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## **From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus**

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### **Citation**

Christofis, N. (2015, February 3). *From socialism via anti-imperialism to nationalism : EDA-TIP : socialist contest over Cyprus*. Retrieved from <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/31818>

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Cover Page



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**Issue Date:** 2015-02-03

## Introduction

When we assess the issue of Cyprus<sup>1</sup> through the perspective of the nations of Greece and Turkey, we inevitably encounter the issue of nationalism, both in Cyprus and in the so-called “motherlands.” This study takes a different approach, however, as the Cyprus Question is assessed through the perspectives of the Greek and Turkish left not through the dominant historical narrative that many studies prefer to follow. More specifically, the issue is explored through the perspectives of the legal leftist representatives of Greece and Turkey, the EDA (United Democratic Left/*Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*, 1951-1967) and the TİP (Workers’ Party of Turkey/*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, 1961-1971), respectively.

Nationalism has been one of the most powerful forces in the history of the modern world. The experience of decolonization, coupled with general developments in the social sciences, has resulted in an intensive and prolific period of research on nationalism.<sup>2</sup> Its appearance as a phenomenon has been evident in the opinions of scholars of nationalism since at least the eighteenth century. For example, Elie Kedourie argues, “Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. [...] Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.”<sup>3</sup> Ernest Gellner also asserts that nationalism is a necessary political doctrine that appeared in the modern world after the industrial revolution because political units were organized along nationalist principles, and he suggests that “the political and the national unit should be congruent.”<sup>4</sup> Gellner goes on to argue that “nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest.”<sup>5</sup> Another scholar, the late Eric J. Hobsbawm, seconds Gellner’s views on nationalism, claiming that it is “a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” and supplements this view with an understanding of it as a tendency to

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<sup>1</sup> When scholars, researchers, and analysts refer to the issue of Cyprus, it is called the “Cyprus Problem,” “Cyprus Dispute,” “Cyprus Conflict,” and “Cyprus Question.” Throughout this study it will be referred to as the latter.

<sup>2</sup> Umut Özkırmı, *Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ed., Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 39; see also his elaborative presentation and analysis on theories of nationalism.

<sup>3</sup> Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, rev. ed., Hutchinson, London, 1961 [1960], p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations Nationalism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

collective identification, which is concomitant with the state's extending reach.<sup>6</sup> Benedict Anderson suggests that a nation is an imagined community “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”<sup>7</sup>

Without going deeper into theories concerning nationalism,<sup>8</sup> we could formally argue that “nationalism... [is] a collective sentiment or identity, bounding and binding together those individuals who share a sense of large-scale political solidarity aimed at creating, legitimizing or challenging states. [And] as such, nationalism is perceived or justified by a sense of historical commonality which coheres a population within a territory and which demarcates those who belong and others who do not.”<sup>9</sup> A population’s cohesion however, as many studies have shown, is not historical but constructed by both elites and the public at large. This cohesion is derived from a sentiment or a political belief that is created in a number of ways, including by the population’s interaction with the state. It can also occur in reference to the state, without the state, or in terms of nations being identified with one another. Nationalism can serve as the basis of popular legitimacy and also be an expression of support for state power. “When nationalism coincides with an existing state it provides legitimacy, spreading acceptance and support for the state’s claim to a monopoly of coercion. When it does not support a state, it de-legitimizes, potentially threatening that state’s coercive power.”<sup>10</sup> Therefore, mass allegiance and institutional power coincide with the ideal of a “nation-state.” Nationalism should not be confused, however, “with the collective action it may or may not inspire. The idea of solidarity which seeks self-determination in a state, or which is built to justify, reinforce, or challenge rule, may or may not produce collective outcomes under particular circumstances. Only when nationalism inspires such action does it become a historical force, such action remains distinct from the sentiment or perceived imperative for it.”<sup>11</sup>

It has been argued that the collective solidarity of nationalism emerges when a population “is perceived as [being] essentially homogenous” with any “crisis of identity” thereby being

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<sup>6</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed., Verso, London – New York, 2006, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Discussions on nationalism and theories of nationalism can be interminable, since there is no coherent and accepted definition of the term.

<sup>9</sup> Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation. Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2003, p. 6; the present reference does not represent an inclusive definition of nationalism, but rather serves as a stimulus for the topic at hand.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

resolved.<sup>12</sup> The above argument perhaps has some validity, for example, in the case of Cyprus, where two communities on the island fought for the nationalist agendas of the “national centers.” Indeed, one might assume that there was a degree of homogeneity considering that the Greek Cypriot community can be identified with the Greek state and its ideological agenda. This community proclaimed *Enosis* (union with Greece), and the Turkish Cypriot community sought to be identified with the political agenda of the Turkish state. But then the process of “inventing” peoples or citizens, based upon the criteria set forth by “motherlands,” would not have taken place. The following pages will offer a discussion of the nineteenth century irredentist Greek agenda of the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), which arose following the Greek defeat in the Asia Minor campaign and was subsequently redeveloped under the guise of *Enosis* in Cyprus, thus preventing the Greek Cypriot community from shaping a Cypriot identity. Similarly, the Kemalist nation-state building process and the Turkish state became the national point of reference for Turkish Cypriots, who, unlike their Greek Cypriot counterparts, considered themselves to be Turks and not Cypriots. Seen in this way, it becomes clear that notions about common identities and the homogenizing of peoples arose gradually as they were invented, constructed, and reinforced.<sup>13</sup> This problematic of identities is still evident and dominant even today in Cyprus.

Inevitably, this study will have to take up and explore another phenomenon that is much more problematic and perplexing: the relationship between socialism and nationalism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did not provide any coherent and well-articulated theories or approaches to the relationship between the two ideologies, as it was not one of their primary concerns. This led some theorists to hold the belief that “the theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure.”<sup>14</sup> Without dismissing the importance of the subject, Anderson argued that it would be better to say that “nationalism has largely been avoided in Marxist theory, rather than confronted,” because “it has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory.”<sup>15</sup> Other scholars argued in favor of “the logical impossibility of a general analysis of this issue.”<sup>16</sup> On the other side of the argument, there are many contemporary

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<sup>12</sup> On that point, see Liah Greenfeld’s introduction in *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992; for a critique, see Anthony Marx, p. 13 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983

<sup>14</sup> Tom Nairn, “The Modern Janus,” *New Left Review*, vol. 1/94, 1975, pp. 3-29, p. 3; reproduced in Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*, New Left Books, London, 1981, p. 329. Walker Connor shares this opinion in *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, p. 28; for an alternative approach, see Umut Özkırımlı, p. 39.

<sup>15</sup> Benedict Anderson, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> Nimni in reference to Sami Zubaida; Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, Pluto Press, London – Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 5.

thinkers who adhere to the belief that nationalism is of great importance to socialism and therefore that analyses of the two must be fully explored. For example, Ronaldo Munck agrees that Marx made no serious attempts to discuss the issue and that by looking into how Marxist thinkers since the nineteenth century have been forced to deal with the powerful movement of nationalism, it can be seen that some have argued in favor of the compatibility of the latter with socialism. In short, such scholars have suggested that there is a need to forge a coherent Marxist approach to nationalism.<sup>17</sup> Schwarzmantel extends this argument further when he argues that nationalism presents an opportunity for socialism to develop a foothold and even to enhance it, both in theory and in practice, if properly taken up. Likewise, nationalism has empowered communist parties in the past.<sup>18</sup> In other words, nationalism can also be seen as being supplementary to socialism.

### **A Brief Overview of the Main Currents of Marxism Regarding the National Question**

Due to the inability of Karl Marx to directly address the issue of nationalism and thus resolve many controversies and inconsistencies concerning its place in the Marxist scheme of things, the national question was to remain a matter of serious discord among later disciples, starting from the Second International onwards, and the ramifications have been felt even down to the present day.<sup>19</sup> The clearest example of this was the opposition to national separatism and the endorsement of a policy of cultural autonomy shared both by the ultra-left Rosa Luxemburg and the centrist Austro-Marxists,<sup>20</sup> who offered harsher criticism of classical Marxism. Classical Marxists claimed that the nation was a temporary phenomenon that represented a particular stage of the development of the forces of production, and as such, it was predetermined to fade out with the abolition of class societies.<sup>21</sup> As mentioned above, Austro-Marxism posed the greatest threat to classical Marxism, and it was represented by political intellectuals such as Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, Max Adler, Friedrich Adler and others. Austro-Marxism represents a sort of third-way-thinking between or beyond (socialist) revisionism and Leninism.<sup>22</sup> Austro-Marxism conceived of Marxism, mainly via

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<sup>17</sup> Ronaldo Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, Zed Books, London, 1986.

<sup>18</sup> John Schwarzmantel, *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York – London, 1991; see also John Schwarzmantel, “Nation versus Class: Nationalism and Socialism in Theory and Practice,” pp. 45-61, in John Coakley (ed.), *The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements: The Contemporary West European Experience*, Sage, London, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> Connor, p. 28.

<sup>20</sup> A. W. Wright, “Socialism and Nationalism,” p. 153, in Leonard Tivey (ed.), *The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981.

<sup>21</sup> Nimni, p. 142.

<sup>22</sup> Günther Sandner, “Nations without Nationalism: The Austro-Marxist Discourse on Multiculturalism,” *Journal of Language and Politics*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2005, pp. 273–291, p. 274.

Max Adler, as “a system of sociological knowledge... [and] the science of the laws of social life and its causal development.”<sup>23</sup>

Karl Renner (1870-1950), a lawyer, focused on Austro-Marxism’s relation to and definition of the nation, although he dwelled to a greater extent on the legal and constitutional problems of the nationalities in the Habsburg Empire. He developed the idea of a transformation of the Empire under socialist rule into a “state of nationalities” which could eventually provide a model for the socialist organization of a future world community. Moreover, Renner defined the nation as a collective, as something that is between the individual and state. For Renner, the recognition of different nations within a state requires national rights which in turn include both individual and group rights. In this formulation, it is not only the individual members of a nation, but also the nation as a collective formation that acts as a legal entity. Significantly, this entails national-cultural autonomy.<sup>24</sup> Renner, like Bauer, described “nations as enduring forms of society and the essential agency of social change.”<sup>25</sup>

In a similar vein, Otto Bauer (1881-1938), in his classic work *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (1907), set out to provide a theoretical and historical analysis of the nation and nationality, and he concluded, “For me, history no longer reflects the struggles of nations; instead the nation itself appears as the reflection of historical struggles. For the nation is only manifested in the national character, in the nationality of the individual; and the nationality of the individual is only one aspect of his determination by the history of society, by the development of the conditions and techniques of labor.”<sup>26</sup>

Bauer, who was confronted by the particular problem of how to guarantee national rights within the framework of the multinational Austro-Hungarian state, developed a general Marxist analysis of the national question that was historical, psychological and sociological. In Bauer’s view, the peculiarity of different nations is a product of their specific histories. Therefore, the process of nation building entails an analysis of the relations and interactions between social classes and the experiences that result from that process. This is to say that nationality is a historical aspect of each individual. For Bauer, scholarship offers a lesson that can be used to define the national elements in each individual’s character by using the tools of Marxist theory of history. “This effective force,” as Bauer argues, “the historical within us, is

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<sup>23</sup> Tom Bottomore, “Austro-Marxism,” pp. 39-42, p. 40, in Tom Bottomore, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 1991.

<sup>24</sup> Sandner, pp. 276-277.

<sup>25</sup> Connor, p. 28.

<sup>26</sup> Bottomore, p. 40.

the national within us; it is that which forges us together as a nation.”<sup>27</sup> When applied to the political and territorial problem of multinational states, Austro-Marxists’ approach “involved a rejection of separate statehood for each nation but an assertion of cultural autonomy and of the constitutional arrangements necessary to secure such self-determination.”<sup>28</sup> Thus, the national character is not fixed but variable. Therefore, the existence of different national characters is not an explanation but something that has to be explained. By defining the nation as a characteristic community that has emerged from a community of fate, Bauer placed emphasis on the historic dimension. But it was not only the idea of communities of character that signified a notable break with the dominant Marxist concept of the nation. Furthermore, Bauer anticipated that national differences would be more important in a socialist world order than in the age of the nation-state. As Bauer puts it, “It is not the leveling of national particularities, but the promoting of international unity within national diversity that can and must be the task of the International.”<sup>29</sup>

Another attempt of a rather different kind was made by Polish socialist Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), who elaborated a doctrine of ongoing proletarian internationalism in opposition to the notion of national self-determination. In *The National Question and Autonomy* (1908) Luxemburg developed a systematic case against national self-determination and invoked the authority of scientific socialism.<sup>30</sup> Luxemburg considered national self-determination to be a mask for bourgeois class rule:

...[U]nder the rule of capitalism there is no self-determination of people, that in a class society, each class of the nation strives to determine itself, in a different fashion; and that the bourgeois classes, the standpoint of national freedom is fully subordinated to that of class rule.<sup>31</sup>

Rosa Luxemburg’s position on nationalism was that it was a movement in which the working class had only an indirect interest, and it was merely a cloak which, translated into foreign policy, concealed imperialistic desires and rivalries. She maintained that since

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<sup>27</sup> For Bauer, “[s]tripping the national character of its substantial appearance, by showing that the respective national character is nothing but a precipitate of past historical processes that will be further altered by subsequent historical processes” appeared as the only way of effectively challenging the nationalistic conception of history.” As quoted in Günther Sandner, p. 279; see also Walker Connor, p. 29.

<sup>28</sup> A. W. Wright, “Socialism and Nationalism,” p. 154.

<sup>29</sup> Sandner, pp. 279-280.

<sup>30</sup> A. W. Wright, p. 155.

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.marxistsfr.org/archive/luxemburg/1909/national-question/index.htm> (accessed May 2, 2014); see also the discussion in Horace B. Davis, *Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism*, Monthly Review Books, New York and London, 1978, p. 54 onwards.

socialism is against oppression of any kind, then there was no need of recourse to such bourgeois slogans such as the right of self-determination.

Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) was obliged to respond such criticism to classical Marxism, as he did to Luxemburg, in *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (1914). Before that, however, Lenin requested Joseph Stalin (1878-1953), his “favorite Georgian,” to prepare a response to Otto Bauer’s work,<sup>32</sup> which took the form of the official source of authority on Bolshevik nationality policy<sup>33</sup> and aimed at setting “the record straight” and correcting the “errors” of the Austro-Marxists. The purpose of Stalin’s account, titled *Marxism and the National Question* (1913), was to attack the Austro-Marxists and specifically the idea of cultural autonomy propagated by Bauer and Renner and the idea of separatism in Caucasus, where Stalin had campaigned against nationalism for years.<sup>34</sup> This attack was situated within the broader issue of the national question. For Stalin, the factors that comprised the nation were as follows: “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”<sup>35</sup> According to Stalin, there was no national status unless all of the above factors were present. This rigid and schematic approach to the national question became the focal point of many critiques, and proved to be insufficient for grasping the dynamic character of nationalism, ultimately giving it a negative status and “closing the door to any strategic accommodation.”<sup>36</sup>

In contrast to Stalin, Lenin elaborated to a greater extent on nationalism and left the door open for such strategic accommodation. Lenin also attacked the Austro-Marxists and the Jewish Bundists, who were, according to Lenin, “the instrument of bourgeois nationalism among the workers.”<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, he criticized Luxemburg for not understanding the significance of self-determination and claimed that because of that she unconsciously supported social imperialism.<sup>38</sup> Lenin’s definition of nation and nationalism followed in many respects the analysis of the Czech-German Marxist theoretician and authoritative promulgator of orthodox Marxism, Karl Kautsky (1854-1938). Like Kautsky, Lenin referred to the nation “as the outcome of the emerging capitalist system and see in the preponderance of national

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<sup>32</sup> Horace B. Davis, *Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism*, pp. 81-83.

<sup>33</sup> A. W. Wright, p. 156.

<sup>34</sup> Davis, p. 78.

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm> (accessed May 2, 2014).

<sup>36</sup> A. W. Wright, p. 156.

<sup>37</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Marxism and Nationalism*, Resistance Books, Australia, 2002, p. 57.

<sup>38</sup> As a political term, social imperialism is the political ideology of peoples, parties, or nations that are “socialist in words, imperialist in deeds.” V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1970, p. 133.

movements an expression of bourgeois hegemony.” In Lenin’s elaboration, there is an organic correspondence between “the economic logic and organizational tendencies of the capitalist mode of production” and the “formation and consolidation of national states.” The emergence of national movements, in this sense, is the reflection of “the superstructural response to this organizational tendency.” Since the hegemonic class in the period of capitalist expansion is the bourgeoisie, national movements accordingly represent the needs and requirements of the bourgeois class.<sup>39</sup> In short, “the bourgeoisie and the nation are connected in a relation of causality from the former to the latter.”<sup>40</sup> In discussing the role of the national state, an outcome exclusively owing to the capitalist system in the development of the capitalist mode of production, Lenin made a clear distinction between two historical different periods: first, that of the collapse of feudalism and absolutism, and second, that of fully formed capitalist states which are accompanied by a high degree of antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. During the second stage of capitalist development, and because the bourgeoisie consolidate power and develop the capitalist mode of production to its own benefit, he argued that national liberation movements should be supported by the communists. In that way, the communists would seize power themselves, as the national struggle, which was innately “bourgeois,” would have no function after capitalism had matured.<sup>41</sup>

Both before and during WWI, Lenin realized that nationalism was more powerful than class consciousness, an opinion that was formulated also by the growing national question in the Russian Empire. He held to the belief that nationalism was the universal characteristic of the early stage of capitalism and that it would disappear with the maturing of capitalism:

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc...

Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development; the latter characterizes a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Nimni, p. 78; Erkan Doğan, *Articulating Socialism with Nationalism: A Critical Analysis of Nationalism in the Turkish Leftist Tradition in the 1960s*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2010, p. 40.

<sup>40</sup> Nimni, *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> James M. Blaut, *The National Question: Decolonising the Theory of Nationalism*, forward by Juan Mari Bras, Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1987, p. 127.

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/crnq/3.htm> (accessed May 2, 2014).

In his attempt to define the relationship between socialist internationalism and national rights, Lenin advanced the slogan of “national self-determination,” per the terms of which he recognized that nations have rights, and this was a slogan that “epitomizes all the problems which it was designed to settle.”<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, although recognition of national rights is an essential condition for international solidarity, this principle was not perpetuated after October 1917,<sup>44</sup> as demonstrated by the invasion of Poland in 1920 and the occupation of Georgia in 1921, or even later with the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Lenin did not believe in an unqualified right of self-determination. “The self-determination of nations,” he wrote, “means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state.”<sup>45</sup> For Lenin, this meant political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state.

From 1914 until his death in 1924, nationalism was a recurring topic of Lenin’s speeches and treatises. He spent considerable time and effort trying to figure out how to “combat nationalism when necessary and how to manipulate it in the interest of the international movement whenever possible.”<sup>46</sup> As he took up such endeavors, Lenin placed great stress on the role of colonies, and perhaps even more than Marx or Engels, he came to appreciate “the tactical wisdom of ostensible alliances with national forces.”<sup>47</sup> In strategic terms, Lenin’s conceptualization was a reflection of the participation and acquisition of the leading role by the socialists in “progressive national movements” and an alliance with oppressed peoples against oppressors/capitalists. As he noted in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, “Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of ‘advanced’ countries.”<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the nationalism of oppressed national minorities acquired a democratic and progressive content, reminiscent of the Marxian motto that “a nation cannot be free if it oppresses other nations” and he pointed out that “the bourgeoisie nationalism of any oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we unconditionally support.”<sup>49</sup> For Lenin, supporting the right of oppressed nations to self-determination against the nationalism of oppressor nations meant limiting the influence of nationalism within the working-class movement itself.

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<sup>43</sup> A. W. Wright, p. 157.

<sup>44</sup> Michael Löwy, *Fatherland or Mother Earth? Essays on the National Question*, Pluto Press and IIRE, London and Virginia, 1998, p. 59.

<sup>45</sup> <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1a/cwg/part4.htm> (accessed May 2, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> Connor, p. 31.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/pref02.htm> (accessed May 2, 2014).

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in Erkan Doğan, p. 42.

For Lenin, more than for any other Marxist theoretician of his time, the strategic importance of the national question was in the political domain. Such a position indicated his appreciation for the revolutionary potential of countries dominated by imperialism. For Lenin, imperialism was a world-system which was divided between a small group of national states that oppressed the majority of peripheral social constructions. He argued that the antagonistic nature of the relationship between dominant, or oppressor, national states and peripheral oppressed peoples constitutes the main contradiction of the imperialist system.<sup>50</sup> From the above, Lenin inferred that nationalism does not only belong to the period in which capitalism emerged, but that it is also intensified in the era of imperialist expansion. In the same vein, the nationalism of the periphery is transformed into an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-colonial force. For that reason, he supported an alliance between the Soviet Union and the national liberation movements of the periphery, which included Asia and Africa.

The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan wars—such is the chain of world events of *our* period in our “Orient.” And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of a *whole series* of bourgeois-democratic national movements which strive to create nationally independent and nationally uniform states. It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighboring countries are passing through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to self-determination.<sup>51</sup>

The distinction between the nationalism of the oppressed and of the oppressor legitimized the former while condemning the latter, an approach that will become quite clear in the case of Greece and Turkey. At the same time, nationalism acquired “an emancipatory dimension as a rebellion against unjust oppression and its limits as a particularistic ideology.”<sup>52</sup> The above distinction led to the false assumption that the left cannot be associated with nationalism. It is also quite misleading to ask whether nationalism is a politics of the right or of the left. In fact, it is neither. This confusion over whether nationalism is a right-wing or a left-wing movement “has become greatly prevalent owing to the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia, and the wide popularity and respect which the writings of its leaders, Lenin and Stalin, have attained.”<sup>53</sup> Both the left and right are concepts that appeared during the course of the struggle between

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<sup>50</sup> Nimni, pp. 82-83.

<sup>51</sup> <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch03.htm> (accessed May 2, 2014).

<sup>52</sup> Löwy, p. 59.

<sup>53</sup> “The attitude of the Bolshevik leaders towards national problems was a strict and subordinate corollary of their Marxism, and of the struggle for revolutionary socialism which engaged all their energies. In their theory, national movements could be both progressive and retrogressive, depending on the stage of economic development at which they occurred.” Elie Kedourie, pp. 89-90.

the aristocracy, middle class and working class in European countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As historical concepts, they cannot be disassociated from their particular histories. “The connection between socialism and nationalism has existed for a long time, it is like one of these common law unions which practice and habit render commonplace and extremely unremarkable. Less so, if only because theoretical discussion has insisted upon their incompatibility, is the ideological alliance of the two, an alliance that interests us here.”<sup>54</sup>

The association between socialism and nationalism started to increase in strength and become more evident during the antifascist period in WWII, becoming “an association which has subsequently been reinforced by the experience of anti-imperial struggle in colonial countries.”<sup>55</sup> Socialism triumphed in the less developed periphery of the capitalist world, but not in advanced capitalist metropolises. Socialism appeared to be an ideology of the Third World, and “a nationalist interpretation of socialism became one of the dominant political idioms of social change and development on the periphery of the world.”<sup>56</sup> In the Third World, “nationalism is identified with socialism, the peasantry with the proletariat, anti-imperialism with anti-capitalism, until all the distinctions painfully elaborated in Marxist literature for a century are cast overboard in favor of a simple dichotomy: Western imperialism versus the starving masses of the Third World.”<sup>57</sup> Self-determination or national liberation is a key concept in Third World rhetoric in that it is signified indirectly in Marxist theory, and the concept was given substance and a wider spectrum of action by Lenin. In his theory of imperialism, Lenin argued that nationalism appears not only with the emergence of capitalism but with imperialism as well, i.e. via territorial expansion.<sup>58</sup> Thus, nationalism works as a bastion against imperialist outlooks and hence constitutes an indispensable tool of Marxist ideology. Still, Marxist movements and states failed to find a solution to “the national question” and prevent the break-up of comprehensive parties when national pressures were great. Indeed, “Marxist movements and states have tended to become national not only in form but also in substance, i.e., nationalist.”<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Eugen Weber, “Nationalism, Socialism and National-Socialism France,” *French Historical Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3, Spring 1962, p. 275.

<sup>55</sup> Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Tradition*, p. 148.

<sup>56</sup> John H. Ehrenreich, “Socialism, Nationalism and Capitalist Development,” *Review of Radical Political Economics*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1983. pp. 1-42, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup> As quoted in Erkan Doğan, p. 57.

<sup>58</sup> Vladimir I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Penguin, London, 2010.

<sup>59</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Some Reflections on ‘The Break-Up of Britain,’” *New Left Review*, no. 105, pp. 3-23, p. 13.

Socialists, in their efforts to reconcile or generate a positive attitude towards nationalism, ended up subordinating socialism to nationalism, which has so often been used as a legitimizing device for the right.<sup>60</sup> Both the Greek and Turkish left have fallen into this group of socialist movements, which when not suppressed by the right chose to subordinate socialism to nationalism. However, the basic argument and goal of the present study is to demonstrate the variety and differences of the nationalisms of the dominant narratives, i.e., the right, and left, through the Cyprus Question. In other words, how did the policies of the two Marxist-oriented parties adopt a nationalist rhetoric? Were they nationalist from the start? And if not, how did they eventually end up being so?

The Greek and Turkish left were allowed to operate but only under the strict surveillance of the state, as Greece and Turkey were in alliance with the Western bloc and Cold War realities dictated this in societies where nationalism was well-entrenched. In fact, the whole nation-state building process was undertaken through the dynamics of nationalism, and empowered by powerful apparatuses such as schools, the army, the judiciary and one of the favorite tools of the right, anti-communist propaganda. Marxist ideology, as will be discussed later, was always suppressed, doomed to operate illegally underground. Marxism and nationalism, as protean ideologies, “changed their shape at will depending on the political agents involved; when they intersected each other, they transformed each other.”<sup>61</sup>

Ideas and concepts such as socialism and nationalism change the moment they interact with each other. Essentialist strategies, however, proceed through a consideration of an ideal type of socialism, and once they are defined, novel elements cannot easily be integrated into them. In light of these issues, this study will be empirically based on the activities and ideas of people commonly thought of as being socialists. This study will also take up a “historical strategy” in discussing and demonstrating the meaning of Greek and Turkish socialism and nationalism in relation with the Cyprus Question.<sup>62</sup> This historical strategy shares the same starting point as the essentialists: “one selects the organizations and thinkers which self-identify as socialists, and tells their stories in a conventional empirical fashion, highlighting similarities and differences. In that, no definition of socialism is required: socialism becomes what socialists do.” As the Greek and Turkish “cases” influence each other incessantly, our approach differentiates from others, and it will be based in its largest part on an *explorative*

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<sup>60</sup> Schwarzmantel, p. 2.

<sup>61</sup> Yannis Sygkelos, *Nationalism From the Left: The Bulgarian Communist Party during the Second World War and the Early Post-War Years*, Brill, Leiden – Boston, 2011, p. 239.

<sup>62</sup> Donald Sassoon, “Socialism in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Reflection,” *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2000, pp. 17-34; reprinted in Michael Freeden (ed.), *Reassessing Political Ideologies. The Durability of Dissent*, Routledge, London – New York, 2001, pp. 49-66.

*contrast*, rather than a causal explanation. In the end, such a historical strategy takes up the connections between a particular ethical view of the world as championed by socialists and their actions in the domain of practical politics. How such a theory and such practices are modified over time is thus the central preoccupation of the historical approach.<sup>63</sup>

### **Why Greece and Turkey? Why the EDA and TİP?**

It is widely accepted that comparative historical analysis works best when applied to a set of a few cases that share certain basic features. The cases need to be carefully selected and the criteria for grouping them together must be made explicit. Greek and Turkish left-wing parties offer an adequate level of similarity for such a comparison. Furthermore, the fact that the two cases, the Greek and Turkish, are so related means also that reciprocal influences cannot be excluded. First of all, despite some differences, they belong to the same political tradition. They represent the official legal socialist parties of the two countries and they managed to play a distinct role in their countries' political scene, although neither of them managed to become hegemonic, although, at least, in the Greek case the EDA was supported by a large percentage of the population and hence had a major impact on the general political scene. Despite the political and cultural differences of Greece and Turkey, they operated within the same anti-communist, suppressive Cold War environment. In the Greek case, the EDA emerged after the Civil War (1946-1949), while the TİP came into being after the military coup d'état of 1960. To a large extent they share the same ideological standpoints; both of them chose a "legal means to attain power" and they hold similar ideological standpoints. Both parties attempted to create the conditions for a different state model and proposed and fought for a foreign policy that differed from than the dominant one as regards the Cyprus Question.

The choice to approach the Cyprus Question from a left-wing standpoint was made consciously, as the majority of scholars – Greek, Turkish, and foreign – continue to treat the subject with respect to a "national" ideology. This tradition approaches the Cyprus Question as a "national" issue *par excellence* and therefore as is common in the narratives of Greece and Turkey "national" always means right/conservative, or simply non-leftist. Lastly, and most importantly, the Greek and Turkish case offers a test case suitable for demonstrating how socialists have dealt with nationalism and the nature of their relationships with it.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

Having said the above, a point of clarification should be made. As the present work is less about Cyprus and more about the “use” of Cyprus as yardstick to both, Greek and Turkish left, the reader might think that Cyprus plays no actual part in inter and intra Greek and Turkish politics. This is not the case. Although, the “agency of Cyprus”, does not dominate a large part, or even better, the place it deserved throughout our endeavor, it was tried when necessary, to narrate the politics undergoing in Cyprus, but most importantly, those politics that were more directly relevant and connected to the decision-making process in Greece and Turkey. Thus, although the inclusion of a third country to our narrative was avoided, there were efforts made to incorporate those elements that were crucial to our understanding of the decision-making and transformations of the Greek and Turkish left.

### **Structure of the Thesis**

The thesis is composed of three parts, the first of which focuses on the development of the communist movement in Greece and Turkey and offers a discussion of the historical path of leftist movements from their emergence up until the period under study. The third chapter presents the historical framework of the Cyprus Question to give the framework of the developments that took place in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to Greece and Turkey.

The second part of the thesis presents the histories of the EDA and TIP. Each chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which provides a historical discussion of the parties. First the trajectory of their development is traced, starting with the establishment of the parties and the conditions under which they formed is discussed in addition to the factors which contributed to this process throughout their existence and thus shaped their political agenda. These factors include the Cold War, anti-communism, notions concerning the Third World, and anti-colonialism. The second part of the chapters directly links with the first one, dealing exclusively with the Cyprus Question and the parties’ policies on the issue from the time they were established up until historical developments in each country led them to be closed down.

The third part of the study is divided into five chapters, each one dealing with an aspect of the study in a comparative manner. The first of these chapters attempts to define the main reasons which led the parties to take up one policy or strategy over another. Specifically, in this chapter the driving force behind the left’s politics is identified as the impact of the main ideological schemes of the state: *Ethnikofrosyni* and Kemalism. After identifying and analyzing the impact that these “ideologies” had on the left, the chapter proceeds with a discussion of the ideological mechanisms they chose in order to provide a counter balance for

the ideological schemes that were mentioned earlier. The left, as with the right, seems to have drawn heavily on the established national pantheon. While never refraining from referring to and seeking to promote communist/socialist revolutions in general, the left “nationalized” their discourses and dressed them up in colors sanctioned by the dominant hegemonic ideology. After a discussion of these topics, the third chapter will explore the issue of internationalism and whether the left adopted an internationalist approach as regards Cyprus. The next two chapters, which are directly linked, are concerned with the issue of anti-imperialism and expressions of anti-Americanism. What becomes evident is that although anti-imperialism has remained a verbal device directed against representatives of the right, anti-Americanism is a discourse in itself, the extent and expression of which, whether verbal or physical, depends on historical conjunctures and the agents who have expressed this sentiment.