Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship : public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands

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Chapter 7
Conclusions and theoretical considerations

7.1 Introduction

This study set out to explore public views on three potentially divisive issues in Western societies which are in the process of becoming increasingly multicultural, that is, ethnically and culturally diverse: the recognition of national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness of both native and immigrant citizens. As said in Chapter 1, multiculturalism is the term used to refer to forms of recognition which can be seen as normative responses to the (cultural) diversity of society (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003). These issues of recognition are potentially divisive, as they concern processes determining the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the nation-state on the basis of their ethnic, cultural and religious distinctiveness (cf. Kymlicka 1995). Consequently, these issues engender fundamental debates on citizenship and are therefore considered central dimensions of multicultural citizenship (Shadid 2009; cf. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Hence, a multicultural society is defined as one which is not only ethnically and culturally diverse, but in which these dimensions of multicultural citizenship are formally and publicly recognized as well (Shadid 2009).

Chapter 1 mentions that the scientific studies on multiculturalism have been many and varied and have included research on policies and regulations which are relevant to the context of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, few studies to with the goal of exploring *public* views about the dimensions of multicultural citizenship have been conducted (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005; Hjerm 1998; Díez Medrano & Koenig 2005). In an effort to step into this breach, this study has focused on answering the main research question about the views of Dutch citizens on the

three dimensions of multicultural citizenship. (*Nota bene:* the goal of this study is *not* to examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible for citizenship.)

It must be stressed that because so few studies of these public views exist, the scope of this study is necessarily wide and it is exploratory in nature. Quantitative and qualitative data have been collected among Dutch citizens, including both native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants, using a survey (n=710) and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66). These methodological aspects have been extensively discussed in Chapter 2.

In this concluding chapter, the time has come to make an attempt to answer the research question by sifting and discussing the main empirical findings relating to public views on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, which have been presented in Chapters 3 to 6. At the same time an assessment will to made to try to discover whether the three theoretically distinguished dimensions of multicultural citizenship are indeed empirically distinct. The thesis will conclude with a brief discussion of recommendations for policy measures.

7.2   Empirical dimensions of multicultural citizenship

In this section, a summary of the main empirical findings of this study will be presented. The section is divided into three parts, each discussing public views on one of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship: national belonging, including loyalty and multiple citizenship (the subject of Chapters 3 and 4), equality (discussed in Chapter 5) and cultural distinctiveness (the subject of Chapter 6).

7.2.1   Public views on national belonging
Respondents disagree about who can be fully included in the Dutch national group. In other words, national belonging is not determined only by the status of legal citizenship, but is inescapably imbued with social aspects as well (see Chapter 3).

The analysis in this study indicates that the respondents have four distinct conceptions of national belonging: *civic*, *territorial*, *ethnic* and *legal* (see Section 3.4.3.2). On average, they appear to attach most importance to the civic type, which refers to such relatively inclusive criteria for belonging to the national group as feeling Dutch, feeling more attached to the Netherlands than to other countries and having a knowledge of Dutch history and culture. At the other end of the scale, least importance is attached to the ethnic type of national belonging, based on such exclusive criteria as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background.

Interestingly, these two types of national belonging appear to be empirically distinct from the territorial type, which includes such criteria as having been born in the Netherlands and having grown up and living for most of one's life in the country. By and large, the respondents consider this type to be almost as important as the civic one and more important than ethnic national belonging. The distinction between the territorial and ethnic types of belonging is explained by the analysis of the qualitative data: those who considered the territorial criteria to be important, also argued that these are necessary preconditions for being able to feel Dutch or having a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In other words, the territorial criteria are seen as preconditions for the civic aspects of national belonging. This finding nuances the distinction between ethnic and civic types of national belonging indicated in studies by Hjerm (1998) and Kunovich (2009). In these studies the territorial criteria – *id est,* having been born and living for most of one's life in the country – are not distinct from, but part of, the ethnic type. Therefore these authors suggest that citizens who attach importance to territorial criteria have an ethnic and exclusive conception of national belonging. In the Netherlands, these territorial criteria appear to be inclusive for the descendants of first-generation immigrants and for those first-generation immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the Netherlands as well (see Sections 3.4.3.2 and 3.2.5).

The fourth type of Dutch national belonging distinguished in the present study – the legal type – implies exclusive legal citizenship, namely, not holding multiple citizenship. Generally speaking, although respondents consider this type almost as important as the civic type of national belonging, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, they found it difficult to explain the necessity of this exclusiveness. Those who did try to elaborate on this issue argued that multiple citizenship can indicate a lack of commitment and fewer feelings of loyalty to the Netherlands. They would say that therefore immigrants who want to naturalize should renounce their original citizenship. This view coincides with theoretical arguments presented by such scholars as Renshon (2004) and by right-wing Dutch politicians, especially members of the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom) and the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party), as discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. This view implies that exclusive legal citizenship is a precondition for the civic aspects of national belonging as well.

The levels of importance respondents attach to these four types of Dutch national belonging are all positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands (see Section 3.4.3.2). This accords with social identity theory, as research in this field indicates that group members with a strong affective group commitment tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating their differences with the out-groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002).

However, it seems that the respondents' commitment to the Netherlands is more strongly related to the civic type than to the other types of national belonging. This, and the above-mentioned importance attached to the civic aspects of Dutch national belonging, corresponds with the findings of Duyvendak (2011), who argues that Dutch citizens are increasingly constructing national group boundaries by stressing the importance of expressions and feelings of national belonging.

All four types of Dutch national belonging distinguished are considered to be more important by native Dutch than they are by non-Western immigrants and their descendants. At the same time, native Dutch consider themselves to be more typically Dutch, which is not surprising considering that social identity theory indicates that members of majority groups tend to deem their own nominal group characteristics to be self-evident (Verkuyten 2005: 59), and hence tend to construct clear and distinctive group boundaries (Theiss-Morse 2009).

Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, the more importance the respondents attach to criteria for national belonging, the stronger their prejudice that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat. (Respondents' prejudice will be discussed in more detail in the next part of this section.) It therefore comes as no surprise that the more exclusive the type of national belonging, the stronger its relationship to this type of prejudice. The strength of this prejudice towards immigrant groups is most strongly related to the ethnic type of national belonging (β = .56, p < .001), and is clearly less strongly related to either the type of exclusive legal citizenship (β = .40, p < .001), the territorial (β = .36, p < .001) or the civic type (β = .26, p < .001).[1] This relationship ties in with social identity theory as well, as research indicates that those who are perceived by the majority as deviating from their own nominal group characteristics are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005).[2]

Moreover, the importance attached to the most exclusive types of Dutch national belonging – the ethnic type and exclusive legal citizenship – appears to be negatively related to educational level. These relationships with prejudice and educational level have been explained by Kunovich (2009: 585), who argues that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to exclusive

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[1] All values for β mentioned in this chapter are standardized. They are the results of Categorical Regression analyses described in Chapters 3 to 6, in which at least the following predictor variables were included: descent, religion, age, gender, educational level, income and political preference.
[2] As mentioned in Chapter 3, this relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of sub-typing (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001).

criteria for national belonging because they perceive an economic threat from immigrants and their descendants (who generally share their lower socio-economic status) (cf. Kaya & Karakoç 2012: 37).

Finally, the analysis indicates that the importance respondents attach to the types of Dutch national belonging is related to political preference as well. Voters for right-wing parties generally attach more importance to criteria for national belonging, whether they be inclusive or exclusive. Most importance is attached to the types of national belonging by PVV and SGP voters, which corresponds with statements made by the members of Parliament representing these parties, who have repeatedly stressed the importance of (exclusive) boundaries of the Dutch national group during the last decade (as discussed in Sections 3.3, 4.3, 5.2.2 and 6.3).

Despite the finding that immigrant respondents consider themselves to be less typically Dutch than do native Dutch respondents, no significant differences were found in the levels of affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state between native Dutch and Western and non-Western immigrants and their descendants (similar results regarding national self-identification were found by Vroome, Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014: 11-13) (see Sections 3.4.1 and 4.4.2.2). Similarly, no differences in commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands were found between respondents with single citizenship and those with multiple citizenship. Importantly, the affective commitment of immigrants, including those with multiple citizenship, to their own ethnic and religious groups, does not seem to conflict with their affective commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands. On the contrary, their affective commitments to their ethnic and religious groups and to the Netherlands are positively related. (However, research by Martinovic and Verkuyten (2012) among Muslim Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany has indicated that, while national identification and religious group identification are not always mutually exclusive, the relationship between these identities can depend on conditions such as the extent to which 'Western and Islamic ways of life' are seen as compatible, and perceived discrimination.) In other words, it appears that neither ethnic and religious identity nor indeed multiple citizenship undermine immigrants' attachment and loyalty to the nation-state. These findings accord with the insights of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 2007), the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2008), De Hart (2005b) and Ronkainen (2011), and contradict the theoretical and hypothetical arguments put forward by politicians and scholars, as among them Barry (2002), Huntington (2004) and Renshon (2004), who argue that cultural distinctiveness and multiple citizenship undermine commitment and loyalty to the nation-state (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).

Interestingly, it was found that loyalty to the nation-state has several empirically distinct expressions, including various types of patriotism (*nationalist*, *uncritical* and *symbolic*), *national-political pride*, *national-cultural pride* and *shame arising from negative aspects of Dutch national history* (see Section 4.4.2.1).

Nationalist patriotism refers to an idealization of one's nation and feelings of national superiority (cf. Sumner 1906; Druckman 1994). The finding that this expression of loyalty is empirically distinct from the other expressions corresponds to the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007) and Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001) discussed in Section 4.2.2 (who label this type of loyalty 'nationalism' – see also Feshbach 1987, 1990, discussed in Druckman 1994).

A matter of some importance, uncritical patriotism illustrates that not all expressions of loyalty to the country to which a person belongs further its interests, as uncritical patriotism refers to abstaining from or opposing any criticism of one's country, which gainsays the principles of democracy (cf. Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999 discussed in Section 4.2). According with the findings of Parker (2009), uncritical patriotism appears to be distinct from symbolic patriotism, which entails attaching emotional importance to ritual practices or symbolic representations of the country, among them such customs as playing the national anthem or hoisting the national flag (cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007).

In its turn, symbolic patriotism appears to be distinct from national-political pride, which includes pride in Dutch democracy, the economy and the welfare state, Dutch political influence in the world and the according of equal rights in Dutch society, and national-cultural pride, which refers to pride of Dutch achievements in sport, science and technology and the arts and literature. These two components of national pride correspond to the dimensions of national pride found by Hjerm (1998: 343-344) in his analysis of empirical data from Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden. On the other hand, one expression of national shame was measured: shame arising negative aspects in Dutch national history. This expression involves the shame aroused by Dutch actions negatively affecting 'others' in the past, including Dutch involvement in colonialism and slavery. These expressions of pride and shame relate to what Keller (2007) calls 'loyalty in identification': a strong tendency to identify with the nation-state which can result in feelings of pride and of shame (see Section 4.2.1).

Finally, the analysis also suggests a distinct constructive type of patriotism, expressed by criticizing the country to further its interests (see also Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). However, the questionnaires included only one item which relates to this expression.

Except for the shame aroused by the negative aspects of Dutch national history, all these expressions of loyalty appear to be positively related to, but

simultaneously empirically distinct from, the affective component of national self-identification, corresponding to the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007). Importantly, this means that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state can be considered to be expressions of national attachment, but not to be indicators of the affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.

Although these expressions of attachment to the Dutch nation-state do not appear to be related to the variables descent, multiple citizenship and strength of ethnic or religious identity (mentioned above), it did turn out that some of these expressions are related to prejudice, age, educational level and political preference (see Sections 4.4.2.2 and 5.3.3). The strength of the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat appears to be positively, but only slightly, related to the affective component of national self-identification (β = .15, p < .05), but more strongly related to national-political pride (β = .31, p < .001), uncritical patriotism (β = .27, p < .001) and nationalist patriotism (β = .22, p < .001), and negatively related to shame arising from the negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = -.29, p < .001). Nevertheless, no significant relationships were found between this type of prejudice and the other expressions of loyalty mentioned above: national-cultural pride, symbolical patriotism and the item which indicates constructive patriotism. This agrees with the study of Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) discussed in Section 4.2.2. They found that a positive evaluation of one's national in-group (expressed by loyalty) is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrant groups (expressed by prejudice) (see also Coenders 2001; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170).

Furthermore, the relationships between loyalty and this type of prejudice do not appear to be (fully) mediated by educational level, as the calculations of the above mentioned βs were controlled for educational level and other variables (see Section 5.3.3). Regardless of their level of prejudice, the educational level of respondents is negatively related to symbolical patriotism (β = -.15, p < .001) and uncritical patriotism (β = -.17, p < .001) and positively related to national-political pride (β = .20, p < .001) and constructive patriotism (β = .20, p < .001). It was also found that age is positively related to the affective component of national self-identification (β = .15, p < .05), symbolic patriotism (β = .25, p < .001) and shame felt about the negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = .20, p < .05).

Finally, political preference is related to some of these above-mentioned expressions of loyalty as well. Voters for liberal parties (the right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy – VVD, and the left-wing liberal Democrats 66 – D66) and the right-wing populist PVV clearly feel less shame about the negative aspects of Dutch national history than voters for left wing (the Labour Party – PvdA, and the Green Left party) and Christian parties (the right-

wing Christian Democratic Appeal – CDA, the Christian Union – CU and SGP) (β = .31, p < .001). Voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, CDA and PVV) tend to be more uncritically patriotic than voters for parties on the left of the political spectrum (PvdA, the Socialist Party – SP, D66 and Green Left) and non-voters (β = .21, p < .001). Similarly, Huddy and Khatib (2007) found that those who classified themselves as right-wing conservatives tended to be more uncritically patriotic. They explained this by referring to the relationship between authoritarianism and uncritical patriotism: authoritarians, like uncritical patriots, tend to refrain from or oppose criticism of their own country and authoritarians tend to vote for (conservative) parties on the right of the political spectrum (see Section 4.4.2.2).

7.2.2   Public views on citizens' equality

A large majority (more than 90%) of respondents supports the principle of the equal treatment of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Those who do not support this principle appear to have a specific view about who can be fully included in their national group: they attach more importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background (β = -.22, p < .001). The support for the principle of equal treatment also appears to be negatively related to educational level (β = -.14, p < .005) and, not surprisingly, to the strength of the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -.19, p < .001). Furthermore, PVV and SGP voters are slightly less in favour of the equal treatment principle (β = .12, p < .001) (see Section 5.3.3).

Despite the strong support of respondents for the principle of equal treatment, national anti-discrimination policies are supported by a smaller, but still sizeable majority of 68%. Almost half (47%) of the respondents thinks that these policies should be improved. They are convinced that more effective policies, such as quota measures and preferential treatment, are necessary and should be introduced. They also stated that such policies will and can only be effective when politicians stop making polarizing statements. Around 13% oppose anti-discrimination policies. Some of the native Dutch opponents stated that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated and that 'it is the immigrants' own fault', because, as one respondent said, 'They want to be different from the Dutch'. However, other opponents, both Dutch natives and immigrants, said that such policies are not effective because it is impossible to 'cure' adults of prejudice and discrimination by introducing such measures, and that the only way to prevent discrimination is by teaching children about equal treatment from a very young age.

Immigrants of non-Western origin and their descendants appear to be more in favour of national anti-discrimination policies than the native Dutch (β = .14, p < .005). Furthermore, the opponents of anti-discrimination policies attach more importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western name (β = -.23, p < .001), and have a stronger prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -.37, p < .001). This concurs with the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1, which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be explained by an existing bias towards other groups caused by social categorization, that is, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging, or the perception of group threat (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Shadid 2007: 209) (see Section 5.3.3).

Not surprisingly, the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat is stronger among native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin than among those of non-Western origin (β = .22, p < .001). This prejudice appears to be strongest among voters for PVV and SGP, followed by voters for VVD, SP and CU. Voters for PvdA, D66, Green Left and CDA are the least prejudiced (β = .36, p < .001). In more general terms, this type of prejudice is negatively related to educational level (β = -.33, p < .001) (see Section 5.3.3).

Turning to the items included in the prejudice scale,[3] more than a third (37%) of native Dutch respondents believe that too many immigrants (and their descendants) are living in the Netherlands. These findings are similar to those presented by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259). (According to these authors, the percentage of the Dutch population that is of the opinion that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands has decreased, from around 50% in the 1990s and 53% in 2002 to 39% in 2008.) Those who hold this view, argued that immigration leads to the growth of such problems as segregation, crime, pressure on the job market and are the source of unacceptable economic costs to the country. With respect to the job market, native Dutch were more concerned about labour migrants from Eastern Europe (55%) than about immigrants who held Dutch nationality (36%). A much lower percentage (24%) does not believe there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands. Some asserted that the Netherlands is historically an immigration country and it has absorbed many immigrants from various parts of the world. These views are related to the perception that immigrants present a threat to Dutch culture. Of the native Dutch, 44% feel that their culture is under threat. They were concerned that the norms and values, especially those of Muslim immigrants, might become too influential. A similar

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[3] As discussed in Section 5.3.3, a prejudice scale was constructed using six items to explore relationships between this type of prejudice and other variables including educational level.

percentage (40%) was found in 2008 by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259-260). (These authors found that this percentage is on the rise, from 18% in 1995 to 40% in 2008, with the strongest increase taking place in the period 2000-2005, when the political and public debate on the multicultural society peaked) (see Section 5.3.3).

Interestingly, although the strength of the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat appears to explain the opposition to anti-discrimination policies (as discussed above) to a substantial extent, it barely explains the opposition to the preferential treatment of (naturalized) immigrants and their descendants in the context of job applications (β = -.14, p < .05). Moreover, the analysis indicates that this type of prejudice accounts only for a small part of the difference between respondents' opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants (74% of native Dutch and 53% of non-Western immigrants opposed) and their opposition to a similar policy for women (around 50% of all groups opposed). Likewise, this opposition cannot be explained by respondents' views on who fully belongs to the national group. There are no significant relationships between this opposition and the importance they attach to such criteria for national belonging as having Dutch ancestors and/or a Western name, just expounded above. These findings contradict two theories discussed by Bobo and Fox (2003), which postulate that opposition to preferential treatment can be explained by a bias towards immigrants, resulting from either the perception of an ethnic threat or from the process of social categorization (namely, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging). This suggests that opposition to such policies in the Netherlands could be explained by a third theory discussed by Bobo and Fox, that is, this opposition is rooted in 'race-neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; see Section 5.2). Indeed, respondents did argue that such policies can cause stigmatization, and that gender or ethnicity should never be used as criteria in selection procedures.

Cogently, results from the qualitative interviews reveal unmistakably that preferential treatment is often confused with positive discrimination measures: many respondents mentioned that preferential treatment implies 'reverse discrimination' and is therefore unacceptable. Such a lack of understanding of these policies might also explain part of the opposition to them. Nonetheless, the substantial difference between the opposition to preferential treatment for immigrants and preferential treatment for women remains largely unexplained (see Section 5.4.3).

While the preferential treatment of immigrants in the context of job applications appears to be supported by only a small minority, more than two-thirds of respondents is in favour of national policies devised to encourage their

integration. Interestingly, during the in-depth interviews none of the proponents of such policies mentioned that specific measures should be implemented to reduce the substantive disadvantages of minorities on the labour market – which appears to be in line with the opposition to preferential treatment just mentioned. However, they did say that the government should create the necessary preconditions for and remove the barriers for preventing participation, for example, by providing courses teaching Dutch language and culture. Moreover, they suggested an anti-discrimination policy because they considered discrimination an obstacle to full participation. Respondents also mentioned that the government should implement policies to promote tolerance of cultural diversity, or, conversely, counter the 'harmful influences of Islam'. This latter issue which is tied up with the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

7.2.3 Public views on cultural distinctiveness

Respondents' views on who can be fully included in the Dutch national group appear to be related not only to their support of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policies, but also to their views on the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants. At this point, it must be stressed that respondents appear to associate the 'cultural distinctiveness of immigrants' primarily with such Islamic religious manifestations as mosques, Muslim schools and the Islamic headscarf. Importantly, the analysis indicates that both respondents' tolerance of such religious distinctiveness and their appreciation of cultural diversity in general are much lower than their support for the principle of equal treatment. While over 90% of respondents supports the latter principle (as mentioned above), only 42% do consider the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an enrichment of society, and the opposition to certain aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness is substantial. For example, almost half (47%) opposes the right of public officials (including teachers) to wear an Islamic headscarf and 34% oppose granting new religious groups the right to build prayer houses (see Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). These findings concerning the different levels of approval of the principle of equal treatment and cultural distinctiveness tie in with the results presented by Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 113) (see also Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar 2008: 96).

Not surprisingly, the analysis indicates that respondents' tolerance of such religious distinctiveness is relatively strongly and negatively related to the importance they attach to such exclusive (ethnic) criteria for Dutch national belonging, as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background (β = -.50, p < .001). This tolerance is clearly less strongly (but still negatively)

related to the importance respondents attach to more inclusive criteria for national belonging, such as feeling Dutch and having been born and living for most of one's life in the country (civic criteria: β = -.22, p < .001; territorial criteria: β = -.19, p < .001). Finally, this tolerance of religious distinctiveness is strongly and negatively related to the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -.61, p < .001), and positively related to support for the principle of equal treatment (β = .17, p < .001).

Similar results were found with regard to respondents' consideration for cultural distinctiveness, namely, to what extent do they think it is important that employers and healthcare providers should take the cultural and religious distinctiveness of employees and clients into account. The lower respondents' support for such consideration, the more important they deem the criteria for national belonging and the stronger their prejudice that immigrants are a threat (see Section 6.4.2).

Bearing in mind that the importance respondents attach to criteria of national belonging is positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands, these findings accord with social identity theory. Research in this tradition indicates that group members with a strong affective commitment to the in-group tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating the differences between their in-group and out-groups, an exercise which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination (and thus intolerance) of out-group members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). In a nutshell, those perceived by the majority group as deviating from the majority's nominal group characteristics are not fully recognized as group members and run the risk of being marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005). Looking at the analysis of respondents' views, these marginalized group members appear to be the Muslim immigrants.

Given these findings, it is not surprising that non-Western immigrants appear to be more tolerant of religious distinctiveness than are either Western immigrants or the native Dutch (β = .23, p < .001), in line with findings of Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) and of Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 113). Unsurprisingly, tolerance of religious distinctiveness is positively related to educational level (β = .38, p < .001). This is in line with findings of Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 98) regarding Dutch natives and immigrant groups, and results presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40) who analysed survey data from France, Germany, Spain and the United States. And, considering the public views on national belonging and equality discussed above, it is not surprising that voters for PVV and SGP are the least tolerant, followed by voters for VVD and SP, whereas

voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left are most tolerant of religious distinctiveness (β = .31, p < .001). The latter results are similar to those presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40), who found that in France, Germany, Spain and the United States, political conservatives appear to have a more negative attitude towards Muslims than liberals.

Generally, respondents who have a strong tendency to construct national group boundaries and/or who are prejudiced towards immigrants appear to reject such Islamic religious expressions as headscarves and mosques. In other words, they oppose the freedom of religion of Muslim citizens. They stated that these expressions are inappropriate in the Netherlands. They also said that these outward symbols force Islam upon non-Muslims, an assertion which can be considered a prejudice against Muslims, especially because these respondents could not substantiate their opinion. A majority (61%) are convinced that Islamic norms and values are incompatible with Dutch norms and values. Nevertheless, the outward religious symbols adopted by Christian and Jewish teachers are not considered a problem because they are 'less conspicuous' and because 'wearing a cross or yarmulke is typically Dutch, unlike the Islamic headscarf' (see Section 6.4.2).

These findings tie in with results of studies discussed by Maliepaard and Phalet (2012: 131-132), who conclude that the 'religious identity, values and ways of life [of Muslims] are devalued by large parts of the majority' of Dutch citizens, and that more than half of the Dutch 'hold unfavorable views of Muslims', and regard Dutch and Muslims values as incompatible (see also Huijnk & Dagevos 2012).

Some respondents' arguments against the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness appear to be in line with those used by critics of multiculturalism, discussed in Section 6.2. Hence, it was argued that Muslim schools are an obstacle to the integration of Muslim immigrants, an idea similar to arguments defended by Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005). However, it is noteworthy that respondents consider Muslim schools, and not the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as such, to be an obstacle to integration. Only a few respondents argued that all denominational schools, including Christian and Jewish schools, should be banned in order to prevent segregation and facilitate integration. In short, it appears that by and large respondents do not oppose the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as such, but reject the presence of Islamic manifestations in the Netherlands.

Interestingly, those respondents who opposed the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness did not believe that such recognition – for example, allowing police officers to wear an Islamic headscarf – would conflict with the neutrality of the state, in contrast with the ideas of such opponents as Cliteur (2004), mentioned in Section 6.2. Explicitly, the formal recognition of religious

distinctiveness, such as the freedom of religion, was not associated by respondents with the risk of the development of multiple loyalties or any decrease in loyalty to the nation-state, in contrast with arguments propounded by several Dutch right-wing politicians and such scholars as Huntington (2004) (discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.2 respectively).

7.3   Multicultural citizenship: a multi-dimensional concept?

This study was based on the theoretical assumption that the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship set out above are distinct (Shadid 2009). To assess this assumption empirically, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis was carried out including items on the boundaries of the Dutch national group (discussed in Chapter 3), the recognition of social and legal equality (discussed in Chapter 5), and the recognition of cultural distinctiveness (discussed in Chapter 6). The analysis indicates seven distinct components, of which the (rotated) loadings are presented in the following table (7.1).[4]

Items which cluster on these components indicate that public views on the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship, distinguished by Shadid (2009) and suggested by other proponents of multiculturalism (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003), are indeed empirically distinct. In other words, the normative response of citizens to the cultural diversity in their society assumes three distinct aspects.

Two of these dimensions, recognition of national belonging and recognition of cultural distinctiveness, can actually be sub-divided into several components. The components of the dimension of national belonging include the territorial (C2), civic (C3), ethnic (C4) and legal (C6) conceptions as discussed in Section 3.4.3.2 (see also 7.2.1 above). Components of the dimension of cultural distinctiveness include the tolerance of religious distinctiveness (C1) and consideration for cultural distinctiveness (C7), discussed in Section 6.4.2 (see also 7.2.3 above). The component representing the dimension of equality (C5) includes only two items (on the importance of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policies), as views on positive action appeared to be unrelated (see Section 5.4.3). This limitation has been discussed in Chapter 2.

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[4] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 7 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 7 components could be extracted, which explained 60.15% of the total variance. Variance Accounted For per item was higher than 35%. (A CATPCA analysis with option 'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

Table 7.1

Public views on the recognition of (aspects of) multicultural citizenship. Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis, transformed variables rotated with PCA).

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
Importance of criteria for being perceived as a 'true Dutch person':							
Born in the Netherlands	.03	**.44**	-.18	**.36**	-.11	**-.37**	.05
Lived in the Netherlands for most of one's life	.02	**.88**	.01	.07	.07	.04	.02
Grown up in the Netherlands	-.03	**.83**	.04	.09	-.04	-.11	.08
Lived in the Netherlands for part of one's life	-.01	**.81**	.08	-.07	.14	.15	-.01
Feel Dutch	.04	.07	**.77**	-.12	.09	-.02	.01
Have knowledge of Dutch history and culture	-.05	.02	**.76**	.12	-.07	.10	.01
Feel more attached to the Netherlands and the Dutch than to other countries or other ethnic groups	-.04	.03	**.69**	.13	-.16	-.07	.05
Speak Dutch	.19	.14	**.50**	-.17	-.07	**-.42**	-.08
Proud of the Netherlands	.07	-.11	**.37**	.25	.22	-.26	-.01
Have a Western name	.13	.04	.09	**.76**	-.03	-.04	-.04
Have a Christian background	.00	-.08	.07	**.77**	.12	.19	.04
Have a Western European appearance	.08	.18	.00	**.66**	-.07	-.05	-.01
Have Dutch ancestors	.03	.16	-.05	**.62**	-.23	-.20	.00
Having Dutch nationality	-.05	.06	.19	-.07	-.04	**-.71**	.07
Only have Dutch nationality and no other nationalities	.06	-.10	-.01	.19	.11	**-.60**	.19
Importance of equal treatment of cultural minorities	.02	-.10	-.03	.05	**-.69**	-.14	.01
Importance of anti-discrimination policies	.06	-.06	.16	.00	**-.68**	.29	.21

(Table 7.1 continued)

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
Acceptability of wearing Islamic headscarf in public	**.79**	-.05	.04	.07	.07	.02	.03
Acceptability of wearing religious dress or symbols	**.66**	,02	.10	.02	.10	.10	.11
Right of public officials (including teachers) to wear Islamic headscarf	**.66**	-.05	-.01	.14	.14	.12	.21
Right to observe religious holidays	**.68**	.08	-.00	.02	-.30	.02	-.17
Right to build prayer houses	**.65**	.01	-.13	.01	-.21	-.19	-.06
Right to establish denominational schools	**.38**	-.01	-.06	-.09	.04	**-.31**	.17
Importance of taking cultural/religious distinctiveness into account by healthcare providers	-.05	.02	.05	.02	-.09	-.02	**.85**
Importance of taking cultural/religious distinctiveness into account by employers	.11	.07	-.05	-.07	-.06	-.09	**.76**
Eigenvalues	5.51	2.57	1.92	1.54	1.26	1.13	1.12
Variance accounted for (%)	22.02	10.26	7.68	6.15	5.05	4.52	4.47

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. The items have been sorted by loadings on each component. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings of the items used as surrogate variables or for constructing scales in Chapters 3 to 6 are italicized.

Finally, these components not only appear to be empirically distinct but as the analysis presented in Sections 5.3.3 and 6.4.2 indicates, they are inter-related, and related to the prejudice that immigrants pose a cultural and economic threat. Consequently, as has been discussed in Section 7.2 above, the fact that respondents disagree about who can be fully included in the national group implies that they also differ in their views on to what extent such citizens' rights as equal treatment and freedom of religion, of certain groups within their nation-state should be upheld.

The finding that support for the principle of equal treatment and national anti-discrimination policies (items on component C5 in the table above) is positively related to tolerance of religious distinctiveness (C1) and consideration for cultural distinctiveness (C7) (see Section 6.4.2), seems to tie in with findings of Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 96). However, the study of the latter authors indicates that issues of cultural diversity (including aspects of

equality) are perceived by Dutch natives[5] on a single dimension, and not on distinct dimensions as indicated by the present study. This difference might be due to the fact that the scales these authors used to measure attitudes towards multiculturalism do not include specific items to do with aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness and consideration for cultural distinctiveness (see also Section 6.4.2).[6]

7.4   Recommendations for policy measures

As said in Chapter 1, debates on multicultural citizenship are potentially divisive, as they concern the processes determining the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the nation-state. In an attempt to contribute to the inclusion of various groups of Dutch citizens in Dutch society, this section includes suggestions for a few recommendations for policy, devised on the basis of the findings of this study. These recommendations relate to the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship: national belonging, equality of citizens and groups' cultural distinctiveness.

National belonging
Considering that Dutch citizenship entails equal rights and duties and considering that the Dutch government is endeavouring to strengthen social cohesion in society and improve the ability of citizens to deal with diversity (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013),

- It is recommended that politicians, other public officials and the media should stress the Dutch national belonging of immigrants who possess Dutch citizenship, irrespective of their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background.

The results presented in Section 3.4.3.2 indicate wide public support for this view: respondents generally consider such inclusive criteria for national belonging as having Dutch citizenship and feeling Dutch, to be more important than such exclusive criteria as having Dutch ancestors or a Christian background. A change to this type of emphasis on national belonging is highly important because respondents who do attach importance to such exclusive criteria for national belonging as having Dutch ancestors tend to oppose granting equal rights to and

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[5] These authors use the term 'Dutch mainstreamers'. However, they discuss earlier studies in which the term 'Dutch natives' is used (e.g. Breugelmans & Van de Vijver 2004).
[6] See also Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar (2009: 659).

equal treatment of immigrants and their descendants, and especially the right to freedom of religion of Muslim citizens (see Sections 5.3.3 and 6.4.2).

This means that, as a rule, priority should be given to immigrants' Dutch identity and belonging and that their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background should only be mentioned when relevant to the context concerned. Stressing the latter aspects of citizens' identity in situations in which they are not relevant can lead to the perception that these aspects conflict with 'being Dutch' or with 'Dutch culture', which implies that these citizens do not fully belong to the national group (see also the discussion in Sections 3.2.3 and 5.3.2). The natural upshot is that the national government should recognize that immigrant integration is being hindered not so much by immigrants' cultural or religious distinctiveness, but principally by their socio-economic disadvantages and by discrimination (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).

More specifically, following the example of the municipalities of The Hague and Amsterdam, national and local governments should consider avoiding the term *allochthon*. As discussed in Section 3.3, the use of this term essentially implies ethnic labelling (as it refers to descent), which means that describing someone as *allochthon* can lead to the perception that he or she does not fully belong to the national group. Indeed, the results of this study indicate that this term is generally used by respondents to describe those who do not fully belong to the national group or are considered to present a cultural threat to Dutch society (see Section 3.4.3).

Furthermore, the national government should consider adapting the national canon of Dutch history and supervise the way in which it is used in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. First and foremost, the canon should reflect that the Netherlands has been a country of immigration since at least the sixteenth century (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011), and, by employing proper teaching methods, it should be used to help pupils to recognize the contribution made by immigrants to Dutch culture and society, and this should include those who have come to the Netherlands in the past 50 years. In this respect, religions 'new' to Dutch society, such as Islam and Hinduism, can be considered Dutch religions specific to the 'new' Dutch, as is the case with the many regional cultures (values and practices) in the Netherlands. In a second step, the construction and dynamic character of the canon itself should be discussed in schools. Pupils have to learn to recognize the various factors (such as immigration, ideology, power relations) which are constantly influencing the dynamic process of interpreting and defining important aspects of 'Dutch history', and learn that this process is part of the social construction of 'who we are', that is, our national identity. (See also Section 3.3.)

On a more general level, politicians and other public officials should be careful when making references to an idealized and nostalgic 'national past', and stress the fact that there should be a shift in the focus to that of a shared future, in which migration and cultural diversity are inevitable and not inherently problematic. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the principle of non-discrimination and the tolerance of all ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the Netherlands, including immigrants, are important aspects of Dutch history and culture. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, research by Smeekes, Verkuyten and Poppe (2012) shows that those who perceive Dutch national history to have been tolerant tend to be more accepting of the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslims in the Netherlands. In this wave of positiveness, it is important not to dismiss anxieties about immigration, as these anxieties reflect the fact that national identities are relatively stable and consequently views on national belonging generally change slowly (see Section 3.2.5). Because immigration and cultural diversity are inevitable, the government should communicate about these changes and anxieties regularly and advisedly with the public. Very importantly, politicians should refrain from exploiting these anxieties with an eye to the ballot box.

The national government should also consider amending the Dutch Nationality Act, by abolishing the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship have to renounce their original citizenship. This requirement is problematic, as it suggests that those who have multiple citizenship (currently more than one million citizens) might be less loyal and hence do not fully belong to the Dutch national group. Caution is advised as this requirement requires that the government publicly emphasizes, as it did in 2007,[7] that multiple citizenship does not undermine or hinder immigrants' loyalty to the nation-state, integration and national belonging. This timely emphasis is important, as the results discussed in Section 4.4.1 indicate that almost half (49%) of respondents oppose multiple citizenship because of these perceptions.

A large majority of respondents (84%) supports the idea that pupils should learn how to deal effectively with cultural diversity in society at school (see Section 5.2.3.3). On the basis of this support, this recommendation can be introduced into the educational system, for example, by extending the existing focus on the multicultural character of the Dutch nation-state in school curricula.

Finally, the national government should consider establishing a Multicultural Council, modelled after the Australian Multicultural Council,[8] as an official and

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[7] Ministerie van Justitie (2007: 2).
[8] See Australian Multicultural Council, accessed April 25, 2014, http:// http://www.amc.gov.au.

independent advisor to the government on multicultural affairs, that is, the intercultural management of Dutch society.

Citizens' equality

Considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to equal treatment and that discrimination is not permitted, enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution, and considering the fact that the Dutch government recognizes the persistence of discrimination, that it should take the proper steps to prevent and combat any form of it by authorities, organizations and citizens themselves (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2013),

- It is recommended that national and local governments and societal organizations should improve the possibilities for reporting discrimination and extend and strengthen existing anti-discrimination measures.

This study indicates that almost half (47%) of the respondents is of the opinion that national anti-discrimination measures should be improved and that only a small minority (13%) holds the view that such measures are not needed. At the same time, more than 90% supports the principle of equal treatment (see Section 5.3.3).

Respondents in this study frequently referred to the lack of effectiveness of anti-discrimination measures. As the discussion in Section 5.3.2 indicates, there are several possible reasons for this lack of effectiveness. Among the most prominent are a lack of awareness of anti-discrimination legislation, the fact that this legislation is only effective when those individuals who are being discriminated against take action, for example, by lodging a complaint, and the fact that institutional discrimination is not being addressed directly. In order to prevent and combat various forms of discrimination more effectively, the national and local governments and organizations should pass various measures properly devised to raise awareness about and knowledge of what discrimination is about, to improve complaint procedures, to combat and prevent negative stereotypes, and to address institutional discrimination.

In order to raise awareness about and knowledge of discrimination, the implementation of codes of conduct in organizations should be promoted. Such implementation would lower the threshold and facilitate the ability of individuals and organizations to recognize and deal with discriminatory behaviour. Such a set-up can also make provision for complaints procedures. Municipalities should be able to provide individuals and organizations with effective knowledge about what

discrimination is and advice on (preventive) anti-discrimination measures. The national government should regularly run awareness campaigns to inform the public about all the possibilities to report discrimination. In 2009 and 2010 these sorts of campaigns proved to be very successful. In all these measures to raise awareness and knowledge, it should be stressed that discrimination is by no means a phenomenon of the past and that combating and preventing discrimination effectively depends on the willingness of individuals and organizations to discuss the problem openly. This willingness can be encouraged by implementing intercultural management in organizations, central to which is the principle that every employee, student or pupil belongs there as an equal member, irrespective of their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background. Intercultural management should become the basis for promoting tolerance and the principle of non-discrimination.

To uphold the non-discrimination principle, it is extremely important to prevent and combat negative prejudice against all groups in society. At this point, it is important to realize that the overwhelming support for the principle of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policy alluded to above does not imply that the level of negative prejudice is low. As the results discussed in Section 5.3.3 indicate, 37% of Dutch native respondents believes that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands and that their presence is leading to more crime, rising pressure on the job market and unacceptable economic costs to the country. A larger percentage (44%) of Dutch native respondents thinks that immigrants, Muslims in particular, present a threat to Dutch culture.

Despite these perceptions, a large majority (90%) of respondents is in favour of teaching pupils in schools to treat people of various cultural backgrounds equally (see Section 5.3.3). Several measures can be implemented to assure this goal, chief among them avoiding textbooks which contain stereotypes and negative prejudice, and educating pupils about the diversity *within* ethnic, cultural and religious groups. This requires, however, that the ongoing education curriculum for teachers includes learning how to recognize and deal with manifestations of racism and discriminatory behaviour.

Another area in which it is vitally important to prevent and combat negative stereotypes is within organizations, especially among managers and employees' councils. The requirement that managers and members of employees' councils should regularly take courses to recognize and deal with negative stereotypes could be included in the codes of conduct and in collective labour agreements.

In order to address institutional discrimination more effectively, employees' councils (in Dutch: *medezeggenschapsraden* and *personeelsvertegenwoordigingen*) should be allowed sufficient time and be equipped with the knowledge needed to

carry out their existing legal task of combating discrimination and promoting equal treatment within their organizations. Codes of conduct could and indeed should anonymous complaint mechanisms and offer the possibility for positive action measures so as to increase the diversity of employees' councils themselves. Local and national governments should not stand idly by but be prepared to address institutional discrimination, for example, by conditionally disqualifying employers who are found guilty of discrimination from tendering public contracts. On the national level, the national government should consider introducing a clause in the Criminal Code which will allow courts to consider a racist motivation a specific aggravating circumstance, as this could act as a real deterrent.

As the effectiveness of measures to prevent and combat discrimination seems to be limited, the government should also consider combating the *effects* of discrimination, especially in the labour market. The government could reconsider its decision in 2011 that integration policies should no longer target specific groups (as is clear from the policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship*, see Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), and implement temporary measures for positive action more widely, following the examples of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization[9] of Dutch Parliament.[10] However, this requires efforts to increase public support for such measures, as the findings of this study indicate that a majority of the respondents oppose positive action (see Section 5.4.3). This opposition might partly be explained by a misunderstanding of the measures concerned: respondents said that they oppose positive action because it implies positive discrimination. However, positive discrimination is forbidden by law in the Netherlands, whereas preferential treatment is perfectly legal.

Respondents also mentioned that anti-discrimination measures can only be effective if and when the government, and more specifically the politicians, set a good example. Consequently, politicians, other public officials and the media should take a stand against racist discourse and avoid ethnic profiling, for instance, by not making empirically ungrounded suggestions that ethnic or religious background can explain problematic behaviour. As discussed in Sections 3.2.3 and 5.3.1, these suggestions can pave the way to the espousal of prejudice, which in its turn can lead to intolerance and discrimination.

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[9] In Dutch: *ondersteunende/ambtelijke organisatie*.
[10] The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization of Dutch Parliament implemented preferential treatment measures (in 2010 and 2008 respectively), to increase the number of ethnic minority employees (see Section 5.4.2).

Cultural distinctiveness

Considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to profess their religion either individually or in a community with others, enshrined in Article 6 of the Constitution, and considering that Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of education and considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to expect equal treatment,

- It is recommended that politicians, other public officials and the media stress that the freedom of religion and freedom of education apply *equally* to all (religious) groups in the Netherlands.

Such an emphasis is of great importance, as the findings discussed in Section 6.4.2 indicate that there is substantial opposition to the freedom of religion and freedom of education for Muslims, although generally speaking respondents do not oppose the *principles* of freedom of religion and freedom of education. Cogently, by and large respondents are not of the opinion that the Dutch interpretation of freedom of religion – which, for example, allows teachers in public schools to wear an Islamic headscarf – conflicts with the neutrality of the state.

Importantly, politicians should realize that wide support for an inclusive conception of national belonging and the principle of equal treatment (discussed above) does not imply a high level of tolerance for all (religious) groups in society. In the context of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, support for the freedom of religion of Muslims can be generated by preventing and combating intolerance of Islamic religious manifestations in Dutch society, including building mosques, establishing Muslim schools and wearing the Islamic headscarf. Despite the substantial intolerance displayed towards these manifestations, the findings of this study indicate a wide support for preventing and combating intolerance and prejudice in general. More than two-thirds of respondents want the government to develop policies to encourage the proper functioning of the multicultural society, including measures to promote tolerance for cultural diversity (see Section 5.2.3.3).

Furthermore, the results in 6.4.2 indicate that respondents who are intolerant of Islamic manifestations think that allowing these manifestations in the public sphere will lead to forcing Islam upon non-Muslims. Therefore it is of the utmost importance to dispel such prejudice about Islam, as the national government noted in its policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011).