Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship : public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands

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Chapter 3
Multicultural citizenship and national belonging

3.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to speak of a multicultural society the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including their belonging to the national group of both natives and immigrants, their cultural distinctiveness and their equality, have to be formally and publicly recognized (Shadid 2009: 5-6). In this chapter, the recognition of one of these dimensions, namely national belonging in Dutch society, will be explored.

The issue of belonging to the national group or nation is fundamental in debates on citizenship, as the concept of citizenship 'entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion' of individuals (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 155). This tension is clearly manifest in the various aspects of citizenship discussed in the literature (e.g. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; Cohen 1999; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). One of these aspects is the legal status of immigrants – those who possess the legal status of a country's citizenship legally belong to the national group. Another aspect of citizenship is the rights and obligations entailed by the legal status of citizenship. Among them are the obligation to obey the country's laws and, on the rights side the right to equal treatment and the right to participate in the country's political institutions. Nevertheless, despite the clearly circumscribed legal boundaries of citizenship and the formal rights and obligations bound up in the concept, citizens can still disagree about who fully belongs to their national group. Views on belonging to a national group are necessarily socially constructed (and therefore dynamic) and consequently the nation itself is a social construct (Anderson 1991; Pehrson &

Green 2010). One example is the frequent use of the term 'foreigners' to describe first- and even second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands, including those who have full legal citizenship. This lack of consensus about who fully belongs shows, for example, that people can differ in their views on to what extent the rights, such as equal treatment and freedom of religion of certain groups in their nation state, should be upheld – issues that will be more extensively discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Despite the fact that in many countries this social construction of national belonging has long been determined by the dominant group, it has become 'increasingly difficult to simply conceive of national citizenship as strictly mono-cultural because citizens of the same country have increasingly diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds' (Duyvendak 2011: 82). As discussed in Chapter 1, this is certainly the case in the Netherlands. To examine who is socially recognized as belonging to the Dutch national group, in this chapter Dutch government policies which relate to national belonging will be reviewed and empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research will be analysed. However, before this is done, the scientific debates on, and the scientific usage of, the concept of belonging will be discussed.

3.2 Perspectives on national belonging

Issues of social belonging essentially concern relationships between individuals and groups. These relationships are generally investigated in social identity research which focuses on how individuals are socially defined, including to which groups they do and do not belong (Verkuyten 2005: 43; see also Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston & McDermott 2009; Jenkins 2008).

However, besides the fact that there is no agreement on how social identity should be defined, Verkuyten (2005: 40) states that the concept of identity is overused, and the resultant familiarity leads to 'confusion, misunderstanding and conceptual vagueness'. Brubaker and Cooper likewise state that, when the concept of identity is used in social science, it 'tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)' (2000: 1-2).[1] Therefore, Brubaker and Cooper propose 'to go beyond "identity"' (2000: 36), and to replace this concept with other concepts which offer more conceptual clarity. But, because conceptual clarity

[1] Brubaker & Cooper state that a strong sense of identity implies 'strong notions of group boundedness and homogeneity', 'a sharp distinctiveness from nonmembers, a clear boundary between inside and outside' (2000: 10). In contrast, a weak sense of identity implies that 'identity is multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, constructed, negotiated, and so on' (2000: 11).

is the goal, this call to replace the concept of identity can also be interpreted as a plea for a more appropriate operationalizing of the concept. The latter position is taken in the present study, following in the footsteps of Verkuyten (2005; 2006) and Jenkins (2008).[2]

In the exploration of the phenomenon of national belonging in this study, insights will be used which are derived from research in the tradition of social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979; see also Druckman 1994; Huddy & Khatib 2007). In this tradition, social identity is generally defined as a cognitive awareness of group membership in combination with an affective commitment to that group (Tajfel 1981).

Several aspects of national belonging will be discussed in this and the next chapter, including the strength of affective commitment to the national group, national pride, patriotism, and criteria deemed important when considering who belongs to the national group. The review of the scientific debates in this section will be structured on the following issues which have been distinguished in studies of social identity by Jenkins (2008), Theiss-Morse (2009) and Verkuyten (2005; 2006): (1) the need of the individual to belong, (2) social categorization and its accompanying behavioural and normative expectations, and (3) social recognition.[3]

3.2.1 The need to belong and the construction of group boundaries

Research in various disciplines has shown that man, as a social animal, has the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary 1995). This individual need, which is defined by Baumeister and Leary as 'a strong desire to form and maintain enduring interpersonal attachments', cannot be dismissed as just any need, as research indicates that it is a 'powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation' (Baumeister & Leary 1995: 497). These interpersonal attachments are sought not only with family members and friends, but also with larger collectivities, such as national, ethnic and religious groups (Druckman 1994; Verkuyten 2006). Importantly, in their overview of empirical research on belonging, Gere and MacDonald (2010: 110) conclude that 'it has become clear that the need to belong has strong effects on people's cognitions, emotions, and behaviors' and that 'a chronically unmet need has many negative consequences that can profoundly affect an individual's life'. These negative consequences can include a lower performance in complex cognitive tasks, higher stress, poorer health and more health conditions (Gere & MacDonald 2010).

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[2] Also see: Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott (2009); Yuval-Davis (2010).

[3] Jenkins (2008) explores the concept of social identity. Theiss-Morse (2009) and Verkuyten (2005; 2006) study national identity and ethnic identity respectively, considering these as specific forms of social identities.

However, belonging to a national group, or any other social group, is not just a matter of individual choice determined by this need to belong. Others in the social environment have to categorize and recognize the individual as part of the group as well. This process relates to social categorization, the second issue in the studies of social identity mentioned above. This means that individuals and groups categorize themselves and are categorized by others in groups. Scholars use various terms to distinguish between these internal and external processes, such as self-ascription and ascription (Verkuyten 2005), and internal and external identification (Jenkins 2008). In these processes, many criteria for categorization are used in various combinations, among them cultural characteristics, ethnic background, gender and age (cf. Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005: 9-11). Importantly, this does not mean that a social group exists because it is objectively different from other groups with regard to certain criteria, but rather, as Barth (1969) realizes, because these criteria are used, in processes of ascription and self-ascription, to construct (imagined) group boundaries socially (cf. Anderson 1991). The very fact that every individual can be categorized according to various criteria means that every individual belongs to various groups at the same time.[4] An individual can legally belong to the Dutch national group, and simultaneously be categorized as belonging to another ethnic group, a family or a political party. In other words, individuals have partial or multiple social identities and belongings.[5] At the individual level, in a specific situation a certain identity, for instance, being a member of a family, can be emphasized, but in a different situation another identity, for instance, being a member of an ethnic or national group can be the most salient (Verkuyten 2005).

There has been an extensive discussion about why group boundaries are constructed, and influential explanations have been proposed by Barth (1969) and Tajfel (1981). Barth has argued that this process is a 'by-product of the transactions and negotiations of individuals pursuing their interests' (Jenkins 2008: 7). In contrast, in his social identity theory, Tajfel has proposed that categorization is a basic human tendency which serves individuals to achieve positive self-esteem by differentiating their in-group positively from out-groups. This need for positive distinctiveness *can* be expressed in favourable behaviour towards members of one's in-group – in-group favouritism and in-group loyalty – and discrimination against members of out-groups.[6] The crux of the matter is that it is not easy to determine the direction of the relationship, which is a process of weighing up between the

[4] See Jenkins (2008: 104) for a discussion of the distinction between categories and groups.

[5] See, for example, research on immigrants' processes of self-identification in the Netherlands by Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover (2005).

[6] The need for positive distinctiveness, however, is not always expressed in these ways. See Shadid (2007:183); also see Jenkins (2008: 114-115); Theiss-Morse (2009: 41).

process of pursuing interests on the one hand and social categorization on the other, because striving for positive self-esteem can also be considered pursuing an interest (Jenkins 2008: 7-8).[7]

Whatever the case might be, it is generally recognized that social categorization does happen, and that categorizations are not only nominal in that they provide labels for groups, but they also have cultural and emotional components which provide meaning (Brubaker 2009: 34; Druckman 1994; Jenkins 2008: 99; Verkuyten 2005: 46; 2006: 6). Consequently, the construction of boundaries not only sets in-group members apart nominally from out-group members, it simultaneously implies expectations of similarity among group members in the matters of specific behaviour and norms (cf. Jenkins 2008: 132-147). Examples are expectations of patriotism and group loyalty, which can be expressed by turning out to vote or being prepared to pay taxes, and also expectations of holding certain views about equality and cultural distinctiveness (Druckman 1994; Theiss-Morse 2009: 13-14, 23-29, 67-70). However, this does not necessarily mean that there is behavioural conformity or consensus about norms within a group, but rather that group members as well as the outside world believe or want to believe this to be the case (Jenkins 2008: 140).[8] As such, these expectations, held by members of both in-groups and out-groups, can be stereotypical (Verkuyten 2005: 46). Such in-group stereotypes, in turn, help to distinguish in-groups from out-groups, which serves the need for (positive) distinctiveness (Theiss-Morse 2009: 70-72).

In practice, in-group members can disagree on what the behavioural and normative expectations really mean, and their interpretations of these expectations are situationally contingent (Jenkins 2008: 136). Research shows, for example, that when the in-group stereotype includes support for the norm of equality, some group members support specific measures (like positive action) to achieve substantive equality, while other group members do not (Theiss-Morse 2009: 21-22; see also Chapter 5). Cogently, an individual who does not meet (all) behavioural and normative group expectations can still identify with the group, and will not necessarily be considered as not belonging to the group by other group members. For example, a Dutch individual who has emigrated to another country might not express loyalty to the Dutch national group, but can still self-identify and be identified by others as Dutch (cf. Keller 2007: 164-166).

[7] For a discussion of these and other perspectives, see Jenkins (2008: 1-15).

[8] Jenkins (2008: 134-140) discusses the work of Anthony Cohen (1985), who proposed that symbols shared within communities allow community members to believe that they behave in similar ways and that they have similar norms.

3.2.2 Social recognition

The expectations of similarity within groups mean that the construction of group boundaries does more than differentiate between in-groups and out-groups, it also affects relations between in-group members. In this regard, Theiss-Morse (2010: 4, 72-77) makes a distinction between typical[9] group members, who exemplify the group stereotypes and are therefore fully recognized as belonging to the group, and marginalized group members, who do not meet (all) these expectations and are therefore not fully recognized. This differentiation between in-group members relates to social recognition, the third issue in the studies of social identity mentioned above. Verkuyten (2006: 5) argues that striving for social recognition is, as are the need to belong and finding meaning through social categorization, a basic human tendency. This includes recognition of who one is as an individual and also one's recognition as member of a group, especially when belonging to this group is important to one's self-esteem (Verkuyten 2005: 68-69; 2006: 9).

This means that the issue of belonging to a certain group, which is reflected in debates on national identity, is not trivial, as it can lead to identity conflicts. For example, Huynh, Devos and Smalarz (2011) researched the 'perpetual foreigner stereotype': the idea that members of ethnic minorities will be seen as others in perpetuity. They conclude that, among ethnic minorities, 'even after controlling for perceived discrimination, awareness of the perpetual foreigner stereotype was a significant predictor of identity conflict and lower sense of belonging to American culture' (Huynh, Devos and Smalarz 2011: 133). In other words, immigrants who perceive that their ethnicity stands in the way of their being fully recognized as part of the national group can suffer from identity conflicts and a lowered sense of belonging to the national group.

3.2.3 The importance of context and intergroup relations

These issues just raised – the need to belong, the need for social recognition, and social categorization and its accompanying behavioural and normative expectations – clearly define that group boundaries, as Jenkins (2008: 44) puts it, are 'the perpetual subject and object of negotiation', which implies that they are dynamic and situationally contingent (see also Verkuyten 2005: 55). Examining this contingent character of group boundaries, scholars identify many factors which play a role in their construction. These factors relate to the situations in which the boundaries are constructed, the relations between and within the categorized groups, and the interpretations of these situations and relations by the individuals and groups concerned (Wentholt 1991; see also Verkuyten 2005: 53). These

[9] Theiss-Morse uses the term 'prototypical'.

factors include, *inter alia*, historical, economic and political circumstances (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004), relations between majority and minority groups (Verkuyten 2010: 151), and power relations (Verkuyten 2005: 58; Brady & Kaplan 2009: 36).

The importance of the interpretation of such factors, more specifically the interpretation of the historical circumstances pertinent to the construction of group boundaries, is shown in research by Smeekes, Verkuyten and Poppe (2012), which indicates that those who perceive Dutch national history to have been tolerant tend to be more tolerant of the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslims in the Netherlands. In considering the relationship between group relations and power, it is of importance 'who is able to construct socially relevant categorizations' (Verkuyten 2005: 56). Members of majority groups tend to consider their own nominal characteristics and accompanying behaviour and norms – which, as discussed above, are stereotypical – to be self-evident (Verkuyten 2005: 59) and typical (Theiss-Morse 2009: 73). Those who deviate from these criteria or are perceived as deviating are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to 'protect the in-group stereotype' (Theiss-Morse 2009: 74).[10] Verkuyten (2005: 59) calls this process the 'normalizing effect' of the majority group identity. An example of this process, which includes historical and political factors as well, is the link between the history of colonialism and the present negative stereotypes of immigrant groups (Verkuyten 2005: 53), which as a result of these stereotypes are not considered to be fully part of the national group (cf. Theiss-Morse 2009: 67). Similarly, in their research Devos and Banaji (2005: 447) found that African Americans and Asian Americans were 'less associated with the national category "American" than are White Americans'.

The construction of boundaries can have negative consequences, among them discrimination and identity conflicts. Verkuyten (2005: 45) states that '[m]aking distinctions is not a problem, but it can become one if it occurs without adequate basis' (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of discrimination). Both discrimination and identity conflicts can lead to a lowered sense of belonging to the national group (Jayaweera & Choudhury 2008; Rumbaut 2005; Smart Richman & Leary 2009). Identity conflicts can occur when individuals who were born in the Netherlands and who consider themselves to be Dutch are still categorized as, for example, Moroccans because their parents or grandparents were born in Morocco (Shadid 2007: 192). In other words, the categorization of someone as belonging to a certain group can persist, even when personal characteristics change. Identity conflicts can

[10] This relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of sub-typing (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001).

also occur when one of the multiple identities each individual has, for example, that of being a Muslim, is not considered to be part of the in-group characteristics (cf. Shadid 2009: 17). In some cases, specific social identities can become stigma identities, which 'provide a chronically salient distinction or a master status that cannot be ignored and serves to define the essential character of those who are classified' (Verkuyten 2005: 52). As an example of a stigma identity, Verkuyten refers to the 'Gypsy' identity of Roma and Sinti in Eastern Europe.

This is not to say that majority groups or those in power are the only groups able to construct socially relevant categorizations. Various collectivities, among them women, homosexuals and religious and ethnic minorities, have been actively engaged in the negotiation of group boundaries, not only in order to be fully accepted as belonging to a national group (acceptance which includes, for example, equal treatment), but also for the recognition of their own cultural, historical or political distinctiveness (see also Chapter 6). Therefore, the construction of boundaries is also a political project, and terms such as the politics of belonging and identity politics are used to describe these negotiations (see, for example, Parekh 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006).

3.2.4 Aspects of identification with the national group

As mentioned above, the construction of group boundaries is an interplay of internal and external processes, that is, of self-identification and the identification by others. In the literature on national identity, various concepts have been discussed which relate to self-identification with the national group, such as national attachment or commitment, nationalism, national pride and patriotism (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009).

In order to clarify the relationship between these concepts and self-identification with the national group or nation, it is helpful to distinguish between various components of self-identification recognized in studies of social identities (for an overview, see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). First of all, individuals need to be cognitively aware that they are members of a certain (national) group. This cognitive awareness can include their assessment of to what extent they consider themselves a typical group member (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 85; Theiss-Morse 2009: 73). Apart from this cognitive component, self-identification also has an affective component which relates to the need of human beings to belong, discussed earlier in this chapter, and an evaluative component which relates to the positive and negative attitudes individuals foster towards the social category to which they belong (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). The distinction between these three components can be traced back to Tajfel's definition of the social identity concept as the 'part of an

individual's self- concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel 1978: 63).[11]

Research in the tradition of Tajfel's social identity theory indicates that there is a strong relationship between the affective component of self-identification – also referred to as the level of affective commitment or the strength of belonging to a group – and behaviour in terms of group membership. Generally speaking, group members who have a high affective commitment to the group are more likely to display in-group favouritism and in-group loyalty (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). Especially when the distinctiveness of a group is cast into doubt, group members with a strong affective commitment to the group tend to defend this distinctiveness by exaggerating differences between their in-group and out-groups, a process which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination of out-group members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002).

As might be expected, the level of affective commitment to the in-group varies, and it has been shown that it depends on the level of voluntariness of group membership (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). When individuals voluntarily choose to be a member of a group, their level of commitment to that group can generally be expected to be stronger than when their membership is involuntary. In the latter case, group members cannot leave the group, at least not easily (the voluntariness can be a matter of degree) and more variation in the level of affective group commitment can be expected. National group membership can be considered to be involuntary to a large extent. As Bakke (2000: 8) argues, '[n]ations are not objects of choice the way e.g. political parties are', and most people never change their national identity. Nevertheless, referring to Billig (1995), Theiss-Morse (2009: 10) argues that national identities have a relatively potent nature, as they are 'constantly reinforced through symbols, culture, language, and politics'. Moreover, national identity is not only reinforced, it is also reproduced by such institutions as schools, in which national culture, history and norms are taught, and consequently, 'for most people, being a part of the nation is a matter of upbringing and socialization rather than a matter of conscious choice' (Bakke 2000: 7; see also Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano & Vertovec 2004). This explains the stability of these identities, and means that those who feel a sense of national belonging tend to 'feel that commitment strongly' (Theiss-Morse 2009: 10).

[11] Also see the distinction between the cognitive process of 'identification as' and the emotional process (including a combination of affection and evaluation) of 'identification with'. See Verkuyten (2005: 65-67).

Despite the widely recognized relationship between the level of affective commitment to the group and behaviour in terms of group membership, there is no agreement among scholars about how to conceptualize and measure this level of commitment (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). Some authors include the cognitive, affective and evaluative components of self-identification in one uni-dimensional construct, in order to describe the level of commitment to the national group (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009, who examines the strength of national identity). However, empirical research indicates that the various components of self-identification do not necessarily co-vary in a predictable way (for an extensive discussion see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). In this respect, Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk found that it is the affective component of self-identification, and not the cognitive and evaluative components, which 'appears to be the key aspect of social identity which drives the tendency for people to behave in terms of their group membership' (1999: 386).

With these insights, it is possible to clarify the relationships between the affective component of national self-identification and related concepts which have been discussed in the literature, including national attachment, national pride, patriotism and nationalism. First of all, the term national attachment is mostly used as a general concept, not only to refer to the affective component of national self-identification, but also to nationalism, national pride and patriotism (cf. Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Latcheva 2010). Some researchers have found that national pride correlates positively with the affective component of national self-identification (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009: 133-138). Nevertheless, it is not clear if these two phenomena necessarily co-vary, as pride has both affective and evaluative components. While affection for a group can undoubtedly influence the evaluation of that group, individuals with a strong affective commitment to a certain group can evaluate certain characteristics of that group negatively (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999: 373). In other words, national pride is a multidimensional concept (cf. Hjerm 1998: 343), and empirical study is necessary to explore how the dimensions of national pride are related to group commitment and other variables.

Similarly, other studies suggest that patriotism is a multidimensional concept as well. The concept of patriotism is used not only to describe the affective component of national self-identification, but to illustrate the attitudes and behaviours in which this affection is expressed as well (cf. Herrmann, Isernia & Segatti 2009; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Various forms of these attitudes and behaviours are considered in the literature as various types of patriotism (for references, see Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Constructive patriotism,

for example, has been defined as criticism and questioning motivated by 'a desire for positive change' (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). Furthermore, empirical studies indicate that national self-identification is distinct from various forms of patriotism (Huddy and Khatib 2007).

As are these aforementioned concepts, in the relevant literature the concept of nationalism is generally used to refer to a bias in favour of one's own nation (cf. Calhoun 2002). However, the concept of nationalism is often used to describe views and behaviour stressing the distinction between one's own national group and other national, ethnic or religious groups (cf. Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993; Latcheva 2010). In this regard, several authors suggest that nationalism refers to an idealization of one's nation (e.g. Sumner 1906), which can be expressed by the sense that one's own nation is superior to other nations (e.g. Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). Furthermore, a distinction is often made between civic and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the view that membership of a nation is first and foremost legal and political, implying that criteria for national belonging include respect for institutions and laws, and a sense of national belonging (Calhoun 2002). In contrast, ethnic nationalism refers to the view that membership of a nation is rooted in specific ethnic or cultural criteria. Below, this distinction will be discussed in more detail.

Considering the discussion above, the relationships between the affective component and other components of self-identification are 'an issue for theoretical elaboration and empirical test' (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 91). In the present chapter, the cognitive and affective components of national self-identification and identification will be examined separately. In this examination, the affective component of national self-identification will also be referred to as 'affective commitment' or 'the strength of belonging' to the national group. The phenomena of national pride and patriotism will be discussed and examined in more detail in Chapter 4.

3.2.5 Inclusive and exclusive aspects of group boundaries

The interplay of the individual, situational and relational factors discussed above produces various forms of boundary construction. In other words, depending on these factors, certain categorization criteria are deemed relevant and others not. With respect to recognition of national belonging, a distinction is often made between nations in which either 'ethnic' or 'civic' criteria are seen as essential. This distinction can be traced back to 1944 when Kohn (1944: 329) stated that the liberal and cosmopolitan values embodied in 'Western civic nationalism' in Europe were superior to the 'ethnic nationalism' in Eastern Europe. Since then, the

distinction has been made in various studies of nationalism and national identities (e.g. Geertz 1973; Jones & Smith 2001).

Apart from the normative aspect of Kohn's comparison between Western and Eastern European nations, Bakke (2000) describes empirical aspects of the distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity, or, in other words, ethnic and civic nationalism. These empirical aspects relate to the extent national identity can be acquired or changed or, in other words, to whether aspects of national group boundaries are inclusive or exclusive. Therefore, the criteria deemed relevant to a civic conception include respect for institutions and laws, civic culture, values, ideology and a sense of national belonging. Bakke says it is assumed that these criteria have voluntary characteristics and that therefore a nation with a civic conception of identity is inclusive, which means that national belonging can be acquired. In contrast, the ethnic conception of national identity includes criteria which are much more difficult to acquire or change, such as a common descent, religion, customs and traditions. Hence this conception is exclusive (Bakke 2000: 2; also see Jones & Smith 2001).[12]

However, the difference between these conceptions is a matter of degree (cf. Bakke 2000; Hansen & Hesli 2009). Empirical research indicates that both ethnic and civic criteria are found in all conceptions of national identity (Jones & Smith 2001; Smith 1991), and that certain civic membership criteria, such as values, 'may be as difficult to acquire as the 'ethnic' criteria' (Bakke 2000: 12). Moreover, certain criteria can indicate either an ethnic conception of national identity or a civic conception of national identity. For example, when someone holds the view that speaking Dutch is an important aspect of being Dutch, this can mean at least two things. It can mean that this individual considers speaking Dutch an important indicator of a common historical or cultural background, which indicates a more ethnic conception of national identity. It is also possible that this individual considers speaking Dutch as an attribute necessary to participate in Dutch society, and has a more civic conception of national identity (cf. Brubaker 2004: 139). Cogently, Bakke (2000) shows that nations with a predominantly ethnic conception of national identity are not completely closed to outsiders.

This discussion indicates that national identity, whether it has a civic or ethnic character, is a social identity and therefore dynamic and can be the subject and object of permanent negotiation (cf. Jenkins 2008; see also Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005). At the same time national identities, which are being constantly reinforced and reproduced, are relatively potent and stable, which implies that the

[12] Bakke (2000) criticizes the assumed distinction between the civic conception as voluntary and the ethnic conception as involuntary. As stated earlier, in this study it is recognized, in agreement with Bakke, that national belonging in existing nations is always quite involuntary.

change in the boundaries of national belonging is a slow process. Therefore, it is more difficult for immigrants to achieve recognition and to retain parts of their original culture in nations with a conception of national identity in which hard-to-acquire criteria, whether they are called civic or ethnic, are deemed relevant (cf. Bakke 2000: 9; Shadid 2009: 16). In other words, a multicultural society (see Chapter 1) is a society whose members have a conception of national identity in which inclusive criteria are deemed the more relevant (cf. Hjerm 1998: 336).

3.2.6 The increasing research interest in the issue of national identity

In the last few decades, there has been an increased interest in the issue of national identity among researchers. Several possible reasons have been suggested for this increase (Fenton 2011). One suggestion is that in societies which become increasingly multicultural, multiculturalism requires a redefinition of the old concept of national identity which is based on ethnic descent (see also Chapters 1 and 6). More specifically, this means that multiculturalism goes beyond demands for the promotion of tolerance of cultural distinctiveness and implementing measures against discrimination, it also insists on the inclusion of minorities in the national group (cf. Shadid 2009; see also Chapter 1). After all, the issue of national belonging relates to a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which is, in the present research, the degree to which Dutch society attributes the quality 'Dutch' to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origin (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005: 448).

Another possible reason for the increased research interest in national identity is the disappearance of the traditional link between the disadvantaged members of the majority – the traditional working class – and left-wing social-democratic parties. Fenton (2011) has argued that this has created a space for racism, which has become apparent in the change in voting behaviour of the working-class members of the majority, who in various countries (such as Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, France and the Netherlands) have turned to populist and anti-immigrant political parties. Weighing up the traditional working-class, Han (2013: 3) suggests that rising inequality leads 'poor people' to identify less with their class, as people tend to prefer to identify with groups which have a high material status. Consequently, as these 'poor people' identify less with their class, their national self-identification tends to strengthen. Han's study indicates that this tendency is strengthened by an inflow of immigrants who have a relatively low educational level and lack skills, because it increases the perceived social distance among people in the lower socio-economic classes.

Finally, the increased interest in national identity might be explained by the globalized economy, which has reduced the capacity of nation-states to provide security for their citizens (Fenton 2011). Examining this situation, Bauman argues

that, in reaction to this increasing sense of insecurity, citizens search to strengthen their group attachments, which can result in conservatism ('going back to the roots') and an increase in the importance attached to exclusive criteria for group belonging (2001: 100-101).

What has just been said serves to illustrate that the construction of group boundaries not only determines whether a person is accepted as a group member, but also to what extent that person is recognized as such. Aspects of group boundaries can be (more or less) inclusive or exclusive, and some of the multiple identities and characteristics individuals have or are perceived to have, can be recognized while others are not. Group members with a strong affective group commitment tend to view themselves as typical, and tend to construct clear and distinctive group boundaries and favour their in-group. At the same time, the construction of boundaries depends on such contextual factors as historical and political developments, group relations and power differences. The next section will shed some light on government policies that relate to national belonging in the Netherlands.

3.3 National belonging in the Netherlands: policies and debates

In the last few decades, debates about national belonging and immigrant integration in the Netherlands, like in other Western European countries (see Chapter 1), have become highly politicized (Duyvendak 2011; Kremer 2013; Shadid 2009). In these debates, the relevance of the cultural boundaries of national belonging has been increasingly stressed – a process which is referred to as the culturalization of Dutch citizenship 'in which emotions, feelings, norms and values, symbols and traditions (including religion) come to play a pivotal role in defining what can be expected of a Dutch citizen' (Duyvendak 2011: 81; also see Geschiere 2011; Shadid 2009).[13] The main arguments in these debates and the related changes in Dutch government policies will pass in review in this section.[14]

In the 1970s and the 1980s, citizenship debates in the Netherlands were barely politicized (Penninx 2005). During the 1970s it became clear that most labour migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s had no plans to return to their countries of origin and wanted to stay in the Netherlands permanently. It then dawned on the government that structural measures had to be

[13] Several scholars have explored possible explanations for this culturalization of citizenship. See for example Duyvendak (2011) and Prins (2004).

[14] Chapters 4, 5 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of cultural boundaries of Dutch citizenship.

developed to encourage immigrant integration.[15] The report entitled *Ethnic Minorities*, published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in 1979, which provided the foundation for the new integration policies, refers to the possibility of identity conflicts among second generation migrants:

> Growing up in two worlds having different social status and divergent attitudes, and which display little understanding for one another and are indeed sometimes hostile towards each other, but which also both lay a claim on loyalty, confronts this generation with great problems of identity, and this can lead to a certain lack of standards of conduct (WRR 1979: XIII).

Consequently, the integration policies which were developed were not only constructed with the goals of equality and participation of immigrants in mind, they were also designed to achieve socio-cultural emancipation which, in turn, was seen as a precondition for the improvement of their socio-economic position and could prevent future identity conflicts (Penninx 2005).[16]

Ten years later, in a report published in 1989 in which the immigrant integration policies of the 1980s were evaluated, WRR stated that too much government attention paid to the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants could hinder their advancement in education and on the labour market. WRR recommended that the government should take account of the differences between and within immigrant groups and focus on socio-economic goals, leaving the responsibility for the development of their cultural identity to the immigrant groups themselves (WRR 1989: 19-24).

These recommendations were reflected in the *Contourennota* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994), the government policy document on immigrant integration presented in 1994. One argument presented in this document states that citizenship entails both rights and obligations, therefore all citizens, including immigrants, have an individual responsibility or duty to participate in Dutch society. More specifically, it was stated that it is incumbent on all citizens to learn Dutch and to acquire a basic knowledge of Dutch society (Ministerie van

[15] See Chapter 5 for a more extensive discussion of the concept of immigrant integration and Dutch national integration policies.

[16] In later criticisms of Dutch integration policies, it has been asserted that the policies of the 1980s emphasized the necessity allowing the preservation of the cultural identities of immigrants as well (Duyvendak & Scholten 2011). However, it must be stressed that this assertion is not correct (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; Vink 2007). The WRR report of 1979 explicitly states that preservation of cultural identities should not be a goal of integration policies, as it could lead to 'cultural isolation of ethnic groups' which could hinder the participation of immigrants in society. (See also Chapter 6.)

Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). The focus on socio-cultural emancipation in the integration policies was consequently abandoned and replaced by a focus on the individual responsibility of immigrants to integrate. In the heyday of these ideas, the early 1990s, local governments developed Dutch language courses and courses on Dutch society in general, but looking at the functioning of the labour market in particular. These civic integration measures were implemented nationally under the Newcomers Integration Act (*Wet inburgering nieuwkomers*) in 1998 (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). At this point, the courses were made mandatory for new immigrants and those with a temporary residence permit.

Another important shift in the debates about the citizenship of immigrants and their descendants occurred around the year 2000. Several authors (e.g. Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn[17]) have claimed that the integration policies had failed and postulated that social cohesion was being threatened because the integration policies focused too heavily on the immigrants' socio-cultural emancipation and too little on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values (Penninx 2005; see also Geschiere 2009; Prins 2004). These authors went on to argue that certain norms and values embraced by immigrants and their descendants, especially those held by Muslims, are incompatible with Dutch norms and values (see Chapter 6 for a more extensive discussion of cultural distinctiveness). In a newspaper article, Scheffer (2000) argued that it is important to take knowledge of 'Dutch language, culture and history much more seriously' if Dutch society were to be held together. These sorts of ideas about the problematic nature of Islamic norms and values were not new. As said, they had already been voiced in 1991 by Frits Bolkestein, one of the leaders of the VVD (right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). However, after 2000 a catalyst occurred when these ideas about integration failures, the threat of Islam and the importance of a consciousness of Dutch norms and values were married together by the politician Pim Fortuyn in one political discourse, important parts of which were appropriated by other political parties (Penninx 2005; see also Hoving 2011).

[17] Paul Scheffer is a prominent member of the PvdA (left-wing Labour Party). In 2000 he published the essay, "The multicultural drama", in the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* (Scheffer 2000), which has been influential in Dutch debates about immigrant integration. Frits Bolkestein was the leader of the VVD (right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) in the 1990s. He has been criticizing Dutch integration policies and declaring Islamic norms and values to be incompatible with Dutch culture since he published an article in the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant* on these issues in 1991 (Bolkestein 1991). Pim Fortuyn was an author and politician, known for his criticism of Dutch integration policies. He qualified Islam as a 'backward culture'. He was assassinated by an environmental activist during the national election campaign of 2002 in which he participated as the leader of the political party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn's Party).

This political discourse elicited a number of policy responses which were related to changes in integration and immigration policies, but also served to strengthen the awareness of Dutch national identity. Among the ideas mooted to achieve the latter were founding a national museum and compiling a national canon of Dutch history. Although the national museum on Dutch history has never materialized, the canon was finished in 2006 and since 2010 primary and secondary schools have been obliged to use it as a guideline in their curricula. This obligation has been criticized, principally on the grounds that it limits discussion on interpretations of Dutch history and also debate on which aspects of Dutch history should be considered important and why (WRR 2007: 97). Despite the fact the authors of the canon have recognized that national identity is a dynamic social construction (WRR 2007: 97) 'and evolves according to dominant ideas, the national canon just gives one story about what the Netherlands is' (Kremer 2013: 10; see also Geschiere 2011: 59).

In a response to these debates about Dutch national identity, WRR (2007) stated that a static conception of Dutch identity with references to the past is inadequate and not future proof. It advised against adopting a perspective in which one national identity is considered fundamental, and proposed a focus on various ways in which individuals identify themselves with the Netherlands. Politicians on the right of the political spectrum especially (representing the VVD, the Christian Democratic Appeal – CDA and the populist Party for Freedom – PVV) were critical of these WRR conclusions. Some argued that there is one fundamental Dutch national identity, and that Dutch norms and values have to be maintained and protected. Others stressed that Dutch society is based on Christian, Jewish and humanist principles.[18]

On the other hand, in 2004 several members of Parliament put forward a motion that the government should no longer use the term *allochthon* to describe Dutch citizens one or both of whose parents were born outside the Netherlands (see Chapter 1).[19] *Allochthon* means 'other' or 'not from here', and is essentially an ethnic category as it is based on descent (cf. Geschiere 2009; Groenendijk 2007). In their motion, the members of Parliament argued that the term has negative connotations and that it suggests that those who are designated as such do not fully participate in and do not fully belong in Dutch society (Tweede Kamer 2004-2005). Although the national government rejected their motion on the abolition of

[18] NRC Handelsblad (August 20, 2008), *Nederlandse identiteit is niet uniek in de wereld*.
[19] This definition has been in use since 1999 (CBS 1999).

the use of the term in 2005, several municipalities, including The Hague (in 2004) and Amsterdam (in 2013), have decided to stop using the term.[20]

Opposing this move as mentioned in Chapter 1, some politicians, notably members of Parliament for the PVV, proposed the definition of the term *allochthon* be extended. They stated that the children of second-generation immigrants, of whom both parents were born in the Netherlands, should also be considered and defined as *allochthons*.[21] It would seem that these politicians are trying to establish even more exclusive criteria for national belonging by the expedient of increasing the number of citizens who can be handily defined as *allochthon*. These proposals are examples of the perpetual foreigner stereotype mentioned in Section 3.2; the idea that members of ethnic minorities will be perpetually seen as 'others'. Obviously, awareness of this stereotype can lead to identity conflicts and a lower sense of national belonging among ethnic minorities (Huynh, Devos and Smalarz 2011).

Changes in integration and immigration policies came in 2003 with the publication of the government's *Integration Policy New Style*. This policy document stressed the social and cultural distance between immigrants and Dutch natives, and announced new policies to safeguard the 'continuity of society' by promoting 'common citizenship' by insisting on learning the Dutch language and abiding by 'basic Dutch norms' (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004: 8). These norms included respecting the law, accepting anyone's freedom of expression, the sexual preferences of others and the equality of men and women. Furthermore, the law on civic integration (the *Wet inburgering*), which applied to immigrants from outside the European Union and a group of residents who did not have Dutch citizenship, was amended. These immigrants could now obtain a residence permit only after they had passed an exam consisting of tests to assess language skills and knowledge of Dutch society.[22]

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[20] De Volkskrant (August 19, 2005), *Verdonk houdt vast aan begrip allochtoon*; De Volkskrant (February 14, 2013), *In Amsterdam wonen geen allochtonen meer*.

[21] See Snel (2011).

[22] The most recent law is the *Wet inburgering* (Law on Civic Integration) passed in 2006, implemented in 2007. In 2012 this law was slightly amended. Applicants in the Netherlands have to contact the municipality which works in conjunction with Regional Educational Centres (ROCs) which are qualified to run courses and set the requisite exams. Persons from outside the EU who want to migrate to the Netherlands have to pass a similar civic integration test at the Dutch embassy or consulate abroad (the *Wet inburgering buitenland* or Law on Civic Integration Abroad). Since 2013, applicants have to pay for the courses and exams themselves. Depending on their financial circumstances, applicants can apply for a loan to pay the tuition fees. In some cases, those who commenced their courses before 2013 can have their fees paid by the municipality. (See "Integration in the Netherlands", accessed July 25, 2013, http://en.inburgeren.nl.)

Another change occurred in the political debates about citizens with multiple citizenship – more specifically immigrants and their descendants who had obtained Dutch citizenship but still retained their original citizenship (see Chapter 4 for a more extensive review of this debate). Before 2003, opponents of multiple citizenship argued that immigrants' retention of their original citizenship would hinder them in developing an affective commitment to the Netherlands and would therefore be an obstacle to integration (De Hart 2005a). But, in the context of the debates about the perceived failure of integration and threats, putative or real, to social cohesion since 2000, this argument was extended to the idea that having multiple nationalities can cause or reveal possible conflicting loyalties, even disloyalty to the Dutch nation-state. The covert message was that immigrants should renounce their original citizenship to prove their loyalty – and by implication their affective commitment – to the Dutch nation-state (cf. Duyvendak 2011). Importantly, the latter idea principally concerned Muslim immigrants, which indicates that this debate was not just about the legal aspect of multiple citizenship but more about ethnic and cultural boundaries of Dutch national belonging (De Hart 2005a).

The policy objective of 'common citizenship' introduced by the government in 2003 was reiterated in the government policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), in which it was argued that Dutch society is based on a 'fundamental continuity of values, views, institutions and customs which shape the predominant culture in Dutch society'.[23] The government plainly states that these values and customs cannot be abandoned, and that immigrants have to adjust to: '[t]he Dutch society, in all its diversity, is the society in which those who settle have to learn to live, to which they are required to adjust and fit into'. [24]

In sum, the views of successive Dutch governments and the political debates about cultural diversity have been subject to pronounced changes in the last few decades. Whereas in the 1980s the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants was seen to be a must to prevent identity conflicts and to support integration, since 2003 the national government has considered the cultural distance between Dutch natives and immigrants and their descendants a problem. Opponents of multiple citizenship now openly expect immigrants to renounce their original citizenship to prove their affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. This stressing of culture in the debates about Dutch citizenship automatically raises

[23] In the document the government uses the Dutch term 'leidende cultuur', possibly a reference to the German term *Leitkultur*. This can be translated as 'guiding culture', 'leading culture' or 'predominant culture'. See Pautz (2005).

[24] Author's translation.

questions about national belonging. Who is considered to be fully included in the Dutch national group? What factors are related to the level of affective commitment to the Dutch nation-state? These questions will be examined in the next section.

3.4 Views in society on national belonging

The discussion in the previous section has brought to light several themes which run through the debate about ethnic and cultural diversity in the Netherlands. These themes raise a fundamental question about national belonging in Dutch society: Who's Dutch? To paraphrase Devos and Banaji (2005: 448), who asked the same question in the context of American society ('Who's American?'), this question relates to a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which is, in the present research, the degree to which Dutch society attributes the quality 'Dutch' to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origin. As explained earlier in this chapter, national belonging has more than a legal aspect (having legal citizenship), it also has social aspects. It is in respect to the latter that people can disagree about who can be fully included in the national group. In other words, who is considered to be 'true' or 'typically' Dutch, and how inclusive or exclusive are the criteria which are used in the construction of national group boundaries?

The exploration of aspects of national belonging in the Netherlands in this section has been inspired by similar research by Theiss-Morse (2009) and Devos and Banaji (2005), who investigated the boundaries of American national identity. In the first part of this section the affective component of national self-identification, namely, the strength of national belonging or affective commitment to the national group will be examined. (In Chapter 4, commitment to the Netherlands will be explored in more detail, in an examination of the various types of loyalty to the Netherlands.) In the second part, cognitive aspects of the social construction of Dutch national group boundaries will be explored, including the reasons certain criteria used in this construction are deemed important.

3.4.1 The affective component of national self-identification

The affective component of national self-identification was measured by the item 'I feel strong ties to the Netherlands'.[25] To put this affective commitment into

[25] Other items which could measure only the affective component of national self-identification were not included in the questionnaires. However, several items were included which measure the affective component *and* the evaluative component and/or behavioural expressions, such as expressions of loyalty. These will be analysed in Chapter 4. Importantly, the affective commitment to the Dutch

perspective, the affective commitment to place of residence, province and Europe as a union was also measured, as can be seen in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1

Level of affective commitment (means, scale from 1 = weak to 4 = strong).

To:	The Netherlands	Place of residence	Province	Europe
	3.1	3.0	2.5	2.3

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

The findings indicate that the average level of Dutch citizens' affective commitment to the Netherlands is moderate (M = 3.1). To explore relationships between this level of commitment and other variables, including age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status (whether or not a person is a legal citizen of more than one state), educational level, income and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out. This analysis indicates that the affective commitment to the Netherlands is slightly and positively related to age (β[26] = .15, $p < .05$) and voting behaviour (β = .17, $p < .001$).[27] With respect to the latter, the level of affective commitment of those who did not vote in the 2012 national elections appears to be slightly weaker.

The level of affective commitment to the Netherlands of immigrants of both Western and non-Western origin and those with multiple citizenship does not appear to be significantly different to that of native Dutch people and those holding only Dutch citizenship (similar results were found by Vroome, Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014: 11-13). To explore these findings in more depth, the affective commitment of these respondents to other groups was also measured, as can be seen in Table 3.2 below.

national group was not measured by the item 'I feel strong ties to the Dutch', as this statement can be interpreted as affective commitment to the Dutch ethnic group.

[26] Unless otherwise stated, the βs mentioned in this study are standardized.

[27] Relationships to gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income were not significant.

Table 3.2

Level of affective commitment to groups (means, scale from 1 = weak to 4 = strong).

Respondents	Ethnic group	Political group	Occupational group
Native Dutch	2.9[a]	2.3	2.6
Non-Western immigrants	2.7	2.4	2.4
Western immigrants	2.4	2.2	2.6

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.
[a] The native Dutch were asked to what extent they felt affective commitment to 'the Dutch', i.e. their ethnic group.

The analysis indicates that both native Dutch and immigrants of non-Western and Western origin have a significant but slightly stronger affective commitment to the Netherlands (as presented in Table 3.1) than to their own ethnic group.[28] Pertinently, these commitments are clearly not seen by these respondents as conflicting. On the contrary, the level of affective commitment to the own ethnic group is positively and strongly related to the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands, among both native Dutch and immigrants and their descendants (β = .51, $p < .001$).[29] Similarly, the analyses indicate a moderate and positive relationship between the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands of religious respondents (those who classify themselves as either a believing Christian or Muslim) and the level of commitment to their religious group, which was also measured (β = .28, $p < .001$).[30] However, research by Martinovic and Verkuyten among Muslim Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany has indicated that, while national identification and religious group identification are not always mutually exclusive, the relationship between these identities can depend

[28] Wilcoxon signed-rank test for native Dutch: z = -7.58, p < .001, r = -.24; non-Western immigrants: z = -2.16, p < .05, r = -.11; Western immigrants: z = -4.40, p < .001, r = -.37. However, the respondents were not asked to rank these commitments.
[29] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if the level of affective commitment to the own ethnic group significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.
[30] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if, among religious respondents, the level of affective commitment to the own religious group significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.

on conditions such as the extent to which 'Western and Islamic ways of life' are seen as compatible, and perceived discrimination (2012: 899-900). In particular, these authors found that, among their respondents, those who perceived 'pressures from their ingroup to maintain an ethnoreligious lifestyle as well as those who perceived discrimination by natives identified more strongly with their religious group and, in turn, identified less with the host country' (2012: 893) (see also Verkuyten & Martinovic 2012; Vroome, Verkuyten & Martinovic 2014: 17-18).

The findings presented in Table 3.1 also indicate that, although the average affective commitments of Dutch citizens to the Netherlands and to their place of residence are neither significantly different, their affective commitments to their province and to Europe as a union are significantly lower.[31] Furthermore, while educational level does not appear to be related to the affective commitment to the Netherlands, it is negatively related to affective commitment to place of residence and province, and positively related to commitment to Europe as a union ($\beta = -.14$, $p < .001$; $\beta = -.18$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .21$, $p < .001$ respectively).[32] Voters for the right-wing (populist) PVV, the left-wing SP (Socialist Party) and the Christian parties SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) and CU (the moderate Christian Union) feel significantly less committed to Europe as a union ($M = 2.1$ or less; $\beta = .21$, $p < .001$).[33]

Interestingly, the levels of affective commitment to the Netherlands and to Europe as a union appear to be positively related ($\beta = .34$, $p < .001$).[34] Duchesne and Frognier (2007), who also found this positive relationship, suggest that this can be explained by what they call 'nested identities'. This is to say that the affective commitment to the nation relates positively to affective commitments to territories in which the nation is embedded. The same idea of nested identities could explain the finding that the levels of affective commitment to place of residence and province are also positively related to the level of affective

[31] The affective commitment to the Netherlands appeared to be significantly stronger than either that to a province or Europe as a union. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for province: $z = -12.38$, $p < .001$, $r = -.34$; Europe as a union: $z = -14.33$, $p < .001$, $r = -.40$.

[32] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income significantly predict the level of affective commitment to place of residence, province or Europe as a union.

[33] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if political preference significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to Europe as a union.

[34] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if affective commitment to the Netherlands significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to Europe as a union.

commitment to the Netherlands as a country ($\beta = .56$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .45$, $p < .001$ respectively).[35]

The fact that all the affective commitments discussed above relate positively to the affective commitment to the Netherlands suggests that these commitments reveal a more fundamental tendency to identify with a group – the need to belong discussed earlier in this chapter (cf. Duchesne & Frognier 2007: 9). To examine the tendency to identify with a group, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out which included the above-mentioned items of affective commitments to the place of residence, province, the Netherlands, Europe and own ethnic group,[36] and the items mentioned in Table 3.2 to do with affective commitments to political and occupational groups (i.e. the affective commitment to groups of people who share political preference or have a similar occupation). In this analysis, two components were extracted which suggests that the tendency to identify with a group has two, positively related dimensions.[37] Items that cluster on the first component suggest that it represents a tendency to identify with *territorially defined groups*, including affective commitments to the Netherlands, place of residence, province and Europe as a union. Items that cluster on the second component suggest that it represents the tendency to identify with *socially defined groups*, including affective commitments to the ethnic, political and occupational groups. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the level of affective commitment to 'the Dutch', which is an ethnic group but can also be interpreted as a national and territorially defined group, correlates positively with all other mentioned affective commitments.[38]

In order to explore these tendencies towards identification with a socially or territorially defined group, summated scales representing these two tendencies were constructed using the previously discussed items which cluster on the components

[35] Categorical Regression analyses, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, were used to test if affective commitment to either place of residence or province significantly predict the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.

[36] With respect to the item measuring commitment to the own ethnic group: immigrants and their descendants were asked for their affective commitment to their own ethnic group, and the native Dutch were asked for their affective commitment to 'the Dutch'.

[37] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 2 components with *eigenvalues* over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 2 components could be extracted, which explained 55.37% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resultant transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

[38] Categorical Regression analyses, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, were used to test if affective commitment to the Dutch significantly predicts the other affective commitments mentioned. All βs between .22 and .58, all ps < .001.

extracted in the aforementioned Categorical Principal Components Analysis.[39] Subsequently, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to examine whether these tendencies can be predicted by age, gender, descent, religion educational level, income and political preference. The analysis indicates that age is positively, but only slightly, related to the tendency to identify with territorial defined groups ($\beta = .17$, $p < .05$). Other significant relationships were not found, which is in line with the theory discussed in Section 3.2 postulating that the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation.[40]

3.4.2 Cognitive aspects of the construction of national group boundaries

Who compose the 'typical' and the 'marginalized' groups in Dutch society? What aspects of Dutch national boundaries are inclusive, and which are exclusive? In this section, these boundaries will be explored by examining the cognitive components of internal (self-identification) and external aspects of social categorization (inspired by a similar analysis in Theiss-Morse 2009: 65). The external aspect will be examined by analysing responses to questionnaire items which measured the perceived importance of criteria to be met before someone is be considered to be 'truly Dutch'. The internal aspect, or, in other words, the cognitive component of national self-identification will be examined by using items which measure the extent to which respondents consider themselves typically Dutch. The latter typicality measure, combined with the information about the level of affective commitment to the national group discussed above, predicts which group members tend to exhibit in-group favouritism. As discussed in Section 3.2, highly committed group members tend to favour members of their in-group, especially when they perceive threats to the distinctiveness of the group, and hence tend to set sharper group boundaries, which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination of out-group members. Therefore, exploring which group members are characterized as typical can provide information about the boundaries between those members on the one hand and the marginalized on the other.

3.4.2.1 Cognitive aspects of national self-identification: typicality

To measure the extent respondents considered themselves typically Dutch, six statements were included in the questionnaires: 'I feel like I belong to mainstream Dutch culture', 'I am what most people think of as a typical Dutch person', 'the

[39] Cronbach's Alpha for tendency to identify with territorially defined groups = .73; Cronbach's Alpha for tendency to identify with socially defined groups = .53.

[40] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, descent, religion, educational level, or political preference income significantly predict the tendencies to identify with a territorially or socially defined group.

term "Dutch" does not fit me', 'when I think of the Dutch people, I think of people who are a lot like me', 'in many respects, I am different from most Dutch people' and 'on the important issues, I often agree with Dutch people'.[41] In order to examine the possibility of constructing a typicality scale, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out including these six items. The analysis indicates that the items clearly cluster around one component, and that Cronbach's Alpha for these items is .80.[42] Therefore, all these items were used to create a summated scale to represent the level of typicality.

To explore the characteristics of those who consider themselves typically Dutch, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out which included the aforementioned typicality scale as the outcome variable and the variables age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as predictors. It appears that native Dutch consider themselves significantly more typically Dutch than immigrants and their descendants of both Non-Western and Western origin (β = .26, $p < .001$).[43] The following Table 3.3 gives more insight into the percentages of native Dutch and immigrants who consider themselves typically Dutch.

Table 3.3

Dutch citizens who consider themselves typical or atypical Dutch (in percentages).

Respondents	Very typical	Moderately typical	Atypical
Native Dutch	57	39	4
Non-Western immigrants	10	73	17
Western immigrants	28	55	17
Total	50	43	7

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).

Note. These percentages were calculated by averaging the scores on the 6 items used to construct the typicality scale, and grouping the averages into 3 categories. Because the percentages were calculated from averaged Likert items, these can only be used for exploratory analysis.

[41] These items were derived from earlier research by Malcarne, Chavira, Fernandez & Liu (2006) and Theiss-Morse (2009). After testing pilot interviews, items were deleted, added and rephrased. For a discussion of typicality also see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe (2004).

[42] The eigenvalues and a scree-plot clearly indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 53%, total VAF was 61.81%.

[43] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, religion, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if descent significantly predicts the level of typicality.

This table indicates that a majority of the native Dutch consider themselves to be very typically Dutch, whereas a majority of both non-Western and Western immigrants consider themselves moderately typically Dutch. Furthermore, the Categorical Regression analysis of the typicality scale indicates that those with a minimum income consider themselves significantly less typically Dutch ($\beta = .40$, $p < .05$). The analysis also indicates a significant relationship between political preference and the typicality scale. Voters for the right-wing VVD and the right-wing populist PVV consider themselves to be more typically Dutch than voters for all other parties and the non-voters ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$).[44]

Importantly, the analysis reveals a very strong positive relationship between the typicality scale and the affective commitment to the Netherlands ($\beta = .68$, $p < .001$).[45] In other words, both native Dutch and immigrants and their descendants who are highly committed to the national group tend to consider themselves typical group members, as might be expected given the findings of research in the tradition of Tajfel's social identity theory. Therefore, bearing in mind the findings of social identity theory research discussed in Section 3.2, the results indicate that native Dutch who voted for the VVD or PVV parties in the 2012 elections are more likely to exhibit in-group favouritism and to set sharper group boundaries, resulting in a relatively high degree of self-stereotyping and possibly discrimination of out-group members.

Respondents who consider themselves typically Dutch stressed that they found it difficult to explain why. One explanation was that they were born and raised in the Netherlands, while others said they simply felt Dutch and could not explain that feeling. One respondent said, 'I don't know. Had I been born in another country, I would probably have felt at home there.' Other respondents said they considered themselves typically Dutch because they held certain Dutch norms and values, but they could not explain what these norms and values were. When they could, they mentioned such stereotypes as hard-working, down-to-earth, tolerant and 'constantly complaining'. Those who did not consider themselves typically Dutch either mentioned that the typically Dutch person does not exist, or explained that they regarded themselves more in the light of a European citizen, a world citizen or cosmopolitan. As one respondent said, 'I don't know what a typical Dutch person is. I do not think a German, Dane, Swede or Norwegian person is very different.' Immigrants and their descendants who said they did not

[44] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if political preference significantly predicts the level of typicality.

[45] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if affective commitment to the Netherlands significantly predicts the level of typicality.

consider themselves typically Dutch even though they felt at home in the country explained that this was because they or their parents had not been born in the Netherlands.

3.4.2.2 Cognitive aspects of national identification: group boundaries

To explore which boundary aspects (see Section 3.2) are deemed important if someone is to be considered a 'truly Dutch' individual, the questionnaires included 15 specific criteria (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005; Theiss-Morse 2009; ISSP 2005).[46] These criteria, sorted according to the means of their perceived importance, are presented in Table 3.4 below.

The table shows that the most importance is attached to such relatively inclusive criteria as being able to speak Dutch and feeling Dutch. Importantly, by far the least importance is attached to clearly exclusive criteria: having Dutch ancestors, a Western European appearance, a Western name or a Christian background.

Turning to the more inclusive criteria, those who consider a knowledge of Dutch culture and history to be important mentioned various reasons for doing so. Respondents argued that this knowledge is important to the strengthening of personal commitment to the Netherlands, while others said that this background is essential to be able to participate in Dutch society. It was also mentioned that having this knowledge is important to protect and sustain Dutch culture, norms and values. In the same vein, respondents said that it is important to be proud of the Netherlands, 'because only then would you know which norms and values you have to maintain and protect'. Pertinently, it was argued that it is important to learn from history to be able to live in a multicultural society. In this respect, a specific knowledge of the centuries-old history of immigration and ethnic diversity in the Netherlands, and of Dutch involvement in colonialism and slavery was seen as important, as it could foster a more tolerant attitude towards people with different cultural and religious backgrounds. Similarly, it was argued that the history of World War II should be taught in school, because it illustrates the importance of tolerance and non-discrimination. However, respondents who said knowledge of history and culture is important acknowledged that among many Dutch citizens, including themselves, this knowledge is pretty sparse.

[46] Items were derived from previous research by Devos & Banaji (2005) and Theiss-Morse (2009) and from the International Social Survey Programme survey on citizenship and national identity (ISSP 2005). After testing in a pilot survey and in-depth interviews, items were deleted, added and rephrased.

Table 3.4[47]

Criteria for being perceived as a 'truly Dutch' individual: Means, (scale from 1 = least important to 4 = most important), Standard Deviations, and Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis – CATPCA, transformed variables rotated with PCA).

Item, ranked by mean	M	SD	C1	C2	C3	C4
Speak Dutch	3.7	0.6	-.14	***.43***	.13	**-.52**
Legal Dutch citizenship	3.3	0.8	-.15	.11	.04	**-.78**
Feel Dutch	3.3	0.8	-.11	***.79***	.08	-.01
Proud of the Netherlands	3.1	0.8	.20	***.34***	-.10	-.30
Feel more attached to the Netherlands and the Dutch than to other countries or other ethnic groups	2.9	0.9	.14	***.67***	.04	-.08
Only have Dutch citizenship and no other citizenships	2.9	1.2	.16	-.05	-.12	***-.69***
Lived in the Netherlands for part of one's life	2.9	0.8	-.06	.12	***.82***	.20
Have knowledge of Dutch history and culture	2.9	0.8	.12	***.76***	.03	.08
Grown up in the Netherlands	2.9	0.9	.08	.01	***.83***	-.14
Lived in the Netherlands for most of one's life	2.9	0.9	.07	.02	***.88***	.02
Born in the Netherlands	2.7	1.0	***.34***	-.25	***.43***	**-.46**
Have Dutch ancestors	2.1	0.9	***.64***	-.10	.16	-.24
Have a Western European appearance	1.8	0.9	***.69***	.01	.17	-.04
Have a Western name	1.7	0.8	***.81***	.09	.01	-.05
Have a Christian background	1.5	0.7	***.79***	.13	-.10	.23
Eigenvalues			4.38	1.89	1.63	1.28
Variance accounted for (%)			29.20	12.61	10.87	8.56

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result the means can be used only for exploratory analysis.
Note. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings used for constructing scales are italicized.

There is more agreement among those who considered the criteria of having been born, growing up or living in the Netherlands to be important. Most of these respondents argued that these are necessary preconditions to be able to feel Dutch

[47] Cf. Devos & Banaji (2005: 450).

or to have a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. Many of those who considered feeling Dutch itself to be the most important precondition to be 'truly Dutch', argued that the other criteria are much less or not important at all, because there would not be many truly Dutch people if the other criteria had been decisive. 'How many Dutch citizens really know about Dutch history, and really have a good command of Dutch language?' one respondent asked.

Most of the respondents who consider the more exclusive criteria to be important, did not offer any motivation for their opinion. A few said it is important to be Christian, because 'the Netherlands is a country based on Christian principles'. Those who consider having a Western European appearance or name to be important did not elaborate, with the exception of a few who explained that 'foreign names are difficult to pronounce' or that 'truly Dutch' people generally have a white skin colour.

Respondents also mentioned other criteria they consider important to be 'truly Dutch', most relating to certain values and attitudes such as loyalty to the Netherlands (discussed in Chapter 4), obeying the law, respecting each other's freedom of speech, non-discrimination and tolerance of people from various cultural and religious backgrounds and with various sexual preferences and life principles. It was also argued that immigrants have to adapt to become a 'truly Dutch' person, for example, by learning to speak Dutch and by respecting Dutch norms and values. Furthermore, respondents expect immigrants to participate in society, or succinctly to get a job or work as a volunteer. (Views on adaptation and participation will be explored in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.)

Finally, the term *allochthon*, which officially designates individuals of whom at least one parent was born outside the Netherlands (see Section 3.3), was clearly used by respondents as a term to describe those who do not fully belong to the national group. For example, respondents argued that 'the culture of *allochthons*' does not belong in the Netherlands and can pose a threat to society (this perception of threat will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). Some argued that the term *allochthon* should be abandoned, because the distinction it indicates is misleading. As one respondent said, referring to immigrants and their descendants, 'They belong to the national group, so we should not regard them as *allochthons*'.

To examine the relationships between the items in Table 3.4 above, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out, in which four components were extracted whose (rotated) loadings are presented in the same table.[48] The clustering of the items on these components suggests that these

[48] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 4 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 4 components could be extracted, which explained 61.23% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option

components represent four different conceptions or types of Dutch national belonging: *ethnic* and *exclusive* (C1 – see Table 3.4 above), *civic* and *inclusive* (C2), *territorial* (C3) and *legal* (C4). The *ethnic* and *exclusive* type includes the criteria having Dutch ancestors, having a Western European appearance and name, and having a Christian background. The *civic* and *inclusive* type of Dutch belonging includes criteria which refer to a sense of belonging, feeling more attached to the Netherlands than to other countries, and having knowledge of Dutch history and culture. Furthermore, the *territorial* type of Dutch national belonging entails that those who have grown up and lived part or most of their lives in the Netherlands are Dutch. This relates to the territorial dimension of national identity as defined by Guibernau (2004: 138), who suggests that 'for the large majority of peoples, the territorial boundaries of the nation signal the limits of their homeland and fellow-nationals are usually portrayed as if they were more "human" than outsiders, as deserving our support, concern and nurture'. Finally, the *legal* type of Dutch national belonging appears to imply an exclusive legal citizenship status, including the criteria having legal Dutch citizenship and *not* having multiple citizenship.

The distinction between the ethnic, civic and territorial types of Dutch national belonging can be further explored by taking the above-mentioned arguments of respondents into account. Those who considered the territorial criteria such as having been born, growing up or living in the Netherlands to be important, argued that these criteria are necessary preconditions to be able to feel Dutch or to have a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In other words, the territorial criteria are seen as preconditions for the civic aspects of national belonging.

This finding nuances the distinction, indicated in studies by Hjerm (1998) and Kunovich (2009), between ethnic and civic types of national belonging. In these studies the above-mentioned territorial criteria – namely, having been born and living for most of one's life in the country – are not distinct from, but part of, the ethnic type. In other words, these authors suggest that citizens who attach importance to these territorial criteria have an ethnic and exclusive conception of national belonging. In the Netherlands these territorial criteria appear to be inclusive for the descendants of first generation immigrants and for those first generation immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the Netherlands as well. However, it must be stressed that the present study included more items (15) to describe possible types of national belonging than the studies by Hjerm and Kunovich (6 and 8 respectively), which made it possible to discern more different

'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

components in the (Categorical) Principal Components analysis. Moreover, the respondents in this study were asked to motivate their ratings of the items, which made it easier to interpret the difference between the civic, territorial and ethnic types of national belonging.

To assess the relative importance of these four types of Dutch national belonging, scales representing the types were constructed. For the ethnic, civic and territorial types, summated scales were constructed using the items with the highest loadings on the respective components (see Table 3.4 above).[49] To represent the legal type of national belonging, only the criterion of not having multiple citizenship has been included in the analysis, as in this study this is the most important item of those which load on this component. An analysis of variance (Friedman's ANOVA) indicates significant differences between the means of the scales, which indicates that there is a hierarchy among these types of Dutch national belonging.[50] Most importance is attached to the civic type of Dutch national belonging (M = 3.0, SD = 0.7), followed by the importance attached to the territorial type of national belonging (M = 2.9, SD = 0.7). The level of importance attached to exclusive citizenship status barely differs from the importance attached to the civic and territorial types (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1), but the standard deviation indicates more disagreement on this issue (which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4). By far the least importance is attached to the ethnic and exclusive type of Dutch belonging (M = 1.8, SD = 0.7).

In order to explore the characteristics of those who consider these types of Dutch national belonging important, Categorical Regression analyses were carried out that included age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income. Furthermore, separate Categorical Regression analyses were carried out, controlled for age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income, to examine relationships between these boundary types on the one hand, and, on the other hand, political preference and the phenomena discussed earlier in this section: affective commitment to the Netherlands, the two dimensions of the tendency to identify with a group, and typicality.

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[49] Cronbach's Alpha values for scales representing: ethnic type = .77; civic type = .68; territorial type = .79.

[50] The averages of the importance attached to the types of national belonging mentioned are significantly different, $\chi^2(2) = 708.11$, $p < .001$ (Friedman's ANOVA).Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to follow up this finding. A Bonferroni correction was applied and so all effects are reported at a .000167 level of significance. The significant pairwise comparisons indicated that the civic type was clearly more important than the territorial type, followed by the ethnic type of national belonging. However, the importance of not having multiple citizenship is not significantly different from the civic and territorial types.

These analyses show that the affective commitment to the Netherlands is significantly and positively related to the importance attached to all mentioned types of Dutch national belonging. The strongest correlation was found with the importance given to the civic ($\beta = .39$, $p < .001$) type. The correlations with the territorial ($\beta = .23$, $p < .001$) and ethnic type ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$) are clearly less strong, and the importance attached to exclusive legal citizenship status is least related to the affective commitment to the Netherlands ($\beta = .13$, $p < .005$).

Similarly, the analysis indicates that those who consider themselves more typically Dutch tend to attach more importance to all mentioned types of Dutch national belonging (civic: $\beta = .37$, $p < .001$; territorial: $\beta = .33$, $p < .001$; ethnic: $\beta = .28$, $p < .001$; exclusive legal citizenship status: $\beta = .26$, $p < .001$). Finally, positive correlations were also found between the previously discussed tendencies to identify with territorial or socially defined groups on the one hand and on the other hand the importance attached to civic and ethnic types of Dutch national belonging.[51]

These findings make it possible to specify which types of Dutch national belonging are deemed important by highly committed members of the Dutch national group. Research in the tradition of Tajfel's social identity theory shows that highly committed group members tend to exaggerate differences between the in-group and out-groups, to defend the distinctiveness of the group (see Section 3.2.4). With respect to Dutch national belonging, highly committed group members appear to defend the distinctiveness of their national group by attaching most importance to expressions or feelings of Dutch national belonging, and to a lesser extent to ethnic and exclusive criteria for national belonging. This corresponds to the findings of Duyvendak (2011), who argues that Dutch citizens are increasingly constructing national group boundaries by stressing the importance of expressions and feelings of national belonging.

Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that immigrants and their descendants of non-Western origin consider all types of national belonging significantly less important than do the native Dutch, while immigrants of Western origin consider the territorial type and exclusive legal citizenship status less important than do the native Dutch.[52] This is not surprising, in view of the fact that immigrants and their descendants consider themselves less typically Dutch than their native Dutch

[51] Correlations between, on the one hand, tendencies to identify with territorial and socially defined groups and, on the other hand, the civic type ($\beta = .34$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .26$, $p < .001$ respectively), and the ethnic type ($\beta = .15$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .21$, $p < .001$ respectively) of Dutch national belonging.

[52] Civic type: $\beta = .21$, $p < .05$; territorial type: $\beta = .24$, $p < .001$; exclusive legal citizenship: $\beta = .20$, $p < .001$; ethnic type: $\beta = .14$, $p < .005$.

compatriots. After all, as discussed above and as suggested in the literature discussed in Section 3.2, typical group members are more inclined to set group boundaries. Crucially Kunovich (2009: 576) has pointed out that citizenship provides access to state resources. Therefore, from a rational choice perspective it can be expected that minority groups do not attach importance to boundaries which would exclude them. Nevertheless, the need to belong and the need for social recognition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, also play a role and should not be dismissed. In this respect, it is important to realize that the construction of exclusive group boundaries can result in discrimination (see Section 3.2.4). Not surprisingly, therefore, Hjerm (1998) concluded from his study that there is a positive relationship between the level of xenophobia and the level of importance attached to ethnic (exclusive) types of national belonging. In the present study, this link will be explored in Chapter 5.

Among all respondents, the higher their educational level the less importance they attached to the ethnic type of Dutch national belonging and exclusive legal citizenship status (β = -.29, $p < .001$ and β = -.21, $p < .001$ respectively). These findings about the role of education are similar to those of Kunovich (2009: 585), who suggests that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to ethnic (exclusive) types of national belonging because they perceive economic competition from immigrants and their descendants, who also have a lower socio-economic status. (This link between construction of boundaries and ethnic threat will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.) Kunovich also suggests that those with a higher level of education have greater cognitive skills which allow them 'better [to] imagine belonging to larger groups' (2009: 575).

The Categorical Regression analyses indicate that voters for the various political parties in the 2012 general election differed significantly in the importance they attached to the four types of Dutch national belonging.[53] This can also be seen in Table 3.5 below.

[53] Civic: (β = .26, $p < .001$); exclusive legal citizenship status: (β = .28, $p < .001$); territorial: (β = .20, $p < .001$); ethnic: (β = .27, $p < .001$).

Table 3.5

Importance attached to types of Dutch national belonging (means, scale from 1 = least important to 4 = most important). Ordered by size of political party in 2012 national election.

Voters for political party	Civic	Exclusive legal citizenship status	Territorial	Ethnic
VVD	3.2	3.2	2.9	1.7
PvdA	3.0	2.6	2.7	1.6
PVV	3.2	3.6	3.3	2.3
Socialist Party (SP)	3.1	3.5	3.0	1.9
CDA	3.2	2.8	2.7	1.9
D66	3.0	2.5	2.7	1.5
Christian Union (CU)	3.0	2.3	2.9	2.1
Green Left	2.9	2.2	2.7	1.5
SGP	3.4	3.6	3.2	2.5
Non voters	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.9
Total[a]	3.0	2.9	2.9	1.8

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.
[a] See the hierarchy calculation in the text above.

First of all, it is clear from the values in the columns in the table that respondents are most in agreement on the importance of the civic type of national belonging. Furthermore, it is obvious that voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, PVV, CDA, and the SGP) and those supporting the left-wing SP and the Christian CU tend to attach more importance to setting national group boundaries, whether they are inclusive or exclusive, than those who vote for parties on the left of the political spectrum: PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal Democrats 66) and the Green Left party. Voters for the PVV and SGP attach by far the most importance to group boundaries. This is principally attributable to the relatively high importance they attach to the exclusive and ethnic type of national belonging.

The finding that both respondents with a lower level of education and voters for the PVV – who generally have this level of education – tend to attach more importance to the ethnic type of national belonging relates to the ideas of Fenton discussed in Section 3.2.6. The increasing interest in the issue of national identity

noted by Fenton (2011) might be because of the importance attached to ethnic types of national belonging by members of the traditional working class, who no longer predominantly support left-wing social-democratic parties, but are turning to populist, anti-immigrant parties like the PVV. To what extent this can be explained by the perception of ethnic threat, as suggested by Kunovich (2009) (see above), will be explored in Chapter 5.