Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship : public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands

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Citation

Cover Page

The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/28976 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

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Title: Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship. Public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands
Issue Date: 2014-10-01

Chapter 4
Citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state

4.1 Introduction

In contemporary scientific discussions about citizenship, citizens' loyalty to their nation-states is generally considered to be a virtue (Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 7). More specifically, it is considered to be important to the health and stability of democracies, as are such behaviours as abiding by the law and participating in political institutions (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 30-31).

Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing emphasis in these discussions on the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of immigrant citizens, which leads to questions about their transnational ties and multiple citizenship (Erdal & Oeppen 2013; Leydet 2011). Some authors argue that ethno-cultural distinctiveness and transnational ties can lead to multiple loyalties which immigrants might have to their ethnic groups and countries of origin, and that such loyalties can potentially undermine their loyalty to the nation-state (e.g. Gitlin 1995; Huntington 2004; Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). Multiple citizenship is a potential security risk, especially during international conflicts when the question might arise which country citizens with multiple citizenship will support. Consequently, proponents of this view oppose the formal recognition of immigrants' cultural distinctiveness, a policy referred to as multiculturalism. From their point of view, defenders of multiculturalism assert that public and formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness is an essential element in fostering a sense of national belonging, which, in its turn, is an indispensable condition for national loyalty (e.g. Kymlicka 2001). Moreover, they take the line that not just immigrants but every individual

in society has multiple loyalties which can potentially conflict with his or her loyalty to the nation-state. Baron (2009: 1040) suggests that this clash of loyalties does not differ from 'the usual conflict of commitments that characterize politics'.

Loyalty to the nation-state in multicultural societies is not and has not been an issue confined to scientific discussions, it is also a topic of political debates. In 2003, a debate in which the loyalty of citizens with multiple citizenship to the Dutch nation-state was the central theme commenced in the Dutch Parliament. In first instance, politicians who took part in this Dutch debate tended to focus on the loyalty of Muslim immigrants. Their emphasis shows that not only was the mere fact of holding multiple citizenship at stake, the ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds of some immigrants were also assumed to conflict with their loyalty to the nation-state (De Hart 2005a).

The theoretical approaches to loyalty and citizenship, as well as the Dutch political debate and government policies which are relevant to these topics, will pass review in this chapter. It also looks at the views on loyalty to the nation-state current in Dutch society. These will be explored by analysing empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires used in this research. This type of empirical analysis is especially relevant, as the scientific and political debates on this issue are largely hypothetical and theoretical, and are not backed up by an empirical basis (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).

The theoretical review of the scientific debates on loyalty to the nation-state will focus on two main aspects. The first aspect is the concept of loyalty to the nation-state and the concepts used in the relevant literature to examine this issue. Among these, ideas about patriotism predominate. Attention will be paid to such questions as how these concepts are differentiated in the literature, how they are operationalized and which attitudes (behaviours and feelings of individuals) are associated with these phenomena. The second aspect covers views on loyalty to the nation-state in the context of the above-mentioned scientific debate on multiculturalism and transnational ties of immigrants.

4.2   Perspectives on loyalty to the nation-state

4.2.1   Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state
Loyalty has been studied in various scientific disciplines, among them philosophy, social psychology, political science and sociology. Although authors differ in their description of loyalty,[1] it is generally agreed that the concept refers to an emotional commitment and its associated behaviour in the form of taking the side of the

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[1] For a discussion of some of these differences see Keller (2007: 1-23).

object of loyalty, for example, a friend, a group or a nation-state (Druckman 1994; Keller 2007; Kleinig 2013; Oglensky 2008; Zdaniuk & Levine 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that the loyalty concept refers to a *special* relationship with the particular object of loyalty, which means that loyalty to, for example, the Netherlands, is not motivated simply by the principle that a citizen should be loyal to her or his country, but also by the fact that the citizen personally considers it to be *her* or *his* country (Keller 2007: 17-18). In this guise, loyalty implies *identification* with the object of loyalty (see also Chapter 3). Importantly, this does not mean that loyalty should override other commitments. It is possible that an individual is strongly motivated to take the side of his or her country because of a commitment to defend his or her family or certain principles, and not so much out of loyalty *per se* to their own country (Keller 2009: 13-15).

In any discussion of the loyalty concept, is important to distinguish between the *normative* and *descriptive* uses made of it. An example of the former is the claim that citizens *should* be loyal to the nation-state. This normative use of the concept is also to be found in the philosophical debate of moral universalists versus communitarians, as described by Keller (2007: ix, 53-54). In this debate, moral universalists take the stance that moral principles should preferably be impartial and not dependent on specific attachments or allegiances to others, for instance, communities or nation-states. The fly in the ointment is that, of its very nature, loyalty implies partiality and hence it poses a problem for advocates of universalist morality. Communitarians, on the other hand, take the view that moral principles are and should be at least partly derived from a shared culture within the community or nation-state, and hence they consider specific loyalty to the nation-state to be a virtue.[2]

The term loyalty is used as a *descriptive* concept in studies of the various forms of behaviour through which loyalty is expressed. This has led Keller (2007: 3-7) to distinguish different forms which he describes as types of loyalty: loyalty in concern, in advocacy, in ritual, in identification and in belief. *Loyalty in concern* is expressed by prioritizing the interests of the object of loyalty over someone or something else's interests. Another way for expressing loyalty is to speak up in defence of the object of loyalty, a form of behaviour Keller refers to as *loyalty in advocacy*. Loyalty can also be expressed by such ritual practices as saluting the national flag or standing for the national anthem, referred to as *loyalty in ritual*. It can also be expressed by a strong tendency to identify with the object of loyalty, referred to as *loyalty in identification*, which can lead to feelings of both pride and

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[2] This does not mean that moral universalism is in principle incompatible with loyalty, or that only communitarians consider loyalty to the community to be a virtue. For a discussion see Keller (2007: 162-181, 220-222).

shame (cf. Dresler-Hawke & Liu 2006: 134). Finally, Keller discusses *loyalty in belief*, a term he uses to refer to the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty. One example would be the refusal to believe that, despite evidence to the contrary, the country (the object of loyalty) has violated human rights treaties.

Closely related to these types of loyalty is the concept of patriotism. Authors generally agree that patriotism refers to an emotional commitment to one's own country and to the associated behaviour which is expressed by taking the side of this country (Brubaker 2004; Depuiset & Butera 2005; Druckman 1994; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999; cf. Herrmann, Isernia & Segatti 2009). In this sense, patriotism implies identification with one's country. Passing the discussion of loyalty above in review, it is therefore not surprising that some scholars describe patriotism as a type of loyalty to the country or nation-state (e.g. Druckman 1994; Keller 2007; Keller 2009).

As has loyalty, expressions of patriotism have been intensively studied. Both theoretical considerations and empirical studies indicate that patriotism is not a one-dimensional phenomenon, but that its various expressions represent various types of patriotism, the most widely discussed being constructive patriotism, uncritical (or blind) patriotism, symbolic patriotism and national pride (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). In view of the above-mentioned general description of patriotism, these four types can be considered specific types of loyalty to the country or nation-state. *Constructive patriotism* has been defined as a type of loyalty to country which is expressed in criticism and questioning motivated by 'a desire for positive change' (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). One example is the constructive criticism of fellow citizens' discriminatory behaviour towards immigrants. In contrast, *uncritical patriotism* is characterized by 'unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism' (Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999: 153). This type of patriotism relates to loyalty in belief, the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty, one of the types of loyalty distinguished by Keller (2007). This illustrates that not every expression of loyalty to a country is necessarily good for its interests: uncritical patriotism can imply refraining from or even opposing criticism, which is contradictory to the principles of democracy. *Symbolic patriotism* refers to the emotional importance attached to such symbolic representations of the country as the national flag and anthem (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Parker 2009). This type of patriotism relates to loyalty in ritual, another of the previously discussed types of loyalty. Finally, some authors describe *national pride* as a distinct expression of patriotism (Davidov 2010; cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007), which involves what has been called loyalty in identification, namely, a strong tendency to identify with the

object of loyalty which can result in feelings of both pride and shame (Keller 2007: 6).

4.2.2   Loyalty and group belonging

Considering that group loyalty refers to a special relationship with a group and emotionally motivated behaviour favouring that group, it is not surprising that expressions of loyalty have been linked to social identity. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of social identity research, Tajfel (1981) has proposed that social categorization is a basic human tendency which serves individuals to achieve positive self-esteem by differentiating their in-group positively from out-groups. Individuals categorize or identify themselves and are categorized or identified by others as belonging to certain groups. Research has shown that this need for positive distinctiveness can be expressed by in-group favouritism, in-group loyalty and by adhering to in-group stereotypes in the form of behavioural and normative expectations (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004).[3]

In line with these findings, some scholars have described patriotism as an indicator of, or even as synonymous with, national self-identification (for discussions, see Huddy & Khatib 2007 and Theiss-Morse 2009: 23-24). However, research in the tradition of social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979) suggests that a distinction should be made between these two concepts. As explained in Chapter 3, national self-identification as an aspect of social identity refers to a multi-dimensional phenomenon which is composed of cognitive, affective and evaluative components. Empirical research has indicated that it is the affective component of self-identification, and not the cognitive and evaluative components, which determines the tendency of people to behave in terms of their group membership. Importantly, the affective and evaluative components of self-identification do not necessarily co-vary in a predictable way. As discussed in Chapter 3, although affection for a group can undoubtedly influence the evaluation of that group, individuals with a strong affective commitment to a certain group can evaluate certain characteristics of that group negatively (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999: 386, and 373 respectively). From this perspective, the various types of patriotism discussed above are not synonymous with, but should instead be considered possible expressions of, national self-identification (cf. Latcheva 2010: 191). After all, while patriotism assumes a sense of national belonging, it also specifically refers to forms of behaviour and to evaluations of aspects of the nation-state (see Section 4.2.1).

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[3] However, the need for positive distinctiveness is not always expressed in these ways. See Shadid (2007:183); see also Jenkins (2008: 114-115); Theiss-Morse (2009: 41).

Factor analyses conducted by Huddy and Khatib (2007) which revealed a distinction between national self-identification[4] on the one hand, and constructive patriotism, uncritical patriotism, symbolic patriotism and national pride on the other hand support these insights.[5] Their investigation indicated all these types of patriotism relate not only to national self-identification, they are also related to political ideology. Conservatives appeared to be more uncritically patriotic than liberals, and liberals were more constructively patriotic than conservatives (Huddy & Khatib 2007: 70). Cogently, no relationship was found between national self-identification and political ideology. (This concurs with the present study, in which no relationship between the affective component of national self-identification and political preference was found – see Chapter 3.)

There have also been discussions about whether these types of patriotism, or, in other words, positive evaluations of one's national in-group, are part of or distinct from feelings of national superiority. Several studies indicate that these phenomena are indeed empirically distinct, but that there is a positive relationship between them (Blank, Schmidt and Westle 2001; Feshbach 1987 and 1990, as discussed in Druckman 1994: 46; Huddy & Khatib 2007). It should be noted that in these studies feelings of national superiority are not referred to as such but are labelled nationalism, using a general definition of nationalism as an idealization of one's nation (Sumner 2006).[6]

Scholars have also gone a step farther and investigated whether a favourable attitude towards one's in-group – for example, in the form of loyalty or patriotism – is consistently accompanied by negative evaluations of out-groups (see Druckman 1994: 63; Spruyt & Vanhoutte 2009). In other words, the question is whether a positive evaluation of one's in-group necessarily implies ethnocentrism,

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[4] Huddy & Khatib (2007) use the term 'national identity' and not 'national self-identification'. However, their operationalization reveals that they measure the internal aspect of (national) social categorization, of which the term 'national self-identification' is a more specific description.

[5] See also Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001).

[6] As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of nationalism is often used to describe views and behaviour stressing the distinction between one's own national group and other national, ethnic or religious groups (cf. Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993; Latcheva 2010). This definition has lead several authors to suggest that nationalism refers to an idealization of one's nation (e.g. Sumner 1906), which can be expressed by the sense that one's own nation is superior to other nations (e.g. Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). Furthermore, a distinction is often made between civic and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the view that membership of a nation is first and foremost a legal and political category, implying that criteria for national belonging include respect for institutions and laws and a sense of national belonging (Calhoun 2002). In contrast, ethnic nationalism refers to the view that membership of a nation is rooted in specific ethnic or cultural criteria. These ethnic and civic conceptions of national belonging are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

which is generally defined as a combination of a positive evaluation of one's own culture with a negative evaluation of the cultures of others (Shadid 2007: 57). Research in the tradition of social identity theory reveals that this is not the case (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170). In a study of 22 countries, Coenders (2001) found a positive relationship between patriotism and negative attitudes towards immigrants in only two countries. In the other countries these relationships were not significant or reversed. On a more general level, a study by Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) indicates that a positive evaluation of one's in-group is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrants (see also Ariely 2012). In this study, the relationship between types of loyalty to the nation-state and negative attitudes towards immigrants will be explored in Chapter 5.

Whether individuals evaluate out-groups negatively appears to depend on the level of affective commitment to their in-group and on the social context (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 163-166). When, in a certain social context, the group distinctiveness of a group is cast in doubt, group members with a strong (affective) commitment to their group tend to defend this distinctiveness by exaggerating differences with out-groups. The outcome of this sort of reaction can be a high degree of self-stereotyping, and negative evaluations and discrimination of out-groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 177; Fiske 2002). These findings also suggest that normative expectations of group loyalty, as aspects of self-stereotyping, are stronger when members of the national group perceive a threat to the distinctiveness of this group (cf. Carter, Ferguson & Hassin 2011; Depuiset & Butera 2005; Druckman 1994).

Finally, the relationship between group belonging and loyalty implies that individuals can be simultaneously loyal to more than one group. As explained in Chapter 3, every individual self-identifies and is socially categorized by others according to a number of different criteria, which means that every individual belongs to various groups at the same time.[7] An individual can belong legally to the Dutch national group, and simultaneously be categorized as belonging to another ethnic group, or to a family or a political party. In other words, individuals have partial or multiple social identities and belongings, and the logical consequence is that they must have multiple group loyalties and can be subject to multiple normative group expectations of group loyalty. In itself, these multiple loyalties and expectations of loyalty are not problematic. However, problems can arise when an individual belongs to groups which have or develop conflicting interests.

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[7] See Jenkins (2008: 104) for a discussion of the distinction between categories and groups.

4.2.3   Perspectives on loyalty to the nation-state in multicultural societies

This discussion has quite clearly revealed that loyalty to the nation-state can be manifested in distinct forms of behaviour, and that individuals have multiple loyalties to the groups to which they belong. At the beginning of this chapter it was said that some authors argue that ethno-cultural distinctiveness and transnational ties lead to multiple loyalties. Conflicts of loyalties might undermine the loyalty to the nation-state of particular groups such as immigrants (e.g. Gitlin 1995; Huntington 2004; Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). In this section, the scientific debate aroused by this argument will be reviewed.

One transnational tie which is widely discussed in the context of this debate is the multiple citizenship of immigrants.[8] Opponents of multiple citizenship argue that it poses a problem because it raises the spectre of conflicting loyalties: immigrants with multiple citizenship might not favour the interests of the nation-state in which they reside over the interests of their nations of origin (Renshon 2004). More specifically, they assert that multiple citizenship poses a security risk, especially during military conflicts in which the question of for whom these immigrants will fight can arise (De Hart 2005b; Ronkainen 2011). On a more general level, there are arguments that multiple citizenship is not the only factor which might pose a danger, the different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds of immigrants and their descendants are also factors which might lead to multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties. It stands to reason that this concern is stronger when an actual or ideological conflict is perceived between the nation-state and the ethnic or religious groups with which immigrants identify (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013). One cogent example is the perceived conflict between 'Western civilization' and the 'Islamic civilization', coined the 'clash of civilizations' by Huntington (1993; 1996), a perception which has been strengthened by the discourse on 'Islamic terrorism'.

Disturbed by this fear of conflicting loyalties, some authors oppose multiculturalism, which they understand to be the formal recognition of immigrants' cultural distinctiveness by host countries (see Chapters 1 and 6).[9]

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[8] For an extensive discussion of the debate on multiple citizenship see De Hart (2012).

[9] Baron (2009) traces the contemporary perceived danger of transnational ties and religious diversity back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), in which the concept of Westphalian sovereignty was introduced. This concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state included the principle of non-interference in another nation-state's domestic affairs. Furthermore, sovereigns could choose the religion of their states, and residents who did not adhere to the religion selected by their ruler were, for a short period, free to migrate to another state. The ultimate goal was to increase religious homogeneity within states to prevent the development of multiple political and religious loyalties. This was seen as necessary to achieve a unified allegiance to the sovereign, thereby protecting the stability of the nation-state and preventing war. Discussing it, Baron (2009: 1030) writes, '[w]hat the

These opponents of multiculturalism worry that a civic conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3) – which is implied in the recognition of cultural distinctiveness – might not be strong enough to foster loyalty to the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Consequently, it can be expected that these opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship will either support immigrant assimilation (see Chapter 5) or will have an ethnic conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3), or both.

Various responses have been made in the relevant literature to counter the arguments of these opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship. In the first place, multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties are not confined to immigrants, every individual can have multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties and everyone is subject to multiple expectations of group loyalty from a number of different sources (cf. Hirsch Ballin 2011: 19). There are instances in which the loyalty of people to their home country can conflict with their loyalty to their friends, family members and their (multinational) employer. Obviously, the interests of multinational employers especially are likely to conflict with the interests of nation-states. In this context it is useful to refer back to the discussion in Chapter 3 which revealed that the boundaries of ethno-cultural groups are socially constructed, are subject to change and are therefore always dynamic. This means that the question centres not only on which ethno-cultural differences and transnational ties can cause conflicting interests and loyalties, but also asks which differences and transnational ties are perceived to be important in society and why (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013; see also Chapter 5 on integration). For example, although an Islamic background is seen by some authors (e.g. Huntington 1993; 1996) to conflict with the interests of Western nation-states, transnational economic trading ties are frequently considered desirable, and as a result internationally conflicting economic interests are perceived normal (WRR 2007: 173).

This issue is cogent to the argument of Baron (2009), who explains how, in the context of the discussion on multiculturalism, the accusation about the putative conflicts which might arise from dual or multiple loyalty is often linked to racism, an ideology which can be used to justify existing inequality (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 319; Shadid 2007: 210). By and large, the simple fact of having a migrant background, or being part of a minority group, can lead to accusations of multiple loyalty. As Baron argues:

Peace of Westphalia termed a problem of religious faith modernity redefined as an issue pertaining to the loyalty of migrant communities'.

while a majority may claim that the migrant community needs to share in the values and participate in local customs in order to demonstrate its inclusiveness, it is also up to the majority to decide when a minority has done enough to satisfy the expectations of assimilation. In this regard a minority population is always potentially suspect of not fulfilling these expectations over assimilation and is thus always subject to the possibility of a dual [or multiple] loyalty accusation. (Baron 2009: 1033.)

Consequently, ethnic, cultural and religious differences between immigrants and natives are 'easily construed to pose various kinds of security risks' (Baron 2009: 1035), and this can be used to justify inequality.

Opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship do not restrict their arguments to stating that the recognition of cultural distinctiveness and transnational ties might lead to conflicting loyalties, they also warn that immigrants' loyalties to their countries of origin and their ethnic or religious groups might lead to a weakening of their loyalty to the nation-state in which they reside. Taking the opposite tack, proponents of multiculturalism argue that the public and formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness is essential to fostering affective identifications with the nation-state. In turn, this is indispensable to cultivating national loyalty (Kymlicka 2001; Martin 2003; Spiro 1998, 2003; Wright & Bloemraad 2012; for a discussion see Chapter 6).

Considering the fact that individuals always belong to multiple groups, have multiple group loyalties and can be subject to multiple group expectations of loyalty, it is perhaps understandable that the debate about the relationship between multiculturalism and loyalty is largely theoretical (cf. Böcker, Groenendijk & De Hart 2005: 161; Driouchi 2007: 113). The few empirical studies which have essayed the vastness of this subject indicate that the relationship between ethnic and cultural diversity and transnational ties on the one hand and loyalty to the nation-state on the other is more nuanced. Multiple citizenship does not appear to be a clear indicator of conflicting loyalties or of the strength of loyalty to the nation-state (De Hart 2005b; Ronkainen 2011). Furthermore, empirical research indicates that transnational ties do not necessarily hinder immigrant integration (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). This suggests that holding multiple loyalties to a number of groups does not necessarily undermine loyalty to the nation-state.

Quite apart from this discussion of the sorts of responses to the hypothesis that immigrants' loyalty to the nation-state can be undermined by their multiple loyalties to ethnic groups and nations of origin, it is worthwhile asking whether the loyalty of citizens to their country is essential to protecting its interests. Some expressions of loyalty might actually help protect these interests, whereas other

expressions might not, or in fact might even conflict with these interests. Consequently, constructive patriotism, as discussed above, might assist a country's interests as it could involve constructive criticism which is motivated by a desire for positive change. Conversely, uncritical patriotism can hinder the democratic process. Moreover, loyalty to their country is not the only and not even necessarily the strongest motivation for citizens to take their country's side. After all, individuals can be strongly motivated to take the side of their country because of a commitment to protect their family, friends or certain principles, and not so much purely and simply out of loyalty to their country. There is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that citizens' loyalty to their country is a better guarantee for furthering or protecting its interests than other commitments these citizens might have. Authors who argue that loyalty to a particular country is essential to protect its interests are either speculating or they are confusing matters by conflating the structure with the strength of political commitments (Keller 2009: 13-15).

In the Netherlands, the loyalty to the nation-state of immigrants with multiple citizenship has been an issue in political debate since 1990. The history of this debate will be reviewed in the next section.

4.3   Loyalty to the nation-state: policies and debates in the Netherlands

As discussed more extensively in Chapters 3 and 5, in the last few decades debates about national belonging and immigrant integration in the Netherlands have become highly politicized. One particular issue which has been increasingly emphasized in these debates is the loyalty to the Dutch nation-state of immigrants with multiple citizenship. The main arguments concerning this issue and the Dutch government policies it has elicited will be reviewed in this section. This short review is largely based on the extensive overviews and discussions of Dutch citizenship laws and policies in the studies of De Hart (2012) and Van Oers, De Hart and Groenendijk (2013). Three phases in the development of these policies and debates will be distinguished: the phase of restrictive citizenship laws and policies until 1953; the less restrictive and more inclusive phase between 1953 and the 1990s; and the phase after the 1990s in which citizenship laws have been made more restrictive once again.[10]

The first laws concerning Dutch citizenship were introduced in the 19th century. The Dutch Nationality Act of 1850 stipulated that individuals born in the

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[10] Chapters 3, 5 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of immigrants' loyalty to the nation-state.

Netherlands and their descendants were automatically considered Dutch citizens – the principle of *ius soli*. This was altered in the new Dutch Nationality Act of 1892, which stipulated that Dutch citizenship could only be automatically acquired by those who were born to a Dutch father. This *ius sanguinis* principle was considered a better guarantee of loyalty and commitment of citizens to the nation-state (Driouchi 2007: 119; Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 43). Under the same Act, the right to obtain Dutch citizenship through naturalization was made possible for adults who had resided in the Netherlands or its colonies for a minimum of five years, provided that they renounced their original citizenship. In the throes of the economic crisis of the 1930s, the naturalization policy tightened up even more to protect the Dutch labour market.

From 1953, laws to do with Dutch citizenship and naturalization were made less restrictive. This liberalization was partly influenced by two factors, the introduction and ratification of international treaties promoting the naturalization of refugees and stateless persons, and the incorporation of the right to legal citizenship in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 5-6). At this time, one of the amendments to the Dutch citizenship law implied that third-generation immigrants born in the Netherlands would automatically acquire Dutch citizenship. These immigrants did not have to renounce other citizenships acquired by *ius sanguinis*, so this amendment resulted in the earliest cases[11] of multiple citizenship in the Netherlands.

A new Dutch Nationality Act was introduced in 1984, when the first structural integration policies targeted at immigrants were being developed (see Chapter 5). One of the important goals of this new act was to improve the legal position of settled immigrants by providing them with easier access to Dutch citizenship. It also allowed second-generation immigrants – those who were born in the Netherlands, between 18 and 25 years of age, who have resided in the Netherlands since birth – to opt for Dutch citizenship. The government 'assumed that feelings of loyalty and commitment towards the Netherlands exist among these immigrants' (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 21). In 1991, the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original citizenship was abolished.

However, in 1997 this renunciation requirement was reintroduced, as outcome of a parliamentary debate which marked the beginning of a phase in which Dutch citizenship laws were once again tightened up. In this debate, members of Parliament of the VVD (right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the CDA (right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal) argued that

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[11] See De Hart (2012: 160-161) for a more detailed discussion.

immigrants who retained their original citizenship did not make a sufficient commitment to the Netherlands and should therefore not be allowed to become a Dutch citizen. They added grist to their mill by arguing naturalization should be *earned* by completing a process of integration (De Hart 2012: 167; Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 16), which implied learning the Dutch language and acquiring basic knowledge of Dutch society (see Chapter 3). Their opponents, members of Parliament for several left-wing parties – PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal Democrats 66) and the Green Left party, argued that in a world caught up in the throes of globalization it would be unavoidable that citizens might have attachments to more than one country. Turning the tables, they made the case that recognition of these multiple attachments, for example, by allowing multiple citizenship, would improve immigrant integration.

Importantly, most immigrants who applied for naturalization were exempted from the requirement to renounce their original citizenship. Exemptions were made for immigrants of whom such a renunciation could not be reasonably expected, among them refugees and citizens whose countries of origin did not allow renunciation of citizenship (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 14, 16). In the Dutch Parliament, the extent of these exemptions was criticized by those members representing the political parties CDA and VVD, who 'claimed that most immigrants had been obtaining Dutch citizenship for pragmatic reasons rather than as a sign of loyalty to the Netherlands' (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 16). The upshot of these debates was an amendment to the Dutch Nationality Act, originally proposed in 1998 but which only came into force in 2003. Apart from the renunciation of original citizenship, this amendment also included new and stricter requirements for people applying for naturalization, including tests on Dutch language and society.[12]

As discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5, an important shift in the debates about the citizenship of immigrants and their descendants occurred around the year 2000, when several authors[13] claimed that integration policies had failed and postulated that social cohesion was under threat because integration policies focused too much on the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants and too little on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values. As already said, these ideas were fused into one political discourse, important parts of which were copied by other political parties, pursued by the politician Pim Fortuyn (Penninx 2005).

In this context, the debate on multiple citizenship was reopened in 2003. Several members of the Dutch Parliament suggested that multiple citizenship of

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[12] See Chapters 3 and 5.
[13] Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

immigrants could hinder their integration and emancipation, and requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration to take steps to prevent citizens from obtaining multiple citizenship (De Hart 2012: 169).

The government responded by issuing the policy document *Multiple Citizenship and Integration*, in 2004 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2004). In this document the government stated that in order to advance the integration of foreigners in the Netherlands, the existing Nationality Act already included the renunciation of the original citizenship as a requirement for naturalization (discussed above). Furthermore, the government stated that ideally immigrants who 'opt for Dutch nationality and thereby indicate that they feel a sense of belonging to Dutch society' should not retain and pass on their original citizenship to their children and grandchildren, especially if these descendants were born in the Netherlands and no longer have real ties to their parents' country of origin (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2004: 3).[14] Consequently, the government stated that it intended to set more limits on the (above mentioned) exemptions to the requirement of renunciation of original citizenship for immigrants who wished to obtain Dutch citizenship.

The weak point of this document is that in it the government did not attempt to explain how multiple citizenship could hinder integration, nor did it give concrete reasons why it considered multiple citizenship undesirable. However, when this issue was debated in Parliament, the Minister did elaborate on the views in the policy document and stated that by renouncing their original citizenship, immigrants would be able to offer proof that they really wanted to be Dutch and that they did have ties with the Dutch community (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004a: 94-6075). In the wake of these intentions, in 2005 the government proposed a bill which included the elimination of two exemptions to the requirement of renunciation of the original citizenship of immigrants who wished to obtain Dutch citizenship, namely the exception for second-generation immigrants and the exception for partners of Dutch citizens.[15]

In the parliamentary debates on this bill, the CDA political party argued that immigrants with multiple citizenship should be stripped of their Dutch citizenship if they were not committed to Dutch values (De Hart 2012: 220). This political party asserted that Dutch citizenship should be exclusive as it implies loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. Opposing this interpretation, the political party Green Left

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[14] Author's translation.
[15] This bill also included the provision that immigrants with multiple citizenship would forfeit their Dutch citizenship if they were ever to act against the fundamental interests of the Dutch state, for example, by being involved in 'terrorist activities'.

argued that citizens were able to feel a sense of belonging to multiple groups and countries, and that this multiplicity does not necessarily lead to disloyalty to the Netherlands. The PvdA likewise argued that multiple citizenship did not necessarily correlate with a weaker loyalty to the Netherlands (De Hart 2005a; Driouchi 2007: 133).

In short, opponents of multiple citizenship – including members of Parliament for the political parties VVD, CDA and the smaller Christian parties – did not only link it to integration, they also associated it negatively with putative disloyalty to the nation-state (Driouchi 2007: 113, 143). De Hart (2005a) summarized the arguments of these opponents as follows: a lack of integration causes immigrants to retain their original citizenship, which in turn, can lead to disloyalty to the Dutch nation-state. This debate turned principally on Muslim immigrants, an indication that more than multiple citizenship was at stake, the ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds of immigrants were also tacitly assumed to conflict with loyalty to the nation-state (De Hart 2005a).[16]

In 2007, the new government[17] withdrew the bill to further prevent holding multiple citizenship which had been proposed in 2005. This withdrawal did nothing to stop the debate about this issue. One very hot topic was that two of the new secretaries of state held more than one passport. The PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom) persistently put forward the argument that the multiple citizenship of two State Secretaries could lead to conflicting loyalties of these members of the government. The PVV leader Wilders explicitly linked this debate about loyalty to religion, by explicitly referring to the Islamic background of these State Secretaries.[18]

It should be stressed that the political debates on the relationship between multiple citizenship and integration and loyalty to the nation-state are largely hypothetical and theoretical. Their empirical basis is very threadbare (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b; see also Section 4.2 of this chapter). This weakness was recognized by two advisory bodies, namely the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 2007) and the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2008), which published reports on the issue. In fact, an empirical study commissioned by ACVZ indicated that there is no relationship

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[16] This was not the first time that the religion of citizens was linked to their loyalty to the nation-state. In the 19th century, Roman Catholics were mistrusted because of the perception that their loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church could conflict with the interests of the Dutch nation-state (Grever & Ribbens 2007: 42-44).

[17] In 2007 a new coalition government came into power, consisting of the political parties CDA, PvdA and Christian Union (CU).

[18] De Volkskrant (February 17, 2007), *"Je moet kiezen voor een land"*.

between multiple citizenship of immigrants and their integration (2008: 32; see also Dagevos 2008). Both advisory bodies put forward strong arguments which denied the relationship between multiple citizenship and the loyalty of citizens to the nation-state. WRR stressed that it is important to make a distinction between loyalty to the nation-state and citizenship as a legal status, because the legal status of citizens cannot be conflated with their emotional commitments. WRR argued that there is no reason to assume that citizens with single citizenship are more loyal to, or have fewer conflicting loyalties with, the nation-state in which they reside than those with multiple citizenship. As stated in the previous section, citizens with a single citizenship can also have transnational ties such as economic and business relations, which can just as well lead to conflicting loyalties.

WRR observed that there is a paradox in the reasoning of the opponents of multiple citizenship, who demand that citizens should self-identify with only one nation-state. These opponents stress the importance of the emotional component of identification with the Netherlands, but simultaneously paradoxically deny the importance of the immigrants' emotional ties to their roots. Citizens can be loyal to their nation-state for a variety of reasons, including pride in their ancestors, self-interest and appreciation of the concrete advantages of belonging to the nation-state (see WRR 2007: 168, 192). ACVZ agreed with the WRR analysis and added that there is no scientific evidence indicating that multiple citizenship leads to conflicting loyalties which might hinder the process of identification with the Netherlands (ACVZ 2008: 30; cf. Hirsch Ballin 2011: 19). ACVZ argued that citizens' loyalty to the Netherlands does not depend on whether or not they are loyal to another country, and that renouncing their original citizenship does not lead to the disappearance of their emotional ties and loyalties to the countries of origin.

In its response to the WRR report, the Dutch government agreed that multiple citizenship is not problematic (Ministerie van Justitie 2007: 2) but it did not take steps to abolish the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original citizenship. Indeed, respective Dutch governments have proposed various limitations to the exemptions which might open the door to multiple citizenship. Two bills, one passed in 2008 and the other in 2011, dealt with this matter. The first bill came into force in 2010 (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 39) and the second, which again stated that multiple citizenship might hinder immigrant integration, was withdrawn by the new government at the end of 2012.[19]

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[19] Ministerie van Algemene Zaken (2012).

Ernst Hirsch Ballin (2011), former Dutch Minister of Justice,[20] notes that these attempts by the government to limit multiple citizenship seem to have been tied into the idea that the success of immigrants' citizenship and integration depends on the extent to which they distance themselves from their culture and country of origin. He dismissed this idea as unrealistic. It was obvious that the crux of the matter was that people undeniably have multiple belongings and ties with various groups and nation-states. Consequently, Hirsch Ballin argued, the acquisition of legal citizenship should not depend on the demand that immigrants renounce all their ties with their culture and country of origin. Instead, citizenship should accept an implicit two-way contract which includes equal rights for citizens and acceptance by citizens 'of the basic principles of liberal democracy, familiarity with the language, history and institutions' (Hirsch Ballin 2011: 20). Such a tacit acceptance is especially important as legal citizenship guarantees civil rights, whose protection is closely bound up with the protection of such human rights as the freedom of speech and freedom of association. Perhaps the most important point is that having legal citizenship is a human right itself, which implies that withholding legal citizenship on the basis of unrealistic expectations violates human rights directly and indirectly (Hirsch Ballin 2011: 20).

As of 2012, the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original citizenship is still part of the Dutch Nationality Act, which makes the Netherlands one of the few West-European countries which still upholds such a requirement (Vink & De Groot 2010). However, making use of the exemptions to this requirement discussed above, more than one million Dutch citizens have multiple citizenship – around 6% of the total population (CBS 2011; see also Gijsberts & Dagevos 2009: 55-57). At the moment of writing, views on multiple citizenship in Dutch Parliament are still divided. The PVV obdurately opposes multiple citizenship on the grounds that it can cause conflicting loyalties, and the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) wants to restrict the legal exemptions which can lead to multiple citizenship.[21] Taking the opposite tack, the PvdA has explicitly stated that multiple citizenship has no relationship to integration or loyalty to the nation-state, and the Green Left party made no bones about it and simply stated that multiple citizenship should be allowed.[22] So far, the current government has not proposed any changes to the Dutch Nationality Act.[23]

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[20] Ernst Hirsch Ballin was Minister of Justice in the national governments of 1989-1994 and 2006-2010, for the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal).

[21] PVV (2012); SGP (2012).

[22] GroenLinks (2012); PvdA (2012).

[23] At the time of writing, the coalition government in the Netherlands consisted of the political parties VVD and PvdA, which came into power in November 2012.

This discussion illustrates that the laws on Dutch citizenship have become more restrictive since the 1990s. Politicians on the right of the political spectrum are the principal proponents of the school of thought that the multiple citizenship of immigrants, especially of Muslim immigrants, is an indicator of a lack of affective commitment to the Netherlands. Hence it is the culprit behind failed integration and a putative lack of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. In the next section, the views on loyalty to the nation-state current in society will be examined.

4.4   Views in society on multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state

The previous section has revealed that in the last two decades loyalty to the nation-state of immigrants with multiple citizenship has become a real focus of attention in Dutch political debates on the multicultural society. In this section, views current in Dutch society about this issue will be explored by analysing empirical data collected in the two questionnaires conducted for this research. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this sort of empirical analysis is especially relevant, as the arguments in the scientific and political debates on citizens' loyalty to the nation-state are hypothetical and theoretical, and lack empirical basis (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).

The analysis in this section consists of two parts. The first will examine views on multicultural citizenship, and in the second views on loyalty to the nation-state will be explored.

4.4.1   Views on multiple citizenship

In the questionnaires used in this research, respondents were asked whether and why they approved or disapproved of multiple citizenship in the Netherlands. Almost half (49%) of respondents disapprove of multiple citizenship. Almost a quarter (23%) of them approve. The other respondents (28%) do not have an opinion on this issue. These findings indicate that the percentage of Dutch citizens who oppose multiple citizenship has decreased, as in June 2010, two and a half years before the survey for the present study was carried out, this percentage was over 60% (CBS 2011). The reason for this drop in disapproval is not clear.

Regardless of their view on the issue, respondents said that they found it difficult to explain why they held their opinion. Those who did explain and disapproved said that holding multiple citizenship indicates a lack of national commitment. They insisted that immigrants would have to renounce their original citizenship in order to prove their commitment to their new home country. These respondents also stressed the risk of conflicting loyalties, showing special concern about government officials with multiple citizenship. Another topic which these

opponents raised was the matter of the risk of the abuse of welfare subsidies. They argued that immigrants with multiple citizenship 'should not be allowed to live in their countries of origin and receive welfare subsidies from the Dutch state'.

Conversely, respondents who approved of multiple citizenship stressed that citizenship status does not say much about a person: 'It is just a piece of paper'. Hence, they considered the political debate about the issue to be a pointless waste of time. Proponents also argued that the motives of citizens, including government officials, should not be judged by their citizenship status. Instead, people should be judged by their behaviour.

In order to explore the characteristics of those who approved and disapproved of multiple citizenship, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out, including the variables age, gender, descent, educational level and income. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this analysis reveals that the view on multiple citizenship is related to the level of education (β = .21, p < .001), descent (β = .20, p < .001) and gender (β = .11, p < .05).[24] The higher the educational level, the more approving of multiple citizenship, and women appear to be slightly more in favour of multiple citizenship than men. This is in line with the findings of the Statistics Netherlands (CBS 2011: 28-29). Furthermore, only 15% of immigrants of non-Western origin, opposed to 52% of native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin, disapprove of multiple citizenship, findings which are similar to those of the CBS (2011: 29). The relationship to descent can be partly explained by the fact that only 21% of those with multiple citizenship actually disapprove of it and that all respondents with multiple citizenship are immigrants.

The analysis also indicates a relationship between the views on multiple citizenship and political preference, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (β = .26, p < .001).[25] By and large voters for political parties on the right of the political spectrum disapprove of multiple citizenship, voters for the PVV (84% disapproval), VVD (65%) and SGP (60%) being particularly vehement. Voters for the SP (left-wing Socialist Party) also largely disapprove (67%). Voters for the PvdA, D66 and the GreenLeft party, parties on the left of the political spectrum, are more divided on the issue, with as many proponents as opponents of multiple citizenship. These findings are also similar to the results of the CBS study (2011: 29).

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[24] All mentioned βs in this chapter have been standardized.
[25] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out, with descent, gender, age, educational level and income as control variables.

4.4.2 Views on loyalty to the nation-state

As is clear from the literature review in Section 4.2, research has indicated that loyalty to the nation-state is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, one of whose components is loyalty in identification (which can engender feelings of pride and shame in achievements and actions of the nation-state). The other components are loyalty in concern, loyalty in advocacy, symbolic patriotism, constructive patriotism and uncritical patriotism. Therefore, to explore views of loyalty to the nation-state in Dutch society, the questionnaires used in this research included several items which relate to these various types. Below, these items will be discussed separately first, before using them to explore whether the above-mentioned types of loyalty to the nation-state are indeed empirically distinct, and whether they are distinct from the affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in the scientific debates (see Section 4.2). Finally, the data will be used to explore whether and how these expressions of loyalty to the nation-state are related to such background variables as multiple citizenship status, descent and political preference, as hypothesized in both scientific and political debates (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).

4.4.2.1 Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state

Pride and shame elicited by past and contemporary achievements and actions of the nation-state are expressions of a strong inclination to identify with the nation-state, a tendency which has been called loyalty in identification (Keller 2007: 6; see Section 4.2). To explore this expression of loyalty to the nation-state, respondents were asked whether they felt proud of various achievements of the Netherlands and Dutch people. The results are presented in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1

Pride in past and contemporary Dutch achievements: Means (scale from 1 = not proud at all to 4 = very proud) and Standard Deviations.

Items	M	SD
Dutch achievements in sport	3.3	0.8
Dutch achievements in science and technology	3.2	0.7
Dutch achievements in arts and literature	3.0	0.8
Functioning of Dutch democracy	2.8	0.8
Functioning of Dutch welfare state	2.8	0.8
Equality in Dutch society	2.8	0.9
Dutch economic achievements	2.7	0.8
Dutch political influence in the world	2.3	0.8

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

This table demonstrates that respondents are most proud of Dutch achievements in sports, science and technology and the arts and literature (means of respectively 3.3, 3.2 and 3). They are clearly less proud of Dutch political influence in the world (M = 2.3). Apart from rating the importance of these items in the survey, respondents also elaborated on these items during in-depth interviews, and mentioned other aspects of the Netherlands and Dutch society of which they were proud. Respondents stressed that they were proud of the high quality of institutions, facilities and regulations in the Netherlands and the resultant high quality of life. In their explanations, respondents mentioned the education, welfare and health care systems, the relative safety in traffic and the low crime rate. Respondents also mentioned that they are proud of the worldwide admiration for Dutch waterworks, including the Dutch levee system. The cultural and ethnic diversity in the Netherlands was also mentioned. Some respondents stressed that this is something to be proud of in itself, while others are proud that the multicultural society functions well, despite cultural differences. One respondent said, 'It is such a small country with so much diversity, and still we do not beat each other's brains out'. Finally, respondents are proud of certain Dutch values and attitudes such as tolerance of people of various cultural and religious backgrounds, tolerance of a wide range of life principles, freedom of speech and critical loyalty.

The respondents were also asked whether they felt ashamed of negative aspects of Dutch history, that is of certain Dutch actions affecting 'others' in the past. The results are presented in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2

Shame of negative aspects of Dutch history (Dutch actions affecting 'others' in the past): Means (scale from 1 = not ashamed at all to 4 = very much ashamed) and Standard Deviations.

Items	M	SD
Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s	2.9	1.0
Dutch involvement in slavery and slave trade	2.8	1.0
Dutch involvement in the fall of Srebrenica in 1995	2.6	1.0
Dutch colonial past	2.5	1.0

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

Speaking about historical aspects, respondents said they not only feel ashamed of the Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s, they were also perturbed by the fact that many Dutch people do not want to recognize what happened there or even refuse to talk about it. Respondents feel ashamed of current Dutch attitudes and behaviour towards immigrants, including discrimination and 'unnecessary insults'. In their discussions, some explicitly said they feel ashamed of the actions and statements of member of parliament Wilders and his political party PVV. Respondents also mentioned that they feel ashamed of certain failings in Dutch society, mentioning the bad treatment of asylum seekers and the fact that there still is poverty and a need for food banks despite the wealth of Dutch society and the strong Dutch economy. Finally, respondents expressed shame about the behaviour of Dutch hooligans, and the drinking and vandalism of Dutch holiday-makers abroad.

Besides items on pride and shame – expressions of loyalty in identification – the questionnaires also included items which relate to other expressions of loyalty to the nation-state, as discussed in Section 4.2. The results are presented in the following table.

Table 4.3

Expressions of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state: Means (scale from 1 = never to 5 = always) and Standard Deviations.

Items	M	SD
I am loyal to the Netherlands	3.6	0.8
I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country	3.5	1.0
I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries	3.2	1.0
I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement	3.2	1.0
I put the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries	3.0	1.2
I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more like Dutch people	2.8	1.0
I am a Dutch patriot	2.7	1.0
I speak up in defence of the Netherlands when people criticize it	2.6	1.0
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national anthem is played	2.6	1.3
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national flag is hoisted	2.3	1.1
I support the Netherlands, also when I know that it is wrong	2.1	1.0
I think that the Netherlands is virtually always right	2.0	0.8

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

The results in this table indicate that, on average, Dutch citizens seem to prefer to express their loyalty by criticizing their country in order to improve it (M = 3.2 on a scale from 1 = never to 5 = always), than by supporting their country uncritically (the items indicating the latter – 'supporting the Netherlands knowing that it is wrong', and 'thinking that the Netherlands is virtually always right' – have means of 2.1 and 2.0). Furthermore, the results also suggest that Dutch citizens have a moderate loyalty in concern (expressed by putting the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries, as discussed in Section 4.2) and a moderate loyalty in advocacy (expressed by speaking up for the Netherlands when it is criticized, as discussed in Section 4.2). They also appear to have a moderate sense of national superiority, as the items 'I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries' and 'I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more like Dutch people' have means of 3.2 and 2.8

respectively. However, the playing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag do not seem to stir up strong patriotic emotions.

Interestingly, it is less specific items such as 'I am loyal to the Netherlands' and 'I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country' which have the highest means, 3.6 and 3.5 respectively. In the in-depth interviews, respondents elaborated on these items. Generally speaking, they found it difficult to explain what their loyalty to the nation-state entails. Those who did explain, mentioned being proud of the country (see also the analysis of national pride, earlier in this section), contributing to Dutch society, respecting Dutch norms and values and protecting the image of the Netherlands. When talking about contributing to Dutch society, respondents said that it is important to participate in society, to keep society peaceful and maintain a liveable environment and to support Dutch interests in international contexts. They also stressed the importance of being critical and constructive in their opinions of government policies and of developments in society. On the other hand, respondents also did say that some people are too critical and complain too much. They considered it to be important to speak up to refute these complaints, as 'the Netherlands is one of the best places to live, and there is not much to complain about'.

Respondents who argued that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries referred to the high quality of institutions, facilities and regulations and the resultant high quality of life (see also the analysis of national pride, earlier in this section). Furthermore, respondents argued that this sense of superiority could improve the life satisfaction of Dutch citizens, and could encourage their willingness to contribute to their country as well. It was also argued that loyalty to the nation-state is less important than such other attitudes as 'trying to be good person', 'to be loyal to people you feel close to and to those who are in need'. Respondents believed that these attitudes are in the interest of the Netherlands as well.

To investigate whether the types of loyalty discussed in Section 4.2 are empirically distinct, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out including all items from Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 above. However, the item 'I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement', which is an indicator of constructive patriotism, had to be removed from the analysis as its correlations with all other items are lower than .3, resulting in a component on which only this item loads significantly. The analysis indicated six distinct components, whose (rotated) loadings are presented in Table 4.4 below.[26]

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[26] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 6 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 6 components could be extracted, which explained 65.57% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option

Table 4.4

Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state: Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis, transformed variables rotated with PCA).

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country	*.85*	-.01	-.02	.03	-.02	-.07
I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries	*.84*	.00	-.05	-.06	-.06	-.03
I am loyal to the Netherlands	*.82*	.00	-.01	.06	.11	-.10
I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more like Dutch people	*.68*	.02	-.07	-.01	-.01	.18
I am a Dutch patriot	*.49*	.00	.05	.07	.12	.29
I feel ashamed of Dutch involvement in slavery and slave trade	-.01	*.91*	-.03	.06	-.03	.01
I feel ashamed of the Dutch colonial past	-.04	*.90*	-.02	.07	-.02	.01
I feel ashamed of Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s	.05	*.88*	-.02	.02	.01	-.04
I feel ashamed of Dutch involvement in the fall of Srebrenica in 1995	.00	*.77*	.06	-.09	.10	.03
I am proud of the functioning of the Dutch welfare state	.07	.06	*-.81*	.04	-.23	.06
I am proud of the functioning of the Dutch democracy	.14	.01	*-.75*	.03	.04	-.11
I am proud of Dutch political influence in the world	.07	.08	*-.64*	.01	.13	.12
I am proud of Dutch economic achievements	-.01	-.10	*-.63*	.03	.25	.06
I am proud of equality in Dutch society	-.09	-.07	*-.61*	.04	.15	-.01
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national anthem is played	.02	.04	-.03	*.95*	-.01	-.09
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national flag is hoisted	-.02	.02	-.05	*.91*	-.04	.06

(Table continued on next page)

'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

(Table 4.4 continued)

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
I am proud of Dutch achievements in arts and literature	-.01	.05	-.09	-.04	*.77*	-.01
I am proud of Dutch achievements in sport	.05	.10	.09	.04	*.75*	.00
I am proud of Dutch achievements in science and technology	.04	-.07	-.23	.01	*.70*	-.02
I support the Netherlands, also when I know that it is wrong	-.08	.03	-.08	-.05	-.03	*.83*
I think that the Netherlands is virtually always right	.15	-.02	.03	-.03	-.03	*.78*
I speak up in defence of the Netherlands when people criticize it	-.03	-.02	-.04	**.32**	.05	*.58*
I put the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries	.25	-.12	.22	.25	.20	**.34**
Eigenvalues	5.67	3.16	2.33	1.66	1.23	1.03
Variance accounted for (%)	24.64	13.76	10.14	7.20	5.35	4.49

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. The items have been sorted by loadings on each component. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings of the items used for constructing scales are italicized.

The items which cluster on these components suggest that these components can be characterized as six distinct types of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state: *nationalist patriotism* (C1), *shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history* (C2), *national-political pride* (C3), *symbolic patriotism* (C4), *national-cultural pride* (C5) and *uncritical patriotism* (C6).

The component which can be characterized as *nationalist patriotism* includes items which refer to an idealization of the nation ('I prefer to be Dutch rather than citizen of another country') and to feelings of national superiority (second and fourth items in the table), but also the less specific item 'I am loyal to the Netherlands'. This suggests that the concept of loyalty is associated more with an idealization of the nation and feelings of national superiority than with other such expressions as pride, the supporting of or speaking up for the Netherlands. The term nationalist patriotism seems to be appropriate to characterize this component, as the term nationalism is mostly used to refer to an idealization of the nation which can be expressed by feelings of national superiority (Sumner 1906; Druckman 1994; see also Section 4.2).

Furthermore, the items referring to getting goose bumps when the national anthem is played or the flag is hoisted both load highly on the same component. These are expressions of an emotional importance attached to ritual practices or symbolic representations of the country, which is referred to in the literature as *symbolic patriotism* (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Parker 2009; see also Section 4.2).

Component C6 includes supporting the Netherlands even though it is known to be wrong, thinking that the Netherlands is always right, and speaking up for the Netherlands when it is criticized. This relates to *uncritical patriotism*, defined in the literature as 'unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism' (Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999: 153). As argued in Section 4.2, this type of patriotism relates to loyalty in belief, namely, the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty (Keller 2007). (This means that loyalty to a country does not necessarily further its interests, as this specific expression of loyalty implies refraining from or opposing criticism which is contradictory with principles of democracy.)

The items referring to pride load on two distinct components, which can be characterized as *national-cultural pride* (including pride of achievements in sport, science and technology, and arts and literature) and *national political pride* (including pride of Dutch democracy, economy and the welfare state, Dutch political influence in the world and equal treatment in Dutch society). These two components of national pride correspond to the dimensions of national pride found by Hjerm (1998: 343-344) in an analysis of empirical data from Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden. Finally, the items referring to shame all load highly on the same component, which can be characterized as *shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history*. As discussed in Section 4.2, pride and shame of past and contemporary achievements and actions of the nation-state are expressions of a strong tendency to identify with the nation-state, a tendency which has been called loyalty in identification (Keller 2007: 6; see Section 4.2).

These results run along the same lines as the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007) and Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001) discussed in Section 4.2.2. These authors also found empirical distinctions between the idealization of one's nation expressed by feelings of national superiority (which, as mentioned above, these authors label nationalism, and in the present study is labelled nationalist patriotism), and other types of loyalty to the nation-state (or patriotism). Moreover, the distinction between symbolic and uncritical patriotism fits with the findings of Parker (2009). To explore the relationships between these phenomena in more detail, the items with the highest component loadings presented in the table above (italicized) have been used to create summated scales. The values of

Cronbach's Alpha for the summated scales are between .64 and .89.[27] The bivariate correlations between these scales are presented in Table 4.5 below, which also includes the affective component of national self-identification as discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Section 4.2).

Table 4.5

Bivariate correlations between the affective component of national self-identification and expressions of loyalty to the nation-state.

	Affective national Self-identification	National-cultural pride	National-political pride	Shame Dutch history	Symbolic patriotism	Uncritical patriotism	Nationalist patriotism
Affective national Self-identification	1.00	.28****	.30****	.01	.25****	.30****	.41****
National-cultural pride		1.00	.40****	.05	.20****	.19*	.26****
National-political pride			1.00	-.02	.24****	.22****	.25****
Shame Dutch history				1.00	.07*	-.01	-.05
Symbolic patriotism					1.00	.37****	.24****
Uncritical patriotism						1.00	.34****
Nationalist patriotism							1.00

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. All values are Kendall's tau-b coefficients.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 (all values two-tailed).

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[27] Values of Cronbach's Alpha: for items selected to represent C1 = .81, C2 = .88, C3 = .79, C4 = .89, C5 = .72, C6 = .64.

These correlations indicate positive relationships between the affective component of national self-identification on the one hand and all the expressions of loyalty to the nation-state distinguished, with the exception of shame of negative aspects of national history, on the other hand. This corresponds with results from studies in the tradition of social identity research, which indicate that self-identification with a group can be expressed by in-group loyalty (see Section 4.2). However, the strength of these relationships is weak to moderate (the highest correlation in this table is .41), which suggests that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state should not be seen as indicators for, or even synonymous with, the affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in Section 4.2 (cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007). Similarly, the CATPCA analysis and the correlations in the table above suggest that nationalist patriotism is positively related to, but distinct from, other expressions of loyalty to the nation-state, which ties in with findings in earlier research as discussed in Section 4.2 (e.g. Blank, Schmidt & Westle 2001; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Importantly, shame of negative aspects of national history appears to be the most distinct expression of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state, as the results in the table indicate that it is not or only barely related to other types of loyalty.

4.4.2.2 Who is loyal?

In both scientific literature and political debates in the Netherlands, as already said, various scholars and politicians have hypothesized that multiple citizenship is an indicator of weaker loyalty to the nation-state. Furthermore, several empirical studies have indicated that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state are more strongly related to political ideology than to national self-identification as understood in terms of social identity theory (see Section 4.2) (for a discussion see Huddy & Khatib 2007). To explore whether such relationships can be found in the present study as well, Categorical Regression analyses were carried out for each of the above-mentioned summated scales which represent the expressions of loyalty.[28] This sort of analysis was also carried out for the item 'I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement'. As this item appears to be the only indicator of constructive patriotism in the questionnaire, as explained above, in the following analysis the variable 'criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its improvement' will be used instead of the term 'constructive patriotism'.[29]

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[28] In the CATREG procedure, these summated scales were specified as ordinal and discretized by ranking, as the scales were derived from ordinal items.

[29] It does not seem sensible to explore the phenomenon of constructive patriotism using only one item. In future studies, constructive patriotism could be explored in qualitative research in order to develop more items to measure its strength (see also Chapter 2).

In the first step, the analyses which were carried out included the variables age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income. These analyses indicate that educational level is to some extent related to national-political pride, uncritical and symbolic patriotism, and the variable 'criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its improvement' (β = .20, p < .001; β = -.17, p < .001; β = -.15, p < .05 and β = .20, p < .001 respectively). The higher the educational level, the more national-political pride and the more respondents criticize the Netherlands when they think that their criticism will help to improve it, but the lower their uncritical and symbolical patriotism. Furthermore, the older respondents are, the more they tend to be symbolically patriotic and feel shame about negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = .25, p < .001 and β = .20, p < .05 respectively). When it comes to gender differences, men have slightly more national-cultural pride than women (β = .12, p < .05). The variable descent is slightly related to all types of loyalty, except shame of negative aspects of national history. Both native Dutch and immigrants of non-Western origin are slightly more proud of national-cultural and national-political achievements than immigrants of Western origin (β = .22, p < .05 for both scales). Furthermore, native Dutch score slightly higher on the nationalist patriotism, uncritical patriotism and symbolic patriotism scales than either Western or non-Western immigrants (β = .22, p < .005; β = .18, p < .001 and β = .12, p < .05 respectively). On the other hand, immigrants of non-Western origin criticize the Netherlands when they think that helps its improvement slightly more often than their compatriots (β = .10, p < .05).

Taken together, and considering the weak correlations, these results do not indicate that descent is related to the strength of loyalty to the nation-state. To explore this in more detail, analyses were also carried out separately for immigrants, in which the variable 'affective commitment to one's ethnic group' (discussed in Chapter 3) was included as well. Analyses were likewise carried out for Muslim immigrants, in which the variable 'affective commitment to one's religious group' was included. These analyses did not reveal significant relationships between the affective commitment to one's ethnic or religious group on the one hand, and types of loyalty to the nation-state on the other. These empirical results contradict the theoretical argument of opponents of multiculturalism, who worry that a civic conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3), namely the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, might not be sufficient to foster loyalty to the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; see Section 4.2.3).

To explore relationships between multiple citizenship and types of loyalty to the nation-state, the variable 'having multiple citizenship status' was added to the Categorical Regression analyses. These analyses revealed no significant differences in levels of loyalty between those who do and those who do not possess multiple

citizenship. Moreover, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, similar analyses did not reveal significant differences in the affective commitment to the Netherlands of these two groups. This is in line with the findings of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) discussed in Section 4.3, indicating that the legal aspect of citizenship cannot be conflated with the emotional commitments of citizens, and that there is no reason to assume that citizens with a single citizenship status are more loyal to the nation-state in which they reside compared to those with multiple citizenship. It also accords with the findings of De Hart (2005b) and Ronkainen (2011), which indicated that multiple citizenship is not related to the strength of loyalty to the nation-state.

Finally, the analyses reveal moderate relationships between the political preference of respondents and their expressions of loyalty to the nation-state (all βs between .19 and .31, with all ps < .001).[30] Voters for parties on the left of the political spectrum (PvdA, SP, D66 and Green Left) and non-voters are slightly less uncritically patriotic than voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, CDA and PVV) (β = .21, p < .001). These results might be explained by the relationship between uncritical patriotism and conservatism, as suggested by Huddy and Khatib (2007: 64). These authors also found that those who classified themselves as right-wing conservatives tended to be more uncritically patriotic. They explained this by referring to the relationship between authoritarianism and uncritical patriotism: authoritarians, like uncritical patriots, tend to refrain from or oppose criticism of their country, and authoritarians tend to vote for (conservative) parties on the right of the political spectrum (see also Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).

Conservatism might also partly explain levels of symbolic patriotism, as voters for the Christian parties CDA and SGP are more symbolically patriotic than voters for other parties (β = .19, p < .001). On the other hand, the relationship between political preference and the variable 'criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its improvement' is difficult to interpret. Although the finding that non-voters score relatively low on this variable appears to make sense, it is not clear why voters for the largest Christian party (CDA) and the left-wing SP score lower on this variable than voters for all other parties (β = .26, p < .001).[31] Furthermore, voters for liberal parties (VVD, D66) and the right wing populist PVV clearly feel less shame of negative aspects of Dutch history than voters for left-wing (PvdA, Green Left) and

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[30] The variable political preference was added to the Categorical Regression analyses, which means that these analyses were controlled for age, gender, educational level and descent.

[31] In future studies, constructive patriotism, for which this variable is an indicator, could be explored in qualitative research in order to develop more items to measure its strength (see also Chapter 2).

Christian parties (CDA, Christian Union and SGP) (β = .31, p < .001). Voters for the SP and non-voters reflect the average for all respondents in this respect. Finally, voters for the traditionally largest political parties (the parties who always have formed the government coalitions) VVD, PvdA and CDA score higher on the national-cultural and national-political pride scales than voters for the other parties (β = .24, p < .001 and β = .22, p < .001 respectively).