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A SUCCESS STORY? ANALYSING ALBANIAN ETHNO-NATIONALIST EXTREMISM IN THE BALKANS

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Introduction

The Liberation Army of Kosova (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*, UÇK) or 'KLA'¹ has been the best known Albanian rebel movement in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Its most important offshoots have been the National Liberation Army (*Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare*, UÇK) or 'NLA'² in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)³ and the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Presheves, Medvegjes dhe Bujanovcit, UÇPMB*) in southern Serbia. Between 1979 and 2001 most Albanian rebel groups were born, grew and withered, though some groups existed since the 1970s and even earlier. Still the arrival of the Kosova Liberation Army surprised Western policymakers. Analysts are uncertain about the intentions of this rebel movement and its offshoots and political successors. This paper contains a structured comparative analysis of the two major Albanian militant formations: KLA (*Kosovo Liberation Army*) and NLA (National Liberation Army). The analysis presents the Albanian grievances in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia and critically examines the origins, structure and success of the two Albanian militant groups. The analysis ends with an evaluation of the current state of popular grievances and the current state of these two organizations.

The Nature of Albanian Violence

The Albanians nurture a culture of violence well tailored to guerilla i.e. hit-and-run warfare. The mostly Muslim Albanians have a long history of resistance against powerful rulers and neighbours. Secular nationalism dominates their thinking since the 1878 League of Prizren under Abdyl Bey Frashëri called for a unified Albanian state.⁴ Albanians have had to do without any state until the establishment of Albania in

1912. Enver Hoxha⁵ and Sali Berisha⁶ did support Albanian separatists in Kosovo and FYROM Macedonia. Yet by and large irredentists had to sustain themselves. Albanian families (*shpi*), clans (*fis*) and political movements are closely-knit and close-mouthed so as to survive and sustain underground activities.⁷ They are only talkative when they feel safe and in their interest to tell their side of the story.⁸ Albanians have had few successful 'state builders'. Even their national hero Skanderbeg, who defeated Ottoman forces from 1443 until his death in 1468, remained a 'mere' rebel chief in his northern Albanian stronghold.⁹ Socially we can speak of a culture of the gun. Albanians customarily keep and use weapons for the blood feud, a major part of their *Kanun* centred on *besa* (oath-of-honour), the traditional 'Law of the Mountains' or 'Kanun of Lek Dukagjin'.¹⁰ Albanians have a low threshold to take up arms for any public or private cause. Albanians frequently use their weapons to 'settle' property disputes in post-war Kosovo; people are killed by them.¹¹ Real and perceived grievances sustain such a propensity to violence. This at times degenerates into violent crime, banditry, terrorism (violence against civilians) and other humanitarian and human rights violations.

Grievances of Albanians in Kosovo

The interethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) deteriorated sharply after the student riots at the University of Pristina on 11 March 1981, nearly a year after the death of Tito. Hundreds of Albanian students demanded better living conditions. Thousands of factory workers, miners and farmers joined the protests, shouting "Kosovo – Republic!" and "We want a Unified Albania!." Blagoje Nikolic even speaks of a full-scale "armed rebellion" between April 1 and 3 and a lingering "separatist insurrection" afterwards.¹² Dissatisfaction with poor living standards – which became worse during the economic crisis of the 1980s – translated into radical political demands which separatist groups like the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosova (GMLK) and the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosova (MNLK) had pursued for years. The Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ) and the Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSHJ) also edged towards secessionism. These groups joined together to form the

Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosova (LPRK), despite the assassination of MNLK-founders Jusuf and Bardhosh Gërvalla and GMLK-leader Kadri Zeka on 17 January 1982 in Germany.¹³ Their successors Xhafer Shatri and future KLA-leaders like Bardhyl Mahmuti and Jashar Salihu reportedly uttered a *besa* to avenge their murdered compatriots.¹⁴

The Yugoslav authorities accused the LPRK and its predecessors of having led the protests, and Albania's Enver Hoxha of masterminding these "Enverists."¹⁵ Belgrade declared a state of emergency and arrested over two-thousand protesters and alleged organizers. Between 1,200 and 2,000 people received substantial prison sentences.¹⁶ Many officials and over 1,000 ordinary members of Kosovo's League of Communists were sacked, expelled and often tried.¹⁷ Xhafer Shatri, Shaban Shala and many other LPRK members were arrested and jailed. The suppression cost the lives of eleven people according to Belgrade, one-thousand people according to Albanians, or up to three-hundred people according to Amnesty.¹⁸ This radicalized sections of the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo. The extremists shared many of their grievances. In spite of their 'culture of violence' most Kosovar Albanians supported the policy of peaceful resistance by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosova (*Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës*, LDK) founded in December 1989 to counteract the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, who played the nationalist card in order to maintain power.¹⁹ The Serbs appeared to win the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and Rugova convinced his people in 1992 that armed resistance would be folly: "the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred."²⁰

On 28 March 1989 Milosevic abolished the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia which Tito had granted in 1974.²¹ This deprived the Kosovar Albanians, by then comprising up to 90% of Kosovo's two million people, of self-ruling powers and responsibilities. It constituted a new grievance and ground for revolt. In response the Democratic League developed an underground government with its own administration, parliament, and parallel institutions for education, health care and social benefits. Initially the League called for the creation of an autonomous Kosovo Republic within a reformed Yugoslavia. In September 1990, however, the former Kosovo Assembly proclaimed at

Kaçanika a "Sovereign Republic of Kosovo." During 18-19 October 1991 the LDK-led parliament declared Kosovo's independence and appointed Dr. Bujar Bukoshi as Prime Minister of the government in exile.

The KLA: Origins, Aims and Success *Origins*

In the spring of 1996 the Liberation Army of Kosova (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*, UÇK) became known in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The rival National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova (*Levizje Kombëtare për Çliricim e Kosovës*, LKÇK) most likely attacked Croatian Serb refugees on 11 Feb. 1996.²² Yet the KLA carried out most actions from then on.²³ At a secret meeting in August 1993 the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosova (LPRK) under the leadership of Ibrahim Kelmendi had renamed itself the People's Movement of Kosova (*Lëvizja Popullore ë Kosovë*, LPK)²⁴ and shed its Marxist ideology.²⁵ The LPK also established a professional fighting force i.e. the KLA – or so it claimed.²⁶ A faction from the GMLK 'blood group' broke away from the People's Movement and became the LKÇK, because it wanted to remain Marxist-Leninist and urgently realize a Greater Albania.²⁷

The KLA's predecessors kept operating openly in Switzerland and secretly in Kosovo, engaging in small-scale violence, sabotage and vandalism. The LPRK approached the militant clan of the Jasharis in the village of Donji Prekaz in Kosovo's central Drenica region during late 1989 and early 1990. Adem Jashari was the clan's leader; his brother Hamza and their father Shaban were deputies. They and a few friends like Sami Lushtaku went to Albania at a secret location to train for war.²⁸ Whatever else they may have been (criminals, bandits) the militants appear to have been politically sincere. They also had an example to live up to: Adem Demaçi, who was finally released in late April 1990 after a total of twenty-eight years in prison especially for founding the 'Revolutionary Movement for Albanian Unity' in 1961. This organization reportedly stated in Article 1 of its Statute that "the first and last objective of our movement is the liberation of the Albanian lands annexed by Yugoslavia and the incorporation of these areas into the motherland Albania."²⁹

Yet not all attempts at cooperation succeeded. Bukoshi and LPRK-leader Xhafer Shatri agreed to jointly train fighters, including former

policemen and army officers. During 1991 and 1992 a hundred recruits from Bukoshi's LDK-branch and the Popular Movement trained at Labinot, Albania, the same place where the Jasharis trained a few years before. Yet both sides suspected the other of attempting to get control over most weapons and funds. Many trained LDK- and LPRK-members were captured in Kosovo. The Serb authorities tried more than hundred of them, accusing them in September 1993 of belonging to the Popular Movement or Bukoshi's 'Ministry of Defence and General Staff of the Republic of Kosova'. Bukoshi's shadow police force in Kosovo ceased to function by the end of 1994 due to numerous arrests.³⁰

Aims

The KLA's objectives were simple: liberate Kosovo from the Serb yoke and make it independent. Some analysts thought that the only salient divide within the KLA was an extreme rightwing versus an extreme leftwing. Many Kosovar rebels became enthralled with the WWII Skanderberg SS division that had consisted of Albanian volunteers.³¹ However, nationalism-irredentism issues superseded left-right divisions. The rightwing clan of the Jasharis, one of the main KLA factions, simply hated the Serbs and embraced the early 20th century *kaçak* (rebel, outlaw) tradition.³² LPK-leaders did contemplate a 'Greater Albania' in the distant future, but had long since shed the idea of incorporating themselves into a Communist Albania. Judah:

these Enverists were not really interested in Enverism, Communism, Stalinism or any other 'ism'. They wanted to believe that one day Kosovo would no longer be part of Yugoslavia and...that their grandchildren might live to see the day when all Albanians lived in one state.³³

Though the LPK managed to keep its grip on the KLA, the latter never became a unified movement with a single ideology and command structure. Due to its sudden popularity and growth in 1998 the KLA became a ramshackle collection of political groups and armed formations; it ceased to be simply the LPK's armed wing. Armed groups claimed to belong to the KLA. Some did use the name 'UÇK' while never really belonging to it. We discern at least six factions:

1. The LPK.
2. The LKÇK which in 1998 had temporarily become KLA's propaganda mouthpiece and auxiliary force as many of its members fought alongside or joined the Liberation Army.³⁴
3. Hashim Thaçi (b. 1968) who with other student activists "joined forces with...the LPK to found the armed movement."³⁵
4. Bujar Bukoshi, premier of the LDK-led exile government who tried and failed to join forces with the LPRK but whose supporters infiltrated the KLA.³⁶
5. Adem Demaçi, the 'Yugoslav Mandela' who had many admirers within the KLA and was its spokesman from August '98 till May '99 when he resigned in protest against the Rambouillet peace accord.³⁷
6. The Jasharis, who deflected with LPRK-help a Serb police attack in 1990 on Donji Prekaz, but perished in a much larger assault in 1998 that really started the Kosova war.³⁸

Irredentism seems to be the long-term goal. Yet the motivations, mindsets and ideologies of the rebel movement's founders, commanders and rank-and-file have been complex, contrasting and contradictory. The main KLA factions³⁹ reflected these differences. Some militias outside the 'real' LPK-dominated Liberation Army may have held extreme-right viewpoints. Some factions, like the Bukoshi-faction, are not unambiguously 'leftist' or 'rightist'.⁴⁰ Others, especially the Thaçi-faction, regarded a Greater Albania as an unrealistic dream. The neo-Marxist LKÇK and rightwing KLA-commanders like Jashari (who had never lived abroad) were naively convinced that they had embarked "on the century-long dream of a Greater Albania."⁴¹ Demaçi contemplated until the end of 1996 a Balkan confederation (*Balkanija*) made up of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo as equal, 'independent and sovereign' republics. Yet he ruthlessly supported KLA's attacks against Serb policemen and Albanian 'collaborators'.⁴²

Structure

In the early 1990s the KLA was a shakily organized yet closely knitted group whose commanders were "former commissioned and non-

commissioned officers of the regular and reserve units of the JNA and territorial defence units.”⁴³ The KLA had the potential to form a sizable outer ring of supporters ready to join the armed struggle: a 1996-1997 CIA report foresaw that the Liberation Army could mobilize tens of thousands of supporters within two or three years.⁴⁴ Indeed, in 1996 the KLA could muster a few hundred fighters. By the end of 1998 it had over 17,000 men.⁴⁵ The Defence Forces of the Republic Kosova (*Forcat e Armatorura së Republikës Kosovës*, FARK) Bukoshi established in June 1998 had just 3,000 men, maybe a mere 120 professionals.⁴⁶ The FARK recruited among the 5,000 ethnic Albanians who had volunteered for the Sarajevo government during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. Its units trained in northern Albania during the summer of 1998.⁴⁷ The Defence Forces sought “to use the organisation skills and superior military knowledge of its former Yugoslav Army officers to take over the much larger UÇK.”⁴⁸ Yet the Defence Forces were established too late to stem the influx of recruits and money into the Liberation Army. Still the KLA was alarmed enough to target FARK members. On 21-22 September 1998 masked gunmen killed Ahmet Krasniqi, the LDK’s minister of defence and supreme commander of the Defence Forces in Tirana. A few days earlier a KLA communiqué said that “these kind of people will pay for the damage they have caused our nation.”⁴⁹ Even after its formal disbandment a year later the KLA was accused of attacking members of the LDK and the anti-independence (!) Reform Democratic Party of Albanians (RDPA).⁵⁰

Success

The activation of the KLA marked the start of a serious uprising in Kosovo. Its arrival utterly transformed the conflict between Serbs and Albanians. The following seven factors account for the movement’s success.

1. Well-prepared rebellion

The People’s Movement patiently prepared a rebellion. Their success was not immediately apparent. Until 1996 the rival LKÇK attacked numerous policemen and ‘collaborators’, making it the best known Albanian armed force. The LKÇK under Valon Murati⁵¹ had opted for immediate insurrection, hoping that its fighters would improve through

action rather than training.⁵² Yet the latter's envisaged uprising was premature and amateurish. The LDK's policy of peaceful resistance was still popular and its parallel institutions worked. The LPK, realizing that it was too early to challenge Rugova, continued to build its propaganda, recruitment and alliance networks and finally eclipsed the National Movement.⁵³

2. Limitations and mistakes by rivals

When the KLA became active in 1996 the Democratic League denied its credentials. Rugova, Bukoshi and LDK-deputy chairman Hydajet Hyseni accused it of being a fake organisation set up by Belgrade to justify a crackdown and discredit the League. It backfired: many lost faith in Rugova and the League.⁵⁴ In contrast Demaçi recognized the KLA as a legitimate movement, derided Rugova's parallel institutions as a "ridiculous caricature of democracy," and called for a broad front against Serb rule including resort to violence.⁵⁵

3. Cheap weaponry from Albania

Most of Albania's pyramid-funds collapsed during early 1997. People burned down town halls, police stations and headquarters of the ruling Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), blaming the government of President and DPA-leader Sali Berisha for their lost savings. At least 1,800 people were killed between Feb. and July alone.⁵⁶ In an attempt to deflect attention Berisha called on the Albanians in Kosovo to rise up against Serbia. The North of Albania remained loyal to Berisha as many policemen and state employees were recruited from Berisha's native town Tropoje. The roots of the ex-Communist Socialist Party (SP) lay in the South. The revolt almost became a civil war between the northern Ghegs and the southern Tosks.⁵⁷ The Italian-led and OSCE-approved Operation *Alba* (Dawn) of 7,000 troops smothered the conflict and secured new elections on 29 June Berisha's party lost. Between Feb. and July 1997 around 500,000 Kalashnikovs, 200,000 automatic and half-automatic guns and 60,000 pistols were looted from Albania's police and army depots; at least one quarter of the weapons reached the Liberation Army.⁵⁸

4. Effective guerrilla

With the new weapons from Albania the KLA staged its first major guerrilla operations. On 25-26 November 1997 it ambushed a police patrol near the village of Llaushe (Lausa), killing two policemen. The rest fled in their armoured cars to Llaushe, where they killed Albanian teacher Halit Gecaj. The attendance of three KLA-fighters at the teacher's funeral on 28 Nov. electrified the 15,000 to 20,000 mourners. This was the first public appearance of the rebel movement, which symbolically yet firmly confirmed its existence.⁵⁹ On 4 January 1998 the KLA announced that its "armed struggle for the liberation of Kosova and its unification with Albania" had begun.⁶⁰

5. Crackdown sparking large-scale revolt

Alarmed by KLA's stepped-up attacks, Yugoslav President Milosevic ordered the first massive 'anti-terrorist operation' in Drenica on 28 Feb. 1998. The Yugoslav Army (*Vojska Jugoslavije*, VJ), the Serbian Ministry of Interior's special police (*Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova*, MUP) and its Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (*Specijalna Antiteroristička Jedinica*, SAJ) had already amassed 50,000 men in Kosovo.⁶¹ Between 28 Feb. and 1 March a battle near Likoshan (Likosan) killed four Serb policemen and an unknown number of KLA fighters.⁶² Another four policemen were killed near Glogovac. The brandishing of the Liberation Army as "without question a terrorist group" by the United States' special envoy Robert Gelbard on 22 Feb. provided Milosevic with a *carte blanche*.⁶³ Special police units encircled a dozen villages and opened fire with mortars, armoured vehicles and helicopters. During 5-6 March they killed at least fifty people including women and children at Donji Prekaz. All belonged to the Jashari clan. Adem Jashari was killed as well. Another extended family was massacred in Llaushe. The 'Drenica offensive' lasted until late March and killed eighty Albanians, mostly unarmed civilians.⁶⁴ More 'anti-terrorist' campaigns followed: between 28 Feb. and 28 Sep. Serb forces killed at least 1,270 Albanians, mostly old men, women and children.⁶⁵ Albanians felt their lives in danger; they turned to the KLA to protect them. New recruits flooded the rebel army.

6. Learning from mistakes

KLA's overconfident leadership believed its core fighters – well-trained, well-educated, determined – could conduct conventional warfare i.e. conquer and hold territory. Thus it occupied Orahovac during 18-19 July. By the end of July Serb forces had recaptured Orahovac, expelling 25,000 people, killing at least sixty-four Albanian civilians and capturing 240 others (they 'disappeared').⁶⁶ More KLA strongholds fell, such as its 'capital' Malisevo on 28 July.⁶⁷ The Liberation Army overstretched itself by occupying locations in nearly 40% of Kosovo. It still had only two thousand professional fighters with no heavy weaponry.⁶⁸ Only a heavily-armed rebel army could control territory: "a lightly armed force which stands against an enormous superiority of tanks, airplanes and artillery, should better not defend territory, let alone dig trenches and build bunkers."⁶⁹ The Liberation Army learned from its mistakes. It appointed experienced commanders and introduced hierarchical command lines. It already had introduced "some central authority" during the Serb onslaught, and it "established training camps, headquarters and military prisons."⁷⁰ The Liberation Army announced on 24 August that it would revert to "the tactics of the classic guerrilla struggle."⁷¹

7. Support from NATO and the West

The Kosova Liberation Army realized that unless it was prepared to conduct protracted guerrilla warfare Serb forces would not be pushed out of Kosovo: it was "never able to hold territory, never successfully defended a town or village, and in the end had to depend on NATO, a gamble which might not have paid off."⁷² From then on it sought full NATO intervention that would hasten Serbia's defeat in Kosovo.⁷³

The Serb atrocities forced the international community to consider stronger measures. Particularly the Americans became sympathetic to the insurgents and acknowledged their neglect of the Kosovo issue at Dayton in Nov. 2005 that ended the Bosnian war. Richard Holbrooke was the first American and Western diplomat to talk openly with KLA-representatives – writer Lum Haxhiu and jurist Gani Shehum – on June 24 in Junik. This meeting was a spectacular public relations coup for the rebel army. Holbrooke's arranged meeting between Rugova and Milosevic on May 15 had no concrete results and sparked criticism and

defections from the LDK.⁷⁴ Moreover, NATO's 'activation order' of 13 Oct. '98 made possible air-strikes if Milosevic kept refusing a dialogue, humanitarian access and a withdrawal of troops from Kosovo, central demands in UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The Holbrooke-Milosevic accord of the same day allowed a 2,000-strong, unarmed OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo to monitor the reduction of Yugoslav troops to the level prior to the Drenica offensive. Milosevic withdrew four-thousand JNA and MUP-personnel just before NATO's deadline expired on October 27.⁷⁵ Yet both sides violated the cease-fire and the alleged massacre of forty-five Albanians in Raçak in Jan. 1999 shocked and angered the West. The Serbs also refused to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement on either 23 Feb. or 15 March '99, while the Albanian delegation did so. On March 24 NATO commenced Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia. After NATO had flown 35,219 missions and dropped 23,000 bombs and missiles during some 14,006 attack sorties⁷⁶ Milosevic agreed on June to withdraw all forty-thousand army, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.⁷⁷ On 10 June NATO suspended its campaign.⁷⁸ On 13 June the first troops of the 50,000-strong NATO-led Kosovo Force entered Kosovo. Its Operation Joint Guardian was meant to aid the safe return of the 986,000 Kosovar refugees and secure "public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility of this task"(UNSC Res. 1244, 9d).⁷⁹ By all appearances the KLA had won a resounding victory 'on the back' of the world's most powerful military alliance.

The third factor of KLA success is perhaps the most important: without Albania's *annus horribilis* it would have taken the rebel group much longer and more money to build a credible fighting force. Yet a rebellion would have been a matter of time, if only because of the pervasive 'gun culture'. By early 1989 Kosovars, presumably of all ethnicities, had permits for 58,612 weapons, mostly guns and rifles. Between April '81 and April '88 Yugoslav authorities confiscated 4,978 pistols, 1,466 hunting rifles, 427 army rifles, 37 automatic rifles, 7 machine guns and huge amounts of ammunitions and explosives. These weaponries were unlicensed and probably presented a tip of the 'arms iceberg' in Kosovo.⁸⁰

Grievances of Albanians in FYR Macedonia

Since the early 1990s, ethnic Albanians in FYR Macedonia have demanded equal constitutional status for the Albanian language, free use of symbols, state funding for third level education in the Albanian language, political and fiscal decentralization, a new census and finally proportional representation in the public service and the security forces.

The provisions for third level education in Albanian and the free use of the Albanian language in public institutions and parliament has been the most contentious issue in FYR Macedonia's post-independence era and a central demand in the rebel's agenda during the 2001 insurgency. Although the country's constitution provided primary and secondary education in the Albanian language, third level education was exclusively practiced in the Slavic Macedonian language.⁸¹ Of the 27,000 students enrolled in higher education in 1991, only 1.5 percent were Albanians.⁸² This disproportional participation in higher education was also the result of higher rates in school drop-outs and conservative views rural Albanians hold on women pursuing higher education. The hoisting of the Albanian flag in the town halls of Albanian majority municipalities brought additional friction. In 1997, riots broke out in major cities (Gostivar-Tetovo) for the free use of symbols. The parliament amended laws concerning ethnic flags before the 2001 crisis, allowing them to be projected along with the official state flag.

The empowerment of local self-administration, although compatible with European 'subsidiarity' and decentralisation has caused much scepticism and suspicion. The Albanians traditionally favoured local self-governance with more powers on financing, healthcare and education. Throughout the 1990s they accused the Slav Macedonians of demarcating [redrawing] municipal borders to their electoral advantage. The one-tier decentralized municipal system was until 1996 an outdated structure from the socialist era that provided no real competencies. The Slav Macedonians were afraid that reformulating the municipal system would encourage Albanian secessionism. The OFA changed the whole picture as the parties agreed to redraw the municipal boundaries and increase their autonomy and administrative powers.

The lack of equitable representation for the minorities in the public services, including army and police has been a source of constant

frustration. In 1996, the vice director of the National People's Party Etem Aziri stated that:

In the administration of the parliament only four out of 200 workers are Albanians, in August 1995 only two ethnic Albanians out of 400 were employed in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and according to Arben Xhaferi head of DPA (the then PDPA), Albanians make up 1.7 percent of the judiciary, 1.7 percent of the officers in the armed forces and 2.0 percent of the state administration.⁸³

The Albanians' poor education, the language barrier, discriminative practices and reluctance to allow Albanians to hold neuralgic positions have resulted in extreme under-representation of the Albanians in vital public and security services. The police and the Ministry of Interior became symbols of majority control hated by most Albanians who often confronted the police violently in mass protests. Percentages of Albanian public employment may slightly vary but there is consensus that Albanians were grossly underrepresented in every public sector. There is also agreement that employment discrimination has ultimately led to social marginalisation and a failure to instill a sense of Albanian patriotism for the newly independent state.

The issue of equitable representation is related to the controversy over the number of Albanians residing in FYR Macedonia. According to the widely accepted and internationally monitored 2002 census the number of Albanians in FYR Macedonia is 25.17 percent'.⁸⁴ The census has been crucial for the recognition and legitimatization of the Albanian demands. The Albanians have fiercely criticized the exceptionally strict law on citizenship imposed after independence. They saw it as a deliberate barrier to prevent the naturalization of thousands of Albanians that have either lived in FYR Macedonia for many years or returned from abroad. Albanians claimed they are approximately 30 percent of the population and thus demanded the reformulation of the Constitution's preamble which until 2001 regarded them as a minority in a state primarily belonging to the Slav Macedonian ethnicity. The Albanians saw this as discriminative. They demanded to be seen as equal partners in a corporate Slav Macedonian and Albanian state.⁸⁵ The Constitution eventually changed, but critics argue that instead of promoting a genuine

multi-ethnic state the new constitution and all the attendant reforms will eventually lead towards a bi-national division and fragmentation of the state.

The NLA: Origins, Aims and Success

Origins

Organized violence against the state was not a new phenomenon for the security authorities of FYR Macedonia. In early November 1993 the authorities arrested ten ethnic Albanians for illegal arms trading and for preparing a rebellion to realize an Independent Illyrida Republic. Deputy Minister of Defence Hussein Huskaj, one of the PDP (*Partia e Prosperiteti Demokratike – Party for Democratic Prosperity*) representatives in government, and PDP's secretary-general Midhat Emini were among the arrested. According to Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski the Albanian paramilitary force received 600,000 DM from the Albanian Diaspora. The police seized 300 semi-automatic rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition and a list of 21,000 recruits. The short prison sentences for Huskaj – the suspected leader of the underground army – and the others in June 1994 temporarily de-escalated the situation, though these sentences still “contributed to the radicalisation of inter-ethnic relations.”⁸⁶

The NLA (*Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare*, UÇK – National Liberation Army) claimed responsibility for sporadic attacks in FYR Macedonia in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Earlier statements implicated the FYR Macedonian born leader of the National Movement for Kosovo [LPK] and KLA founding member Fazli Veliu in the case of the “Kicevo bombers,” when small bombs exploded near several police stations in 1998 and 1999.⁸⁷ Yet, until 2001 the NLA never really managed to mobilize much support for a full-scale insurgency and the group's aims remained widely unknown.

Aims

In January 2001 the so-called NLA initiated a systematic campaign of armed attacks, which soon escalated into full insurgency across the country. Contradictory statements by rebel commanders, ranging from improved community rights to outright secession, suggested strong factionalism and weak central leadership. The NLA initially heralded an ‘alternative route’ to those who believed that peaceful debate and reso-

lution of their grievances has proven fruitless. By April 2001 the NLA outlined the same demands as those expressed by the Albanian political parties: equal status, official status of the Albanian language, new census and higher education in Albanian. Zidas Daskalovski observed that:

At the onset of the conflict, the organizations goals were unclear. Its communiqués claimed it was fighting against 'Slavo-Macedonian' oppressors and for a 'Greater Kosovo' or a 'Greater Albania'. Later the NLA changed its rhetoric and argued that it was fighting for the human rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and for constitutional reforms.⁸⁸

Some analysts feared that frequent remarks of a 'Greater Albania' and the establishment of territorial control by the NLA indicated secessionism rather than autonomy and equal rights.⁸⁹ The state authorities viewed the crisis as a provocation instigated by Kosovar Albanians boosted by a small number of Albanian ultra-nationalist academics and politicians within FYR Macedonia.

It is difficult to determine the precise motivation behind the insurgency. Yet, the human and financial resources had been carefully secured and coordinated long before the unfolding of the crisis. Some local Albanians who felt financially disenfranchised and politically excluded wished to provoke a speedy political change i.e. reform and access to political assets and resources. Many of these people associated with extremist circles in Kosovo and the Albanian Diaspora. Public frustration with the slow progress made by the DPA (Democratic Party of Albanians) and the controversial delineation of the border between Kosovo and FYR Macedonia also played into the militant's hands.

Structure

A mix of KLA veterans and local Macedonian Albanian volunteers comprised the NLA. Local men and boys were recruited to provide logistical support, medical help and other administrative tasks and villagers provided food for the fighters. Diaspora groups linked to localities provided the funds and expertise to buy and smuggle arms to specific brigades.⁹⁰ The NLA leadership resided in Slipkovica, but the real headquarters was Prizren in Kosovo. Ali Ahmeti, a Kosovo educated Albanian of Macedonian origin acted as the NLA's political representative and

coordinated activities with ex-KLA commander Ramush Hajredinaj. Gezim Ostremi, a senior KLA commander who deserted from his chief of staff post in the Kosovo Protection Forces had taken over as NLA chief of staff Fazil Veliu, a former editor of a newspaper in Kosovo and a close friend of the Kosovo's Jashari clan and Emrush Xhemaili who served as an advisor of Thaci and were also leading figures among the extremists in FYR Macedonia and Southern Serbia.⁹¹

It is highly unlikely that the NLA exceeded the 3000 active combatants at its peak.⁹² A more moderate estimate speaks of 1,000 to 1,200.⁹³ The rebel group probably consisted of at least six brigades. It is doubtful whether these so-called brigades fully submitted to a higher authority. However, given the post-crisis influx of NLA veterans into Ahmeti's political party DUI (*Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim – Democratic Union for Integration*), most regional commanders probably paid allegiance to Ahmeti. The NLA also attracted a number of mercenaries, former 'professional' combatants from Kosovo, Bosnia and the Presevo Valley. The FYR Macedonian security services claim involvement of Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The mutilation and desecration of eight soldier's bodies at the Skopje-Tetovo highway massacre in Aug. 2001 indicated Mujahedin involvement as Albanians are not known for such cruelties at least up till this point. State security officials claim that the rest of the NLA comprised of local Albanian fighters who were paid or forced to participate but this allegation remains contentious.

Success

1. Well-prepared rebellion and effective guerrilla

The NLA formations were lightly equipped and accustomed to the mountainous and rugged terrain in the north of the country. Battle-hardened KLA Kosovar fighters, some of them originating from FYR Macedonia were quick to exploit tensions in bordering villages. The proximity of Kosovo with FYR Macedonia allowed for escape routes after the conduct of hit and run attacks. The widespread possession of small arms in FYR Macedonia made access to weaponry easy but arms caches in Kosovo supplied the insurgents with additional weaponry. As in the case of Kosovo, the affluent illegal arms market in Albania also provided a secure flow of weaponry. Officers from the official Albania

Army may have also facilitated the transfer of weapons to the rebels. Weapons held by the NLA include 9M32 Strella-2M, portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 120mm and 82mm mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, light anti-tank rockets, 12.7mm heavy machine guns as well as assorted light machine guns and AK-type assault rifles.⁹⁴ Same weapons had been used during the Kosovo conflict. NATO's Operation Essential Harvest (TFH) collected 3,875 weapons including mortars, anti tank missiles, machine guns and rifles as well as a large number of mines, explosives and ammunitions. Yet, state authorities believed the rebels possessed no less than 50,000 weapons.⁹⁵ Similarly to Kosovo's KLA, initial attacks by the NLA included the bombings of police stations and the killing of policemen. Exploiting the government's inability to control certain areas of the national domain, NLA fighters gradually entered into small isolated mountainous Albanian villages declaring them 'liberated' and establishing zones of control.

2. Crackdown sparking large-scale revolt

As in the case of Kosovo, the rebels pursued a ruthless retaliation by the security forces to their provocations. This came in March 2001 after a military offensive against rebel positions around Tetovo. The clumsy shelling of villages, among which rebels had found shelter, led to the radicalization of the Albanians. The bombing of rural dwellings and the political stalemate led to mass demonstrations in all Albanian inhabited cities and the numbers of NLA recruits started to peak. Although the strategy pursued by the militants was very similar to that of the KLA, the degree and decisiveness of retaliation was much smaller in scale than that of the Serbian Army. The Slavic Macedonian forces were ill-equipped and coordination among the security branches was inadequate. These deficiencies became evident in the Aracinovo operation (June 2001), where a whole army proved incapable of restoring order in a village occupied by a few dozens of NLA militants. In Kosovo, the militants exploited the Serbian Army's fierce crackdown while in FYR Macedonia rebels manipulated the governmental weakness and military deficiency.

3. Support from NATO and the West

Less than a year of fighting has brought an unparalleled change for the FYR Macedonian society and an indisputable success for the insur-

gents and their supporters. In Kosovo, two years of low-intensity warfare against the Serb authorities have resulted in equally disproportionate outcomes, especially when compared to other long standing insurgencies in Northern Ireland, Kurdistan and the Basque Country. Under that prism, the Albanians' militant strategy proved successful in both cases. Political parties in FYR Macedonia attempted to capitalize on the NLA's success as soon as they realized that many and perhaps most Albanians sympathized with the rebellion. The NLA correctly grasped the degree of Albanian deprivation, disaffection and alienation, the weak counter-insurgency capacity of the state and the catalytic role of the international community. The rebels proved, as has been the case in so many other armed conflicts that limited but decisive violence can bring about disproportionately significant changes. NATO and the EU condemned the rebellion but realized that the government was unable to eliminate the militants. From March 2001, the rebellion attracted renewed international interest and mediation due to the deteriorating situation in FYR Macedonia. The political stalemate, coupled with the inability to counter the rebellion helped to perpetuate violence. From June 2001, the EU's High Commissioner on Foreign Affairs Xavier Solana and NATO's Lord Robertson quickly took initiatives for securing a ceasefire and enabling negotiations.

NATO played a significant political role during and after the Aracinovo crisis. NATO officials helped to safely evacuate rebels from the suburb of Aracinovo. This ended a futile confrontation with the security forces. At the same time, NATO – and the EU special envoys – offered the necessary guarantees to the Slav Macedonian leadership with regards to the state's integrity. By August 2001 most Albanian demands were quickly met and the state was consequently set under international probation prompting PDP leader Emir Imerit to tell the media that: "If there were no NLA no one would seriously get involved in dialogue with the Albanians. The bottom line is that every Albanian in his soul is with the NLA."⁶ The political gains were enormous. Ali Ahmeti entered politics as the only reliable 'defender of the Albanians' with the formation in June 2002 of the *Democratic Union for Integration (DUI)*. The new party attracted many so-called reformed rebels and won sixteen seats (11.9 percent / almost 70 percent of the Albanian vote) in the

September 2002 elections. It became the key partner in implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement with SDSM (*Social democratic Party of Macedonia*) and the Liberal Democratic Party. For many Slav Macedonians the interference of NATO and the EU was driven by partisan bias in favor of the Albanians. The KLA managed to attract a NATO-led military response against Serbia while this did not happen in FYR Macedonia due to the less difficult conditions on the ground (i.e. the level and severity of grievances and governmental stubbornness). The striking similarity, however, lies on the fact that the KLA and the NLA have both managed to put Kosovo and FYR Macedonia under foreign probation and control. The KLA succeeded in releasing Kosovo from Serbian dominance and the NLA succeeded making FYR Macedonia the state of both Albanians and Slavic Macedonians.

Post-Conflict Grievances and Militant Structures

Current grievances in Kosovo evolve around the question of independence. In FYR Macedonia, grievances exist with regards to the meaningful implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Kosovo Albanians are eager and uncompromising for independence. However, Kosovar independence could create a violent backlash among Serbs. By contrast, keeping Kosovo formally part of Serbia may spark an Albanian uprising among frustrated Albanians against the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Contact Group (*Troika*) and other bodies of the international community face an apparently unsolvable dilemma. In FYR Macedonia, the legalization of Tetovo University and the opening of the multilingual 'Stoel University'⁹⁷ helped to overcome the educational deadlock. The University of Tetovo lacks the resources and infrastructure, and since its legalization its educational quality and standards have been criticized. The law provides for ethnic flags alongside the official state flag on public and national holidays only. Some Albanian majority municipalities have ignored this restrictive provision refusing to remove ethnic flags from public offices. This practice infuriated the Slav Macedonian community. New statues portraying historical Albanian heroes such as the grandiose statue of Skanderbeg in Skopje, the naming of schools after historical Albanian figures and the inauguration of memorials dedicated to the fallen NLA and KLA fighters aggravate interethnic elations. The major-

ity has reluctantly accepted the reforms on decentralisation but new questions regarding financing, infrastructure, vast municipal debts and the lack of skilled personnel haunt the post-agreement agenda. Years of educational exclusion has rendered the Albanians unsuitable for public administration positions. Moreover, unemployment, perceived corruption and poverty are major concerns in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. The stagnancy on Kosovo's independence and the slow-paced reforms in FYR Macedonia negatively combine with the profound failure to achieve a meaningful and visible economic and institutional change. This combination could probably encourage extremists to capitalize on public frustration. The significant lack of economic prospects is forcing people to seek for alternatives in organized crime. Except from the grave economic losses and the threats posed in the well functioning of societies, organized crime is also responsible for the perpetual militarization of the Albanian society and the socialization of the younger generations in a climate of crime and *machismo*.

If the Albanians feel that their hopes are not being fulfilled and if the moderate forces fail to canalize their grievances by peaceful means then support for groups such as the ANA (*Armata Kombëtare Shqiptar*, AKsh – *Albanian National Army*, ANA) could increase. The Albanian National Army is believed to be a splinter Albanian militant group revived by a few die-hard Albanians who seceded from the KLA and the NLA.⁹⁸ It is difficult to assess the numerical strength of the so-called ANA but it is unlikely to have more than a few dozens of active fighters spread across different countries. Security experts in FYR Macedonia observe that support for the ANA is near to none and suggest there is no existing militant structure operating in the country at the moment. By contrast, in the same intelligence sources the Serbian authorities claim the operational forces of ANA in Kosovo and south Serbia are composed of about 650 terrorists, most of them situated in the region of Kosovska Kamenica and Gnjilane. Yet, it is more likely that extremist Albanians opportunistically perpetrate acts of violence under the banner of the ANA. It is also probable that a serious backlash in Albanian affairs could re-mobilize many supporters from the Kosovo Protection Forces and the NLA.⁹⁹

Conclusion

To recap, the above analysis attempted to explain the rise, formation and success of the two major Albanian rebel groups in the Balkans. Grievances in Kosovo differed from those held by the Albanians in FYR Macedonia. Kosovo Albanians are more maximal in their political demands. All political and militant formations in Kosovo concentrated on independence. Albanian grievances in FYR Macedonia were mostly concentrated against a perceived Slavic dominance and discrimination. Similarly, the aims of the two rebel groups differed. Political manifestations and fractionalization were significantly more evident among Kosovo Albanians. However, the two militant organizations were connected to a considerable degree. The organizational structures of the NLA were heavily influenced by those in Kosovo. Similar weapons were used in both conflicts. Hit and run attacks in FYR Macedonia involved escape routes to Kosovo. In terms of their success, the similarities are striking. Both rebellions provoked a clumsy retaliatory response and attracted Western attention. However, international approaches towards the conflicts differed. Former militant personalities became powerful political figures in both cases. By all means, the two rebellions made progress possible. The current state of affairs is fluid to the extent that the major question of Kosovo's independence remains open. Dissatisfaction with this protracted stalemate may bring reactionary violence. The Albanians in FYR Macedonia have serious concerns over the practical application of the reforms. Extremist formations exist in both national domains, including organized crime gangs. Hence, grievances and opportunities for mobilization exist. The question therefore concentrates on how resistive to violence the Albanians would be.

Notes

1. The English acronym 'KLA' helps to distinguish it from the National Liberation Army (*Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombetare*, UÇK) in FYR Macedonia (FYROM), which we refer to by 'NLA'. The Albanian acronyms of both rebel movements – UÇK – are identical, and can lead to confusion.

2. Ibid.

3. The UN formally recognized the country under the provisional name 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' or FYROM on 8 April 1993 (UNRES/47/225) due to objections raised by Greece on the appropriation of the name and symbols which are consid-

ered to be part of the Greek heritage. We apply the term 'FYR Macedonia' to indicate both the country's international title and its constitutional name.

4. Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Papermac/Macmillan Publishers, 1998), esp. pp. 217-26, 232-34. Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albanians* (Hurst and company London., 1975). Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: A modern history* (B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1995).

5. Albania's Stalinist regime supported Albanian separatist movements like the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosova (est. 1976) and the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosova (est. 1978).

6. In March 1992 Albania's President Sali Berisha disclosed that his Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) "will not stop fighting until her great dream of uniting the Albanian nation comes true": Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, (1998), pp. 256, 258; see also her note 24 for the source: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), EE/1336, 23 March 1992, p. B/3.

7. Ger Duijzings: "people may tell lies or falsify their identities in order to protect themselves": *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, PhD Thesis at University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences UVA, April 1999), p. 35.

8. Albanians expect and hope that "their grandchildren might live to see the day when all Albanians lived in one state": KLA representative Jashar Salihu in Tim Judah, "Kosovo's Road to War," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 9 (note 8: interview August 1997).

9. Malcolm, pp. 88-90.

10. *Besa* also translates as 'word of honour', 'oath', 'honour', 'truce'. Lek (Lekë) Dukagjin was a contemporary of Skanderbeg, though experts differ on which one of the several Lek Dukagjins living then was the 'author' of the *Kanun*. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, 'The enactment of 'tradition': Albanian constructions of identity, violence and power in times of crisis' Chapter 1 in Bettina E. Schmidt and Ingo W. Schröder, *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict* (London/New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 97-120. Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, (1998), esp. pp. 17-21 (and his endnotes 34, 37). Alexander Lopasic, 'Cultural Values of the Albanians in the Diaspora,' Chapter 7 in Tom Winniffrith (ed.), *Perspectives on Albania* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 91-105.

11. Krenar Gashi, "Real Estate Rows Cause Carnage in Kosovo," *Balkan Investigative Reporting Network* (BIRN), *Balkan Insight*, BIRN's online publication (26 April 2006), archive www.birn.com.

12. Blagoje Nikolic, 'Anti-Yugoslav Separatism relying on "Motherland Albania",' in Ranko Petkovic and Gordana Filipovic (eds.) *Kosovo: Past and Present* (Belgrade: Review of International Affairs, 1989), pp. 235, 237 (quotes).

13. Analysts have difficulty in identifying and labeling these Albanian underground groups, disagreeing on which groups exactly joined to form the LPRK.

14. Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 108; see further pp. 104-05. Judah, "The Kosovo Liberation Army," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sept.-Nov. 2000), p. 64. Judah: "some believe that they might have been killed by...the Albanian intelligence services...[as] their commitment to Enverism was less than total" (*War and Revenge*, pp. 105-06).

15. The analyst Shkelzen Maliqi coined the terms "Enverist" and "Titoist." Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic* Boulder (US) and

Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), p. 33. Judah, "The Kosovo Liberation Army," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Sept.-Nov. 2000), pp. 62-63.

16. Numbers diverge because sources use other definitions of 'substantial' prison sentence. Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 30-31 and esp. pp. 42-43 (and her endnote 138). Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), pp. 204-05 and 207-08 (and her footnotes 27, 32: Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia - Prisoners of Conscience* (London, 1985)). Malcolm, p. 335 (and his endnote 4).

17. Even KLC Chairman Mahmut Bakalli was replaced by its predecessor Veli Deva, "a man thought to be harder on Tirana" (Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, p. 42). Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, pp. 201, 208. Malcolm, p. 336 (and his endnote 6). Bakalli was belatedly expelled from the Communist party in April 1983 as well: Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (1992 2nd ed.), p. 197.

18. Vickers, p. 198, (footnote 9). Mertus, p. 31 (and endnote 79). Malcolm, p. 335 (and endnote 3). Nolic speaks of just nine people killed ('Anti-Yugoslav Separatism' in Petkovic and Filipovic, *Kosovo: Past and Present*, p. 235).

19. The LDK included Titoists of the Communist elite and Enverists like GMLK-founder Hydajet Hyseni and LPRK-founder Xhafer Shatri: "those who remained behind in the LPRK were embittered and accused their former comrades of...treachery" (Judah, *War and Revenge*, p. 109 (also p. 64)).

20. Judah, "The Kosovo Liberation Army," *Perceptions*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sept.-Nov. 2000), p. 65.

21. The new Serbian Constitution of 28 September 1990 completed and formalised the abolitions of the autonomies of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the latter inhabited by a substantial Hungarian minority.

22. Fabian Schmidt, "Conflict brewing in Kosovo," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (JIR), Vol. 8, No. 7 (July 1996), p. 293. Paul Wood, "The KLA's armed struggle," *BBC News Online* (21 September 1999), archive <http://news.bbc.co.uk>. Tim Judah, *War and Revenge* (2000), pp. 130-31. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian* (1998), p. 290.

23. Some scholars believe that the KLA was active in 1993 or even earlier. The KLA may have done some 'trial runs' that observers erroneously attributed to the LKÇK, but it only became seriously active in 1996. Zoran Kusovac, "Another Balkans bloodbath? - part one," *JIR*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1998), p. 14. Robert Thomas, "Choosing the Warpath," *The World Today*, Vol. 54, No. 5 (May 1998), p. 118. Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (May-June 1999), p. 26. Tihomir Loza, "Kosovo Albanians: Closing the Ranks," *Transitions*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 31-32.

24. *Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës* (LPK) is also translated as the 'Popular Movement off/for Kosova'.

25. Judah cautions that "although officially the LPK had divested itself of Marxist ideology it still clung to some of the old forms of language" (*War and revenge*, p. 127).

26. Judah, *War and Revenge*, pp. 115-116. Zoran Kusovac, "Another Balkans bloodbath?," *JIR*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1998), p. 16. International Crisis Group, *Who's Who in Kosovo*, ICG Balkans Report, No. 76 (31 August 1999), esp. p. 6 (archive www.crisisweb.org). Most Balkan experts believe the People's Movement formed or at least helped to form the KLA in 1993: Jonathan S. Landay, "Cash for Kosovo - Inside a Rebellion: Banking on War," *The Christian Science Monitor* (17-23 April 1998), pp. 1, 8, 9. Loza,

"Closing the Ranks," *Transitions*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 31-32. James Hooper, "Kosovo: America's Balkan Problem," *Current History*, Vol. 98, No. 627 (April 1999), p. 160.

27. According to some sources the LKÇK already broke away from the LPRK. Allegedly the former was established in 1992 in Tirana, and called in its paper *Çlirimi* (Liberation) for a 'Greater Albania'. BBC's SWB Central Europe, the Balkans, EE/2440 (21 October 1995), p. B/2 (*Gazeta Shqiptare*, Tirana, 19 October '95). Kusovac, "Another Balkans bloodbath?," *JIR*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1998), p. 14.

28. Judah, *War and Revenge*, pp. 110, 116 and 118 (contacting Jasharis). According Shaban Shala, member of the LPRK, LPK and UÇK successively (pp. 110, 139, etc.), Albanian army officers trained Jashari, Lushtaku and the others at Labinot, Albania (p. 111).

29. Nikolic, 'Anti-Yugoslav Separatism,' in Petkovic and Filipovic (eds.), *Kosovo: Past and Present*, p. 231. By 1964 it had over 300 members in Kosovo and links with the Albanian intelligence service. Hasani, 'Chauvinist and Separatist organizations,' in Petkovic and Filipovic (eds.), *Kosovo: Past and Present*, pp. 222-23 ('Revolutionary Movement of Albanian Unification'), pp. 226, 229 (small-scale violence), p. 228: allegedly some 800 members of the 4,000 Enverists in the 20,000-strong émigré organizations were involved in 'terrorist' and 'propaganda' activities.

30. Judah, *War and Revenge*, pp. 87-89, 110-13, 116-18.

31. Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 26-28. Aydin Babuna, "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 2000), p. 78. Hedges does not describe the Jasharis as rightwing *kaçaks*, even though the Jashari clan "made up much of the KLA at the start of the rebellion" in 1996-1997 (p. 33).

32. The *kaçaks*, meaning "outlaws", "bandits" or "rebels" in Albanian, deriving from the Turkish term "fugitive", opposed Turkish, Serb, Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian rule prior to and during the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and WWI. The *kaçaks* resisted Yugoslav rule in the uprising of 1918-1919 until they were annihilated in the mid-1920s - though some tiny rebel groups survived. Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, 1998, pp. 239-263 and pp. 272-278. Judah, *War and Revenge* (2000), pp. 17-21, 24, 99-102. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom* (2001), p. 11 (see also esp. pp. 5, 8-9, 12). Babuna, "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2000), p. 68.

33. Judah, "Kosovo's Road to War", *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 9 (and note 8). Judah, *War and Revenge*, pp. 106-07 and "Kosovo Liberation Army," *Perceptions*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000), p. 63.

34. ICG, *Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?* (Pristina, London and Washington: ICG Balkans Report No. 78 Amended version, 2 November 1999), p. 13 (archive www.crisisweb.org).

35. ICG, *Who's Who in Kosovo* (31 August 1999), p. 18. Judah, "The Kosovo Liberation Army," *Perceptions*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000), p. 64. The LPK's old guard had to give ground to this new generation of militants who dominated the KLA's new General Staff (ShP) in late '98.

36. Judah, *War and Revenge*, pp. 87-89, 110-113, 116-118.

37. Adem Demaçi founded the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms in 1991. He joined the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (*Partia Parlamentare e Kosovës*, PPK) in '96 and became its President in January '97. The Parliamentary Party was then the biggest and most popular party after the LDK. Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe* (1994), p. 154. ICG, *Who's Who in Kosovo*, No. 76 (31 August 1999), pp. 6 and 13.

38. See on the 1990 attack: Judah, *War and Revenge*, p. 111.

39. The KLA factions were not mutually exclusive entities. Some did overlap in organization and memberships, some leaders switched between factions or simultaneously belonged to more than one faction, and some – like LKÇK – integrated with the Liberation Army only partially and temporarily.

40. We define 'leftists' as those believing that states should reform societies and its citizens, and 'rightists' as those believing that communities should shape and limit the reach of states. Leftists are often but not necessarily progressive-revolutionary and rightists conservative-reactionary.

41. Hedges, *Kosovo's Next Masters* (1999), p. 37 (see also p. 36).

42. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, pp. 243, p. 295 (*Balkanija*), 301 (peaceful resistance). Judah, *War and Revenge* (2000), pp. 132-133. Dutch sources: NRC, "Adem Demaçi: Consequent en onbuigzaam (Consistent and inflexible)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 17 augustus 1998, p. 4. Peter Michielsens, "Adem Demaçi: De onbuigzame (The unbendable)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 3 maart 1999, p. 5. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, p. 190.

43. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, p. 291.

44. Bart Rijs, "Kruitvat Kosovo (Powder keg Kosovo)," *Volkskrant* (*The People's Paper*, a Dutch newspaper), 7 juni 1997, p. 7 Vervolg (Supplement).

45. ICG, *Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?* (Pristina, London and Washington: ICG Balkans Report No. 78 Amended version, 2 November 1999), p. 13 (archive www.crisisweb.org).

46. The FARK is also called the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova (AFRK). Stratfor.Com – Kosovo Crisis Centre, "Rivalry Between Kosovo Rebel Groups Reflected in Albanian," Politics, 22 April 1999, <http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/specialreports/special48.htm?section=3>. ICG's estimate is "600-700 FARK soldiers": *Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?* (ICG Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999), p. 13.

47. Stratfor.Com – Kosovo Crisis Centre, "KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army," <http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/kla.htm?section=3> (date article not shown).

48. Kusovac, "Kosovo anticipates a Serbian swan song," *JIR*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1999), p. 13. Vickers, "The Mob Behind, the Cliffs Below," *Transitions*, Vol. 5, No. 11 (November 1998), p. 38. ICG, *Who Will lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?: Making Sense of Kosovo's Feuding Factions* (ICG Kosovo Briefing – South Balkans, 28 June 1999), p. 4 in: <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/kos24brf.htm> (not downloadable from www.crisisweb.org).

49. Judah, "The conflicts among the Kosovars," *RFE/RL*, 30 September 1998, p. 17 (archive www.rferl.org). Judah: "sources close to the UCK have hardly bothered to disguise the fact that Krasniqi's death was the UCK's handiwork" (p. 16). Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) *Newsline*, 22 September 1998, pages 10-11 of 16 (www.rferl.org). NRC, "Serviërs in de aanval in Kosovo (Serbs on the attack in Kosovo)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 23 September 1998, p. 5 (Reuters, AP). ICG, *Who Will lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?* (ICG Kosovo Briefing 28 June 1999), p. 4. ICG, *Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?* (ICG Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999), pp. 12-13.

50. RDP leader Sokol Cuse claimed that during October '99 alone six RDP members were killed in Djakovica; two more were killed and ten reported missing in Mitrovica; nine went missing in Pristina; and twelve in Pec. ICG, *Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom?* (ICG Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999), p. 13 (www.crisisweb.org). NB: Cuse's allegations absent from Amended version). On September

29 the Ministry of Defence of Bukoshi's government accused the former KLA of harassing, beating and kidnapping half a dozen members of its ministry inside Kosovo. SWB, EE/3655, 2 October 1999, p. A/9 (*Bota Sot*, Pristina, 30 September '99).

51. The International Crisis Group speaks of the LKÇK as "a former underground movement led by Valon Murati": *Who's Who in Kosovo* (ICG Balkans Report No. 76, 31 August 1999), p. 7.

52. Gus Xhudo, "The Balkan Albanians – Biding Their Time?," *JIR*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May 1995), p. 211. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, p. 278. Pleurat Sejdiu asserts that the LKÇK "wanted an uprising, an *intifada*" while the LPK "wanted a guerrilla war" (*War and Revenge*, p. 115). Yet Loza claims the opposite: see his "Closing the Ranks," *Transitions*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 1998), p. 33).

53. After Serb police arrested suspected LKÇK-leader Avni Klinaku in late January 1997 on suspicion of KLA-involvement, the National Movement denied its involvement with the ever more popular Liberation Army. See BBC's SWB, EE/2829, 29 January 1997, p. A/13 (*Tanjug*, Belgrade, 27 January '97); EE/2833, 3 February 1997, p. A/10 (*Tanjug*, Belgrade, 1 February '97); EE/2834, 4 February 1997, p. A/12 (*Beta*, Belgrade, 2 February '97).

54. Tihomir Loza, "Kosovo Albanians: Closing the Ranks," *Transitions*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 31-32. Gus Xhudo, "Ethnic violence escalates in Kosova," *JIR*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (March 1997), p. 112.

55. Loza, "Kosovo Albanians," *Transitions*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 1998), p. 30. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, p. 301. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, pp. 190-91.

56. NRC, "Herstel van orde in Albanië is prioriteit (Restoration of order in Albania is priority)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 29 juli 1997, p. 4 (AP, AFP). Fabian Schmidt: "according to official figures, about 1,500 people were killed" in March 1997: "Upheaval in Albania," *Current History*, Vol. 97, No. 617 (March 1998), p. 129.

57. Aydin Babuna, "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 2000), p. 67.

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59. Kusovac, "Another Balkans bloodbath?," *JIR*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1998), pp. 13, 15. Kusovac: the "most spectacular attacks which gave [the] UÇK real credibility took place within four hours of each other on the night of 10-11 September 1997" (p. 14; see also p. 16 "Lausa ambush").

60. Pinkerton, Global Daily Intelligence Survey (GDIS), 6 January 1998 (www.pinkerton.org). Jakup Krasniqi, the Liberation Army's 'official' spokesman, often spoke about the desirability of such a Greater Albania (*Der Spiegel*, 4 July 1998, etc.).

61. The Public Security Service within MUP had three specialized police forces: the SAJ led by Franko Simatovic ('Frenki'), the Special Police Unit (*Posebna Jedinica Milicije*, PJM), and the Special Purposes Police Units (*Jedinice Posebne Namjene Policije*, JPNP) also called the Red Berets. Simatovic's SAJ was the best known and most brutal. Troebst, 'The Kosovo conflict,' Appendix IC in SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 1999* (SIPRI/Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1999), p. 47. See Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intelligence Resource Program, "Serbia Intelligence and Security Agencies," <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/serbia/index.html> (Troebst's note 8). FAS classified the JPNP as "Special Forces Corps [Red Berets]" under the Ministry of Defence.

62. Stefan Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo: Failure or Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998* (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), ECMI Working Paper # 1, 1998), p. 3.

63. Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) *Newsline*, "U.S. envoy calls for calm in Kosovo," 23 February 1998, page 12 of 16 (www.rferl.org). APA [Associated Press Austria] OnlineManager, "US-Balkan-Emissär Gelbard nimmt kein Blatt vor den Mund," APA0256 5 AA 0586, 16 März 1998.

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66. Michel Maas, "De angst waart rond in Orahovac (The fear wanders around in Orahovac)," *Volkskrant*, 25 juli 1998, p. 1. NRC, "Na strijd om de stad Orahovac - Nog eens 25,000 Kosovaren gevlucht (After battle for town Orahovac - Another 25,000 Kosovars fled)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 21 juli 1998, p. 5 (Reuters, AP, AFP). NRC, "Tientallen doden in strijd Kosovo - '240 Albanezen ontvoerd' (Dozens of deaths in conflict Kosovo - '240 Albanians abducted')," *NRC Handelsblad*, 22 juli 1998, p. 5 (Reuters, AP, AFP). Amnesty International, *Kosovo: the evidence* (London: AI United Kingdom, September 1998), p. 21. AI, *Orahovac, July-August 1998* August 1998, EUR 70/58/98 (esp. p. 7).

67. The fall of Malisevo brought 65,000 refugees. Troebst, 'The Kosovo conflict,' Appendix 1C in *SIPRI Yearbook 1999* (1999), pp. 56-57. NRC, "Servische troepen heroveren 'hoofdstad' UÇK (Serb troops recapture 'capital' UÇK)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 29 juli 1998, p. 5 (AFP, AP, Reuters). *Volkskrant*, "Val Malisevo psychologische tegenslag voor UÇK-guerrilla (Fall Malisevo psychological blow to UÇK-guerrilla)," *Volkskrant*, 29 juli 1998, p. 5 (AFP, AP, Reuters).

68. Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo: Failure or Prevention?* (Flensburg: ECMI, 1998), p. 3.

69. Coen van Zwol, "Nieuwe spierballen - Albanese UÇK zegeviert zolang Servië dat toestaat (New muscles - Albanian UÇK triumphs as long as Serbia allows this)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 1 augustus 1998, p. 23, quote translated from Dutch.

70. Ibid. Demaçi announced the re-adoption of 'classic guerilla warfare tactics': Troebst, 'The Kosovo conflict,' Appendix 1C in *SIPRI Yearbook 1999* (1999), p. 57.

71. Pinkerton, GDIS, 24 August 1998 (www.pinkerton.org).

72. Paul Wood, "Analysis: The KLA's armed struggle," BBC News, *BBC Online Network*, 21 September 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_453000/453897.stm.

73. Our sources contain no reliable information that the KLA deliberately sought NATO intervention prior to 1998, let alone provoke or 'manufacture' Serb atrocities to prod NATO into the conflict.

74. Two of Rugova's fifteen advisors, LDK-vice chairman Hydajet Hyseni and Bujar Dugolli, resigned in protest to Rugova's symbolic meeting with Milosevic. Rugova's negotiating team led by Agani held the first meeting with their Serb counterpart on 22 May. The Albanian team agreed to talk further without international mediation, but this did not stop the fighting. The Serb offensive continued in June and July, forcing Agani to suspend the talks indefinitely.

75. Milosevic's attempts to hide troops predated the Holbrooke-Milosevic accord. A NATO official disclosed on 8 October that 14,000 VJ-soldiers and 11,000 MUP-police were still in Kosovo, though substantially less than the 36,000 soldiers and policemen two weeks earlier.

76. One estimate speaks of 37,465 missions altogether. Contrary to NATO commander Wesley Clark, his top Air Force Officer, Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, believed that NATO's air war was won by the strategic bombardments against Serbia proper: Dana Priest, "The Battle Inside Headquarters: Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy (Third of three articles)," *Washington Post*, 21 September 1999. Tim Ripley, "Kosovo: a bomb damage assessment," *JIR*, Vol. 11, No. 9 (September 1999), pp. 10-13. Birgit Donker and Peter Michielsen, "Elfde week van de oorlog werd de laatste (Eleventh week of the war became the latest)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 12 juni 1999, p. 5.

77. Operation Allied Force ended formally on June 20, the day when the last Yugoslav forces left Kosovo, on schedule according to the Military Technical Agreement. The Rambouillet accord only allowed 2,500 MUP-policemen and 2,500 VJ-soldiers (including 1,500 border guards) to stay in Kosovo. Final Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo of 23 February 1999, see Jurist, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm>.

78. *NRC Handelsblad*, "Aftocht Joegoslavische leger uit Kosovo begint (Withdrawal Yugoslav army from Kosovo commences)," *NRC Handelsblad*, 10 juni 1999, p. 1 (Reuters, AP, AFP). Stratfor.Com – Kosovo Crisis Centre, *Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia 09 June [1999]*, 2000 GMT, <http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/specialreports/special84.htm>.

79. NATO Basic Documents, *Resolution 1244 (1999) – Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999*, 30 June 1999 (updated), <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990610a.htm>. KFOR was also called the Kosovo Implementation Force.

80. See 'Facts on the Repression of the anti-Yugoslav separatist activity in Kosovo,' in Ranko Petkovic and Gordana Filipovic (eds.), *Kosovo: Past and Present* (Belgrade: Review of International Affairs, 1989), pp. 374-75.

81. Jenny Engström, "The power of perception: The impact of the Macedonian question on interethnic relations in the Republic of Macedonia", *The Global Review of Ethno-politics*, Vol. 1, No 3 (March 2002) pp. 3-17.

82. "A threat to stability? Human Rights violations in Macedonia", Human Rights Helsinki Watch, (June 1996). p. 16, <http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Macedoni.htm> [accessed 23 November]

83. "A threat to stability? Human Rights violations in Macedonia", Human Rights Helsinki Watch, (June 1996), p. 17, www.hrw.org/reports/1996/macedonia.htm [accessed 23 November 2006].

84. Republic of Macedonia Statistical Service Report, http://www.stat.gov.mk/english/glavna_eng.asp?br=18 [accessed 18 October 2006].

85. The 1994-2002 period is characterized by very large differences in the increase of the population by nationality. Namely, the number of Slav Macedonians increased only by 2,017 persons (0.2 percent) and the average annual increase rate is 0.02 percent. The highest increase is that of the Albanians (67,979 persons or 15.4 percent), who have an annual increase rate of 1.79 percent. Hence, as much as 88.7 percent of the total population increase in FYR Macedonia comes from persons who declared themselves as of Albanian nationality, p. 13, <http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/undp-stat/socioekonomski%20ANG.pdf> [accessed 19 October 2006].

86. Aydin Babuna, *The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia*, (2000), pg. 81. See on the November 1993 arrests regarding the "All Albanian Army": Gus Xhudo, "The Balkan Albanians – Biding Their Time?", *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7 No. 5 (May 1995), p. 210. Van Moyland, "Macedonia – Home But Not Yet Dry", *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7 No. 2 (February 1995), p. 65. Marko Milivojevic, "The 'Balkan Modeling' ", *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7 No. 2, (February 1995), pp. 68-69. SWB, EE/3294, 1 August 1998, pp. A/12-13 (Tanjug, Belgrade, 30 July 1998).

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89. "Greater Albania question", BBC, (18 August 2001), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1228380.stm>, and in Reality Macedonia News, (15 August 2001), http://www.realitymacedonia.org.mk/web/news_page.asp?nid=252

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94. Anna Mateveeva with Dunacan Hiscock, Wolf Christian Paes and Hans Risser, 'Macedonia: Guns Policing and Ethnic Division', in Arms and security in Southeastern Europe, Saferworld and Bonn International Centre for Conversion, (October 2003) p. 53, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/eu_pdf/europe-macedonia-2003.pdf, [accessed October 2006]; "How many groups, how many guns?" *The Economist* (25 August 2001), pp 26-27

95. NATO, Task Force FOX Harvest Achievements, (December 2002), <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje/ACHIEVEMENTS.htm> [accessed 17 June 2006] Mateveeva (et.al), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/eu_pdf/europe-macedonia-2003.pdf, [accessed 25 October 2006]

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