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## **Tenure Security for Indonesia's Urban Poor : a socio-legal study on land, decentralisation, and the rule of law in Bandung**

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*Bandung, Bandung, Bandung nelah Kota Kembang  
Bandung, Bandung, sasakaal Sangkuriang  
di lingkungan gunung, heurin ku tangtung, puseur kota nu mulya Parahiangan  
Bandung, Bandung, pada muru di jarugjugan<sup>1</sup>*

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

“In the colonial period, Taman Sari was so different. You would not recognise the place!” Ibu Darsum gives me a meaningful look. She is not happy about the current condition of her kampong, Gang Bongkaran, located in City Quarter (*Kelurahan*) Taman Sari in the north of Bandung. Like so many older people, she speaks about the past with full appreciation and nostalgia, as if everything has deteriorated ever since she was born.

We sit in front of her house over a cup of tea. Her house is neither impressive in size, nor in quality, but by far the best in the neighbourhood. It even has a small flower garden in front. People in the kampong insisted that I should talk to her. She could take the edge off my curiosity about the history of Gang Bongkaran and adjacent kampongs in Taman Sari. At 84, she is one of the oldest residents in the neighbourhood. More importantly, no one has been residing in Gang Bongkaran as long as she: Ibu Darsum was born, raised and grew old here.

Indeed, kampongs in Taman Sari must have looked very different before the war. At present, housing thousands of low-income families, the settlements make a dilapidated impression. Most people live in one of the many small houses built alongside the Cikapundung River. They can be reached by alleys, some of which are so narrow that they are called *gang senggol*, bump alleys.

As discussed in Chapter 1, kampongs are Indonesia’s typical low-income settlements that in the international development debate are qualified as ‘slums’. There is however much more to say about these settlements and about the challenges that come with them. And more should be said in order to understand the possible role of development strategies that centre

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1 Lyrics of a Sundanese song by Mang Koko Koswara, which in English could be translated as: Bandung, Bandung, Bandung is called a city of development; Bandung, Bandung, the legend of Sangkuriang; surrounded by mountains, densely inhabited, the capital of beautiful Parahyangan; Bandung, Bandung, has become the destination of everyone (own translation).

on the issue of tenure security. This chapter therefore gives an historical overview of the local, national and international factors underlying the formation of kampongs in Bandung. It assesses the impact of the main development policies towards kampongs adopted by subsequent colonial and Indonesian governments, international organisations, and civil society groups. The last part of the chapter analyses the contemporary social-economic, physical, and legal characteristics and dynamics of kampongs, and thus assesses to what extent they qualify as slums. By way of illustration, special reference will be made to kampongs in Taman Sari.

The structure of this chapter is mainly chronological and subdivided into the five periods discussed, which also form major eras of Indonesia's political history: late colonial times, the Japanese occupation and Revolution, the Old Order, the New Order, and the Post-New Order. It ends with some concluding remarks.

## 2.2 AUTONOMOUS VILLAGES IN AN EXPANDING COLONIAL TOWN

From the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the end of colonial rule, Bandung developed from a small settlement of about 10,000 inhabitants into a modern European colonial city with a population of 200,000. Just as in other cities in the Dutch Indies, Bandung's development was in large part the result of a new era in colonial policy, the liberal period, which led to legal reforms and in turn a radical increase of commercial activity (Voskuil 1996:31). From 1854 private planters could lease land from the colonial government, and from 1870 this became commercially attractive.<sup>2</sup> The physical environmental conditions in the Priangan region around Bandung proved suitable for the cultivation of tea, coffee and quinine. Tea planters in particular were commercially successful, and spent their money in Bandung – or, as it was also called because of its fashionable reputation, 'Parijs van Java' (Paris of Java). The city also functioned as a transshipment point for their plantation products.

Soon Bandung started to attract people from outside the region, particularly from 1884, when the city was opened up by railway connections (Kunto 1984:161-2). From 1916 onwards the colonial government even developed plans to make Bandung the capital of the Dutch Indies. Due to financial and other reasons the plans never eventuated, but a number of government agencies were moved to the city (Van Roosmalen 2008:49-51). The plans also contributed to the city government's success in attracting new European residents. Another important reason why Dutchmen (in the

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2 From 1870 holders could take out a mortgage, because the state no longer granted them a lease right ('pacht') with a maximum of 20 years, but a long lease right ('erfpacht') with a maximum of 75 years. This attracted many foreign private investors.

1920s and 1930s, mainly pensioners) chose to settle in Bandung was its pleasant climate (Voskuil 1996:34-5).

Rural-urban migration of the indigenous population also contributed to Bandung's expansion. Land in the Priangan region around Bandung was rapidly changing from an attribute of the community bound by genealogical or territorial ties into a private commodity. At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the region was already known for its large-scale landownership. Over time the size of the land holdings further increased and more land was alienated to (absentee) landowners, such as members of the *menak* (noble) families, well-to-do villagers, merchants and *hadji*. This resulted in a concentration of land ownership on the one hand, and a group of landless people on the other hand (Van Dijk 1981:363-373). Combined with a growing population pressure on land and a decline of employment opportunities in rural areas, especially from the 1920s, this led to many peasants moving to the city (Jellinek 1991:4). With an expansion of economic activities and growing labour demand, Bandung proved an attractive destination.

The expanding city engulfed many *desa* (indigenous rural villages), which soon lost their rural character and developed into urban kampongs with an almost entirely residential nature (Flieringa 1930:36). As part of colonial legal dualism, these kampongs were allowed a high degree of autonomy ('*desa-autonomie*' or village autonomy), which means that the population could apply its own customary or *adat* law, administration, and administration of justice, also in relation to land. Village autonomy was said to respond to the divergent economic and social needs of the colony's different population groups.<sup>3</sup> In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, 17 such autonomous villages existed within Bandung's borders. By 1942, after the extension of the boundaries of Bandung Municipality, the number of villages had increased to 43.<sup>4</sup>

One of the villages, then called Soekadjadi, was Taman Sari. On first sight this area appeared strictly European. Located in the valley of Bandung's major Cikapundung river and enclosed between the Lembangweg and Van Houten Parkweg (currently Cihampelas Street and Taman Sari Street), it was covered with the private back gardens, orchards with cacao trees, and fishponds of the predominantly European, middle class population residing in these main streets. At the eastern side of the river (now RW 20 or Neighbourhood 20), alongside the Van Houten Parkweg, there was a European graveyard. This area as well as the area alongside the Cikapundung River was municipal land.

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3 Art. 71 of the 1854 Constitution acknowledged the autonomy of indigenous villages, and general standards were laid down in the 1906 Indigenous Village Ordinance ('Inlandse Gemeente Ordonnantie'). The subsequent 1925 Constitution ('Indische Staatsregeling') acknowledged this autonomy on the basis of Art. 128(3).

4 See Appendix I (p. 243) for an overview of these villages.

Behind a façade of European property and infrastructure, the village was hidden. The area around Gang Bongkaran (now RW 15, a small alley or actually a fire lane) off the Lembangweg, formed one of the village's settlements. An informant remembers that in the early 1930s around this alley there was a handful of houses, owned by Dutch residents and by some indigenous who had bought the land from its former Dutch owners. A bit further north there was another settlement, called Garunggang Timur (later called Liang Maung, now RW 07 or Cimaung), consisting of another handful of houses.

Taman Sari initially retained a rural character. The plots were generally big. In Garunggang Timur a single resident held most of the land, but every household at least presided over a sawah or orchard, often with cacao trees. There were fishponds too. This land was so-called *tanah garapan*: land that on the basis of *adat* law had come into the residents' possession through cultivation. The houses were constructed in a traditional manner, with raised floors, walls made of wood and bamboo mats (*bilik kayu*), and a bamboo roof. Paths consisted of sand or pebbles. Parts of the area were swampy and muddy. The Cikapundung River was so clean that it was used for drinking water. Contemporary names of kampongs in Taman Sari still reveal the rural character of the area. For instance the word Maung, which forms part of the name of the settlement Liang Maung or Cimaung, means 'wildcat' in Sundanese, the regional language. This animal was just one of the wild species that were said to live in the area. According to several informants the area retained its rural character until the late 1930s. In the Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Town Planning Ordinance, which will be discussed below, Cikapundung Valley was referred to as "one of the few examples of natural scenery having been converted into scenes of natural beauty" (Toelichting 1938; Wertheim 1958:33).<sup>5</sup>

It should be noted that Taman Sari is located in the northern part of Bandung. The city was ethnically and to some extent also socio-economically divided, the railway track forming a clear borderline. The northern, cooler part was mostly reserved for well-to-do European citizens, who lived in 'old Indies' brick houses with large yards. Although the Europeans formed only 12 per cent of the population, they occupied more than half of the urban land (Wertheim 1956:180). The northern part was thus relatively spacious. Similarly, the indigenous residents of Taman Sari were relatively well off and the area had a small population. They were mostly cultivators and market gardeners, but some had made a fortune in trade.

Conditions were very different in the many kampongs in the southern part of Bandung. As a result of strong population growth and the allocation of land for the development of urban infrastructure and European districts, the majority of the indigenous population was packed into these

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5 This extended version of the Explanatory Memorandum was not enacted as the official elucidation of the Ordinance (Niessen 1999:229).

settlements (Voskuil 1996:39-40).<sup>6</sup> The indigenous formed 77 per cent of Bandung's population, but occupied only 40 per cent of the land (Wertheim 1956:180). Many were pushed out of the city centre to the city's outskirts. Just as in Taman Sari, however, kampongs in the south retained a rural character, both in terms of construction of buildings and infrastructure, and from a social-economic perspective (Wertheim 1956:175-6). In combination with the densely populated environment, the very basic nature of the infrastructure constituted a risk for public health.

Bandung's urban government increasingly felt the need to improve conditions in the kampongs. Within the framework of the 1903 Decentralisation Act, in 1906 Bandung had become a Town ('Gemeente') with relatively strong powers.<sup>7</sup> Yet, village autonomy severely restricted the town government's scope to interfere in the kampongs. Besides, for a long time there remained uncertainty about the extent of the town government's authority over the kampongs. The colonial government had already informed the town governments in 1907 that regulations concerning matters with a citywide scope were applicable to these settlements, but there seems to have been misunderstanding about this matter until the end of the 1930s (Stadsgemeente Bandoeng 1938:19-20).

In order to enable the town government to exert influence within the kampongs, the Town Council ('Gemeenteraad') in 1917 expressed its wish to annul village autonomy.<sup>8</sup> Legally this only became possible after a constitutional amendment in 1918, which allowed for the abolishment of villages or limitation of their authorities within the borders of a town by ordinance.<sup>9</sup> The central government supported the unification of government

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6 It should be noted that these settlements did not consist of indigenous residents only. Surveys in kampongs in Bandung and other major cities in Java reveal that the kampung population also consisted of Chinese, Eurasian, and European people (Colombijn 2010:117-23). Colombijn goes as far as to argue that the defining social characteristic of kampongs was class and not ethnicity (Colombijn 2008:161).

7 The Decentralisation Act ('Decentralisatiewet') was a response to the increasingly complicated tasks of the expanding administration, but also to the demands of the urban elite for self-government (Wertheim 1958:viii). It was implemented by other legislation. On the basis of the 1904 Decentralisation Decision ('Decentralisatiebesluit'), the Governor-General promulgated separate Creation Ordinances ('Instellingsordonnanties') to create Towns, including Bandung in 1906. After the 1903 Decentralisation Act had been replaced by the 1922 Government Reform Act, the 1926 Municipality Ordinance ('Stadsgemeente-Ordonnantie') turned Towns already existing on the basis of the Creation Ordinances into Municipalities ('Stadgemeenten'), leading to refinement of the structure of urban government (Niessen 1999:51).

8 This development occurred in the era of Ethical Policy, when the colonial government set increasing store by the fate of the indigenous population. Still, village autonomy was one of the few 'native' issues that received the council's attention. See Otto, who on the basis of an analysis of the council's minutes describes the lively discussions in Bandung's Municipal Council about this issue (Otto 1991).

9 A fourth section was added to Art. 71 of the 1854 Constitution of the Dutch Indies. This later became Art. 128(6) of the 1925 Constitution ('Indische Staatsregeling').

in the cities, but did not want to cover all the financial costs leading to annulment of village autonomy, which in view of the improvement activities that had to be undertaken in kampongs would be considerable. The financial hurdle remained a matter of discussion between the Municipality and the central government until the end of colonial rule, the latter never offering to pay more than half the costs involved in this measure (Stadsge-meente Bandoeng 1938:1-28).<sup>10</sup> As long as the kampongs remained autonomous the central government did not allow municipal governments to interfere in these settlements.

Despite this attitude of the central government, Bandung's town government did take several measures to improve conditions in kampongs. In 1919 it started a housing programme, for which it established a Town Housing Authority ('Gemeentelijk Woningbedrijf'). Each year hundreds of houses were built for low-income residents, who could either rent the house or acquire it on the basis of a hire purchase system. However, the town government could not provide houses for the entire population (Gemeente Bandoeng 1929:42-8). In practice only the lower middle-class groups benefited from the programme, since the dwellings built under the programme remained too expensive for the masses residing in kampongs. In any event, the programme was only of limited scale (Toelichting 1938:34-5; Wertheim 1958:21-2). Private real estate firms never showed any interest to participate in such housing programmes, unless they were forced to (Toelichting 1938:74; Wertheim 1958:61).<sup>11</sup> For most low-income people, particularly indigenous, kampongs thus remained the only settlement option.

In 1926, in the same year Bandung became a Municipality, the government reserved the southern part of the city for the indigenous population (Gemeente Bandoeng 1929:37-9). It would thus be protected against the allocation of more land for urban infrastructure and European districts. This measure, however, sharpened ethnic divisions (Voskuil 1996:39-40).

Meanwhile the central government remained opposed to urban government interference in the kampongs, without prior abolishment of the kampongs' autonomy. Nevertheless, Bandung's municipal government did not await a change of policy to take measures. In 1927 it officially started kampong improvement ('kampongverbetering'), improving roads, constructing drainage and sewerage facilities, providing lighting equipment, and building hydrants and public baths (Gemeente Bandoeng 1929:36).

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10 Village autonomy was annulled in some other cities, mostly after the Decentralisation Act of 1903 was replaced by the 1922 Government Reform Act ('Wet op de Bestuurshervorming') (Niessen 1999:47); for example in Malang and Surabaya in 1930. However, this measure only applied to villages whose residents felt that village ties no longer existed (Stadsge-meente Bandoeng 1938:17-9).

11 From the mid-1920s onwards, a Public Housing Company ('N.V. Volkshuisvesting'), which was a joint venture between the central government and a Municipality for the development of public housing, was established in many cities, but not in Bandung. However, within ten years the concept of housing companies came under attack, as most operated at a loss (Cobban 1993:892-5).



In 1929 the central government officially departed from the idea that the villages could only be improved if their autonomy was abolished (Van de Wetering 1939:3).<sup>12</sup> Consequently, the central government started providing funding to the Municipality for improvement activities (Stadsge-meente Bandoeng 1938:1-28).<sup>13</sup> The municipal governments could now officially interfere in all interests and issues related to these villages, such as housing and hygiene; especially in villages located in or near the crowded city-centre. It should be noted that this change in policy was driven not only by concerns over hygiene and welfare, but also by underlying political motives. It was feared that poor living conditions would draw the urban poor into the arms of the nationalists, who wanted to overthrow the colonial government (Van Roosmalen 2004:194).<sup>14</sup>

Kampong dwellers appeared to accept and sometimes responded positively to the colonial administration's interventions in their settlements (Colombijn 2008). The effects of kampong improvement were however limited. Only a few of the problems could be tackled, specifically drainage and path construction. The activities were limited in scope and progress was slow (Toelichting 1938:32-3; Wertheim 1958:20). In some cases, kampong improvement only led to social upgrading in the sense that lower class residents were forced out by the more well-to-do (Wertheim 1956:179). Bandung's municipal government also tried to limit the construction of new primitive dwellings, but as a result the shortage of kampong housing increased, with several families being forced to share one house. Living conditions, in turn, further deteriorated (Toelichting 1938:33; Wertheim 1958:21). By the end of the colonial period, it was acknowledged that the government had failed to manage the kampong issue (Toelichting 1938:33; Wertheim 1958:20).

This is not entirely surprising. Village autonomy remained, resulting in both the central and municipal governments being unable to exert their powers in all matters within their territories. And, as acknowledged by one government adviser on decentralisation, it remained hard to determine the extent of the municipal government's authority to interfere in the kam-

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12 The Municipalities were invited to start improvement activities by Art. 70 of the 1926 Municipality Ordinance ('Stadsge-meente Ordonnantie'). This ordinance – contrary to the earlier-mentioned Art. 128(3) of the 1925 Constitution on village autonomy – stated that the Municipal Council had the competence to regulate and administer the Municipality's household.

13 The activities were formalised in 1934 by the Kampong Improvement Ordinance ('Kampong Verbeeteringsordonnantie'). Notably, Van de Wetering criticised the Municipality of Bandung for not fulfilling its moral obligation to spend as much on kampong improvement as it received from the Central Government for that purpose (Van de Wetering 1939:7).

14 See also the reference to the political consequences of kampong conditions in the Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Town Planning Ordinance's (Toelichting 1938:32; Wertheim 1958:19). For a further discussion of the colonial administration's kampong improvement policy, see Van Roosmalen 2008:97-108.



pongs.<sup>15</sup> Bandung's municipal government had great difficulties in enforcing regulations that were applicable, such as the 1929/1931 enacted building code, because existing settlements developed continuously (Gemeente Bandoeng 1929:41). In addition, enforcement often remained limited for financial reasons (Kampongverbeteringscommissie 1939:42).

By the end of the colonial period, the failure to manage the kampong issue led to an acknowledgement of the need to formulate central directives for town planning. The objective was to develop an integrated town planning approach, within which the government would acknowledge the singular status of kampongs as native neighbourhoods, and would therefore make an exception for kampongs with respect to the type of state regulation, but not with respect to the actual level of state regulation. As formulated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Town Planning Ordinance, the kampong would form "a unity with the rest of the Municipality, however, just like other neighbourhoods, with its own identity that requires individual treatment" (own translation) (Toelichting 1938:95).

### 2.3 REFUGE SETTLEMENTS IN AN OCCUPIED CITY

The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 marked a new period of kampong development in Bandung. During the occupation, the living conditions in the West-Javanese countryside quickly deteriorated. Jobs on plantations disappeared, farmers were forced to deliver large quantities of rice to the occupying forces, rural people were 'recruited' for forced labour (becoming *romusha*), and there was significant inflation (Smail 1964:12). These difficult conditions resulted in an influx of refugees to the cities: in just three years Bandung's indigenous population almost doubled, from about 200,000 to some 400,000 (Van Bruinessen 1989:3). The Japanese administration tried to force people back to the countryside, but this was only partly successful (Wertheim 1956:185). Detailed data are absent, but it is clear that a large proportion of the refugees settled in existing kampongs or created new settlements. The Japanese administration allowed and even encouraged people to squat on private land (Colombijn 2010:207).

After the Japanese surrender and the struggle for independence, warfare in West-Java between the Dutch and the Republican Army would result in new flows of refugees, but this time in the opposite direction. As soon as Allied troops arrived in Bandung in 1946, the city was effectively divided into two parts, separated by the railway track, with the north being guarded by British troops and the south by the Indonesian Republican Army. In March 1946, after four months of turmoil and following an ulti-

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15 Such was acknowledged in 1938 by Levelt, the government adviser on decentralisation, in response to questions from a member of the Dutch Indies People's Council ('Volk-sraad') during a session on the abolishment of the autonomy of a number of villages in Malang (Handelingen 1937-1938:207-11).

matum by the British, who wanted to put an end to the division, the Republican Army evacuated the Indonesian population to the countryside south of Bandung and destroyed large parts of the city by arson.<sup>16</sup> By the end of the month, an estimated half a million people had moved out of the city. For a year and a half the southern part of Bandung remained a dead city, with people visiting the area only occasionally. Only the northern part of Bandung remained populated, generally by Europeans and Chinese (Smail 1964:148-152).

Developments similar to those described above also occurred in Taman Sari. During the Japanese occupation the population grew considerably; although, as we will see, not as significantly as in later years. New houses were constructed, as well as a mosque. After the Japanese surrender, most of the Indonesian residents of Taman Sari fled to the countryside, to nearby places such as Tasikmalaya and Sumedang. Their houses were occupied by Dutch military. The Dutch, Indo-European, and Chinese populations generally stayed. Indonesian residents only returned in 1949-1950, after the Dutch had granted independence to the Indonesian Republic.

In the turbulent years of Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence, state interference in kampongs remained limited. The Japanese did introduce the *tonarigumi* system in 1943, consisting of neighbourhood associations aimed at controlling the Indonesian population. These associations formed the predecessors of the neighbourhood associations that exist in Indonesia to the present day, under the names *Rukun Warga* (RW) and *Rukun Tetangga* (RT). After the Japanese surrender, as part of an urban housing policy, the central colonial government took several emergency measures to tackle the housing crisis, including rent control, allocation of extant housing, and reconstruction of damaged urban quarters (Colombijn 2010:311). During the period of conflict migration, the unlawful occupation of government land had become common. In response, the central colonial government promulgated an ordinance in 1948, making such occupation a criminal offence.<sup>17</sup> In the same year the government laid the foundation for future interference in kampongs, by finally enacting the first Town Planning Ordinance for Municipalities on Java. The Municipalities had to design a town plan, detail plans, and a municipal building code (Niessen 1999:223-6).<sup>18</sup> However, the Ordinance was not applicable to Bandung.<sup>19</sup>

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16 This event is known as *Bandung Lautan Api*: Bandung a Sea of Fire.

17 'Ordonnantie onrechtmatige occupatie van gronden'.

18 'Stadsverordeningsordonnantie Stadsgemeenten Java'. An implementing regulation, the Town Planning Regulation (*Stadsvormingsverordening*), followed in 1949. For a discussion of the rationale, drafting process, enactment, and content of the Ordinance and the Explanatory Memorandum, see Van Roosmalen 2008:145-52; 179.

19 See Decision 3 of the Lieutenant Governor-General of Indonesia dated 3 October 1948, concerning the Assignment of cities which fulfil the requirements of Art. 51(1) of the Town Planning Ordinance ('Aanwijzing van steden, welke voldoen aan het bepaalde in het eerste lid van artikel 51 van de Stadsvormingsordonnantie') (Niessen 1999:225).

## 2.4 MIGRANT SETTLEMENTS IN A DECOLONISING CITY

The transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic in 1949 marked the beginning of a period of decolonisation. The decolonisation effort, however, was far from easy. The first years of independence were as tumultuous as the years before. It was a period of struggle, uncertainty and quick transformation, particularly for the population of West-Java. During these years, Bandung experienced the most significant population growth in its history. With the population increasing from about 200,000 to over 1,000,000 inhabitants, it was the fastest growing of all major Indonesian cities (Hugo 1981:81).

The first group of migrants after independence were civil evacuees and soldiers who had left Bandung in 1946 (Hugo 1981:84). Informants gave testimony of the difficulties they confronted when returning to their homes in Taman Sari. Some learnt that other Indonesians had occupied their houses and land. Others found their houses partly demolished by the residents who had not left Taman Sari. The cacao trees in the orchards had been cut down and the fishponds were empty.

Soon, conflict migrants followed suit. They came to Bandung to escape the rebellion in the West-Java countryside by the *Darul Islam*, a movement that wished to establish an Islamic state. The uprising was particularly violent in East Priangan, near Tasikmalaya and Garut. Each year hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands of houses burnt down. In 1951, more than one hundred thousand people were evacuated from the area. Between 1955 and 1962, a yearly average of 250,000 people fled their homes (Van Dijk 1981:104-6). Since the cities were relatively safe, most evacuees sought refuge there, not least in Bandung. The atrocities only ended in 1962, when the last prominent leaders of the *Darul Islam* movement were arrested.

In the same period Bandung also started to experience labour migration. The city became the seat of the provincial government and it resumed its role as a centre for education. The industrial sector focused on processing agricultural products and textiles. The Asia-Africa conference in 1955 created new job opportunities, including for lower-skilled people. However, these demands for labour fell short of the number of people moving to Bandung (Hugo 1981:84-5).

By the late 1950s, net migration into Bandung had become negligible, and in the early 1960s it even became slightly negative (Van Bruinessen 1989:4). The number of migrants moving to Bandung dropped considerably and many people moved back to their home villages as the West-Javanese countryside became safer again. However a great number of people stayed on in Bandung, including some who may have originally considered returning to their village of origin; not least because job prospects in the countryside were even worse than those in the city.

The above developments coincided with the exodus of the Dutch population. The nationalisation of Dutch enterprises in 1957/8 forced these residents to leave the country. The first Europeans to leave managed to sell their property, although at below market value; while those who initially

remained, would later also be forced to leave. Their houses were occupied by government and military officials, and were often on-sold to well-to-do Chinese. Large plots of land, especially in the north, became vacant.

Some of the migrants from the West-Java countryside moved to one of the many existing kampongs, while others created new kampongs by squatting on land that had become vacant as a result of the departure of the European population. Other migrants occupied municipal land alongside railway tracks and riversides, and also in graveyards. The vast flow of evacuees was disorganised, as many poor villagers attempted to escape the violence between the Darul Islam and the Republican Army. Many could not find a job, or were employed in the informal sector.<sup>20</sup> They could not, therefore, afford formal access to land and housing; of which there was an increasing shortage anyway. In 1959 the ratio of people to houses in Bandung was 12:1 (Hugo 1981:85). Refugees thus had no other choice but to build their own houses, often without permission from the Municipality.

According to several informants, the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or PKI), which was increasingly influential as an opposition party, supported unlawful occupation of vacant land. This strategy fitted into the party's political objective to organise a strong power base among lower-income groups.<sup>21</sup> The party forged alliances with particular worker groups, which could become strategically important in times of revolution. For instance, the party established strong links with workers in the state railway company, through the Railway Workers Union (*Serikat Buruh Kereta Api* or SBKA); particularly in Bandung, where the company's head office was located.<sup>22</sup> The Railway Workers Union's actions included the occupation of railway company land, and once unionists began to occupy their employer's land, other workers followed.<sup>23</sup>

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20 Hugo refers to a report of the national labour agency which presents the results of a survey, finding that only 62.7 per cent of males of twelve years and older were formally employed (Hugo 1981:85).

21 In terms of political support, the strategy proved successful. By the end of 1950 the Party had built up a strong and organised base among urban workers and other non-peasant groups. In later years the party tried to gain support from the peasant population, including by organising a campaign for land reforms in the countryside, as well as drafting and backing bills on that matter, and subsequently by initiating the unilateral action movement (*aksi sepihak*) that was responsible for the unlawful occupation of agricultural land (Mortimer 1972).

22 There were two unions at the time. The other Union was the Railway Workers Association (*Persatuan Buruh Kereta Api* or PBKA), which was backed by the Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or PSI) and Nasution's Alliance of Supporters for Freedom of Indonesia (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or IPKI).

23 I have found no accounts of the occupation of land with support of the PKI in any of the literature on the history of Bandung, except a general reference in a book by Siregar, who states: "In the city, the illegal occupation of land continued and, to a limited extent, it was even encouraged by left-wing political factions" (Siregar 1990:113). Despite this paucity of written accounts, several informants confirmed that the practice occurred.

In spite of the large numbers of squatters, the process of land occupation was incremental, which is typical for countries in Asia and Africa, and is unlike the large-scale invasion practices common in South-American countries. The land was developed without authorisation, usually via a similar series of steps. Typically, the process would begin with a small number of squatters occupying the land, to check for a response by the owner or caretaker of the land (which could be a government agency or a private party). If no eviction occurred, other people would join the squatters. Often, people required approval from a community leader before they could move onto the land. It is likely that this form of social screening also contributed to the slow rate of growth of these settlements, which may have been a prerequisite for survival of the community, as an inundation of people would likely have led to resource scarcity and ensuing disputes (Wibowo 1983:4-5).

In 1964 an estimated minimum of 11,000 houses were *rumah liar* (Hugo 1981:85).<sup>24</sup> This is probably a serious underestimation. By that year, hundreds of thousands of people had already migrated to Bandung, and the city had reached a population of over a million.

What were the developments in Taman Sari in the first years after the transfer of sovereignty? Taman Sari also proved an attractive destination for migrants. According to several informants, many of the families of current residents settled in this period, coming from places like Cipendeuy, Malangbong, Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Subang. Initially they were rather separate communities according to their place of origin. Liang Maung, for instance, consisted of three separate areas: Kidul, Sisi Gawir, and Mesjid, with migrants from three different places. Many of these migrants stayed, even after the Priangan countryside had become safe again. With the inflow of new migrants in later years, the three communities gradually mixed and unified.

Taman Sari drew many migrants because there was so much land available. Here too, the Dutch residents were leaving. Generally, their houses became occupied by Indonesian military personnel during the late 1950s. A single Indo-European family also chose to remain in their residence. However, few of the original residents retained control over their land, which allowed newcomers to occupy the land easily. Many newcomers would first rent a house or room and then occupy land, subdivide it, and build their own house. It seems that some bought the land from the Dutch, while others had the land donated to them; for instance because they had been employees of the owners. Most former orchards or sawahs that had become empty or uncultivated, or were on absentee land, were simply occupied without obtaining permission from the European or Indonesian title holder.

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24 Unfortunately Hugo gives no reference for this statement. Considering the cautiousness of this estimation, it would not be surprising if it were derived from documents from the municipal government.

An informant recalls that one of the European residents strictly guarded his land and threatened newcomers with the gun if they attempted to occupy it. Others had greater consideration for the refugees, who were generally in poor condition. Some newcomers occupied land alongside the Cikapundung River.<sup>25</sup> The Municipality, which managed the riverside land, was not as strict as some private owners. Newcomers therefore settled here first. If someone (later) claimed a right to the land, migrants sometimes agreed to buy or lease it. These claimants were not always rightful owners, however.

Informants gave no account of any involvement of the PKI in the occupation of land in Taman Sari. Such involvement seems unlikely, given that a small number of newcomers took control over larger plots of land – a practice that the party strongly opposed. Some informants explained that certain people occupying the land had close connections with the municipal government or the army. Early occupants enclosed plots, subdivided them, and leased them out to newcomers. Some of these newcomers bought the land. In Liang Maung a kampong head, who was the leader of the area, played a central role in the allocation of former European land to newcomers.<sup>26</sup>

Taman Sari also proved attractive because it was located close to labour opportunities. Most migrants found employment in the informal sector, for instance as petty-traders. Migrants from each region developed their own specialisations. Their modest incomes and dependence on customers urged many of them to settle near markets.

With the first flow of migrants, Taman Sari finally started to develop from a rural into an urban residential area. Sawahs and orchards steadily transformed into a residential area. Initially the houses were temporary or semi-permanent constructions made of wood and bamboo, and many empty plots remained available around them. Yet the basic structure of the area was already taking form: a labyrinth of small alleys giving access to more or less permanent constructions.

From Taman Sari we return to the national level to discuss further relevant developments. Despite the 1948 enactment of legislation against unlawful occupation and town planning legislation, which remained in force after independence, the new Indonesian government also failed to effectively regulate kampongs. In the first busy years after independence, the government was occupied with other matters; and at this point it also had no financial resources to interfere.

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25 In later years, when the settlement became denser, newcomers reclaimed land by narrowing the Cikapundung River. The European graveyard that had been cleared in the 1950s was used only as orchard land and a playfield; until around 1980, when the Islamic University of Bandung (Unisba) was founded. It is likely that newcomers were reluctant to reside on a place of burial (Van Bruinessen 1988:40).

26 One of the informants remembers that he was called Pak Apung, an acronym of *kepala kampung* (head of the kampong). His real name was Pak Karta and he headed the area until 1960.



This changed in later years. In the early 1950s, the Department of Labour initiated a housing programme in Bandung. Similarly to other municipalities, Bandung's municipal government established a Co-operative Housing Association (*Jajasan Kas Pembangunan*) in 1953, which financed housing through central government funding and the savings of individual members. The municipal administration also spent part of its own budget on housing. However, the effects of these activities on the city's housing market were marginal, and in any event they mostly benefited civil servants, rather than the masses in the kampongs. At the same time, kampong improvement activities remained limited. Under these circumstances, Indonesia's central government began to place an emphasis on self-help housing policy, which also gained prominence within international development circles. However, this policy was not properly implemented in Indonesia – except of course by kampong dwellers themselves (Colombijn 2010:336-52).<sup>27</sup> In an effort to curb rural-urban migration; which, as discussed above, was the major cause of the expansion of kampongs and the deterioration in living conditions, on 1 March 1954 the municipal government declared Bandung a 'closed city'. Each newcomer required a so-called settlement certificate ('vestigingsbewijs or VB').<sup>28</sup> The regulation remained in force until 1964, but the main effect was that migrants were discouraged from registering as permanent residents (Hugo 1981:85). Land reforms in the countryside, meant to provide access to land to poor tenants and landless labourers, were just as unsuccessful at halting the migration. Alarmed by the growing practice of squatting, in 1954 the Mayors of the twelve provincial cities in Indonesia, including Bandung, initiated a joint effort to tackle this problem, demolishing squatters' houses with the help of the police and the army. During four months in the first half of 1955, as many as 657 houses were demolished in Bandung. These actions however soon met with strong resistance, forcing the municipal administration to reconsider its stance on squatting (Colombijn 2010:215-24).

Meanwhile, the autonomous legal status of the kampongs was maintained. Only after the European population had departed and the rural-urban migration of low-income Indonesians to Bandung was reaching a peak, with its associated occupation of abandoned and municipal land, did the central government attempt to end this colonial-era legal dualism. In the 1950s there were increasingly strong calls to abolish village autonomy. Opposition was directed towards the 1906 Indigenous Village Ordinance

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27 The central government funding came from the People's Housing Department (*Djawatan Peroemahan Rakjat*, later spelt as *Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat*), which was established in 1951.

28 The municipal government also had a political rationale for this policy; it could check whether any *Darul Islam* members were among the newcomers (personal communication of a retired senior municipal official, 20 July 2006).



and the 1907 Regulation on the Election of Village Heads.<sup>29</sup> On the basis of the latter ordinance, only the original residents of the villages were allowed to vote for the election of village heads. Since the villages had become very heterogeneous, this was considered unfair. In the early 1960s, the National Council (which had replaced the National Parliament in 1957) finally issued a statement that the dualist administrative structure had been abolished, and stopped providing funds for the election of the village heads. Formally the ordinances were never abolished.<sup>30</sup>

As noted in Chapter 1, in 1960 the Indonesian government enacted the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), which was meant to unify land law.<sup>31</sup> Most *adat* rights were intended to be integrated into a unified system of land law. This required the surveying of the land, after which the land was to be registered and certified by the administration. However, as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, for various reasons few kampong dwellers registered their land.

By this time many people, both within and outside the larger Indonesian cities, continued to occupy state land or land that was privately owned by third parties. In response to this situation, in 1961 the government enacted another law, which stipulated that every person residing on land without permission from the title holder would be considered an unlawful occupant and could be evicted at the discretion of the regional head (i.e. the Mayor).<sup>32</sup> Unlike the 1948 ordinance, the law not only involved a prohibition to occupy state land, but also private land. Private right holders could already base an eviction claim on private law, but this new law made eviction easier, because enforcement authorities could be called in without a prior court order. Moreover, the law might prevent the practice of unlawful occupation, because such an action now formed a criminal offence. The General Elucidation to the Law explains that the government understands the reasons behind unlawful occupation, given the shortage of land for the people, but considers that in the interest of the state's development, the use of land should be regulated in an organised manner.<sup>33</sup>

The abolishment of village autonomy was an important symbolic step, but because this measure was not accompanied by a consistent set of applied policies to improve living conditions in kampongs, it had little consequences in practice. A similar situation occurred with the enactment of

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29 'Inlandse Gemeenteordonnantie'; 'Reglement op de verkiezing, de schorsing en het ontslag van hoofden van inlandsche gemeenten op Java en Madoera'.

30 Personal communication of a retired senior official, 20 July 2006. See also: Otto 1991:214.

31 The full name of the law is: Law No. 5/1960 on the Basic Provisions of Agrarian Principles (*UU No. 5/1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria*).

32 Law No. 51/1960 on the Prohibition to Use Land Without Permission from the Right Holder or his Deputy (*UU No. 51/1960 tentang Larangan Pemakaian Tanah Tanpa Izin yang Berhak atau Kuasanya*). The Military Command had enacted similar regulations in as early as 1957. The law will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.

33 General Elucidation, under 1 Law No. 51/1960.

land legislation. While this legislation changed the legal position of kampong dwellers and turned many kampongs into informal settlements, housing residents with weak or no legal claims to the land, again the regulatory changes were not enforced. Residents therefore continued to have no reason to fear immediate interference by the municipal government. To illustrate this point, only one informant in Taman Sari could give an account of an eviction case in that period for reason of unlawful occupation and this seemed to have been a rare and ad-hoc affair. Other informants revealed that some newcomers in Taman Sari not only asked and obtained permission to settle in the area from the informal kampong leader, but also personally from local officials. This may even have been common practice, a practice that continued in later years, as we will see in Chapter 4. Obviously, this does not mean that it was lawful to settle in Taman Sari.

Political-economic conditions prompted the government's *laissez-faire* attitude. As an official of the City Quarter Office explained, the vast flow of migrants to Bandung forced the municipal government to allow them to settle in the area, even though it was not their land and in most part was not reserved for residential purposes. Besides, the political influence, at the municipal level, of the PKI and other parties supporting the urban poor should not be underestimated. Through the late 1950s and in the early 1960s, two out of six of Bandung's Aldermen were members of the PKI. The party also received support from at least one member of the judiciary. As a consequence, if formal landholders whose land had been occupied went to court, they often lost the case. The few efforts of the administration to evict people led to protests.<sup>34</sup>

## 2.5 MIGRANT SETTLEMENTS IN A METROPOLITAN CITY

After Soeharto had established his New Order regime in 1966, Indonesia experienced extraordinary economic growth. The focus of the regime's economic policy on industrialisation resulted in increasing employment opportunities in the cities.<sup>35</sup> Being the target of domestic and foreign investments, Bandung was one of them. These developments effectively reduced poverty, but also resulted in new flows of rural migrants coming to the city in search of jobs. Generally, urban incomes were higher than rural incomes; for instance in 1980 they were up to 1.5 times higher (Keban 1993:88). Other catalysts for migration included the development of modern transportation and better communication networks.

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34 Personal communication of a retired senior municipal official, Bandung, 20 July 2006.

35 The regime also focussed on agricultural development, by initiating intensification programmes, but these programmes led to a labour surplus rather than an increasing labour demand in rural areas. Economic disparities between urban and rural areas increased.

Most migrants came from the West-Java countryside. Just like in other cities in Indonesia, with the exception of Jakarta and some other coastal cities, intra-provincial migration remained the most common mode of population movement to Bandung.<sup>36</sup> This was mainly due to significant ethnolinguistic and socio-cultural differences between Indonesian Provinces (Wibowo 1983:25-6).

Some migrants found employment in the formal sector. From the 1970s, the garment industry attracted many poor agricultural labourers to Bandung. Mainly women worked in this industry (Keban 1993:93). The sizable military and civilian bureaucracy, as well as institutions of higher education, created employment opportunities for low-skilled workers (Van Bruinessen 1988:40).

One should not overestimate the importance of the formal sector in terms of job opportunities for migrants, who were generally low-educated and ill-skilled. Moreover, throughout the years, labour-intensive workshops were replaced by modern capital-intensive factories, which only employed a fraction of the former labour force. Other employment in the formal sector was hard to find without a proper network of *koneksi* (Van Bruinessen 1988:46). This explains why 66 per cent of the migrants surveyed in Bandung in 1986 were employed in the informal sector (Keban 1993:99).<sup>37</sup> Even in this period of economic growth, many other migrants were unemployed, which was not reflected in official figures. Labour demand in the formal sector was not increasing as fast as the number of migrants moving to Bandung, and the absorption capacity of the informal sector proved also insufficient to provide the jobs needed.<sup>38</sup>

In this period too, most migrants settled in kampongs. Most importantly, because of their socio-economic position, they had no access to formal land and housing. In addition, being employed predominantly in the informal sector, migrants preferred to settle in centrally-located kampongs, for that is where they could find employment. In any case, living at the outskirts of the city was usually not an option, since travel expenses would be too high in relation to their modest incomes. Rural migrants were also likely

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36 This picture also emerges from the research by Van Bruinessen in a kampung called Sukapakir, which he conducted in 1983-4. He observed that in the 1950s many of the residents of this settlement came from Tasikmalaya, Garut and the southern parts of Bandung District, while in the 1960s and the early 1970s many came from the north coast, further away from Bandung, such as Indramayu, Cirebon, Brebes and Tegal. At the mid-1970s people from Majalengka dominated the migration flows (Van Bruinessen 1988:42).

37 See also: Hugo, who estimated that between half and two thirds of the West Javanese resident urban workforce worked in the informal sector (Hugo 1981:41).

38 Van Bruinessen claims that 10 per cent of the residents in kampung Sukapakir were long-time unemployed. 80 per cent worked in the informal sector, in which there was no regular employment. Lifetime mobility between different kinds of employment and intergenerational mobility was also limited (Van Bruinessen 1989:27-32).

attracted by the settlements' way of life; which retained rural features as villages turned into urban settlements and the inflow of new migrants from the countryside continued.<sup>39</sup>

Migrants tended to cluster on the basis of origin, near relatives or someone from their village who could assist them in getting a house and a job. A survey organised in 1973 revealed that three quarters of migrants were initially housed with family or friends (Hugo 1981:204-5). This concentration of ethnic, regional and kinship groups was part of the chain migration process occurring in Bandung and many other cities in Indonesia (Hugo 1981:88). This is not to say that kampongs were homogeneous. Several groups would cluster in the same settlement (Van Bruinessen 1988:38). Group members often assisted migrants in housing construction, which was generally an incremental process. Benjamin et al., who conducted research in nine kampongs in Bandung in the mid-1980s, estimated that such assistance from members of the group resulted in the initial capital requirements being reduced by as much as 50 per cent of total construction costs. Kampong dwellers could live in housing well beyond their actual budget (Benjamin & Ali Arifin 1985:94). Since group members often also supported migrants in finding a job, regional specialisations emerged.<sup>40</sup> So migrants from each different place of origin developed their own distinct profession.

Several surveys in the 1970s and 1980s, including some conducted in Bandung, as well as our own informants suggest that the buildings changed in that period; towards dwellings of a more permanent character, especially in older kampongs (Benjamin & Ali Arifin 1985:100-1). By the mid-1980s, all but the poorest kampongs in Bandung consisted mostly of permanent housing. In the older kampongs, as many as 75 per cent of the dwellings were permanent (Benjamin & Ali Arifin 1985:106).

Notably, housing consolidation occurred despite the informality of the kampongs in terms of land tenure and land use. By 1971, the number of illegal houses in Bandung was conservatively estimated at 60,000 (Hugo 1981:86).

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39 The rural character of kampongs can for instance be illustrated by the fact that in these settlements social control and security were still relatively strong. Yet, the traditional culture of *gotong royong* (mutual help), whereby residents provide services to the community without any financial reward (for instance helping each other with the construction of a house), was already disappearing at that time.

40 Van Bruinessen notes that residents of Sukapakir who originated from Tegal-Brebes Districts on the north coast and Purwokerto further south, mostly worked as itinerant vendors of *mie baso* (noodles with meatballs). Other residents originating from Majalengka worked as vendors of *baso tahu* (fish balls with bean curd in spicy sauce). A third group, originating from one village in Indramayu, made an income as beggars. The fourth group that could be distinguished on the basis of their origin and occupation, were people from Kebumen, who worked in a big modern factory (Van Bruinessen 1989:19-20).

Bandung's migration rate remained high, but in general slowed down from the 1970s. An increasing proportion of migrants were circular migrants, who returned to their village of origin after a relatively short time. In addition, the number of migrants settling in the Districts around Bandung Municipality grew, especially from the 1980s. Lastly, more people were now commuting daily between their village of origin and the city. Growing transportation opportunities in West-Java enhanced these developments (Keban 1993:102-3). From the 1970s onwards, physical accessibility greatly improved as a result of road extensions and increases in the numbers of vehicles, including vehicles for public transportation. This enabled people living in isolated rural areas to travel to the city easily and at relatively low cost (Keban 1993:91). Overpopulation in Bandung was another reason for the slower pace of population growth during the 1970s. It had become difficult to find an affordable place to live in the increasingly dense city. Partly for that reason, many non-circular migrants returned to their villages to retire. Declining living conditions in the urban kampongs also made the countryside more attractive (Van Bruinessen 1989:22-3). A survey on migration intentions in Bandung conducted in 1986 revealed that 58 per cent of the migrants intended to leave the city, while 26 per cent was undecided (Keban 1993:99).

Despite these developments, Bandung's kampung population continued to grow. This was not only the result of migration; the numerous poor families were also generally large. As soon as the older generation had passed away, the land and house would be subdivided. This is how the plots of some landlords became increasingly small. Depending on their financial position, some heirs rented the new space to fellow-residents, while others sold the land.

Taman Sari was one of the areas that attracted migrants from this new wave. Residents commonly returned to their village of origin for the Feast of Ramadan, and afterwards took relatives or other villagers with them home. Migrants who moved to Taman Sari unaccompanied often had relatives or friends living there. The origins of migrants who settled in Taman Sari changed over the years. Initially, most were from West-Java. In contrast to other kampung areas, in later years many migrants came from Middle and East-Java, and later again even from Sumatra and other outlying islands. In Cimaung (currently RW 07) many residents originate from villages around Cipendeuy, Malangbong and Garut, where they had already been members of the same community. They followed as relatives or former neighbours of the refugees who had settled in the 1950s. Later migrants from other parts of West-Java, like Kuningan, and Middle and East-Java moved to Cimaung. Part of that neighbourhood is called *kampung Jawa* (Javanese kampung), because its residents are mostly of Javanese origin. The first migrants from this second wave arrived in the 1970s, and relatives soon followed.

Throughout the years the location of Taman Sari became of great economic value, not only because of the proximity of the city-centre and good

transportation facilities, but also because its surroundings transformed. In the 1970s a number of new universities and schools were built around Taman Sari, like the Islamic University of Bandung (*Universitas Islam Bandung* or UNISBA), built on the land of the former European graveyard; Pasundan University (*Universitas Pasundan* or UNPAS); and Bandung Law School (*Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Bandung* or STHB). From the end of the 1980s, Cihampelas Street developed into the famous 'jeans street', with shops offering cheap clothing.

Many newcomers found employment in and around these new educational and commercial centres. Some ran their own stand (*warung*) at the market or just on the sidewalk, others worked as itinerant vendors, pedicab (*becak*) drivers, craftsmen, or offered small services. Here too, regional specialisations emerged. So almost all of the male Javanese residents of Cimaung worked as meatball soup traders (*tukang bakso*) and the females went door to door with traditional medicines (*tukang jamu gendong*). Especially from the 1970s, as a result of upward social mobility, some residents of Taman Sari worked as state officials or employees in the (formal) private sector. Because of the proximity of schools and universities, many students settled in Taman Sari. For many residents, renting out rooms to students became one of the major sources of income. This changed the physical structure of the kampong, for they built one or two extra floors on top of their houses.

As the 1973 survey earlier referred to revealed, the first migrants of the new wave usually stayed in a relative's or friend's house until they had found employment and a place to live, both often nearby. Later residents occupied the last plots of non-residential land in Taman Sari. In the meantime, prices of land and buildings continued to rise, so many of the later migrants would initially rent a house.

As a result of the continuing influx of low-income migrants, Taman Sari became dense and dilapidated.<sup>41</sup> In 1975, the area had 404 residents and 79 houses per hectare. The settlement's infrastructure was in bad shape or non-existent (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum dan Tenaga Listrik 1975:130-1). There were social problems too. The population had become increasingly heterogeneous, and as a result of circular migration the percentage of temporal residents increased. Crime was rife within the kampongs. The community feeling that had been very strong until the end of the 1960s was lost to a large extent.

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41 Compared to other kampong areas, it appears that the area was still in relatively good shape though. In a 1975 report by the Department of Public Works, the problems in Taman Sari were put into perspective by comparing the situation in this City Quarter with that in two other City Quarters, Pajajaran and Jamika. Unemployment rates were relatively low in Taman Sari and because dwellers had relatively good jobs, they were well aware of environmental issues. The physical circumstances were also better than in the other City Quarters (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum dan Tenaga Listrik 1975:129-130).



In the first years after the Soeharto regime became established, the regime did little to address the above problems. For instance, state expenditure on housing was modest; not only because of the government's limited resources, but also because the informal housing sector, as mentioned before, proved to have great absorptive qualities (Goldblum 1987:150). However, following the beginning of the oil boom, a policy shift occurred. In 1974, the Indonesian government implemented a national housing policy, leading to the establishment of the National Housing Cooperation (*Perusahaan Umum Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional* or Perum Perumnas), which was to build houses at low cost; and a state bank (*Bank Tabungan Negara* or BTN), which provided credit for public and private housing (Goldblum 1987:154). As well, the government introduced the 1-3-6 rule, requiring (private) developers to build 6 units of 'simple' housing and 3 units of mid-standard housing for every unit of 'luxury' housing. In the following years, the National Housing Cooperation built 400,000 and the private sector another 800,000 housing units.

On first consideration, the housing programme seemed impressive; but it was of too small a scale, and in any case mostly benefited mid-income groups. The 1-3-6 rule was formulated vaguely and was easy to circumvent. In addition, its implementation was rarely monitored (Hoek-Smit 2002:30). Bandung Municipality's 1992 General Town Plan acknowledged that there was general shortage of housing, particularly for lower income groups (Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung 1991:2-9). This indicated that new forms of housing only partially substituted for self-help housing in kampongs (Goldblum 1987:159-160).

In view of these circumstances, the Indonesian government decided to take a pragmatic approach. Just as the colonial Municipality had done 40 years before, it attempted to improve the living conditions of kampong dwellers in the country's major cities, this time through the so-called Kampong Improvement Programme (KIP). This programme initially focussed on the improvement of infrastructure and housing conditions. The first project was set up by the Jakarta Municipality in 1969, and later copied to other cities. From 1974, when the government implemented its second five-year development plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* or REPELITA II), the programmes became part of a national development policy. The Indonesian government made the KIP part of integrated urban projects, in which the KIP's emphasis on micro-level facilities was complemented by citywide services and systems (Suselo & Taylor 1995:13). The government also broadened the KIP's scope, implementing it in two hundred cities and expanding the range of interventions, such as in the field of nutrition, health and education (Goldblum 1987:154-6). The KIP covered over 85,000 hectares of "slum areas", assisting more than 36 million people at nearly 2,000 locations in a wide variety of towns and cities (UN-Desa 2002).

Kampong dwellers in Bandung were among the first to benefit from the KIP. From 1972, kampongs had already been the target of the Bandung Water Supply (BAWS) programme, which focussed on water supply, sani-



tation, and waste management. In 1975, the Department of Public Works selected five kampongs as priority areas for the KIP, Taman Sari being one of them.<sup>42</sup> The settlement was chosen because “a large share of unauthorized housing located on government property alongside the riverbanks could be found here. Its central location, unauthorized status, and the frequent flooding of some areas all indicate[d] that a portion of the residents [had to] be resettled and those areas which remained for residential use [...] be upgraded” (Department of Public Works and Electric Power 1975:9).<sup>43</sup> In 1976 the Bandung Urban Development and Sanitation (BUDS) Project was initiated, of which the KIP would form part. In the same year, the Indonesian government started a pilot project in two kampongs in Bandung (and one in Surabaya) with assistance from the United Nations Environmental Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund. This project took an integrated approach, not only focusing on physical improvement, but also on the amelioration of social and economic conditions. In 1979 Bandung signed another loan for a KIP with the ADB which was meant to upgrade a total area of 385 hectares of kampongs in the city (Suyono 1983:174). These activities now became part of the Bandung Urban Development Project (BUDP), which was followed by the Bandung Urban Development Project II in 1985 and the Metropolitan Bandung Urban Development Project (MBUDP) in 1996.

Not all kampongs could benefit from the KIP. As the project formed an integrated part of town planning policy, it primarily targeted kampongs located in residential zones and whose population consisted of low-income groups. Subsequently, kampongs were selected not only on the basis of criteria such as age, state of dilapidation, density, population growth rate, income of population, and physical condition of the settlement, but also concordance of the location with the General Town Plan. Because of the final criterion, most squatter settlements should have been excluded from the KIP (Goldblum 1987:161-2 and 170-1). However, on the basis of our own observations we can safely conclude that these criteria were not strictly applied in Bandung.<sup>44</sup>

Generally, the KIP had at least two unwanted side effects. First, the value of the houses and the land increased considerably – by an estimated 243 percent in ten years. The KIP was partly focused on the improvement of access and drainage of land, and these factors are among the two most important determinants of the market price of land. Second, the social dif-

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42 Other selected City Quarters were Babakan Surabaya, Cikutra, Maleber and Warung Muncang.

43 All selected kampongs had high population densities, but otherwise they differed greatly. The programme would therefore focus on different aspects in each kampung (Department of Public Works and Electric Power 1975:9-11).

44 Bandung's 1991 General Town Plan partly explains this practice, by noting that previous Plans had not indicated in detail which regions could benefit from the KIP (General Town Plan, chapter 2, p. 8).

ferentiation increased as well, both within rehabilitated kampongs and between rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated kampongs (Goldblum 1987:159).

Despite the above unforeseen side effects of the KIP, Bandung's municipal government intensified the programme in the 1990s on the basis of the so-called Tribina concept, which pursue an integrated approach and gave a greater role to its beneficiaries in its implementation. Taman Sari was again one of the City Quarters that benefited from the programme. The municipal government chose a bottom-up approach, supporting community demands both technically and financially. Improvement activities became part of a larger community-based development programme, and focused on housing and environment, which were expected in turn to have a beneficial effect on public health, employment, and productivity (Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung 1993:4-26).

Bandung's municipal government also experimented with new approaches, such as land consolidation and urban renewal, by replacing kampong housing with low-income tenement buildings (Pemerintah Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Bandung 1991:5-21).<sup>45</sup> The experiment, facilitated by the Department of Public Works and implemented in a kampong in City Quarter Arjuna, was however put on hold as a result of the 1998 financial crisis; and never finished.

In later years the Indonesian government paid increasing attention to the socio-economic conditions in kampongs. It did not take measures to target poverty directly, but provided 'social services' in the fields of education and health. In the early 1970s, the government had started promoting the expansion of public health centres (*Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat* or Puskesmas) and sub-centres (*Pos Pelayanan Terpadu* or Posyandu). In 1994, the government adopted the Health Cards (*Kartu Sehat*) programme, which aimed to enable the poorest families in the community to receive free medical treatment at community health centres and public hospitals.

From the late 1980s, the Indonesian government began to support the activities of microfinance institutions, and initiated various microfinance programmes. Many of these activities were implemented on behalf of the government by banks and other financial institutions. The commercial Indonesian People's Bank (*Bank Rakyat Indonesia* or BRI) implemented some of the most significant programmes, such as the Village Credit Programme (*Kredit Umum Pedesaan* or KUPEDDES) and the Urban Savings Programme (*Simpanan Masyarakat Kota* or SIMASKOT). Secondary micro-banks, known as the People's Credit Banks (*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat* or BPR), were established in later years and implemented similar programmes. In 1990 the

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45 Such buildings were also constructed in Jakarta and Palembang (Kuswartojo 2005:34). This new approach was in line with Presidential Instruction No. 5/1990 on the Upgrading of Slum Housing that is Located on State Land (*Instruksi Presiden No. 5/1990 tentang Peremajaan Pemukiman Kumuh yang Berada di Atas Tanah Negara*).

Indonesian government established a state-owned pawnshop company, *Perum Pegadaian*, which formed an important source of liquidity for low-income households with savings in movable assets. During the 1990s the government also implemented various other microfinance programmes, such as the Family Welfare Income Generation Effort (*Usaha Peningkatan Pendapatan Keluarga Sejahtera* or UPPKS) in 1996. This programme was managed by the National Family Planning Coordination Board, and provided women belonging to low-income households with guidance, entrepreneurship and credit (Holloh 2001:15-38).<sup>46</sup>

With all these efforts aimed at the physical and social-economic development of kampongs, what then happened to their legal status? The initiators of the KIP expected that once the kampong's infrastructure had been improved, residents themselves would take the initiative to improve their tenure status; but there has never been any evidence to support this hypothesis.<sup>47</sup> The government thus initiated various land registration programmes. In 1981 the government instituted the National Land Registration Project (*Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria* or PRONA), a project that was to accelerate land registration by providing land titles to the urban poor at low cost. Bandung's municipal government also initiated and financed a Regional Land Registration Project (*Proyek Operasi Daerah Agraria* or PRO-DA). Moreover, the World Bank initiated the Land Administration Project (LAP) in 1994, registering land of the urban poor at low cost in Java and in urban areas. These programmes will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.

## 2.6 BANDUNG'S KAMPONGS TODAY: A 'CHALLENGE OF SLUMS'?

Indonesia's 1997 economic crisis had severe consequences for Bandung's kampong dwellers and for the government programmes supporting them. The number of urban poor increased substantially as real wages fell and unemployment increased. At the same time, government (supported) pro-

46 Not all microfinance activities were government-related. Some banks also initiated their own microfinance activities. Other institutions, such as cooperatives and NGOs, followed suit, albeit on a relatively limited scale. The most important cooperatives are some of the previously mentioned People's Credit Banks and savings and credit cooperatives. Examples of such NGOs are the national *Yayasan Bina Swadaya* and West-Java *Yayasan Dharma Bhakti Parasahabat* (YDBP). Finally, international development organisations initiated microfinance programmes aimed at developing sustainable microfinance systems in cooperation with banks, NGOs and self-help groups, such as the Project Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups Project of Bank Indonesia and the German Society for Technical Cooperation ('Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit' or GTZ), and the Micro Credit Project of the ADB, which were launched in 1989 and 1996 respectively.

47 See for instance Taylor 1987, who in his evaluation of the Jakarta KIP could not draw any conclusions on that matter.

grammes on housing and human settlements came to a standstill. The National Housing Cooperation nearly went bankrupt, but was bailed out by the government. The private housing sector had to recover from their over-investment and loan failures (UN-Desa 2002).

Under these circumstances, poverty became the government's primary concern. So in mid-1998 the government initiated several programmes as part of a larger emergency programme for poverty reduction, the Social Safety Net (*Jaringan Pengaman Sosial* or JPS, henceforth SSN). The programmes covered various needs, including food security, employment, crucial social services – particularly health and education –, and community empowerment (Hatmadji & Mursitama 2003:269).

From 2001 the Indonesian government took an unprecedented series of further poverty reduction measures, which also benefited kampongs and their dwellers. These measures addressed the socio-economic, physical and legal conditions of kampongs.

The measures addressing the socio-economic conditions followed the five-year poverty reduction strategy that the government had formulated in 2000 and were based on three pillars: focusing on promoting social security for the poor, supporting their empowerment, and facilitating their economic opportunities. These and other measures also addressed the physical and legal conditions in kampongs.

As part of the effort to promote social security, some of the programmes of the SSN became regular development programmes. So the SSN programme in the field of food security was succeeded by the Rice for Poor Families (*Beras untuk Keluarga Miskin* or Raskin) Programme. When in 2005 the Indonesian government again reduced fuel subsidies, it reallocated most of the released funds to four programmes in the fields of education, health, direct unconditional cash transfers and, less relevant here, village infrastructure. Finally, in 2007 the Indonesian government initiated the Hopeful Families Programme (*Program Keluarga Harapan* or PKH), which is a conditional cash transfer system meant to ease the burden of poor households and to break the vicious circle of poverty between generations.

Empowerment activities and activities facilitating economic opportunities included the Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme/Urban Poverty Project (*Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan di Perkotaan* or P2KP, henceforth the UPP), which the Indonesian government had already initiated in 1999. It is based on the so-called Tridaya approach, pursuing community-based development in the social, economic, and physical fields, with the aim of empowering urban communities to overcome poverty. Self-help has thus become part of government policy. The programme provides funding for sustainable economic activities demanded by the people themselves. It also supports individual urban poor with credit, which they have to pay off within two years with interest at commercial rates. Last, it funds development of community-selected basic infrastructure and related employment-generating activities. In order to guarantee that communities participate in the UPP, the Indonesian government established Community Self-Reliance

Bodies (*Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat* or BKM) in each targeted City Quarter. Bandung was among the cities where the programme was first implemented. In 2006, the UPP integrated into the National Community Empowerment Programme (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* or PNPM), which is designed to accelerate the handling of poverty in urban and rural areas by empowering the people's economy, and which again consists of several components. In 2007, the programme was renamed PNPM Mandiri.

At least 16 structural poverty reduction programmes, part of which are (also) implemented in cities, have a microfinance component (ProFI 2005:4). Meanwhile, existing microfinance activities outside the banking sector, such as by NGOs, continue to expand. For instance, since 2002 Yayasan Bina Swadaya has followed the Nobel Prize winning Bangladeshi ASA microfinance model, targeting low-income factory workers and micro-entrepreneurs in urban settings. In 2008, several credit programmes conducted by ministries and other government institutions were unified into the People's Business Credit (*Kredit Usaha Rakyat*) programme. The objective is to accelerate the development of primary sectors and employment of small businesses, to improve accessibility to credit and financial institutions, and to reduce poverty. Six banks implement this programme.

Activities focusing on the physical conditions of kampongs are mostly integrated into the above UPP. As well, there have been some housing construction activities outside this programme. In 2002, the newly established Department of Settlements and Rural Infrastructure (*Departemen Pemukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah* or Kimpraswil) introduced a new National Housing and Settlement Policy and Strategy (*Kebijakan dan Strategi Nasional Perumahan dan Permukiman* or KSNPP). A year later the President initiated the human settlement development activities in the form of the One Million Houses (*Satu Juta Rumah*) Development Programme (UN-Desa 2002). However, so far construction activities have focussed mostly on relieving internally displaced persons and disaster victims and rehabilitating facilities in conflict areas.

Activities addressing the legal conditions in kampongs consist of the Land Management and Policy Development Project (LMPDP), which was initiated in 2004 to succeed the LAP, and PRONA.

All of the above programmes are initiated by the central government. However, as a result of regional autonomy, municipal governments have an increased responsibility in poverty reduction. Bandung's municipal government has actively assumed this responsibility, although the scope of activities is limited. In 2006, it initiated the 'Bring me...' programmes (*Bawaku...*), such as 'Bring me Prosperity, Health, Brightness' (*Bawaku Makmur, Bawaku Sehat, Bawaku Cerdas*), aimed at improving the socio-economic position of low-income households. In 2007 it initiated the Housing Operation (*Bedah Rumah*) programme, which is to renovate houses in slum areas. Each City Quarter receives Rp. 45 million for the renovation of about nine houses.

Aside from these government activities, kampong communities are still to some extent self-reliant – although the feeling of ‘community’ is not particularly strong. In Taman Sari residents have initiated social-economic activities, for instance in the field of family planning, microfinance, social security, and religion. They also clean the river, improve roads and other infrastructure, and organise waste management. Most of these initiatives are cash-based. Each month, the neighbourhood heads collect money from the people.<sup>48</sup> Some kampongs in Taman Sari also receive contributions for these activities from Bio Farma, a nearby pharmaceutical company.

Having given an historical overview of the local, national and international factors underlying the formation of kampongs in Bandung, and having assessed the impact of the main development policies towards kampongs adopted by the Indonesian government, international organisations, and civil society groups, the question rises what are the contemporary socio-economic, physical and legal characteristics of kampongs in Bandung. Our survey provides some data on the socio-economic and physical features of these settlements. Appendix II (see p. 244) presents data on the socio-economic characteristics of the kampongs, more specifically on education levels of dwellers, the sectors they work in, and their income. The survey reveals that generally, contemporary kampongs in Bandung are low-income settlements. A large proportion of the kampong population is low-educated, the majority works in the informal sector and, according to international standards in particular, poverty is rife in all kampongs. On average, 40 per cent of male household heads have only received primary school education (not always completed). As many as 63 per cent work in the informal sector. 65 per cent live under the poverty line of \$1 US per day, as set in the UN Millennium Development Goals. In Taman Sari, the percentage of low-educated male household heads is slightly higher than average, namely 43 per cent. However, at the same time a relatively high percentage of this category of respondents (19 per cent) have enjoyed higher education. This does not mean that a proportional quantity of people in Taman Sari works in the formal sector. Just as in most other City Quarters, a majority of male family heads is employed informally, namely 63 per cent. A high percentage of this category of respondents works as petty traders, as is the case in Ciroyom; probably because big market places are near at hand in both these City Quarters. On the basis of several income calculations, we can see that households and their individual members in Taman Sari are poor, but still relatively well off when compared to households in kampongs in the other City Quarters.

Appendix III (see p. 245) presents data on the physical characteristics of the kampongs. Dwellings are generally small, particularly if measured as

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48 Interviews with neighbourhood heads (about 25) in the kampongs where survey research was conducted reveal that almost every kampong community organises these kinds of activities and finances them in a similar way.



average house size per person, but they are also reasonably consolidated. There is relatively good infrastructure and access to public utilities. So on average, 39 per cent of the dwellings are less than 36 m<sup>2</sup>. 86 per cent of the dwellings have roof consisting of tiles, 92 per cent of the dwellings have brick walls, and 75 per cent of the dwellings have a roof consisting of tiles. 17 per cent of the households have piped water and 98 per cent have electricity. Compared to other kampong City Quarters, the percentage of very small (less than 18 m<sup>2</sup>) and large dwellings (more than 70 m<sup>2</sup>) is considerable in Taman Sari. Here, the average house size per person is the biggest of all City Quarters. Furthermore, the houses are even more consolidated. (Only) 79 per cent of the dwellings have roofs consisting of tiles, but 95 per cent of the dwellings have brick walls. Access to public utilities is relatively good in Taman Sari. About 35 per cent of households have piped water, which is a high percentage compared to other City Quarters, such as Kebon Lega, where as little as 7 per cent of households have this facility.

Kampongs in Bandung still have a predominantly informal status in terms of land tenure and land use, but as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, there are various degrees of legality among and within these settlements. Many kampongs are not consistent with spatial planning laws, whether with respect to zoning, sub-division, or building regulations. Almost none of the households hold the required permits to reside on the land. Many dwellers are informal landholders, most of whom reside on state land. However, at the same time a considerable share of the population has a land certificate or owns land on the basis of a customary land right. Many others lease land from the Municipality.

In view of the physical and legal characteristics of kampongs in Taman Sari and other City Quarters in Bandung, it would be inaccurate to qualify these settlements as slums on the basis of international standards. Nonetheless, the Indonesian government does so – on the basis of its own standards. On the basis of a survey conducted in 1999, the Department of Public Works concluded that 121 out of the 139 City Quarters in Bandung consist of ‘slum settlements’. 44 of these City Quarters consist of slum settlements that are non-legal, because they are not consistent with spatial planning law or because dwellers reside on state land. Taman Sari is qualified as a City Quarter consisting of ‘slum, non-legal settlements’ (Departemen Pekerjaan Umum 1999:1-32-50).<sup>49</sup>

While the conclusions of the Department of Public Works can be debated, it is clear that conditions in kampongs in Bandung remain adverse. There is also little chance that this will change in the near future. Currently,

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49 Interestingly, Bandung’s municipal government had earlier conducted similar research and identified only 54 City Quarters that consisted of ‘slum settlements’, Taman Sari again being one of them. In its latest Spatial Plan the municipal government identifies 62 slum-like areas, apparently mistakenly referring to the same report of the Department of Public Works, which only states that these 62 areas were initially selected for closer research.



Bandung is a metropolitan city of 2.3 million inhabitants.<sup>50</sup> With 13,346 people per km<sup>2</sup>, it is one of the densest cities in Indonesia (BPS Kota Bandung 2005:35). Kampongs are not attracting as many newcomers as in earlier years, partly because of increasing circular migration and a growing number of people commuting between their village and Bandung. Still, low-income migrants keep flowing into kampongs, which also remain populous with newborns. Bandung's annual population growth rate is currently about 2.5 per cent, meaning that each year the population increases by more than 50,000 people (Pemerintah Kota Bandung 2004a:12).

The reduction of (urban) poverty continues to be a policy priority of the Indonesian government. As noted in Chapter 1, in 2005 it adopted a five-year National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (*Strategi Nasional Penanggulangan Kemiskinan* or SNPK) which, in line with the UN Millennium Development Goals, takes an integrated, rights-based approach.<sup>51</sup> It thus formulates ten basic rights that should be fulfilled, including the right to adequate housing and (notably, mentioned separately) the right to secure land tenure (BAPPENAS 2005:137-8; 140-1). The Strategy has been included in the 2004-2009 National Mid-Term Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* or RPJMN 2004-2009).

## 2.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has described the history of Bandung's kampongs, government measures aimed at improving the conditions in these settlements, and contemporary characteristics of kampongs in view of international standards on slums. It thus aims to clarify the local settings of development strategies that centre on the issue of tenure security.

Notably, since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century Bandung transformed from a small town into a metropolis of 2.3 million inhabitants. Kampongs developed in parallel. During the heyday of the colonial period the expanding city engulfed rural villages, which turned into urban settlements with a residential nature, thus becoming the city's first kampongs. During the Japanese occupation kampongs served as refuge settlements for those fleeing the hardships of West-Java's countryside. A few years later, these and other dwellers again had to leave Bandung, because of warfare between the Indonesian Republican Army and the Allied, later Dutch troops. They returned after independence, accompanied by vast flows of new refugees,

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50 This number represents the population size of the City of Bandung alone. The population size of Bandung Metropolitan, including Bandung District, which encloses the city, is estimated at up to five million inhabitants.

51 Notably, the Indonesian government does not follow the distinction of rights or use the related concepts that can be found in international human rights law: instead of explicitly referring to tenure security as part of the right to adequate housing, the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction refers to legal certainty regarding rights to land.

who fled the violent clash between the Darul Islam and the Republican Army. Coinciding with the exodus of the European population, they settled in existing kampongs or created new ones by occupying vacant land. In later years, and particularly during the early years of the New Order period, kampongs continued to grow as a result of labour migration. Under these circumstances, living conditions in kampongs quickly deteriorated.

Subsequent governments have tried to improve the living conditions in kampongs through a variety of measures, first addressing their physical, then their socio-economic, and later also their legal characteristics. So Bandung's colonial government introduced a housing programme, allocated the southern part of the city for the Indonesian population, and later initiated kampong improvement activities. These measures were limited in scope, not least because of 'village autonomy', which gave kampongs a legally autonomous status and which, despite calls for its annulment, was maintained; thereby severely restricting the government's opportunity to exert influence in the kampongs. During the struggle for Independence the Dutch Indies colonial government promulgated an ordinance that made the unlawful occupation of government land a criminal offence. It also enacted the first Town Planning Ordinance for Municipalities on Java, which laid the foundation for future town planning, also in relation to kampongs. In the early 1950s, the Department of Labour of the Indonesian Republic initiated a housing programme, the municipal government declared Bandung a close city and initiated a joint effort to tackle the problem of squatting. A few years later, 'village autonomy' was abolished. In 1960 the Indonesian government enacted the BAL, which was meant to unify land law. Customary land owners had to register their land, otherwise their rights would no longer be recognised. The government also enacted a law in 1961 enabling the state and private landholders to easily evict unlawful occupants. In practice, however, eviction only occurred on a limited scale in Bandung. To the contrary, practices of unlawful occupation were tolerated and even approved by the administration and judiciary, perhaps under the influence of the PKI and other parties supporting the urban poor. From the 1970s, the New Order regime formulated and implemented a social housing policy. It also started the KIP, which was initially focused on physical improvements only, but later also on socio-economic issues. From the 1980s the regime initiated land registration programmes like PRONA, PRODA, and the LAP. Following the 1997 economic crisis, the Indonesian government took an unprecedented series of new measures, first as part of an emergency programme and later as part of a structural poverty reduction strategy, in which several of the previous strategies are integrated.

Despite the above measures, our survey data reveal that contemporary kampongs in Bandung are low-income settlements, in the sense that they house dwellers who are generally low-educated, work in the informal sector, and have low incomes. Although on first sight they give the impression of a slum, most settlements do have reasonably consolidated housing,

access to public utilities, and relatively good infrastructure. Besides, while they still have a predominantly informal status in terms of land tenure and land use, there are various degrees of legality among and within these settlements. On the basis of international standards it would therefore be inaccurate to qualify these settlements as slums – as the Indonesian government does. Still, conditions in kampongs remain adverse. The Indonesian government is continuing its efforts in addressing (urban) poverty, in which the provision of tenure security can be identified as one of the government's priorities.

As discussed in Chapter 1, there are questions whether strategies centred on tenure security in which land registration plays a dominant role can indeed contribute to poverty alleviation in settlements like in Taman Sari. Alternative approaches that combine the provision of basic services and credit facilities – for which in Indonesia, programmes have already been initiated decades ago – with protective administrative or legal measures against evictions may be just as or even more successful. In any event, the success of these approaches depends on the enforceability of property and/or human rights. This requires a rule of law environment, in which the urban poor are protected against arbitrary behaviour by the state or private parties. In order to be able to answer the main questions addressed in this book, the next chapter therefore first provides a general overview of Indonesian land law in the context of the country's changing rule of law environment.

