Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship : public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands
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Chapter 5
Multicultural citizenship and equality

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, a multicultural society is characterized by cultural and ethnic diversity plus the formal and public recognition of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including belonging to the national group of both natives and immigrants, their cultural distinctiveness and their equality (Shadid 2009: 5-6). The dimension of equality is an important aspect in fundamental debates on citizenship, as in Western countries legal citizenship entails the right to equality (cf. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). This chapter reviews some of the ideas about equality prevalent in Dutch society, in an attempt to explore how and indeed whether aspects of this dimension of multicultural citizenship are recognized and dealt with in practice. The method adopted for this purpose is to discuss the policy measures introduced by the Dutch government to promote equality and the analysis of relevant empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research. Before this can be done, the scientific meaning and usage of the concept of equality and factors which can hinder or promote the equality of various groups in society must be discussed.

In the relevant literature, equality is used by scholars as both a descriptive and a normative concept (Capaldi 2002). As a descriptive concept it is employed to describe the relationship between entities with certain identical characteristics. In this sense, the recognition that all human beings are equal in certain aspects is *descriptive* in nature. A *normative* use of equality is present in the view that the recognition of equality requires a special treatment of human beings (Capaldi 2002: 1).

The question of which kind of special treatment is required and indeed desirable to achieve equality has been widely discussed in the literature (Barnard & Hepple 2000; Capaldi 2002; Miller 1996; Rosenfeld 1986; Shin 2009). Various types of equality are distinguished, including such descriptive types as the equality of conditions and equality of opportunity, and normative types, among them formal equality and substantive equality of opportunity. Formal equality enshrines the ideal that all persons should be treated equally. In the Netherlands, this principle is laid down in Article 1 of the Constitution, which stipulates that 'All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex, or on any other ground whatsoever shall not be permitted.'[1] In other words, formal equality refers to the *act* of equal treatment. However, equal treatment does not guarantee equality of opportunity, because the latter depends not only on the absence of acts of unequal treatment, also called discrimination,[2] it also requires equal starting points (Barnard & Hepple 2000: 566) or, in other words, equal conditions (cf. Miller 1996: 203). When starting conditions are unequal because of the disadvantaged position of a group, for example, in the labour market or because the level of education of its members is holding back from acquiring a better position in society, the opportunities for the members of this group will be limited. The concept of equality which includes measures to overcome these limitations and to level the playing field (Roemer 1998) is referred to as substantive equality of opportunity. Such measures are usually referred to as measures for positive/affirmative action (Barnard & Hepple 2000).[3]

Since the 1980s, various policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands to achieve both formal equality and substantive equality of opportunity for those citizens from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds who had come to the country primarily as labour migrants. These efforts include positive action policies, measures and regulations to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination and policies designed to assist integration. In this context, the term integration refers to the process of incorporating immigrants and their descendants into society. The equality of citizens was one of the main principles of the first structural integration policy developed by the Dutch government in the early 1980s, and since then—as will be discussed later in this chapter—integration has been used as a central concept to describe the juxtaposition between equality and the ethnic and cultural diversity in society.

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[1] Translation by Rayar & Wadsworth (1997).

[2] But see Section 5.3.1 for the difference between legal and empirical conceptions of discrimination.

[3] For an extensive discussion of various aspects of formal and substantive equality, see Loenen & Rodrigues (1999).

To examine these concepts of equality and the types of Dutch policies devised to promote equality in more depth, in this chapter the views on three particular topics will be examined: integration, prejudice and discrimination, and positive action. It will also attempt to probe into the matter of whether these views are related to such other variables as educational level, political preference and the frequency of social contact with other ethnic groups. Hence the chapter is divided into three sections, each of which concentrates on the three designated topics. In the first part of each section, the existing relevant literature will be discussed. This is followed by a discussion of policies and regulations. In the last part of each section, an analysis of the empirical data will be presented.

5.2   Integration

5.2.1   Perspectives on integration of immigrants and their descendants

Since the 1920s, the integration of immigrants and their descendants in nation-states has been the central theme in studies by scholars in various disciplines (Kivisto 2005; Waters, Tran, Kasinitz & Mollenkopf 2010: 1169) and has presented a challenge to policy makers in many immigration countries, as among them Canada, Australia, the United States and, more recently, European nations (see for example Bijl & Verweij 2012). The purpose of this section is not to offer a comprehensive overview of these studies but to present a brief discussion of the main results of the relevant scientific research on this topic.

In essence studies about the integration of immigrants and their descendants are about the process of change elicited by migration to a different society (cf. Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010: 173; see also Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005). Although the studies are many and varied, there is no consensus among scholars about which concept to use to refer to this process. Although the concept of integration is the one most used in European studies, whereas in the United States the concept of assimilation tends to be more prevalent (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010; Vermeulen 2010), other concepts such as acculturation and incorporation are also in common use. In the present study, the concept of integration is the one chosen.

Notwithstanding the fact that different concepts are used to attempt to explain it, there is general agreement among scholars that the integration process is a prism made up of legal, social, cultural, political, and economic aspects. These aspects are frequently categorized into two separate dimensions: the *structural* and *socio-cultural* dimension (Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 128; Portes & Rivas 2011; Waters, Tran, Kasinitz & Mollenkopf 2010). The concept of structural integration is used to refer to the socio-economic incorporation of immigrants and their descendants

into society, and covers such straightforward topics as attempts to improve their educational status and their position in the labour market. In contrast, socio-cultural integration describes aspects which are more complex and difficult to measure (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 871), such as immigrants' social relationships with 'natives', discrimination, and the real or perceived differences in norms and values between immigrants and natives (Goodman 2010; Spencer & Cooper 2006).

The concepts of integration and assimilation are not confined to their empirical purposes but are also used to form normative judgements. Hence, these concepts are used in empirical studies on the process of change driven by migration, and also to describe the desired end points of this process or the goals of integration policies (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).

Many theoretical models to describe *empirical* differences in the pace, progress and outcome of the integration process have been proposed, discussed and measured (e.g. Gordon 1964; Shadid 1979; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault & Senécal 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Alba & Nee 2003; Berry 2011). Berry has proposed an influential two-dimensional model to describe different strategies for acculturation (1974; 2011). The first dimension of this model relates to the relative preference displayed by immigrants and their descendants to maintain their own culture and identity; whereas the other dimension describes their relative preference to interact with other groups in society. These two dimensions produce four intercultural strategies which can theoretically be resorted to by immigrants and their descendants: *integration*, *assimilation*, *separation* and *marginalization*. Integration and assimilation both refer to strategies adopted by immigrants and their descendants who wish to interact with other groups in society. These two strategies are opposed to the other dimension: integration refers to the strategy adopted by which immigrants and their descendants who wish to maintain their original culture and assimilation refers to the strategy adopted when they do not wish to adopt the norms and values of the receiving society. Berry goes on to define separation and marginalization as strategies in which immigrants and their descendants do not wish to interact with other groups in society, but differentiating between the way in which they wish to maintain their original culture. Separation refers to the strategy followed by immigrants and their descendants who wish to maintain their original culture, marginalization describes the strategy in which they do not (2011: 2.6).

However, this model presents a one-sided view of the acculturation process, because it does not take into account important factors which influence this process, for instance, the fact that preferences for cultural retention and interaction with other groups actually have to be developed in interaction with others and that

they also depend on specific individual, societal and institutional factors (cf. Berry 2001; Bowskill, Lyons, & Coyle 2007; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar 2009; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga & Szapocznik 2010). Moreover, the model presents only a limited number of mutually exclusive strategies in which there is no place for contextual variations. It does not take into account that individuals might prefer to interact with members of their own ethnic or cultural group in their free time, but do not object to interacting with members of other ethnic and cultural groups in the labour market (cf. Schrauf 2002; Schwartz & Zamboanga 2008).

To understand the factors which influence the integration process, it is not sufficient to restrict any investigation only to the preferences of immigrants and their descendants. Integration studies recognize that the integration process can be influenced by, *inter alia*, *individual*, *institutional* and *societal* factors. Contributory individual factors might be the specific socio-economic background of first generation migrants, which implies examining their level of education, work experience and the reasons for their immigration (Haller, Portes, & Lynch 2011; Shadid 2007: 298). These studies also recognize the influence of social networks encountered at school and at work (Eve 2010).

The effect of institutional factors on the integration process is discussed in various studies, among them those by Crul & Schneider (2010) and Reitz (1998). In their comparison of educational systems in different countries, Crul & Schneider show that differences between national education systems goes a long way towards explaining the differences between the educational attainments of second-generation ethnic Turks (2010: 1258; also see Alba, Sloan & Sperling 2011 and Wiesbrock 2011).[4] Another widely discussed factor which can help or hinder the process is residential segregation. However, so far evidence of a relationship between this factor and the integration process is limited and inconclusive (Musterd & Ostendorf 2009; Phillips 2010).

Finally, societal factors which influence the integration process include discrimination (cf. Vermeulen 2010; Vedder, Sam & Liebkind 2007), which limits opportunities, and normative views on integration—either current in society in general or explicitly formulated in integration policies (cf. Crul & Schneider 2010: 1260).

In *normative* approaches to the integration process, the concept of assimilation is often used to describe an endpoint of change which is reached when immigrants and their descendants have come to resemble the natives in both socio-economic

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[4] Specific educational challenges related to increasing ethno-cultural diversity in the classroom have also been studied. See for example Vedder, Horenczyk, Liebkind & Nickmans (2006).

and socio-cultural aspects (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010). This use of the term assimilation is in contradiction to the normative use of the term integration, which describes a process in which immigrants and their descendants do achieve equal opportunities (e.g. in the labour market and in education) but generally retain their own cultural identities (Phillips 2010). Normative ideas about the goals of the integration process are made explicit when they are laid down in policies developed by governments to advance the integration of immigrants and their descendants. These goals can include, but are not limited to, equal treatment and equal opportunities for newcomers (Geddes 2003; Penninx 2005). In recent years, integration policies in several European countries have been amended to include more specifically honed goals, from a practical point of view the newcomers' proficiency in the native language and, something less easy to pinpoint, their knowledge of the norms and values of the receiving society. In some countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, these latter goals—referred to as civic integration (Goodman 2010: 755)—have recently been made requirements even for acquiring temporary and permanent residency, not to mention for obtaining legal citizenship (Goodman 2010; Green 2007; Joppke 2007).

Both empirical studies of and normative views about the integration process often make distinctions between the native group and groups of immigrants and their descendants. These distinctions can be used as tools to detect and describe the disadvantages experienced by certain groups, for example, in the labour market (e.g. Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). However, several authors warn that focusing on this distinction can be problematic in any attempt to explain differences in the course of the integration process (Crul & Schneider 2010; Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 870; Groenendijk 2007: 104). They point out that, in the first place, it can lead to the incorrect perception that the native groups and the various groups of immigrants and their descendants are homogenous entities. This perception can lead to assumptions about causal relations between ethnicity and the integration process that are, 'in the worst case, tautological', as Crul & Schneider (2010: 1255) write, referring to Latour (1999: 71). In practice, there are many differences *between* the various immigrant and native groups in society as well as differences *within* each group (cf. Vermeulen 2010: 1219).[5] It is an inescapable fact that the socio-cultural aspects and structural aspects of integration are related, but, partly because of individual differences, the causal relations between these aspects can be bi-directional and are difficult to investigate

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[5] The process of integration will probably only compound these differences. For example, consider the possible effects of intermarriage between natives and immigrants or their descendants – see Song (2010).

pertinently (cf. Portes & Zhou 1993; Dagevos 2001; Veenman 2002; Demant 2005).

Very importantly, as explained in Chapter 3, boundaries between ethno-cultural groups are socially constructed and simultaneously dynamic. Therefore the nub of the matter is not just which ethno-cultural differences can explain aspects of the integration process, but also which differences are perceived to be important in society and why (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013; Eve 2010: 1233). With respect to integration, an important question is therefore which cultural and religious differences between these groups are recognized and accepted and which are not (cf. Shadid 2009; Waldinger 2007). The relationship between actual acceptance and recognition and formal integration policies has been studied by academics whose work leads them to construct national models to describe country-specific regulations and public attitudes towards immigration, citizenship, and integration (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005). These models have been constructed on the basis of empirical studies of the relationships between integration policies, views on national identity and the (mutual) recognition of cultural differences.

This discussion has explicitly revealed that—although no consensus exists on the meaning of the concept of integration—there is a recognition that the process of integration is inexorably influenced by many factors, including institutional and societal factors, such as discrimination and the presence of an integration policy. The next section will shed some light on the principles and goals of integration policies developed by the Dutch government in the period 1980-2013.

5.2.2   Integration of immigrants in the Netherlands: policies and debates

Since the 1980s, both the national and local governments in the Netherlands have developed a series of policies designed to integrate immigrants and their descendants.[6] Over the years, pronounced changes have been made in the principles and goals set out in these policies. These changes will be discussed in this section. Five phases in this discussion will be distinguished (cf. Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007; Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; Penninx 2005): the period of *laissez-faire* without any structural integration policy prior to the 1980s; the Ethnic Minorities policy of the 1980s which was characterized by *accommodation*; the policies of *replacement* (De Zwart & Poppelaars 2007) in the 1990s in which the focus on ethnic groups was replaced by

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[6] For an overview of current national integration policies see "Integration", accessed July 25, 2013, http://www.government.nl/issues/integration. An example of local government policies can be found in the overview of policy principles and goals in the municipality of Amsterdam: *Bestuurlijke reactie op de Staat van Integratie Rotterdam – Amsterdam* (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012).

a focus on socio-economic disadvantages; the period between 2002 and 2011 in which *cultural adaptation* was stressed; and the period since 2011 in which the replacement policies of the 1990s have been combined with a focus on the responsibility of the immigrants themselves in the integration process.[7]

In the first phase, prior to 1980, the government constructed its immigration policies on the premise that the Netherlands was not and would not become a country of immigration (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). The question had not yet become pressing as immigrants from former Dutch colonies were considered repatriates, and the presence of the labour migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s was viewed as temporary. As there was not perceived need, no structural policies for immigrant integration were developed (Penninx 2005; Poppelaars & Scholten 2008). Instead, the government adopted *laissez-faire* policies to accommodate the assumed temporary residence of the labour immigrants, who were called 'guest workers' as a consequence (cf. Penninx 1996).

However, during the 1970s it was becoming more obvious that most (of the recently arrived) immigrants had no plans to return to their countries of origin and wanted to remain in the Netherlands permanently. Consequently, the government realized that the *laissez-faire* policies, founded on a premise of temporary migration, needed revision (Penninx 2005). In its search for advice, the government consulted the scientific community. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM), at that time responsible for the welfare of the labour immigrants, established the Advisory Committee on Research related to Minorities (ACOM). Although ACOM advised the government about research matters, a report published in 1979[8] by another advisory body, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), was the factor which led the government to develop its first national and structural integration policy.

This new policy, devised and implemented in the 1980s, was known as the Ethnic Minorities Policy. One of the main principles was, Penninx wrote, '[e]quality in the socio-economic domain, inclusion and participation in the political domain and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional conditions and to the extent feasible' (2005: 38; see also Bijl & Verweij 2012: 242). The government at that time considered such structural factors as discrimination and the immigrants' lack of education, not ethnic and cultural diversity, the main obstacles to their successful integration and socio-economic success. In fact, socio-cultural emancipation was seen to have positive

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[7] Chapters 3, 4 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of integration policies.
[8] The report was called *Ethnic Minorities* (WRR 1979).

effects on their integration in society (see also Chapter 6). Hence, the integration policies were targeted at specific ethnic minorities with a low socio-economic status. Therefore, the Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s can be characterized as a policy of accommodation, when accommodation refers to the fact that this policy explicitly targeted groups whose boundaries were defined not just by their socio-economic status, but also and primarily by their ethnic background (De Zwart & Poppelaars 2007).

In its efforts to develop the integration policies in this period, the government commissioned several research reports (Penninx 2005) and also began to monitor the integration process and the effects of its integration policies (Bijl & Verweij 2012: 245). Ever since then, in the formulation of the principles and goals of minorities policies, the government has made use of reports from various scientific institutions such as the above-mentioned WRR, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS), which have all been commissioned by the government to study the process of integration at various times.[9] In this regard, the government has also commissioned researchers to monitor discrimination in the Netherlands. A prominent example is the *Monitor racisme & extremisme*, originally started by Jaap van Donselaar (see Donselaar 1997; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010: 251).

In 1987, the Dutch government requested WRR to evaluate the effects of the Ethnic Minorities Policy, and it presented its report in 1989 (WRR 1989). In this report, WRR concluded that the Ethnic Minority Policy had failed to make an adequate contribution towards improving the socio-economic position of immigrants, especially in the fields of education and employment. As mentioned in Chapter 3, WRR went on to state that a focus on ethnic groups and an excess of government attention paid to the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants could hinder their advancement in the fields of education and the labour market. WRR recommended that the government should take account of the differences between and within the immigrant groups, focus on socio-economic goals and leave the responsibility for the development of their cultural identity to the immigrant groups themselves (WRR 1989: 19-24).

These recommendations were enshrined as principles in the *Contourennota*, a new policy document the government presented in 1994 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). The government opted for what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call 'replacement', in other words the focus on ethnic groups and socio-cultural emancipation in the old policies was replaced by a focus on such

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[9] See, for example, Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos (2012) and Huijnk & Dagevos (2012). For a study of this co-operation between researchers and policy makers see Penninx (2005).

socio-economic categories as groups considered to be socio-economically disadvantaged (Scholten & Timmermans 2004) and disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

These changes were reinforced by a focus on civic integration, which has been discussed in Chapter 3. This involved individual immigrants being given training in Dutch language and courses about Dutch society in general and the functioning of the labour market in particular. Initially developed by local governments in the early 1990s, this civic integration policy was implemented nationally as the Newcomers Integration Act (*Wet inburgering nieuwkomers*) in 1998 (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). The courses were made mandatory for new immigrants and those with a temporary residence permit.

The next shift in the integration policy occurred around the year 2000. As mentioned in Chapter 3, several authors claimed, notwithstanding the fact that during the 1990s the socio-economic position of immigrants had improved substantially (Penninx 2005: 42, footnote 7; Ham & Van der Meer 2012: 14), that the integration of immigrants had failed.[10] These authors not only warned that social cohesion was threatened because the norms and values of Muslim immigrants in particular appeared incompatible with Dutch culture. They also argued that immigrants' and their descendants' knowledge of Dutch society and language was inadequate, and this linguistic disadvantage impeded their integration. In 2001 the politician Pim Fortuyn married the ideas about the failure of integration and fears of the threat of Islam together in one political discourse. Weighing up the situation, Penninx argues that other political parties appropriated important parts of this discourse, and that this inevitably influenced integration policies (2005: 43). Integration and immigration became political priorities, especially after the elections of 2002, a shift which was reflected in the attention political parties devoted to the topic in their political programmes.[11]

Under these circumstances, the Dutch Parliament decided that the best move would be to investigate the effects of the integration policies and a parliamentary research committee known as the Blok Commission (chaired by Stef Blok from the VVD, the right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) was established for this purpose. Despite the biased text of the parliamentary motion which led to this investigation, in which no bones were made about the effects of the policies being 'unsatisfactory' (Blok Commission 2004: 9), in its 2004 report the commission concluded that the integration of 'many immigrants has been fully or at least partially successful' (Blok Commission 2004: 105). This conclusion was

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[10] Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

[11] See, for example, *Verdeeld verleden, gedeelde toekomst* by the political party PvdA (2009).

supported by statistics which showed immigrants' progress in the fields of education and employment (cf. Gijsberts 2004: 38). Nevertheless, the Blok Commission was criticized for not focusing enough attention on the alleged problems caused by cultural and religious aspects of immigrant integration (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012: 277), and its conclusions were 'widely dismissed as naïve' (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007: 20).

These concerns about the socio-cultural aspects of immigrants' integration were reflected in the *Integration Policy New Style*, formulated by the Dutch government in 2003. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the stated goal of this policy was to promote 'common citizenship', a process which sensibly included the pragmatic step of learning the Dutch language and also the rather less tangible goal of abiding by 'basic Dutch norms' (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004: 8). The text of the policy document quite clearly makes plain that the government linked the goal of integration to national identity and social cohesion. Persistent cultural and religious differences were considered a possible hindrance to social cohesion and therefore an obstacle to integration. Moreover, the national integration policies developed since 2003, focusing on Dutch language tests and courses about Dutch society,[12] have increasingly served as instruments to regulate the admission of immigrants (Groenendijk 2011: 159; see also Chapter 3).

One overriding problem with this focus on cultural and religious aspects as obstacles to integration is that it can lead to the disregarding of individual differences within immigrant and native groups, masking them and causing the other obstacles to integration, including societal and institutional factors, to be underestimated (see the previous section).[13] Analysing Dutch policy debates about setting up a programme to promote the socio-economic integration of non-Western immigrant women, Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos show that these debates

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[12] As mentioned in Chapter 3, the most recent law is the *Wet inburgering* (Law on Civic Integration) passed 2006, implemented in 2007. In 2012 this law was slightly amended. The law applies to immigrants from outside the European Union and a group of residents who do not have Dutch citizenship. These immigrants can only obtain a residence permit after passing an exam consisting of tests to assess language skills and knowledge of Dutch society. Applicants in the Netherlands have to contact the municipality which works in conjunction with Regional Educational Centres (ROCs) which are qualified to run courses and set the requisite exams. Individuals outside the EU who want to migrate to the Netherlands have to pass a similar civic integration test at the Dutch embassy or consulate abroad (the *Wet inburgering buitenland* or Law on Civic Integration Abroad). Since 2013, applicants have to pay for the courses and exams themselves. Depending on their circumstances, applicants can apply for a loan to pay the tuition fees. In some cases, those who commenced their courses before 2013 can have their fees paid by the municipality. (See "Integration in the Netherlands", accessed July 25, 2013, http://en.inburgeren.nl.)

[13] However, the development of the policies and regulations to prevent and combat discrimination seem to be much less affected by this debate. See the next section.

'framed the social problems of these women to effectively reduce a diverse range of ethnic minority women into a narrowly defined group of Muslim women' (2013: 109). In short, the complexity of the integration process with all its possible individual, societal and institutional barriers was reduced to a problem of religious and cultural practices.

Around the same time as the introduction of the *Integration Policy New Style*, a discussion about residential segregation commenced in the city of Rotterdam. At its core was the problem of high concentrations of low-income residents as an obstacle to integration.[14] The city launched a trial which meant that people with a minimum income were prevented from renting houses in designated neighbourhoods, a clear example of what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call replacement policies (see above). In 2005, the Equal Treatment Commission ruled that such a policy was discriminatory, as it affected people from certain ethnic backgrounds disproportionately (CGB 2005a). Despite this ruling, Rotterdam persevered with its policy and in 2005 the national government implemented a law,[15] widely known as the Rotterdam law (*Rotterdamwet*), which allows all municipalities to implement similar policies under specific conditions.[16]

Despite this focus on replacement policies, Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) show that policy makers at the local level, who are confronted daily with a diversity of problems and structural barriers to integration, have continued to develop 'tailor-made projects' and to involve immigrant organizations in this process, because the national approach expressed in general policies 'often fails to substantiate' and is simply not up to scratch for tackling the variety of problems and barriers met in reality (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008: 352).[17]

The ongoing immigration debate and the widely voiced criticism of the idea of a multicultural society have been the two mainsprings in the continuous adjustment of principles and goals of integration policies developed by both the national and local governments. One recent adjustment can be found in the government policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011

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[14] Although segregation has been an important theme in Dutch housing policies for decades, until 2000 not many policies had been devised to combat segregation (Van Kempen et al. 2000).

[15] The *Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek*, of 22 December 2005.

[16] In a report published in 2007, SCP concluded that the effects of this law and similar policies on ethnic segregation in the Netherlands were either at worst unmapped or at the very most limited (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2007: 240-241).

[17] Many local initiatives have been focused on the social aspect of integration. In a report published in 2007, SCP counted almost 400 projects whose goal was to stimulate social contact between natives and immigrants. Some of these projects aimed to bring people together through shared interests, the goal of others was to familiarize people with each other's ethnic and cultural diversity (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2007: 252).

(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), which, unlike the *Integration Policy New Style* of 2003, explicitly criticizes the integration debate. In its 2011 policy document, the government argues that the debate has created the misconception that the integration of minorities has stagnated and stresses that progress is clearly indicated in the statistics.[18] However, in this document the government does recognize that there are large differences between and within minority groups and that, although there are positive developments, problems still remain. The problems discussed in the document include the over-representation of immigrants and their descendants in the statistics on crime, school drop-outs and unemployment in these groups, their perceptions of discrimination, views in society about the incompatibility of norms and values and distrust between native Dutch and immigrants.

Despite admitting the existence of these problems, the policy document stresses the principle that integration is not the responsibility of the government, but of the immigrants and their descendants themselves. The government also emphasizes that integration policies would no longer target specific groups, thereby reiterating the principles of the national integration policy introduced in 1994 (see above). Instead, the government has argued, the integration process will be encouraged by general policies in the fields of the labour market, education and housing. Any policy focus on specific ethnic groups was thought to be undesirable because it would, the government felt, emphasize the boundaries between groups, thereby creating unwanted separations between group members (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011). This last argument is typical of what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call 'replacement' strategies, in which a focus on ethnic categories is replaced by a focus on such socio-economic issues as school drop-outs and unemployment in general. The most recent government policy document on integration issued in 2013 contains similar principles, and explicitly adds that education plays an important role not only in instilling norms and values in children but also in teaching them how to deal with diversity in society (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).

In a nutshell, the principal message conveyed by this section is that the role of the Dutch government in the process of immigrant integration has undergone pronounced changes during the last few decades. In the 1980s the government developed specific integration policies devised to target ethnic minorities, but since the 1990s the national government has steadily abrogated its position, adopting the stance that, apart from the civic integration courses designed for new immigrants,

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[18] A similar argument can be found in a 2004 report by SCP, in which it was argued that the picture of integration would be much more optimistic if the steady rise in the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities were to be taken into account (Gijsberts 2004: 38).

general policies would suffice. These changes have introduced a politicization of the integration debate which is specifically directed towards the cultural adaptation of Muslim immigrants. The section below examines views about immigrant integration prevalent in society.

5.2.3   Views in society on immigrant integration

The discussion in the previous section has brought to light several themes in the debate on immigrant integration which raise questions about the views prevalent in society about this topic. Since 2000, these debates have become more heavily focused on the degree of the retention of the immigrants' home cultures as a perceived obstacle to integration. The government integration policies which targeted specific minority groups in the 1980s have been abandoned in favour of general policies to do with such issues as disadvantaged neighbourhoods and learning how to deal with diversity. Therefore, the investigation in this section will focus on views about the need for government policies on integration and views about the retention of their cultures by immigrants. However, as the most direct way in which native Dutch and immigrants are confronted with the integration process is their mutual social interaction, the frequency of, and views on, inter-ethnic social relations will also be explored.

5.2.3.1   Social contact and views on inter-ethnic relations

The analysis shows that more than one-third (36%) of the native Dutch never have any social contact with immigrants or their descendants in their free time, that 42% of them never interact socially with immigrants of non-Western origin and that 65% never interact socially with Muslims. A little more than half of the native Dutch who *did* report social contact with immigrants mentioned that they interacted with them frequently. The higher the educational level of respondents, the higher the frequency of their social contact with immigrants (β[19] = .21, p < .001).[20] Similar results were found by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012: 63).

On the other hand, almost all the immigrants and their descendants in the sample indicate that they interact socially with natives in their free time. This finding differs from the results obtained by Huijnk and Dagevos, who reported that between 14% and 32% of the non-Western immigrants in their sample never interacted socially with native Dutch (2012: 53). Huijnk & Dagevos also found that the number of natives who never interacted socially with immigrants was

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[19] Unless otherwise stated, the βs mentioned in this study are standardized.
[20] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income significantly predict the frequency of social contact.

higher than the number of immigrants who never interacted socially with natives. Considering the results presented by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) and Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 228-231), the frequency of social interactions between immigrants and natives appears to have remained mostly stable since 1994.

Views on inter-ethnic relations have been measured by other scholars as 'social distance' (Bogardus 1925; Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 47). To measure this social distance, the questionnaire included items to do with the acceptance of a Dutch person with another ethnic background as a neighbour, colleague, boss, future son-in-law or future daughter-in-law, and an item about children with another ethnic background as the classmates of one's own children. Later in this section, a distance scale will be constructed to explore relationships between these views and other personal variables but the first step is to discuss views about the inter-ethnic relations themselves.

The percentages of native Dutch who either approve or disapprove of the types of inter-ethnic relations adduced are presented in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1[21]

Approval and disapproval by native Dutch in percentages.

Person with another ethnic background as	Approved	Disapproved	Don't know	Total
A classmate of own children	83	13	4	100
A colleague	83	14	3	100
A neighbour	75	21	4	100
Own boss	70	26	4	100
Daughter-in-law	54	39	7	100
Son-in-law	51	41	8	100

Note. n = 468 (sub-sample of native Dutch, see Chapter 2).

The conclusion has to be that the majority of the native Dutch approve of inter-ethnic contact. In this context, expatiating on this they referred to equality, mutual respect and mutual understanding. A sample of some respondents' quotes are 'we are all humans and we are all equal', 'background does not matter, as long as there is mutual respect' and 'as long as they behave according to the law'. Talking about

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[21] The questionnaire contains 5 categories for these items, including 'don't know'. Three of those categories measured disapproval: 'unpleasant', 'very unpleasant' and 'I would resist'. Most disapproving respondents scored in the first two categories. The three categories have been merged into the category 'disapproved' for presentation in this table.

mutual understanding, it was stated that inter-ethnic relationships are not a problem 'as long as they speak Dutch', and 'as long as you understand each other's habits'.

However, as is clear from Table 5.1, views on inter-ethnic relations differ with respect to the intimacy of the relationship type presented. Natives are clearly less tolerant of having a future daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic background than of other inter-ethnic relations. Those who disapproved of inter-ethnic relations mentioned the incompatibility of norms and values, and more specifically their fear of extremist Muslims. The percentages are similar to those discussed by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 264-266), and, given the development discussed by these authors, appear to indicate that the views of Dutch natives on inter-ethnic relations have become somewhat more positive in the last few years.

Compared to the natives, immigrants and their descendants, of both Western and of non-Western origin, are much less negative about such inter-ethnic relations. Around 24, as opposed to around 40% of the natives (see Table 5.1 above), disapprove of a future daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic background. Less than 10% disapprove of the other inter-ethnic relations mentioned.

In order to investigate the statistical relationships between views on inter-ethnic relations and other variables, the items discussed above have been used to construct a social distance scale (cf. Bogardus 1925; Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 47). For each respondent, this scale indicates the average degree of approval of the types of inter-ethnic relations presented.[22] The scale varies from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates the smallest social distance, corresponding to most approval for inter-ethnic relations, and 3 indicates the largest social distance, indicating the most disapproval.[23] As might be expected from what has just been said, the native Dutch indicate a larger average social distance with immigrants and their descendants, with a score of 1.34 (SD = 0.49) on the scale, than the reverse, with the immigrants and their descendants scoring an average of 1.16 (SD = 0.33).

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[22] The eigenvalues and scree-plot of a CATPCA analysis (see Chapter 2) of the items indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 59%, total VAF was 68.98%.

[23] As mentioned in the footnote of Table 5.1, each item originally contained 5 categories, including 'don't know'. In the construction of the social distance scale, the category 'don't know' has been coded as missing, and the two categories indicating most disapproval were merged. The score for each respondent on the social distance scale was established by calculating the means of all six items. Another way would have been to calculate factor scores from a factor analysis of these items. However, a comparison between these methods did not result in different outcomes for the analyses in this study. Cronbach's Alpha of the items: .87.

To explore the relationships between social distance and such other variables as the frequency of social (inter-ethnic) contact, gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.[24] This analysis indicates that, among the native Dutch, social distance is related to social contact, educational level and political preference.[25] This can be seen in the 'joint plot of category points' below, in which the relationships between the categories are displayed. The strength of these relationships is indicated by the distance between the categories in the plot: : the smaller the distance, the stronger the relationship.

As the ellipses in this plot indicate, three clusters of categories can be distinguished. In each cluster the categories are scattered around one of the social distance categories: 'Large', 'Medium' and 'Minimal'. Obviously these categories are related to the social contact categories, respectively 'Never', 'Moderate' and 'Often'.

The respondents in the first cluster, on the left in the plot, can be characterized as *intolerant* of other ethnic groups. They indicate a large social distance, implying a relatively disapproving view of inter-ethnic relations, rarely or never have social contact with members of ethnic minorities, have a relatively low average educational level and many of them voted for the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom). Not included in this cluster are the categories representing non-voters and voters who support the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) and the SP (left-wing Socialist Party), because these categories are much closer to the other social distance categories ('Medium' and 'Minimal') than the category representing the PVV voters.

The respondents in the second cluster, at the top in the plot, can be characterized as being *moderately tolerant* of other ethnic groups. They indicate a medium social distance, have moderate social contact with members of ethnic minorities and generally voted for the CDA (right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal) or the VVD. Their average educational level is medium to high. The category representing voters for the left-wing Green Left party is not included in this cluster, because this category is much closer to the social distance category 'Minimal'.

Finally, respondents in the third cluster, lower and to the right in the plot, can be characterized as *tolerant* of other ethnic groups, as they seem to acknowledge diversity fully. They indicate a minimal social distance and have relatively frequent social contact with ethnic minority members, and voted for PvdA (left-wing

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[24] See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA.
[25] No relationships between social distance and other factors was found for the immigrants and their descendants, clearly because most immigrants in our sample have a minimal social distance from native Dutch.

Labour Party) or D66 (left-wing liberal Democrats 66). Their average educational level is between medium and high.


Figure 5.1: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of social distance and other factors for native Dutch (n=468). (Variable principal normalization.)

This analysis reveals that, among native Dutch respondents, social distance is related to the frequency of their inter-ethnic social contact, educational level and political preference. These conclusions can also be drawn from Categorical Regression analyses.[26] Those who had more frequent contact with ethnic minority

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[26] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income significantly predict social distance.

members indicated a smaller social distance, implying more positive views on inter-ethnic relations (β = -.33, p < .001). This relationship between social contact and social distance is in line with Allport's contact hypothesis which states that 'under appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members' (1954). At the same time, the lower the educational level of native Dutch, the larger their social distance, implying relatively disapproving views of inter-ethnic relations (β = -.16, p < .01). Finally, a moderate relationship between social distance and political preference can be observed (β = .23, p < .005) for the native Dutch. Most voters on the left of the political spectrum (D66, PvdA, Green Left) indicate a lower social distance than those on the right (PVV, SGP). The voters for the parties on the right of the political spectrum (CDA and VVD) indicate a medium social distance, and voters for the SP are divided.

5.2.3.2 Views on retention of immigrants' cultures

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, ideas current in society on the question of the integration of immigrants will also be investigated by examining views on the retention of immigrants' cultures. The reason for this is that since 2000 the integration debates have been increasingly concerned with cultural retention by immigrants as a perceived obstacle to integration. To examine views on retention of immigrants' cultures, the two questionnaires used in the present study included items on the desirability of immigrants' cultural retention in the public and the private spheres. Later in this section, relationships between these views and other variables will be explored. First of all, the views on cultural retention themselves will be discussed.

The analysis shows that around two-thirds of the native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin (69%), as opposed to a minority of the non-Western immigrants (23%) and an even smaller minority of the Muslim immigrants (9%), disapprove of immigrants' cultural retention in the public sphere. These findings are similar to those found by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 262). Results presented by these authors indicate that the opposition to cultural retention in the public sphere has increased since the changes in the political and public debate on the multicultural society in 2000 (see section 5.2.2), from 57% of the total population (16 years of age and older) in 1994 to almost two-thirds in 2006. At the same time, the analysis indicates that less than a third of the natives and very small minorities of the other groups disapprove of cultural retention in the private sphere.

Respondents who disapprove of cultural retention in the public sphere perceived some aspects of immigrants' cultures either as outright obstacles to integration or as not compatible with Dutch culture. In explicating their ideas on

the former, both native Dutch and immigrants referred to a lack of language skills, the wearing of a burqa and discrimination as a consequence of not adapting sufficiently to Dutch culture. Objections to the burqa concentrated on the fact it is important to see someone's face in order to be able to communicate. Explaining their ideas about discrimination, respondents said that they personally did not have any problem with immigrants' cultures, but that immigrants, unfortunately, have to adapt to avoid discrimination in society.

Turning to the perceived incompatibility of some aspects of immigrants' cultures to Dutch culture, both natives and non-Muslim immigrants mentioned that certain aspects of Islamic culture, such as the burqa, the headscarf and mosques did not fit into Dutch society (see Chapter 6 for a more extensive discussion of the recognition of religious practices). Talking about this topic, some natives stressed the importance of maintaining the Christian identity of the Netherlands. Finally, some respondents of immigrant origin said that you simply have to adapt to local norms and values when you want to settle in a new society.

Those who approve of cultural retention by immigrants were either indifferent and referred to the importance of respect for the law, mentioning that, 'It's OK as long as you play by the rules', or were positive, and stressed the value of diversity because it 'colours society' and 'you can learn from people with different cultures and ideas'.

To explore relationships between views on cultural retention and such other variables as gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out.[27] The variables frequency of social inter-ethnic contact and social distance (see previous section) were included in this analysis. The analysis indicates that views on cultural retention are related to social distance, social contact, educational level and political preference. In these relationships, the higher the level of education and the smaller the social distance, the stronger the approval of immigrants' cultural retention in the public sphere (β = .22, p <.001 and β = -.40, p <.001 respectively). The frequency of social inter-ethnic contact was only slightly positively related to this approval (β = .14, p <.01). Similar relationships were found with regard to approval of immigrants' cultural retention in the private sphere. These relationships might also be explained by the contact hypothesis. Less social distance and more social contact could lead to more tolerant views of cultural distinctiveness, although the direction of the causality could not be established in this study.

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[27] This analysis included the variables descent, age, gender, educational level, income, political preference, social contact and social distance.

Politically, those who approve of cultural retention in the public sphere generally voted for parties on the left of the political spectrum, PvdA, D66 and Green Left. Voters for the VVD, CDA, SP and the non-voters are divided on the issue, and voters for the PVV and SGP generally disapprove of cultural retention in the public sphere (β = .29, p <.001). The relationship between political preference and views on cultural retention in the private sphere is slightly different. Those who disapprove of this retention generally voted for the PVV and SGP, while those who approve, voted for other parties (β = .24, p <.001).

5.2.3.3   Views on the need for national integration policies

As pointed out in the previous section, national integration policies have undergone pronounced changes. The integration policies targeted at specific minority groups in the 1980s have been abandoned in favour of general policies devised to deal with such issues as disadvantaged neighbourhoods and helping people learn how to deal with diversity. Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, views current in society on the integration of immigrants will also be explored by examining what people think about the need for government policies to deal with this matter.

To examine these views, the two questionnaires used for the present study included items on the need for national policies to ensure the proper functioning of the multicultural society. and they also contained items on the desirability of such specific policies as teaching pupils in schools to deal with diversity in society, the importance of which was stressed in the most recent government policy document on integration (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).[28] Later in this section, relationships between these views and other factors will be explored. First of all, it is important to take a look at the views themselves.

The great majority of all respondents (more than 84%) consider ethnic and cultural diversity important and support the idea that pupils should learn how to deal with cultural diversity in society in school. Proponents explained that this sort of education is an important way to prevent the growth of prejudice and discrimination against various groups. One respondent said that, 'To prevent conflict later, it is important to encourage tolerance in children'. Another said that, 'You have to begin early, because it is difficult to unlearn prejudice later in life'. In a similar vein, one respondent argued that, 'Children still have few prejudices, and you have to help them to keep it that way'.

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[28] Note, however, that the questionnaires for the present study were developed before this policy document was published.

Opponents of diversity education are either those who hold the opinion that education about how to deal with diversity does not work or those who believe that schools should not interfere in these matters. Supporters of the former opinion argued that it is more important that both the government and educational institutions promote cultural heterogeneity and combat segregation in neighbourhoods and schools, because children will only be able to learn how to deal with diversity in a culturally diverse environment.[29] Whereas one argument put forward to support the second opinion was that children should be allowed to form their own ideas about how to deal with diversity. 'If children do not want to accept certain others, that's is up to them', one respondent said.

Turning to the need for national policies to be put in place if a multicultural society is to function properly, more than two-thirds of all respondents are of the opinion that such policies should be developed.[30] Their arguments hinge on removing obstacles to integration, promoting tolerance of cultural diversity, preventing a baleful influence of Islam and preventing the abuse of welfare subsidies. When thinking about how to deal with obstacles to integration, respondents mentioned that the government should take the initiative to create the essential preconditions for it and remove barriers to participation, for example, by providing courses on Dutch language and culture. Besides envisaging this role for the government, it was also suggested that an anti-discrimination policy be devised as discrimination is considered to be a real obstacle to participation. Talking about stimulating tolerance of cultural diversity, respondents, especially those with a Muslim background, mentioned that, if a better mutual understanding is to take root, Dutch citizens need to acquire more knowledge about the cultural and religious norms and values of various immigrant groups. Another take on this issue was provided by some non-Muslim respondents who argued that the government has to formulate measures to avoid 'the Islamization' of society and by so doing anticipate the problems this putative process might create. Finally, proponents of government policies stated that proper measures have to be taken to prevent immigrants and their descendants abusing welfare subsidies.

Interestingly, in response to the general issue of policies which would facilitate the proper functioning of the multicultural society, for which no specific directions were suggested, not one person mentioned that policies should be implemented to reduce the substantive disadvantages experienced by (certain) minorities in the labour market.

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[29] This opinion has been substantiated by research conducted by Geel & Vedder (2011).
[30] This opinion was shared by 69% of native Dutch, 72% of immigrants of non-Western origin and 81% of immigrants of Western origin.

The small number of respondents who oppose national policies to facilitate the proper functioning of the multicultural society (around 10% of all groups[31]) expressed the opinion that these sort of policies can lead to unequal treatment. These respondents clearly interpreted 'Policies for the proper functioning of the multicultural society' to be those targeted at specific groups. Whereas some of the opponents did not explicitly mention discrimination, stating instead that the government should not implement policies targeted at specific groups, others said that they felt discriminated against by such policies. As one respondent said: 'The government is already doing too much for immigrants, they are neglecting and discriminating against the real Dutch'.

To explore the statistical relationships between these views and such other variables as social distance and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out.[32] This analysis shows that the lower a respondent's social distance to other frequent groups, the stronger their support for policies to encourage the functioning of the multicultural society and educating pupils in schools how to deal with specifically with ethnic and cultural diversity (β = .32, p <.001 and β = .35, p <.001 respectively). Examining their political preference, most opponents of national policies to encourage the proper functioning of the multicultural society are among those who voted for the VVD (19% opposed), the PVV (15%) or were among the non-voters (13%). Among those who voted for other parties, the percentage of opponents of these policies is much lower (around 6%). As explained above, opponents of such policies objected to the fact that the policies are targeted at specific groups. Nevertheless, it might seem surprising that the percentage of PVV voters who oppose such policies is only 15%. However, PVV voters figured largely among the proponents of the view that national policies should be developed to oblige immigrants to learn the Dutch language, norms and values, and should also be extended to prevent 'Islamization' and the abuse of welfare subsidies.

The analysis in this and the previous section show that discrimination is considered an obstacle to the participation of immigrants and their descendants, and that it is also an unwanted side-effect of integration policies. The latter argument will be discussed in more detail in the section on positive action (5.4). In the next section, views on discrimination and policies to combat and prevent this social phenomenon will be explored.

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[31] Around 20% of the respondents did not have an opinion on this issue, more than two-thirds supported such policies, as explained above.

[32] This analysis included the variables descent, age, gender, educational level, income, political preference, social contact and social distance.

5.3 Prejudice and discrimination

As explained at the beginning of this chapter, discrimination implies differential treatment and is therefore the opposite of equal treatment. Basically it limits the opportunities open to individuals and groups. Discrimination of individuals or groups can be motivated by prejudice (Bodenhausen & Richeson 2010; Fiske 2002), which has been defined by Allport as 'an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a group member' (1954: 9).

In response to the debates about immigrant integration ever since the 1980s, policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands for the specific purpose of preventing and combating prejudice, racism and discrimination, the sought-after goals being both the formal equality and the equality of opportunity for citizens of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. It is important to stress that, whereas discrimination and prejudice refer to behaviour and attitudes respectively, the concept of racism relates to an ideology which can be used to justify existing inequality (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 319), hierarchical classification of groups and discrimination on the basis of racial, ethnic or cultural criteria. Statements such as 'minorities should leave the country, because the Netherlands is full' and 'keep the Netherlands white and clean' are expressions of racist views (Shadid 2007: 210).

As part of the exploration of whether and how aspects of equality are formally and publicly recognized and accepted in the Netherlands, in this section Dutch measures to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination will be discussed and the views about these topics prevalent in society will be examined. Before commencing this operation, it is necessary to shed some light on the scientific use of the concept of discrimination, and a brief discussion of the main results of the current scientific research will be presented.

5.3.1 Perspectives on prejudice and discrimination

Discrimination has been extensively studied in a wide range of scientific disciplines, including social psychology, social and cultural anthropology, law, economics and medical sciences (e.g. Bodenhausen & Richeson 2010; Crengle, Robinson, Ameratunga, Clark & Raphael 2012; Havinga 2002; Loenen & Rodrigues 1999; Pager & Shepherd 2008; Visweswaran 1998). Research has also been instigated by or on behalf of policy makers and organizations for human rights at both national and international levels (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2008; McCrudden & Prechal 2009; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010). In these studies, the concept of discrimination is used first and foremost to refer to behaviour, actions,

policies and structures which in a specific context might result in a relative disadvantage for members of groups whose group characteristics are irrelevant in that context. Examples of this are when public education benefits men more than women, women are discriminated against when gender is considered to be irrelevant to this differential treatment. Conversely, when a dark-skinned actor is preferred to a light-skinned actor to play the role of Nelson Mandela in a film, this is usually not considered discrimination because skin colour is relevant in this context.

It is important to take cognizance of the fact that discrimination is used as a legal and as an empirical concept. In a juridical sense, discrimination can be defined as a prohibited form of unequal treatment that results or can result in disadvantage for the discriminated groups (cf. Terlouw 2010: 8-10). Legal discussions focus on which forms of unequal treatment are or should be prohibited. Depending on international and national legislation, exceptions can be made to the principle of equal treatment. Examples are the above-mentioned selection procedure for the role of Nelson Mandela, the prohibition of certain religious manifestations in institutions for denominational education in the Netherlands (discussed in Chapter 6, also see Section 5.3.2), and positive action (see Section 5.4).[33] In contrast, studies in which discrimination is used as an empirical concept generally focus on its effects and its causes, and also include the role of prejudice and racism (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Pager & Shepherd 2008).

A useful definition of discrimination is that in the Dutch Penal Code. This definition stipulates that discrimination 'is to be taken to mean any form of differentiation, any act of exclusion, restriction or preference, that intends or may result in the destruction or infringement of the recognition, enjoyment or equal exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the field of politics or economics, in social or cultural matters or any other area of social life'.[34] This definition is useful because it focuses on behaviour which might result in inequality, but does not presume underlying causes for this behaviour (cf. Pager & Shepherd 2008: 182).

Therefore, this definition covers intentional, unintentional, conscious and unconscious forms of discrimination. As it so happens, direct and indirect discrimination are distinguished in both empirical studies and anti-discrimination legislation of various countries including the Netherlands (cf. McCrudden &

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[33] There are also other possible exceptions. For an overview of exceptions in the Netherlands, see *Gelijkebehandelingswetgeving* (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.mensenrechten.nl/gelijkebehandelingswetgeving.

[34] Article 90quater, Dutch Penal Code. Translation of the provisions of the Dutch Penal Code by Rayar & Wadsworth (1997).

Prechal 2009). Direct discrimination refers to acts or policies with the apparent intent to exclude members of specific groups, whereas indirect discrimination can be both intentional and unintentional, and refers to acts, policies or structures which are not directly aimed at specific groups but nevertheless result in disadvantages for members of specific groups.[35] For example, the practice of recruiting new employees by an organization primarily through informal social networks, also known as nepotism, is a form of indirect discrimination when immigrants and their descendants do not have equal access to these networks (Nilsson & Wrench 2009: 38). Nepotism in this example is also referred to as institutional discrimination. Institutional discrimination, sometimes called structural discrimination,[36] can be direct as well as indirect, and refers to acts, policies, ideologies or structures of institutions which disadvantage specific groups (Bovenkerk 1986: 36, 53-54; also see Pager & Shepherd 2008; Shadid 2007: 309-310).

Empirical studies on discrimination and inequality indicate that discrimination is not a social phenomenon which can be consigned to the past. Discrimination is prevalent and persistent, even in such countries as the United States (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; Pager & Shepherd 2008) and the Netherlands (cf. Andriessen, Nievers & Dagevos 2012; Havinga 2002; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010) where there is strong support for the principle of formal equality. In a concise overview, Bobo and Fox (2003: 323) address the causes for the prevalence and persistence of discrimination (also see Pager & Shepherd 2008: 186-200) and the reluctance of members of majority groups to support certain measures, such as positive action which could pave the way for equality. They distinguish three sets of theories which address these issues.

The first set of theories is based on social psychological research which indicates that discriminatory behaviour is not confined to individuals with an explicit racist ideology. These studies suggest that unequal treatment in general is an inevitable consequence of negative stereotypes, prejudice or social categorization. As explained in more detail in Chapter 3, there is convincing evidence that all people categorize themselves and others into social categories and ascribe general characteristics to these categories. A negative consequence of this process is that people tend to overestimate the differences between social categories and, simultaneously, underestimate the differences between individuals within

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[35] The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination should not be confused with the distinction between conscious and unconscious discrimination. Both direct and indirect discrimination can be conscious or unconscious. Intentions and aims can be unconscious and the act of direct discrimination can result from unconscious prejudices (Wax 2008).
[36] See Pager & Shepherd (2008: 197) for a discussion.

their own social category, or, to use a social psychological term, their in-group. This leads to bias which implies, 'reacting to a person on the basis of perceived membership in a single human category, ignoring other category memberships and other personal attributes' and can be described as, 'a narrow, potentially erroneous reaction, compared with individuated impressions formed from personal details' (Fiske 2002: 123). Biases underlie stereotypes, prejudice, ethnocentrism (cf. Shadid 2007: 209), discrimination and unequal treatment in general.

The second set of theories distinguished by Bobo and Fox explains discrimination as a consequence of 'competing group interests' (2003: 323). These theories postulate that bias originates when people perceive a threat to their in-group. This threat might be thought to be to 'real or symbolic resources and privileges' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323). It can emerge when in the perception of natives their jobs are being taken by immigrants, or that traditional values are threatened (Fiske 2002: 127). Moreover, dominant groups among whose members these biases originate, 'develop and propagate ideologies that maintain and even legitimize their higher social status' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323), such as racism and sexism.

The third set of theories discussed by Bobo and Fox explains opposition to equality policies among members of majority groups as being rooted in 'race-neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism' (2003: 323). An example is the rejection of positive action measures on the basis of the argument that such measures constitute reverse discrimination. Bobo and Fox argue that such arguments can indeed play a role, but point out that many studies show that opposition to equality policies is usually linked to stereotypes and prejudice. Moreover, it appears to be difficult to reduce prejudice and stereotyping. Bodenhausen and Richeson postulate that adopting the perspective of a member of a disadvantaged group seems to be the best way to reduce bias (2010: 357). The stumbling block to any such move is that, in a real, functioning society, this requires constructive intergroup contact, which, Fiske (2002: 127) states must feature 'equal status within the immediate setting' and co-operation in the pursuit of shared goals. As a consequence, inequalities between groups limit such constructive intergroup contacts and, as research by Brezina and Winder (2003) shows, can even reinforce the negative stereotypes of the group with the lower socio-economic status. In turn, these negative stereotypes can partly explain opposition to equality policies, even among 'egalitarian-minded' majority members (Brezina & Winder 2003: 407).

Related causes for the prevalence and persistence of discrimination are the accumulation of its effects (Pager & Shepherd 2008: 199), and the fact that it is maintained by 'feedback effects' between social domains (Reskin 2012: 31). This

means that a disadvantage in one social domain, for example, the level of prosperity of the neighbourhood one lives in, leads to relative disadvantages in other domains, such as education, which in its turn leads to a lower level of income. As an example, Pager and Shepherd discuss how a disproportionately high number of minority students in the United States attend public schools in 'high poverty neighbourhoods'. Compared to schools in richer neighbourhoods, these schools have fewer resources, provide a lower quality of education and have to deal with more social problems, the upshot being the greater the disadvantages confronting the minority students, a clear example of institutional discrimination (2008: 198). Relative disadvantages as a result of discrimination can also accumulate because, as explained above, negative stereotypes of a certain group can be reinforced by this group's lower socio-economic status. For example, the relatively high unemployment rates in a specific group can lead to the stereotype that it members are unwilling to work. Discrimination occurs when, on the basis of this stereotype, an employer refrains from employing members of this group – a phenomenon which is called statistical discrimination. This implies a self-fulfilling prophecy and an accumulation of disadvantage.

Although these theories explain discrimination and opposition to the implementation of equality policies in different ways, empirical research underlying these theories has definitely shown that prejudice plays an important role, and that discrimination is prevalent and persistent, partly because of its cumulative effects. In the next section, Dutch national policies and regulations to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination will be reviewed.

5.3.2   Prejudice and discrimination in the Netherlands: policies and debates

In the past few decades, policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination on various grounds, such as gender, ethnic origin and disability. In this section, the development of and debates on the desirability and effectiveness of relevant measures regarding ethnic minorities will be discussed.

In 1971, the Dutch Penal Code was adapted to include specific provisions against racial discrimination.[37] These changes followed Dutch acceptance of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), a United Nations convention which came into force in 1969 (Rodrigues 1997). The next significant changes in the Dutch anti-discrimination legislation to do with ethnic minorities occurred in the 1980s when the Constitution was amended in 1983 to include the prohibition of

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[37] Where the concept of race refers to skin colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin (Neut 1986).

discrimination in Article 1, which since then reads: 'All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.'[38] The principles laid down in this article were elaborated in more detail in the Equal Treatment Act (ETA)[39] of 1994, which explicitly prohibits both direct and indirect forms of discrimination.[40] This act also provided for the establishment of the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC), an independent semi-judiciary body tasked with, *inter alia*, investigating complaints about discrimination and handing down opinions on individual cases (Goldschmidt & Gonçalves-Ho Kang You 1997).[41]

Notwithstanding these legal developments, national and local governments and organizations in various sectors have recognized that legislation on its own is not enough to prevent and combat discrimination.[42] Therefore, since 1987 codes of conduct in organizations have been established in various sectors, including employment agencies, the insurance sector, labour unions and the national government.[43] The goal of these codes goes beyond providing clear social norms and well-defined complaint procedures, they have also been devised to raise awareness of and support for anti-discrimination measures. Furthermore, since the late 1990s the government has commissioned various researchers, anti-discrimination organizations and scientific institutes to monitor discrimination in the Netherlands. A prominent example is the *Monitor racisme & extremisme*, originally started by Jaap van Donselaar (see Donselaar 1997; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010: 251).[44] Additionally, in the context of the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), held in 2001, the Dutch government developed a National Action Plan against Racism, which includes initiatives undertaken by the national government itself, as well as municipalities, NGOs and schools.[45] These initiatives consist of awareness campaigns, and plans to improve the national monitoring of discrimination and the functioning of local anti-discrimination

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[38] For the text of the Dutch Constitution see *Nederlandse Grondwet* (in Dutch), accessed January 18, 2013, www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl.

[39] In Dutch: *Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling* (AWGB).

[40] The ETA explicitly prohibits discrimination in the fields of employment, education, the supply of goods and services, including healthcare and housing.

[41] ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012.

[42] See, for example, Blok Commission (2004: 233-239).

[43] See, for example, *Algemene Bond Uitzendbureaus* (1987) and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2001).

[44] See also Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar & Rodrigues (2010).

[45] *Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme* (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004b; Final report: Tweede Kamer 2006-2007).

bureaus which handle individual questions and complaints.[46] In 2010, the Law Municipal Anti-discrimination Facilities came into force. This law requires municipalities to provide their residents with access to a local complaints office.[47]

These policies and regulations have been developed with the backing of wide political support (Blok Commission 2004: 39, 234; cf. Pellikaan, Van der Meer & De Lange 2003). Only a few populist politicians, such as Fortuyn (also see Section 5.2.2) and the PVV leader Wilders, have advocated the abolition of Article 1 of the Constitution, because, they have argued, it limits freedom of speech. More specifically, their bone of contention is that the principle of equal treatment prevents them from criticizing Islam.[48, 49]

On account of the extent of the policies and regulations it has developed, the Netherlands has been called 'Europe's champion of anti-discrimination policy' (Joppke 2007: 260). Nevertheless, the Netherlands has been criticized, among other bodies by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (see ECRI 2008) which object to proposed government policies and discriminatory statements by politicians. The political parties PVV and SGP, for example, have called for a ban on the construction of mosques,[50] and in the context of the discussion about civic integration the government has proposed such discriminatory measures as the mandatory civic integration courses for immigrants who had already acquired Dutch citizenship (Groenendijk 2011: 164-165).

Criticism has also been expressed about the ineffectiveness of the existing anti-discrimination legislation, as research indicates that discrimination and inequality in the Netherlands are persistent. The unemployment rates of non-Western

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[46] These bureaus have been established since the 1980s, see Rodrigues (1997).

[47] The Law Municipal Anti-discrimination Facilities (*Wet Gemeentelijke Antidiscriminatie-voorzieningen* - WGA), implemented on January 28, 2010.

[48] De Volkskrant (February 9, 2002), *De islam is een achterlijke cultuur. Interview met Pim Fortuyn*; De Volkskrant (March 21, 2006), *Wilders wil artikel 1 uit Grondwet schrappen*.

[49] Another criticism regarding the contents of the anti-discrimination legislation concerns the legal exception to the principle of equal treatment for institutions for denominational education, on the basis of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution which guarantees freedom of education. This exception allows these institutions, in their application and admission procedures, to demand from teachers and pupils that they support the ideological or religious principles of the institution. Some critics point out that this makes the exclusion of homosexual teachers from these schools possible, which they find unacceptable. Others argue that Article 23 leads to educational segregation, which, according to them, hinders integration (also see Chapter 6). An overview (in Dutch) of these discussions can be found at *Vrijheid van Onderwijs* (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.vrijheidvanonderwijs.nl.

[50] See Shadid (2009: 14) for several references.

immigrants and their descendants remain disproportionately high,[51] which can at least partly be attributed to discrimination (Andriessen, Nievers & Dagevos 2012; Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). This suggests that the effects of the anti-discrimination legislation might be limited. Havinga (2002) argues that this is indeed the case. One reason for this ineffectiveness, Havinga says, is the limited knowledge of the law in society. In their ignorance, people do not know whether their own behaviour, for example in the context of selection procedures, contravenes the law. As has already been said, this lack of awareness could be partly remedied by the implementation of codes of conduct. However, research indicates that only a few organizations have implemented these codes of conduct, and often only partially.[52] In 2008, ECRI recommended the Dutch government improve the implementation of these codes of conduct, and also consider making human rights, including anti-discrimination, a compulsory subject in the curricula of primary and secondary schools (ECRI 2008).

Another reason for the ineffectualness of the anti-discrimination legislation is sought in the fact that the enforcement of this legislation depends principally on the individuals who feel discriminated against. If the regulations are to be effective, these individuals have to take action, for example, by lodging a complaint. Havinga, referring to Macaulay (1979) and Griffiths (1999), calls this the 'individual rights strategy' (2002: 82; also see Crosby & Ropp 2002). One problem with this strategy is that victims of discrimination are sometimes reluctant to step forward and lodge a complaint for fear of escalation or retaliation (Bochhah 2006; Sechrist, Swim & Stangor 2004). Research also shows that some individuals do not recognize or do not want to admit that they are being discriminated against (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton & Downing 2003), or, instead of lodging a complaint, they adapt their behaviour to avoid further discrimination (Nievers 2007).

Some of these causes have been addressed by the Racial Equality Directive issued by the European Union (EU) which came into force in 2000.[53] In 2004, the Dutch Equal Treatment Act was amended to implement this directive. These changes allowed the sharing of the burden of proof: provided that the plaintiff has established facts supporting the presumption of discrimination, a judge can decide to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Moreover, the changes include better

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[51] For example, in February 2014 the employment rates of non-Western immigrants and their descendants was 18.6%, as opposed to 6.7% among native Dutch. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl.

[52] See Bochhah (2002); Masselman (1998); Meloen (1991).

[53] EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC, accessed August 9, 2013, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l33114_en.htm.

protection for those who lodge a discrimination complaint, entailing the stipulation that the defendant is explicitly prohibited to victimize the plaintiff.[54] In another move, since 2009 organizations are required by law to implement such policies as complaints procedures, to protect their employees from discrimination.[55]

Another, more general limitation of the individual rights strategy is that it only indirectly addresses institutional discrimination. For individuals it can be difficult, or indeed impossible, to detect institutional discrimination, for example, during a job selection procedure (Boog, Coenders & Kik 2007). A ruling in an individual case can lead to a change in institutional practices, but these practices are not often directly scrutinized or legally challenged (Boog & Houtzager 2007; cf. Böcker & Havinga 2000). To address this problem, in 2006 and 2007, the municipality of Nijmegen experimented with anonymous job applications, on the premise that this would reduce the number of rejections on the basis of ethnic background in the phase prior to face-to-face job interviews. Although it was impossible to establish whether these experiments had any effect, it was assumed that they did lead to an increased awareness of possible discrimination in selection procedures (Gemeente Nijmegen 2008). Another way to address these limitations of the individual rights strategy is the legal possibility for advocacy groups to file a complaint in the interest of others or in a collective interest such as upholding the non-discrimination principle. Advocacy groups in the Netherlands make use of this instrument, but on a relatively small scale (for an extensive discussion see Rodrigues 2011).

Finally, the effects of the current anti-discrimination legislation are limited by the stumbling block that inequality itself can cause and maintain discrimination. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the lower socio-economic status of a certain group can reinforce negative stereotypes of this group, which, in turn, can lead to discrimination of its members.

To address this effect of inequality and the problem of institutional discrimination, ECRI recommended the government to implement wider measures for positive action (2008; 2012). ECRI also recommended the maximum penalties in the Penal Code provisions against racial discrimination should be increased, racist motivations for an offence as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing be established and to disqualify employers who are found guilty of discrimination from tendering public contracts (ECRI 2008). Among the political parties in the

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[54] CGB (2005b).
[55] See "Discriminatie onderdeel Arbowet" (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2009/07/06/discriminatie-onderdeel-arbowet.html.

Netherlands, only the SP and Green Left called for similar measures in their 2012 programmes.[56]

In its most recent policy documents on discrimination, the Dutch government has recognized the persistence of discrimination and how important it is that the authorities, organizations and citizens in a concerted effort continue to be permanently involved in the struggle to prevent and combat discrimination (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2013). Furthermore, the limitations of the individual rights strategy have been implicitly recognized, by stressing the importance of the reporting of discrimination by victims. Various measures, including those to raise awareness, were announced to encourage the willingness of victims to lodge a complaint. However, in these policy documents the government has still failed to address the problem caused by the fact that the individual rights strategy is also limited by institutional discrimination and by inequality itself.

This discussion clearly shows that, although the Netherlands is praised for its anti-discrimination measures, discrimination and inequality are persistent in Dutch society and the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination legislation is limited. In the next section, in order to investigate the public recognition of equality in the Netherlands, prejudice and support for anti-discrimination policies in society will be examined.

5.3.3   Prejudice and views on anti-discrimination policy in society

The discussion in Section 5.3.1 has brought to light the fact that even when a person supports the principle of formal equality, this does not have to imply that he or she also supports anti-discrimination policies in general. This phenomenon has been explained by three sets of theories (Bobo & Fox 2003), which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be motivated either by race-neutral values or by an existing bias towards other groups, directly influenced by social categorization or perception of group threat. Furthermore, Section 5.3.2 has revealed that the effects of the current anti-discrimination policies in the Netherlands appear to be limited. In this section, perceptions of group threat, the support for equal treatment and views on anti-discrimination policies in Dutch society will be explored.

To measure the support for the principle of equal treatment, the questionnaires included items on the desirability of teaching pupils in schools to treat people of various cultural backgrounds equally. A large majority (around 90%) of both Dutch natives and immigrants and their descendants is in favour of such

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[56] GroenLinks (2012); Socialistische Partij (2012).

education. Proponents argued that this is important because the older a person the more difficult it is to combat prejudice. Although opponents of this sort of education supported the principle of equal treatment, they thought that children should learn this principle at home and not at school.

Those who do not support this principle appear to have a specific view on who can be fully included in their national group: they attach more importance to the in exclusive (ethnic) criteria of Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background (β = -.22, p < .001) discussed in Chapter 3.[57] The support for the principle of equal treatment also appears to be negatively related to educational level (β = -.14, p < .005). Furthermore, voters for the PVV and SGP are slightly less in favour of the equal treatment principle (β = .12, p < .001).

Nevertheless, as said, this strong support for equal treatment does not imply that respondents are not prejudiced towards other groups. More than a third (37%) of the native Dutch thinks that there are too many immigrants and their descendants living in the Netherlands, but a much lower 24% explicitly disagrees with this point of view. Among immigrants and their descendants of both Western and non-Western origin, 18% holds the opinion that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands. More than 40% do not support this view. These findings are similar to those presented by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259). According to these authors, the percentage of the Dutch population (16 years of age and older) that is of the opinion that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands has decreased, from around 50% in the 1990s and 53% in 2002 to 39% in 2008.

Both natives and immigrants who are of the opinion that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands adduced the argument that immigration generates such problems as segregation and a rise in the crime rate, as well as causing the country unacceptable economic costs. One respondent said, 'They profit from social security benefits and the healthcare system, and we pay for it. The Netherlands is too small.' On the other side of the fence, those who did not think there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands either argued that there is no problem as long as they participated and 'respect the rule of law', or else put forward the idea that the Netherlands is historically an immigration country. As

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[57] A Categorical Regression analysis was used to test whether age, gender, educational level, income or political preference significantly predict the support for the equal treatment principle. Categorical Regression analyses were also carried out to test whether this principle is related to the in Chapter 3 discussed types of national belonging. The latter analyses were controlled for descent, age, gender, educational level and income.

one respondent said, responding to the question of whether there are too many immigrants, 'Since when? Since the year 1500?'

These sorts of opinions are related to perceptions of group threat (see threat theory of discrimination in Section 5.3.1). This means that those who think there are too many immigrants agree with the opinion that immigrants take the jobs of the native Dutch (V = .56, p < .001). In this respect, however, the native Dutch are more concerned about labour migrants from Eastern Europe (55%) than about immigrants with Dutch nationality (36%). The perception of too many immigrants in the Netherlands is also related to the opinion that they present a threat to Dutch culture (V = .42, p < .001). Of the native Dutch, 44% feel that their culture is under threat. They were concerned that the immigrants' norms, especially those associated with Islam, and values might become too influential. 'It feels threatening, the way Muslims deal with women', one respondent said. A similar percentage (40%) was found in 2008 by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259-260). These authors found that this percentage is on the rise, from 18% in 1995 to 40% in 2008, with the strongest increase taking place in the period 2000-2005, when the political and public debate on the multicultural society peaked (see Section 5.2.2 and Chapter 6).

On the other hand, the native Dutch who do not feel that their culture is threatened (43%) referred to the Netherlands as an immigration country (also see above) and to the contribution of immigrants to Dutch culture, which 'has always been largely shaped by immigrants', as one respondent said.

To explore whether such prejudice is related to such other variables as gender, age, educational level, political preference, the frequency of social (inter-ethnic) contact, and social distance (see Section 5.2.3), a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.[58] This analysis included 6 items indicating such prejudice, including the items discussed above. The relationships can be seen in the following 'joint plot of category points' in which the relationships between categories are displayed. The closer the categories are to each other, the stronger their relationship.

[58] See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA.

Figure 5.2: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of prejudice and other factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal normalization.)

The ellipses in this plot indicate that three clusters can be distinguished. The categories in each cluster are scattered around the categories of the variables indicating prejudice: 'Agree', 'Impoverishment' and 'Negative effect', meaning that respondents were prejudiced, 'Disagree', 'Enrichment' and 'Positive effect',

meaning that they rejected prejudice, and 'Undecided', 'Neither' and 'No effect' meaning that they neither agreed nor disagreed with prejudice. As the six items measuring prejudice appear to be strongly correlated, these items were used to construct a summated scale describing the level of the prejudice that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat.[59] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to assess in more depth to what extent this prejudice is related to the above-mentioned variables.

This analysis and the plot indicate that respondents in the first cluster, on the top left of the plot, can be characterized as *unprejudiced*: they generally reject the idea that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat, indicate a 'Minimal' social distance, generally have a high level of education and voted for parties on the left of the political spectrum (D66, Green Left or PvdA). Respondents in the second cluster, on the top right of the plot, can be characterized as *prejudiced*: they clearly think that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat, indicate a 'Large' social distance to immigrants, rarely or never have social contact with them, are not highly educated and generally voted for the political parties PVV or SGP. The respondents in the third cluster, below in the plot, can be characterized as *ambivalent*: they could not decide whether to agree with or to reject this type of prejudice. Among them is a relatively large number of SP voters. Finally, voters for the VVD are divided with respect to this type of prejudice.

The Categorical Regression analysis shows that the lower respondents' educational level, the stronger their prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat ($\beta = -.33$, $p < .001$). The relationship between this prejudice and political preference is moderate ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, the relationships between this type of prejudice and social distance and the frequency of social inter-ethnic contact ($\beta = .60$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = -.25$, $p < .001$ respectively) are in line with the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954, also see Section 5.2.3). Unsurprisingly, this type of prejudice is negatively related to the support for the principle of equal treatment discussed above ($\beta = -.19$, $p < .001$).

It is also not surprising that the stronger this type of prejudice, the more importance respondents attach to the criteria for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3. The stronger the respondents' prejudice, the more exclusive the type of national belonging they consider to be important, which agrees with studies by Hjerm (1998), Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere and Boen (2010), and Wakefield et al. (2011). Hence, the level of this prejudice towards immigrant groups is most

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[59] The eigenvalues and scree-plot of a CATPCA analysis (see Chapter 2) of the items indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 48%, total VAF was 55.85%. Cronbach's Alpha of these six items is .89.

strongly related to the importance attached to the ethnic type of national belonging (β = .56, p < .001), and clearly less strongly to the exclusive legal citizenship (β = .40, p < .001), the territorial (β = .36, p < .001) and the civic types (β = .26, p < .001).[60] This relationship can be explained by social identity theory, as research indicates that those who are perceived by the majority to deviate from their own nominal group characteristics, are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005).[61]

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the importance attached to the most exclusive types of Dutch national belonging – ethnic and exclusive legal citizenship – is negatively related to educational level. These relationships between the levels of prejudice and education discussed above have been explained by Kunovich (2009: 585), who argues that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to exclusive criteria for national belonging because they perceive an economic threat from immigrants and their descendants (who generally share their low socio-economic status) (cf. Kaya & Karakoç 2012: 37). The finding that these respondents generally vote for the populist and anti-immigrant political parties PVV or SGP is also in line with the ideas of Fenton (2011) mentioned in Chapter 3.

This type of prejudice also appears to be slightly related to the affective component of national self-identification discussed in Chapter 3 (β = .15, p < .05), and more strongly related to some of the expressions of loyalty to the nation-state discussed in Chapter 4: national-political pride (β = .31, p < .001), uncritical patriotism (β = .27, p < .001), nationalist patriotism (β = .22, p < .001) and shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = -.29, p < .001). However, no significant relationships were found between this type of prejudice and the other expressions of loyalty described in Chapter 4: national-cultural pride, symbolic patriotism and the item which indicates constructive patriotism. This ties in with the study of Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) discussed in Section 4.2.2. In it they found that a positive evaluation of one's national in-group (expressed by loyalty) is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrant groups (expressed by prejudice) (see also Coenders 2001; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170).

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[60] Categorical Regression analyses were carried out to test whether this prejudice is related to the types of national belonging discussed in Chapter 3. In these analyses was controlled for descent, age, gender, educational level and income.

[61] As mentioned in Chapter 3, this relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of subtyping (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001).

Despite the fact that more than a third of the native Dutch harbours the prejudice that immigrants and their descendants present a cultural and economic threat, only 13% of them and a similar percentage of immigrants were of the opinion that national anti-discrimination policies are not needed, as is clear from Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2

Opinion about national anti-discrimination policies in percentage.

	Need improvement	Are sufficient	Not needed	Don't know	Total
Native Dutch	44	23	13	20	100
Non-Western Immigrants	62	15	11	12	100
Western immigrants	55	13	13	19	100
Total	47	21	13	19	100

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).

Some opponents of anti-discrimination policies, both native Dutch and immigrants, argued that these policies are not effective because it is impossible to 'cure' adults of prejudice and discrimination simply by putting such measures in place, and that the only way to prevent discrimination is to teach children about equal treatment at a very young age. It must also be pointed out, some native Dutch opponents thought that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated, arguing, for example, that 'it is the immigrants' own fault', because, as one respondent said, 'they want to be different from the Dutch'.

While a minority of respondents (19%) said they have no idea what these policies entail, the majority (68%) approved of anti-discrimination policies, and almost half (47%) was of the opinion that these policies should be improved. Some stated that the current policies are completely ineffectual, and that other measures, such as quota systems and preferential treatment should be introduced. Others mentioned that policies can only be effectual when the government and politicians set a good example, and said that politicians should stop making polarizing statements.

The percentage of non-Western immigrants who believed that these policies should be improved was relatively high (62%). A possible explanation is that they

have more experience of being discriminated against. Unlike the native Dutch, the immigrants referred to their personal experiences when explaining their view that the policies should be improved. Some referred to the difficulty in proving discrimination, and one respondent argued that individuals are powerless to combat discrimination.

To explore whether these views are statistically related to the type of prejudice and other variables discussed, for instance, social distance and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out. The table above already indicates that non-Western immigrants are more in favour of national anti-discrimination policies than are the native Dutch (β = .14, p < .005). Not surprisingly, opponents of such policies attach more importance to exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western name (β = -.23, p < .001), and exhibit a stronger prejudice that immigrants do pose a cultural and economic threat (β = -.37, p < .001). This is in line with the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1, which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be explained by an existing bias towards other groups caused by social categorization, namely, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging, or the perception of group threat (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Shadid 2007: 209). Finally, voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, SP and Green Left appear to be slightly more in favour of anti-discrimination policies (β = .22, p < .001).

In the next sections, views on the measures to take positive action and its relationships with prejudice will be analysed. But first of all, to provide some background the relevant literature, government policies and political debates concerning the topic of positive action will be passed in review.

5.4 Positive action

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, equal opportunities for individuals and groups in society not only require equal treatment, they must commence from equal starting conditions. A group's disadvantaged position limits the opportunities of its members. Policies, measures and regulations to overcome the effects of these limitations, or, in other words, to achieve substantive equality of opportunity for members of these groups, are referred to as measures for positive action (Bovenkerk 1986; Sabbagh 2011: 109; Waddington & Bell 2011: 1521).

In the Netherlands, positive action policies targeted at women, ethnic minorities and the disabled have been being developed since the 1970s. In the next section some light will be shed on the variety of forms of positive action and on the main results of relevant scientific research..

5.4.1 Perspectives on positive action

Measures for positive action have been introduced in various countries over the years, among them the United States, the United Kingdom (Bovenkerk 1986; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006), India, Malaysia, South Africa (Sabbagh 2011) and the Netherlands (Verbeek & Groeneveld 2010). Different terms are used to refer to such measures in these countries. Although the term positive action is common in Europe, in the United States the term affirmative action is generally used (Waddington & Bell 2011: 1507-1508).

In 1986, Bovenkerk published the results of an extensive comparative study of measures for positive action in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in which he distinguished various forms of such measures (1986: 21, 56). In his first step, Bovenkerk distinguishes between procedural and substantive measures. The aim of a procedural measure is to increase the opportunities of members of disadvantaged groups, for example, through such outreach efforts as advertising a vacancy in such a way that it reaches all groups in society, instead of exclusively using informal networks to recruit employees.[62] A substantive measure implies that explicit preference is given to members of disadvantaged groups, for example, in job selection procedures or by developing specific training programmes for members of these groups. A distinction can be made between the substantive measures which reduce the application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups, and the substantive measures in which this is not the case. The former type of measures is sometimes called positive discrimination. In the latter type, commonly labelled preferential treatment (Bovenkerk 1986: 22), preference is given to the member of a disadvantaged group, but only when his or her qualifications are at least equal to those of other qualified candidates.

Such procedural and substantive measures are referred to as direct measures when they are implemented by organizations to increase the opportunities of members of disadvantaged groups in these organizations. Indirect measures are those steps take to motivate or oblige other organizations to implement direct measures (Bovenkerk 1986; Verbeek & Penninx 2009: 69). Sometimes, governments might implement both indirect and direct measures to set an example to other organizations (Bovenkerk 1986: 56). An example of an indirect measure is contract compliance. This entails that the government makes the granting of assignments and subsidies to organizations conditional on their implementation of

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[62] Another procedural measure worth mentioning here is the policy of replacement (De Zwart & Poppelaars 2007) discussed in Section 5.2.2, which entails that instead of developing policies targeted at specific ethnic groups, additional resources are provided to specific economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods, which in practice benefits the disadvantaged ethnic minorities who live in those neighbourhoods. Sabbagh calls these policies 'indirect affirmative action' (2011: 110).

specific measures to promote the employment of disadvantaged groups (Bovenkerk 1986: 56; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 587). One of the strongest indirect measures the government can implement is a quota system for job allocation (cf. Waddington & Bell 2011: 1509). This means that a minimum number or percentage of the workforce of an organization has to consist of members of a specific group.

The central argument for introducing measures for positive action is that they appear to be the best way to level the playing field by overcoming the limiting effects of disadvantage, whether or not the disadvantage is a direct result of discrimination (cf. Holzer & Neumark 2006: 466). Proponents argue that, because measures for positive action do not rely on an individual rights strategy (see Section 5.3.2), they are more effective in preventing and combating both direct and institutional discrimination than (other) anti-discrimination legislation (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 592). Moreover, measures for positive action contribute, in various ways, to the reduction of bias and the prevention of expressions of bias (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 592). Reducing bias requires a number of preconditions among them constructive intergroup contact, featuring co-operation in the pursuit of shared goals and, very importantly, equal status in the context of the interaction because, among other reasons, negative stereotypes of groups can be reinforced by their lower socio-economic status. In society, intergroup contact featuring equal status of group members is only possible when inequality has been reduced, or, in other words, when the playing field is levelled, for example, by positive action measures (cf. Bovenkerk 1986: 36, 50).

Measures for positive action have been the subject of intensive debates, in which both empirical and normative arguments have been used (for an overview see Bovenkerk 1986). A widely discussed normative argument is that these measures imply reverse discrimination – discrimination against members of non-disadvantaged groups. Opponents argue that giving preference to members of a certain group on the basis of their group membership is an unacceptable violation of the principle of equal treatment. However, proponents argue that when equal treatment is taken to imply that people should be treated equally in equal circumstances, positive action does not imply discrimination because measures for positive action can only apply in unequal circumstances. Moreover, when equality is interpreted as having equal opportunities, equal starting points are required, and this could justify measures for positive action (cf. Bovenkerk 1986: 40).

Apart from the debates about the desirability of positive action measures, there is also discussion about whether empirical research has shown that such measures are really effective, and whether they have negative effects which outweigh their possible positive results. Since the 1990s, it has become easier to address such

questions, because, as Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 586) point out, studies on positive action have become increasingly empirical and interdisciplinary.

Looking at putative negative effects, critics refer to the possibility of resentment and group tensions resulting from the perception by members of non-disadvantaged groups that positive action implies reverse discrimination. Empirical studies discussed by Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 593) indicate that, while poorly implemented diversity programmes can indeed cause resentment, members of non-disadvantaged groups who work for organizations which implement positive action measures or who interact with the beneficiaries of those measures, do not react negatively. By and large, Bovenkerk (1986: 107) says, it can be expected that measures in which requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are reduced do lead to more resentment than measures in which preference to a member of these groups is given only when his or her qualifications are at least equal to if not better than those of other qualified candidates.

Another possible negative effect which measures for positive action might set in train is group stigmatization, suggesting that its beneficiaries cannot succeed on their own. However, Bovenkerk (1986: 107) has argued that when measures for positive action succeed, these stigma will eventually disappear, a hypothesis which has been confirmed in later studies (see Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 593).

The remaining empirical issue is whether positive action can really improve the socio-economic position of minorities. Generally, the available empirical studies indicate that it does indeed have a positive impact on the position of members of disadvantaged groups in the fields of education and employment (Bovenkerk 1986: 69-71; Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 588-591; Holzer and Neumark 2006; Kalev, Kelly & Dobbin 2006). Apart from this, Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 590) also consider increased ethnic diversity, especially at educational institutions, as a positive effect. They refer to research results indicating that this diversity has improved the ability of students to take the perspective of others into account. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, this is probably the best way to reduce bias and the expression of bias.[63]

The crux of the matter is that the success of measures for positive action depends on various factors, including the type of measures taken, the scale of its implementation and also the quality of implementation and the reception of such

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[63] Other possible positive effects of increased ethnic diversity on the work floor and in educational institutions are also mentioned, by Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 590-591) and by Bovenkerk (1986). These effects include the improvement of both services and the representation of interests of minority groups, because, as Bovenkerk argues, police officers, doctors, lawyers, social workers and other professionals who are members of disadvantaged groups, are in a better position to assess possible special needs of these groups (1986: 55).

measures by decision makers in the selection procedures, the beneficiaries themselves and the wider society. Successful implementation requires raising awareness of procedures and goals, which must also cover the provision of information about barriers to opportunities and the way these barriers can be overcome by the measures (Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 594). Obviously, poor communication can lead to the stigmatization of the beneficiaries and lack of support from decision makers in selection procedures, which, in turn, can weaken the implementation. Moreover, according to Shadid, the effects of measures for positive action will be limited as long as the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic minorities is not structurally recognized within organizations (2007: 310; also see Chapter 6). This view was confirmed in a longitudinal study (covering the period 1971-2002) of a large sample (n=708) of organizations by Kalev, Kelly & Dobbin (2006). These scholars found that the increase in the employment of minority employees in private sector management was largest in organizations which had structurally embedded accountability, authority and expertise on diversity and positive action (2006: 611).

In the end, to paraphrase Holzer and Neumark, whether and in what form positive action will be implemented, depends on whether citizens believe it is fair to give preference to such disadvantaged groups as ethnic minorities and women in some contexts, 'to overcome the barriers they continue to face from current discrimination, past discrimination, and a variety of other causes. Views on fairness are very subjective, and sometimes impervious to empirical evidence' (2006: 484). In other words, while empirical evidence indicates that positive action has positive effects, whether measures for positive action will be implemented depends on the views on this issue in society and on decisions by politicians. In the next section, these decisions by politicians and debates about positive action in the Netherlands will be discussed.

5.4.2   Positive action in the Netherlands: policies and debates

The discussion in Section 5.3.2 has undeniably revealed that, although the Netherlands is praised for its anti-discrimination measures, discrimination and group inequality do persist in Dutch society and the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination legislation appears to be limited. This section contains a discussion of whether and how these problems have been addressed by implementing measures for positive action.

The first measures for positive action in the Netherlands, introduced in the 1970s and it was devised to improve the position of women on the labour market (Bacchi 1994). In 1986, in the context of the implementation of the first structural integration policies for ethnic minorities, the Advisory Committee on Research

related to Minorities (ACOM) (see Section 5.2.2), recommended the government implement such measures to assist ethnic minorities. However, ACOM explicitly recommended that positive discrimination measures should not be introduced but that instead preferential treatment, without reducing the job or application requirements for members of disadvantaged groups, be adopted to prevent the possible stigmatization of the beneficiaries (see Section 5.4.1) and also to lower the risk of giving places to employees with insufficient qualifications (Bovenkerk 1986: 145). In 1989 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) also recommended the implementation of contract compliance (WRR 1989: 37).

Since 1990, a series of measures for positive action have been implemented by the Dutch government, and municipalities and organizations in various sectors have followed suit (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003; Shadid 2007: 306-307). Legally, the Equal Treatment Act (ETA), which came into force in 1994, allows preferential treatment (but not positive discrimination) for women, ethnic minorities and the disabled. ETA also permits outreach procedures and quota systems, but considers strict quota systems which reserve a specific number of jobs for members of a disadvantaged group are out of the question.[64] Consequently, ETA has complied with EU anti-discrimination legislation. In various directives this legislation has authorized member states to implement measures for positive action.[65]

In 1990, employers and labour unions[66] signed an agreement to allocate 60,000 jobs for members of ethnic minority groups over a period of five years. In the same period, the national government implemented a plan to increase the number of immigrant employees in government service to 5%.[67] The first indirect nation-wide measure for positive action targeted at ethnic minorities was introduced by the government in 1994. This Act for the Stimulation of Proportional Labour Participation (WBEAA)[68] obliged organizations in the private and public sectors with more than 35 employees to implement measures to achieve a proportional representation of ethnic minorities in their workforce. Organizations had to register the ethnicity of their employees so that information on the representation of ethnic minorities among their staff could be made public

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[64] See for an overview: *Dossier voorkeursbeleid* (in Dutch), accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.mensenrechten.nl/dossier/voorkeursbeleid.

[65] For a discussion of these aspects of EU law see Waddington & Bell (2011). For an overview of the implementation and practices in EU countries see Wrench (2007). *Nota bene*: the possibility to implement measures for positive action was already included in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which came into force in 1969.

[66] United in the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid).

[67] The EMO plan (Ethnic Minorities in Government Service).

[68] The *Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen* (WBEAA).

(Berkhout, Homburg & Van Waveren 1996). This act was replaced in 1998 by the similar Act on the Stimulation of Labour Market Participation of Minorities (Wet SAMEN),[69] which was abrogated at the end of 2003. Both these acts came into a great deal of from employers and employers' organizations and consequently compliance was weak (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003). Glastra, Schedler and Kats (1998) say that the employers' organizations were generally opposed to measures for equality of opportunity, and they doubted the beneficial effects of such measures. Their preference was for favourable investment to ensure job growth and educational measures to improve the qualifications of ethnic minority members.

Apart from these indirect measures, since 2000 the government has also signed agreements with employers' organizations to increase the labour market participation of ethnic minorities by registering job vacancies. It is hoped that by doing so they will fill these vacancies with more people from ethnic minorities, provide training programmes and develop tailor-made approaches for employment in specific sectors (Schaafsma 2006: 20).[70] The effects of these agreements have generally been evaluated as positive (Blok Commission 2004: 257).

However, since these measures and agreements ended in the early 2000s, no nationwide indirect measures have been implemented and preferential treatment and quota systems have continued to be controversial (Schaafsma 2006; De Zwart 2012).[71] Research in 2006 indicated that both employers and employees, including members of ethnic minority groups, generally rejected preferential treatment measures (Schaafsma 2006: 56-57). Employers perceived such measures to be unfair, and generally explained the under-representation of minorities in their organizations by pointing out that they did not apply or were not sufficiently qualified (cf. Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 599). For their part, members of ethnic minority groups feared the risk of stigmatization (Schaafsma 2006: 68-69).

The effectiveness of positive action measures in the Netherlands has also been questioned. In their analysis of the national indirect measure Wet SAMEN, Verbeek and Groeneveld found no short-term effects of preferential treatment, but suggest that this could be explained by weak implementation (2010: 234).

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[69] The *Wet Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Minderheden* (Wet SAMEN).

[70] Respectively through the MKB Covenant, RGO Covenant and the .KOM Project.

[71] In 2008, the then incumbent Minister of the Interior Ter Horst announced measures for positive action to increase the number of ethnic minority members and women in the management of the police force. This elicited widespread criticism, even within the police force (see NRC Handelsblad (March 10, 2009), *Voorkeursbeleid scheidt minister en politietop*). The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization (in Dutch: *ondersteunende / ambtelijke organisatie*) of Dutch Parliament implemented preferential treatment measures (in 2010 and 2008 respectively), to increase the number of ethnic minority employees (see CGB 2008; CGB 2010).

However, they certainly did find a positive relationship between the increase in ethnic minority representation and the existence of structural diversity policies in organizations (Groeneveld & Verbeek 2012), which is in line with the views of Shadid (2007) on the structural recognition of diversity and the findings of Kalev, Kelly and Dobbin (2006) discussed in Section 5.4.1.

Despite all efforts, the unemployment rates of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands remain disproportionately high.[72] For this reason, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommended the Dutch government should make better use of measures for positive action (ECRI 2008). However, as mentioned in Section 5.2.2, in the policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011) the government emphasized that integration policies would no longer target specific groups. It appears therefore that the government no longer advocates the principle of positive action. Nevertheless, the above mentioned Equal Treatment Act (ETA) still allows preferential treatment for women, ethnic minorities and the disabled. In their programmes for the national elections in 2012, a few political parties, concerned about the above mentioned unemployment rates, advocated outreach measures (Green Left, SP, VVD) and preferential treatment (Green Left) in an effort to assist disadvantaged groups.[73]Nevertheless, their efforts came to nought and the implementation of strong measures for positive action continued to be a pipe-dream. The most recent government policy document on discrimination does not mention measures for positive action (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012) at all, and the most recent policy document on integration announced only one such measure, namely that the government will co-operate with municipalities in supporting young members of ethnic minority and their parents with their entrance into the labour market (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).[74]

What has just been said shows that it goes without saying that the introduction and the effects of positive action measures are controversial in the Netherlands. Part of the problem appears to be that such hard measures as preferential treatment and contract compliance have barely been implemented, and therefore few people

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[72] For example, in February 2014, the employment rates of non-Western immigrants and their descendants was 18.6%, as opposed to 6.7% among native Dutch. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl.
[73] GroenLinks (2012); Socialistische Partij (2012); VVD (2012).
[74] The government elected in 2012 also announced a quota system for the disabled, to be enforced in 2015 (Rutte & Samsom 2012: 32).

are familiar with such measures. In the next section, views current in society on such measures will be examined.

5.4.3   Views in society on positive action

As was just stated, the discussion on policies and debates in the Netherlands has revealed that measures for positive action are controversial. Research has shown that, whereas many Dutch natives considered such measures unfair, immigrants and their descendants also viewed them negatively because they feared the risk of stigmatization. Whereas they are still haunted by controversy in the Netherlands, research in the United States has indicated that people who are familiar with these measures tend to view them more positively. Possibly measures for positive action have acquired a bad name in the Netherlands because people equate these measures with positive discrimination and not with preferential treatment, not realizing that positive discrimination is illegal in the Netherlands. As Bovenkerk wrote in 1986, it can be expected that measures for positive discrimination, implying that application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are reduced, would lead to more resentment than measures for preferential treatment, in which preference is only given to the member of a disadvantaged group only when his or her qualifications are at least equal to those of other qualified candidates (1986: 107; also see Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 595).

In this section, the views in Dutch society on measures for positive action will be examined. This will include an analysis of relationships between these views and prejudices or race-neutral values, relationships which are postulated in the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1. Hence, the analysis will not only include the prejudices in society analysed in Section 5.3.3, but also a comparison of views on measures for positive action targeted at ethnic minorities and at women.

Support for positive action was measured by including an item in the questionnaires on the acceptability of preferential treatment for both (naturalized) immigrants and their descendants and for women in the context of job applications. The results are shown in Table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3

Opinions about preferential treatment[a] in percentages.

| | For immigrants | | For women | |
	Approve	Disapprove	Approve	Disapprove
Native Dutch	17	74	33	52
Non-Western Immigrants	32	53	38	47
Western immigrants	17	73	29	58
Total[d]	18	72	33	51

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
[a] But see the analysis below.

From this table it is clear that, although almost a third of all groups approve preferential treatment for women, only 18% approve such measures for immigrants. Among non-Western immigrants the support for such measures is clearly higher (38% and 32% respectively). Muslims in this last group were even more positive (43% and 41% approval respectively).

The main argument of those who support preferential treatment of both women and ethnic minorities was that it is necessary to combat prejudices and discrimination. 'In an ideal world, such measures should not be necessary, but alas, we have to deal with discrimination', one respondent said. Some native Dutch pointed out that increasing ethnic diversity in organizations is not the same as overcoming disadvantages for ethnic minorities. These respondents support preferential treatment as a way to increase diversity, but did not think that the opportunities of ethnic minorities are still limited.

Many native Dutch who approve of preferential treatment for both women and ethnic minorities admitted that, although they support the principle of equal treatment, they have more difficulty approving of preferential treatment for the latter group. As one respondent said, 'After some heart searching, I would say yes to preferential treatment for women, and no to preferential treatment for ethnic minorities. But, with some hesitation, I approve of both, because you have to treat people equally.'

Interestingly, although the strength of the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat appears to explain the opposition to anti-discrimination policies to a substantial extent (see Section 5.3.3), it barely explains

the opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and their descendants (β = -.14, p < .05). Moreover, the analysis indicates that this type of prejudice goes only a very little way towards explaining the difference between respondents' opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and their opposition to a similar policy for women. Likewise, this opposition also cannot be explained by respondents' views on who can be fully included in the national group. There are no significant relationships between this opposition and the importance they attach to the criteria for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3, among them having Dutch ancestors or having a Western name. These findings contradict two theories, discussed by Bobo & Fox (2003), which claim that opposition to preferential treatment can be explained by a bias towards immigrants, resulting either from the perception of ethnic threat or from the process of social categorization (that is, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging). This suggests that opposition to such policies in the Netherlands could be explained by a third theory discussed by Bobo and Fox, namely, opposition rooted in 'race-neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; see Section 5.2). Indeed, these sorts of ideas have led respondents to argue that policies like these can cause stigmatization, and that gender or ethnicity are two categories which should never be used as criteria in selection procedures.

The qualitative interviews revealed the problem that preferential treatment is often confused with positive discrimination measures: many respondents mentioned that preferential treatment is unacceptable because it implies 'reverse discrimination'. After the interviewer explained that preferential treatment implies that application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are not reduced, and that positive discrimination is illegal in the Netherlands, most of these respondents said that they do approve of preferential treatment.[75] Therefore, a lack of understanding of such policies might also explain the opposition to some degree. Nonetheless, the substantial difference between the opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and preferential treatment of women remains largely unexplained.

Finally, the analysis revealed no significant relationships between views on preferential treatment – which was apparently understood by many as positive discrimination – and the variables gender, age, educational level and political preference.

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[75] This finding cannot be generalized however, as the number of in-depth interviews was only 66 (see Chapter 2).