaya Lokal dalam Ritual Keagamaan Islam’, in Ajip Rosidi, H. Edi S. Ekadjati and A. Chaedar Alwasilah (eds.), *Prosiding Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda Jilid 1* (Bandung: Yayasan Kebudayaan Rancagé, 2006), pp. 419-432.

³² Millie, *Splashed by the saint*, p. 1.

³³ Interview, ustadz Toha, a follower of Tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqshabandiyah (TQN) Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, Serpong, 17 November 2013.

in Cirebon and that of Shaikh Abdulmuhyi in Pamijahan in Tasikmalaya.³⁴ If we look at how *ziarah* is observed, we find in it a substantial continuity of Islamic practices and pre-Islamic paganism.³⁵

In his *Nine Saints of Java*, D.A. Rinkes relates how in Pamijahan the grave of Shaikh Abdulmuhyi was venerated.³⁶ Until the present, crowds of people with all sorts of intentions and objectives make routine visits to the cave and pay homage at his grave. Rinkes observed:

Shaikh Abdulmuhyi is what one might call an 'all round man'; he is not a holy man for particular purposes, who mainly helps on specific request, but he is one who gladly shows his interest in all daily needs and wants, and who tries to alleviate everyone's difficulties. If a childless woman requests the Saint's mediation that she might acquire motherhood, in her dream she might, for example, see a hen with chicks, showing that her wish will be granted. A young *magang*³⁷ might desire promotion; he would go to Pamijahan and near the grave, having made his request, would burn *menyan* (incense) and recite a set of formulae, then dream of a person carrying a *payung* [umbrella], or indeed that he climbs a ladder or a tree. This indicates that the Saint is favourably disposed towards him. A merchant desiring property in commerce would consider himself fortunate if the Saint caused him to dream of shooting a deer while hunting.³⁸

Rinkes also describes how visitors to Shaikh Abdulmuhyi's grave paid homage at another cave nearby. He continues:

Just as a visit to Medina is customary for those making the *hajj* to Mecca, so is it necessary for a visitor to Shaikh Abdulmuhyi's grave to go to the cave and to Panyalahan to pay homage to the mysterious powers there. The entrance to this cave is about ten minutes' walk from Pamijahan. Amply provided with bamboo torches and oil lamps, one

³⁴ A valuable reference on grave visitation (*ziarah*) is Henri Chambert-Loir and Claude Guillot, *Ziarah dan Wali di Dunia Islam* (Jakarta: Serambi, 2007).

³⁵ Fadillah, 'Pengultusan Orang Suci', p. 419.

³⁶ D.A. Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1996). See also Tommy Christomy, 'Pamijahan as the Centre of the Shattariyah Order in 17th Century', in Ajip Rosidi, H. Edi S. Ekadjati and A. Chaedar Alwasilah (eds.), *Prosiding Konferensi*, pp. 343-358.

³⁷ *Magang*; candidate for a post in the civil administration who volunteers in an office while awaiting appointment.

³⁷ Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java*, p. 3.

³⁸ *Idem*.

enters a place where water drips from the rocks above. Each in turn puts his or her mouth under it to drink the icy water. Opinion is that this is '*chai jamjam*', or water that trickles through from the Zamzam well in Mecca, the beneficial power of which is famous.³⁹

In his conclusion, Rinkes argues that there is a possible connection with and a continuity between this grave veneration and earlier non-Islamic practices. He argues that "It is known that many places which had been worshipped or venerated by a former generation kept that veneration after the population converted to a new religion, on condition, however, that the places also took part in the transition."⁴⁰ The Sundanese have maintained this mystical phenomenon to this date and they continue to uphold mystical practices their predecessors had adopted regardless of their religions. This also shows that previous non-Islamic practices which are strongly *adat*-inspired are essential in the life of the Sundanese people.

The *tarekat* tradition is not the only crucial element that helped Islamising the Sundanese. Islam was predominantly disseminated through *dakwah* and education in mosques, *pesantren* and *madrasah*. *Ulama* provided classes in Quranic instruction for youths and adults, the elderly and the under aged, both male and female. In Priangan District, Quranic classes were held in the *pesantren* for underage students under the guidance of Islamic teachers (*ajengan*). After having finished the reading of the entire Quran, a graduation session was held to celebrate the achievement of the graduates. Elderly people, both male and female, regularly held religious sessions and services according to their interests and needs.⁴¹

Pijper witnessed the dynamics of the transmission of Islamic knowledge and practices in various regions in West Java in the early twentieth century. He witnessed women's participation in Islamic learning-teaching activities where the teacher's and the *ajengan*'s wives and female pupils of higher classes acted as religious instructors.⁴² Interestingly, female pupils apparently did not often wear a *tiyung* or *kukudung* (headscarf).⁴³ For most Sundanese, Islam's successful transmission came

³⁹ Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java*, p. 10.

⁴⁰ *Idem*, p. 12.

⁴¹ Suhamihardja, 'Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan', p. 213.

⁴² Pijper, *Fragmenta Islamica*, p. 16.

⁴³ *Idem*, p. 17.

about because Muslim preachers made adjustments to the fundamentals of the Islamic teachings to make them accord with Sundanese worldviews and *adat*.⁴⁴ This ingrained Islam in the social life of the Sundanese people as faith, culture and identity.

The transmission of Islam presented extraordinary challenges to Christian missionaries. Dutch missionary accounts from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reveal the frustration among the missionaries who were serving in various parts of West Java and the astonishing challenges they faced in proselytising among the Sundanese people.⁴⁵ Th. van den End and J. Weitjens S.J. argued that the meagre success of their conversion efforts stemmed from the fact that Islam was already entrenched in Sundanese social and cultural life.⁴⁶ It is probably because of this history that scholars of Islam in West Java have consistently argued that the region has become more deeply influenced by Islam than Central and East Java. In Indonesia, it is common knowledge that the Sundanese have been more observant Muslims than the Javanese.

Although commonly considered observant Muslims, some Sundanese believe in material and immaterial objects and rituals somewhat alien to Islamic tenets. Julian Millie observes:

Hasan Moestapa⁴⁷ represents Sundanese *adat* as a body of practices and rituals somewhat different from Islam. These include the belief in the influence of the spirits of deceased ancestors; the belief that certain places, notably graves and places of natural beauty, and objects, especially knives and other steel items, are inhabited by these spirits; a ritual symbolism rooted in agriculture and reverence for the rice goddess Dewi Sri; a conviction that mantras are useful for achieving worldly goals; a repository of norms made up of sayings and patterned speech...⁴⁸

The belief in natural beauty is manifested in the Sundanese conviction that there are spirits (*guriang*) that control the mountains and who possess supernatural powers that bring and guarantee prosperity and safeguard the life of every Sundanese. The Sundanese people value the

⁴⁴ Interview, Abah Cakra Waluya Wirapati, Bandung, 15 April 2009.

⁴⁵ Th. van den End and J. Weitjens, S.J., *Ragi Carita 2: Sejarah Gereja di Indonesia 1860an-sekarang* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2003), p. 222.

⁴⁶ *Idem*, pp. 222-223.

⁴⁷ We will return to him below.

⁴⁸ Millie, *Splashed by the saint*, p. 14.

beauty and power of their natural landscape. The three important mountains in the land of Sunda, Mount Gede, Mount Putri and Mount Padang, are believed to be sacred and powerful.⁴⁹ The Sundanese celebrate rites and ceremonies in pursuit of the blessings of the spirits of their late ancestors (*karuhun*) by offering them food and other items.⁵⁰ They also acknowledge the existence of other spirits such as *dedemit*, *jurig* and *ririwa* and it is not uncommon among the Sundanese that children, young girls and pregnant women are prohibited from visiting sites like cemeteries, big stones and trees during specific moments in time in order to safeguard them from the harm caused by these malevolent spirits.⁵¹ The character most discussed in Sundanese mythology of the spirit world is Nyai Roro Kidul. This myth occupies a special place in the mystical world of the Javanese. She is believed to be the goddess of the Southern Sea (i.e. Indian Ocean) who is also said to be a Sundanese princess, namely the daughter of a Pajajaran ruler.⁵² Although other sources claim that the princess hailed from a kingdom in East Java, either Kediri or Koripan, Pajajaran is most often mentioned.⁵³

Robert Wessing argues that belief in supernatural forces influenced the religious life of the Sundanese. He points out that:

A major feature of the Sundanese belief system is the conviction that life is influenced by various supernatural forces, both beneficent and deleterious. It is important therefore in conduct of daily affairs to determine where the positive and negative influences are located since these forces are not stationary. To this end the Sundanese have developed divination devices which are described in their *Paririmbón* (divining books). If a Sundanese wants to conduct some business in a given place he must ask in which direction his objective is located relative to himself. He then consults his *Paririmbón* in order to find out where the evil influence is located on that particular day. If the evil is located in a direction other than the one he must take, he may set out directly toward his goal. Should his goal and the evil coincide, however, it would be best not to go at all. If one must go then it is best to start by heading in the direction opposite to

⁴⁹ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 18 April 2009.

⁵⁰ Suhamiharja, 'Agama, Kepercayaan dan Sistem Pengetahuan', p. 215.

⁵¹ *Idem*.

⁵² Robert Wessing, 'A Princess from Sunda: Some Aspects of Nyai Roro Kidul' in *Asian Folklore Studies*, Volume 56, 1997: pp. 317-318.

⁵³ *Idem*, p. 319.

the one in which the evil influence is located and only later curve toward one's objective.⁵⁴

These practices are certainly not Islamic but seem to be derived from Hindu-Buddhist traditions or perhaps from native beliefs. Observers claim that there is an intricate mix of various religious traditions of Islam, Indian Hinduism and Buddhism and native beliefs. As Wessing notes, these belief systems seem to be "like a layer cake with each influence superimposed on the previous one."⁵⁵

Ulama and Adat

I shall underline from the outset that by discussing *ulama* and *adat*, I do not mean to subscribe to the often seen statement that 'Sunda is Islam,' which seems to imply that 'Sunda is Islamic.' Julian Millie is correct when he criticised that "this statement involves a radical effacement of difference".⁵⁶ The point I want to make here by discussing this theme is that *adat* is important, and for the *ulama* such as Hasan Moestapa (1852-1930), it is often relevant to help 'Islamising' the Sundanese or, the other way around, 'Sundanising' Islam.

Adat is a complex mix of customs and values which has served to maintain the ancestral heritage. It is central to the social, cultural, spiritual and ritual lives of *ulama*, Sundanese *menak* (aristocracy, *priyayi* in Javanese), and ordinary people.⁵⁷ The Dutch colonial government realised this social capital and promoted *adat* over religion. Dutch Advisor on Native Affairs, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, even argued for the precedence of *adat* over Islam in society. Snouck Hurgronje's '*receptie*' theory posited that this precedence would mean that Islamic law could

⁵⁴ R. Wessing, 'Life in the Cosmic Village: Cognitive Models in Sundanese Life' in Edward M. Bruner and Judith O. Becker (eds.), *Art, Ritual and Society in Indonesia* (Papers in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 53 (Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, Athens, Ohio, 1979), p. 104.

⁵⁵ R. Wessing, *Cosmology and Social Behaviour in a West Javanese Settlement* (Ohio University: Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 47, 1978), p. 14.

⁵⁶ Millie, *Splashed by the saint*, p. 13.

⁵⁷ Nina H. Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak Priangan 1800-1942* (Bandung: Pusat Informasi Kebudayaan Sunda, 1998), p. 257.

only be observed by indigenous people after having been filtered and deemed compatible with local *adat*. For Snouck Hurgronje, *adat* was not to be subordinated to a kind of Islam as the Arabs professed it. In order to implement *adat* in West Java, Snouck Hurgronje approached the *menak* and Muslim leaders to seek political and religious support for his policy. Haji Hasan Moestapa was his most important ally in championing *adat's* primacy.

Haji Hasan Moestapa was born in Cikajang, Garut, on 3 June 1852 into a *menak* family. His father was Mas Sastramanggala, a descendant of Tumenggung Wiratanubaya, the Regent of Parakanmuncang. His mother was Nyi Mas Salpah, a daughter of Mas Kartapraja, the head of the Cikajang sub-district and descendant of Dalem Sunan Pagerjaya of Suci Garut. His mother's family members were pious Muslims and some were known as *ulama*, including Kyai Hasan Basari and Kyai Cibunut. From childhood age, his parents made him recite from the Quran twice a day, in the morning and evening, without fail. At the age of seven, he undertook religious studies under the supervision of Kyai Hasan Basari. At the tender age of eight years, he made the pilgrimage to Mecca with his father. Upon his return, he studied a number of Islamic subjects with various *kyais*, including Rd. H. Yahya, Kyai Abdul Halim, Kyai Muhammad, and Kyai Abdul Kahar.⁵⁸ When he was seventeen years old, his father sent him to Mecca to study. After ten years in the holy land, he returned and studied Sufism under his grandfather, Ajengan Cibunut. He also studied with his uncle, Muhammad Irja'i, who had just returned from Madura after studying Islam with the local Kyai Khalil.⁵⁹ From 1874 to 1882 he returned to Mecca to study with Syaikh Hasbullah and Syaikh Abdul Hamid Dagastani, as well as with Syaikh Muhammad, Syaikh Umar Sani, Syaikh Mustomal Apipi, Sayid Bakri and Sayid Abdullah Janawi. He claimed to have mastered sixteen religious sciences.⁶⁰ Upon his return, his prominence saw him becoming

⁵⁸ This short biography of Haji Hasan Moestapa rests on Tini Kartini and Ningrum Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga Haji Hasan Mustafa* (Jakarta: Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1985), p. 13. For a discussion of recent publications on Haji Hasan Mustafa's work see Millie 2014.

⁵⁹ Ajip Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda* (Bandung: Kiblat, 2009), p. 149.

⁶⁰ In 1882, Raden Haji Moehammad Moesa, the chief Penghulu of Garut, asked Haji Hasan Moestapa to return home to address tensions between the *ulama* in Garut. He played the role of mediator very well and became the most important

acquainted with Dutch orientalist like K.F. Holle. J.L.A. Brandes, Ph.S. van Ronkel, G.A.J. Hazeu, and D.A. Rinkes later in his life. In 1889, Snouck Hurgronje asked Hasan Moestapa to accompany him on his travels around Java and Madura.⁶¹ In 1893, upon Snouck Hurgronje's request, Hasan Moestapa was appointed Chief Penghulu in Kutaraja, Aceh (1893-95),⁶² where he arrived on 22 February. Snouck Hurgronje praised Hasan Moestapa's abilities in a letter to the Governor-General on 22 May 1894, stating: "It is obvious that he could easily develop relations with the Acehnese and has a grasp of the local situation."⁶³

After having served the Dutch colonial government in Kutaraja for two years, Haji Hasan Moestapa was promoted to Chief Penghulu in Bandung (1895-1917). During his time in Bandung, he contributed much to the synthesis between Islam and Sundanese *adat* and language. He proselytised in Sundanese in a way that blended Islam with local values.⁶⁴ His understanding of Islam, coupled with an amazing mastery of the Arabic language, enabled him to translate and paraphrase Arabic in Sundanese in such a way that the Sundanese were able to understand it without too much trouble. In doing so, Hasan Moestapa made Arabic consonants sound familiar to the ears and minds of his Sundanese audience.⁶⁵ This, his greatest contribution, rendered Islam more familiar to the Sundanese, and was extraordinarily useful in maintaining the harmonious Islam-Sunda synthesis. His unique expertise and leadership has attracted much scholarship.⁶⁶

ulama serving his people day and night, based in the Garut Grand Mosque, for seven years. See Kartini and Djulaeha (eds.), pp. 16-17. See also Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 149.

⁶¹ Jajang Jahroni, 'The Life and Mystical Thought of Haji Hasan Mustafa (1852-1930)', MA thesis, Leiden University, 1999, p. 24.

⁶² Kartini and Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga*, p. 17.

⁶³ Jahroni, 'The Life and Mystical Thought', p. 25. See also P.Sj. van Koningsveld, 'Nasehat-Nasehat Snouck Hurgronje sebagai Sumber Sejarah Zaman Penjajahan', in E. Gobe and C. Adriaanse (eds.), *Nasihat-Nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya Kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda 1889 - 1936* volume I (Jakarta: Seri Khusus INIS, 1990), pp. XIII-LXXV.

⁶⁴ Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 153.

⁶⁵ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 18 April 2009.

⁶⁶ Haji Hasan Moestapa authored a great number of works on various themes, spanning Sundanese literature, Islam and society. His best-known monograph is about *adat* and entitled *Adat-adat Urang Priangan jeung Sunda lianna ti eta*

Haji Hasan Moestapa's intellectual enterprise sought to maintain *adat* central to 'Sundanese-ness.' For him, Islam should be understood and observed within the framework of *adat*. He argued that Islamic movements which ignored *adat* could never be sustained.⁶⁷ His efforts to synthesise Sundanese *adat* and Islam were incomparable. A leading expert on Sundanese literature and culture, Ajip Rosidi, acknowledged Moestapa's contribution. In his *Manusia Sunda*, Ajip observes that Haji Hasan Moestapa was deeply concerned with making Islam compatible with local culture in a way that would not stifle the future growth of the *adat*. He cited how Haji Hasan Moestapa's work on Quranic exegesis contains only 105 verses which were interpreted and translated into the Sundanese language. For Hasan Moestapa, these verses were most relevant to the Sundanese.⁶⁸ The rest, he said, were difficult for the Sundanese to understand because they were revealed in an Arabic context alien to Sundanese culture.

Hasan Moestapa paid considerable attention to the central role *adat* played in shaping society's cultural and spiritual lives. His adoption of *adat* into religious practices meant that his 'Islamic' practices were sometimes at odds with those of the more orthodox masses. When his beloved son, Toha Firdaus, passed away in a car accident, his corpse was brought from their home to the cemetery accompanied by a *keroncong* orchestra,⁶⁹ instead of *tahlil*,⁷⁰ as traditionally-observed. This was done as a mark of respect to Toha, who had been a leading *keroncong* artist and had headed a *keroncong* orchestra ensemble.⁷¹ Due to his unusual religious practices, Moestapa was accused of having deviated from the *Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah*⁷²

(1913). It was translated into Dutch by leading Dutch expert on Native affairs, R.A. Kern, under the title *Over Gewoonten en Gebruiken der Sundaneezen door Haji Hasan Moestapa* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1946). See Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 147.

⁶⁷ Kartini and Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga*, pp. 11-12.

⁶⁸ Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 153.

⁶⁹ *Keroncong* is a type of Indonesian musical ensemble that typically uses a violin, flute, guitar, ukulele, banjo, cello, and a string bass with a female or male singer.' See <http://kbbi.web.id/> (accessed 5th of February 2014).

⁷⁰ *Tahlil* is the reading of *lā ilāha illa Allāhu* which means No God but Allah.

⁷¹ Kartini and Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga*, pp. 12-13. Also Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 18 April 2009.

⁷² *Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah*, Muslims who follow the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and the [consensus] of the Islamic community; long-hand term for the majority Sunni branch within Islam.

orthodoxy. The prominent mufti of Batavia, Sayyid Uthman, criticised Moestafa for his eccentric and controversial interpretations of Islam.⁷³

Hasan Moestapa's friendship with Snouck Hurgronje, as with other Dutch orientalist, influenced his intellectual and political choices. Snouck Hurgronje was active as Advisor for Native and Islamic Affairs in Indonesia (1889-1906).⁷⁴ Their strong bond is illustrated in their correspondence between 1893 and 1895. Writing to Snouck Hurgronje, Hasan Moestapa liked to sign off with "your friend in Allah" or "your faithful friend."⁷⁵ He was proud of Snouck Hurgronje and called him "my brilliant friend forever, who knows everything."⁷⁶ In one of his books, his *Aji Wiwitan Istilah*, Hasan Moestapa denied that this friendship stemmed from his allegiance to him or to the Dutch colonial government. Rather, he said, "I am a descendant of *ulama* loved by the Dutch..... all of them love me not because of my expertise, but because I am concerned and patient."⁷⁷

The Dutch Government deeply trusted Hasan Moestapa because of his loyalty to his Dutch friends. Snouck Hurgronje's own theories had probably influenced Hasan Moestapa's devotion to the *adat* and was unhappy with Sarekat Islam's negative views about the *adat*. This inspired him to warn the movement, in its Congress in Bandung from 17 to 24 June 1916, to forget its purification mission as this could jeopardise the *adat*'s precedence and confuse the community.⁷⁸ He maintained that a social movement which overlooked *adat* and did not care for commoners would certainly disintegrate.⁷⁹

⁷³ Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 151.

⁷⁴ Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, third edition, 1996), p. 115.

⁷⁵ Jahroni, 'The Life and Mystical Thought', p. 26.

⁷⁶ *Idem*, pp. 26-27.

⁷⁷ Kartini and Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga*, pp. 44-45. In the *Aji Wiwitan Istilah*, R.A.A. Moeharam Wiranatakoesoema expressed his recognition of the book's originality, claiming that the book was authored by Hasan Moestapa. This also attests to the close relation between them.

⁷⁸ Kartini and Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga*, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁹ *Idem*, pp. 3 and 12-13. See also Jahroni, 'The Life and Mystical Thought', pp. 49-51. Haji Hasan Moestapa had been one of the greatest and most knowledgeable Muslim scholars who had spent much of his time studying Islam and serving the *ummat*. In the fields of Islamic studies and Sundanese literature his works are invaluable. Garut and Bandung are two regions where he spent much of his life. In respect of his contribution, generations after him paid tribute to him. In

These warm ties, however, were challenged and some notables, among them Sayyid Uthman, considered them a treacherous conspiracy against Islam.⁸⁰ The Modernist Sarekat Islam (SI) and PERSIS were also known to be critical of Hasan Moestapa. H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto opposed the acculturation agenda Hasan Moestapa pushed. Tjokroaminoto thought that Islam promoted ethical and spiritual foundations and he stated:

Our culture is based on a religion whose strong ethical and spiritual foundations (especially *Tauhid*) best fulfil human needs, in a way that best agrees with reason. The Islamic faith on which our culture is based possesses a Book revealed by God, a perfect ethical guide unrivalled by any other book seen or possessed by man.⁸¹

This quote was also intended as an attack against the Nationalist movement, which claimed to promote 'authentic' Indonesian culture. For Tjokroaminoto, the Nationalists sought to revive Hindu culture. While this was true to some extent, his critique was insufficiently discriminating and to some extent also implicated local culture, which Muslim communities had in fact generally accepted. It was ironic that he adopted such a stance given the fact that he was a descent of a *priyayi* family whose cultural life was mostly rooted in syncretic traditions.⁸²

Hasan Moestapa accused Tjokroaminoto and his SI of trying to articulate the puritanical Wahhabi orientation and hence he cautioned SI leaders that their movement might alienate their own support-base if it

1965, for example, the Governor of West Java presented Hasan Moestapa with an award in recognition of his achievements. Soeharto's New Order government awarded him the esteemed cultural title of national Sundanese poet.

⁸⁰ Michael Laffan, *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 168-169.

⁸¹ Tjokroaminoto, *Pembela Islam*, (P.I), No. 59, pp. 11, n.d. The original version of this quote is as follows: "*Cultuur kita berdasar atas soeatoe agama yang paling koeat dasar boedi dan kebatinannja (teristimewa sekali Tauhid) jang paling sempoerna memenoehi keperloean dan keboetoehan manoesia, dan paling setoejoe dengan akal. Agama Islam jang mendjadi dasarnja cultuur kita adalah mempoenjai Kitab jang diwahjoekan oleh Toehan, jang paling sempoerna mendjadi pedoman boedi pekerti sehingga tak ada bandingannja di antara segala kitab jang pernah dilihat dan diempenjai oleh manoesia.*"

⁸² Budi Setyarso and Redaksi KPG, *Tjokroaminoto Guru Pendiri Bangsa* (Jakarta: KPG [Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia], 2011), p. 28.

maintained its uncompromising attitude. It was ironic too that SI adopted such a stance, given that their own constituency comprised mostly of the rural peasantry whose *adat* and culture were inspired by ‘animistic’ and Hindu traditions. In the following years, however, the SI, later known as PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party), changed its attitude as it realised that *adat* practices remained common among SI members. In the end this provoked criticism from PERSIS leaders, who accused the SI of perpetuating *bid’a* (innovation not based on the Quran or *Sunnah*), and of betraying its own principles.⁸³

Despite PERSIS’ early bitter opposition, its attitude to *adat* was ambivalent. In the late 1960s, for example, PERSIS leader, Endang Saefuddin Anshari, astonished many Sundanese leaders by stressing the need to defend the Islam-Sunda synthesis since, for him, “Islam *teh* Sunda, Sunda *teh* Islam” (Islam is Sunda, Sunda is Islam).⁸⁴ While this synthesis revealed the intimate association between Islam and Sunda, many saw this as the outcome of mixing Islamic practices and Sundanese *adat* which is strongly animistic or Hindu.⁸⁵ The proponents of the Islam-Sunda synthesis strived to develop a cultural and religious justification to sustain the inter-relation between the two. Probably because of this nexus, Karel Steenbrink observed that among the Sundanese the differences between *santri* and *abangan* are not so obvious.⁸⁶ While the latent tension between Islam and *adat* remained, the Modernists and Traditionalists continued to push Islamisation through different approaches.⁸⁷ The Traditionalists sought to maintain tradition, while the Modernists promoted education and social services.

Menak and Islam

From the nineteenth until the first quarter of the twentieth century, Islam became increasingly rooted in Sundanese society and had become the

⁸³ A.M., ‘Bid’ah Dengan Pergerakan’, in *Pembela Islam*, No. 61, n.d. pp. 3-5.

⁸⁴ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 18 April 2009.

⁸⁵ Lubis (et al.), *Sejarah Perkembangan Islam*, pp. vi-vii.

⁸⁶ Karel Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach: The Contested Conversion of Madrais Adherents in West-Java Between 1960-2000’, in Chr. G.F. de Jong (ed.), *Een vakkraft in het Koninkrijk. Kerk- en zendings historische opstellen aangeboden aan dr. Th. van den End ter gelegenheid van zijn vijfenzestigste verjaardag*. Heerenveen: Groen, 2005, p. 288.

⁸⁷ Interview, Azyumardi Azra, Singapore, 23 May 2011.

religion of the Sundanese aristocrats, the *menak*, as well as that of the commoners.⁸⁸ Most members of the *menak* observed Islamic worship such as the daily prayers but they also mostly performed the *hajj* to the *Ka'bah* for which many travelled to Mecca. The Sundanese elite sent its children to *pesantren* (Islamic schools). It also celebrated festivals such as *Idul fitri* and its members donned Arab-style dress during official public ceremonies.⁸⁹

In 1924, the Regent of Bandung, R.A.A. Moeharam Wiranatakoesoema,⁹⁰ made the pilgrimage to Mecca.⁹¹ A leading expert on Indonesian Islam, Azyumardi Azra, observed that on the ship taking him to Mecca, Wiranatakoesoema noted a great diversity of ordinary men and women, young and old, who enthusiastically expressed their impatience to get to Mecca. He wondered what motivated these people to leave their relatives and to risk their lives to embark on such a costly and exhausting journey. In Mecca, he saw thousands of Muslims from around the world who were still living under colonial rule, congregating in a desert valley for the sake of their God.⁹² Wiranatakoesoema met the Governor of the Hijaz, Hidayat Sharif. In recognition of his reputation as a Muslim leader, Sharif presented him the Istiqlal Star, an honorary award usually reserved for distinguished guests.⁹³

However, Wiranatakoesoema did not seem to have found his *hajj* experience as entirely uplifting. Contrarily, in most respects, he experienced awful things during his pilgrimage trip. As observed by Ricklefs, Wiranatakoesoema criticised “the exploitation and extortion of the pilgrims by local Arabs, of the threat of highwaymen and murderers and, when the *hajis* reached Mecca, of finding there, the Islam’s holiest place, ‘people who unscrupulously sin against the holy prescriptions’.”⁹⁴ But, in spite of those awful experiences, Wiranatakoesoema found the *hajj*

⁸⁸ Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 7.

⁸⁹ Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak*, p. 253.

⁹⁰ Moeharam Wiranatakoesoema served as the Regent of Cianjur from 1912 to 1920 and was subsequently promoted as Regent of Bandung from 1920 to 1931 and again from 1935 to 1942.

⁹¹ Upon his return, Wiranatakoesoema wrote down his travel experience in a book entitled *Mijn reis naar Mecca*. Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak*, p. 253. Also Interview, Mira Richard Gnagey, Bandung, 16 April 2009.

⁹² Interview, Azyumardi Azra, Singapore, 23 May 2011.

⁹³ Interview, Mira Richard Gnagey, Bandung, 16 April 2009.

⁹⁴ Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 219-220.

experience moving, especially it what he viewed as 'Islam's universal reach.'⁹⁵

Upon his return, Wiranatakoesoema was called Kangjeng Haji or Dalem Haji. His attention and devotion to Islam also increased.⁹⁶ Some of his relatives described him as a Muslim who was inclined always to observe his Islamic obligations including praying, *zakat*, fasting in the month of *Ramadan*, giving alms and undertaking the *haji*.⁹⁷ As noted by the expert on the history of West Java, Nina H. Lubis, the Regent Wiranatakoesoema supported the construction of Bandung's grand mosque (*masjid agung*) even though his Dutch superior, Assistant Resident Hillen, disapproved it.⁹⁸ Wiranatakoesoema was strongly attached to Islam, an attachment which he expressed in the public sphere. He, for example, liked to sing Quranic verses in *kidung* form.⁹⁹ He was known for his habit of opening his public speeches by singing a *kidung fatihah*.¹⁰⁰

Kangjeng Haji's articulation of Islam in the Sundanese language and by using traditional poetry (*tembang*) was impressive as well as rare. By singing the *kidung fatihah*, which is *bid'a* in the eyes of many puritan Modernists, Kangjeng Haji sought to express Quranic meanings through a cultural form familiar to the Sundanese. Though it seems unpretentious, the singing of *al-fatihah* during his official speeches expressed Kangjeng Haji's endeavour to lend a sense of 'Sundaneness' to the articulation of the Quran's opening chapter. Such an original and native articulation of religion was a serious experiment at the time. The expert of Sundanese literature and culture, Hawe Setiawan, maintained that it was one of the few genuine attempts to make Islam Sundanese.¹⁰¹

Aria Suriaatmaja is another Sundanese *menak* who was a practising Muslim.¹⁰² Nina Lubis observes that, serving as Regent of the Priangan, he was known as the 'Prince of Mecca'. His people believed that he was

⁹⁵ *Idem*, p. 220.

⁹⁶ Rosidi and Ekadjati (eds.), *Ensiklopedi Sunda: Alam, Manusia, dan Budaya termasuk Budaya Cirebon dan Betawi* (Bandung: Pustaka Jaya, 2000), pp. 702-703. See also Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak*, p. 254.

⁹⁷ Interview, Mira Richard Gnagey, Bandung, 16 April 2009.

⁹⁸ Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak*, p. 253.

⁹⁹ *Kidung* is a form of traditional Javanese poetry.

¹⁰⁰ Rosidi and Ekadjati (eds.), *Ensiklopedi Sunda*, p. 703.

¹⁰¹ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 18 April 2009.

¹⁰² The following account rests upon Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak*, pp. 255-257.

endowed with *keramat* (sanctity) much like a saint. He was trusted and well-respected by the people in general as well as by his subordinates who used to rush to visit him during *Idul fitri*, in the hope of receiving blessings through him. Lubis explains that Raden Haji Muhammad Musa was yet another *menak* who paid attention to Islam, especially to the *shari'ah* and he warned the Regent of Lebak to maintain observing his daily prayers in order to remain a true and proper Regent. Another Regent of Bandung, R.A.A. Martanagara, liked to visit *pesantrens*. Meanwhile, the Regent of Tasikmalaya established good relationships with *kyais* and thereby allowing himself to be a patron of the *Al-Imtisal* magazine Martanagara and the *kyais* published together.¹⁰³

The widespread interest in Islam encouraged the *menak* to sustain good relationships with Muslim leaders such as the *ulama* and the *penghulu*, which no doubt strengthened their socio-cultural position. From a political perspective, such relationships were also useful in maintaining stability, especially since the *menak* were in fact Dutch government officials. Wiranatakoesoema, for example, was a close friend of Haji Hasan Moestapa, the *Hoofdpenghulu* of Bandung and both entertained warm relations with the Dutch Advisor on Native and Arabic Affairs, C. Snouck Hurgronje. They were also devoted promoters of the Islam-Sunda synthesis.¹⁰⁴ These acquaintances played an extraordinary role in the cultural and socio-political aspects of their society, especially between the 1890s to the 1920s.

Penghayat and Native-Syncretic Creeds

The Sundanese people constituted a remarkable diversity of believers. Besides Muslims who display a notable diversity of religious observances and interpretations, some Sundanese have a rich religious vision that includes the belief in one or another native-syncretic creed, which promotes values and practices different from any world religion. The native-syncretic creeds and practices are variously termed 'indigenous syncretism', and 'peasant religious syncretism'.¹⁰⁵ The particular syncretism to be addressed below may be designated as *Aliran Kebatinan*,

¹⁰³ Lubis, *Kehidupan Kaum Menak*, p. 257.

¹⁰⁴ Rosidi, *Manusia Sunda*, p. 144.

¹⁰⁵ Geertz, 'Ritual and Social Change', p. 39.

which originates from the Javanese *weltanschauung* postulating “the essential unity of all Existence.”¹⁰⁶ The leading expert on Javanese religion, Niels Mulder, calls it ‘Javanism’¹⁰⁷ and argues that this worldview is “more encompassing than religion and it views human existence within its cosmological context, making life itself a religious experience.”¹⁰⁸ This worldview sees life as a unity between all forms of existence and thus denies the “separation between religious and non-religious elements.”¹⁰⁹ In West Java, *Aliran Kebatinan* followers are called *Penghayat*, some sort of Sundanese *abangan*, to borrow part of Clifford Geertz’s typology of the Javanese society.¹¹⁰

In what follows I will discuss the contribution of two Sundanese *Penghayat* leaders who were most outspoken in inspiring the religious way of life and the religious outlook of the Sundanese. The first is Kyai Madrais (the popular designation of Kyai Muhammad Rais), from Cigugur, Kuningan, West Java. The second is Mei Kartawinata from Cimerta, Subang, West Java. Both argued for the significance of self-identity and authenticity over Islam. Kyai Madrais is the founder and was the leader of Agama Djawa Sunda (ADS) or Madraism while Mei Kartawinata led the establishment and promulgation of Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan (AKP), especially across West Java. Even under intensified Islamisation, both leaders remained unwilling to accept Islam and remained loyal to what they claimed was an authentic Sundanese syncretic creed, which they deemed superior to Islam and other religions.

Kyai Madrais and the Significance of Self: Agama Djawa Soenda (ADS)

Kiai Madrais Sadewa Alibassa Kusumah Wijaya Ningrat (1835-1939) was born to Raden Kestawil and Pangeran Alibassa Kusumawijayaningrat, known as Pangeran Surya Nata. Pangeran Alibassa was the son of Pangeran Sutawijaya, who was dismissed as *pangeran* of Gebang on the Dutch charge

¹⁰⁶ Mulder, ‘Aliran Kebatinan as an Expression of Javanese Worldview’, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 1. No. 2 (Sept., 1970), p. 105.

¹⁰⁷ Although one might argue that ‘Javanism’ would seem to point to the Javanese part of the population of Java, the Sundanese adhered to much the same kind of religious outlook. Therefore the term will be used also furtheron in the book.

¹⁰⁸ Mulder, ‘Aliran Kebatinan’, p. 105.

¹⁰⁹ *Idem*.

¹¹⁰ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

that he exploited his subjects.¹¹¹ As a consequence, his territories were confiscated and divided between the Residencies of Cirebon and Priangan. This had severe consequences for Pangeran Alibassa, who was marginalised and forced to live in Gebang Udik. Alibassa died in this rural area before Madrais was born and the orphan was brought up by Ki Sastrawardana, who was asked to accept the baby as his son.¹¹²

Madrais was trained in *pesantrens* in Cirebon and neighbouring areas, such as Leuweungbata, Brebes, Ciawigebang led by Kyai Ishak, Heubeul Isuk and Ciwedus.¹¹³ Various well-known Muslim leaders of his generation had graduated from these *pesantrens*. They include the founder of Persatuan Umat Islam (Islamic Community Union, PUI), K.H. Abdul Halim, Haji Muhammad Thohir, who was Madrais' bitter opponent, and a mystic progenitor, Sastrosudibyo.¹¹⁴ Because mysticism was widely practiced at that time, this tradition had very much attracted Madrais' attention.¹¹⁵ When he was fifteen years old, he claimed to have received a *wangsit* (divine/spiritual inspiration).¹¹⁶ Not long after, he began to promulgate doctrines that are largely unheard of in popular authoritative Islamic texts. Alexander Matheus Basuki Nursena Ningrat, one of Madrais' loyal followers who married Madrais' granddaughter, said that the number of Madrais' following increased rapidly in the late nineteenth century.¹¹⁷ In 1925, the Dutch administration officially recognised the movement they named ADS (Agama Djawa Soenda, Sundanese-Javanese Religion).¹¹⁸

The fundamental doctrine of Madraism is a call to the awareness of what is conceptualised as 'self', which obliges man to reflect on his origin and identity. Fundamental to the Madrais community is the question 'who' the 'self' is, in other words, humanism is central to Madrais' spiritual teachings.¹¹⁹ In addition to the importance of the 'self' as involving

¹¹¹ Didin Nurul Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State: The Dissolution of Madrais in 1964*, M.A Thesis, Leiden University, 2000, p. 36.

¹¹² Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 37.

¹¹³ *Idem*, p. 38.

¹¹⁴ *Idem*.

¹¹⁵ Interview, Ira Indrawardana, young leader of Madraism, Bandung, 14 August 2009.

¹¹⁶ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 290.

¹¹⁷ Interview, Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009.

¹¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 292.

¹¹⁹ *Idem*.

spirituality and identity, Madraism puts much emphasis on the concept of 'land.'¹²⁰ Land may be interpreted as one's home country, culture or norms or even ancestral wisdom. Ira Indrawardana understands the creed of the ADS as meaning to "choose and select life's spirit and pay respect to the place of gathering (*tanah pakumpulan*) and to reach the ultimate human spirit."¹²¹ Based on this, the followers of Madraism are obliged to love and respect their homeland, which is a strong element of their identity, in order to achieve the ultimate perfection as human beings.¹²² The proper combination of respect for self and land constitute the fundamentals through which ultimately human perfection can be achieved in this world.

Madraism's notion of the importance of 'self' was the most salient factor in inspiring the philosophy of the movement. Madraism entails "the obligation to achieve the ultimate perfection of the self rather than drowning in the theological debates that occurred in many Indonesian 'formalised' religions such as Islam and Christianity."¹²³ Didin Nurul Rosidin observes:

The ultimate perfection of human beings is seen as the ultimate goal of human life in this world, though such quality of life will only be met at the time when man dies and returns back to the origin, that is God, who had caused his existence in this crowded life. All doctrines of Madraism seem to be devoted towards guiding its members or other interested people to reach the ultimate goal of life, *sampurnaning hirup, sajaning pati* (to achieve perfection in life, then to attain the genuine death).¹²⁴

From the doctrinal perspective, Madraism resembles the *Aliran Kebatinan* movement, which is similarly rooted in Javanism. *Aliran Kebatinan* maintains the harmonious unity of all beings.¹²⁵ Its worldview projects a harmonious balance between human beings, religious doctrine, and the universe/nature. Madraism sanctifies the value of human life as integrated in the universe. Humanity and the universe coexist in a cosmology which demands that humans respect and protect the earth and

¹²⁰ *Idem.*

¹²¹ *Idem.*

¹²² *Idem.*

¹²³ Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 61.

¹²⁴ *Idem.*

¹²⁵ Mulder, 'Aliran Kebatinan', p. 105.

each other. These elements cannot destroy one another.¹²⁶ The confluence in this movement of nativism, spiritualism and local identity put it in a diametrically opposed position to Muslim Modernism which sought to assert the superiority of Islam over all other worldviews unless they could be reconciled with Islam's fundamental doctrines.

Notwithstanding its Sundanese essence, Madraism seems to have been influenced by Islamic doctrine. This is exemplified by the *pikukuh tilu* (three principles). These are *ngaji badan* (literally means 'reading the body'), *mituhu kana tanah* (literally denotes belief in one's land), and *ngandep* or *ngiblating ka ratu raja* (faithful to king/queen).¹²⁷ The first principle refers to its specific and cosmic conception of 'self' called '*ngaji badan*'. Steenbrink traced the origins of this principle back to Islamic mystical teachings. He claims that this doctrine "must be understood in the context of the famous mystic *hadith qudsi*: *man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu* (whomsoever knows himself, knows his Lord).¹²⁸ As God's creation, the body is believed to contain symbolic messages that are decipherable on contemplation.¹²⁹

Together with this cosmic understanding of the human body, Madraism believes in the one and only God, *Ka Gusti Sikang Sawiji Wiji*¹³⁰ where the spirits of God and human beings unite (*manunggal*).¹³¹ Like energy, God is omnipresent. Madrais also believed in God's unicity, commonly declared as *laysa kamithlihi shai'un* (there is nothing comparable to Him), an Islamic precept adopted by the ADS community.¹³² Because God is the absolute One and without equivalent, Madrais decided that differences between religions are superficial. This being so he realised that this superficiality did not really exclude the possibility that all religions might arrive at a common ground and at mutual recognition. Nonetheless,

¹²⁶ Interview, Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009.

¹²⁷ *Pemaparan Singkat Jejak Sejarah Komunitas ADS (Agama Djawa Sunda) ke Komunitas AKUR (Adat Karuhun Urang) di Cigugur Kuningan Jawa Barat* (Kuningan: Masyarakat Adat Karuhun Urang Sunda, 2008), p. 7.

¹²⁸ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 292.

¹²⁹ Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 61.

¹³⁰ 'Custom of Sundanese Ancestors: Explanation of Spiritual Culture' (Cigugur-Kuningan: National Foundation Study of Indonesian Culture, 2000), p. 9.

¹³¹ Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma (Chairman of Paguyuban Adat Cara Karuhun Urang, Adat Association for Ancestors' PACKU), Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.

¹³² *Idem*.

religion should not become a barrier in human beings' efforts in creating what Jatikusuma called "one understanding" namely that all of them are the community (*ummat*) of God, the One and Only.¹³³ Jatikusuma argued that this shared understanding should evolve into becoming "one belief" which should then serve as the foundation for the various communities of believers to unite upon.

Aside from Madrais' mystical dimensions, it also had nationalist inclinations as *mituhu kana tanah*.¹³⁴ *Mituhu kana tanah* had two connotations with regards to *tanah* (land); the first is *tanah amparan* which means home land, and the second, *tanah adegan*, which means land as the location in which the human psyche and man's ego or self are manifested.¹³⁵ *Mituhu kana tanah* is described as follows:

A human being, as a part of a nation or community, must value and love his nation. Therefore he must be able to maintain, observe and perpetuate his nation's identity/attributes. Man must respect and value other nations. The existence of different national identities constitutes the will of God.¹³⁶

These beliefs came together in a loosely-created and rather vague construct of mysticism and identity. This vagueness has remained due to the fact that no religious text was ever produced and transmitted across generations. Most of the Madrais' discourse has been transmitted in the form of oral traditions vulnerable to varying interpretations.

As a consequence of ADS's commitment to its own culture and nation, like other native-syncretic movements, it saw Islam as an opponent that endangered its existence. The ADS was critical of Islam not on doctrinal grounds, but because it saw Islam as imported culture. ADS leaders denounced Islam's medium of the Arabic language and argued that Islam is the religion of the Arabs. Over time, their hostility towards Islam appeared to have increased. Sartono Kartodirdjo observes that Madrais had tried to spread the ADS for some forty years before his native-syncretic movement achieved official recognition in 1925. It was clear that Madrais was adamant to propagate this movement as he engaged many envoys (*badals*)

¹³³ *Idem*.

¹³⁴ Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 61.

¹³⁵ *Pemaparan Singkat Jejak Sejarah Komunitas ADS (Agama Djawa Sunda)*, p. 8.

¹³⁶ *Idem*.

to assist him in spreading his movement across the region. The major targets of propagation were people in rural areas and those in the mountains and hills. Sartono was astonished to learn that Madrais' manifesto did not seem to be "messianic in character" although it was not free from "expressed millenarian expectations."¹³⁷ Nevertheless, he argues, this characteristic was largely articulated in terms of "a rather extreme nativism."¹³⁸ Sartono observes:

An apparently conscious effort was made to revive selected elements of Javanese and Sundanese culture. Much emphasis was put on one's duty to the fatherland. Ancient native magical and animistic rituals were re-introduced in the celebration of feasts or in religious performances. The movement even went so far as to argue that Islam was the religion of the Arabs and was not intended for the Javanese.¹³⁹

The argument that Islam was the religion of the Arabs and thus not intended for the Javanese and the Sundanese people was common among the followers of this native-syncretic creed. The argument about the universality of world religions, such as Islam and Christianity, was not relevant as they saw elements of locality, nativity and also ethnicity in each religion. This anti-Islam mentality gave rise to uneasy relationships with Muslims.¹⁴⁰

Although in 1922-23 the movement's reputation suffered due to the fraudulent behaviour of some of Madrais' envoys, the Dutch officially recognised the movement's statute in 1925. The statute posited that the movement was nativist in vision, with religious mission as its goal, arguing that God bestowed upon the Sundanese and Javanese people their own faith based on their own culture of origin. For our purpose, the most important point made in the statute was its declaration that the movement had abandoned Islam. As noted by Rosidin in his study, the statute was formulated by Madrais' son, Tedjabuana, his son-in-law, Raden Satria

¹³⁷ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 128-129.

¹³⁸ *Idem*, p. 129.

¹³⁹ *Idem*.

¹⁴⁰ Interview, Sobana Hardjasaputra, Bandung, 15 April 2009.

Kusuma, and allegedly by a mysterious Dutchman, Mr. J.L. Jacobs.¹⁴¹ The report did not specify Madrais' role in the drafting of this statue, so his endorsement of this declaration remains in question.

As Rosidin noted, it seems that in 1922 the Dutch attempted to confront Madraism and Muslims. Rosidin said that:

In 1922, *Fazar Asia* reported that an anonymous Dutch agitator had incited an official of the Cirebon branch of the Sarekat Islam (SI) to take steps to halt the development of Madraism because of its anti-Islam proclivities. He claimed that Madraism would establish a new religion of the Galuh (Sundanese), which was not in accordance with Islam. Surprisingly, in a reply the SI official did not give any expected response to this incitement because, as the SI official stated, he had never heard this issue before. He suggested the Dutchman report this movement to the authorities, if the latter considered that Madrais had broken the law.¹⁴²

The incident described above raises questions about the involvement of the Dutch Jacobs in developing ADS's statute, especially with regards to the declaration that the movement had abandoned Islam; I suspect that there was a *divide et impera* logic at work. It is also important to be critical of the Dutch role in organising this local syncretic community and naming it 'ADS'. Ira Indrawardana, a young ADS leader, argues that Kyai Madrais never intended to turn his mystical and spiritual community into an organised religion.¹⁴³ The explicit mention of the 'abandonment' of Islam was in fact peculiar because Madrais' followers had never embraced Islam or any other world religion in the first place. So, how could they turn away from Islam? As stated above, Steenbrink suggests that certain doctrinal aspects of Madraism originated from the Islamic mystical tradition. There was thus a connection, so while Madraism and Sufism were two traditions that shared certain elements in some respects, they also had sufficient differences which potentially could lead to conflict. However, both traditions had a common enemy in the Modernism (at the time called Wahhabism) which came up in the 1920s.

¹⁴¹ Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, pp. 43-46. I have been unable to identify who this Mr. Jacobs is. Accidentally, Rosidin also failed to do so.

¹⁴² *Idem*, p. 47. See also *Fazar Asia*, Tuesday, 14-8, 1922, p. 2, as quoted by Rosidin.

¹⁴³ Interview, Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009.

Mei Kartawinata and His Doctrine: Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan (AKP)

Mei Kartawinata was born in Kebon Jati, Bandung on 1 May 1897 to Raden Kartowidjojo and Raden Siti Mariah from Citereup, Bogor. He grew up in the Kanoman Palace of the Sultan of Cirebon.¹⁴⁴ His father, Kartowidjojo, is said to be descended from King Brawijaya of the East Javanese kingdom Majapahit. His mother is a daughter of Pangeran Sageri, the grandson of Panembahan Rakean Sake who is claimed to be descended from the Pajajaran Kingdom of Bogor. Thus, Mei Kartawinata is heir to two prominent kingdoms: East-Javanese Majapahit and Sundanese Pajajaran.¹⁴⁵ Unlike other members of the *kaum menak* who attended traditional Islamic schools, Mei did not. On the contrary, he went to the private Hollandsch Indische Zending School and took various courses to become a junior-level officer.¹⁴⁶ Because of this education, Mei was familiar with the fundamentals of Christian theology and acquainted with Dutch values.¹⁴⁷

In 1914, after having finished his formal training he sought a job and was hired by a printing company in Bandung. By 1922, he had joined the Indische Drukkerij Bond (IDB) labour union. It was probably during this time that Mei became involved in the Nationalist Movement that was flourishing in the region, in which Soekarno played a leading role. In 1925, when he was 28, Mei married Sukinah in Cirebon who was the daughter of Perwatadisastra from Kuningan, Cirebon. Upon his marriage he worked at a British-owned printing house in Atelir, Subang.¹⁴⁸

On 17 September 1927, Mei claimed that he had received a *wangsit* (divine guidance) while at the bank of the Celeuleuy River in Cimerta, Subang, West Java in the company of his best friends, M. Rashid and Sumitra.¹⁴⁹ The *wangsit* contained ten messages which came to constitute the fundamental doctrine of the AKP. They are: (1 and 2) commands to stand upright and never to let anybody affront you since that would also

¹⁴⁴ Abdul Rozak has made a very interesting study of this nativist current. See Abdul Rozak, *Teologi Kebatinan Sunda: Kajian Antropologi Agama tentang Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan* (Bandung: Kiblat Buku Utama, 2005), p. 123.

¹⁴⁵ Interview, Asep Setia, Bandung, 08 June 2008.

¹⁴⁶ *Pangeling-ngeling Ajaran Mei Kartawinata* (Bandung: 2007).

¹⁴⁷ Abd. Mutholib Ilyas and Abd. Ghofur Imam, *Aliran Kepercayaan & Kebatinan di Indonesia* (Surabaya: CV. Amin Surabaya, 1988), p. 68.

¹⁴⁸ *Pangeling-ngeling Ajaran Mei Kartawinata*.

¹⁴⁹ *Budaya Spiritual Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan* (Bandung: DMP AKP, 2005), p. 1. See also Abdul Rozak, *Teologi Kebatinan Sunda*, p. 119.

mean disrespect toward your parents and your nation's ancestors; (3) there is no power superior to the power of God, the most beneficent and compassionate, and this recognition must be reflected in one's personal attitude; (4) to take pride in one's self as each individual's perfection is a divine gift; (5) to recognise God's omnipresence; (6) that momentous change in the status quo will come, which in the end will bring freedom to the nation; (7) that abuse of knowledge and power for the fulfilment of one's own *hawa nafsu* (desires) will result in resentment, resistance and retaliation. Conversely, putting them to use for those in need will bring affection and induce a sense of brotherhood; (8) to love one's fellow beings regardless of appearances; (9) that one's achievements depend on one's efforts; (10) to rise for the good of the oppressed Indonesian people.¹⁵⁰

These 'Ten Commandments' provided Mei with the doctrinal system which earlier was lacking and which cohered around three main themes: divinity, humanity and patriotic fraternity.¹⁵¹ *First*, God is the most powerful, beneficent, compassionate and present; divine compassion must illuminate one's attitude. *Second*, help those in need and love all mankind regardless of racial and social background. *Third*, protect one's dignity, help those under oppression and be part of future efforts to challenge it.¹⁵²

The way Mei's doctrines developed owes much to his society's natural and cultural circumstances. His humanism, for example, was inspired by the natural environment at the Cileuleuy riverside. Mei once sat at the riverside and reflected on the origin of the water and the benefit it provides to creation. He stated that "the river actually starts with some drops of mountain water which swells to create an enormous volume of water flowing down to the ocean."¹⁵³ He maintained that the water of the river should have run out before it could reach the ocean. This was, however, not the case. He wondered how this could happen. After some time, he speculated that the water volume must have increased due to the advantage it dispersed to creation. He came to the conclusion that the water kept flowing because of its generosity to those in need. Mei Kartawinata then said by himself, "If the river water can benefit others,

¹⁵⁰ Details of the contents of the *Wangsit* can be found in *Idem*, pp. 2-5.

¹⁵¹ *Pangeling-ngeling Ajaran Mei Kartawinata*.

¹⁵² *Budaya Spiritual Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan*, pp. 2-5.

¹⁵³ Interview, Andre Hernandi and Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 7 July 2010 and 27 July 2010.

what about myself, a creature of God's, endowed with sound body and mind?" Upon his personal reflection, Mei disseminated his thoughts to the people. At that time he was convinced that abiding to the *wangsit's* messages of divinity, humanity and patriotic fraternity would bring back the nation's past glory, wisdom and noble character.¹⁵⁴

In 1930, Mei lived in Ciateul Street in Bandung where he had the opportunity to share his thoughts with Soekarno, Indonesia's founding father.¹⁵⁵ Mei's encounter with Soekarno was probably made possible through his political activism. The IDB, which he served, struggled to obtain equal rights for the indigenous people. Mei's reputation as a pro-nationalist meant he was very much under surveillance by the Dutch Colonial Administration.¹⁵⁶ Because of his political activities, he was arrested several times by the Dutch as well as by the Japanese occupation forces. He was first arrested in 1937 in Bandung. In 1943, the Japanese occupation forces arrested him because of his political activism. He was detained yet again in Cirebon in 1947 and once more arrested and jailed in Glodok, Jakarta, two years later.¹⁵⁷

Mei believed that the *wangsit* contained values that were compatible with the nation's cultural heritage and which might revive that heritage through political activism. He demonstrated his commitment to reinventing these values and to implement them into Sundanese society through his political activities. Mei's involvement in the Nationalist movement was probably linked to and influenced by his native-syncretic thoughts.

Like Kyai Madrais from Cigugur, Kuningan, Mei Kartawinata of Cimerta, Subang held nativist-mystical thoughts which cohered around the notion of the authentic Sundanese self. They soon resonated with the

¹⁵⁴ *Pangeling-ngeling Ajaran Mei Kartawinata*.

¹⁵⁵ Arriving in Bandung in June 1921 to study at Bandung's *Technische Hoge School*, now Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Soekarno soon married his landlady, Inggit Garnasih, after having divorced Cokroaminoto's daughter, Utari. Only after two years, his youthful activism saw him gain prominence in what he himself called a nationalist movement, frontline contender against the Dutch colonial administration. The nationalist movement in Bandung might have influenced the birth and growth of other social movements, such as the one led by Mei Kartawinata. See *Soekarno an Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis - Kansas city - New York: The Bobb-Merill Company, 1965), pp. 11-68.

¹⁵⁶ Ilyas and Abd. Ghofur Imam, *Aliran Kepercayaan*, p. 69.

¹⁵⁷ *Pangeling-ngeling Ajaran Mei Kartawinata*.

nationalist discourse on sovereignty that demanded political freedom from colonial power and sought cultural supremacy and legitimacy over other religious and cultural visions. Their search for cultural supremacy and legitimacy challenged efforts to Islamise Sundanese culture. This kind of opposition to Islam shows how Islamisation and Islam as a religion were continuously contested while it confirms that a religious vision other than Islam existed and also demonstrates the confidence of various Sundanese leaders to promote and defend what they believed as the true and genuine religion of their society.

The Christian Sundanese Community

This section examines the origins and the expansion of Christianity in West Java. It analyses how Christian Sundanese leaders tried to neutralise the increasing influence of Islam through the tireless promotion of Christian missions across West Java from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. During that period, Christianisation had successfully garnered a tiny minority of the Sundanese in Cikuya, Banten; Cikembar, Sukabumi; Ciranjang, Cianjur; Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah, Bekasi, among other localities. That success owed much to the mission's leadership, who appreciated indigenous culture and adopted a low profile approach. In particular Frederik Lodewijk Anthing (1820-83) who had made missionary work his life, made great contributions towards this end.¹⁵⁸ I selected a well-known Muslim-majority area, the Ciranjang district in Cianjur for my case study to present the history of the arrival of Christianity in the area and how the Christians established an exclusive settlement in a Muslim neighbourhood. Although the converts constituted only a tiny minority, it is important to learn how these reputedly strict Muslim people of Sundanese origin came to embrace Christianity. They claimed they descended from Raden Karadinata of the Sultanate of Cirebon, who was nota bene a Muslim with a *pesantren* background. The Christian leaders claimed that the first generation of Karadinata's descendants had migrated to Banten in the early nineteenth century and had converted to Christianity mid-century. Church leaders in Ciranjang admit that Islam is the religion of the vast majority of the Sundanese but refuse to deprive adherents of other faiths of their

¹⁵⁸ Gerald H. Anderson (ed.), *Biographical Dictionary of Christian Missions* (Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 24-25.

‘Sundanese-ness’.¹⁵⁹ When questioned about their choice of Christianity amidst the Muslim majority, they wondered what might be wrong being Christians in Sundanese society.¹⁶⁰

Batavia was an important hub for the Christian mission in West Java as a strategic international port city. In his *Visible Cities*, Leonard Blussé argues that in the eighteenth century, along with Canton in China and Nagasaki in Japan, Batavia was one of the most important port cities in Asia. They were often written about and “fired the imaginations of sailors and writers alike because of their extraordinary appearance and exotic attractions.”¹⁶¹ As an international port, Batavia became a centre for trade, culture and socio-religious activities. From 1620 to 1844, Batavia evolved into the centre of Christian activity in Java, in addition to the Moluccas and the lesser Sunda Islands.¹⁶² Denys Lombard observed that Batavia had been a city of Christian pastors long before other Javanese port cities such as Semarang and Surabaya became attractive to them.¹⁶³ In 1714, he says, a member of the Indies Council, Cornelis Chastelein, contributed to forming a Christian community in Depok.¹⁶⁴ Particularly after the 1830s, Batavia became the central post for European missionaries before they obtained permission to carry out their missionary activities in other regions in the country.¹⁶⁵ It was in Batavia that the Zending Consulate Office was situated. From 1822 to 1842, W.H. Medhurst from England stayed in Batavia and did what he could to win the sympathy of the Batavian Chinese. He propagated Christianity through the dissemination of Christian books which were printed by a small printing house in Prapatan, South Jakarta. This endeavour was subsequently continued by Anthing.¹⁶⁶

Although the Christian mission had been present since the eighteenth century, systematic attempts at conversion in Batavia only began in the

¹⁵⁹ Interview, pastor Nupelus Marchasan, Ruchman Marchasan, and Martan Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

¹⁶⁰ *Idem*.

¹⁶¹ Léonard Blussé, *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 2-3.

¹⁶² Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, pp. 218-219. See also Denys Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya, Batas-Batas Pembaratan* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2005), p. 98.

¹⁶³ Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya*, p. 98.

¹⁶⁴ *Idem*, p. 100.

¹⁶⁵ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 219.

¹⁶⁶ Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya*, p. 102.

1850s after which it expanded to other regions. S. Coolsma, a Dutch missionary and historian of the Christian mission in Indonesia, called the nineteenth century the “Century of Mission” (*Zendingseeuw*).¹⁶⁷ Karel Steenbrink explains the motive behind the waves of Christian missionaryism as follows: “Frustration caused by failure at home, idealism, a sense of adventure, and a longing to perform great and heroic deeds all contributed in different ways to the motivations and attitudes of many of the Dutch citizens who decided to go overseas.”¹⁶⁸

The rise of the Christian missionary age in the East Indies was due to the Christian leaders’ initiative to reverse the Christian mission’s inward-looking orientation. The mission expanded its previous focus on Batavia to include a larger area across West Java. This shift was initiated in 1851 by Christian leaders including F.L. Anthing, J. Esser, and E.W. King. They founded an association called the *Genootschap voor In- en Uitwendige Zending te Batavia* (Organisation for Inward and Outward Missionary Activities in Batavia) aiming to disseminate the Gospel outside Batavia, particularly among the Sundanese.¹⁶⁹ A Christian of Chinese origin, Gan Kwee, supported this initiative. He contributed by building the first Christian mission network across Cirebon, Sukabumi and Bandung in West Java and Purworejo and Purbolinggo in East Java.¹⁷⁰ Lombard observes that during the twentieth century, a wave of Chinese, most of whom were rich and generous, were ushered into Christianity.¹⁷¹ The Chinese integration into Christianity continued after independence and was deepened during

¹⁶⁷ Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950* (Amsterdam-New York, NY: Rodopi, 2006), p. 98. See also S. Coolsma, *De Zendingseeuw voor Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* (Utrecht, 1901).

¹⁶⁸ Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism*. p. 98.

¹⁶⁹ F.L. Anthing and J. Esser advised the NZV to send missionaries to West Java. Esser argued that “since 1569, there has not been a single Dutch Christian missionary who organised his mission in West Java whereas the Priangan contributed a lion’s share to the Dutch treasury.” He challenged his fellow Dutchmen by questioning how the Netherlands would reciprocate. He asserted that there had been no contribution to the Sundanese. “The time had come for the Netherlands to do something for the people who had so far been marginalised by means of delivering some ‘Kabar Keselamatan’ to them.” Koernia Atje Soejana, *Benih Yang Tumbuh II: Suatu Survey Mengenai Gereja Kristen Pasundan* (Bandung: Badan Pekerja Sinode Gereja Kristen Pasundan, 1974), pp. 19, 23, and 32.

¹⁷⁰ Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya*, p. 102.

¹⁷¹ *Idem*.

the New Order and Reform eras.

The Jemaat Cikuya: The Origin of Christian Sundanese

Before the arrival of the Nederlandsche Zendingsvereeniging, Adolf Mühlnickel had started his mission activities in this region on a voluntary basis. He was based in Cikuya, Banten and carried out missionary work for the Dutch *Zending Tukang* (ZT).¹⁷² ZT sought evangelists who wanted to work (as a *Tukang* 'worker') to serve the mission (Zending) and this seems to have been the first initiative to the voluntary mission project in West Java. As we will see in the following pages, Mühlnickel established the first Sundanese parish in Cikuya, Banten, known as the Cikuya parish (Jemaat Cikuya), and inspired the growth and development of missionarism in Banten and West Java in the following decades.

Mühlnickel's contribution towards the conversion of the Sundanese to Christianity was telling.¹⁷³ ZT sent missionaries across the country with little financial support. This forced the volunteers to work hard in order to support both themselves and their missionary activities. Mühlnickel had to work first before he could set out on his missionary trips. He sought and was offered work on a plantation in Cikuya owned by a European named Reesink. Mühlnickel was prepared to accept Reesink's offer on the condition that he be provided with a church and with a school to proselytise. Reesink agreed.¹⁷⁴

In 1854, Mühlnickel opened a school in Cikuya and built a church in the same place two years later. He worked on the plantation during working hours and served the mission after that. While working on the plantation, Mühlnickel met Minggu, who later worked for him as a house maid.¹⁷⁵ After some time, he met a young man named Sarma. Under

¹⁷² During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there were no significant evangelist activities. The emergent interest in evangelism was attested to in the seventeenth century by the founding of missionary organisations, for instance the one with the curious name *Zending Tukang* in Cikuya by Adolf Mühlnickel. See Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, p. 429 footnote 1.

¹⁷³ Ali, *Misionarisme di Banten*, pp. 55-56, 96. Also Interview, pastor Koernia Atje Soejana, Bekasi, 11 May 2010.

¹⁷⁴ *Idem*, p. 56.

¹⁷⁵ There is no account why Minggu and Sarma wanted to convert to Christianity. Also, there is no account of the faith they subscribed to before that. However, it is quite clear that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the vast majority

Mühlnickel's influence, Minggu and Sarma converted and were officially baptised in the Willemskerk (Williams Church) near the Gambir railway station in Central Batavia in 1855.¹⁷⁶ With this baptism, the pair were among the first indigenous Sundanese Muslims in Banten who had converted to Christianity after Helena van Bantam (d. 1704). After having been baptised, they returned to Cikuya to offer Christian services. With Mühlnickel's support, Minggu and Sarma established a Christian parish in Cikuya, Banten.¹⁷⁷ In the following years, Sarma's children, Sondjat and Esther, played central roles in propagating Christianity in Cikuya.

After some years, the Cikuya parish came to Anthing's attention. The association of Anthing with the Cikuya congregation energised missionary activities there in terms of finance, target and approach. With Anthing's support, the mission began to aim at converting the Baduy.¹⁷⁸ This mission did not work out well, however, as only one family converted while the rest of the Baduy rejected Christianity and since the Baduy continued to refuse to convert, the mission among them was halted in the end. This termination was also due to the financial constraints Anthing and his missionaries faced.

In their mission to convert the Baduy, the indigenous missionaries used *ngelmu*,¹⁷⁹ mystical sciences commonly believed to empower its

of the West Javanese population were Muslims. Interview with pastor Koernia Atje Soejana, Jakarta, 7 July 2009.

¹⁷⁶ *Idem*.

¹⁷⁷ The *Nederlandsche Zendingsvereeniging* (NZV), the most important evangelist organisation in West Java, realised that there were only few documents furnishing information on the Cikuya parish. See Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, p. 429.

¹⁷⁸ "Baduy is a popular designation for the land/area and people of Kanekes given by outsiders. The naming of Baduy links to two matters. Firstly, it points to a location named Baduy, a Mountain called Baduy and a River called Cibaduy, which all three are close to each another. For the Kanekes people themselves, only those who settled in Baduy are properly called Baduy. It is possible that the identification originated from visitors to the place. Second, it was possible that the designation was linked to a group of desert Arabs considered uncivilised. They were desert nomads." See Rosidi and. Ekadjati (eds.), *Ensiklopedi Sunda*, pp. 81-82. Also Ali, *Misionarisme di Banten*, p. 98.

¹⁷⁹ Eringa translates *elmu* as 'wetenschap, kennis, leer; geheime (esoterische) wetenschap; kunsten (in ongunstige zin)' (knowledge; secret (esoteric) knowledge; arts (in a negative sense). See F.S. Eringa, *Soendaas-Nederlands Woordenboek*, p. 201.

practitioners in order to influence people. At the time, *ngelmu* was popular in Banten, Batavia and other parts of West Java. People living in this region continued to believe in it and remained reluctant to abandon it even after conversion to Islam or Christianity. Sarma from Rangkas, for example, was a *ngelmu* seeker and although he had embraced Christianity¹⁸⁰ he continued to use it to convert locals, who were fascinated by these practices.¹⁸¹ The most prominent evangelist, Anthing, also practiced *ngelmu* and used it in his proselytisation efforts with the help of Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung, a Javanese disciple. Although some Christian missionaries condemned his 'mantrasising' of Biblical verses was, Anthing's 'mystical' approach afforded Christianity a veneer of familiarity which made it more attractive to the Sundanese.¹⁸² This approach was also useful in promoting mutual respect and understanding between the missionaries and their audience. Perhaps one very good example in this regard was demonstrated by Conrad Laurens Coolen in mid-nineteenth century interior East Java.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, pp. 251-252.

¹⁸¹ Interview, pastor Koernia Atje Soejana, Bekasi, 11 May 2010.

¹⁸² Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

¹⁸³ As told by Ricklefs, Coolen was born in Semarang to a Russian father and a Javanese mother said to be descended from an aristocratic family from Surakarta, c. 1773. He married a European wife who bore him five children and a Javanese Muslim woman who gave him six. Coolen began spreading his mission on land leased in Ngara South of Majaagung in 1830. He built a church at the centre of the plot, using the rest for agriculture. His estate was well organised and eventually piqued Javanese interest. By 1844 many Javanese wanted to move to Coolen's estate situated on the low lands of Mt. Kelud. It is also probable that the Javanese interest in Coolen's mission was due to his charismatic personality and syncretic religious doctrines and practices, a combination of essential Christian tenets and Islamic symbolism wrapped in Javanese culture. No baptism was required for his converts. Coolen translated Christian doctrines into Javanese in both the linguistic and cultural senses and created a prayer for his parish that mixed Javanese tradition and the Islamic profession of faith. In Ricklefs' words: "Coolen translated basic doctrines into Javanese, not only in a linguistic but also in a cultural sense. He took over the Javanese custom of a leader ritually ploughing the soil while singing an invocation in Javanese verse of the rice-goddess Dewi Sri and her brother Sedana, whose union promised fertility. A prayer by Coolen has been preserved that shows how he Christianised this Javanese tradition, employing the Islamic profession that there is no God but God (*La ilaha illa 'llah*) and presenting the Christian idea of the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in a way that would, indeed, have made European missionaries uncomfortable:

Anthing and his followers realised the importance of indigenous culture in their mission. Sondjat, a talented singer (*penembang*), for example, often sang *tembang* and sometimes he used allegories and metaphors to attract his audience to the Gospels.¹⁸⁴ In Cikuya, Sondjat built a church using modest building materials like bamboo for its walls and palm leaves and grass for its roof. After serving his parish with patience, he managed to attract others to the Cikuya parish and it is clear that his belief in Christianity was profound and manifested itself through a remarkable dedication towards his newly adopted faith. Sondjat was a poor man but he consistently served the Cikuya parish and continued to teach the Bible around the village and in rural areas.¹⁸⁵ Sondjat continued his father's efforts in the development of the Jemaat Cikuya parish with Anthing's support. Later he became the first apostle of the apostolic church.¹⁸⁶ During his wanderings in Banten, Sondjat met Anthing, who eventually appointed him as his assistant in the Cikuya parish.

In the 1880s, the NZV set up a plan to expand its mission across Banten to include Serang, Pandeglang, Caringin, Leuwidamar, and Lebak. The Governor-General, however, rejected this ambitious plan. He disappointed the NZV by allowing the establishment of only one mission post in Leuwidamar, Lebak. The well-known missionary, A.A. Pennings,

Mount Semeru we sing of,
the sign of the land of Java:
may my farming endure
in the pleasure of Sri and Sedana,
who take the form of rice.
Who gives me leave is Allah the Most Pure.
Yea, there is no God but God (*la ilaha ilelah*) and Jesus Christ is the Spirit of
God.

Through this syncretic approach, Coolen converted hundreds of Javanese who felt at home with a 'Christianity' which was not mutually-exclusive with regards to Javanism. See Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 109-113.

¹⁸⁴ Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, pp. 282-283 and 429.

¹⁸⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁸⁶ Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009. In 1855, Sondjat was 15 years old when his father Sarma was officially baptised. Before assuming his religious responsibilities, Sondjat liked to travel across Java. Once he visited Banten and was so impressed with the tradition of the *orang Baduy* that he decided to settle in the area for several years.

was appointed to serve there and he began his mission in 1894.¹⁸⁷ To support his mission, Pennings established a clinic and a church and he built a house nearby. Pennings' mission in Leuwidamar did not produce the fruitful results he had expected; only one family converted after several years of missionary activity. This failure was in part due to Muslims' resistance to missionary activities. In 1902, Pennings was found dead after having been poisoned, although the official NZV account concealed this, claiming that Pennings had died of cholera.¹⁸⁸ Pennings' death froze the Christian missionary activities in this location. Towards independence the anti-Christian missionary attitude in the area had not changed much. After independence the situation became even worse, especially when churches in Leuwidamar and Cikuya were burned down.¹⁸⁹ Because of this violent action, the forty-five members of the Leuwidamar and Cikuya parishes were forced to relocate to Sukabumi (Cikembar) and Bogor (Gunung Putri), where they built new churches.¹⁹⁰

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Christian missionaries kept struggling to win the hearts of the people in Batavia and West Java despite being challenged from doing so by indigenous Muslims and by restrictions imposed by the Dutch Colonial Administration. The NZV was the first European missionary organisation to carry out extensive missionary work in Batavia and West Java. It was established on 2 December 1858 and it sent three missionaries, C. Albers, D.J. van der Linden, and G.J. Grashuis to the Priangan in 1862.¹⁹¹ On 5 January 1863, they arrived in Batavia and after several days they continued their trip to Bandung, which was selected to be the hub of their missionary work in West Java.¹⁹² They arrived in Bandung in March 1863 but could not start their work immediately because the Dutch colonial administration strictly

¹⁸⁷ Ali, *Misionarisme di Banten*, pp. 108-109.

¹⁸⁸ *Idem*, p. 117.

¹⁸⁹ By that time, the heads of the church were Sainim and Esther respectively. Interview, Mufti Ali, Singapore, 23 April 2011.

¹⁹⁰ Esther and Sondjat followed the caravan while Sarma remained in Cikuya and spent the rest of his life there. Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

¹⁹¹ Koernia Atje Soejana, *Sejarah Komunikasi Injil di Tanah Pasundan*, PhD Dissertation, Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Jakarta, 1997, p. 254.

¹⁹² *Idem*, p. 254. See also Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, pp. 3-8.

prohibited missionary work in the colony.¹⁹³ This ban was aimed at maintaining *rust en orde* (peace and order) and to prevent instability among the Sundanese, the majority of whom adhered to Islam. The colonisers were well aware of the trouble that might ensue if they failed to keep control of missionary activities in the region.¹⁹⁴ Years after the prohibition was lifted, the Dutch administration still adopted a cautious approach on the issue by banning the presence of more than one missionary association in the same place at the same time.¹⁹⁵

In 1865, a license was eventually issued by the Colonial Administration to allow missionary activities. Missionary C. Albers obtained his license to work in Cianjur in 1865. His colleague Van der Linden, who had already arrived in Cirebon in 1863 and who had subsequently moved to Indramayu in 1864, was also given permission to do his missionary work. Ds. Krol and G.J. Grashuis were asked to learn the Sundanese language and to translate the Bible into Sundanese. Grashuis returned to the Netherlands in 1865 to carry out this work but failing to accomplish it was forced to leave the NZV in 1868.¹⁹⁶

The evangelist missionaries eventually succeeded in paying visits to nearly all the important places across West Java, including Bandung

¹⁹³ This ban caused much inconvenience to the Christian missionaries. It also provoked reactions in The Hague, especially from liberal politicians, who forced the Colonial Administration to modify its policy. This demand for change stemmed from the liberal atmosphere prevailing in the Netherlands in particular and in Europe in general during the 1880s. Corresponding with the winds of change, the Administration effected some changes in its policy, adopting a more positive attitude towards missionary associations. The NZV was now at liberty to expand its mission into the Priangan and other places in West Java including Cirebon and Indramayu on the north coast areas and to the environs of Batavia including Bogor, Karawang, and Tangerang. NZV named locales targeted by evangelists a '*pos*', referring to a place where an evangelist resides. A place where an evangelist teacher lived was called a '*cabang*' or '*pos luar*'. In the twentieth century the name '*pos*' was replaced by '*resor*'. Prior to the twentieth century, the number of '*pos*' in West Java was not well-recorded. Nonetheless, in 1926 a report revealed that there were 9 '*resor*' in the area. In 1944, however, the number had dropped to five: Bandung, Batavia, Cirebon, Garut and Jatikebon. Van den End, *Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁹⁴ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 221.

¹⁹⁵ Jan S. Aritonang, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2005), p. 79.

¹⁹⁶ Soejana, *Sejarah Komunikasi Injil*, pp. 254-255. See also Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 221.

(1870), Sukabumi and Sumedang (1872), Jatinegara (1884), Tangerang (1889), Lebak (1894) and Tasikmalaya (1898). Initially, the NZV mainly targeted the Sundanese for its missionary activities but in later years it also tried to include the Chinese. This was because the NZV found that some Chinese on the north coast had already embraced Christianity.¹⁹⁷ The NZV found a Christian parish on the north coast that had a large number of Chinese members. This reality forced the missionaries no longer only to focus their attention on the indigenous Sundanese (who spoke three languages: Sundanese, Javanese and Malay) but also on the Chinese community. It appeared somewhat easier to convert the Chinese than to convert the Sundanese.¹⁹⁸ There is no report, however, that mentions which missionary organisations had arrived on the north coast of West Java and the manner in which they attracted the Chinese to Christianity.

Changes in the Netherlands had also caused changes in the emphasis, content, and direction of NZV's mission in West Java. It shifted its emphasis from religion to social empowerment and capacity-building. This shift aimed to support the colonial administration's program for the promotion of the people's wellbeing by advancing education, health, agriculture and transportation. Inspired by the spirit of the "*Ethische Politiek*" (Ethical Politics) after 1901, the colonial administration and the evangelist organisations cooperated in running the government's social programs particularly in education and health services aimed at improving the quality of life of the people in the Netherlands East Indies.¹⁹⁹ In the early years of their presence in West Java, NZV missionaries also became increasingly involved in, and worked for, government schools. In collaboration with NZV missionaries as their agents of development, the Administration managed to organise its programs efficiently.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ Van den End, *Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁸ Once, all the students in a class in Cirebon converted to Christianity. Massive conversion was unheard of in the Priangan, while there were few who converted to Christianity. Interview, Koernia Atje Soejana. Bekasi, 7 July 2009. Little has changed about Christian missionaryism in recent times. Interview, Fabianus who served in the Liturgy Commission of the Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia (KWI), in the Keuskupan Bogor and currently acts as Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of Parahyangan University, Bandung, 15 June 2009.

¹⁹⁹ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 221.

²⁰⁰ *Idem*, p. 6. Despite the challenge of missionary work in an overwhelmingly Muslim environment, the NZV expended much effort to win over the

It is a truism in Sundanese society that abandoning Islam is regarded as a betrayal of religion, ethnicity and culture. This may be related to the fact that Islam had been the religion of the Sundanese majority for a long time although the quality and the level of acceptance and observance of Islam varied.²⁰¹ The social stigma attached to the grave sin of apostasy thus served as another bulwark against conversion attempts. Apostates were labelled '*murtad*' and this dishonour alone served as a social and cultural barrier to conversion. Abandonment of their faith entailed the alienation from their families and communities. The new converts thus left their homes and sought others like themselves, amongst whom they would be accepted.

This cultural impediment meant that missionary efforts in the Priangan yielded little success even after thirty years. By 1898, the NZV had established 24 parish groups in West Java with 2,260 listed Christians. The number of churches increased, although not significantly. There was a Christian church in Pangharepan, Sukabumi with 308 members, one third of whom originated from the Chinese following of the late Anthing.²⁰² Only the conversion of indigenous people could be credited to NZV efforts. The Priangan prospects for the Christian mission remained rather bleak compared to the situation in other places in the Dutch East Indies.

Sundanese, as illustrated by the following initiatives. The first expert on agriculture the NZV sent to Indonesia was M. Ottow. He arrived in 1918. He was followed the next year (1919) by doctor W.J.L. Dake. The NZV also appointed various new indigenous converts to help the mission in managing its activities in religious affairs, and to further support their educational programs. In the following years, the NZV received more support from the Netherlands with the arrival of various agricultural and medical experts. From only seventeen Protestant ministers, twenty-seven missionaries and nine Roman Catholic priests in 1850, these numbers increased to seventy-seven, seventy-three and forty-nine respectively in 1900, and continued to increase after that. See Van den End, *Sejarah Gereja di Jawa Barat*, pp. 11-24; Soejana, *Benih Yang Tumbuh II*, pp. 39-41; Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism*, p. 98.

²⁰¹ Almost all pastors in charge in the churches in Ciranjang, Cianjur expressed similar opinions. Interview with Dody S. Truna, Bandung, 3 April 2009.

²⁰² Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 222. Sadi'in (Petrus) joined the Pangharepan parish after Anthing's death in 1883 following his brother Sariun who had already joined the parish much earlier.

The Christian Community in Pangharepan, Sukabumi

In 1872, P.N. Gijsman was sent from Cianjur to Sukabumi and, ten years later, he had managed to convert twenty-five people.²⁰³ In 1883, the NZV appointed Simon van Eendenburg as missionary in Sukabumi to replace Gijsman. Eendenburg purchased plantation land in Pangharepan, Cikembar only 18 km from Sukabumi in the direction of Pelabuhan Ratu, which was also used to build residences and a village for the new Christian converts who were alienated from their people. The converts would be assigned to work on the plantation, for which they were paid. At the same time they could dedicate themselves to church services.

In 1886, the Pangharepan settlement was ready for habitation. The Christians relocated there and began a new life. Among the migrants were Sariun and Sadi'in, two brothers who had been born into the Marchasan family who originated from Leuwidahu in Banten and who were formerly loyal followers of Anthing's. As noted by Koernia Atje, Sariun had been in Sukabumi since 1877 after having been instructed by Anthing to help NZV missionary, Gijsman. That year, Djimun, a follower from Batavia, introduced Sadi'in to Anthing, who warmly welcomed him. He offered to put Sadi'in, baptised as Petrus, up at his residence, during which he would undergo intensive training before being sent on missionary activities.

Petrus was assigned to carry out his mission in Cikuya, Banten, where he married Nyai Bani from Cigelam, Serang. There is no account of Petrus' missionary activities in Cikuya.²⁰⁴ Soon after Anthing's death in 1883, however, Petrus left Cikuya for Batavia to seek employment before he finally joined his brother Sariun in Pangharepan, Sukabumi.²⁰⁵ Simon van Eendenburg was in charge in Sukabumi before he took up residence on the settlement in 1888. By that time, the Pangharepan Christian population numbered 272, the largest Christian community in West Java.²⁰⁶ Van Eendenburg served the Pangharepan parish for twelve years. By 1900, Hendri Muller was appointed to replace him. Muller served the NZV until 1905 but failed to keep the parish united as we will see below.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ Soejana, *Benih Yang Tumbuh II*, p. 34.

²⁰⁴ Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

²⁰⁵ Soejana, 'Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang: Mengenal Gereja Kerasulan Tertua di Jawa Barat.' unpublished paper (Jakarta, June 2006), pp. 18-19.

²⁰⁶ *Idem*, p. 17.

²⁰⁷ Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

Koernia Atje states that Petrus or Sadi'in is said to have attended a *pesantren* before embracing Christianity. Petrus was the grandson of a Muslim nobleman from Cirebon named Raden Karadinata, who had left Cirebon in the first half of the nineteenth century to go to Serang, Banten, because of a quarrel he had had with his stepmother. There are no details about Karadinata's ancestry but his marriage to the daughter of the *penghulu* of Banten, who bore him six daughters, suggests his linkage to the Cirebon aristocracy. One daughter, Dewi Sai, married the son of the *penghulu* of Serang, whose name is unfortunately unknown. Her first son was Mukayam, whose children were Marchasan, Ibu Maat, Sadi'in, Sariun and Ibu Karsiah.²⁰⁸ Thus Mukayam, the grandson of Raden Karadinata, was the direct ancestor of the first generation of Christian Bantenese. Not only did they convert to Christianity, they also played an instrumental role in leading their fellow Bantenese to adopt the faith through their involvement in the mission work carried out by Anthing and the NZV across Banten, Sukabumi and Cianjur. Mukayam's sons, Sadi'in and Sariun, converted to Christianity in the second half of the nineteenth century. The reason for their conversion is unknown but Martan Marchasan, a third-generation descendant of Karadinata, put it down to God's call.²⁰⁹ Martan also suggested that their decision might also have been influenced by the close relationship they maintained with Chinese and Dutch individuals.²¹⁰

The brothers later became the leaders of NZV's Pangharepan Parish in Sukabumi. After having joined the parish, Petrus, Sariun and their friends, however, could not really appreciate the Christian canon as promoted by the NZV. Instead, they endlessly tried to revive Anthing's doctrine whom they very much appreciated for his humility, generosity and his respect for their identity and culture. This was most clearly manifested in his preference for tailoring the Christian precepts to match the indigenous context. Although he was Dutch, he interacted with his followers with full respect for indigenous tradition and values. It seemed that Anthing's legacy remained firmly rooted. It was therefore his indigenous - if not quite his nationalist - sentiment that factored in the separation between the indigenous Christians and their Dutch landlord-

²⁰⁸ Soejana, *Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang*, pp. 17-19.

²⁰⁹ Interview, pastor Nupelus Marchasan, Ruchman Marchasan and Martan Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

²¹⁰ *Idem*.

cum-Pastor, Hendri Muller.²¹¹ Under Petrus' and Sariun's leadership, the entire congregation of fifty-seven Christians left the Pangharepan parish and migrated to Ciranjang in the early twentieth century. On arriving there, they established a settlement with the assistance of an irrigation worker named Armin, who at that time was in the service of the Dutch administration. Armin converted to Christianity after having been born into a Muslim family.²¹²

Anthing's followers consisted mostly of people who were related to one another through shared familial linkages, namely through Mukayam and Raden Karadinata. Therefore, filial sentiments and interest seem to have been an important element in their bond and unity.²¹³ Until recently, various individuals who claimed to be descendants from Karadinata and Mukayam played leadership roles in several churches. I found their influence in at least two large churches; namely the Kerasulan Baru Church and the Kerasulan Pusaka Church, both located in Rawaselang, Cianjur.²¹⁴

The Christian Community in Gunung Halu, Cianjur

In the late nineteenth century, the Christians began to consolidate their identity with the establishment of a village whose inhabitants comprised Sundanese converts. Over time, their number increased slowly but surely, thanks to NZV's tireless missionary work. By the 1880s, the first Christian community was formed in Pangharepan, Sukabumi, West Java. Years later, two more Christian communities came into existence in Palalangan and Rawaselang in Gunung Halu, Ciranjang, Cianjur.²¹⁵

From the start, the NZV considered Cianjur an important target.

²¹¹ Soejana, *Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang*, p. 23.

²¹² Interview, pastor Nupelus Marchasan, Ruchman Marchasan and Martan Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

²¹³ *Idem*. Almost all of them came from Banten. Petrus (Sadi'in) of Leuwidahu, probably with support from his brother Sariun and other close friends was upset with the leadership of the 'zendeling' Hendri Muller. Soejana, *Gereja Kerasulan Rawaselang*, p. 20.

²¹⁴ Interview, Martan Marchasan, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

²¹⁵ Gunung Halu is now divided into four villages: Sindangjaya, Kertajaya, Sindangsari, and Gunungsari. These villages are situated in Ciranjang, Cianjur. Among these villages, Sindangjaya and Kertajaya are inhabited by a majority of Christians. There is also a significant number of Christians in the other two villages even if they do not outnumber those in Kertajaya and Sindangjaya.

Therefore, in 1863, it sent C.J. Albers to head the mission there. The mission work obtained permission to operate only in 1865, but a report shows that in December 1863, a Sundanese couple named Ismail and Murti had already embraced Christianity.²¹⁶ Although the mission failed to result in massive conversion, NZV missionaries declined to give up their efforts but patiently persisted. In the early twentieth century, there were seventy Christians. Although insignificant in terms of numbers, through this achievement the NZV had actually planted the seed for the further growth of Christianity in West Java. Forty years after NZV's arrival in Cianjur, the Christian community had grown. The increase was not only due to proselytisation, but also to immigration from other places in West Java, especially from Bandung and Pangharepan, Sukabumi.

It seemed obvious that Cianjur would become a training laboratory for missionaries. P.N. Gijsman and S. Coolsma were appointed to work first in Cianjur before their appointments in Sukabumi and Bogor respectively. S. Coolsma was sent to Bogor in 1869 and after fourteen years, six persons had embraced Christianity. Coolsma wrote a grammar and a dictionary of the Sundanese language.²¹⁷ These efforts aimed to improve the understanding of the Sundanese language and its culture among the missionaries. Coolsma's important contribution was that he translated the Bible into the Sundanese language.²¹⁸

In 1903, Muller could not prevent the exodus of parishioners from Pangharepan. This group of Anthing's followers migrated to Kampung Rawaselang, which is close to the NZV's Kampung Palalangan. Under Petrus' leadership, they started a new religious life away from the influence of Muller's Dutch NZV tradition. Since Anthing was no longer there, Petrus and his followers enjoyed great autonomy in the organisation and in the management of their religious institution and they continued to act upon their own tradition. The reaction to the NZV appeared to have strongly informed the religious tradition they constructed. Soon after their arrival they established a denomination named the *Gereja Kerasulan Baru* (New Apostolic Church).

In 1902, a year before the arrival of the Christians from the Pangharepan settlement, NZV followers under Bouke Minnes Alkema's

²¹⁶ Soejana, *Benih Yang Tumbuh II*, p. 27.

²¹⁷ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 222.

²¹⁸ *Idem*.

leadership had already arrived in Cianjur and had settled in Palalangan village. Alkema erected his first church in Palalangan, Kertajaya village, Ciranjang sub-district and called it the Pasundan Christian Church (GKP) Palalangan. The NZV church, with only 30 parishioners, was the first to bring Christianity to Cianjur in 1902.²¹⁹ Economic hardship had compelled them to migrate from Bandung. Lacking agricultural land to sustain them economically, the situation in Cianjur was not much better for the migrants. Alkema, who chaired the NZV Bandung 'pos' (1893-1903), along with other pastors responsible for Cianjur, was aware of the situation and sought to establish an agricultural settlement for the community.

In support of his efforts, the Dutch administration granted the NZV 130 *bau* (1 *bau* is 0,71 ha) of land in Cianjur. In 1901, Alkema, accompanied by Wedana Sabri and seven indigenous Christians, travelled around in search of suitable land. They went all the way along the Citarum River and eventually arrived at what they felt was a good location. They erected emergency shelters and opened up space in the tropical forest, which process lasted nearly one year. By May 1902, the work was finished and subsequently nine households comprising of 21 people from Cianjur moved in to inhabit the new settlement under the leadership of Pastor Elipas.²²⁰

Right from the outset, Alkema had the concrete plan to establish a Christian village using traditional designs and concepts. This involved a town square with residences for common use: church, schools, office buildings for the village administration, clinic, and residence for the Pastors. The people's residences were to be built around this square.²²¹

The village was named Palalangan, which means 'lookout post'.²²² In

²¹⁹ Interview, pastor Mintarya Sondjat, Cianjur, 12 August 2009.

²²⁰ There is no account offering the exact number of the first generation of immigrants to the Palalangan village. According to Pastor Putu Suwintana, the first group to come to Palalangan consisted of seven persons. Interview with pastor Putu Suwintana, Cianjur, 11 May 2010; Koernia Atje Soejana nonetheless talked about nine persons. Soejana, *Sejarah Komunikasi Injil*, p. 286.

²²¹ Interview, pastor Putu Suwintana, Cianjur, 11 May 2010; See also Soejana, *Sejarah Komunikasi Injil*, p. 285. When I visited Palalangan in 2009 and 2010, the village landscape indeed appears to have been shaped according to Alkema's initial conception - the town square is situated in the centre with public buildings including church, school, office and minister residence. The residences of the parishioners are situated surrounding the public buildings.

²²² 'Palalangan Bersinar', <http://www.palalanganbersinar.com> (accessed 24 June 2009).

the following years, the parish gradually grew through marriage and birth as well as by the arrival of Christian families from places in West Java such as Pasirkaliki in Karawang, Cikembar in Sukabumi, and Gunung Putri in Bogor. As we will briefly discuss below, some Christians from Gunung Putri in Bogor maintained good relations with their relatives in Kampung Melati in Bekasi. This caused an inflow of adherents and enabled the expansion of the Christian mission in Bekasi in the late-nineteenth century from Bogor.

The Christian Community in Kampung Sawah, Bekasi

The Christianisation of Bekasi²²³ started in the nineteenth century (c.1870s) and was the result of the expansion of the mission into various parts of West Java like Bandung, Cianjur, Sukabumi and Bogor. Like in many parts of this region, the expansion of the Christian mission into Bekasi seems to have been a continuation of the Christian mission's earlier presence and its settlement in Bogor. The initial stages of Christianisation in the area owe much to Anthing and his disciples. Prior to their arrival in Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah in Bekasi, Anthing's disciples held services in Gunung Putri, Bogor.

Koernia Atje Soejana maintains that before Christianity was started to be propagated in Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah, the majority of the villagers, who are of Betawi origin, adhered to Islam.²²⁴ Aside from practicing Islam, Betawi Muslims also observed animistic practices like making food offerings and they believed that spirits guard mountains, empty lands and houses, big rocks, et cetera. They used to perform rituals which consisted of charitable offerings (*sedekahan*) in order to obtain permission to enter those places.²²⁵ They also have *wisit*, supernatural objects they believe can bring fortune.²²⁶ The majority of the villagers in

²²³ The District of Bekasi was established by Law Number 14/1950 with Jatinegara as its center. After some years the center moved to Ir. H. Juanda Street and subsequently to Jend. A. Yani street in downtown Bekasi. Bekasi has 13 sub-districts, one of which is named Bekasi.

²²⁴ Koernia Atje Soejana, *Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah: Mengupas Kisah Perjalanan Injil di GKP Jemaat Kampung Sawah* (Bekasi: Majelis Jemaat GKP Kampung Sawah, 2008), p. 5.

²²⁵ *Sedekahan* literally means giving something of value to others.

²²⁶ *Wisit* is a Sundanese word which means "*milik teu pahili-hili, bagja teu paalala teu paliili milik jelema sabab unggal jelema geus pada boga milik sorangan*" (No person's luck and happiness can be changed because each individual's fate

these places were rice farmers. From the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries they held a *slametan* in each stage of the rice growing cycle up to harvest. These ceremonies are testament to their belief in a variety of deities including *Dewi Sri*, the Goddess of fertility and the Goddess of rice.²²⁷

The first indigenous person in Pondok Melati who converted to Christianity was Semain Empi, a *ngelmu* seeker, who conceded the superiority of the evangelists' *ngelmu sejati*²²⁸ over his *ngelmu*. He was of Betawi origin and he was most likely a nominal Muslim who sought *ngelmu* to demonstrate his supernatural powers in order to win the respect and the following of the people in his surroundings. The pursuit of *ngelmu* and its practice was a common phenomenon in Batavia and all across Java. The missionaries, especially those who served under Anthing, were aware of these mystical practices and they tried to find out how to counter the influence of *ngelmu* practitioners.

Having acquired a small following in Pondok Melati, the evangelists pursued the Christianisation of Kampung Sawah, two kilometres to the east. This effort was highly successful with the help of Anthing's disciple, Paul Rikin, and his son, Loekas. Loekas underwent evangelist training in Sumedang under the supervision of S.A. Schilstra. After finishing his training he went west to serve Albers' mission in Cianjur.²²⁹

Culture-based Christianisation

The Christianisation of Pondok Melati and Kampung Sawah owes much to Anthing's cultural approach towards the indigenous people and the capitalizing on their social connections for the recruitment of new converts. Anthing and his disciples used the social bond between the Christians in Gunung Putri and Cigelam in Bogor and their relatives and friends in Pondok Melati. This approach was effective in attracting the indigenous Betawi to Christianity. In 1885, there were 80 Christian converts in Gunung Putri and after some twenty years their number had increased to more

has been decided in advance). See R.A. Danadibrata, *Kamus Basa Sunda* (Panitia Penerbitan Kamus Basa Sunda, second edition, 2009), p. 441.

²²⁷ Soejana, *Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah*, p. 6.

²²⁸ *Ngelmu sejati* is true mystical sciences, which Christian missionaries claimed could be derived from the Bible.

²²⁹ Soejana, *Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah*, pp. 30-31.

than 100.²³⁰ The initial Christianisation of Bekasi owes much to the Christians in Gunung Putri, Bogor. The Christianisation in this part of Bekasi was also due to Anthing's missionaries' tireless efforts in building relations with the indigenous people in this place, eventually winning them over.²³¹ There are at least three reasons for Anthing's success. The *first* is that he used the right approach in communicating with the people. He studied their culture and communicated with them in their language. *Second*, Anthing empathised with and respected them. *Third*, Anthing tried to understand the spiritual life of these people and attempted to learn about their magic and superstition practices. He equipped his missionaries with the proper knowledge about *ngelmu sejati* using mantras born out of the Bible to counter *ngelmu* practices employed by local leaders.²³² However, according to the leading Dutch missionary, Hendrik Kraemer (1888-1965), the missionaries did not seem to have properly understood the social, cultural and religious aspects of the Sundanese. To him, these missionaries did not intimately interact with the Sundanese people. Rather, they created parishes in places that isolated them and their church from Sundanese society.²³³

The Christian Javanese

It is believed that the Christian Javanese, migrants from Mt. Muria in Jepara, Central Java and Mojowarno, East Java, were the first generation of Christians to settle in Kampung Sawah, possibly by the late nineteenth century before the arrival of the people from Batavia. Their presence benefited from the help of Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung and Sadrach who went to Batavia in 1865. They were brilliant disciples of Anthing's, who met in the early nineteenth century in Semarang where Anthing served the Dutch. They became two well-known Javanese proselytisers. Tunggul Wulung took Sadrach, known as Radin Abas, to Batavia in 1865, and both helped Anthing in his proselytising activities there and in surrounding areas. After a couple of years of working with Anthing, however, Tunggul Wulung and Sadrach returned to Java.

The Javanese presence in Kampung Sawah is also evident in

²³⁰ Ali, *Misionarisme di Banten*, p. 63.

²³¹ Soejana, *Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah*, pp. 25-29.

²³² *Idem*, pp. 28-30.

²³³ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 223.

Anthing's Trinity formulae, one of which reads in Javanese as follows:

*Bapa Allah, Putra Allah, Roh Suci Allah, telu-telune dadi siji, upas racun dadi tawa, lemah sangar kayu angker dadi tawa, isti Gusti, Tuhan Yesus Kristus juru slamet kami slami-lamine.*²³⁴

(Allah the Father, Allah the Son, Allah the Holy Ghost, three become one, poison becomes cure, enchanted places and woods no longer harm and lose their power by the will of Allah, Jesus Christ is the eternal saviour).

The use of Javanese shows Anthing's appreciation of the significance of language and culture in missionary work. As described above, Anthing's mission mainly targeted the Javanese before he started his service in Batavia and West Java. Anthing's missionary contribution in Batavia, Depok and other parts in West Java and Banten was profound. He contributed to the establishment of a seminary in Depok - a training centre that churned out missionaries from the late nineteenth to the first quarter of the twentieth century. One of the mission's founding fathers, Hendrik Kraemer, praised Anthing for his dedication to the faith. Anthing was also generous. He lent his property in Kramat for the mission's use as a training centre for the induction of indigenous missionaries.²³⁵ Anthing died in 1883, leaving his invaluable legacy for the missionary world across Java, from the East to the West.

Conclusion

This chapter shows how Islam and other religions in West Java developed and describes how their followers created a plural, dynamic society. It shows the importance of Islam as a faith, a set of practices and an identity for the vast majority of the Sundanese people since the nineteenth century. Their observance of Islamic practices (*rukun Islam*) and their adoption of an Islamic identity, however, did not stop some of them from practicing *adat*, engaging in native mystical practices and believing in spiritual forces.

²³⁴ Letter from C. Albers to NZV (10 April 1899) as cited in Soejana, *Berakar, Tumbuh, Berkembang dan Berbuah*, p. 18.

²³⁵ Ali, *Misionarisme di Banten*, p. 62

Sundanese religious identity rests upon intimate and dialectical relations between Islam and *adat* which also enabled Islamic co-existence with the tiny Christian minority.

Members of the Sundanese elite, such as Moeharam Wiranatakoesoema and Haji Hasan Moestapa, were aware of this social capital and they continued to maintain *adat* blended in Islamic practices. This relationship between Islam and *adat* was sustained with the intellectual and political support from the Dutch expert on Islam and native affairs, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. These three men represent the special proponents of the Islam-*adat* 'synthesis.' Their religious, intellectual and cultural contributions were instrumental in keeping the Islam-Sunda relation intimate and for sustaining the blending of Islamic practices into local *adat*.

Although there was a certain degree of resistance towards Islamisation, it failed to polarise Sundanese society along cultural and religious lines. During 1920s-1960s, for example, opposition to Islam emerged from *Aliran Kebatinan* followers who embraced native-mystical practices that underpinned a belief in a native value system and in supernatural forces other than the ones embraced by world religions. AK leaders and followers sought the supremacy of local values over those promoted by world religions, especially Islam. They saw Islam as a threat to their supremacy, legitimacy and legacy. They held nativist-mystical ideas, which cohered around the notion of an authentic Sundanese identity which resonated with the Nationalist movement that sought sovereignty for Indonesia as an independent state. Islam, particularly in its Modernist guise, was contested for its continuous efforts to gain cultural supremacy they deemed threatening to their authentic Sundanese identity. Although this kind of opposition was insufficient to temper the Islamisation of Sundanese society, it nevertheless shows that some Sundanese leaders were in favour of 'a true Sundanese religion' other than Islam. This polarisation, however, did not exist until the twentieth century. Resistance to Islam reached its apogee when some of the Sundanese leaders together with thousands of followers embraced Christianity in 1964, as will be discussed below in Chapter Two. Although this opposition seems to have separated practicing Muslims from non-practicing ones, it failed to produce social categories such as *santri* and *abangan*, as Geertz had observed in East Java. As evidence, these terms (*santri* and *abangan*) or the like are

unknown in Sundanese society.

The conversion to Christianity by many Sundanese was in part the result of tireless efforts by Christian missionaries to promote Christianity. Above I discussed how the Christian mission and its institutions played instrumental roles in the conversion of Muslim Sundanese to Christianity since the second half of the nineteenth century. The conversion in the early years of missionary work in West Java was heavily driven by socio-political and economic motives through which converts recast their relationship with the Dutch. Most of the converts were the needy who embraced Christianity to secure their livelihoods and future prospects.²³⁶ Socio-economic motives aside, conversions also depended highly on the missionaries' ability to promote the adjustment of Christian practices to local culture and identity in promoting a 'Sunda Kristen' identity to smooth relations between Dutch missionaries and their converts. Anthing and his well-trained indigenous missionaries were especially skilled in this regard. Although the missionaries failed to convert on a mass scale, over time interest in Christianity increased.

²³⁶ Lombard, *Nusa Jawa*, p. 101.

CHAPTER TWO

ISLAMIC MODERNISM AND ANTI-ISLAMIC SENTIMENT (1920s-1980s)

Since the early twentieth century Modernists emerged in Java and their presence contributed to enhancing Islam as an ideology and identity. In West Java, Muslim activists from Sumatra established Persatuan Islam (PERSIS, Islamic Union) in 1923. In Java, Sarekat Islam (SI) and Muhammadiyah were established in 1912. The Modernists' rise posed a challenge to Sundanese society's socio-political and religious setting. PERSIS promoted Islamic Modernism and questioned the Islamic practices combined with *adat* local leaders and Traditionalists commonly upheld. PERSIS sought to achieve social change through the work of its cadres rather than through the development of a popular following. PERSIS failed to change the religious visions and practices of the Sundanese which were rich, plural and mystical. In what follows, we shall see how the Modernist's rise contributed to promoting Islam as a political identification and helped pose a challenge to the established religious and cultural visions of the Sundanese.

Embracing Islam as an Ideology

Persatuan Islam (PERSIS)

PERSIS emerged, and its vision and political orientation were shaped within a socio-political context of intense competition in a society where groups promoted divergent visions regarding the right and proper foundations for the nation.¹ PERSIS' outlook was largely shaped by fundamental notions of Islamic doctrine and ideology. It was led entirely by intellectuals of the Modernist persuasion. These included Haji

¹ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 182.

Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Junus, both of whom hailed from Padang.² It is worth noting that Padang had had encounters with the Modernist movement in the Middle East since early 20th century. The first Islamic Modernist journal *Al-Munir* was published in Padang in 1911 by several *hajis* upon their return from Mecca.³ The movement flourished and some of its followers left Padang and went to West Java including Haji Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Junus. Zamzam studied religion in Mecca for three years, which of course influenced his way of thinking. He also had connections with the Modernist Muslim network across Sumatra, Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung. In Bandung, Zamzam and Muhammad Junus held religious gatherings and organised discussions, which later extended to conceiving cogent arguments for selecting the valid bases from which to formulate fundamental Islamic principles and to form PERSIS.⁴

The stated goal of PERSIS in its statute was “to achieve the ultimate goal of religious life according to Islamic doctrine.”⁵ PERSIS propagated a school of thought based on the Quran and the *Sunnah*. Its major concern was the reconstruction of religious thought in the Indonesian context and it did not actively seek to increase its following. As such, PERSIS did not encourage the opening of new chapters unless there was a real need.⁶ Genuine need was measured against PERSIS’ mission, as posited in the 1950s by its chairman M. Isa Anshary, which was to carry out *Ishlah al-Aqidah* (theological reform) and *Ishlahal-‘ibada* (worship reform).⁷ Aside from this internal mission, PERSIS was committed to challenging any movement hostile to Islam.⁸ Like other Modernist movements, it embraced a rationalist theology which

² Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990), p. 96.

³ Taufik Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 12.

⁴ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, pp. 182-188.

⁵ G.F. Pijper, *Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di Indonesia 1900-1950*, translated by Tadjimah and Yessy Augustin from *Studiën over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia 1900-1950* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1985), p. 127.

⁶ Dadan Wildan, *Sejarah Perjuangan Persis 1923-1983* (Bandung: Puslitbang PP Pemuda Persis and Gema Syahida, 1995), pp. 30-31.

⁷ M. Isa Anshary, *Manifes Perjuangan Persatuan Islam* (Bandung: PP Persatuan Islam, 1958), pp. 24-25.

⁸ Wildan, *Sejarah Perjuangan Persis*, p. 31.

underpinned its understanding of Islam according to the Quran and *Sunnah* and its implementation accordingly. As such, it condemned superstition, mysticism and the cults that were common across Java at the time. PERSIS' doctrine was founded on a scripturalist interpretation of Islam stressing the absolute unity of God, strict observance of the *shari'ah*, commitment to purify Islam from any unlawful innovations (*bid'a*) and the responsibility of defending Islam from its antagonists.⁹

It would be wrong to think that PERSIS' leaders did not know how to mould their ideology into a practical organisation. They thought that their religious ideology should be maintained through the application of certain recruitment criteria and by following specific procedures. To ensure the quality of its members, PERSIS used stringent membership recruitment criteria and procedures. To be admitted, one had to meet the following requirements: He/she should be at least 18 years old and live in the East Indies; by 'Muslim' the statute implied the observance of Islamic obligations including daily prayers, fasting, and alms giving, and at the same time of adhering to prohibitions such as gambling, consuming alcohol, adultery and *bid'a*.¹⁰

From a socio-political perspective, to achieve its goal, PERSIS sought a sound Islamic ideology, particularly in responding to Nationalists' charges that Muslim leaders failed to offer an ideal model for an independent Indonesia. PERSIS endeavoured to neutralise the Dutch-trained Nationalists' proposals for a secular nation state. As noted by Howard M. Federspiel, Nationalist leaders contended that "the best way to achieve independence and build a strong Indonesian state was to follow the secular trend of the West and confine religion to the areas of individual belief and worship."¹¹ PERSIS' role in promoting *dakwah* as well as its search for a sound Islamic ideology was probably incomparable. Similarly, its leadership, especially under Ahmad Hassan and Mohammad Natsir, excelled over other Muslim leaders in challenging the Nationalists' promotion of a secular nation-state and Christian missionaryism.¹² Concluding the third chapter of his book on PERSIS, Federspiel discusses the formative period of PERSIS' doctrine during which Hassan, along with Natsir and Sabirin, played central

⁹ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 122.

¹⁰ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 129.

¹¹ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 45.

¹² *Idem*, pp. 45-51 and pp. 154-157.

roles.¹³ Hassan's thoughts, in particular, considerably shaped the organisation's character and attitude.

Hassan was born in Singapore in 1887 to a Tamil father, who was a scholar, and a Javanese mother.¹⁴ Hassan received his religious training in Singapore. In 1921 he moved to Surabaya where he met Kyai Haji Abdul Wahab, who later inspired him to study Islam further.¹⁵ In 1924, he moved to Bandung where he met Zamzam and Muhammad Junus who also were very enthusiastic about spreading Islam. They formed a group and subsequently Hassan acted as the most important religious leader in the newly established organisation.¹⁶

A talented propagandist, Hassan wrote extensively. His works cover many subjects including theology, law, jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, history, language, governance and politics. Among the major works he published during the 1930s-40s are *Al-Boerhan* (The Evidence [1933]), *Pengadjaran Sholat* (Prayer Instruction [1935-1937]), *At-Tauhid* (The Unity of God [1937]), *Annubuwwah* (The Prophecy [1941]), *Ketoehanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel* [Jesus' Divinity according to the Bible [1940]], and *Islam dan Kebangsaan* (Islam and Nationalism [1941]). Hassan translated into Indonesian the *Bulughul Maram* of Ibnu Hajar al-Asqalani, a standard work on *fiqh* widely used in *pesantrens*.¹⁷ Through these publications, Hassan not only demonstrated that he was PERSIS' most prolific author but also its ideological architect. Aside Hassan's works, PERSIS also regularly published the magazines *Pembela Islam* (Defender of Islam), *Al-Lisan* (The Tongue), *Sual Jawab* (Questions and Answers), *Al-Fatwa* (The Legal Opinion), and *Al-Taqwa* (Piety).¹⁸ These publications helped tremendously in circulating PERSIS' messages across the country, particularly among Muhammadiyah and Al-Irsyad members.

Mohammad Natsir was perhaps the most important PERSIS leader. He was born to Idris Sutan Saripado and Khalida on the 17th of July 1908, in the small town of Alahan Panjang in West Sumatra, home to

¹³ *Idem*, pp. 121-195.

¹⁴ See a must read political biography of Mohammad Natsir authored by Audrey R. Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p. 10.

¹⁵ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 127.

¹⁶ *Idem*, p. 127.

¹⁷ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, pp. 347-348.

¹⁸ Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia*, pp. 103-104.

the Minangkabau people.¹⁹ Because of economic constraints, Natsir's father could not afford to send him to the Hollandsch Inlandsche School (HIS, the Dutch Native School), the seven-year primary school that used Dutch as language of instruction.²⁰ However, Natsir was lucky to be able to attend the school because the head teacher of the local HIS allowed it provided that he hide himself whenever a school inspector showed up.²¹

Natsir used this opportunity to demonstrate to the people that by becoming the best student in his class he showed that he was not just anybody and in 1923 he won a scholarship to continue his study to the MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs), the advanced elementary school in Padang where he sat in the same class with the Dutch children²² and after a few years Natsir graduated satisfactorily. Being aware that Natsir was quite smart, his father encouraged him to continue his studies at the next level. Natsir did not want to disappoint his father, so he applied for a place at the General Secondary School (AMS, Algemene Middelbare School) in Bandung and he was admitted there in July 1927 when he turned nineteenth.

Natsir's intellectual, religious and political activism began here. As observed by Audrey R. Kahin, in the late 1920s Bandung was attractive to educated young people from all over the Netherlands East Indies because the city was turning into the centre of excellent higher education where 'most of the advanced Western-education schools in the archipelago were concentrated.'²³ Bandung's position as a learning centre had political consequences. Kahin noted:

As the result, Bandung became the center of anti-colonial discussion and activity embracing all forms of the new Indonesian nationalism. In the same month Natsir arrived there, July 1927, the foremost leader of the Indonesian Nationalist movement, Soekarno, founded the party "that came to dominate nationalist politics not only in the city but throughout Java and beyond."²⁴ Initially known as the Indonesian National Association, it was soon renamed the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI). Under Dutch

¹⁹ Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, pp. 1-2.

²⁰ *Idem*, p. 3.

²¹ *Idem*.

²² *Idem*, pp. 4-5.

²³ *Idem*, p. 9.

²⁴ Rudolf Mrazek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asian Program, 1994), p. 49.

pressure the PNI was dissolved in 1931, but it exerted an enduring influence over all subsequent political parties working for Indonesian independence.²⁵

This political atmosphere certainly influenced Natsir. He frequently attended talks delivered by prominent Indonesian leaders of various political orientations ranging from the Nationalist Tjipto Mangoenkoesoema to the Islamist Haji Agoes Salim.²⁶ During this critical time Natsir met Ahmad Hassan, the most important figure of PERSIS, whom he much admired as the most influential among his early teachers.²⁷ It seemed obvious that Natsir's admiration for Hassan after their frequent encounters and discussions caused him to join PERSIS and bound both him and Hassan in 'the strictest and most uncompromising Muslim group of the time.'²⁸

Like Hassan, Natsir wrote a lot, while he was also actively involved in educational matters. He wrote for *Pembela Islam* under the pen-name, A. Muchlis. In the 1930s, he championed initiatives to promote Islamic education by establishing Islamic schools ranging from kindergarten (1930), HIS (1930), Mulo (1931), teacher-training colleges (1932) and *pesantren* (1936).²⁹ This initiative was in response to the reluctance of many private schools in Bandung to include Islamic instruction in their curricula.³⁰ The absence of religious subjects in some schools caused PERSIS leaders to build their own schools to serve the interests of the *ummat*. Natsir's long service to PERSIS and his connection to Hassan provided him with considerable *dakwah* experience which came in very useful, especially when much later he established the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII,) in 1967.

In the 1930s PERSIS emerged as one of the most prolific publishing houses. Media thus also became an effective tool for both Hassan and Natsir to communicate their religious thoughts and political ideologies. Hassan and Natsir regularly wrote in journals. Soekarno was proud of Natsir and expressed this in a letter he sent to Hassan from his

²⁵ Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, p. 9.

²⁶ *Idem*, pp. 9-10.

²⁷ *Idem*, p. 10.

²⁸ *Idem*.

²⁹ Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia*, pp. 101-102.

³⁰ *Idem*, p. 101.

place of exile in Ende, Flores.³¹

PERSIS' most striking features were its persistence in promoting its ideology and in challenging its opponents. PERSIS held debates with many organisations on many issues. Among the organisations were Ahmadiyah Qadian (1930), Seventh Day Adventists, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Cirebon, Al-Ittihadul Islamiyah in Sukabumi and Majlis Ahli Sunnah in Bandung. Pijper observed that the debate sessions were organised to discuss sensitive religious issues. Sometimes they were held in response to particularly heated public topics. For example, in April 1933, a series of debate sessions in Bandung and in September 1933 in Jakarta were held in response to Hassan's 1932 article entitled *Risalah Ahmadiyah: Membantah beberapa l'tikad Ahmadiyah* (All about Ahmadiyah: Denying the Ahmadiyah Creed).³²

Unhappy with the article, Ahmadiyah spokesman, Rahmat Ali, challenged PERSIS' leader to a public debate on the issue.³³ During the debate, both spokesmen exchanged questions, answers, agreements and criticism, which showed their understanding of Islam despite their disagreement on some points. Pijper once attended a debate session and was impressed by how the debaters carried themselves despite the fact that the atmosphere was highly charged, especially when both spokesmen exchanged challenges and critical comments.³⁴ The content of the debates was then published in *Pembela Islam*.³⁵ Through promoting education, prolific publication and engaging in religious debates, PERSIS demonstrated its authority as defender of Islam³⁶ despite the insignificant growth in its membership. Pijper states that this identification owes much to PERSIS' most important leader, Hassan.³⁷

³¹ *Idem*, pp. 97-100.

³² Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 129.

³³ *Pembela Islam* (P.I.) No. 61, pp. 37-42, n.d. and *Pembela Islam* (P.I.) No. 62, pp. 25-30. n.d.

³⁴ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 138.

³⁵ *Pembela Islam* (P.I.) No. 61, pp. 37-42, n.d. and *Pembela Islam* (P.I.) No. 62, pp. 25-30. n.d.

³⁶ Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia*, p. 103.

³⁷ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 129.

Confronting Nationalism

We should note that PERSIS was formed in a socio-political context where most Indonesian leaders were seeking independence from Dutch rule for which the question of the nation's ideology was discussed extensively. From 1912 to the 1920s, members of the Indonesian elite championed competing visions in terms of the social, cultural and political foundations of the future independent Indonesia. The contest to envision the best cultural foundations for the nation involved a range of actors of different backgrounds.

Hassan and Natsir paid much attention to this development and they participated in the debates on nationalism in their writings. Both Hassan and Natsir considered the secular ideology as promoted by Nationalist proponents such as Soekarno and Soetomo dangerous for religion in general and Islam in particular.³⁸ For Hassan, nationalism boiled down to the socio-political system in pre-Islamic Arabia called '*asabiyah*'.³⁹ Hassan used the Prophet's warning to Muslims not to wage war for the sake of '*asabiyah*', for such motives were illegitimate.⁴⁰ Hassan also argued that nationalism had alienated Indonesian Muslims from their brothers overseas, despite the fact that all Muslims are brethren as insisted by the Quran.⁴¹ Hassan also made the controversial ruling that joining the nationalist party is sinful because it would never enforce Islamic law. As he understood it, this ruling was justified by the Islamic precept that Muslims who do not judge by Islamic law are considered *fasiq* (morally corrupt).⁴² On this issue, PERSIS periodical, *Pembela Islam*, argued that:

Nationhood in Islam is broad; it is not based on ethnicity, on origin, nor on shared dialects. Nationhood that is limited by ethnicity, origin, dialect, fate, is not only too narrow, but also gives rise to conceit, envy and seeking the downfall of members of other nations. Nationhood understood as such encourages arrogance towards those who have less Islamic nationhood and is far removed from encouraging its followers to be proud of their descent, ethnicity, dialect or origin. On the contrary, it is Islam that is able to tie all skin

³⁸ Hassan, *Islam & Kebangsaan*, p. V.

³⁹ '*Asabiyah* is an Arabic term which means tribalism.

⁴⁰ Hassan, *Islam & Kebangsaan*, p. VI.

⁴¹ *Idem*.

⁴² *Idem*, p. VII.

colours, dialects and lands of origin in a bind of fellow-feeling, of certainty, of worship, of laws, which realises genuine brotherhood which in turn brings genuine harmony and equality. In Islamic politics, this is the basis which equates Dutch Muslims with Indonesian Muslims, French Muslims with Negro Muslims, and so on.⁴³

PERSIS' argument is a classic one and commonly cited by Islamists, Revivalists and to some extent Modernists. It has to be noted that around this time, the Muslim world was influenced by notions of Islamic nationhood or Pan-Islamism as embraced by Muslim scholars such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Sayyid Qutb, and Muhammad Abduh. This view of human brotherhood is rooted in the Quran, although it does not specifically refer to Muslims as a political entity or as a nation.

Opposing Christian Missionary

Like many other Modernist organisations, PERSIS was bitterly opposed to Christian missionaryism. Federspiel observes:

The tone of the Persis commentary on Christianity is intense, defensive and retaliatory, and it is apparent in the articles, *fatawa* and major writings that activists saw Christian missionary activity as a serious threat to the existence of Islam in Indonesia. We have already seen in the *Islamic Defender* some very trenchant comments in regard to Christian missionaries and their endeavours in Indonesia. Persis activists stayed alert to Christian propaganda and outreach activity and made responses in the name of the Indonesian Muslim

⁴³ *Pembela Islam*, No. 61, p. 3. n.d.: *Kebangsaan dalam agama Islam itoe loeas; boekan karena persamaan koelit, boekan karena sepoelaoe setanah air, boekan poela karena selagam bahasa jang dipakai. Kebangsaan jang berbatas oleh persamaan koelit, oleh sepoelau setanah air, oleh selagam bahasa jang dipakai, oleh senasib sepertoentoengan, boekan sedja terlaloe sempit, tapi joega mendjadikan terbitnya rasa banggakan diri, rasa dengki dan meroegikan manoesia lain tanah. Kebangsaan tjara begini mengadjarkan sifat sombong terhadap golongan manoesia lain jang lebih sedikit Kebangsaan Islam itoe djauh daripada mendjadikan pemeloeknya rasa bangga karena toeroenan darah, karena warna koelit, karena selagam bahasa, karena tanah air. Bahkan Islamlah jang dapat mengikat segala warna koelit, segala lagam bahasa, segala tanah air dengan persatoean perasaan, persatoean kejakinan, persatoean tjara ibadat, persatuan oendang-oendang, jang membawa kepada persaudaraan sedjati jang beroejoed perdamaian sedjati dan persamaan sedjati. Dalam politik tjara Islam, inilah jang jadi asas sampai tidak ada kelebihan Moeslim Belanda dari Moeslim Indonesia, Moeslim Perantjis dengan Moeslim Neger dan lain-lain.*

community.⁴⁴

Christianity was considered the religion of the Dutch, the *kafir* colonialists. Opposition to Christianisation began since the late nineteenth century and galvanised around Muslim institutions since the early twentieth. In West Java, PERSIS along with Sarekat Islam (SI) and the Muhammadiyah challenged the spread of Christianity. PERSIS was a healthy organisation with a sound leadership, ran Islamic schools, promoted *dakwah* and published prolifically. Ever since, through religious and educational programs the Modernists posed a tremendous challenge to Christian evangelism which had gained ground in terms of institution-building and massive conversions across the country.⁴⁵ Modernist leaders such as Natsir's fear of Christianity was because of the point of view commonly upheld by Islamic scholars that 'the Dutch were using Western education to draw Indonesians away from Islam and into the purview of Christianity'.⁴⁶ However, this stance does not necessarily mean that Natsir was anti-Christian inclined. He held the view that Indonesia should become a tolerant nation in which religious freedom is protected and all believers' rights to follow their own faiths is guaranteed.⁴⁷

Criticising Traditionalist Practices

As observed previously, interestingly, Geertz's Javanese *santri-abangan* social dichotomy does not exist in Sundanese society;⁴⁸ it is also true that initially in West Java the dialectical relations between Modernists and Traditionalists were not as bad as those in East and Central Java but

⁴⁴ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 154.

⁴⁵ NZV claimed monopoly in West Java since the nineteenth century but this did not last long as from the early nineteenth century the Episcopal Methodist Church also sought followers in West Java. The Apostolic, Adventist, Pentecostal, and Roman Catholic Churches also provided services in West Java and did not recognise NZV's monopoly. See Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, po. 11, 25.

⁴⁷ *Idem*, p. 186.

⁴⁸ Steenbrink states that in his study of the Sundanese, R.A. Kern mentioned the word *abangan* only once. R.A. Kern, *Over de Gewoonten en Gebruiken der Soendaneezen*.

as we will see, later on they were.⁴⁹ The Modernist-Traditionalist dichotomy was already latently present in the early decades of the twentieth century, although it had not yet crystallised. The dichotomy became more pronounced due to the intensification of the Modernist campaign against those aspects of the religion the Traditionalists very much embraced, as the Modernists were against local values and the cultural identity of the local people. However, in what follows we will discuss how PERSIS challenged the traditional practices upheld by the Traditionalists.

PERSIS is famous for its stand against unlawful innovations (*bid'a*), including the seeking of saintly intercession and saint worship. For PERSIS, worship must be based solely on the Quran and the *Sunnah*. There are, however, many interpretive disagreements about the reliability of the references to specific religious practices. Muslim leaders hold different views on the reliability of these references and also employ different methodologies in arriving at legal conclusions. Likewise, their understanding and reasoning about aspects of religion differ. This in part contributed to sustained disagreement among them. One example is the disagreement on reciting prayers known as *tahlil* in the house of the deceased, which is usually followed by a meal provided by the family or friends of the deceased. Practiced on the burial day and on several succeeding days, this is observed by many Indonesian Muslims, especially among the Traditionalists.⁵⁰ For them, the prayers recited in the house of mourning by those present generates religious merit (*pahala*), which accrues to the deceased.⁵¹ To the Traditionalists, such practices help to improve the religiosity of the people. PERSIS saw this celebration as *bid'a*, but argued against it on financial rather than religious grounds.⁵² In a *fatwa* entitled "Ritual meal for Pregnancy," as discussed in his *Sual Jawab*, Hassan argued that "This particular type of innovation sometimes ruins people who are not well-to-do, for they even sell or pawn their belongings, or borrow money to hold a feast, and consequently fall into debt and poverty."⁵³

PERSIS is also known for its critical stand against any celebrations

⁴⁹ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 288.

⁵⁰ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, pp. 140-141.

⁵¹ *Idem*.

⁵² *Idem*, p. 140.

⁵³ *Idem*. See also *Sual-Djawab V*, p. 37.

of the Prophet's birthday (*maulud*), commonly held by the majority of the Muslim community. The *maulud* festival, celebrated largely by Hadramis of Ba'alawi descent and Traditionalists, involves a religio-cultural event where the celebrants recite prayers and narrate poetry about the Prophet's life and his virtues.⁵⁴ At one point, members of the congregation are required to rise out of respect for the Prophet who is believed to be invisibly present at such gatherings. For the Modernists, this practice is irrational and unlawful. Despite opposition from organisations like PERSIS, Muslims continued to celebrate the *maulud*. Over time, it was celebrated in even grander fashion. Pijper reports that in 1936, Bandung Muslims celebrated *maulud* with a procession of 2000 Islamic school students. The procession ended in the Regency Hall of Bandung where Islamic leaders and local authorities had been waiting and a religious ceremony was undertaken. As part of the celebrations, the Regent of Bandung and the Head Penghulu delivered speeches. Similarly, representatives of various Muslim organisations delivered speeches as well.⁵⁵ For PERSIS, however, this celebration had no base in Islam and was therefore religiously prohibited.⁵⁶ For this reason, PERSIS did not join the event.

While attacking such practices in order to purify Islam from unlawful innovations in worship, PERSIS condemned intercession (*tawassul*) and saint worship in order to safeguard Muslims' belief from polytheism. PERSIS' basic argument was that prayers must be addressed directly to God without the intercession of the Prophet or holy men by using such formulae as "with the blessing of the Prophet/Abdul Qadir Jailani."⁵⁷ Hassan argued that intercession had been possible during the Prophet's life when he prayed on behalf of his Companions upon their request, but the Companions "did not ever ask his spirit, or at his

⁵⁴ A comprehensive study on the *maulud* in Muslim history is presented in N.J.G. Kaptein, *Muhammad's Birthday Festival: Early History in the Central Muslim Lands and Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th Century* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993). See also Nico Kaptein, 'The Berdiri Mawlid issue among Indonesian muslims in the period from circa 1875 to 1930,' *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 149 (1993) pp. 124-153.

⁵⁵ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, pp. 136-137.

⁵⁶ *Idem*, p. 126.

⁵⁷ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 145.

grave....”⁵⁸ and thus never sought his intercession after he had died or went to his grave to seek his help. Federspiel noted that PERSIS’ writers pointed to two groups, Muslim mystics and Ba’alawi Arabs whom they regarded as particularly guilty of perpetuating the belief in intercession, leading to the worship at the tombs of “holy men.”⁵⁹

As PERSIS sought to abolish established Traditionalist practices, it brought about polarisation. In Bandung, for example, PERSIS leaders pushed their reform mission and tried to create a break from established culture and customs. Its commitment to break with the past meant PERSIS leaders refused to participate in public religious events organised by various Muslim organisations in celebration of particular Islamic festivals. PERSIS’ refusal to join the Prophet’s Birthday procession in Bandung in 1936, for example, was a stark deviation from the religious order of the day. As a consequence, this alienated PERSIS’ leaders and members from other Muslim organisations.⁶⁰ Due to its campaign inciting divisions and tension within society, various organisations and individuals opposed PERSIS. What was astonishing was the degree of tension it engendered. In a village in Bandung, two brothers severed ties with each other when one of them joined PERSIS. As Pijper related:

In a village in Bandung district, there were two brothers living next to each other. One of them became a member of PERSIS. Ever since, they have been at odds with each other as one did not want to be associated with the other (the member of PERSIS). He then went to partition their shared front yard with a fence. It was said that he even went to saw their shared rice stamping block (*lisung*) into two parts.⁶¹

The Modernist campaign invited similar sentiments across Java. In 1926, Traditionalist leaders, under the leadership of K.H. Hasyim Asyari, founded the Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in East Java. This initiative was in response to the Modernists’ critical stand against religious discourses and practices embraced in the Traditionalist cultural milieu and environment. The Modernist aim “to return to the

⁵⁸ *Idem*, p. 145. See also A. Hassan, *At-Tauhid* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1937), p. 50.

⁵⁹ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 147.

⁶⁰ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 137.

⁶¹ *Idem*.

fundamental truths of Islamic texts and tradition, the Quran and *Sunnah*,”⁶² challenged established culture and the long-held authority and practices of the Traditionalists. PERSIS in Bandung, as noted above, waged war against religious practices commonly observed by the majority of Muslims such as holding *tahlilan*, *tawassul*, and ritual meals and celebrating *maulud*. Opposing traditions which were very much respected by the Traditionalists created a rift within Muslim society.

In West Java, PERSIS’ campaign against the Traditionalist offended believers in the nativist-syncretic practices commonly held by the followers of *Aliran Kebatinan*, and thus incited anti-Islam sentiments among them. ADS leader, Pangeran Jatikusuma, told me that his father, Tejabuana, Madrais’ son (see Chapter One), was an ardent critic of PERSIS.⁶³ For ADS leaders, any religious practice rooted in nativist traditions and values is legitimate. Conversely, all religious practices that do not share nativist spiritual visions are illegitimate.⁶⁴

Turning Islam into a Political Identity

Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah

In addition to PERSIS seeking to build and promote an Islamic ideology through the interpretation of a complex set of Islamic doctrines it also endeavoured to make them relevant in Indonesian politics and culture in general. Sarekat Islam (SI) and the Muhammadiyah had emerged in the preceding years with explicit Islamic agendas that marked the rise of Islam as a form of political and ‘ethnic identification’ which amplified the distinction between the Indonesian and Dutch camps.⁶⁵ Soon upon its establishment in 1912, the Modernist movement spread and moved towards politics as Islamic identity consolidated, as was the case especially with SI.⁶⁶ M.C. Ricklefs noted:

...while at the beginning the “Islam” of its title was mainly a form of ethnic identification – it proclaimed itself thereby Indonesian and

⁶² James L. Peacock, *Purifying the Faith: The Mouhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam* (California: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing company, 1978), p. 24.

⁶³ Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.

⁶⁴ *Idem*.

⁶⁵ Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, p. 226.

⁶⁶ *Idem*.

not Dutch, Chinese or regionalist as were many other associations – its spread often stimulated increased religious observance and over time it became more self-consciously religious in aspiration. SI thus became the political vehicle of Javanese *putihan*. In many branches, for example, its leadership was in the hands of local *hajis*, many of whom were also traders.⁶⁷

With such Islamic identification with firm support from the grassroots population, SI inspired people to seek change aimed at advancing their socio-economic welfare and political interests. The organisation also used its influence to politically counter the activities of the Christian missionaries which increasingly worried Muslims. With the presence of these organisations, Muslims embraced a new pattern of response toward their socio-political issues, from one resting heavily on the efforts of disorganised collections of individuals to that of an organised movement. By doing so, the Muslim leaders and their followers united and cooperated to seek improved conditions for their religion and for their nation.

The SI was founded by the charismatic Javanese leader, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934), believed by some Javanese peasants to be a *Ratu Adil*.⁶⁸ The peasants believed Tjokroaminoto to be a King who had come to them with the truth and who would lead them to an imagined era of justice.⁶⁹ Crowds of people, especially those from the villages, demonstrated their extraordinary respect for him. They gathered to listen to the speeches he would deliver from the podium and it is said that they also liked to touch his clothes and even kiss his feet.⁷⁰ This is surprising because SI followers imagined that social change would be effected in the framework of a millenarian movement.⁷¹ Sartono Kartodirdjo argues that “Although the Sarekat Islam movement was designed to participate in modern political activity, it was bound to have strong millenarian overtones.” He maintains that “It is not surprising that the hopes that the peasants came to place in Sarekat Islam should find expression in traditional millenarian thinking.”⁷²

⁶⁷ *Idem.*

⁶⁸ *Idem.*

⁶⁹ Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite* (Den Haag: van Hoeve, 1960), p. 158.

⁷⁰ *Idem.*, p. 158.

⁷¹ Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java*, p. 18.

⁷² *Idem.*

SI is known for its critical stand against the Chinese. Because of this attitude it was seen as a threat by many Dutch officials and businessmen as well as by the Javanese *priyayi* because of the intermediate position of the Chinese community in the colonial setting. Ricklefs observes that the 1913-14 anti-Chinese riots across Java were linked to this movement.⁷³ He also maintains that the Javanese *priyayi* could not accept the SI's rejection of various established practices such as bowing to the *priyayi* as commonly observed by commoners. For members of the Javanese elite, such criticism of established *priyayi* culture could be a threat to "their authority and status."⁷⁴ SI's opposition to this recognised *adat* had upset the *priyayi* community.

In this regard, SI shared the Muhammadiyah's vision of a return to the Quran and the *Sunnah*, to pursue *ijtihad* and to reject syncretic practices.⁷⁵ The Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 to seek socio-religious reform and to serve in reforming education and culture.⁷⁶ The movement's initial objective was to implement organised tactical measures to challenge the spread of the Dutch-supported Christian mission across Java.⁷⁷ In his account, G.F. Pijper describes how the Muhammadiyah was established in Yogyakarta by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, the son of the Imam of the Grand Mosque of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta named Kyai Haji Abubakar bin Kyai Suleiman.⁷⁸ Already as a child, Ahmad Dahlan received religious education from his parents. As an adult, he went to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and to stay there for some years to study Islam.⁷⁹ He returned home but after several years of living in the Dutch East Indies, Ahmad Dahlan made his second trip to Mecca to perform another pilgrimage and to continue studying Islam.

Ahmad Dahlan was a friend of Ahmad Surkati from Sudan, the founder of Al-Irsyad, another reform organisation founded in 1915, and they had made each other's acquaintance some years before the emergence of Islamic Modernism or Reformism in Java. In his interview with Pijper, Surkati said that Ahmad Dahlan had a very good character,

⁷³ Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, pp. 226-227.

⁷⁴ *Idem*, p. 226.

⁷⁵ Peacock, *Purifying the Faith*, p. 24.

⁷⁶ *Idem*, p. 23.

⁷⁷ Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, p. 111.

⁷⁸ The following account rests largely on Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, pp. 110-133.

⁷⁹ *Idem*, pp. 110-111.

and was a sincere and humble man.⁸⁰ He read works by leading Muslim scholars like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). He knew of the reform movement in Egypt but, as Haji Agus Salim told Pijper, he did not devote himself to learning more about it. Rather, Ahmad Dahlan discussed the foundation of the Muhammadiyah with Surkati. The Muhammadiyah's rise, as Pijper himself noted, was actually closely linked to "contemporary Dutch politics that attempted to Christianise the Indonesians."⁸¹ It was a reaction to the missionary activities promoted by the Protestant NZV and the Roman Catholics, he stressed. This concern featured profoundly in the early stages of the development of the Muhammadiyah. Only after some years had elapsed did it slowly and organically evolve, a process that accelerated after Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan's death in 1923.

Within the socio-religious atmosphere of Islamic Modernism and anti-colonial agitation, SI grew fast and spread across and outside Java. In Bandung, the SI was established in 1913 by Suwardi Suryadiningrat, A. Widiadisatra and Abdul Muis.⁸² Suwardi was a journalist who worked for the Bandung-based publication *De Express*. He was unable to keep his job for a long time because of his critical attitude towards the Dutch. One day he wrote an article entitled "If I were Dutch" criticising the colonial administration, for which *De Express* was dissolved and Suwardi was exiled to the Netherlands.⁸³ As Robert van Niel states, A. Widiadisatra and Abdul Muis were also journalists who wrote for *Kaum Muda*, established in 1912 in collaboration with Mohammad Junus, an Arab from Palembang who supported the publication financially. Widiadisatra inspired the establishment of this publishing company. His marriage to one of the daughters of the *penghulu* in Bandung seemed to have religiously inspired him. He played an active role in SI until 1919.⁸⁴

Like Suwardi and Widiadisatra, Abdul Muis had much experience in journalism. For his concern for the welfare of the people, he was

⁸⁰ *Idem*, p. 111.

⁸¹ *Idem*, p. 111.

⁸² Van Niel, *Emergence*, p. 161.

⁸³ *Idem*.

⁸⁴ *Idem*.

promoted to the SI's Central Board.⁸⁵ Like the leaders of the Muhammadiyah, Abdul Muis was critical of the NZV. In the *Volksraad*, he criticised the Dutch Colonial Government's subsidising of *zending* organisations.⁸⁶ For him, it was outrageous that the subsidy which was generated largely from Muslims through their income taxes (*belasting*) was not utilised for the benefit of Muslims but, on the contrary, used to support Christian missionary organisations.⁸⁷ The SI most strongly criticised missionaryism when A.W.F. Idenburg was Governor-General in Batavia (1909-16). The issue of Christian missionaryism, previously the problem of Muslim commoners, soon became the concern of SI leaders. As soon as SI mobilised its members as a community against the Dutch, society polarised along Muslim and Christian lines. The identification of the Dutch with Christianity introduced an association between the Dutch and Indonesian Christians. So, from cultural and socio-political perspectives, while the emergence of Islamic Modernism stepped up pressure on the colonial government in introducing a political distinction between Indonesians and the Dutch, it also caused polarisation along ethnic and religious lines.

In this atmosphere the SI continued to grow. In 1916, an SI Congress was held in Bandung. Many prominent Muslims attended and addressed the congress. Among them were Rd. H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (President), Rd. Hasan Jayadiningrat (Banten), Rd. Wignyodarmoyo (Surabaya), Daeng Kanduruan Ardiwinata (Volkslectuur Editor), Wignyadisastra (SI President, Bandung Chapter), Abdul Muis (SI Vice President, Bandung Chapter), Abdul Manap (Aceh), and Habib Ali bin Abdulrahman Al-Habshi (Arab leader from Batavia).⁸⁸ SI struggled in the face of politics and the ideological competition between Nationalism, Islamism and Communism, to which in the end it succumbed.⁸⁹ In reaction to this division, the Perserikatan Komoenis di Hindia (later

⁸⁵ *Idem.*

⁸⁶ Aritonang, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam dan Kristen*, p. 156.

⁸⁷ *Idem.* See also Aritonang, *Sejarah Pendidikan Kristen di Tanah Batak* (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1988), p. 330.

⁸⁸ Tini Kartini and Ningrum Djulaeha (eds.), *Biografi dan Karya Pujangga Haji Hasan Mustafa* (Jakarta: Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1985), p. 11.

⁸⁹ Continuing division in SI's leadership is explained in Taufik Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy*, p. 21.

named Partai Komunis Indonesia) was formed in 1921.⁹⁰ The division had a negative impact at the grassroots level. Some Muslim leaders and activists in Bandung questioned the support lent by the Bandung SI chapter to the leftists during the SI Congress. To counter this socio-political fragmentation inside the SI, which might have important negative impact on the Islamic community, various Modernist leaders in Bandung started to promote Islam as a purified identity and as a political ideology.

The Rise of Anti-Islamic Sentiment

Anti-Islamic Opposition: Seeking an 'Authentic' Faith

The Modernist intensive campaign to promote Islam as a purified religious identity and a political ideology destabilised Sundanese social-religious and political life. In religious life, the leaders of *sufi* orders were alert to the spreading of a what seemed to them to be a Wahhabi-inspired movement in the country.⁹¹ This puritanical religious movement had swept over West Java during the 1920s. Pijper suggests that the movement was met with formidable opposition by the established *sufi* orders.⁹² From the early to the late-1920s friction between *sufi* orders saw various orders labelling the others as 'Wahabi'. In short, the Wahabis became the number one enemies of Islamic mystical as well as of nativist syncretic movements. Against this backdrop, I presume that the locally and native-inspired syncretic movements such as AKP and ADS came to exist as attempts to reduce the influence of or even to displace such puritanical religious orientations deemed extraneous to local spiritual needs.

It is possible that the need to counter Modernist religious orientations contributed to inspiring the Dutch administration to respond amicably to native-syncretic movements such as the one that arose in Kuningan, West Java. In 1925, the Dutch Administration officially recognised one native-syncretic movement it termed Agama

⁹⁰ Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy*, p. 21.

⁹¹ Wahhabism is a Saudi-based religious movement that emerged in the late eighteenth century and was led by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. The movement called to return to a pristine Islam by purifying religious practices from superstition and unlawful innovation (*bid'a*).

⁹² Pijper, *Fragmenta Islamica*, p. 85.

Djawa Sunda (ADS), as mentioned in the first chapter.⁹³ ADS was led by Madrais, who led his movement from Kuningan, Cirebon. Mei Kartawinata, the leader of Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan (AKP) was inspired by Madrais' religious movement. According to Madrais' grandson, Pangeran Jatikusuma from Kuningan, Mei met Madrais several times and they discussed various issues especially regarding the social movement needed for the nation's independence.⁹⁴

The AKP came up in 1927 and flourished in the 1950s and 1960s.⁹⁵ During this time the AKP following grew to comprise thousands of people. The enthusiasm among the West Javanese to join this native-syncretic belief was probably due to the interests they shared with the Javanese. As described by Mulder, "They participate because they may look for inner tranquillity, for escape from oppressive social ties, for consolation in disappointment, for magical powers, for mystical expression, for an esoteric milieu of initiated friends, but nowadays they probably join most often for reasons of dissatisfaction with organised religion and in search for a valid emotional form of personal cultural expression."⁹⁶ This is a real example of an experiment initiated by local leaders' initiatives to promote native religion as relevant to indigenous identity and culture in contradistinction to the Modernists' intensive campaign for purification.

AKP and ADS's emergence saw its leaders put in efforts to express their vision to their followers. The defenders of the AKP and ADS were of the opinion that Islam's fundamental doctrines contradict *Aliran Kebatinan* principles. Muslims believe in one God and the Prophet Muhammad as His last Messenger. Muhammad represents the Seal of Prophethood, which absolutely denies any further claim to Prophethood. The *Aliran Kebatinan* proponents perceived Islamic norms, as mediated through Arabic culture, as contradictory to their Sundanese culture and identity, especially in matters pertaining to *adat*. The Classical Arabic language, which is the language of the Quran and *hadith* and used by Muslims in rituals but rarely in communication, is alien.⁹⁷ The AKP leader, Mei Kartawinata, stated that "Islam is the

⁹³ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 292.

⁹⁴ Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.

⁹⁵ Interview, Mimin Sukandar, Subang, 14 July 2010.

⁹⁶ Mulder, 'Aliran Kebatinan', p. 108.

⁹⁷ Interview, Asep Hari, Bandung, 07 October 2009.

religion of the Arabs and (the Arabs) came to colonise the Sundanese.”⁹⁸ For Mei, there was nothing sacred about the Quran, and to symbolise this he once publicly stuffed a copy into his pants, exclaiming to observers: “Look, it is simply paper!”⁹⁹ By doing so, Mei tried to desacralise the Muslims’ authoritative text and sought to reveal as baseless the Sundanese people’s respect for it. Not all *Aliran Kebatinan* proponents, however, would go to such extremes. Especially in the era of reform after 1998, the leaders of the AKP do not seem to have displayed such an extreme anti-Islamic stand.

Mei’s doctrine urged followers to seek authentic faith, as rooted in Sundanese history and to respect Sundanese dignity. The Sundanese had inherited this and transmitted it from one generation to the other. The followers of the AKP believe that everybody must respect their origin in terms of their place of birth, ethnicity, languages, race and nation.¹⁰⁰ An *Aliran Kebatinan* active member, Asep Setia, stated that “As a Sundanese, I have been bestowed with my own tradition, language, custom and land; I therefore owe God gratitude and show belief in Him in my own manner.” He added: “I wonder why nowadays many Sundanese people would prefer the use of Arabic greetings such as *assalamu ‘alaikum* (peace be upon you) or *alhamdulillah* (Praise be to Allah) instead of *sampurasun, rahayu* or *puji Gusti* (Praise be to Gusti).”¹⁰¹ The ‘doctrine’ of the supremacy of local symbols and values is central to the AKP movement and for AKP’s followers this reactive attitude toward Islam has almost become ‘theological’. By considering Islam, Arabic, and the Quran foreign, Mei and his followers identified Islam as ‘the other’ distinct from established local Sundanese society and culture.

Anti-Islam Sentiment’s Slowdown

The anti-Islamic tone propagated by the defenders of *Aliran Kebatinan* weakened during the 1940s due to the changing political context. In 1943, Japanese forces occupied Java and forced the Dutch Colonial Government to relinquish its authority. Under the Japanese occupation

⁹⁸ Razak, *Teologi Kebatinan Sunda*, p. 145.

⁹⁹ In a talk with Martin van Bruinessen, Singapore, 14 October 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Interview, Andre Hernandi, Bandung, 07 July 2011.

¹⁰¹ Interview, Asep Setia, Bandung, 08 June 2009.

national politics changed in favour of Muslims.¹⁰² Some Muslim leaders used this shifting political constellation to pressurise the native-syncretic movements.¹⁰³ During this time opposition to AKP and ADS from the Muslim community increased. As Steenbrink noted, Muslims accused the ADS leadership of supporting the Dutch Colonial Government which, in return, granted them recognition independent from Muslim authority.¹⁰⁴ In 1944, the ADS was banned and, moreover, before this date there was a Japanese attempt at returning the ADS community to the Islamic tradition by telling Tedjabuana to promote circumcision among his followers. Unwilling to bow to Japanese rule he temporarily dissolved the movement and moved to Bandung.¹⁰⁵ In the meantime, AKP was suppressed after its leader, Mei Kartawinata, was arrested in 1943 for his political activism.¹⁰⁶ As a consequence, AKP followers kept a low profile or went underground.

As the political context was in favour of Muslims, the Japanese occupation galvanised the Muslim community by recognising them as an important political force. W.F. Wertheim maintained that “the recognition of Moslems as an important political factor was a bold deviation from the former colonial practice, which denied Islam any latitude as a political creed.”¹⁰⁷ During the Japanese occupation, PERSIS, NU, Muhammadiyah and PERTI joined in MIAI (Majelis Islam A'laa Indonesia/Madlisul Islamil A'la Indonesia, Indonesian High Islamic Council). The Modernists and Traditionalists had never before united as a socio-political force.¹⁰⁸ In 1943, MIAI transformed itself into an Islamic party named Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council). As Wertheim has noted, Soekarno

¹⁰² W.F. Wertheim, ‘Indonesian Moslems under Sukarno and Suharto: Majority with Minority Mentality’, in *Indonesian Politics: A Reader*, Christine Doran (ed.) (Centre for South-east Asian Politics: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987), p. 115.

¹⁰³ Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink (eds.), *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 660.

¹⁰⁴ Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 293.

¹⁰⁵ Steenbrink, ‘A Catholic Sadrach’, p. 293.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 27 July 2010.

¹⁰⁷ Wertheim, *Indonesian Moslems under Sukarno and Suharto*, p. 115.

¹⁰⁸ See the definition of the Modernist in Analytical Terms and Definition in the Glossary.

recognised Islam as an official religion but rejected to give it a dominant position within the state structure.¹⁰⁹

After independence, the *Aliran Kebatinan* regained its feet, capitalising on the new dynamics resulting from the changing political context. The 1945 Constitution (article 29) officially recognised the right of each citizen to believe in their '*agama*' and '*kepercayaan*' (religion and belief).¹¹⁰ According to *Aliran Kebatinan* followers, the term '*kepercayaan*' referred to their faith. Contrarily, Muslims contended that the term is synonymous with 'religion'.¹¹¹ Each group in society continued to make claims about the meaning of the word according to their interpretation of that article. This polarising debate divides them to the present day. The changing political context, however, offered a chance for the ADS to revive and prosper. ADS' leader Tedjabuana, for example, returned to Cigugur in 1946 and revived the ADS with the construction the Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal, 'Madrais Grand Mansion'.¹¹²

Anti-Islam sentiment continued and culminated in 1950s and 1960s. I presume that in West Java it was most likely induced by national post-independence political developments and the outcome of the Madiun affair in East Java¹¹³ that pitted *abangan* against *santri* in

¹⁰⁹ Wertheim, *Indonesian Moslems under Sukarno and Suharto*, p. 115.

¹¹⁰ Letter of the Minister of Justice dated 6 June 1979, *Himpunan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan yang Berkaitan dengan Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa* (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Nilai Budaya Seni dan Film, Direktorat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 2006), pp. 302, 313.

¹¹¹ Anas Saidi (ed.), *Menekuk Agama, Membangun Tahta: Kebijakan Agama Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Desantara, 2004), p. 61, Interview with Engkus Ruswana, the Chairman of Budidaya, Bandung, 15 August 2009. Also interview with Sulistyo Hadisaputro, former Director of Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan YME at the Department of Culture and Tourism, Jakarta, 31 May 2010. Mr. Wongsonegoro, who once held a high ranking position during Soekarno's time, is said to have endorsed the insertion of the word 'Kepercayaan' into the aforesaid article. Interview with Andri Hernandi, the chairman of AKP, Bandung, 7 July 2010.

¹¹² Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 293.

¹¹³ The Madiun Affair was a communist uprising in 1948 against the leaders of the newly-declared Indonesian Republic of Soekarno and Hatta in the town of Madiun, East Java. Led by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the uprising declared the establishment of an 'Indonesian Soviet Republic' and killed the governor of East Java, R.M. Suryo, several Muslim leaders and

retaliatory bloodshed.¹¹⁴ As Hefner has noted, the polarisation between Javanists and orthodox Muslims later became the basis for political organisation in rural Java.¹¹⁵ This political division and ideological rivalry very much intensified following the development of local religious tension between Javanists and orthodox Muslims.¹¹⁶ This fostered an anti-Islamic mentality among the followers of Javanism or *Aliran Kebatinan*.

I would like to remind readers that there is no evidence to show how this development in East Java reached West Java. However, I believe that this political tension and the division it caused had a negative impact on other areas and spread outside East Java to the west. In West Java, tensions occurred in various places including Ciparay, Lembang, Subang, Sumedang and Cianjur. In Ciparay, for example, in 1954, Darul Islam rebels¹¹⁷ attacked AKP followers and killed twenty

police officers. The insurgency was exterminated by Republican forces and its leader, Musso, was killed.

¹¹⁴ Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', p. 535. See also Jamie Mackie, 'Indonesia since 1945: Problem of Interpretation', in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds.), *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate* (Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca, Cornell University, 2011), pp. 117-130.

¹¹⁵ Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', p. 535. See also William Liddle, 'Power, participation and the political parties in Indonesia', in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (1978), *Political Power and Communication in Indonesia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), pp. 171-195.

¹¹⁶ Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', p. 535.

¹¹⁷ Darul Islam literally means the House of Islam. It is known as DI/TII (Indonesian: *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia*, means *Darul Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia*). On August 7, 1949, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the birth of DI/TII in West Java. Its major goal was to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia. Its birth was to protest against the Renville Agreement the Indonesian government had signed in 1948, which ceded West Java to the Dutch. This rebellion under the banner of Islam continued its movement and did not disband itself even after the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch administration to the Indonesian government in 1949. This unyielding attitude provoked a clash between DI/TII rebels and the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia. After some years, the DI/TII movement mainly developed in West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan. These movements promoted the implementation of the *Shari'ah* as the only valid source of law. Until 1962, the movement produced splinters and offshoots that ranged from the well-known violent Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent religious groups. The

four persons.¹¹⁸ At the time of the attack, the victims were busy making preparations for an arts performance to celebrate their Saka Year. In the Lembang region, tension between Muslims and *Aliran Kebatinan* followers occurred from the late 1950s until the 1970s. Muslim *dakwah* was often mocked by *Aliran Kebatinan* followers; the Muslim call to prayer was met with derisive comments such as, "Listen, that is dog's barking."¹¹⁹ This situation, however, illustrates the degree of hostility between people of different faiths born out of a complex mix of ideological and cultural conflicts.

Let me return to the MIAI transformation into Masyumi, which initially seemed to be a significant step towards consolidating a single Islamic party but proved false after only a few years. The unity between the Traditionalists and the Modernists ended in 1952 after the NU Conference in Palembang yielded a separation from Masyumi. Nevertheless, Masyumi remained in existence with major support from PERSIS and the Muhammadiyah. The leading Muslim politician, M. Natsir, was appointed the chairman of Masyumi. In the 1955 election, the party won West Java, leaving other big parties in their wake. Masyumi gained 26.46 per cent of the votes, slightly more than its Jakarta branch (26.13 per cent). The Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) came in second with 23.63 per cent, before the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) with 10.84 per cent.¹²⁰ The other Islamic parties including Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI) and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) shared 15.73 per cent. In total, the 1955 election gave 41.49 per cent to all Islamic parties in West Java.¹²¹ The Non-Islamic parties including PNI, PKI, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, the Association of Indonesian Independence

best study on the movement to date is C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1981).

¹¹⁸ Interview with Iyus Jusuf, Ciparay, 20 July 2010.

¹¹⁹ Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Cikole, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹²⁰ An outstanding study of Indonesian Communism is Ruth T. McVey's *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965).

¹²¹ A. van Marle, 'Indonesian Electoral Geography under Orla and Orba', in Oey Hong Lee (ed.), *Indonesia: After the 1971 Election*, pp. 52-53: The NU gained 9.66%, below its achievement in Jakarta (15.73%), PSII and PERTI had 5.64% and 0.06% respectively.

Supporters), Partai Katolik (Catholic Party), Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia, the Indonesian Christian Party) and Murba (Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak, Many People Deliberation) gained 42.83 per cent of the total vote. Total participation in the election was 88.65 per cent.¹²² These figures also show that in terms of political participation, the Sundanese aspirations were divided into Islamic and non-Islamic ones.

The considerable gain in the 1955 election demonstrates the social and political influence of Islamic parties. Although they failed to achieve a dominant majority, Islam remained significant. The majority of the Sundanese embraced Islam even if they did not vote for an Islamic party. One's belief in Islam does not automatically 'Islamise' one's political orientation. Wertheim – writing in the early 1970s - argued that Islam as a faith does not necessarily resemble Islam as politics.¹²³ He contends that "although Islam is the religion of a large majority of the Indonesian people, the attitudes of those who confess Islam as their faith and as an ideology often resemble those of a minority group."¹²⁴ This echos Dutch colonial policy, which confined Islam to personal observance for fear of it becoming a "rallying symbol for anti-colonial resistance."¹²⁵

PERMAI: A Political Resistance against Islam

During the 1950s, the *Aliran Kebatinan* organisations were considered religious sects. They achieved resurgence due to social and political contexts favourable to them. Aritonang observes that: "Notwithstanding protest by Muslim clerics, especially during Japanese rule, ADS was able to develop and even claim some 100,000 adherents in the early 1950s."¹²⁶ By 1953, for instance, there were 360 organisations, a massive increase from 29 in 1952, according to a Department of Religious Affairs report.¹²⁷ By 1954, the increasing presence of the

¹²² Van Marle, 'Indonesian Electoral Geography', pp. 52-53.

¹²³ W.F. Wertheim, 'Islam Before and After the Elections' in Oey Hong Lee (ed.), *Indonesia: After the 1971 Election* (London-Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press), p. 88.

¹²⁴ *Idem.*

¹²⁵ *Idem.*

¹²⁶ Aritonang and Steenbrink, *History of Christianity*, p. 660.

¹²⁷ Samuel Agustinus Patty, "Aliran Kepercayaan" A Socio Religious Movement in Indonesia, PhD Dissertation, Washington State University, 1986, p. 69.

Aliran Kebatinan as well as of other sects and groups forced the Ministry of Religious Affairs to establish a Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society (Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran dan Kepercayaan Masyarakat, BAKOR PAKEM) to monitor their development and activities. BAKOR PAKEM was tasked with keeping these religious movements in check and ensuring that charismatic leaders would not mobilise the movements against the state or cause social unrest.¹²⁸ The rapid spread of the religious sects was an important phenomenon across West Java at that time.

Prior to the 1955 General Election, *Aliran Kebatinan* elites attempted to consolidate and unite themselves in a national body named All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress Body (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Seluruh Indonesia, BKKI), resulting from the first *Aliran Kebatinan* Congress in Semarang in 1955. For his own political gain, President Soekarno backed the attempt and endorsed the BKKI's establishment. He even attended the third BKKI Congress in 1957, in which he delivered a speech and praised the movement for its commitment to Pancasila.¹²⁹ Wongsonegoro requested Soekarno to recognise the *Aliran Kebatinan* as an official religion.¹³⁰

Under this socio-political setting, the *Aliran Kebatinan* grew into a socio-religious and political force. In Lembang, for example, the significance of the *Aliran Kebatinan* tradition overshadowed Islam at the time. Throughout the course of the 1950s to the 1970s, for example, Islamic practices such as *salat*, *puasa*, *haji*, *zakat* and *tahlilan* and so on were not widely-observed in Lembang.¹³¹ Only a few mosques were available throughout Lembang. And it was not easy during the 1950s to the 1970s to find Islamic institutions such as Islamic religious study groups (*majlis taklim*), Islamic schools (*madrasah*) and Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) or Quranic Kindergarten (Taman Pengajian Anak, TPA), and so forth.¹³² Haji Otong from Tasikmalaya, who arrived in

¹²⁸ Mulder, 'Aliran Kebatinan', p. 108.

¹²⁹ *Pancasila* is the official political philosophy for Indonesian state. It has five pillars: 1. Belief in One God; 2. Just and Civilized Humanity; 3. The Unity of Indonesia; 4. Democracy; 5. Social Justice.

¹³⁰ Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin, 'Penghayat, Orthodoxy and the legal Politics of the State: The Survival of Agama Djawa Sunda (Madraism) in Indonesia, *Indonesia and Malay World*, Vol. 42, No. 122, p. 14.

¹³¹ Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹³² *Idem*.

Nyalindung, Lembang, in the late 1950s established a mosque and an Islamic school in this village to neutralise the influence of *Aliran Kebatinan* and anti-Islam sentiments there.¹³³

During the 1950s and early 1960s, tension between *Aliran Kebatinan* movements and Muslims came up because many of them opposed Islamic parties.¹³⁴ The *Aliran Kebatinan*'s struggle against Islam was politically manifested in the establishment of a party, named Indonesian Marhaen Association (Persatuan Marhaen Indonesia, PERMAI). In 1955, Mei and his friends, including J.B. Asa and Iwa Kusumasumantri, declared the establishment of the PERMAI party prior to the general election.¹³⁵ PERMAI was a nation-wide party even if it did not play a prominent role at the national level. The party, however, failed to make the electoral threshold in the 1955 election, having won only two seats in the Konstituante.¹³⁶ This result forced the Party's

¹³³ Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Cikole, Lembang, 28 July 2010

¹³⁴ Martin van Bruinessen, 'Saints, Politics and Sufi Bureaucrats: Mysticism and Politics in Indonesia's New Order', in Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (eds.), *Sufism and the 'Modern' in Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 98.

¹³⁵ Clifford Geertz argues that PERMAI is an effort to seek relevance for Abangan beliefs. On one hand it depends on esoteric and ritual techniques; on the other hand it functions as "an-anti Islam social organisation" which strives against it. Its membership contains "urban labourers, unemployed and employed radical urban people, and those who worked on plantation lands." See Niels Mulder. *Mistisisme Jaw: Ideologi di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001), p. 65. Geertz argued that "those members believe PERMAI/Perjalanan was revealed as 'authentic knowledge' instead of Islamic or even Hindu beliefs seeking Pancasila as national ideology by means of ancient Javanese pattern. By doing so, PERMAI tried to exist as a way of adjustment to a changing social context. PERMAI is therefore a belief system created for those farmers who come to the city." PERMAI's anti-Islam sentiment can be seen in Mei's statement that "Islam is the religion of the Arabs that came to colonise Pasundan land." See Razak. *Teologi Kebatinan AKP*. p. 145.

¹³⁶ Konstituante was the state body which was set up to formulate the permanent Constitution for the Republic of Indonesia to replace the provisional one of 1950. It served from 10th of November 1956 to 2nd of July, 1959. On the 5th of July 1959, President Soekarno issued a decree that dissolved this body and he reimposed the 1945 Constitution. A valuable study on the Konstituante is Adnan Buyung Nasution's *The Aspiration for constitutional government in Indonesia: a socio-legal study of the Indonesian Konstituante, 1956-1959* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992).

dissolution, marking Mei's failure to consolidate his political position in the Konstituante through which he had hoped to politically promote the Pancasila and the native-syncretic creeds. Mei returned to the grassroots and re-united with former PERMAI members, officially reorganising his movement under the banner of AKP.

Turning Away from Islam

Pressure against *Aliran Kebatinan*

Since independence, Muslim leaders paid much attention to their missionary (*dakwah*) activities aiming to promote Islamisation and to challenge anti-Islam tendencies among *Aliran Kebatinan* followers. Social mobilisation for economic, social and political reasons brought about social change. Migration from areas such as Tasikmalaya and Garut, where Islamic culture was strong, to other places where Islamic influence was less pronounced, such as Lembang, gradually caused socio-religious and cultural changes that forced the decline of anti-Islamic sentiment and the decline of native-syncretic culture commonly embraced by *Aliran Kebatinan* followers. These changes pressurised the *Aliran* and caused tension.

As said above, during the 1950s and early 1960s the *Aliran Kebatinan* movement reached its culmination. AKP had a considerable growth and was well-institutionalised. AKP and ADS movements were two of the most prominent religious movements in the region. This golden era ended in the mid-1960s. The AKP failed to keep the pace of its considerable growth due to leadership crises and socio-political pressure. In the meantime, in 1964, the Kuningan Court, supported by the army and the national government, banned the ADS. Popular accounts claimed that the ADS was not banned; rather, Tedjabuana dissolved it.¹³⁷ The ADS and AKP leaders failed to understand why the government refused to recognise their beliefs amidst its support for the interests of the people of other religions and faiths.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Interview, Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009.

¹³⁸ *Idem*.

Disappointment and Dissolution

ADS undoing began with the discrimination ADS followers faced.¹³⁹ One day in March 1964, Sakim, a male nurse who was an ADS follower, failed to get a health subsidy for his wife's stay in a government hospital in Kuningan after she had given birth. Sakim was a government civil servant eligible to receive subsidy for stays at government hospitals. The hospital, however, refused to give Sakim a subsidy because he failed to show his marriage certificate to prove that the woman giving birth was his wife. According to contemporary Indonesian law, a marriage was recognised if it was registered either with the Civil Registry Office for non-Muslims or with the Office of Religious Affairs for Muslims. Sakim's marriage, however, was conducted according to ADS custom, which was recognised by neither office.¹⁴⁰ This case soon came to the attention of BAKOR PAKEM, the Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society. Tedjabuana tried to help Sakim with the assistance of A. Hidayat Sasmita, a parish priest from Cirebon, and Sie Tjie Djiem, the President of the Cirebon chapter of the Catholic Party, at the Kuningan Court. The ADS leader, however, failed. On 9 July 1964, the Kuningan Court prosecutor through BAKOR PAKEM decided that since the ADS marriage was unrecognised according to law, Sakim's marriage was considered unlawful.¹⁴¹ His application for medical subsidisation for his wife was therefore rejected. For ADS leaders, this rejection was a symbolic denial to recognise the ADS's existence, its vision and its mission.¹⁴²

There was also, of course, a political complication because inter-marriage between ADS followers and Muslims was rampant and provoked tension in society. In many respects, Muslims, as well as the authorities, wanted to conduct marriages according to Law number 22/1946, which obliged every citizen to marry "under the auspices of government religious officials in order to obtain a formal

¹³⁹ The following account rests largely on interview with Jatikusuma, Cigugur, 5 August 2009; Interview with Ira Indrawardana, Bandung, 14 August 2009, and Interview with Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of the Cigugur Church, Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 294.

¹⁴¹ *Idem*.

¹⁴² Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.

acknowledgement from the government.”¹⁴³ ADS followers defied this law and this defiance often provoked animosity. It was not rare that to get their way, ADS leaders and followers converted to Islam for the sake of marriage and afterwards abandoned the religion. Tedjabuana, for example, converted to Islam in February 1951 to be able to be the legal guardian in the marriage of his son, Siti Jenar, but soon after renounced the religion.¹⁴⁴

Muslim leaders tended to be extraordinarily sensitive whenever they were challenged with this kind of problems. They sometimes blew issues out of proportion in a way that suggested they took personal affront.¹⁴⁵ In 1964, the following case was brought before the court and the perpetrator was jailed for several months. One day in 1964, Kamid, a citrus farmer of Cigugur, Kuningan, wanted to express his thanks to God after having had a successful harvest by giving some of his citrus to his neighbours. Unfortunately, a Muslim family fell ill after having eaten the citrus and Kamid was accused of having intended to harm them by poisoning them. Kamid denied the charge. To prove his innocence, Kamid swore that he did not poison his neighbours, and for unknown reasons, he then went on to step on the Quran. This action outraged Muslims and they demanded justice from the public prosecutor for Kamid’s offense of the Muslim Holy Book. Kamid was punished with a jail sentence.¹⁴⁶

Such sustained tension had great impact. Muslim activists and organisations were outraged and demanded the suspension of ADS.¹⁴⁷ In 1964, ADS leaders were accused of breach of trust in the construction of the ADS Tri Mulya School in downtown Cigugur, Kuningan. They were accused of having raised funds by coercion and using them irresponsibly. Muslim demands to suspend the ADS provoked the court to take action. By 1964 hundreds of ADS members were arrested and imprisoned. The ADS leaders, Tedjabuana, and his son, Jatikusuma, were

¹⁴³ Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 52.

¹⁴⁴ *Idem*.

¹⁴⁵ Interview, Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of Cigugur Church, Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009.

¹⁴⁶ Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 54.

¹⁴⁷ Interview, Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of Cigugur Church, Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009.

also detained.¹⁴⁸ Tedjabuana recognised that this situation put the lives of the members of his community at risk and that he had to take concrete action. Tedjabuana finally dissolved the ADS in 1964 after having been suffering for decades.

Embracing Roman Catholicism

Frustrated at having been denied recognition for decades, along with exposure to discrimination and other social and political pressures, in the end Tedjabuana embraced Roman Catholicism. Many considered this an act of apostasy although Tedjabuana had never been a real Muslim. His conversion was witnessed by Pastor A. Hidayat Sasmita and soon afterwards thousands of his followers joined him in embracing Catholicism. Only a few of them embraced Protestantism or Islam. Tedjabuana saw many similarities between Catholicism and ADS, especially in their doctrine of love. Neither faith required circumcision, which the ADS saw as a violation of the human body. The palace-sanctuary of Paseban Tri Panca Tunggal, which was previously used to carry out ADS ceremonies, was soon used as a Catholic Church. The 'conversion' of ADS members to Catholicism also facilitated the permeation of Catholic influence in the villages where ADS followers lived, such as in Cisantana in Cigugur, Ciawi in Tasikmalaya, Pasir in Garut and the village of Manggahang near Bandung.¹⁴⁹ After some years, the Catholics built churches in Cisantana and Pasir.¹⁵⁰ On 5 March 1978, Tedjabuana died as a Catholic at the age of 82. Since then, his son Jatikusuma took over full leadership of his community.

Jatikusuma had in fact begun to exercise more authority since 1974. He followed his father in embracing Catholicism.¹⁵¹ He lived in the Grand Mansion of Cigugur and allowed the use of the residence's hall for the Catholic mass.¹⁵² Later, the Catholic community erected a church, parish houses, clinic and school just uphill near the mansion. While church activities, properties and membership significantly increased,

¹⁴⁸ Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009. See also Rosidin, *Kebatinan, Islam and the State*, p. 53.

¹⁴⁹ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 295.

¹⁵⁰ *Idem*.

¹⁵¹ This following account rests largely on my interview with Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2010.

¹⁵² Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p. 296.

the mansion and its residents, including the Pangeran, were not really saved from economic insecurity. The conversion of the ADS members to Catholicism had also redirected regular and irregular donations away from ADS' coffers to the church treasury. It seems that the ADS leaders did not anticipate the economic consequences of this conversion. Steenbrink argues that "some events and developments in 1964-1981 show that the expectations of Jatikusuma and the Catholic clergy about the conversion to Catholicism were quite different."¹⁵³

There were several consequences the ADS leaders had not foreseen. *First*, Jatikusuma, as well as his father, Tedjabuana, lost their privileged positions as Pangeran (Lord). Social activities were organised with due respect to the Pangeran but the religious hierarchy saw Jatikusuma complain that after having become a Catholic, his position turned into one of a sheep in a flock from previously having been a Lord.¹⁵⁴ This represented the unexpected 'desacralisation' of the ADS leaders. *Second*, as said above, economic and social resources which were previously channelled to the leaders of the ADS were now allocated to the church. The radical shift in the socio-religious and cultural life of the ADS community had tremendous economic consequences, especially for the ADS leadership. *Third*, this radical change also seriously eroded ADS authority. With the adoption of church leadership and organisation, the old ADS authority was challenged and a new pattern of allegiance emerged. The allegiance of the former ADS followers had split in two. Some of them continued being loyal to Pangeran Jatikusuma rather than to the church; but the majority of followers found the church to be the true spiritual place to which they surrendered their allegiance.

Jatikusuma was unhappy that in church he was just a member of the congregation and to assert his influence, he boycotted discussions with church leaders. In this situation, there was clearly tension between Jatikusuma and the church leaders, most of whom were former ADS followers. This illustrates the dynamics and the impact of the radical shift in the religious and organisational orientation of the ADS community, from a native-syncretic current to that of the world religion of Roman Catholicism.

¹⁵³ *Idem*, p. 9.

¹⁵⁴ Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.

Some of the factors cited above constituted the reasons behind Jatikusuma's disillusionment that caused him to turn away from Catholicism and to return to the teachings of his grandfather. While his sense of disappointment was latent for some time, the trigger came later on, in Bandung in the late 1970s, during the Sundanese Christmas Mass in a church in Kebon Kelapa.¹⁵⁵ Prior to the celebration, Jatikusuma demanded that the attendants of the Sundanese mass celebration should wear Sundanese attire and that the liturgy should be conducted in Sundanese. For some church leaders, this demand was too much. Pastor Abu Kasman said that "In the Catholic Church, hierarchy and authority are strong and exercised carefully; the liturgy must be in Latin like Muslims use Arabic in their prayers. All churches will always maintain uniformity in performing worship. If one church allows the adoption of local culture, the others will come with similar demands."¹⁵⁶ The church, however, did approve of Jatikusuma's dress proposal for the *pelayan misa* (mass assistants) but not for the Pastor. Jatikusuma was upset with the inflexibility of the Church and decided to leave the Sunda Mass.

Abu Kasman argues that the Catholic Church had in fact made many adjustments in order to accommodate local culture, especially the use of Sundanese music and art such as *angklung* (bamboo musical instrument) and *degung* (small gong) in the church, in addition to wearing a *keris* (kris) and a *blankon* (Sundanese headdress, especially for the mass assistants). For the pastor, this kind of adaptation has not yet been allowed by the Catholic Church.¹⁵⁷ Due to this restriction, the relationship between the church leaders and ex-ADS leaders became strained. Misunderstandings continued to occur and polarised the Church and the devoted proponents of Sundanese culture, the ADS followers.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ *Idem.*

¹⁵⁶ Interview, Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of Cigugur Church, Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009.

¹⁵⁷ *Idem.*

¹⁵⁸ In 1977, Jatikusuma declared his breaking with the church and he began to revive the old ADS tradition under a new banner, PACKU (*Paguyuban Adat Cara Karuhun Urang*; Adat Association for Ancestors' Way of Life) in 1980. Under Muslim pressure, the West Java court banned PACKU in 1982, accusing this new organisation of being a reincarnation of ADS. Despite this challenge, Jatikusuma continued his struggle by establishing another organisation named AKUR (*Adat Karuhun Urang*, Our Ancestral Adat).

Conclusion

Islamic Modernists sought a crucial shift in the Islamisation trend. They argued for the superiority of Islam over all other cultural heritages which upset the existing socio-religious setting and the political order among Sundanese society. With their 'purification' agenda, the Modernist leaders questioned the amalgamation of Islamic practices and *adat* and condemned belief in spiritual forces and native-syncretic practices. They believed that *adat* is Hindu and that Christianity is the religion of the Dutch and therefore both are Muslims' opponents. In this context, the pressure put upon the *Aliran Kebatinan* continued. As pressure mounted, the *Aliran Kebatinan* leaders saw that the Islamic vision did not share their worldviews and that these visions could not be reconciled. As a consequence, anti-Islam sentiments emerged. After being disappointed because the state did not recognise them as members of a full-fledged religious organisation and after it failed to meet the civil rights of *Aliran Kebatinan* followers, they turned away from Islam massively and converted to Christianity.

CHAPTER THREE

THE WANE OF *ALIRAN KEBATINAN* AND RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE: THE NEW ORDER'S POLITICS ON RELIGION, ISLAMISATION AND CHRISTIAN REVIVAL (1965-1990)

This chapter discusses a crucial stage in the development of Islam in Indonesia in the shifting political context in the aftermath of the 30 September 1965 coup attempt, which produced unprecedented political turmoil and seriously damaged President Soekarno's legitimacy. In this context Soeharto came officially to power in 1968 to lead the New Order Regime.¹ Soeharto was acutely aware of complex mixture of fear of Communism and of Islamism as represented by the PKI and DI/TII ideologies fighting for Communism and the investment of the Islamic State. Soeharto and his regime made this fear work for them through the promotion of remarkable socio-political changes in order to gain control over the grassroots and by so doing causing strict control of social and political life. One such change was the promotion of what Boland called 'religious freedom' even if this came with restrictions.² In his words:

.... and religion was in favour as never before. Freedom of religion has also often been stressed since 1965, but with this restriction: that such freedom does not include the freedom to be non-religious, let

¹ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, pp. 149-151.

² With loyal support from all his aides in the military and the civil forces, Soeharto sought to exercise total control over politics and society. Communists, actual and alleged, were exterminated while the leaders of the left-wing Nationalists were eliminated. Since then the Army played a crucial role, soon becoming the dominant political force. The New Order kept control of the economy by regulating foreign investment. See Herbert Feith, 'Political Control, Class Formation and Legitimacy in Soeharto's Indonesia', in *Indonesian Politics: A Reader*, Christine Doran (ed.) (Centre for South-east Asian Politics: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1987), p. 222. See also Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 149 and Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Revised Edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 135.

alone anti-religious. ...So it came about that after Soekarno's fall his slogan of 1964 once more became topical: the Indonesian people as well as the Indonesian state "must have a God and a religion" (*harus ber-Tuhan dan harus beragama*). It is undeniable that many religious leaders considered this development a reason for new hope.³

It would seem like a paradox that the promotion of religious freedom boiled down to efforts to obliterate the (religious) native syncretic creed across Java. However, with reference to its first principle of the belief in One God, the regime provided the Pancasila with deep religious meaning and by so doing it silently warned the *Aliran Kebatinan* followers in West Java not to take side with the leftists or their sympathizers as they had done in the past.⁴ The anti-Communist mentality of the regime provided the setting for policy making that more or less outlawed the existence of all syncretic movements and, as a consequence, negated their growth and influence in society.

In a similar way, the regime 'abolished' political Islam but promoted cultural Islam and by doing so provided the ground for the unprecedented increase in Islamic institutions and expressions of Islamic cultural identity.⁵ As a consequence, Muslim leaders and particularly the Modernists used this context for the promotion of *dakwah*, after their leaders' pursuit for the rehabilitation of the suspended Masyumi party (of course) was rejected. This *dakwah* campaign, particularly at the grassroots level, had a tremendous impact on the social structures in the decades to come.

Christian leaders also greatly benefited from these remarkable changes. This was so despite the disagreement and the tension they had with Muslim leaders and activists across the country on various matters pertaining to the ethics of propagation, the construction of houses of worship, the receipt of foreign aid, and so on.⁶ As a result of their efforts, Christians won large numbers of converts and they used Soeharto's political change as a solid basis for demanding the unequivocal implementation of article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human

³ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 149.

⁴ Van Bruinessen, 'Saints, Politics and Sufi Bureaucrats', p. 98.

⁵ *Idem*.

⁶ The study on these issues refers to Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order* (Leiden/Amsterdam: ISIM/Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 21-104.

Rights (UDHR), which guarantees the freedom of religion, including the freedom to convert.⁷ Coincidentally, it was in this context that Christians capitalised on their considerable advance in terms of human capital because they were better schooled and consequently had gained better access to higher positions in society. The people in parts of West Java were aware of this, and also realised that Christian social institutions like hospitals and schools were of a higher quality than others in the area. This made conversion to Christianity for them even more interesting.⁸

Soeharto's political change tremendously influenced the Indonesian political context in entire regions, including West Java. Readers should keep in mind that at the time, all political expression in West Java was in fact a direct reflection of the political dynamics in Jakarta which demanded compliance from all provinces and which influenced the political atmosphere in these provinces.

Soeharto's Politics on Religions and Pressures Against *Aliran Kebatinan*

Soeharto's Regime's Claim of Pancasila and Anti-Communist Mentality

Soeharto's politics on *Aliran Kebatinan* and religion were drawn on the following premises: *First*, Soeharto officially recognised the *Aliran Kebatinan* as '*kepercayaan*' (belief) distinctive from '*agama*' (religion). This constitutional recognition should have ensured the state's protection of this native syncretic creed. This was not the case, however, as Soeharto declared on one occasion that a *kepercayaan* is not a religion but that all religions are *kepercayaan*. The New Order regime slowly marginalised the *Aliran Kebatinan* across West Java and pressured its followers to embrace an official religion. In 1967, the regime tasked the Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society (BAKOR PAKEM), established in the 1950s, to keep a close eye on *Aliran Kebatinan* groups which were suspected of sympathising with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). This

⁷ *Idem*, p. 50.

⁸ Interview with Romo Abu Kasman, chief pastor of the Cigugur Church, Cigugur, Kuningan, 6 August 2009.

suspicion fed the social stigma that descended on them, especially from among believers, both Muslims and Christians.⁹ From 1967 onward, the government also required some hours of religious instruction in state schools that promoted orthodox religions associated with modern schools, literacy and modernity.¹⁰ Under this political pressure and within this shifting social context, the *Aliran Kebatinan* groups and their followers, the *Penghayat*, suffered and failed to prosper.

Second, the regime officially recognised five religions and each citizen was required to embrace one of them. Religious elites were given strong support to conduct *dakwah* or missionary activities. Freedom of religion was promoted from 1965 onwards and atheism was prohibited. Indeed, in a speech before the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Soeharto proclaimed that every citizen must embrace one formal religion; otherwise they would be considered atheist. The adage was that if one is an atheist, one is a communist. Islam and Christianity were supported in their capacities as counter-ideologies to Communism rather than as moral and spiritual teachings.

Third, religion was useful; radical political Islam or Islamism was not.¹¹ While Soeharto sanctioned the use of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), a fusion of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, PARMUSI) and others, as a conduit for Muslim political sentiment, any attempt to use religion as a political ideology was not to be tolerated. Nonetheless, the regime viewed the Party as a potential threat and hence kept controlling it. Here, while it is unclear exactly what kind of relation between religion and politics Soeharto approved of, it was obvious that he wanted a separation of religion and ideology. Soeharto, therefore, crushed any initiative that might lead to the 'ideologisation' of religion.

Fourth, although hostile towards the use of Islam as a political ideology, Soeharto sought to strengthen his relationship with Muslims. To this end, he lent considerable support to Muslims, especially on matters pertaining to their social and cultural interests, often at the expense of Christian aspirations.¹² By satisfying the Muslims, Soeharto

⁹ Interview, Andre Hernandi, Bandung, 7 July 2010.

¹⁰ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, p. 155.

¹¹ Feith, 'Political Control', p. 222.

¹² Perhaps the best examples to note are Decree No. 1/1969 on Religious

hoped to avoid political instability. At the same time, he sought to firm up an electoral constituency which would help maintain the political *status quo* and his share in it.

Fifth, at first blush, this political stance seems to have favoured Muslims over Christians. In fact, this was not the case. Rather, the New Order regime treated Christians as important allies, many of whom were well-educated technocrats appointed to ministerial and other high-ranking offices. But in essence such policy did not mean to favour the Christians. Rather it was created in the best interests of the regime itself. It was hoped that Christians would contribute to the regime's development campaign and lend a hand in negotiations with Western donors. The New Order regime thus paid attention to the social and religious interests of Christians living in Christian-majority regions, such as Papua, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and North Sulawesi.

Aliran Kebatinan's Continued Decline

Within these political parameters, *Aliran Kebatinan*, once the worldview of the overwhelming majority of Sundanese and Javanese, suddenly found itself on the back foot. At the expense of *Aliran Kebatinan*, Soeharto's political succession facilitated Islamisation on the one hand and Christianisation on the other. The revitalisation of Islam saw significant social transformation after the 1980s, resulting from *Dakwahism*, while that of Christianity was reflected in the growth and numbers of its adherents and institutions. This coincidence of growth contributed to a sense of competitiveness which ultimately resulted in tension between Muslims and Christians, built up around a number of issues including the ethics of proselytisation, the construction of houses of worship, accusations of forced conversion, the need for pluralism, etcetera. This chapter will discuss the context that gave rise to the

Propagation decreed jointly by the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs, and Law No. 1/1974 on Marriage. It seems obvious that the latter represents Muslim voices rather than Christian aspirations. Article 2 (1) of the law states that "marriage is valid only if it is conducted in accordance with the religious laws and beliefs of the parties." This article has produced the common view that inter-religious marriage is forbidden in Indonesia. A good reference to this issue is Ratno Lukito's 'The enigma of legal pluralism in Indonesian Islam: the case of interfaith marriage', *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp. 176–187.

dialectical dynamic in which these faiths were engaged. Before that, we will explore how the heavy pressure on the *Aliran Kebatinan* has institutionally weakened their creeds and socially marginalised their followers. Especially across West Java, the New Order politics on *Aliran Kebatinan* and religion had several repercussions.

The *first* was that the growth in number of Islamic institutions such as mosques, *pesantrens* and *madrasahs* in rural areas undermined village traditions and led to stronger marginalising of *Aliran Kebatinan* followers contributing to tensions between them and Muslims.¹³ As we will see below in the Subang case, Muslim-supported state organs launched assaults against *Aliran Kebatinan* rituals and historical sites at the Cileuleuy riverside in Cimerta. *Aliran Kebatinan* followers were also forced to embrace Islam.¹⁴ In Lembang, the rise of Islam as a social force replaced village syncretic traditions with Islamic ones which contributed to the gradual Islamisation of the region since the 1960s.

Secondly, Soeharto's support of religion prejudiced state neutrality with severe consequences at the community level. In Sumedang, for example, civil and military officers pressured *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents to embrace Islam. The latter were persuaded that, by becoming Muslim, they would be considered Pancasilaists. The political identification of Islam with Pancasila explains how the ruling bureaucrats used the New Order regime's promotion of religion for its political interests, prejudicing the state's neutrality and autonomy.

Third, Soeharto's support of religion encouraged *Aliran Kebatinan* followers and former Communist sympathisers to embrace recognised religions independent of actual religious motives. The state's promotion of religion as well as the expansion of grassroots Islamisation initiatives in both rural and urban areas weakened the socio-cultural basis of *Aliran Kebatinan* and negated the influence of Communism. In this socio-political atmosphere, the PKI was obliterated while *Aliran Kebatinan* also experienced a considerable setback. In what follows I will present a few brief case-studies illustrating the social and political repercussions the New Order policy on *Aliran Kebatinan* and religion had in Subang and Sumedang, West Java.

¹³ Ibnu Hajar Apandi, 'Sekilas Perkembangan Islam di Desa Wangunharja Kecamatan Lembang Kabupaten Bandung Barat', unpublished document, Lembang, 26 March 2011. pp. 1-6.

¹⁴ *Tempo*, 'Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)', 4/VI August 1976.

The Weakening of Aliran Kebatinan in Subang

Subang is made up of highlands in the south and plains and coastal-lands in its northern littoral. The southern parts include Sagalaherang, Jalan Cagak, Cislak, Kasomalang, Bunihayu to Tanjungsang. Islamic influence is rather strong across these areas. Islam probably came to Subang through Cikalama, Sumedang, as suggested by the fact that many Muslim figures, for example the Subang head of the Indonesian Islamic Scholars' Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI),¹⁵ trace their lineage back to Kyai Oo Muhyidin of Pesantren Pagelaran 2 in Sumedang.¹⁶ In terms of intellectual tradition, the influence of Traditionalist Islam as represented by the NU, is strong. The people in this region easily accepted the *Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* tradition by virtue of its relative compatibility with local syncretic cultures. Other Muslim organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, and Islam Jamaah are also active there but their influence is minor. In the general elections held from 1971 to 1987, the United Development Party (PPP) won a significant proportion of the votes across southern Subang.¹⁷

While this socio-religious culture characterises the southern part, the northern littoral that encompasses Subang to Pagaden, Pamanukan, Ciasem and Patokbeusi was less influenced by Islam. On contrast with the rest, Ciasem and Pamanukan are relatively more religious, probably

¹⁵ Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) is the Indonesian Islamic Scholars' Council, founded on 24th of May 1975 by President Soeharto. As observed by Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Soeharto encouraged the MUI's establishment for two reasons. *First*, Soeharto thought that the Muslim community needed a nationwide body of *ulama* to talk on its behalf in the inter-religious body. He also emphasised that such a body would be required to encourage Muslims' participation in solving national problems. In practice, MUI's main role is to give legal opinions (*fatwa*) on Islamic affairs. A very good study on MUI's legal opinions is the one by Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, *Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975-1988* (edisi dwibahasa) (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 46. A good article about the MUI is Moch Nur Ichwan's 'Ulama, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto', *Islamic Law and Society*, Vol. 15, no. 1, 2005, pp. 45-72.

¹⁶ Pesantren Pagelaran 1 is located in Cikalama, Sumedang. The following account on Subang rests largely on interviews with Hawe Setiawan, lecturer at Pasundan University, Bandung, 14 July 2010.

¹⁷ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 14 July 2010.

owing to their proximity to deeply religious Islamic Cirebon. Large parts to the south of Pamanukan, across Pagaden and Patokbeusi to Subang have green plantations and scenery attractive to Europeans on their breaks during the colonial days. There is a railway station in Pagaden that enables people to travel to and from the area. In the coastal regions, local traditional arts and performances are vibrantly alive and the area has apparently become a hub for arts and performances.¹⁸

Economically, Subang is relatively resource-rich with many plantations in its territory. Subang was home to a famous plantation company named P&T (Pamanukan and Tjiasem, 1886) which later changed its name to NV. Maatschappij ter Exploitatie der Pamanukan en Tjiasem Landen. The P&T Company was led by Peter Willem Hofland. His prominence was later commemorated by a statue which was erected in Subang. P&T owned expansive tea plantations across Bunihayu, Jalan Cagak, and Subang. There are also significant rubber plantations across Kalijati, Pamanukan and Ciasem. Agriculture is thus of great importance in the life of the Subangese. During the 1950s and 1960s, these regions became the bases of the PKI, which engaged peasants in its labour movement. *Aliran Kebatinan* was also based in these regions, but its followers were not necessarily PKI members. Probably due to this background, the New Order regime, from its advent, saw Subang as a communist enclave in need to be cleaned up.

After the New Order Regime came to power, it decided that its rule over Subang had to be different from that applied under Soekarno's Old Order. The New Order adhered to the Pancasila as an important mark of distinction, and designated Subang as a Pancasila Bastion, while launching a radio station called BENPAS (*Benteng* Pancasila) to spread its propaganda.¹⁹ The *Aliran Kebatinan* elite tried to dance to the New Order's tune. The AKP, an important *Aliran Kebatinan* organisation in West Java, demonstrated its loyalty to the Pancasila with its adherents claiming it to be their paramount ideology.²⁰ The AKP even adopted the name 'Agama Yakin Pancasila' which literally means 'Religion Convinced

¹⁸ *Idem.*

¹⁹ *Idem.*

²⁰ AKP is *Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan*, a Kebatinan association that emerged since 1927 and grew well in the 1950s, especially in some parts of West Java. Budidaya is an *Aliran Kebatinan* group in West Java born out of a division within the AKP organisation in 1981.

of Pancasila'. As we will discuss later, the Subangese authorities, together with members of the Traditionalist Muslim youth organisation, Ansor, were hostile towards the *Aliran Kebatinan* community and demolished the Pancasila Memorial (*Tugu Pancasila*) on bank of the Cileuleuy River in 1973. *Aliran Kebatinan's* strategic appropriation of the Pancasila only appears to have gained relevance after Soeharto's downfall followed by the rise of Islamism.

Besides having been home to PKI bases in the past, Subang was and still is also known as an Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) stronghold. Recently, politicians from the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) have dominated Subang's administrative and legislative bodies. Eep Hidayat, the PDI-P Regent of Subang (2008-2011) introduced an interesting socio-cultural program that required all civil servants once a week to dress in black and to sport a head band (*ikat kepala*) and to wear slippers, a dress code similar to that of the Baduy people of Kanekes, in the Banten's southern littoral.²¹ This promotion of Kanekes culture appears to have been a symbolic reaction seeking to reassert Sundanese ethnic identity amidst the deepening influence of other cultures and identities among the Sundanese and Bantenese. The Islamic identity of Banten continues to strengthen.

Given the area's history, the New Order applied a strategy of containment, placing it under surveillance and deliberately facilitating Islamisation. This initiative, aimed at the grassroots, was supplemented by the promulgation of legislation aiming to marginalise the AKP. On 23 May 1967, the BAKOR PAKEM, the Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society, issued decree number SK-23/PAKEM/1967 that banned the AKP and its activities across West Java. AKP leaders, never having received a copy of the decree, did not know how to respond to the suspension.²² After this, the state enhanced its promotion of religion by making it a compulsory subject in state schools and universities. Some years after the issuance of the decree, the BAKOR PAKEM of Subang issued another decree number: Kep. 01/1.2.SK.1.312/4/1974 which dissolved the AKP in Subang. By May 1974, AKP followers were forced to declare that they would cease their

²¹ The Baduy people are believed to be the original Sundanese people and their culture is considered authentic Sundanese.

²² Interview, Adang Amung, General Secretary of AKP, Bandung, 7 July 2010.

involvement in the organisation.²³ They were also driven to embrace Islam.²⁴

This ban was enforced following tensions between Muslims and *Aliran Kebatinan* followers, especially of the AKP, about the *Tugu Pancasila* and *sumur wangi* (fragrant well) in Cileuleuy.²⁵ The *Tugu* was constructed by AKP leader Mei Kartawinata as the sacred focal point of pilgrimage, while at the same time symbolising the importance of the Pancasila for the movement and its followers. AKP followers also deemed sacred the well located a hundred meters from the memorial. They believed that its water cured a number of diseases and increased the fecundity of agricultural lands. Some of them stated that, “because the water from the fragrant well had healing powers, why not consider it to be similar to the *zam zam* well in Mecca, and the Pancasila Memorial as our *Ka’bah*.”²⁶

This equation offended Muslims. The AKP claim to the Pancasila did not sit well with the New Order regime. To deprive them of the bases of such claims, and capitalising on anti-*Aliran Kebatinan* sentiments among Muslims, the sacred sites were demolished. One day in 1973, a crowd of people from the village administration office together with Ansor members converged on the sites, demolished the *Tugu* and filled the well with rubbish.²⁷

AKP Suspension

The demolition of the Pancasila Memorial and the AKP suspension across Subang and Sumedang illustrates the sustained hostility in these regions on the part of both the State and Muslim organisations towards the AKP in particular and *Aliran Kebatinan* in general. Denied the freedom to practice their belief, the movement went underground. Most AKP adherents claimed Islam as their religion, especially when having to

²³ ‘Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)’, *Tempo*, 4/VI August 1976.

²⁴ *Idem*.

²⁵ Interview, Mimin Sukandar and Agus, Subang, 14 July 2010.

²⁶ Interview, Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 27 July 2010. Zamzam water comes from a well in Mecca and Muslims believe it to possess miraculous properties. The *Ka’bah* is the holy centre of Islam to which all Muslims face when performing prayers.

²⁷ Interview, Mimin Sukandar and Agus, Subang, 14 July 2010.

make declarations for official purposes, as on identity cards.²⁸ While regretting the inability to take pride in their true identity, the tactic was necessary for their own safety.²⁹ It was also not unusual during the New Order regime for village administration officials to write 'Islam' on the identity cards of the *Aliran Kebatinan* followers without their prior permission.³⁰

From the 1970s to the 1980s, AKP's underground bases in Subang were spread out across rural areas including Patimban, Randu and Gantar. The most important leaders at the time were Ahmad Zaini and Jinul. Under Zaini's leadership, the AKP grew in strength despite the consistent pressure from regime organs in the villages. As in other places, the AKP proliferated mainly through family ties.³¹ There were also, however, many members who embraced the AKP individually after having gained more knowledge and understanding about it. Yayanda Sapin, a respondent in Pusakajaya in Subang, admitted that he embraced the AKP only in 1988, earning him government surveillance as a consequence. Once, he was summoned and interrogated about his religious affiliation by people working in the village office. Learning that he was an *Aliran Kebatinan* follower, they condemned him by saying "How is it that you do not have a religion? You are just like a pig; Damn you PKI!" Holding on to *Aliran Kebatinan* as their true faith in such daunting circumstances, most AKP loyalists resorted to keeping a low profile and to operating underground.

State and Islamisation in Sumedang

The New Order's policies on *Aliran Kebatinan* followers represent the administration's efforts to contain its growth and to funnel its members into an official religion. In this unfavourable climate, *Aliran Kebatinan* followers capitulated to State pressure and converted mostly to Islam or Christianity. With little resistance, many embraced a formal religion and abandoned their native-syncretic currents.³² Those unwilling to

²⁸ Interview, Adang Amung, Bandung, 7 July 2010.

²⁹ Interview, Yayanda Sapin, Subang, 14 July 2010.

³⁰ Interview, Narka, Subang, 14 July 2010.

³¹ Interview, Narka and Darga, Subang, 14 July 2010.

³² In Marpu's case in Cimanggung, Sumedang in 1976, the state's apparatus along with proponents of the ruling Golkar Party encouraged him to

concede, like Yayanda above, were placed under surveillance and were accused by the regime of being PKI sympathisers, a label that carried a heavy social stigma.

The Politics on Marriage and Coercive Conversion

Aliran Kebatinan followers were denied any rights to marry according to their *adat*. According to Law 1/1974 on Marriages, marriage must be conducted according to one's religion and belief. Muslim marriages are registered with the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA) situated in all districts across the country. Non-Muslim marriages are registered with the Municipal Registry Office. This office, while not explicitly being prohibited to do so, had not been authorised to register the marriage of *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents. This means that *Aliran Kebatinan* members, who were considered to be Muslims, did not want to register their marriages at the KUA but also could not register at the Municipal Registry Office. After the issuance of Law 1/1974 on Marriages, various government organs from ministry levels down to provincial levels issued a number of decrees and regulations on *adat* marriage and its registration.³³ For Muslims, the enactment of the Marriage Law was a reminder to live according to Islam. For *Aliran Kebatinan* followers, the law limited their lives with regards to their *adat* and syncretic culture.

The objective behind the requirement that *Aliran Kebatinan* followers register their marriages at the KUA and the Municipal Registry Office was to encourage them to embrace one of the formal religions, since registration presupposed subscription to a recognised faith.³⁴ The strategy produced ambivalent results. It was not uncommon for followers of *Aliran Kebatinan* to identify themselves as Muslim, as they did on their identity cards.³⁵ For the state, this identification entailed that their marriages should be conducted according to Islamic law as per

embrace Islam and to make his fellow *Penghayat (Aliran Perjalanan)* to do the same. Interview, Marpu, Sumedang, 28 May 2010.

³³ See all degrees and regulations compiled in *Himpunan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan yang Berkaitan dengan Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa* (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Nilai Budaya Seni dan Film, Direktorat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 2006).

³⁴ Interview, Andri Hernandi, the Chairman of AKP, Bandung, 15 August 2009.

³⁵ *Idem*.

Law 1/1974. *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents, however, could not accept this scenario. Their refusal stemmed from their view that their identification as Muslim should not necessarily do away with their right to marry according to the *adat*. For many of them, registering themselves as Muslim was purely a pragmatic move and politically motivated. The regime had forced this action upon them.

The issue of *adat* marriages dates back to the 1950s and continued to trouble *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents until 2006 when the relevant laws were changed. In 1953 the AKP of West Java requested that the Regent of the Priangan allow them to marry not in accordance with Islamic law. The Regent, Ipik Gandamana, accepted their request.³⁶ In the New Order era (1967-1998), the marriage issue was more complicated because it was politicised. AKP followers attempted to address this at all levels from the Central Government down to that of the local authorities but never met with a satisfactory resolution.³⁷

'Declaration of Apostasy', Opposing the Politics on Marriage

In July 1976, Marpu, AKP's leader in the Cimanggung highlands in Sumedang and his 262 followers declared that they were abandoning Islam and thereby rejecting Islamic jurisdiction in matters pertaining to their civil rights, such as marriage, burial, and other social and cultural affairs. The national weekly, *Tempo*, reported this development in August 1976. Emus, a member of the AKP in Cimanggung, who was also a friend of Marpu's, had a problem in arranging his daughter's marriage and its registration. Neither the Cimanggung Office of Religious Affairs (KUA) nor the Sumedang Registry Office was willing to register it. While not surprised by the KUA rejection, Emus and Marpu could not accept the Registry's refusal. Emus and Marpu thus consulted Pak Uu, the AKP leader of the Sumedang branch. Pak Uu approached the Registry Office. Surprisingly, with Pak Uu's declaration that Emus was not a Muslim, the Registry Office permitted the registration of Emus daughter's marriage on condition that Emus himself provided a written declaration that he was not a Muslim.

Marpu, Emus, and their friends interpreted this success as a recognition of their identity and the occasion deserved to be celebrated

³⁶ 'Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)', *Tempo*, 4/VI August 1976.

³⁷ Interview, Marpu, Sumedang, 28 May 2010.

by declaring that they were leaving Islam, despite the fact that they had never been Muslim.³⁸ This declaration symbolised their having gained recognition of their rights to marry and to be registered according to existing law.³⁹ It was also an expression of their liberation from Islam, which had become a barrier against them exercising their rights. For them, this marked the end of the state's discrimination against them, a happy occasion after years of frustration with the state's reluctance to protect their right to observe the *adat* they believed in and wanted to live by. This imprudently dramatic gesture, however, provoked a reaction from the Sumedang Court and police and military officers. They soon summoned Marpu and his friends and they were forced to revert to Islam. As will be discussed and analysed later in this chapter, this issue should inspire caution among observers of Islam in this region, sweepingly characterising West Java as entirely Islamic. In the following discussion we will see the results of my investigation into this case and the impact it had on the future development in Cimanggung.

Successful Islamisation under State Sponsorship

This case as reported by *Tempo* surprised me and made me curious so that I decided to do my own investigation. However, I wondered whether Marpu was still alive, and also whether he and his community had remained Muslim after their coerced 'return' to Islam. I wanted to get some idea of the consequences of state-sponsored Islamisation. On 27 May 2010, I went to Cimanggung, Sumedang, to find Marpu. On my arrival I met the village head, Edi Kusnaldi, whom I interviewed. He informed me that Marpu was still around. The next day, I tried to find him in the Sumedang highlands. On my way to his house I met Dede, the head of a sub-village territory, who accompanied me there. On arriving at our destination, Dede approached Marpu's family and told them about me and why I had come. While Dede talked with Marpu's elder son, Yana, some villagers eyed me with suspicion. It was a while before I was invited to enter Marpu's house. Dede informed me that "the people here still remember and fear a return of the 1976 case, so they are always cautious of outsiders like you."⁴⁰

³⁸ *Idem.*

³⁹ *Idem.*

⁴⁰ Interview, Dede, Sumedang, 28 May 2010.

Decades had passed since Marpu had led the mass ‘apostasy’, so it was indeed my good fortune to have been able to meet him. Although he was 89 years old and could not hear very well, he still spoke eloquently. Marpu recounted that after the declaration, Emus and himself along with some other friends were summoned and interrogated at the Sumedang Court. The interrogation was led by prosecutor Kuffal who was accompanied by police and military personnel. Marpu told me that they were asked to ‘return’ to Islam. This request was strange for them because they had never been properly Muslim. He could still remember how one interrogator tried to persuade and proselytise him. The interrogator stated:

Kamu harus kasihan sama saya. Negara kita negara Pancasila. Kalau kamu tidak kembali masuk Islam, berarti kamu tidak ber-Pancasila dan tidak kasihan sama saya!⁴¹ (you have to take pity on me. Our state is a Pancasila state. If you refuse to return to Islam, that would mean that you are not a Pancasilaist [loyal to the Pancasila]; and also that you have no pity for me).

It is worth noting how Kuffal equated Islam with Pancasila and how he enticed Marpu and friends to convert to Islam so as to be categorised as Pancasilaists. The association also connoted that loyalties to *Aliran Kebatinan* and Pancasila are mutually exclusive. In the end, Marpu and friends converted to Islam, out of fear of being stigmatised as being other than Pancasilaists. Under this pressure, Marpu and his friends were ‘forced’ to recite the Islamic profession of the faith (*shahadat*) under Kuffal’s direction which was not without some difficulty given the strangeness of the formula to them. Marpu and friends had been given a ‘new faith’ by the government to replace the one they had had.

Although they had ‘returned’ to Islam, many Muslims remained sceptical. Marpu remembered that among them were members of PERSIS, the Muslim organisation that enjoyed strong support in West Java.⁴² In response to continuing pressure, Marpu thought that he should convince the people that he was intent on becoming a practicing Muslim. He realised that this required a mosque, which would boost their credibility in the eyes of the Muslims and reduce the likelihood of harm

⁴¹ Interview, Marpu, Sumedang, 28 May 2010.

⁴² *Idem*.

from the more fanatical amongst them. The fact that they had been under public surveillance after their 'return' also factored in Marpu's request for the local authority to build a mosque for the former AKP followers. The Sumedang administration approved Marpu's request, reflecting the government's line on religion. By the early 1980s, the Sumedang Department of Religious Affairs provided a grant of IDR 500,000 for the construction of a mosque. With the support of the people in the village, Marpu constructed the mosque on his own land right behind his house. After its construction was finished, Sumedang's Regent and his subordinates in the civil and military organs came to inaugurate the new mosque. Marpu described the inauguration session as joyous and the inauguration encouraged the subsequent 'conversion' of AKP's followers to Islam, marking the Islamisation of the entire village.⁴³

Since then, the mosque became the centre of Islamisation. It functions as a venue for prayer and for other regular religious sessions. Over time, the holding of the congregational Friday prayers there attracted more and more people. As an important figure, Marpu began to change his lifestyle to more reflect his new faith and identity. He observed the teachings of the *shari'ah*, performed daily prayers, fasted during *Ramadan*, celebrated the *Idul Fitri* and *Idul Adha* festivals, attended *tahlilan*, and *mauludan*, and so on. He began to manage his mosque and to play an active role in the Mosque Prosperity Council (Dewan Kesejahteraan Masjid, DKM) activities in Sumedang. He demonstrated his ability in managing mosque affairs, at the same time increasing his knowledge about Islam. He studied Islam with Kyai Ajengan Abu from Sumedang. After some years he became a *khatib* delivering sermons in his mosque.⁴⁴ All this is evidence of the existence of an intimate connection in the Islamisation project between state organs, local officers and Islamic organisations and leaders.

In the last session of my interview I posed my closing question to Marpu who was sitting next to his wife and eldest son. The question aimed to determine his level of happiness in Islam. I asked him whether he was happier as a Muslim or with *Aliran Kebatinan*. He said "Well I am happy with Islam, but I think being Muslim is like eating a banana with

⁴³ *Idem.*

⁴⁴ *Idem.*

the skin; what you really taste is only its skin, you don't taste the real banana."⁴⁵ On 11 August 2010, three months after my interview with him, I was informed by Dede that Marpu had died. Marpu's son, Yana, told me that in the last days of his life, Marpu was still obsessed with matters of the mosque, advising his son to renovate it.⁴⁶

The Islamisation of Cimanggung was a success due to the support of Muslim institutions such as *pesantren* and the MUI. The most important figure contributing to *dakwah* in Cimanggung was Kyai Ajengan Abu from Cikalama in Sumedang. Edi Kusnaldi, the current head of Cimanggung village, informed me that more than 50 mosques and *mushalla* have been constructed in his territory since the 1980s. Edi proudly related that the Village Office involved itself in the promotion of Islam in Cimanggung by holding routine travelling propagation tours (*dakwah keliling*).⁴⁷ The vast majority of Cimanggung's population of 10,000 people is Muslim. There are only five people who declare themselves as AKP adherents.⁴⁸ The attempt by local authorities to Islamise AKP followers was a manifestation at the grassroots of the state's backing of religion and its suspicion of *Aliran Kebatinan*.

Cimanggung is a village in the Cikeruh District, a ten kilometres' drive from Bandung on the Padalarang highway. In geographical terms, it is easier to get to Cimanggung from Bandung than from Sumedang. In the 1970s and 1980s, before the Padalarang highway was constructed, people preferred going to the village via Cicalengka, approximately four kilometres up to the hills, rather than via Sumedang.⁴⁹ Cimanggung itself is directly north of Bandung.

In the west, the AKP gained considerable following in the mountainous Lembang area down to Cimahi.⁵⁰ There are several important AKP enclaves to the east of Cimanggung including Ciparay, Majalaya, and Cicalengka. Thus, the AKP created a half-ring stronghold from Ciparay in the east, through Cimanggung in the north and down to Lembang and Cimahi in the west. Bandung has been known as an AKP

⁴⁵ *Idem*.

⁴⁶ Interview, Yana, Sumedang, 15 October 2010.

⁴⁷ Interview, Edi Kusnaldi, Sumedang, 27 May 2010.

⁴⁸ *Idem*.

⁴⁹ 'Keluar dari Islam (Lalu masuk lagi)', *Tempo*, 4/VI August 1976.

⁵⁰ Interview, Mimin Sukandar, Cimahi, 20 July 2010.

base since the 1950s.⁵¹

Ciparay is the most important AKP home ground to date. Its significance is attested to by the large *Pasewakan* building that was erected in the early 1980s as a place where AKP activities are planned and organised. The *Pasewakan* also functions as a convention hall, hosting art performances and annual festival celebrations. The construction of the *Pasewakan* was initiated by AKP followers. When the building was under construction, one government officer offered financial assistance to the head of the Construction Committee, Iyus Jusuf. Iyus, however, was asked to offer him a bribe so he refused to accept the funds on principle.⁵² The construction of the *Pasewakan* was eventually completed with the sole financial support of AKP followers.

Because of the unfavourable social-political environment under Soeharto's regime, the AKP kept a low profile. In the early 1980s, there were 150,000 AKP members but in the following years their numbers had dropped dramatically to 19,406.⁵³ The 1990s saw no improvement and the 2000 census saw their number further decreased to 14,535 across West Java.⁵⁴ Only a couple of years after Soeharto's fall, the AKP followers tried to reclaim their golden past, attempting a revival in various places across West Java including Subang, Sumedang, Ciparay and Lembang. This will be discussed later on.

In addition to the aforementioned causes, it is worth noting that some more factors at the national level were essential in providing the context for such a change. Hefner's study of the Islamisation in the Pasuruan highlands in East Java⁵⁵ sheds light to a better understanding of this situation. *First*, there was the shift in the social and cultural bases of Soekarno's political reign in the aftermath of his downfall. Hefner observes that Soekarno's fall caused a dramatic political change that created a socio-cultural setting that increasingly shifted away from the social and cultural bases of Soekarno's political reign. Soekarno had been supported by the Nationalists and the Communists and he had followers primarily among the peasant and lower middle classes, most

⁵¹ Interview, Andri Hernandi, Bandung, 15 August 2009.

⁵² Interview, Iyus Jusuf, Ciparay, Bandung, 20 July 2010.

⁵³ Interview, Andri Hernandi, Bandung, 15 August 2009.

⁵⁴ *Population of Indonesia: Results of the 2000 Population Census*, Series: 1.2.2., Table 06.1 and 06.8 (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000), pp. 31 and 38.

⁵⁵ Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', pp.553-551.

of who hailed from rural Java where religious syncretism was prevalent. With the extermination of the PKI and the weakening of the left-wing Nationalists, this political base was weakened.

Second was that the implementation of the floating mass strategy by the regime had significantly implicated the dramatic change in the rural political setting.⁵⁶ Hefner observes that Soeharto cleaned up rural political activism via his 'floating mass' policy, which further eradicated the influence of the Communists and the Nationalists across the rural areas.⁵⁷ The 'floating mass' strategy, although meant to serve New Order politics, in fact favoured Muslim groups. In his conclusion to his study of the Islamisation in the highlands of Pasuruan Regency, East Java, Hefner observes:

Moreover, in a curious way— and this is an irony that may not be apparent to some Indonesian Muslim leaders— New Order restrictions on rural political activity may in fact have worked in favour of more broadly conceived Muslim interests. With the field cleared of most of the Old Order anti-Islamic organisations and with strong government pressure on all Indonesians to profess a recognised religion, many former opponents to Islamic parties have come to view Islam in less politicised terms.⁵⁸

The view of Islam "in less politicised terms," corresponded with the weakening of Islamic parties, especially in rural areas, along with the continuous transformation of Islam on the ground as a religious and spiritual entity. Islam actively expressed itself in society through the agency of *dakwah*. It was politically expedient that Soeharto encouraged *dakwah* activities. Modernist elements played a crucial role in boosting Islamic *dakwah* in urban and rural areas. *Dakwah* was promoted chiefly to prevent people from becoming atheists or sympathisers of the Marxist ideology. Hence, religious education and the construction of houses of worship were promoted by the government's development program. This support for official religion and its institutions weakened the *Aliran Kebatinan* across Java. Hefner notes that:

⁵⁶ The 'floating mass policy' prohibited parties to have offices below the district administrative level or to campaign or indulge in political activities in this level, except during times leading up to elections.

⁵⁷ Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', p. 549.

⁵⁸ *Idem*, p. 551.

Developments under the New Order appear to have only enhanced the overwhelming institutional advantage of the orthodox Muslim community. Javanist initiatives aimed at creating a mass-base and explicitly non-Islamic “Javanese” religion have all but ceased. Despite some regional successes, Hindu and Buddhist organisations still claim only a small percentage/proportion/number of Java’s rural population.....Meanwhile, the social forces undermining village tradition have grown stronger, encouraging villagers, particularly the young, to look elsewhere for more encompassing moral guides to modernity. The Pasuruan example awaits ethnographic comparison with other areas of rural Java. If similar developments are occurring in even a few other sectors of the Javanist community, the New Order may provide the setting for a profound adjustment in the balance of cultural power between Islam and Javanism. Whatever the short-term setbacks of Muslim political parties, the social forces unleashed under the New Order may contribute to the partial realisation of one of the Muslim community’s primary religious goals, the Islamisation of Java.⁵⁹

I believe that Hefner’s observation that the New Order politics on religions may have contributed to the partial success of the Islamisation of East and Central Java also applies to other part of Java.

Political Change and Christian Revival

Christian religious leaders in the post-Soeharto era, like leaders of other religions, could hardly have foreseen that the State would one day offer them again the strong support the New Order had provided rather than merely tolerate them.⁶⁰ As Boland noted, the Soeharto regime had been in favour of religions and had realised the importance of religious freedom as we have seen above.⁶¹ Soeharto, who was a devoted subscriber to Javanese values and worldviews, was surprisingly accommodating to the religious hopes and ambitions of *Dakwahists* and missionaries alike. Moreover, he invited the leaders of religious communities to offer him their ideas with respect to his development

⁵⁹ *Idem.*

⁶⁰ In what follows the general position of Christianity in Indonesia and West Java will alternate because one is incomprehensible to the topic of this book without the other. The reader will find in Chapter Six that particular attention is paid to the situation in some areas in West Java such as Bekasi.

⁶¹ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 148.

agenda especially on issues such as family planning, education, economic empowerment, and so on. Soeharto's politics on religion were primarily intended to control society but also provided the harmonious setting for people adhering to different faiths. At the initial stage, Soeharto's political recruitment and cultural preference seemed to favour Christians and *Aliran Kebatinan* members over Muslims. However, in the following years changing circumstances had forced him to make adjustments to prevent an upsurge of Muslim opposition.

Christians were seen as important allies to the New Order Regime, with a number of Christian intellectuals and technocrats serving as cabinet ministers and occupying high-ranking posts in Soeharto's cabinet. Examples are General T.B. Simatupang, General M. Panggabean, Admiral Sudomo (before his conversion to Islam in 1997), Minister Radius Prawiro, Minister B.J. Sumarlin, Indonesian Central Bank Governor Adrianus Moy, General T.B. Silalahi, General Benny Moerdani, to name but some. As ambassadors to the West they were invaluable to Soeharto. This picture could not have been more different from that of the *Aliran Kebatinan* members, who increasingly lost political clout after Soekarno's fall and thus gained nothing whereas Christians celebrated the new political context favourable to them and almost immediately reaped the benefits of this considerable transformation.

The Christians enjoyed at least two boons in the wake of Soekarno's departure in the mid-1960s. The *first* was the surprisingly large-scale conversion of *abangan* Muslims to Christianity. Ricklefs argues that one of the most important motives behind this conversion in Java was "animosity towards Islam among *abangan* who had previously supported or been sympathetic to PKI," and that this conversion constituted a "major and on-going transformation of Javanese society."⁶² Returning to West Java, there is no reason to assume that the situation there would have been dramatically different from that in Java despite the fact that *abangan* do not exist in the area.⁶³

⁶² Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, p. 138.

⁶³ A more general picture of the situation in Indonesia may be glanced from the following. A survey held by a Catholic organisation claims an increase of 7.45 per cent in the Catholic population in Indonesia in general from 1966 to 1967.⁶³ The leading Christian figure of the Indonesian Christian Church Council (DGI), T.B. Simatupang, reports "an increase of roughly 825,000 in the total membership of the 36 member churches" in 1967 compared to 1964. Simatupang, a Chief Staff of the Indonesian Army (1950-54), also

Secondly, the New Order regime's support to missionary organisations from overseas, particularly from the United States and Europe, benefited Christians as these organisations did everything in their power to help their Christian counterparts in financing church programs and in matters like building mission networks, organisations and management. With this in mind, Christians benefited from the avalanche of foreign aid in the form of financial and human resources (missionaries)⁶⁴ which helped to accelerate the growth of churches and other Christian social institutions across the country. Christians overseas were excited by this state of affairs, which they called a "revival" that was to be sustained.⁶⁵ As they considered Asian countries and Indonesia especially as new promising places for renewed missionary activities after the 1960s, they thought that Indonesia might want to host the World Council of Churches (WCC) conference in 1975.⁶⁶ Simatupang accepted the suggestion to have Jakarta host the conference during the WCC executive committee meeting in Sofia in 1971. Although President Soeharto and the Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Idham Chalid, largely endorsed his plan, the majority of Muslims, particularly the Modernists, were opposed to the initiative.⁶⁷

As devoted critics of Christianisation, the Modernists were suspicious of Christian activities. In responding to the WCC to plan their conference in Jakarta, for example, one leading Modernist, H.M. Rasjidi wrote a book entitled *Sidang Raya DGD di Jakarta 1975: Artinya bagi Dunia Islam* (WCC Assembly in Jakarta 1975: Its Implication to the Islamic World) and accused the conference of being a forum for the planning of the expansion of Western colonialism through Christian missionaries and through Christianising the Indonesian people.⁶⁸ The

claims that there was a "considerable growth" in church membership outside the DGI.⁶³ One Christian account claims that the conversion to Christianity reached two million. See Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, p. 138.

⁶⁴ Rifyal Ka'bah, *The Christian Presence in Indonesia: View of Christian-Muslim Relations* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1995), pp. 47-52.

⁶⁵ Avery T. Willis, Jr. *Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ* (California: The William Carey Library, 1977).

⁶⁶ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened*, pp. 63-64.

⁶⁷ *Idem*, p. 63.

⁶⁸ Aritonang, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam*, p. 415. See also, H.M. Rasjidi, *Sidang Raya DGD di Jakarta 1975: Artinya bagi Dunia Islam* (Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah, 1974).

Soeharto regime did not want to risk an outbreak of social and political instability and therefore in response to the Modernists' latent fear it took the pragmatic option to call off the WWC conference in Jakarta. The conference was held in Nairobi instead.

A series of disagreements, tension and conflicts in the preceding years between Muslim and Christian leaders all over the country including West Java over many religious issues such as a propagation code, foreign aid, and the construction of houses of worship, illustrate the continuous distrust between Muslims, Modernists especially, and Christians.⁶⁹ Under this distrustful relationship, Muslims and Christians fiercely competed to secure their interests in order to prevail as will be illustrated in West Java with the Pentecostal experiences. I chose the Pentecostal church because they have been subjected to violent attacks by radical Islamists because of their spectacular growth in the area.

The Revival of the Pentecostals in West Java

The conversion of significant numbers of lay Muslims and the revival of Christianity produced a kind of excitement for the leaders of and people active in different Christian denominations, who had been operating in the country for decades, including those of the Pentecostal churches. Like many members and organisations of other churches, the Pentecostals used the remarkable change in religious politics to strengthen their presence in terms of intense member recruitment and the building of places of worship. After some years this effort provided the setting for the upsurge of Pentecostalism across the country, particularly across West Java.⁷⁰

A brief history of the Pentecostal church in Indonesia in general provides the following picture. In the second half of the nineteenth

⁶⁹ The unfavourable political setting may have contributed to provoking Muslims. An example of this is the commotion around a proposed marriage bill which had been considered much too secular by Muslims. They had protested the initial Bill's adoption of various secular and anti-Islamic principles such as the rights to engage in interreligious marriages and in the procedure of performing and the registration of marriages. To some Muslims, there was a Christian conspiracy in that Bill. See also Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened*, p. 65.

⁷⁰ Interview, pastor Chrisman Hutabarat (Secretary of the Pentecostal Church of West Java/Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Pentakosta Indonesia/PGPI), Bandung, 7 July 2008.

century, Indonesian Pentecostalism was rooted in the Holiness movement of the Methodist Church in America. This movement insisted on a return to old Methodist religious traditions as prevalent during the time of John Wesley (1703-91) which stressed modesty and passion in worship and service.⁷¹ This movement aimed at a revival of Christians' spiritual life and a return to a free worship style that celebrates sensation and unrestrained emotion.⁷² To this end, the leading figure of the Pentecostal Church, CH. F. Parham established a Holiness Movement independent from the Methodist Church. It was in 1900 that Parham began to promote Pentecostalism with its three major tenets, namely, an emphasis on eschatology, baptism by the Holy Spirit, and 'speaking in tongues' as proof of one's having been baptised by the Holy Spirit.⁷³

As Aritonang and Steenbrink observed, Pentecostalism sprouted from Bali to East, Central and West Java and continued to expand across other islands. From its inception in the early twentieth century, the Pentecostal mission was centred in Surabaya, Cepu, Temanggung and Bandung.⁷⁴ From Bandung, the evangelicals propagated their mission and erected churches in Cimahi, Jakarta, Bogor, Sukabumi, Cirebon and Depok, all in West Java.⁷⁵

Missionaries from the Netherlands had attempted to spread Pentecostalism across the Netherlands East Indies since 1911. Gerrit L. Polman was one of the early leaders of Dutch Pentecostalism. He liked to send the Dutch Pentecostal bulletin, *Spade Regen*, to the Netherlands East Indies, which later influenced the Dutch in Temanggung, Central Java.⁷⁶ As a result, various Dutch Christians including Horstman, Weirs and Van Abode, began to conduct Pentecostal prayer services in 1911.

⁷¹ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita* 2, p. 270.

⁷² *Idem*.

⁷³ *Idem*.

⁷⁴ Aritonang and Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity*, p. 880. Gani Wiyono, 'Pentecostalism in Indonesia', in *Asian and Pentecostal: The Charismatic Face of Christianity in Asia (Regnum Studies In Mission: Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies Series 3)*, Allan Anderson and Edmond Tang (eds.), (Oxford: Regnum Books International, 2005), p. 309.

⁷⁵ Those based in Temanggung, Cepu and Surabaya planted their churches throughout East Java, Sangir Talaud and Sulawesi. In the following years the mission spread to Lampung in Sumatra, Nias, West Timor, Kalimantan, the Moluccas and Irian Jaya (now Papua). See Wiyono, 'Pentecostalism in Indonesia', pp. 308-309.

⁷⁶ *Idem*, p. 308.

From September 1920 to 1923, after the arrival of the first generation of Dutch Pentecostal missionaries in West Java, the Pentecostal mission was to see the arrival of more missionaries. Among them missionaries were Willem Bernard Blekkink and his wife Marie (Polman's sister) and Mina Hansen, all of whom settled and worked with Horstman in Temanggung, and Johann Thiessen, who settled in Bandung.⁷⁷

In the following years the mission flourished further as many Indonesians converted to Pentecostalism. 1923 saw a *Vereeniging De Pinkstergemeente in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Pentecostal Organisation in the Netherlands East Indies) established in Cepu and officially recognised by the Dutch as a *kerkgenootschap* (church body) through Besluit No. 33, Staatsblad no. 364. This development was due to Weenink van Loon's efforts in concert with other leaders. Most of the converts from 1920 to 1941 were non-Christians, mainly Chinese Buddhists-Confucianists, Indo-Europeans or of ethnic Javanese religious backgrounds, as well as Protestants and Catholics of Dutch origin.⁷⁸

Considerable Pentecostal Growth in West Java

The Pentecostal church enjoyed considerable growth after Indonesia's Independence and continued to thrive from the 1970s to 1990s under the leadership of the prominent and leading Evangelist, Ho Lukas Senduk, popularly known as Oom Ho. Barbara Watson Andaya reports that Senduk was born as Ho Liong Seng in Ternate in 1917 to a middle-class Indonesian-Chinese family. His father was a wealthy Singaporean and his mother was an Indonesian of Chinese descent said to have ties to Ternate's ruling family.⁷⁹ For a period of time they lived in Ternate before moving to Manado, where later he led the Chinese community.

⁷⁷ *Idem.*

⁷⁸ Mark Robinson, 'The Growth of Indonesian Pentecostalism', in *Asian and Pentecostal: The Charismatic Face of Christianity in Asia* (Regnum Studies In Mission: Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies Series 3), Allan Anderson and Edmond Tang (eds.), (Oxford: Regnum Books International, 2005), p. 331.

⁷⁹ Barbara Watson Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global: Exploring the Roots of Pentecostalism in Malaysia and Indonesia', paper presented to a symposium on the Management and Marketing of Globalizing Asian Religions (University of Hawaii, Aug. 11-14, 2009), p. 17. See also Amos Hosea, 'Seluk Beluk dasar Pengembangan Kepemimpinan Om Ho', in Ferry H. A. Lembong (ed.), *Hanya oleh Anugerah: Aku Jadi Seperti Aku Sekarang* (Jakarta: Gereja Bethel Indonesia, 1998), pp. 21-25.

Senduk studied at a Dutch school in Manado and worked for a Dutch oil company in Ambon, the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM), where he joined the Pentecostal church (*De Pinkstergemeente in Nederlandsch-Indië*) in 1935. During the Japanese Occupation, the Pentecostal Church changed its name to the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia (Gereja-gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia, GPdI), where Senduk was appointed secretary of the Central Board. During 1945-1946 Senduk served a Pentecostal denomination in West Java in Tasikmalaya.⁸⁰

In the mid-1960s, Indonesia went through a period of political turmoil following the failed coup attempt in 1965, which caused a remarkable change in Indonesian politics and society. Senduk used the changing political context to strengthen the Pentecostal mission. In 1967, he established cooperation with one of the world's best-known Pentecostal Churches, the Church of God (CoG), based in the U.S. In the following years, the Church of God helped with the promotion of education and the missionary activities of Senduk's Indonesian Bethel Church (Gereja Bethel Indonesia, GBI), established in Sukabumi West Java in 1970. The major concern of this cooperation was the provision of teacher training programs aimed at providing teachers for elementary schools and for the Bethel Academy of Theology (Akademi Theologia Bethel, ATB).⁸¹ This program continued to expand throughout the 1970s and flourished during the 1980s-1990s with the opening of the Faculty of Missiology. In cooperation with the Church of God in Cleveland, Tennessee, the faculty offered post-graduate studies and offered programs for certificates of Master of Arts in Church Ministry (MACM), Master of Divinity (M.Div) and Master of Theology (M.Th).⁸² GBI is perhaps one of the most successful Pentecostal denominations and it has become the largest Pentecostal community in Indonesia with 2.5

⁸⁰ http://dbr.gbi-bogor.org/wiki/Ho_Lukas_Senduk, accessed 9th of November 2012. In 1952, Senduk formed Gereja Bethel Injil Sepenuh (GBIS) in Surabaya with the help of Dutch evangelist Frans Gerald van Gessel, which was in part in protest to the discrimination suffered by members of Chinese descent within the GBI denomination and due to pressure exerted by other mainstream Christians who denigrated the evangelist Pentecostals as heretics and 'poachers.' Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global', p. 18.

⁸¹ <http://www.seminaribethel.net/content/sejarah-seminari-bethel-jakarta.html>. accessed 9 November 2012.

⁸² *Idem*.

million members and 5,200 congregations.⁸³ Senduk died in 2008 leaving the ambition to build 10,000 Bethel churches across Indonesia for the next generation.⁸⁴

The Pentecostal growth demonstrates the recurring pattern of new churches brought into existence by virtue of fragmentation. Aritonang and Steenbrink observed that one of the major characteristics of the Pentecostals was their propensity for engaging in schisms.⁸⁵ One group that was born out of Pentecostalism was the Charismatic Church whose followers reject associations with any particular denomination. It emerged in the second half of the 1960s and became popular in the 1980s.⁸⁶ Its popularity was the result of its capacity in meeting Christians' need for a new spirituality, certainty and security caused by the failure of the established churches in fulfilling such needs.⁸⁷ Wiyono observes: "When Charismatic conventions offered 'casual' and 'therapeutic' services, warm fellowship, plus comfortable environments (held mostly in ballrooms of expensive hotels), many churchgoers, primarily those from the middle class, intellectual society and mainstream churches, came and joined them."⁸⁸

One important leader of the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement in the 1970s and 1980s was Jeremia Rim who was a Javanese from Madiun and who steered the movement from Surabaya. His ability and popularity saw him receive frequent invitations to visit the U.S. where he met prominent Charismatic leader, Moris Cerurou, who blessed him.⁸⁹ He also received numerous invitations to lead prayers from Charismatic congregations across Java, Jakarta and West Java. His movement reached its peak in the mid-1980s. In 1985, he organised a massive congregation and healing session called *Kasih Melanda Jakarta* (Love Sweeps over Jakarta) in the Senayan Sports Centre. This successful service attracted tens of thousands of people and inspired Jeremia to hold another session in the following year called *Kasih*

⁸³ Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global', p. 17.

⁸⁴ Among GBI's important leaders is Niko Njotorahardjo, who led the GBI in Bandung. Interview, Jeremy Wijaya, Bandung, 22 March 2011.

⁸⁵ The trend of schism is analysed by Aritonang and Steenbrink, *History of Christianity*, pp. 881-882.

⁸⁶ Wiyono, *Pentecostalism in Indonesia*, p. 314.

⁸⁷ *Idem.*

⁸⁸ *Idem.*

⁸⁹ Interview, Jeremy Wijaya, Bandung, 22 March 2011.

Melanda Indonesia (Love Sweeps over Indonesia).⁹⁰ The Charismatic boom during the 1980s encouraged the establishment of *bukit-bukit doa*, prayer sites located on hills across Java, but also in Jakarta and Bogor.

Encouraged by the successful congregation in Jakarta, Jeremia established a New Covenant Christian Church in West Java in Bandung with the help of his supporter Bambang Wijaya whom he trusted and who later became his successor after his death in December 1993. Currently, Bambang is the chairman of *Jaringan Persekutuan Doa* (Prayer Alliance Network) throughout the Asia Pacific.⁹¹

The Pentecostal-Charismatic movement gained ground in various parts of West Java. In 1978, Nani Susanti, a businesswoman well-respected by Cirebon's Chinese business community, established the Ecclesia Foundation in Cirebon to promote Pentecostal-Charismaticism in the city. The foundation invited prominent Charismatic leaders from other parts of West Java and from abroad to lead the congregations. The foundation held regular prayer congregations and organised social services.⁹² This movement inspired the presence of the Charismatic movement in other places including Bekasi and Karawang in the West Javanese surroundings east of Jakarta in the following years. As will be discussed below, in November 1999 a foundation named Mahanaim was founded in Bekasi with the task to reach out to thousands of underprivileged children and adults.⁹³ The foundation claims to "help the future of Indonesia's young generation and to equip them to become future world leaders able to meet any challenges in life."⁹⁴ The foundation sought to solve the problem of poverty and to improve the education of the needy to prevent them from "turning into a generation

⁹⁰ *Idem.*

⁹¹ Besides Jeremia Rim and Bambang Wijaya, several others are known to have led the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement during the New Order. They are Mailool, Yusak Tjipto, Nani Susanti, Yuda Mailool, Niko Njotorahardjo, Abraham Alex Tanuseputra, Joe Sudirgo, Hana Sudirgo, Andreas Yosep and Daniel Alexander. Interview, Jeremy Wijaya, Bandung, 22 March 2011.

⁹² Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global', p. 19. The foundation also built the Gratia assembly hall and sponsored the operation of Christian radio Gratia. In 2008, both the Gratia hall and Gratia radio became the targets of anti-Christianisation protests. The foundation and radio station saw their premises sealed by anti-Christianisation activists.

⁹³ <http://www.love-mahanaim.or.id/vision.php?lang=eng>, accessed on 22 November 2012.

⁹⁴ *Idem.*

without hope trapped in the never-ending cycle of poverty.”⁹⁵ Since then until the Reform Era, the upsurge of Pentecostalism was apparent across West Java and showed a new strength in terms of church attendance, church numbers and organised social services, which created tensions between the church and Muslim hard liners.⁹⁶

Muslims’ Search for Mission Restriction

Of course the Modernists all over Indonesia were very unhappy with the Pentecostal success and with Christianisation in general and therefore they initiated a counter-Christianisation discourse and took anti-Christianisation action, also in West Java. However, they lacked confidence in competing with their Christian counterparts and looked for protection from the State. Modernist leaders did everything in their power to mitigate the Christian mission’s dominance by demanding stringent regulations on missionary funding. In a 1967 parliamentary question session, for example, Lukman Harun, a Muhammadiyah leader, demanded that the government regulate and control the inflow of foreign aid into non-Muslim religious organisations.⁹⁷

All steps undertaken by the Modernists sought to secure the Muslims from being targeted by missionaries. In a panel on Inter-religious Consultation held in November 1967, Mohammad Natsir strongly appealed to the Christian elites not to make efforts to convert believers in other faiths, including Muslims. He argued:

.....what we really hope from you, our Christian brothers, is that you should witness and acknowledge that we are Muslims. Please understand that we are not heathens or animists. We all have embraced a religion, namely Islam. We all have *shibghah* (faith), with our own identity. So please do not go against our identity. Please do not make us a target for Christianisation (leading to apostasy).⁹⁸

Natsir’s appeal represented Muslim hopes in relation to religious propagation. The idea was that missionaries regardless of their religion should not try to proselytise believers in other faiths, that is, people who

⁹⁵ *Idem*.

⁹⁶ Interview, pastor Chrisman Hutabarat, Bandung, 7 July 2008.

⁹⁷ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened*, pp. 72-79.

⁹⁸ M. Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1969), p. 1.

have already embraced a recognised religion. Muslims sought consensus with their Christian counterparts on this point but they failed despite the government decrees' favouring their interest.⁹⁹ Christians considered this as running against their religious principles and therefore rejected the proposal. Christians instead argued for more freedom, particularly in the construction of houses of worship. The New Order's voice was careful but clear. In his opening address of the Inter-religious Consultation in 1967, President Soeharto said:

The government wants to assert and guarantee that it will not hamper any efforts of religious propagation. It is the sublime task for a religion to ensure that those who do not embrace a religion in Indonesia become devoted believers. By doing so the Belief in One God adopted by the Pancasila has been adopted. It is, however, the government's concern, if religious propagation is simply done for the sake of increasing the number of followers, let alone that the propagation method used would create the impression that it aimed to attract those who already have embraced a religion.¹⁰⁰

Soeharto's stance soon materialised in a concrete public policy. On 13 September 1969, Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Machmud, and Minister of Religious Affairs, Mohammad Dachlan, issued joint decree number 1/1969, regulating religious propagation and the construction of houses of worship. In principle, the decree accommodated both sides. It guaranteed the freedom to proselytise and worship for all believers but made this conditional on the maintenance of security and social order as reflected in article one.¹⁰¹ Article two of the decree charged the *Kepala Daerah* (local authority) at the district and provincial levels with the responsibility of keeping an eye on religious propagation so as to: (a) prevent it from causing division or polarisation among people of different faiths; (b) keep it free of intimidation, deception, and coercion; (c) ensure its keeping within the law, security and social order.

Point (c) is more or less a repetition of the first article, which betrays the nature of the decree as being in reality more of an instrument towards maintaining social order rather than a guarantee for the freedom of religion. Consistent with the New Order strategy, the

⁹⁹ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened*, pp. 57-82.

¹⁰⁰ Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*, p. 2.

¹⁰¹ Aritonang, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Islam dan Kristen*, pp. 398-399.

decree seemed to favour Muslim interests more than those of Christians. The Indonesian Church Council (Dewan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, DGI) and the Supreme Council of Indonesian Bishops (Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia, MAWI) objected to the absence of detailed guidelines on the construction of churches and voiced their concerns over the possibility of government officials facing a conflict of interests because of their own religious affiliation.¹⁰²

The Christian desire to liberalise regulations on proselytisation and Muslim anxieties concerning the potential consequence of liberalisation kept both communities locked in competition, which eroded their relationship. Since the advent of the New Order, relations between the two Abrahamic religions have been largely characterised by latent misunderstanding, competitive tension and hostility. Muslims were suspicious of Christianisation and similarly, the Christians were unhappy with the deepening Islamisation as promoted by *Dakwahists*. Their relationship remains delicate to date, despite each community claiming to have received their religion from the same God, Allah.

Muslim suspicion of their Christian counterparts was rooted in the colonial era. During that time, the Modernists were ardent critics of the Dutch whom they accused of taking a biased position toward Islam. In the 1930s-1940s in PERSIS' central office in Bandung, West Java, M. Natsir devoted himself to monitoring of and reacting to affronts against Islam commonly committed by Christian missionaries. PERSIS' popular magazine, *Pembela Islam*, was used very well to voice and to communicate displeasure at the 'blasphemy' frequently perpetrated during that time.¹⁰³

Colonial precedents fed a post-colonial fear of Christianity. This fear manifested itself in Muslim suspicion of the New Order State, which they saw as favouring Christians. Many could not accept the significant representation of the Christians in the higher bureaucracy and the army, especially in the earlier half of the regime. This state of affairs created prejudice among Muslims. Probably due to this prejudice, Muslim

¹⁰² *Idem*.

¹⁰³ See the interview between an *Antara* reporter and some *Pembela Islam* functionaries including Fachroeddin Alkahiri, M. Natsir, M. Isa Anshary, and Ahmad Kemas, discussing "Urusan Hinaan Atas Islam." The Interview was published by *Pembela Islam* no. 22, 2 June 1941, pp. 426-427. See Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*, pp. 173-182.

activists were tempted to link any state policy and intimidation against them to a State-Christian conspiracy. As a result, these activists expressed themselves as a strong political protest movement. They were very influential at the grassroots where they had a large following.

In many respects, most *Dakwahists* felt inferior to their counterparts, given the Christian superiority in terms of financial, educational and institutional resources. Rifyal Ka'bah, a Modernist activist in the 1970s, reported on the huge financial aid obtained by Indonesian churches from 1967-1976, most of which was used to fund personnel and to promote service and development projects.¹⁰⁴ As Mujiburrahman has noted, American Christians paid considerable attention to the situation in Indonesia and provided huge grants to support the Christian mission.¹⁰⁵ M. Natsir once analogised the superiority of the Christian mission over Islamic *dakwah* by saying: "How could a cart win a race against an express train?"¹⁰⁶ Mujiburrahman observes:

For the development programmes in 1973 – again with reference to *Sinar Harapan*, 25 May 1973 – Natsir said that the International Christian Aid had provided \$150,000 and the WCC gave \$200,000. Natsir argued that it would be very naïve not to think of the development programmes as a means to convert people. After the Inter-religious Consultation in 1967, he said, there had been a 'free fight for all' and 'survival of the fittest' in the field of religious propagation in Indonesia. In this regard, how could Muslims compete with the Christians, "how could a cart compete with an express train?" he said.

Muslims observed Christian empowerment with unease. The Modernists were especially disappointed and frustrated in their expectations of playing a greater role in development and politics.¹⁰⁷ Boland recalls a *tashakkuran* (thanksgiving) day held by Modernists on 14 August 1966 around the Kebayoran Baru Al-Azhar Mosque. The

¹⁰⁴ Ka'bah, *Christian Presence in Indonesia*, pp. 47-52.

¹⁰⁵ *Time* published a special report on the flow of international aid to Indonesia since the early days of the New Order. Mujiburrahman, *Mengindonesiakan Islam: Representasi dan Ideologi* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008), p. 245.

¹⁰⁶ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened*, p. 66.

¹⁰⁷ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 148.

gathering was attended by an enthusiastic crowd of about 50,000. It seems that their gratitude also resulted from the release from prison of various Masyumi leaders including HAMKA, Isa Anshary and Burhanuddin Harahap. Other Masyumi leaders were also present among the crowd including Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Asaat, Prawoto Mangkusasmitho, Mohamad Roem, Kasman Singadimejo and M. Natsir. Boland relates that the leaders went on stage to present their concerns. A near-unanimous concern was the “rehabilitation of Islam.”¹⁰⁸ Prawoto demanded ‘*rehabilitasi multikompleks*’, something of a total rehabilitation that included the Masyumi’s restoration. This demand, however, was not met and, likewise after September 1965, developments in general “held disappointment for the Islamic community.”¹⁰⁹

Ricklefs captures the psychological state of Muslims at the time well in the following quote:

The religious environment was made more volatile by the changing perception of the senior generation of Modernist Islamic leaders. They had lost some of the self-confidence of the early years of the twentieth century. Rather than awaiting others’ recognition of what they regarded as their natural right to lead the nation, they became bitterly accustomed to the role of political outsiders. They now saw leadership as something to be won rather than assumed. Their belief that anyone who was shown the true Islam would naturally embrace it had meanwhile been shaken by the limited (albeit very significant) progress of the Modernist interpretation of Islam and the hostile reaction it sometimes produced.¹¹⁰

The Modernist perception of having lost out under the new arrangement forced them to re-shape their future trajectory. They reformed their strategy to “bring their religious ideals into engagement with the rapid social transformations of the period and the new course of national development” through promoting *dakwah* activities in the country.¹¹¹ Another major drive that forced Muslims to re-shape their

¹⁰⁸ *Idem.*

¹⁰⁹ *Idem.*

¹¹⁰ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 323.

¹¹¹ R. Michael Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 103-104.

future trajectory was that they were convinced that the New Order was replicating the colonial policy on Islam. The ban on wearing the *jilbab* for Muslim female students at state schools, for example, was seen as a reflection of a secular policy, demonstrating the New Order's commitment to keep Islam in the private sphere in order to prevent it from becoming dominant in the public sphere. Such policy was aimed at containing and mitigating the potential influence of the imported ideology of radical Islamism.¹¹²

The overall political atmosphere during the 1970s was deeply influenced by the New Order's continuous attempt to portray radical Islam as the nation's enemy. From 1976 up to 1988, the regime, as pointed out by Ricklefs, was 'less inclined' to "identify Communism as the greatest threat to the nation's security but rather spoke of 'imported ideology', by which radical Islam was meant."¹¹³ Given this scenario, the early 1970s saw the regime turn to reactivate the *Darul Islam* (DI) movement since it was strategically expedient to conjure up a radical political other, in opposition to which Indonesians would identify with the regime. In fact, this threat was also created to deny momentum to the only Muslim party, the ascendant United Development Party (PPP), in the build-up to the 1977 elections.¹¹⁴ However, the regime's serious miscalculation became evident from the PPP's garnering a significant 29.3 per cent of the votes in the elections, the biggest share it achieved throughout the New Order.¹¹⁵ This intelligence game had involved General Ali Moertopo as general in charge, BAKIN the intelligence agency as operator, and former Darul Islam fighters, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian Army, as mediators.¹¹⁶ The ICG presented the scenario as follows:

The argument provided by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, and that only the

¹¹² Yudi Latif, 'The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia', *Studia Islamika*, Volume 12, Number 3, 2005, p. 378.

¹¹³ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 346.

¹¹⁴ International Crisis Group, 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia', *Indonesia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 5.

¹¹⁵ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 347.

¹¹⁶ International Crisis Group, 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia', p. 5.

reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether through coercion or money or a combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people whom they accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called *Komando Jihad*, committed to following the ideas of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). In reality, the *Komando Jihad* was Ali Moertopo's creation.¹¹⁷

As a consequence, mutual mistrust between the regime and the Muslims kept relations tense. With Ali Moertopo masterminding policy, Muslims kept protesting state policies against them while simultaneously working at the grassroots to counter the Christian mission.

The culmination of this mistrust of the New Order regime was the Muslim protests against Soeharto's campaign to impose Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state and of all mass organisations. It seems that through the Pancasila Soeharto wanted to pre-empt Modernist attempts at formulating Islam as an ideology and to thwart their ambition of making Indonesia an Islamic state. On 16 August 1982, Soeharto posited the Pancasila as *asas tunggal* (the sole foundation) in his annual address to the People's Representative Assembly (DPR), urging all social and political forces to consider adopting the Pancasila as their only ideological basis.¹¹⁸ This irked some radical Muslim activists, who then agitated against its acceptance during Friday prayers or other religious occasions.

The Tanjung Priok tragedy in 1984 that claimed tens of Muslim lives in the impoverished North Jakarta neighbourhood perhaps best exemplifies how these factors played out. In the tragedy's aftermath, Muslim activists accused General Benny Moerdani, a national Army Commander, who was a Catholic, of targeting Muslim activists. The state was perceived as an agent of Christian interests only because its representative, who happened to be Christian, was responsible for a particular policy and specific action. This kind of logic fed identity politics which contributed to sustaining a mutual negativity between Christians and Muslims.

¹¹⁷ *Idem*, p. 5.

¹¹⁸ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 50.

While Modernist protests continued, the Traditionalists also responded. In 1984, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) declared its return to its initial guidelines (*khittah*) in its congress in Situbondo,¹¹⁹ meaning that it thereby withdrew from the PPP and that NU members were no longer expected to support the PPP. The NU elite granted their followers the freedom to support whatever party they liked.¹²⁰

The regime's desire to depoliticise Islam culminated in 1985 with law number 3/1985, obliging all socio-religious and student organisations to adopt the Pancasila as their sole ideology.¹²¹ Paradoxically, Islam gained greatest influence at a time when its political significance appeared to have dwindled under Soeharto's New Order. It is undeniable that this regime succeeded in weakening Muslim political parties, but it failed to moderate growing devotion among Muslims and the increased presence of Islamic symbols in public life, both of which factored in the rise of what Hefner called "civil Islam" that marked a deepening process of Islamisation.¹²²

Engaging *Dakwahism*, Engaging Politics

Two major orientations surfaced as Islamist/Muslim politics failed. The first was *Dakwahism* and the second was the renewal of Islamic thought. By seeking to promote adherence to Islamic norms and values through *dakwah*, the Modernists tactically circumvented engagement in mainstream politics while planting the seeds for their future constituency. It is reminiscent of Natsir's popular statement: "Before we promote *da'wah* through politics, we engage in politics through *da'wah*."¹²³ In order to realise this idea, in May 1967, the Modernists founded the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) or Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, with Natsir as its chairman, to implement a

¹¹⁹ See Glossary.

¹²⁰ Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana Baru* (translated from *Traditionalist Muslims in a Modernizing World: The Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's New Order Politics, Factional Conflict and the Search for a New Discourse* [Manuscript] (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 1994), pp. 3-7.

¹²¹ Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, p. 51.

¹²² Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 121.

¹²³ Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought*, p. 119. see also Mohammad Natsir, *Politik Melalui Jalur Dakwah* (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 2008), p. 52.

long-term Islamisation.

Given that Soeharto's interest to contain communist ideology required him to encourage *dakwah* and missions in both urban and rural areas, the Department of Religious Affairs was assigned to oversee religious instruction in state schools, designing a curriculum, manuals and textbooks. To sustain the initiative, the Department organised the training of the religious teachers it appointed. The government made religious instruction compulsory, stipulating two hours per week for all state primary schools beginning at form four, continued at secondary schools and for two years at the universities.¹²⁴

At the same time, the government promoted religious education and supported the construction of Islamic schools (*madrasah*) at all levels. In the following years, Soeharto sponsored the establishment of the Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila (Pancasila Muslim Good Deeds Foundation) that helped the construction of mosques all across the country. A huge budget was also allocated through the Department of Religious Affairs to boost Muslim devotion through social development programs. In the late 1960s Soeharto approved the establishment of the National Alms Collection Body (Badan Amil Zakat Nasional, BAZNAS) to help needy Muslims and he declared himself an '*amil*'.¹²⁵ The 1970s and 1980s saw the increasing presence of Islamic institutions in urban and especially rural areas. It was a gradual but consistent development that energised *dakwah* activities. This in part contributed to the decline of the *Aliran Kebatinan* across Java although its practices could still be observed in certain rural areas. By contrast, the Christian mission upsurged everywhere which in turn created anti Christian sentiments as said above.

Initially, such negative sentiments were latent, particularly among the Modernists from PERSIS, the Muhammadiyah and DDII but they became increasingly real especially after the massive conversion to Christianity across Java in the aftermath of Soekarno's downfall.¹²⁶ In West Java these negative sentiments became a matter of serious concern especially after the unprecedented conversion of ADS members in

¹²⁴ Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 196.

¹²⁵ An *amil* is person or organisation responsible for collecting and distributing alms.

¹²⁶ Solahudin, *NII Sampai Ji: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), pp. 132-133.

Kuningan to Catholicism in 1964.¹²⁷ Over time this facilitated the permeation of Catholic influence in various villages in West Java, such as Cisantana in Cigugur, Ciawi in Tasikmalaya, Pasir in Garut and Manggahang near Bandung as we have seen in the Chapter Two.¹²⁸

Under these circumstances, Muslims felt they were under pressure in such a way that they even believing unverivied reports, rumours and leaflets causing even more unrest. In 1970, for instance, DDII functionaries were alarmed by a leaflet that went around and which stated that Central Java would have been Chritianised after 10 years.¹²⁹ Muslim leaders, including Natsir were worried about this development in Christianisation efforts and the unrest it brought and as a result their reaction was that they would not allow the region to be Christianised any further.¹³⁰

Kahin is critical about Natsir's position towards Christianisation, as she considers it not in line with his support for democracy and his admiration of Western culture.¹³¹ Kahin said:

Natsir's struggles in trying to work out the relationship between Islam and democracy and between Islam and nationalism are in line with his ambivalence regarding the influence of Western powers and Western thought. As with many of reformist Muslim thinkers who influenced him, and especially Haji Agus Salim who had worked so closely with leading members of the Dutch colonial administration, Natsir was torn between an admiration and embrace of the "positive sides of Western culture" and a strong opposition to Western imperialism and what he saw in the Netherlands East Indies as its effort to Christianize the people it governed.¹³²

It seemed a paradox that while Natsir admired Western culture his outlook towards Christianity was unfavourable. He never objected to non-Muslims assuming high positions as cabinet ministers even if he believed that the Indonesian President should be a Muslim.¹³³ It seems possible that this paradox was the result of his involvement in the Islamic mission organisation called the Muslim World League of which

¹²⁷ K.H. Athian Ali (Chairman of FUUI), Bandung, 27 November 2008.

¹²⁸ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach', p.295.

¹²⁹ *Idem*.

¹³⁰ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹³¹ Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy*, p. 24.

¹³² *Idem*, p. 24.

¹³³ *Idem*, p. 186.

he was appointed vice President in 1969.¹³⁴

Since 1980, Natsir focused on *Dakwahism* especially after his relationship with the Soeharto regime had increasingly become worse because of his association with the opposition group *Petisi 50*. He was banned from making trips overseas. Because of this, he turned his *dakwah* attention inwards and he made Bandung one of his homebases for his *dakwah* activities alongside Jakarta. He capitalised on his relationship with Saudi and other Middle Eastern countries to get financial aid. From Bandung he continued his strategy to place the *Dakwahism* on the shoulders of young Muslims who studied at tertiary educational institutions in Bandung, Bogor, Jakarta and elsewhere in part through *Bina Masjid Kampus* as will be discussed in the next chapter.¹³⁵

Dakwahism and Secularism

As stated above, the two major orientations of the Muslim community in responding to their political circumstances, especially among Modernists, was to promote *Dakwahism* and to renew Islamic thought. While *Dakwahism* was promoted by senior Modernist leaders, in the early 1970s, young Modernist intellectuals led by Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) began to turn away from their seniors. Madjid's bold call to reform Islamic thought clearly contradicted the struggle of Natsir and his supporters to re-create a Muslim *ummat* and an Islamic state in which the *shari'ah* would be enforced. With his popular slogan '*Islam Yes, Partai Islam No*', Nurcholish set the rationale for his reform and his quest for the relevance of Islam and the political discourse of modernity, strictly emphasising the unity of God and promoting liberal and progressive ideas.¹³⁶ Nurcholish deliberately challenged his fellow Modernists' obsession with an Islamic state and tried to delegitimise their claims to an 'Islamic' politics while questioning their ability to

¹³⁴ *Idem*, p. 184.

¹³⁵ *Idem*, p. 179.

¹³⁶ On Nurcholish Madjid's Renewal Movement, See Muhammad Kamal Hassan, 'Muslim Ideological Responses to the Issue of Modernisation in Indonesia' in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (eds.), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 362-378. See also Chaider S. Bamualim, *Transforming the Ideal Transcendental into the Historical Humanistic: Nurcholish Madjid's Islamic Thinking (1970-1995)*, unpublished MA thesis, Leiden University, 1998.

properly address the challenges Muslims faced.¹³⁷ The reform challenged DDII's politicisation of Islam, known initially as political Islam and subsequently as Islamism.

Nurcholish's reforms tended to be less critical of NU Traditionalist Muslims. The senior generation of Modernists, who were very much anti-Traditionalist, were thus faced with challenges posed by their own younger generation as personified by Nurcholish, but also by the state and by thriving Christianity. This partly explains why these Modernists sought support from, and alliance with, Muslim forces overseas, especially from Saudi Arabia. This effort brought financial aid, but also the transmission of an "Arab-Islamic" political and religious discourse,¹³⁸ reflecting the failure of the senior Modernists to independently produce a discourse on Islam and politics relevant to the context of modern Indonesia's pluralistic society.

Since Independence, Modernist exertions towards gaining political prominence, whether through *Dakwahism* or the renewal of Islamic thought, have only met with frustration. They had first hoped that they were in a position to win the nation's leadership, but this did not eventuate. They also attended the *Konstituante* sessions (1955-57) with the genuine expectation that they could defeat their Nationalist and Communist rivals, however this was unsuccessful. Soon after the destruction of the Old Order and the PKI at the hands of Soeharto's military forces and supporting Islamic organisations in October 1965, Modernists thought that their time had finally come. Once again, there was only more frustration. Although Modernist Muslims supported the New Order's rise to power, after only a few years they found themselves marginalised by the elites of the same New Order, which overwhelmingly consisted of military personnel and of only small groups of civilians.

The *Dakwahists* feared that Christianity's growing influence might herald a deepening process of Westernisation and by implication of Secularisation and hence they actively tried to defeat Christianity. This

¹³⁷ Bamualim, *Transforming the Ideal*, pp. 16-17.

¹³⁸ The term "Arab-Islamic" discourse is used by Armando Salvatore to denote "a framework of reference [that] occurred through the transcultural interaction between two discursive formations, orientalism and Islamic reformism." See Armando Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity* (Reading, United Kingdom, Ithaca Press, 1997), p. 81.

explains why, in the early 1970s, Nurcholish Madjid's renewal movement was challenged when he opined the need to reform Islamic thought through recourse to concepts enunciated from Western ideas and notions, such as secularisation, liberalism, de-sacralisation, et cetera.¹³⁹ Madjid points out that:

The term secularisation actually means all forms of *liberating development* which function to liberate the ummat from their own historical process of growth which is no longer capable of distinguishing which values are Islamic and transcendental from those that are non-Islamic.

Because of his 'secularisation' ideas, Nurcholish, who was previously considered Natsir's potential successor and therefore known as 'Natsir muda' (Natsir junior) disappointed his seniors and added to their frustrations. DDII members understood that, if not downright against them, Nurcholish's movement in any event did not support their interests. Against this backdrop, the DDII began to develop a connection with campus *dakwah* activists in order to provide a shelter for devout Muslim students at secular universities against the dangerous influence of Nurcholish's reform movement and the threat of secularisation which in essence it considered part and parcel of Westernisation and Christianisation.¹⁴⁰ This connection can be traced to Muslim activist training sessions Natsir and his colleagues organised in the Indonesian Hajj Committee (Panitia Haji Indonesia, PHI) in Kwitang, Jakarta in 1968, and subsequently in Pesantren Darul Falah in Bogor, West Java.¹⁴¹

Conclusion

This chapter relates the social transformation born out of the intricate dialectics of New Order politics, religious development and social change, which resulted in the rise of religions as identities and significant social forces, on the one hand, and in the decline of local

¹³⁹ Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Response to "New Order" Modernisation in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982).

¹⁴⁰ Latif, 'The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia', p. 393.

¹⁴¹ A.M. Lutfi, 'Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia', in Clifford E. Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad, Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Pers, 2002), pp. 158-164.

syncretic creeds such as *Aliran Kebatinan*, on the other. Soeharto's promotion of 'religious freedom' for official religions, with restriction, favoured Islam, Christianity and other faiths weakening local syncretic currents. While it is unclear exactly what kind of relation between religion and politics Soeharto approved of, it was obvious that he wanted a separation between religion and ideology. He, therefore, crushed any initiatives that might lead to the 'ideologisation' of religion. These politics transformed religious ideology to mere *dakwah*/missionary activities.

Under this shifting context, the significance of the official religions had considerably increased, producing *Dakwahism* and mission activities. The immediate implication of this situation was that Islam and Christianity, in particular, increasingly became important as aspects of social identity. The dynamics of religious life at the grassroots, which promoted Islamisation and Christianisation, depended on how religious leaders responded to various social factors (e.g., migration, education, economic situation, institutions, et cetera). The process of Islamisation (and Christianisation) was very much related to the regime's search for strategic allies in order to neutralise the influence of Communism and in order to impose its hegemonic control over society. Against this motive, the promotion of religion was not built on a solid vision of religious freedom and tolerance. The Christian leaders sought a liberal policy in spreading religions whereas Muslims, on the contrary, demanded restrictions. Meanwhile, the regime saw order and stability as its priority and warned all parties in society not to violate this (despite its support of religious mission). The absence of a solid vision of religious freedom and tolerance sparked tension between communities of different religions, especially between Muslims and Christians.

Soeharto's increased interest in Islam also contributed to Islamisation and social change in Indonesia. As a Javanese, Soeharto actually was personally inclined towards *Aliran Kebatinan*. However, he did not sustain this devotion for a mix of political, social and religious reasons. Meanwhile, in the end, his own spiritual needs compelled him to seek a form of personal piety.¹⁴² This quest saw Soeharto develop greater interest in learning about Islam since the early 1980s although he did not completely abandon his devotion to 'mystical power' or *Aliran*

¹⁴² Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, pp. 118-124.

Kebatinan/Javanism.¹⁴³

Seeing Christianity as their greatest opponent, the Modernist leaders sought for a gigantic leap in organising and leading the *dakwah* agenda. They realised that they would not be able to win the religious race with the Christians unless they were equipped with qualified human capital and the proper resources in order to promote the birth of *dakwah* activists from among intellectual circles (the middle class). Therefore, Natsir turned his eyes to campuses and began to cultivate his mission on these secular training centres. After some years, this strategy proved fruitful, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

This rather long discussion of the situation in Indonesia in general is necessary to provide the background for what was about to transpire in West Java. Many new developments were initiated in this context of which the Salman *dakwah* movement on the ITB campus in Bandung in West Java was one of the most important as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. We will see there that the nation's general attitudes towards religion in the entire country caused a movement that was initially specific to West Java but later spread out over all of Indonesia.

¹⁴³ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 83.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM STUDENTS AS DAKWAH ACTIVISTS AND THE ISLAMISATION OF EDUCATED MUSLIMS (1960-1990s)

In the preceding Chapter we have discussed case studies of Islamisation in the rural areas of Subang and Sumedang which were in part the result of the Soeharto regime's policies on religion, which provided the setting for this kind of social change. This chapter discusses the Islamisation at the Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung, ITB) where practicing Muslim students played a prominent role. Through the promotion of *dakwah*, they tirelessly sought to turn Islam into their moral foundation, to adopt it as their identity in their personal and social life and to entice other ITB students to observe Islam as their cultural reference.¹ They used this prominent state campus as their new centre for the promotion of a variety of Islamic discourses and activities. This initiative knitted Muslim students from various backgrounds into solid *dakwah* networks, which inspired the flourishing of *Dakwahism* at the ITB and promoted deepening Islamisation among the educated class in Muslim society at secular campuses and beyond. Robert W. Hefner describes this transformation as an effort to turn away from the old-fashioned "scholastic arguments of the Traditionalist scholars (*ulama*) and the harshly exclusive styles of the Modernist elite."² This transformation also marks an important development in *dakwah* leadership and organisation and mirrors the wider context of social change in urban West Java.

¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009; Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

² Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123.

Socio-Political Context

The Coalesce of 'Santris' on Secular Campuses and their Search for Piety

As Hefner observed, after Indonesia's independence (1945), middle class³ practicing Muslim students began to coalesce in large cities⁴ and they started to pursue tertiary education at universities. They originated particularly from the Modernist group.⁵ Despite their differences in religious orientation, once they entered university they were unified by their desire to attend classes that would not interfere with their performance of the five daily prayers. They wanted to be pious Muslim students. However, in the 1950s devout Muslim students could not easily perform their religious duties at the ITB. By 1960, when the number of these students had increased, they started to fight for their right to practice their religion through the establishment of the Salman Mosque. As we will see, the ITB community was polarised by the conflict between secular education and religion that crystallised around the issue of the Friday prayers which must be performed in congregation.⁶ Due to the Salman Mosque's instrumental role in the resurgence of *dakwah* on campuses since the early 1970s, the phenomenon came to be known as the 'Salman Movement.'⁷

³ For a study on the politics of the middle class in Indonesia see Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1993). This book contains a collection of translated papers that were presented at Monash University during a conference entitled *The politics of middle class Indonesia*, organised by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, held in June 1986.

⁴ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123. See also Robert W. Hefner, 'Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', *Indonesia* Vol. 56 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1-35.

⁵ Aswab Mahasin, 'Kelas Menengah Santri: Pandangan dari Dalam', in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia*, p. 153.

⁶ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁷ The expression 'Salman Movement' was introduced by Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), p. 308. Hefner also uses the expression in *Civil Islam*, p. 123.

Much like earlier modern Muslim movements, the Salman Movement aspired to imbue social life with Islam.⁸ There are, however, obvious differences between the Salman Movement and its predecessors. Muslim movements that emerged in the early part of the twentieth century (e.g. Modernism) generally aimed at the purification of the faith, with some movements employing Islam as an ideological means for political identification towards this end.⁹ By contrast, although there was a certain degree of political motives, the Salman Movement was primarily concerned with cultural-intellectual issues and focused mainly on faith and piety, education, leadership, and aimed to turn ITB students from less devoted Muslims into practicing Muslims.¹⁰

This quest for piety was rooted in the simple demand to be able to perform obligatory prayers. Students and academic staff members who came from practicing Muslim families began to face problems in performing their daily prayers because there was no place designated for them to pray. This was problematic particularly on Friday, since Muslim students who attended the Friday noon prayers had to forego classes to do so.¹¹ Thus, the desire for a mosque to pray was essentially a demand for the reconciliation between the students' freedom of religion and their right to education, which conflicted due to the status quo.¹² For students like Imaduddin Abdulrahim, popularly known as Bang Imad, the issue was not that simple, however. For him the main question was why classes were held on Fridays at all when everybody knew that Muslims had to attend congregational prayers on Fridays.¹³ This question related to the dominant culture and ideology of the vast majority of the ITB community.

Professor Van Roemont, an expert on Islamic architecture who taught at the ITB in the 1950s, saw that his student, Ahmad Noe'man, a

⁸ Rifki Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung Indonesia* (The ANU Press, 1995), p. 21.

⁹ *Idem*.

¹⁰ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009; Interview with Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹¹ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. See also: Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 33.

¹² Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹³ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 24.

practicing Muslim of Muhammadiyah background from Garut, West Java, regularly performed his prayers in places around the campus grounds. The lack of a designated prayer space became progressively more problematic due to the increasing admission into ITB of students from Islamic backgrounds. The problem crystallised when classes continued without the attendance of the students who had to leave for Friday prayers. Van Roemont eventually sympathised with Noe'man and he discussed the situation with him. Van Roemont realised the needs of the Muslim students and he had no objections allowing them to leave class to go to the mosque in Cipaganti or the Grand Mosque at the town square in Bandung.¹⁴ At the time, roadside mosques were hard to find. Larger mosques were located miles away from the ITB campus in villages, meaning that students had to miss classes travelling to and from the mosque. This was compounded by derisive 'secular' students deriding them by asking them to 'convey their regards' to God.¹⁵

It was against this backdrop that some Muslim students proposed the building of a campus mosque but failed to obtain support from the ITB Rector, Professor Otong Kosasih.¹⁶ The rector argued that allowing its construction discriminated against students of other faiths, who would likely seek similar concessions. The disappointed students, reading between the lines, suspected that the rector was reluctant to allow religion to intrude on the secular ITB environment. Meanwhile, the political climate was also not in favour of Islam thanks to the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) rebellion in West Java and Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) action in West Sumatra. The alleged involvement of the leaders of the Modernist party, Masyumi, in the PRRI revolt had caused friction between them and Soekarno.¹⁷ Thus, the combination of a strongly secular culture and an unfavourable national political atmosphere contributed to the sustained marginalisation of practicing Muslims within the campus student body.

Despite these circumstances, the students persisted in their ambition to build a mosque. A mosque committee was formed on 17

¹⁴ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹⁵ *Idem*. In the end Prof. van Roemont became one of the first supporters of the initiatives for the construction of the ITB Salman Mosque.

¹⁶ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

¹⁷ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 299-301.

April 1960, with T.B. Soelaiman¹⁸ appointed as its chairman and Bang Imad as his deputy.¹⁹ On 27 May, 13 students held their first Friday prayers on campus using part of the grand auditorium which, up till then, 'secular' students had used for social but non-religious gatherings. The Muslim student congregation eventually grew to fill the whole auditorium. 'Secular students' respected this venue's use for prayers and decided not to desacralise it by organising their parties in the same spot and they started to seek other venues for their entertainment. The interesting situation thus arose where 'secular tolerance' displayed by 'secular students' proved to initiate the early phase of an Islamisation process on the campus they themselves did not desire.²⁰

However, this tolerance did not quite pave the way for the construction of a mosque, with the secular campus bureaucracy proving the main obstacle. Practicing Muslim students did not have much bargaining power in their encounters with the campus authorities, which were comprised mostly of members of the Sundanese educated class. The rector, born in Majalaya, Bandung, was himself a member of this class and cared little for the students' religious needs. From a cultural perspective, this was no surprise since, at the time, wealthy educated Sundanese were generally secular people. The students from practicing Muslim families and others perceived this insensitivity towards religion as a violation of their rights, and it only strengthened their resolve in their struggle for the mosque's construction. Surprisingly in view of his nationalist inclinations, President Soekarno supported the proposal for a campus mosque on 28 May 1964.²¹ Because of this, the rector of the ITB and its 'secular' students had no option but to support the project.²² The endorsement Soekarno gave to the mosque committee opened the gate for many students from a wide political spectrum to support the plan, among them Purwoto Handoko, Chairman of the ITB Student Council; Doddy A. Tisna Amidjaja, ITB Rector (1969-76), and people who became important in Indonesian

¹⁸ T.B. Soelaiman is the son of T.B. Sjaib Sastradiwirja, a Masyumi activist and a founder of Masjid Agung Al-Azhar Jakarta. See www.kalamsalman.org.

¹⁹ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 25.

²⁰ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

²¹ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

²² Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

Islam much later like Ahmad Zuhail, later the Minister for Research and Technology; and Muslimin Nasution, then the Chairman of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI). Because of Soekarno's endorsement, support even came from the wealthy Aburizal Bakrie, Erna Walnono (later known as Erna Witoelar) and Dedi Panigoro who were not particularly known as practicing Muslims. Through their fundraising activities they were instrumental in helping the construction of the Salman Mosque.²³

It is unclear why these secular students changed their minds but this was perhaps due to the fact that at that time, Soekarno's influence was still formidable among the students as well as among the campus bureaucrats. The atmosphere of respectful tolerance on the campus was also a contributing factor which was showcased with the secular students coming to support the mosque project. A former Salman activist, Sakib Machmud, stated "ITB students with a secular background, known as the 'dance group', were involved in fundraising for the mosque; we needed their participation because they knew where to get funds."²⁴ Only three years later, the mosque project was realised and it was finally used for the first time in 1972.²⁵

While the role of students from an 'Islamic' background from rural areas in the Salman Movement is significant, they never pretended to promote Islamism as a political ideology.²⁶ Initially, they wanted to fulfil their religious obligations (prayers).²⁷ The presence at ITB of many practicing Muslim students in the 1950s and the 1960s, including student leaders Ahmad Sadali and Ahmad Noe'man from Garut, T.B. Soelaiman from Sumedang, Imaduddin Abdulrahim from Medan, Sakib Machmud from Java, and A.M. Lutfi from Cirebon, had a profound impact on campus social and cultural life in the course of championing the construction of the Salman mosque.²⁸ The mosque was the second to be built on a secular campus in Indonesia after the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque on the grounds of the University of Indonesia in

²³ Nashir Budiman and Ziauddin Sardar, 'Salman: Masa Lalu, Kini dan Mendatang', www.Kalamsalman.org, 10 November 2008.

²⁴ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

²⁵ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009 and Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

²⁶ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009.

²⁷ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

²⁸ *Idem*.

Salemba in Jakarta.²⁹ Its great symbolic significance and function as a centre of leadership saw it inspire Islamic *dakwah* and piety as well as intellectualism and activism on secular campuses in the following decades, particularly across Java.

Neutralising the Dominance of Secular Students

In the 1950s and early 1960s, practicing Muslim students were “the weaker of the factions in the student body” *vis-a-vis* secular nationalist student factions that were the predominant players at national universities around the country.³⁰ The perception of this ‘campus political’ imbalance perhaps served as another impetus towards the emergence of the Salman Movement. Its main actors were students affiliated, directly or otherwise, with Muslim student organisations such as Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, The Association of Muslim Tertiary Students) and Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Muslim Students). They had become politicised during the power transfer from the Soekarno regime to that of Soeharto. At the time, left-wing student groups had already lost their credibility because of the 30 September 1965 ‘coup’ attempt.

The national student political scene was reflected on the ITB campus with Muslim student activists being greatly outnumbered by ‘secular’ students. It was feared that the secular students would dominate the Student Council and therefore practicing Muslim students constructed a campus mosque not only primarily for religious purposes but later also in part to neutralise the dominance of secular students.³¹ In its construction, the motive of the practicing Muslim students, who only dreamed of having a mosque in which to perform their prayers,³² became integrated with the political motivations of former HMI/PII activists, who wished to build a mosque-based social movement. It is important to note that the latter’s motivations coincided with the interests of senior Muslim politicians who were also former Masyumi activists such as Mohammad Natsir, Mohamad Roem, Zainal Abidin

²⁹ *Idem*.

³⁰ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123. Also, Interview with Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

³¹ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

³² For instance, Ahmad Noe'man who originates from a Muhammadiyah family in Garut, West Java.

Ahmad, Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. Although they had already been side-lined or had left the political arena because they were disappointed with Soeharto's New Order regime, they still maintained ties with, and were even active in, the cadre formation of Islamic students in order to create a generation of young Muslims who could carry on their struggles.³³

The Salman Movement was in part realised because practicing Muslim students on campus were politically dissatisfied with the Soeharto regime. Notwithstanding the importance for the Movement of this dissatisfaction as a political impetus, its religio-cultural and intellectual motivations were also important.

Leadership Inspiration, Intellectual and Religious Vision

Soekarno's Inspiration: Seeking the Fire of Islam

Readers should note that when the Salman Movement came up in the end of the 1950s and continued to grow up to 1965, Indonesia embraced the politics of Guided Democracy in which Soekarno himself was the principal actor.³⁴ Ricklefs observes that:

He (Soekarno) offered Indonesia something to believe in, something which many hoped would give them and their nation dignity and pride. Other powerful forces turned to him for guidance, legitimacy and protection.³⁵

As we have seen above, Soekarno inspired Salman Movement's activists to turn to him for support for the construction of the Mosque on the secular ITB campus. That they succeeded may be seen as one example of the validity of Ricklef's notion as mentioned above.

The process to obtain the President's consent started when a delegation of the Salman Mosque Construction Foundation (Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, YPM), including Prof. T.M. Soelaiman, Ahmad Sadali and Ahmad Noe'man, met with President Soekarno in the State

³³ Endang Saefuddin Anshari, Sakib Machmud, Hasan Sutanegara, A.M. Lutfi, Miftah Faridl, Rudy Syarif Sumadilaga, Yusuf Amir Feisal and others were also among the early Salman Mosque activists who had been fostered by senior politicians. Lutfi, 'Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia', pp. 158-159.

³⁴ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 294-321.

³⁵ *Idem*, p. 294.

Palace in Jakarta on 28 May 1964. During the breakfast meeting, the President was attended by his Minister of Religious Affairs, K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri.³⁶ Soekarno asked the delegation to explain their proposal and he was satisfied with the arguments it presented to him. After having inspected Ahmad Noe'man's drawings of the mosque, Soekarno asked why there was neither a dome nor any pillars inside. Noe'man explained that a dome was merely an accessory without a clear function and might even be seen as an extravagance. According to Noe'man, the ITB Mosque had no intention to build a dome. He quoted verse 170 from the Chapter of The Cow (al-Baqarah) in the Quran, which criticises the behaviour of those who were adamant to blindly imitate the tradition of their ancestors. Concerning the pillars, he explained that they would impede the line formation (*safl*) during congregational prayers and should therefore not be included. Soekarno agreed and immediately signed the blueprint, naming it 'Salman Mosque' after consulting K.H. Saifuddin, who was seated next to him.³⁷ The name of Salman Al-Farisi, one of the close companions of the Prophet Muhammad and a brilliant strategist and contemporary technocrat, inspired Soekarno to suggest the students to use this name for their mosque. The complex use of strategy, Soekarno as strategist for independence, the students using him for their strategy and Salman as strategist under Muhammad gave enough impetus to use this name for the ITB campus mosque which was also the more fitting because Soekarno himself was a graduate of this same institution and Salman was a technocrat in his time.

Apart from discussing the mosque's structural aspects, the YPM ITB delegation also engaged in discussions with Soekarno on Islamic thought. They convinced Soekarno that the orientation of the mosque to be built on campus would resonate with his conviction that what needed to be taken from Islam was its 'fire', not its 'ashes'.³⁸ Soekarno's idea about the 'fire of Islam' was greatly inspired by L. Stoddard, a

³⁶ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

³⁷ *Idem*.

³⁸ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009. "Fire" and "ashes" are used to distinguish between the values of Islam, which are eternal, and its symbols, which are temporary and contextual.

Western scholar who wrote *The New World of Islam* and *The Rising Tide of Colour*.³⁹

During polemics with Muslim intellectuals such as A. Hassan and Mohammad Natsir, Soekarno expressed his admiration for the Turkish State which had implemented Kemal Attaturk's secular, modernised conception of Islam.⁴⁰ Soekarno desired to separate religion from the State while retaining the 'fire' of Islam as its driving force. His opponents in their turn, sought to formally embed religious principles and laws the formation of the State. The debate also involved other intellectual circles and split into nationalist and Islamist camps. As we know now, the debate was never settled to the satisfaction of either camp and came to a dead end in the Constitutional Assembly in 1955 when the foundations of the state were argued.

Soekarno thus found that the initiators of the mosque project appreciated the importance of the "fire of Islam", which had been his obsession since the 1930s. At the same time, the mosque to be built on the grounds of his very own *alma mater* would deliver a progressive message as symbolised by its unconventional architectural style, and would be a token of an open nationalist spirit rather than that an exclusively Islamic one. It was against this backdrop that Soekarno sanctioned the plan to construct the Salman Mosque, as mentioned above. No huge leap of political imagination was required to guess at the strategy behind his approval. Over time, however, dynamics developed that pushed the mosque in the direction of Islamic visions *a la* Mohammad Natsir rather than those of Soekarno's. Its construction was halted after Soeharto took over from Soekarno "because the New Order Government mistrusted Islam" at that time.⁴¹

Although by that time unfinished, the mosque could already be used as a venue for activities conducted by Muslim student activists. It had library facilities and hosted meetings, lessons on classical music appreciation, martial arts and sports, Islamic training, student Quranic

³⁹ *Idem.* L. Stoddard's *New World of Islam* was translated into Indonesian (*Dunia Baru Islam*) and published in January 1966 by a committee chaired by Lieutenant General H.M. Muljadi Djojomartono. President Soekarno wrote short introductory remarks to the Indonesian edition.

⁴⁰ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 103.

⁴¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

studies and *subuh* religious classes (after dawn prayers).⁴² It was the first mosque to organise these *subuh* classes featuring specially-invited speakers. However, only small numbers of students regularly attended these classes. Seeking more participants, Salman activists intentionally brought in female students from the Universitas Pasundan and Universitas Padjadjaran campuses. This succeeded in baiting more students to the early morning classes because “boys usually like to come to places where there are many girls.”⁴³ Towards the same end, the classes were pushed forward to 7 a.m.

Natsir was extremely committed to maintaining secure relationships with the young Muslim intellectuals who were engaged in the Salman Movement. Along with other senior public Muslim figures, he made a point of visiting Bandung to deliver talks during the mosque’s morning classes. During these visits he would also attend dialogue sessions with student activists in A.M. Lutfi’s house, where they felt safe from police raids – which had happened on other occasions in Indonesia - and avoided being suspected of conducting subversive Islamic activities.⁴⁴ Often, Imaduddin was asked to lead the congregational prayers because of his melodious voice and superb recitation of the Quran.⁴⁵

M. Natsir’s Crucial Role: Modernist Appropriation of Public Space

Having failed in rehabilitating the Masyumi in 1966, Natsir, the main figure of Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), withdrew from the political stage and initiated activities in *dakwah* and education by founding the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII, later to be called Dewan Dakwah) in May 1967.⁴⁶ Within a short time, Natsir and his DDII were pulling the wagon of Muslim groups who were frustrated with Soeharto’s New Order Regime, which they perceived as having become increasingly detached or even hostile to Islam.⁴⁷ The DDII became

⁴² Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁴³ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁴⁴ Lutfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, p. 159.

⁴⁵ *Idem*, p. 158.

⁴⁶ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 334.

⁴⁷ Indications of the Soeharto regime’s hostility towards political Islam were: *First*, apart from rejecting the rehabilitation of the Masyumi, Masyumi figures were also banned from leading the Partai Muslimin Indonesia

increasingly influential because of the financial and other support it received from the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami of which Natsir had been chairman.

Natsir's actions also inspired Muslim students in engendering new forms of Muslim movements, which remained aloof of practical political currents and rather regarded university campus environments as home to intellectual communities.⁴⁸ Natsir and the Muslim students' interests coincided because Natsir had recognised the possibility of appropriating the religious space of the mosque as a venue insulated from political interference. Therefore, through the Dewan Dakwah, Natsir started to actively initiate the construction of mosques in campus environments.⁴⁹ Like Natsir, Muslim students also recognised the relative freedom from state intervention which mosques enjoyed and which made them potentially the social movements' prime loci.

(Indonesian Muslims Party, PARMUSI), 'created' by Soeharto to replace the Masyumi; *Second*, in October 1970, the government unilaterally announced its installation of PARMUSI functionary Djaelani Naro as general chairman of the PARMUSI, which up to then had been led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo. Dispute could not be avoided. In the end, Soeharto appointed M.S. Mintaredja (state minister) as the new general chairman. Muslim groups considered this a concerted effort by the Soeharto regime to control political Islam. See, for instance, Solihin Salam, *Sedjarah Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Jakarta: Lembaga Pendidikan Islam, 1970), and K.E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1970); *Third*, Soeharto became increasingly close to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that was dominated by Chinese-Catholic and secular figures who, in fact, had helped to topple Soekarno's regime and had paved the way for Soeharto to enter the stage of power. The CSIS was founded in 1971 as a New Order think tank and was led by Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani – both Soeharto's private assistants. The institution formulated various New Order policies including the policy in countering the influence of Muslim groups. See, for instance, R.E. Elson, *Soeharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 146.

⁴⁸ This was also connected with the policy of 'depoliticizing' the campus implemented by the New Order regime through Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus-Badan Koordinasi Kampus (NKK-BKK, Normalisation of Campus Life-Campus Coordination Body). This policy sought to free the campus from practical politics after the period of student political upheavals from 1974-1978.

⁴⁹ Aay Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), pp. 124-127.

Excepting the ITB and University of Indonesia (UI), until the earlier period of the New Order secular campuses lacked permanent mosques. Although the Salman Mosque was only established in 1972 as the result of efforts having been made since 1960, a temporary prayer facility had been available for prayers and other religious activities since the mid-1960s. Having taken two years to construct, the University of Indonesia's Abdul Rahman Hakim (ARH) Mosque opened in 1968. However, the Salman Mosque issue resonated louder than that of the mosque at the UI in Jakarta due to the firm and courageous leadership of Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his friends. The University of Indonesia, however, became the centre for religious and political activism of the Tarbiyah movement's young leaders later in the 1990s.

Nurcholish Madjid's Influence: Cultivating Monotheism

The influence Natsir's charismatic leadership had on the likes of Imaduddin, Faridl, Lutfi, Saifuddin Anshari, Sadali, Noe'man, and Sakib was undeniable. However, these Muslim activists were also important HMI figures with close ties to Nurcholish Madjid, the General Chairman of the Muslim Student Association (HMI) whose reformist thoughts provoked controversy and were challenged by many ex-Masyumi leaders affiliated with the DDII.⁵⁰ They were the main opponents of Nurcholish's call for Islamic reform in the 1970s. Strong opposition to Nurcholish came from H.M. Rasjidi, Abdul Qadir Jaelani, and Endang Saifuddin Anshari.⁵¹ Apart from these figures, others greatly appreciated his thoughts. Imaduddin even compiled materials for his Mujahid Dakwah Training (Latihan Mujahid Dakwah, LMD) by adapting the Nilai-nilai Dasar Perjuangan Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Fundamental Values of Struggle of the Islamic Student Association, NDP-HMI) formulated by Nurcholish, Saefuddin Anshari, and Sakib Machfud during its 1968 congress in Malang, East Java.⁵²

Imaduddin's close relationship with Nurcholish began with the 1966 Congress of the HMI when he was appointed head of Lembaga

⁵⁰ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁵¹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 34.

⁵² Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. NDP-HMI is a HMI must-read text for students who wanted to join the Islamic Student Association. See Yudi Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20* (Bandung: Mizan 2005), p. 534.

Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (LDMI, the Predication Body of Muslim Students) and Nurcholish elected as HMI Chairman.⁵³ Admiring Nurcholish for his honest and modest character, Imaduddin even named his daughter 'Nurcholishah'.⁵⁴ Their relationship deteriorated when Nurcholish called for Islamic reforms, urging Muslim intellectuals to consider secularisation. Imaduddin could not appreciate that and it led to misunderstanding between them. Their relationship was restored, however, when both pursued their PhDs in America and occasionally met to discuss issues related to Islam and the Indonesian *ummah*.⁵⁵ In addition, when Imaduddin became involved in the formation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), he invited Nurcholish to join the meetings. Nurcholish was also Imaduddin's friend whom he asked for support when in need, and who provided him with constructive input.⁵⁶ Imaduddin once even declared that he would be in the forefront to support him if Nurcholish ever sought the presidential office.⁵⁷

Regardless of their differences in Islamic thought, for both the oneness of God (*tauhid*) was at the centre of their religious belief. This means that even if Nurcholish was in favour of secularist and other modern not necessarily Muslim ideas, the notion of *tauhid* was never contested. In this particular aspect, all agreed. It was only in the issue of to what extent *tauhid* could be maintained in modern outlooks that ideas differed. Muslim intellectual and Nurcholish friend and colleague, Dawam Rahardjo, states that with his ideas about secularisation, Nurcholish believed in the centrality of the man-God relation in all aspects of life. In order to reach a situation of political secularisation, Nurcholish was convinced that "in order to keep the man-God relationship central a radical devaluation of existing social structures

⁵³ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, pp. 158-159.

⁵⁴ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009 and Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁵⁵ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009. See also Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 47.

⁵⁶ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, pp. 51-55.

⁵⁷ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

was needed”,⁵⁸ but not necessarily religious ones. Dawam also notes that Nurcholish’s thought about *tauhid* was in essence the same as that of Imaduddin’s because both shared the notion of *tauhid uluhiyya* (the unity of God).⁵⁹ Another strong correspondence is Imaduddin’s thought that it is imperative for all Muslims to liberate themselves from any reliance upon others except Allah.⁶⁰ Imaduddin agreed with Nurcholish who argued that in this world there is nothing sacred except Allah and the Quran. He said that he did not oppose Nurcholish’s reform ideas.⁶¹ While true that he disagreed with Nurcholish’s use of Western concepts in his description of Islam, for Imaduddin it was simply a question of terminology. Therefore it is safe to claim that Imaduddin and Nurcholish Madjid shared the same fundamental intellectual and religious vision. Imaduddin’s intellectual vision became the buttress for the Salman *dakwah* movement’s intellectual diversity in the years to come.

The Training of Muslim Students to be *Dakwah* Activists

Only at the end of 1972 was the Salman mosque finally declared finished and ready to be used for Friday prayers for the first time. In 1974, the Salman mosque initiated the LMD, set up by Imaduddin and his associates, and which proved a phenomenal success. Imaduddin had earlier been mentored by Mohammad Natsir in the group called Panitia Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Hajj Committee) and the PHI entrusted him with the coordination of youth training and development.⁶² Imaduddin was thus a central figure in LMD training. A mentor in the

⁵⁸ M. Dawam Rahardjo, ‘Islam Kemodernan: Catatan atas Paham Sekularisasi Nurcholish Madjid’, in Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 2006), p. 26.

⁵⁹ Rahardjo, ‘Tauhid Uluhiyyah Tokoh Muslim Modernist dari Salman’, in Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, pp. 133-142.

⁶⁰ Imaduddin Abdulrahim, *Kuliah Tauhid* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembina Sari Insan- YAASIN, 1990), pp. 35-52.

⁶¹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 34.

⁶² It was called the PHI group because initially their training schedules took place in the PHI building on Jalan Kwitang, Central Jakarta. See, Luthfi, ‘Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia’, in Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 161.

early training, he also compiled training materials⁶³ which contained the NDP-HMI modified *tauhid* doctrine mentioned previously.⁶⁴

During the LMD, participants were isolated from contacts with the outside world for three to five days, during which time their faith was further buttressed with basic Islamic teachings on theology (*aqida*) and introductions to the sources of Islam, the Quran and *Sunnah*.⁶⁵ The training was intense and lasted whole days, starting one hour before early morning prayers. At night, the participants had to rise in order to perform nightly prayers and at the closing of the training session, they had to take their vows by uttering the *shahadat* in front of their trainer without paying allegiance to a specific doctrine, as was the tradition of the Ikhwanul Muslimin of Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood, hence forth Ikhwan).⁶⁶

From 1974 to 1989, the Salman Mosque organised 71 LMD training sessions, not only in Bandung but also in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and in other cities.⁶⁷ Muslim student activism gradually developed a new culture among the mosque-based youth movement. LMD activities represented the height of this new culture. This was so because they involved activists from campuses all over Indonesia so that in a matter of just a few years a network of LMD alumni was created which facilitated *dakwah* dissemination. The success of the training program caused the use of the mosque to shift from that of a space traditionally used for ritual worship to a centre for faith, piety, intellectualism and activism. In the early 1980s, the Salman Mosque offered pre-university training and mentoring sessions which attracted thousands of Senior High School students from Bandung and sought to equip them with the intellectual and leadership skills needed at university. In fact, this mentoring served practically as a sort of recruitment mechanism for future university activists. In addition, upon their return, the alumni of the pre-university training and mentoring

⁶³ *Salman Review*, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, edition 02/2009, p. 7.

⁶⁴ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 22 July 2009.

⁶⁵ Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam*, p. 33.

⁶⁶ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁶⁷ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*. See also Abdul Aziz (ed.), *Gerakan Kontemporer Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989), p. 267.

sessions became mentors at their schools and they got involved as activists in universities and society in following years.⁶⁸

Over time in and around Bandung, interest in Islamic piety, Muslim lifestyles and fashion, and publications increased following the increased mosque attendance. This had a profound impact on campuses and society across Bandung by the 1980s, laying the ground for what was arguably the Salman movement's greatest contribution, enhancing faith and devotion, intellectualism and activism.⁶⁹ The LMD quickly came to involve activists from other secular universities so that in a short time, it became an integral part for the formative training of Muslim student cadres attached to campus mosques all over Indonesia. It is important to mention here that the ITB Salman Mosque not only took the lead in the campus *dakwah* movement, but also sparked the construction of campus mosques all over Indonesia.⁷⁰ In the course of the 1970s-1980s, the mosque's activities thus established a foundation for the enhancement of the observation of Islamic duties among the educated class of Muslim society. This was in response to a call mounted by senior Modernist leaders for the revival of Islam in the fifteenth century A.H.⁷¹

Coinciding with the growth of the DDII in supporting campus mosques,⁷² religious activism also responded to the warm reception by Muslim students at other secular state universities. This gave the impetus for the formation of pockets of students who had become

⁶⁸ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

⁶⁹ Interview, Ahmad Noe'man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁷⁰ *Salman Review*, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, edition 02/2009, p. 7.

⁷¹ Abdulrahim, *Kuliah Tauhid*, pp. xiv and 12.

⁷² DDII-supported campus mosques included: Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim on the campus of Universitas Indonesia (UI), Salemba Jakarta; Sultan Alauddin Mosque on the campus of Universitas Muslimin Indonesia (UMI), Ujung Pandang; Islamic Centre Al-Quds, Padang; Fatahillah Mosque near the campus of UI Depok; Al-Hijri Mosque on the campus of Universitas Ibnu Khaldun, Bogor; Al-Taqwa Mosque on the campus of IKIP Rawamangun, Jakarta; Islamic Centre Shalahuddin, Yogyakarta; Islamic Centre Ibrahim Mailim in Surakarta; Islamic Centre Darul Hikmah near the campus of Universitas Lampung in Bandar Lampung; Islamic Centre Ruhul Islam, Magelang; Sultan Trengganu Mosque, Semarang; Al-Furqan Mosque on the campus of IKIP Bandung; IKIP Mosque Malang; Campus Mosque of the Institut Teknologi Surabaya (ITS) Surabaya; Campus Mosque of the Al-Ghifari Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), See: Muhammad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 127.

‘enlightened’ because of the religious studies they conducted on their campuses. Their consciously having taken the road of a return to Islam, as opposed to students who decided not to follow this kind of education, formed the basis of a distinguishing identity. As a result of campus *dakwah*, the headscarf (*jilbab*), which initially was donned on the successful completion of a student’s Islamic training, obtained greater significance symbolising the Muslim woman’s new Islamic identity. In the Salman Mosque, this first appeared in the mid-1970s. Since then, more Muslim women, especially students, have started to wear the *jilbab*. This new trend spread to other universities along with the *dakwah* model’s expansion.

Since the mid-1980s, Muslim observance increased and came to be markedly more visible.⁷³ Progress on secular campuses and schools expanded in subsequent years, going beyond the campus environment and into wider society. The increase in piety among the public was indicated by the rise in mosque attendance whether for regular, Friday or *tarawih* prayers, the rapid building of prayer houses and increased payment of the Muslim tithe.⁷⁴ There was simultaneously an obvious heightened interest in travelling to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage (*hajj*), the fifth pillar of Islam. In the following years, the number of Islamic educational institutions such as *madrasah* and *pesantren* mushroomed all over West Java.⁷⁵ Parents were no longer reluctant to send their children to Islamic schools. This phenomenon occurred in a context where Muslims sought moral support and a moral framework in the midst of rapid social change.⁷⁶ In Bandung, numerous outlets opened selling Muslim dress and halal food and beverages. Stickers with Islamic slogans were posted on walls, cars and in student

⁷³ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009.

⁷⁴ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010. This Islamisation became a major trend in Java. See Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 356.

⁷⁵ See an example of this increase in Cianjur, West Java, as cited in *Rekapitulasi Pertumbuhan Lembaga Islam di Kabupaten Cianjur 1990-2010* (Cianjur: Kementrian Agama Kabupaten Cianjur, May-July 2010).

⁷⁶ Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam and Nation in the Post-Soeharto Era’, in Adam Swartz and Adam Paris (eds.), *The Politics of post-Soeharto Indonesia* (New York: Council of Foreign Relation, 1999), pp. 42-44.

dormitories and so forth.⁷⁷ Mizan, a prominent printing and publishing house in Bandung, began to publish Islamic books that were attractive, with elegant cover designs, different from the plain, old-fashioned ones.⁷⁸ In short, Islam's upsurge changed Bandung social life as more people abided to the rules of Islam by going to mosques, dress the Islamic way, attend Islamic schools and perform the *hajj*.

Campus Activists' Radicalisation

As stated in Chapter Three, despite the propagation of a more Islamic lifestyle, especially among those considered nominal Muslims, the overall political atmosphere during this time was not in favour of political Islam. For Muslim activists, keeping a low profile was the only way to avoid a crackdown on their *dakwah* activities by intelligence personnel. During these years, Soeharto and the issue of corruption became the targets of student rallies.⁷⁹ Student opposition peaked in 1978 when they rejected Soeharto's re-election. The political upheaval saw security forces seal off the ITB campus following the student's rejection of Soeharto's re-election. The army occupied the Salman Mosque dormitory and for several months, Salman Mosque activities came to a halt. Consequently the regime became the focus of heated opposition from a wide variety of student movements, including those engaged in Muslim activism on campus and outside the universities' premises, and particularly within *usroh* circles.⁸⁰ Campus mosques have

⁷⁷ For instance, 'I am proud to be a Muslim'; 'Islam is my religion'; or 'Islam is the religion of peace.' Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

⁷⁸ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 04 June 2009.

⁷⁹ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 346.

⁸⁰ *Usroh* literally means 'nuclear family or cell' and is considered effective for the development and the formation of cadres under the repressive New Order circumstances. It is worth noting that during the 1970s, the concept of *usroh* was not exclusively used in campus *dakwah* circles. The term was also officially used by DI/TII groups in the early 1980s. The *usroh* model was also widespread among NII (Islamic Indonesian State) followers. Thus, everything that goes in the direction of radical expression using the *usroh* model was immediately suspected of plotting against the State. This was the more so since the police had apprehended members of the *usroh* group of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who were suspected of scheming to create an Islamic State and who considered the leader of Darul Islam, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, as their primary source of political

been used as bases for religio-political student movements ever since, which is a new phenomenon in Indonesian history.⁸¹ It has to be noted, however, that the Salman Movement kept focusing on the religious, intellectual and cultural dimensions of *dakwah*. It was only after the Soeharto regime imposed severe restrictions on campus politics in 1978, which caused many student activists to join mosques as the only safe venue for their activism, that campus *dakwah* became “a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration.”⁸²

It is not surprising that this quickly drew public attention, and also came to Soeharto’s notice. The New Order regime suspected that the *dakwah* movement was a repackaging of the radical political aspirations which it wanted to suppress. Moreover, Salman activists did not hide their opposition to Soeharto’s regime out of frustration over its repression and the persecution of Muslim activists.⁸³ This political scenario saw the Indonesian state adopt an increasingly repressive attitude against Islamic activism. As a result, the Salman Movement and all other mosque-based *dakwah* movements that belonged to its network were further politicised. Several of their key activities including mentoring, and the LMDs were designed with the goal of opposing the state in mind.⁸⁴

In January 1978, the Student Council was disbanded by the order of Admiral Sudomo in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, KOPKAMTIB). Daoud Joesoef was appointed Minister of Education and Culture (1978-1983) and he implemented the ‘normalisation of campus life’ policy seeking the ‘de-politicalisation’ of the campuses. Although the policy has often been opposed for fear that it turns students passive and apolitical, it remains in force. Eventually, the character of the classes changed from being

inspiration. International Crisis Group, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’, *Indonesia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 3. Also Interview with Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

⁸¹ Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa*, p. 531.

⁸² Elizabeth Fuller Collins, “Islam is the Solution” *Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia*, in *Kultur: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures*, Vol. 3 no 1, 2003, p. 158.

⁸³ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

⁸⁴ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

rather open to rather restricted by the implementation of the Semester Credit System (Sistem Kredit Semester, SKS), under which students only had 4 years (8 semesters) to finish their studies, failing which they would be disenrolled. The Semester Credit System policy ensured that students no longer had the time to engage in political activities outside campus giving them limited opportunities to become too much involved in the *dakwah* movement. Even though its members were still active in mentoring and training, they (of course) realised they were increasingly susceptible to state intervention.⁸⁵

In 1978, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, the foremost figure in the Salman Mosque, was detained by the police and incarcerated for 14 months for criticising President Soeharto in a speech he had delivered a Yogyakarta.⁸⁶ In his speech which he held at Gadjah Mada University in May 1978, Imaduddin stated “Anyone who prepares a grave before s/he dies resembles Pharaoh.”⁸⁷ Although Imaduddin did not explicitly mention Soeharto, the security service inferred that the statement was directed at Soeharto due to the fact that the President had made preparations for his final resting place on the Astana Giri Bangun premises on Mount Lawu, near Solo. On 23 May 1978, upon his return to Bandung, Bang Imad was arrested in his home.⁸⁸ In response to the situation unfavourable to Salman’s interests, the movement adopted a low profile. Since then LMD activities were terminated.

Imaduddin was released in July 1979 with the help of Prof. Doddy Tisna Amidjaya, the ITB Rector. Prof. Tisna came to see Admiral Sudomo and appealed for Imaduddin’s release, proposing to send him overseas to pursue his PhD. Initially Sudomo rejected the appeal because he felt Imaduddin was too critical of the government. However, he finally accepted it after being persuaded to do so by Tisna.⁸⁹ Tisna then saw Daoed Joesoef, the Minister of Education and Culture, and asked him for a PhD scholarship for Imaduddin. Daoed declined, saying that “With only a Master’s Degree he already rebelled, what might he do after having obtained a Doctorate?”⁹⁰ In 1980, with the help of

⁸⁵ Interview, Ahmad Noe’man, Bandung, 18 June 2009.

⁸⁶ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

⁸⁷ Lutfi, *Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia*, p. 39.

⁸⁸ *Idem*.

⁸⁹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 43.

⁹⁰ *Idem*.

Mohammad Natsir, Imaduddin, who was in the US in the 1960s, eventually returned to Iowa State University on a PhD scholarship from the King Faisal Foundation and with additional financial assistance from the Minister of Religious Affairs of Kuwait, with whom Natsir happened to be personally acquainted.⁹¹ With Bang Imad's departure, the Salman *dakwah* movement underwent a gradual shift in its ways of operation and in its orientation.

Since Bang Imad was detained and subsequently sent overseas to pursue his PhD, Ahmad Sadali assumed an important leadership role. In 1979, Salman's LMD training program resumed under the new name 'Studi Islam Intensif' (SII, Intensive Islamic Study) to avoid surveillance while member recruitment resumed. In 1981, training and mentoring activities also targeted secondary and high school students as well as elementary students with programs such as Salman Islamic Youth Family (Keluarga Remaja Islam Salman, KARISMA) and Nurturing Salman Children (Pembinaan Anak-anak Salman, PAS). Because of these activities, the Salman Movement's popularity increased among students and it succeeded in implanting its influence in society. KARISMA's way of mentoring quickly became the frontrunner in guidance activities for Islamic youth in West Java in particular and in Indonesia in general.⁹² These programs attracted thousands of students and continued throughout the decade. Even today, KARISMA still has more than 1000 members while PAS has more than 500.⁹³

Ahmad Sadali's leadership was uneventful and because of his calm character fitting to the unfavourable political situation. Ahmad Sadali and his brother Ahmad Noe'man came from Garut, West Java and had been admitted to the ITB in the 1950s. Sadali and Noe'man's father was a Modernist member of the Muhammadiyah and a religious leader in their hometown. While Noe'man was admitted to the Department of Architecture at the ITB, Sadali was admitted at the Department of Visual Arts. Sadali's intellectual and leadership visions differed from Imaduddin's as the latter adopted a tough approach while Sadali

⁹¹ *Idem*, p. 44.

⁹² *Salman Review*, Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman, Edition 02/2009, p. 7.

⁹³ I would like to express many thanks to Budhiana Kartawijaya who gave me an unpublished article by Sudarmono Sasmono entitled 'Salman, Sebuah Masjid dalam Sebuah Catatan Kaki', during my interview with him in Bandung, 29 October 2010.

preferred the soft touch. His vision was built on a simple combination of what was termed 'faith, reason and feeling'.⁹⁴ Hence, it is no wonder that in the 1980s Salman's *dakwah* activities had more of an intellectual and cultural bent, rather than a political one. Aside from religious classes, the 1980s saw the Salman Mosque promote social and cultural activities such as classical music, vocal group and life music performances, mountain climbing, and the like.⁹⁵ The Mosque also paid particular attention to knowledge and competence aspects rather than to political activism.

The 1980s saw interesting progress when the campus *dakwah* movement was further disseminated to other campuses across and outside Java. Campus mosques that stood out with regards to the Salman Mosque *dakwah* movement were: Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque (ARH), on the campus of the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta; al-Ghifari Mosque, on the Institut Pertanian campus in Bogor (IPB); Jamaah Shalahuddin, on the Gadjah Mada University campus in Yogyakarta; and the al-Falah Mosque in Surabaya. Because the Islamic study activities were conducted simultaneously by student activists across these locations, the campus *dakwah* movement spread out fast. During the 1980s and 1990s, the *dakwah* effort was reinforced by the establishment of Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK, Campus Islamic Propagation League) across secular universities. Salman Mosque activists who had previously been involved in the LMD played a crucial role in this reinforcement process. Within and outside Jakarta, the LMD alumni reinforced the *dakwah* movement not only through the establishment of the LDK but also by means of offering religious activities on their respective campuses, which appealed to students.

The introduction of the Salman Mosque *dakwah* movement into the UI and the IPB was a strategic step made by LMD activists. However, while it is true that former LMD activists facilitated the proliferation of the Salman *dakwah* movement, Salman did not set out to propagate a single solid and coherent notion of its Islamic ideology with which it tried to resist the New Order regime's push towards social and political hegemony.

⁹⁴ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

⁹⁵ *Idem*.

The Salman movement failed to notice that by not adopting a solid ideology of its own, it was prone to influence by other groups of *dakwah*-inspired students. These students had been trained in universities in the Middle East and were convinced of the ideology of the Ikhwanul Muslimin. Because Salman did not realise this they found themselves in competition with these graduates from the Middle East. This early 'infiltration', in its part, shaped the gradual and tangible shift in the direction and orientation of the campus *dakwah* movement in Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta, and in other parts of Java, led by graduates from Islamic universities in the Middle East, who leaned towards Ikhwanul Muslimin's ideology and movement.

In Jakarta, the ARH Mosque at the UI played a leading role in the redirection and reorientation of the campus *dakwah* model previously developed by the Salman Mosque. The ARH mosque was built in 1968 and named after a Muslim activist who was killed during the students' protest against Soekarno demanding the extermination of Indonesian Communist Party after the failed coup attempt in 1965.⁹⁶ Aay Muhammad Furkon reveals that the ARH mosque was built with DDII support. The presence of these mosques on and around campuses was achieved by courtesy of the DDII and thus strengthened DDII's *dakwah* activities.⁹⁷ Since the mid-1970s, the DDII had facilitated the Islamisation of campuses through the promotion of strategic initiatives, such as aforementioned *Bina Masjid Kampus*,⁹⁸ an integrated *dakwah* program consisting of building mosques as said above, Islamic predication and the training of *dakwah* activists. These initiatives continued from the 1980s onward. With its influence and religious resources, the DDII managed to control the Islamic discourse in the mosque, particularly during Friday prayers, after it was authorised to select preachers (*da'i*) for the Friday sermons.⁹⁹ Although LMD alumni, such as Aus Hidayat Nur and Zaenal Muttaqien, kept control over the administration of the mosque's activities, the DDII played a definite role

⁹⁶ Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa*, p. 532.

⁹⁷ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 126-127.

⁹⁸ *Idem*.

⁹⁹ Y. Setyo Hadi, *Masjid Kampus untuk Ummat dan Bangsa (Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim UI)*, (Jakarta: Masjid ARH UI dan LKB Nusantara, 2000), p. 103. See also: Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 62.

in the reproduction of Islamic discourse. With these LMD alumni and DDII mentors, the leadership of the ARH mosque pushed the *dakwah* by means of recruitment and network-building. Recruitment was carried out through various activities, such as group study meetings and discussions known as *tadabbur* and *halaqah*.¹⁰⁰ These study clubs drew the attention of great numbers of students in the following years.

From 1976 to 1980, at least six mosques were built on and around campuses in Jakarta, Depok, Bogor and Bandung with the support of the DDII.¹⁰¹ Over time, these became the centres for the expansion of the LDK. In Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta, the presence of mosques and the LDK on the universities' premises caused a significant shift in the orientation of student activities. Students grew more receptive to mosque activities, which were different from those offered by intra-campus student organisations. As a result, *dakwah* activities at universities in these three cities produced young Muslim activists and intellectuals who later became public figures and politicians, including present-day Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS) members of parliament such as Mahfudz Siddik, Muzammil Yusuf, Radzikun, Fahri Hamzah, Mustafa Kamal, Zulkiflimansyah, Priatna, Suswono, and Rama Pratama.¹⁰²

In Jakarta the LDK promoted the donning of the *jilbab* among female students. In his account, Ali Said Damanik presents an interesting case about this expression of identity.¹⁰³ Damanik cites the transformation of identity as experienced by female students at the Polytechnic Faculty at UI, as the consequence of their sustained participation in religious activities conducted by the faculty's LDK. It is said that almost none of the female students wore headscarfs when they were admitted to the faculty. Shortly before they graduated, however, almost all of them sported the *jilbab* and thus had accepted a

¹⁰⁰ *Tadabbur* is an Arabic word that means 'to contemplate'; it is a religious session which offers reflective and spiritual exercises for its participants. A *halaqa* is a discussion circle. Furkon mentions Aus Hidayat Nur and Zaenal Muttaqien as alumni of Salman LMD training programs who later became the leading figures of the ARH *halaqa* activity. See Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 131.

¹⁰¹ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, pp. 126-127. See above.

¹⁰² Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), p. 32.

¹⁰³ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, p. 179.

dress code that had been strange for them in the past.¹⁰⁴ This phenomenon was not only a matter of changing the style of dress, but rather constitutes the expression of a new Muslim female identity. This illustrates the crucial transformative role of the mosque and the LDK in 'Islamising' the female students of a secular university.

The campus *dakwah* movement grew rapidly during the late 1980s up to the 1990s because of the fertile spiritual Islamic ground as a result of the prohibition put on the students of being engaged in politics. R. William Liddle, termed this the 'Islamic turn',¹⁰⁵ with its slogan 'back to the mosque in anticipation of the fifteenth century Islamic revival'. In the 1980s and 1990s, this slogan had been popularised by mosque youth activists and grew prolifically. Large mosques such as the Al-Azhar, Cut Meutia, and Sunda Kelapa in Jakarta; Al-Istiqamah and Mujahidin in Bandung; Syuhada in Yogyakarta; and Al-Falah in Surabaya turned into new public venues for the guidance of Muslim youth through training sessions and mentoring activities adopted from the campus mosque movement. With the formation of the Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Body (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia, BKPMI, 1977), chaired by Salman Mosque figure, Toto Tasmara, Islamist ideas spread out even further through the activities of the mosque. The BKPMI also became a conduit for the ideas of Muslim movements from other parts of the Muslim world, especially that of the Ikhwan. Under Tasmara's leadership, the BKPMI even officially adopted the idea of *usroh* as developed by the Ikhwan in Egypt.¹⁰⁶

The Shift in *Dakwah* Orientation

The Leading Role of Middle East Graduates

The Soeharto regime favoured the *dakwah* movement as it did not seem to have any political agenda and because it agreed with the regime's politics of religion; to stop the comeback of Communism and Islamist

¹⁰⁴ *Idem*. A very good study of Javanese women and the *jilbab* is Nancy J. Smith-Hefner's 'Javanese women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia' in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May 2007): 389-420.

¹⁰⁵ R. William Liddle, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug. 1996), pp. 613-634.

¹⁰⁶ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 137.

ideologies. Political developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s seemed to oppose the regime's expectation. In late 1979, the 'normalisation of campus life' policy radicalised students activism. The *asas tunggal* campaign in the early 1980s had a major impact on Muslim activism, radicalising its politics and provoking the re-emergence of Darul Islam/NII activists. Consequently, *dakwah* activism risked being infiltrated by *jihadi* cells.¹⁰⁷ The student movement became increasingly weary of Soeharto and his cronies and their rampant corruption and they reacted by taking more radical steps. This was the more so when *dakwah* leaders like Imaduddin had become involved. This 'radicalisation' of the students increased significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because of this, the regime boosted a *dakwah* movement that was strongly devoted to religious orientations rather than to political activism. The Iranian revolution which started in 1979 caused Soeharto to fear the emergence of intellectual Muslim activists who, inspired by the Iranian revolution, had embraced an Islamic universalist and fundamentalist creed to seek revolutionary social change in Indonesia. Liddle observes:

Islamic universalism is a powerful creed on university campuses, especially at two major national universities in West Java, the Bandung Institute of Technology and the Bogor Agricultural Institute. Campus mosques at both institutions are well-known centres of Islamic study where, many believe, a new breed of religiously-devout *cum* technologically-sophisticated leaders of the *umat* is being created. The universalists have translated the writings of the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati, and still follow closely the Iranian Islamic revolution.¹⁰⁸

This socio-political background seems to have favoured religious-oriented movements such as the Tarbiyah to continue to exist and flourish and in time to replace the 'radicalised' campus *dakwah*

¹⁰⁷ From the mid-to-late-1980s, the Salman Mosque became the arena for the rivalry between former Darul Islam/NII activists and Islamists from various transnational Muslim movements. Bambang Pranggono and Toto Tasmara are known to have been among the Darul Islam/NII proponents who sought to imbue the Salman community with their vision even if their effort did not succeed. Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

¹⁰⁸ R. William Liddle, *Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics* (Australia: Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1996), pp. 75-76.

movement.¹⁰⁹ The Tarbiyah was born out of this context and was established by graduates from Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria in the early 1980s.¹¹⁰ The leaders of the Tarbiyah initiated a new phase in the history of the *dakwah* movement in Indonesia and transformed the simple *usroh* model into a Tarbiyah model, thus hijacking, or say capitalising on the existing *dakwah* resources built up by Salman activists. This meant a shift away from the model of the campus *dakwah* movement that the Salman Movement promoted towards the pattern of the Tarbiyah inspired by the method (*manhaj*) of the Ikhwan.¹¹¹ Tarbiyah activists utilised the *dakwah* network that had already been established by LMD alumni all over West Java and in Jakarta. Some Muslim figures who were involved as Tarbiyah trainers include Buya Malik Ahmad, Rahmat Abdullah, and Hilmi Aminuddin, as well as M. Daud Ali and Nurhay Abdurrahman who played important roles in activist training.¹¹² Over time, the Tarbiyah began to gain ground in the ARH. This was reflected in the 'defection' of former LMD activists, among others Aus Hidayat Nur from the faculty of History and Literature, who became actively involved with the Tarbiyah.¹¹³

In this shifting *dakwah* context, Salman's pre-eminence in the campus *dakwah* movement declined in the early 1990s. Especially after the death of Ahmad Sadali, Salman Movement's leadership weakened and failed to be consistent with the established Salman *dakwah* vision and cadre recruitment.¹¹⁴ This was not surprising since his successor, Professor Iftikar Zotalaksana, then-chairman of Salman Mosque

¹⁰⁹ This notion came up in discussions I had with Van Bruinessen in Singapore in 2011.

¹¹⁰ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 132.

¹¹¹ Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 89.

¹¹² Buya was an activist with a Masyumi and Muhammadiyah background who strongly advised the Muhammadiyah not to accept the *Asas Tunggal*, the sole socio-political ideology Soeharto promoted. Rahmat Abdullah and Hilmi Aminuddin were fresh graduates of the Islamic University of Medinah, Saudi Arabia. M. Daud Ali and Nurhay Abdurrahman had participated in DDII training sessions in the late 1960s and were appointed campus *Dakwah* coordinators in Jakarta. See Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 132. See also Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS*, p. 28.

¹¹³ Aus Hidayat Nur was a UI student. He later became a PKS activist. See Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, p. 174.

¹¹⁴ Sasmono, 'Salman, Sebuah Masjid dalam Sebuah Catatan Kaki.'

Construction Foundation (YPM), was not a well-trained Salman activist.¹¹⁵ The movement's most important leadership training program, Intensive Islamic Study (Studi Islam Intensif, SII), began to suffer. The SII, which had been a successful cadre recruitment mechanism until this time, received insufficient attention from the Salman leadership.

The Promotion of the Ikhwan Vision

Intense cultural exchange between Indonesian and Middle Eastern countries paved the way for intellectual exchange, especially from the Middle East to Indonesia. The introduction of the thoughts of Ikhwan's intellectuals, including Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, to campus *dakwah* activists was one such exchange. In Bandung, the early spread of the Ikhwan ideology, however, was very much the result of ties between the Salman Mosque and the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), which had been established in 1972. Imaduddin had lived for two years in Malaysia and had had intellectual exchange with ABIM's activists.¹¹⁶ His connection with international Islamic organisations, such as the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (IIFSO), in which he served as General Secretary (1977-78), and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) enabled him to become acquainted with the Ikhwan ideology.¹¹⁷ Salman activist, Hermawan Dipoyono, who Imaduddin had sent to Malaysia, stated that there, he found books authored by Qutb, Al-Banna, and Sa'id Hawwa.¹¹⁸ He took them home with him but at that time they could not be translated and published due to the regime's surveillance measures against radical Islam. It was in this political setting that activists began to organise themselves in cells, popularly known as *usroh*.

The *usroh* concept had been imported from Malaysia by another Salman activist, Toto Tasmara. In Malaysia, *usroh* had been adopted earlier because many Malaysian activists had studied at Middle Eastern universities.¹¹⁹ *Usroh* was initially a vehicle of Islamic propagation,

¹¹⁵ *Idem*.

¹¹⁶ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹¹⁷ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Fuller Collins, *Indonesia Betrayed: How Development Fails* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), p. 156.

¹¹⁹ See *usroh* on footnote 79 above.

which originated from the thought of Hasan Al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan. *Usroh* groups were formed based on religious class groups and consisted of five to eight people led by a *murabbi* (teacher), who was their more senior mentor.¹²⁰ The students realised that the government was not in favour of any radical ideas and of some of the Arabic books authored by Ikhwan members and thus the students only dared to translate part of these books and to circulate them among Salman activists and *usroh* groups.¹²¹ However, the spread of Ikhwan ideas was impeded by the covert nature of the *usroh* networks and the fact that Qutb's books could not be reproduced in full. The dissemination of Ikhwan discourse increased significantly only after the publication of the Indonesian translation of Qutb's *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts along the Road or *Petunjuk Jalan* in Indonesian) and other Ikhwan writings by the DDII's publishing house in the early 1980s.

It was under these circumstances that *dakwah* activities began to meet transnational radical thought, although its influence was not yet significant.¹²² During this era of leadership (1992-96), there was an endeavour by Tarbiyah activists to subvert Salman's *dakwah* vision. This was possible because some Salman activists at that time were affiliated with the Campus Islamic Propagation League (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) of the UI, which they had joined when still at senior high school in Jakarta before moving on to study at the ITB. Since the 1980s, the LDK of the UI has been known to be an important centre for Tarbiyah cadre recruitment. In Jakarta Tarbiyah mentors were able to manage and control the LDK of the UI and they used it as its recruitment and reproduction centre for the new generation of Muslim activists with a vision different from that of Salman's. Hilmi Aminuddin and Rahmat Abdullah are known to have been the main mentors in the Tarbiyah recruitment training sessions in Jakarta.

By the late 1980s, the Tarbiyah had consolidated its presence at the ITB. This enabled it to temporarily control Salman Movement's leadership and to modify its vision and orientation between 1992 and 1996.¹²³ One big change was the de-emphasising of Salman's intellectual and cultural commitment and a shift in emphasis to *harakah*

¹²⁰ Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

¹²¹ Collins, 'Islam is the Solution', p. 156.

¹²² *Idem*, p. 156.

¹²³ Sasmono, 'Salman, Sebuah Masjid dalam Sebuah Catatan Kaki'.

(political activism) and to a *shari'ah* mind-set. The consequence of this shift was that the movement acquired a more exclusive character at the expense of its inclusive tolerance. Gender segregation, for example, was strictly observed. Salman's office hours were divided into female (*akhwat*) and male (*ikhwan*) ones.¹²⁴ Boys and girls were still able to interact or communicate but could not make eye contact. Budhiana, a former Salman activist now heading the YPM research and development department, recounted that where an *akhwat* needed her *ikhwan*'s signature for work, this was done with their faces turned away from each other.¹²⁵

Tarbiyah means education or training. This movement's vision and ideology are very much the same as those of the Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, the socio-religious movement established by Hassan Al-Banna. In the early 1980s Tarbiyah activists returned home having graduated from universities in the Middle East. They joined the *dakwah* activism organised by the LDK on campuses across Java. One important centre of Tarbiyah activism was the LDK of the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque. When the New Order regime collapsed in 1998, the Tarbiyah movement declared the foundation of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan - PK; from 2004 onwards, Prosperity and Justice Party - PKS) which the LDK supported. This political manoeuvre of the Tarbiyah movement once again underlines its difference from Salman which from the outset emphasised that it was a religious, cultural and intellectual movement and not a political one. When its alumni who were active in the PK/PKS pulled out of the Salman Movement to join – or support – the Tarbiyah movement's party, the Salman leadership firmly refused because it considered itself the property of the entire Muslim community and not of any specific Islamic party or Muslim group.¹²⁶ The leaders of the Salman Mosque rejected any political alliance and firmly maintained their commitment to remain neutral towards all Muslim political

¹²⁴ Interview, Budhiana Kartawijaya, Bandung, 29 October 2010.

¹²⁵ *Idem*.

¹²⁶ According to Ahmad Nuruddin, Chairman of the Badan Pengurus Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman ITB, his side was strongly opposed to the efforts of PKS sympathisers in Salman circles who tried to drag the Salman community into politics. 'I was confrontational towards them', he said. Interview, Ahmad Nuruddin, Bandung, 6 April 2009.

forces.¹²⁷ For them, alliance to a particular party would cause Salman to take sides which would violate its inclusive vision.

What Made the Shift Possible?

Readers may want to know why the Tarbiyah was able to displace the prominent position of the Salman *dakwah* movement among campus activists. The reason is because the Salman Movement was an open-minded institution and liberal in its orientation. The Movement did not insist on a single reference or orientation of the Islamic ideology of its members because it did not have a coherent and solid ideology of its own as mentioned above. As a consequence, the Movement became a breeding ground for diverse intellectual discourses as well as various ideological orientations. Its alumni, who spread out to mosques on campuses all over Indonesia, were free to choose or promote whatever intellectual or ideological orientation on their return to their respective universities. The Salman movement's role as a centre of Muslim activism turned it into fertile soil for the reproduction of a wide range of discourses. It is true that from early on, the Salman Movement's young intellectuals had been under the guidance of Mohammad Natsir who was inclined to adopt a strict Modernist understanding of Islam. But Natsir, as Hefner emphasised, was also a more open minded intellectual than his colleague, Isa Anshari. Similarly, although Imaduddin, the most influential of all Salman leaders, had a short fuse, he was nonetheless relatively intellectually open-minded as Miftah Faridl, his close friend stressed.¹²⁸ Evidently, he displayed no hostility to Nurcholish's basic argument for Islamic reform, whereas his friends Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Abdul Qadir Jaelani were vehemently opposed to Nurcholish's thoughts. The charismatic Imaduddin showed his aptitude to act as mediator when tension among his friends mounted. When conflict arose after Nurcholish had expressed his reform ideas, Imaduddin took the initiative to reconcile Nurcholish and his opponents in his house in Bandung shortly before he left for Malaysia in the early 1970s.¹²⁹ By so doing, Imaduddin had revealed

¹²⁷ *Idem*.

¹²⁸ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹²⁹ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 34.

leadership and intellectualism that configured the Salman Mosque's intellectual orientation.

At times, articulations of radical Islam indeed did surface in the Salman Movement such as passages of Ikhwan books mentioned above, but, once again, there were no strong radical tendencies as there was no solid ideological soil in which radicalism could take root. It seems that the radical tendencies that did emerge came up as a means of opposition to the New Order regime's brutal oppression of student movements. It is undeniable that the Salman Movement initiated the introduction of Ikhwan Islamist thought among Muslim student activists in Indonesia.¹³⁰ LMD training sessions, for instance, clearly emulated the *dakwah* method of the Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslimin but its training materials were not derived from the Ikhwan but were in part compiled by Imaduddin and Miftah Faridl¹³¹ while part of them were modifications of the Basic Struggle Values of the Muslim Student Association (NDP-HMI) drawn up by Nurcholish Madjid and friends as mentioned above.¹³²

No single Ikhwan figure became a fixed point of reference. The Salman Movement not only embraced aspects (adoption of *shari'ah* law, return to the core sources of Islam, the Quran and *hadith* and the instalment of Islamic social justice and so forth) of the politically-oriented discourse of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, it also appreciated the less politicised and more religious Albani, the progressive Yusuf al-Qardhawi, and the rationalist Juhaili. At the same time, Salman Mosque's publishing house, *Pustaka*, published the Indonesian translation of *Islam*, the book written by the liberal thinker Fazlur Rahman. Imaduddin, considered one of Salman Mosque's most Islamist-oriented leaders, was in fact proud of the Pakistani-born intellectual, who had fled Pakistan to settle in the USA seeking to renew his Islamic thought.¹³³ When he was in the USA to pursue his PhD in the 1980s, Imaduddin became acquainted with Fazlur Rahman at Chicago University and he invited him to deliver a lecture at his *alma mater*, the State University of Iowa. The reason for the Salman Movement's inclusive attitude is that, according to the chairman of the Salman

¹³⁰ Latif, *Inteligensia, Muslim dan Kuasa*, p. 534.

¹³¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Faridl, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

¹³² Interview, Sakib Machmud, Bandung, 21 July 2009.

¹³³ Smith (et al.), *Bang Imad*, p. 48.

Mosque Islamic Propagation Development Board, 'As long as it is possible from a rational point of view, we accept anybody.'¹³⁴ Thus, rather than standing for radical Islamism, on the contrary, the Salman Movement facilitated the pluralisation of Islamic thought because Salman activists realised its reality. Salman activists argue that under this condition the "Salman Movement was no longer the undivided point of orientation; there were many models and we here realised that we were no longer the only one."¹³⁵

Against this backdrop, signs of polarisation within the *dakwah* movement resurfaced in the 1980s, when Muslim activists and intellectuals failed to cope with the growing pluralisation and politicalisation within the movement. Apart from the Tarbiyah, polarisation within the *dakwah* movement gave birth to the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) and the Salafis.¹³⁶ The HTI was founded in 1983 in Bogor at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB) and it used Pesantren Alghazali in Bogor as its religious stronghold. The HTI's founding fathers are the Abdullah bin Nuh, the head of the *pesantren* and lecturer in Arabic literature at the UI, Abd al-Rahman al-Baghdadi, Hizbut Tahrir activist from Australia, and Mustafa Bin Nuh's son who studied in Jordan and who was involved in the Hizbut Tahrir movement there.¹³⁷ Al-Baghdadi later joined the teaching staff at LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab/the Institute of the Study of Islam and Arab).¹³⁸

The HTI's expansion also rode on campus *dakwah* networks that began to flourish in the course of the 1980s. HTI shares much with other campus movements in terms of its concern about leadership, fraternity, and intellectualism. It differs profoundly from other *dakwah* groups in its goal, which is the reestablishment of the world-wide

¹³⁴ Interview, Asep Zainal Aushof, Chief of the Salman Mosque's Islamic Propagation Development Board, Bandung, 07 April 2009.

¹³⁵ *Idem*.

¹³⁶ These *harakah* groups include Hizbut Tahrir, Salafiah, Ikhwanul Muslimin, Tarbiyah, Darul Arqam, and Jamaah Tabligh. See, *Tempo* magazine, 3. 4. 1993, as quoted by Rifki Rosyad (1995), p. 44.

¹³⁷ Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, pp. 100-107.

¹³⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006), p. 48.

Caliphate.¹³⁹ For the Hizbut Tahrir, the Islamic Caliphate is the ideal form of government and it considers it obligatory to fight for it. The struggle to reinstall the Caliphate is to be accomplished in three phases: *first*, build a cadre, *second* interaction with society, while the *third* phase is the takeover of power.

Initially, HTI activists joined the Tarbiyah in its use of the campus *dakwah* network, which originated in Salman's LMD in order to disseminate their ideas and to recruit members. However, competition eventually saw HTI part ways with the others. The Tarbiyah formed the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), whereas the student activists of the Hizbut Tahrir formed the Student Movement for Liberation (Gema Pembebasan). In order to organise *dakwah* on the campuses, Tarbiyah cells congregated in the Campus Islamic Propagation Board Friendship Forum (Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus Daerah, FSLDK) while HTI students gathered in the Campus Islamic Propagation Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, BKLDK).¹⁴⁰

Although some alumni from the Salman Mosque joined the HTI, there was neither cooperation nor confrontation between the two. However, politically, the Hizbut Tahrir is clearly more radical than the Tarbiyah. Nevertheless, Hizbut Tahrir activists do not resort to force to intervene with the Salman Movement and therefore the Salman Movement is careful to maintain good relations with its alumni who are active in the Hizbut Tahrir even though relations are 'limited to mere discussions.'¹⁴¹

Apart from transnational politics, Muslim activism's national political arena was extended with the return of Darul Islam underground cells. Sources close to Darul Islam's old leaders claimed that in the 1970s, the movement "had already shown signs of

¹³⁹ Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, 'Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia', Working paper. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*.

¹⁴¹ Interview, K.H. Miftah Farid, Bandung, 4 April 2009.

revival.”¹⁴² For this reason, it is possible that Gen. Ali Moertopo rebuilt the Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII) organisation only to crush it later, ironically, after he initially intended to use it to counter Communism.¹⁴³ The crackdown of more than a hundred ex-Darul Islam followers only a few months before the 1977 elections hints at the proponents’ aims of the reactivation of ex-Darul Islam.¹⁴⁴ Regardless, some cells went underground due to military oppression and looked for safe shelter in campus *dakwah* movements. This specific aspect has not yet been studied in full but probably deserves more attention than it has received so far.

The picture that does emerge when we look a bit further in history is the following. In the 1970s, the Salman Mosque was in danger of being used for recruitment by DI/NII activists known under the name of Darul Islam (DI) Muda (Young Darul Islam).¹⁴⁵ This group, as its name suggests, inherited the DI/NII ideology of Kartosoewirjo who had declared the founding of the NII in May 1948 in Garut, West Java. In 1962-63, the government obliterated the group but the NII ideology did not die but was rather transmitted to a new generation that shared its dreams of an Islamic state.¹⁴⁶ They tried but failed to infiltrate the Salman Mosque which, at that time, indeed tended towards radical action.

Although they managed to recruit a number of Salman Mosque activists, they failed to prevail over the Salman Movement ideologically because of their militancy.¹⁴⁷ An ex-NII activist admitted that, in the end, “we became disappointed with the Salman Movement and were more compatible with the Shiites.”¹⁴⁸ According to one NII activist, the Shiite revolutionary spirit that had succeeded in toppling Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran in 1979 had drawn the NII to its teachings and they had

¹⁴² International Crisis Group, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’, *Indonesia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002, p. 5.

¹⁴³ *Idem*.

¹⁴⁴ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 346.

¹⁴⁵ Interview, anonymous, a former follower of NII and former activist of the Salman Mosque, Bandung, 12 April 2009.

¹⁴⁶ Interview, Asep Zainal Aushof, The Chief of Salman Mosque Islamic Propagation Development Board, Bandung, 07 April 2009.

¹⁴⁷ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

¹⁴⁸ Interview, anonymous, a former follower of NII and former activist of the Salman Mosque, Bandung, 12 April 2009.

started to build communications with Shiite leaders in Bandung. In fact, Shiite teaching attracted activists not only from NII but also from Salman Movement backgrounds. The Salman Mosque organised studies on Shiism, and pictures of Imam Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, started to appear on book covers and on the vehicles of student activists. The Salman Movement again revealed its open-minded character by allowing Shiite admirers (and followers) to use its forums. It even translated and published books from authors with a Shiite background, such as Ali Shariati and Murtadha Muthahari along with those from Ikhwan and Salafi backgrounds and liberal thinkers.

The Salafi Movement was born in the context of rising Shiite influence. It originated from LIPIA in Jakarta, which is a branch of the Muhammad Ibnu Saud University in Riyadh. This Saudi-funded college played the most crucial role as the agent for the ‘salafisation’ of Muslim activists. This group has been present in secular universities across Java since the early 1980s and increased its presence in the early 1990s.¹⁴⁹

In training activities conducted in the 1980s, graduates from Saudi Arabia and Egypt sometimes combined principles stemming from both Salafi “true Islamic” theology and the Ikhwan model of activism and training. This collaboration was undertaken for the promotion of *halaqah* and *daurah* at campuses. The orientation of their training program was popularly labelled “*Aqidah Salafi, Manhaj Ikhwani*.” (Salafi in belief, Ikhwan in methodology).¹⁵⁰ This brand explicitly shows the influences of two of the most important trans-national Islamist movements, the Saudi-based Salafi and the Egyptian Ikhwan, and at the same time indexes the further political and social differentiation of both groups. According to a Salman Mosque activist who later became a Salafi figure, Salafi teachings started to enter West Java in the early 1990s. The Salman Mosque itself had by that time already become mixed with various other movements so that the presence of the Salafis was not all too obvious.¹⁵¹

Distinct from Tarbiyah, HTI and the NII, the Salafi Movement is ‘a-political’ and spends all its resources to engage in the direct propagation of pure Islam, even by going from door to door. In contrast to Modernist Islamic groups who refer to the Quran and the *Sunnah* by

¹⁴⁹ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

¹⁵⁰ *Idem*. See also Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, p. 53.

¹⁵¹ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

using their own reasoning (such as the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS), or Traditionalists who refer to their religious experts (*ulama* such as the NU), the Salafis claim to understand the Quran through the interpretation of the close companions of the Prophet. Salafis are Revivalists who consider the way of life during the lifetime of the Prophet and his close companion as ideal. Hence, Salafis supplant into the present what they imagine to have been the way of life during the Prophet's time, for instance by dressing themselves as they think the close companions of the Prophet dressed and by adopting the close companions' interpretation of their morals.¹⁵²

The Salafis claim to follow the example of the Prophet by engaging in *dakwah*.¹⁵³ Like the Modernist Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, the Salafis refuse to observe religious celebrations they consider deceitfully innovative (*bid'a*) such as *mauludan* and *tahlilan*. Moreover, they reject music, which they consider prohibited by religion and they are opposed to Sufi orders. The Salafis are not a single entity. Some Salafi take an a-political stance and focus fully on *dakwah*; others take the radical road, such as Jafar Umar Thalib, who founded Laskar Jihad, which was involved in the religious conflicts in Ambon.¹⁵⁴

Although some Salman Mosque activists became Salafi, the Salman Movement has no organisational ties with them. Abu Chaidar, a Salman activist who was attracted to Salafi teachings, swiftly left Salman for the LIPIA where he immersed himself in Salafi teachings and subsequently became the most prominent Salafi teacher in West Java. He used to consider the Salman Mosque as his most ideal 'home', but nowadays, after having reached maturity, his most ideal 'house' is that of the Salafi. He was also formerly active in PERSIS' religious activities, but after having studied at LIPIA he abandoned it because, he insisted, of the deviant *aqidah* PERSIS held.¹⁵⁵ For him, PERSIS' religious teachings conform largely to the interpretation of its religious teachers and are not based on the Prophetic traditions and the understanding of his pious companions. Concerning *aqidah*, Abu Chaidar also criticised the articulation of *tauhid* as promoted by Imaduddin in his popular

¹⁵² *Idem*.

¹⁵³ *Idem*.

¹⁵⁴ Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, pp. 185-213.

¹⁵⁵ Interview, Abu Chaidar, Bandung, 14 April 2009.

book *Kuliah Tauhid*.¹⁵⁶ For Abu Chaidar, Imaduddin has no background in religious training so his teaching about *tauhid* has no strong foundation. Abu Chaidar also criticises the PKS for its use of Islam for its political interests. More recently, the ITB campus for the first time witnessed the increased presence of the Salafi community on its premises, although the total number of Salafi members did not increase significantly.¹⁵⁷

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the Salman Movement is a sustained effort to promote Islamisation and to articulate Muslims' religious identity and social interests in the big cities where the new middle class was taking shape and educated generations of observing Muslims began to come to towns in pursuit of tertiary education.¹⁵⁸ This *dakwah* movement contributed to at least three achievements in the process of deepening Islamisation. The *first* was in influencing the Islamisation of the educated classes, particularly those with nominal Muslim backgrounds, at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). The movement offered a moral foundation amidst rapid social change, rampant state corruption, and moral degeneration within society through a proper understanding of the values of *tauhid*, personal devotion, and piety.

Second, by emphasising *tauhid*, the movement did not pretend to promote any single ideology. This stand, however, meant that the vision of the Salman Movement was at times diluted by intruding ideologies such as those of the Tarbiyah, Hizbut Tahrir, Salafis, Shiites and the NII. Nonetheless, it is certain that the Salman Movement stands apart and remains true to its identity. It remains part of the overall Muslim community and is not appropriated by nor allied with any specific Islamist group. However, by not adopting a particular Islamist ideology, the Salman Movement failed to keep its alumni from aligning themselves with the above models of *dakwah* activism, which were attractive to some but not all of them. But again, the Salman movement, by not aligning itself with any specific Islamist group, became home to Muslim communities from different backgrounds, accommodating a

¹⁵⁶ See Abdulrahim, *Kuliah Tauhid*.

¹⁵⁷ Interview, Ahmad Nuruddin, Bandung, 6 April 2009.

¹⁵⁸ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 123.

variety of different and even opposing thoughts, and remained consistent with its vision as an open, non-sectarian, cultural-intellectual movement aloof from partisan politics.

Thirdly, with its characteristic open-minded vision, the Salman Movement was instrumental in the creation of *Dakwahism* and was instrumental in providing the setting for the expansion of various *dakwah* networks spanning Islamic activities on campuses and on senior high schools in and around Bandung. It is worth considering whether the Salman movement influenced, or was independent from, the process of deepening Islamisation across rural West Java, such as Lembang and Sumedang. If the Islamisation of these rural areas occurred independently of the Salman movement, both can be understood within the wider context of social transformation and the further and intensified Islamisation of West Java. However, as the question remains, further research is recommended in order to provide a clearer understanding of the Islamisation process of West Java. For example, if the Salman movement contributed to the Islamisation of these areas, it is still unclear how the Salman Mosque's *dakwah* networks worked towards the Islamisation process in rural West Java.

CHAPTER FIVE

ISLAMISING LEMBANG: OBSERVING *ALIRAN KEBATINAN*'S DECLINE AND ITS STRUGGLE TO REVIVE IN RURAL WEST JAVA (1998-2011)

Above we have seen the impact of the New Order's policy on religions on deeper Islamisation and on the steady development of *Dakwahism* after Muslim student leaders took the initiative in leading campus *dakwah* and transformed the ITB into the centre for *dakwah* activists. This development had significant consequences for society, particularly among Muslims in urban areas. This case study examines the process of Islamisation in Lembang and tries to answer the question of how Islam entered rural areas and how it built the institutions that increasingly influenced and changed the religious life of the Sundanese. This chapter goes back briefly to the development starting in the 1950s of Islamic institutions in three different villages across rural Lembang and discusses the effects of *dakwah* institutions and organisations on deeper Islamisation. The second major question addressed in this chapter is how the *Aliran Kebatinan* defended itself during the process of deepening Islamisation and what enabled it to endure and eventually to revive. As case studies, I have selected *Aliran Kebatinan Perjalanan* (AKP) and *Budidaya*, both coming from the same roots and asserting significant influence in Lembang, West Java.

Social Change that Leads to Islamisation

Lembang's Geography and Socio-Demography

Lembang is located in West Bandung, south of Subang which border is only a few kilometres away. Lembang and Subang are separated by the famous Tangkuban Perahu Volcano. Lembang is located across mountainous highlands, parts of which belong to Subang territory.

Perhaps because of this geographic nexus, the AKP native-syncretic movement easily penetrated to the south, that is, from Lembang in West Bandung down to Ciparay in the east from which it expanded in the eastern region towards the north, across Sumedang, Majalengka, and Cirebon. There was also a sprinkling of AKP followers in Ciamis and Tasikmalaya.¹⁵⁹

Since the 1920s, Lembang, like Subang and Bandung, became a stronghold of the nationalist movement and home to the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI).¹⁶⁰ The territorial propinquity of three nationalist bases strengthened the ideological network across the area. This also inspired the breeding of nationalist and native-syncretic movements such as the AKP. While the movement was founded in Subang, its influence has flowed down south, where it emerged stronger. In Lembang, a road map of AKP influence would begin in Mekarwangi and continue across Langansari, Pagarwangi, Kayu Ambon, Cibogo, Cikole, Cikidang down to the village of Wangunharja. It thus formed a circle across the mountainous Lembang district throughout agricultural lands.¹⁶¹

The Lembang district occupies 10,620 ha and consists of 16 villages. According to data recently published by the District Administration Office, Lembang's total population is 156,078¹⁶² of which 14,446 persons are peasants who work as labourers in the agricultural industry, 11,562 people till the land while 6,047 are livestock farmers. 3,561 Persons work in informal sectors, 775 are entrepreneurs and 1804 work in small-scale enterprises. More than 5,000 people are employed by the government as civil servants, soldiers and members of the police force.¹⁶³ The vast majority of Budidaya followers are peasants and many of them are low-income workers. The General Secretary of the West Bandung Budidaya branch, Asep Hari, is a peasant. Given that the livelihood of the majority of the people depends to a large extent on the availability and affordability of land for rent or purchase, land is a major issue in the region.

Lembang is home to 148,263 Muslims, 5,200 Protestants and

¹⁵⁹ Interview, Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 27 July 2010.

¹⁶⁰ *Idem*. See Soekarno: *An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams*, pp. 11-68.

¹⁶¹ Interview, Ayi Endang, Lembang, 02 October 2009.

¹⁶² *Profil Kecamatan Lembang* (Lembang: Kantor Kecamatan Lembang, 2010).

¹⁶³ *Idem*

2,502 Catholics and the remaining includes some Buddhists and Hindus. From the total Muslim population, 87,651 are categorised as tithe-payers (*muzakki*).¹⁶⁴ In terms of contributions to Islamic propagation (*dakwah*), state organs played a role in supporting Islamic institutions, but this support was not as significant compared to that provided in Cimanggung, Sumedang (as discussed in Chapter Three). Successful *dakwah* efforts across Lembang over the last five decades depended primarily on help from individuals from private and civil organisations.

This demographic reality should provide sufficient caution against characterising Sunda as entirely Islamic. One Modernist leader argues that it is true that Islam has had an expansive presence throughout West Java but that it would be wrong to assume that the Sundanese possess an in-depth understanding or strict observance of Islam.¹⁶⁵ There are some places in the region where Islamic influence was dominant and where Muslims were more observant than in other places. These include Tasikmalaya, Ciamis and Garut in the south, Majalengka and Sumedang in the centre, and Cianjur and Sukabumi in the west. Purwakarta, Subang, Indramayu, Karawang and Bandung are territories where Islamic influence was less significant.¹⁶⁶ It is thus not surprising that since independence, Ciparay and Lembang, both in Bandung, became the bases of the native syncretic culture and currents.

The major *Aliran Kebatinan* organisation, the AKP, was strong in this region, especially in the 1940s and 1950s, but has weakened since the 1970s. In the 1980s it was divided, giving birth to a new organisation named Budidaya. While this split added to the drop in *Aliran Kebatinan*'s influence, it is interesting that Budidaya has survived and retains a following there to date. In the meantime, Islam permeated into Lembang since the 1950s, and its doctrine and institutions were promoted in this established native-syncretic community, which in the end changed society.

Muslim Migration into Lembang

Readers should notice that the socio-political contexts during the 1940s to the 1960s had a tremendous impact on religious development across

¹⁶⁴ Data collected from Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA), Lembang, 27 July 2010.

¹⁶⁵ Interview, Dody S. Truna, Bandung, 3 April 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Interview, Hawe Setiawan, Bandung, 14 July 2010.

West Java, especially in Lembang. The political context was the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion, which caused social and political damage, anxiety and bloodshed and a forced migration of observing Muslims into other places in the region. Kees van Dijk's, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, sheds much light to understanding the damage the Darul Islam rebellion had on Sundanese society from its declaration in 1948 until its extermination in 1962. He points out that the rebellion had inflicted material damage and changed the lives of many people in West Java. He said "in the first quarter of 1952, Darul Islam inflicted damage to the tune of Rp. 9,981,366,- and 11,016 people were evacuated or fled their homes. From 1955 to 1962 the number of evacuees fluctuated between 209,355 in 1962 and 303,764 in 1958."¹⁶⁷ As hundreds of thousands of people evacuated from the areas and thousands of them fled their homes, there was thus a large number of migrants who entered secure places across West Java.

Hiroko Horikoshi in her study on the Darul Islam movement argued that the DI's insurgents jeopardised the internal security in the Priangan and thus brought about the general deterioration of the social conditions in this area which in the end created serious social and economic damage.¹⁶⁸ Horikoshi observes:

In the next decade Indonesia underwent both political and economical decline, and in Priangan the virtual absence of internal security caused by the DI insurgents contributed to the general deterioration of social conditions. Refugees from the fertile Priangan hills and plains flooded the major cities, thereby increasing the urban population along with the number of administrative problems. A sudden drop in agricultural productivity and a virtual cessation of commodity flows between regions, resulting from disruptions of the transportation system, worsened the already inflationary conditions in DI areas. The possibility of destroying the DI began to emerge only after the political climate in Jakarta changed in the early 1960s when Guided Democracy was put into effect.¹⁶⁹

In the Lembang case, the refugees or migrants included Muslims like religious teachers (*ustadz*) such as Haji Muhammad Ishak and Haji

¹⁶⁷ Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*, p. 105.

¹⁶⁸ Hiroko Horikoshi, 'The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process', *Indonesia*, Vol. 20 (Oct, 1975), p. 77.

¹⁶⁹ *Idem*.

Mohammad Otong from Tasikmalaya and Haji Syarif Muhidin from Garut. The other important migrants were Haji Junaidi from Cianjur and Haji Ahmad Masduki from Central Jawa.¹⁷⁰ In their new surroundings, the migrants worked and lived a normal life. Those who were trained in Islamic schools or *pesantrens* brought Islamic values and practices with them. In a simple way, in their new social environment, the Traditionalists sought to maintain what they were obliged to perform according to the Islamic laws and doctrines they adhered to. They prayed, fasted, read the Quran and celebrated festivals including *mauludan*, *rajaban*, *nisfu sha'ban* and others.¹⁷¹ As they had to pray the communal Friday prayers, they struggled to build mosques for that purpose.¹⁷² Having inherited Islamic traditions and living the Islamic way, practicing Muslims played important roles in promoting Islamic practices and in organising *dakwah* activities and hence in furthering the Islamisation of Lembang.

Let me take Haji Mohammad Otong by way of example, even though other Muslim leaders may have made greater contributions. Haji Mohammad Otong was born in Tasikmalaya and attended Pesantren Cintawana in Tasik and Pesantren Sempur in Purwakarta. In 1960 he moved to Lembang to escape the DI/TII rebellion. With his religious training, ustadz Otong served as a religious teacher while promoting Islamic propagation (*dakwah*). This helped in his proposal to marry Mariam, the daughter of Haji Mohammad Toyib, then a well-known figure in Nyelindung Cikole, Lembang, and after his marriage, he joined his father-in-law in strengthening *dakwah* in the village. He used the mosque established by Haji Mohammad Toyib as the centre for religious and educational activities. By 1968 he established an Islamic elementary school named Madrasah Ibtidaiyyah (MI) in the mosque's compound. After a few years, many people of different social backgrounds came to study at the *madrasah* and attended religious activities in the mosque compound. As the religious activities increased, the mosque and the *madrasah* became centres of *dakwah* and increasingly counterbalanced *Aliran Kebatinan* practices and activities

¹⁷⁰ Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010 and ustadz Asep, Bandung, 1 September 2014.

¹⁷¹ See Glossary.

¹⁷² Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010 and ustadz Asep, Bandung, 1 September 2014.

in the village.¹⁷³ It is worth noting that Muslim individuals such as religious teachers who organised informal religious activities in private residences and in mosques had contributed substantially to introducing Islamic practices among the local people. And this success was strengthened by the increased presence of Islamic institutions such as mosques and *madrasahs*, *pesantrens* and others. As readers will see in what follows below, the growth of Islamic institutions very much helped the further expansion of *dakwah* activities among the local people in the rural areas of Lembang.

The Growth of Islamic Institutions and the Transmission of its Doctrines

As argued above, the migration of Muslims including the likes of religious teachers such as Haji Muhammad Ishak, Haji Otong, Haji Muhidin, Haji Junaidi and Haji Ahmad Masduki into Lembang, helped the consolidation of *Dakwahism* and Islamic institutions since the 1960s, and this also factored in the Islamisation of Lembang in the following years.¹⁷⁴ The growth of mosques as well as other institutions including Islamic schools (*madrasah*), Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), Islamic kindergarten (TPA) and Islamic religious group (*majlis taklim*) across the villages and districts was instrumental to this Islamisation. The mosques became centres of doctrine, worship, and of socio-religious activities. From the 1960s till 1970s, the most popular Islamic activity at mosques was learning the Quran and practicing daily prayers (*solat*). By the 1980s, the most popular Islamic activity was *pengajian* (learning the Quran and other religious subjects) at *majlis taklim*. These informal religious sessions organised in mosques or sometimes at private residences, attracted many people.¹⁷⁵ In Cikole, Mekarwangi and Wangunharja, *dakwah* challenged the growth of the *Aliran Kebatinan* community.¹⁷⁶

Let us look at the development of Islamic institutions in

¹⁷³ Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹⁷⁴ Ibnu Hajar Apandi, 'Sekilas Perkembangan Islam di Desa Wangunharja Kecamatan Lembang Kabupaten Bandung Barat', unpublished document, Lembang, 26 March 2011. pp. 1-6.

¹⁷⁵ Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹⁷⁶ Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

Wangunharja village in Lembang as an example.¹⁷⁷ Wangunharja is one of 14 villages located across the Lembang sub-district of West Bandung. In the 1940s to the 1960s, the majority of Wangunharja's population were nominal Muslims. Mosques or *dakwah* efforts were rarely found. Folklore was a big element in popular culture and the commoners were devoted of mystical practices such as *ruwatan*, *slametan*, food offerings, et cetera.¹⁷⁸ The Islamisation of the village took place slowly, with the 1940s-1950s probably representing its initial stage. Muslim leaders in the village reported that this was when the first mosque was established before other Muslim institutions in subsequent decades.

The gradual Islamisation began with the founding of the Al-Ikhlâs Mosque in the sub-village of Cikawari. According to Masri Hidayat, the MUI head of Wangunharja village, the mosque was established in the 1950s. Another Muslim leader, ustadz Soleh Abdullah, claimed that the mosque had been built even earlier, in the 1940s. The building of this mosque owed much to Muslim *da'i* (preacher) such as Haji Kosasih, R. Hidayat, Haji Mansyur and ustadz Iip Sadikin. However, the holding of the congregational Friday prayers attracted only a few people. In the 1960s, the mosque augmented its *dakwah* activities by building an Islamic elementary school, named Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) Cikawari.¹⁷⁹

In the 1960s, through the efforts of ustadz Iip Sadikin, Haji Idi Alisan and Ahi Syahidin two further mosques were established, al-Huda and al-Mukmin. This project was linked to the religious campaign held with the support of the early New Order Regime. Upon the failed coup attempt on 30 September 1965, government officials worked with local religious leaders to promote "*operasi mental*" (mental operation), encouraging people to embrace Islamic teachings. The government officials, with the help of local Islamic leaders, intensified *dakwah* across the village. They established the mosques in the hope that people would be blessed with divine guidance (*al-huda*) by which they might be persuaded to become believers (*al-mukmin*). So the names of these mosques refer to this *dakwah* objective by targeting Communist

¹⁷⁷ This description largely rests on Ibnu Hajar Apandi, *Sekilas Perkembangan Islam*, pp. 1-6.

¹⁷⁸ Interview, Dede Atmaja, senior leader of Budidaya, Cikole, Lembang, 30 September, 2009.

¹⁷⁹ Interview, MUI head of Wangunharja, Lembang, 27 July 2010.

sympathisers and those Sundanese who remained observing the *adat* and the legacies of their ancestors.

From the 1970s to 2000s, six more mosques were built across the village including Miftahul Khoir, Nurul Arifin, Al-Hikmah, Nurul Iman, Al-Hidayah and Darussalam. Since *dakwah* activities centred in mosques they generally involved fewer female Muslims. However, since the mid-1980s, female Muslims began to hold regular congregations in the mosques and also they established a *majlis taklim* named al-Hidayah (1984), reminiscent of the one of the same name organised by the New Order ruling party, Golkar.¹⁸⁰

In the early 1990s, the *dakwah* in Wangunharja village intensified with the establishment of Pesantren Salafiyah Ar-Rochma in 1993. The *pesantren* was established by ustadz Dedeng Abdul Hamid from Garut. With the help of his wife, Euis Mumih, ustadz Dedeng initially based his *pesantren's* activities in the al-Huda mosque. This *pesantren* grew and eventually could afford the construction of its own building. In the following years, the *pesantren* introduced classes at kindergarten, secondary and high school levels. The development of this Islamic school paralleled that of the Madrasah Ibtidaiyah of Cikawari which was centred in the al-Ikhlas mosque.

Due to the sustained interest in Islamic education, in 1991, Haji Otong from Tasikmalaya established a secondary school named Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs) Nurul Huda. In 1992, Haji Otong died and he was succeeded by his son, Haji Tajuddin who attempted to continue his predecessors' *dakwah* albeit with some innovations. In 1994, he transformed Nurul Huda into an integrated boarding school named Pesantren Nurul Huda.¹⁸¹ He also established ties with the government to develop agro-business in the village. To this day, Muslims of Tasik descent still make important contributions to Lembang society. Amongst these is Aam Abdussalam, an important Muslim leader who graduated from Pesantren Sukahideng Tasikmalaya.¹⁸² Given the fact that Muslim leaders from Tasikmalaya come from Nahdlatul Ulama backgrounds, the socio-religious character of Lembang has been very much influenced by Muslim Traditionalism.

In the 2000s, the Al-Mansuriyah Assa'adah foundation was

¹⁸⁰ Interview, ustadz Dedeng, Lembang, 2 September 2014.

¹⁸¹ Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹⁸² Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

established with the objective of improving the educational levels of the people. The foundation also introduced new Islamic schools from kindergarten up to high school levels.¹⁸³

In 2007, Wangunharja female Muslims established another *majlis taklim* named al-Mubarak, which in Arabic means “the blessed.” Aside from these two *majlis taklim*, nearly every mosque in Wangunharja conducted Quranic recitation or other religious study sessions. These sessions were conducted by the Mosque Prosperity Council (DKM) with the support of the village office of the Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council (MUI). The development of *dakwah* in Wangunharja as visible in the growth of the number of mosques, *madrasah* and *majlis taklim* was similar to its development in other parts of Lembang.¹⁸⁴

From a handful of mosques in the 1950s, Lembang today has 151 mosques, 105 *langgar/mushalla*. Each village has numerous mosques. There are 156 *majlis taklim* and 320 teachers of Quranic recitation classes across the region. There are also 88 *khatibs* (preachers for Friday prayer) and 38 *muballighs* (common preachers), *dakwah* institutions for children abound and include 53 Quranic Kindergartens (TPA), 28 Islamic Kindergartens and 5 Islamic Elementary Schools (MI). There are 5 Islamic Secondary Schools (MTs), 1 Islamic High School (MA), 1 Islamic Tertiary School and 4 *pasantrens*. Almost all of these institutions are owned privately or by organisations. In comparison, Lembang has 7 churches and 1 *vihara*.¹⁸⁵

The head of Cikole village, Adang Soabana, argues that institutional growth enabled the intensification of Islamic doctrines’ transmission leading to higher rates of conversion. Adang mentioned the RW 13 neighbourhood as an example where there is now a mosque with an active *majlis taklim* organised by adult female Muslims. During the 1980s and 1990s, the vast majority of the neighbourhood were *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents.¹⁸⁶

In Mekarwangi, the influence of Islam has very much deepened.

¹⁸³ Ibnu Hajar Apandi, ‘Sekilas Perkembangan Islam’, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Interview, ustadzah Euis Mumih, Lembang, 2 September 2014.

¹⁸⁵ Data collected from the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA), Lembang, 27 July 2010.

¹⁸⁶ RW refers to Rukun Warga or an administrative unit in a village which consists of several sub-administrative units the so called Rukun Tetangga (RT).

During the 1960s-1980s, for example, Mekarwangi village was known as an important *Aliran Kebatinan* centre. By the mid-1980s, the number of *Aliran Kebatinan* followers reached into the thousands. Since the 1990s, Islamisation, however, has decreased their strength. The pattern of Islamisation in Cikole and Mekarwangi was similar to that in Kampung Cibereum, Wangunharja.¹⁸⁷ In the mid-1980s a mosque was established by Haji Mana and used to promote Islamic doctrines among adults and children with the establishment of a *majlis taklim* and a TPA.

The most important doctrine the Islamic institutions addressed was the belief in the absolute unity of Allah, called *tauhid* (monotheism). Rejection of *tauhid* may lead to *shirk* (polytheism) or idolatry. *Shirk* means to associate or attribute anyone or anything with Allah and is regarded as an unforgivable act.¹⁸⁸ My informant in Lembang, Haji Tatang Haidar, pointed out that the major point stressed in *dakwah* during the 1960s to the 1980s was *aqidah*, especially teaching monotheism (*tauhid*) and the Islamic pillars (*rukun Islam*).¹⁸⁹ This stressing point aimed to counter syncretic practices upheld by the people in the region which is regarded as a form of polytheism. Islamisation's main focus was thus the promotion of monotheism which challenged the cultural syncretism especially the *Penghayat* upheld.

Changing of Land Ownership

The expansion of Islam over the last few decades has changed the structure of land-ownership through the increased demand for land by Muslims for *dakwah* usage, their own personal interests, or for a mix of *dakwah* and entrepreneurship. Haji Tajuddin, the owner of Pesantren Nurul Huda of Nyalindung, for example, owns a sizeable area of agricultural land. In the last couple of years, with the support of the Department of Agriculture, his *pesantren* was selected as a model for agro-business development. Haji Tajuddin said he established the *pesantren* for both economic and *dakwah* reasons:

In the last couple of years we have sought a creative way of conducting *dakwah* by promoting agricultural initiatives rather than merely through preaching and teaching. To make this initiative a

¹⁸⁷ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, 26 July 2010.

¹⁸⁸ Interview, Haji Tatang Haidar, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹⁸⁹ *Idem*.

dakwah, we included people from other faiths and cultural backgrounds. Many peasant members of the *Penghayat* community joined this agro-business program. We organised regular meetings with all peasants, often in mosques, in which the *Penghayat* participated too. When the time for prayer came, the Muslims went to pray while the *Penghayat* remained. Although they did not perform prayers, they joined us in this socio-economic interaction centred in the mosque. In order to make the business more viable, I am seeking more land to purchase in this area.¹⁹⁰

This shows religious expansion with an economic connection. Regarding land ownership, the expansion of agro-business will automatically require the purchase of more land in the village, which will increase land prices. While this project is still in the pipeline, I have been informed that in Wangunhardja, a village several kilometres from Nyalindung, land prices have gone up, ultimately causing unemployment in the village as poor *Penghayat* farmers can no longer afford to rent land to make a living.¹⁹¹ It is also true that the population growth in this area has become another factor in the rise of unemployment.

Asep Hari was anxious about the concentration of agricultural land in the hands of people from outside the village or by the wealthy in the village. He stated that these land holders included, for instance, the chairman of the consultative assembly of the Prosperity and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), popularly called Pak Haji. Pak Haji is said to have purchased approximately 100,000 square metres in Cibereum in Wangunharja village in 2009. Some people in the village believe that it was the PKS that bought the land although the transaction was carried out in Pak Haji's name. Wangunharja's village secretary, Entar Sutarya, said that to the best of his knowledge, the land purchased was to be used for social needs, that is, for the construction of a training centre. Prior to the transaction, the land was used to grow hardwood trees. According to Entar, there is serious concern about this transaction among the villagers, some of whom protested due to the fact that the transaction raised land prices. Most recently, the PKS used

¹⁹⁰ Interview, Haji Tajuddin, Cikole, Lembang, 28 July 2010.

¹⁹¹ Interview, Entar Sutarya, Lembang, 1 October 2009. The rest of this sub chapter is also largely based on this interview.

philanthropic funds from Kuwait for the construction of mosques and for the execution of socio-religious programs in the village.

For poor people in the village, this price hike creates huge economic problems as it places the land outside their financial capacity to rent, let alone to purchase. Since 2010, the unemployment rate in the village has increased significantly and caused an unprecedented exodus of villagers seeking work overseas as Indonesian Workers (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, TKI). The village has never before seen emigration on this scale. Asep Hari's concern about this problem led him to meet with Pak Haji. In the meeting Pak Haji claimed that the land was taken over to create a community project and to promote human resource development and training, especially for disadvantaged locals. Until now, the anticipated community project has yet to be realised. Asep Hari's attempt at obtaining an explanation as to why Pak Haji's promise never materialised received no satisfactory answer.¹⁹² Rather, what Pak Haji and his allies from PKS seemed to have done was to help *dakwah* activities in the village with philanthropic funds from the Middle East. For the *Penghayat* in the village, the *dakwah* programs the PKS promoted with aid from Arab countries is unacceptable.¹⁹³ A *Penghayat* in Wangunharja protested why the mosque, constructed as an Islamic trust (*wakaf*), was built in the village office compound whereas the land is owned by the state and therefore its use for mosque construction should have been prevented.

***Aliran Kebatinan* in Decline**

The Weakening of the Syncretic Basis

With the significant growth of Islamic institutions and considerable spread of Islamic doctrines and *dakwah* in Lembang since the mid-1960s, Islam grew steadily in sharp contrast to *Aliran Kebatinan*'s constant decline. The introduction of Islamic institutions and the

¹⁹² A leader of the Budidaya organisation from Wangunharja told me recently that Pak Haji purchased sizeable plots of land and used them to raise cattle and to plant grass; while other remaining parts were unused. As far as I am aware, there is no evidence to show that the land has been used for community development programs as promised. Interview with Ayi Endang, Lembang, 21 February 2014.

¹⁹³ Interview, Ayi Endang, Lembang, 25 March 2014.

practices they promoted came at the expense of Sundanese syncretic practices such as *sesajen*, *ruwatan* and *wayang* performances, which were observed especially in mountainous areas. This decline resulted from the weakening of, to borrow Geertz' phrase, 'the syncretic basis'¹⁹⁴ of the Sundanese culture on the one hand, and internal divisions within AKP, on the other.¹⁹⁵

Gauging by the increased attendance at the mosques and *pengajian* sessions conducted by religious teachers, popular adherence to Islam increased significantly. All the religious teachers I met admitted their involvement in teaching the people in the mosques and in their surroundings in Lembang to read and understand the Quran, the *aqidah* (Islamic theology), and the *ibadat* (Islamic compulsory worship).¹⁹⁶ These teachers usually came from a Traditionalist *pesantren* background in which they had been instructed by using many standard textbooks, commonly known as *kitab kuning* (yellow books). The teachers told me that in their teaching they went back to what they had learned from these books, such as, for instance, *Tijan al-Durari*¹⁹⁷ and *Tuhfatul Murid*¹⁹⁸ authored by Shaikh Ibrahim al-Bajuri (d. 1860), and *Jauharat al-Tauhid* by Shaikh Ibrahim al-Laqqani (d. 1631) on *aqidah*. Textbooks on Islamic law they mentioned include the *Safinat al-Najah* by Shaikh Salim bin Sumair al-Hadrami (d. 1271 A.H), *Bulugul Maram* by Ibnu Hajar al-'Asqalani (d. 1449) and *Kifayat al-Akhyar*¹⁹⁹ by Imam Taqiyuddin bin Muhammad al-Husaini (d. 829 A.H). Of course they were very well versed in the contents of one of the most significant

¹⁹⁴ Geertz, 'Ritual and Social Change', pp. 32-54

¹⁹⁵ The leadership crisis of the AKP has split the movement into three groups. Apart from Budidaya that plays a leading role in Lembang to date, there are two other associations named Aji Dipa and Bumi Hantoro which identified themselves with AKP. Aji Dipa has some following in Pelabuhan Ratu, West Java and Bumi Hantoro has a following in Lampung, South Sumatra. Abd. Mutholib Ilyas and Abd Ghofur Imam, *Aliran Kepercayaan*, p. 81.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with K.H. Asep, ustadz Mahdi and ustadz Saeful Hakim, Lembang, 2-4 September 2014.

¹⁹⁷ The reviews and commentaries to *Tijan al-Durari* named *Syarh Tijan al-Durari* is authored by Shaikh Nawawi al-Jawi popularly known as Shaikh Nawawi al-Bantani (d. 1897).

¹⁹⁸ *Tuhfatul Murid* by al-Bajuri is the reviews and commentaries (*syarh*) to *Jauharat al-Tauhid*.

¹⁹⁹ *Kifayat al-Akhyar* is the reviews and commentaries (*syarh*) to *Ghayah wa al-Taqrir* authored by Abu Syuja' (d. 1196).

tafsirs for the study of the Quran, namely *Tafsir Jalalain* authored by Jalaluddin al-Mahalli (d. 1459) and Jalaluddin al-Suyuti (d. 1505). Last but not least mention should be made of *Ihya' Ulumuddin*, one of the best Islamic works in Sufism and ethics by Imam al-Ghazali (d. 1111).²⁰⁰ Their socio-religious background as Traditionalists enabled them to approach the people in Lembang to embrace Islam without being confrontational but rather through friendly and appealing ways.²⁰¹

The Islamisation of Lembang was also linked to the region's prevailing social and political dynamics. With deep Islamisation and social change during the New Order, *Aliran Kebatinan* followers faced many social constraints, particularly in matters of education, employment and marriage. Adang Soabana explained that proof of one's official religion had to be produced when seeking admission to schools, in applications for work and to register marriages. Thus, he maintained that *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents faced religious discrimination when looking for employment.²⁰² School admission forms require applicants to answer a question about their religion or the religion of their parents. As a result, pupils whose parents adhere to *Aliran Kebatinan* must choose one of the five official religions, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism in order to be admitted to schools because each pupil has to be instructed in one of these religions.²⁰³

Furthermore, all pupils must follow religious studies (*pelajaran agama*) and sit compulsory exams on the subject. This requirement induces them to learn about religious doctrines, particularly Islam and to interact with their Muslim schoolmates. This social interaction has to some extent increased their knowledge and interest in Islam, resulting in conversions from *Aliran Kebatinan* to Islam among the youth.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ Interview, K.H. Asep and ustadz Mahdi, Lembang, 1-2 September 2014.

²⁰¹ Interview, K.H. Junaidi, Lembang, 03 September 2014. Van Bruinessen's *Kitab Kuning* is an important work that gives us valuable information about the textbooks which are used as teaching materials and *dakwah* references especially in Traditionalist *pesantrens*. Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat*, pp. 142-176.

²⁰² Interview, Adang Soabana, Lembang, 30 September 2009.

²⁰³ And more recently, Confucianism has been added as the state's official religion number six.

²⁰⁴ Interview, Adang Soabana, Lembang, 30 September 2009.

Islamisation progressively undermined *Aliran Kebatinan's* native-syncretic culture and caused disruptions in, to borrow Geertz' phrase, the 'simple uniformity of religious belief' of the *Penghayats* in Lembang as well as in other parts of West Java.²⁰⁵ This transformation corresponds to the changes that took place among the Javanese in the mid-twentieth century in East Java as Geertz observed.²⁰⁶ Geertz noted that the syncretic basis of Javanese culture has changed since the first half of the twentieth century. He argued:

.....in all but the most isolated parts of Java, both the simple territorial basis of village social integration and the syncretic basis of its cultural hegemony have been progressively undermined over the past fifty years. Population growth, urbanization, monetization, occupational differentiation, and the like, have combined to weaken the traditional ties of peasant social structure; and the winds of doctrines which have accompanied the appearance of these structural changes have disturbed the simple uniformity of religious belief and practice characteristic of an earlier period. The rise of nationalism, Marxism, and Islamic reform as ideologies, which resulted in part from the increasing complexity of Javanese society, has affected not only the large cities where these creeds first appeared and have always had their greatest strength, but has had heavy impact on the smaller towns and villages as well.²⁰⁷

This impact was increasingly apparent following the momentous changes in the mid-1960s, especially after the failed 30 September 1965 coup attempt. The attempt that killed six generals and a young daughter of general Nasution's, caused serious political turmoil. Rex Mortimer observed the developments after the abortive action, arguing that "although Soekarno insisted on devising a political solution to the crisis, and formidable punitive action, the army moved on its own volition to ban PKI activities, arrest Communists and suspects, and suspend members of the party holding official positions."²⁰⁸ Mortimer described:

A ruthless campaign of extermination of Communists and alleged Communists was inaugurated in Central Java and quickly spread to

²⁰⁵ Geertz, 'Ritual and Social Change', pp. 32-54.

²⁰⁶ *Idem*.

²⁰⁷ *Idem*, p. 36.

²⁰⁸ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Soekarno* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 389.

East Java and other provinces. Most accounts agree that the army triggered the massacres that took place in Indonesia in the following months, but in most places it enlisted the aid of Moslem and other anti-Communist youth groups, who probably accounted for the greater part of the death toll.²⁰⁹

Because the PKI was strongly against any deeper penetration of Islam, especially in Java and also in West Java, this new social and political context paved the way for Islam to grow deeper and to expand. Ricklefs observed that the annihilation of the PKI demolished one of the pillars of *aliran* politics and thereby was undoubtedly essential in facilitating the Islamisation surge."²¹⁰ In Java, after the PKI was destructed and the political party system had changed so that the many nationalist local parties had merged into one PNI party no longer with branches in the villages,²¹¹ the Nationalists experienced what Ricklefs called a "complete de-institutionalisation of *abangan* village life."²¹² This institutional decline weakened the nationalist and *abangan* capability to "defend and promote *abangan* social, cultural and spiritual styles."²¹³

In West Java, the PKI destruction allowed Muslims to strengthen their *dakwah* agenda and use this moment to support their institutionalisation of Islam largely through private initiatives but not rarely with the support of the state.²¹⁴ Muslim leaders promoted *dakwah* activities in both rural and urban areas. The Traditionalists played a greater role in rural areas while the Modernists successfully

²⁰⁹ *Idem*, p. 390.

²¹⁰ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its Opponents in Java*, p. 162.

²¹¹ After the 1971 election, the New Order regime changed the political party system (officially since January 1973) by fusing all political parties into two party coalitions apart from Golkar, which claimed to be a functional group but in fact was used as the vehicle of the ruling class. These two party coalitions include the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), which united Traditionalists and Modernists, and Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), which fused Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) and the Catholic and Protestant Parties. For details of this political party fusion see Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its Opponents in Java*, p. 163.

²¹² *Idem*, p. 164.

²¹³ *Idem*.

²¹⁴ Interview, Sobana Hardjasaputra, Bandung, 15 April 2009.

promoted and uplifted Islamic lifestyles in the cities. Their influence, however, sometimes overlapped. *Dakwah* in both areas revolved around mosques, *pesantrens*, universities, schools, communities, publications and fashion. I do not argue that urban Islamic activism was directly linked to the progress of rural *dakwah* activities, but rather I suggest that urban and rural *dakwah* expansion happened in sequence or probably in tandem. Adang Soabana said that since the 1980s, *dakwah* activity had increased significantly in Lembang and that this was clearly discernible by the increased number of mosques in the region that played an important role as agents for the dissemination of Islamic doctrines and cultures.²¹⁵ This trend continues to date.²¹⁶ This Islamisation pattern resembles that in other parts of the country, where the role of the mosques along with other Islamic institutions was central.²¹⁷

Preserving the Creed through Family Ties

Surprisingly, the Islamisation project across Lembang had not wiped out the *Aliran Kebatinan* or caused the total extermination of its influence in society. Rather, the *Penghayat* remained on the defence and did their best to survive with minimal expressions of their syncretic culture such as celebrating the *Saka* New Year, organising *slametan* and *sesajen* gatherings and such.²¹⁸ Most *Penghayats*, however, adopted a more cautious attitude toward Islam. Many of them accepted Islam as their religion on their identity cards but demonstrated little interest in observing Islamic rituals. Popularly known as 'Islam KTP', this group contributed to sustaining *Aliran Kebatinan* culture and later became the main agents of its revival in Lembang.

Several causes led to the continued existence of the *Aliran Kebatinan*. *First* was the strict preservation of its culture transmitted through family ties.²¹⁹ *Second*, the Islamic *dakwah* in some respects failed to reconcile aspects of Islamic doctrine with *Aliran Kebatinan* culture and values. As Niels Mulder noted, *Aliran Kebatinan* proponents

²¹⁵ Interview, Adang Soabana, Lembang, 30 September 2009.

²¹⁶ Interview, ustadz Mahdi, Lembang, 2 September, 2014.

²¹⁷ Interview, K.H. Maman Sumantri, Lembang's Chairman of Indonesian Islamic Scholars' Council (MUI), Lembang, 4 September 2014.

²¹⁸ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, 8 October 2009.

²¹⁹ Interview, Suparman, Lembang, 8 October 2009.

were dissatisfied with organised religion, especially given their commitment towards an authentic traditional belief, or in Niels Mulder's words, a "valid emotional form of personal cultural expression."²²⁰ *Third*, *dakwah* and its organisations failed to address the *Penghayat's* socio-economic needs. One good example is the purchase by a leader of a Muslim party of sizeable plots of land, which pushed up land prices in the village. This taking over of these plots of land was against the economic interests of the local people. *Penghayat*, most of whom are peasants and labourers who very much depend on affordable agricultural land and low-prices basic commodities, were naturally upset over this inconsiderate transaction.

Different from world religions with their books and prophets, history, intellectual traditions, sophisticated civilizations and institutions, *Aliran Kebatinan* only had their immediate surroundings and family at their disposal mainly working with simple doctrines and oral traditions incomparable with these world religions they had to face. To explain *Aliran Kebatinan* we need to have a look at these family ties in order to understand how it survived in Lembang in the deepening process of Islamisation and how it was contested by the personal convictions of its members sometimes causing them to go over to Islam or back.

Aliran Kebatinan's spread across Lembang took place from the 1950s to the 1980s. This was due to the contribution of some individuals of the first generation including, Anwar Wijaya, Wira, Umar, Emeh, Enjum and Suratma. These are believed to have been the first people to introduce the AKP to Lembang. Anwar Wijaya was the most prominent figure among the *Aliran Kebatinan* followers in this region. He travelled to various places across West Java.

Wira was known as the most prominent figure in the propagation of the *Aliran Kebatinan* in Cibedug in the Cikole village. In carrying out his mission, he was aided by his allies including Iko and Atmaja.²²¹ Wira's daughter, Edah, married Atmaja's son, Ade, currently known as a senior figure in the Cibedug *Penghayat* community. Atmaja's nephew, Ayep Supriatna, is among the new generation and enjoys a leadership role among the youth. Ayep married Euies who was born into a Muslim

²²⁰ Mulder, 'Aliran Kebatinan', p. 108.

²²¹ Interview, Ade Amas, Lembang, 8 October 2009.

family. His marriage was conducted according to Islamic law but his wife, Euies, eventually abandoned Islam for *Aliran Kebatinan*. The other, currently a senior leader in the area, is Rahmat, the son of Iko, who is known to have been an important ally of Wira's.

Similar to Cibedug, Budidaya membership in Wangunharja has been sustained by demanding family members' strict loyalty to the tradition. In Desa Wangunharja, almost all Budidaya members (approximately 50 people) belong to the family of Suratma. Suratma was a first-generation adherent and connected to Mei Kartawinata and his allies, who were involved in propagating *Aliran Kebatinan* in Lembang. Suratma's son, Ujang Yaya, has five children, Rika, Asep, Ayi, Ajang and Eden. Eden married Anwar Wijaya's grandson and is now an active member of the Budidaya organisation. Ayi, also an active member, married a Muslim woman, Nyi Wiwi. In order to avoid complications, Ayi married Nyi Wiwi according to Islamic law, which meant he had to hide his identity. One year after their wedding, Nyi Wiwi began to wonder why her husband never performed Islamic rituals such as *salat* (prayer), *ngaji* (reciting Quran), and why he never fasted in the month Ramadhan. She questioned her husband about this and was shocked to discover that her husband was a *Penghayat*. This confession created some turbulence in their one year-old marriage. Nyi Wiwi immediately left the house and returned to her parents. In order to save his marriage and family, Ayi tried to convince his wife about the reason why he embraced the religion, hoping that she would also convert. After several weeks of arguments and persuasion, Nyi Wiwi finally embraced her husband's belief. The reason behind her decision to become a *Penghayat*, as she related, was that its religious precepts are simpler, and offer her more happiness and security than Islam as she understood it. She claimed to have been frightened of the threat to go to *neraka* (hell) in Islam, while for her, belief in hell is not rational because nobody can ever know about life after death. "It is not our business," she stated.²²²

Suratma's grandson, Asep Hari, Ayi's brother, also married a Muslim woman named Tin Tin Nurhayati who was born into Haji Mulya's family. Like Wiwi, Nurhayati eventually abandoned Islam. In my interview with her, Nurhayati explained why she embraced *Aliran*

²²² Interview, Nyi Wiwi, Lembang, 7 October 2009.

Kebatinan. She stated that she found her new belief simple and comfortable because of the way its followers manifested it in social interaction. "My husband has been a good model as a husband, father and member of society; he has never overstepped the traditional limits of *mapipitu*, that is, *maen*, *maling*, *madon*, *madat*, *minum*, *mateni*, *mangani*."²²³ On the other hand, what Muslim preachers teach in mosques and during *pengajian* sessions has become mere empty teaching. Many Muslims are committing *mapipitu* and thus violate the values of their own religion. "In spite of the increasing presence of Muslim institutions and symbols elsewhere in the village, I have not seen Islam in the reality of Muslim society," she stated.²²⁴ "There is even an *ustadz* (religious teacher) who practices polygamy while the faith I now hold prohibits such practice," she asserted.²²⁵

Its insistence on monogamy has been an important reason why Wiwi was interested in and continued to adhere to this syncretic tradition. In her eyes, in his family, her husband was a key figure in leading and propagating *Aliran Kebatinan*. His leadership is authoritative and his contribution crucial in the recruitment of new followers. He is outspoken in promoting the economic interests and civil rights of his fellow *Penghayat*.

However, the most important reason behind Budidaya's recent state of affairs is the adoption of legal reform at the national level. As said above, in 2006 the government issued law number 32/2006 on population registration, which provided the legal basis for the protection of the *Penghayat*'s civil rights. The law allows them to marry according to their *adat* and to register their marriages at the Registry

²²³ *Maen* is gambling; *maling* is thieving; *madon* is venting lust/womanizing; *madat* means using drugs, *minum* means drinking alcohol, *mateni* means killing and *mangani* means acting in a gluttonous way, greedy, voracious (*Penghayat* may also translate it as 'gossip'). R.R. Hardjadibrata, calls these seven prohibitions *mim pitu* rather than *mapipitu*. He explains *mim pitu* as follows: "*mim n.Ar.* the fifth letter of the Arabic alphabet, similar to m; *mim pitu* Jav. the seven Javanese commandments of *madat* opiate; *madon* womanizing; *maén* gambling; *minum* drinking; *mangani* gluttony; *maling* stealing; *maténi* killing." See *Sundanese English Dictionary* compiled by R.R. Hardjadibrata, Department of Asian Languages and Studies Monash University Clayton, Australia, Based on *Soendanees-Nederlands Woordenboek* by Eringa, pp. 521 and 536.

²²⁴ Interview, Tin Tin, Lembang, 8 October 2009.

²²⁵ *Idem*.

Office.²²⁶ In October 2009, Asep Hari, the leader of *Aliran Kebatinan* in Lembang celebrated the marriage of his daughter Neng Yeni Mulyani which was conducted according to *adat*. Neng Yeni was proposed to by a Muslim man named Asep Rudi Setiawan.²²⁷ Asep Rudi agreed that the marriage was to be undertaken in accordance with law number 32/2006. By doing so, Asep Rudi implicitly declined to marry according to Islamic law, as regulated by Law No. 1/1974 on marriages.

Recent Signs of Revival?

Obtaining Political Recognition in Law No. 23/2006

In the light of preserving their creed, the *Penghayat* struggled to survive and sought to re-emerge. Signs of its revival have been apparent since 2000 and is evident in their persistent search for the legal recognition of their civil rights and culture reconstruction, such as in the case of *adat* marriages and so on.²²⁸ They won this struggle with the issuance of Law Number 23/2006 regarding Population Registration. Since then, its membership has slowly but steadily increased. It is, however, not simple to obtain accurate statistics on the number of *Aliran Kebatinan* followers because many of them hide their true religious affiliations, refusing to reveal their religious identity for social and political reasons.²²⁹ One respondent said that the total number of *Penghayat*, especially those associated with the Budidaya organisation, is about eight hundred across Lembang.²³⁰ This constitutes a small minority within an overwhelmingly Muslim population.

Nursigit, of the Lembang District Office staff, confirmed this increase and affirmed that the *Aliran Kebatinan* seems to have been enjoying a revival in the Reform Era.²³¹ Its adherents have galvanised their struggle in defence of what they claim to be the only authentic

²²⁶ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, 07 October 2009.

²²⁷ *Idem*.

²²⁸ Interview, Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 17 July 2010.

²²⁹ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, 08 October 2009.

²³⁰ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, 08 October 2009. This claim exceeds the official number issued by the Lembang District Administration Office, which is 407 persons. See *Profil Kecamatan Lembang* (Lembang: Kantor Kecamatan Lembang, 2010).

²³¹ Interview, Nursigit, Lembang District Office, Lembang, 27 July 2010.

Sundanese faith and culture.²³² Of late, more *Penghayats* have gained the courage to express their identity. Some of them even came to the Lembang District Office to declare that they were not Muslims, but that they have their own belief.²³³

This development inspired caution among Muslims. Muslim leaders in Cikole village pre-empted this revival with the construction of mosques and the promotion of *dakwah* activities. Moreover, in almost every village in Lembang one can find a Quranic Kindergarten (TPA). The exchange I had with Dede Atmadja, the *Aliran Kebatinan* leader in Cibedug village, epitomises how the cultural difference between *Aliran Kebatinan* followers and Muslims remains entrenched in the face of the intensified campaign of *dakwah*. His grand-daughter graduated from the TPA in his village. On a wall near in his living room hung his grand-daughter graduation picture, in which the child is wearing a headscarf. When asked, "How could your grand daughter join the Quranic class?" he replied with confidence, "Well, out there she might engage in Islamic training, but at home she indulges in *Aliran Kebatinan* customs."²³⁴

Attempts by *Penghayats*' leaders to consolidate the difference have mostly been articulated in various forms of resistance.²³⁵ *First*, in their hostility towards Islamic symbols. Niels Mulder describes this resistance as manifesting "an anti-Islamic mentality."²³⁶ This is also seen in their critical stance towards the collaboration of Islamic institutions with state organs at the grassroots. For instance, they denounce the growing presence of Islamic institutions and culture across the villages such as mosques, Islamic schools, Quranic kindergartens, Muslim dress and the mushrooming Islamic movements and organisations.²³⁷ The *second* important act of resistance among some Sundanese in Lembang was abandoning the practice of 'Islam KTP'²³⁸ which they had allowed to exist in less secure times. *Third*, is

²³² Interview, Toyibin Wiranatakoesoema, Bandung, 15 April, 2009.

²³³ Interview, Nursigit, Lembang, 27 July 2010.

²³⁴ Interview, Dede Atmaja, Cikole, Lembang, 30 September, 2009.

²³⁵ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, Bandung, 08 October 2009.

²³⁶ Mulder, 'Aliran Kebatinan', p. 109.

²³⁷ Interview, Ade Amas, Lembang, 7 October 2009.

²³⁸ 'Islam KTP' is a common term used in Indonesia to indicate nominal Muslims who embraced Islam but partly because of political reasons do not practice it.

their sustained rejection of Islam despite its increasing presence and dominance. *Penghayat* strongly uphold their faith and refuse to convert when they marry Muslims or people of other religions. The Budidaya chairman in West Java claims that in case of inter-religious marriages with Muslims, more Muslims than *Penghayats* would end up converting to each other's conviction. The protection of their syncretic creed was achieved through close ties with their families, which cements loyalty to their tradition. Since the group seeks to consolidate its identity, its concern has been in championing Sundanese symbols, institutions and culture over others. When I tried to attract their attention to the Traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama, which shares similar religious interests with them, particularly in honouring *adat*, a *Penghayat* leader contended that "all Muslims and their organisations are the same because they all are hostile to *Aliran Kebatinan*."²³⁹

Another front of resistance involved the struggle to obtain legal and political recognition, and the *Penghayat* passed up no opportunity to achieve this end. In the drafting of the Constitution (1945), Wongsonegoro, later the chairman of All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress Body (BKKI), succeeded in inserting the word "Kepercayaan" into article 29 (2), which reads:

The State guarantees the freedom of each citizen to embrace his/her religion and to perform rituals according to his/her religion and belief (*Kepercayaan*).²⁴⁰

This provided *Aliran Kebatinan* with a constitutional basis. However, immediately on gaining power in the aftermath of 1965 coup attempt, Soeharto led a profound socio-political transformation across the country. Since then, the Soeharto regime promoted religiosity yet restricted the development of *Aliran Kebatinan*. The state preferred to officially recognise world religions and categorised *Aliran Kebatinan* as a cultural feature of the nation. All its followers were encouraged to embrace one official religion while maintaining *Aliran Kebatinan* as their tradition. Many of the *Penghayat* wanted to keep only *Aliran*

²³⁹ Interview, Asep Hari, Lembang, 08 October 2009.

²⁴⁰ *Himpunan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan yang Berkaitan dengan Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa* (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Nilai Budaya Seni dan Film, Direktorat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 2006), p. 4.

Kebatinan as their faith. This opposition created tension in many places across West Java.

In 1974 the government issued law number 1/1974 on marriages. Following this law, there were many regulations from various levels of government, from the President and ministers, down to the governor. These legal products largely address the implementation of the law, especially regarding marriage registration for *Penghayat*. Generally, they reflect the political line, which encouraged all citizens to embrace a sanctioned religion and to marry according to their respective religions. Exceptions were the decrees issued by Minister of Justice Mijiono in 1982, and by Minister of Home Affairs Rudini in 1990.²⁴¹ Mijiono's decree acknowledged *adat* marriage outright, while Rudini's decision was premised in legal and humanitarian arguments that made *adat* marriages conditional on judicial discretion (*Penetapan Pengadilan*).²⁴² This policy, however, was abolished in 1995 by the decree of Minister of Home Affairs Yogy S. Memet, signed by the Director-General for General Governance Affairs and Regional Autonomy, Sumitro Maskun.²⁴³

Another effort was undertaken in 2000 with the establishment of the Civil Registry Consortium, which sought to formulate a Civil Registry Bill. The draft was ready by 2004 and was then revised several times before it was brought before Parliament in 2006 under the name *Administrasi Kependudukan* or Population Registration as said above. This law includes various articles that regulate *adat* marriages.²⁴⁴ In order to provide the rules of the game, in 2009, the Ministers of Home Affairs and Culture and Tourism issued a joint decree providing detailed guidelines on the provision of services to *Penghayat*,²⁴⁵ who welcomed the law with much joy, declaring, "We have achieved

²⁴¹ *Idem*, pp. 374-376. Also Interview with Engkus Ruswana, Bandung, 2 July 2009.

²⁴² *Idem*.

²⁴³ *Idem*, pp. 378-383.

²⁴⁴ See *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 23 Tahun 2006 tentang Administrasi Kependudukan* (Jakarta: Departemen Dalam Negeri R.I., Direktorat Jenderal Administrasi Kependudukan, 2007). See articles, 8, 61, 64, 92, 105.

²⁴⁵ See *Peraturan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Nomor 43 Tahun 2009 dan Nomor 41 Tahun 2009 tentang Pedoman Pelayanan Kepada Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa* (Jakarta, 2009).

Sovereignty!”²⁴⁶ The law provided the legal foundations for the members of the *Penghayat* community to exercise their civil rights and liberties, including marriages according to their *adat*. The government also guaranteed the community’s right to burial in public cemeteries and according to *adat* rites.²⁴⁷ This has brought about great consequences in society, as became visible in the last couple of years.

The quest for securing legal recognition for the *Penghayat*, having begun during the New Order, thus finally bore fruit in 2006. This milestone in their struggle owed much to changes across the country in the reform era.²⁴⁸ The issuance of the law represents a breakthrough for the revival of *Aliran Kebatinan* across West Java. Its implementation on the ground, however, remains problematic since popular perceptions of the *Penghayat* as a deviant sect remain entrenched. Nanang, general secretary of AKP East Bandung branch, informed us that in most cases, government organs, from district down to village levels, were not prepared for this change. Nanang added: “We have anticipated this legal change and tried to implement it in cooperation with our members as well as with the local government. In Ciparay, East Bandung, the government officials did not know what to do. The irony is that they often ask us to consult the Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council (MUI), the fierce opponent of *Aliran Kebatinan*, in order to be acknowledged as *Aliran Kebatinan* adherents.”²⁴⁹

Conversions Away from Islam

The *Penghayat*’s sustained rejection of Islam and their obsession with

²⁴⁶ Interview, Sulisty Tirtokusumo, Jakarta, 31 May 2010.

²⁴⁷ Interview, Sigit Widodo, Direktorat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan YME, Jakarta, 31 May 2010.

²⁴⁸ One day in 2006, the Department of Home Affairs held a public hearing in Parliament and invited the Director of Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan YME, Sulisyo Tirtokusumo, to share his opinions with the Commissioners. Sulisty used the moment to convince the commissioners that the *Penghayat* community’s civil rights were violated and that they were in need of a resolution. He criticised the ministry and called for the attention of the Commissioners by showing them the Director General’s official letter, which refused the appeal of a large number of un-registered married couples from Cilacap and Kebumen in Central Java. Interview with Sulisty Tirtokusumo, former Director of Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan YME, Jakarta, 31 May 2010.

²⁴⁹ Interview, Nanang, Ciparay, 20 July 2010.

Sundanese identity recently witnessed Muslims' conversions out of Islam. In the last three years, conversions out of Islam have involved primarily two groups of people in the Lembang district. The first group comprised of non-practicing Muslims who, while identifying themselves as Muslims in fact maintained their native-syncretic creed and practices. The second were either observant or nominal Muslims who developed an interest in *Aliran Kebatinan* after having integrated into the *Aliran Kebatinan* family through marriage or have adopted it as an alternative faith.

While the number of conversions is not yet significant, during 2009 there were several people who embraced *Aliran Kebatinan*. I selected some of them for my case studies in seeking to understand their motives as well as the social and cultural contexts of their conversions. One convert I interviewed was Eman, a man of 35 years of age. He was born into a Muslim family to a father named Haji Ujug from Wangunharja Lembang. Growing up, Eman practiced rituals including the obligatory daily prayers and fasting during Ramadhan. He can recite the Quran, having learnt recitation since childhood. Eman fathered two sons who graduated from a junior high school in Lembang and for fifteen years now he has been working as a farmer in northern Subang. He rented 1,000 square meters of land on which he planted *cabe merah* (red hot chillies). From his agricultural business he earns about IDR 1,000,000 with each harvest, every three months.²⁵⁰

His conversion process, to what he called "*agama Sunda*" or Sunda religion, commenced with a conversation he had in 2009 with Ayah of Subang, who works on an agricultural estate there. Ayah felt responsible for bringing back his fellow Sundanese to what he was convinced was the religion of their ancestors. After getting to know him better, Ayah informed Eman about *Aliran Kebatinan* as promoted by Budidaya. Eman was dumbfounded at his ignorance of his ancestors' religion.²⁵¹ Ayah advised him to meet Asep Hari of Wangunharja for a better understanding about *Aliran Kebatinan*.

By mid-2009, Eman returned to Wangunharja after his had business collapsed. For some time, he observed Islamic rituals, particularly Friday prayers, until one day it struck him that he had

²⁵⁰ Interview, Eman, Lembang, 08 October 2009.

²⁵¹ *Idem*.

never seen Asep during the congregational prayer sessions in the al-Ikhlas Mosque near his house. Curious as to why this was the case, Eman tried to find him. He finally met Asep and discussed the 'religion of their ancestors' which Ayah had earlier told him about. Eman then decided to leave Islam. Eman confessed as follows:

I had been a Muslim for 35 years and never felt fully comfortable with the religion. Islamic *shari'ah* is difficult and Muslims society is polarising. Recently I had the good luck of having met Ayah from Subang and Asep Hari from Wangunharja. They led me to the *Aliran Kebatinan Budidaya*, which maintains the simple traditional Sundanese worldview, uniformity and practices inherited from my ancestors. I do not know why I was so ignorant about this religion. However, I am now happy after having found this tradition, the religion of my ancestors, and having become a *Penghayat*.²⁵²

Apart from believing that *Aliran Kebatinan* is the legacy of his ancestors, Eman argued that his interest in the creed was also due to its adherents' deep commitment to *Aliran Kebatinan* principles. He thus saw the community of *Aliran Kebatinan* as true believers. Actually, Eman believes that Islam promotes similar values but he could not accept the contradiction he witnessed between Islamic precepts and Muslims' behaviour. This suggested to him that Islam is simply the religion on their identity cards and not a reality in their daily lives. Above all, he maintained that his conversion was cemented by his conviction that *Aliran Kebatinan* is the religion of the Sundanese, as opposed to Islam which is a foreign import, the religion of the Arabs.²⁵³

Another convert to *Aliran Kebatinan* I interviewed was Ujang who is 50 years old and was born into a Muslim family with six brothers and sisters. Financial difficulties meant he was unable even to complete elementary school in his village. Today he works as an agricultural labourer and earns IDR 20,000 per day. He decided to convert only in mid-2009. He claims that he is able to better identify with this Sunda religion. He stated, "The reason for my conversion is due to my recent encounter with this creed. I had never heard of it before. Islamic teachings are good but come from the Middle East and Islam is not the

²⁵² *Idem*.

²⁵³ *Idem*.

religion of the nation's ancestors."²⁵⁴ His encounter with Abas, a farmer from Capunagara, Subang, changed his belief. Ujang's sons, however, refused to follow him but he is hopeful that they will eventually change their minds.

Though Eman and Ujang from Wangunharja have embraced *Aliran Kebatinan*, they are still registered in the village administrative office as Muslims. The deepening influence of Muslim politics from national to district levels and the issue of legal procedures in many respects prevent equal recognition of the *Penghayat* as a faith community. While this does not really imply a systematic effort to violate the religious freedom of the *Penghayat*, it is obvious that the administrative process caused by changing their religious belief is far from easy. Even the administration fee charged to those wanting to register their conversions is prohibitive. Both my respondents could not afford the IDR 35,000 (USD 3) which is no small amount of money to them.²⁵⁵

Conclusion

This case study shows how, in rural Lembang, the political and social context shaped religious developments which had a tremendous impact and caused wide social change. As observed in this chapter, the social change that drove towards Islamisation in Lembang was due to several factors. The *first* was the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion from 1948-62 which caused much damage and loss of confidence in socio-economic security among the people living in the conflict areas, such as Tasikmalaya and Garut. It provided the setting for Muslims to escape from these places of origin and to make them look for a safe destination, particularly in Lembang. The migration of individuals into Lembang had social and cultural consequences because of their individual conduct and because they introduced Islamic doctrines and practices into their new environment.

Second, the contributions of these individuals continued to have significant consequences as they built Islamic institutions which strengthened the Islamic presence at the detriment of *Aliran Kebatinan* interests. The institutionalisation of Islamic propagation caused the

²⁵⁴ *Idem.*

²⁵⁵ *Idem.*

transformation of *dakwah* from being conducted as individual acts and as a personal obligation to institutional activities undertaken by groups of Muslim activists. This had a much more significant impact on society. The change was made possible after a vast range of Islamic institutions grew from the 1960s onward. The arrival and the spread of Islamic institutions like mosques, *pesantrens*, *majlis taklim*, *madrasahs*, and TPA in Lembang increasingly promoted Islamisation. These institutions functioned as *dakwah* centres and were important sources for the reproduction and the promulgation of established Islamic doctrine centred in *tauhid*. The institutions were also set up to promote Islamic cultures. After a few years, these institutions started to have tangible impacts at the grassroots level. More and more people started to visit mosques and *madrasahs* and they wanted to study the Quran and to seek for Islamic instruction and education.

Third, readers should bear in mind that at the start of the Soeharto era in mid-1967, the Islamisation of Lembang entered a new stage of development as the regime's politics on religions provided the setting for the religions to have more privileges. Although this shift in context was centred in Jakarta, its impact had reached far beyond the Capital and had influenced society at the grassroots in West Java.

Scholars who understand these developments in the religious lives of the Sundanese people who were living under great Islamic influence, would have thought that this transformation would have brought about the end of the native-syncretic creeds. This is in fact not really the case. Although *Penghayat* were living under tremendous pressure inflicted by the totalitarian regime and in the shadow of *Dakwahism*, this local faith had in fact never disappeared. I found that from roughly 1980 to 1998, this group had been on the defence and had waited for the right moment to revive.

The wind of change since 1998 provided them with the context and the moment for their comeback. The following factors enabled them to retain. The *first* factor is the claim that the *Aliran Kebatinan* is essentially a true Sunda religion that had been upheld by their Sundanese ancestors and should be considered superior and be defended against other religions, especially Islam which is foreign to Sundanese culture. Because they considered Islam as foreign, *Aliran Kebatinan* leaders sought to reclaim their place in indigenous Sundanese history and to legitimise their presence in recent times. This

claim rests on nativist and ethnic sentiments and aimed to reconstruct their identity. People from rural areas found it easier to entertain meaningful relationships with the ethnic symbols that already were embedded in everyday rural life. The growing appreciation of local symbols reflects the resurgent identification with their cultural heritage. One point made by my respondents about why their faith in the *Aliran Kebatinan* has not gone under amidst deepening Islamisation is the fact that its creed is simple compared to Islam or other religions. This is perhaps relevant to what Geertz called “the simple uniformity of religious belief and practice” as observed above.²⁵⁶

The *second* is that in the view of the *Penghayat*, the 1945 Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens and thus provides *Aliran Kebatinan* with the right to live in co-existence and in harmony with other official religions, by interpreting the word ‘*kepercayaan*’ as ‘religion’ to denote their native-syncretic creed. While they had faced no serious challenges during Soekarno’s time, his downfall and the extermination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) signalled trouble for them. Some of them were arrested, others were put under surveillance. The regime allowed religions to play a greater role in society and promoted them as fundamental aspects of Indonesian culture. This policy soon caused an imbalance in what Hefner phrased “the cultural power” structure of society as socio-political life increasingly favoured religions and weakened the *Aliran Kebatinan*.²⁵⁷

Third, the strong ties between family members and lineages which were maintained with extreme care and patience resulted in the *Aliran Kebatinan*’s resilience and its ability to defend its tradition. The Reform era provides the setting for them to revive some cultural elements of their faith and they were able to struggle to obtain the right to conduct marriages and funerals according to their *adat*. Although these phenomena signify the dynamics of the persistent old resistance of the *Penghayat* towards Islamisation, it is too optimistic to claim that this attempt will be able to temper the on-going Islamisation in West Java. Islam’s presence in West Java is too pertinent and the forces of Islamisation too strong to enable *Penghayat* members to completely

²⁵⁶ Geertz, ‘Ritual and Social Change’, p. 36.

²⁵⁷ Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java?’, p. 551.

withstand it. However, their resilience has shown that they can sustain while promoting transformations among themselves.

CHAPTER SIX

CHRISTIANISATION IN BEKASI: RECENT TRENDS AND OPPONENTS AMIDST ISLAMISATION (1970-2011)

In its report of November 2010, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) reported an intense Christianisation process in West Java and indicated that the region had become the place where missionaries had gained ground fastest.¹ The district of Bekasi in West Java is one of the most important Christian strongholds.² It saw a significant growth in its Christian population and institutions, especially due to the influx of migrants from Sumatera and other parts of Indonesia since the 1970s. Although Christianity had already gained ground in various parts of West Java like Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bogor and Bekasi since the nineteenth century, in terms of actors and institutions, the recent development of the Christian community in Bekasi constituted a new trend.

In terms of actors, the recent Christian development does not seem to be primarily the result of the leadership of local leaders and activists. Readers should note that in the past, the Christianisation in West Java and in Bekasi in particular depended very much on local leaders and activists who were mostly of Sundanese, Betawi and Javanese origins. They shared a keen sense of identity cohesiveness because of their religious bonds. Nowadays, the role in Christian development and leadership in Bekasi is primarily played by new actors

¹ ICG, 'Indonesia: 'Christianization' and Tolerance', *Asia Briefing* No. 114, 24 Nov 2010, p. 2.

² Bekasi statistics show that the Christian population has seen a significant growth as does the number of churches. According to the 2009 statistics, Bekasi has currently 413 out of a total of 2135 churches in 17 districts and 9 cities across West Java. Its appeal to the evangelist mission lies in its strategic position, situated right between the capital Jakarta and heavily industrialised West Java.

of Batak and Chinese origins whose social and cultural identification differs from those of the Sundanese majority.

This development provides the context for the rise of anti-Christian sentiments with heavy ethno-religious undertones. In other words, the anti-Christianisation reaction contains strong anti-Batak and anti-Chinese sentiments. These sentiments are not a surprise. The Christian Chinese played important roles in the Christianity's upsurge in this growing city, especially in its leadership and in the building of Pentecostal churches. Batak Christians have lived in Bekasi for some decades where they earn their living while preserving their identity. They came, stayed, worked and built churches where and when they could afford it. Thus, in Bekasi, their existence contributed in making Christian culture and institutions increasingly apparent in the public sphere.

The reaction against Christianity that contains ethno-religious sentiments is novel and evidences the new dynamics in Christianisation and Islamisation dialectics in West Java. It involves new actors, leadership and institutions even if it shows a consistent effort by the Christians to promote their religion in order to oppose and neutralise Islam's hegemonic influence across the region. This chapter seeks to discern how these dynamics work out and tries to explain their impact among Bekasi grassroots society.

The Development of Religions in West Java

Throughout Indonesia's history, the development of religions has been inextricably connected with the power game of the prevailing regime. Soeharto's welcoming politics towards religions saw churches, mosques, schools and other social institutions with religious affiliations proliferate. This steady increase indexes a rise in religious devotion among Christians and Muslims on the one hand, and sustained competition between these two communities, on the other. This religious development is linked to economic and industrial development resulting from the national economic transformation during the New Order era. During the first half of the New Order liberal economy (1967-85), the country received huge foreign loans and direct investment with the 1970s oil boom which boosted national economy and

industrialisation.³ Recession in the early to mid-1980s, however, changed the regime’s economic policy, with industry reoriented towards exports and with the promotion of trade liberalisation and deregulation.⁴ Due to this change, from 1986 to 1996, the country recorded more than 7 per cent growth per annum, which saw unprecedented industrialisation and urbanisation.⁵ As centres of industrialisation, Jakarta and West Java experienced much economic growth that facilitated urbanisation along with increased economic migration.

Table 1
 Numbers of Immigrant Flow into West Java, 2006⁶
 (by thousands)

Migrant Destination						
Migrant origins	West Java		Bogor & Bekasi		Bandung	
	1995	2000	1995	2000	1995	2000
DKI Jakarta ⁷	48,82	48,22	65,27	64,10	16,62	26,33
Central Java	21,57	19,55	16,21	15,92	34,94	29,28
DIY ⁸	1,46	3,61	1,04	2,56	2,82	7,54
East Java	7,46	6,38	7,36	5,54	4,97	10,90
Sumatra	14,36	14,84	7,91	9,42	23,23	22,50
Bali, NTB ⁹ & NTT ¹⁰	0,38	3,08	5,31	0,03	1,28	1,87
Sulawesi	1,98	1,23	0,84	0,00	5,46	1,85
Maluku & Irian (currently Papua)	1,10	0,13	0,78	0,00	0,00	0,00

³ Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁴ *Idem.*

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ *Profil Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2000* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000), p. 7.

⁷ DKI is the acronym for Daerah Khusus Ibukota (the Capital Special Region).

⁸ DIY is the acronym for Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Special Region).

⁹ NTB is the acronym for Nusa Tenggara Barat.

¹⁰ NTT is Nusa Tenggara Timur.

From a socio-cultural perspective, the influx of people of various social and religious backgrounds introduced new symbols, cultures and institutions. Likewise, from the socio-political and socio-economic angles, the migratory flow entailed demographic shifts with significant repercussions in Jakarta and West Java. Known as majority-Muslim regions they were now being slowly coloured with new Christian churches along with increased Christian activities.

Trends in Christianity's Upsurge in Bekasi

In what follows below we shall look at the most recent trends in Christianisation which are a continuation of those in the past in terms of cause, actors and leadership. In terms of cause, the Christian population and the increase in numbers of Christian institutions born out of migration and urbanisation seem to have become the major factors that changed the social demography and the identity of the Bekasi community's make-up. The Christian population and the number of Christian institutions increased significantly during the past few decades.¹¹ In general in West Java, the Christian population's annual growth rate exceeded 4.0 per cent per annum from 1970 to 2000, the highest percentage experienced by Christians in majority-Muslim areas across Indonesia. Christian leaders, however, rejected the speculation that this growth was the result of conversions from Islam. They acknowledged that conversions took place but claimed their number was insignificant and instead stated that the population growth was caused by migration from majority-Christian regions including North Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and NTT.¹² From the 1970s to the 1990s, Christians flooded into West Java. Among them were Batak Protestants.¹³ In their new majority-Muslim community, it was difficult to find a church or to build one in which to conduct Sunday services and therefore they held services in private residences and in other venues such as shop-houses (*ruko*), malls and hotels. Eventually they sought to

¹¹ Suryadinata, Nurvidya Arifin, and Ananta, *Indonesia's Population*, pp. 104-110.

¹² Interview, Fabianus, Bandung, 15 June 2009. While we do not have census or survey materials to gauge the reality of Muslim conversion to Christianity, my observation in a Christian village in Cianjur confirms that there was no significant conversion from Islam to Christianity.

¹³ Interview, pastor Pieterse, Jakarta, 9 March 2011.

construct churches. Over the years the number of churches would seem to have multiplied in tandem with the Christian population growth and their increasing frequent attendance at services although the impact of the problem of church construction constraints needs to be studied before this correlation can be established with any certainty.¹⁴

Readers should keep in mind that in the early New Order period, Christians entered high positions in society because they were highly educated and held excellent academic qualifications.¹⁵ Because later the national education system improved in general, also Muslims became better trained. Soeharto helped modernizing Islamic schools (*madrasah*) by standardizing its system.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the initial advantage of the Christians remains to be felt to this day. With better education and having more political opportunities the Christian minority thus enjoyed considerable political and economic advantages that, together with their own efforts, boosted them to “unprecedented social and political prominence.”¹⁷ Sidel observes:

From parish schools scattered throughout the archipelago to seminaries to the Protestant and Catholic students’ organisations at the most prestigious universities in the country, some Indonesian Christians enjoyed a clear head start in the multitiered hierarchy of education that fed into the New Order bureaucratic elite, even as their church coffers and business connections were enhanced by growing numbers of wealthy Chinese Protestants and Catholics. University lecturers and student activists affiliated with the Partai Katolik and other Christian groups had joined the rallies against the PKI and Soekarno in the critical first months of the New Order and enjoyed something of a hegemonic position as the regime’s leading political operatives for years thereafter.¹⁸

In this context, the Christians grabbed their opportunity and converged on civilian and military posts in the cabinet, parties, media and business sectors. Until the late 1980s, Protestants and Catholics

¹⁴ *Idem*.

¹⁵ A useful analyses of this hypothesis may be found in Gavin Jones’ ‘Religion and Education in Indonesia’, *Indonesia*, 22 (Oct. 1976), pp. 19-56.

¹⁶ Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic Schools in Indonesia’, *Studia Islamika*, Volume 19, Number 1, 2012, pp. 84-85.

¹⁷ John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006), p. 45.

¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 48-49.

secured the Soeharto cabinet's top economic and security portfolios.¹⁹ The crucial role the Christian elites played for the nation's development demonstrates the significance of Christian education and the importance of their institutions at the grassroots even if the regime withdrew its political support from them.

From the 1990s, Christian representation in the civil bureaucracy and military ranks started to wane, much to their chagrin. This was caused by the vast improvement of the national and particularly Islamic educational system²⁰ but also an important contributing factor was Soeharto's embrace of Islam. A leading political observer, William R. Liddle, observes that the Catholics and Protestants "have long been wary of *santri* intentions toward them."²¹ They were unhappy with a campaign in 1992-93 "to replace Christian members of the cabinet with Muslims."²² Christians kept struggling to preserve their socio-political and economic interests at the level of the state while keeping up competition with Muslims at the grassroots. From 1997 to 2000 the Protestant church kept growing, despite the violence perpetrated against it under the political volatility of the years surrounding the New Order's downfall in 1998. In this shifting political constellation, protests against church construction and Sunday services conducted in private residences in Jakarta and West Java emerged.²³ The mid-1990s saw such protests increase and turn destructive. In 1995-96, waves of violent protests swept over Rengasdengklok in West Java, leaving behind the charred remains of several churches. Muslim hostility nonetheless failed to slow down the construction of churches. During the transitional years (1997-99) the number of churches rose significantly and this trend was sustained in the following years, with the rate of increase almost doubling from 1999 to 2005.

Since 1998, democratisation induced fundamental social and political changes that provided the political setting for the Christianisation more than ever. In the meantime, Muslim activists of various persuasions, including Modernists, Islamists, Revivalists and

¹⁹ Liddle, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia', pp. 616-617.

²⁰ For a detailed and relevant discussion of this particular point, see Ricklefs *Islamisation and its Opponents in Java*, pp. 206-210.

²¹ Liddle, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia', p. 617.

²² *Idem*.

²³ Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad*, pp. 7-74.

Dakwahists, were busy struggling to consolidate their political forces. The Christians largely continued to focus on their socio-religious and cultural agenda, which sustained development and kept it on track. During these years of transition, the Christian revival was strengthened, and church attendance soared. Perhaps the denomination that best exemplifies the reality of the Christian growth rate is the Pentecostals, to be discussed later in this chapter. The number of its adherents mounted sky-high during the time of reform.²⁴ Recent statistics show the distribution of the Christians across West Java in terms of population and numbers of churches. The Christian/Catholic population-to-church ratios were thus: Catholics 4,651: 1, Protestants, 994:1.²⁵

Table 2²⁶

Numbers of Christian and Catholic Population (by thousands) &
Numbers of Christian and Catholic Churches & their Distribution across West Java 2009

	Protestants	Protestant Church	Catholics	Catholic Church	Total Church
Kabupaten/Regency					
1. Bogor	141,352	232	55,880	7	239
2. Sukabumi	39,061	39	9,228	6	45
3. Cianjur	33,930	46	8,658	3	49
4. Bandung	163,799	196	13,111	6	202
5. Garut	2,622	19	1,098	2	21
6. Tasikmalaya	19,669	17	3,400	4	21
7. Ciamis	25,718	38	1,466	3	41
8. Kuningan	17,344	11	6,997	2	13
9. Cirebon	61,935	41	11,433	9	50
10. Majalengka	65,125	22	1,078	1	23
11. Sumedang	21,994	21	1,893	2	23
12. Indramayu	18,131	36	2,589	8	44

²⁴ Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global', p. 4.

²⁵ The Christian population-Church ratio is as follows: 1. Protestants 844.5: 1 (districts) and 1148: 1 (cities). The ratio in West Java in total is 999.4: 1. The ratio for Catholics is 2357: 1 (districts) and 9.175: 1 (cities) while being 4654: 1 in West Java in total.

²⁶ *Jawa Barat Dalam Angka* (BPS Statistics of West Java Province, 2010), p. 141.

13. Subang	1,996	34	3,341	5	39
14. Purwakarta	21,598	153	33,435	1	24
15. Karawang	52,071	62	6,084	3	65
16. Bekasi	134,589	153	33,435	1	154
17. West Bandung	13,544	4	4,321	8	12
Sub-Total	839,488	994	167,413	71	1,065
City/Kota					
1. Bogor	87,422	88	45,032	2	90
2. Sukabumi	83,364	37	13,663	1	38
3. Bandung	556,422	396	68,707	17	413
4. Cirebon	85,232	51	14,276	2	53
5. Bekasi	248,442	253	21,072	6	259
6. Depok	65,075	150	54,230	5	155
7. Cimahi	25,095	16	9,376	1	17
8. Tasikmalaya	20,256	29	3,044	1	30
9. Banjar	15,984	14	924	1	15
Sub-Total	1,187,372	1,034	330,324	36	1,070
TOTAL	2,026,860	2,028	497,737	107	2,135

During the 1980s, the Christian population in Indonesia including East Timor which had been incorporated into the nation since 1975 increased at an average rate of 5.2 per cent; about double the national population growth rate of 2.5 per cent. From 1980 to 1985, the numbers of followers of Protestantism, Roman Catholicism and Buddhism increased while those of Islam and Hinduism decreased. From 1980 to 1987, there was significant growth in the number of churches across all 27 provinces. East Java and Jambi saw 200 per cent growth, Central Java 150 per cent growth and North Sumatra 90 per cent, for instance.²⁷ The rise of Christianity, in terms of numbers of churches, is likewise reflected at the national level, from 1977 to 2004.

²⁷ F. Ukur, 'Pertumbuhan Gereja: Suatu Telaah Historis-Misiologis', in *Buku Makalah Seminar Pertumbuhan Gereja 1989* (Jakarta: Panitia Seminar Pertumbuhan Gereja 1989, 1990), p. 11.

Table 3²⁸
National Growth
Houses of Worship 1977 – 2004

Religions	1977	2004	Growth Rate (%)
Islam	392,044	643,834	64.22
Protestant	18,977	43,909	131.38
Catholics	4,934	12,473	152.79

Pentecostal Revival and Chinese Leadership

The Christian population growth rate in West Java trumps that of all other provinces inhabited by majority Muslims. From 1970 to 2000, it stood at 4.5 per cent.²⁹ In 1980, the Christian population was 599,049.³⁰ This number increased to 763,363 in 2005.³¹ The evangelical Christianisation campaign, especially that of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements, is active in Muslim-majority provinces recording a pronounced Christian population growth. After Soeharto's downfall in 1998, Christianity enjoyed more room to propagate its mission across West Java. In November 1999, one prominent Pentecostal leader, Rachel Indriati Tjipto Purnomo Wenas, known as Iin Tjipto, established the Mahanaim foundation in Bekasi with the help of the Ecclesia foundation. Nani Susanti from Cirebon is Iin's aunt and Yusak Tjipto's younger sister. Yusak, Nani, and Iin, together with Petrus Agung Purnomo, Petrus Hadi Susanto and Daniel Alexander are known as the '6 Hamba Tuhan' (God's 6 Servants), and claimed a divine mandate for their 'prophethood'. Petrus Agung Purnomo is a successful businessman in Semarang.³² Petrus Hadi Susanto is an important charismatic leader in Temanggung. They all joined the Jemaat Kristus

²⁸ See *Naskah Sosialisasi Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 9 and 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat*.

²⁹ Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, Aris Ananta (eds.), *Indonesia's Population*, pp. 104-110.

³⁰ *Penduduk Indonesia Menurut Propinsi Seri L. No. 3. Hasil Pengecekan Lengkap Sensus Penduduk 1980* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1980), pp. 26-27.

³¹ *Penduduk Indonesia Seri S 1. Hasil Survei Penduduk Antar Sensus 2005*.

³² Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global', p. 19.

Indonesia Sangkakala in Semarang.³³ The ICG report alleged the Mahanaim of being involved in evangelical action.³⁴ Since the early stage of the Pentecostal's presence in Indonesia, Bandung was selected as one of the evangelicals' major centres, along with Temanggung and Cepu in Central Java. In the following decades, Pentecostal-Charismaticism consolidated its hold in West Java.

There are several factors behind its growth. *First*, as the ICG report noted, was the cultural crisis mostly experienced by workers in the region's industrial centres. The evangelical community was attractive to industrial workers who sought new cohesive communities after having been "uprooted from their traditional social networks."³⁵ *Second*, according to Juliette Koning, through Pentecostal religious activities, persons can conceptualise themselves as global citizens. For the Chinese, who constituted a significant number of adherents to this denomination, to be a Pentecostal means the affirmation and reaffirmation of their ethnic identity.³⁶ *Third*, another motive that led the Chinese and other Christians to join the Pentecostal church was political. During 1990-2000, the Pentecostals and their churches became the targets of attacks that left them in a state of crisis, psychologically, religiously, politically and culturally. Juliette Koning, who recently conducted research on the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement in Indonesia, argues that these evangelist Christians provide theological and spiritual experiences to those who cannot derive such experiences from modernisation. This movement is mostly concerned with supernatural experiences, a sort of divine communication with God or meeting Jesus 'face to face'.³⁷

Aside from spiritual experiences, this religious movement is attractive for its simple practices. It shares Bible teachings about everyday life, holds religious gatherings with vibrant singing and testimonies, and also tries to recruit as many members as possible, emphasising a sense of belonging.³⁸ In fact, evangelists "claim a divine

³³ Interview, Jeremy Wijaya, Bandung, 22 March 2011. Petrus Hadi Susanto's school in Temanggung became the target of an uprising on 8 February 2011.

³⁴ ICG, 'Indonesia: "Christianization" and Tolerance', p. 3.

³⁵ *Idem*, p. 2.

³⁶ Juliette Koning's unpublished presentation in Singapore Management University (SMU) on Understanding the rapid rise of Charismatic Christianity in Southeast Asia Singapore, 2010.

³⁷ *Idem*.

³⁸ *Idem*.

mandate to urgently save as many souls as possible before Christ's Second Coming, believed to be imminent."³⁹ Currently, the number of evangelist Christians worldwide is estimated at 647.8 million, 523.7 million comprise of Pentecostals in addition to Revivalist Protestants and charismatic Catholics.⁴⁰

The Pentecostal revival is in fact an essential part of the Christianisation process in Indonesia. Christian activists I interviewed did not deny Christianisation efforts. However, they believed it to be simply the consequence of the more visual performance of Christian religious duties across the country.⁴¹ In West Java, Christian evangelical activists acknowledged this reality but were convinced that each Christian is obliged to serve God by means of converting non-Christians, whose salvation is thus guaranteed. One Protestant activist argued specifically that converting Muslims is a positive religious duty for Christians. He admits that converting Muslims has become almost intuitive especially in the course of providing social services within Muslim communities. This mission for salvation translated into a powerful call for them to salvage Muslims, in which conversion is logically unavoidable.⁴²

Under these circumstances, the Christians felt more confident to assert and express their identity in the public sphere. The advent of democracy in the late 1990s, together with its concomitant guarantee for the freedom of expression, has seen Christians demand their freedom of expression from the national state alongside other social and political aspirations. Christian leaders no longer shy away from the public spotlight, and now unabashedly declare that Indonesia is not an exclusively Muslim country. Muslims can no longer ignore the fact of the presence of Christianity in Indonesia. Obviously, Christianity has been part of Indonesia since colonial times, but their adoption of this high profile is something rather new. This confidence in expressing their identity and their faith is attested to, for instance, by the following

³⁹ Katharina Hofer, 'The Role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Uganda', *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2003), (Hamburg/Germany: Institute of African Affairs at GIGA), p. 376.

⁴⁰ *Idem*, p. 378.

⁴¹ Interview, John Simon Timorason, Bandung, 9 July 2008.

⁴² *Idem*.

statements. My Christian respondents acknowledged the revival of Christianity across West Java since the 1990s. Pastor Putu Suwintana of the Pasundan Christian Church in Cianjur, said that this revival is witnessed by the following phenomena: (1) increased levels of Christian observance and devotion as reflected by church attendance; (2) increased attendance caused greater identification and heightened engagement with church affairs – consequently Church activity has also risen. These interlinked phenomena spurred the growth of Christianity and its institutions across the region. Pastor Putu Suwintana stated that this revival has become apparent since the 1990s.⁴³

Of Chinese background, Stephen Tong, a popular Indonesian pastor known throughout Southeast Asia for his services and oratory talent provided the following testimony. Tong has 15,000 members in his congregation in the region which has grown in just two decades.⁴⁴ Tong is extremely confident. For Jakarta, for instance, Hannah Beech of *Time* Magazine reports: “When Tong, 69, raised a crucifix onto the church’s massive steeple, worshippers at a nearby mosque complained. Tong didn’t back down. “Jakarta has 1.2 million Christians, so a church for 4,000 people is nothing,” he says. We did this legally, so why can’t we put a cross on our church, just likes mosques have their symbol?”⁴⁵

Such confident assertions were buttressed because of increased Christian revival. Similarly, nowadays it is not rare to witness other cultural expressions of Christianisation, such as car stickers with slogans such as ‘Jesus inside’ or ‘We love Jesus’, reminiscent of similar expressions among Muslims in the 1990s. Indeed, according to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, the number of Asian adherents to various Christian denominations exploded to 351 million in 2005, up from 101 million in 1970.⁴⁶ This spiritual blossoming, in turn, influences Muslims’ religious conservatism. Hanna Beech observed that “a religious revolution is transforming Indonesia.”⁴⁷ With increasing confidence in propagating their mission, along with demographic change and democracy, Christian leaders, especially the evangelicals, rose to prominence. With Chinese leaders playing an important role – such as

⁴³ Interview, pastor Putu Suwintana, Cianjur, 11 May 2010.

⁴⁴ Hannah Beech, ‘Christianity’s surge in Indonesia’, *Time*, 26 April 2010.

⁴⁵ *Idem*.

⁴⁶ This citation is quoted from Beech, ‘Christianity’s Surge in Indonesia’.

⁴⁷ *Idem*.

Tong mentioned above – Muslims saw these developments as threatening and began to organise resistance to defend Islam. While their defensiveness is understandable it is more important to note that the anti-Christianisation rhetoric seems to be an expression of panic caused by the growth of Christianity in the region mixed with anti-Chinese sentiment.

Since 1970s, Chinese Christians played leadership roles and courageously ran activities across West Java. Due to its history, leadership and membership, the Pentecostal-Charismatic church may be considered as a largely Chinese religious movement, although in reality it is not exclusively so. Historically, the Chinese were associated with Christianity since the nineteenth century. In West Java and especially in Jakarta, they played a significant role in missionary work. A Chinese missionary known to have served the Chinese community in Batavia (1899-1901) was Gan Kwee from China, who had links to the most prominent Apostolic missionary, F.L. Anthing.

In 1938, the Christian Chinese *Classis*⁴⁸ of West Java established a Chinese Christian Church named THKTKH-KHD (Tiong Hoa Kie Tok Kauw Hwee Khoe Hwee Djawa). In 1958, this communion of Chinese-Christians changed its name to GKI-Jabar, Indonesian Christian Church in West Java. The Chinese-Christians were led by John Sung, their most prominent pastor and spiritual leader.⁴⁹ Pastor Sung was renowned for his extraordinary oratorical talent. Many Chinese-Christians very much enjoyed his sermons, which they commonly described as ‘spiritualising.’ His talent and charisma increased the church membership from 1,681 persons in 1941 to 6,000 in 1951. The number of its members mounted to 45,000 in 1994 and in 1988, GKI became a member of the Communion of Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia, PGI).⁵⁰

The GKI church has thus largely been the home for Chinese-Christians. They kept a low profile during the New Order for political reasons. During that time, there were no reports about their active involvement in proselytising missions. In what follows, however, we will see how the vision and the stance of the Chinese-Christians towards

⁴⁸ *Classis* is a group of local churches centered in a district and directed by a church body.

⁴⁹ Van den End and Weitjens, *Ragi Carita 2*, p. 225.

⁵⁰ *Idem*, p. 225.

missionary work have changed. Although no accurate numbers are available, more and more have joined the Pentecostal-Charismatic Church since the New Order. Of late, not only have they become active members but some of them also play significant roles in its missionary activities.

While this leadership role is not a relatively new phenomenon, the association between the Chinese and the evangelist Christian denomination is 'heavily freighted.'⁵¹ A scholar on Pentecostals in Malaysia and Indonesia, Barbara Watson Andaya, observes that "not only does Christianity carry the baggage of European colonialism, but resentment towards Chinese economic dominance has at times resulted in violence."⁵² The ICG report observes:

In fact, evangelical Protestantism has seen significant growth in recent years. According to the 2000 census, Indonesian Christians officially constitute about 8.8 per cent of the population, of whom 5.8 per cent are Protestant and 3 per cent Catholic. Muslims are 88.2 per cent, Hindu (mostly on Bali) 1.8 per cent, and Buddhists, Confucians and others make up the rest. Many Protestant evangelists believe the true percentage of Christians is closer to 12 to 15 per cent, and some put the figure even higher, although this is dismissed as wishful thinking by many objective sources. Some said the converts to Christianity are often afraid or unwilling to change the religious designation on their identity card, so they are counted as Muslims in the census. One pastor said the fastest growing segment of converts on Java was the thirteen to eighteen year old age group, young people travelling into the cities for work or school and becoming exposed to Christian proselytisation.⁵³

While in demographic terms urban teens represent the group most likely to be successfully proselytised in Java, the report has identified West Java as the home of the fastest growing evangelism, with Banten next in line. While the extent of evangelist success, especially in attracting Muslim converts, remains unclear, the report suggests that the 'conquest' of West Java and Banten would serve as an important foothold towards the further Christianisation of the capital, Jakarta. As claimed by the report:

⁵¹ Andaya, 'Contextualizing the Global', p. 2.

⁵² *Idem*.

⁵³ ICG, 'Indonesia: "Christianization" and Tolerance', p. 2.

The Sundanese people have been identified as having among them “the least followers of Christ,” and so the evangelists have geared up projects, like the Joshua Project and Lampstand, to the challenge of converting them. These projects are overseas initiatives launched with the help of locally-based foundations. Towards this end, the Joshua Project set up a database of unreached people while Lampstand focuses on planting churches and proselytising to the Sundanese people.⁵⁴

The ICG report observes that another active evangelical organisation is Partners International based in Washington, USA. This foundation emphasises the importance of local culture in realising its mission so its leaders work with local partners in promoting community development projects in support of ‘Vision Indonesia 1:1:1’.⁵⁵ The latter is a missionary initiative which encourages missionaries to build “one church in one village in one generation.”⁵⁶ To achieve this ambitious goal, the foundation established the Evangelical Theological Seminary of Indonesia (ESTI) with some 30 branches across Indonesia and it launched an initiative called the Sundanese Christian Fellowship, which has a dozen groups active around West Java.⁵⁷

As the report above notes, ethnic Chinese have for a long time been playing clear leadership roles. Some figures involved, with names indicating ethnic Chinese origin,⁵⁸ include Pastor Rachel Indriati Tjipto Purnomo Wenas, the head of Mahanaim foundation; Wong Christopher Cahyadi,⁵⁹ allegedly responsible for the ‘human cross’ in front of Al-Barakah mosque in downtown Bekasi on 2 May 2010; and Hendry Leonardi Sutanto, whose house in the elite Bekasi Kemang Pratama Regency complex was allegedly used for a mass baptism on 23 June

⁵⁴ *Idem.*

⁵⁵ *Idem*, p. 3.

⁵⁶ *Idem.*

⁵⁷ *Idem.*

⁵⁸ For Indonesians, these Javanese sounding names clearly indicate Chinese origins because they may sound Javanese but no Javanese would be named like this.

⁵⁹ See ‘*Christofer Jadi Tersangka Formasi Pedang-Salib di Masjid Agung Bekasi*’, Voice of Al-Islam, Monday 14 June 2010, p. 1. www.voa-Islam.com/news/print/2010/06/147089/christofer-jadi-tersangka-formasi-pedang-dsalib-di-masjid-agung-bekasi. Accessed 20 November 2010.

2010.⁶⁰ Such active involvement of ethnic Chinese as evangelical leaders suggests a new trend in the Christian mission in the country which deserves an in-depth study in the future.⁶¹

The Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) Church and Batak Christians in Bekasi

From the early twentieth century to the 1960s, the Bekasi regency was home to an overwhelmingly Muslim population.⁶² The rest of the population adhered to Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. A tiny minority adhered to *Aliran Kebatinan*. In the early half of the twentieth century, the break-down of all believers totalling 2,457,585 persons, was as follows: Islam 2,145,447 (87.30 per cent); Protestantism 198,000 (8.05 per cent); Catholicism 73,224 (2.98 per cent); Hinduism 73,224 (2.98 per cent), Buddhism 5,615 (0.23 per cent); Confucianism 201 (0.008 per cent); and the rest, mostly followers of *Aliran Kebatinan*, make up 8,816 (0.35 per cent).⁶³ While this highlights the diversity of Bekasi's population, it has to be noted that the demographic composition of religious believers was distributed disproportionally throughout 12 sub-districts.

The villages Kampung Sawah and Pondok Melati, for instance, stood out for their Christian majorities and therefore were known as the 'Christian villages' in the regency. Currently, Kampung Sawah and Pondok Melati are under the administration of the Pondok Melati sub-district office. Recent statistics show that there are nearly 25,000 Christians living in this administrative sub-district alongside 130,000 Muslims and several hundred Hindus and Buddhists, among others. There are 23 Protestant and Catholic churches and 65 mosques in this 'Christian' village.⁶⁴ For decades, a culture of tolerance prevailed

⁶⁰ ICG, 'Indonesia: "Christianization" and Tolerance', p. 10.

⁶¹ Muslim activists living in Bekasi claimed to have observed a series of probably unrelated but highly offensive events against Muslims from May 2008 onwards in Bekasi. These include an offensive blog, the Sculpture Saga, and a human cross formation in front of Bekasi's *Al-Barakah* mosque. See ICG, 'Indonesia: "Christianization" and Tolerance', pp. 6-9.

⁶² Badruzzman Busyairi, *Rumah Ibadat di Kota Bekasi* (Bekasi: Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama [FKUB] Kota Bekasi, 2009), p. 21.

⁶³ *Idem*, p. 21.

⁶⁴ *Idem*, pp. 22 and 28.

enabling the Bekasi people to live in harmony irrespective of religious background. Christians and Muslims kept cordial relationships. This harmony endured well because, despite their religious differences, these people shared identities anchored in their ethnic bonds as most of them are of Betawi, Sundanese and Javanese origin, sharing the same languages and values. It was thus not surprising that until the 1960s Muslims and Christians enjoyed freedom in constructing houses of worship or in performing religious and cultural activities. Muslims respected the existence of Sundanese and Javanese churches, which they saw as tolerant and polite.⁶⁵ The Christian population and institutions grew in an atmosphere of respect of their Muslim neighbours and it sent no messages of threat or intolerance.⁶⁶

The situation in Bekasi evolved in correspondence to rapid social change in the capital Jakarta. Since the 1970s, Soeharto had developed Jakarta and its surrounding areas as economic, trade and industrial centres. The Bekasi District has several sub-districts, one of which is also named Bekasi. Due to its economic link with Jakarta, the Bekasi Sub-district grew rapidly. In April 1982, the Minister of Home Affairs upgraded it to a so-called *kota administratif* (administrative city). In several years' time, the city saw a rapid growth in population and the development of infrastructure, transportation, and many educational and socio-religious institutions. In response to this growth, the Minister elevated Bekasi's status of administrative city to that of a municipality. It has an area of 210,49 km² and includes 12 sub-districts and 56 villages. The number of sub-districts had increased from an initial four in its infancy stage in the 1980s as a result of expansion (*pemekaran*) over the last three decades. The municipality is surrounded by Jakarta to the West, Bekasi District to the East, and Bogor District to the South.

Having become the centre of economic development, Bekasi attracted economic migration from outside the municipality, especially from Java and Sumatra. Migration figures from 1995 to 2000 show that of all people arriving in West Java, those arriving in the Bekasi and Bogor districts from Java comprised 24.61 per cent in 1995 and 23.22

⁶⁵ 'Kasus HKBP, Warga Bekasi Justru Akrab dengan Gereja Jawa-Pasundan', www.republika.co.id. Jumat, 17 September 2010. See also 'Jangan Sudutkan Masyarakat Bekasi', www.kompas.com, Kamis, 16 September 2010. Accessed 16 September 2010.

⁶⁶ Interview, Koernia Atje Soejana, Bekasi, 11 May, 2010.

per cent in 2000, and 7.91 per cent and 9.42 per cent from Sumatra in the same years.⁶⁷ The total migration into Bekasi in 1995 was 1,081,228 persons or 35.03 per cent of the total migration in West Java.⁶⁸ Probably due to the economic crisis this figure fell to 66,977 in 2000. This migration contributed to the municipality's population surge. According to statistics, in 2000, the total population of Bekasi municipality was 1,663,802 with a population density of 8,255 per square kilometre, which is higher than any other district and municipality across West Java except Bandung with 12,711 per square kilometre.⁶⁹ This migration also contributed to the municipality's population diversity; Bekasi is overwhelmingly inhabited by Betawi along with significant numbers of Sundanese and Javanese. In addition to these major ethnic groups, Bekasi has many migrants from north Sumatra, mostly comprising of Batak people from Tapanuli.⁷⁰

Table 5⁷¹

2000 Census Bekasi Population according to Ethnic Origin

Bekasi Regency				
Sundanese	Javanese	Betawi	Batak, Tapanuli	Chinese
599,762	206,906	717,863	25,401	2,692
Bekasi Municipality				
Sundanese	Javanese	Betawi	Batak, Tapanuli	Chinese
331,117	523,740	473,309	78,149	13,476

⁶⁷ *Profil Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2000* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000), p. 39.

⁶⁸ *Idem*, p. 37.

⁶⁹ *Idem*, pp. 12 and 15.

⁷⁰ I failed to find accounts of the initial arrival of Bataks and Chinese into Bekasi. However, it is possible that the Bataks migrated to Bekasi through Batavia since the late 19th century for missionary reasons. In 1880, it was *zendeling* Nommensen who sent the first group of seven Batak youths from Selindung to Batavia to attend Seminari Depok, the oldest missionaries' training centre across the archipelago. Before the suspension of the seminary in 1926, 67 persons had been sent to be trained at this Christian missionary school. Some of the Christian Bataks did not return home after they had been trained but preferred to stay in Batavia.

⁷¹ See *Profil Kependudukan Provinsi Jawa Barat Tahun 2000* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000).

In their new settlements, the Bataks would seek churches or congregations where they could meet other Bataks:

Many observers note the great enthusiasm the Bataks have to build churches in their new settlements inspired by their desire to replicate their place of origin, their culture and their life and the circumstances in their villages. It is therefore no surprise that after a short while one can see the presence of HKBP congregations and churches everywhere.⁷²

HKBP churches existed across West Java and Jakarta. In these regions (including Banten), the HKBP conducted services in various places.⁷³ During the 1930s-1950s, the HKBP provided services in Kernolong (where the first HKBP church was built in 1931-32), Tanjung Priok, Menteng Taman Suropati 2 (Adhuc Stat Building), Petojo Tanah Abang II, Jalan Sindoro South Jakarta, and Pademangan.⁷⁴ It is worth noting that from the 1960s to the 1980s the number of HKBP members kept increasing. The growth in number of HKBP churches and adherents was determined by Batak migration into the area and mortality and birth rates. They did not settle in the expensive central Jakarta areas but rather in less affluent areas like peripheral Jabodetabek⁷⁵ neighbourhood mainly because of their low-income professions. Since ordinary Batak people are employed as low-income labourers such as drivers and conductors, construction labourers, roadside tire repair men, small-time traders and the like, they can only afford to live in the peripheral areas of Jakarta. This helped the spread of HKBP to these areas.⁷⁶

⁷² Gomar Gultom (ed.), *Keyakinan Dalam Percobaan: Studi Kasus Gereja HKBP* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sopo Metmet, 1993), p. 37.

⁷³ This includes Menteng Central Jakarta, Sudirman Avenue, Slipi, Tanjung Priok, Tanah Tinggi, Ancol Podomoro, Kapuk, Kelapa Gading, Arabika Road West Jakarta, Pos Pengumben, Srengseng Road, Pademangan Barat, Sukapura, Pasar Minggu, Cijantung, Serang, Cengkareng, Tangerang, Merak, Duren Jaya Bekasi, Setia Mekar Bekasi, Cimahi, and Bandung. See Mika P.L. Tobing (et al.), *Profile Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) Distrik I Jakarta – 3* (Jakarta: HKBP Distrik XXI Jakarta-3, 2008), pp. 333-342.

⁷⁴ Tobing (et al.), *Profile*, pp. 333-342.

⁷⁵ Jabodetabek stands for Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Bekasi and Tangerang.

⁷⁶ Tim Bidang Sejarah, *Sejarah Perkembangan HKBP Distrik VIII Jawa Kalimantan* (Jakarta, 2006), p. 26.

According to Pieterse, a pastor serving in the so-called Taman Mini Resort, the Batak Christians are known to be devout individuals.⁷⁷ They maintain their religious practices even after having lived in majority Muslim regions for a long period of time.⁷⁸ Since the early days of the arrival of Protestant Bataks into Jakarta and West Java, they would always seek out fellow Bataks with whom they could share their language and culture,⁷⁹ and they congregate for Sunday Church services wherever they went. The fact that the services were conducted in their shared Batak language contributed significantly to their attendance. The association between Batak identity and Christianity increased the demand for building churches which aided the expansion of Batak churches in Jakarta and West Java.

However, building houses of worship is not easy. Government regulations stipulate many terms and conditions that have to be met in order to be able to build a house of worship.⁸⁰ These requirements in many cases prove to be quite prohibitive, especially when it comes to obtaining the 'approval' of people living in the neighbourhood. Muslims are generally reluctant to allow Christians to build churches in their neighbourhood especially when there are few Christians. Failure to gain approval for the building of churches cause much frustration to immigrant Christians and leads to tension with local Muslims forcing them to carry out services at their private homes. Muslim activists accused Christians of sometimes having been able to procure the support for church construction projects by donations of money or other gifts. This tactic could backfire, however, in the event of an objection at any point afterwards, even when construction was already underway and pursuant to Joint Decrees No. 8 and 9/2006 or Joint decree No.1/1969.

The cases of the HKBP church in Cinere Depok, GKI church in Bogor Yasmin residence, and Santa Maria Catholic Church in Purwakarta best exemplify how objections put forth even after construction had

⁷⁷ Interview, pastor Pieterse, Jakarta, 10 March 2011.

⁷⁸ *Idem.*

⁷⁹ *Idem.*

⁸⁰ *Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 9 Tahun 2006 dan Nomor: 8 Tahun 2006 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah Dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat*, articles no. 13-20.

begun could hold up the project or even nullify its authorisation. These cases have created a complex mix of legal and political problems as well as inter-religious tension and intolerance.⁸¹ In her study entitled 'Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia', Melissa Crouch portrays how court action taken by the church with regards to its permit for the construction of a place of worship has on occasion successfully challenged objections that were largely influenced by local politics. The Cinere HKBP's church first attempt at court action, for example, was successful and the Bandung State Administrative Court ruled that the mayor of Depok's cancellation of the HKBP church permit could not be upheld.⁸² However, it did not help. Depok officials ignored the Bandung State Administrative Court's decision to enforce the law and to ensure the construction of the church.

A Christian leader I interviewed claimed to be committed to fulfilling all the legal requirements necessary but found it difficult to accept that objections raised by residents in the vicinity of the construction site might veto constructions, let alone those already underway.⁸³ There is, however, in the spirit of the joint decree number 1/1969, an emphasis on social order in matters pertaining to the propagation of religion and the construction of houses of worship. The mix of legal terms and conditions required in such efforts, on one hand, and the need to ensure order, on the other, have facilitated political intervention in the construction of houses of worship in particular and in the propagation of religion in general.

A Case of Tension in Mustika Jaya

Since the 1970s, the Mustika Jaya sub-district of East Bekasi has been inhabited largely by Protestant Bataks. Some of them live in Pondok Timur Indah (PTI). At one point in the 1990s, Samosir, a Christian Batak in the PTI estate, used his house for Sunday services. In the first few

⁸¹ Melissa Crouch of Melbourne University has written a very interesting study of this kind of legal cases in her 'Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New Problems, Local Politics and Court Action', *Asian Studies Review*, December 2010, Vol. 34, pp. 403–419. See 'Bogor Church congregation defies threats, authorities', *The Jakarta Post*, Monday, 6 September, 2010, p. 2.

⁸² Crouch, 'Implementing the Regulation', pp. 403-404.

⁸³ Interview, pastor Esron Tampubolon, Jakarta, 25 March 2011.

years the use of his house for congregations drew no protests. Over time attendance increased forcing the Protestant Bataks in the mid-2000s to purchase another house next door owned by a Javanese Muslim. By that time, there was a real need for a place of worship and this need became more pressing as the local Batak population grew. Meanwhile, Bataks from Tapanuli, North Sumatra, kept arriving. The Sunday congregation continued to grow, and the Christian Bataks used the private residence to celebrate Christmas.

A local Muslim leader, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin, expressed Muslims' displeasure with this situation.⁸⁴ He expressed his discontent over the fact that most attendants came from outside the village.⁸⁵ Over time, he said, more HKBP Christians attended the Sunday services, during which a public road was closed in part to make more parking space for those attending. There were many vehicles coming from outside the village and this worsened traffic conditions and caused noise pollution. The local community felt that the visitors showed neither respect nor care for the neighbourhood. Over time the congregation grew even further, with new members arriving from various places across Bekasi and Karawang.⁸⁶ Muslims began to seriously worry about this development, not really because the residence was being used for Sunday worship and Christmas services, but about the prospect of it being permanently used as a church in the neighbourhood. Interestingly, they feared that this would most likely alter the socio-religious and cultural character of their society⁸⁷ whereas the actual use of the property as a 'church' was not seen as a problem. The fear of the establishment of a real church underpinned the Muslims' reluctance to agree to the construction of a permanent one in their neighbourhood. Within this atmosphere, tension slowly mounted.

Muslims began to protest by expressing their objections over simple administrative and technical issues, such as regarding the permission to conduct services and celebrations or over traffic congestion caused by the meetings.⁸⁸ The private residence happened to

⁸⁴ Interview, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin, Bekasi, 1 November 2010.

⁸⁵ *Idem.*

⁸⁶ *Idem.*

⁸⁷ *Idem.*

⁸⁸ The objection of the people can be seen in '*Berkas Kasus Alih Fungsi Rumah Jl. Puyuh Raya No. 14. RT.01 RW.15 Kelurahan/Kecamatan Mustika Jaya dari*

be at the side of the road, causing many commuters to complain about the heavy traffic and the inconvenience caused by the use of the house. In the meantime, Muslims saw this as a showcase of the Christian Batak faith.⁸⁹ Muslim leaders in the village perceived it as an expression of arrogance. The issue soon escalated from the technical matter of the use of a private residence causing congestion on the public road into a religious and cultural problem.

Local Muslims wanted to keep the village as it was and resented the arrival of the Bataks. In an effort to maintain the local status quo, the community mobilised and presented its complaints to the local village administration. On 15 January 2009, a leader of the administration unit at the local level (RW),⁹⁰ Nyaman, mediated the tension.⁹¹ He invited the HKBP leaders to discuss the objections of the Muslims and to question the use of a private residence for mass religious services.⁹² Nyaman said that the HKBP had been using the house for 18 years without prior permission from the local village administration. Pastors Luspida Simanjuntak and Asian Lumbontaruan acknowledged this situation but wondered why the objections arose only recently.⁹³

While no appropriate solution was given to the objections, in December 2009 the HKBP held another Christmas service in the same place, which drew a large crowd. Protests repeated and Nyaman re-invited the HKBP and local leaders to sit together to talk on 3 January 2010. The HKBP apologised, promising to look for a new place for their services, and appealed to be given time for that. However, local leaders demanded the HKBP stick to a timeframe. Aware that this situation could escalate into unrest, on 16 January 2010, the PTI village head took over the handling of the problem and held a meeting. In addition to village officials, local leaders and HKBP leaders, the meeting was also attended by the Forum for Inter-Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan antar-Umat Beragama, FKUB). In this meeting potential solutions were

Januari 2009-Juni 2010' (Pemerintah Kota Bekasi, Kecamatan Mustika Jaya, Kelurahan Mustika Jaya. Rukun Warga (RW) 15., 2010)'.

⁸⁹ Interview, Suwito, Jakarta, 5 January 2011.

⁹⁰ Rukun Warga or RW is a small administration unit that operates under the village office and is tasked to manage the coordination of Rukun Tetangga (RT).

⁹¹ See *'Berkas Kasus Alih Fungsi Rumah Jl. Puyuh Raya'*.

⁹² Interview, Nyaman, by Muchtadlirin, Bekasi, 16 January 2011.

⁹³ *Idem*.

discussed with the HKBP leaders, with the FKUB proposing the Muslim community to allow the HKBP to temporarily conduct their Sunday services for a period of time to be agreed upon. The HKBP leader Luspida Simanjuntak argued that the HKBP had been there for 18 years and wondered why they should now have to go. She, however, pointed out that HKBP would do its best towards a workable compromise provided a new building or land could be found.

Luspida claimed that since 2004 the HKBP sought to build a church on their own empty land one to two kilometres from *Puyuh Raya* road in Ciketing but the people there warned them not to do that in order not to cause problems.⁹⁴ In this complicated situation, HKBP leaders sought understanding from the Muslims, who said they could not wait too long. In the end, they demanded the HKBP leave the house on the 31st of January 2010. The HKBP could not accept this ultimatum and continued to worship there because they felt that their religious freedom should always be protected by the state.⁹⁵

Meeting failure at village and district levels, the problem was then pushed up to the Bekasi municipal authority. On 2 February 2010, the Bekasi mayor held a meeting with all civil, police and military authorities under his jurisdiction. The meeting decided that the P2P office⁹⁶ would issue an order to seal the house on 10 February as it violated its building function. The sealing was scheduled for 12 February; however, it was postponed after a Member of Parliament from the PDI-P party intervened by making a call to the mayor.⁹⁷ This call helped postpone the sealing for two weeks. However, due to Muslim pressure, the P2B office issued another order to close the house to any religious services on 25 February 2010. On the 1st of March, the house that was used as venue for Sunday and Christmas services of the HKBP congregation was officially sealed.

The sealing of the house outraged HKBP members. Some female HKBP members came to the houses of Nyaman, the RW head, and Suwito, the Muslim's spokesperson, who was also the *imam* of the local

⁹⁴ Meeting notes written by Abd Jabbar named '*Berkas Kasus Alih Fungsi Rumah*'.

⁹⁵ *Idem*.

⁹⁶ P2B is Dinas Pengawasan dan Penertiban Bangunan (Office for Building Control and Order).

⁹⁷ Interview, Nyaman, by Muchtadlirin, Bekasi, 16 January 2011.

mosque, to express their anger. These Muslims sought police assistance as they felt they felt intimidated. The HKBP found the sealing unacceptable. They removed the cordon, accusing the government officials of being unfair. They maintained that the 1945 Constitution guaranteed their right to worship and continued to oppose the government decision. In the name of religious freedom they resumed their services in the house. On 20 March 2010, however, the municipal authority sealed the house again and warned the HKBP not to oppose the law.

In the meantime, Muslim activists argued that articles of the 1945 Constitution should provide practical guidelines on the implementation of Joint Decree Number 8/9 2006, which authorised the construction of all houses of worship at the district level and required that it be based on a real need. The joint decree requires proof of 90 members of the religious community seeking to construct a house of worship, with verified names and identity card numbers along with support from 60 residents living in the neighbourhood.⁹⁸ Due to the fact that the Mustika Jaya district is overwhelmingly Muslim, it seems unlikely that any Bataks seeking a church would be able to fulfil this requirement. The Decree also requires recommendations from the head of the office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the FKUB at the district level.

In order to be fair to the Batak Christians, the Bekasi municipality promised to provide a location for them to perform their Sunday services. The HKBP, however, said that the government did not keep its word. Since then, the issue became so politically-charged that their search for other places for their Sunday services became very difficult. In July 2010, they moved their services to an empty plot of land about 2.5 kilometres to Ciketing Asem, Mustika Jaya, East Bekasi. Although they claimed to have obtained the permission of the local authorities in this new location, their arrival was challenged by the people in the neighbourhood with the support of members of Muslim organisations from outside the village. Every Sunday morning they organised protests. For the Christians, the reason behind their objection was not really clear. What was stated was that they did not want the HKBP Christians to hold their Sunday services in their village, let alone build a church.

⁹⁸ See Joint Decree issued by the Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Home Affairs Numbers 9 and 8 Tahun 2006, article 14.

They considered the performance of Sunday services in their village an intrusive imposition. The general complaint was that the Sunday services would disturb those residing in the area.⁹⁹

However, the HKBP rejected these protests as they were convinced of their right to conduct services on their own land. Especially after their experience in their old location, this new challenge encouraged them to continue to defend their religious rights. The Bataks, especially those from North Tapanuli, are strongly attached to the Christian faith which has become enmeshed with their culture. They left home with their parents' prayer that they would maintain their culture and keep faithful to their church.¹⁰⁰ This religious element in the Batak culture lends great fervour in the defence of their religion. It seems that this commitment, at once cultural and religious, is what drove the HKBP congregation to keep performing their weekly Sunday services while ignoring the protest from all sides.

This was an expression of resistance. The Batak Christians acknowledged the prohibition of using a private residence for public religious services. Nonetheless, they were unhappy with the government's sealing of the house because they felt that they were impeded in performing their Sunday services and were denied their freedom of religion. They knew they had violated a government regulation, but also felt that the government was complicit in denying their fundamental human right to worship as guaranteed by Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights. Recognising their marginalised position and banking on the sympathies of various electronic and print media, they accentuated their discontent. Towards this end, they kept gathering at the sealed house every Sunday morning before walking the few kilometres to the empty plot of land in Ciketing where they performed their service. My respondents, whose house is next to the plot the Bataks use complained of the inconvenience they faced. One of them said:

You know... upon the sealing of the house they used for Sunday services, the HKBP Christians kept coming to the place and used it as their meeting point. From there, they walked in lines to perform their Sunday service on an empty piece of land owned by a member of HKBP congregation. On their way to the land they kept walking in lines together, singing Christian songs in the Batak language at the top of

⁹⁹ Interview, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin and Siti Hafsah, Bekasi, 1 November 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Interview, pastor Erson Tampubolon, Jakarta, 25 March 2011.

their voices, even louder than the Quranic recitation usually heard from the village mosque minaret. It sounds strange to us as Muslims.¹⁰¹

Local Muslims were unhappy with what my respondent suggests is a 'theatrical performance.'¹⁰² She pointed out that before the clash on 12 September 2010 erupted the Bataks did this without fail every Sunday. She complained: "Their voices were loud and their language was strange to us."¹⁰³ She then compared the gospel choir on the Ciketing Street every Sunday morning with the Quranic recitation from the minaret and reiterated her discontent because the gospel choir drowned the Quranic recitation. Religious and ethnic identity were thus involved as the bases of tension, which in the end escalated into violence.

The clash also indirectly resulted from the failure of the local authorities to step in timely to mediate the situation. Outside intervention on behalf of both groups also contributed to the clash. Local Muslims sought the help of their brethren outside the village.¹⁰⁴ The Christians sought the political intervention from a PDI-P member of parliament.¹⁰⁵ The former succeeded in applying more pressure on the HKBP members in the village, while the latter demanded that the Bekasi municipality, having gained office with the support of the party, act as fairly as possible. This situation, left unresolved, culminated in the small-scale attack on 12 September against the Batak Protestants of HKBP that left their pastors injured. Many Christian and Muslim leaders were shocked over the sudden eruption of this inter-religious tension in Bekasi.

The Bekasi Islamic Community Congress (Kongres Umat Islam Bekasi, KUIB) accused the HKBP of violating the law as well as having transgressed local norms and cultures. The latter was demonstrated in their disrespect for the local people and their environment. It was said that the way in which they had obtained permission from the local people was illegitimate because the Muslims claimed the Batak

¹⁰¹ Interview, Siti Hafsa, Ciketing, Bekasi, 1 November 2010.

¹⁰² *Idem.*

¹⁰³ *Idem.*

¹⁰⁴ Interview, Suwito, Jakarta, 5 January 2011. Also Interview with Nyaman, by Muchtadlirin, Bekasi, 16 January 2011.

¹⁰⁵ Interview, Suwito, Jakarta, 5 January 2011.

Christians had misused people's identity cards.¹⁰⁶ HKBP leader, Erson Tampubolon, rejected this accusation, claiming that they had obtained the consent from the local people without any tricks.¹⁰⁷

The conflict was actually there because the Muslims thought that the Protestant Bataks were trying to proselytise and the Muslim wrongly thought that the Batak Christians were intolerant.¹⁰⁸ Muslim leaders in Mustika Jaya sub-district said that they have been living with the Javanese and Sundanese churches since the nineteenth century in tolerance and mutual respect. There never had been any misunderstanding or clash.¹⁰⁹ They felt the tension with the Bataks was rooted in the cultural gap between Muslims mostly of Betawi, Sundanese and Javanese origins and the HKBP Christians of Batak origin.

The introduction of Christianity in Mustika Jaya failed to garner the reception it enjoyed in Pondok Melati in the late nineteenth to early twentieth century. Aside from the fact that the Protestant Bataks did not use the same approach as deployed by missionaries in Pondok Melati, today's context has also changed. What we see in this case is the refusal of the local community to accept the HKBP Christians in their neighbourhood. There were too many irreconcilable differences.

Christianisation and its Opponents

The Pentecostal and HKBP growth in Bekasi caused deep concern among Muslim activists leading them to oppose Christianisation and establish anti-apostasy organisations. They hoped to maintain their monopoly of the public sphere by taking anti-apostasy actions to put pressure on missionaries. However, it seems clear that the establishment of these organisations is symptomatic of Muslim anxieties about Christianisation. Interestingly, Muslim activists have been paying much attention to Christianisation in a situation of the deepening Islamisation across the region. A 2000 census indicated Muslims constitute the largest population in West Java (34,884,417 million/97.65

¹⁰⁶ Jeje Zainuddin, 'Solusi Konflik Ciketing', *Republika*, 20 September 2010, p. 4; see also a report in the same edition on p. 5. See also 'Klarifikasi FPI Bekasi Raya Atas Insiden HKBP', www.fpi.or.id 16 September 2010.

¹⁰⁷ Interview, pastor Erson Tampubolon, Jakarta, 25 March 2011.

¹⁰⁸ Interview, ustadz Sahid Tajuddin, Bekasi, 1 November 2010.

¹⁰⁹ *Idem*.

per cent), where Islam is a thriving aspect of identity.¹¹⁰ Despite being lower than the annual Christian growth rate of over 4.5 per cent, the annual Muslim growth rate in this region (2.42 per cent) is higher than that nation-wide (1.86 per cent). In terms of numbers and percentage, the national Muslim population totals 177,528,772 or 88.22 per cent, which percentage is much lower than that of the total West Javanese Muslim population of around 97.65 per cent.¹¹¹

The Christian demand for new houses of worship increased in this context as an expression of growth, but Muslim activists saw the surge in church construction as an expression of evangelist Christianisation efforts instead of an honest need for houses of worship. The Muslims' conviction that evangelism is a threat means that this issue is difficult to resolve. In countering the evangelist mission, Muslim activists established anti-apostasy organisations in places across West Java and Jakarta which staged strong protests against church construction. They also protested against conducting Sunday services in private residences. Counter-actions culminated in 2004 and 2005, causing continuous tension in Muslim-Christian relations.

Muslims accused Christians of implementing an insidious Christianisation agenda, while Christians kept denouncing Muslims for the violence they perpetrated against them. Sustained mutual suspicion meant they were hyper-sensitive towards each other's religious activities. The perceived threat of Christianisation has affected the Muslim community psychologically, inciting fear, anger and suspicion towards Christians. There was the potential that the Muslims would become paranoid. This might cause the danger that they would over-generalise and consider all Christian denominations hostile and ambitious, while aggressive proselytisation was in fact mainly carried out by evangelicals. How irrationality turns into violence is well-exemplified by the build-up of tension between the Muslims and the Christians of the HKBP denomination in Bekasi, which erupted into the attack on two HKBP pastors on 12 November 2010. The violence also

¹¹⁰ Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, Leo Suryadinata (eds.), *Indonesian Electoral Behaviours: A Statistical Perspective* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 203.

¹¹¹ Suryadinata, Nurvidya Arifin, Ananta (eds.), *Indonesia's Population*, pp. 104-110.

speaks to the latent tension between these two different faith communities.

Muslim activists responded through the formation of a coalition of *Dakwahists*, Modernists and Islamists to challenge evangelical Christianisation. The ICG report mentioned above claims that Salafi jihadists seem to have become involved in this movement and warns that they may use the Christianisation issue as their “recruitment theme” for a new generation of jihadists.¹¹² While this particular claim needs to be investigated, it is obvious that Christianisation represents a threat considered serious enough to induce Muslim leaders and activists to mobilise into a coalition cutting across diverse ideological persuasions. Most of the groups involved have no history of violence, but some have frequently been responsible for the sealing of churches across Jakarta and West Java.

For many anti-apostasy activists, the ICG report’s claims came as no surprise because most facts presented in the report were already known. The ICG, long viewed with suspicion by Muslim activists, now acknowledged the reality of Christianisation. An Islamist website, *Voice of Islam*,¹¹³ which was a major source used in the report, used it to convey to its readers the message of the reality of Christianisation. On 29 December 2010, it published a report entitled “These are cases of Christianisation behind the Bekasi Incident.”¹¹⁴ Quoting the ICG report, it maintained that one major reason for the disharmony between Muslims and Christians was the “aggressive evangelical Christian proselytisation in Muslim strongholds.”¹¹⁵ A coalition of Bekasi *dakwah* activists claimed the report as plain evidence of their complaints about Christianisation.

Although the report did not invoke a collective response from mainstream Muslim organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, it did draw the attention of intellectuals like Azyumardi

¹¹² ICG, ‘Indonesia: “Christianization” and Tolerance’, pp. 15-16.

¹¹³ www.voa-islam.com.

¹¹⁴ See ‘Inilah Kasus-kasus Kristenisasi di Balik Insiden Ciketing Bekasi’ (These are cases of Christianisation behind the Ciketing Bekasi Incident), in <http://www.voa-Islam.com/news/indonesia/2010/12/29/12549/inilak-kasuskasus-kristenisasi-di-balik-insiden-ciketing-bekasi/> dated 29 December 2010.

¹¹⁵ <http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesia/2010/12/29/12549/inilah-kasuskasus-kristenisasi-di-balik-insiden-ciketing-bekasi> (accessed 13 March 2011).

Azra who authored an article in the national daily, *Republika*, entitled “Christianisation and tolerance”¹¹⁶ criticising evangelist intolerance.¹¹⁷ Arguing for respectful tolerance in spreading religion, Azra warned of the danger to inter-faith harmony posed by aggressive proselytising, the more so when deception or other illegitimate means are employed. He reiterated that to avoid tension and disharmony within society, the government had actually barred missionary activities from targeting those people who already embraced a recognised faith.¹¹⁸ Anti-Christianisation activists subsequently tapped Azra’s critique as intellectually legitimising their protests. They made numerous copies and distributed them on the 6th of January 2011 to activists involved in the rally on the streets in front of the Bekasi Court.¹¹⁹ From Bandung, prominent Muslim leader K.H. Athian Ali praised Azra’s article for his critical comments about the intolerance of the evangelist approach.¹²⁰

In fact, the outpour of Muslim resentment toward Christians had been on-going since mid-2010. By that time Muslim groups established the Bekasi Islamic Congress and used every mosque in the city to create an anti-apostasy movement.¹²¹ The coalition of Muslim groups convened at the Al-Azhar mosque to address the so-called ‘Christianisation problem.’ One of the group’s leaders, Murhali Barda, head of the Bekasi chapter of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), who later allegedly assaulted the two church leaders in Ciketing, East Bekasi,¹²² proclaimed that all Muslims should “unite and be on guard because the Christians

¹¹⁶ Azyumardi Azra, ‘Kristenisasi dan Toleransi’ (Christianisation and Tolerance), *Republika*, 02 December, 2010.

¹¹⁷ *Idem*.

¹¹⁸ *Idem*. Azra was probably referring to Joint Decree of the Ministers of Home Affair and Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1/1969 dated 13 September 1969 over the Implementation of the Government Officials’ Task in Guaranteeing Order and Smooth Operation of Development and Religious Worship amongst Believers.

¹¹⁹ My own observation on-site in Bekasi, on the 6th of January 2011. The rally itself aimed to influence the outcome of the trial while showing support for those accused of incitement against the Protestant Bataks of Ciketing, East Bekasi.

¹²⁰ Interview, Hedi Muhammad, Bandung, 13 January 2011.

¹²¹ <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/city/muslim-groups-talk-war-over-christianization/382952>, accessed 13 March 2010.

¹²² ‘Two Church Leaders Assaulted’, *The Jakarta Post*, 1 September 2010.

are up to something.”¹²³ An activist from the Forum for Ulama-Ummat of Indonesia (Forum Ulama-Ummat Indonesia, FUUI) in Bandung, Hedi Muhammad, characterised Christianisation as illegitimate missionary activity. He argued that the methods employed by the evangelicals have no basis in Christ’s teachings and he questioned whether Christianisation more accurately involved the commodification of religion.¹²⁴ Some initiatives to proselytise Muslims obviously contradict Christianity itself, he said. Instead of deceptively baiting destitute Muslims with financial carrots in such un-Christian fashion, Hedi held up the personification of genuine compassion that was Mother Theresa. He felt that her sincere dedication to humanity earned her a place in heaven.¹²⁵

It was under these circumstances that the anti-apostasy activists organised their resistance. In May 2010, they held two religious rallies (*tabligh akbar*) that brought together a coalition of Muslim activists of various organisations from around Jakarta, Bekasi and Bandung. Unlike ordinary religious rallies that served as forums for addressing ritual, spiritual and social issues, the latter rallies addressed sensitive issues surrounding apostasy or *pemurtadan*.¹²⁶ The first rally was held in South Bekasi on 8 May and was led by K.H. Athian Ali, the head of the FUUI in Bandung. The following day, another mass rally was held at the Barokah Mosque in downtown Bekasi. Represented at the meeting were Muslim organisations from all over Bekasi, including the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII), Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council (MUI), Reformist Islamic Movement (GARIS), Islamic Defender Front (FPI), Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, Indonesian Islamic Youth Organisation (GPPI), and many others. The meeting was hosted by the Bekasi Anti-apostasy Front (FAPB) which had put Christianisation on the agenda for discussion.¹²⁷

The gathering produced the Bekasi Muslims Declaration which included: (1) the rejection of the construction of churches that do not

¹²³ <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/city/muslim-groups-talk-war-over-christianization/382952> (13 March 2010).

¹²⁴ Interview, Hedi Muhammad, Bandung, 13 January 2011.

¹²⁵ *Idem*.

¹²⁶ Interview, Abu Al-Iz, Bekasi, 2 November 2010. See also ICG, ‘Indonesia: “Christianization” and Tolerance’.

¹²⁷ Interview, Abu Al-Iz, Bekasi, 2 November 2010.

meet genuine needs and follow legal procedures as this may cause disquiet among the people and lead to unrest; (2) the strong condemnation of any attempts by evangelist Christians to convert Muslims; (3) the expression that Muslims were offended by affronts towards Islam and its symbols; (4) the demand that local authorities and the police take action and sentence the perpetrators.¹²⁸ The declaration conveys that Muslims were angry with the attempts to Christianisation. Their defensive mind-set is also evident in their much-heightened sensitivity towards criticism of their religious symbols in a situation where they are growing themselves through increased Islamisation.

Increasing Assaults Targeting Churches

Anti-apostasy actions involving the use of violence provoked tension between Christians and Muslims with socially-polarising potential. From 1998 to 2010, numerous churches and other Christian properties across West Java were the targets of frequent attacks by Muslim mobs and many churches were forced to close. During this time, militant Muslim activists often protested the use for Sunday services of private properties such as shop-houses (*ruko*) or private residences. They also regularly mobilised to protest the construction of churches in a number of places, even where the government had issued construction permits. There was also an increase in the number of church construction disputes brought before the courts.¹²⁹ Among these disputes are those involving the HKBP church in Depok and one Christian church in Taman Yasmin, Bogor. Church closures increasingly occurred across West Java with 45 instances reported in 2004-05.¹³⁰ A Christian pastor, Chrisman Hutabarat, acknowledged that many of the churches that were forcibly closed indeed did not have construction permits (IMB). Most of the churches closed or destroyed, however, had been there for decades and had been constructed in the 1960s to the 1990s with the support of the residents in their surroundings. The *Jakarta Post*, for instance, stated

¹²⁸ 'Deklarasi Ummat Islam Bekasi', a pamphlet issued by Bekasi Anti-Proselytising Front (Front Anti-Pemurtadan Bekasi, FAPB) of Bekasi, Pekayon Jaya, Bekasi, West Java.

¹²⁹ Melissa Crouch, 'Implementing the Regulation', pp. 403-419.

¹³⁰ Interview, pastor Chrisman Hutabarat, the Secretary of the Association of Indonesian Pentacostal Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Pentakosta Indonesia, PGPI, West Java), 7 July 2008.

that from September 2004 to July 2007 there were more than 30 cases of churches being attacked or forcibly closed.¹³¹ This number would seem to be rather too low in view of other findings. What is significant here is the fact that the number does not seem to have reduced in the past few years. Moreover, anti-Christianisation activists have continued to pursue their agenda and to consolidate their position at the grassroots.¹³² Their concerns over the intensified proselytising actions appeared in the early days of post-1998 Indonesian democracy even though the establishment of formal anti-apostasy organisations is a more recent development that started in 2005.

The Ministers' Joint Decree Numbers 8 and 9/2006

Due to increasing tension and intensified clashes between people of different faiths, the need for a solution to the problem became ever more urgent. Believers, however, could not see eye to eye about the causes of disharmony within their society. The tension revolved especially around the expansive presence and the construction of houses of worship, especially churches. Muslim activists accused Christians of having a Christianisation agenda focusing on Muslims while attacks on churches were becoming more frequent. In this context, various religious leaders opined that Joint Degree No. 1/1969 should be suspended while others said that it should be upheld or even revised. The former generally represents the voices of Christian leaders, while the latter, those of Muslim ones.

A prominent pastor, Ismartono, noted that the forced church closings shared a common pattern. In his words:

Muslim residents were mobilised to complain about the “unrest” caused by activities in the churches or in other Christian buildings. Then, Christians living near the churches were intimidated, he said. Finally, government officials declared the churches closed, based on the Joint Ministerial Decree No. 1 of 1969, and especially its article 4 on the construction of worship houses.¹³³

¹³¹ ‘Another Christian church attacked in Bandung’, *The Jakarta Post*, 4 June 2007.

¹³² Interview, Abu Al-Iz (FAPB’s chairman), Bekasi, 2 November 2010.

¹³³ ‘Indonesia Christians Intimidated to “Voluntarily” Close Down Churches’, *UCAN*, May 13, 1999.

The Christians had been disappointed that the Ministerial Decree had even been issued in 1969. Now, with churches increasingly forced to close, Christian leaders felt compelled to demand a review of the Decree. On May 1999, members of the Communication Forum of Jakarta Christians (Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Jakarta, FKKJ) held a seminar discussing and reviewing the Decree. An adviser to the Justice minister, Cecilia F.G. Sunaryati, who was on the seminar panel, agreed with the idea to review the Decree in order to imbue it with the spirit of reform as well as to strengthen its legal basis.¹³⁴ Sunaryati, a Catholic and former director of the national board for the development of laws at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, pointed out that the need to review the Decree also stemmed from its failure to concur with the spirit of religious freedom which informed the 1945 Constitution.¹³⁵ The forum was also concerned with the human rights perspectives regarding the Decree. The FKKJ chairman, Bonar Simangunsong, promised to continue studying the decree from both legal and human rights aspects and to submit his findings to the government. He argued that the Decree had been extensively misused to “deny Christians religious freedom by halting church construction.”¹³⁶

Under these circumstances the chairman of the Communion of Indonesian Churches (PGI), Andreas A. Yewangoe, put this controversial issue to the attention of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in their meeting on 23 August 2005.¹³⁷ In response, the President asked the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs to undertake an assessment of the existing legal foundations which regulate the socio-religious life of people of different faiths.¹³⁸ The main question concerned the joint decree of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1/1969. The joint decree, passed in 1969 by the New Order regime, stipulated the general guidelines for the

¹³⁴ *Idem.*

¹³⁵ *Idem.*

¹³⁶ *Idem.*

¹³⁷ ‘Hard-Liners confirm church closure in Bandung’, *The Jakarta Post*, 8/25/2005.

¹³⁸ ‘Naskah Sosialisasi Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri dalam Negeri No. 9 and 8 year 2006 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat.’ p. 2.

implementation of the tasks of the government apparatus in keeping order and the regulation of sustainable development and religious observance by believers.¹³⁹ The decree contained regulations on religious propagation and the construction of houses of worship, inspired by the fact that the construction of houses of worship created much inter-religious tension.¹⁴⁰

The aim of joint decree no 1/1969 was to give full protection towards religious freedom while upholding social order. The regime guaranteed the freedom of religious observance but insisted that this be conditional on social order. After more than forty years, many view the joint decree as inadequate, because ambiguous, and having lost relevance to address specific practical aspects of religious life.¹⁴¹ This appraisal was made in September 2005 in a joint meeting of high-ranking state officials including the Ministers of Home Affairs, Religious Affairs, Law and Human Rights and the Attorney-General. The officials concluded that various aspects of joint decree no 1/1969 were no longer relevant and needed to be revised.¹⁴² The weaknesses included, *first*, the ambiguous wording it contained, with many sentences amenable to multiple interpretations. *Second*, it lacked detailed provisions regarding the construction of houses of worship. These were the roots of more recent social discord.

Upon the instruction of the President, the Minister of Religious Affairs, in cooperation with the Minister of Home Affairs, made drafts of joint decrees number 8 and 9 on the guidelines for local authorities in the maintenance of religious harmony, the empowerment of the Forum for Inter-religious Harmony (FKUB), and the construction of houses of

¹³⁹ 'Sambutan Menteri Agama R.I Pada Sosialisasi Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 9 Tahun 2006/Nomor 8 Tahun 2006', in <http://www.depdagri.go.id/news/2006/04/17>, accessed 14 May 2009

¹⁴⁰ 'Naskah Sosialisasi Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri dalam Negeri No. 9 and 8 year 2006 regarding Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat.' p. 7.

¹⁴¹ 'Sambutan Menteri Agama RI Pada Sosialisasi Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 9 Tahun 2006/Nomor 8 Tahun 2006', in <http://www.depdagri.go.id/news/2006/04/17>, accessed 14 May 2009.

¹⁴² *Idem*.

worship. The joint decree No 9 and 8 contains ten chapters and 31 articles. The regulations about the construction of houses of worship are stipulated in articles 13-17 of chapter IV. Article 14 stipulates the procedures to obtain permission to build houses of worship. Article 14 (1) says: "the construction of houses of worship must meet administrative and technical requirements." The following point, article 14 (2), states:

In addition to the requirements referred to in article 14 (1), the construction of house of worship must meet specific requirements that include: (a) a list of names and identity card numbers of the house of worship's users of at least 90 (ninety) persons authorised by local authorities, according to the boundaries referred to in article 13 (3); (b) local support of at least 60 (sixty) persons authorised by the headman/village head; (c) a written recommendation from the head of the Department of Religious Affairs at the district/city office, and (d) written recommendation from FKUB of district/city office.

These requirements look conservative, weak and prone to incite conflict in society. It has proved difficult for believers who want to build a house of worship to meet these requirements especially those required by points (b) and (c). In many cases, it is not easy to get support from the local people of a different faith. Under this situation, or when there is an urgent demand to build a house of worship, local support of at least 60 (sixty) persons can become a matter of manipulation by conflicting parties; either local support is indeed manipulated or accused of being manipulated. Conflict and tension often occur after a house of worship has started construction and generally after accusations that local support had been manipulated.

However, leaders of different religions do not seem to have an alternative to these conservative requirements and they approved the arrangement. Upon the completion of the draft by the two Ministers, religious leaders of various religions were invited to offer their insights and comments. After the decree had been discussed eleven times all parties involved in the discussion finally decided to agree to a final draft on 21 March 2006. Subsequently, the Ministers of Religious and Home Affairs both signed it into law.

Conclusion

In chapter three we have seen how the changing context, the regime's politics and the state's ideology exterminated the Communist party and its followers, which slowly undermined the significance of *Aliran Kebatinan* and provided the context for the increased insistence of the significance of religions. Christianity was among the official religions that benefited from the changing context and increasingly appeared to be a strong opponent against Islam. As the importance of the PKI and the *Aliran Kebatinan* had disappeared, Christianity's significance increased and seemed to have replaced them in neutralising deepening Islamisation in the region. Christian leaders saw that the regime's change provided the context to pave the way for Christianisation *pari passu* with Islamisation.

As said in the beginning of this chapter, Christianity had been present in West Java, especially, since the nineteenth century and continued to gain ground in various parts of the region including Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bogor, and Bekasi. Thousands of Sundanese embraced Christianity at the end of the nineteenth century and more Sundanese chose Christianity in the 20th century. The conversion continued after independence and grew rapidly from the mid-1960s onward. Although Muslim Sundanese denounced their fellow Sundanese for converting to Christianity, their opposition to Christianisation did not seem to be very strong and therefore did not cause polarisation along the lines of strict-religious sentiments, or create conflict of identity between people of different faith. Recently, in the past few decades, Christianisation in the region, especially in Bekasi, had different consequences after society had changed due to economic development.

As stated from the outset, since the 1970s, economic growth and industrial development in Bekasi as promoted by the New Order has changed society, especially after the influx over several decades of hundreds of thousands of migrants from Sumatra and other parts of the country. As said, among the migrants were Christians of Batak and Chinese origins who entered Bekasi along with their social institutions and cultural identity. Living among a majority Muslim population, the Chinese and Batak Christians secured their ethnic distinctiveness and religious identity through a Christian way of life, and by displaying their desire to promote Christian values among non-Christians. Leading experts on Christianity in Indonesia, Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel

Steenbrink, observe a 'spectacular growth' of Christianity, especially of Pentecostals and Evangelicals.¹⁴³ This Christianisation is done by new Christian actors under non-Sundanese leadership and this marked a new trend in the Christianisation of West Java. Some Christian elites took note of Muslims' fears about the recent development of Christianity,¹⁴⁴ as witnessed by Muslim activists' creation of anti-Christianisation organisations tasked to neutralise Christianity's upsurge. Now, in this context, Muslim activists acted as the opponents who caused the tension between Bekasi Muslims and Batak Christians to emerge to the surface.

This opposition trend is novel, especially in terms of organisation. The anti-Christianisation organisations now came to be organised under new banners including those of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Jamaat Ansarut Tauhid (JAT), Gerakan Reformis Islam (GARIS), and Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan (AGAP), et cetera, displacing old banners like those of Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, NU, and others. In terms of approach, these new anti-Christianisation organisations did not seem to be well-organised nor endowed with the right direction and goal: they even tended to be violent. They were different from anti-Christianisation organisations in the early days of the New Order, which had a clear *dakwah* vision and had programs with access to proper intellectual resources. At that time, the *Dakwahists* struggled to win over the regime's policies on the management of religion and *dakwah*. On the contrary, the most recent anti-Christianisation organisations do not seem to adopt a proper strategy in their demands for legislation in their favour. They are weak and reactionary. While the New Order politics on religion were losing relevance in the face of the Reform era, it is unfortunate that since the early days of the Reform era, after four regimes in power, no proper religious policy has been issued to cope with radicalism inspired by anti-Christianisation reactions caused by continued rivalry between Islam and Christianity, two world religions whose institutions keep developing and whose influence are deepening

¹⁴³ Aritonang and Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, pp. 867-902.

¹⁴⁴ "There is a real fear that Christianity is on the march," says Mike Hilliard, a Scottish minister who with his Indonesian wife runs an orphanage outside Jakarta that has been targeted by militant Muslims. Because of this fear, emotions are easily stirred up and mobs can form quickly. See Hannah Beech, 'Christianity's surge in Indonesia'.

in Indonesia. What is worth noting is that Christianity, which in the past failed to become deeply rooted in West Java, is now becoming more apparent and more significant in the urban areas of Bekasi.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATING ISLAMISATION, POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

This study aims to show that in Sundanese society, since the 19th century there has always been an intimate negotiation between Islamisation and other faiths, especially *Aliran Kebatinan* and Christianity. This means that there has always been a coherent dialectics between cultural categories in society. This negotiation was caused either by social integration or by conflict as Islamisation had different impacts depending on its approach and objectives. Islamisation integrated and united society when it did not threaten or pretend to change the existing power balance of culture and politics but included valued native beliefs and *adat* into its practices. Contrarily, Islamisation threatened social integration when it harmed the integrated belief system and the culture society preserved. This is because in society there is always a fundamental link between culture and power.¹⁴⁵

The findings of this research show that in West-Javanese society, cultural and religious - both Islamic and Christian - changes are the results of social and political adjustments caused by shifting political contexts that together provided the imperative for these adjustments. There are at least three shifting contexts that became crucial in defining the direction of Islamisation and the extent of the changes to take place in society. The *first* was the pre-independence context in which Islamic institutions were inclined to be autonomous bodies and Muslims in most cases sought to compromise with the Dutch ruler. *Second*, in the post-independence context, Soekarno guaranteed state neutrality towards all religions recognised by the state. As a rationalist, he called upon the Islamic *umat* and other believers to embrace a rational interpretation of

¹⁴⁵ Ann Swidler, 'Cultural Power and Social Movements', in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (eds.), *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 31.

religious beliefs. *Third*, Soeharto's authoritarian context provided Muslims with the setting for *Dakwahism* that led to the rise of Islamic culture and social institutions. *Fourth*, there is the *Reformasi* context during which regimes promoted democracy and an open society, but were contested by the radical Islamists and other groups who all had their own agenda and problems. Muslims, Christians and the *Penghayat* were given a new setting in which to push their religious agenda and to exist. In this democratic context, during which the more or less fair and liberal atmosphere was contested, rivalry among and negotiation between Islam and Christianity continued. It is also important, in this new setting, to bear in mind the dynamics of *Aliran Kebatinan* at the time.

Islamisation and Unified Religious Systems

Holding Balance between Islam and *Adat*

As observed in Chapter One, Islam and Sunda have variously been imagined and interpreted as two distinct phenomena or as two sides of the same coin. The most-discussed interpretation is the claim that the Sundanese have always been more Islamic observant than the Javanese although objections to such claim have been raised. Missionary accounts, especially about the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries about Sundanese society seemed to justify such common vision.¹⁴⁶ That Islamisation in the region from the sixteenth century onwards was successful was in part the result of Islam's accommodative attitude towards native syncretism, whose followers believe in what Niels Mulder calls 'the essential unity of all Existence'.¹⁴⁷ In the native-syncretic environment, Islamisation inclined to preserve *adat*, though not in its entirety. This attitude made it possible for the Sundanese to adapt Islam and to 'blend' its worldviews with their own typical religious practices and *adat* and other way around. Most important is that Islam had not in all cases, and also not in its entirety, been promoted to displace the *adat* that was largely rooted in Hindu-Buddhist worldviews and mysticism.¹⁴⁸ This Islamisation model obtained cultural and political legitimacy because the Sundanese *ulama*

¹⁴⁶ Van den End, *Sumber-Sumber Zending*, p. 159.

¹⁴⁷ Mulder, 'Aliran Kebatinan', p. 105.

¹⁴⁸ Wessing, 'A Princess from Sunda', pp. 317-318.

and aristocrats, for instance Haji Hasan Moestapa and R.A.A. Moeharam Wiranatakoesoema, gave their supports to such a model. They even played important roles in maintaining the balance between Islam and *adat*. This came to be so through a long process of 'intimate' dialectics between Islam and *adat* that caused the easy permeation of Islam into West Java and the transformation of its society.¹⁴⁹

It was not uncommon that *adat* was harmoniously preserved in Islamic practices, which shaped the religious identity of the Sundanese.¹⁵⁰ This *adat*-Islam setting provided the context for the protection of various native-syncretic beliefs. Even after world religions increasingly became central to the Sundanese, some syncretic creeds remained well preserved, for instance the belief in *guriang*, the Sundanese deity of prosperity, and honouring Nyai Roro Kidul, the Goddess Queen of the Southern Sea.¹⁵¹ The Sundanese custom of venerating the graves of saints remained to be honoured too.¹⁵²

The *adat*-Islam configuration has perhaps inspired some Sundanese leaders to juxtapose Islam-Sunda identities and to conceptualise them in the popular slogan "Islam *teh* Sunda, Sunda *teh* Islam," which means 'Islam is Sunda and Sunda is Islam'. Of course, this slogan does not necessarily mean to obscure the differences between the Sundanese and Islamic categories. Rather, this seems to be an affirmation of Islam-Sunda identity. Surprisingly this idea was conceptualised by Endang Saefuddin Anshari, none other than the leader of PERSIS, who was known to be highly critical of such blending. Although this notion was only first popularised in 1967, this view of Islam and *adat* had already become widespread among Sundanese Muslim leaders long before that time.¹⁵³ I think such claim has been generally accepted for the reason that Sundanese society has never been polarised according to strict religious and *adat*-cultural lines.

¹⁴⁹ A good example of the blend between Islamic precepts and existing practice may be found in 'The Makam of Syaikh Abdulmuhyi', in D.A. Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java*, pp. 1-16. Also Wessing, 'A Princess from Sunda', pp. 317-318. Interview with the expert on Sundanese culture and arts, Hidayat Suryalaga, Bandung, 13 August 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Interview, Hidayat Suryalaga, Bandung, 13 August 2009.

¹⁵¹ Wessing, 'A Princess from Sunda', pp. 317-318.

¹⁵² Rinkes, *Nine Saints of Java*, p. 10.

¹⁵³ Interview, Hidayat Suryalaga, Bandung, 13 August 2009.

Thus, the importance of *adat* as the element of Sundanese identity seemed also to be effective in case Sundanese converted to other religions than Islam which most Sundanese consider religiously unacceptable. However, conversion did not necessarily polarise the Sundanese. The Christian Sundanese community in Gununghalu, Cianjur, for instance, has embraced Christianity since the nineteenth century and has lived in harmony with their fellow Sundanese Muslims to this day. Radical Islamists recently appeared in town trying to disrupt this unity, but they failed because the Muslim majority refused to support them and, as a consequence, they lost their influence.

Unified Religious System under Threat

Purified Islamic Discourse and Social Disintegration

As highlighted in Chapter Two, PERSIS had been critical towards *adat*. PERSIS leaders thought that *adat* contains animistic elements they considered un-Islamic and, therefore, must be removed as a means to carry on the complete conversion to Islam.¹⁵⁴ PERSIS's insistence on authenticity causes them to juxtapose Sundanese and Islam as two different identities, asserting that Hindu elements in Sundanese *adat* are harmful to Islam. PERSIS's attitude is not surprising, however, given the Modernist tendency to devalue tradition's significance¹⁵⁵ by imposing 'pure' religious practices. PERSIS's stance provoked this kind of anti-Islamic sentiment, which came up after the 1930s and climaxed in the 1960s. The way PERSIS campaigned against Traditionalist practices, like what Geertz calls 'unified *slametan*',¹⁵⁶ offended the *Penghayat* who propagated the anti-Islam sentiments among them. For instance, Madrais' son, Tejabuana, an ADS leader, criticised PERSIS ardently and called upon them to respect any religious practice that was integrated in nativist traditions. He insisted that any religious practice that does not share nativist spiritual visions is illegitimate.¹⁵⁷ This anti-*adat* tone is directed at the complex socio-political reality and the cultural plurality

¹⁵⁴ Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 150.

¹⁵⁵ Dale F. Eickelman, 'Islam and the Languages of Modernity', in Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.), *Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 41.

¹⁵⁶ Geertz, 'Ritual and Social Change', p. 48.

¹⁵⁷ Interview, Pangeran Jatikusuma, Cigugur, Kuningan, 5 August 2009.

of Sundanese society. Its multicultural and syncretic composition meant that it is difficult to breathe in the straightjacket puritanical identity PERSIS sought.¹⁵⁸

Kyai Madrais and Mei Kartawinata, two important opponents of Islam, condemned this anti-*adat* and confrontational vision of PERSIS's religious discourses. That increased Islamisation causing the abandonment of other parts of the Sundanese creed caused social relationships to disintegrate as well as, perhaps, may be best exemplified by the example of Ciganjur, Kuningan where numerous Sundanese abandoned Islam and opted to convert to Christianity instead from 1964 onwards. However, the effect of these broken ties was not so great. This confirms that Sundanese society had not become polarised like Javanese society in Clifford Geertz's well-known social categorization of *priyayi*, *santri*, and *abangan*. Or at least, as Steenbrink observed, the polarisation of Sundanese society was not as strict as that of Javanese society, which was polarised along social-religious and cultural lines.¹⁵⁹

Dramatic Shifting Contexts

State Recognition of Islam and Soekarno's Rational Interpretation of Religion

In the 1945 Constitution, religions and beliefs were given all sorts of opportunities to grow and the Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion. Deeply inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Soekarno insisted that Indonesian Muslims should think and behave in modern

¹⁵⁸ Kusnaka Adimihardja, 'Pergumulan antara Kebudayaan Sunda dengan Islam', in Cik Hasan Bisri (et al.), *Pergumulan Islam dengan Kebudayaan Lokal di Tatar Sunda* (Bandung: Kaki Langit, 2005), pp. 85-88.

¹⁵⁹ Steenbrink, 'A Catholic Sadrach'; p. 288 and Ricklefs' *Islamisation and its Opponent in Java*, p. 495. Ricklefs has also noticed that since 1830 to 1930, Javanese society changed and polarised along religious and cultural lines. This polarisation continued after independence. During the early years after the revolution, for example, the *santri-abangan* conflict deepened. See Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, p. 496. The impact of the *aliran* conflict spread widely after the Madiun affair in 1948 and became what Hefner called "the basis for political organization in rural Java" as recounted in Chapter Two. See Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?', p. 535. See also Liddle, *Power, Participation and the Political Parties*, pp. 171-195.

ways by embracing the fire (spirit) of Islam.¹⁶⁰ He saw Islam as compatible to reason, so he thought that there was no contradiction between Islam and modernity.¹⁶¹ Soekarno had rational and modern views of Islam and he condemned Islamic backwardness, feudalism, mystical and irrational practices and superstitions, just like PERSIS, as revealed in his correspondence with A. Hassan from his place of exile in Ende, Flores. Having this understanding of Islam, Soekarno provided the setting for the development of Islamic institutions and cultures that promoted further Islamisation, both in urban and in rural areas.¹⁶² This was not only because of religious reasons but also to enable Indonesian culture to become more modern in other aspects as well. This caused Islamic institutions to flourish and created a gradual socio-religious transformation. In Bandung, Soekarno's approval for the construction of the Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) was crucial in intensifying campus *dakwah* and this increasingly Islamised ITB students, as observed in Chapter Four.

Extermination of DI and Its Impacts

From the political perspective, Soekarno's dealing with the extremism committed by DI rebels left no message to Muslim Sundanese except to rationalise their political choice. The overwhelming majority of Sundanese Muslims refused to answer the call to join the DI guerrilla in the 1950s and the 1960s. Rather, they decided to escape the tense situation in Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Garut, Ciamis and other parts in the

¹⁶⁰ Soekarno admired liberal thinkers including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Halide Edib Hanoum and Amir Ali. Atatürk and Halide are the most quoted Muslim thinkers in Soekarno's writings although Amir Ali was probably the most influential in his Islamic thinking. Lubis, *Soekarno & Modernisme Islam*, pp. 142, 143, 286.

¹⁶¹ Lubis, *Soekarno & Modernisme Islam*, pp. 142-43.

¹⁶² After independence to 1966, Soekarno contributed to building Islamic education, both state and private Islamic universities, and initiated Islamic festivals celebrated officially by the state. Soekarno contributed to *dakwah* in secular campuses especially after he approved the establishment of the Salman Mosque just inside the grounds of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) in 1964. As discussed in Chapter Four, Soekarno's approval of the mosque, despite the ITB Rector's disapproval, helped inspiring *Dakwahism* among the educated class of Muslim society. Under Soekarno, Muslims enjoyed state neutrality of religion from which *dakwah* and the Islamisation project continued.

region, and they fled to places in rural mountainous West Java, particularly Lembang, to liberate themselves from the insecurity inflicted by the rebellion. They also chose to go to Lembang for economic reasons because, as Horikoshi suggested, due to the rebellion, agricultural productivity had dropped and there were disruptions in commodity flows between regions caused by the deterioration of the transportation system.¹⁶³

As observed in Chapter Five, the majority of these people were Traditionalist Sundanese Muslims. They were trained in *pesantrens* across West Java and their socio-religious background enabled them to speak the same language as the people in Lembang and because they shared a similar cultural identity they encountered little difficulties to live in harmony with the people in their new place of residence. Endowed with this social and cultural capital they were able to approach the people in Lembang without being confrontational and they persuaded the people to embrace Islam through friendly and appealing ways.¹⁶⁴ Because the people in Lembang were introduced to Islamic doctrine and practices, in the end the migration of the people from outside led to a gradual replacement of the established syncretic cultural basis in the area, as discussed in Chapter Five.

The change created a new religious configuration in the area which was known as a Nationalist stronghold where Islamic identity had not been predominant. Interestingly, this process occurred without meeting strong opposition from Nationalist proponents which may indicate that the Nationalist Sundanese did not feel uncomfortable with the increased presence of Islam; or it might be fair to say that they did not think that these Muslim migrants were their opponents, because they upheld Sundanese identity while practicing Islam as a cultural category rather than as a political one.

¹⁶³ Horikoshi, 'The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62)', p. 77.

¹⁶⁴ Interview, K.H. Junaidi, Lembang, 03 September 2014. Van Bruinessen's *Kitab Kuning* is an important work that gives us valuable information about the textbooks which are used as teaching materials and *dakwah* references especially in Traditionalist *pesantrens*. Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat*, pp. 142-176.

The Rise of the New Order and the Fall of the *Penghayat*

The dramatic political change in the aftermath of the 30 September 1965 coup attempt was crucial in the development of Islam in Indonesia. This change produced an unprecedented socio-cultural and political setting that increasingly shifted away from the social and cultural foundations of Soekarno's political reign, which had been rather liberal in its outlook, towards Soeharto's political reign in which religions were given a wider mandate. Consequently, this shift weakened the nativist syncretic creeds and favoured a much more intense Islamisation than ever before. Religious identity became increasingly stronger. In other words, political change caused religious change and the other way around, and these changes in their turn caused social change. This Islamisation transformed Sundanese society.¹⁶⁵ It swept across West Java's rural areas and weakened the *Penghayat*, the guardians of the native-syncretic creeds and caused them to become outsiders in this region. This socio-political change provided the context for the Islamisation of the Sundanese.

***Dakwahism* and 'Islamisation from Below'**

The fall of the *Penghayat* paved the way for 'Islamisation from below' after Soeharto supported Muslims' *dakwah* projects notwithstanding his opposition to political Islam. As said in Chapter Three, Soeharto, a devoted subscriber to Javanese values, was surprisingly accommodative towards Muslims' cultural projects especially those the Modernists demanded. Moreover, he accepted the ideas of religious communities with respect to his development agenda, on issues such as family planning, education, economic empowerment and so on. Soeharto secured Muslims' civil rights by accepting the Islamic inspired Marriage

¹⁶⁵ In East and Central Java, Ricklefs observes that: ".....Soeharto's New Order brought an aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound social change from Java's past. Even while multiple scholars, journalists and politicians, both within Indonesia and outside, maintained the view that the Javanese constituted of a sort of impregnable *abangan* bastion against greater Islamic influence in Indonesian affairs – an idea resting largely on the still-influential 1950s work of Clifford Geertz – Javanese society was moving beyond this stereotype." See Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its opponents in Java*, p. 259.

Law no 1/1974. This law had slowly but constantly driven the *Penghayat* to convert to Islam. Some of them, however, converted by coercion or had embraced Islam for political reasons. Islamisation was in part the result of the politicisation of Islam among the grassroots.

Marpu and his followers' coercive conversion to Islam in 1976, as discussed in Chapter Three, is perhaps the best example of politically-driven Islamisation in Sumedang West Java. This coercive conversion in part marked the fall of the *Penghayat* but strengthened the supremacy of Islam and Christianity in society. Soekarno's fall was followed by tremendous socio-political transformation in which Muslims and their identity and institutions increasingly became more influential. This considerably factored in what Ricklefs calls 'Islamisation from below'¹⁶⁶ or what Van Bruinessen called the 'Conservative Turn'.¹⁶⁷ The *Dakwahist* upsurge in both urban and rural West Java across campuses in the cities and across mosques in the villages proves that Islamisation was indeed deepening among the grassroots in Sundanese society.

Christianity Turned into Islam's Greatest Opponent

As said in Chapter Three, the Soeharto regime's politics on religions was translated into a favourable attitude towards *Dakwahism* and Christian missionaries aiming to neutralise Communist influence over society. Although ambivalent, theoretically the regime considered Islam and Christianity as important allies. Under these changing circumstances conflict patterns changed. Muslim Sundanese were happy with the pressure that had been put on the *Penghayat* across West Java, but their joy was tempered by the realisation that the Christian mission had turned into their greatest opponent, especially in the wake of the conversion of many thousands of Sundanese to Christianity.

The promotion of religion, however, was not built on a solid vision of religious freedom and tolerance. The Christian leaders sought a liberal policy in spreading religion but, contrarily, Muslims demanded restrictions and favoured a conservative religious policy. Facing this dilemma, the regime resorted to a conservative stance and it saw social

¹⁶⁶ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its opponents in Java*, p. 162.

¹⁶⁷ Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), 'Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the "Conservative Turn" of the Early 21st century', in *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).

order and stability as its priority and without hesitation, the regime warned all parties not to provoke social and political instability. The Christian leaders, in particular, were upset by the regime's insistence on a stable social and political order through downplaying the Christians' right to exercise their religious freedom.

Regardless of this development, and to the surprise of many observers, under this circumstance, Evangelical Protestantism has seen significant growth. The Christian leaders, especially the evangelicals, were now more passionate and courageous in their efforts to propagate Christianity. With increasing confidence the Christian leaders rose to prominence. With Chinese leaders playing an important role – as elaborated in Chapter Six, Muslims saw these developments as threatening and began to organise resistance to defend Islam.

Educated Muslims Turned *Dakwahists*

In the past Muslim leaders, particularly the Modernists, believed in politics as an effective means to defend Islam and their religious objectives. Now they could no longer trust this belief as it crumbled in front of their eyes. They even had mixed feelings of hope and anxiety whether the changing political environment under the New Order regime would provide the political changes they expected to ensure greater fairness for their religion and their *umat*. With these mixed feelings, they sought a solid foundation to enable them to defend their religious aims by turning Muslim students, youths and the educated class among Muslim society's agenda towards *dakwah*.

They hoped that with the students playing an important role, *dakwah* leadership and its vision would be transformed. With this mission in mind, the most prominent *Dakwahist*, Mohamed Natsir and student leaders such as Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his friends, turned their eyes to secular campuses to promote Islamisation. The Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) became one of their most important targets. After some years, this *dakwah* project increasingly became the agenda of the educated class in Muslim society; and it no longer became an exclusive job routinely exercised by *ulama* or other traditional *dakwah* agents. With Muslim intellectuals in charge of the *dakwah* project, a significant change was promoted especially in the organisation, leadership and themes of *dakwah*.

However, it is worth noting that under the Salman movement, particularly during the 1970s to 1990s, no single ideology prevailed. Campus *dakwah* offered a diversity of Islamic discourses. With this new leadership and vision, *dakwah* had become attractive to a wide range of students and to society in general. Over time, this *dakwah* movement provided an Islamic nuance and an identity not only to Muslim intellectuals of the ITB, but also to other Muslims in the capital of West Java and surrounding areas. However, as no single ideology was promoted, the Salman movement was prone to ideological infiltration from Islamist like the Tarbiyah in the 1990s. This infiltration, however, did not succeed because of resistance from Salman elites.

The dynamics of religious resurgence from below and of social changes are largely determined by the regime's political programme made to sustain the rulers and to control society. Despite being crucial, the regime and its ambition to control society has, to some extent, failed to engineer the social religious vision and way of life the regime expected. It seems clear that during this period the relationships between Islam, the AK and Christianity formed a unique, continually-changing dialectic of contest, negotiation, victory, and defeat.

The Reform: The Contest Continued

Penghayat's Reclaim of their Identity?

Under the New Order's closed political system, the regime ruled in authoritarian ways and it engineered the making of political dynamics in society, one of which caused religious change as exemplified by the decrease of the *Aliran Kebatinan* in Lembang. After politics became democratised and thus changed society to become more open and free, this changing political setting again brought about religious change that also caused social change. Thus, the political change under the authoritarian regime was a form of top-down social engineering; contrarily, in the Reform era, the change was inspired by people from the grassroots. The latter is exemplified by the *Penghayat's* mounting claim that their belief in the *Aliran Kebatinan* is a true faith because the syncretic current is essentially the religion of the Sundanese ancestors.

In recent times, the *Aliran Kebatinan* followers have sought to legitimise their presence by reclaiming their position in Sundanese history. This is an attempt to reconsolidate the superiority of their

Sundanese identity and that of the *Aliran Kebatinan* over other religions, particularly Islam, whose influence was deepening. Nativist or ethnic sentiments were important factors in *Aliran Kebatinan's* search for identity consolidation. Islam's use of the Arabic language and culture prevented it from being meaningful to some local people in the rural areas who found it easier to have meaningful relationships with the ethnic symbols already embedded in everyday rural life. The growing appreciation of local symbols thus reflects their resurgent identification with their cultural heritage. *Aliran Kebatinan* followers are worried about the dominance of the current Muslims' legal, political and cultural presence in the life of the Sundanese as this will come at the expense of local traditions and symbols, thus jeopardizing their ties to their authentic historical identity. For this reason they are now struggling to revive.

Christianisation and Ethno-Religious Sentiments

Under the shifting political context from the 1960s, Christianity revived too and it flourished even more after the start of the Reform era pioneered especially by the Pentecostal churches. Indonesians of ethnic Chinese origins played a crucial role in this revival and thus provoked anti-Christian and anti-Chinese sentiments at the same time. Muslims' fear of Christianisation as observed by Mujiburrahman¹⁶⁸ was increasingly transformed into fear of Christian Chinese. Which motive was stronger, religion or ethnic, can not be decided. Muslims' fear was evident, for instance, in the protests against the Mahanaim Foundation owned by Iln Tjipto, an Indonesian of ethnic Chinese origin, in Bekasi. This sentiment adds fuel to the existing tension between Islam and Christianity across West Java. The eruption of anti-Christianisation actions across West Java and the attack on HKBP leaders in Bekasi in 2010 seems to have been inspired by the effect of the intersection of ethno-religious sentiments.

Radical Islamist's Dictating of the State

Unlike the New Order regime which set and controlled politics and society, the following democratic regimes did not have strong policies on religions. Rather, the pervasive roles of religious organisations in

¹⁶⁸ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened*.

politics saw them assume significant control and impose pressure on the state. Ricklefs observes that “in post-Soeharto years, it became less a case of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the reverse: religious dynamics shaping the political regime.”¹⁶⁹ Muslim activists preferred building mass organisations to articulate their interests especially in launching their protests against Christianisation which have thus sustained the perpetual tension and competitive relations between Islam and Christianity. Christianity’s upsurge and the eruption of anti-Christianisation actions in the past two decades, from 1990s to the 2000s, was also exacerbated by the shift in pattern of contemporary conflicts, from *aliran* politics during the 1950s to the 1960s to religious-ethno sentiment during the 1990s to 2000s during which Christianity became the greatest Islamic opponent. In the absence of strong policies on religions, tension and conflict between radical Islamists and evangelists will continue to erupt, thus West Javanese society will most likely be polarised according to religious, and maybe, ethnic sentiments unless the state embraces policies designed to maintain social harmony in the multicultural society of West Java.

¹⁶⁹ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its opponent in Java*.

SAMENVATTING

*Negotiating Islamisation and Resistance:
A Study of Religions, Politics and Social Change in West Java
from the Early 20th Century to the Present*

De studie beoogt te laten zien hoe Islamisering plaatsvond en hoe het werd betwist en onderhandeld in West Java. De studie concentreert zich op drie belangrijke religieuze groepen: Islam, *Aliran Kebatinan* en christendom en beslaat de periode van de vroege twintigste eeuw tot heden met de nadruk op de periode na 1965. Aangezien de Soendaneze samenleving bestaat uit verschillende groepen heb ik een aantal strategisch geselecteerde lokale case studies bij mijn studie betrokken. Ik heb verscheidene malen veldwerk verricht in West Java van juli 2008 tot en met maart 2011 om een grote verscheidenheid aan mensen te interviewen die getuigen waren van of zelfs sleutelfiguren waren in het hele proces. Een grote hoeveelheid materiaal is gebruikt om the begripen hoe Islam werd omhelsd als een ideologie en hoe het werd gebruikt om nationalisme, christenheid en lokale gebruiken (adat) te betwisten.

De studie vertrekt vanuit de werkhypothese dat er altijd een hechte dialectiek bestaat tussen culturele categorieën in de samenleving aan de ene kant en negotiatie tussen de staat en deze culturele categorieën aan de andere kant. De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat in de West Javaanse samenleving, culturele en religieuze - zowel islamitische als christelijke - veranderingen het resultaat zijn van verschuivende politieke contexten die het imperatief geven aan sociale en politieke aanpassingen. De studie geeft een beeld van het belang van religieuze praktijken en hoe de *adat*, mystiek en mythen zorgvuldig werden gehandhaafd binnen deze praktijken en uiteindelijk leidden tot een specifieke Soendaneze identiteit. Islam en Soenda zijn afwisselend gezien en geïnterpreteerd als twee zijden van dezelfde munt. De meest bediscussieerde interpretatie is de aanspraak dat de Soendanezen altijd meer nadrukkelijk de islamitische plichten naleven dan de Javanen alhoewel bezwaren tegen deze zienswijze zijn geuit. Missieverslagen,

speciaal die uit de achttiende en negentiende eeuw aangaande de Soendaneze samenleving lijken deze algemeen aanvaarde aanspraak te bevestigen. De succesvolle islamisering in de regio vanaf de zestiende eeuw was gedeeltelijk het resultaat van de zich aanpassende houding van de islam tot inheems syncretisme. In de inheems-syncretische omgeving was islamisering geneigd om de *adat* te handhaven waarvan de volgelingen geloofden in wat Niels Mulder 'the essential unity of all Existence' heeft genoemd, zij het niet in zijn geheel. Deze trend maakte het de Soendanezen mogelijk om islam aan te passen en om de islamitische wereldbeschouwing te doen 'samensmelten' met haar eigen typische religieuze praktijken en *adat* en omgekeerd. Het belangrijkste is dat islam niet in alle gevallen, en ook niet in zijn geheel, werd gepromoot om de *adat*, die is geworteld in hindoe-boeddhistische wereldbeschouwingen en mystiek, te vervangen. Dit islamiseringsmodel verkreeg culturele en politieke legitimatie omdat de Soendaneze *ulama* en de aristocratie hun steun verleenden aan dit model. Het was niet ongebruikelijk dat *adat* op harmonieuze wijze werd gehandhaafd in islamitische gebruiken die de religieuze identiteit uitmaakte van de Soendanezen. Deze *adat*-islam setting leidde tot de protectie van verscheidene inheems-religieuze overtuigingen. Het Soendaneze gebruik om de graven van heiligen te vereren bleef gerespecteerd. De *adat*-islam configuratie heeft mogelijke sommige Soendaneze leiders geïnspireerd om de islam-Soenda identiteiten tegenover elkaar te stellen in de populaire zegswijze "Islam *teh* Sunda, Sunda *teh* Islam", hetgeen betekent 'Islam is Soenda, Soenda is Islam'.

De studie observeerde welke redenen een rol speelden in de opkomst van anti-islamitische sentimenten en analyseert hoe deze sentimenten religieuze visies kritisch bekeken. De studie ontdekte dat anti-islamitische sentimenten niet voortkwamen uit angst voor islam als een religie maar dat het veeleer de consequentie was van de oplegging van islam als ideologie en als totalitaire levenswijze. In deze traditie had *adat* niet langer een plaats en het werd derhalve van deze traditie uitgesloten. De wijze waarop PERSIS campagne voerde tegen de *adat*, bijvoorbeeld, beledigde de *Penghayat* die anti-islam sentimenten onder hen propageerde. Deze sociale setting leidde tot antagonisme jegens islam en met name in oppositie onder leiding van *Aliran Kebatinan* leiders. Kyai Madrais en Mei kartawinata, twee belangrijke islam opposenten, veroordeelden deze anti-*adat* en confronterende visies in

het religieuze discours van sommige islamitische leiders. Zij stonden erop dat alle religieuze praktijken die niet de inheems-spirituele visies deelden illegitiem waren. De voortdurende islamisering leidde sinds 1964 tot het verlaten van de Soendaneze *adat*, zoals huwelijksgebruiken, en leidde tevens tot de desintegratie van sociale relaties waarvan wellicht Ciganjur, Kuningan het beste voorbeeld was waar grote aantallen Soendanezen zich afwendden van de islam en ervoor kozen om over te gaan tot het christendom. Dit bevestigt dat de Soendaneze samenleving gepolariseerd was geraakt, net als de Javaanse samenleving, in Clifford Geertz' categorisering van *priyayi*, *santri*, en *abangan*. In ieder geval, zoals Steenbrink observeerde, was de polarisering van de Soendaneze samenleving niet zo strikt als die van de Javaanse samenleving die gepolariseerd was langs sociaal-religieuze en culturele lijnen.

De Indonesische grondwet van 1945 geeft religie en geloofsovertuigingen alle ruimte om te groeien en het garandeert vrijheid van religie. Soekarno was sterk beïnvloedt door Mustafa Kemal Atatürk en hij stond erop dat Indonesische moslims konden denken en zich gedragen als moderne mensen door het vuur (de geest) van de islam te omhelzen. Hij veroordeelde islamitische achterlijkheid, feudalisme, en mystieke en irrationele praktijken. Met dit begrip van islam zette Soekarno de setting voor de ontwikkeling van islamitische instituties en culturen die verdere islamisering bevorderden, zowel in stedelijke als in landelijke regio. Gezien vanuit het politieke perspectief liet Soekarno's handelswijze tegen het extremisme van de DI opstandelingen geen andere boodschap toe aan de Soendaneze moslims dan dat zij hun politieke keuze moesten rationaliseren. Het gevolg was dat de overgrote meerderheid van de Soendanezen weigerden gehoor te geven aan de oproep om de DI guerrilla in de jaren vijftig en zestig om zich aan te sluiten. Integendeel, zij kozen ervoor de geladen situatie in Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Garut en Ciamis en andere regio te ontvluchten en zij namen de wijk naar de landelijke bergstreken van West Java, vooral Lembang om zich te vrijwaren van de onzekerheden van de rebellie en van de economische ontwrichting. Zoals Horikoshi heeft gesuggereerd, als gevolg van de rebellie was de agrarische productie sterk gedaald en er was ontwrichting in de toevoer van producten ten gevolge van de grote verstoring in het transport systeem. De meerderheid van deze mensen waren geschoold in traditionele *pesantrens* over geheel West

Java en door hun socio-culturele achtergrond spraken ze dezelfde taal als de bewoners van Lembang waardoor ze op een vriendelijke en aantrekkelijke manier de bevolking konden benaderen om hen de islam te doen omhelzen wat resulteerde in de geleidelijke vervanging van de gevestigde syncretische en culturele basis van de regio die bekend stond als een nationalistisch bolwerk.

De dramatische politieke verandering die plaatsvond na de 30 september 1965 couppoging was cruciaal in de ontwikkeling van de islam in Indonesië. De verandering veroorzaakte een socio-culturele en politieke setting die meer en meer verschoof van de sociale en culturele basis van Soekarno's politieke regime naar die van Soeharto waar religie een groter mandaat verkreeg. Dit had tot gevolg dat de inheems syncretische geloofsovertuigingen verzwakten en op de hand kwam van meer intense islamisering dan ooit tevoren. Deze socio-culturele verandering vormde de context voor de opkomst van *Dakwahisme* en, diensengevolge, opende de weg tot een diepere islamisering van de Soendanezen van onder af, vooral toen Soeharto *dakwah* projecten begon te steunen ondanks zijn weerstand tegen politieke islam. Soeharto, die een fervent aanhanger was van Javanse waarden, was verbazingwekkend toegeeflijk jegens islamitische culturele projecten, met name die van Modernisten. Meer nog, Soeharto waarborgde de burgerrechten van moslims door zijn islamitisch geïnspireerde Huwelijkswet nr. 1/1974. Langzaam maar zeker had deze wet de *Penghayat* ertoe gedreven zich tot de islam te bekeren. Sommigen van hen hadden zich onder dwang laten bekeren of gingen tot de islam over uit politieke overwegingen. De bekering van Marpu en zijn volgelingen in 1976 is misschien het beste voorbeeld van politiek-gedreven islamisering in Sumedang, West Java. Deze gedwongen bekering betekende voor een deel de ondergang van de *Penghayat* maar het versterkte de alleenheerschappij van de islam en het christendom in de samenleving. Onder deze geweldige sociaal-politieke transformatie werd de moslimse identiteit steeds meer van invloed. Dit is wat een belangrijke rol speelt in wat Ricklefs noemt de 'Islamisation from below', of wat Van Bruinessen de 'Conservative turn' noemde. The plotselinge geweldige opkomst van de Dakwaisten zowel in landelijke als in urbane regio in West Java over campussen in de steden en moskeeën in de dorpen bewijst dat de islamisering steeds dieper ging onder het gewone

volk en de Soendaneze maatschappij steeds meer begon te transformeren.

Onder deze veranderende omstandigheden veranderden conflict patronen. De christelijke zending had zich getransformeerd tot de grootste tegenstander van moslims. Christelijke leiders zochten naar een liberale gedragslijn in hun zending maar moslims eisten beperkingen en waren voor een conservatief religies beleid. Moslims zochten met gemengde gevoelens van hoop en zorg naar een solide basis om hen in staat te stellen hun religieuze doelen te verdedigen door moslimse studenten, jongeren en de geschoolde klassen tot *dakwah* te voeren. Ze verwachtten dat met studenten in prominente rollen *dakwah* leiderschap en *dakwah* visie getransformeerd zouden worden. Het was met deze missie in zijn achterhoofd dat Mohammad Natsir, de meest prominente dakwaist, en studentenleiders zoals Imaduddin Abdulrahim en vrienden hun ogen richten op de campussen om islamisering te promoten. Een van hun belangrijkste doelen was de campus van het Bandung Instituut voor Technologie (ITB) in Bandung. Na een aantal jaren werd dit *dakwah* project steeds meer de agenda van de geschoolde klassen in de moslimse samenleving en was het niet langer het exclusieve en routineuze werk van *ulama* of van andere traditionele *dakwah* figuren. Met moslimse intellectuelen verantwoordelijk voor het *dakwah* project had er een belangrijke verandering plaatsgevonden, met name in de organisatie, leiderschap en in *dakwah* themas.

Nadat de politiek gedemocratiseerd was in de Reform Era, en de maatschappij dus meer open en vrij was geworden veroorzaakten deze veranderde politieke setting wederom religieuze vernieuwing die op haar beurt weer sociale veranderingen teweeg bracht. Was de politieke verandering onder het autoritaire regime een vorm van top-down sociale machinaties, nu was deze verandering geïnspireerd door de mensen van de grassroots zelf. Dit laatste kan worden geïllustreerd aan de hand van de steeds krachtiger wordende aanspraak van de *Penghayat* dat *Aliran Kebatinan* een echt geloof is omdat deze syncretistische stroming in feite de religie is van de Soendaneze voorvaders en door hier aan vast te houden probeerden zij hun identiteit terug te krijgen. De volgelingen van de *Aliran Kebatinan* probeerden hun aanwezigheid te legitimeren door hun positie in de Soendaneze geschiedenis op te eisen. In hun zoektocht naar de bevestiging van hun identiteit waren voor de *Aliran Kebatinan* inheemse

of etnische sentimenten van groot belang. De groeiende waardering voor lokale symbolen reflecteerde dus hun herlevende identificatie met hun culturele erfenis. *Aliran Kebatinan* volgelingen waren bezorgd over de dominantie in het leven van de Soendanezen van de legale, politieke en culturele aanwezigheid van de moslims waarin Arabische symbolen een belangrijke rol speelden omdat dit ten nadeel zou zijn van lokale tradities en symbolen en dus hun banden met hun authentieke historische identiteit op het spel zouden zetten.

Het christendom maakte ook een opbloei door en het bloeide na het begin van de Reform Era, vooral door Pinkstergemeenschappen. Vooral Indonesiërs van Chinese etnische afkomst speelden een cruciale rol in deze ervaring en daarmee riepen ze tegelijkertijd antichristelijke en anti-Chinese sentimenten op. Zoals gezien door Mujiburrahman transformeerde de angst van de moslims voor kerstening in een angst voor christelijke Chinezen en de HKBP Batak Kerken. Moslimse activisten prefereerden massa organisaties te stichten om hun belangen te ventileren, voornamelijk in hun protesten tegen kerstening en daarmee zetten ze kracht bij aan de eeuwige spanningen en rivaliserende relaties tussen islam en christendom. De grote toename van het aantal christenen en de eruptie van antichristelijke acties in de negentiger jaren en in de eerste decade van de eenentwintigste eeuw werden verergerd door de wijzigende patronen van contemporaine geschillen van *aliran* politieke spanningen gedurende de jaren 50 en 60 naar etnisch-religieuze sentimenten vanaf de negentiger jaren waarin christendom de grootste tegenstander van de islam werd. Het samenkomen van etnisch-religieuze sentimenten verergerde bestaande spanningen tussen islam en christendom over heel West Java. Het is nog niet besloten welk motief het sterkste was, religie of etniciteit.

Ricklefs zag dat 'in post-Soeharto years, it became less a case of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the revers: religious dynamics shaping the political regime' (Ricklefs, 2012). Anders dan de New Order die politiek en maatschappij onder controle had heeft het nieuwe democratische regime geen sterk politiek beleid ten aanzien van religies. Integendeel, de alomtegenwoordige rollen die religieuze organisaties in de politiek spelen maakt dat ze een belangrijk deel van de controle op zich nemen en zij het zijn die druk uitoefenen op de staat.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.H.	Anno Hegirae, in the Islamic era.
ATB	Akademi Theologia Bethel; Bethel Academy of Theology.
BAKIN	Badan Intelijen Negara; The State Intelligent Body.
Bakor PAKEM	Badan Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat; Coordinating Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief in Society.
BAZ	Badan Amil Zakat; Alms Collection Body.
BAZNAS	Badan Amil Zakat Nasional; National Alms Collection Body.
BKKI	Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia; All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress Body.
BKPMI	Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia; Coordinating Body for Indonesian Mosque youth.
BKLDK	Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus; Coordinating Body for Campus Islamic Propagation League.
DGI	Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia; The Indonesian Church Council.
DKM	Dewan Kesejahteraan Masjid; Mosque Prosperity Council.
FAPB	Front anti-Pemurtadan Bekasi; Bekasi anti-Apostasy Front.
FKKJ	Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Jakarta; Jakarta Christian Communication Forum.
FKUB	Forum Kerukunan antar-Ummat Beragama; Forum for Inter-religious Harmony.

FSLDK	Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus; Campus Islamic Propagation League Forum.
FUII	Forum Ulama-Ummat Indonesia; The Forum for Ulama-Ummat of Indonesia.
GARIS	Gerakan Islam Reformis; Reformist Islamic Movement. Gema Pembebasan
GEMA PEMBEBASAN	Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan; Student Movement for Liberation.
HIS	Hollandsch Inlandse School.
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; The Association of Muslim Tertiary Students.
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia; The Association of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals.
IKIP	Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan; The Institute for Teachers and Education Training.
IMB	Izin Mendirikan Bangunan; Construction Permits.
KAMMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit.
KARISMA	Keluarga Remaja Islam Salman; Salman Islamic Youth Family.
KOPKAMTIB	Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban; The Command for the Restoration of Security and Order.
KUA	Kantor Urusan Agama; Office of Religious Affairs.
KUIB	Kongres Umat Islam Bekasi; Bekasi Islamic Community Congress.
LAZ	Lembaga Amil Zakat; Alms Collection Agent.
LDK	Lembaga Dakwah Kampus; Campus Islamic Propagation League.
LDMI	

	Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam; The Predication Body of Muslim Students.
LIPIA	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab; The Institute of the Study of Islam and Arab.
LMD	Latihan Mujahid Dakwah; Mujahid Dakwah Training.
MAWI	Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia; The Supreme Council of Indonesian Bishops.
MIAI	Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims.
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People's Consultative Assembly.
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia; Indonesian Islamic Scholars' Council.
Mulo	Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs; Secondary School in Dutch Colonial Time.
NDP-HMI	Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; Fundamental Values of Struggle of the Islamic Student Association.
PACKU	Paguyuban Adat Cara Karuhun Urang; Adat Association for Ancestors' Way of Life.
PERMAI	Persatuan Marhaen Indonesia; Indonesian Marhaen Associaton.
PARMUSI	Partai Muslimin Indonesia; Indonesian Muslims Party.
PAS	Pembinaan Anak-anak Salman; Nurturing Salman Children.
PERSIS	Persatuan Islam; Islamic Union.
PERTI	Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia; Indonesian Tarbiyah Association.
PGI	Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia; The Indonesian Communion of Churches.
PGPI	Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Pentakosta Indonesia; Associaton of Indonesan Pentacostal Churches.

PHI	Panitia Haji Indonesia; Indonesian Hajj Committee.
PII	Pelajar Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Students.
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party.
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development Party.
PRRI	Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
P2B	Dinas Pengawasan dan Penertiban Bangunan; Office for Building Control and Order.
SII	Studi Islam Intensif; Intensive Islamic Study.
RW	Rukun Warga; A small administration unit that operates under the village office authority to coordinate the RT (Rukun Tetangga).
RT	Rukun Tetangga; Smallest unit of administration that operates under RW (Rukun Warga) in the village.
TKI	Tenaga Kerja Indonesia; Indonesian worker.
YPM	Yayasan Pembina Masjid Salman; Salaman Mosque Construction Foundation.

GLOSSARY¹⁷⁰

Abangan

Nominal Muslims; the antonym of *santris* or practicing Muslims according to Clifford Geertz's categorization of Javanese society.

Agama Sunda

Sunda Religion.

Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah

Muslims who follow the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and the consensus of the Islamic community; long-hand term for the majority Sunni branch within Islam.

Aliran Kebatinan/Aliran Kepercayaan

Religious currents that promote the values and practices that originate from Javanese worldviews, postulating the essential unity of all existence, different from any world religion.

Amil

Person or organisation responsible for collecting and distributing Islamic *zakat* tithe.

Al-Salaf al-Salih

The pious ancestors; the first few generations of Muslims who are considered as having provided the exemplary model of proper Islamic thinking and behaviour.

Asas Tunggal

The Pancasila, the single ideological foundation all organisations in Indonesia had to adopt as stipulated by the Soeharto regime in 1984.

Baduy

Baduy is a popular designation for the land/area and people of Kanekes.

Bina Masjid Kampus

An integrated *dakwah* program consisting of mosques construction, Islamic predication and the training of Muslim students into *Dakwahist*.

Bid'a

Unlawful innovations in Islam.

¹⁷⁰ This glossary largely depends on Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its Opponent in Java*, pp. 508-513 and Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. xiii-xxii.

Classis

A group of local churches centered in a district and directed by a church body.

Da'i

Person engaged in *dakwah*.

Dakwah

A combination of Islamic mission, propagation, predication; call to accept and improve one's Islamic ways of life.

Dedemit

Spirits that harm people by entering their bodies, and who live in particular places such as cemeteries, big stones or trees.

DI/TII

Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia; a rebellious movement to create the Indonesian Islamic State which was against the central government. It came up in 1948 and was active across West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh and South Kalimantan. It was crushed in 1962.

Ngelmu

Mystical science.

Ngelmu Sejati

True and genuine mystical sciences, which Christian missionaries claimed could be derived from the Bible.

Fiqh

Islamic jurisprudence; interpretation of Islamic law. Also the generic term for the complete body of fiqh texts.

Guriang

The Sundanese deity of prosperity.

Habib

Beloved, a term of address exclusively used for the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

Hadith

Prophet Muhammad's sayings and traditions.

Hadith Qudsi

God's word which is not included in the Quran but which is preserved in The tradition of the Prophet.

Haji

A person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Hajj

The pilgrimage to Mecca; the last of the five pillars of Islam.

Idul Fitri

Islamic festival celebrated on the first of Syawwal (Islamic Lunar Year) marking the end of fasting month, Ramadhan.

Ijtihad

Independent religious judgement on legal and theological matters based on authoritative sources of Islam (*Quran, Sunnah, Qiyas, Ijma'*).

Ikhwan

Muslim Brothers, also short for Muslim Brotherhood.

Ikhwan al-Muslimin

An Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement born in Egypt. It was established in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna.

Jemaah

Community of believers.

Jihad

Struggle; the term may be used for various forms of striving for religious objectives, including but not restrictic to armed conflict (Holy War) in certain circumstances.

Jilbab

Headscarf.

Jimat

Magical amulet for warding off evil and misfortune.

Jurig

Spirit that harms children.

Ka'bah

The rectangular building at the centre of the Great Mosque of Mecca, housing the holy black stone; the focus of prayer and pilgrimage for Muslims.

Kafir

Unbeliever, infidel.

Kebatinan

Javanese Spiritualism, usually seen to be opposed to orthodox Islamic norms and practices; literally inwardness.

Keroncong

Keroncong is a type of Indonesian musical ensemble that typically uses a violin, flute, guitar, ukulele, banjo, cello, and a string bass in addition to a female or male singer.

Khittah

The organizational and principle foundation guidelines, the initial mandate of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

Konstituante

The state body established to formulate the permanent Constitution for the Republic of Indonesia to replace the provisional Constitution of 1950.

Kyai

Title for Islamic religious leaders or learned scholars in Java.

Langgar/Musalla

Muslim house of worship, generally small in size and used for daily prayers only, not for Friday prayers.

Madiun Affair

A communist uprising in 1948 in the town of Madiun against the leaders of the newly-declared Indonesian Republic, Soekarno-Hatta.

Madrasah

Islamic school that not exclusively teaches on Islamic matter but includes the national curriculum.

Magang

Candidate for a post in the civil administration who volunteers to work in an office while awaiting appointment.

Majlis Taklim

A term popularly used to denote informal religious sessions or Islamic religious groups commonly organised especially by adult female Muslims.

Manakiban

Arabic *manaqib*. This word is semantically complex, yet in the meaning most relevant to current purposes it refers to both the “laudable traits of an individual and the text of an event in which those traits are illustrated.”¹⁷¹

Mauludan

Birthday celebration of the Prophet Muhammad.

Nisfu Sha’ban

A religious festival held in the mid of the month Sha’ban. Sha’ban is the 8th month in Islamic Lunar Year calendar. Muslims, largely the Traditionalists, believe that the Nisfu Sha’ban night is special because God promised forgiveness and rewards to those who celebrate it by observing some specific prayers.

Pasewakan

Penghayat’s house of worship and cultural activities.

Penghayat

The followers of *Aliran Kebatinan* or *Aliran Kepercayaan*.

Penghulu

Religious functionary who is responsible for administrating of marriages and other religious affairs.

Pemekaran

Literally means ‘proliferation’. The expansion of administrative levels of non-central government like the sub-district, district or provincial levels.

Pesantren

¹⁷¹ Julian Millie, *Splashed by the saint*, p. 2.

Islamic boarding school led by a kyai as its central figure. *Pesantren* provide Islamic teachings and activities for *santris* (students) who board the school for certain period of time.

Quran

The holy scripture of Islam.

Rajaban

A religious festival held in the month of Rajab, the 7th month of the Islamic Lunar Year calendar. Muslims, especially the Traditionalists, believe that the month is sacred because the Prophet Muhammad used to pray to Allah to ask for blessing when he sighted the moon of Rajab.

Ririwa

A spirit that emanates from a newly buried corpse as a result of improper treatment in the burial process.

Rukun Islam

The five pillars of Islam that consist of: (1) *Shahadat*: the confession of the faith; (2) *Salat*: performing ritual prayers in the proper way five times each day; (3) *Zakat*: paying an alms (or charity) tax to benefit the poor and the needy; (4) *Saum*: fasting during the month of Ramadan; (5) *Haji*: Pilgrimage to Mecca.

Ruwatan

Ceremonies required in particular under specific social and personal circumstances to banish diseases and to eradicate pests, plants and so on, often using spells to protect people from disasters in their quest for protection or fortune from supernatural spirit.

Salafi

Muslims who seek to follow the example of the righteous ancestors of early Islam; the *Salaf al-Salih*; a position commonly associated with adherents of Wahhabism.

Salat

Ritual prayer, one of the five pillars of Islam.

Santri

Observing Muslims.

Sedekahan

Giving valuable things such as money, clothes and foods to the needy.

Sesajen

Ritual offering usually consisting of flowers, foods, drinks (especially coffee), cigarettes and money.

Slametan

Ritual communal meal to observe major occasions such as birth, death, marriage etc.

Sufi, Sufism

Islamic mystic, mysticism.

Supersemar

Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret; official letter signed by Soekarno to Soeharto dated 11 March 1966 that authorised Soeharto to take over power which in consequence eliminated Soekarno from active politics.

Tahlilan

A Traditionalist devotional ceremony consisting of group repetitive chanting of the first part of the confession of faith, that there is no God but God (*la ilaha illa Allah*).

Tarawih

Prayers performed during the nights in the month of Ramadhan.

Tarekat

Sufi mystical order.

Ulama

Islamic religious leaders, learned Muslim scholars. Unlike in Arabic, in Indonesia *ulama* can be used as a singular noun. In Javanese society, these scholars are commonly called *kyai*; in West Java they are commonly called *ajengan*.

Ummah/ummat

The Islamic Community.

Usroh

Literally means nuclear family or cell. The concept of *usroh* was not exclusively used in campus *dakwah* circles and considered very effective for the formation of cadres under repressive New Order circumstances. The *usroh* model was officially used and widespread among NII (Islamic Indonesian State) followers in the early 1980s.

Vihara

Buddhist house of worship.

Wahhabi

Saudi-based religious movement that emerged in the late 18th century and was led by Muhammad ibn Abd Wahhab (1710-1787). The movement called for a return to a pristine Islam by purifying religious practices from superstitions and unlawful innovations (*bid'a*).

Wayang

Javanese shadow play using flat parchment puppets; also used for other forms of theatrical performances such as *wayang wong* (dance drama) and *wayang topeng* (masked dance performance).

Zakat

Alms giving, one of the five pillars of Islam.

KEY ANALYTICAL TERMS¹⁷²

BASIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS

Traditionalism	Acceptance of the four Sunni Schools of Law as valid guides to knowing Islam. Traditionalism usually recognises that these legal traditions are subject to change and redefinition. It commonly involves tolerance towards locally derived cultural expressions, acceptance of mysticism, and a gradualist approach towards greater Islamisation.
Traditionalist	One who, or that which, adheres to Traditionalism.
Modernism	An approach to knowing Islam which denies that the four Sunni Schools of Law are authoritative guides and which relies fundamentally upon human reason in understanding Revelation. This commonly involves a disregard for socio-historical contexts but openness to modern learning as a way of enhancing the power of reason. It is principally opposed to what it sees as the medieval obscurantism of Traditionalism, may reject local cultural expressions and is at least suspicious of mysticism.
Modernist	One who, or that which, embraces Modernism.
Revivalism	An approach to knowing Islam which denies that the four Sunni Schools of Law are authoritative guides and which aspires to revive a pristine universal Islam as in the time of the Prophet and

¹⁷² This list of analytical terms and their definitions grew from discussions over several months by a research project team led by M.C. Ricklefs at the National University of Singapore (NUS) with my colleague R. Michael Feener and myself as active participants.

his Companions. Its epistemology rests on cognition of Revelation as found in the Quran and *Hadith* through Divine guidance.

Revivalism normally distrusts the application of human reason and denies that understandings of Revelation may legitimately change over time or that Islam may evolve in changing socio-historical contexts. It commonly rejects local cultural expressions and regards mysticism as a source of heresy.

Revivalist One who, or that which, adheres to Revivalism.

Social & political projects

Islamism A project whose principal locus of activity is the state. It seeks a more perfect political order by establishing state institutions and/or controlling existing ones so as to impose deeper Islamisation, achieve greater justice, and safeguard the integrity of the Muslim community.

Islamism is most commonly associated with Modernist and Revivalist thought and sometimes (but not necessarily) validates the use of force to achieve its objectives. It usually seeks social conformity and, where it is tolerant of other faiths, normally expects them to accept a position subordinate to Islamic dominance.

Islamist One who, or that which, embraces the Islamism.

Dakwahism A project whose principal locus of activity is at the level of the society. It seeks a more perfect social order by actively propagating what it regards as a correct understanding of the faith, its moral standards and its ritual obligations. Dakwahism is found mainly among Traditionalists, Modernists and Revivalists. Traditionalist Dakwahism is normally consistent with tolerance towards locally derived cultural expressions, acceptance of mysticism, and a gradualist approach towards

greater Islamisation, and is usually said to rest upon the example of the Wali Sanga. Modernist and Revivalist styles are normally characterised by rejection of local practices and superstitions and insistence on the superiority of Islam over other religions. All styles may prioritise associated values such as the solidarity of the Islamic ummah and strict female modesty.

Dakwahist One who, or that which, embraces Dakwahism.

Liberalism A project whose principal locus of activity is the individual. It seeks greater individual freedom in religious and other matters, so long as no harm is done to the rights of others. Liberalism is found amongst Traditionalists, Historicalists and Modernists, but is rare among Revivalists. It is generally suspicious of the role of government in religious affairs and opposed to the use of force in any context. It commonly prioritises associated values such as social and gender equality, freedom of thought, interfaith harmony, social pluralism and economic progress.

Liberal One who, or that which, embraces Liberalism.

Socio-religious process

Islamisation a process of deepening commitment to standards of normative Islamic belief, practice and religious identity. Those standards are subject to contestation among groups and individuals. Islamisation as an objective is associated with all of the epistemological approaches described above.

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
MAPS

WEST JAVA




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BANTEN




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WEST BANDUNG



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BANDUNG, SUMEDANG, SUBANG AND CIANJUR



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SUMEDANG



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BEKASI



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CURRICULUM VITAE

Chaider S. Bamualim was born in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, on 24 May 1966. He attended the Islamic college, Pondok Modern Gontor in Ponorogo, East Java (1979-1986). He completed his undergraduate studies in Islamic Law (*Shari'ah*) at the Islamic University of Indonesia (UII), Yogyakarta in 1995. He obtained his Masters degree in Islamic Studies from Leiden University in the Netherlands (1998) with a thesis centering on Nurcholish Madjid's Islamic Thoughts. Upon his return to Indonesia, he taught Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Philosophy and Religion at Paramadina University (1999-2000), in Jakarta. In 1999 he gained a position in the Faculty of Theology and Philosophy of Syarif Hidayatullah State Institute for Islamic Studies (at present State Islamic University), Jakarta, where he taught Modern Islamic Thought (1999-2007). In 2003, he was granted a summer trip to the United States from the Fulbright American Studies Institute to study Religion in the United States (2003). From 2004 to 2006 he acted as the director of the international research project *Islamic Philanthropy for Social Justice*, a comparative study in six different countries including Egypt, India, Indonesia, Tanzania, Turkey and United Kingdom which was funded by the Ford Foundation. From 2005 to 2007 he participated in a project entitled *The Future of Shari'ah* led by Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im from Emory University Law School, USA. In 2006, he was appointed as the director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta, working on various research and training projects covering a variety of topics including 'Islamic Philanthropy and Social Justice,' 'Islam and Human Rights,' and 'Ethno-religious Conflict and Peace-Building in Indonesia.' In 2008, he was granted a research fellowship at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), National University of Singapore (NUS), where he joined a project research team chaired by professor M.C. Ricklefs, entitled *Islam and Social Dynamics in Indonesia: Comparative Analysis of Law, Culture, Politics and Religion Since c. 1998 in Three Decisive Regions* (Java, Jakarta and Aceh). Within the framework of this research project which was funded by the Singaporean Ministry of Education (MoE). At present he works as a lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta next to his project activities within the CSRC. His academic interests focus on modern Islamic developments within and without Indonesia with special attention to Islamic politics, culture and society.

