2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Visions of the Future and the Concept of Utopia

As previously stated, this study will deal with works of Turkish literature written prior to and following the Balkan War, specifically those offering a perspective on the future of Turkey, setting a goal, or devising a specific formula for salvation or progress. It will also seek to identify the process of trauma in the aftermath of the Balkan War, by comparing works produced before the War with those produced after it.

Such an aim inevitably compels us to come to terms with the concept of "utopia." There is some uncertainty regarding this topic; indeed, from some points of view, it may not even be possible to classify the works featured in this thesis as "utopias." The primary reason for such hesitancy, perhaps, is the Eurocentric character of the alternative ways of life or dreams of the future found in these texts. In other words, instead of presenting visions derived from an entirely free imaginary world, these works take their bearings from Western European civilization, a civilization they both wished to emulate and viewed as a rival and threat. Striving not to fall behind Western Europe, catching up with it, even overtaking it, became their directly or indirectly stated goal.[18] Consequently, the majority of these utopias – as will be explained below – cannot be considered "*u*-topias" per se; they had a definite *topos*, namely that of Europe. However, the Europe they sought to emulate was not a geographical entity, but rather a theoretical "construct."

At the same time, it would not be meaningful or productive to analyze the works in this thesis by forsaking the concept of utopia altogether. To be sure, this depends on how utopia is defined. Various parameters found in different definitions of the term furnish useful keys for evaluating these works. For instance, the works dealt with here contain many of the themes, techniques, motifs, and approaches encountered in a number of utopias from the *Utopia* of Thomas More to those written today. These include discussions of the societal conditions and mindset which make utopias feasible; a critical attitude towards existing reality; a capacity for imagining a place that is chronologically or geographically remote, or for inventing an alternative way of life and describing it in detail; efforts to evoke a desire for utopia; and the literary device of having the hero travel around accompanied by a guide. Most importantly, when one takes into account the authors' motivations and the conditions in which they lived, it

[18] Murat Belge, "Ütopya" [Utopia] in *Ütopya* [Utopia], ed. Ali Bülent Kutvan (Istanbul: İndex, 2004), 39-44; Uğur Tanyeli, "Zihinsel Yapımız Ütopyaya Kapalı mı?" [Does Our Intellectual Makeup Preclude Utopia?], *İstanbul* 5 (April 1993): 22-25.

becomes obvious that each work – despite its stylistic flaws – is, in essence, the product of an entirely utopian way of thinking.

For this reason, it will be useful to include an explanation here on the positioning of the concept of utopia – how it is perceived and how it is defined.[19]

Utopias – which we can define, roughly speaking, as ideals of the "good life," or as plans for an "ideal society" bear a diverse range of implications. They could be considered as imaginative texts showing how societies ought to evolve, and evoking a wish for such an evolution; or they could be seen as social critiques; they could even be viewed as crude daydreams or as a "literature of escapism." In addition to literary utopian texts, social movements, political schools of thought, and religious sects have also at times been classified as utopian.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term "utopia" as follows:

- an imaginary place in which the government, laws, and social conditions are perfect
- an imaginary and indefinitely remote place
- often capitalized: a place of ideal perfection especially in laws, government, and social conditions
- an impractical scheme for social improvement[20]

In fact, this definitional multivalence dates back to the coining of the word. An invention of Sir Thomas More (1478–1535), the term "utopia" was created by combining the Greek word *topos* [place] with the prefix "u," which could serve equally well as the English pronunciation of *ou* [Greek for "not"] or of *eu* [Greek for "good/well"]. Due to this deliberate ambiguity, "utopia" has come to be used in the sense of a place which does not exist, but where people want to live.[21]

Before attempting a detailed, comparative definition which will serve as a productive analytical tool in this thesis, it would be worthwhile to take a brief look at the history of the concept of utopia.

2.1.1. Narratives of Alternative Ways of Life before More's *Utopia*

Visions of an ideal society which could be said to possess utopian characteristics had also been produced prior to More's *Utopia*, even if it was the latter that lent its name to

[19] The lines that follow base their definition and history of utopia on the relevant section in my 2005 Master's thesis entitled "Visions of an Ideal Society in Literary Utopias of the Republican Period." For a more detailed analysis of the concept of utopia, the reader is referred to the aforementioned thesis: Kılıç, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi."

[20] "Utopia," Merriam-Webster, accessed July 30, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utopia.

[21] Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), 2.

the term. Below, I will briefly touch on these – as far as is necessary for the purposes of this thesis – while grouping them thematically.

Myths of the Golden Age

Many cultures have possessed an Age of Felicity or a Golden Age: a past era in which, it is believed, humans once lived a life that was simple, happy, and free, lacking nothing. The origin of these myths dates all the way back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, in which there is a description of the land of Dilmun, where humans live peacefully, in harmony with nature, amid springs that never run dry, without needing to work.[22] Hesiod's *Works and Days*, Vergil's *Eclogues* (with their depiction of the land of Arcadia), and Ovid's *Metamorphoses* are important examples of this genre.

The belief in the Golden Age depends on a very specific conception of time. This cyclical understanding of history, which entered Islamic philosophy by way of Plato and Ibn Khaldun (and which, incidentally, was also prevalent in Ottoman culture), finds its quintessential expression in the *Works and Days*: in Hesiod's poem, the Golden, Silver, Bronze, and Iron Ages follow each other in sequence, along with generations of humans befitting each respective age.[23] Naturally, there is a hierarchy of value among these Ages. Additional examples of Golden Age myths could include the *Krita Yuga* [the initial "Perfect Age"] in the Indian epic the *Mahabharata*; the "Dreamtime" of the Australian Aborigines; and the "Age of Perfect Virtue" in Chinese Daoism.[24] In addition to such ahistorical, mythical Golden Ages, one can also encounter historical ones. In this context, one might mention references to the Roman Empire in the European tradition of the Golden Age; allusions to the time of Muhammad in Islamic culture; or references in Ottoman poetry to – for example – the period from Fatih Sultan Mehmet to Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, seen as the Ottoman Golden Age. Myths of the Golden Age, in addition to their nostalgia for this supposed past time, might be said to suggest that if only people lived the way they did in the Golden Age, they would be as happy as the inhabitants of the latter.

Paradise Myths

Paradise myths are another type of narrative[25] centering on the theme of the "happy life."[26] As late as the 16th century, many cultures believed that Paradise was

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[22] Daniel Hollis III, *The ABC-Clio World History to Utopian Movements* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1998), 41.

[23] Michéle Riot-Sarcey, Thomas Bouchet, Antoine Picon, *Ütopyalar Sözlüğü* [Dictionary of Utopias], trans. Turhan Ilgaz (Istanbul: Sel, 2003), 13.

[24] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 5.

[25] In this thesis I will make frequent references to the term "narrative". Manfred Jahn defines it as "a form of communication which presents a sequence of events caused and experienced by characters." (Jahn, *Narratology*) I will be using this term in this sense.

[26] For Paradise Myths, see Kumar, *Utopianism*, 5; Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

located somewhere on Earth; numerous epics were written telling stories of the discovery of this Paradise. Examples include the Islands of the Blessed, where the living bodies of Greek and Roman heroes ended up; the Tibetan legend of Shambala, a mysterious kingdom in a remote Himalayan valley, where perfect Enlightenment and true Buddhism hold sway; and the Paradise Islands seen by Sinbad the Sailor. Traces of these ancient legends of an earthly paradise can frequently be found in Christian Paradise Myths, as well. The belief that the Garden of Eden existed on Earth was based on a line in the Book of Genesis: "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed." (Genesis 2:8) We know from Columbus's letters, among other things, that he was in search of the "Kingdom of Prester John," a legend which was apparently an amalgamation of the Biblical Paradise and the legend of the *Fortunatae Insulae* [Fortunate Isles] of Celtic mythology.[27] Furthermore, there is the earthly paradise in the Atlantic Ocean known as St. Brendan's Isle, mentioned in a 9th century legend narrating the sea voyage of the eponymous Irish saint (484–577); as soon as it had been penned, the legend was immediately accepted as fact. For centuries, St. Brendan's Isle was shown on maps, and voyages to discover the island were carried out as late as the 18th century. Columbus, too, mentions this island in his journal as though it were real.[28]

Messianic/Mahdist/Millenarian Texts

Another significant vein of thought relevant to the Utopian canon consists of beliefs regarding the coming of the Messiah or Mahdi, as well as Millenarian beliefs. Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism contain many versions of a "savior" figure, whose coming will herald the start of a new age. This savior will fight pitched battles with a Satanic figure representing the forces of evil, but will be victorious in the end, ushering in a new age of universal peace, plenty, and justice in the world.[29] I will not go into a more detailed discussion of the beliefs that have arisen among the various conservative and radical sects within these faiths. What they share in common is an anticipation of a savior who will realize a vision of an ideal society and establish a terrestrial paradise. From the 16th century German peasant rebellion led by Thomas Muntzer to the Diggers

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1979), 33–44 and Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, Lyman Tower Sargent, ed. *Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in The Western World* (New York: Oxford University Press and New York Public Library, 2000), 38–49.

[27] Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, "Tarihin Sonu Senaryosu Olarak Ütopya" [Utopia as an End-of-History Scenario] in Ali Bülent Kutvan, *Ütopya* (Istanbul: Index, 2004), 13; Kumar, *Utopianism*, 5.

[28] Akşit Göktürk, *Ada: İngiliz Yazınında Ada Kavramı* [Island: The Concept of the Island in English Literature] (Istanbul: Adam, 1982), 22–23.

[29] The origin of the tradition of awaiting the Messiah/Mahdi in monotheistic religions dates back to Jewish Messianism. The Hebrew word *mashiah* originally meant "anointed (with oil)"; as there was a custom of anointing kings with oil at their coronation ceremonies, it came to be used as a metonym for "king." After the destruction of the First Temple and the Babylonian exile, the term later came to indicate a future king (of the line of David) who would re-establish the Kingdom of Israel. Disasters like the Roman Conquest and the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Temple strengthened the Jews' belief in the Messiah. See Kumar, *Utopianism*, 7–8.

and Fifth Monarchists during the 17th century English Civil War, from the Shakers and Mormons of 19th century America to the Jehovah's Witnesses of the 20th century, many sects have adopted beliefs of this nature.[30] The belief in the Mahdi – a just ruler who will pave the way for the second coming of the Messiah – has also cropped up in different versions in Muslim societies, generally during times of revolt.[31]

The "City" as a Utopia

The city is another central theme in utopian thought – in ancient Greece and Mesopotamia as well as in the Renaissance – and one which would have a profound influence on later thinkers. Envisioned as the embodiment of the good life and the ideal society, the city was viewed in pre-Renaissance times as a small-scale reflection of God's universal order. This divine order was reflected both in the configuration of the city and in its operation.

Discipline is the most conspicuous feature of the ideal city. While some allowance might be made for private life, this is only possible within the framework of strict governmental supervision. Such a state of affairs reflects the original purpose of the city, namely communal living. For the same reason, one can encounter a social hierarchy within these ideal cities. The divine hierarchy of the universe is reflected in the city's functional division of labor.[32] The best-known work in this category is Plato's *Republic*. The dialogue, written in approximately 360 BC, portrays a city whose key elements are authority and discipline. With its prediction of class division – and of a system in which every aspect of life is planned and monitored by the authorities – the *Republic* has had a profound effect upon modern utopias.[33]

The entire utopian tradition has been deeply influenced by the notion of an ideal city, self-sufficient, closely supervised, based on a social hierarchy, and reflecting the divine order of the universe. Nearly all late Renaissance utopias – the chief examples being Andreae's *Christianopolis* (1619) and Campanella's *La città del Sole* [The City of the Sun] (1602) – have reproduced this structure.

Additionally, innumerable legends, romances, and works of science fiction have been written about ideal societies said to exist in the past or in the future, on this earth or on other planets, such as the lost continent of Atlantis, the hidden valley of Shangri-La, the far-off land of El Dorado, the Land without Evil of the Brazilian Guarani people, the way of life of the "Noble Savage," or civilizations found on Earth or on the Moon.

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[30] Kumar, Utopianism, 6–11.

[31] For more on Mahdist belief under the Ottoman Empire, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlı Kültürü ve Gündelik Yaşam* [Ottoman Culture and Daily Life], trans. Elif Kılıç, 2nd edition (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 87–89.

[32] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 12.

[33] John Carey, ed. *The Faber Book of Utopias* (London: Faber and Faber, 1999), 12.

2.1.2. *Utopia* and Modern Times

Despite the evident contributions made to utopian thought by Golden Age myths, Paradise myths, Millenarian practices, Mahdist traditions, etc., still, none of these come to mind when we say the word "utopia." When we speak of "utopia," we do not mean a vision of the good life based on religious beliefs, divine interventions, hedonist fantasies, etc. Rather, when we use this term, it refers to a dream of a well-run society founded upon human intellect and human will, one which possesses some relevance to currently existing conditions. These kinds of works are encountered following the arrival of Modernity, specifically after the publication of *Utopia*. In this connection, let us briefly return to the aforementioned work**.**

Published by Sir Thomas More in 1516 under the full title *Libellus vere aureus, nec minus salutaris quam festivus, de optimo rei publicae statu deque nova insula Utopia* [A Truly Golden Little Book, no less Beneficial than Entertaining, Concerning the Optimal State of a Republic and the New Island of Utopia], *Utopia* consists of a series of recollections of the voyages of Raphael Hythloday, a traveler whom the author claims to have met in Antwerp. Depicted as a just, happy, egalitarian society, Utopia is an island nation cut off from the mainland by a canal dug by King Utopus, a place where money and private property are unknown, leaders are chosen by election each year, people work six hours a day, societal supervision and regulations are set with mathematical precision, luxury and waste are avoided, and life is lived in harmony with nature and human intellect. A vision of an ideal humanistic society, resistant to being classified in terms of then-existing types of narrative, *Utopia* would later give its name to a genre featuring many such works.

When we examine the course taken by the utopian genre after More's *Utopia*, it becomes eminently clear that these narratives are a product of that monumental transformation in the human mindset known as Modernity, which puts a premium on the individual, the intellect, science, and progress. In addition to the Renaissance – and, in the longer term, the Reformation – the voyages and discoveries of the 16th century played a decisive role in this process. These voyages had a direct impact on the literary form of the utopian genre; from More's *Utopia* onwards, all early-period utopias consisted of tales of "fortunate countries" discovered by travelers.

Following More, science became an additional element of utopias. Just as More's egalitarianism had challenged the hierarchy of the ideal states of antiquity, so Bacon's *New Atlantis* – which could be characterized as a "scientific utopia" – put an end to the scientific inertia of all previous ideal societies, including More's. After Bacon, equality and science became the necessary conditions for any utopia.[34]

In many 17th century utopias – especially Campanella's *City of the Sun* and Andreae's *Christianopolis* – science is seen as a means of better understanding God and

[34] This fact highlights one of the most important contradictions of utopias: the advance of science, which does not recognize any final, terminal goal, will often clash with the utopian order, which has already reached perfection. Kumar, *Utopianism*, 54.

his works, and creating a truly Christian society. With their carefully planned, heavily monitored imaginary countries, where private property, individualism, and ambition have been cast out, utopian writers of this period once more put science and technology at the center of their utopias, while also having them serve spiritual ends.

Another encomium of rationality can be found in Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), in the fourth book of which Gulliver visits the island of the Houyhnhnms, a race of intelligent horses. By nature, the Houyhnhnms value intelligence above all else in their lives. They have no feelings of lust, and never tell lies. The island is also inhabited by a humanoid race known as the Yahoos, who act according to their urges, and are hated by the Houyhnhnms. In fact, Gulliver himself is expelled from the island on account of his physical resemblance to the Yahoos.[35]

As Krishan Kumar, professor of sociology who wrote extensively on utopias, points out, towards the end of the 17th century the center of utopian thought shifts from England to France, and new themes are added to the idea of utopia.[36] The most important of these is the theme of "time." Influenced by the geographical discoveries of their day, utopias had begun as an island; later, following the astronomical discoveries of Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, etc., they had turned into planets; but their separation from the known world was still only a matter of *location*. With Louis Sebastien Mercier's 1770 work *L'An 2440* [The Year 2440], utopias now became oriented towards the future. In the words of the French philosopher Charles Renouvier, "eutopia" was transformed into "euchronia."[37]

By the 19th century, we encounter a very different picture. In a world which had witnessed the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, and imperialist expansion, there was no longer a wish to find lost terrestrial paradises or to establish an isolated island state with an ideal communal life; rather, there was a desire to create a scientific, political social model which would bring about the liberation of all humanity. Utopia, in this period, is not a fiction; it is a theory. Moreover, in an atmosphere in which socialist theories were debated under the leadership of thinkers like Saint-Simon, Fourier, Comte, and Marx, in particular, the concept of "utopia" takes on a negative meaning. Reacting to criticisms that his work was "utopian," Marx declared that he was "not writing recipes for the soup kitchens of the future."[38]

In the 20th century, with the gradual realization of the traditional utopian vision that valued equality over freedom and strictly monitored private and public life, utopias began to be supplanted by anti-utopias or dystopias. Zamyatin's *We* (1920), Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), Orwell's *1984* (1949), and similar works carry the "positive" elements of previous utopias (such as discipline, order, planning, and technological advances) to their logical extreme; in doing so, they depict the darkness of the totalitarian societies to which these elements would give rise.

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[35] Schaer et al., *Utopia*, 180–183.
[36] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 57.
[37] Manuel and Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World*, 4.
[38] Marx, quoted in Kumar, *Utopianism*, 32.

Following in the footsteps of these works are anarchist utopias, feminist utopias, and ecological utopias. In a world where repression holds sway, these utopias – which now prize the ideal of liberty over that of order – advance a vision of future freedom. What previous utopias had considered the indispensable elements of a perfect society have now – in these latter-day utopias – become defects. Thus, in place of an overbearing, centralist order, the ideal of a perfect society becomes predicated on the goal of individual freedom. Examples of such utopias include Marge Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time* (1976), Ursula Le Guin's *The Dispossessed* (1975) and *Always Coming Home* (1986), and Ernest Callenbach's *Ecotopia*.

2.1.3. How to Define Utopia

Having thus provided an outline of the development of the utopian genre, we can now turn to the issue of its definition. At the beginning of this chapter I made reference to the vagueness of the term "utopia." Indeed, right from its inception, this concept has given rise to a voluminous literature concerning its definition, scope, and function. Various writers have adopted different – and, at times, mutually contradictory – approaches. Therefore, I will first touch on the main points of this literature, in order to reveal the relevant debates and points of controversy; afterwards, I will attempt to arrive at a definition of utopia to be used as a reference-point in this thesis.

When we examine attempts to define utopia, it appears that the prevailing approach is generally a negative one, which differs considerably from the current understanding of the term. As Manuel and Manuel report, one of the oldest works to evaluate utopia as a genre, Louis Reybaud's *Etudes sur les Réformateurs ou Socialistes Modernes* [Studies on the Reformers, or the Modern Socialists] (1840), describes utopias as "destructive." Writing in the same period, Robert von Mohl gives utopias the epithet *Staatsromane* [novels of the state], considering them works of political science.[39]

But it was Marx and Engels who staged the greatest coup against utopias, which were, in their view, "fantasies which had outlived their expiration date." I have already quoted Marx's furiously anti-utopian remark above. As for Engels, another theorist of utopia named Marie Berneri writes that he equated utopias with "all social schemes which did not recognize the division of society into classes, the inevitability of the class struggle and of social revolution."[40] Engels's pamphlet *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*[41] [Socialism: Utopian and Scientific] (1880) effectively turned the term "utopian socialism" into an epithet of contempt.

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[39] Manuel and Manuel, *Utopian Thought*, 10.

[40] Berneri, quoted in Levitas, *Utopia*, 29.

[41] It is first published in France and in French (Friedrich Engels: *Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique*. Traduction francaise par Paul Lafargue. Paris: Derveaux Libraire-Éditor, 1880). Although the literal translation of the original German title is "The Development of Socialism from

All the same, Marxism has generally been treated as part of the utopian canon. According to Levitas, the writer Moritz Kaufmann – in his 1879 book *Utopias* – uses the word "utopia" as virtually synonymous with "socialism," describing his own book as "a consideration of 'the principal socialist schemes' since the Reformation." Kaufmann states that all utopian projects will do away with excesses of wealth and poverty. As in all works written about utopia during this period, there is an emphasis on the idea of progress.[42]

In addition, the 1929 book *Ideologie und Utopie* [Ideology and Utopia] by Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) had lasting effects on 20th century utopian works. Examining the inter-relationship between the two concepts in the book's title, Mannheim contends that they transcend the reality out of which they arise, but are also incongruous with this reality. While ideologies aim to preserve the existing order, utopias, by contrast, seek to change it.[43] When considered in terms of the function they serve, ideologies legitimize and idolize the prevailing social order with respect to the past, while utopias are a model for rejecting and surpassing the status quo.[44] And yet it is impossible to separate these two concepts from one another. Such a distinction can only be made after the fact: according to Mannheim, whether an idea is utopian or ideological depends on whether or not it has been realized.

Krishan Kumar's criticism of Mannheim – one with which I concur – is that the latter's chief function is to furnish ammunition to the enemies of utopia, and to provide a justification for criticisms of utopia as "a blueprint for totalitarianism." Mannheim does so, Kumar argues, by overlooking many aspects of utopia and focusing solely on the question of its "feasibility."[45]

Karl Popper can be also regarded as one of the "enemies of utopia," so to speak. Popper describes any utopian enterprise as a probable means[46] of paving the way for dictatorship; it is clear from the examples he provides that, in making this criticism, he mainly has in mind hierarchical social models like Plato's *Republic*, or totalitarian regimes like Nazism and Stalinism. Moreover, Popper's criticism is apparently based on a conviction that totalitarianism is one of the essential features of utopia, and an identification of utopia with the social engineering projects of the twentieth century. These assumptions are highly debatable. As Chris Ferns suggests, some utopias are authoritarian in character, but there are also dystopias and libertarian utopias.

Utopia to Science", another title is adopted for its English publication: Frederick Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. Translated by Edward Aveling. With a special introduction by the author. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892.

[42] Kaufmann, quoted in Levitas, *Utopia*, 14-15.

[43] Karl Mannheim, *İdeoloji ve Ütopya* [Ideology and Utopia], trans. Mehmet Okyayuz (Ankara: Epos, 2002), 216–220.

[44] Mannheim, *İdeoloji ve Ütopya*, 21.

[45] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 92.

[46] Karl Popper, *Açık Toplum ve Düşmanları, Cilt 1: Platon* [The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1: Plato], trans. Mete Tunçay, 4th ed. (Istanbul: Remzi, 2000), 158.

Therefore, the accusation of totalitarianism should not be applied to the entire utopian genre.[47]

In studies of utopia following the Second World War, we see an emphasis on the fictional aspect of utopia, rather than on notions like its feasibility, its status as a "blueprint," or its synonymousness with socialism. Marie Berneri, for instance, in her book *Journey Through Utopia* (1950), states that only works of fiction can be classified as utopias. According to Berneri, utopias are works which describes "ideal commonwealths in some imaginary country or in an imaginary future."[48] *The Quest for Utopia* (1952), by Glenn Negley and Max Patrick, highlights the status of utopia as an independent genre. According to this approach, a utopian author[49] is neither a reformer, nor a satirist, nor a dreamer, nor a theorist. Utopia is an altogether separate means of expression. Just as philosophy is distinct from poetry, or as law is distinct from political tracts, so utopia is different from other forms by which humans have expressed their ideals. If one gave the name of "utopia" to all speculation, idealization, planning, political platforms, and associated practical measures, it would be impossible to understand utopian literature properly. What sets utopia apart from these other closely-related forms of expression is the presence of fiction. Utopia depicts a specific state or community; its main topic is the political structure of this fictional state or community. Therefore, the use of a fictional state excludes all works of political philosophy and political theory from the genre of utopian literature.[50]

Krishan Kumar is another scholar who has emphasized the fictional dimension of utopia; to a large degree, I share his approach to the concept of utopia, and have benefited from his research in writing this section. According to Kumar, utopia "is first and foremost a work of imaginative fiction in which, unlike other such works, the central subject is the good society."[51] The fundamental principle of utopia – a secular variety of social thought which emerged along with Renaissance humanism – is its faith

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[47] Chris Ferns, *Narrating Utopia: Ideology, Gender, Form in Utopian Literature* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 14.

[48] Berneri, quoted in Levitas, *Utopia*, 29.

[49] In any analysis involving literary works, the concepts of author, narrator and character are of pivotal importance and they should not be confused. Manfred Jahn's diagram about the elements of narrative communication is very useful for seeing the different levels of narrative communication and which agant belongs to which level (Jahn, *Narratology*):



[50] Levitas, *Utopia*, 31-33.

[51] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 27.

in human reason.[52] "Its 'practical' use is to overstep the immediate reality to depict a condition whose clear desirability draws us on, like a magnet."[53]

With all these definitions available, the question with which we are faced – "How to define utopia?" – is clearly an issue of scope. Thus, whenever we examine the utopian canon of a given culture, we encounter an extremely wide-ranging, amorphous mass of texts. We are compelled to comb through many literary genres, such as satire, fantasy, and science fiction; religious and non-religious paradises; various religious sects; political theories, programs, and manifestos; and diverse practical attempts to create an ideal society.

Therefore, we inevitably must apply a certain number of restrictive criteria, as well as specific premises and assumptions. Perhaps the most important criterion is that of "secularism." This does not mean that a utopia needs to promote the ideal of a secular way of life. In utopias, it is crucial for human beings to be able to come up with alternatives through the use of their own intellect and free will. Therefore, narratives or practices based on the (by definition) indisputable, unquestionable dogmas or teachings of certain religions cannot be regarded as utopias; these do not count as visions for a future society, but rather belief-systems which abhor alternativity. Examples of these include Millenarianism, Messianic and Mahdist beliefs and practices, narratives evincing a longing for a Golden Age of religion, religious depictions of Paradise, etc. This does not mean that no text containing religious elements can be regarded as a utopia. Works like Campanella's *City of the Sun* and Andreae's *Christianopolis*, or the two works which I will examine below – Mustafa Nazım's *Rüyada Terakki ve Medeniyet-i İslâmiyeyi Rüyet* [A Dream of Progress and Islamic Civilization] and Hasan Ruşeni's *Rüya* [Dream] – are texts which focus respectively on Christianity and Islam, foreseeing a way of life lived in accordance with each religion. However, they do so not by modeling themselves on the Holy Scriptures, but rather by envisioning a new, unprecedented social fabric. In this sense they are a product of Modernity and rationality.

An example provided by Şerif Mardin, in the course of an argument with Mannheim, will be useful here:

> Mannheim says that conservatives do not have a utopia in the true sense of the word, but that we can give the name of 'counter-utopia' to the ideas which they adopt in reaction to the social dynamism of other currents of thought. Thus, even conservatism is forced to transform itself through the influence of those who wish to change society. Naturally, Mannheim does not cite the example which we are about to cite; nonetheless, we can see the aptest example of the process he describes in the self-transformation (to a certain extent) of religious thought in Turkey over the past ten years. This current of thought,

[52] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 35.
[53] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 3.

> aiming to create a new foundation for Islam within the industrialized life of the West, has emerged as a reaction to Western industrial society.[54]

Another critical question concerning the scope of utopia is whether this category should include every secular vision of the good life and the ideal society. To answer this question in the affirmative would force us to add a large part of political philosophy to the category of utopia, along with the entire literature of socialism, communism, and anarchism, as well as all utopian novels. This would result in a less homogenous genre, making our task more difficult. At the same time, however, it is impossible to discuss utopia without including thinkers like Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Marx in the utopian canon, for we see many examples of utopian novels which are based on their political theories. Rather than excluding such thinkers, we need to make a distinction between theoretical utopia (or utopian thought) and literary/fictional utopia. The key difference between these two categories is that of "telling" versus "showing."[55] Whereas utopian thought analytically conveys the conundrums of existing society as well as the advantages of the alternative social structure it proposes, fictional utopia, by contrast, is a story of what life is like in a good society; it relies on imagination rather than analysis, using literary tools to paint us a picture of life in such a society.

Fictional utopia can be distinguished from other fictional genres in that "the good life" and "the ideal society" constitute its main topic. Utopia, for Kumar, "is primarily a vehicle of social and political speculation rather than an exercise of the literary imagination in and for itself. It is meant to engage our sympathies and our desires in the direction favoured by the writer."[56]

Utopias portray an ideal society, and their vision of this ideal society is affected by the conditions under which they arise. Both the author's vision of the good life, and the way his or her readers perceive this vision, are linked to the values of the society they belong to. At this point, let us turn to the relationship between utopia and reality. As Kumar emphasizes, utopias are not "political formulas" waiting to be put into practice; neither, however, should they be understood as daydreams unconnected to reality.[57]

> All utopias are by definition, fictions; unlike say historical writing, they deal with possible, not actual, worlds. To this extent they are like

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[54] Şerif Mardin, *İdeoloji* [Ideology] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1992), 60: "Tutucuların gerçek anlamda bir ütopyası yoktur, fakat diğer akımların yarattığı toplumsal hareketliliğin karşısına çıkardıkları fikirlere bir kontr-ütopya diyebiliriz diyor Mannheim. Böylece, tutuculuk bile toplumu değiştirmek isteyenlerin etkisiyle kendi kendini değiştirmeye mecbur ediliyor. Mannheim bizim vereceğimiz örneği vermiyor, tabiî, fakat anlattığı sürecin en mükemmel bir örneğini Türkiye'deki dinsel fikirlerin son on yıl içinde kendilerini kısmen yenilemelerinde görebiliriz. Batının endüstriyel yaşamı içinde Müslümanlığa yeni bir temel kurmayı amaçlayan bu fikirler Batı endüstri toplumuna bir tepki olarak ortaya çıkmıştır."

[55] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 31.

[56] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 24.

[57] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 2.

> all forms of imaginative literature. They go further than conventional fiction in their extension of the bounds of the possible to include what to many may seem impossible or at least very improbable. (….) They are not, for instance, to be judged by a straightforward appeal to history or contemporary life for their 'truth' or validity –but no more than other kinds of novels can they ignore history or social reality.[58]

In this way, utopias can be distinguished from genres like science fiction or fantasy: one of the fundamental characteristics of utopias is that they allow us to detect a causal relationship, to a greater or lesser extent, between their own fictions and existing reality.

Inevitably, a vision of the good life will also contain an element of dissatisfaction with existing conditions. Therefore, utopias' criticism of the existing social order is a precondition for the alternative social order which they propose. In other words, utopias have two political/social components: opposing the existing order, and presenting an alternative to it. This purpose of this alternative is to evoke a desire to change the existing order.

Ruth Levitas, by defining utopia as the expression of a "desire for a better way of being and living,"[59] sees the concept of "desire" as taking priority over all other characteristics; Levitas argues that "desire" is one of the fundamental requirements of a utopia. Unlike theoretical utopias, fictional utopias seek to change existing reality not by means of scientific or philosophical arguments, but rather by the attractiveness of the proposed alternative.

The fact that not all utopias are cut from the same mold – indeed, the existence of a vast utopian literature in all its diversity – is related to this fact. Objects of desire change according to their time period, culture, social conditions – in short, their context – and can even be mutually contradictory. Thus, two concepts like "order" and "freedom" (or "equality" and "freedom"), both of which are desirable in themselves, can conflict with one another. Therefore, what seems like a utopia in one era or from one perspective can seem like a dystopia under different circumstances. Thus, the utopias of the Balkan War, for example, which we will deal with in this thesis, seem to us today like nightmarish scenarios.

Building on all of the above, I will define utopia in the following way: a fictional narrative, particular to Modernity, which is a product of a belief in human reason; which is based on a secular worldview; which takes place in a different time and/or location from "here and now"; which possesses a viewpoint openly or implicitly critical of the existing order; which has as its main theme a vision of an ideal society furnishing an alternative to this order; and which is described in sufficient detail to make this ideal society come alive in one's mind. I will use the term "utopia" in this sense in the present work.

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[58] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 25.
[59] Levitas, *Utopia*, 8.

Finally, it is necessary for the purposes of this thesis to touch briefly on the relationship between utopias and crises or social trauma. The years between 1913 and 1915 were a period of back-to-back wars and significant territorial losses, and hence a period in which worries about the future of Turkey intensified, and the need for salvation became urgent; during this period, as will be seen below, utopian works were written in numbers unequaled either before or since. In the literature on utopia, there is a debate about whether there is a true correlation between periods of social crisis and uncertainty – or traumatic social developments – and the number of utopias written during these periods. For instance, Kumar denies any such direct link: "A sociology of utopias might make some rough correlations between times of particular stress or conflict within society and the appearance of some important utopias. (….) [But] It is impossible to establish (…) a causal connection between the appearance of any utopia and its social context.[60] Nevertheless, he admits that "in a period in which utopia is, for whatever reason, weak or marginal, social movements can play some part in sustaining the utopian impulse and perhaps even stimulating a revival. Social movements need utopias even though they may not be the direct cause of them."[61] Ferns, on the other hand, argues, at least for the earlier utopias, that, "utopias emerged from historical contexts in which the promise of civil order must have seemed especially appealing."[62] So, arguments may differ in detail, but some sort of relationship between periods of social turmoil or disorder and the emergence of utopias seems undeniable. Indeed, The Ottoman-Turkish case constitutes a good example, for the catastrophic defeat in the Balkan War led to the emergence of a large quantity of utopian activity. The Parts 4 and 5 of this thesis will illustrate the significance of the trauma caused by this defeat for the production of Ottoman literary utopias. A brief summary of the historical developments in the Balkan War will be provided in the following chapter.

[60] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 101.
[61] Kumar, *Utopianism*, 101.
[62] Ferns, *Narrating Utopia*, 14.

2.2. The Balkan War

While the previous chapter has dwelled on the history and development of the concept of utopia, the present one aims to focus on history of the Balkan War of 1912-1913.[63] These historical backgrounds are indispensible for contextualizing and linking two phenomena to one another: The Balkan War in the cultural memory of Turkey, and utopian works in Turkish literature.

The Balkan War, which began in the autumn of 1912 and continued until the summer of 1913, consisted of two phases, often referred to as the First and the Second Balkan War. During the First Balkan War, an alliance of Balkan states, consisting of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, fought against the Ottoman Empire. During this war, which began in October 1912 and continued on many fronts (albeit with interruptions) until the spring of 1913, the Ottomans suffered a crushing defeat. As for the Second Balkan War, which started in June 1913 and lasted around a month, it ended in defeat for Bulgaria, which had fought against Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania and the Ottoman Empire.

As for the Ottoman Empire, as a result of this war it lost all of its European lands, which were indeed, economically, demographically, intellectually, and culturally speaking, its most valuable ones. These losses led on the one hand to the end of the empire, and on the other to a trauma that caused the rise of Turkish nationalism, the effort to create an ethnically homogeneous nation, and a shift in concentration to Anatolia; they constituted the nucleus of the struggle for independence that would last until 1922.[64] From the point of view of the Balkan states, on the other hand, as a result of the failure of conflicting maximalist nationalist policies, this war led to the entire area being racked by chaos, discord, and conflict throughout all of the twentieth century.

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[63] As explained in the Introduction, the number of publications in Turkish about the Balkan War is small. However, there are a large number of works produced on this War in other languages. Publications about the Balkan War in English, for instance, cover a broad spectrum ranging from the observations of war correspondents and reports of international institutions like the *Carnegie Endowment*, to literary texts and political analyses. Since this war was considered to be connected to the First World War, which broke out immediately in its wake, it has been an object of great interest on the part of academia, hence the numerous comprehensive studies written about it. For a few examples, see Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans* (Westport-Conn, London: Praeger, 2003); André Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond* **(**New York: Basic Books, 2002); Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000); Mark Mazover, *The Balkans* (London: Weidenfeld&Nicholson, 2000).

[64] In an article in which he analyzes the Balkan War from the point of view of Turkey's history, historian Zafer Toprak mentions this point, observing that it was the Turks who had fought the longest world war, since while the other countries were essentially finished with the war after four years, in the case of the Turks, this war, for them compounded by the Balkan War and the National Liberation Struggle, lasted no less than a decade. Zafer Toprak, "Cihan Harbinin Provası Balkan Harbi" [The Balkan War, a Trial Run for the First World War], *Toplumsal Tarih* [Social History], no. 104 (August 2002): 45.

As I stated earlier, there are comprehensive studies on the military aspects of the Balkan War,[65] and elaborating on those aspects is not the main task of this thesis. Therefore, in what follows, I will touch upon the causes, the outburst and the military phases of the war only briefly. Nevertheless, the dire consequences of the war is directly linked to the main argument of this thesis, thus I will dwell on the consequences in greater detail.

2.2.1. Causes, Outburst and Military Phases of the War

There were many factors that led to a war in the Balkans. First of all, the idea of nationalism, having spread from France, and in the case of the Balkans, especially from Germany, throughout the 19th century, influenced the Balkan nations. The view according to which a freely led life, progress, and wealth depended upon the establishment of national unity, as in the cases of Germany and Italy, became increasingly prevalent, eventually becoming more popular than the idea of perpetuating the existing Ottoman administrative system, which granted a certain amount of autonomy to individual *millet*s.[66] These nationalist currents, which harked back to pre-Ottoman conquest medieval Balkan states (the First and Second Bulgarian Empires in the case of the Bulgarians, Stephan Dushan's empire in the case of the Montenegrins and of the Serbians, and the Byzantine Empire in the case of the Greeks), gave voice to their ideals of re-establishing those states.[67] The Serbian and Greek revolts of the first half of the 19th century and the resulting autonomy for the Serbians and independence for the Greeks resulted from these dynamics.

However, this struggle against the Balkan nations' common enemy, the Ottoman Empire, failed to unite them, because the individual nations' own maximalist state ideals conflicted with one another too strongly, especially concerning the sharing of Macedonia, which in 1885 led to outright war between the Bulgarians and the Serbians. The Macedonian problem has been of fundamental importance not only for the history of Turkey but also for all Balkan countries.[68] This observation is undoubtedly true in the case of all Balkan countries. The VMRO (Vatreshna Makedonska Revolyutsionna Organizatsiya - Internal Macedonian Revolutionary

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[65] See note 62.

[66] In the Ottoman administrative system, "a *millet* was an autonomous self-governing religious community, each organized under its own laws and headed by a religious leader, who was responsible to the central government for the fulfillment of *millet* responsibilities and duties, particularly those of paying taxes and maintaining internal security." Beginning from the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856 onwards, with the introduction of several secular law codes for all citizens, this system underwent significant structural changes and *millet*s' autonomy was lost. ("Millet", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/382871/millet (Accessed 27.11.2014).)

[67] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 2.

[68] Historian Fikret Adanır points at the significance of the Macedonian problem for understanding fully the history of Turkey. Fikret Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu* [The Macedonian Problem] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), 1.

Organization), founded with the aim of obtaining autonomy for Macedonia, the Higher Committee founded by the Bulgarians, the Greeks' *Ethniki Etaireia* (National Society) and the Serbians' Society of Saint Sava, were all propaganda and paramilitary organizations engaged in the struggle for Macedonia.

While these struggles were underway, all of these states, none strong enough to take on the Ottoman State by itself, sought to establish alliances. Erik Jan Zürcher too underlined the fact that even though they might be in conflict insofar as sharing territory was concerned, the young nation states of the Balkans were united in their struggle to seize Ottoman lands in Europe.[69]

The 1908 Young Turk Revolution was undoubtedly another important event that set the stage for the Balkan War. Albeit for a short while, the revolution created a genuine atmosphere of optimism, and what is more, not just amongst Ottoman subjects. For example, in his book titled *Türk Devrimi ve İstikbali* [The Turkish Revolution and Its Future], written immediately after the revolution, former Serbian Prime Minister Vladan Georgevitch not only states that this revolution generated hope for peace also in the Balkans but also considers the possibility of a Balkan Federation inclusive of the Turks and proposes a Balkan Customs Union.[70] Following this revolution, which had an enormous effect upon the Ottoman lands and had the potential to bring about tremendous changes, both the great powers and the Balkan countries took action to achieve their aims before the reforms planned by the Young Turks came to fruition. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian Empire's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina became a new source of tension for both the Russians and the Balkan states.

Furthermore, the Law of Churches, enacted in 1910 by the *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası* [Union and Progress Party, a continuation of the Committee of Union and Progress], solved the problem of the churches, which was one of the greatest sources of friction amongst the Balkan peoples, and made a Balkan alliance more plausible. This law, which made it possible for the Balkan churches to merge, was to be considered by later critics of the Union and Progress Party as one of its greatest mistakes before the Balkan War.[71]

In addition, the Turco-Italian War in Tripolitania was the main factor facilitating their efforts during this process. The Ottoman Empire, which had unsuccessfully sought to suppress the revolt in the distant land of Yemen since 1905, was caught completely off-guard by Italy's declaration of war and subsequent occupation of Tripolitania. This war blatantly revealed the weakness of the Ottoman

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[69] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1997), 111.

[70] Vladan Georgevitch, *Türk Devrimi ve İstikbali* [The Turkish Revolution and Its Future], translated by Hulki Demirel (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).

[71] In his short story titled "Delik Kiremit" [Broken Rooftile] dated 13 Kanunuevvel 1328 [December 26th, 1912], Hamdullah Suphi [Tanrıöver] criticized this law, observing that it served as the glue cementing the Balkan Union. Hamdullah Suphi [Tanrıöver], "Delik Kiremit," *Türk Yurdu*, v. 2 (Ankara: Tutibay Yayınları, 1999), 81-86. In this thesis, this edition will be used for all the references to *Türk Yurdu*.

army, and as such made it clear to the Balkan states that the moment had come to set up an alliance and take action against the Ottomans.

Illustration 1: Rally of *Darülfünun* students in Sultanahmet Square, 1912[72]

Under these circumstances, in March 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria signed an agreement, which was quickly followed by an agreement between Bulgaria and Greece in May of the same year. Throughout the summer of 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro completed a web of agreements and thus was the Balkan Alliance established. And with Montenegro's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire on October 8th, 1912 and then the Ottoman State's declaration of war on the other three states, [73] the First Balkan War had officially begun.

The First Balkan War

It was the first phase of the war, namely the First Balkan War, which had the most disastrous effects on the Ottomans. The Second Balkan War, apart from the liberation of Edirne, did not have any determining results from the point of view of the Ottoman State.

The Balkan armies were similar to each other. With the exception of the army of Montenegro, all had been organized based upon European models. They all used

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[72] Taha Akyol, *Rumeli'ye Elveda: 100. Yılında Balkan Bozgunu* [Farewell to Rumelia: The Balkan Defeat after 100 Years] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013), 114.

[73] The Union and Progress Party mobilized the youth for pro-war rallies. Following the rally on October 2nd, 1912, during which *Darülfünun* [University] students shouted "Hurrah for the war!" there were two more university student rallies organized by the Union and Progress Party on October 4th and 7th. Yücel Aktar, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi Öğrenci Olayları (1908-1918)* [Student Protests During the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918)] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 83-97.

weapons produced in Europe.[74] Their cadres were for the most part ethnically homogeneous, which meant that there was minimal discord.[75] Furthermore, they were all being indoctrinated with a nationalist ideology embellished with the motif of a glorious past.

The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, was at a disadvantage due to its heterogeneous population. Drafting army members from such a heterogeneous population rendered training and communication particularly difficult. Furthermore, the army had been subjected to radical reforms by the Young Turks after the latter came to power in 1908, and this reform process was not yet complete by the time the Balkan War broke out, which meant that the army was beset by significant organizational problems. In addition to all of this, there was also the fact that only half of the army was stationed on European soil, with the rest dispersed throughout the Asian and North African lands of the empire. Assembling all of these troops and sending them to the Balkans was yet another challenge, not to mention the fact that eighty thousand trained soldiers had been discharged just before the war.

The eve of the war witnessed developments that only served to heighten the Ottomans' state of confusion. That was mainly because, as Feroze Yasamee notes, "the Ottoman mobilization and deployment of October 1912 proved to be a catalog of errors, amounting to a self-inflicted defeat before a shot had been fired."[76] Firstly, the units sent to the front had, following the Ottoman general staff's plans, been organized for defensive warfare in case of foreign aggression.[77] But the author of the plans, Chief of General Staff Ahmet İzzet Paşa, was in faraway Yemen, trying to suppress the Imam Yahya Revolt. Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Nazım Paşa had a different take on the situation and it was his unrealistic choices given the state of the army, which we shall read about further on, that would comprise primary factors leading to the imminent disaster that was to befall the Ottoman army.

Fighting during the First Balkan War was waged on the Eastern and Western fronts. The Ottoman army consisted of the 1st Army commanded by Abdullah Paşa and stationed in the East in Thrace, and of the 2nd Army commanded by Ali Rıza Paşa and stationed in the West in Macedonia. The position of the 1st Army operating in Thrace was particularly important, because this area was very close to the capital, and also because it served as a bridge between headquarters and the 2nd Army in the West.

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[74] Historian Tarık Zafer Tunaya has underlined the fact that with regard to the armaments used, the Ottoman and Balkan states had much in common. They all bought weapons from the great powers, especially from Germany and France. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, v. 3: İttihat ve Terakki. Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi* [Political Parties in Turkey, v. 3: the Union and Progress Party – the History of an Era, a Generation, a Party] (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 461.

[75] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 15.

[76] Feroze Yasamee, "Armies Defeated before They Took the Field?", in Yavuz and Blumi (eds.), *War and Nationalism*, 251.

[77] Zürcher, *Turkey*, 112. See also Erickson, *Defeat*, 65.

The Eastern Front

As Hall has stated, the Bulgarian war strategy was to strike a quick and deadly blow to the Ottoman troops, before the Ottomans were able to use the advantages afforded by a larger population and had time to send reinforcements.[78] The Ottoman army, however, rather than benefiting from this advantage, followed the orders of Minister of Defense Nazım Paşa, which were based on an unfounded sense of self-confidence,[79] and embarked upon a rushed and badly planned attack before all troops had assembled.[80]

Thus it was that the two armies charging forward came into contact at Kırkkilise (Kırklareli) on October 22nd under heavy rain. On the night of October 23rd, while the armies were still jostling for position and the fate of the battle was not yet clear, the Ottomans began to flee in a state of panic and utter disorder, abandoning along the way all their weapons, including their artillery. Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, who in his memoirs stated, "Military history gives no other such example of a similar rout beginning without cause"[81], believed that this haphazard flight was to be attributed largely to the rain. However, it is clear that the Ottoman army, which was very weak in terms of its chain of command, morale and discipline, had been terrified by the Bulgarians' modern maneuvers, such as surprise encirclement and nighttime operations illuminated by floodlights, all of which were carried out successfully against them, and by the devastating impact of effective coordination between units and the use of modern weapons like machine guns and shrapnel.[82]

The results were disastrous. Abdullah Paşa, commander of the routed 1st Army, panicked and, claiming that it was impossible to wage war employing the troops at hand, "implored" Mahmut Muhtar Paşa, who was also a cabinet member, to resolve the issue by using diplomatic means.[83]

When, rather than pursuing the fleeing troops, the Bulgarian armies chose to rest, the Ottoman forces, who in the meantime had been reinforced with new units, managed to set up new defensive positions along the Pınarhisar-Lüleburgaz hills. Although Ottoman forces fought relatively more effectively during the fighting that resumed on October 30th, the collapse of the supply chain and the determined and disciplined attacks of the Bulgarian forces; in particular, their deadly artillery fire led to

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[78] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 23.

[79] In a speech he made to the officers, who were about to join their units, Nazım Paşa advised them to take their ceremonial uniforms with them, because they will be needing them in two months when they make their entrance into Sofia. Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 25.

[80] Fort he mistakes regarding the formation of the Ottoman army, see Yasamee, "Armies Defeated before They Took the Field?"

[81] Quoted in Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 27.

[82] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 27.

[83] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 28. An anecdote concerning Abdullah Paşa, recounted by war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, is one of the most pitiful scenes of this defeat. Here we find a commander, who was supposed to have led an entire army, stuck in a village where he has lost all contact with the rest of the world and cannot even find bread. Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1913), 149.

the same result as the one in Kırkkilise, and so on November 2nd another panicky flight began.[84]

This defeat was an even greater disaster for the Ottomans than the previous one. Control of Thrace was lost, and the road to Istanbul was rendered completely clear. Since the army's system of supply had collapsed, the wet and hungry troops were unable to find food or shelter. As Andonyan states, "100,000 fleeing soldiers were wandering on the meadows and plains, begging 'Bread! Bread!' This terrible nightmare and hunger had damned the empire's army, but be they hungry or fed, the vanquished had to proceed at all costs. They had to reach the Çatalca line."[85] Consequently, cholera and dysentery epidemics broke out among the troops and the refugees fleeing together with them, which in turn increased the number of casualties exponentially. One of the witnesses of this catastrophe was Hochwächter: "Dead bodies lying all over the place; a terrible ghostlike epidemic… Those collapsing with hunger are mistaken for cholera victims, and without any check to see whether they are living or not, are covered with lime putty. The lime burns the eye-sockets."[86]

When the Bulgarian army was once more unable to pursue the retreating Ottoman troops due to fatigue, weather and road conditions, and supply problems, the Ottomans managed to set up a new position on the Çatalca fortifications at a distance of 35 kilometers from the capital, thanks to reinforcements.

This phase of the war created a new situation, whereby the Bulgarians had won within a very short time span a victory beyond their wildest dreams, and had managed to press forward until they found themselves in close proximity to the capital. Overcoming the obstacle of Çatalca would have meant seizing Istanbul, and this made people wonder what the reaction of the Bulgarians' protector, Russia, which had been coveting this city for centuries, would be. Enamored by the idea of seizing Istanbul, and wishing to avoid the "national shame" of not at least attempting to take the city when they were already so close, on November 17th the Bulgarians attacked, even though they suffered from fatigue and supply issues and were increasingly plagued by cholera and dysentery, diseases they had caught from the Ottomans. These unfavorable conditions were compounded by rain, fog and artillery fire from Ottoman warships, culminating in defeat for the Bulgarians, who then took up a defensive position. At this point, both armies were exhausted, and no longer had the strength to attack.[87] Military immobility reigned over the Çatalca front.

Edirne was another critical point on the Eastern Front. During the attacks on Lüleburgaz-Pınarhisar, the Bulgarian army was also besieging Edirne, with support

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[84] According to Hall, with respect to the number of troops involved and the number of victims, the battle at Pınarhisar-Lüleburgaz was the greatest battle to occur between the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War and the First World War. (*Balkan Wars*, 31)

[85] Andonyan, *Balkan Savaşı*, 479.

[86] Hochwächter, *Türklerle Cephede*, 75-76.

[87] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 33-38.

from Serbian forces. Following a long and challenging resistance, Edirne fell on March 26th.

The threat of losing the Muslim-majority former capital Edirne had led to a coup in the capital. Once it had become clear during the peace negotiations (continuing while troops commanded by Şükrü Paşa were resisting in Edirne) that Edirne would be ceded to the Bulgarians, the Unionists had found an excuse for their coup, which was carried out on January 23rd, 1913. A group of Unionists raided the cabinet meeting and killed Minister of War Nazım Paşa, and after forcing Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa to resign, took over the government.[88]

The seven-month-long resistance of Hasan Rıza Paşa during the siege of Scutari and the struggle to resist ceding Edirne to the Bulgarians under the command of Şükrü Paşa were among the few events of which the Turks could be proud of during the Balkan War. The fall of Edirne was arguably more serious than the loss of any other city and came as an immense shock to the Ottomans. The lion's share of the psychological shock and trauma created by the Balkan War and of the new state of mind that it led to, can be attributed to the loss of Edirne. As it will be discussed below, under the heading "The Western Front", this shock could only be compared to the trauma created by the loss of Salonica.

The words of literary critic Raif Necdet [Kestelli], who took part in the defense of Edirne as a captain and fell into the hands of the Bulgarians as a prisoner of war for six months, summarize this state of mind:

> But no… No! Sometimes, when you are sunk, this is only the beginning of a more brilliant rebirth. Right now, flames and sparks are emanating from my veins with the enthusiasm of the most fanatical and excited patriot. All my soul and person is crying out "Revenge, revenge!"[89]

In short, the Ottoman Eastern Army began the war with defeats. Its only success was the defense at Çatalca, whereby it saved the capital.

The Western Front

The first battle in this area encompassing Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, was fought between the Serbians and Ottomans on October 24th at Kumanova. On this occasion, once again according to the plans of Nazım Paşa, the Ottoman army attacked rather than taking up a defensive position, even though it did not have sufficient resources,[90] and the Serbians managed to defeat the Ottomans, thanks especially to the

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[88] Zürcher, *Turkey*, 113.

[89] Raif Necdet [Kestelli], *Uful (Batış)* [The Decline], ed. Esra Keskinkılıç (Istanbul: Benseno Yayınları, 2002), 121: "Ama hayır… Hayır! Bazen batış daha parlak bir doğuş getirir. Şu dakikada, en mutaassıp, en coşkulu bir vatanseverin heyecanı ile, damarlarımdan ateşler, kıvılcımlar yükseliyor. Bütün ruhum, bütün benliğim 'İntikam, intikam!' diye feryat ediyor."

[90] Gerolymatos, *Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution*, 211.

effective fire of their batteries. The defeat at Kumanova triggered the general defeat all along the Western front.

Illustration 2: Lieutenant Fuat Bey, captured by the Serbian army at Kumanova in 1912.[91]

Just as in the case of the Eastern Front, this defeat too resulted in the Ottoman units fleeing in panic, this time south towards Manastır (Bitola), in such great disorder that along the way they abandoned their munitions to the enemy. Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920), who took part in the war and fell prisoner of war to the Greeks, and who later became one of the most important personalities of the Turkish nationalist literature, described this retreat in his memoirs:

> On the night of November 8th, 1912 we reached Manastır, but the commander of the Western Army did not let us into the city. We began to wander aimlessly just outside the city. Big snow-flakes were falling. Troopers with frozen feet were screaming. The wounded were dying, with convulsions and groans, on the carts, on the ground, and in the snow and mud… Terrible, we shall all be destroyed.[92]

Thanks to this defeat, the Serbians managed to seize Skopje, an important city of the region, without even fighting for it. As in the case of the Eastern Front, again the

[91] Akyol, *Rumeli'ye Elveda*, 50.

[92] Ömer Seyfettin, quoted in Akyol, *Rumeli'ye Elveda*, 56: "8 Kasım 1912 – Gece Manastır'a döküldük. Fakat Batı Ordusu Kumandanı bizi şehre sokmadı. Şehrin dışında serseriyane dolaşıyoruz. Kuşbaşı kar yağıyor. Ayakları donan neferler haykırıyorlar. Yaralılar arabaların üstünde, yerlerde, karların ve çamurların içinde kıvranarak, inleyerek can veriyorlar… Rezalet, hepimiz mahvolacağız." For another description of the panic and chaos during the retreat of the Ottoman troops, see Andonyan, *Balkan Savaşı*, 328.

enemy, in this case the Serbians, were unable to pursue the fleeing troops, and thus missed the opportunity to further rout the Ottoman units.

The Serbians managed to overcome the weak resistance at Pirlep and on November 16th attacked the Ottoman forces that had set up defensive positions at Manastır. The Serbians' artillery played a decisive role in their victory over the Ottoman units, which, suffering heavy casualties, once again began a disorderly and panic-stricken retreat. Thus did Manastır fall into Serbian hands and the five-century-long Ottoman domination of Macedonia came to an end.

With the Western Army having suffered such a defeat, it did not take much for the Serbians to then conquer Pristina, Novipazar and the northern half of Albania.

Greece, another participant on the Western Front, had two main objectives: Salonica and Ioannina. On October 22nd, the Army of Thessaly marched upon Salonica and defeated the Ottoman forces at the Sarantaporos Pass, but then things developed as they had in the previously described cases: even though the Ottomans were completely demoralized and abandoned their munitions and fled, the Greeks were not able to pursue and destroy them.[93] A violent battle resulted in Greek victory over the Ottoman forces, which had taken up a new position at Yenice, thus leaving clear the way to Salonica. The Greeks managed to reach Salonica before the Bulgarians. It was at this point that something that would prove a grievous wound to the Turkish nationalist spirit occurred: Hasan Tahsin Paşa, the commander of the garrison at Salonica, demoralized by the sinking of the Ottoman warship *Feth-i Bülend* in the port of Salonica, by the news of the terrible defeats suffered by Ottoman forces in Macedonia and Thrace, and by the approach of the Bulgarian army and the Greek siege of the city, surrendered to the Greeks without firing a single shot. Thus did 26,000 Ottoman soldiers become prisoners of war.

Things did not go quite so smoothly for the other army of Greeks, the Army of the Epirus. Like Edirne, the citadel of Ioannina surrendered only after a long resistance. The third defense in which the Ottomans achieved victory was that of Scutari, where they managed to withstand besiegement by the Montenegrins, who were not particularly triumphant during the First Balkan War.

The London Peace Conference, which met on December 16th, following the armistice signed on December 3rd, was marked by a clash amongst the members of the Balkan League which, having attained unexpected success against the Ottoman State, were battling it out over how to divide the spoils of the war, especially the lands of Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Young Turk coup that took place in the form of a raid on the Sublime Porte led by Enver Bey and his cohorts, who refused to accept the possibility of losing Edirne, a city of great importance for the Turkish public, cost Minister of War Nazım Paşa his life, and Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa his position. When the new offer of the newly installed Grand Vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa was rejected by the Balkan powers, the armistice ended on February 3rd, 1913. By the end of April all

[93] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 60.

three besieged cities had fallen, and by the end of the First Balkan War, the Ottoman State had lost all its European territories beyond the Çatalca line.

The Second Balkan War

The disagreement concerning how to share the grand prize of Macedonia[94] led to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War in June 1913. On this occasion, three of the allies of the first war, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece, fought against Bulgaria, their formal mutual ally. These three countries fighting against Bulgaria were later joined by Romania, which wanted to solve the question of Dobrudja, and by the Ottoman State, which wanted to regain Edirne. Bulgaria lost this war, which it was later to remember as the "First National Catastrophe," and in this way lost the territories it had gained in the First Balkan War. While the Romanians seized Southern Dobrudja, a primary objective of theirs, the Greeks gained a large part of Eastern Macedonia. Following this war, the Serbians, who got the greater part of Macedonia, became the dominant entity amongst the southern Slavs.

The great importance and gain of this war, from the point of view of the Ottomans, was that they got Edirne back. However, seizing Edirne, which possessed symbolic value as a former capital, and strategic value with regard to defense of the capital, was the only consolation of a war otherwise rife with disaster for the Ottomans.

2.2.2. Consequences of the Balkan War for the Ottomans

For the Ottomans, the Balkan War had numerous devastating results that played a role in determining the future destiny and trajectory of the country. By the end of the first phase of the Balkan War, the Ottoman State had lost 160,000 square kilometers containing a population of about 6,500,000, and then during the second phase had managed to regain only Edirne, which comprised only a very small part of its losses. What is more, the land it had lost was undoubtedly the most valuable part of the country, from the economic, political and sociological points of view. The loss of these lands, where all the most significant investments had been made and which paid the most taxes, was a devastating loss for the country.

The Ottoman army's casualties[95] also constituted a grievous blow to the Ottoman State and accelerating its destruction. The cholera and dysentery epidemics that meanwhile spread amongst both civilian and soldier populations also wreaked tremendous havoc.[96]

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[94] Carnegie Endowment, *Report*, 38.

[95] Figures for the Ottoman casualties vary: Hall claims it to be 100,000 (*Balkan Wars*, 135-136), while for Erickson it is as high as 350,000 (*Defeat*, 329).

[96] Oya Dağlar Macar describes epidemic diseases as the most important problem that the Ottoman Empire faced during the Balkan Wars. She notes that during the Balkan War, the Ottoman army lost more people to cholera, typhus, smallpox and dysentery epidemics, than it did during battle, and it

Another aspect of the war undoubtedly deserving of attention is that of war atrocities. The Balkan War became notorious as a war during which armies ferociously attacked not just enemy troops, but also civilians, and in this respect, it can be said that it was the harbinger of the age of war atrocities, an age which would continue into the twentieth century.[97] The main reason for this was certainly the fact that the most fundamental motif of these wars was nationalism. Since the main objective of the warring states was a maximalist nation-state, and since this kind of nation-state required a population that was as ethnically homogeneous as possible, the armies did not distinguish between enemy troops and civilians. There were times when armies chose to kill rather than take prisoners, and even when prisoners were taken, they were treated very badly. Civilians were killed and raped, and their villages burned and pillaged. It is obvious that the primary aim of these atrocities, which were generally accompanied by "demonstrations of punishment," was to create a nation from which all unwanted ethnic groups had been expelled by means of murder, fear, population exchange and forced emigration.[98] Hall quotes the Greeks' expression for the Bulgarians, *dhen einai anthropoi!* ["They are not human!"].[99] And true enough, almost all parties referred to each other with this succinct expression which gives voice to the mechanism of dehumanization that made these kinds of atrocities possible. What is interesting is that, despite all the massacres and the demographic mobilizations carried out in accordance with the concept of "Balkanization," none of the states ended up with a homogeneous population after the war.

Concerning the Ottomans, the Balkan War was essentially an effort to expel the Ottoman State from the Balkans, not just politically, but also demographically. Apart from the military losses, thousands of Muslims and/or Turkish civilians were massacred, raped, tortured and had their goods pillaged during the war, and were thus made to flee.

Added on top of all this, the population exchange between the Ottoman State and Bulgaria and Greece left the Ottoman State struggling with a daunting migration problem. As Zürcher states,

> The Balkan War caused many people to leave their homes. Around 800.000 people fled in different directions. In part, these were people simply fleeing the battle zones, but about half of them, some 400.000,

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accelerated the process of the Ottoman disintegration. Oya Dağlar Macar, "Epidemic Diseases on the Thracian Front," in Yavuz and Blumi (eds.), *War and Nationalism*, 292-294.

[97] For a study of the massacres of Muslim-Turkish civilians during the Balkan War, see H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanlar'ın Makûs Talihi: Göç* [The Misfortunes of the Balkans, from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic: Migration] (Istanbul: Kum Saati Yayıncılık, 2001), 62-91.

[98] One journalist stated that the Serbian army had cleansed Novipazar of its Albanian population following Tacitus's principle of *solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant* ["They make a desert and call it peace"] (Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 182). This principle was applied almost everywhere in the Balkans during the war.

[99] Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 136.

> were Muslims, who, out of fear for Greek, Serbian or Bulgarian atrocities, followed the retreating Ottoman army. Large numbers of these refugees died from cholera (which had been brought over with the troops arriving from Syria), but those who remained, gravitated towards Constantinople and had to be resettled there or transferred to Asia Minor. In the Constantinople area the refugees built the first of what later came to be known as 'gecekondu's, settlements built without permission on state land. [100]

The effort to absorb tens of thousands of Balkan refugees, with resources that had already been limited and that had dwindled even further because of the war,[101] gave rise to grievous social problems. As Fuat Dündar has underlined, many of the refugees that arrived because of the Balkan War received neither goods of any kind nor any land. Moreover, the money required to settle the Balkan refugees into newly built villages in 1915 rose to 15 million lira, which was equal to one quarter of that year's budget. Even by the end of 1917, housing and subsistence issues still remained unresolved for many Balkan refugees.[102]

In addition to the difficulties the state faced, strife between local populations and the refugees led to even more problems. For example, Muslim refugees discontent with the inadequacy of their new living conditions adopted a hostile attitude towards better-off non-Muslims. Inability to adapt to the social life of their new locations, occupying houses and lands other than those assigned to them, and damaging forests were other sources of discord recorded at the time. Meanwhile, indigenous populations, for their part, did not always behave amicably towards the refugees. Police intervention proved necessary on numerous occasions, in a variety of cases, due to such issues as the indigenous people's distress at the refugees' arrival, their jealousy of exemptions and material aid provided to the refugees, or simply the presence of unscrupulous people and thieves trying to profit from the refugees' confusion and lack of knowledge due to their displacement.[103]

Such incidents lead us to one definite conclusion: The arrival of such a large number of Balkan refugees, under such trying conditions and within such a short

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[100] Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Greek and Turkish Refugees and Deportees." (January 2003), 1-2, http://edoc.bibliothek.unihalle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00003226/greek_turkish_refugees.pdf (Accessed 09.12.2014).

[101] Prompted by the raging Balkan War, the Union and Progress Party began to advocate an acute, radical form of nationalism; they consequently turned the matter of settling the Balkan refugees into an operation of Turkification and assimilation, and, if need be, of "cleansing", with the result that the lands of Turkey were subjected to a population mobilization of extraordinary dimensions. See Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913-1918)* [The Settlement Policy of the Union and Progress Party (1913-1918)] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), 247.

[102] Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası*, 249. Also Ağanoğlu studied the problems of refugees under headings like social problems, education and health matters, and military and financial problems. Ağanoğlu, *Göç*, 225-273.

[103] Ağanoğlu, *Göç*, 238.

amount of time,[104] made it extremely difficult for the state to properly prepare and carry out settlement policies. Moreover, the difficulties experienced at the social level rendered it impossible to sustain the discourse of Islamic brotherhood, mutual aid, and solidarity. In many cases, Balkan refugees fleeing from disaster were treated with brazen insensitivity, even inimicality, something which is commented upon, with shock and disapproval, by the writers of many texts quoted in this thesis.[105]

In summary, the Balkan War had a devastating impact on the Ottoman state, by shrinking its most-valued Western territories; by creating new social strifes with the flood of Balkan refugees in Anatolia; and most importantly by causing deep humiliation on the part of the military, political and intellectual elite due to the defeat by non-Muslim nations which were once Ottoman subjects. These consequences of the war were the building stones of the trauma which generated a new "trauma narrative" that will be dealt with in the next part.

[104] For a study containing demographic data about the migrations caused by the Balkan War, see Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri (1912-1913)* [Turkish Migrants from Rumelia during the Balkan War (1912-1913)] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994). For the migrations following the 1877-1878 Ottoman Russian War, see Bilal Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri*, 3 volumes [Turkish Migrants from Rumelia, 3 Volumes], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989). See also Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1996).

[105] For example, in Azmizade's story "A Night at Samatya," we see a Balkan refugee woman in the cold of March. Her son has been killed and her daughter raped and killed. Now she is begging on the Galata Bridge, together with her younger son, because nobody is helping her. Azmizade, "Samatya'da Bir Gece" [A Night at Samatya] (*Mektepli* [The Pupil], no. 10 (8 Ağustos 1329 [August 21st, 1913], 162-164) In Nesime Ceyhan, *Balkan Savaşı Hikâyeleri* [Stories of the Balkan War] (Istanbul: Selis, 2006), 91-95.