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The lazy mindreader : a humanities perspective on mindreading and multiple-order intentionality

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The Lazy Mindreader

**A Humanities Perspective on Mindreading
and Multiple-Order Intentionality**

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The Lazy Mindreader

A Humanities Perspective on Mindreading and Multiple-Order Intentionality

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