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The lazy mindreader : a humanities perspective on mindreading and multiple-order intentionality

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Citation
Duijn, M. J. van. (2016, April 20). *The lazy mindreader : a humanities perspective on mindreading and multiple-order intentionality*. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/38817

Version:	Corrected Publisher's Version
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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Cover Page

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Author: Duijn, Max van
Title: The lazy mindreader : a humanities perspective on mindreading and multiple-order intentionality
Issue Date: 2016-04-20

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A Humanities Perspective on Mindreading and Multiple-Order Intentionality

The PhD research reported in this thesis was funded by the NWO Spinoza prize awarded to Ineke Sluiter in 2010.

Print: CPI / Koninklijke Wöhrman

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The Lazy Mindreader

A Humanities Perspective on Mindreading and Multiple-Order Intentionality

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker, volgens besluit van
het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op woensdag 20 april 2016
klokke 15.00 uur

door

Max Johannes van Duijn
geboren te Leiden
in 1984

Promotores:
Prof.dr. Ineke Sluiter
Prof.dr. Arie Verhagen

Promotiecommissie:
Prof.dr. Herbert H. Clark (Stanford University)
Prof.dr. Robin I.M. Dunbar (University of Oxford)
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