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## **From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus**

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## 5.2 1821 vs. 1919-1922: Bringing Back the Past

Politicians often argue about how important the past was, and still is. The past has been used in a variety of ways, such as “to explain the origins and purpose of human life, to sanctify institutions of government, to give validity to class structure, to provide moral examples, to vivify his/her cultural processes, to interpret the future, to invest both the individual and human life or a nation’s with a sense of destiny.”<sup>1</sup> It has also been rightly argued that “[...] history is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies [...]. The past is an essential element, perhaps *the* essential element [...]. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented. Indeed, in the nature of things there is usually no entirely suitable past, because the phenomenon these ideologies claim to justify is not ancient or eternal but historically novel. [...] The past legitimizes. The past gives a more glorious background to a present that doesn’t have much to celebrate.”<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, the past is recalled in present times, especially in periods of political, social, or economic crisis, in which history serves to “prompt awareness of the crucial importance of the past for the present.” In other words, the past is interactive with the present, as the history that is presented during times of crisis acts as a kind of mythical re-enactment of the past.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, as society becomes more literate and sophisticated, the more complex and powerful become the uses to which the past is put.<sup>4</sup>

Nationalism, involuntarily and often also intentionally, appeals to the construction of a history of a special cultural tradition and makes great efforts for that purpose. Even if the stirring up of the past does not bear fruit quickly enough, a nationalist ideology takes refuge in the invention, or more often in the embodiment and appropriation of historical facts,<sup>5</sup> to cover the gaps that emerge to provide proof of continuity between the past and the future and thus present a “future past.”<sup>6</sup> As a result, a specific national particularity is promoted, without historical justification of which “the credibility of nationalism is undermined in contrast to

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<sup>1</sup> John H. Plumb, *The Death of the Past*, Palgrave MacMillan, Great Britain and USA, 2004 [1969], p. 11; see also David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 41ff.

<sup>2</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, “Outside and Inside History,” p. 6, in Eric Hobsbawm, *On History*, Abacus, London 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Jan-Werner Müller (ed), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2004, p. 3 quoting John Keane; see also Chris Lorenz, “Unstuck in Time: Or: The Sudden Presence of the Past,” pp. 67-102, in Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree and Jay Winter (eds), *Performing the Past. Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe*, Amsterdam U.P. - Chicago U.P., 2010.

<sup>4</sup> J. H. Plumb.

<sup>5</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; see also Stephen Prickett, *Modernity and the Reinvention of Tradition: Backing into the Future*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On The Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. with an introduction by Keith Tribe, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004.

other nationalisms,” and perhaps more importantly, “it also ventures the appeal to its own national body to which it addresses.”<sup>7</sup>

Nobody, however, has a monopoly on the past. Entire communities and groups, even individuals within the same community or nation-state can make use of it according to their beliefs. Hobsbawm argues that post-1945 “world politics were basically the politics of revolution and counter-revolution, with national issues intervening only to underline or disturb the main theme,”<sup>8</sup> shaking the established political order that was divided between the two superpowers. Greece and Turkey present two case studies that fall precisely within the abovementioned scheme.

The dominant ideological schemes in Turkey and Greece, i.e. Kemalism and *ethnikofrosyni*, came to be contested by the left for the first time, although the re-marriage of social revolution with that of patriotic sentiment was a rather complicated affair. The left presented itself as a group that would recycle the past selectively and interpret the present in terms of past “myths” thus presenting a “counter-memory” that would challenge the dominant rhetoric;<sup>9</sup> the biggest difference was that the left aimed primarily at changing society. Thus, for the left, first and foremost history was just a tool in the service of social change, not a way of understanding it. Revolution for the communist movement, which believed that the process of change in social formation takes place through revolutions, becomes a historical break *par excellence*.<sup>10</sup> If, for other ideologies the past is read through the prism of the present, for the left, the social revolutions were broadened as revolutionary stages of development towards a communist society as forerunners of proletarian revolution.

State mobilization unites individuals from different localities for a common cause, and the struggle for territory serves to define the boundaries of a collective. Perhaps most salient are the cultural effects of warfare, in which ‘us/them’ stereotypes are created by the competing propaganda of rival states, and heroes and epochal events provide role models and reference points, especially when taken up by poets, artists and writers who embed these in the collective consciousness.<sup>11</sup> But in order for this to be achieved, real, commonly approved,

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<sup>7</sup> Padelis E. Lekkas, *Nationalist Ideology. Five Working Hypothesis in Historical Sociology*, 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ed., Katarti, Athens, 1996, p. 201; from the same author see also “Nation and People: The Plasticity of a Relationship,” pp. 49-66, in Faruk Birtok and Thalia Dragonas (eds), *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, Routledge, London and New York, 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, p. 183.

<sup>9</sup> Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1977.

<sup>10</sup> Panagiotis Stathis, “Left Readings of Twenty-One,” *Avgi*, March 27, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Anthony D. Smith as quoted in John Hutchinson, “Warfare, Remembrance and National Identity,” p. 44 in Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby (eds), *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007.

glorious event(s) must be chosen, from which a series of interpretations or narrations are produced and used for political or social ends. Hobsbawm rightly argues that “what is officially defined as ‘the past’ clearly is and must be a particular selection from the infinity of what is remembered or capable of being remembered”<sup>12</sup> Political rhetoric in particular has to be based upon prevailing conditions since it aims to convince the public and acquire mass appeal. Indeed, the past is presented as a collective condition; needless to say, the older or the more ancient and glorious the past, the better.<sup>13</sup>

Most nation-states that came into existence before the mid-twentieth century were created via wars or had their boundaries defined by wars or internal violence.<sup>14</sup> Subconsciously or not, such periods of warfare provided a heroic reference point of national reassurance and self-realization. To a large extent, the figures taking part in such struggles became the heroic figures or martyrs who sacrificed themselves for the ideals of the nation. Similarly, parties of the left also sought their point of reference in the victorious past struggles of their respective nation-states; for Greece it was the 1821 Revolution, and for the Turkey it was the National Struggle for Liberation of 1919-1922. Ironically enough, each revolution or struggle for independence was won at the expense of the other. Through this process, both the EDA and TİP instrumentalized their countries’ glorious past and associated them with the Cyprus question. The present argument, however, is better presented in reverse; the Cyprus question is presented and associated with the glorious past of the two countries in order to present the patriotism of the left, in both cases domestically, against the dominant ideological schemes and externally against the “other.”

### **The EDA and the Greek War of Independence<sup>15</sup>**

Since its infancy, the EDA fought for “national democratic change and independence.” In order to achieve its goals, however, the EDA had to find ways to channel them through a public rhetoric rooted in a commonly approved grounding. In this way, the appeal would be stronger and more successful, and hence the public rhetoric of the left had a dual purpose. Firstly, the public rhetoric of the right had dominated collective and popular memory,<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, “The Social Functions of the Past: Some Questions,” *Past and Present*, vol. 55, issue 1, pp. 3-17, here p. 3, 1972; reprinted also in Eric Hobsbawm, *On History*, Abacus, London, 1997, pp. 13-31.

<sup>13</sup> David Lowenthal, pp. 41-45.

<sup>14</sup> John Hutchinson, p. 42.

<sup>15</sup> Also known as 1821 Revolution of Greece

<sup>16</sup> Scholars demonstrated recently that this was only partially true, especially if we consider the electoral results in 1950 in Makronisos and the fact that in 1958 the EDA managed to become the main opposition party. In addition, the fact that leftist intelligentsia was dominating the intellectual and cultural debate of the country also played a role in revising that dominant view. Tasoula Vervenioti, “Oral History and Research on Greek Civil

especially after the civil war. Therefore, the left had to counter the right's hegemony over public political rhetoric, while also presenting a "counter-memory" so as to prove its own patriotism in that extremely hostile anti-communist environment.

It was this account of the different perceptions of history that aimed at inventing a new identity, one based on the international stage by the Soviet Union while in the interior the nation itself was the bone of contention between the left and the right.<sup>17</sup> From the 1940s onwards, the EDA identified with patriotism in order to prove its *ethnikofrosyni* and organized commemorations that could aptly have been referred to as "memory seminars."<sup>18</sup> Parties on both sides of the political spectrum were in need of additional symbols, which the left found in the martyrdom of the resistance fighters during World War II, and this basis in the recent past added continuity.<sup>19</sup> Specifically, it was based on the period of National Resistance and the patriots who fought against the Axis alliance and freed Greece. However, due to the devastating consequences of the civil war, the period of National Resistance had to be based on more stable and undisputed ground. This was found in the Greek Revolution of 1821 and its "heroic Greek fighters"<sup>20</sup> who were integrated smoothly into the neo-Hellenic national consciousness, constituting the ultimate event of Greek-ness and collective self-assurance.

This integration became clear in the numerous articles published in *Avgi*, but also in the party's official publications and its attempts to "educate" its voter base. Specifically, in the list of suggested festivities for party branches, apart from celebrating national poets and commemorating anniversaries and important labor struggles,<sup>21</sup> there are tributes to Greek heroes of the Greek War of Independence; names such as Kolokotronis, Karaiskakis, Makrygiannis, Androutsos and Botsaris were praised, and local associations of the party were urged to organize festivities and commemorations to glorify the Greek Revolution.<sup>22</sup> Thus,

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War: Political Circumstance and the Researcher – Narrator," Special Issue: Aspects of Oral History, *Social Sciences Review*, 107, 2002, pp. 157-181.

<sup>17</sup> Tasoula Vervenioti.

<sup>18</sup> Similar gatherings still take place to commemorate tragic events. The speakers were usually high-ranking party members, guiding the "official" version of events.

<sup>19</sup> Eleni Paschaloudi, "Memory and Political Discourse. The 1940s in the Party Political Rhetoric (1961-1964)," p. 153, in Alkis Rigos, Serafim Seferiadis, Evanthis Chatzivasiliou (eds), *The "Short" 1960s*, Kastanioti, Athens, 2008; see also *The War Without End*, p. 219 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Many scholars tend to stress the period of national resistance as the point of reference for national re-integration and fulfillment. However, it is believed that the scheme as it will be presented here can be drawn back to a great extent to the ultimate national event of the Greek Revolution.

<sup>21</sup> Commemorations include the 1<sup>st</sup> of May and Kileler. The village of Kileler became known for a peasant uprising that took place on March 6, 1910.

<sup>22</sup> ASKI, "List of Festivals and Historical Dates for "Civilizing Dash" of the Party," *EDA Archive*, Box 43, folder 1, [n.d. probably early 1960s]; numerous tributes to the heroes of the Revolution were paid in the newspaper *Avgi* during 1952-1967.

the EDA tried to create a historical narrative that linked the 1821 Greek Revolution and the period of the National Resistance (1940-1944) with both the struggles of democracy and amnesty of the 1950s and 1960s and the Cyprus question, the resolution of which, it was believed, would make the Greek nation whole again. However, as noted above, the catastrophic period of the civil war is completely absent from this narrative. In other words, the EDA was trying to invent and construct a “tradition of resistance.” The left was using the prism of the recent past of resistance in order to re-read and re-interpret the past and shape it in terms of the future. It appropriated the Greek Revolution within the context of the persistent resistance of the Greek nation. This re-interpretation also marked the core of the party’s identity, and was used to encourage political activity.<sup>23</sup>

According to the EDA, the real *ethnikofrones* were those who fought the German occupier, while the traitors, i.e. the contemporary proponents of *ethnikofrosyni* – Papagos’ Greek Alarm (ES) and later Karamanlis’ National Radical Union (ERE) – were those who collaborated with the occupiers to “slaughter the National Resistance.”<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the right’s rhetoric, the EDA called the leftists “patriots” and “democrats,”<sup>25</sup> “heroes of the national resistance,”<sup>26</sup> as well as “the real fighters of the revolution [...] who, with their courage and their struggles, represent the democratic people’s heritage.”<sup>27</sup> This recalling of the past sought to debunk the right’s accusations the EDA’s and KKE’s “national treason” while also seeking to boost the EDA politically by mobilizing a segment of the non-communist left.<sup>28</sup>

It is noted that it was the “simple people’s”<sup>29</sup> courage that led to the victory of the revolution and it was exactly that courage that inspired the Greek people, but the “dark forces, the bowed ones and the foreign ‘protectors’ that prevented the materialization of the social and people’s demands”<sup>30</sup> undermined it. Thus, the Greek Revolution and its spirit, aims and

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<sup>23</sup> Eleni Paschaloudi, “Memory and Political Discourse. The 1940s in the Party Political Rhetoric (1961-1964),” p. 152, in Alkis Rigos, Serafim Seferiadis, Evanthi Chatzivasilioi (eds).

<sup>24</sup> *Avgi*, February 14, 1964.

<sup>25</sup> *Avgi*, October 17, 1961.

<sup>26</sup> *Avgi*, October 26, 1961.

<sup>27</sup> *Avgi*, “The Real Meaning of 1821,” March 25, 1953.

<sup>28</sup> Eleni Paschaloudi.

<sup>29</sup> The people are marked and identified with the progressive and patriotic forces of the country in the 1940s because of the national resistance and civil war, in opposition to conservatism, the oligarchy and its allies. Panagiotis Stathis, “Neohellenic Historiography about 1821: Hermeneutic Schemes for the Outburst of the Revolution,” *Avgi*, March 24, 2002; another scholar adds that this happened partly because of the introduction of the Marxist historiography in Greece by Kordatos, Skliros and Zevgos. Anta Kapola, “History and Politics: The Commemoration of 25<sup>th</sup> March in the Newspaper *Avgi*, 1953-1967,” unpublished manuscript.

<sup>30</sup> *Avgi*, “1821 Inspires Our People,” March 25, 1953. That issue devoted 6 pages – more than half of the total issue – to the Greek Revolution.

ideals were brought to a halt and never fulfilled. Thereafter, the Greek people struggled incessantly for “freedom, national independence, and democracy.”<sup>31</sup>

In the mid-1960s, in the interests of cooperation, the party adopted the political framework of Democratic Union (*Dimokratiki Enosi*) and attempted to nullify the dichotomies of the past. This represented a serious effort to silence the past and reconstruct rhetoric on the basis of cooperation with the opposition forces. For example, the EDA, for the first time, spoke of the period of the civil war (1946-1949) to condemn it and eventually to completely forget it.

This perspective also focused on democratic change as a political outcome; in other words, it aimed to shake off *ethnikofrosyni* as a system of political and social exclusion. Thus, the election campaigns of the EDA and its opponents were critically reappraised. The right-wing government of the ERE was presented as the holdover of the traitorous government of WWII. Its anti-communist measures made it easier to identify it with violence, suppression and defense of imperialist interests. The EDA, however, was presented as the true bastion of democracy. Notably, the EDA was fighting “the same way it was fighting in the past, drawing its continuity from the revolutionary tradition of 1821” and “with the National Resistance period of the EAM, it defended the independence of the country.”<sup>32</sup> In addition, it would be fair to argue that the EDA presented itself also as *the* vehicle of unity of the masses; from the 1821 Greek Revolution to the EAM (National Liberation Front) to the struggles for democracy, and then Cyprus in the 1950s and 1960s.

To commemorate the period of National Resistance, the EDA chose events that transcended the limits of the party and were commonly approved of by all parties. This gave the party the opportunity to link its rhetoric to the great events of national history. In other words, it provided the missing link between the National Resistance and the 1821 Greek Revolution. An article in *Avgi* is quite revealing in that respect. It states:

The 27<sup>th</sup> of September, 1941: National Resistance day – a turning point in the history of our people, since our people won their independence with the 1821 uprising. This parallelism takes place on its own on every anniversary in the thoughts of every patriot: National Resistance is the contemporary 1821. The love for country, the urge for freedom and prosperity, are identical.<sup>33</sup>

The commemoration and the usage of the 1821 Greek Revolution as a heroic national event provided the necessary legitimization not only for the EDA, but to all the democratic

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> *Avgi*, October 24, 1963.

<sup>33</sup> *Avgi*, September 27, 1959; quoted also in Paschaloudi, pp. 307-308.

elements of the country. In addition, even more important is the fact that the Greek Revolution's primary aim, and its incorporation into the national program of the left, was not to legitimize the left as much as it was to delegitimize the right; it de-established the right as the spokesman for and regulator of society.

The EDA drew its unity from “the bavarocracy [Bavarian rule] that hated the fighters of 1821 and their accomplishments. Likewise, the foreign-driven oligarchy in government today terminates the heroes of the new National Resistance of our people.”<sup>34</sup> To strengthen this argument and tease out the nuances of the historical pattern that the EDA was trying to construct, it will be useful to point out the fact that the 28<sup>th</sup> of October<sup>35</sup> was incorporated into the great moments in the national narrative, and was mentioned as a continuation of the Greek War of Independence as well as the beginning of the National Resistance movement. This last point in particular bears great importance because the left associated that the day the Greek government said “No” to the Italians with the emergence of the resistance movement. Hence, it would be fair to claim that the left was not only attempting to legitimize itself in the present by presenting its patriotic past, it was also attempting to posit its legitimacy and faith in the national ideals and delegitimize *ethnikofrosyni*.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the EDA acted as a substitute for the eternal national truth against *ethnikofrosyni*. The tragic nature of the Greek nation, as perceived in its rhetoric (e.g. unfulfilled revolution because of bavarocracy, or now because of the alliance between the imperialist powers and the *ethnikofrones*, etc.) as well as its attempt for unity, testify towards a gesture in that direction.

The Cyprus Question took a central position in *Avgi* in that respect. The messages of commemoration for the Greek people persistently turned to Cyprus. In addition, the Cyprus Question and the struggle for the liberation of the Greek Cypriots was one and the same with the revolutionary struggle of 1821. Thus, in 1954, always in touch with the contemporary situation, *Avgi* stated in an article that:

[...] the enthusiastic national and patriotic exhibitions of our people, its unrestrained rage against the enslavers of the people of Cyprus and their allies, show how focused it is on the ideals of the generation that gave us freedom [...] Let it be today, Cyprus day, [day] of freedom, [day] of national independence.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *Avgi*, September 27, 1959; Eleni Paschaloudi, p. 308.

<sup>35</sup> The 28<sup>th</sup> of October, 1940, or *Ohi* Day (“No Day”), is celebrated throughout Greece, Cyprus and the Greek communities around the world on October 28<sup>th</sup> each year to commemorate the rejection made by Greek Prime Minister, the dictator Ioannis Metaxas (in power from August 4, 1936, until January 29, 1941), of the ultimatum made by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

<sup>36</sup> Eleni Paschaloudi, pp. 308 and 340.

<sup>37</sup> *Avgi*, “The 1821 Command,” March 25, 1955, p. 3.

Cyprus is referred to in almost all of the presidential messages. The following year in a front page article entitled “Promises in the Shadows of the Heroes,” it was stated that:

The struggle of the heroes of 1821 is not finished yet. And it will not be finished until the day Cyprus is united with the Motherland, because this will mean that Greece is also free, since only a Greece like that can achieve the rescue of its captured children [...].<sup>38</sup>

In the same issue, one of the central articles on the main page was an announcement by the Executive Committee of the EDA, commemorating the 25<sup>th</sup> of March, in which it proposed a coalition government of national unity in order to deal with the Cyprus question:

The EDA, far from having any expectation of gaining anything from the bankrupt government, declares publicly that it is ready to discuss, to decide [with the other parties] and to support a common patriotic policy on Cyprus [...]. The government should put this national policy into effect, a government that will reinstate fully national unity and handle the Cyprus Issue responsibly [...].<sup>39</sup>

In addition, not only *Avgi* but also the newspaper *Charavgi*, the political organ of the AKEL in Cyprus, was publishing the EDA leader’s tributes to the Cypriot fighters who had fought for the liberation of “motherland” Greece. Pasalidis, on the occasion of the 9<sup>th</sup> of July,<sup>40</sup> sent a supportive telegraph to Ziartidis, General Secretary of Pancyprian Workers’ Association (PEO), stating:

The Greek people turn their thoughts [...] to their Cypriot brothers and martyrs, who for decades have pressed on with their struggle for liberation.<sup>41</sup>

Cyprus presents perhaps the best example of the tragic nature of the Greek nation and the claims of unity made by the EDA. In one of the many articles published in *Avgi* in reference to the 1821 commemorations in Cyprus in 1955, it was noted that: “the real 1821 was forgotten a few years ago. The new slavery and the new uprising of the People brought it back to the memory of the Nation.”<sup>42</sup> The 1821 revolution and its true meaning were presented as

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<sup>38</sup> Main article in *Avgi*, “Promises in the Shadows of the Heroes,” March 25, 1956.

<sup>39</sup> The title of the article is “No Party Claims: Its Only Guide the Interest of the Nation.” Quoted also in Tasos Trikkas, vol. 1, p. 327.

<sup>40</sup> July 9, 1821 is the date that the Cypriots of Nicosia were slaughtered by the Ottomans as a punishment for their contribution to the Greek War of Independence; see John Koumoulides, *Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence, 1821-1829*, Zeno publishers, London, 1974.

<sup>41</sup> See for example the supportive telegraph of Pasalidis to Ziartidis, General Secretary of PEO (Pancyprian Workers’ Association), on the occasion of July 9<sup>th</sup>; “The EDA will support our struggle for self-determination until the final victory,” *Charavgi*, July 11, 1958; see also “President of EDA, Ioannis Pasalidis, on the national anniversary of 9 July,” *Charavgi*, July 19, 1958, p. 3.

<sup>42</sup> “The 1821 Command,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1955, p. 3.

an ongoing life-work. While the Greeks managed to fight back the Turks, new “protectors” would appear soon. And the article ends with the question: “Who would have thought that Cyprus would suffer under the same protectors’ yoke?”<sup>43</sup>

Apart from the call for the political forces of the country to unite so they could establish an independent foreign policy, the left made an appeal to the church as well, referring to the speech made by Archbishop Theoklitos on the 17<sup>th</sup> of September in which he stated:

Interpreting the feelings that imbue even the last Greek’s soul, we declare that Hellenism, as a State and as a Nation, will not be able to restrain itself. Above any friendship, above any alliance, above any interest, there is Cyprus. And for the freedom of Cyprus, every Greek and first of all, the State, will proceed indifferent to the so-called alliances and other words with vacant meanings, which on every occasion side, as one person, with the dominant forces. It is high time we taught that the national issues cannot be betrayed in favor of any ideological interests or social systems.”<sup>44</sup>

For a national issue such as Cyprus, all the elements that express, reproduce and represent the Greek national ideology have been appropriated, and all of them have had a place in the Cyprus cause. Also noteworthy was the identification of the left with the church, one of the leading propagators of *ethnikofrosyni*, the main difference being the church’s more radical rhetoric, as it could act more freely. In addition, the party went even further and addressed the pan-national cross-party front called for by the fanatic anti-communist EOKA leader, Grivas Digenis. Pasalidis stated that:

The government, with the policy it follows, is in direct contravention of pan-Hellenic sentiment. It is in direct contravention of the content of the EOKA leader’s call [...].<sup>45</sup>

The statement goes on to censure the government for fighting against national unity and for debasing the demand for Cypriot self-determination, and lastly for being the group that was still enslaved to the bitter “allies” of NATO.<sup>46</sup> The EDA was prepared to ally with all those who were presented as backers of the “national front.”

There are forces on all sides of the Parliament that are feeling the patriotic duty of us all; in the face of such a serious situation, united they can carry out a policy of national rejuvenation with coordinated actions. [...] [The] entire spiritual, social, financial [support of the]

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.; See also *Avgi*, March 25, 1954 and March, 26 1954.

<sup>44</sup> Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, vol. 2, December 14, 1958, p. 346. Eliou also refers to another vote of protest signed by the Metropolitan, the Law Association, and the President of Professionals, which requested Greece’s exit from NATO.

<sup>45</sup> As quoted in Tasos Trikkas, vol. 1, p. 438.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

trade unions, professionals, and Academy [...] can bolster the Cyprus cause for freedom by making known the atrocities [on the island].<sup>47</sup>

Pasalidis had already said as much in the Greek Parliament, and, representing the party, he claimed in front of the common national enemy that he thought the government believed in *Enosis*. He said that “there is no Greek who does not believe in *Enosis*.” However, he claimed that the government’s policies would lead nowhere since they were “slaves to NATO [...] and [could not] undertake a strenuous struggle.”<sup>48</sup>

In the second half of the 1950s, the EDA’s rhetoric took on another element: the political prisoners of the left. Specifically, it was mentioned that “we cannot celebrate 1821 [...] while those who continued their struggle during the recent occupation are in prison. This national tragedy must stop, based on the will of the people in the upcoming elections.”<sup>49</sup> In the 1960s, although references to the past were relatively rarer than in the 1950s, they acquired a more democratic character. The past was wheeled out to signify the processes of democratization in the country as well as to justify demands for the release of prisoners accused of being traitors or communists. The democratization of the country, especially after 1961, and the release of the communists from the prison camps, comprised the core of EDA’s rhetoric:

The great national and democratic ideals of the 1821 Revolution excited the soul of the fighting people that created the Albanian and the National Resistance epos. They [the ideals] today inspire our people in its struggle for normalcy, peace, and general amnesty.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time, the idea that this was a struggle for democratic normalcy was maintained and it aimed for an electoral coup d’état.<sup>51</sup> The revolutionary freedom fighters of the Greek Revolution were compared with the fighters in the war in Albania and the National Resistance, as well as the people in Cyprus who were fighting for independence from the United Kingdom and *Enosis* with Greece. The left called openly for a general amnesty and “freedom for the fighters of Albania who bore a great burden from the sacrifices of 1821,”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Elias Eliou, *CQGP*, December 14, 1958, vol. 2, p. 350.

<sup>48</sup> Ioannis Pasalidis, *CQGP*. November 29, 1956, vol. 1, p. 298.

<sup>49</sup> *Avgi*, “1821 and its Continuer,” March 25, 1958.

<sup>50</sup> ASKI, “1821 – 1962,” p. 1, *EDA Archive*, Box 43. In Greek literature, the Albania Epos refers to the heroic battles of the Greek soldiers in Albania against the Italians. In mid-November 1940, Greek soldiers counter-attacked and forced the Italians to draw back in Albania, making their future offensives more difficult.

<sup>51</sup> Ioannis Pasalidis, “Keep the Flag of Democracy High,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1961.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

and to “free the fighters of the new 1821”<sup>53</sup> while at the same time the party sought the support of religious, political and social agents within the country.<sup>54</sup>

The EDA was presented as a savior in the process of democratic, political, social and economic re-establishment because it managed to embody “the spirit of heroic traditions of the nation and especially of the patriotic grandeur of the National Resistance,”<sup>55</sup> which culminated in the struggle of Cyprus, where “obsequiousness to NATO and the US imperialists brought betrayal and humiliation.”<sup>56</sup> This, however, would stop because “no country managed to stop the just and righteous struggles of a small people.”<sup>57</sup> Similarly, it was argued that continuation of the Greek National Struggle for Liberation would bring *Enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. The National Struggle for Liberation was referred to as the struggle for democracy and independence by the EDA’s parliamentary leader Elias Eliou, who, on the occasion of the elections of 1963, mentioned:

[These] are not ordinary elections. [...] This is a genuine, a pure National Struggle for Liberation. This can and must be the most determinative stage of the democratic resistance and struggle of the Greek people against those who attempted to enslave it.<sup>58</sup>

The EDA’s president, in commemorative message to the Greek and Cypriot people, stated that “continuing the holy traditions of 1821, the Greek people managed to overthrow the reactionary right” and with the same enthusiastic spirit, continued to struggle for “real national independence.”<sup>59</sup> The following year, a few months before the July events, which led to the overthrow of George Papandreou, Pasalidis again stated that “The 25<sup>th</sup> of March in 1821 always enlightens the nation on its tortuous path. [...] The heroic democratic struggles to oust Karamanlis’ tyranny”<sup>60</sup> and “the foreign powers that are in alliance with the domestic ones, [as well as] their compromises and agreements”<sup>61</sup> [...] “are imbued with the spirit of the great national revolution of 1821.”<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> ASKI, “Declaration of EDA for the Completion of the 10 years after its Establishment,” *EDA Archive*, Box 43.

<sup>56</sup> ASKI, “A New Greek Policy,” [n.d. but after 1965], *EDA Archive*, Box 478, folder 1, p. 7.

<sup>57</sup> ASKI, [untitled], *EDA Archive*, Box 478, folder 1, p. 3.

<sup>58</sup> Elias Eliou, *Avgi*, October 22, 1963.

<sup>59</sup> Ioannis Pasalidis, “Continuing the Holy Traditions of 1821,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1964.

<sup>60</sup> Ioannis Pasalidis, “For a National Democratic Rejuvenation of Our Land,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1965; see also “Pasalidis’ Message,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1966 and “We Continue the Great National and Patriotic Traditions of 1821,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1967.

<sup>61</sup> ASKI, [untitled], *EDA Archives*, Box 478, folder 1, p. 1-2.

<sup>62</sup> Ioannis Pasalidis, “For a National Democratic Rejuvenation of Our Land,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1965; see also “Pasalidis’ Message,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1966 and “We Continue the Great National and Patriotic Traditions of 1821,” *Avgi*, March 25, 1967.

The overthrow of Karamanlis, however, did not mark the end of the Greek people's struggle for national independence and democracy. The people's victory was "undermined by the circles of anomalies. These circles [...] counter-attacked and organized the July coup d'état. [...] The apostates of democracy took over the task of returning to the dark days of Karamanlis' fascism."<sup>63</sup> The harsh criticism of the July events also turned against the EK for allowing conservative forces to pave the way to dictatorship. In that way, the struggle of 1821 continued unabated<sup>64</sup>

### **The TİP and *Kurtuluş Savaşı*, 1919-1922**

The TİP, unlike the EDA, did not have an official party organ operating on a daily basis, such as *Avgi. Sosyal Adalet* and *TİP Haberleri* served as the official organs of the party, and *Vatan* and *Öncü* as unofficial organs, but none of these functioned on a permanent basis throughout the party's existence. However, references to a glorious Turkish past and to those elements that comprise Kemalism in general and the Turkish War of Independence in particular provide adequate material for this study. It should be noted also that the party's rhetoric was closely associated with various notions such as anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism which more often than not overlap.

The TİP is really not so different from its Greek counterpart apart from the significant fact that Kemalism managed posthumously to become an embedded ideological scheme transcending every social and political aspect of Turkish life. Starting in the late 1950s, it became impossible to speak of just one Kemalism for there were too many threads. Kemalism had become a set of ideas or ideals<sup>65</sup> that were inherently persuasive in nature, an ideology created by people (Kemalist military-political figures) who took advantage of the condition the state to legitimize their actions, activities and beliefs. As such, there is a clear identification between Kemalism and the state, upon which Mustafa Kemal foisted himself as the leader of the Turkish transformation.

Accordingly, the ideologues of the Turkish Workers' Party, wary of the dangers of the Cold War environment and fearful of the party's closure, were influenced greatly by Kemalism. Almost throughout its existence, parts of Atatürk's speeches were included in the party's manifesto and statutes. Specifically, the party used part of a speech given by Atatürk on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December in 1921 in which he stated:

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<sup>63</sup> ASKI, "Positions for the Commemoration of the 25<sup>th</sup> March," p. 5, *EDA Archives*, Box 43.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, p. 181.

We are the people who, through work, protect our life's independence. Let us know who we are. We are a laboring and poor people. Through our labor, we all have rights and power. Our society has no place for those that lie on their backs or clamber on the backs of others. So what is populism? This social doctrine bases its law on the labor of our society. Gentlemen, populism is the appropriate doctrine of a people who, in order to protect their independence, must wage a national war against imperialism that seeks to completely destroy our nation, against a capitalism that aims to swallow us whole.<sup>66</sup>

More than once, the Turkish Workers' Party paid tribute to the national hero of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, seeking legitimization through his achievements and writings. The tribute paid to Atatürk, and the rhetoric the party used, had the same effect on the people as it did on the party, or at least, that is what the party was hoping for. The TİP's socialism was based on re-reading and redefining Mustafa Kemal's practices, and the Turkish War of Independence was the vehicle through which the party could both be legitimized and could engage in politics without risking its very existence while also increasing its popular appeal. This became a common practice that was adopted by other political currents as well, as shall be briefly discussed later.

Since the party's infancy, issues relating to the need for change in official policy were brought forth in the speeches of party leaders with the slogan *İkinci Kurtuluş Savaşı* (Second Liberation Struggle). As support for the party grew, it adopted a more radical vocabulary, with the party leader claiming the "national struggle for liberation cannot be separated from the socialist struggle."<sup>67</sup> Within this scheme, Cyprus and the Cyprus question was presented as the vehicle by which the independence of Turkey, and of course, Mustafa Kemal's struggles and ideals, would be fulfilled. Thus, in a similar vein to its Greek counterpart, the party attempted to present a historical narrative that would eventually provide the tools needed to dominate Turkish politics and society. In short, it was a "war of words" in which efforts were made to redefine those words and most optimally present them. In addition, the party attempted to reproduce the common Kemalist narrative of the Turkish nation as a constant revolutionary community. Since the socialist re-interpretation was created within the hegemonic narrative of Turkish nationalism, it could also be accepted by those who had already internalized the prevailing Kemalist consciousness and narrative of the nation.<sup>68</sup> Thus,

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<sup>66</sup> As quoted in Nimet Arsan (ed), *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. I, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1964, p. 196.

<sup>67</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, p. 505.

<sup>68</sup> Hegemony in this context is used as defined by Antonio Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, 3 vols. Columbia University Press, New York, 2007. We can refer to hegemony when this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the population and becomes part of what is generally called "common sense" so that the philosophy, culture

if the TİP could manage to appropriate patriotism and consolidate its position as the only patriotic force of the country, then it would expand its public appeal and present itself as a political opposition that could claim to be leading the country.

Mehmet Ali Aybar, in a speech given on the 10<sup>th</sup> of November in 1964 on the occasion of the 26<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Atatürk's death, praised the latter saying:

[...] All of our minds and hearts are full of him. We will mention our commitment to him in various ways. These speeches will be mere emotional orations. Yet we will see that those who had idolized Atatürk will be the ones who would brag about him. However, we should love Atatürk with our minds as much as we love him with our hearts, as these days are the days that we need his teachings more than ever.<sup>69</sup>

Aybar outlined and marked one of the first attempts to re-read the great Turkish legacy and give it a different content. Thus, in lending a socialist-revolutionary character to the war of independence and defining it as the struggle of a “people who took up arms,” Aybar added a revolutionary character to the party, since the TİP itself was also a party with a revolutionary socialist manifesto. Notably, he stated that:

Our Independence War was not a regular one. Our nation, who fought against the Sultan's commands and Sheikh al-Islam's fatwas, was not only fighting the enemy, but fighting against the current system which had been cruel and despotic; in other words, imperialism and capitalism. They were paving also the way for other nations to become free.<sup>70</sup>

The Turkish resistance aimed not only at preventing a foreign enemy occupation but at the same time sought to disrupt the established order of oppression and autocracy in the world. In other words, they were fighting against both capitalism and imperialism. By defining Atatürkism as the ultimate anti-imperialist ideology in the struggle against the West, and to some extent, against capitalism, the party was legitimized and it also aimed to de-legitimize the government and the opposition parties. “From the Congress of Erzurum in July 1919, through the Congress of Sivas in September of the same year and the final sessions of the Ottoman parliament in early 1920,” when, during the “National Struggle” (*Millî Mücadele*) Ottoman Muslim nationalism reached its apogee, “in the rhetoric of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and others in the National Assembly after April 1920, the struggle was always defined as one of

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and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. Carl Boggs, *Gramsci's Marxism*, Pluto Press, London, 1976, p. 39.

<sup>69</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, “TİP Genel Başkanı Mehmet Ali Aybar'ın Atatürk'ün 26. Ölüm Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Yayınladığı Mesaj,” *Nebil Varuy Papers*, Box 11, folder 926.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

Ottoman Muslims for self-determination and against the unjust claims of Armenians and Greeks and their European supporters.”<sup>71</sup>

Not only was the Turkish War of Independence an important sign of resistance for Turkey and its people, but also “in this way, they [the Turks] opened the path to freedom for all the captive people of the world.”<sup>72</sup> Aybar attempted to strengthen his position further by using an address made by Atatürk to the Russian people. Atatürk had associated Turkey with the Soviet Union, and he had stated that “the oppressed nations of the world will one day destroy their oppressors. On this day, there will no longer be oppressor and oppressed, but a social order befitting humanity. Our nations [Russia and Turkey] will then take pride in taking the first steps toward this goal.”<sup>73</sup> One of the achievements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was “the formation of an unlikely alliance with the Soviet Union,”<sup>74</sup> an achievement that served the TİP’s purposes and goals, and which aimed to help the party rid itself of accusations of communist activities. Atatürk was presented in the Turkish left’s rhetoric also as a savior who freed Turkey from the obscurantism of the Ottoman Empire, arguing that:

Atatürk, as a genius who had acutely comprehended this development of human history, drove our nation to success in the Great Independence War and drew the path of a new Turkey within this framework.<sup>75</sup>

The TİP’s socialism was legitimized through the achievements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who “above all, is *the Savior Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha*.” On another occasion, it was argued that “he is the leader of the first national war against imperialism” in the sense that:

He is the great savior who showed the way to freedom for suffering, enslaved nations. This is the main reason for our love and respect. And this is why his reputation supersedes him.<sup>76</sup>

Atatürk’s and the national forces’ faith in the motto “freedom or death” underlie all of his revolutions,<sup>77</sup> and the party fully subscribed to this. With the TİP having defined Atatürk’s

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<sup>71</sup> Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State,” pp. 55-68, in Celia Kerslake, Philip Robbins, Kerem Öktem (eds), *Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity*, Palgrave MacMillan, United Kingdom, 2010.

<sup>72</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, “TİP Genel Başkanı Mehmet Ali Aybar’ın Atatürk’ün 26. Ölüm Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Yayınladığı Mesaj,” *Nebil Varuy Papers*, Box 11, folder 926.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioglu, p. 119.

<sup>75</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, “TİP Genel Başkanı Mehmet Ali Aybar’ın Atatürk’ün 26. Ölüm Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Yayınladığı Mesaj,” Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> “Halaskâr Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa,” Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Atatürk’ün 29. Ölüm Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Genel Başkan Mehmet Ali Aybar’ın Yayınladığı Mesaj,” *TİP Haberleri*, issue 1, November 15, 1967, p. 4; emphasis in the original. There is no date on the issue. According to the message on the first page, the review was published twice every month, on the 1<sup>st</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>. The second issue has a date of the 1<sup>st</sup> December, thus it would be reasonable to assume that the first issue was published on the 16<sup>th</sup> of the previous month.

central ideas as anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, it called upon Turkey to return to those ideals by which Turkey had become free. The TİP declared that Turkey remained free for only 15 years and in addition, had never come under the influence of any other state.

We [the Turkey of Atatürk] have provided our own security with our own strength. Turkey has become a reputable country that is respected by friends as well as foes, [...] [a] country that has become a hope for enslaved nations

And the declaration goes on to place blame on the domestic collaborators of imperialism, stating that:

We [Turks] have lived with the hope of casting off imperialism's cruel oppression without thinking that native capitalism would invite imperialism again and without placing political independence above social independence.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, it becomes clear that the Turkish Workers' Party attempted to create a linear narrative of the struggles of Atatürk, notably the Struggle for Independence, with the concurrent struggles of the people, which, according to the party, were the same, i.e. imperialism and capitalism. Moreover, by appropriating "Atatürkist elements" and calling upon the Turkish people to return to the principles of Atatürk, the party was calling for a return to proper political practice, as was done by Mustafa Kemal, making constant references to the War of Independence and how, during Atatürk's lifetime, the Great Powers never managed to set foot in Turkey.

The call to return to Atatürk's policies meant that the struggle of the 1919-1922 war had not yet come to a close. However, the TİP refrained from defining or referring to the conditions of the 1960s or presenting a new struggle; the party was recovering, or better yet, re-inventing the original narrative, maintaining, however, some established elements given by Atatürk and others, such as anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. It presented a linear narrative of Turkish history in which Turkey was always on the defensive, taking up the struggle against Western attempts to infiltrate the country via domestic collaborators, i.e., the comprador bourgeoisie. Slightly shifting the discourse, the latter can be contrasted and paralleled with the organizations of 1919, referred to in the *Nutuk*, that tried to influence post-war political developments by collaborating with the enemy and trying to eliminate national

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<sup>77</sup> "Ya İstiklal Ya ölüm!" ("Freedom or Death") was the motto of the national forces (*Kuva-yi Milliye*) during the Turkish War of Independence. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, vol. 1, 12<sup>th</sup> ed., Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul, 1970, p. 13.

<sup>78</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, "Atatürk'ün 29. Ölüm Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Genel Başkan Mehmet Ali Aybar'ın Yayınladığı Mesaj."

*millî şuur* (national consciousness).<sup>79</sup> This national consciousness of the Turkish people was developed during the national struggle, which was defined by Mustafa Kemal in *Nutuk*, setting aside anything else, as a struggle fought by the Turks from 1919 to 1922 and as a collective effort to rebuild the Turkish state as an independent nation.<sup>80</sup> Thus, the party invented anew the glorious Turkish past of resistance and the victorious struggle against the West in a linear historical narrative of revolution and resistance, just as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did. While the latter constructed a narrative in which the national struggle became a struggle for a Turkish national state, so the TİP redefined it as a struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Moreover, as Aybar stated on another occasion “we had attained national consciousness through this war.”<sup>81</sup>

Needless to say, other segments of society attempted similar constructions. For example, to mention just a few, the review *Yön* used similar rhetoric. Doğan Avcıoğlu utilized and interpreted the Anatolian Resistance Movement, albeit in a different way,<sup>82</sup> to legitimize his anti-imperialist and socialist opinions. Other left-wing Kemalists, such as Mümtaz Soysal, also shared Avcıoğlu’s re-interpretation of the Anatolian Resistance. Soysal asked:

What did Atatürk want to achieve? What did he achieve? What was left unfinished? Which of his principles are currently observed? Which have been brought to ruin? Lastly, what shall we do in order to complete the mission started in Samsun?<sup>83</sup>

The above statement, in the form of question, can be considered as a call to remember May 19, 1919, when, according to Kemalist mythology, the struggle for independence started, and thus should be conceived of as an enlightened path to emancipation through “socialism.”<sup>84</sup> Similarly, Bülent Ecevit appropriated the Kemalist past and claimed, in a similar vein, the continual mission of Kemalist revolutionism:

Atatürk’s revolutionism consists of two parts. The first part includes all those reforms that were carried out in his lifetime. These concern the form of the government, law, secularism, language, women’s rights, changes in clothing, and the abolition of privileges. Above all,

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<sup>79</sup> For example, one of these was the so-called *İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyeti* (Society for the Friends of England); Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk (Söylev)*, Kitap Zamanı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 10-11; for English, see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *The Great Speech*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1997, pp. 125-126.

<sup>81</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Kıbrıs Tezimiz,” p. 327 in Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> According to Doğan Avcıoğlu, the Ottoman state was, by the sixteenth century, on its way to capitalism and industrialization, similar to the West. Without foreign-imposed obstacles, Turkey would have developed into a prosperous industrial country, and its “Westernization,” which had produced such a powerful identity crisis, would have been avoided altogether. Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye’nin Düzeni (Dün, Bugün, Yarın)*, Tekin Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2003 [1968], pp. 45-46.

<sup>83</sup> Mümtaz Soysal, *Güzel Huzursuzluk*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1975, p. 15.

<sup>84</sup> See Doğan Avcıoğlu, esp. pp. 156-225.

there is, of course, the securing of the political and economic independence of the Turkish nation [...]. Secondly, Atatürk wanted Turkish society to progress in revolutionary leaps. Thus, the Atatürkist revolution does not mean only the revolutions taking place during his lifetime; it supposes continuing revolutionism.<sup>85</sup>

The Bursa speech made by Mehmet Ali Aybar in May of 1964 should be seen in this light. It was a call for revolution, a call for the never-ending mission of Kemalism to fulfill the socialist revolution that was left unfinished in 1922. The Bursa speech was the first crucial attempt to appropriate Kemalism and its principle of *Mısak-i Milli* in order to promote its own political agenda on Cyprus and on democracy, for which the TİP was constantly fighting. Due to fierce attacks by the media and other parties, however, the TİP shifted and radicalized its rhetoric. The party emphasized the struggle against imperialism, without, however, neglecting to include central Kemalist elements. Some scholars have suggested that even the lack of use of the term “socialism” in the party’s program for the year 1964 represented “the need to articulate the party’s objectives in the common Kemalist vocabulary. The leaders of the TİP decided not to use the word “socialism” at this initial moment of the party’s emergence, but suggested that their proposed path was that of Kemalist statism, an interventionist economic policy traditionally favored by the ruling parties since the founding of statist policies by the CHP starting in the 1930s.”<sup>86</sup>

The Malatya Congress in 1966 also helped to present this narrative when it was argued that “forty-four years after completing the First National Struggle for Liberation, we must start the Second,” and that the “Second Struggle for Liberation has started [And] this time it will be certain that victory will also mean a victory for socialism.”<sup>87</sup> It is clear that Mustafa Kemal was considered by the party to be socialist and all of his battles sought to achieve that end. The spirit of the National Forces was rejuvenated and re-launched to complete the Kemalist mission, and “nobody will dare to stop this second independence movement,” not even those who betrayed it after his death.<sup>88</sup> The struggles for independence and for socialism were two sides of the same coin, as mentioned before. Since, according to the TİP, “independence and nationalism are the foundation stones of socialism,”<sup>89</sup> Cyprus also had to be freed in order for socialism to be established

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<sup>85</sup> Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*, Tekin Yayınevi, Ankara, 1973, p. 17-18.

<sup>86</sup> İhsan Bal and Sedat Laçiner, “The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy, 1960–80,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 13, no.4, 2001, pp. 98–99.

<sup>87</sup> IISG, “Basın Bülteni,” 20 October 1966, Malatya, *Kemal Sülker Papers*, Box 610, folder 1.

<sup>88</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Amerikan Emperyalizmi Yenilecektir,” p. 445, in Mehmet Ali Aybar.

<sup>89</sup> Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tarihin Çizgisi Antiemperyalist Savaş Çizgisidir,” p. 621.

Thus, when the party issued two declarations in November of 1967 accusing the Demirel government of balking at intervention in Cyprus, there was a feeling that the second liberation struggle had been betrayed and that to a certain extent Turkey had moved away from the primary goal of independence and socialism. Thus, it was argued by the party leadership that Greece would annex Cyprus and put Turkey “under its yoke” and the second opportunity to intervene in Cyprus had been lost, and with it the opportunity to fulfill the second Turkish national liberation.

Also of great importance was the TİP’s rhetoric about action including the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), which implied siding with the Kemalist state. Furthermore, as was claimed numerous times in the Grand National Assembly, “we have to establish an army similar to the National Forces army in the Turkish War of Independence.”<sup>90</sup> This opinion is reminiscent of Atatürk’s statement in the assembly that “our army is a steel-like expression of Turkish unity, of Turkish might and ability, of Turkish patriotism.”<sup>91</sup> The same MP also argued that the spirit of both Atatürk and the National Forces drew their support and strength from the people. The Turkish Workers’ Party, he argued, “holds the belief that the greatest strength in struggles for liberation always stem from the people.”<sup>92</sup> Thus, the Cyprus cause was a struggle for independence that had started more than 40 years prior, and more importantly, it was the same forces that were called upon to fulfill it at the time: the army and the people. Therefore, the people, and more importantly, those who lost their lives fighting for Turkish independence, just as in the Greek case, were presented as martyrs. Thus, the TİP, and more specifically, President Aybar, referred to the dead young student Vedat Demircioğlu<sup>93</sup> as the “first martyr of the Second National Independence Movement.” Vedat was paralleled with Hasan Tahsin (1888-1919), a young Turkish national and journalist who was said to have been the first person to open fire on the Greek soldiers who landed in Izmir in May of 1919 and the first victim of the Turkish struggle for liberation. Aybar stated:

The first martyr of our First National Independence Movement [was] Hasan Tahsin, who defeated the Greek soldiers in Izmir on the 5<sup>th</sup> of May in 1919 and was killed by bayonets there.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Muzaffer Kuran, “Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Bütçesi,” *TIP Parlamento’da*, vol. 1, p. 381

<sup>91</sup> Nimet Arsan (ed), pp. 402-403

<sup>92</sup> Muzaffer Kuran, p. 381

<sup>93</sup> Demircioğlu was the first student who was killed by the Turkish state during the anti-American student resistance movement, see later, chapter on anti-Americanism.

<sup>94</sup> “Vedat’ı Anma Töreni,” *TIP Haberleri*, issue 18, 1 August 1968, p. 2

However, unlike Tahsin, who was killed by the Greek enemy, Vedat was killed by the state, and more specifically, by the AP government, which he claimed was an imperialist collaborator. Moreover, both Tahsin and Vedat were socialists. He argued that

It is a coincidence that history created because a War of National Independence can only be carried out by the most devoted, most unique and bravest youth of Turkey. Socialists are those most devoted, most unique and bravest youth. Hasan Tahsin was one of the bravest of us all in 1919. Vedat was one of the bravest of us all in 1968.<sup>95</sup>

It is clear that the Second War of Independence, just as the first had been, was as much a struggle for socialism as it was for anti-imperialism. Moreover, and equally important, was that the deaths of those martyrs corresponded to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's "Message to the Youth" in which he raised the specter of internal and external dangers:

Ey [Hey! Attention! Look!] Turkish youth! Your very first duty is to protect and defend eternally Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic.

The sole foundation of your being and future is this. This foundation is your most valuable treasure. Even in the future, you will have enemies, internal and external, who will want to deprive you of this treasure. If one day you find yourself forced into the position of defending independence and the republic, in order to take up duty at once, you should not think about the contingencies and constraints of the situation in which you find yourself.

These contingencies and constraints may manifest themselves in very inconvenient ways. The enemies, who will have designs against your independence and republic, might be the representatives of a victory never seen before in the world. By force and intrigue, all the fortresses of the dear country may have been captured, all the shipyards penetrated, all the armies dispersed, and every corner of the country actually, taken over.

Even sadder and graver than all these conditions, within the country, those who are in power might be inept or [led] astray or even traitorous. Furthermore, those in power might unite their personal interests with the political aims of the invaders. The nation might be desolate and exhausted in destitution.

Harken, children of the Turkish future. So, even under such conditions and situations your duty is: to rescue the Turkish independence and the republic. The power you need is present in the noble blood in your veins!<sup>96</sup>

The incidents that brought about the death of Turkish youth were utilized to attack the government, which was held responsible not only for the exploitation of the country, but also

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Vesikalar*, vol. 3 of *Nutuk*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Istanbul, 1963, pp. 897-898 [emphasis in original]. This translation is from Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey. Progress or Order?*, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2004, p. 205.

for undermining of the principles of Atatürk. In a speech about the events in Konya, Mehmet Ali Aybar stated:

[In Konya] the attacks were not only against progressivist, Atatürkist socialist establishments and figures, but also against entertainment venues. This is proof [...] that it was a rebellious act carried out against secularism and targeting the republican regime.<sup>97</sup>

The combination and appropriation of all these elements are subsumed, however, by the notion of *milli menfaat*, that of national interest. It seems that in talking about national interests, the TİP aimed to move beyond the restrictions presented by any particular ideology. National interests were presented as a social construct to engage the party “in a process of interpretation in order to understand both the situation the state faces and how they should respond to it.”<sup>98</sup> In addition, the concept provided all the necessary tools to permit, as mentioned above, both the appropriation of the best elements of Turkey and, more specifically, the noble Kemalist past of the Turkish War of Independence and delegitimize all those forces that presented themselves as the sole agents of patriotism or Kemalism. The TİP adopted a rhetoric that aimed at using the Turkish past to show, as was the case with Greece, that the Turkish Workers’ Party was the only true patriotic force in the country whose anti-imperialism and true patriotism could save Turkey and to some extent, Cyprus.

## Conclusion

Although “we need to think about ourselves beyond the nation,”<sup>99</sup> this was clearly beyond the parties of the Greek and Turkish left, and more specifically, as regards Cyprus, which provided fertile ground for not only competing politics but also competing nationalisms. Nationalism matters. It matters for the simple reason that nationalism is, or ought to be, understood as a dual process: on the one hand, it attempts to link a society-in-crisis with rapid and intense changes with its past, and on the other hand, it attempts to relate itself to future perspectives. This dual process is performed by the nation, which comprises the fundamental element in the “nationalist quest of new mechanisms to coordinate the social presence with action.”<sup>100</sup> In other words, it attempts to link the past with the present, the general with the

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<sup>97</sup> Speech of Mehmet Ali Aybar in Konya, July 21, 1968 as quoted in “A.P. Anayasaya Gerçekten Saygılı Öğrenmelidir,” *TİP Haberleri*, issue 18, 1 August 1968, p. 6.

<sup>98</sup> Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, issue 2, 1996, p. 275.

<sup>99</sup> Arjun Appadurai, “Patriotism and its Futures,” *Public Cultures*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1993, pp. 411-429; reprinted in Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 1996, pp. 158-177.

<sup>100</sup> Padelis E. Lekkas, *The Nationalist Ideology*, p. 197.

particular, appropriating symbols and codes of the nation, and thus construct a new perception and attitude towards life; it is an ideology by which the state can shape and support the novel and unknown realities of the future.<sup>101</sup>

The projection of the past on to the present and then on to the future is what Marx called the “process of world-historical necromancy.”<sup>102</sup> Thus, a sense of belonging and a sense of communality are constructed, which, with strong references to the past, represents the foundations for future arrangements. The nation is brought forth from the past and takes aim at the future; it comprises the main pillar of affinity, because it is that communal ideal that sweeps away all these antinomies and reproduces a sense of continuity with the traditional order of things.<sup>103</sup> A tradition under threat becomes an empowering element that, precisely because of its reference to the past, confutes historical discontinuity. The turning to the past and its subsequent reconstruction of historical continuity strengthens the feeling that the social subject holds a place in the course of time. This feeling may also impose active behavior patterns depending on the image of continuity: concepts such as historical duty, historical debt, national interest, and national resistance are indicative of this rather energetic frame of mind that is derived from the past.

The left in Greece and Turkey made use of the above notions, not only in the case of Cyprus, but more generally as well, since the case of Cyprus was just one piece of the historical narrative of the left, just as it was for the right. The perception of history that a person or a group of people develops is marked by the key events that are maintained and referred to and thus are used to construct or reconstruct a coherent narrative of historical continuity. On the one hand, we saw that the EDA decided to use the Greek Revolution, which was seen as a shared, glorious moment of Hellenism, together with the period of Resistance during WWII, but wittingly, it decided to silence the period of the Greek Civil War. Thus, the EDA, using key moments of the Greek Revolution and resistance to the Germans, managed to incorporate the Cyprus question into its rhetoric of anti-imperialism, democracy, national independence and self-determination. On the other hand, the TİP chose to use the National Struggle for Liberation, a key event in Turkish history and of equal

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<sup>101</sup> Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966, p. 15.

<sup>102</sup> Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” p. 32, in Karl Marx, *Later Political Writings*, edited and trans by Terrell Carver, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom and United States of America, 1996.

<sup>103</sup> Recalling the past is an action with intense ritual content; it expresses nostalgia for the imagined safety of traditional society because of the social and cultural new classifications that take place in the present and in the face of the spectrum of an unknown future. See Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Polity Press, London, 1996 and Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Palgrave, London, 2010.

importance to the Greek Revolution. As with its Greek counterpart, the period 1919-1922 served and was easily incorporated into the rhetoric of the TİP, since Kemalism and the “cult of the hero,” Mustafa Kemal, was already established as the undisputed force of anti-imperialism, independence and socialism. Thus, Cyprus as part of the anti-imperialist Turkish struggle was legitimized through the struggles of Mustafa Kemal but also by the self-sacrifice of the victims of the first and of the second battles for liberation, who, being youth, obeyed the Kemalist call for sacrifice and emancipation.