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## **From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus**

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## **5.5 Anti-Americanism as an Expression of Anti-Imperialism**

Many scholars argue that anti-Americanism is nothing more than a simple criticism of capitalism or that it is based on mere jealousy of what the US and the American dream represent. The anti-Americanism prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, however, was not devoid of content. It was based on real conditions, i.e. imperialism, including American interventionism, which led to anti-American sentiment and reactions against it that were both verbal and physical. The development of the international arena provided the context through which anti-imperialism was given concrete expression, rather than mere ideological criticism of the US. This expression took the form of intense anti-Americanism due to the direct and indirect intervention of the US in the domestic affairs of each country. Cyprus played a significant part in the anti-imperialist/anti-American context because the events that took place on the island became “episodes of contention” for both the Greek and Turkish left.

### **The American Presence**

American rivalry with the Soviet Union in the post-WWII environment led President Harry S. Truman to appear before a joint session of congress on March 12, 1947 and make one of the most momentous addresses of the postwar era. He based his speech on a perceived threat to national interest and national security.<sup>1</sup> That speech is considered by many to signify the beginning of the Cold War and the struggle for domination between the two world powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. One of the dominant and distinct characteristics of the Cold War was the emphasis on the ideological dimension of the rivalry. As it has been argued, “ideology, even more than military industrial pressures, [...] is the driving-motor of the Cold War ... It is as if ... ideology has broken free from the existential socio economic matrix within which it was nurtured and is no longer subject to any control of rational self-interest.”<sup>2</sup> Having as a starting point the Truman Doctrine which took hold in 1947, followed a few months later by the Marshall Plan, the US, in order to counter the “communist threat,” proclaimed that she “would support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” and undoubtedly the latter’s communist identity was tacit.<sup>3</sup>

Greece and Turkey were such “free peoples” and the amount of money they both received through the Marshall Plan was \$400 million in economic and military aid. The economic aid

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<sup>1</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48,” *The American Historical Review*, vol. 89, no. 2, 1984, pp. 346-381.

<sup>2</sup> E.P. Thompson, *The Heavy Dancers. Writings on War, Past and Future*, Merlin Press, London, 1985, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *Global Rivalries. From the Cold War to Iraq*, Zed, London 2006, p. 34,

to Greece and Turkey aimed at putting an end to Soviet expansion. The British had already given up “protecting” Turkey and Greece due to a lack of economic means and relegated that role to the US.<sup>4</sup> By the early 1950s, the dominance of the US became apparent in many regions and countries around the world, and “the homogenization of patterns of living across national and social boundaries seemed to many people to mark a loss of identity, and the evolution of a typically American model of society.” American policy-makers sought to force American hegemony, or Americanization, upon the world, as they believed that the US was a model for the resolution of all the political, social and economic ills the war had instigated.<sup>5</sup> As part of the imperialist pursuit of areas in which to invest, set up cheap manufacture, find consumers, or trade, American military might did in fact frequently intervene abroad, but usually pulled out after those lands were made secure for American political and economic objectives, often leaving proxy armies and puppet governments in their stead.<sup>6</sup>

But this pursuit elicited a growing sense of anti-Americanism. As has been eloquently demonstrated, imperialism and resistance to it, i.e. anti-imperialism, are inextricably linked, defining and competing with each other.<sup>7</sup> Hence, anti-imperialism was, to a great extent, identified with anti-Americanism after the 1950s, mainly because of economic expansion (the Marshall Plan, etc.) and intrusion into domestic economies and the politics of foreign countries through the American embassies, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other American networks.

### **The Greek Case**

The political instability prevalent after World War II in Greece and the ensuing civil war allowed Britain in 1944 and the United States in 1947 “to act decisively and determine Greece’s domestic and foreign policy orientation.”<sup>8</sup> For over thirty years the USA was intervening systematically through its embassy in major ways in the economy, politics and military of Greece in order to shape domestic developments and impose their own solutions.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For the talks between the British and the Americans, see Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East*, IB Tauris, London and New York, 2007, pp. 68-70 and Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism. The United States and the Origins of Cold War, 1917-1953*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1994, p. 56.

<sup>5</sup> By “Americanization” I mean an amalgam of different strands and not a homogenous set of influences. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe’s Twentieth Century*, Vintage Books, New York, 2000, pp. 309-312.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Buzzanco, “Anti-Imperialism,” p. 49-60, here p. 50, in Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, Frederick Logevall (eds), *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage Books, New York, 1994.

<sup>8</sup> Van Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1985: Seeking Interdependence in an Interdependent World – Problems and Prospects,” p. 231, in Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (eds), *Political Change in Greece. Before and After the Colonels*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1987.

<sup>9</sup> Alexis Papachelas, *The Rape of Greek Democracy. The American Factor, 1947-1967*, Estia, Athens, 1998.

The Greek government allied fully with the US and dovetailed its foreign policy with American will in the first decades after the war because it was believed that as a small country it had no power.<sup>10</sup>

In 1945, the UNRRA, an international agency dominated by the US, began a mission in Greece and “paved the way for the Truman doctrine” as a “catalyst for transition from Anglokratia [British rule] ... to Amerikanokratia [American rule].”<sup>11</sup> American policy, based on the two pillars of the Truman Doctrine on the political and military front and a transition from the UNRRA to Marshall Aid on the economic front, had two main effects: the first was to make Greece economically dependent, while failing to implement policies that would lead to the long-term economic health of the country, and the second was to polarize domestic politics and favor the right.<sup>12</sup>

In terms of the military,<sup>13</sup> the regular army, in line with American pressure to reorganize, was being transformed in a way that it supported a strong state and foreign-driven ambitions, and it would play a crucial role in the following decades in Greek politics. The argument that “US interference could not be achieved without consent and domestic acceptance”<sup>14</sup> is indeed quite apt, as indicated by the role played by the Greek military.<sup>15</sup>

American policy regarding Greece took various forms, but it had one primary goal: to limit the power and influence of the Greek left. Thus, the American government supported the Palace and the army, provided financial and military support for the Right, and restricted political and personal liberties, but most importantly all these efforts sought to counter the “communist threat.”<sup>16</sup> The Korean War marked anew American interference in Greek politics, in exchange for NATO membership which was granted in 1952.<sup>17</sup> Soon after this the Papagos

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<sup>10</sup> For example, see the article by the minister without a portfolio, Grigoris Kassimatis, *Eleftheria*, September 3, 1955, in which he defended the view that “it is not time for small (countries) to take the lead. The Big Ones have the last word. It is pointless to believe that we will change the course of politics of the two colossi [...]”

<sup>11</sup> Jon V. Kofas, *Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War*, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1989, p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Christina Politi, “American Intervention in Greece, 1946-1964,” *SAIS Bologna Paper*, June 2011, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *United States, Great Britain and Greece, 1949-1954: The Problem of Greek Security and Internal Security*, PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1989, p. 29.

<sup>14</sup> Nicos Svoronos, “Greece 1940-1950: Meaning and Problematique,” p. 35, in John Iatrides (ed), *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, Themelio, Athens, 1984.

<sup>15</sup> Papagos’ appointment as chief of general staff was just a small part on the issue concerning the army, although the army could also influence electoral results. Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, trans. Vasilis Kapetanyannis, Themelio, Athens, 2005, p. 238.

<sup>16</sup> “All these Greeks – communist or not – who wished a way of life not to be restricted by the legacy of the past, had to face, unavoidably, the enormous military, economic and diplomatic influence and power of the United States of America.” Lawrence AS. Wittner, “American Policy toward Greece: 1944-1949,” pp. 410-411, in John O. Iatrides (ed).

<sup>17</sup> Mogens Pelt, *Tying Greece with the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-1974*, Museum Tusulanum Press, Copenhagen, 2006, p. 51.

government expressed its willingness to support the goals of the US through a spirit of allying selflessness.<sup>18</sup> Papandreou, who despite having lost the premiership in 1945 continued to hold high offices, such as Labor Minister and in 1950-1952 served also as Deputy Prime Minister, had drafted a statement expressing the government's willingness to establish good relations with its neighbors, in other words, the West. The statement was meant to reassure the Americans that the government would be guided by the principle that communism represented a "permanent threat" to Greece; in this context, dedicated communist elements would not be allowed to benefit.

### **The Turkish Case**

As with Greece, Turkey was already part of the American agenda in 1946 when Harry S. Truman requested a report on the Soviet threat to Turkey. Prior to World War II the two countries had limited relations which mainly dealt with economic transactions, and they shared no strategic interests with one another.<sup>19</sup> After George F. Kennan's "long telegram," in which it was stated that the Soviet threat was imminent,<sup>20</sup> relations between the two countries changed positively.

Since World War II there was a deep sense of isolation in Turkey and an acute awareness of the Soviet threat, which was made worse by a focus on the subject by the Western media leading to a "war of nerves."<sup>21</sup> Turkey was included in the list of countries that could apply for economic and military aid as a symbolic gesture<sup>22</sup> through which the US sought allies that shared borders with the Soviet Union. As the emergence of the "Soviet menace" drove Ankara to side more firmly with the Western Bloc,<sup>23</sup> it also had crucial internal effects on the Turkish political system which was hastened by the closer relationship between Ankara and Washington and the Turkish need to profit more fully from American political support.

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<sup>18</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, p. 295; Papagos and Markezinis were characterized by the Americans as loyal to the "world resistance to communism."

<sup>19</sup> Füsün Türkmen, "Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition," *Turkish Studies*, vol. 10, issue 1, pp. 109-129.

<sup>20</sup> Eduard Mark, "The Turkish War Scare of 1946," p. 113 in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds), *Origins of the Cold War. An International History*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, Routledge, London and New York, 2005; see also Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Interpretive Wars Over the Cold War, 1945-1960," pp. 106-124, in Gordon Martel (ed), *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993*, Routledge, London and New York, 1994.

<sup>21</sup> Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu," p. 491, in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 1919-1980*, vol. 1, İletişim, İstanbul, 2001.

<sup>22</sup> Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Ibid.*, p. 205; Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, Praeger, Westport-Connecticut-London, 1999, although it should be pointed out that she cites the wrong page.

<sup>23</sup> Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, Ankara 2006.

The peak of Turkish-American cooperation, however, came about during the Korean War (1950-1953).<sup>24</sup> This conflict was marked by legendary solidarity between US troops and the Turkish brigade and guaranteed Turkish membership to NATO in 1952. One of the consequences of NATO membership, however, was that the US created bases in Turkey,<sup>25</sup> and in addition bilateral agreements were signed<sup>26</sup> which increased the Turkish obsession with the communist threat.<sup>27</sup> Critics accused government officials of “representing Western interests in Turkey instead of Turkish interests in the West,”<sup>28</sup> but after American praise of the Turkish military mission in Korea, Turkish criticism was softened with a sense of pride.<sup>29</sup> Turkey, as an ally of the West, made a series of decisions that served American interests. Indeed, Menderes was at times more pro-Western in foreign policy matters than the West itself. The opposition, however, accused the government of making concessions regarding national security and the sovereignty of the country.<sup>30</sup>

The future representatives of the Turkish left, and the TKP, despite the fact that it was banned, criticized and took an active stance against Turkish foreign policy, which they argued submitted to the will of the imperialist US. The future leaders of the TİP, Mehmet Ali Aybar and Behice Boran,<sup>31</sup> had critiqued Turkish foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War.<sup>32</sup> Aybar was critical of the fact that Turkey took part in the Truman Doctrine in 1947,<sup>33</sup> and he was against Turkish participation in the Korean War, particularly as regards the sending of Turkish troops to the front.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Mehmet Gönübol, et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed., Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, p. 228.

<sup>25</sup> Actually, they were all over the country. Izmir, Çiğli (the Aegean coast), Izmit Karamürsel (the Marmara coast), Diyarbakır Pirinçlik (the southeast), Manisa, Afyon, Konya (central Anatolia), Samsun, Trabzon (the Black Sea coast), Erzurum (the east), Ankara (the capital city in central Anatolia), and Incirlik Adana (in the south, near the Mediterranean coast).

<sup>26</sup> For a list of these agreements, see Haydar Tunçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Tekin Yayınevi, 1975.

<sup>27</sup> For an analysis of this, see Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, METU, Ankara, 2001, pp. 19-35.

<sup>28</sup> John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy. İsmet İnönü and the Foundation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2005, pp. 207-208.

<sup>29</sup> Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctions during the Cold War,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 36, no 1, 2000, p. 117.

<sup>30</sup> Mehmet Gönübol, et al., pp. 235-236.

<sup>31</sup> Jacob M. Landau, p. 115; Yunus Emre, *Social Democracy in the Periphery? The Case of the RPP of Turkey*, PhD Dissertation, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Boğaziçi University, 2011, p. 295; Gökhan Atılğan, *Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı*, Yordam, Ankara, 2009, p. 156 and for the protest letter see *Ibidem*, appendix 2, p.457.

<sup>32</sup> Barış Ünlü, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, pp.113-127; see also Mehmet Ali Aybar, *TİP Tarihi*, vol. III, BDS Yayınları, 1980, p. 118 ff.

<sup>33</sup> As quoted in George S. Harris, p. 30.

<sup>34</sup> Jacob M. Landau, p. 125.

### **Anti-Americanism and Cyprus: The EDA**

In the year that the Greek government first attempted to raise the Cyprus Question with the UN, there was unrest among members of the Greek government and policy-makers, proving that Greek-American interests were not what the Greek government believed them to be. The American stance regarding Greek efforts in this regard contributed significantly to the breaking down of feelings of goodwill. Even conservative nationalist newspapers adopted a critical stance regarding the US, and it was argued that “American paternalism will not be tolerated since Greek interests have not been satisfied.”<sup>35</sup> Additionally, the “American factor” caused a series of anti-American demonstrations. Needless to say, every time the Cyprus Question hit the headlines of the Greek press, not just Britain but also the role of the US was also inevitably brought up.<sup>36</sup>

### **The Youth Factor**

In two major Greek cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, as well as in Nicosia, the youth turned against the Americans because they were to blame for the disappointing result in the UN. The demonstrations brought to the surface an anti-American sentiment which was expressed in a dynamic way never seen before. In the capital, students from all the schools gathered on the campus of the University of Athens; the speakers, with militant and nationalist fervor, condemned and criticized the American stance and students held banners bearing slogans such as “we want justice from the UN,” “shame on you Americans,” and “we don’t sell Cyprus.” The police and government were verbally attacked in the Greek Parliament for the brutal way the police suppressed the protests.<sup>37</sup> What made matters worse was the paradox of the fact that the demonstrations were for a “national” issue while the prime minister and the foreign minister were not present during the crucial discussions in the UN.<sup>38</sup>

The student demonstrations escalated further when the decision of the Political Commission of the UN became known the following day. At the University of Thessaloniki, students shouted anti-American and anti-British slogans and started throwing rocks at the American consulate, inflicting damage on the building.<sup>39</sup> Declarations calling the youth to protest in the streets were secretly printed by students and distributed at the university and

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<sup>35</sup> A. Antonakakis, “We, the Americans and the Help,” *Kathimerini*, April 28, 1955.

<sup>36</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*. p. 200.

<sup>37</sup> The demonstrations ended with 38 students and 24 policemen injured. Spyros Linardatos, *From the Civil War to Junta. 1952-1955*, vol. 2, p. 254.

<sup>38</sup> George Papandreou, *CQGP*, vol. 1, December 15, 1954.

<sup>39</sup> Newspapers, December 17, 1954; Spyros Linardatos, p. 256; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, “The Movement for Enosis of Cyprus with Greece in Thessaloniki, 1950-1958. Development, Organization, Ideology,” *ΚΑΕΙΩ*, vol. 1, 2004, pp. 145-175.



other schools. During the protests, the youth forced shop owners to take down any sign that had the words “American,” “English,” or any of its derivatives,<sup>40</sup> marking also the exaggeration and obsession with the “American factor,” and urged the government not to collaborate with the British and the Americans.<sup>41</sup> Despite the police presence, the slogan “to the American library” fueled the impulsivity of the youth which led to them causing some damage to the building housing the American Information Service (USIS). Meanwhile, the demonstrations took on unprecedented dimensions leading to government suppression and, for the first time, the Third Regiment of the Army was used to impose order.<sup>42</sup>

### **The Events of 6-7 September Events**

The Events of 6-7 September marked the beginning of a more powerful demonstration of anti-Americanism that started to take shape and be expressed more openly, especially by the student youth, which had started to become highly politicized and dominate the radicalized body politic of Greek society. Although initially the student youth were restricted from publishing decrees, soon after the streets of Thessaloniki were filled with youth who demonstrated against the refusal of the second proposal to the UN. The students also demanded weapons to fight for Cyprus, while in the decree it was stated that “the UN proved to be a club of international frauds” and that they “do not recognize the US as the leader of the free world.” They mocked the message of the American Foreign Minister Dulles about relations between Greece and Turkey, and they demanded the immediate withdrawal of Greece from NATO and a revision of foreign policy, as did the EDA.<sup>43</sup> The students of the Agronomics School stated their anti-American feelings outright by declaring that “they consider ... any American action to be pure propaganda ... They reprobate anything American ... and [will] stop attending the regular screenings of the USIS.”<sup>44</sup>

The demonstrations were the vehicle through which the political reality of conservatism and censorship could be overcome. All the demonstrations started from a politically motivated legitimate demand, “a demand not only legitimate, not only accepted by the authorities of the country, but even more, they were starting from a demand which was expressing the official policy of the government – the demand for self-determination in

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<sup>40</sup> *Makedonia*, December 17, 1954; Ioannis D. Stefanidis.

<sup>41</sup> *Avgi*, December 23, 1954.

<sup>42</sup> The scale so extreme that the government was forced to replace the Deputy General Commander of Northern Greece and the director of the police. The demonstrations were prohibited *sine die* and the university was closed down for two days. Stefanidis.

<sup>43</sup> ASKI, “Positions of EDA for the Political Problem of the Country,” November 1956, *EDA Archive*, Box 478.

<sup>44</sup> *Makedonia*, September 23, 1955. For a full account of the events, see Ioannis D. Stefanidis, “The Movement for Enosis of Cyprus with Greece in Thessaloniki, 1950-1958. Development, Organization, Ideology.”

Cyprus.”<sup>45</sup> What is striking, however, is the fact that they went beyond the starting point of the demonstrations, and the demonstrations for Cyprus “from nationalistic started to develop and turn into anti-imperialistic ones.”<sup>46</sup> Thus, the demonstrations concerning Cyprus changed character and finally, after the concessions of Karamanlis to the British and Americans, turned into an anti-government struggle.

The events also caused the conservative segment of Greek society to adopt a staunchly anti-American stance, taking advantage also of the anti-Americanism in the Balkans and the Middle East. The newspaper *Kathimerini* (*Daily*) talked about American “wrong-doings” and direct intervention in Greek politics,<sup>47</sup> while it claimed that the US “turned Greece into the most wretched protectorate of the world” by using “their dollars ... We took them to increase the gap between the rich and the poor,” and in doing so, also engaged in self-criticism.<sup>48</sup> *Avgi* commented on it as “a rare moment of sincerity by the soundest journalistic representative of vassalage.”<sup>49</sup> This was also one of the rare moments in which the right and the left were in accordance in the 1950s as regards the Marshall Plan. However, unlike the right and center, the left was the only party that presented a coherent and dynamic account of the American role and direct intervention in Greek politics. According to the EDA, the US suffocated the people of Greece, an issue that was presented in a lively way: “the soil you [i.e. Greek] were standing [on] was once Greek. Now others own it ... You once had Cyprus, now you don’t even have Athens.”<sup>50</sup> Greece was presented by the EDA as a conquered state while the American conquerors acquired the characteristics of an occupying force and were paralleled with the Germans during WWII.<sup>51</sup> This opinion regarding an “occupying force” seems to have been intensified by the Sixth Fleet and its actions, which were interpreted as being the actions of the army of occupation. “The presence of the Sixth Fleet constitutes a disaster for the land, because its crew is educated with that arrogant spirit of occupiers since they are not under any regulations or restrictions.”<sup>52</sup>

This highly critical stance of the US became evident especially after their intervention in the national issues of the country. In February of 1956, the issue of Cyprus was discussed in the parliament and although the government was criticized, all parties present in the discussions stood in favor of a solution to the Cyprus Question in accordance with, and within

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<sup>45</sup> Giorgos Katiforis, *The Legislature of the Barbarians*, Themelio, Athens, 1975, p. 146.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Kathimerini*, September 30, 1955.

<sup>48</sup> *Kathimerini*, September 23, 1955.

<sup>49</sup> *Avgi*, October 22, 1958.

<sup>50</sup> *Avgi*, January 1, 1956.

<sup>51</sup> *Avgi*, February 24, 1955.

<sup>52</sup> *Avgi*, November 19, 1957.

the framework of the country's alliances. The only party that expressed a different opinion was the EDA, which stated that "the country will find a solution only by adopting a new approach, that of political independence, equal friendship and solidarity with all real liberal and anti-colonial powers."<sup>53</sup> The posting in Greece of US ambassador George V. Allen in 1956-7 was seen as evidence of the US desire to close the Cyprus Question and prevent the Greek government from proceeding with their attempts to take the issue to the UN. At this time, Allen became the second most feared danger for Greece, the first one being the German invasion in WWII.<sup>54</sup>

During the period 1955-1958, the Cyprus Question created an intense anti-Western and neutral current in the country which strengthened the electoral stirring of the left. Every new unpleasant and unexpected turn regarding the Cyprus Question escalated calls for change in foreign policy, even from conservatives.<sup>55</sup> Although Karamanlis, who had confirmed his intention to do his best to keep Greece on the Western front and function within "the existing alliances,"<sup>56</sup> warned after two years of unproductive talks that relations between Greece and NATO would be put to the test since many of the allies were not acting friendly. The government also claimed that Greece would not compromise their interests in Cyprus for the sake of the interests of their allies. As a result of the Turkish Cypriot attacks in Nicosia, the Greek government decided to withdraw her troops from the NATO headquarters in Izmir.

Similarly, the Church of Greece launched an anti-American campaign, although soon after it changed its stance. For example, Archbishop Spyridon, as President of the Panhellenic Association of the Cyprus Union, on the 12<sup>th</sup> of March in 1956, a few days before he passed away, called on the people of Athens to demonstrate in Omonoia Square as a sign of protest over the arrest of Archbishop Makarios by the British. However, the government, under intense pressure from the American Ambassador Cannon, forbade the demonstrations, claiming them to have been instigated by "unruly elements" that sought to "prepare incidents of a broad magnitude." The archbishop called the gathering off, and adopted the government position stating that "dark forces had laid plans in order to transform the current demonstration into a real slaughter of each other."<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> *Avgi*, February 9, 1955.

<sup>54</sup> *Avgi*, July 26, 1956.

<sup>55</sup> Theodore A. Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 1966, pp. 95-109; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Unequal Partners*, p. 114.

<sup>56</sup> *Konstantinos Karamanlis Archives: Records, Facts and Documents*, vol. 1, Konstantinos Svolopoulos (ed), Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute, Athens, 1993, p. 273.

<sup>57</sup> As quoted in Giorgos Karayiannis, *Church and State, 1833 – 1997. A Historical Overview of their Relations*, Pontiki, Athens, 1997, p. 115.

## The American Factor in Domestic Greek Politics

For the EDA, the American presence in Greek affairs was the cause of political instability as well as a compromise in political integrity through dependence on the US and the country's transformation into a peripheral country, by which national independence was severely compromised. The American intervention in Greek politics was also felt in the introduction of the majority electoral system,<sup>58</sup> which was given high priority by the American officials and by Peurifoy in particular.<sup>59</sup> Generally, the adoption of the majority system in Greece was labeled electoral manipulation that was "stage-managed by the Americans," and like other countries after the Korean War, such as Italy and France, it was implemented in order to achieve "institutional control" and thus neutralize the threat of extremes.<sup>60</sup> However, this actually entailed the neutralization of the center and the domination of the triumvirate, the right, the Palace with the help of the army,<sup>61</sup> and the US as the sole rulers of the country, since the left had been severely weakened.

For the EDA, "national domination and the territorial integrity of the country" had been compromised. The party identified the beginning of American dependency with "the approval of the Truman Doctrine by the Greek oligarchy, [which] was followed by the adherence to NATO and by a series of political, financial and military agreements that were opposed to the interests of the nation."<sup>62</sup> Additionally, the triple occupation of Greece during the war (by German, Italian and Bulgarian forces) completely devastated the country and its people; therefore, the Greek government was doing well by expecting economic aid from its allies, but "this aid can never have as a consequence neither the decrease of the dominant rights nor the lack of recognition of the national dignity, not, even less, any restriction in the free exercise of its rights as an independent and sovereign country."<sup>63</sup>

Cyprus became the base on which the left managed to regroup itself and at the same time blame the government for sacrificing Cyprus to American interests.<sup>64</sup> After the failed attempt

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<sup>58</sup> "With the majority system Peurifoy was forced to give, regardless of whether he wanted or not, the Parliament and the Government to the ERE," *Avgi*, November 19, 1954.

<sup>59</sup> Mogens Pelt, p. 59; John O. Iatrides, "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century," p. 83 in Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou (eds), *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, Frank Cass, London and New York, 2004. Peurifoy seems to have said on the 19<sup>th</sup> of August in 1952 that "the political situation has to be cleared once and for all, and the only way to do this is the holding of elections and the only way to elect a strong government is through the majority system," as quoted in Elias Nikolakopoulos, p. 154.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>61</sup> Nicos Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets and Underdevelopment*, Themelio, Athens, 1978.

<sup>62</sup> EDA, *Draft Program of EDA*, Athens, 1957, p. 4; EDA, *Program of EDA*, Athens, 1961, p. 13-14.

<sup>63</sup> ASKI, "Establishing Declaration of EDA," *Michalis Kyrkos Archive*; Tasos Trikkas, vol. 1, p. 139.

<sup>64</sup> See *Avgi*, October 2, 1954 and *Avgi*, October 13, 1954.

at the UN and lack of US support, Cyprus was having a strong impact on the Greek public,<sup>65</sup> especially after September of 1955.<sup>66</sup> The entire press pronounced the Greek-Turkish relationship dead and buried. The fact that both countries joined NATO together back in 1952 seemed pointless to the left and proved once more that Turkey was not to be trusted. “The fact that,” *Avgi* wrote, “the Turks had raised issues in the past about the Dodecanese and Western Thrace means that their anti-Greek intentions became more specific and more dangerous.”<sup>67</sup> The EDA, and left-of-center politicians, seized the opportunity to ask for a policy of “peace and equal friendship for all.”<sup>68</sup> In Izmir, “Turkish chauvinists carrying the NATO sign violating ‘the Greek-Turkish friendship’ burn, destroy, molest and steal,” *Avgi* announced. All these atrocities took place with the silent consent of the “English imperialists – the great ‘allies’ of Greece and one of the pioneers of NATO – similar with the past, during the Asia Minor catastrophe, with their fleet – eternally obtrusive in the Mediterranean, sail in the deep blue waters of the Aegean.”<sup>69</sup>

The EDA also seized the opportunity to associate the Istanbul and Izmir pogrom against Greeks and Turkish atrocities with the Cyprus Question. However, the article went on to say, “it is not time for nostalgia and fanaticisms.” It was argued that those were inspired, promoted and cultivated by English imperialists and their partners whose agents were the chauvinist Turks. Thus, the imperialists as well as NATO were seen as trying to halt the holy and just Cypriot cause and maintain, or even increase, the heavy obligations that were imposed on Greece for strategic reasons. The British, NATO, and the Greek government, which was still tied to unilateral alliances, armed the Turks and allowed such actions to be carried out, and it was declared in London through the leader of the Greek Alarm party that: “No further initiative will be taken on behalf of the Greek side concerning Cyprus,” and that “the Greek-Turkish friendship remains intact.” To conclude, it was noted “the foreign policy of Greece will not change.” The Greek mission in Izmir, within the scope of its NATO obligations, continued; although what happened in Istanbul and Izmir was NATO wire-pulling in order to maintain a “ready for war” scenario and counter the struggle in Cyprus.<sup>70</sup> All these events

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<sup>65</sup> On the 17<sup>th</sup> of September in 1955 King Paul and Queen Frederica urged the United States to support the inscription of the Cyprus Question at the UN General Assembly or otherwise, the royal couple warned, the Prime Minister succeeding Papagos might be forced to take a neutral or even an anti-NATO line in order to maintain popular support. As quoted in Mogens Pelt, p. 396, fn. 197.

<sup>66</sup> Stefanidis is actually right when he claims that “the September events in Istanbul and Izmir proved a watershed for the growth of anti-American and neutralist feeling.” Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 191.

<sup>67</sup> *Avgi*, “Turkish Intrigues,” June 28, 1955.

<sup>68</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis.

<sup>69</sup> *Avgi*, “The Victimizer and the Victim,” September 8, 1955.

<sup>70</sup> *Avgi*, “The Highest Interest of the Nation,” September 9, 1955.

took place with the consent of the Greek government, which refused to disengage from NATO despite the EDA request sent via a memorandum to the King that the government resign.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, as the president of the EDA argued in parliament, “When the countries of NATO become aware of the fact that the Greek government will remain loyal to ‘friendship’ which is actually hostility, they will take up the Cyprus Question and they will do the same with the national and economic interests of Greece.”<sup>72</sup>

After the failure of the negotiations between Harding and Makarios and the latter’s dislodgement in March of 1956, demonstrations were organized in which members of the church also participated. Two months later, the execution of two Cypriot fighters, Karaolis and Dimitriou, fueled new tensions and new anti-British decrees were voted in which characterized Britain as the “number one enemy of Greece.”<sup>73</sup> The British decision to execute Karaolis and Dimitriou was answered with a rally on April 24, 1956 in Athens, but a few days later it was followed by a massive rally on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May. That day street conflicts between young protesters and the police resulted in the deaths of Evangelos Yerontis (28 years old), Ioannis Konstantopoulos (21 years old) and Frangiskos Nikolaou (23 years old). A few days later a police officer, K. Yiannakouris, who had also been injured during the conflicts, passed away. The use of guns with real ammunition resulted, apart from deaths, in the injury of at least 200 people.<sup>74</sup>

*Avgi* filled its first page with pictures showing the government brutality<sup>75</sup> which resulted in the deaths of two young protesters.<sup>76</sup> The EDA, via a statement made by its leader, demanded that the government be removed from power.<sup>77</sup> “Hangman Harding” referred to the need to impose order on the island, but this, the EDA argued, was “bloodthirsty and cynical British imperialism” in collaboration with the Karamanlis government.<sup>78</sup> By the end of the year, anti-American, and more generally anti-Western, sentiment increased. In a Gallup poll published

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<sup>71</sup> *Avgi*, “The Memorandum of the EDA to the King,” September 13, 1955.

<sup>72</sup> *Avgi*, “Pasalidis’ Speech in the Parliament,” April 6, 1956; Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*, vol. 1.

<sup>73</sup> As quoted in Stefanidis.

<sup>74</sup> Ioanna Papathanasiou, *The Lambrakis Youth Organisation in the 1960s: Archival Documentation and Autobiographical Testimonies*, with the collaboration of Polina Iordanidou, Anta Kapola, Tassos Sakellaropoulos and Aggeliki Christodoulou, E.I.E., Athens, 2008, p. 55, fn. 37.

<sup>75</sup> *Avgi*, “The Government of Blood and National Servility Should be Ousted Immediately,” May 10, 1956. The newspaper mentioned 6 dead and 200 injured. The same argument was posed a few days later on the 18<sup>th</sup> of May in 1956 in the Greek Parliament by Konstantinos Mitsotakis, *CQGP*, vol. 1, p. 189.

<sup>76</sup> The two young men were Evangelos Yerontis and Ioannis Konstantopoulos; *Avgi*, “Mourning and Lamentation in the Funeral of the Murdered Protesters,” May 11, 1956.

<sup>77</sup> *Avgi*, “Announcement of the Administrative Commission of EDA,” May 10, 1956.

<sup>78</sup> *Avgi*, “In Front of the Dead,” May 11, 1956.

by the newspaper *Makedonia* in Thessaloniki, 74% of respondents wanted Greece to leave NATO, while 49% believed that the Western alliance was harmful for national interests.<sup>79</sup>

In February of 1957, after the third attempt in the UN and because of Turkish Cypriot acts of vandalism in Cyprus, there was an hourly walk-out. The students showed once again that the US was not welcome in Greece, demanding the return of money that was used to sponsor various establishments in Greece because, it was argued, “we do not want money, but self-determination for Cyprus.”<sup>80</sup> Another anti-American protest also took place on the occasion of the fourth attempt in December 1957,<sup>81</sup> which was intensified by Turkish Cypriot acts of vandalism, similar to the following year in 1958. In general, the student and youth movement proved to be the most dynamic factor in the spread of anti-Americanism and the prevalence of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial spirit.

Starting in 1956, however, demonstrations and anti-American and anti-Western protests were limited due to government censorship, apart from the period of the third attempt in the UN when Evagoras Pallikaridis, a young Greek Cypriot fighter, was hanged by the British.<sup>82</sup> The EDA believed that there was a gap between the government and popular will which sought satisfaction for the demand of self-determination.<sup>83</sup> The people, the EDA continued, “demand decisive support, without hesitations or compromises, for the Cypriot demands on behalf of the government.” This meant that there were “all these preconditions for the massive and robust mobilization of our people,” but the government responded “with lukewarm protests about the terrorism in Cyprus.”<sup>84</sup> The same happened when the British hanged Cypriots to influence Cypriot morale. At the same time, the Prime Minister, despite all these atrocities, insisted on solving the Cyprus Question within “the allied” context. In other words, “with the government’s consent the British colonialists, without any fear, know that that they can go on with their horrific orgy and their denial to self-determination.” For the left, censorship and more generally police measures and the undemocratic way of treating demonstrations was an attempt to “gag popular feeling.”<sup>85</sup> The same argument was presented in the Greek Parliament by Eliou and Tsirimokos.<sup>86</sup> However, Karamanlis claimed that the

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<sup>79</sup> *Makedonia*, September 9, 1956; Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis; see also *Avgi*, February 10, 1957 ff.

<sup>81</sup> *Avgi*, December 12, 1957.

<sup>82</sup> *Avgi*, “Evagoras Palikaridis was Executed by Hanging,” March 14, 1957.

<sup>83</sup> ASKI, “Positions of EDA for the Political Problem of the Country,” November 1956, *EDA Archive*, box 478.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, vol. 2, p. 347; Elias Tsirimokos, *CQGP*, vol. 2, p. 286.

bottom line was that these demonstrations proved to be harmful to the national cause of Cyprus.<sup>87</sup>

On the other hand, the deeper and real meaning of Democratic Change which the EDA supported was “the restoration of its [the people’s] dominant rights and the *Enosis* of Cyprus with Motherland Greece.”<sup>88</sup> Before the Cyprus Question was sealed with the London/Zurich Agreements, the left named the Americans and NATO as the enemies *par excellence* of Hellenism, referring to them as the “New Perses” that aimed at subjugating the people.<sup>89</sup> Similarly, Themistocles Dervis, the mayor of Nicosia, at a time when anti-American sentiment was running high in Cyprus, stated that the US was “the worst among the group of the international frauds in the UN,”<sup>90</sup> while the signing of the agreements was dictated to both Karamanlis and Menderes by Americans holding a “whip over their heads.”<sup>91</sup> The agreements were a “national disaster”<sup>92</sup> and comprised a “nightmare that squeezes the soul of the nation.”<sup>93</sup> With the agreements, Cyprus was turned into an aircraft carrier of NATO and a prisoner of the British, Americans and Turks.<sup>94</sup> The EDA was of the opinion that the whole issue of Cyprus was a grand conspiracy comprising an “anti-Hellenic” crime that brought together “the British, the Americans and the Turks, as well as the unworthy Greeks, in a dishonored common front against the people of Cyprus.”<sup>95</sup>

### **The Cyprus Crisis in 1963**

Following the bloody events of December 1963, the Cyprus crisis re-emerged along with the vehemence of anti-Americanism, which had crystallized in the previous decade. The latter took the Americans by surprise, but all the ingredients were already there.<sup>96</sup> The differences from the 1950s, however, were the changes in the political culture of the country and the shifts in the political administration of the country, with the left having established its position in the public sphere. Political parties and the public at large wanted major amendments to the agreements and the demand for *Enosis* was brought to the forefront more powerfully, and it was in large part because of these political changes that the post-agreement period was

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<sup>87</sup> Konstantinos Karamanlis, *CQGP*, 14 December 1958, vol. 2, p. 328; see also Stefanidis, *Ibid*.

<sup>88</sup> *Avgi*, 20 April 1955

<sup>89</sup> Perses was used metaphorically since in mythology was the Titan god of destruction; *Avgi*, “New Perses,” December 6, 1958

<sup>90</sup> *Charavgi*, 4 December 1958.

<sup>91</sup> *Avgi*, “The Meeting,” February 6, 1959.

<sup>92</sup> *Avgi*, February 12, 1959.

<sup>93</sup> *Avgi*, “The Rocks Even,” February 10, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>94</sup> *Avgi*, February 13, 1959.

<sup>95</sup> *Avgi*, “The Conspiracy,” February 20, 1959.

<sup>96</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 224.



marked with shared sentiments among the center and the left, at least on national issues such as US interventions.

Starting in February of 1964, the US and UK offered to contain the crisis through a NATO peacekeeping force, but Makarios refused to comply with the great powers' wishes. Cypriot associations in Greece called on people to protest against allied intentions, and students organized sit-ins outside the British and American embassies as a sign of protest. One of the demonstrations ended up with the faculty of the School of Philosophy of Athens University joining theologians and priests at the head of a demonstration in the Athenian streets, while on one of the placards there was the warning "NATO, EOKA is waiting for you."<sup>97</sup>

During this period, the American stance on the Greek position concerning Cyprus was perceived as being quite hostile towards Greece and the people of Cyprus,<sup>98</sup> in short a conspiracy that eventually would aim at creating Cyprus as a NATO base to realize their military designs for the region.<sup>99</sup> Hence, the Fulbright mission was sent to Greece to put pressure on and blackmail the Greek government<sup>100</sup> so that it would abandon its position in the international arena. This was also the first time that pro-Soviet slogans were shouted outside the US Embassy,<sup>101</sup> especially after Khrushchev's message declaring that the Soviet Union would not permit the destruction of the Cyprus Republic and its transformation into a NATO base.<sup>102</sup> In the meantime, the EDA Youth,<sup>103</sup> which eventually became highly radicalized not only through struggles over the Cyprus Question but also because of issues related to education and democracy, organized massive demonstrations against US policies on Cyprus and demanded the departure of the American 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet that had been anchored in Phaliro.<sup>104</sup> These demonstrations followed a week of anti-American demonstrations in

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<sup>97</sup> As quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

<sup>98</sup> See *Avgi*, May 5, 1964; *Avgi*, May 6, 1964; *Avgi*, May 7, 1964 and *Avgi*, May 8, 1964. During that period centrist newspapers also considered the American stance to be hostile towards Greece. See for example *Ta Nea*, April 8, 1964 and *Ta Nea*, April 11, 1964.

<sup>99</sup> Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, April 24, 1964, vol. 3, p. 200.

<sup>100</sup> Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, May 12, 1964, vol. 3, p. 203; see also *Avgi*, June 11, 1964.

<sup>101</sup> Many of which were shouted by supporters of the Center Union party of Papandreou, as can be seen in the articles of the pro-government newspaper *Ta Nea*. Some of the slogans were "Bravo to Russia," "No to NATO," and "Americans go to Texas."

<sup>102</sup> According to *Avgi*, Cyprus was saved because of the Soviet intervention and otherwise, the island would have been lost. *Avgi*, "USSR Saves Cyprus," August 18, 1964. The KKE, in an interview with its general secretary Koliyiannis, also expressed the conviction that the USSR was on the side of Greece. For the interview see *Avgi*, "Koliyiannis Talks about the Cyprus Question," August 21, 1964.

<sup>103</sup> See the elaborative introduction in Ioanna Papathanassiou, pp. 31-110; The Democratic Movement of Grigoris Lambrakis Youth (DMGLY), established after the assignation of Grigoris Lambrakis in May of 1963, merged with the EDA Youth at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Synod of the Central Committee of the EDA Youth on 20-21 June 1964, but the decision was officially released only on the 17<sup>th</sup> of September in 1964. The name of the new organization was Lambrakis Democratic Youth (LDY).

<sup>104</sup> *Avgi*, May 8, 1964 and *Avgi*, May 9, 1964.

Thessaloniki in February also demanding the withdrawal of British bases from Cyprus and the American 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet from Crete.<sup>105</sup> The left seized the opportunity to promote Soviet “virtues” in contrast with American “immorality,”<sup>106</sup> and, despite their common stance on some issues, the EDA accused the centrist government for not taking advantage of the dynamic mass mobilization of the people and for succumbing to American pressure.<sup>107</sup> According to the party, Papandreou was forced to state that his policy on Cyprus differed from that of the ERE government<sup>108</sup> and that “it is not only the EDA that holds the flag of the Cyprus Question high.” Papandreou’s policy to side with the “international forces,” which according to the EDA were “US marines, British commandos and Turkish militia,” clearly demonstrated his Western orientation and alliance with the “enemies of the country,” showing that there was no difference between the two governments.<sup>109</sup>

In the summer of 1964, after the Johnson letter which deterred a possible Turkish military landing in Cyprus, anti-American agitation in Greece reached new heights. As Stefanidis observed, indeed it would seem paradoxical since President Johnson’s call stopped a Turkish invasion, but the intervention received little credit in the Greek press, which “continued to harp on the theme of American pressures aimed at a compromise to the detriment of national interests.”<sup>110</sup> Newspaper articles held that the US sided with Turkey and aimed at giving “Greek territory to the Turks,” while *Avgi* published an article purporting that the Turkish prime minister claimed that “the US assured Turkey that the Cyprus Question would be solved based on Turkish demands.”<sup>111</sup> The American stance was generally seen as pressuring both countries to trade territories and thus settle the situation, by passing the work of the United Nations. The present argument was verified by the permanent representative of Greece to the UN, Bitsios, who argued that “the US is pressing the Greek government and public opinion in order to accept the trading of territories between Greece and Turkey and to accept other unspeakable ‘solutions.’”<sup>112</sup> But the KKE, in an interview with Koliyiannis in the French *L’Humanité*, referred to and condemned the “persistent pressure of the imperialists,

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<sup>105</sup> On the demonstrations, see *Ta Nea, Makedonia, Avgi*; see also, Ioannis D. Stefanidis, p. 227.

<sup>106</sup> See for example the main article in *Avgi*, “The Two Worlds,” August 1, 1964.

<sup>107</sup> *Avgi*, “The Enemy,” August 21, 1964.

<sup>108</sup> The party mouthpiece had already declared in February of the same year that “Cyprus is threatened by NATO, the English, the Americans, the ERE party and the royal councils.” ASKI, “Positions-slogans in View of the 16<sup>th</sup> of February 1964 Elections,” *EDA Archive*, Box 478, n.d.; see also Ioannis D. Stefanidis, p. 230.

<sup>109</sup> ASKI, “Positions on the Statements of Mr. Papandreou over the Cyprus Crisis,” *EDA Archive*, Box 478, n.d., p. 1.

<sup>110</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, p. 231.

<sup>111</sup> *Avgi*, June 13, 1964.

<sup>112</sup> See newspapers June 14, 1964.

first and foremost the Americans, to acquire the consent of Greece for a solution which will not serve the national interests of Greece and Cyprus, but also not even Atlantic ones.”<sup>113</sup>

In view of the crisis, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou paid a series of visits to the United States, as did the Turkish Prime Minister, in order to talk with the American leadership about the Cyprus Question. Both the pro-government and the leftist press referred to the talks between Papandreou and the American leadership as a “terrain of extreme pressure” on the Greek government. Pro-government *Ta Nea* talked about “a dramatic two-day talks of dramatic pressures...”<sup>114</sup> and praised Papandreou for succeeding in taking the upper hand and resisting the demands of the American “servants of Turks”<sup>115</sup> which gave him a hero’s welcome on his return to Greece. *Avgi*, on the other hand, described the environment in which the talks were conducted as “a pressing, suffocating one,” and the American stance as “clearly pro-Turkish.”<sup>116</sup> However, Papandreou, before visiting the US, sent a thank you letter to the US president stating explicitly that “the main dilemma is the ‘NATO-ization’ or Cuba,” meaning dependence to NATO or independence as Cuba was. According to Papandreou, the first solution could be achieved “only through *Enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. Thus, the whole island, if united with Greece, can become a NATO base, just as Crete. Internal communism [in Cyprus] will be considerably reduced, just as it did in Greece, by 12%.”<sup>117</sup> Of course, this was part of the anti-communist and pro-western political agenda of Papandreou,<sup>118</sup> which was staunchly opposed by the EDA. Opposition to the government was also expressed by the youth of Peiraias in response to the agreements signed by the government allowing military bases on the island of Crete. The demonstration was massive and slogans such as “Prime Minister, the youth does not commit suicide,” “Take Away NATO and its missiles,” and “No to the Arch-activists of NATO, Stikker and Ball” were shouted out.<sup>119</sup>

In May of 1964, the Second Peace Marathon took place on the commemoration of the death of Lambrakis, and thousands participated.<sup>120</sup> The main slogan of the marathon was “Out of NATO” and the demonstrations took on anti-imperialist and anti-government content due to the banning of a protest that was organized in opposition to the American Embassy regarding the Vietnam War. Due to the tense atmosphere, there was an eight-hour “guerilla

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<sup>113</sup> Reprinted in *Avgi*, July 5, 1964.

<sup>114</sup> *Ta Nea*, June 29, 1964. See also the correspondences and articles in previous days.

<sup>115</sup> *Ta Nea*, June 27, 1964.

<sup>116</sup> *Avgi*, June 25, 1964.

<sup>117</sup> Tasos Trikkas, vol. 2, p. 1103-1104.

<sup>118</sup> Spyros Linardatos, vol. 4, pp. 457-458; Tasos Trikkas.

<sup>119</sup> *Avgi*, 15 June 1964; *Avgi*, June 16, 1964; *Avgi*, June 17, 1964.

<sup>120</sup> *Avgi*, May 19, 1964.

war” in the center of Athens between the police and students who shouted slogans such as “the people do not want you” and “keep your hands off Vietnam.”<sup>121</sup> A few months later, the arrival of three destroyers from the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet in Phaliro instigated a new round of anti-American tensions. The left and the student movement started to become more radicalized and demonstrations spread across the country. The demonstrations organized by the left continued in subsequent months and had mixed content which combined domestic and international issues under one umbrella, based around opposition to US policies and its expansive tendencies. In other words, the content of the demonstrations included the issue of democratization and the threat of a coup by the Palace, as well as opposition to conservative forces such as the army which was backed by the Americans and international issues such as the Cyprus Question and the Vietnam War, while slogans such as “Americans, killers of people” and “Yankee, go home” were common.<sup>122</sup> At the same time, students in Peiraias were distributing pamphlets with a clearly hostile anti-American message and accusations: “American killers of the Cypriot people leave Greece now.”<sup>123</sup>

The policing of the demonstrations alongside harsh undemocratic measures became a target for the left, which attacked the government at length while contributing pan-national content to the anti-American demonstrations.<sup>124</sup> National claims on Cyprus, anti-imperialism with Vietnam as a point of reference, and demands for democratization brought together the anti-American discourse. The left accepted and saluted all the slogans that were shouted by the youth and the democratic forces of the country as “national, patriotic and democratic.”<sup>125</sup>

Anti-Americanism was fueled also by the fragile state of the Greek government and democracy. Specifically, the crisis in July 1965 acquired a dynamic that soon became a massive movement in which anti-Americanism was one of the most important and crucial factors.<sup>126</sup> Slogans about democracy and national independence had as common denominator condemnation of the Americans. A slogan that summarizes the above argument is “Democracy – 1-1-4 – Elections – Out with the Americans,”<sup>127</sup> which brought together all the important issues that were considered indispensable for Greece to become or return to normalcy.

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<sup>121</sup> *Ta Nea*, April 3, 1965.

<sup>122</sup> *Avgi*, February 16, 1965.

<sup>123</sup> *Avgi*, February 17, 1965.

<sup>124</sup> *Avgi*, April 3, 1965.

<sup>125</sup> *Avgi*, “The Attack,” April 3, 1965.

<sup>126</sup> *Avgi*, August 5, 1965.

<sup>127</sup> *Avgi*, August 13, 1965; *Avgi*, August 18, 1965; *Avgi*, September 4, 1965.

As it appeared, the accusations concerning the “American factor” and its contribution to the preparations of a coup d’état were not ungrounded, since in April of 1967 generals staged a coup, clearly with the help of the Americans. On numerous occasions both the Center Union party and the EDA brought to the fore information concerning a possible threat to the political regime, but nothing was done until it was already too late. However, it should be noted that while anti-Americanism was strong and omnipresent, issues such as national integrity and democracy were in danger, while signs of actual violence were limited. The same cannot be said about the police and generally all the conservative forces that were collaborating with the Americans and the Palace, who killed Lambrakis, the EDA deputy in 1963, and later in July of 1965 killed Sotiris Petroulas, a student at the Supreme School of Economics and Business (University of Athens) who became an icon for later generations that fought the dictatorship.

### **The TİP**

The TİP was both the first political group in Turkey to oppose the European Economic Community and the first party to politicize Turkey's foreign policy. Throughout the 1960s, the TİP challenged what it saw as Turkey's increasing political and economic dependence on the West and loss of national sovereignty. The TİP was quite sensitive to the issue of the national integrity of Turkey and its rights to sovereignty, and it was against any foreign power’s intervention in the country’s internal affairs. It argued that Turkey had dangerously veered from the non-aligned and independent foreign policy that Atatürk had preached and implemented as necessary to maintaining Turkey's sovereignty. In this spirit, the TİP advocated the immediate withdrawal from all international organizations, including NATO, the OECD, the GATT, and the EEC.<sup>128</sup> Specifically, the party declared that in order to return to the *Mısak-ı Milli* the NATO alliance should undergo significant revisions without putting a halt to relations between the two countries; however, they argued, this relationship had to be based on the principle of mutual respect and mutual interest, otherwise “Turkey will be used in the next war as a ‘launching point’ in return for a few dollars.”<sup>129</sup> The state of affairs at the time, it was argued, marked a lack of national foreign policy which was needed to protect the interests of its people, and therefore that Turkey had placed the interests of the US before its own.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Mehmet Döşemeci, *Associating Turkey with Europe: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC, 1959-1980*, PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2009, p. 108.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Cumhuriyet*, October 17, 1964; Mehmet Ali Aybar, “İkili Anlaşmaların Feshi Bağımsızlığın İlk Şartıdır,” p. 339, in Mehmet Ali Aybar.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337.

## **NATO membership, Bilateral Agreements and the Exceptional American Role**

It was claimed that NATO membership prevented Turkey from using its right to decide on war or peace because the NATO command was actually under the control of the US. In addition, it was felt that Turkey's membership in NATO should be rescinded because the different structures (in terms of industrialization, etc.) of Turkey and the US made it impossible to have an agreement on equal terms and hence Turkey would become dependent on US. The sole interest of the US was Turkey's geostrategic position. Needless to say, NATO was dominated by and represented the economic and political interests of the US. Turkey's membership in NATO, as well as in CENTO, resulted in US tutelage.<sup>131</sup> Full alliance with the western bloc and specifically with the US through NATO was an issue that Boran took up at length. The whole situation came about, from 1947 onwards, through a series of bilateral agreements (NATO, CENTO and the Agreement in 1959, according to which the US was allowed to intervene militarily in Turkey if there were reactionary movements). The Johnson letter ordering Turkey to refrain from using American weapons was based on the agreement of 1947, as will be discussed later. However, it was argued by the party that those agreements were not subject to international law, as it was argued by the government, for the simple reason that they did not include the Americans.<sup>132</sup> For example, international law could not be put into effect because it served the American staff, the staff of NATO, and Turkish laws did not apply to those groups.<sup>133</sup>

In the early 1960s, Turkish-American relations were put to the test. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the U-2 issue stirred doubts in Turkish political circles about American intentions and the hidden agenda of the American government.<sup>134</sup> This situation indicated for the first time that the interests of the two countries were not the same. Although the outcome of the crisis for Turkey showed once more that relations between Turkey and the US were in alliance, public opinion started to turn about the American commitment to protecting the interests of the country. However, this changed the following year when the crisis in Cyprus

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<sup>131</sup> Turhan Salman (ed), *TİP Parlamento'da*, vol. 1, pp. 313-323.

<sup>132</sup> See also the speech by Aybar, Turhan Salman, pp. 100-103.

<sup>133</sup> Turhan Salman (ed), *TİP Parlamento'da*, vol. 2, pp. 164-167. In 1956 Turkey enacted Law 6816 which provided that "the basis regarding the status of duty" would be determined between the government of the Turkish Republic and the sending state, and that the language of the agreement would be applied to any act or omission done in, or in connection with, the performance of official duties. In 1964, the American authorities were compelled to make a showcase of a colonel who had caused the death of a couple of Turkish soldiers while driving intoxicated. Although the colonel was brought to trial in an American military court, Turkish journalists were admitted to the proceedings where the sending state saw to it that justice was carried out. Nur Bilge Criss, "US Forces in Turkey," p. 346, in Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993.

<sup>134</sup> Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," pp. 681-683, in Baskin Oran.

led to the open discussion of foreign policy issues.<sup>135</sup> Cyprus became the “episode of contention” which sent Turkish-American relations into a new phase and resulted a wide range and blend of anti-imperialist, nationalist and anti-American sentiment.

### **The Cyprus Crisis, the Johnson Letter and the Youth**

The TİP, akin to other segments of the left, brought anti-Americanism and independency to the political agenda of Turkey by invoking “provocative and nationalistic motives,” such as the “occupation of Turkish land,” “the impossibility of hoisting of Turkish flag on American bases,” and “the holy war of independence.”<sup>136</sup> When the events in Cyprus took place, they became a “safe ground” for promoting the anti-imperialist agenda of the TİP, while Cyprus in general was transformed into a “place of contention.”

Following the violent clashes that broke out between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus in 1963, the Turkish government had come under heavy public pressure to intervene. Under this pressure, the İnönü government was forced to start preparations for a military intervention, although they remained hopeful for US mediation.<sup>137</sup> On June 5, 1964, Ankara received the infamous “Johnson Letter,” which was a fatal blow for bilateral relations and the instigator of anti-Americanism.<sup>138</sup> President Johnson reminded the Turkish Prime Minister in rather harsh terms that (a) Article 4 of the 1947 Assistance Act would not allow such action without prior consultations with Washington, and (b) NATO might not come to Turkey’s rescue in case of a Soviet reaction to such an intervention.<sup>139</sup> Turkey had joined NATO only to protect itself from the Soviet threat, but Johnson made it clear that if Turkey provoked the Soviets, NATO would not defend Turkey against a Soviet attack. Johnson’s approach to NATO’s role brought the reliability of both NATO and the US into question in Turkey. This became manifest in the rapid transformation of Turkish foreign policy when the Cold War was no longer a priority and would be replaced by rapprochement with Moscow and the Third World, while domestic

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<sup>135</sup> Duygu Sezer, *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Ankara, 1972, p. xvii

<sup>136</sup> Tanıl Bora, “Türkiye’de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD/Amerika İmgesi: Amerika ‘En’ Batı ve ‘Başka Batı,” in pp.163-165, in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gultenkigil (eds), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, vol. 3: *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, İletişim, İstanbul, 2007.

<sup>137</sup> Füsün Türkmen, p. 112. In May of 1964, Senator Fulbright visited Turkey and reassured the public that the United States was only concerned about avoiding a clash between NATO members, implying that the Americans believed that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would automatically bring Greece and Turkey into an armed conflict. The senator said that Turkey may have a single Cyprus Question to deal with, but that the United States had dozens of “Cypruses” to handle. That statement invited the question in Turkish editorials that if that were the case, what business Turkish troops had had in Korea. Nur Bilge Criss.

<sup>138</sup> Hamit Bozarslan, “L’Anti-Americanisme en Turquie,” *Le Banquet*, no. 21, October 2004, p. 64.

<sup>139</sup> “Document, President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü,” *Middle Eastern Journal*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1966, p. 387.

politics progressively became dominated by the left, with its strongly anti-imperialist discourse enhanced by systematic anti-American propaganda in the media.<sup>140</sup>

The text of Johnson's letter, after long discussions in the assembly,<sup>141</sup> was published by the newspaper *Hürriyet* on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January in 1966 against the wishes of the Demirel government. However, the contents of the letter had been partially leaked to the press and the Turkish news media was informed that the United States had somehow prevented Turkey from taking action. Concomitantly, articles appeared in newspapers which questioned US objectivity.<sup>142</sup> The frustration over Cyprus led to the Turkish government's criticism of NATO and the US, and the people's enmity towards both, but "it generated a great deal of noise and emotion but little action."<sup>143</sup> The letter, on the other hand, created a strong sense of anti-Americanism in public opinion, both among the left and the right. The left felt vindicated by the actions of the US, while the right felt betrayed because its trust in the West had been shaken along with its faith in the organizations that it had so strongly believed in, and official circles' belief in Turkish "exceptionality" on the "international chessboard" had collapsed. The effect of Johnson's letter was greater than the Cyprus event itself. With the Cyprus events "monopolizing the attention of the country," the extent of Turkish isolation in foreign affairs became evident, especially in light of the complete negligence of the Turkish position at the UN.<sup>144</sup>

Apart from the Turkish media targeting the United States, the crisis in Cyprus reinforced what the radical intelligentsia had been saying about the US and NATO, and spread anti-imperialist/anti-American and nationalist feelings as well.<sup>145</sup> Anti-Americanism gained momentum, especially through the efforts of the socialists in Turkey. In August of 1964, several public demonstrations took place in Turkey to protest the US. Along with many Turkish army officers, Cemal Tural, the commander of the Turkish ground forces, joined the demonstrators, shouting "Down with America."<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Füsün Türkmen, "Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study," *Turkish Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2010, p. 335.

<sup>141</sup> See Turhan Salman, *TİP Parlamento'da*, vol. 1, p. 154.

<sup>142</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment with Democracy*, p. 406. Nur Bilge Criss mentions that it became public in 1968. Nur Bilge Criss, "US Forces in Turkey," p. 348, in Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993. The most vociferous group in Turkey which criticized American behavior was Korean War veterans. They, more than any other segment of Turkish society, felt betrayed by the United States.

<sup>143</sup> Feroz Ahmad, p. 407.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>145</sup> Erkan Doğan, p. 193.

<sup>146</sup> Süha Bölükbaşıoğlu. *The United States-Turkey Influence Relationship during the Cyprus Crises*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1987, p. 154, as quoted in Tamer Balci, *Turkish Nationalism during the*



By the end of August in 1964, daily demonstrations in front of the American embassy in Ankara were taking place. The backbone of the demonstrations consisted of students who had started to become radicalized.<sup>147</sup> The students, already sympathetic towards and influenced by left-wing ideas, strove to show that the US and NATO were against the interests of the country. The Cyprus Question was a turning point in the sense that it popularized anti-imperialism among students, thereby making Cyprus an important national cause. Student unions organized numerous demonstrations, especially in the second half of the 1950s, to demand the Turkish position of division, taking up the slogan “partition or death” (*ya taksim ya ölüm*). Those demonstrations were generally organized with the encouragement of the state, which fueled the student youth with extreme nationalism and tried to demonstrate in the foreign arena that the Turkish people backed the state, while at the same time showing that it was difficult for the Turkish state to persuade the public to take up any solution except for division.<sup>148</sup>

In March of 1964, a demonstration in Saraçhane Square was organized by the TMTF and the MTTB. Thousands of students protested the attacks of the Greek forces on the Turkish minority and demanded a military operation on the island. The common slogan was “[Send the] Army to Cyprus.”<sup>149</sup> Following the violent clashes in Kokkina/Erenköy, a major student demonstration erupted, the first with a clear anti-American and anti-imperialist character. In Ankara, more than one thousand students marched on the US embassy to protest US policy on Cyprus. The students carried placards on which was written “Yankee Go Home,” “You can’t buy us with your dollars,” and “Don’t play with our pride.” The newspapers of the period mentioned that there were thousands of protesters.<sup>150</sup>

The students then gathered in Zafer Square and shouted slogans like “Learn the attitude of America,” “Army to Cyprus,” “We students don’t approve of the attitude of America,” and “America go home.” In their speeches, the students emphasized that the attitude of America in

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*Cold War: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*, PhD Dissertation, University of Texas, 2007, p. 217. This information is missing however, in the revised published book of Süha Bölükbaşıoğlu.

<sup>147</sup> The most important student organization from the 1950s and 1960s was TMTF (*Türk Milli Talebe Federasyonu*) which was established in 1948. MTTB (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) existed from WWI until 1938, when it was dissolved. It reappeared in 1946 in affiliation with the CHP. The MDD (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*) and SD (*Sosyalist Devrim*) belonged to the left, and split following the Malatya Congress in 1966 due to disagreement within the TİP. The FKF (*Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*) was established on November 12, 1965 and was leftist in orientation, receiving support from the TİP. In 1969, it was named the TDGF (*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu*), or briefly the DEV-GENÇ (*Devrimci Gençlik*).

<sup>148</sup> Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler,” p. 613, in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, vol.1, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001.

<sup>149</sup> Turan Feyzioğlu *Türkiye’de Devrimci Gençlik Hareketleri Tarihi 1960-1968*, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993as quoted in Emin Alper, *Student Movement in Turkey from a Global Perspective, 1960-1971*, PhD Dissertation, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History Boğaziçi University, 2009, p. 254.

<sup>150</sup> George S. Harris, p. 118; Gönübol et al., pp. 514-519.

the Middle East, Southeast Asia and all over the world was imperialist and exploitative. What is of note, however, is that it was the first time that students clashed with the police and it was also the first time that the word “imperialism” had been used in a popular student demonstration.<sup>151</sup> The following day, Ankara witnessed a much larger demonstration of almost 20,000 students, who continued marching without facing much police opposition. The slogans were “30 million wants division,” “fake friend Johnson,” “we will win our cause,” and “America, friend or enemy?” The students stopped in front of the US embassy and protested the US presence. A violent attack was prevented by soldiers but when the group arrived at the Greek embassy, they stoned the building of the embassy and damaged the consul’s car.<sup>152</sup>

Anti-American demonstrations also spread to Istanbul, where they lasted for four days. Alper notes that, “...the character of the demonstrations was not completely dominated by anti-imperialism. Sometimes just nationalist feelings or an apolitical anti-Americanism was prevalent. However, more conscious anti-imperialist slogans were also heard.”<sup>153</sup> During the demonstrations, however, the right-wing demonstrators were distinguishable from their left-wing counterparts based on the slogans they were shouting. The former generally attacked Greece and shouted nationalist slogans like “Cyprus is Turkish, and will remain Turkish,” while the latter emphasized anti-imperialism, attacking the US by shouting slogans like “Yankee Go Home.” Those demonstrations marked the first time that students were exposed to the influences of anti-imperialist rhetoric.<sup>154</sup>

The influence of that rhetoric was clear, especially in the case of Ahmet Gürüz Ketenci, the head of the TMTF. Although Ketenci adopted a rather nationalist, even chauvinistic stance during the August events in Cyprus, by December he changed his rhetoric and adopted a socialist approach, echoing change in Turkish foreign policy.

The Cyprus events should constitute the basis for re-evaluating our international relations. All the peace-lovers and newly independent, post-colonial and underdeveloped countries have built up a non-aligned bloc against imperialists. New Turkey should adjust its foreign policy according to the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world” and to its national interests and the changing conditions of the world. The Cyprus problem should be brought to an end. Peace and

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<sup>151</sup> See the lengthy and in-depth analysis in Emin Alper.

<sup>152</sup> According to Zileli the attacks were carried out by nationalist groups and not leftists, who remained in front of the US embassy. Gün Zileli, *Yarıлма (1954-1972)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p. 166. See also Emin Alper; Alper notes that although the government indirectly supported the demonstration, it did not allow the students to attack the US embassy, while it did not do the same for the Greek embassy.

<sup>153</sup> Emin Alper, p. 256.

<sup>154</sup> Interview with Ahmet İnel, June 28, 2010, İstanbul.

human rights should be protected. The drama, the war on this small island where imperialist interests clash, should stop.<sup>155</sup>

The same view was shared by the TİP, which used President Johnson's letter as proof that Turkey could not depend unconditionally on its Western allies. The general agony and frustration of the public at the American president's decision created a generalized climate of anti-Americanism wherein the TİP also found a space in politics to transform the image of the US into an enemy of Turkish interests. Aybar, in an interview in *Cumhuriyet* on October 17, 1964, expressed his and the party's distrust:

...the crisis in Cyprus proved that the alliance with NATO is an alliance that serves the interests of only one side, that of the US. And when American interests are in conflict with Turkish ones, the US does not take Turkey's side.

In addition, Aybar stated:

...the alliance essentially shows the contraposition in securing our [Turkish] national independence and our [Turkish] dominant rights. It [the alliance] has already violated our national independence and dominant rights.<sup>156</sup>

Until that moment, the party argued that Turkey was expecting solutions from the US and Great Britain but the government tended "to neglect the fact that when these two powers had to solve any disagreements in Cyprus, they were always in favor of Greece and not Turkey" despite the fact that both countries were NATO members. It was argued that only then did Turkey realize that American and Turkish interests were not in accord, and the statement of regret on behalf of President İnönü was a clear sign of change.<sup>157</sup>

A speech made by Aybar in Ankara in September of 1964 presented the party's official proposal on Cyprus in which it was noted that the bilateral agreements were voted in without the consent and approval of the TBMM. Those agreements gave the right to American and NATO troops to station and create bases in the country. Aybar's argument that "the prevailing rights of Turkish citizens stop at the gates of these bases and behind these gates it is foreigner's laws that are in effect" is thus not an exaggeration and by no means unfounded.

Following the American intervention, the left and right were fighting a common enemy, the USA. Needless to say, their interpretations varied concerning the reasons behind the

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<sup>155</sup> Translation and quotation owed to Emin Alper.

<sup>156</sup> Interview with Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Cumhuriyet, October 17, 1964; Mehmet Ali Aybar, "İkili Anlaşmaların Feshi Bağımsızlığın İlk Şartıdır," p. 340, in Mehmet Ali Aybar.

<sup>157</sup> Turhan Salman (ed), vol. 1, p. 147.

intervention and of course the policy that Turkey should follow. Subsequently the TİP launched a scathing attack on the successive governments, which consisted of the DP, CHP and then the AP, to prove that they had put the country in high-risk situations, even in the middle of a possible nuclear war, World War III.<sup>158</sup> It seems that for Aybar the fact that the president of the country expressed his inability to do anything after the American intervention is a prime example of that national independence had been lost: “As we are informed,” Aybar stated, “[...] our Turkey is not independent and sovereign any more, it is a state dependent on the USA.”<sup>159</sup>

The Cyprus events shocked Turkey, the party proclaimed, for it made the people realize that they were dependent on the US. The demonstrations that took place in the last months of 1964 were a prime example, according to the party,

...to explain the will of the people to respect the dominant rights [of Turkey] and the decision to exist as an independent state. No government can resist this will of the people. *All the external relations that make Turkey dependent, sooner or later, will be abolished... [Turkey will be] neither dependent on American hegemony nor a Soviet satellite.*<sup>160</sup>

*Yön*, as well as the MDD, had a common cause as well at the time. The periodical was quite influential in that respect, especially among university students, who launched a Coca-Cola boycott. That famous boycott was generally enforced at universities. The boycott started after issue no. 119 of *Yön* featured the slogan “Cola is a poison, don’t drink it.” Instead of Coca-Cola, a Turkish brand of soda was thereupon sold at university canteens.<sup>161</sup> Harun Karadeniz, one of the leading student figures, noted that selling Coca-Cola in the canteens was banned and that the Turkish producers of Coca-Cola visited the student organization to persuade students that it was produced in Turkey, but received the reply, “only the water in it is Turkish.”<sup>162</sup>

The Turkish left also accused the government of being domestic collaborators with the imperialists. In this respect, *Yön* tried to raise consciousness regarding imperialism by using concrete examples to show how the “US had exploited Turkey socially and politically” and also “fundamentally economically” and how Turkey had become a “new colony,” making the

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<sup>158</sup> IISG, “Mehmet Ali Aybar’ın Dünya Olaylarıyla İlgili Konuşması,” January 10, 1965, *Kemal Süller Papers*, Box 552.

<sup>159</sup> IISG, “M. A. Aybar’ın Ankara’daki Konuşması,” *Kemal Süller Papers*, folder 551; Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Kıbrıs Tezimiz,” p. 326.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., emphasis in the original.

<sup>161</sup> Özgür Mutlu Ulus, p. 35; Turan Feyzioğlu.

<sup>162</sup> Harun Karadeniz, *Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik*, May Yayınları, İstanbul, 1975, pp. 22-23.

US a “state within a state.”<sup>163</sup> On another level, the letter contributed to a proposal made by the TİP which urged the creation of a national industry by the TİP. It was revealed, and quite rightly argued, that the Turkish military was wholly dependent on the US. Since all the military equipment was from the US, they could not be used in the case of an embargo,<sup>164</sup> and therefore it was argued that a national military industry had to be developed in Turkey which would be based on local resources and technology, or at least alternative resources aside from those provided by the US. This argument was raised by the TİP during the 1965 elections,<sup>165</sup> and it was repeated again later in 1967.<sup>166</sup> Such an industry was directly related to the issue of Turkish oil,<sup>167</sup> which, notably, student mobilization took up as well.

### **Other Issues Causing Anti-American Sentiment**

In May of 1965, the issue of oil was at the top of the country’s agenda. Intellectuals and students created panels and wrote articles, declarations, and campaigns, through which they succeeded in rousing public opinion and opening discussions about changing the existing Oil Law of 1954. At the time of its passage, the law had been criticized by the RPP since it granted broad array of privileges to foreign oil firms. In 1965, there were eleven foreign firms and TPAO in Turkey.<sup>168</sup> However, the production of TPAO was more than the total production of the other 11 firms, and this fact led students to believe that the foreign firms were more interested in preventing the extraction of oil than extracting it themselves. According to the students, by closing reserves the foreign firms were raising prices and increasing their profits while harming the economic interests of the country. For that reason, the students started a vigorous campaign with the hope that it would create powerful opposition to the foreign firms. They hung placards and wrote slogans in the streets, such as “down with imperialism,” and “oil should be nationalized.” The oil campaign is significant in the history of student politics since it was the first time that students mobilized for an economic cause, and the anti-imperialism of the students found a concrete subject other than the Cyprus Question. The oil issue also became one of the dividing lines between right- and

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Çağrı Erhan, p. 690.

<sup>165</sup> Artun Ünsal, p. 140; Emin Alper, p. 261.

<sup>166</sup> IISG, “Dış Politika. Dünya Olayları,” *Kemal Sülker Papers*, folder 558, p. 15.

<sup>167</sup> Turhan Salman, *TİP Parlamento’da*, vol. 1, pp. 92-94.

<sup>168</sup> See also Ali Yıldırım, *FKF/ DEV-GENÇ Tarihi. 1965 – 1971 Belgelerle Bir Dönemin Serüveni*, vol. 2, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2008, p. 457 ff.

left-wing nationalisms. Right-wing nationalism, stressing the Cyprus Question, accused the left-wing of working for Soviet interests by trying to end the alliance with the US.<sup>169</sup>

By 1967, however, anti-Americanism entered a new era in Turkey through the influence of the Arab-Israeli war as well as the war in Vietnam. Furthermore, American interventions in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and elsewhere had a great impact on public opinion in Turkey. “Vietnam was too far away for most Turks to feel that success or failure of the US effort there would have any direct repercussions on their country,”<sup>170</sup> but still, American involvement in the domestic affairs of countries was certainly striking a chord, consciously or subconsciously, in terms of the US preference for an AP government in Turkey. The active American intervention in the domestic affairs of countries all over the globe, from Greece to Vietnam, was a dominant perception around the world at the time. Similarly, American favoritism for the AP led to increasing reactions in various circles. Some of these reactions were instigated by the articles of Çetin Altan, who suggested that “America was conniving with the AP to carry out an American military intervention to suppress all the opposition and bring it to power alone.”<sup>171</sup> Two years later, Altan would be beaten in the assembly and threatened with the stripping of his parliamentary immunity because of his pointed speeches. The AP, however, was unable to fulfill its wishes as the proposal was stopped by the court.

The summer of 1967 was dominated by massive demonstrations against the Sixth Fleet. Although these lacked the massive mobilization prevalent in previous years, they targeted imperialism under the guise of the symbolic Sixth Fleet of the US. This fleet was one of the main forces constituting the backbone of the US military presence in the Middle East, and it regularly visited Turkey’s ports throughout the 1960s. However, developments in the Middle East, such as tensions between Egypt and Israel, the Six Day War and the explicit support of the US for Israel, drew attraction anew to the military presence of the US in the region. Both the TİP and the student movement, or the Atatürkist youth as the TİP called it,<sup>172</sup> turned against American imperialism and called on a passive revolution until US personnel was withdrawn from Turkey.<sup>173</sup> The Sixth Fleet, around which the main demonstrations and clashes would take place,<sup>174</sup> symbolized the essence of American imperialism.

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<sup>169</sup> For the contributions of the oil issue to the maturation and also radicalization of the Turkish youth, see Emin Alper, p. 280 ff.

<sup>170</sup> George S. Harris, p. 133.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> IISG, “Basın Bülteni,” October 14, 1966, *Kemal Süller Papers*, Box 558.

<sup>173</sup> IISG, “Genel Yönetim Kurulu,” July 9, 1966, *Kemal Süller Papers*, Box 557.

<sup>174</sup> See the protest leaflet about the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet which returned to Turkey; *Amerikan Emperyalizmine ve 6. Filoya Direniyoruz Sen de Katıl*, n.p., n.d. [most probably 1969].

At the end of June, an anti-imperialist demonstration was organized protesting the Sixth Fleet. 4,000 students gathered in Beyazit and walked to Taksim. They supported Çetin Altan and Nasser with their slogans and shouted slogans like “Yankee go home,” “Demirel is prime minister, hungry are the peasants and workers,” and “The US is the killer of Muslims.”<sup>175</sup> During the protest, slogans like “army and youth are hand in hand” were used for the first time, which perhaps also indicated the militarization that would follow over the next few years. The students then took down the American flag at the port and raised the Turkish flag.<sup>176</sup> At the end of October in 1967, with the departure of the fleet from Turkey, the anti-Sixth Fleet demonstrations stopped for a while; however, anti-imperialist feelings found fresh fodder when a new crisis broke out in Cyprus in November of 1967.

### **The Cyprus Crisis in 1967**

Apart from the developments in the Middle East, however, the Turkish left concerned themselves more, or were more directly involved, with the coup d'état in Greece.<sup>177</sup> The coup in Greece was considered, not mistakenly, to be a US conspiracy against the rising left and democratic forces in Greece.<sup>178</sup> Apart from the party, student associations in Turkey were also concerned and issued a declaration in which they protested American involvement in Greek affairs and expressed their solidarity with the Greek people.<sup>179</sup> It was widespread knowledge that starting in the mid-1960s the US was taking active steps through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that it could, and did, organize coup d'états to bring to power pro-American regimes. This had been the case with Greece as well.

When the new crisis in Cyprus broke out in November, Turkey felt obliged not to repeat the same mistake made in 1964 and make sure that steps were taken to protect the “brother Turks” of Cyprus. That sentiment was prevalent in Turkish society, as memories of the past experience were still fresh. Leftist circles, as well as university students, thought that the US would again block a Turkish initiative in Cyprus. Therefore, they organized demonstrations that, at least momentarily, marked some success, as with the demonstrations against the mission of Cyrus Vance, the American mediator. Vance was not able to land at the civilian

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<sup>175</sup> Emin Alper, p. 313.

<sup>176</sup> The second head of the TMTF, Faruk Yalınz, said that they did not want to see the fleet which cut off the Turkish navy on its way to Cyprus. *Cumhuriyet*, June 25, 1967; quoted also in Emin Alper.

<sup>177</sup> For instance see the common declaration of *Dev-Genç's Türk Talebe Cemiyeti, Kıbrıs Türk Ulusal Öğrenci Federasyonu* and other “*Demokratik Bir Kıbrıs İçin*,” pp. 508-510, in Ali Yıldırım.

<sup>178</sup> IISG, “Dünyada Durum,” 2 February 1968, *Kemal Sülker Papers*, Box 562.

<sup>179</sup> For newspapers see Turan Feyzioğlu, p. 332.

airport of Esenboğa in Ankara, and landed at a military one.<sup>180</sup> Behice Boran took the floor in the assembly and expressed the party's concern that if Turkey's intervention was to be obstructed once more, then it was very likely that a permanent solution to the Cyprus question would be prevented, an opinion that Boran repeated a few months later.<sup>181</sup> When the TİP accused the government of missing the opportunity to launch the Second Struggle for Liberation through two letters it published in *TİP Haberleri*, it based its argument on the dependence of the authorities on the US and their submission to American pressure. On the other hand, the Turkish authorities and government proudly countered the TİP's accusations by stating that they used their NATO rights and acted independently.<sup>182</sup>

Socialist students tried to show that since the Demirel government was dependent on NATO and the US, it was impossible for it to intervene on behalf of Turkish interests. On the 16<sup>th</sup> of November, at the same time as protests were ongoing about private schools,<sup>183</sup> right-wing and socialist students, and for the first time the student youth of the TİP, protested together about the US and Greece. Right-wing students attempted to hegemonize the national cause through right-wing discourses in addition their slogans which targeted Greece and Cypriots, whereas the leftists attacked the Demirel government and US imperialism. The tension turned into a physical clash by the end of the demonstration.<sup>184</sup> The situation got out of control in the following days when groups of chauvinist students protested using slogans such as "we want war," "we are volunteers," "let's meet in Athens," "Athens will be our 69th city," and "war, war, war."<sup>185</sup> Conservative student organizations even marched to the Greek-Turkish border shouting for war.<sup>186</sup> Although there were also some socialist students present, like Deniz Gezmiş, the conservative nationalist student youth did not leave any space for socialist students to demonstrate as had happened in 1964. The youth movement was becoming increasingly polarized and clear divisions opened up between them.

Despite the persistence of conservative groups, the position of the left was supported at conferences and in newspaper articles. The reason behind this support was the fact that both the socialist bloc and the conservative/chauvinist bloc in Turkey demanded and were in favor

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<sup>180</sup> Süha Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers and the Third World*, p. 140; Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947-2003*, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 196.

<sup>181</sup> Turhan Salman, *TİP Parlamento 'da*, vol. 4, p. 93-100, here p. 96.

<sup>182</sup> Nasuh Uslu.

<sup>183</sup> The students (especially members and sympathizers of the TİP) had long planned for a campaign to protest a law dating from 1965 concerning private schools which allowed the establishment of private higher institutes of education and academies.

<sup>184</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, November 17, 1967.

<sup>185</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, November 22, 1967; Turan Feyzioğlu, p. 370.

<sup>186</sup> *Milliyet*, November 25, 1967; Turan Feyzioğlu, p. 372.



of a military intervention. The former, however, wished to fulfill an irredentist agenda, while the latter claimed that such an intervention was circumscribed by the dependence of Turkey on NATO and the US, and that the intervention was necessary in order to guarantee the rights of both Turks and Greeks and the Federal State of Cyprus.

The following year was a year of increasing tensions for Turkey, as it was for many countries around the globe. Specifically, as it was noted by a prominent Turkish intellectual and activist about the 1960s and 1970s, “The US decision to invade and bomb Vietnam in 1965; the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’ in 1966; Che Guevara’s example in Bolivia in 1967: all helped to inspire revolutionary sentiments in students across the world. In Turkey, the ‘Third World’ themes of this moment seemed all the more compelling, especially as the United States had military bases across the country, and President Johnson had prevented Inonu from intervening in Cyprus. Hostility to reactionary Greek influence in Cyprus was a heady ‘leftist’ brew of Turkic anti-Americanism.”<sup>187</sup> All of the above marked the radicalization of the following year, but also of the polarization of student politics and their support of the increasingly tense struggle between the TİP and the Turkish conservative forces, as they were influenced by international developments. 1968 started in the US and Western Europe as a year in which student and peace movements were expected to make gradual and modest progress. The failure of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam appeared as a victory of peace movements and anti-imperialist, left-wing forces, and the same held true in Turkey as well. At the same time, the increasing influence of the TİP also became apparent in student politics, which would be followed by a split in the student movement following the divisions in the TİP itself after the withdrawal of the MDD group. However, as with other countries, the first months of 1968 were dominated by clashes between right- and left-wing students who took on politics, often resorting to violence.

### **Anti-Sixth Fleet Demonstrations and the Intensification of Violence**

By July, however, the clashes had stopped on university campuses and were transferred to the anti-Sixth Fleet demonstrations.<sup>188</sup> The increasing tension between the police and students, which was raised by the fervor of student activism, led to the death of Vedat Demircioğlu in a violent raid carried out by the police on an İTÜ dormitory. This was a turning point for student politics, since it was the first loss of a student’s life since 1960. Demircioğlu’s death precipitated a war between the students and police, which led to unprecedented street clashes.

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<sup>187</sup> Ahmet Samim, “The Tragedy of the Turkish Left,” *New Left Review*, no. 126, 1981, p. 69.

<sup>188</sup> Turan Feyzioğlu, p. 488.

This turn of events reminded many people of the situation just before the 27<sup>th</sup> of May. However, this time right-wing groups were much more organized in responding to such a rising student movement.

Apart from the regular demonstrations, students also decided to make random attacks on American soldiers who were visiting Taksim by taking their hats or pouring ink on them. The police arrested such students numerous times. Students from Istanbul Technical University gathered to protest the arrests and decided to close the district of Gümüssuyu to US soldiers in the evening of the same day. Then some students began stoning a hotel in Gümüssuyu that where US soldiers were staying with some Turkish girls. The police surrounded the Gümüssuyu campus of İTÜ, as that was the center of the attacks. As the clashes escalated, some students managed to take the police commissar hostage and held him as leverage so that he could be used in exchange for the release of a student. Just as matters seemed to be settling down, the police violently raided the university campus, severely injuring many students and throwing a student, Vedat Demircioğlu, out of his dormitory window. Despite the accusations made by the students and police claims of “self-defense” as they claimed they were attempting to release the commissar, one fact remains, and that is the tragic death of a young student. After that moment, clashes between the leftists and the police took on an extremely violent character. The government would then go on to make use of nationalist and Islamist forces to counter socialist elements in the country.<sup>189</sup>

The students, however, decided to go through with their planned anti-Sixth Fleet demonstrations. They were guided to the Dolmabahçe port, and the police did not try to stop them. There they beat up some US soldiers and they threw the soldiers into the sea. The Dolmabahçe event constitutes one of the major mythological symbols of the 1968 generation, representing the struggle and victory of the students against American imperialism. Alper draws a very interesting parallel here, especially in terms of “the similarity of the metaphor of driving the enemy to the sea which had been used for the expulsion of Greek army in the Independence War, and again for the driving of US soldiers into the sea, and in that way it was crucial in the construction of this myth.”<sup>190</sup>

In this climate of extreme violence, which would only escalate over the following months, American Ambassador Komer arrived in Turkey. Komer’s career as a CIA analyst in the past raised some serious questions and worries on behalf of the left. The leftist circles thought that

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<sup>189</sup> Emin Alper, p. 330; On Vedat Demircioğlu’s killing, see Harun Karadeniz, p. 151; Turan Feyzioğlu, pp. 496-497; some of his friends even wrote an anthem based on his name.

<sup>190</sup> Emin Alper, p. 370.

Komer's goal was to split the leftist movement by using his CIA contacts in Turkey.<sup>191</sup> In January of the following year, the president of Middle East Technical University invited Komer for lunch. During Komer's visit to the university, radical students reacted spontaneously and some of the students turned the ambassador's car upside down and set it on fire. This incident caused critical diplomatic tensions between the two countries and a serious debate at the university as regards to the decisions to be made regarding the people responsible for the burning of the car; in the end, some students were expelled and the university was closed for a period of time. The TİP argued that bringing Komer to the university was a provocative action<sup>192</sup> and expressed its support for the students, saying that the party was on their side.<sup>193</sup>

Despite the tensions between the two countries, the Sixth Fleet cast anchor in Turkey again in the last days of January. The students were prepared, but this time decided to plan the demonstrations meticulously with the help of a coordinating committee, turning the protests into a campaign that would last a week, and plans were made to hang placards, distribute brochures, hold small protests and end the campaign with a massive demonstration that would also include workers and trade unions. Their associations even sent a letter to Sunay. The latter invited the representatives of the associations and, although he assured them that the police would remain neutral, as requested by the students as long as the demonstration was and remained legal, the police were brutal from the start. The police also seized thousands of copies of a declaration, which stated:

We are resisting the American *infidel* and the Sixth Fleet. Join us. The American fleet is coming again. There was a fleet that stopped the Turkish fleet on its way to help our brothers in Cyprus; that fleet is coming... They used the Turkish flag as a doormat at the Efes Hotel. They killed even their president who talked about human rights. They built 101 bases in Turkey. Even our Ministry of Defense cannot enter those bases. They say that the frontiers of the US begin in Kars.<sup>194</sup>

### **The Bloody Sunday Events**

The demonstrations were a matter of debate between MDD and SD supporters. The impact of the Malatya Congress was visible in the student movement as well. For example, Harun Karadeniz was not in accord with the guerilla methods employed by the MDD student

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<sup>191</sup> George S. Harris, p. 139.

<sup>192</sup> "CIA Ajani Komer," 1-16 March 1969, *TİP Haberleri*, issue 29-30, p. 10.

<sup>193</sup> "TİP Gençlerin Yanındadır," January 16, 1969, *TİP Haberleri*, issue 26, p. 3, reproducing the announcement the party gave to the newspaper *Akşam*; however, the incident with Komer was not discussed in the TBMM.

<sup>194</sup> Harun Karadeniz, pp. 130-132; Emin Alper, p. 401.

supporters. The latter supported small legal demonstrations without marches and avoiding clashes with the police until the big demonstration, while the former was trying to turn small demonstrations into a long march and did not hesitate to engage in clashes with police forces. The MDD organized the demonstrations, the first of which was followed by another one organized by female students a few days later, and they too shouted slogans against the Sixth Fleet. However, at other demonstrations led by nationalists and Islamists, slogans against the left were shouted and used harsh language. A gathering to protest the Sixth Fleet was attacked in Taksim Square by a mob shouting “Muslim Turkey” in opposition to the slogan “independent Turkey,” or “non-aligned Turkey.”<sup>195</sup> During the protests, Islamist elements comprised the third pole during those troubled times. However, although they were in favor of “killing the communists,” the Islamists had no such intentions, and the same holds true for the leftist supporters in terms of taking up armed combat. They placed blame on the “infidel” regime, but they were not anti-American.<sup>196</sup>

The students and some trade unions focused on the major anti-imperialist demonstration against the Sixth Fleet. The significance of this demonstration was that it would be the first massive anti-American event, aside from the previous ones which had been held only by students and could only draw few thousand people. People came together in Beyazit Square for the last big demonstration and then began to march to Taksim. The group consisted of 20-30,000 people. At the same time, a group of approximately 10,000 right-wingers gathered in Taksim Park, waiting for the leftists. When the leftists arrived Taksim, some bombs were thrown at the group. According to witnesses, the police attacked the leftist group and split it up, leaving a few thousand of them isolated in Taksim. Then, the right-wingers attacked the isolated leftists by easily breaking the police line, and with knives and sticks injured 200 people and killed two workers.<sup>197</sup> After the leftist group was dispersed, anti-leftist groups gathered again in Taksim and marched to Saraçhane shouting slogans celebrating their victory.

This event, later called “Bloody Sunday,” sparked immense reactions in Turkey. The leftist press declared it a new 31<sup>st</sup> of March insurgency and their political representatives attacked the government. The 31<sup>st</sup> of March Incident (*31 Mart Olayı*) was directly linked to the Ottoman era and specifically with the rebellion of reactionaries in Constantinople on the 31<sup>st</sup> of March in 1909 against the restoration of the constitutional system that had taken place in

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<sup>195</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 381.

<sup>196</sup> Hamit Bozarslan, *Histoire de la Turquie Contemporaine*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>197</sup> *Hürriyet*, February 17, 1969.

1908 through the Young Turk Revolution, and it was invoked to signify the political disorder that was ravaging the country. All of the political parties agreed that the government was responsible for the bloody incident, and it was accused of being ineffective and impotent. The Interior Minister and the governor tried to defend themselves by proving that they had taken the necessary precautions and the police had done their best, but many witnesses accused the police of attacking the leftist group, who had obtained legal permission to march, and did nothing to prevent the attacks.<sup>198</sup> The following months were characterized by extreme violence and constant clashes between the two groups. On the one hand, there was the left, and on the other, there were the nationalist chauvinist forces and the Islamists, who started to play a central role in the politics of the country starting in 1968, and this was coupled with criticism of Necmettin Erbakan regarding the government's economic policies. The outcome of these extremely violent clashes was the 12<sup>th</sup> of March coup d'état which would bring to an end the "first circle of violence" and pave the way for the second one.

## **Conclusion**

Anti-Americanism is related to a number of factors and causes. Particularly important in the development of individuals' attitudes are the following variables: nationalist sentiments; the legitimacy of the government; U.S. military, economic, and political intervention in one's home country; and, feelings about democratic values, just to name a few. In the postwar period, the hegemonic position of America was an undeniable fact, and this hegemony has had social, economic and cultural, as well as political-strategic, features. This section dealt exclusively with the latter dimension.

For the left during that period of global anti-Americanism, anti-Americanism was mainly a political position which sought to show the depth of its commitment to radicalism, dedication to leftist ideas, and a willingness to subject all other thoughts to the causes of the Third World. To put it more succinctly, anti-Americanism was limited to the abovementioned factors and causes, not cultural factors, and this led America to be accused of, and hated for, its "imperialism" and "colonialism."

Anti-Americanism was an inevitable consequence of Third World disenchantment with the United States. The idealized conception of an America exemplified by Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson was rudely dispelled by the actions of US administrations that became intimately enmeshed in international politics, and in the process, [s]upported colonialism, apartheid, and

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<sup>198</sup> "(Kanlı Pazar)ın Baş Sorumlusu Hükümettir," 1-16 March 1969, *TİP Haberleri*, issue 29-30, p. 13.

dictatorships, sounding the alarm over communism when throughout the Third World the clarion call was for change.<sup>199</sup>

Attitudes toward the United States have been critical for both the right and the left. The Cold War, however, by adding an anti-communist dimension to traditional political cleavages, helped shape anti-Americanism as a typical left-wing leitmotif.<sup>200</sup> This was the case in countries that had strong communist parties, such as France and Italy,<sup>201</sup> where they influenced and framed the perceptions of the public toward the United States. The attempt of the left to universalize overseas threats drew upon its equivalent assertion of universality and perfectibility. In addition, confrontations between left-wing parties and America represented a struggle for their own legitimacy and existence.

However, countries are different and not all fall into the same paradigm indicated above. Indeed, while they may criticize American political decisions, they are not necessarily anti-American *per se*. With the advent of “left-wing” public discontent in the mid- and late 1960s, the USA became more of a focal point for the left. However, generally, “the left-wing movement of the mid- to late 1960s was often very critical of American actions, but it was not, anti-American *per se*. Most of the left-wing publications were highly critical of US military action in Vietnam, of the CIA involvement with right-wing paramilitary groups and of the US support for right-wing and military dictatorships world-wide, e.g. in Greece. Left-wingers critically analyzed capitalism, imperialism and ‘late capitalism’, but they did not necessarily use ‘America’ as a mirror for what they perceived as modernity.”<sup>202</sup>

The specific type of modernization, the capitalist and Western-oriented model that Washington advocated, caused anti-Americanism which is largely owed to unequal economic interaction between the United States and most of the rest of the world, especially Third World countries, for the poverty it brings about. Moreover, US perceptions, misperceptions and characterizations of “others” can lead to resentment in Third World nations.

Similarly, Greek and Turkish Left anti-Americanism was created largely by the same factors that led to it elsewhere in the world. Firstly, anti-Americanism was a reaction against

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<sup>199</sup> Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon,” p. 29, in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith (eds), *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*, Praeger, New York, 1985.

<sup>200</sup> Pierangelo Isernia, “Anti-Americanism in Europe during the Cold War,” p. 85, in Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds), *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2007.

<sup>201</sup> Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2011.

<sup>202</sup> Christoph Hendrik Müller, *West Germans Against The West: Anti-Americanism in Media and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1968*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 179.

domestic governments that chose to collaborate with the US at the expense of the people and their own nation. Secondly, Greek and Turkish anti-Americanism was influenced by the international developments that were taking place at the time. Lastly, collaboration between national governments with the Americans was, in the eyes of the left and the public in general, national treason due to the concessions their governments were granting to the US. The anti-American sentiment that was created because of the Cyprus Question should be seen through such a prism.

Domestic governments willingly turned their attention and hopes to the Western bloc, which was dominated by the US. Regardless of the reasons behind each country's alliance with the US, whether they be economic, political, or even perhaps "civilizational," there was one common denominator for both of the countries, communism and the alleged threat the latter presented in the Cold War context. The communist threat was perceived as being so great during the Cold War that both countries preferred to side with the US and provide whatever was asked for (such as bases, political obedience, etc.) to prevent political action by legal leftist parties.

On the other hand, it had become fashionable to blame Americans for everything that was going wrong in both countries' domestic and international affairs, but the all-pervasive American missions in Greece and Turkey demonstrates that this "obsession" was based on real conditions. In this way, leftist anti-Americanism was based on one core premise: asymmetric alignment with the United States and NATO turned Greece and Turkey into American dependencies, even semi-colonies, where genuine democracy was impossible and economic underdevelopment inevitable. This anti-Americanism was the derivative of the initial, though interrelated, anti-imperialist agenda. Based on this anti-imperialist agenda, which was tremendously aided by American tactics and decisions (regarding Cyprus, elections, bases, etc.), the leftist movement gained momentum.

The leftist discourse was dominated by an anti-imperialist agenda with strong nationalist elements, as well as irredentist ones, as in the Greek case. In due course it took the form of strong anti-Americanism, expressed both verbally and physically; the latter preferred by students at demonstrations, while the verbal, non-violent anti-Americanism was characteristic of parliamentary parties. It was the parties, however, that armed the students ideologically and grafted anti-imperialist ideas into the student movement, helping the movement grow to such large proportions. In addition, international developments were regularly taken up by the student movement, which saw its future falling into the hands of the government and foreign interventional policies. Especially, "from 1968 onwards, student movements in Germany, the

United States and especially France (where students had come close to launching a revolution and toppling General de Gaulle in May 1968) influenced the youth movement in Turkey. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a crisis of consciousness among the Turkish left, as it did in socialist circles around the world.”<sup>203</sup> This ideological anti-Americanism formulated by the party and radical intelligentsia “did not extend upward to the government but downward to revolutionary organizations.” The more both countries’ domestic environments became polarized, the more anti-Americanism was used as a legitimizing context for political action that also pervaded other segments of society.

Indeed, anti-American sentiment in Greece and Turkey, and anti-Americanism in general, although it was triggered in large part by the national issue of Cyprus, took on major proportions and was linked with the student movement which gave anti-Americanism a more radical and at times militant content and expression. Influenced by international developments both in Europe (Poland in 1956, May of 1968) and the rest of the world (Vietnam and Latin America), the student movement linked educational deficiencies with national and government problems. This is an important difference as regards other student movements, for example the one in France that occurred in May of 1968. The students in France were much more interested in the problems of the university in comparison with the movements in Turkey and Greece. The student movement in France was chiefly engaged with reforming the universities; in Greece and Turkey, student activism aimed at macro political and systemic structures instead of limiting themselves to the problems of the educational system, problems that, according to the student movement, were directly affected by the American presence and interventionist policies in domestic affairs that impacted the whole state structure.

The escalation of anti-Americanism should be highlighted because it makes it possible to see that initially in Greece, until 1954, and in Turkey until early 1964, anti-Americanism existed but it was spreading slowly. Criticisms of government decisions to ally with the US and critiques of American strategy existed, but it was only after the “episodes of contention” in Cyprus that anti-Americanism reached a whole new level and became more dynamic. The crisis in Cyprus was only one of the events that triggered anti-Americanism, but indeed it may have been one of the most important events as it affected all aspects of Greek and Turkish politics, providing most important of all a chance for the left to demonstrate its patriotism through anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-American rhetoric.

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<sup>203</sup> Erik-Jan Zürcher, p. 255; Kostis Kornetis.



For the left it presented the opportunity to strengthen and increase the influence of its ideological position and promote its leftist program in general, and more specifically on Cyprus and the US. Cyprus provided both countries with reasons for their reactions to the US, as was the case, for example, with the Johnson Letter. In other words, it was the trigger not for developing anti-American sentiments, but also for politicizing whole segments of society. Although both the TİP and EDA, holding to their ideological principles of parliamentarism, limited their criticisms of the handling of the Cyprus Question to the assembly and through writings and declarations, the students that were nurtured by the party's ideas continued in a more dynamic, passionate, and sometimes militant way. While students, Jacob M. Landau has argued, and the same holds true for those in Greece, "were formerly concerned mainly with the Cyprus Question, other international problems have been looming larger in the late 1960s."<sup>204</sup> However, by the late 1960s, the United States "had proven itself to the nationalist and Islamic right as well as to the radical left to be an undependable ally, and worse, an imperialist power which sought world domination by practicing extraterritorial law."<sup>205</sup> Beyond a doubt that the same argument is valid for Greece as well, especially since the American factor played a crucial role in destabilizing the entire country. Lastly, although to a large extent the left saw anti-Americanism as a blueprint for challenging the anti-communist political order, bourgeois parties were not immune to the mesmerizing "image of resistance image" that anti-Americanism promised, and of course the idea of leaving such a "political tool" in leftists' hands was simply inconceivable for them.

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<sup>204</sup> Jacob M. Landau, p. 33.

<sup>205</sup> Ahmet Evin, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey," p. 130, in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith (eds), *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for US Foreign Policy*, Praeger, New York and Westport, 1984.