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From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus

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Citation

Christofis, N. (2015, February 3). *From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/31818>

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Issue Date: 2015-02-03

Conclusion

James Connolly was an Irish socialist leader, an enigmatic and problematic figure in the history of Irish nationalism, less on account of any ambiguities in his theories and practices than because of what he represents.¹ He was born in Edinburgh in 1868 to Irish working-class parents. He was executed by the British because he participated in the 1916 uprising in Dublin. After his execution, someone allegedly stated, “He lived as a socialist, he died as a nationalist.” This last sentence represents, I believe, the main theme of this thesis. Not because of its meaning *per se*, although in a way it could be, but rather because the process it represents: a shift from one state to another, without distinguishing between which comes first and to what degree.

This thesis has tried to show the interaction of the Greek and Turkish left with nationalism during the Cold War (1951-1971) through their policies concerning the Cyprus Question. The Cyprus Question occupies a special place in Greek and Turkish history because of its national meaning, and therefore is justifiable as a point of reference. The method chosen for this study is based on comparative historical analysis, and through a comparative investigation it aims to overcome the limitations of existing scholarship, i.e. a lack of available literature on socialism, nationalism and Cyprus in the cases of Greece and Turkey, and more generally the lack of comparative studies on the two countries. Furthermore, the study seeks to contribute to the puzzling question of the relationship between Marxism and nationalism.

By adopting a comparative approach, the details of which are described in Chapter 2, this study aims to pinpoint similarities and differences as regards leftist movements in Greece and Turkey as regards Cyprus. It then examines possible explanations for the variations and assesses them against the weight of the evidence. Moreover, it seeks not just to compare the Greek and Turkish cases but also to compare them across comparable historical phases. Without becoming explicitly apparent, critical stages and events were of great significance and they demonstrated a specific element that proved crucial in considerably changing the discourses of the parties. These were defined by numerous factors: the development of the Cyprus Question; developments within the respective states; the international Cold War environment; and the political decisions that were made within the international communist movement, all of which are discussed in the study. They were also the same factors that

¹ “Nationalism without Socialism – without a reorganization of society on the basis of a broader and more developed form of that common property which underlay the social structure of Ancient Erin – is only national recreancy.” David Lloyd, “Rethinking National Marxism: James Connolly and ‘Celtic Communism,’” *Interventions*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2003, pp. 345-370, here p. 348.

shaped and defined the political rhetoric and strategy of the socialist parties. The purpose of this study was thus twofold. First, to demonstrate whether the two parties shared similarities in the policies they adopted regarding the national issue of Cyprus and subsequently to examine the extent to which those were situated in terms of socialist theory. Second, to demonstrate the differences within the states themselves between left-wing and right-wing political rhetoric as well as investigate the decisions and strategies that were adopted regarding Cyprus and in what respect their approaches differed, especially when the issue was the “nation.” At the same time, the study tried to take into consideration the historical development of each country, in other words its national history, in relation both to Cyprus and to each other. In order to do so, however, the study focused more on practices than on theory.

Ultimately, this study compares Greek and Turkish socialism during the Cold War era and their relationship with Cyprus, and interrogates the exceptionalist thesis, i.e., both countries’ persistence in the “exceptional” anti-nationalist character of the left. In historiography, comparisons must be analyzed in a *double* sense. Every representation of a particular history is comparative, because “it is (implicitly or explicitly) international *and* on the fact that the particularities of each representation – of a nation and of a national historiography – can only be established by comparing these representations *with each other*.”² In that respect, the Turkish case expressed explicitly its adoption of nationalism, a kind of nationalism that represents according to the party the “right” kind of nationalism and therefore an “acceptable” kind. The comparisons undertaken in the study were made with the hope of achieving a genuine understanding of the above mentioned questions by avoiding the trap of claiming the particularity of one case over the other, making it possible to draw perhaps more general conclusions. As regards the long-lasting Greek-Turkish rivalry, this last point carries additional significance considering the rival nationalisms of the two countries.

As with any comparative endeavor, this one too aims at drawing out larger schemes. In other words, it aims to allow us to arrive at a larger theory of the relationship between the left and nationalism. However, the apparent limitation to this method, the “small-N” method, does not permit the testing of all findings. Additional cases, such as, for example, the interesting case of the Cypriot left, because of the participation of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, would probably provide additional results and strengthen the results. What is of value,

² Chris Lorenz, “Double Trouble: A Comparison of the Politics of National History in Germany and in Quebec,” p. 53, in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds), *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2010; emphasis in the original.

however, in “small-N” studies is that despite the endemic weakness of paired comparisons, this weakness is exchanged for strength in other accounts.

Each chapter of the thesis, implicitly or explicitly, shows the workings of the interaction of the relationship mentioned above between Marxism and nationalism. If we are to attempt an understanding of the complex relationship between Marxism and nationalism, at least for the two countries and period this study focuses on, we should be acutely aware of the factors that also shaped the history of the leftist movement in those countries.

The purpose of Chapter 1 was to present the history of the communist movement in the two countries. Through this brief exploration of the history of communism in Greece and Turkey, similar patterns emerged which seemed to influence and shape the policies and strategies of the left later in the period of study. Marxism in both countries was harshly persecuted and never allowed to be implemented and operate in such a way that it could develop and play an active role in the politics of the country. On the contrary, Marxism was used as a tool in the hands of the authoritarian national bourgeoisie, manipulated whenever needed for the sole purpose of promoting its own interests; if the left failed to comply with the bourgeoisie’s interests, then it was forced into illegality. The suppression of the leftist movement forced the left to adopt a defensive stance and adopt conciliatory and compromising strategies, as seen in the subsequent chapters, so that it could have a say in politics.

The third part of the chapter presented the history of the Cyprus Question and its direct links with and impacts on the politics of the “motherlands,” as well as upon the politics of the island itself. The Cyprus Question was used as a yardstick in our study instead of an additional case study of comparison. Cyprus, with its strategic position, held an important place for the great powers, especially after WWII. For Great Britain, and the West in general, the island provided a location for establishing military bases to “protect” a region that included the Suez Canal, which was a conduit for oil used by Western industries, and was used for their imperialist agenda. This left the local actors in Cyprus with a dilemma: a) to identify with the colonialists and the new world power, the US, and accept the use and control of the island, or b) to refuse colonial and neo-colonial control and to try to use the island for their own interests and identify with their insubordinate neighbors. The second choice prevailed.

The great powers aside, Cyprus also held a special position in Greek and Turkish national history. Cyprus became an “apple of discord” for both countries and affected the politics in the motherlands by stirring additional nationalist feelings and representing a source of hatred.

Cyprus was also intimately related with anti-colonial movements and anti-western sentiments. On the island itself, an anti-colonial struggle was launched to free it from the British colonial administration. In effect, this anti-colonial struggle, launched by the EOKA, was an irredentist strategy ultimately aiming to unite the island with mainland Greece, while the EOKA struggle itself became a contentious issue between political actors on the island and Greece, for both the left and the right alike. For the left, it provided the interpretation it needed to justify its leftist rhetoric and public discourse, since nobody could deny the struggle's anti-British, and more generally anti-Western, aims.

The Republic of Cyprus was founded after the conclusion of the London-Zurich Agreements in 1960. What can be said about the Republic of Cyprus with great certainty is that its fragile establishment was achieved during a period of extreme nationalism. The ideologies of *Enosis* and *Taksim*, the core targets of the national agendas of Greece and Turkey, shaped the history of the island. These two ideologies, or ideological strategies, were in complete accordance and practically shared the same goals with the policy and directives of Athens and Ankara, the so-called “national centers” of the motherlands. In addition, during the period under study, the “national centers” dictated the political path the elites in the island would follow, which complicated matters even more, at least for the left.

After the necessary background information was given, Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with the main narrative of our cases, the EDA and TİP. Specifically, those chapters attempted to narrate the story of the parties through their political relations and interactions with the Cyprus Question. It was argued that neither the EDA nor the TİP presented a static case with an ideological program and programmatic principles that was not subject to changes. On the contrary, without pulling away from their basic principles and political positions, both parties were adapting to the conditions of their time and changed their strategies and policies accordingly.

Apart from the obvious similarities that led to the establishment of the two parties, i.e. they were both founded after a period of crisis and had to contend with the strict anti-communist attitudes of their governments, it was found that both parties also shared *mutas mutandis*, the same political program and agenda as they sought to achieve similar goals in their respective countries. During the first years of their formation, both parties were trying to find and formulate their ideological identities; they were both Marxist-oriented, regardless of how that was defined by the parties themselves, and as supporters of the Marxist tradition devoted their efforts to promoting an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist agenda using similar rhetoric. In addition, there was an exploration of how their governments established repressive

apparatuses, which indeed was perhaps the only stable factor throughout the period of study, thus representing the baseline of the investigation at hand.

The third chapter focused on the Greek case. In the early 1950s, Greece entered the Cold War era with a political system inherited from the civil war. It was not a dictatorship, as elections were held and the parliamentary system was similar to that of the other Western European countries, but there were some crucial differences as well: all communist activities were illegal and laws relating to espionage or high treason could result in prison terms as well as the firing squad.³ The party attempted to consolidate its position in Greek society so that it could contribute to politics and the reorganization of the left, in addition to mobilizing the masses and successfully counter the existing repressive measures. In this environment, the EDA formulated its positions on international developments and the Cyprus Question. In this way, it attempted to take advantage of the dynamic created by international developments and use it in the political scene of the country in the development of national struggles. Furthermore, the Cyprus Question was used by the EDA as a way to strengthen its influence and bring about electoral gains. The EDA attempted to formulate a program that would represent current affairs while adapting with existing conditions and developments in Cyprus.

The EDA's position on Cyprus was from the start explicit. Since the first year of its establishment, the EDA grasped the opportunity to promote its program and proposed in the parliament to hold a vote in favor of *Enosis*, which was firmly embedded in the continuum of Greek history as the keystone of national consciousness, and the left presented no exception. Therefore, as we have seen, the *Enosis* campaign was presented as nationally just and nationally necessary. Evaluations were given of the party's rhetoric and official speeches in and out of the Greek Parliament, and as regards Cyprus, it was found that "nobody dared to question the Hellenicity of the island and the right of its people to unite with the national whole." Furthermore, the party was in a position to understand that the escalation of the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus was proving to be a crucial factor for maintaining the stability of both NATO and Greece. Starting in the mid-1950s, the number of articles and discussions in parliament about the issue increased significantly, including in the party's newspaper, *Avgi*. An important factor for this development was the people's national sentiment regarding the Cypriots, and that issue could not be ignored by any of the political parties. Likewise, the EDA bolstered its political agenda with analyses of Cyprus.

³ George Margaritis, "Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974," p. 1445, in Immanuel Ness (ed), *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, 1500 to the Present*, vol. III, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex, 2009.

By the time the EOKA launched its struggle for liberation, the *Enosis* campaign had already become a fundamental issue in political debates which had unforeseen effects. For the EDA, as for the rest of the parties of course, it served multiple purposes. The EDA used the developments in Cyprus as a national issue to challenge the exclusive monopoly of the agents of the Greek government to speak about “national issues” on behalf of the Greek people and turn the tables on its opponents and outbid them in nationalist fervor. On the other hand, it also used Cyprus as anti-colonial and anti-imperialist issue to “safely” promote its leftist agenda and tap negative sentiment for the United State and the Western alliance in order to embarrass the government and cast doubt on the country’s foreign orientation. To sum it up, the Cyprus Question demonstrated “the condensed expression of foreign rule on Greek national territories.”

It was apparent that the EDA’s goal was twofold. On the one hand, it aimed to legitimize itself and exercise its political rights freely, and on the other, it sought to de-legitimize the Greek government as the “sole” representative of the nation. In order to do this, it sought alliances with all the democratic forces of the country, regardless of where they were in the political spectrum. The Greek political scene after the rigged elections of 1961 is an example of this attempt by the EDA to form a broad alliance that would be able to overthrow the government and change foreign policy concerning Cyprus and its population.

The issue of self-determination, although temporarily set aside as the result of the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, was revived through the second *Enosis* campaign after the 1963 crisis erupted. Self-determination, one of the fundamental ideological positions of Lenin and the communist line, represented the EDA’s fundamental political strategy throughout its existence, which, however, would lead not to the liberation and independence of Cyprus, as one might expect, but to *Enosis* with Greece. Thus, it was seen that the political tactics of the EDA shared the same goal as the Greek government but via a different means, that of the self-determination of the people which would be achieved through the launch of an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle against the forces of capitalism.

The TIP’s policy on Cyprus was the focus of Chapter 4. It was marked by two distinct stages, roughly divided by the elections of 1965. The party, like its Greek counterpart, was loyal to the leftist agenda, but the TIP saw the Cyprus question as an issue that fit into the party’s anti-imperialist agenda. The Cyprus Question was a vehicle through which the party could engage in the politics of the country. It is true that although the party never managed to dominate Turkish politics, through its very existence it forced the other parties to define themselves more clearly in ideological terms. Furthermore, with its political interpositions,

the party managed to create fertile ground for the public to openly discuss foreign policy issues. The Cyprus Question was a case in point in which the people increasingly participated in the process.

The TİP's anti-imperialism was identified with an increasingly independent foreign policy in which Cyprus was its top priority. Thus, the party was able to raise a safety net around itself so that it would not be accused of treason and of being unpatriotic (read as non-Kemalist) and additionally to obtain legitimization. One of the major differences with the Greek case was the party's explicit statement and support of nationalism, or to put it more correctly, support of Kemalist nationalism. Both of these elements were proudly adopted in the official documents and programs of the party, and were considered to be core elements of their leftist existence. Nationalism for the TİP meant standing "against foreign repression and exploitation" and accordingly, the "nationalization of socialism" was an element never denied by the party. Indeed, the party openly stated that it was "a hundred percent nationalist organization" following Kemalist principles. This was the element, according to party ideologues, that set them apart as the "true" patriotic force of the country. Throughout its existence the party never ceased repeating its fundamental positions regarding the Cyprus Question: a de-militarized, neutral under international guarantees, in other words a federate and independent country based on a law of equality between the two communities.

The clear-cut event that defined the party's future stance on Cyprus took place after the speech by the chairman of the party in Bursa in May 1964. This was the first attempt by the party to formulate an official and coherent position on the national issue of the country. However, the position expressed during the speech evoked a series of harsh criticisms putting the party "in the corner" as its true intentions and patriotism were challenged and questioned. The party, among other issues, argued that the Cyprus Question was relatively new for Turkey and did not represent the Kemalist principle of *Mısak-i Milli*. It was argued that Turkey's borders did not include Cyprus and therefore an irredentist quest would be a deviation from the Kemalist principle, which was the real reason behind the country's decisions and problems. Furthermore, it linked Cyprus with the imperialist agenda of the British colonialists and suggested that Turkey should appraise the situation before being dragged into the imperialist scheme. It was argued, implicitly and explicitly, that the harsh criticism in newspapers and the position held by the government, as well as by other conservative forces in the country, drove the party to adopt a stance on the national issue of Cyprus that echoed the official line, and not just because of the electoral gains in the elections of 1965. That

process had already started in 1965 and would be accelerated by the Johnson letter in June of 1964.

The shift in the TİP's foreign policy and the adoption of its seemingly contradictory stance on Cyprus should be seen in terms of the process of development of the party itself, which was adapting to international and national developments. The elections of 1965 and the party's gains at the ballot box were taken advantage of by the party, as it was seen as an opportunity to address more people. In other words, it is unknown what would have happened had there not been such heavy censorship and criticism by anti-communist state actors. It was a tactical move in the process prodded along by concurrent developments. On the one hand, it was argued that the path of the party's demise to nationalism was inevitable. As discussed, this kind of nationalism also had Kemalism at its core, like the rest of the parties, but attributed different content to it. In the second stage of the party, it gained popularity but did not abandon its original stance. However, the positions of the party were strengthened with a more radicalized anti-colonial and anti-imperial vocabulary, but more significantly it adopted and actually took a leading role in suggesting a military operation in Cyprus to liberate "brother Turks" during the crisis in Cyprus in 1967.

The adoption of a militarized position on Cyprus gave the party the opportunity to approach the *par excellence* Kemalist forces that defined the politics and safeguarded the "national interests" of the country. Indeed, through a militarized discourse the party attempted, as its Greek counterpart, to both legitimize itself in the eyes of the people and gain popularity, and to an extent, de-legitimize the Turkish government. By talking about "national interest," a notion which goes above and beyond any particular ideology or set of beliefs and ideals, the party attempted to monopolize the terrain of national politics and acquire the role of the "savior" of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots.

Underestimation of the depth and range of nationalism has always been a blind spot of socialist theory and practice, thus allowing movements of the right to appropriate the idea of the nation and therefore be in a position to claim to be *the* "national movement."⁴ The post-war era had a tremendous effect on socialism, in the sense that nationalism in the Third World became an even more radical force behind rapid national economic development and therefore class-related issues were subordinated to national issues and interests. "Socialism became entirely encompassed by radical nationalism, even though nationalism and the belief

⁴ John Schwarzmantel, p. 8.

in a strong state were by tradition part of the politics of the right.”⁵ The outcome of this approach was what could be termed a “nationalization of socialism” and “socialization of nationalism.” The result of this for Marxism was the abandonment of the classical approach and interpretations, and the beginning of an era of inventing and providing new ones. The intimate relationship between nationalism and socialism in the Third World context blurred the boundaries between the notions of “class,” “nation” and “people.” The principal question was who would be the historical agent of social, political and economic transformations in the peripheral societies of the capitalist system, as Greece and Turkey were. As it was argued,

...the nationalists expropriated the concepts of the Left, and the Left became dominated by nationalism. The social basis for revolutionary change became equivocal. The vehicle for the emancipation of the world had been, for Marxists, and even for many other socialists, the industrial working class. But in the post-war period, the agency of change became different things at different times: the people, the poor, the peasantry, even the lumpen-proletariat, sometimes students, ethnic minorities, and many others.⁶

It is believed that the decisions and policies of the Greek and Turkish left in that time period should be seen through that prism. After the Second World War, both cases were appropriated by nationalism, which proved to be equally useful to the left as well. To elaborate and bolster this set of arguments, a comparison was made of the two cases in terms of a set of topics that appeared to be just as important during the course of this study, on which the last chapter of this study focused.

In Chapter 5.1, I first attempted to demonstrate and make apparent the environment and ideological enemy against which the left had to wage its struggle. Repeatedly it was emphasized that by the time the left was allowed to play a part in politics, there was already an embedded ideological scheme in both countries that regulated state affairs, and more importantly, divided the society into “good” and “bad” citizens. In the Greek case, this division was depicted as a division between *ethnikofrones* (read as “patriots”) and non-*ethnikofrones* (read as “non-patriots”) which emerged after the Greek Civil War. The victorious forces of the conservative right had to legitimize themselves, militarily, politically, and even more importantly, ideologically. In order to do so, they had to marginalize their opponents, who, because they stood victorious against the occupying forces of Germany and

⁵ Nigel Harris, *The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology*, Penguin, London, 1986, p. 122.

⁶ Anouar Abdel-Malek, as quoted in Erkan Doğan, p. 71.

Italy in WWII, occupied a special place in people's minds. Additionally, the right had to cut off the non-*ethnikofrones*, the communists, from the social whole to avoid the potentiality of a future overturn of the political scene, as it came to exist from the 1950s onwards. This situation forced the Greek communist movement to seek shelter in illegality, exile, and mass confinement, and also suffer political and social slander. This was a fundamental element throughout the history of the communist movement and especially after the civil war, and in the end the Greek left was forced to adopt a defensive position against the sociological and historical commitments that defined the terms of who and what could be deemed legitimate and what could not.

The Turkish case presents a similar case, although there was not a civil war that led to a division of Turkish society. In Turkey, the game was played between Kemalists (read as "patriots") and non-Kemalists ("non-patriots"). The fact that there was not civil strife in Turkey does not mean that communism in Turkey faced milder treatment by the Turkish regime. What differentiates the Turkish case more, however, is the fact that since its formation, the communist movement had to compete with a more organized and influential nationalist movement. The nationalist movement managed to dominate to a great extent both public and private space, and the Kemalist effect on the Turkish left can be seen by the fact that the latter sought legitimization through Kemalism, while, in the Greek case the EDA was trying to provide a different scheme than that of *ethnikofrosyni*. To complicate matters further, the Soviet Union's decision not to take action against the Kemalist suppression of the TKP in the early years of the communist movement, as well as the latter's false idea of sharing the same goals with the nationalist movement, proved in many respects problematic for the Turkish leftist movement until the mid-1970s. As it becomes clear in those chapters, both the Greek and the Turkish case adopted a similar stance concerning national politics. The TİP also adopted a defensive position, since this provided the safest way to prolong the party's existence.

In Chapter 5.2 it was argued that while both the EDA and TİP strove to interpret and present the national issue of Cyprus through leftist terms and provide a different model for their societies, the left made use of the same model of legitimization with the right, i.e. through a "glorious national past" and its instrumentalization. The parties "nationalized" and bolstered their rhetoric through the dominant discourse of *Ethnikofrosyni* and Kemalism. A politics of memory, as it has rightly been argued, "based on standardized, formulaic and sacralized narrativization, manipulation or oblivion of selected past events, is crucial in this discourse. The past and present are linked in such a way in these narratives that present social

events or actors appear as mere repetitions or replicas of the past events or actors.”⁷ It was in this sense that the left appropriated a glorious national past. Since nationalism was already well-entrenched in Greek and Turkish society, the image of national unity proved to be substantially effective for a party that sought the legitimization of its own actions. It could gain credentials and popularity by presenting itself as the vanguard of the whole nation, and as such, challenge the premiership of the right. Thus, the chapter draws its theoretical framework from memory studies, and most particularly, by the politics of memory. The goal was to present the mechanisms/narratives that the left mobilized and recalled from the past, as well as examine in what respect they differed from the right and for what purpose. It became clear that although the left appropriated the same reference periods of national history, i.e. the “glorious” moments of national struggles for liberation, their use differed in the sense that it was imbued with anti-imperialist elements and therefore aimed at legitimizing their own left-wing rhetoric. This part of the past, especially in times of crisis, served the purpose of shaping an analytical and interpretive framework for the political reality of the present and guidance for the future.⁸

However, the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist content expressed by the EDA and TIP had different goals which were defined by national politics and not by an internationalist perception. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 5.3, both parties shared the same ideological standpoint concerning internationalism. They were not internationalist in the sense that they were fighting in favor of a global united working-class and communist movement. Local and national particularities prevailed in both cases, following again the international events that took place in different places at different times.

This becomes clear in Chapter 5.4 in that although the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist rhetoric was practically the same, the goal was different. Of course, there were variations in the discourse of the two parties, perhaps the most evident being the emphasis on the right of self-determination in the Greek case and the lack of it, not serving its purpose, in the Turkish case. However, the public discourse of both parties presented striking similarities. Of great interest is the revival of Greek-Turkish hatred, as they each perceived the other to be imperialist, with the exception of the notion that they were just “pawns” of imperialist powers.

⁷ Umut Azak, *Janus-Faced Memory of Secularism: Continuity and Change in the Discourse of Secularism in Turkey*, PhD Dissertation, Leiden University, 2007, p. 333.

⁸ See the introduction in Paloma Aguilar Fernández, *Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy*, Berghahn, Oxford – New York, 2002.

The nation's primacy became basic also to the actions of the anti-imperialist movement. While, on the one hand, anti-imperialism becomes the means for the Left to mobilize the people, that mobilization took place in the name of nationalism, national sovereignty and national interests, and not in the name of anti-imperialism, or internationalism as one would expect. In other words, socialism was subordinated to national ends, placing the anti-imperialist values of socialism at the service of the particularistic irredentist values of nationalism.

To conclude, the greatest difference as noted was the goal they wished to achieve. The goal of the left, and of the right in that respect, was not that Cyprus should achieve national independence that would lead to an independent nation-state. Rather, in the Greek case, it meant that national independence was a transitory stage to *Enosis*, while, in the Turkish case it meant that national independence was the necessary solution, since *Taksim* (partition), or accession to Turkey, was strongly opposed by Greece and the great powers and therefore, impossible to achieve. In other words, it seems that the left also was trapped in the anachronistic irredentism of their respective motherlands; *Enosis*, as demonstrated by the Greek and Greek Cypriot elite, was presented as the only national solution for the Greek Cypriot community, while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community adopted as a national solution *Taksim* (partition). The EDA, concealing the nationalism of its discourse with the help of slogans of self-determination, spoke of "the defense of the motherland" instead of defending the co-operation of two communities. Through this process, it attacked "its own ruling class" and exposed the behavior of the Greek bourgeoisie. The TİP, on the other hand, followed a similar strategy as the EDA but argued in favor of *Taksim* instead of putting its efforts into reconciling the two communities in the name of proletarian internationalism. What is certain is that both parties were driven and had at the core of their policies first and foremost "national interest" which superseded any particular ideology. Therefore, not only did the parties not think of themselves beyond the nation, but they operated within it and most of the time in parallel with it.

It was argued that the left's anti-imperialist and anti-colonial policies on Cyprus became more explicit through anti-Americanism as the factual expression of these policies. There was no attempt to codify and present an all-inclusive definition of anti-Americanism and this means that other factors (social, cultural and economic) would have to be included. Instead, however, this study focused in the final chapter on the political-strategic dimension of anti-Americanism, specifically as it was triggered by developments on the island of Cyprus. Anti-Americanism was treated as a discourse, a code-word indicating reactions to the American

intervention in the domestic and national affairs of Greece and Turkey, and furthermore, through the American intervention in Cyprus, expressing both a feeling and a strategy based on ideological aversion and political expediency.

It was also noted that the degree and content of anti-Americanism varied depending on the historical occasion. A prime example was the harsh reactions evoked by the Johnson letter for both the left and the right, mainly in Turkey. In this way, the stringent anti-Americanism employed by the left did not strike the public as unpatriotic but on the contrary served as a legitimizing tool for the Turkish left in engaging in a struggle to defend the country's national sovereignty, and Cyprus was an indispensable part of that. Anti-American rhetoric thus was a means of legitimizing the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-colonial agenda of the left. At the same time, it was argued that the reaction against American political decisions to invade and regulate national affairs in collaboration with the Greek and Turkish governments pervaded all segments of the society, with the student movement representing one of the most important of those.

What becomes evident throughout this study is that although there is a thin line between socialism and nationalism in precisely determining and distinguishing the boundaries of this relationship. What can be concretely argued, however, is the fact that the left was also nationalist, regardless of whether its nationalism was filtered through anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and generally, leftist theory, ideology and rhetoric. Nationalism was mobilized by the left, presenting it as both a tactic and a conviction, especially when it came to national issues and interests. Even today, a certain amount of confusion exists regarding what the strategy of the left should be, whether anti-national or anti-nationalistic, especially when it comes to "national" issues.

It is clear that what prevails in the left's political strategy is its emphasis, which, as pointed out, has been influenced by different factors concerning the "national," leading the parties at times to "leftist opportunism." Thus, in both cases the decision was made to promote the official political lines of their countries, not a leftist ideology, which seems to have been a means for the legitimization of the left as well as a means to an end. In this way, it was found that there was a subordination of socialism to nationalism, and not the other way around. Indeed, nationalism was, and still is, time-resistant, and one of the most powerful forces in the modern world. As far as the left is concerned, the nation has been accepted as the defining element for socialist action, instead of class for example, and it has sought to interpret the nation in terms that differ from that of their right-wing opponents.

We cannot be certain what the parties' development would have been like had the military coups not occurred, but judging from the immediate aftermath of the coups, the situation of the left did not change considerably. The same policies on the national issue of Cyprus were still dominant. However, the post-coup political experience of the Greek and Turkish left presents a different story which should be thoroughly examined before jumping to conclusions.