From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus

Christofis, N.

Chapter 5
Comparisons

5.1 Ethnikofrosyni and Kemalism: Two Ideologies that Shaped the Future of the Left

The history, as well as the decisions and political agendas of the Greek and Turkish left, might appear out of context or half-true if they were treated without taking into consideration the dominant ideological platforms of the two countries, notably *Ethnikofrosyni* and Kemalism. These platforms influenced and shaped communist movements enormously ever since they came into existence. Indeed, leftist agendas and policies were influenced, directly or indirectly, by official state ideologies. A discussion of the interactions and policies that came about under the ideological platforms predominant in Turkey and Greece will shed some light on the decisions that were made by the left in the 1950s and 1960s.

Ethnikofrosyni

The terms *ethnikofron* (believer/loyal to the nation) and *ethnikofrosyni* (nationalism/loyalty to the nation) had been part of Greek political vocabulary since at least 1915 when it was used in the name of the main anti-Venizelist party.[1] However, the word was used even earlier to denote national consciousness and nationalist feelings, or to juxtapose a more conservative political group with a more radical group, as for example the revolutionaries in Russia. *Ethnikofrosyni* made its appearance in the political vocabulary to indicate that patriotism and loyalism supersede political groups and parties. Later, in the early 1930s, before the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941), the newspaper *Eleftheron Vima* was of the opinion that in Greece none of the preconditions needed to establish a dictatorship existed because all the people were "patriots and *ethnikofrones*" and there was no socialism, only "small communism."[2]

The division between the Venizelists and anti-Venizelists in Greece, a result of the National Schism (1914-1917), had further consequences. The issue, which triggered such vehement division between the Greeks, was initially centered on a choice of foreign policy. Not without justification, great significance was attached to the decision to either side with the Triple Entente as Venizelos insisted or observe neutrality, as advocated by the Germanophile Constantine, since the future of the state would inevitably depend on the outcome of the conflict. The subsequent clash of personalities between Venizelos and

[1] Elias Nikolakopoulos, *Cachectic Democracy*, p.35; Ioannis Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 29, ft. 12.
[2] In reference to the limited effect communism had in Greece. As quoted in Despina Papadimitriou, *From Law-Abiding People to the Nation of the Nationally Minded: Conservative Thought in Greece, 1922-1967*, Savvalas, Athens, 2006, p. 146.

Constantine made the controversy an acrimonious contest of personal loyalties for most of the population.[3]

Furthermore, apart from political and social circles, the consequences of the National Schism also reverberated in terms of the constitution. The National Schism prevented its unhindered implementation and eight years after its approval it was cancelled. The Asia Minor "Catastrophe" in 1922 may have brought the irredentist agenda of the *Megali Idea* to an end, albeit temporarily, but it did not stop the clashes between the Venizelists and Royalists. The chasm between the two rival camps became deeper, especially after the trial of those who were held responsible for the tragedy in Asia Minor. After the collapse of the Asia Minor venture, a revolutionary committee led by a group of colonels brought to justice a group of politicians and officers who were found guilty as charged. After that, the royalist leadership was seen as being enfeebled, and the Venizelist leadership defined Greek politics for at least a decade.

The tensions that arose during WWI and the National Chasm and the aftermath of the Asia Minor "Catastrophe" in conjunction with the other major crises of the inter-war years resulted in a series of systemic violations of the constitution. With the permanent adoption of special legislative measures and practices of questionable constitutionality, political leaders were able to deal with their opponents more easily and efficiently. For example, a law was enacted that proved to be an extremely effective measure in fighting political beliefs. Through this legislation, any person holding a state position could be removed from his post if there was suspicion that he had acted against "public order and the security of the country." This law was based not on guilt but merely on "suspicion."[4] In addition, in a period in which "the law had been identified with peremptoriness, and vice-versa, the law remained in effect whether it was at the expense of the royalists (1917-1920, 1922-1923) or the Venizelists (1920-1922); but it was always at the expense of the left."[5]

Although this period of time is certainly worthy of detailed examination, it is beyond the scope of this study, but nonetheless, the *ethnikofrosyni* that the left had to fight against acquired an entirely new meaning starting in the 1940s. The inter-war years were seen as denoting "a bourgeois consciousness, a conservative, and anti-communist mentality, and defined the symbolic community of "healthy thinking Greeks" beyond the division of

[3] John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, pp. 78-79.
[4] Nikos K. Alivizatos, *The Constitution and Its Enemies in the Neohellenic History, 1800-2010*, Polis, Athens, 2011, p. 269.
[5] Nikos K. Alivizatos, *The Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974. Aspects of the Hellenic Experience*, Themelio, Athens, 1995, p. 344.

Venizelists and anti-Venizelists."[6] This period thus entailed the idea of national unity since the term united the entire bourgeois and by that point, a definition of the enemy had not yet been specified. It could easily have been personified or again rendered abstract, but the danger seemed to always have derived from communism and the "treacherous" actions it brought about. Indeed, it seems there was a constant variable when it came to the enemy of the state, primarily identified as communism. This made it easier for other laws to be passed, particularly the *idionymon* (Special Illegal Act, Law #4229) in 1929.[7] This was the first clear anti-communist law of Greece which was passed under the Venizelos administration, according to whom, paradoxically, the country was not threatened by communism.[8] The law did not oppose acts of violence but the propaganda of ideas aimed at destabilizing the state through violence. This law marked the cornerstone of legislature for the security of the state and the social regime and remained in effect until 1974, when the Greek junta brought it to an end.[9]

Ethnikofrosyni, backed by words such as "nation," "nationalist," or "nationally driven," came to dominate the public and private sphere[10]in the 1940s and early 1950s as an ideological framework and, perhaps more importantly, as a practice, and it was associated with anti-communism; its target was spokesmen of the "anti-national" ideology of Marxism-Leninism in Greece, represented by the KKE during the civil war and the KKE and EDA after the war. Although it had its roots in the past, this version of *ethnikofrosyni* came about in the environment of the civil war[11] and realities of the Cold War. It had emerged as a platform for rallying heterogeneous opposition to the communist-led political and social bloc of the National Liberation Front (EAM) during the enemy occupation and its bitter aftermath. It preached attachment to "national ideals," including post-war irredentist claims and constant vigilance against the internal enemy, communism.[12]

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[6] Despina Papadimitriou, p. 177.
[7] Similar laws were also passed in Switzerland, Germany, and Yugoslavia.
[8] Venizelos stated in the Greek Parliament on May 30, 1929 that "*idionymon* was not targeting communism as an idea, but the 3rd International and the Bolshevik principles." *Rizospastis*, May 31, 1929.
[9] Nikos K. Alivizatos, *The Constitution and Its Enemies*, p. 271.
[10] This is not to say that *Ethnikofrosyni*, as Kemalism in the Turkish case, can be considered to be hegemonic in Gramscian terms as he described it in his prison notebooks. For that reason, the terms "dominate" and "dominant" will be used to differentiate its use here from that of Gramsci. There was definitely coercion but not consent. "Hegemony is best understood as *the organization of consent*." Michele Barrett, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1991, p. 54. And more completely put recently, "the question of hegemony is not about coercion *or* consent but about coercion *and* consent". Mark Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society: Towards a Theory of State Power*, MacMillan, London, 1996, p. 42
[11] Aggelos Elefantis, "Ethnikofrosyni: The Ideology of Terror and Victimization," p. 136, in Aggelos Elefantis, *They Took Athens from Us… Rereading Some Aspects of History, 1941-1950*, Vivliorama, Athens, 2003.
[12] Ioannis Stefanidis, p. 29.

An analysis of *ethnikofrosyni* reveals that there were two main characteristics that inflected the environment of post-war Greece. The most important of these was the fact that the ruling elite of the country tried and eventually managed to elevate this specific ideology as an official perception and the narrative of the whole country.[13] Borrowing from practices in other countries such as the USA,[14] *ethnikofrosyni* "was institutionalized in the security apparatus established during the civil war. It served as a measure of loyalty to national integrity and the 'prevailing social order' which helped to divide the Greek citizens into *ethnikofrones* and '*miasmata.*'"[15] The other characteristic, which was directly linked with the first, was associated with what practically means anti-communism. The extreme anti-communism of *ethnikofrosyni* supporters created the perception that whoever was not *ethnikofron* was automatically against it and therefore characterized as an "enemy of the nation"[16] and "non-Greek." The publisher of the best-selling encyclopedia *Ilios* (*Sun*) partly attributed the growth of anti-national creeds such as communism to "the lack of a more profound national consciousness among certain lower strata." This deficit, exacerbated by "the intellectual and moral anarchy" of the age, could be redressed if all Greeks were properly indoctrinated.[17]

Therefore, the left had to face a strictly exclusionary ideology which had at its disposal the state and all of its mechanisms to fight communism and to "exclude" not only individuals but whole social groups from the "nation."Taking into consideration the fact that communism was seen as being the primary enemy of the state, it is easy to understand who "exclusion from the nation" targeted. The members of EAM-KKE were the first victims of *ethnikofrosyni*, as well as citizens who simply did not agree with the state ideology. Communism was treated as an ideology that was foreign to Hellenism, thus making communists' reintegration into the "Greek nation" impossible.[18] Since there was a bipolar scheme of "Communism vs. Hellenism," anyone who believed in, or thought that he believed in, communism was considered "non-Greek" for two reasons: a) Communism's principles

[13] *Ethnikofrosyni* replaced in a way the irredentist *Megali Idea* of the nineteenth century as the official ideology of the Greek state.

[14] See for example Apostolos Diamantis, "The Establishment and the End of the McCarthy Commission. McCarthyism in Greece," pp. 139-159, in Art. Psaromiligkos, V. Lazou, K. Kartalis (eds), *The Trials of McCarthyism, Eleftherotypia*, Athens, 2011.

[15] Ioannis Stefanidis, p. 30; *miasma* in Greek becomes *miasmata* in plural form.

[16] For one of the best accounts of the Greek anti-communist state, see Stratis Bournazos, "The State of the Ethnikofrones: Anti-Communist Discourse and Practice," pp. 9-49, in Christos Chajiiosif (ed),*History of the Twentieth Century Greece: Reformation, Civil War, Restoration, 1945-1952*, vol. D2, Vivliorama, Athens, 2009; see also Georgis Katiforis, *The Legislature of the Barbarians. Essays*, Themelio, 1975, pp. 31-88.

[17] Ioannis Stefanidis, p. 31.

[18] Draw parallels with Anders Stephanson, "Liberty or Death: The Cold War as US Ideology," pp. 81-102, in Odd Arne Westad (ed), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, Frank Cass, London-Portland, OR, 2000.

were in direct opposition to the principles of Hellenism and, therefore, it sought the division of Hellenism; and, b) according to its ideology, communism undermines the interests of Greece and, therefore, it is an enemy of the Greek nation.

The period of the civil war is especially marked with an increase in anti-communist rhetoric, which was expressed through political articles, speeches, and philosophical and historical accounts, as well as through theatrical works and poems. These anti-communist discourses were categorized in five broad groups.[19] First, the civil war was underpinned by the notion that it was "a struggle of Greeks against Slavs." The communist fighters were associated with foreign threats and communism was bound up with Slavism, and therefore the KKE was accused of committing treason through its allegiance to Moscow and Pan-Slavism. The Greek state denied that it was a civil war and raised the issue with the UN in December of 1946 by placing the blame on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, saying that its actions were carried out in self-defense against dangerous northern neighbors.[20] The link, however, of communism with a foreign threat was the result of not only Greek but international characteristics. In the Greek case, however, the state mechanism and deep-state practices were mobilized due to the leading role EAM and KKE played during the occupation of Greece in WWII as "the" patriotic force of the country. Secondly, the civil war was projected as being a struggle of Christians against infidels, a scheme that is a variation of previous paradigms that centered on texts mainly of religious origin.[21] Thirdly, crime and violence were presented as innate features of communism. After treason, communism was characterized as something that sought blood and devastation, and images and rhetoric about it were drawn from the deep-seated anti-Bulgarian sentiment that had come about mainly during the Macedonian struggle, especially through the narrations of the Comitadjis.[22] Fourthly, communism was depicted as being both a fraud and a lie. That was how the Greek state tried to explain the powerful influence of the EAM on people during the occupation. In other words, the masses were deceived by "evil communists" who claimed to be fighting for the good of the country. Lastly, communism was presented as a "disease." Communism was described as "a virus, as a

[19] The categorization follows that in Stratis Bournazos, pp. 17-19.
[20] Ibid., p. 17. The Greek state recognized that it was a civil war only in 1989, while until 1974 the word that was used was "guerilla war," or "a gang war."
[21] Vasilios N. Markides, "Orthodoxy in the Service of Anticommunism: The Religious Organization Zoë during the Greek Civil War," pp. 159-174, in Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (eds), *The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences*, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2004.
[22] The Macedonian Struggle was a series of social, political, cultural and military conflicts between Greeks and Bulgarians in the region of Ottoman Macedonia between 1904 and 1908. The Comitadjis were a brutal paramilitary group that comprised the main opponents of the Greeks.

horrible contagious disease, that infects the social body, leading it to death."[23] Additionally, what the state tried to do, and was partially successful in doing, was deconstruct the resistance movement. By appropriating Colonel Woodhouse's[24] "three round" rhetoric(resistance – the December events[25] – civil war), state ideology attempted to degrade the "thorny issue" of being at the forefront of patriotism and therefore legitimize their own extreme actions as just. The "three round" (the internecine fighting which occurred within the resistance in the last stage of the Axis occupation, in December of 1944 and from 1946 to 1949) explanation of the events that happened during the civil war was accepted because it was the only explanation consistent with the cold war values of militant anti-communism. According to this view, the civil war in Greece was the result of the deliberate and persistent efforts of the KKE to seize power by force and establish a single-party communist dictatorship under Moscow's aegis.[26]

What made matters worse was that *ethnikofrosyni* and the entire process already instigated during the inter-war years by the bourgeois, conservative Greek community aimed to differentiate and ascribe different content and characteristics to the "people" and the "nation," the two having been presented as identical for a century. The nation had been transformed into the source of all power, the central tenet of which was "national interest," which was to supersede all individual interests. As a dictator, Metaxas stated, "The social/national entity comes before any citizen of the Greek state."[27] For a century, ever since the establishment of the Greek state, the "people" were actually the "nation." This identification changed and the "people" had been degraded to just a numeric part of a totality playing no part in the affairs of the "nation" unless they were driven by the "national will." Of course, this did not also mean the majority of the national electing body. As it was argued by two constitutionalists of the Metaxas period, "'national will' can be represented by a minority as well."[28] This "national will" was represented and expressed through the state, the "organized force of the nation."[29]In this way, regardless of whether it was represented by the many or the few, as long as it was

[23] Stratis Bournazos, p. 19.
[24] C. M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949*, Hart-Davis, London, 1976, where he states in page 3: "The Greeks commonly distinguish 'three rounds' in the Communists' struggle for power, though the Communists themselves nowadays abjure the phrase. It is better to distinguish three climaxes in a continuous process."
[25] The *Dekemvriana* (December Events) refers to a series of clashes in Athens from December 3, 1944 to January 11, 1945 between Greek left-wing resistance forces (EAM-ELAS, KKE) and the British Army supported by the Greek government, the city police and the far-right Organization X led by Georgios Grivas.
[26] John Sakkas, p. 11.
[27] Nikos K. Alivizatos, *The Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974*, p. 324.
[28] Nikos K. Alivizatos, "'Nation' Against 'People' After 1940," p. 84, in D. Tsaousis (ed), *Hellenism – Hellenicity: Ideological and Experiential Pivots of Modern Greek Society*, Estia, Athens, 1983.
[29]Ibid.

driven by "national will" the nation was the sole entity capable of dealing with state affairs. In that process, of course, communists, pro-leftists or mere anti-*ethnikofrones* were excluded by the national body.

Finally, according to *ethnikofrosyni*, communism was an ideology that was incompatible with the ideals of the Greek national body. Furthermore, the proponents of *ethnikofrosyni* went to great extremes to present communism as a non-Western ideology. This latter attribute made it easier for *ethnikofrosyni* to be considered by the West as an ideology of the West and Western values, which, in a Cold War environment, also served the interests of the Western powers. As an ideology of the West, it could be accepted by the Western camp as representative of the Greek nation-state and even more in relation with the US. The Greek communist alliance with the Soviet Union was thus, at the same time, a threat to the US. The discourse of America as the "protector of the free world" was adopted and reproduced by the Greek right-wing and *ethnikofrones* newspapers and journals that presented the US as the "perpetual revolutionary" dominated by Christian values and God-given rights.[30] Despite the incorporation of all those elements, including nationalism, anti-communism, Christian values, Americanism, into *ethnikofrosyni*, Greece was involved in an extended critical period with her Western allies due to her irredentist agenda concerning Cyprus, brought about, as discussed before, by the refusal of the Western allies to bring the issue to the UN.[31]

Kemalism

Unlike *ethnikofrosyni*, which arose in the nineteenth century, Kemalism, as an ideological framework, starting to take shape with the establishment of the Turkish Republic; it was a keyword, referring to and identified with the Turkish Republic, that has "haunted" Turkish society as a "ghost,"[32] impacting every group and party, even down to the present day. Kemalism, however, is not an ideology in the sense of fascism or Marxism;[33] "*Kemalizm* (Kemalism) or *Atatürkçülük* (Atatürkism) as it came to be called in the 1930s was a set of ideas or ideals that evolved gradually. It never became a coherent, all-embracing ideology but can best be described as a set of attitudes and opinions that were never defined in any detail," and "…as an ideology it lacked coherence and, perhaps even more importantly, emotional

[30] *National Defence*, no. 66, November 1951, pp. 10-11, as quoted in Despina Papadimitriou, p. 179.
[31] See the previous chapter on the EDA.
[32] MesutYeğen, "Kemalizm ve Hegemonya?," p. 60, in Ahmet İnsel (ed), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce*, vol. 2; *Kemalizm*, İletişm, Istanbul, 2002.
[33] Murat Belge, "Mustafa Kemal ve Kemalizm," p. 38, in Ahmet Insel (ed).

appeal."[34] But, Kemalism can best be described as being anything but static. Indeed, Kemalism is a flexible set of ideas that covers all aspects of Turkish life. Therefore, Kemalism has been adjusted to suit the conditions at hand, and it is open to influences and developments. As a result, Kemalism remained a flexible concept and people with widely differing world views have been able to call themselves Kemalists, something that became explicitly evident starting in the 1960s.[35] As it has been argued, "The Atatürk cult manufactured and promoted by the state continued as before but many left-wing and right-wing movements also claimed the founding father as 'one of them.'"[36]

In a similar way, Kemalism affected the Turkish leftist movement starting in its infancy and created a dependent relationship between the two, and this became more than apparent in the 1960s. This relationship dates back to the emergence of the communist movement and the establishment of the TKP and the historical context of its emergence. A successful war of independence and the fact that it was one of the first revolutionary instances of its kind had a deep impact on leftist groups and parties. At the same time, to further confuse matters for the communists, strategic necessities made Mustafa Kemal and his circle keep friendly relations with the Bolshevik administration during the period of the War of Independence. As a result of this encouraging atmosphere, left-wing activities gained momentum in Anatolia. Apart from the influential resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal, which actually made it impossible for the communist movement to gain traction, Soviet support for the Kemalist movement was another reason for the dependent relationship of communism with Kemalism, and the former's support for Kemalism in the decades that would follow. Indeed, the "Turkish communist movement was the victim of the diplomacy between the Turkish Republic and the Soviet regime,"[37] which maintained friendly relations even after the bloody suppression of fellow communists, as with the TKP in the Black Sea in January of 1921.[38] Mustafa Kemal was neither a communist nor pro-Soviet. As he used "extreme Islamist and pan-Islamic rhetoric […], so also Mustafa Kemal augmented his nationalist opposition to imperialism with

[34] Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey*: *A Modern History*, pp. 181–182.
[35] Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Kemalism: Birth and Evolution of the Official Ideology of Modern Turkey*, Ellinika Grammata, Athens, 2006.
[36] Erik-Jan Zürcher, "In the Name of the Father, the Teacher and the Hero: The Atatürk Personality Cult in Turkey," p. 135, in Vivian Ibrahim and Margit Wunsch (eds) *Political Leadership, Nations and Charisma*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012; different interpretations of Kemalism, see Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Brill, Leiden, 1974.
[37] Ertuğrul Kürkçü, "İyi İşte, Demokratikleştik, Başımıza Gelecek Var!," p. 128, in Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (eds), *Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor*, Metis Yayınları, Istanbul, 1991.
[38] Bülent Gökay, "The Turkish Communist Party: The Fate of the Founders," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1, 1993, pp. 220-235.

a purely rhetorical socialism."[39] He seemed to be a Muslim communist, resembling Sultan Galiev, who wished to reconcile Islam with socialism, arguing like him that the East had been a victim of Western bourgeois colonialism.[40]

The support given to Kemalists by the TKP and the Soviet Union was based on the resolutions of the Third International which approved of and supported the anti-imperialist activities of the leadership of the national liberation in Anatolia,[41] considering it a progressive bourgeois nationalist movement necessary for the global anti-imperialist struggle. "In underdeveloped countries like Turkey, communists had to form an alliance with the most radical sectors of the bourgeoisie, both in order to legalize themselves, and in order to find some breathing space" by making socialist movements appendages to "national progress."[42] However, as it appears with the development of the history of the communist movement in Turkey, the small TKP was not in a position to distinguish between the "progressive bourgeoisie" and "radical Kemalism," as it was very difficult to distinguish between "left-Kemalism" and its right-wing variants.[43]

On the other hand, in conformity with the new eastern orientation of its foreign policy in the early 1920s, the Soviet government pursued common interests with the nationalist government of Turkey. Drawn together by a mutual fear of the plans and activities of the Western powers in the region, Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey moved to an uneasy rapprochement. Less than a month after the "Black Sea incident" official talks between the Turkish delegation and the representatives of the Soviet government began on February 26, 1921. The negotiations were conducted on two separate subjects, one dealing with political matters and the other involving questions of military assistance. These were smoothly brought to a successful conclusion within a few weeks. The murder of leading Turkish communists in early 1921 represents the first example of the failure of the Soviet dilemma in the East: how to support the anti-communist leadership of a national liberation movement and at the same time sponsor and organize local communist groups against the nationalist leadership of the country. When the Kemalist leadership openly started to root out all communist activities in Turkey, the protests made at world communist gatherings did not affect the good diplomatic and economic relations between Moscow and Ankara. The Soviet government chose to continue its official policy of cooperation with Ankara, regardless of the fate of the local

[39] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk. An Intellectual Biography*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p. 105.
[40] Alexandre A. Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1979, pp. 76-78.
[41] StefanosYerasimos, p. 1648.
[42] Murat Belge, "The Left," p. 150, in İrvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds).
[43] Ibid.

communists loyal to Moscow. This was the first but not the last time that the interests of Soviet foreign policy directly affected other communist parties.[44]

The Turkish communist movement was weak for numerous reasons. First, as a "child" of the October Revolution and the Third International, its primary policy was the protection of Soviet socialism as well as all parties loyal to Comintern.[45] Additionally, one also has to bear in mind the genuine sympathy that existed for Kemalism. Ahmet İnsel had rightly argued that the "idea of progress" or "national progress" was perhaps the most influential concept in Turkey in the early 1920s, stronger than any other concept, let alone communism. There was a sincere belief and conviction among the left that Kemalism would bring economic development and Westernization in Turkey, and, in combination with the identification of Kemalism with the National Liberation Movement, the left saw itself as a variant of Kemalism.[46]

In terms of socialism, as part of the modernization project,[47] the Kemalist modernization project was seen as a "minimum program" between the two. If we consider that modernity is a process directly related to capitalism and the development of it,[48] then we can understand why they shared such a "minimum program."[49] The concept of late modernity has been used for countries like Turkey[50] as an indicator of the fulfillment of the modernization project undertaken by a "decisive willpower" or a conscious leadership equipped with the knowledge of modernity which then strove to realize the foundation of capitalism by the omission of some necessary steps. Since the embracing paradigm of the first period of the communist movement in Turkey was national liberation and since this paradigm was dominant over all other tendencies with which it had linkages, "the first socialist intellectuals of Turkey saw socialism not as a coherent system of thinking or a route lading to universal emancipation, but as a practical means to get the country out of the difficult situation it was facing at the

[44] All taken from Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991*, Routledge, London – New York, 2006, chapter 2, pp. 14-35.
[45] See Haluk Yurtsever, pp. 32-35.
[46] Ahmet İnsel, "Sosyalist Olduğum İçin Anti-Kemalist'im," p. 197, in Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (eds).
[47] Kemal H. Karpat, "Ideology in Turkey after the Revolution of 1960," p. 341, in Kemal H. Karpat (ed), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey – A Structural and Historical Analysis*.
[48] See among many others, Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1990; Peter Wagner, *Modernity as Experience and Interpretation. A New Sociology of Modernity*, Polity, Cambridge, 2008, esp. pp. 75-142.
[49] The socialist movement in Turkey was concerned with economic development, social justice, taxation, industrialization, workers' rights, education and a variety of welfare problems, all of which corresponded to the modernization program of the bourgeoisie and the minimum (short-term) program of socialism.
[50] Ibrahim Kaya, *Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2004.

moment."[51] Thus, the left had to adopt "a political strategy," an approach to local (the national liberation movement) and international conditions (the October Revolution, the Third International), which led to a pragmatist approach and day-to-day politics.[52]

It is unlikely that any part of the left ever considered Kemalism to be the final aim; that is, the eradication of the capitalist system of exploitation and the establishment of a socialist society ruled by the laboring classes.[53] However, the fact that both the Kemalist and the socialist movements shared to a large extent the same reforms and objectives they wished to achieve through modernization caused extensive turbulence during the Republican period. As Mete Tunçay very eloquently demonstrates, on the one hand, the Turkish left desired a non-capitalist approach to development, an attitude also adopted by the Turkish left in the 1960s, and therefore they sympathized with the Kemalist movement but, on the other hand, it opposed the Kemalist movement because it did not share the same world view.[54]

By using positivism as its scientific base, Kemalism sought the reconstruction of Turkish society,[55] and its ultimate goal was the desire for Turkey to join "modern civilization."[56] Kemalism is rightly considered a nationalist modernizing "ideology"[57] in the sense that it was based on a modernization project that was premised on the equation of modernity with progress, constantly seeking to create a modern nation-state.[58] Sympathizers of Kemalism positively presented those characteristics as being a modern, industrial, urban society based around national terms. Kemalism, on the other hand, adopted etatism as its economic model in order to reach that level of economic development and secularism to sustain cultural transformation. In sum, the Turkish left supported Kemalism's modernizing, centralist nation-state and secularism project to a great extent and found Kemalism to be progressive, anti-imperialist and at times even anti-feudal.[59] All these were considered progressive stages and,

[51] Metin Çulhaoğlu, "The History of the Socialist-Communist Movement in Turkey by Four Major Indicators," p. 173, in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds), *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, Nova Science, New York, 2002.
[52] Metin Çulhaoğlu, "Modernleşme, Batılılaşma ve Türk Solu," pp. 170-189, in Uğur Kocabaşoğlu (ed), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce,* vol 3: *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, İletişim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2002.
[53] Serpil Çelenk Güvenç, p. 47.
[54] Mete Tunçay, "Mustafa Suphi Öldürülmeseydi Muhtemelen Bakan Olurdu," p. 15, in Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (eds), Ibid.; Levent Köker shares the same point of view.
[55] See M. Şükrü Hanioğlu; Şerif Mardin, "Atatürk ve Pozitif Düşünce," pp. 189-202, in Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, İletişim, Istanbul, 2006.
[56] Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hâli. Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslâmcılık*, 3rd ed, Birikim, Istanbul, 2003, p. 26.
[57] Murat Belge, "Mustafa Kemal ve Kemalizm," p. 38, in Ahmet İnsel (ed).
[58] Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, İletişim, Istanbul 1994; Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey.*
[59] LeventKöker, "Sol, Çağdalaşma Adına Kemalizm'ı Hep Olumladı," p. 32 in Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (eds).

as such, they were easily accepted by a large segment of the left and led Kemalism to be considered a progressive movement.

As noted previously, communist parties or groups faced difficulties in legitimizing themselves and finding a political space in which to organize "an independent socialist workers' movement" and prosper. This became more evident in non-Western countries, such as in Latin America, that had weak or non-existent democratic traditions. In Turkey, a democratic tradition was absent and its place was taken by the state and the nationalist-monopolist-Kemalist ideology.[60] In the absence of its own abilities and strength, the communist movement turned to Kemalism,[61] and it was on this unpromising ground that the left sought to find some space for itself.

The global economic crisis of 1929 also had consequences in the political and social structure of the country. During the 1930s, the Turkish state prioritized industrialization to promote a mixed economy in which both state and private industries would play significant roles.[62] The journal *Kadro*, which was established in the early 1930s by five intellectuals who were influenced by and participants of the early Turkish communist movement and who became Kemalists in the process, emerged from this conjecture. The ultimate goal was to provide Kemalism with a theoretical framework.

According to the authors writing for *Kadro*, the Turkish revolution carried the seeds of anti-imperialism. The historical mission of Turkey was to create a national economy out of the remnants of a colonial economy, which the Ottoman Empire was considered to be. There was no such example before Turkey and so the nation had to create all it needed by itself. *Kadro* authors emphasized the importance of an idealist vanguard cadre which should devote itself to the national liberation movement. Seeing the Kemalist Revolution as the first successful struggle for national liberation on the periphery of the world and as a model for other national liberation movements in underdeveloped countries against imperialism, as did the TİP in the 1960s, *Kadro* writers assigned themselves the mission of generating a systematic ideology that the Kemalist Revolution deserved.[63] Unlike the Marxist view, which considered class struggle to be the primary conflict, they asserted that the primary conflict of

[60] Murat Belge "Nationalism, Democracy and the Left in Turkey," *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2009, p. 9.
[61] Seyfı Öngider, "Kemalizm'e En Büyük Darbeyi Son Dönemde Kürt Ulusal Hareketi Vurdu," p. 146, in Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır Ibid.; Metin Çulhaoğlu, "The History of the Socialist-Communist Movement in Turkey by Four Major Indicators," p. 174, in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds).
[62] Mustafa Türkeş, "A Patriotic Leftist Development-Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33, 2001, pp. 91-114.
[63] See Mustafa Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi. Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım*, İmge, Ankara, 1999; IlhanTekeli and SelimIlkin, *Kadroculaı ve Kadro'yu Anlamak, Bir Cumhuriyet Öyküsü*, Tarih Vakfı, Istanbul, 2003.

the world economic system was the metropolis-colony conflict, an approach resembling the dependency theory of later decades. They believed that national liberation movements led by revolutionary intellectual cadres would solve both of these conflicts. They wished to become the leading cadre of Turkey and saw their mission as doing whatever they could to raise up the country by enhancing it with advanced scientific, technical and cultural knowledge that would be disseminated to the public.[64] Such an approach, however, inherently posits Turkey as being underdeveloped and since the Turkish Revolution was not a class-based movement, the outcome ought to be different from socialism and capitalism, thus providing "a third way."[65]

The arguments in *Kadro* provided a more "'rational infrastructure' for Soviet favoritism of the Turkish Republic. The illegal communist party, although it despised the *Kadro* group (partly on the grounds of personal rivalries), in fact accepted their 'theoretical' approach. Under the influence of *Kadro* and the Comintern, it honored Kemalism as a progressive ideology of anti-imperialist nationalism. In this way, nationalism was sanctified."[66] Under the heavy hand of Kemalist and Cold War suppression, the communist movement turned clandestine only to re-emerge in the 1960s, giving life to some of the old ideas through the pages of publications such as *Yön* and the spread of ideas by parties such as the TİP and other leftist groups such as the MDD.

Conclusion

The effect that was caused by the interaction of nationalist bourgeois ideologies with communism had tremendous impacts upon the latter, especially when the conditions seemed to be ripe for the development and dissemination of leftist ideas. Domestic politics were dominated to such an extent by well-entrenched nationalist ideologies that the left had to invent and mobilize mechanisms that would be strong enough to counter those ideologies and secure their normal functions. The safest and most effective way for the left was to appropriate the national issue of Cyprus and integrate it into the ideological mechanisms that the left had to invent. However, the appropriation of nationalist mechanisms and motives dressed up with leftist rhetoric can be exemplified by the impact and interaction that was previously mentioned.

[64] Ilhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin, as quoted in M. Erdem Özgür, "Kadro and its Analysis of the Great Depression," *ZKÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, vol. 2, no. 4, 2006, pp. 91–103.
[65] Ali H. Bayar, "The Developmental State and Economic Policy in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1996, pp. 773-785.
[66] Ibid., p. 10.