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Central European Constitutional Courts in the face of EU membership : the influence of the German model of integration in Hungary and Poland

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Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership:
The Influence of the German Model of Integration in Hungary and Poland

by

Allan F. Tatham

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The Influence of the German Model of Integration in Hungary and Poland

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