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

MULTICULTURALISM & MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP

Public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands

Igor Boog

Multiculturalism & multicultural citizenship

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Public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose of this study

Since the end of World War II, Western societies have grown increasingly diverse ethnically and culturally as a result of international migration. This growing diversity has given rise to issues that Kymlicka (1995: 1) calls 'potentially divisive'. Generally, these issues concern the rights and identities of ethnic and cultural minorities in immigrant-receiving societies. The contents of and responses to public, political and scientific debates reflect the disagreements about the content of various concepts central to inter-ethnic relations, such as citizenship, multiculturalism, national identity and immigrants' integration and loyalty to the nation-state. In particular, these debates concentrate on aspects of social equality, including government policies and regulations to achieve equality for citizens of different ethnic backgrounds. Concerns have been expressed about the need and effectiveness of these policies, and about the impact of social inequality on disadvantaged groups as well (Joppke 2007; Vermeulen 2010). Other debates concern aspects of immigrants' cultural and ethnic identity. Volatile public and political discussions have flared up in various European countries, for example, on whether Muslim immigrants should be allowed to wear a headscarf in school or at work (Lettinga 2011), and whether the multiple citizenship status or transnational ties of immigrants and their descendants could undermine their loyalty to the nation-state (Faist 1999). In the last two decades, these debates have increasingly tended to focus on the practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants in particular (Ogan, Willnat, Pennington & Bashir 2014; Vermeulen 2010). More generally, the increased ethnic and cultural diversity has been challenging the old concept of national identity in Western European societies, which is based on ethnic descent (cf. Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014: 53; Fenton 2011).

This study explores the views on these issues prevalent in Dutch society. As in other Western societies, ethnic and cultural diversity has increased in Dutch society since the 1950s as the result of decolonization, the recruitment of labour migrants and their subsequent family reunification in the 1970s and 1980s, and, mostly since the 1980s, asylum migration (Castles & Miller 2009; Lucassen & Lucassen 2011).[1] In 1972, 9% of the Dutch population consisted of *allochthons*, a term used by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) to designate individuals of whom at least one parent has been born outside the Netherlands.[2] This percentage increased to 21% in 2013. The largest increase, from 1.2% in 1972 to 11.7% in 2013, is seen in the number of *non-Western allochthons*: persons of whom at least one parent was born in Africa, South America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) or Turkey.[3] Part of these non-Western immigrants are Muslims, mainly originating from Turkey and Morocco, who constituted around 5% of the Dutch population in 2012 (Maliepaard & Gijsberts 2012).

These debates have been accompanied by a growing number of scientific studies of how Western societies have responded to immigration and the resultant ethnic and cultural diversity. A central issue in these studies is whether and to what extent these responses have been 'multicultural', an adjective which generally means that the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants is being taken into account. However, a distinction has to be made between two uses of this adjective (cf. Shadid 2009; Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 5-8). In the first, the adjective 'multicultural' is used as a demographic variable to describe a society which is culturally diverse. In this sense, Dutch society, as are most other societies, can be described as multicultural, as it consists of various ethno-cultural groups. In the second, it is used to describe specific normative responses to the (cultural) diversity in society, often referred to as policies of multiculturalism. Although many varieties of multiculturalism exist, most proponents agree on the importance of three central aspects: national unity and the social cohesion in society, the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of the various groups in society, and non-discrimination principles which not only concern social equality on grounds such as gender and sexual orientation but also the social equality of ethnic minorities (Vermeulen &

[1] However, Dutch society has always been culturally diverse. In past centuries, groups of various ethnic origins have settled in the Netherlands, including labour immigrants and refugees who fled other European countries for political or religious reasons. The Netherlands received a relatively large number of immigrants in the 17th century. Between 1850 and 1950 the number of immigrants settling in the Netherlands was low (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011).

[2] This definition is in use since 1999 (CBS 1999).

[3] CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl; CBS (2003). The term *allochthon* was not used by the CBS before 1989. However, in the publication *Allochtonen in Nederland 2003*, the CBS uses the term to describe statistics concerning 1972 (CBS 2003).

Slijper 2003: 8-11; cf. Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth & Breugelmans 2006: 104).[4]

These three aspects are closely related to fundamental debates on citizenship, and therefore Shadid (2009) describes these aspects as the central dimensions of multicultural citizenship (see also Castles 1994; Modood 2010). The relationship between citizenship and the equality of citizens is clear, as legal citizenship in Western countries invariably entails the right to equality, as well as other rights and obligations including the right to participate in the country's political institutions and the obligation to obey the country's laws (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008).

The dimension of social cohesion relates to the recognition that individuals of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds who have legal citizenship belong to the national group. This recognition is fundamental to debates on citizenship as well, as the latter concept 'entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion' of individuals (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 155). Despite the clear legal boundaries circumscribing citizenship, citizens' views about who fully belongs to their national group are socially constructed, and consequently the nation itself is a social construct (Anderson 1991; Pehrson & Green 2010). In some studies, a distinction has been made between concepts of the nation in which either exclusive or inclusive criteria are considered important to belonging to the national group. Exclusive criteria, also referred to as 'ethnic', include common descent and religion, while inclusive criteria, often referred to as 'civic', include respect for institutions and laws and a sense of national belonging (for references see Bakke 2000).

Nevertheless, the most defining aspect of multiculturalism is the recognition of cultural distinctiveness. Several authors argue that it is necessary to give formal recognition to such group distinctions as gender, culture and religion, in order to achieve citizen equality (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Shadid 2009). When these distinctions are not recognized, these authors argue, policies are often biased towards the interests of the majority group and consequently can cause inequalities or perpetuate existing inequalities (Leydet 2011; Modood 2010).

In these above-mentioned studies of how Western countries have responded to ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from immigration, the Netherlands is described by many authors – including opponents of multiculturalism – as a country which has represented or still represents a 'multicultural model', implying that its immigrant integration policies have been or still are multicultural (e.g.

[4] In other words, diversity in society raises two general questions: (1) who belongs to which group and (2) how should diversity be dealt with. The recognition of belonging relates to national unity and social cohesion, while the issue of dealing with diversity relates to equal treatment and the recognition of distinctiveness (cf. Verkuyten 2006: 5).

Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005; Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007). However, this assertion has been criticized by other authors, who argue that opponents of 'multicultural' integration policies often fail to explain what they mean by a 'multicultural' policy or country (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 7), or that they have been describing policies as 'multicultural', when these policies obviously have not fitted the criterion. Indeed, an analysis of Dutch integration policies by Duyvendak and Scholten (2012) indicates that these policies 'were not that multicultural at all', especially when it came to dealing with the aspect of the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness.

Leaving aside this criticism for the moment, it has to be said that most studies of whether countries have adopted a 'multicultural model' are limited, as they focus narrowly on regulations, policies and the political discourse of the societies concerned. In this respect, Shadid (2009) argues that, in order to characterize a society as multicultural, the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship discussed above have to be *publicly* recognized as well (cf. Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar 2008: 95). In other words, Shadid proposes using these three dimensions of the concept of multicultural citizenship to assess the normative responses of both a country's institutions *and* its citizens to the (cultural) diversity of society.

Despite the large number of studies on multiculturalism, few studies have yet been done of public views on the three said dimensions of multicultural citizenship.[5] Especially rare are studies about public views on the national belonging of (new) citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds (cf. Díez Medrano & Koenig 2005).[6] To paraphrase the researchers Devos and Banaji (2005): there is surprisingly little research on a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which in the Netherlands is the degree to which society attributes the quality 'Dutch' to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origins. Consequently, studies in which relationships between public views of national belonging and the public recognition of the social equality and cultural distinctiveness of citizens from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds are explored are rare as well (cf. Hjerm 1998).[7]

[5] Notable exceptions are studies by Van de Vijver and his colleagues (e.g. Breugelmans & Van de Vijver 2004; Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar 2008; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar 2009). However, these studies focus on attitudes towards cultural diversity and equality, and not on national belonging.

[6] Examples of research on national belonging in the United States are Devos & Banaji (2005) and Theiss-Morse (2009).

[7] A rare example is an ethnographic study of national identity in Denmark by Jenkins (2011).

Apart from these knowledge gaps, to date there has also been little empirical research on the relationship between immigrant's ethnic identity or multiple citizenship status and their loyalty to the nation-state, a specific aspect of the recognition of national belonging which has been increasingly debated and problematized in the last few decades. Both scientific and political debates on this issue were and still are largely theoretical and hypothetical, and lack empirical basis (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).

The purpose of this study is therefore to explore Dutch citizens' views on all three of these dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including loyalty to the nation-state. By exploring these views, this study hopes to contribute to the understanding of how the social construction of national belonging is related to various aspects of attitudes towards cultural diversity, including views on equality, prejudice and cultural distinctiveness. By assessing these relationships, this study will also make an empirical exploration of whether the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship are indeed distinct, as theorized by Shadid (2009). Furthermore, by exploring the views expressed by both natives and first- and second-generation immigrants about loyalty to the nation-state, it is hoped that this study will strengthen the empirical basis for scientific and political discussions on this issue. More generally, the intention behind exploring these various aspects of multicultural citizenship in this study is to gain insight into factors which affect the incorporation of new citizens into society which can be used in the development of policies concerning immigrant integration. (*Nota bene:* the goal of this study is to explore public *views* on multicultural citizenship, and *not* to examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible for citizenship.)

A word of caution, the reader should bear in mind that this study is exploratory in nature, and that its wide scope has limited the depth to which each of the issues could be researched. Furthermore, this study is synchronic and does not explore changes in public views over time, as the data were collected within a limited time frame (2012-2013). To put the findings of this study into a historical perspective, each chapter contains a brief review of the development of the political debates on the issue at hand. Finally, this study does not address the question how these public views are shaped in society or influenced by institutional processes such as education and the development of school curricula. This does not mean that such processes are not influential. On the contrary, see, for example, studies by Anderson (1991), Bakke (2000), Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano and Vertovec (2004), and Vertovec (2011).

The wide scope of this study has also led to specific methodological choices. In order to facilitate the exploration of relationships between all these views and also

to be able to include such background variables as political preference, educational level and gender in the analysis, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected using a survey (n=710) and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66). Both 'native Dutch' and first- and second-generation immigrants – holding Dutch citizenship – were interviewed. The design of the questionnaires was based on a study of the literature, including the literature on public and political debates.

1.2 Structure of this study

This study consists of 7 chapters, including this introductory chapter. In Chapter 2, aspects of the research methods and techniques and the sample used in this study are described, including the composition of the sample, the development and conduct of the questionnaires, and the analysis of data. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are discussed in relation to possible directions for future research. In Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, the results of the analyses are presented. Each of these chapters consists of a concise review of the relevant literature, a brief overview of regulations and political debates on the issue at hand, and an analysis of the empirical data.

The theme of Chapter 3 is public views about national belonging, one of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship as discussed above. More specifically, this chapter examines the strength of belonging felt by citizens of various cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and explores the criteria deemed important when considering which fellow-citizens of various backgrounds do belong to the national group.

Another aspect of national belonging, namely loyalty to the nation-state, is the subject of Chapter 4. In this chapter, public views on loyalty to the nation-state are examined, as well as relationships between these views and such specific characteristics of citizens as multiple citizenship status, descent and political preference.

Chapter 5 examines public views on another dimension of multicultural citizenship: the equality of citizens of various cultural and ethnic backgrounds. To this end, views on several topics will be explored, including immigrant integration, prejudice and discrimination, and positive action. Immigrant integration is examined in this chapter because 'integration' has been used by the Dutch government as a central concept in describing the relationship between equality on the one hand and ethnic and cultural diversity of society on the other.

Public views on the third dimension of multicultural citizenship, the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, will be explored in Chapter 6. As mentioned above, in the last two decades political debates on this issue have increasingly focused on religious practices, norms and values of, in particular, Muslim

immigrants and their descendants. Therefore, the examination of public views on cultural distinctiveness in Dutch society will be mainly concerned with religious distinctiveness.

Finally, Chapter 7 contains the general conclusions and theoretical considerations. In this chapter, the main results of the previous chapters will be integrated. Part of this integration concerns the questions of how the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship are related, and whether they are indeed empirically distinct. Finally, some recommendations for policy measures will be discussed.

1.3 Some key terms: 'natives', 'immigrants' and 'descent'

Various terms are (and were) used in the Netherlands to describe immigrants and Dutch citizens of different origins. In the period after World War II, the term 'guest workers' was widely used to designate labour migrants. When it became clear in the 1970s and 1980s that many of these labour migrants were not guests but were settling in the Netherlands permanently, policy makers began using the term 'ethnic minorities'. This term was replaced in the 1990s by the term *allochthons*, which, as mentioned above, is defined by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).[8] In this regard, a distinction is made between Western and non-Western *allochthons*, where, as mentioned above, the latter category includes persons of whom at least one parent was born in Africa, South America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) or Turkey.

It is important to realize that this distinction is based not on analytical considerations but on the political view that the integration of one group (non-Western) presents more challenges than integration of the other (Groenendijk 2007: 103-104). Furthermore, the distinction between *allochthon* and autochthon has been politicized (cf. Geschiere 2009: 130-168). This became clear in recent discussions about the future use of the terms. According to the current definition, a person who is born of parents born in the Netherlands is an autochthon, even when his or her grandparents were born outside the Netherlands. To be able still to make a distinction between descendants of (relatively recent) immigrants, some have decided to replace the term *allochthons* with the term 'immigrants and their descendants'.[9] Others, notably members of Parliament for the PVV (right-wing

[8] See CBS (1999).

[9] See for example some reports published by The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) since 2007 (available at http://www.scp.nl).

populist Party for Freedom), have argued that the children of second-generation immigrants have to be considered and defined as *allochthons* as well.[10]

This indicates that the question of who is an autochthon and who is an *allochthon* is more than a matter of definition. It is an ongoing social construction, based on such criteria as origin and how long ago someone's ancestors migrated to the Netherlands.

To prevent confusion, in this study the terms 'native Dutch' and 'immigrants' (or 'immigrants and their descendants') will be used. Unless otherwise stated, the term immigrant in this study indicates no more and no less than that at least one parent was born outside the Netherlands. Similarly, the term native is only taken to mean that both parents have been born in the Netherlands. However, as this study will make clear, it takes more than that to be described as a fellow native by many Dutch citizens. Finally, the variable 'descent' will be used, containing the aforementioned values 'native Dutch', 'non-Western immigrant' and 'Western immigrant'.

[10] See Snel (2011).

Chapter 2
Research methods

2.1 Introduction

The methodological aspects of this study will be discussed in this chapter. First of all, the research type will be described, followed by a discussion of the sampling method, sample characteristics, a description of the questionnaire development, a review of the data collection and a brief explanation of the employed techniques for data analysis. Finally, a number of limitations of this study as well as possible directions for future research on this topic will be discussed.

2.2 Research type

As mentioned, the main research question is focused on the views of Dutch citizens about the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship discussed in Chapter 1.[1] Using these dimensions as a point of departure, the main research question has been divided into the following sub-questions:

- What views do Dutch citizens entertain about national belonging and its relationship with multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state?
- What views do Dutch citizens have about the equality of citizens, both immigrants and natives, in society?
- What views do Dutch citizens have about the cultural distinctiveness of the various cultural and religious groups in the country?

[1] As said, the goal of this study is to explore public *views* on multicultural citizenship, and *not* to examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible for citizenship

- How are these views interrelated, and how are they related to the background variables of respondents, including age, gender, descent, educational level, income and political preference?

As mentioned in Chapter 1, few empirical studies on these public views exist, especially any which concern the dimension of national belonging and its relationship to national loyalty.

The proposed exploratory character and wide scope of this study led to the choice of a mixed-method methodological design, including a survey (n=710) and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66) in which both native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants – holding Dutch citizenship – were interviewed. The survey was meant to facilitate the exploration of relationships between views on all dimensions of multicultural citizenship and the inclusion of background variables in the analysis. Open-ended questions in the questionnaire and in the in-depth interviews allowed respondents to elaborate on their opinions, for instance, why and in what context do they hold certain views, in order to enrich the data and to improve the validity of the research findings (cf. Small 2011).

Given the size of the survey sample, it was not practicable to conduct the questionnaire by means of face-to-face interviews. Therefore, Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) was carried out by the TNS NIPO survey agency (further explained below). Respondents received an email invitation requesting them to participate in this research and a web link to the online questionnaire. In contrast, the in-depth interviews were conducted in person or by telephone.

2.3 Population, sample selection and sample characteristics

2.3.1 Sample selection

Decisions concerning the selection and composition of the sample were based both on two points, a review of the relevant literature and on practical considerations. The literature review indicated that such background variables as descent, religion, age, educational level and political preference are relevant in research on such topics as national belonging and loyalty to the nation-state (Devos & Banaji 2005; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Jones & Smith 2001a; Theiss-Morse 2009). Furthermore, in view of the scientific and political debates on multiculturalism (see Chapter 1), it was abundantly clear that the sample should include at least both native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants.

The wide scope of this study required a relatively large sample. Given a desired confidence level of 95% and also a confidence interval of around 95%, the sample

size should ideally be at least 400 (cf. Israel 1992). However, considering the number of the background variables, the sample size should be even larger, to allow for describing and comparing sub-groups. Moreover, the planned multivariate analyses (see Section 2.6) would require a respondent to survey-item ratio of around 10:1 (Bijleveld & Commandeur 2008; Costello & Osborne 2005). The limited budget for the study allowed for a sample size of only around n=700. Therefore, it was decided to select a sample which would at least include a sub-group of native Dutch and a sub-group of non-Western immigrants, each large enough to allow an analysis with, or close to, the desired confidence level and interval.

One of the problems with this sort of research is that it is not always easy to obtain a representative sample which is of the desired size, mainly because it is difficult and time-consuming to establish a comprehensive sampling frame.[2] Therefore it was decided to use the research panel TNS NIPObase, which contains around 216,000 respondents in 143,640 households (June 2012). It is mainly based on random respondent pre-recruitment (and therefore not on self-selection).[3] By referring to the information TNS NIPO has about the background characteristics of respondents in their panel, it was possible to obtain a sample which is, by and large, representative with respect to the variables mentioned above. Another advantage of this panel is that it includes respondents who have already agreed to participate in TNS NIPO online surveys, which improves the response rate.

The panel included Dutch citizens who are 18 years of age or older. Consequently, it was decided to define the population for this study in the category of Dutch citizens who are 18 years of age or older. Studying children and young adolescents would require a different legal and theoretical approach (cf. French, Seidman, Allen & Aber 2006; Phinney 1990), which would make the scope of this study even wider, and would have limited its depth.

Considering the relatively low percentage of immigrants in the Netherlands (see Chapter 1), simple random sampling would have resulted in a low absolute number of immigrant respondents, negatively affecting the reliability of the study.

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[2] Only Statistics Netherlands (CBS) has direct access to the Municipal Personal Records Database (Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie – GBA), which contains the requisite information for a sampling frame for studies on Dutch citizens.

[3] The pre-recruitment by TNS NIPO is done in face-to-face and telephonic interviews, for which respondents were selected through random sampling. To increase the proportion in the panel of groups which are difficult to reach or less represented in society such as minorities, TNS NIPO uses other recruitment methods, including snowball sampling. For an assessment of this panel and other panels in the Netherlands, see Van Ossenbruggen, Vonk & Willems (2006). See also: http://www.nopvo.nl.

Therefore, a disproportionate stratified sample was selected, which included two sub-samples. The first consisted of Dutch citizens excluding non-Western immigrants, the second included immigrants belonging to the four largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands: persons of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean descent. In total, 950 persons were approached, of whom 710 returned filled in questionnaires. Consequently, the first sub-sample consisted of 468 native Dutch, 33 Western immigrants and 7 persons whose descent is unknown, and the second sub-sample consisted of 202 non-Western immigrants.[4] The response rate varied between 67% (non-Western immigrants) and 84% (native Dutch and Western immigrants).

For the semi-structured in-depth interviews, a sub-sample of respondents was taken from the survey sample. To this end, the survey included questions about whether respondents were willing to co-operate in a follow-up interview and whether this willingness depended on a potential reward of 25 Euros. Such an incentive was indeed provided, as experience with other studies indicates that the relatively low response for in-depth follow-up interviews in the Netherlands can be increased by offering a reward (cf. Stoop 2005). Of the 710 respondents who filled out the survey, 184 consented to a follow-up interview, of whom 143 were only prepared to be interviewed in return for a monetary reward. The prevalent recommendation for a minimum size of non-probability samples for qualitative interviews is between 30 and 50 (Bernard 2011: 154). Therefore, of the 184 respondents who were prepared to participate, a random sample of 120 was selected and approached for an interview. In total, 66 persons responded (some after a reminder) and were interviewed, including 42 who expected a reward and 24 who did not. All 66 participants, however, were rewarded with a gift voucher worth 25 Euros.

2.3.2 Sample characteristics

As mentioned above, the sample was disproportionally stratified and included two sub-samples. The first sub-sample, consisting of native Dutch (n=468) and Western immigrants (n=33), was representative (in 2012) with respect to the variables gender, age, educational level, family size, province of residence and political preference. Of the Western immigrants, 21% were not born in the Netherlands (i.e. are first generation), and 18% of them have multiple citizenship. The second sub-sample, consisting of immigrants of Turkish (n=59), Moroccan

[4] As mentioned above, given the limited budget it was decided to select a sample which allowed for analysis with or close to the desired confidence level and interval of at least native Dutch and non-Western immigrant respondents. This led to a sample that included a low number of Western immigrants. This limitation will be discussed in more depth in Section 2.7.

(n=45), Surinamese (n=73) and Antillean (n=25) descent, was representative with respect to gender, age and educational level. Of these respondents, 57% were not born in the Netherlands, and 38% do have multiple citizenship.

The total sample consisted of 359 female and 351 male respondents who were between 18 and 93 years old. The average age of the native Dutch respondents was 47.7 (SD = 17.3). The non-Western immigrants were younger (M = 37.2, SD = 15.1) and the Western immigrants older (M = 52.0, SD = 17.2). The mean educational level, measured on a scale from 1 (no or primary education) to 7 (MA at university) of the native Dutch respondents was 4.0 (SD = 1.8), of the non-Western immigrants 3.4[5] (SD = 1.8) and Western immigrants 4.4 (SD = 1.6).

The sample for the in-depth interviews (n=66) consisted of 41 native Dutch and 25 non-Western immigrants, including 26 male and 40 female respondents. At the time of the study, they were between 20 and 77 years old (M = 45.2, SD = 14.8). Their average educational level was clearly higher than that in the survey sample: 4.9 (SD = 1.3), which equalled higher general secondary education or pre-university secondary education.[6]

2.4 Development of the questionnaires

As said, two questionnaires were developed for this study: one for the survey and the other for the in-depth follow-up interviews. To this end, the sub-research questions regarding the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship (see 2.2 above) were operationalized on the basis of a study of the relevant literature.

To answer the first sub-research question, regarding views on national belonging and its relationship to multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state, questions were formulated on:

- cognitive aspects of national identification, that is, criteria for national belonging;
- cognitive aspects of national self-identification;
- affective aspects of national and ethnic self-identification, that is, sense of belonging;
- views on multiple citizenship in relation to belonging and loyalty;

[5] This average of 3.4 indicates a level between lower general secondary education (Dutch: VMBO) and vocational education (Dutch: MBO), consistent with the information of Statistics Netherlands (CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl). However, respondents of Antillean and Surinamese origin have a higher average educational level (3.8 and 3.7 respectively) than those of Turkish and Moroccan origin (3.2 and 2.8 respectively).

[6] In Dutch: HAVO/VWO.

- views on expressions of national loyalty, including aspects of national pride, shame and patriotism.

To answer the second sub-research question about citizens' equality, questions were formulated in order to investigate views on:

- the principle of equal treatment;
- anti-discrimination policy and positive action measures;
- immigrant integration (policy and cultural retention);
- aspects of the prejudicial view that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat;
- frequency of social contact with, and social distance between, different groups.

To answer the third sub-research question, on cultural distinctiveness, questions were formulated to investigate views on:

- the value of cultural diversity;
- cultural and religious distinctiveness;
- the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness;
- cultural diversity measures in the workplace and in healthcare organizations;
- Islamic religious expressions;
- the compatibility of Islamic and Dutch norms and values.

These topics and the literature from which they were derived will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 to 6. Finally, questions were included to collect information about such background variables as gender, age, educational level, income and political preference.

The survey questionnaire included both closed-ended and open-ended questions in order to understand the motivation of respondents in answering the questions and simultaneously to improve construct validity. This questionnaire also included scales for measuring views on various aspects of national (self-)identification, prejudice and social distance. These scales were derived from previous studies and adapted for the present study.

The questionnaire for the follow-up in-depth interviews was semi-structured, focusing on why and in what context respondents hold certain views on the various

aspects. These questions did not just focus on respondents' views, they also asked them to relate these views to their personal experiences.

Pilot interviews were conducted among respondents from various (educational) backgrounds, to assess the expected duration of the interviews and the perceived difficulty and phrasing of the questions. The maximum duration of the survey, which was conducted online (as mentioned above), appeared to be around 25 minutes. The comments of the pilot respondents indicated that a longer duration would probably have lowered the completion rate, with which researchers at TNS-NIPO concurred. The maximum duration of the face- to-face interviews appeared to be around 60 minutes. Pilot respondents mentioned that they considered some questions to be quite difficult, and 'therefore one hour is more than enough'.

To improve intelligibility, when they had been deemed too complicated questions were rephrased and simplified. The questions which most needed some modification were those on the topics of loyalty and positive action measures. Furthermore, to reduce the risk of socially desirable responses, the order in which topics were addressed was adapted. In the survey questionnaire, for example, the question on positive action measures for ethnic minorities and questions about similar measures for women were addressed in different sections. In the questionnaire for the in-depth interviews, such questions were followed by a question in order to compare the respondent's views on such issues.

2.5 Data collection

The survey was conducted in November 2012 and the in-depth follow-up interviews took place between March and August 2013.

The in-depth interviews were conducted by the main researcher (n=31) and by three other interviewers (n=35). Respondents were asked to determine the location of the interview themselves. Most interviews were carried out face-to-face and in respondents' homes. Other interviews took place in their offices, or in cafés and restaurants. Some interviews were carried out by telephone or Skype, for practical reasons or at the request of the respondent. The duration of these interviews varied from 45 to 70 minutes. Respondents were asked permission to record the interview and only 4 refused. Consequently, 62 interviews were recorded. Notes were taken during the interviews.

In their introduction to the interview, interviewers stressed that this study concerned the respondents' views and that they were not being judged, there were no wrong answers and that not having an opinion or considering a question difficult is normal, perfectly acceptable and at the same time important information.

By and large, respondents appeared to be at ease during the interviews. Some clearly enjoyed answering the questions, and said that they considered it refreshing to talk extensively about these topics and not ending up in a polarized discussion. A few reacted emotionally to questions which concerned cultural or religious distinctiveness, and had to be reminded by the interviewer that the questions were not meant to spark a debate. As one respondent said, 'Why are you asking this? Why on earth would I consider it to be a problem if women choose to wear a headscarf?' Interestingly, interviewers were often surprised by the frankness of respondents who appeared to consider immigration and the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants to be problematic. They talked frankly and without hesitation about their views. Other respondents appeared to be very tolerant of cultural and religious distinctiveness in the first part of the interview, but had to acknowledge later that they were not tolerant with respect to all forms of cultural distinctiveness. Some argued, for example, that they support the principle of equal treatment, but at the same time had more difficulty approving of preferential treatment measures for immigrants than of preferential treatment measures for women. As one respondent said, 'After some heart searching, I would say yes to preferential treatment for women, and no to preferential treatment for ethnic minorities. But, with some hesitation, I approve of both, because you have to treat people equally.' These doubts expressed by respondents underlined how important it is to approach issues of citizens' equality and cultural distinctiveness in various ways, by addressing topics covering all three dimensions of multicultural citizenship.

It turned out that there were several categories of questions which respondents considered difficult to answer. The most challenging were those questions concerning national belonging. Some explained that they do not, or only rarely, think about criteria which determine who belongs to the Dutch national group, and found it difficult to think of relevant criteria. In the same vein, those who argued that they consider a certain manifestation of cultural distinctiveness, such as an Islamic headscarf or a mosque, to be a problem, often admitted that they were at a loss to come up with an example of a personal experience in which they had experienced these manifestations as problematic. This is in line with research which has indicated that thoughts and feelings about social groups reflect both 'controlled and conscious processes' and 'automatic and less conscious processes' (Devos & Banaji 2005: 448). For this reason, this study focuses not only on specific criteria for defining national belonging and specific manifestations of cultural distinctiveness, but also on patterns of inclusion and exclusion of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Other possibilities to examine less conscious forms of social categorization in future studies will be discussed in Section 2.7.

Other questions which were considered difficult were those about aspects of multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state. While almost all respondents indicated that they were aware of the political debates on these issues, during the interview most of them said that they did not know of any actual cases of multiple citizenship or of any lack of loyalty which had presented a problem. Some began speculating, others simply said they did not know or did not understand why these issues were considered problematic by politicians. Similarly, most respondents did not know what the concept 'neutrality of the state' means, and considered it difficult to answer, for example, whether public officials and teachers should be allowed to wear an Islamic headscarf. Finally, many respondents did not know what the equality policies and regulations of the Dutch government, including measures for immigrant integration, anti-discrimination and positive action, entail. Thinking these issues over, many respondents admitted that they did not have any personal experiences to which they could refer to formulate an opinion. These responses illustrate the importance of researching the views on these issues of the political elite in future studies. Such directions for future studies will be discussed in Section 2.7.

2.6 Data analysis

After completion of the survey, TNS NIPO delivered the collected data in a file which could be processed by IBM SPSS Statistics. This file included factors in order to weight the total disproportional stratified sample to reflect the demographic profile of the Netherlands. Before commencing the statistical analysis, the data were cleaned and examined by calculating frequencies and creating contingency tables.

The quantitative data, collected by means of closed-ended questions in the online survey, served to explore views on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship (see Chapter 1), and relationships between these views and such background variables as gender and educational level. To this end, techniques for univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis have been employed. The bulk of this data is of either the nominal or the ordinal type (most questions used Likert scales), which means that linear relationships cannot be assumed. For this reason, techniques have been used which are nonparametric and can reveal possible nonlinear relationships between variables with various levels of measurement. To explore patterns in respondents' views, two such (related) techniques were used: Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) and Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (provided in the SPSS Categories module), which are alternatives to linear Principal Components Analysis (see also Linting &

Van der Kooij 2012). As mentioned above, such exploration is important, as this study focuses on patterns of inclusion and exclusion of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and not just on specific criteria for national belonging and specific manifestations of cultural distinctiveness (cf. Spruyt & Vanhoutte 2009). Furthermore, such data reduction techniques allow the exploration of patterns in expressions of national attachment, including loyalty to the nation-state. Consequently, the CATPCA technique was used to construct scales by which to explore relationships between these patterns (represented by scales) and other variables. These scales were constructed by summating items, and not by calculating component (factor) scores, as this study is exploratory and summated scales are generally more stable across samples and therefore easier to compare with results of future studies (cf. DiStefano, Zhu & Mîndrilă 2009). Importantly, it must be noted that the means that were calculated to compare scores on items are exploratory as well, as the items were measured using Likert-scales.

These techniques and the related technique of Categorical Regression (CATREG) (also provided in the SPSS Categories module) were also used to explore profiles of respondents, that is, response patterns (see also Bijleveld & Commandeur 2008; Van der Kooij 2007). The latter technique allowed the exploration of relationships with background variables, while controlling for other variables. It bears repeating, however, that while p-values to assess significance (derived from the CATREG procedures) have been reported, this study is exploratory in nature.

The qualitative data, collected by means of the open-ended questions in the survey and the in-depth interviews, served (as mentioned above) to explore why and in what context respondents hold certain views, in order to enrich the data and improve the validity of the research findings. The data collected by the in-depth interviews was transcribed, using the recordings and notes. These transcriptions and the data derived from the open-ended questions in the survey were coded, initially using a list of codes which was compiled on the basis of the interview topics, the literature study and notes made during the interviews. During the coding process, new codes were created to describe unforeseen topics in the data. Subsequently, relationships between codes were identified and described by categories (see also Strauss & Corbin 1998). In the next phase of the analysis, these categories were related to the results of the analysis of the quantitative data.

2.7 Limitations and possible directions for future research

In this section, the methodological and theoretical limitations of this study and possible directions for future research will be briefly discussed.

A general methodological limitation of this study is its exploratory nature (see Chapter 1). The reader has to bear in mind that the goal of this study is to provide insights into respondents' views and the relationships between these views and other variables. Furthermore, views were explored within a relatively short period of time (8 months).

Other limitations have to do with the sample selection. First of all, the survey sample contained a relatively small number of Western immigrants (n=33), whereas according to Statistics Netherlands their number (1.5 million) is close to the number of non-Western immigrants (1.9 million).[7] The former group was also missing in the sample for the in-depth interviews. Both shortcomings limited the reliability of the results concerning this group. Similarly, the various groups of non-Western immigrants included in the sample (Dutch citizens of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean background) were relatively small, which limited the reliability of separate analyses of each group.

An important point is that the survey and in-depth interviews were conducted in Dutch. This limited the study, as it was not (practically) possible to explore the views of Dutch citizens who do not have a relatively good command of the Dutch language. Other limits are attributable to the fact that the sample was selected from the access panel TNS NIPObase, and that the survey was conducted online. This might have resulted in a sampling bias, as the sample only contains individuals who are able to participate in online web interviewing. While 96% of Dutch citizens had access to the Internet in 2012 (Van Deursen & Van Dijk 2012), not everyone has the (technical) capability to fill in online questionnaires. Furthermore, although their panel is based on random pre-recruitment and not on self-selection (as mentioned above), obviously respondents have already agreed to participate in online surveys of TNS-NIPO. As is the case with all studies which require samples for interviewing, this results in a non-response bias. This means that, while the sample was representative with respect to the variables mentioned above, it is not known to what extent and how the response patterns of the respondents included differ from (potential) responses of individuals who did not want to participate in such surveys.

This method of online interviewing has some other limitations as well. There was no interviewer present to explain questions which needed more clarification. This problem could only be partly dealt with by testing the phrasing and difficulty of the questions in pilot interviews, and by relating the results to those of the in-depth interviews. There is also the possibility that respondents might have been less motivated, which can lead to non-differentiation between items on the same

[7] Numbers in January 2013. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl.

response scale and to an acquiescence bias as well. The risk of the latter type of bias has been reduced (but cannot be eliminated) by including items which are neutrally worded, and by mixing negatively and positively worded items.

A further limitation of this study concerns the question type used. Most questions in the survey were of the closed-ended type, possibly introducing researcher bias and reducing the level of spontaneity in respondents' answers (cf. Bryman 2012: 250-252). However, this limitation was partly overcome by adding the response category 'other' to several questions, the inclusion of open questions to allow respondents to elaborate and by relating the results of the survey to those of the follow-up in-depth interviews.

A final methodological limitation concerns the fact that the in-depth interviews were carried out by native Dutch interviewers. As relations between majority and minority groups are important factors in the construction of social boundaries (see Chapter 3), this might have influenced responses by non-native respondents, namely by introducing social desirability bias.

The study also has theoretical limitations. First of all, the questions in the survey questionnaire were largely based on the relevant literature, and not on preliminary qualitative research to identify relevant topics (for example, regarding criteria for national belonging and expressions of loyalty) and to construct specific scales. In other words, this exploratory study did not include a preliminary exploratory phase.

Furthermore, views on citizens' equality, one of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, were measured by a small number of items concerning the principle of equal treatment, anti-discrimination policies and positive action measures. Views on the above-mentioned topic of immigrant integration and the prejudice that immigrants present a threat appeared to be related not only to views on equality, but also to views on the other dimensions of multicultural citizenship, as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In future studies, more items should be included to explore public views concerning citizens' equality in more depth.

More generally, the wide scope of the study has limited the depth in which the views on multicultural citizenship could be researched. As mentioned in Section 2.5, existing research indicates that thoughts and feelings concerning social groups reflect both 'controlled and conscious processes' and 'automatic and less conscious processes' (Devos & Banaji 2005: 448). Therefore, in future studies specific attention could be paid to less conscious associations, for example, using Implicit Association Testing (IAT) (e.g. Devos & Bajani 2005), and the views of the elite on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship could be explored. In this context, Brady and Kaplan (2009: 35) argue that 'elites typically take the lead in constructing and elaborating ethnic identities, so that the dynamics of ethnicity

involve an interplay between elites and mass publics that cannot be understood without separate measures at the two levels'. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.5, the results of the present study indicate that the Dutch discourse on aspects of multicultural citizenship, for example, on the issue of national loyalty, is partly shaped by the political elite. While such studies might provide insights into the interplay between elites and mass publics, longitudinal studies could take diachronic factors into account, for example, the effects of changes in the political debate, economic developments and immigration patterns (cf. Scheepers, Coenders & Lubbers 2003). Finally, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this study does not address the question how these public views are shaped in society or influenced by institutional processes such as education and the development of school curricula. This does not mean that such processes are not influential. On the contrary, see, for example, studies by Anderson (1991), Bakke (2000), Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano and Vertovec (2004), and Vertovec (2011). Obviously, future studies addressing this question should also pay attention to the aforementioned role of the elite and diachronic factors.

Chapter 3
Multicultural citizenship and national belonging

3.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to speak of a multicultural society the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including their belonging to the national group of both natives and immigrants, their cultural distinctiveness and their equality, have to be formally and publicly recognized (Shadid 2009: 5-6). In this chapter, the recognition of one of these dimensions, namely national belonging in Dutch society, will be explored.

The issue of belonging to the national group or nation is fundamental in debates on citizenship, as the concept of citizenship 'entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion' of individuals (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 155). This tension is clearly manifest in the various aspects of citizenship discussed in the literature (e.g. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; Cohen 1999; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). One of these aspects is the legal status of immigrants – those who possess the legal status of a country's citizenship legally belong to the national group. Another aspect of citizenship is the rights and obligations entailed by the legal status of citizenship. Among them are the obligation to obey the country's laws and, on the rights side the right to equal treatment and the right to participate in the country's political institutions. Nevertheless, despite the clearly circumscribed legal boundaries of citizenship and the formal rights and obligations bound up in the concept, citizens can still disagree about who fully belongs to their national group. Views on belonging to a national group are necessarily socially constructed (and therefore dynamic) and consequently the nation itself is a social construct (Anderson 1991; Pehrson &

Green 2010). One example is the frequent use of the term 'foreigners' to describe first- and even second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands, including those who have full legal citizenship. This lack of consensus about who fully belongs shows, for example, that people can differ in their views on to what extent the rights, such as equal treatment and freedom of religion of certain groups in their nation state, should be upheld – issues that will be more extensively discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Despite the fact that in many countries this social construction of national belonging has long been determined by the dominant group, it has become 'increasingly difficult to simply conceive of national citizenship as strictly mono-cultural because citizens of the same country have increasingly diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds' (Duyvendak 2011: 82). As discussed in Chapter 1, this is certainly the case in the Netherlands. To examine who is socially recognized as belonging to the Dutch national group, in this chapter Dutch government policies which relate to national belonging will be reviewed and empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research will be analysed. However, before this is done, the scientific debates on, and the scientific usage of, the concept of belonging will be discussed.

3.2 Perspectives on national belonging

Issues of social belonging essentially concern relationships between individuals and groups. These relationships are generally investigated in social identity research which focuses on how individuals are socially defined, including to which groups they do and do not belong (Verkuyten 2005: 43; see also Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston & McDermott 2009; Jenkins 2008).

However, besides the fact that there is no agreement on how social identity should be defined, Verkuyten (2005: 40) states that the concept of identity is overused, and the resultant familiarity leads to 'confusion, misunderstanding and conceptual vagueness'. Brubaker and Cooper likewise state that, when the concept of identity is used in social science, it 'tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)' (2000: 1-2).[1] Therefore, Brubaker and Cooper propose 'to go beyond "identity"' (2000: 36), and to replace this concept with other concepts which offer more conceptual clarity. But, because conceptual clarity

[1] Brubaker & Cooper state that a strong sense of identity implies 'strong notions of group boundedness and homogeneity', 'a sharp distinctiveness from nonmembers, a clear boundary between inside and outside' (2000: 10). In contrast, a weak sense of identity implies that 'identity is multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, constructed, negotiated, and so on' (2000: 11).

is the goal, this call to replace the concept of identity can also be interpreted as a plea for a more appropriate operationalizing of the concept. The latter position is taken in the present study, following in the footsteps of Verkuyten (2005; 2006) and Jenkins (2008).[2]

In the exploration of the phenomenon of national belonging in this study, insights will be used which are derived from research in the tradition of social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979; see also Druckman 1994; Huddy & Khatib 2007). In this tradition, social identity is generally defined as a cognitive awareness of group membership in combination with an affective commitment to that group (Tajfel 1981).

Several aspects of national belonging will be discussed in this and the next chapter, including the strength of affective commitment to the national group, national pride, patriotism, and criteria deemed important when considering who belongs to the national group. The review of the scientific debates in this section will be structured on the following issues which have been distinguished in studies of social identity by Jenkins (2008), Theiss-Morse (2009) and Verkuyten (2005; 2006): (1) the need of the individual to belong, (2) social categorization and its accompanying behavioural and normative expectations, and (3) social recognition.[3]

3.2.1 The need to belong and the construction of group boundaries

Research in various disciplines has shown that man, as a social animal, has the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary 1995). This individual need, which is defined by Baumeister and Leary as 'a strong desire to form and maintain enduring interpersonal attachments', cannot be dismissed as just any need, as research indicates that it is a 'powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation' (Baumeister & Leary 1995: 497). These interpersonal attachments are sought not only with family members and friends, but also with larger collectivities, such as national, ethnic and religious groups (Druckman 1994; Verkuyten 2006). Importantly, in their overview of empirical research on belonging, Gere and MacDonald (2010: 110) conclude that 'it has become clear that the need to belong has strong effects on people's cognitions, emotions, and behaviors' and that 'a chronically unmet need has many negative consequences that can profoundly affect an individual's life'. These negative consequences can include a lower performance in complex cognitive tasks, higher stress, poorer health and more health conditions (Gere & MacDonald 2010).

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[2] Also see: Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott (2009); Yuval-Davis (2010).

[3] Jenkins (2008) explores the concept of social identity. Theiss-Morse (2009) and Verkuyten (2005; 2006) study national identity and ethnic identity respectively, considering these as specific forms of social identities.

However, belonging to a national group, or any other social group, is not just a matter of individual choice determined by this need to belong. Others in the social environment have to categorize and recognize the individual as part of the group as well. This process relates to social categorization, the second issue in the studies of social identity mentioned above. This means that individuals and groups categorize themselves and are categorized by others in groups. Scholars use various terms to distinguish between these internal and external processes, such as self-ascription and ascription (Verkuyten 2005), and internal and external identification (Jenkins 2008). In these processes, many criteria for categorization are used in various combinations, among them cultural characteristics, ethnic background, gender and age (cf. Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005: 9-11). Importantly, this does not mean that a social group exists because it is objectively different from other groups with regard to certain criteria, but rather, as Barth (1969) realizes, because these criteria are used, in processes of ascription and self-ascription, to construct (imagined) group boundaries socially (cf. Anderson 1991). The very fact that every individual can be categorized according to various criteria means that every individual belongs to various groups at the same time.[4] An individual can legally belong to the Dutch national group, and simultaneously be categorized as belonging to another ethnic group, a family or a political party. In other words, individuals have partial or multiple social identities and belongings.[5] At the individual level, in a specific situation a certain identity, for instance, being a member of a family, can be emphasized, but in a different situation another identity, for instance, being a member of an ethnic or national group can be the most salient (Verkuyten 2005).

There has been an extensive discussion about why group boundaries are constructed, and influential explanations have been proposed by Barth (1969) and Tajfel (1981). Barth has argued that this process is a 'by-product of the transactions and negotiations of individuals pursuing their interests' (Jenkins 2008: 7). In contrast, in his social identity theory, Tajfel has proposed that categorization is a basic human tendency which serves individuals to achieve positive self-esteem by differentiating their in-group positively from out-groups. This need for positive distinctiveness *can* be expressed in favourable behaviour towards members of one's in-group – in-group favouritism and in-group loyalty – and discrimination against members of out-groups.[6] The crux of the matter is that it is not easy to determine the direction of the relationship, which is a process of weighing up between the

[4] See Jenkins (2008: 104) for a discussion of the distinction between categories and groups.

[5] See, for example, research on immigrants' processes of self-identification in the Netherlands by Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover (2005).

[6] The need for positive distinctiveness, however, is not always expressed in these ways. See Shadid (2007:183); also see Jenkins (2008: 114-115); Theiss-Morse (2009: 41).

process of pursuing interests on the one hand and social categorization on the other, because striving for positive self-esteem can also be considered pursuing an interest (Jenkins 2008: 7-8).[7]

Whatever the case might be, it is generally recognized that social categorization does happen, and that categorizations are not only nominal in that they provide labels for groups, but they also have cultural and emotional components which provide meaning (Brubaker 2009: 34; Druckman 1994; Jenkins 2008: 99; Verkuyten 2005: 46; 2006: 6). Consequently, the construction of boundaries not only sets in-group members apart nominally from out-group members, it simultaneously implies expectations of similarity among group members in the matters of specific behaviour and norms (cf. Jenkins 2008: 132-147). Examples are expectations of patriotism and group loyalty, which can be expressed by turning out to vote or being prepared to pay taxes, and also expectations of holding certain views about equality and cultural distinctiveness (Druckman 1994; Theiss-Morse 2009: 13-14, 23-29, 67-70). However, this does not necessarily mean that there is behavioural conformity or consensus about norms within a group, but rather that group members as well as the outside world believe or want to believe this to be the case (Jenkins 2008: 140).[8] As such, these expectations, held by members of both in-groups and out-groups, can be stereotypical (Verkuyten 2005: 46). Such in-group stereotypes, in turn, help to distinguish in-groups from out-groups, which serves the need for (positive) distinctiveness (Theiss-Morse 2009: 70-72).

In practice, in-group members can disagree on what the behavioural and normative expectations really mean, and their interpretations of these expectations are situationally contingent (Jenkins 2008: 136). Research shows, for example, that when the in-group stereotype includes support for the norm of equality, some group members support specific measures (like positive action) to achieve substantive equality, while other group members do not (Theiss-Morse 2009: 21-22; see also Chapter 5). Cogently, an individual who does not meet (all) behavioural and normative group expectations can still identify with the group, and will not necessarily be considered as not belonging to the group by other group members. For example, a Dutch individual who has emigrated to another country might not express loyalty to the Dutch national group, but can still self-identify and be identified by others as Dutch (cf. Keller 2007: 164-166).

[7] For a discussion of these and other perspectives, see Jenkins (2008: 1-15).

[8] Jenkins (2008: 134-140) discusses the work of Anthony Cohen (1985), who proposed that symbols shared within communities allow community members to believe that they behave in similar ways and that they have similar norms.

3.2.2 Social recognition

The expectations of similarity within groups mean that the construction of group boundaries does more than differentiate between in-groups and out-groups, it also affects relations between in-group members. In this regard, Theiss-Morse (2010: 4, 72-77) makes a distinction between typical[9] group members, who exemplify the group stereotypes and are therefore fully recognized as belonging to the group, and marginalized group members, who do not meet (all) these expectations and are therefore not fully recognized. This differentiation between in-group members relates to social recognition, the third issue in the studies of social identity mentioned above. Verkuyten (2006: 5) argues that striving for social recognition is, as are the need to belong and finding meaning through social categorization, a basic human tendency. This includes recognition of who one is as an individual and also one's recognition as member of a group, especially when belonging to this group is important to one's self-esteem (Verkuyten 2005: 68-69; 2006: 9).

This means that the issue of belonging to a certain group, which is reflected in debates on national identity, is not trivial, as it can lead to identity conflicts. For example, Huynh, Devos and Smalarz (2011) researched the 'perpetual foreigner stereotype': the idea that members of ethnic minorities will be seen as others in perpetuity. They conclude that, among ethnic minorities, 'even after controlling for perceived discrimination, awareness of the perpetual foreigner stereotype was a significant predictor of identity conflict and lower sense of belonging to American culture' (Huynh, Devos and Smalarz 2011: 133). In other words, immigrants who perceive that their ethnicity stands in the way of their being fully recognized as part of the national group can suffer from identity conflicts and a lowered sense of belonging to the national group.

3.2.3 The importance of context and intergroup relations

These issues just raised – the need to belong, the need for social recognition, and social categorization and its accompanying behavioural and normative expectations – clearly define that group boundaries, as Jenkins (2008: 44) puts it, are 'the perpetual subject and object of negotiation', which implies that they are dynamic and situationally contingent (see also Verkuyten 2005: 55). Examining this contingent character of group boundaries, scholars identify many factors which play a role in their construction. These factors relate to the situations in which the boundaries are constructed, the relations between and within the categorized groups, and the interpretations of these situations and relations by the individuals and groups concerned (Wentholt 1991; see also Verkuyten 2005: 53). These

[9] Theiss-Morse uses the term 'prototypical'.

factors include, *inter alia*, historical, economic and political circumstances (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004), relations between majority and minority groups (Verkuyten 2010: 151), and power relations (Verkuyten 2005: 58; Brady & Kaplan 2009: 36).

The importance of the interpretation of such factors, more specifically the interpretation of the historical circumstances pertinent to the construction of group boundaries, is shown in research by Smeekes, Verkuyten and Poppe (2012), which indicates that those who perceive Dutch national history to have been tolerant tend to be more tolerant of the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslims in the Netherlands. In considering the relationship between group relations and power, it is of importance 'who is able to construct socially relevant categorizations' (Verkuyten 2005: 56). Members of majority groups tend to consider their own nominal characteristics and accompanying behaviour and norms – which, as discussed above, are stereotypical – to be self-evident (Verkuyten 2005: 59) and typical (Theiss-Morse 2009: 73). Those who deviate from these criteria or are perceived as deviating are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to 'protect the in-group stereotype' (Theiss-Morse 2009: 74).[10] Verkuyten (2005: 59) calls this process the 'normalizing effect' of the majority group identity. An example of this process, which includes historical and political factors as well, is the link between the history of colonialism and the present negative stereotypes of immigrant groups (Verkuyten 2005: 53), which as a result of these stereotypes are not considered to be fully part of the national group (cf. Theiss-Morse 2009: 67). Similarly, in their research Devos and Banaji (2005: 447) found that African Americans and Asian Americans were 'less associated with the national category "American" than are White Americans'.

The construction of boundaries can have negative consequences, among them discrimination and identity conflicts. Verkuyten (2005: 45) states that '[m]aking distinctions is not a problem, but it can become one if it occurs without adequate basis' (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of discrimination). Both discrimination and identity conflicts can lead to a lowered sense of belonging to the national group (Jayaweera & Choudhury 2008; Rumbaut 2005; Smart Richman & Leary 2009). Identity conflicts can occur when individuals who were born in the Netherlands and who consider themselves to be Dutch are still categorized as, for example, Moroccans because their parents or grandparents were born in Morocco (Shadid 2007: 192). In other words, the categorization of someone as belonging to a certain group can persist, even when personal characteristics change. Identity conflicts can

[10] This relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of sub-typing (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001).

also occur when one of the multiple identities each individual has, for example, that of being a Muslim, is not considered to be part of the in-group characteristics (cf. Shadid 2009: 17). In some cases, specific social identities can become stigma identities, which 'provide a chronically salient distinction or a master status that cannot be ignored and serves to define the essential character of those who are classified' (Verkuyten 2005: 52). As an example of a stigma identity, Verkuyten refers to the 'Gypsy' identity of Roma and Sinti in Eastern Europe.

This is not to say that majority groups or those in power are the only groups able to construct socially relevant categorizations. Various collectivities, among them women, homosexuals and religious and ethnic minorities, have been actively engaged in the negotiation of group boundaries, not only in order to be fully accepted as belonging to a national group (acceptance which includes, for example, equal treatment), but also for the recognition of their own cultural, historical or political distinctiveness (see also Chapter 6). Therefore, the construction of boundaries is also a political project, and terms such as the politics of belonging and identity politics are used to describe these negotiations (see, for example, Parekh 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006).

3.2.4 Aspects of identification with the national group

As mentioned above, the construction of group boundaries is an interplay of internal and external processes, that is, of self-identification and the identification by others. In the literature on national identity, various concepts have been discussed which relate to self-identification with the national group, such as national attachment or commitment, nationalism, national pride and patriotism (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009).

In order to clarify the relationship between these concepts and self-identification with the national group or nation, it is helpful to distinguish between various components of self-identification recognized in studies of social identities (for an overview, see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). First of all, individuals need to be cognitively aware that they are members of a certain (national) group. This cognitive awareness can include their assessment of to what extent they consider themselves a typical group member (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 85; Theiss-Morse 2009: 73). Apart from this cognitive component, self-identification also has an affective component which relates to the need of human beings to belong, discussed earlier in this chapter, and an evaluative component which relates to the positive and negative attitudes individuals foster towards the social category to which they belong (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). The distinction between these three components can be traced back to Tajfel's definition of the social identity concept as the 'part of an

individual's self- concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel 1978: 63).[11]

Research in the tradition of Tajfel's social identity theory indicates that there is a strong relationship between the affective component of self-identification – also referred to as the level of affective commitment or the strength of belonging to a group – and behaviour in terms of group membership. Generally speaking, group members who have a high affective commitment to the group are more likely to display in-group favouritism and in-group loyalty (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). Especially when the distinctiveness of a group is cast into doubt, group members with a strong affective commitment to the group tend to defend this distinctiveness by exaggerating differences between their in-group and out-groups, a process which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination of out-group members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002).

As might be expected, the level of affective commitment to the in-group varies, and it has been shown that it depends on the level of voluntariness of group membership (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). When individuals voluntarily choose to be a member of a group, their level of commitment to that group can generally be expected to be stronger than when their membership is involuntary. In the latter case, group members cannot leave the group, at least not easily (the voluntariness can be a matter of degree) and more variation in the level of affective group commitment can be expected. National group membership can be considered to be involuntary to a large extent. As Bakke (2000: 8) argues, '[n]ations are not objects of choice the way e.g. political parties are', and most people never change their national identity. Nevertheless, referring to Billig (1995), Theiss-Morse (2009: 10) argues that national identities have a relatively potent nature, as they are 'constantly reinforced through symbols, culture, language, and politics'. Moreover, national identity is not only reinforced, it is also reproduced by such institutions as schools, in which national culture, history and norms are taught, and consequently, 'for most people, being a part of the nation is a matter of upbringing and socialization rather than a matter of conscious choice' (Bakke 2000: 7; see also Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano & Vertovec 2004). This explains the stability of these identities, and means that those who feel a sense of national belonging tend to 'feel that commitment strongly' (Theiss-Morse 2009: 10).

[11] Also see the distinction between the cognitive process of 'identification as' and the emotional process (including a combination of affection and evaluation) of 'identification with'. See Verkuyten (2005: 65-67).

Despite the widely recognized relationship between the level of affective commitment to the group and behaviour in terms of group membership, there is no agreement among scholars about how to conceptualize and measure this level of commitment (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). Some authors include the cognitive, affective and evaluative components of self-identification in one uni-dimensional construct, in order to describe the level of commitment to the national group (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009, who examines the strength of national identity). However, empirical research indicates that the various components of self-identification do not necessarily co-vary in a predictable way (for an extensive discussion see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). In this respect, Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk found that it is the affective component of self-identification, and not the cognitive and evaluative components, which 'appears to be the key aspect of social identity which drives the tendency for people to behave in terms of their group membership' (1999: 386).

With these insights, it is possible to clarify the relationships between the affective component of national self-identification and related concepts which have been discussed in the literature, including national attachment, national pride, patriotism and nationalism. First of all, the term national attachment is mostly used as a general concept, not only to refer to the affective component of national self-identification, but also to nationalism, national pride and patriotism (cf. Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Latcheva 2010). Some researchers have found that national pride correlates positively with the affective component of national self-identification (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009: 133-138). Nevertheless, it is not clear if these two phenomena necessarily co-vary, as pride has both affective and evaluative components. While affection for a group can undoubtedly influence the evaluation of that group, individuals with a strong affective commitment to a certain group can evaluate certain characteristics of that group negatively (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999: 373). In other words, national pride is a multidimensional concept (cf. Hjerm 1998: 343), and empirical study is necessary to explore how the dimensions of national pride are related to group commitment and other variables.

Similarly, other studies suggest that patriotism is a multidimensional concept as well. The concept of patriotism is used not only to describe the affective component of national self-identification, but to illustrate the attitudes and behaviours in which this affection is expressed as well (cf. Herrmann, Isernia & Segatti 2009; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Various forms of these attitudes and behaviours are considered in the literature as various types of patriotism (for references, see Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Constructive patriotism,

for example, has been defined as criticism and questioning motivated by 'a desire for positive change' (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). Furthermore, empirical studies indicate that national self-identification is distinct from various forms of patriotism (Huddy and Khatib 2007).

As are these aforementioned concepts, in the relevant literature the concept of nationalism is generally used to refer to a bias in favour of one's own nation (cf. Calhoun 2002). However, the concept of nationalism is often used to describe views and behaviour stressing the distinction between one's own national group and other national, ethnic or religious groups (cf. Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993; Latcheva 2010). In this regard, several authors suggest that nationalism refers to an idealization of one's nation (e.g. Sumner 1906), which can be expressed by the sense that one's own nation is superior to other nations (e.g. Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). Furthermore, a distinction is often made between civic and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the view that membership of a nation is first and foremost legal and political, implying that criteria for national belonging include respect for institutions and laws, and a sense of national belonging (Calhoun 2002). In contrast, ethnic nationalism refers to the view that membership of a nation is rooted in specific ethnic or cultural criteria. Below, this distinction will be discussed in more detail.

Considering the discussion above, the relationships between the affective component and other components of self-identification are 'an issue for theoretical elaboration and empirical test' (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 91). In the present chapter, the cognitive and affective components of national self-identification and identification will be examined separately. In this examination, the affective component of national self-identification will also be referred to as 'affective commitment' or 'the strength of belonging' to the national group. The phenomena of national pride and patriotism will be discussed and examined in more detail in Chapter 4.

3.2.5 Inclusive and exclusive aspects of group boundaries

The interplay of the individual, situational and relational factors discussed above produces various forms of boundary construction. In other words, depending on these factors, certain categorization criteria are deemed relevant and others not. With respect to recognition of national belonging, a distinction is often made between nations in which either 'ethnic' or 'civic' criteria are seen as essential. This distinction can be traced back to 1944 when Kohn (1944: 329) stated that the liberal and cosmopolitan values embodied in 'Western civic nationalism' in Europe were superior to the 'ethnic nationalism' in Eastern Europe. Since then, the

distinction has been made in various studies of nationalism and national identities (e.g. Geertz 1973; Jones & Smith 2001).

Apart from the normative aspect of Kohn's comparison between Western and Eastern European nations, Bakke (2000) describes empirical aspects of the distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity, or, in other words, ethnic and civic nationalism. These empirical aspects relate to the extent national identity can be acquired or changed or, in other words, to whether aspects of national group boundaries are inclusive or exclusive. Therefore, the criteria deemed relevant to a civic conception include respect for institutions and laws, civic culture, values, ideology and a sense of national belonging. Bakke says it is assumed that these criteria have voluntary characteristics and that therefore a nation with a civic conception of identity is inclusive, which means that national belonging can be acquired. In contrast, the ethnic conception of national identity includes criteria which are much more difficult to acquire or change, such as a common descent, religion, customs and traditions. Hence this conception is exclusive (Bakke 2000: 2; also see Jones & Smith 2001).[12]

However, the difference between these conceptions is a matter of degree (cf. Bakke 2000; Hansen & Hesli 2009). Empirical research indicates that both ethnic and civic criteria are found in all conceptions of national identity (Jones & Smith 2001; Smith 1991), and that certain civic membership criteria, such as values, 'may be as difficult to acquire as the 'ethnic' criteria' (Bakke 2000: 12). Moreover, certain criteria can indicate either an ethnic conception of national identity or a civic conception of national identity. For example, when someone holds the view that speaking Dutch is an important aspect of being Dutch, this can mean at least two things. It can mean that this individual considers speaking Dutch an important indicator of a common historical or cultural background, which indicates a more ethnic conception of national identity. It is also possible that this individual considers speaking Dutch as an attribute necessary to participate in Dutch society, and has a more civic conception of national identity (cf. Brubaker 2004: 139). Cogently, Bakke (2000) shows that nations with a predominantly ethnic conception of national identity are not completely closed to outsiders.

This discussion indicates that national identity, whether it has a civic or ethnic character, is a social identity and therefore dynamic and can be the subject and object of permanent negotiation (cf. Jenkins 2008; see also Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005). At the same time national identities, which are being constantly reinforced and reproduced, are relatively potent and stable, which implies that the

[12] Bakke (2000) criticizes the assumed distinction between the civic conception as voluntary and the ethnic conception as involuntary. As stated earlier, in this study it is recognized, in agreement with Bakke, that national belonging in existing nations is always quite involuntary.

change in the boundaries of national belonging is a slow process. Therefore, it is more difficult for immigrants to achieve recognition and to retain parts of their original culture in nations with a conception of national identity in which hard-to-acquire criteria, whether they are called civic or ethnic, are deemed relevant (cf. Bakke 2000: 9; Shadid 2009: 16). In other words, a multicultural society (see Chapter 1) is a society whose members have a conception of national identity in which inclusive criteria are deemed the more relevant (cf. Hjerm 1998: 336).

3.2.6 The increasing research interest in the issue of national identity

In the last few decades, there has been an increased interest in the issue of national identity among researchers. Several possible reasons have been suggested for this increase (Fenton 2011). One suggestion is that in societies which become increasingly multicultural, multiculturalism requires a redefinition of the old concept of national identity which is based on ethnic descent (see also Chapters 1 and 6). More specifically, this means that multiculturalism goes beyond demands for the promotion of tolerance of cultural distinctiveness and implementing measures against discrimination, it also insists on the inclusion of minorities in the national group (cf. Shadid 2009; see also Chapter 1). After all, the issue of national belonging relates to a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which is, in the present research, the degree to which Dutch society attributes the quality 'Dutch' to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origin (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005: 448).

Another possible reason for the increased research interest in national identity is the disappearance of the traditional link between the disadvantaged members of the majority – the traditional working class – and left-wing social-democratic parties. Fenton (2011) has argued that this has created a space for racism, which has become apparent in the change in voting behaviour of the working-class members of the majority, who in various countries (such as Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, France and the Netherlands) have turned to populist and anti-immigrant political parties. Weighing up the traditional working-class, Han (2013: 3) suggests that rising inequality leads 'poor people' to identify less with their class, as people tend to prefer to identify with groups which have a high material status. Consequently, as these 'poor people' identify less with their class, their national self-identification tends to strengthen. Han's study indicates that this tendency is strengthened by an inflow of immigrants who have a relatively low educational level and lack skills, because it increases the perceived social distance among people in the lower socio-economic classes.

Finally, the increased interest in national identity might be explained by the globalized economy, which has reduced the capacity of nation-states to provide security for their citizens (Fenton 2011). Examining this situation, Bauman argues

that, in reaction to this increasing sense of insecurity, citizens search to strengthen their group attachments, which can result in conservatism ('going back to the roots') and an increase in the importance attached to exclusive criteria for group belonging (2001: 100-101).

What has just been said serves to illustrate that the construction of group boundaries not only determines whether a person is accepted as a group member, but also to what extent that person is recognized as such. Aspects of group boundaries can be (more or less) inclusive or exclusive, and some of the multiple identities and characteristics individuals have or are perceived to have, can be recognized while others are not. Group members with a strong affective group commitment tend to view themselves as typical, and tend to construct clear and distinctive group boundaries and favour their in-group. At the same time, the construction of boundaries depends on such contextual factors as historical and political developments, group relations and power differences. The next section will shed some light on government policies that relate to national belonging in the Netherlands.

3.3 National belonging in the Netherlands: policies and debates

In the last few decades, debates about national belonging and immigrant integration in the Netherlands, like in other Western European countries (see Chapter 1), have become highly politicized (Duyvendak 2011; Kremer 2013; Shadid 2009). In these debates, the relevance of the cultural boundaries of national belonging has been increasingly stressed – a process which is referred to as the culturalization of Dutch citizenship 'in which emotions, feelings, norms and values, symbols and traditions (including religion) come to play a pivotal role in defining what can be expected of a Dutch citizen' (Duyvendak 2011: 81; also see Geschiere 2011; Shadid 2009).[13] The main arguments in these debates and the related changes in Dutch government policies will pass in review in this section.[14]

In the 1970s and the 1980s, citizenship debates in the Netherlands were barely politicized (Penninx 2005). During the 1970s it became clear that most labour migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s had no plans to return to their countries of origin and wanted to stay in the Netherlands permanently. It then dawned on the government that structural measures had to be

[13] Several scholars have explored possible explanations for this culturalization of citizenship. See for example Duyvendak (2011) and Prins (2004).

[14] Chapters 4, 5 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of cultural boundaries of Dutch citizenship.

developed to encourage immigrant integration.[15] The report entitled *Ethnic Minorities*, published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in 1979, which provided the foundation for the new integration policies, refers to the possibility of identity conflicts among second generation migrants:

> Growing up in two worlds having different social status and divergent attitudes, and which display little understanding for one another and are indeed sometimes hostile towards each other, but which also both lay a claim on loyalty, confronts this generation with great problems of identity, and this can lead to a certain lack of standards of conduct (WRR 1979: XIII).

Consequently, the integration policies which were developed were not only constructed with the goals of equality and participation of immigrants in mind, they were also designed to achieve socio-cultural emancipation which, in turn, was seen as a precondition for the improvement of their socio-economic position and could prevent future identity conflicts (Penninx 2005).[16]

Ten years later, in a report published in 1989 in which the immigrant integration policies of the 1980s were evaluated, WRR stated that too much government attention paid to the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants could hinder their advancement in education and on the labour market. WRR recommended that the government should take account of the differences between and within immigrant groups and focus on socio-economic goals, leaving the responsibility for the development of their cultural identity to the immigrant groups themselves (WRR 1989: 19-24).

These recommendations were reflected in the *Contourennota* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994), the government policy document on immigrant integration presented in 1994. One argument presented in this document states that citizenship entails both rights and obligations, therefore all citizens, including immigrants, have an individual responsibility or duty to participate in Dutch society. More specifically, it was stated that it is incumbent on all citizens to learn Dutch and to acquire a basic knowledge of Dutch society (Ministerie van

[15] See Chapter 5 for a more extensive discussion of the concept of immigrant integration and Dutch national integration policies.

[16] In later criticisms of Dutch integration policies, it has been asserted that the policies of the 1980s emphasized the necessity allowing the preservation of the cultural identities of immigrants as well (Duyvendak & Scholten 2011). However, it must be stressed that this assertion is not correct (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; Vink 2007). The WRR report of 1979 explicitly states that preservation of cultural identities should not be a goal of integration policies, as it could lead to 'cultural isolation of ethnic groups' which could hinder the participation of immigrants in society. (See also Chapter 6.)

Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). The focus on socio-cultural emancipation in the integration policies was consequently abandoned and replaced by a focus on the individual responsibility of immigrants to integrate. In the heyday of these ideas, the early 1990s, local governments developed Dutch language courses and courses on Dutch society in general, but looking at the functioning of the labour market in particular. These civic integration measures were implemented nationally under the Newcomers Integration Act (*Wet inburgering nieuwkomers*) in 1998 (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). At this point, the courses were made mandatory for new immigrants and those with a temporary residence permit.

Another important shift in the debates about the citizenship of immigrants and their descendants occurred around the year 2000. Several authors (e.g. Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn[17]) have claimed that the integration policies had failed and postulated that social cohesion was being threatened because the integration policies focused too heavily on the immigrants' socio-cultural emancipation and too little on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values (Penninx 2005; see also Geschiere 2009; Prins 2004). These authors went on to argue that certain norms and values embraced by immigrants and their descendants, especially those held by Muslims, are incompatible with Dutch norms and values (see Chapter 6 for a more extensive discussion of cultural distinctiveness). In a newspaper article, Scheffer (2000) argued that it is important to take knowledge of 'Dutch language, culture and history much more seriously' if Dutch society were to be held together. These sorts of ideas about the problematic nature of Islamic norms and values were not new. As said, they had already been voiced in 1991 by Frits Bolkestein, one of the leaders of the VVD (right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). However, after 2000 a catalyst occurred when these ideas about integration failures, the threat of Islam and the importance of a consciousness of Dutch norms and values were married together by the politician Pim Fortuyn in one political discourse, important parts of which were appropriated by other political parties (Penninx 2005; see also Hoving 2011).

[17] Paul Scheffer is a prominent member of the PvdA (left-wing Labour Party). In 2000 he published the essay, "The multicultural drama", in the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* (Scheffer 2000), which has been influential in Dutch debates about immigrant integration. Frits Bolkestein was the leader of the VVD (right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) in the 1990s. He has been criticizing Dutch integration policies and declaring Islamic norms and values to be incompatible with Dutch culture since he published an article in the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant* on these issues in 1991 (Bolkestein 1991). Pim Fortuyn was an author and politician, known for his criticism of Dutch integration policies. He qualified Islam as a 'backward culture'. He was assassinated by an environmental activist during the national election campaign of 2002 in which he participated as the leader of the political party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn's Party).

This political discourse elicited a number of policy responses which were related to changes in integration and immigration policies, but also served to strengthen the awareness of Dutch national identity. Among the ideas mooted to achieve the latter were founding a national museum and compiling a national canon of Dutch history. Although the national museum on Dutch history has never materialized, the canon was finished in 2006 and since 2010 primary and secondary schools have been obliged to use it as a guideline in their curricula. This obligation has been criticized, principally on the grounds that it limits discussion on interpretations of Dutch history and also debate on which aspects of Dutch history should be considered important and why (WRR 2007: 97). Despite the fact the authors of the canon have recognized that national identity is a dynamic social construction (WRR 2007: 97) 'and evolves according to dominant ideas, the national canon just gives one story about what the Netherlands is' (Kremer 2013: 10; see also Geschiere 2011: 59).

In a response to these debates about Dutch national identity, WRR (2007) stated that a static conception of Dutch identity with references to the past is inadequate and not future proof. It advised against adopting a perspective in which one national identity is considered fundamental, and proposed a focus on various ways in which individuals identify themselves with the Netherlands. Politicians on the right of the political spectrum especially (representing the VVD, the Christian Democratic Appeal – CDA and the populist Party for Freedom – PVV) were critical of these WRR conclusions. Some argued that there is one fundamental Dutch national identity, and that Dutch norms and values have to be maintained and protected. Others stressed that Dutch society is based on Christian, Jewish and humanist principles.[18]

On the other hand, in 2004 several members of Parliament put forward a motion that the government should no longer use the term *allochthon* to describe Dutch citizens one or both of whose parents were born outside the Netherlands (see Chapter 1).[19] *Allochthon* means 'other' or 'not from here', and is essentially an ethnic category as it is based on descent (cf. Geschiere 2009; Groenendijk 2007). In their motion, the members of Parliament argued that the term has negative connotations and that it suggests that those who are designated as such do not fully participate in and do not fully belong in Dutch society (Tweede Kamer 2004-2005). Although the national government rejected their motion on the abolition of

[18] NRC Handelsblad (August 20, 2008), *Nederlandse identiteit is niet uniek in de wereld*.
[19] This definition has been in use since 1999 (CBS 1999).

the use of the term in 2005, several municipalities, including The Hague (in 2004) and Amsterdam (in 2013), have decided to stop using the term.[20]

Opposing this move as mentioned in Chapter 1, some politicians, notably members of Parliament for the PVV, proposed the definition of the term *allochthon* be extended. They stated that the children of second-generation immigrants, of whom both parents were born in the Netherlands, should also be considered and defined as *allochthons*.[21] It would seem that these politicians are trying to establish even more exclusive criteria for national belonging by the expedient of increasing the number of citizens who can be handily defined as *allochthon*. These proposals are examples of the perpetual foreigner stereotype mentioned in Section 3.2; the idea that members of ethnic minorities will be perpetually seen as 'others'. Obviously, awareness of this stereotype can lead to identity conflicts and a lower sense of national belonging among ethnic minorities (Huynh, Devos and Smalarz 2011).

Changes in integration and immigration policies came in 2003 with the publication of the government's *Integration Policy New Style*. This policy document stressed the social and cultural distance between immigrants and Dutch natives, and announced new policies to safeguard the 'continuity of society' by promoting 'common citizenship' by insisting on learning the Dutch language and abiding by 'basic Dutch norms' (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004: 8). These norms included respecting the law, accepting anyone's freedom of expression, the sexual preferences of others and the equality of men and women. Furthermore, the law on civic integration (the *Wet inburgering*), which applied to immigrants from outside the European Union and a group of residents who did not have Dutch citizenship, was amended. These immigrants could now obtain a residence permit only after they had passed an exam consisting of tests to assess language skills and knowledge of Dutch society.[22]

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[20] De Volkskrant (August 19, 2005), *Verdonk houdt vast aan begrip allochtoon*; De Volkskrant (February 14, 2013), *In Amsterdam wonen geen allochtonen meer*.

[21] See Snel (2011).

[22] The most recent law is the *Wet inburgering* (Law on Civic Integration) passed in 2006, implemented in 2007. In 2012 this law was slightly amended. Applicants in the Netherlands have to contact the municipality which works in conjunction with Regional Educational Centres (ROCs) which are qualified to run courses and set the requisite exams. Persons from outside the EU who want to migrate to the Netherlands have to pass a similar civic integration test at the Dutch embassy or consulate abroad (the *Wet inburgering buitenland* or Law on Civic Integration Abroad). Since 2013, applicants have to pay for the courses and exams themselves. Depending on their financial circumstances, applicants can apply for a loan to pay the tuition fees. In some cases, those who commenced their courses before 2013 can have their fees paid by the municipality. (See "Integration in the Netherlands", accessed July 25, 2013, http://en.inburgeren.nl.)

Another change occurred in the political debates about citizens with multiple citizenship – more specifically immigrants and their descendants who had obtained Dutch citizenship but still retained their original citizenship (see Chapter 4 for a more extensive review of this debate). Before 2003, opponents of multiple citizenship argued that immigrants' retention of their original citizenship would hinder them in developing an affective commitment to the Netherlands and would therefore be an obstacle to integration (De Hart 2005a). But, in the context of the debates about the perceived failure of integration and threats, putative or real, to social cohesion since 2000, this argument was extended to the idea that having multiple nationalities can cause or reveal possible conflicting loyalties, even disloyalty to the Dutch nation-state. The covert message was that immigrants should renounce their original citizenship to prove their loyalty – and by implication their affective commitment – to the Dutch nation-state (cf. Duyvendak 2011). Importantly, the latter idea principally concerned Muslim immigrants, which indicates that this debate was not just about the legal aspect of multiple citizenship but more about ethnic and cultural boundaries of Dutch national belonging (De Hart 2005a).

The policy objective of 'common citizenship' introduced by the government in 2003 was reiterated in the government policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), in which it was argued that Dutch society is based on a 'fundamental continuity of values, views, institutions and customs which shape the predominant culture in Dutch society'.[23] The government plainly states that these values and customs cannot be abandoned, and that immigrants have to adjust to: '[t]he Dutch society, in all its diversity, is the society in which those who settle have to learn to live, to which they are required to adjust and fit into'. [24]

In sum, the views of successive Dutch governments and the political debates about cultural diversity have been subject to pronounced changes in the last few decades. Whereas in the 1980s the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants was seen to be a must to prevent identity conflicts and to support integration, since 2003 the national government has considered the cultural distance between Dutch natives and immigrants and their descendants a problem. Opponents of multiple citizenship now openly expect immigrants to renounce their original citizenship to prove their affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. This stressing of culture in the debates about Dutch citizenship automatically raises

[23] In the document the government uses the Dutch term 'leidende cultuur', possibly a reference to the German term *Leitkultur*. This can be translated as 'guiding culture', 'leading culture' or 'predominant culture'. See Pautz (2005).

[24] Author's translation.

questions about national belonging. Who is considered to be fully included in the Dutch national group? What factors are related to the level of affective commitment to the Dutch nation-state? These questions will be examined in the next section.

3.4 Views in society on national belonging

The discussion in the previous section has brought to light several themes which run through the debate about ethnic and cultural diversity in the Netherlands. These themes raise a fundamental question about national belonging in Dutch society: Who's Dutch? To paraphrase Devos and Banaji (2005: 448), who asked the same question in the context of American society ('Who's American?'), this question relates to a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which is, in the present research, the degree to which Dutch society attributes the quality 'Dutch' to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origin. As explained earlier in this chapter, national belonging has more than a legal aspect (having legal citizenship), it also has social aspects. It is in respect to the latter that people can disagree about who can be fully included in the national group. In other words, who is considered to be 'true' or 'typically' Dutch, and how inclusive or exclusive are the criteria which are used in the construction of national group boundaries?

The exploration of aspects of national belonging in the Netherlands in this section has been inspired by similar research by Theiss-Morse (2009) and Devos and Banaji (2005), who investigated the boundaries of American national identity. In the first part of this section the affective component of national self-identification, namely, the strength of national belonging or affective commitment to the national group will be examined. (In Chapter 4, commitment to the Netherlands will be explored in more detail, in an examination of the various types of loyalty to the Netherlands.) In the second part, cognitive aspects of the social construction of Dutch national group boundaries will be explored, including the reasons certain criteria used in this construction are deemed important.

3.4.1 The affective component of national self-identification

The affective component of national self-identification was measured by the item 'I feel strong ties to the Netherlands'.[25] To put this affective commitment into

[25] Other items which could measure only the affective component of national self-identification were not included in the questionnaires. However, several items were included which measure the affective component *and* the evaluative component and/or behavioural expressions, such as expressions of loyalty. These will be analysed in Chapter 4. Importantly, the affective commitment to the Dutch

perspective, the affective commitment to place of residence, province and Europe as a union was also measured, as can be seen in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1

Level of affective commitment (means, scale from 1 = weak to 4 = strong).

To:	The Netherlands	Place of residence	Province	Europe
	3.1	3.0	2.5	2.3

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

The findings indicate that the average level of Dutch citizens' affective commitment to the Netherlands is moderate (M = 3.1). To explore relationships between this level of commitment and other variables, including age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status (whether or not a person is a legal citizen of more than one state), educational level, income and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out. This analysis indicates that the affective commitment to the Netherlands is slightly and positively related to age (β[26] = .15, $p < .05$) and voting behaviour (β = .17, $p < .001$).[27] With respect to the latter, the level of affective commitment of those who did not vote in the 2012 national elections appears to be slightly weaker.

The level of affective commitment to the Netherlands of immigrants of both Western and non-Western origin and those with multiple citizenship does not appear to be significantly different to that of native Dutch people and those holding only Dutch citizenship (similar results were found by Vroome, Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014: 11-13). To explore these findings in more depth, the affective commitment of these respondents to other groups was also measured, as can be seen in Table 3.2 below.

national group was not measured by the item 'I feel strong ties to the Dutch', as this statement can be interpreted as affective commitment to the Dutch ethnic group.

[26] Unless otherwise stated, the βs mentioned in this study are standardized.

[27] Relationships to gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income were not significant.

Table 3.2

Level of affective commitment to groups (means, scale from 1 = weak to 4 = strong).

Respondents	Ethnic group	Political group	Occupational group
Native Dutch	2.9[a]	2.3	2.6
Non-Western immigrants	2.7	2.4	2.4
Western immigrants	2.4	2.2	2.6

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.
[a] The native Dutch were asked to what extent they felt affective commitment to 'the Dutch', i.e. their ethnic group.

The analysis indicates that both native Dutch and immigrants of non-Western and Western origin have a significant but slightly stronger affective commitment to the Netherlands (as presented in Table 3.1) than to their own ethnic group.[28] Pertinently, these commitments are clearly not seen by these respondents as conflicting. On the contrary, the level of affective commitment to the own ethnic group is positively and strongly related to the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands, among both native Dutch and immigrants and their descendants (β = .51, $p < .001$).[29] Similarly, the analyses indicate a moderate and positive relationship between the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands of religious respondents (those who classify themselves as either a believing Christian or Muslim) and the level of commitment to their religious group, which was also measured (β = .28, $p < .001$).[30] However, research by Martinovic and Verkuyten among Muslim Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany has indicated that, while national identification and religious group identification are not always mutually exclusive, the relationship between these identities can depend

[28] Wilcoxon signed-rank test for native Dutch: z = -7.58, p < .001, r = -.24; non-Western immigrants: z = -2.16, p < .05, r = -.11; Western immigrants: z = -4.40, p < .001, r = -.37. However, the respondents were not asked to rank these commitments.
[29] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if the level of affective commitment to the own ethnic group significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.
[30] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if, among religious respondents, the level of affective commitment to the own religious group significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.

on conditions such as the extent to which 'Western and Islamic ways of life' are seen as compatible, and perceived discrimination (2012: 899-900). In particular, these authors found that, among their respondents, those who perceived 'pressures from their ingroup to maintain an ethnoreligious lifestyle as well as those who perceived discrimination by natives identified more strongly with their religious group and, in turn, identified less with the host country' (2012: 893) (see also Verkuyten & Martinovic 2012; Vroome, Verkuyten & Martinovic 2014: 17-18).

The findings presented in Table 3.1 also indicate that, although the average affective commitments of Dutch citizens to the Netherlands and to their place of residence are neither significantly different, their affective commitments to their province and to Europe as a union are significantly lower.[31] Furthermore, while educational level does not appear to be related to the affective commitment to the Netherlands, it is negatively related to affective commitment to place of residence and province, and positively related to commitment to Europe as a union ($\beta = -.14$, $p < .001$; $\beta = -.18$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .21$, $p < .001$ respectively).[32] Voters for the right-wing (populist) PVV, the left-wing SP (Socialist Party) and the Christian parties SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) and CU (the moderate Christian Union) feel significantly less committed to Europe as a union ($M = 2.1$ or less; $\beta = .21$, $p < .001$).[33]

Interestingly, the levels of affective commitment to the Netherlands and to Europe as a union appear to be positively related ($\beta = .34$, $p < .001$).[34] Duchesne and Frognier (2007), who also found this positive relationship, suggest that this can be explained by what they call 'nested identities'. This is to say that the affective commitment to the nation relates positively to affective commitments to territories in which the nation is embedded. The same idea of nested identities could explain the finding that the levels of affective commitment to place of residence and province are also positively related to the level of affective

[31] The affective commitment to the Netherlands appeared to be significantly stronger than either that to a province or Europe as a union. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for province: $z = -12.38$, $p < .001$, $r = -.34$; Europe as a union: $z = -14.33$, $p < .001$, $r = -.40$.

[32] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income significantly predict the level of affective commitment to place of residence, province or Europe as a union.

[33] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if political preference significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to Europe as a union.

[34] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if affective commitment to the Netherlands significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to Europe as a union.

commitment to the Netherlands as a country ($\beta = .56$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .45$, $p < .001$ respectively).[35]

The fact that all the affective commitments discussed above relate positively to the affective commitment to the Netherlands suggests that these commitments reveal a more fundamental tendency to identify with a group – the need to belong discussed earlier in this chapter (cf. Duchesne & Frognier 2007: 9). To examine the tendency to identify with a group, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out which included the above-mentioned items of affective commitments to the place of residence, province, the Netherlands, Europe and own ethnic group,[36] and the items mentioned in Table 3.2 to do with affective commitments to political and occupational groups (i.e. the affective commitment to groups of people who share political preference or have a similar occupation). In this analysis, two components were extracted which suggests that the tendency to identify with a group has two, positively related dimensions.[37] Items that cluster on the first component suggest that it represents a tendency to identify with *territorially defined groups*, including affective commitments to the Netherlands, place of residence, province and Europe as a union. Items that cluster on the second component suggest that it represents the tendency to identify with *socially defined groups*, including affective commitments to the ethnic, political and occupational groups. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the level of affective commitment to 'the Dutch', which is an ethnic group but can also be interpreted as a national and territorially defined group, correlates positively with all other mentioned affective commitments.[38]

In order to explore these tendencies towards identification with a socially or territorially defined group, summated scales representing these two tendencies were constructed using the previously discussed items which cluster on the components

[35] Categorical Regression analyses, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, were used to test if affective commitment to either place of residence or province significantly predict the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.

[36] With respect to the item measuring commitment to the own ethnic group: immigrants and their descendants were asked for their affective commitment to their own ethnic group, and the native Dutch were asked for their affective commitment to 'the Dutch'.

[37] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 2 components with *eigenvalues* over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 2 components could be extracted, which explained 55.37% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resultant transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

[38] Categorical Regression analyses, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control variables, were used to test if affective commitment to the Dutch significantly predicts the other affective commitments mentioned. All βs between .22 and .58, all ps < .001.

extracted in the aforementioned Categorical Principal Components Analysis.[39] Subsequently, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to examine whether these tendencies can be predicted by age, gender, descent, religion educational level, income and political preference. The analysis indicates that age is positively, but only slightly, related to the tendency to identify with territorial defined groups ($\beta = .17$, $p < .05$). Other significant relationships were not found, which is in line with the theory discussed in Section 3.2 postulating that the need to belong is a fundamental human motivation.[40]

3.4.2 Cognitive aspects of the construction of national group boundaries

Who compose the 'typical' and the 'marginalized' groups in Dutch society? What aspects of Dutch national boundaries are inclusive, and which are exclusive? In this section, these boundaries will be explored by examining the cognitive components of internal (self-identification) and external aspects of social categorization (inspired by a similar analysis in Theiss-Morse 2009: 65). The external aspect will be examined by analysing responses to questionnaire items which measured the perceived importance of criteria to be met before someone is be considered to be 'truly Dutch'. The internal aspect, or, in other words, the cognitive component of national self-identification will be examined by using items which measure the extent to which respondents consider themselves typically Dutch. The latter typicality measure, combined with the information about the level of affective commitment to the national group discussed above, predicts which group members tend to exhibit in-group favouritism. As discussed in Section 3.2, highly committed group members tend to favour members of their in-group, especially when they perceive threats to the distinctiveness of the group, and hence tend to set sharper group boundaries, which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination of out-group members. Therefore, exploring which group members are characterized as typical can provide information about the boundaries between those members on the one hand and the marginalized on the other.

3.4.2.1 Cognitive aspects of national self-identification: typicality

To measure the extent respondents considered themselves typically Dutch, six statements were included in the questionnaires: 'I feel like I belong to mainstream Dutch culture', 'I am what most people think of as a typical Dutch person', 'the

[39] Cronbach's Alpha for tendency to identify with territorially defined groups = .73; Cronbach's Alpha for tendency to identify with socially defined groups = .53.

[40] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, descent, religion, educational level, or political preference income significantly predict the tendencies to identify with a territorially or socially defined group.

term "Dutch" does not fit me', 'when I think of the Dutch people, I think of people who are a lot like me', 'in many respects, I am different from most Dutch people' and 'on the important issues, I often agree with Dutch people'.[41] In order to examine the possibility of constructing a typicality scale, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out including these six items. The analysis indicates that the items clearly cluster around one component, and that Cronbach's Alpha for these items is .80.[42] Therefore, all these items were used to create a summated scale to represent the level of typicality.

To explore the characteristics of those who consider themselves typically Dutch, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out which included the aforementioned typicality scale as the outcome variable and the variables age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as predictors. It appears that native Dutch consider themselves significantly more typically Dutch than immigrants and their descendants of both Non-Western and Western origin (β = .26, $p < .001$).[43] The following Table 3.3 gives more insight into the percentages of native Dutch and immigrants who consider themselves typically Dutch.

Table 3.3

Dutch citizens who consider themselves typical or atypical Dutch (in percentages).

Respondents	Very typical	Moderately typical	Atypical
Native Dutch	57	39	4
Non-Western immigrants	10	73	17
Western immigrants	28	55	17
Total	50	43	7

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).

Note. These percentages were calculated by averaging the scores on the 6 items used to construct the typicality scale, and grouping the averages into 3 categories. Because the percentages were calculated from averaged Likert items, these can only be used for exploratory analysis.

[41] These items were derived from earlier research by Malcarne, Chavira, Fernandez & Liu (2006) and Theiss-Morse (2009). After testing pilot interviews, items were deleted, added and rephrased. For a discussion of typicality also see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe (2004).

[42] The eigenvalues and a scree-plot clearly indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 53%, total VAF was 61.81%.

[43] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, religion, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if descent significantly predicts the level of typicality.

This table indicates that a majority of the native Dutch consider themselves to be very typically Dutch, whereas a majority of both non-Western and Western immigrants consider themselves moderately typically Dutch. Furthermore, the Categorical Regression analysis of the typicality scale indicates that those with a minimum income consider themselves significantly less typically Dutch ($\beta = .40$, $p < .05$). The analysis also indicates a significant relationship between political preference and the typicality scale. Voters for the right-wing VVD and the right-wing populist PVV consider themselves to be more typically Dutch than voters for all other parties and the non-voters ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$).[44]

Importantly, the analysis reveals a very strong positive relationship between the typicality scale and the affective commitment to the Netherlands ($\beta = .68$, $p < .001$).[45] In other words, both native Dutch and immigrants and their descendants who are highly committed to the national group tend to consider themselves typical group members, as might be expected given the findings of research in the tradition of Tajfel's social identity theory. Therefore, bearing in mind the findings of social identity theory research discussed in Section 3.2, the results indicate that native Dutch who voted for the VVD or PVV parties in the 2012 elections are more likely to exhibit in-group favouritism and to set sharper group boundaries, resulting in a relatively high degree of self-stereotyping and possibly discrimination of out-group members.

Respondents who consider themselves typically Dutch stressed that they found it difficult to explain why. One explanation was that they were born and raised in the Netherlands, while others said they simply felt Dutch and could not explain that feeling. One respondent said, 'I don't know. Had I been born in another country, I would probably have felt at home there.' Other respondents said they considered themselves typically Dutch because they held certain Dutch norms and values, but they could not explain what these norms and values were. When they could, they mentioned such stereotypes as hard-working, down-to-earth, tolerant and 'constantly complaining'. Those who did not consider themselves typically Dutch either mentioned that the typically Dutch person does not exist, or explained that they regarded themselves more in the light of a European citizen, a world citizen or cosmopolitan. As one respondent said, 'I don't know what a typical Dutch person is. I do not think a German, Dane, Swede or Norwegian person is very different.' Immigrants and their descendants who said they did not

[44] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if political preference significantly predicts the level of typicality.

[45] A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if affective commitment to the Netherlands significantly predicts the level of typicality.

consider themselves typically Dutch even though they felt at home in the country explained that this was because they or their parents had not been born in the Netherlands.

3.4.2.2 Cognitive aspects of national identification: group boundaries

To explore which boundary aspects (see Section 3.2) are deemed important if someone is to be considered a 'truly Dutch' individual, the questionnaires included 15 specific criteria (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005; Theiss-Morse 2009; ISSP 2005).[46] These criteria, sorted according to the means of their perceived importance, are presented in Table 3.4 below.

The table shows that the most importance is attached to such relatively inclusive criteria as being able to speak Dutch and feeling Dutch. Importantly, by far the least importance is attached to clearly exclusive criteria: having Dutch ancestors, a Western European appearance, a Western name or a Christian background.

Turning to the more inclusive criteria, those who consider a knowledge of Dutch culture and history to be important mentioned various reasons for doing so. Respondents argued that this knowledge is important to the strengthening of personal commitment to the Netherlands, while others said that this background is essential to be able to participate in Dutch society. It was also mentioned that having this knowledge is important to protect and sustain Dutch culture, norms and values. In the same vein, respondents said that it is important to be proud of the Netherlands, 'because only then would you know which norms and values you have to maintain and protect'. Pertinently, it was argued that it is important to learn from history to be able to live in a multicultural society. In this respect, a specific knowledge of the centuries-old history of immigration and ethnic diversity in the Netherlands, and of Dutch involvement in colonialism and slavery was seen as important, as it could foster a more tolerant attitude towards people with different cultural and religious backgrounds. Similarly, it was argued that the history of World War II should be taught in school, because it illustrates the importance of tolerance and non-discrimination. However, respondents who said knowledge of history and culture is important acknowledged that among many Dutch citizens, including themselves, this knowledge is pretty sparse.

[46] Items were derived from previous research by Devos & Banaji (2005) and Theiss-Morse (2009) and from the International Social Survey Programme survey on citizenship and national identity (ISSP 2005). After testing in a pilot survey and in-depth interviews, items were deleted, added and rephrased.

Table 3.4[47]

Criteria for being perceived as a 'truly Dutch' individual: Means, (scale from 1 = least important to 4 = most important), Standard Deviations, and Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis – CATPCA, transformed variables rotated with PCA).

Item, ranked by mean	M	SD	C1	C2	C3	C4
Speak Dutch	3.7	0.6	-.14	***.43***	.13	**-.52**
Legal Dutch citizenship	3.3	0.8	-.15	.11	.04	**-.78**
Feel Dutch	3.3	0.8	-.11	***.79***	.08	-.01
Proud of the Netherlands	3.1	0.8	.20	***.34***	-.10	-.30
Feel more attached to the Netherlands and the Dutch than to other countries or other ethnic groups	2.9	0.9	.14	***.67***	.04	-.08
Only have Dutch citizenship and no other citizenships	2.9	1.2	.16	-.05	-.12	***-.69***
Lived in the Netherlands for part of one's life	2.9	0.8	-.06	.12	***.82***	.20
Have knowledge of Dutch history and culture	2.9	0.8	.12	***.76***	.03	.08
Grown up in the Netherlands	2.9	0.9	.08	.01	***.83***	-.14
Lived in the Netherlands for most of one's life	2.9	0.9	.07	.02	***.88***	.02
Born in the Netherlands	2.7	1.0	***.34***	-.25	***.43***	**-.46**
Have Dutch ancestors	2.1	0.9	***.64***	-.10	.16	-.24
Have a Western European appearance	1.8	0.9	***.69***	.01	.17	-.04
Have a Western name	1.7	0.8	***.81***	.09	.01	-.05
Have a Christian background	1.5	0.7	***.79***	.13	-.10	.23
Eigenvalues			4.38	1.89	1.63	1.28
Variance accounted for (%)			29.20	12.61	10.87	8.56

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result the means can be used only for exploratory analysis.
Note. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings used for constructing scales are italicized.

There is more agreement among those who considered the criteria of having been born, growing up or living in the Netherlands to be important. Most of these respondents argued that these are necessary preconditions to be able to feel Dutch

[47] Cf. Devos & Banaji (2005: 450).

or to have a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. Many of those who considered feeling Dutch itself to be the most important precondition to be 'truly Dutch', argued that the other criteria are much less or not important at all, because there would not be many truly Dutch people if the other criteria had been decisive. 'How many Dutch citizens really know about Dutch history, and really have a good command of Dutch language?' one respondent asked.

Most of the respondents who consider the more exclusive criteria to be important, did not offer any motivation for their opinion. A few said it is important to be Christian, because 'the Netherlands is a country based on Christian principles'. Those who consider having a Western European appearance or name to be important did not elaborate, with the exception of a few who explained that 'foreign names are difficult to pronounce' or that 'truly Dutch' people generally have a white skin colour.

Respondents also mentioned other criteria they consider important to be 'truly Dutch', most relating to certain values and attitudes such as loyalty to the Netherlands (discussed in Chapter 4), obeying the law, respecting each other's freedom of speech, non-discrimination and tolerance of people from various cultural and religious backgrounds and with various sexual preferences and life principles. It was also argued that immigrants have to adapt to become a 'truly Dutch' person, for example, by learning to speak Dutch and by respecting Dutch norms and values. Furthermore, respondents expect immigrants to participate in society, or succinctly to get a job or work as a volunteer. (Views on adaptation and participation will be explored in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.)

Finally, the term *allochthon*, which officially designates individuals of whom at least one parent was born outside the Netherlands (see Section 3.3), was clearly used by respondents as a term to describe those who do not fully belong to the national group. For example, respondents argued that 'the culture of *allochthons*' does not belong in the Netherlands and can pose a threat to society (this perception of threat will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). Some argued that the term *allochthon* should be abandoned, because the distinction it indicates is misleading. As one respondent said, referring to immigrants and their descendants, 'They belong to the national group, so we should not regard them as *allochthons*'.

To examine the relationships between the items in Table 3.4 above, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out, in which four components were extracted whose (rotated) loadings are presented in the same table.[48] The clustering of the items on these components suggests that these

[48] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 4 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 4 components could be extracted, which explained 61.23% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option

components represent four different conceptions or types of Dutch national belonging: *ethnic* and *exclusive* (C1 – see Table 3.4 above), *civic* and *inclusive* (C2), *territorial* (C3) and *legal* (C4). The *ethnic* and *exclusive* type includes the criteria having Dutch ancestors, having a Western European appearance and name, and having a Christian background. The *civic* and *inclusive* type of Dutch belonging includes criteria which refer to a sense of belonging, feeling more attached to the Netherlands than to other countries, and having knowledge of Dutch history and culture. Furthermore, the *territorial* type of Dutch national belonging entails that those who have grown up and lived part or most of their lives in the Netherlands are Dutch. This relates to the territorial dimension of national identity as defined by Guibernau (2004: 138), who suggests that 'for the large majority of peoples, the territorial boundaries of the nation signal the limits of their homeland and fellow-nationals are usually portrayed as if they were more "human" than outsiders, as deserving our support, concern and nurture'. Finally, the *legal* type of Dutch national belonging appears to imply an exclusive legal citizenship status, including the criteria having legal Dutch citizenship and *not* having multiple citizenship.

The distinction between the ethnic, civic and territorial types of Dutch national belonging can be further explored by taking the above-mentioned arguments of respondents into account. Those who considered the territorial criteria such as having been born, growing up or living in the Netherlands to be important, argued that these criteria are necessary preconditions to be able to feel Dutch or to have a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In other words, the territorial criteria are seen as preconditions for the civic aspects of national belonging.

This finding nuances the distinction, indicated in studies by Hjerm (1998) and Kunovich (2009), between ethnic and civic types of national belonging. In these studies the above-mentioned territorial criteria – namely, having been born and living for most of one's life in the country – are not distinct from, but part of, the ethnic type. In other words, these authors suggest that citizens who attach importance to these territorial criteria have an ethnic and exclusive conception of national belonging. In the Netherlands these territorial criteria appear to be inclusive for the descendants of first generation immigrants and for those first generation immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the Netherlands as well. However, it must be stressed that the present study included more items (15) to describe possible types of national belonging than the studies by Hjerm and Kunovich (6 and 8 respectively), which made it possible to discern more different

'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

components in the (Categorical) Principal Components analysis. Moreover, the respondents in this study were asked to motivate their ratings of the items, which made it easier to interpret the difference between the civic, territorial and ethnic types of national belonging.

To assess the relative importance of these four types of Dutch national belonging, scales representing the types were constructed. For the ethnic, civic and territorial types, summated scales were constructed using the items with the highest loadings on the respective components (see Table 3.4 above).[49] To represent the legal type of national belonging, only the criterion of not having multiple citizenship has been included in the analysis, as in this study this is the most important item of those which load on this component. An analysis of variance (Friedman's ANOVA) indicates significant differences between the means of the scales, which indicates that there is a hierarchy among these types of Dutch national belonging.[50] Most importance is attached to the civic type of Dutch national belonging (M = 3.0, SD = 0.7), followed by the importance attached to the territorial type of national belonging (M = 2.9, SD = 0.7). The level of importance attached to exclusive citizenship status barely differs from the importance attached to the civic and territorial types (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1), but the standard deviation indicates more disagreement on this issue (which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4). By far the least importance is attached to the ethnic and exclusive type of Dutch belonging (M = 1.8, SD = 0.7).

In order to explore the characteristics of those who consider these types of Dutch national belonging important, Categorical Regression analyses were carried out that included age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income. Furthermore, separate Categorical Regression analyses were carried out, controlled for age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income, to examine relationships between these boundary types on the one hand, and, on the other hand, political preference and the phenomena discussed earlier in this section: affective commitment to the Netherlands, the two dimensions of the tendency to identify with a group, and typicality.

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[49] Cronbach's Alpha values for scales representing: ethnic type = .77; civic type = .68; territorial type = .79.

[50] The averages of the importance attached to the types of national belonging mentioned are significantly different, $\chi^2(2) = 708.11$, $p < .001$ (Friedman's ANOVA).Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to follow up this finding. A Bonferroni correction was applied and so all effects are reported at a .000167 level of significance. The significant pairwise comparisons indicated that the civic type was clearly more important than the territorial type, followed by the ethnic type of national belonging. However, the importance of not having multiple citizenship is not significantly different from the civic and territorial types.

These analyses show that the affective commitment to the Netherlands is significantly and positively related to the importance attached to all mentioned types of Dutch national belonging. The strongest correlation was found with the importance given to the civic ($\beta = .39$, $p < .001$) type. The correlations with the territorial ($\beta = .23$, $p < .001$) and ethnic type ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$) are clearly less strong, and the importance attached to exclusive legal citizenship status is least related to the affective commitment to the Netherlands ($\beta = .13$, $p < .005$).

Similarly, the analysis indicates that those who consider themselves more typically Dutch tend to attach more importance to all mentioned types of Dutch national belonging (civic: $\beta = .37$, $p < .001$; territorial: $\beta = .33$, $p < .001$; ethnic: $\beta = .28$, $p < .001$; exclusive legal citizenship status: $\beta = .26$, $p < .001$). Finally, positive correlations were also found between the previously discussed tendencies to identify with territorial or socially defined groups on the one hand and on the other hand the importance attached to civic and ethnic types of Dutch national belonging.[51]

These findings make it possible to specify which types of Dutch national belonging are deemed important by highly committed members of the Dutch national group. Research in the tradition of Tajfel's social identity theory shows that highly committed group members tend to exaggerate differences between the in-group and out-groups, to defend the distinctiveness of the group (see Section 3.2.4). With respect to Dutch national belonging, highly committed group members appear to defend the distinctiveness of their national group by attaching most importance to expressions or feelings of Dutch national belonging, and to a lesser extent to ethnic and exclusive criteria for national belonging. This corresponds to the findings of Duyvendak (2011), who argues that Dutch citizens are increasingly constructing national group boundaries by stressing the importance of expressions and feelings of national belonging.

Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that immigrants and their descendants of non-Western origin consider all types of national belonging significantly less important than do the native Dutch, while immigrants of Western origin consider the territorial type and exclusive legal citizenship status less important than do the native Dutch.[52] This is not surprising, in view of the fact that immigrants and their descendants consider themselves less typically Dutch than their native Dutch

[51] Correlations between, on the one hand, tendencies to identify with territorial and socially defined groups and, on the other hand, the civic type ($\beta = .34$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .26$, $p < .001$ respectively), and the ethnic type ($\beta = .15$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .21$, $p < .001$ respectively) of Dutch national belonging.

[52] Civic type: $\beta = .21$, $p < .05$; territorial type: $\beta = .24$, $p < .001$; exclusive legal citizenship: $\beta = .20$, $p < .001$; ethnic type: $\beta = .14$, $p < .005$.

compatriots. After all, as discussed above and as suggested in the literature discussed in Section 3.2, typical group members are more inclined to set group boundaries. Crucially Kunovich (2009: 576) has pointed out that citizenship provides access to state resources. Therefore, from a rational choice perspective it can be expected that minority groups do not attach importance to boundaries which would exclude them. Nevertheless, the need to belong and the need for social recognition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, also play a role and should not be dismissed. In this respect, it is important to realize that the construction of exclusive group boundaries can result in discrimination (see Section 3.2.4). Not surprisingly, therefore, Hjerm (1998) concluded from his study that there is a positive relationship between the level of xenophobia and the level of importance attached to ethnic (exclusive) types of national belonging. In the present study, this link will be explored in Chapter 5.

Among all respondents, the higher their educational level the less importance they attached to the ethnic type of Dutch national belonging and exclusive legal citizenship status (β = -.29, $p < .001$ and β = -.21, $p < .001$ respectively). These findings about the role of education are similar to those of Kunovich (2009: 585), who suggests that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to ethnic (exclusive) types of national belonging because they perceive economic competition from immigrants and their descendants, who also have a lower socio-economic status. (This link between construction of boundaries and ethnic threat will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.) Kunovich also suggests that those with a higher level of education have greater cognitive skills which allow them 'better [to] imagine belonging to larger groups' (2009: 575).

The Categorical Regression analyses indicate that voters for the various political parties in the 2012 general election differed significantly in the importance they attached to the four types of Dutch national belonging.[53] This can also be seen in Table 3.5 below.

[53] Civic: (β = .26, $p < .001$); exclusive legal citizenship status: (β = .28, $p < .001$); territorial: (β = .20, $p < .001$); ethnic: (β = .27, $p < .001$).

Table 3.5

Importance attached to types of Dutch national belonging (means, scale from 1 = least important to 4 = most important). Ordered by size of political party in 2012 national election.

Voters for political party	Civic	Exclusive legal citizenship status	Territorial	Ethnic
VVD	3.2	3.2	2.9	1.7
PvdA	3.0	2.6	2.7	1.6
PVV	3.2	3.6	3.3	2.3
Socialist Party (SP)	3.1	3.5	3.0	1.9
CDA	3.2	2.8	2.7	1.9
D66	3.0	2.5	2.7	1.5
Christian Union (CU)	3.0	2.3	2.9	2.1
Green Left	2.9	2.2	2.7	1.5
SGP	3.4	3.6	3.2	2.5
Non voters	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.9
Total[a]	3.0	2.9	2.9	1.8

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.
[a] See the hierarchy calculation in the text above.

First of all, it is clear from the values in the columns in the table that respondents are most in agreement on the importance of the civic type of national belonging. Furthermore, it is obvious that voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, PVV, CDA, and the SGP) and those supporting the left-wing SP and the Christian CU tend to attach more importance to setting national group boundaries, whether they are inclusive or exclusive, than those who vote for parties on the left of the political spectrum: PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal Democrats 66) and the Green Left party. Voters for the PVV and SGP attach by far the most importance to group boundaries. This is principally attributable to the relatively high importance they attach to the exclusive and ethnic type of national belonging.

The finding that both respondents with a lower level of education and voters for the PVV – who generally have this level of education – tend to attach more importance to the ethnic type of national belonging relates to the ideas of Fenton discussed in Section 3.2.6. The increasing interest in the issue of national identity

noted by Fenton (2011) might be because of the importance attached to ethnic types of national belonging by members of the traditional working class, who no longer predominantly support left-wing social-democratic parties, but are turning to populist, anti-immigrant parties like the PVV. To what extent this can be explained by the perception of ethnic threat, as suggested by Kunovich (2009) (see above), will be explored in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4
Citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state

4.1 Introduction

In contemporary scientific discussions about citizenship, citizens' loyalty to their nation-states is generally considered to be a virtue (Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 7). More specifically, it is considered to be important to the health and stability of democracies, as are such behaviours as abiding by the law and participating in political institutions (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 30-31).

Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing emphasis in these discussions on the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of immigrant citizens, which leads to questions about their transnational ties and multiple citizenship (Erdal & Oeppen 2013; Leydet 2011). Some authors argue that ethno-cultural distinctiveness and transnational ties can lead to multiple loyalties which immigrants might have to their ethnic groups and countries of origin, and that such loyalties can potentially undermine their loyalty to the nation-state (e.g. Gitlin 1995; Huntington 2004; Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). Multiple citizenship is a potential security risk, especially during international conflicts when the question might arise which country citizens with multiple citizenship will support. Consequently, proponents of this view oppose the formal recognition of immigrants' cultural distinctiveness, a policy referred to as multiculturalism. From their point of view, defenders of multiculturalism assert that public and formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness is an essential element in fostering a sense of national belonging, which, in its turn, is an indispensable condition for national loyalty (e.g. Kymlicka 2001). Moreover, they take the line that not just immigrants but every individual

in society has multiple loyalties which can potentially conflict with his or her loyalty to the nation-state. Baron (2009: 1040) suggests that this clash of loyalities does not differ from 'the usual conflict of commitments that characterize politics'.

Loyalty to the nation-state in multicultural societies is not and has not been an issue confined to scientific discussions, it is also a topic of political debates. In 2003, a debate in which the loyalty of citizens with multiple citizenship to the Dutch nation-state was the central theme commenced in the Dutch Parliament. In first instance, politicians who took part in this Dutch debate tended to focus on the loyalty of Muslim immigrants. Their emphasis shows that not only was the mere fact of holding multiple citizenship at stake, the ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds of some immigrants were also assumed to conflict with their loyalty to the nation-state (De Hart 2005a).

The theoretical approaches to loyalty and citizenship, as well as the Dutch political debate and government policies which are relevant to these topics, will pass review in this chapter. It also looks at the views on loyalty to the nation-state current in Dutch society. These will be explored by analysing empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires used in this research. This type of empirical analysis is especially relevant, as the scientific and political debates on this issue are largely hypothetical and theoretical, and are not backed up by an empirical basis (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).

The theoretical review of the scientific debates on loyalty to the nation-state will focus on two main aspects. The first aspect is the concept of loyalty to the nation-state and the concepts used in the relevant literature to examine this issue. Among these, ideas about patriotism predominate. Attention will be paid to such questions as how these concepts are differentiated in the literature, how they are operationalized and which attitudes (behaviours and feelings of individuals) are associated with these phenomena. The second aspect covers views on loyalty to the nation-state in the context of the above-mentioned scientific debate on multiculturalism and transnational ties of immigrants.

4.2 Perspectives on loyalty to the nation-state

4.2.1 Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state

Loyalty has been studied in various scientific disciplines, among them philosophy, social psychology, political science and sociology. Although authors differ in their description of loyalty,[1] it is generally agreed that the concept refers to an emotional commitment and its associated behaviour in the form of taking the side of the

[1] For a discussion of some of these differences see Keller (2007: 1-23).

object of loyalty, for example, a friend, a group or a nation-state (Druckman 1994; Keller 2007; Kleinig 2013; Oglensky 2008; Zdaniuk & Levine 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that the loyalty concept refers to a *special* relationship with the particular object of loyalty, which means that loyalty to, for example, the Netherlands, is not motivated simply by the principle that a citizen should be loyal to her or his country, but also by the fact that the citizen personally considers it to be *her* or *his* country (Keller 2007: 17-18). In this guise, loyalty implies *identification* with the object of loyalty (see also Chapter 3). Importantly, this does not mean that loyalty should override other commitments. It is possible that an individual is strongly motivated to take the side of his or her country because of a commitment to defend his or her family or certain principles, and not so much out of loyalty *per se* to their own country (Keller 2009: 13-15).

In any discussion of the loyalty concept, is important to distinguish between the *normative* and *descriptive* uses made of it. An example of the former is the claim that citizens *should* be loyal to the nation-state. This normative use of the concept is also to be found in the philosophical debate of moral universalists versus communitarians, as described by Keller (2007: ix, 53-54). In this debate, moral universalists take the stance that moral principles should preferably be impartial and not dependent on specific attachments or allegiances to others, for instance, communities or nation-states. The fly in the ointment is that, of its very nature, loyalty implies partiality and hence it poses a problem for advocates of universalist morality. Communitarians, on the other hand, take the view that moral principles are and should be at least partly derived from a shared culture within the community or nation-state, and hence they consider specific loyalty to the nation-state to be a virtue.[2]

The term loyalty is used as a *descriptive* concept in studies of the various forms of behaviour through which loyalty is expressed. This has led Keller (2007: 3-7) to distinguish different forms which he describes as types of loyalty: loyalty in concern, in advocacy, in ritual, in identification and in belief. *Loyalty in concern* is expressed by prioritizing the interests of the object of loyalty over someone or something else's interests. Another way for expressing loyalty is to speak up in defence of the object of loyalty, a form of behaviour Keller refers to as *loyalty in advocacy*. Loyalty can also be expressed by such ritual practices as saluting the national flag or standing for the national anthem, referred to as *loyalty in ritual*. It can also be expressed by a strong tendency to identify with the object of loyalty, referred to as *loyalty in identification*, which can lead to feelings of both pride and

[2] This does not mean that moral universalism is in principle incompatible with loyalty, or that only communitarians consider loyalty to the community to be a virtue. For a discussion see Keller (2007: 162-181, 220-222).

shame (cf. Dresler-Hawke & Liu 2006: 134). Finally, Keller discusses *loyalty in belief*, a term he uses to refer to the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty. One example would be the refusal to believe that, despite evidence to the contrary, the country (the object of loyalty) has violated human rights treaties.

Closely related to these types of loyalty is the concept of patriotism. Authors generally agree that patriotism refers to an emotional commitment to one's own country and to the associated behaviour which is expressed by taking the side of this country (Brubaker 2004; Depuiset & Butera 2005; Druckman 1994; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999; cf. Herrmann, Isernia & Segatti 2009). In this sense, patriotism implies identification with one's country. Passing the discussion of loyalty above in review, it is therefore not surprising that some scholars describe patriotism as a type of loyalty to the country or nation-state (e.g. Druckman 1994; Keller 2007; Keller 2009).

As has loyalty, expressions of patriotism have been intensively studied. Both theoretical considerations and empirical studies indicate that patriotism is not a one-dimensional phenomenon, but that its various expressions represent various types of patriotism, the most widely discussed being constructive patriotism, uncritical (or blind) patriotism, symbolic patriotism and national pride (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). In view of the above-mentioned general description of patriotism, these four types can be considered specific types of loyalty to the country or nation-state. *Constructive patriotism* has been defined as a type of loyalty to country which is expressed in criticism and questioning motivated by 'a desire for positive change' (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). One example is the constructive criticism of fellow citizens' discriminatory behaviour towards immigrants. In contrast, *uncritical patriotism* is characterized by 'unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism' (Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999: 153). This type of patriotism relates to loyalty in belief, the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty, one of the types of loyalty distinguished by Keller (2007). This illustrates that not every expression of loyalty to a country is necessarily good for its interests: uncritical patriotism can imply refraining from or even opposing criticism, which is contradictory to the principles of democracy. *Symbolic patriotism* refers to the emotional importance attached to such symbolic representations of the country as the national flag and anthem (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Parker 2009). This type of patriotism relates to loyalty in ritual, another of the previously discussed types of loyalty. Finally, some authors describe *national pride* as a distinct expression of patriotism (Davidov 2010; cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007), which involves what has been called loyalty in identification, namely, a strong tendency to identify with the

object of loyalty which can result in feelings of both pride and shame (Keller 2007: 6).

4.2.2 Loyalty and group belonging

Considering that group loyalty refers to a special relationship with a group and emotionally motivated behaviour favouring that group, it is not surprising that expressions of loyalty have been linked to social identity. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of social identity research, Tajfel (1981) has proposed that social categorization is a basic human tendency which serves individuals to achieve positive self-esteem by differentiating their in-group positively from out-groups. Individuals categorize or identify themselves and are categorized or identified by others as belonging to certain groups. Research has shown that this need for positive distinctiveness can be expressed by in-group favouritism, in-group loyalty and by adhering to in-group stereotypes in the form of behavioural and normative expectations (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004).[3]

In line with these findings, some scholars have described patriotism as an indicator of, or even as synonymous with, national self-identification (for discussions, see Huddy & Khatib 2007 and Theiss-Morse 2009: 23-24). However, research in the tradition of social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979) suggests that a distinction should be made between these two concepts. As explained in Chapter 3, national self-identification as an aspect of social identity refers to a multi-dimensional phenomenon which is composed of cognitive, affective and evaluative components. Empirical research has indicated that it is the affective component of self-identification, and not the cognitive and evaluative components, which determines the tendency of people to behave in terms of their group membership. Importantly, the affective and evaluative components of self-identification do not necessarily co-vary in a predictable way. As discussed in Chapter 3, although affection for a group can undoubtedly influence the evaluation of that group, individuals with a strong affective commitment to a certain group can evaluate certain characteristics of that group negatively (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999: 386, and 373 respectively). From this perspective, the various types of patriotism discussed above are not synonymous with, but should instead be considered possible expressions of, national self-identification (cf. Latcheva 2010: 191). After all, while patriotism assumes a sense of national belonging, it also specifically refers to forms of behaviour and to evaluations of aspects of the nation-state (see Section 4.2.1).

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[3] However, the need for positive distinctiveness is not always expressed in these ways. See Shadid (2007:183); see also Jenkins (2008: 114-115); Theiss-Morse (2009: 41).

Factor analyses conducted by Huddy and Khatib (2007) which revealed a distinction between national self-identification[4] on the one hand, and constructive patriotism, uncritical patriotism, symbolic patriotism and national pride on the other hand support these insights.[5] Their investigation indicated all these types of patriotism relate not only to national self-identification, they are also related to political ideology. Conservatives appeared to be more uncritically patriotic than liberals, and liberals were more constructively patriotic than conservatives (Huddy & Khatib 2007: 70). Cogently, no relationship was found between national self-identification and political ideology. (This concurs with the present study, in which no relationship between the affective component of national self-identification and political preference was found – see Chapter 3.)

There have also been discussions about whether these types of patriotism, or, in other words, positive evaluations of one's national in-group, are part of or distinct from feelings of national superiority. Several studies indicate that these phenomena are indeed empirically distinct, but that there is a positive relationship between them (Blank, Schmidt and Westle 2001; Feshbach 1987 and 1990, as discussed in Druckman 1994: 46; Huddy & Khatib 2007). It should be noted that in these studies feelings of national superiority are not referred to as such but are labelled nationalism, using a general definition of nationalism as an idealization of one's nation (Sumner 2006).[6]

Scholars have also gone a step farther and investigated whether a favourable attitude towards one's in-group – for example, in the form of loyalty or patriotism – is consistently accompanied by negative evaluations of out-groups (see Druckman 1994: 63; Spruyt & Vanhoutte 2009). In other words, the question is whether a positive evaluation of one's in-group necessarily implies ethnocentrism,

[4] Huddy & Khatib (2007) use the term 'national identity' and not 'national self-identification'. However, their operationalization reveals that they measure the internal aspect of (national) social categorization, of which the term 'national self-identification' is a more specific description.

[5] See also Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001).

[6] As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of nationalism is often used to describe views and behaviour stressing the distinction between one's own national group and other national, ethnic or religious groups (cf. Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993; Latcheva 2010). This definition has lead several authors to suggest that nationalism refers to an idealization of one's nation (e.g. Sumner 1906), which can be expressed by the sense that one's own nation is superior to other nations (e.g. Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). Furthermore, a distinction is often made between civic and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the view that membership of a nation is first and foremost a legal and political category, implying that criteria for national belonging include respect for institutions and laws and a sense of national belonging (Calhoun 2002). In contrast, ethnic nationalism refers to the view that membership of a nation is rooted in specific ethnic or cultural criteria. These ethnic and civic conceptions of national belonging are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

which is generally defined as a combination of a positive evaluation of one's own culture with a negative evaluation of the cultures of others (Shadid 2007: 57). Research in the tradition of social identity theory reveals that this is not the case (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170). In a study of 22 countries, Coenders (2001) found a positive relationship between patriotism and negative attitudes towards immigrants in only two countries. In the other countries these relationships were not significant or reversed. On a more general level, a study by Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) indicates that a positive evaluation of one's in-group is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrants (see also Ariely 2012). In this study, the relationship between types of loyalty to the nation-state and negative attitudes towards immigrants will be explored in Chapter 5.

Whether individuals evaluate out-groups negatively appears to depend on the level of affective commitment to their in-group and on the social context (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 163-166). When, in a certain social context, the group distinctiveness of a group is cast in doubt, group members with a strong (affective) commitment to their group tend to defend this distinctiveness by exaggerating differences with out-groups. The outcome of this sort of reaction can be a high degree of self-stereotyping, and negative evaluations and discrimination of out-groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 177; Fiske 2002). These findings also suggest that normative expectations of group loyalty, as aspects of self-stereotyping, are stronger when members of the national group perceive a threat to the distinctiveness of this group (cf. Carter, Ferguson & Hassin 2011; Depuiset & Butera 2005; Druckman 1994).

Finally, the relationship between group belonging and loyalty implies that individuals can be simultaneously loyal to more than one group. As explained in Chapter 3, every individual self-identifies and is socially categorized by others according to a number of different criteria, which means that every individual belongs to various groups at the same time.[7] An individual can belong legally to the Dutch national group, and simultaneously be categorized as belonging to another ethnic group, or to a family or a political party. In other words, individuals have partial or multiple social identities and belongings, and the logical consequence is that they must have multiple group loyalties and can be subject to multiple normative group expectations of group loyalty. In itself, these multiple loyalties and expectations of loyalty are not problematic. However, problems can arise when an individual belongs to groups which have or develop conflicting interests.

[7] See Jenkins (2008: 104) for a discussion of the distinction between categories and groups.

4.2.3 Perspectives on loyalty to the nation-state in multicultural societies

This discussion has quite clearly revealed that loyalty to the nation-state can be manifested in distinct forms of behaviour, and that individuals have multiple loyalties to the groups to which they belong. At the beginning of this chapter it was said that some authors argue that ethno-cultural distinctiveness and transnational ties lead to multiple loyalties. Conflicts of loyalties might undermine the loyalty to the nation-state of particular groups such as immigrants (e.g. Gitlin 1995; Huntington 2004; Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). In this section, the scientific debate aroused by this argument will be reviewed.

One transnational tie which is widely discussed in the context of this debate is the multiple citizenship of immigrants.[8] Opponents of multiple citizenship argue that it poses a problem because it raises the spectre of conflicting loyalties: immigrants with multiple citizenship might not favour the interests of the nation-state in which they reside over the interests of their nations of origin (Renshon 2004). More specifically, they assert that multiple citizenship poses a security risk, especially during military conflicts in which the question of for whom these immigrants will fight can arise (De Hart 2005b; Ronkainen 2011). On a more general level, there are arguments that multiple citizenship is not the only factor which might pose a danger, the different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds of immigrants and their descendants are also factors which might lead to multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties. It stands to reason that this concern is stronger when an actual or ideological conflict is perceived between the nation-state and the ethnic or religious groups with which immigrants identify (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013). One cogent example is the perceived conflict between 'Western civilization' and the 'Islamic civilization', coined the 'clash of civilizations' by Huntington (1993; 1996), a perception which has been strengthened by the discourse on 'Islamic terrorism'.

Disturbed by this fear of conflicting loyalties, some authors oppose multiculturalism, which they understand to be the formal recognition of immigrants' cultural distinctiveness by host countries (see Chapters 1 and 6).[9]

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[8] For an extensive discussion of the debate on multiple citizenship see De Hart (2012).

[9] Baron (2009) traces the contemporary perceived danger of transnational ties and religious diversity back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), in which the concept of Westphalian sovereignty was introduced. This concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state included the principle of non-interference in another nation-state's domestic affairs. Furthermore, sovereigns could choose the religion of their states, and residents who did not adhere to the religion selected by their ruler were, for a short period, free to migrate to another state. The ultimate goal was to increase religious homogeneity within states to prevent the development of multiple political and religious loyalties. This was seen as necessary to achieve a unified allegiance to the sovereign, thereby protecting the stability of the nation-state and preventing war. Discussing it, Baron (2009: 1030) writes, '[w]hat the

These opponents of multiculturalism worry that a civic conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3) – which is implied in the recognition of cultural distinctiveness – might not be strong enough to foster loyalty to the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Consequently, it can be expected that these opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship will either support immigrant assimilation (see Chapter 5) or will have an ethnic conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3), or both.

Various responses have been made in the relevant literature to counter the arguments of these opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship. In the first place, multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties are not confined to immigrants, every individual can have multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties and everyone is subject to multiple expectations of group loyalty from a number of different sources (cf. Hirsch Ballin 2011: 19). There are instances in which the loyalty of people to their home country can conflict with their loyalty to their friends, family members and their (multinational) employer. Obviously, the interests of multinational employers especially are likely to conflict with the interests of nation-states. In this context it is useful to refer back to the discussion in Chapter 3 which revealed that the boundaries of ethno-cultural groups are socially constructed, are subject to change and are therefore always dynamic. This means that the question centres not only on which ethno-cultural differences and transnational ties can cause conflicting interests and loyalties, but also asks which differences and transnational ties are perceived to be important in society and why (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013; see also Chapter 5 on integration). For example, although an Islamic background is seen by some authors (e.g. Huntington 1993; 1996) to conflict with the interests of Western nation-states, transnational economic trading ties are frequently considered desirable, and as a result internationally conflicting economic interests are perceived normal (WRR 2007: 173).

This issue is cogent to the argument of Baron (2009), who explains how, in the context of the discussion on multiculturalism, the accusation about the putative conflicts which might arise from dual or multiple loyalty is often linked to racism, an ideology which can be used to justify existing inequality (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 319; Shadid 2007: 210). By and large, the simple fact of having a migrant background, or being part of a minority group, can lead to accusations of multiple loyalty. As Baron argues:

Peace of Westphalia termed a problem of religious faith modernity redefined as an issue pertaining to the loyalty of migrant communities'.

> while a majority may claim that the migrant community needs to share in the values and participate in local customs in order to demonstrate its inclusiveness, it is also up to the majority to decide when a minority has done enough to satisfy the expectations of assimilation. In this regard a minority population is always potentially suspect of not fulfilling these expectations over assimilation and is thus always subject to the possibility of a dual [or multiple] loyalty accusation. (Baron 2009: 1033.)

Consequently, ethnic, cultural and religious differences between immigrants and natives are 'easily construed to pose various kinds of security risks' (Baron 2009: 1035), and this can be used to justify inequality.

Opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship do not restrict their arguments to stating that the recognition of cultural distinctiveness and transnational ties might lead to conflicting loyalties, they also warn that immigrants' loyalties to their countries of origin and their ethnic or religious groups might lead to a weakening of their loyalty to the nation-state in which they reside. Taking the opposite tack, proponents of multiculturalism argue that the public and formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness is essential to fostering affective identifications with the nation-state. In turn, this is indispensable to cultivating national loyalty (Kymlicka 2001; Martin 2003; Spiro 1998, 2003; Wright & Bloemraad 2012; for a discussion see Chapter 6).

Considering the fact that individuals always belong to multiple groups, have multiple group loyalties and can be subject to multiple group expectations of loyalty, it is perhaps understandable that the debate about the relationship between multiculturalism and loyalty is largely theoretical (cf. Böcker, Groenendijk & De Hart 2005: 161; Driouchi 2007: 113). The few empirical studies which have essayed the vastness of this subject indicate that the relationship between ethnic and cultural diversity and transnational ties on the one hand and loyalty to the nation-state on the other is more nuanced. Multiple citizenship does not appear to be a clear indicator of conflicting loyalties or of the strength of loyalty to the nation-state (De Hart 2005b; Ronkainen 2011). Furthermore, empirical research indicates that transnational ties do not necessarily hinder immigrant integration (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). This suggests that holding multiple loyalties to a number of groups does not necessarily undermine loyalty to the nation-state.

Quite apart from this discussion of the sorts of responses to the hypothesis that immigrants' loyalty to the nation-state can be undermined by their multiple loyalties to ethnic groups and nations of origin, it is worthwhile asking whether the loyalty of citizens to their country is essential to protecting its interests. Some expressions of loyalty might actually help protect these interests, whereas other

expressions might not, or in fact might even conflict with these interests. Consequently, constructive patriotism, as discussed above, might assist a country's interests as it could involve constructive criticism which is motivated by a desire for positive change. Conversely, uncritical patriotism can hinder the democratic process. Moreover, loyalty to their country is not the only and not even necessarily the strongest motivation for citizens to take their country's side. After all, individuals can be strongly motivated to take the side of their country because of a commitment to protect their family, friends or certain principles, and not so much purely and simply out of loyalty to their country. There is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that citizens' loyalty to their country is a better guarantee for furthering or protecting its interests than other commitments these citizens might have. Authors who argue that loyalty to a particular country is essential to protect its interests are either speculating or they are confusing matters by conflating the structure with the strength of political commitments (Keller 2009: 13-15).

In the Netherlands, the loyalty to the nation-state of immigrants with multiple citizenship has been an issue in political debate since 1990. The history of this debate will be reviewed in the next section.

4.3 Loyalty to the nation-state: policies and debates in the Netherlands

As discussed more extensively in Chapters 3 and 5, in the last few decades debates about national belonging and immigrant integration in the Netherlands have become highly politicized. One particular issue which has been increasingly emphasized in these debates is the loyalty to the Dutch nation-state of immigrants with multiple citizenship. The main arguments concerning this issue and the Dutch government policies it has elicited will be reviewed in this section. This short review is largely based on the extensive overviews and discussions of Dutch citizenship laws and policies in the studies of De Hart (2012) and Van Oers, De Hart and Groenendijk (2013). Three phases in the development of these policies and debates will be distinguished: the phase of restrictive citizenship laws and policies until 1953; the less restrictive and more inclusive phase between 1953 and the 1990s; and the phase after the 1990s in which citizenship laws have been made more restrictive once again.[10]

The first laws concerning Dutch citizenship were introduced in the 19th century. The Dutch Nationality Act of 1850 stipulated that individuals born in the

[10] Chapters 3, 5 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of immigrants' loyalty to the nation-state.

Netherlands and their descendants were automatically considered Dutch citizens – the principle of *ius soli*. This was altered in the new Dutch Nationality Act of 1892, which stipulated that Dutch citizenship could only be automatically acquired by those who were born to a Dutch father. This *ius sanguinis* principle was considered a better guarantee of loyalty and commitment of citizens to the nation-state (Driouchi 2007: 119; Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 43). Under the same Act, the right to obtain Dutch citizenship through naturalization was made possible for adults who had resided in the Netherlands or its colonies for a minimum of five years, provided that they renounced their original citizenship. In the throes of the economic crisis of the 1930s, the naturalization policy tightened up even more to protect the Dutch labour market.

From 1953, laws to do with Dutch citizenship and naturalization were made less restrictive. This liberalization was partly influenced by two factors, the introduction and ratification of international treaties promoting the naturalization of refugees and stateless persons, and the incorporation of the right to legal citizenship in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 5-6). At this time, one of the amendments to the Dutch citizenship law implied that third-generation immigrants born in the Netherlands would automatically acquire Dutch citizenship. These immigrants did not have to renounce other citizenships acquired by *ius sanguinis*, so this amendment resulted in the earliest cases[11] of multiple citizenship in the Netherlands.

A new Dutch Nationality Act was introduced in 1984, when the first structural integration policies targeted at immigrants were being developed (see Chapter 5). One of the important goals of this new act was to improve the legal position of settled immigrants by providing them with easier access to Dutch citizenship. It also allowed second-generation immigrants – those who were born in the Netherlands, between 18 and 25 years of age, who have resided in the Netherlands since birth – to opt for Dutch citizenship. The government 'assumed that feelings of loyalty and commitment towards the Netherlands exist among these immigrants' (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 21). In 1991, the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original citizenship was abolished.

However, in 1997 this renunciation requirement was reintroduced, as outcome of a parliamentary debate which marked the beginning of a phase in which Dutch citizenship laws were once again tightened up. In this debate, members of Parliament of the VVD (right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the CDA (right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal) argued that

[11] See De Hart (2012: 160-161) for a more detailed discussion.

immigrants who retained their original citizenship did not make a sufficient commitment to the Netherlands and should therefore not be allowed to become a Dutch citizen. They added grist to their mill by arguing naturalization should be *earned* by completing a process of integration (De Hart 2012: 167; Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 16), which implied learning the Dutch language and acquiring basic knowledge of Dutch society (see Chapter 3). Their opponents, members of Parliament for several left-wing parties – PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal Democrats 66) and the Green Left party, argued that in a world caught up in the throes of globalization it would be unavoidable that citizens might have attachments to more than one country. Turning the tables, they made the case that recognition of these multiple attachments, for example, by allowing multiple citizenship, would improve immigrant integration.

Importantly, most immigrants who applied for naturalization were exempted from the requirement to renounce their original citizenship. Exemptions were made for immigrants of whom such a renunciation could not be reasonably expected, among them refugees and citizens whose countries of origin did not allow renunciation of citizenship (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 14, 16). In the Dutch Parliament, the extent of these exemptions was criticized by those members representing the political parties CDA and VVD, who 'claimed that most immigrants had been obtaining Dutch citizenship for pragmatic reasons rather than as a sign of loyalty to the Netherlands' (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 16). The upshot of these debates was an amendment to the Dutch Nationality Act, originally proposed in 1998 but which only came into force in 2003. Apart from the renunciation of original citizenship, this amendment also included new and stricter requirements for people applying for naturalization, including tests on Dutch language and society.[12]

As discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5, an important shift in the debates about the citizenship of immigrants and their descendants occurred around the year 2000, when several authors[13] claimed that integration policies had failed and postulated that social cohesion was under threat because integration policies focused too much on the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants and too little on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values. As already said, these ideas were fused into one political discourse, important parts of which were copied by other political parties, pursued by the politician Pim Fortuyn (Penninx 2005).

In this context, the debate on multiple citizenship was reopened in 2003. Several members of the Dutch Parliament suggested that multiple citizenship of

[12] See Chapters 3 and 5.

[13] Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

immigrants could hinder their integration and emancipation, and requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration to take steps to prevent citizens from obtaining multiple citizenship (De Hart 2012: 169).

The government responded by issuing the policy document *Multiple Citizenship and Integration*, in 2004 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2004). In this document the government stated that in order to advance the integration of foreigners in the Netherlands, the existing Nationality Act already included the renunciation of the original citizenship as a requirement for naturalization (discussed above). Furthermore, the government stated that ideally immigrants who 'opt for Dutch nationality and thereby indicate that they feel a sense of belonging to Dutch society' should not retain and pass on their original citizenship to their children and grandchildren, especially if these descendants were born in the Netherlands and no longer have real ties to their parents' country of origin (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2004: 3).[14] Consequently, the government stated that it intended to set more limits on the (above mentioned) exemptions to the requirement of renunciation of original citizenship for immigrants who wished to obtain Dutch citizenship.

The weak point of this document is that in it the government did not attempt to explain how multiple citizenship could hinder integration, nor did it give concrete reasons why it considered multiple citizenship undesirable. However, when this issue was debated in Parliament, the Minister did elaborate on the views in the policy document and stated that by renouncing their original citizenship, immigrants would be able to offer proof that they really wanted to be Dutch and that they did have ties with the Dutch community (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004a: 94-6075). In the wake of these intentions, in 2005 the government proposed a bill which included the elimination of two exemptions to the requirement of renunciation of the original citizenship of immigrants who wished to obtain Dutch citizenship, namely the exception for second-generation immigrants and the exception for partners of Dutch citizens.[15]

In the parliamentary debates on this bill, the CDA political party argued that immigrants with multiple citizenship should be stripped of their Dutch citizenship if they were not committed to Dutch values (De Hart 2012: 220). This political party asserted that Dutch citizenship should be exclusive as it implies loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. Opposing this interpretation, the political party Green Left

[14] Author's translation.

[15] This bill also included the provision that immigrants with multiple citizenship would forfeit their Dutch citizenship if they were ever to act against the fundamental interests of the Dutch state, for example, by being involved in 'terrorist activities'.

argued that citizens were able to feel a sense of belonging to multiple groups and countries, and that this multiplicity does not necessarily lead to disloyalty to the Netherlands. The PvdA likewise argued that multiple citizenship did not necessarily correlate with a weaker loyalty to the Netherlands (De Hart 2005a; Driouchi 2007: 133).

In short, opponents of multiple citizenship – including members of Parliament for the political parties VVD, CDA and the smaller Christian parties – did not only link it to integration, they also associated it negatively with putative disloyalty to the nation-state (Driouchi 2007: 113, 143). De Hart (2005a) summarized the arguments of these opponents as follows: a lack of integration causes immigrants to retain their original citizenship, which in turn, can lead to disloyalty to the Dutch nation-state. This debate turned principally on Muslim immigrants, an indication that more than multiple citizenship was at stake, the ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds of immigrants were also tacitly assumed to conflict with loyalty to the nation-state (De Hart 2005a).[16]

In 2007, the new government[17] withdrew the bill to further prevent holding multiple citizenship which had been proposed in 2005. This withdrawal did nothing to stop the debate about this issue. One very hot topic was that two of the new secretaries of state held more than one passport. The PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom) persistently put forward the argument that the multiple citizenship of two State Secretaries could lead to conflicting loyalties of these members of the government. The PVV leader Wilders explicitly linked this debate about loyalty to religion, by explicitly referring to the Islamic background of these State Secretaries.[18]

It should be stressed that the political debates on the relationship between multiple citizenship and integration and loyalty to the nation-state are largely hypothetical and theoretical. Their empirical basis is very threadbare (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b; see also Section 4.2 of this chapter). This weakness was recognized by two advisory bodies, namely the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 2007) and the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2008), which published reports on the issue. In fact, an empirical study commissioned by ACVZ indicated that there is no relationship

[16] This was not the first time that the religion of citizens was linked to their loyalty to the nation-state. In the 19th century, Roman Catholics were mistrusted because of the perception that their loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church could conflict with the interests of the Dutch nation-state (Grever & Ribbens 2007: 42-44).

[17] In 2007 a new coalition government came into power, consisting of the political parties CDA, PvdA and Christian Union (CU).

[18] De Volkskrant (February 17, 2007), *"Je moet kiezen voor een land"*.

between multiple citizenship of immigrants and their integration (2008: 32; see also Dagevos 2008). Both advisory bodies put forward strong arguments which denied the relationship between multiple citizenship and the loyalty of citizens to the nation-state. WRR stressed that it is important to make a distinction between loyalty to the nation-state and citizenship as a legal status, because the legal status of citizens cannot be conflated with their emotional commitments. WRR argued that there is no reason to assume that citizens with single citizenship are more loyal to, or have fewer conflicting loyalties with, the nation-state in which they reside than those with multiple citizenship. As stated in the previous section, citizens with a single citizenship can also have transnational ties such as economic and business relations, which can just as well lead to conflicting loyalties.

WRR observed that there is a paradox in the reasoning of the opponents of multiple citizenship, who demand that citizens should self-identify with only one nation-state. These opponents stress the importance of the emotional component of identification with the Netherlands, but simultaneously paradoxically deny the importance of the immigrants' emotional ties to their roots. Citizens can be loyal to their nation-state for a variety of reasons, including pride in their ancestors, self-interest and appreciation of the concrete advantages of belonging to the nation-state (see WRR 2007: 168, 192). ACVZ agreed with the WRR analysis and added that there is no scientific evidence indicating that multiple citizenship leads to conflicting loyalties which might hinder the process of identification with the Netherlands (ACVZ 2008: 30; cf. Hirsch Ballin 2011: 19). ACVZ argued that citizens' loyalty to the Netherlands does not depend on whether or not they are loyal to another country, and that renouncing their original citizenship does not lead to the disappearance of their emotional ties and loyalties to the countries of origin.

In its response to the WRR report, the Dutch government agreed that multiple citizenship is not problematic (Ministerie van Justitie 2007: 2) but it did not take steps to abolish the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original citizenship. Indeed, respective Dutch governments have proposed various limitations to the exemptions which might open the door to multiple citizenship. Two bills, one passed in 2008 and the other in 2011, dealt with this matter. The first bill came into force in 2010 (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 39) and the second, which again stated that multiple citizenship might hinder immigrant integration, was withdrawn by the new government at the end of 2012.[19]

[19] Ministerie van Algemene Zaken (2012).

Ernst Hirsch Ballin (2011), former Dutch Minister of Justice,[20] notes that these attempts by the government to limit multiple citizenship seem to have been tied into the idea that the success of immigrants' citizenship and integration depends on the extent to which they distance themselves from their culture and country of origin. He dismissed this idea as unrealistic. It was obvious that the crux of the matter was that people undeniably have multiple belongings and ties with various groups and nation-states. Consequently, Hirsch Ballin argued, the acquisition of legal citizenship should not depend on the demand that immigrants renounce all their ties with their culture and country of origin. Instead, citizenship should accept an implicit two-way contract which includes equal rights for citizens and acceptance by citizens 'of the basic principles of liberal democracy, familiarity with the language, history and institutions' (Hirsch Ballin 2011: 20). Such a tacit acceptance is especially important as legal citizenship guarantees civil rights, whose protection is closely bound up with the protection of such human rights as the freedom of speech and freedom of association. Perhaps the most important point is that having legal citizenship is a human right itself, which implies that withholding legal citizenship on the basis of unrealistic expectations violates human rights directly and indirectly (Hirsch Ballin 2011: 20).

As of 2012, the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original citizenship is still part of the Dutch Nationality Act, which makes the Netherlands one of the few West-European countries which still upholds such a requirement (Vink & De Groot 2010). However, making use of the exemptions to this requirement discussed above, more than one million Dutch citizens have multiple citizenship – around 6% of the total population (CBS 2011; see also Gijsberts & Dagevos 2009: 55-57). At the moment of writing, views on multiple citizenship in Dutch Parliament are still divided. The PVV obdurately opposes multiple citizenship on the grounds that it can cause conflicting loyalties, and the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) wants to restrict the legal exemptions which can lead to multiple citizenship.[21] Taking the opposite tack, the PvdA has explicitly stated that multiple citizenship has no relationship to integration or loyalty to the nation-state, and the Green Left party made no bones about it and simply stated that multiple citizenship should be allowed.[22] So far, the current government has not proposed any changes to the Dutch Nationality Act.[23]

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[20] Ernst Hirsch Ballin was Minister of Justice in the national governments of 1989-1994 and 2006-2010, for the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal).

[21] PVV (2012); SGP (2012).

[22] GroenLinks (2012); PvdA (2012).

[23] At the time of writing, the coalition government in the Netherlands consisted of the political parties VVD and PvdA, which came into power in November 2012.

This discussion illustrates that the laws on Dutch citizenship have become more restrictive since the 1990s. Politicians on the right of the political spectrum are the principal proponents of the school of thought that the multiple citizenship of immigrants, especially of Muslim immigrants, is an indicator of a lack of affective commitment to the Netherlands. Hence it is the culprit behind failed integration and a putative lack of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. In the next section, the views on loyalty to the nation-state current in society will be examined.

4.4 Views in society on multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state

The previous section has revealed that in the last two decades loyalty to the nation-state of immigrants with multiple citizenship has become a real focus of attention in Dutch political debates on the multicultural society. In this section, views current in Dutch society about this issue will be explored by analysing empirical data collected in the two questionnaires conducted for this research. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this sort of empirical analysis is especially relevant, as the arguments in the scientific and political debates on citizens' loyalty to the nation-state are hypothetical and theoretical, and lack empirical basis (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).

The analysis in this section consists of two parts. The first will examine views on multicultural citizenship, and in the second views on loyalty to the nation-state will be explored.

4.4.1 Views on multiple citizenship

In the questionnaires used in this research, respondents were asked whether and why they approved or disapproved of multiple citizenship in the Netherlands. Almost half (49%) of respondents disapprove of multiple citizenship. Almost a quarter (23%) of them approve. The other respondents (28%) do not have an opinion on this issue. These findings indicate that the percentage of Dutch citizens who oppose multiple citizenship has decreased, as in June 2010, two and a half years before the survey for the present study was carried out, this percentage was over 60% (CBS 2011). The reason for this drop in disapproval is not clear.

Regardless of their view on the issue, respondents said that they found it difficult to explain why they held their opinion. Those who did explain and disapproved said that holding multiple citizenship indicates a lack of national commitment. They insisted that immigrants would have to renounce their original citizenship in order to prove their commitment to their new home country. These respondents also stressed the risk of conflicting loyalties, showing special concern about government officials with multiple citizenship. Another topic which these

opponents raised was the matter of the risk of the abuse of welfare subsidies. They argued that immigrants with multiple citizenship 'should not be allowed to live in their countries of origin and receive welfare subsidies from the Dutch state'.

Conversely, respondents who approved of multiple citizenship stressed that citizenship status does not say much about a person: 'It is just a piece of paper'. Hence, they considered the political debate about the issue to be a pointless waste of time. Proponents also argued that the motives of citizens, including government officials, should not be judged by their citizenship status. Instead, people should be judged by their behaviour.

In order to explore the characteristics of those who approved and disapproved of multiple citizenship, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out, including the variables age, gender, descent, educational level and income. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this analysis reveals that the view on multiple citizenship is related to the level of education ($\beta = .21$, $p < .001$), descent ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$) and gender ($\beta = .11$, $p < .05$).[24] The higher the educational level, the more approving of multiple citizenship, and women appear to be slightly more in favour of multiple citizenship than men. This is in line with the findings of the Statistics Netherlands (CBS 2011: 28-29). Furthermore, only 15% of immigrants of non-Western origin, opposed to 52% of native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin, disapprove of multiple citizenship, findings which are similar to those of the CBS (2011: 29). The relationship to descent can be partly explained by the fact that only 21% of those with multiple citizenship actually disapprove of it and that all respondents with multiple citizenship are immigrants.

The analysis also indicates a relationship between the views on multiple citizenship and political preference, as mentioned in Chapter 3 ($\beta = .26$, $p < .001$).[25] By and large voters for political parties on the right of the political spectrum disapprove of multiple citizenship, voters for the PVV (84% disapproval), VVD (65%) and SGP (60%) being particularly vehement. Voters for the SP (left-wing Socialist Party) also largely disapprove (67%). Voters for the PvdA, D66 and the GreenLeft party, parties on the left of the political spectrum, are more divided on the issue, with as many proponents as opponents of multiple citizenship. These findings are also similar to the results of the CBS study (2011: 29).

[24] All mentioned βs in this chapter have been standardized.

[25] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out, with descent, gender, age, educational level and income as control variables.

4.4.2 Views on loyalty to the nation-state

As is clear from the literature review in Section 4.2, research has indicated that loyalty to the nation-state is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, one of whose components is loyalty in identification (which can engender feelings of pride and shame in achievements and actions of the nation-state). The other components are loyalty in concern, loyalty in advocacy, symbolic patriotism, constructive patriotism and uncritical patriotism. Therefore, to explore views of loyalty to the nation-state in Dutch society, the questionnaires used in this research included several items which relate to these various types. Below, these items will be discussed separately first, before using them to explore whether the above-mentioned types of loyalty to the nation-state are indeed empirically distinct, and whether they are distinct from the affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in the scientific debates (see Section 4.2). Finally, the data will be used to explore whether and how these expressions of loyalty to the nation-state are related to such background variables as multiple citizenship status, descent and political preference, as hypothesized in both scientific and political debates (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).

4.4.2.1 Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state

Pride and shame elicited by past and contemporary achievements and actions of the nation-state are expressions of a strong inclination to identify with the nation-state, a tendency which has been called loyalty in identification (Keller 2007: 6; see Section 4.2). To explore this expression of loyalty to the nation-state, respondents were asked whether they felt proud of various achievements of the Netherlands and Dutch people. The results are presented in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1

Pride in past and contemporary Dutch achievements: Means (scale from 1 = not proud at all to 4 = very proud) and Standard Deviations.

Items	M	SD
Dutch achievements in sport	3.3	0.8
Dutch achievements in science and technology	3.2	0.7
Dutch achievements in arts and literature	3.0	0.8
Functioning of Dutch democracy	2.8	0.8
Functioning of Dutch welfare state	2.8	0.8
Equality in Dutch society	2.8	0.9
Dutch economic achievements	2.7	0.8
Dutch political influence in the world	2.3	0.8

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

This table demonstrates that respondents are most proud of Dutch achievements in sports, science and technology and the arts and literature (means of respectively 3.3, 3.2 and 3). They are clearly less proud of Dutch political influence in the world (M = 2.3). Apart from rating the importance of these items in the survey, respondents also elaborated on these items during in-depth interviews, and mentioned other aspects of the Netherlands and Dutch society of which they were proud. Respondents stressed that they were proud of the high quality of institutions, facilities and regulations in the Netherlands and the resultant high quality of life. In their explanations, respondents mentioned the education, welfare and health care systems, the relative safety in traffic and the low crime rate. Respondents also mentioned that they are proud of the worldwide admiration for Dutch waterworks, including the Dutch levee system. The cultural and ethnic diversity in the Netherlands was also mentioned. Some respondents stressed that this is something to be proud of in itself, while others are proud that the multicultural society functions well, despite cultural differences. One respondent said, 'It is such a small country with so much diversity, and still we do not beat each other's brains out'. Finally, respondents are proud of certain Dutch values and attitudes such as tolerance of people of various cultural and religious backgrounds, tolerance of a wide range of life principles, freedom of speech and critical loyalty.

The respondents were also asked whether they felt ashamed of negative aspects of Dutch history, that is of certain Dutch actions affecting 'others' in the past. The results are presented in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2

Shame of negative aspects of Dutch history (Dutch actions affecting 'others' in the past): Means (scale from 1 = not ashamed at all to 4 = very much ashamed) and Standard Deviations.

Items	M	SD
Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s	2.9	1.0
Dutch involvement in slavery and slave trade	2.8	1.0
Dutch involvement in the fall of Srebrenica in 1995	2.6	1.0
Dutch colonial past	2.5	1.0

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

Speaking about historical aspects, respondents said they not only feel ashamed of the Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s, they were also perturbed by the fact that many Dutch people do not want to recognize what happened there or even refuse to talk about it. Respondents feel ashamed of current Dutch attitudes and behaviour towards immigrants, including discrimination and 'unnecessary insults'. In their discussions, some explicitly said they feel ashamed of the actions and statements of member of parliament Wilders and his political party PVV. Respondents also mentioned that they feel ashamed of certain failings in Dutch society, mentioning the bad treatment of asylum seekers and the fact that there still is poverty and a need for food banks despite the wealth of Dutch society and the strong Dutch economy. Finally, respondents expressed shame about the behaviour of Dutch hooligans, and the drinking and vandalism of Dutch holiday-makers abroad.

Besides items on pride and shame – expressions of loyalty in identification – the questionnaires also included items which relate to other expressions of loyalty to the nation-state, as discussed in Section 4.2. The results are presented in the following table.

Table 4.3

Expressions of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state: Means (scale from 1 = never to 5 = always) and Standard Deviations.

Items	M	SD
I am loyal to the Netherlands	3.6	0.8
I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country	3.5	1.0
I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries	3.2	1.0
I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement	3.2	1.0
I put the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries	3.0	1.2
I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more like Dutch people	2.8	1.0
I am a Dutch patriot	2.7	1.0
I speak up in defence of the Netherlands when people criticize it	2.6	1.0
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national anthem is played	2.6	1.3
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national flag is hoisted	2.3	1.1
I support the Netherlands, also when I know that it is wrong	2.1	1.0
I think that the Netherlands is virtually always right	2.0	0.8

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for exploratory analysis.

The results in this table indicate that, on average, Dutch citizens seem to prefer to express their loyalty by criticizing their country in order to improve it (M = 3.2 on a scale from 1 = never to 5 = always), than by supporting their country uncritically (the items indicating the latter – 'supporting the Netherlands knowing that it is wrong', and 'thinking that the Netherlands is virtually always right' – have means of 2.1 and 2.0). Furthermore, the results also suggest that Dutch citizens have a moderate loyalty in concern (expressed by putting the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries, as discussed in Section 4.2) and a moderate loyalty in advocacy (expressed by speaking up for the Netherlands when it is criticized, as discussed in Section 4.2). They also appear to have a moderate sense of national superiority, as the items 'I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries' and 'I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more like Dutch people' have means of 3.2 and 2.8

respectively. However, the playing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag do not seem to stir up strong patriotic emotions.

Interestingly, it is less specific items such as 'I am loyal to the Netherlands' and 'I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country' which have the highest means, 3.6 and 3.5 respectively. In the in-depth interviews, respondents elaborated on these items. Generally speaking, they found it difficult to explain what their loyalty to the nation-state entails. Those who did explain, mentioned being proud of the country (see also the analysis of national pride, earlier in this section), contributing to Dutch society, respecting Dutch norms and values and protecting the image of the Netherlands. When talking about contributing to Dutch society, respondents said that it is important to participate in society, to keep society peaceful and maintain a liveable environment and to support Dutch interests in international contexts. They also stressed the importance of being critical and constructive in their opinions of government policies and of developments in society. On the other hand, respondents also did say that some people are too critical and complain too much. They considered it to be important to speak up to refute these complaints, as 'the Netherlands is one of the best places to live, and there is not much to complain about'.

Respondents who argued that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries referred to the high quality of institutions, facilities and regulations and the resultant high quality of life (see also the analysis of national pride, earlier in this section). Furthermore, respondents argued that this sense of superiority could improve the life satisfaction of Dutch citizens, and could encourage their willingness to contribute to their country as well. It was also argued that loyalty to the nation-state is less important than such other attitudes as 'trying to be good person', 'to be loyal to people you feel close to and to those who are in need'. Respondents believed that these attitudes are in the interest of the Netherlands as well.

To investigate whether the types of loyalty discussed in Section 4.2 are empirically distinct, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out including all items from Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 above. However, the item 'I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement', which is an indicator of constructive patriotism, had to be removed from the analysis as its correlations with all other items are lower than .3, resulting in a component on which only this item loads significantly. The analysis indicated six distinct components, whose (rotated) loadings are presented in Table 4.4 below.[26]

[26] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 6 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 6 components could be extracted, which explained 65.57% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option

Table 4.4

Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state: Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis, transformed variables rotated with PCA).

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country	***.85***	-.01	-.02	.03	-.02	-.07
I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries	***.84***	.00	-.05	-.06	-.06	-.03
I am loyal to the Netherlands	***.82***	.00	-.01	.06	.11	-.10
I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more like Dutch people	***.68***	.02	-.07	-.01	-.01	.18
I am a Dutch patriot	***.49***	.00	.05	.07	.12	.29
I feel ashamed of Dutch involvement in slavery and slave trade	-.01	***.91***	-.03	.06	-.03	.01
I feel ashamed of the Dutch colonial past	-.04	***.90***	-.02	.07	-.02	.01
I feel ashamed of Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s	.05	***.88***	-.02	.02	.01	-.04
I feel ashamed of Dutch involvement in the fall of Srebrenica in 1995	.00	***.77***	.06	-.09	.10	.03
I am proud of the functioning of the Dutch welfare state	.07	.06	***-.81***	.04	-.23	.06
I am proud of the functioning of the Dutch democracy	.14	.01	***-.75***	.03	.04	-.11
I am proud of Dutch political influence in the world	.07	.08	***-.64***	.01	.13	.12
I am proud of Dutch economic achievements	-.01	-.10	***-.63***	.03	.25	.06
I am proud of equality in Dutch society	-.09	-.07	***-.61***	.04	.15	-.01
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national anthem is played	.02	.04	-.03	***.95***	-.01	-.09
I get 'goose bumps' when the Dutch national flag is hoisted	-.02	.02	-.05	***.91***	-.04	.06

(Table continued on next page)

'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

(Table 4.4 continued)

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
I am proud of Dutch achievements in arts and literature	-.01	.05	-.09	-.04	***.77***	-.01
I am proud of Dutch achievements in sport	.05	.10	.09	.04	***.75***	.00
I am proud of Dutch achievements in science and technology	.04	-.07	-.23	.01	***.70***	-.02
I support the Netherlands, also when I know that it is wrong	-.08	.03	-.08	-.05	-.03	***.83***
I think that the Netherlands is virtually always right	.15	-.02	.03	-.03	-.03	***.78***
I speak up in defence of the Netherlands when people criticize it	-.03	-.02	-.04	**.32**	.05	***.58***
I put the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries	.25	-.12	.22	.25	.20	**.34**
Eigenvalues	5.67	3.16	2.33	1.66	1.23	1.03
Variance accounted for (%)	24.64	13.76	10.14	7.20	5.35	4.49

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. The items have been sorted by loadings on each component. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings of the items used for constructing scales are italicized.

The items which cluster on these components suggest that these components can be characterized as six distinct types of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state: *nationalist patriotism* (C1), *shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history* (C2), *national-political pride* (C3), *symbolic patriotism* (C4), *national-cultural pride* (C5) and *uncritical patriotism* (C6).

The component which can be characterized as *nationalist patriotism* includes items which refer to an idealization of the nation ('I prefer to be Dutch rather than citizen of another country') and to feelings of national superiority (second and fourth items in the table), but also the less specific item 'I am loyal to the Netherlands'. This suggests that the concept of loyalty is associated more with an idealization of the nation and feelings of national superiority than with other such expressions as pride, the supporting of or speaking up for the Netherlands. The term nationalist patriotism seems to be appropriate to characterize this component, as the term nationalism is mostly used to refer to an idealization of the nation which can be expressed by feelings of national superiority (Sumner 1906; Druckman 1994; see also Section 4.2).

Furthermore, the items referring to getting goose bumps when the national anthem is played or the flag is hoisted both load highly on the same component. These are expressions of an emotional importance attached to ritual practices or symbolic representations of the country, which is referred to in the literature as *symbolic patriotism* (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Parker 2009; see also Section 4.2).

Component C6 includes supporting the Netherlands even though it is known to be wrong, thinking that the Netherlands is always right, and speaking up for the Netherlands when it is criticized. This relates to *uncritical patriotism*, defined in the literature as 'unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism' (Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999: 153). As argued in Section 4.2, this type of patriotism relates to loyalty in belief, namely, the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty (Keller 2007). (This means that loyalty to a country does not necessarily further its interests, as this specific expression of loyalty implies refraining from or opposing criticism which is contradictory with principles of democracy.)

The items referring to pride load on two distinct components, which can be characterized as *national-cultural pride* (including pride of achievements in sport, science and technology, and arts and literature) and *national political pride* (including pride of Dutch democracy, economy and the welfare state, Dutch political influence in the world and equal treatment in Dutch society). These two components of national pride correspond to the dimensions of national pride found by Hjerm (1998: 343-344) in an analysis of empirical data from Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden. Finally, the items referring to shame all load highly on the same component, which can be characterized as *shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history*. As discussed in Section 4.2, pride and shame of past and contemporary achievements and actions of the nation-state are expressions of a strong tendency to identify with the nation-state, a tendency which has been called loyalty in identification (Keller 2007: 6; see Section 4.2).

These results run along the same lines as the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007) and Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001) discussed in Section 4.2.2. These authors also found empirical distinctions between the idealization of one's nation expressed by feelings of national superiority (which, as mentioned above, these authors label nationalism, and in the present study is labelled nationalist patriotism), and other types of loyalty to the nation-state (or patriotism). Moreover, the distinction between symbolic and uncritical patriotism fits with the findings of Parker (2009). To explore the relationships between these phenomena in more detail, the items with the highest component loadings presented in the table above (italicized) have been used to create summated scales. The values of

Cronbach's Alpha for the summated scales are between .64 and .89.[27] The bivariate correlations between these scales are presented in Table 4.5 below, which also includes the affective component of national self-identification as discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Section 4.2).

Table 4.5

Bivariate correlations between the affective component of national self-identification and expressions of loyalty to the nation-state.

	Affective national Self-identification	National-cultural pride	National-political pride	Shame Dutch history	Symbolic patriotism	Uncritical patriotism	Nationalist patriotism
Affective national Self-identification	1.00	.28****	.30****	.01	.25****	.30****	.41****
National-cultural pride		1.00	.40****	.05	.20****	.19*	.26****
National-political pride			1.00	-.02	.24****	.22****	.25****
Shame Dutch history				1.00	.07*	-.01	-.05
Symbolic patriotism					1.00	.37****	.24****
Uncritical patriotism						1.00	.34****
Nationalist patriotism							1.00

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. All values are Kendall's tau-b coefficients.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 (all values two-tailed).

[27] Values of Cronbach's Alpha: for items selected to represent C1 = .81, C2 = .88, C3 = .79, C4 = .89, C5 = .72, C6 = .64.

These correlations indicate positive relationships between the affective component of national self-identification on the one hand and all the expressions of loyalty to the nation-state distinguished, with the exception of shame of negative aspects of national history, on the other hand. This corresponds with results from studies in the tradition of social identity research, which indicate that self-identification with a group can be expressed by in-group loyalty (see Section 4.2). However, the strength of these relationships is weak to moderate (the highest correlation in this table is .41), which suggests that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state should not be seen as indicators for, or even synonymous with, the affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in Section 4.2 (cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007). Similarly, the CATPCA analysis and the correlations in the table above suggest that nationalist patriotism is positively related to, but distinct from, other expressions of loyalty to the nation-state, which ties in with findings in earlier research as discussed in Section 4.2 (e.g. Blank, Schmidt & Westle 2001; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Importantly, shame of negative aspects of national history appears to be the most distinct expression of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state, as the results in the table indicate that it is not or only barely related to other types of loyalty.

4.4.2.2 Who is loyal?

In both scientific literature and political debates in the Netherlands, as already said, various scholars and politicians have hypothesized that multiple citizenship is an indicator of weaker loyalty to the nation-state. Furthermore, several empirical studies have indicated that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state are more strongly related to political ideology than to national self-identification as understood in terms of social identity theory (see Section 4.2) (for a discussion see Huddy & Khatib 2007). To explore whether such relationships can be found in the present study as well, Categorical Regression analyses were carried out for each of the above-mentioned summated scales which represent the expressions of loyalty.[28] This sort of analysis was also carried out for the item 'I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement'. As this item appears to be the only indicator of constructive patriotism in the questionnaire, as explained above, in the following analysis the variable 'criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its improvement' will be used instead of the term 'constructive patriotism'.[29]

[28] In the CATREG procedure, these summated scales were specified as ordinal and discretized by ranking, as the scales were derived from ordinal items.

[29] It does not seem sensible to explore the phenomenon of constructive patriotism using only one item. In future studies, constructive patriotism could be explored in qualitative research in order to develop more items to measure its strength (see also Chapter 2).

In the first step, the analyses which were carried out included the variables age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income. These analyses indicate that educational level is to some extent related to national-political pride, uncritical and symbolic patriotism, and the variable 'criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its improvement' (β = .20, $p < .001$; β = -.17, $p < .001$; β = -.15, $p < .05$ and β = .20, $p < .001$ respectively). The higher the educational level, the more national-political pride and the more respondents criticize the Netherlands when they think that their criticism will help to improve it, but the lower their uncritical and symbolical patriotism. Furthermore, the older respondents are, the more they tend to be symbolically patriotic and feel shame about negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = .25, $p < .001$ and β = .20, $p < .05$ respectively). When it comes to gender differences, men have slightly more national-cultural pride than women (β = .12, $p < .05$). The variable descent is slightly related to all types of loyalty, except shame of negative aspects of national history. Both native Dutch and immigrants of non-Western origin are slightly more proud of national-cultural and national-political achievements than immigrants of Western origin (β = .22, $p < .05$ for both scales). Furthermore, native Dutch score slightly higher on the nationalist patriotism, uncritical patriotism and symbolic patriotism scales than either Western or non-Western immigrants (β = .22, $p < .005$; β = .18, $p < .001$ and β = .12, $p < .05$ respectively). On the other hand, immigrants of non-Western origin criticize the Netherlands when they think that helps its improvement slightly more often than their compatriots (β = .10, $p < .05$).

Taken together, and considering the weak correlations, these results do not indicate that descent is related to the strength of loyalty to the nation-state. To explore this in more detail, analyses were also carried out separately for immigrants, in which the variable 'affective commitment to one's ethnic group' (discussed in Chapter 3) was included as well. Analyses were likewise carried out for Muslim immigrants, in which the variable 'affective commitment to one's religious group' was included. These analyses did not reveal significant relationships between the affective commitment to one's ethnic or religious group on the one hand, and types of loyalty to the nation-state on the other. These empirical results contradict the theoretical argument of opponents of multiculturalism, who worry that a civic conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3), namely the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, might not be sufficient to foster loyalty to the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; see Section 4.2.3).

To explore relationships between multiple citizenship and types of loyalty to the nation-state, the variable 'having multiple citizenship status' was added to the Categorical Regression analyses. These analyses revealed no significant differences in levels of loyalty between those who do and those who do not possess multiple

citizenship. Moreover, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, similar analyses did not reveal significant differences in the affective commitment to the Netherlands of these two groups. This is in line with the findings of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) discussed in Section 4.3, indicating that the legal aspect of citizenship cannot be conflated with the emotional commitments of citizens, and that there is no reason to assume that citizens with a single citizenship status are more loyal to the nation-state in which they reside compared to those with multiple citizenship. It also accords with the findings of De Hart (2005b) and Ronkainen (2011), which indicated that multiple citizenship is not related to the strength of loyalty to the nation-state.

Finally, the analyses reveal moderate relationships between the political preference of respondents and their expressions of loyalty to the nation-state (all βs between .19 and .31, with all ps < .001).[30] Voters for parties on the left of the political spectrum (PvdA, SP, D66 and Green Left) and non-voters are slightly less uncritically patriotic than voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, CDA and PVV) (β = .21, p < .001). These results might be explained by the relationship between uncritical patriotism and conservatism, as suggested by Huddy and Khatib (2007: 64). These authors also found that those who classified themselves as right-wing conservatives tended to be more uncritically patriotic. They explained this by referring to the relationship between authoritarianism and uncritical patriotism: authoritarians, like uncritical patriots, tend to refrain from or oppose criticism of their country, and authoritarians tend to vote for (conservative) parties on the right of the political spectrum (see also Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).

Conservatism might also partly explain levels of symbolic patriotism, as voters for the Christian parties CDA and SGP are more symbolically patriotic than voters for other parties (β = .19, p < .001). On the other hand, the relationship between political preference and the variable 'criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its improvement' is difficult to interpret. Although the finding that non-voters score relatively low on this variable appears to make sense, it is not clear why voters for the largest Christian party (CDA) and the left-wing SP score lower on this variable than voters for all other parties (β = .26, p < .001).[31] Furthermore, voters for liberal parties (VVD, D66) and the right wing populist PVV clearly feel less shame of negative aspects of Dutch history than voters for left-wing (PvdA, Green Left) and

[30] The variable political preference was added to the Categorical Regression analyses, which means that these analyses were controlled for age, gender, educational level and descent.

[31] In future studies, constructive patriotism, for which this variable is an indicator, could be explored in qualitative research in order to develop more items to measure its strength (see also Chapter 2).

Christian parties (CDA, Christian Union and SGP) ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$). Voters for the SP and non-voters reflect the average for all respondents in this respect. Finally, voters for the traditionally largest political parties (the parties who always have formed the government coalitions) VVD, PvdA and CDA score higher on the national-cultural and national-political pride scales than voters for the other parties ($\beta = .24$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .22$, $p < .001$ respectively).

Chapter 5
Multicultural citizenship and equality

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, a multicultural society is characterized by cultural and ethnic diversity plus the formal and public recognition of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including belonging to the national group of both natives and immigrants, their cultural distinctiveness and their equality (Shadid 2009: 5-6). The dimension of equality is an important aspect in fundamental debates on citizenship, as in Western countries legal citizenship entails the right to equality (cf. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). This chapter reviews some of the ideas about equality prevalent in Dutch society, in an attempt to explore how and indeed whether aspects of this dimension of multicultural citizenship are recognized and dealt with in practice. The method adopted for this purpose is to discuss the policy measures introduced by the Dutch government to promote equality and the analysis of relevant empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research. Before this can be done, the scientific meaning and usage of the concept of equality and factors which can hinder or promote the equality of various groups in society must be discussed.

In the relevant literature, equality is used by scholars as both a descriptive and a normative concept (Capaldi 2002). As a descriptive concept it is employed to describe the relationship between entities with certain identical characteristics. In this sense, the recognition that all human beings are equal in certain aspects is *descriptive* in nature. A *normative* use of equality is present in the view that the recognition of equality requires a special treatment of human beings (Capaldi 2002: 1).

The question of which kind of special treatment is required and indeed desirable to achieve equality has been widely discussed in the literature (Barnard & Hepple 2000; Capaldi 2002; Miller 1996; Rosenfeld 1986; Shin 2009). Various types of equality are distinguished, including such descriptive types as the equality of conditions and equality of opportunity, and normative types, among them formal equality and substantive equality of opportunity. Formal equality enshrines the ideal that all persons should be treated equally. In the Netherlands, this principle is laid down in Article 1 of the Constitution, which stipulates that 'All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex, or on any other ground whatsoever shall not be permitted.'[1] In other words, formal equality refers to the *act* of equal treatment. However, equal treatment does not guarantee equality of opportunity, because the latter depends not only on the absence of acts of unequal treatment, also called discrimination,[2] it also requires equal starting points (Barnard & Hepple 2000: 566) or, in other words, equal conditions (cf. Miller 1996: 203). When starting conditions are unequal because of the disadvantaged position of a group, for example, in the labour market or because the level of education of its members is holding back from acquiring a better position in society, the opportunities for the members of this group will be limited. The concept of equality which includes measures to overcome these limitations and to level the playing field (Roemer 1998) is referred to as substantive equality of opportunity. Such measures are usually referred to as measures for positive/affirmative action (Barnard & Hepple 2000).[3]

Since the 1980s, various policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands to achieve both formal equality and substantive equality of opportunity for those citizens from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds who had come to the country primarily as labour migrants. These efforts include positive action policies, measures and regulations to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination and policies designed to assist integration. In this context, the term integration refers to the process of incorporating immigrants and their descendants into society. The equality of citizens was one of the main principles of the first structural integration policy developed by the Dutch government in the early 1980s, and since then—as will be discussed later in this chapter—integration has been used as a central concept to describe the juxtaposition between equality and the ethnic and cultural diversity in society.

[1] Translation by Rayar & Wadsworth (1997).

[2] But see Section 5.3.1 for the difference between legal and empirical conceptions of discrimination.

[3] For an extensive discussion of various aspects of formal and substantive equality, see Loenen & Rodrigues (1999).

To examine these concepts of equality and the types of Dutch policies devised to promote equality in more depth, in this chapter the views on three particular topics will be examined: integration, prejudice and discrimination, and positive action. It will also attempt to probe into the matter of whether these views are related to such other variables as educational level, political preference and the frequency of social contact with other ethnic groups. Hence the chapter is divided into three sections, each of which concentrates on the three designated topics. In the first part of each section, the existing relevant literature will be discussed. This is followed by a discussion of policies and regulations. In the last part of each section, an analysis of the empirical data will be presented.

5.2 Integration

5.2.1 Perspectives on integration of immigrants and their descendants

Since the 1920s, the integration of immigrants and their descendants in nation-states has been the central theme in studies by scholars in various disciplines (Kivisto 2005; Waters, Tran, Kasinitz & Mollenkopf 2010: 1169) and has presented a challenge to policy makers in many immigration countries, as among them Canada, Australia, the United States and, more recently, European nations (see for example Bijl & Verweij 2012). The purpose of this section is not to offer a comprehensive overview of these studies but to present a brief discussion of the main results of the relevant scientific research on this topic.

In essence studies about the integration of immigrants and their descendants are about the process of change elicited by migration to a different society (cf. Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010: 173; see also Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005). Although the studies are many and varied, there is no consensus among scholars about which concept to use to refer to this process. Although the concept of integration is the one most used in European studies, whereas in the United States the concept of assimilation tends to be more prevalent (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010; Vermeulen 2010), other concepts such as acculturation and incorporation are also in common use. In the present study, the concept of integration is the one chosen.

Notwithstanding the fact that different concepts are used to attempt to explain it, there is general agreement among scholars that the integration process is a prism made up of legal, social, cultural, political, and economic aspects. These aspects are frequently categorized into two separate dimensions: the *structural* and *socio-cultural* dimension (Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 128; Portes & Rivas 2011; Waters, Tran, Kasinitz & Mollenkopf 2010). The concept of structural integration is used to refer to the socio-economic incorporation of immigrants and their descendants

into society, and covers such straightforward topics as attempts to improve their educational status and their position in the labour market. In contrast, socio-cultural integration describes aspects which are more complex and difficult to measure (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 871), such as immigrants' social relationships with 'natives', discrimination, and the real or perceived differences in norms and values between immigrants and natives (Goodman 2010; Spencer & Cooper 2006).

The concepts of integration and assimilation are not confined to their empirical purposes but are also used to form normative judgements. Hence, these concepts are used in empirical studies on the process of change driven by migration, and also to describe the desired end points of this process or the goals of integration policies (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).

Many theoretical models to describe *empirical* differences in the pace, progress and outcome of the integration process have been proposed, discussed and measured (e.g. Gordon 1964; Shadid 1979; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault & Senécal 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Alba & Nee 2003; Berry 2011). Berry has proposed an influential two-dimensional model to describe different strategies for acculturation (1974; 2011). The first dimension of this model relates to the relative preference displayed by immigrants and their descendants to maintain their own culture and identity; whereas the other dimension describes their relative preference to interact with other groups in society. These two dimensions produce four intercultural strategies which can theoretically be resorted to by immigrants and their descendants: *integration*, *assimilation*, *separation* and *marginalization*. Integration and assimilation both refer to strategies adopted by immigrants and their descendants who wish to interact with other groups in society. These two strategies are opposed to the other dimension: integration refers to the strategy adopted by which immigrants and their descendants who wish to maintain their original culture and assimilation refers to the strategy adopted when they do not wish to adopt the norms and values of the receiving society. Berry goes on to define separation and marginalization as strategies in which immigrants and their descendants do not wish to interact with other groups in society, but differentiating between the way in which they wish to maintain their original culture. Separation refers to the strategy followed by immigrants and their descendants who wish to maintain their original culture, marginalization describes the strategy in which they do not (2011: 2.6).

However, this model presents a one-sided view of the acculturation process, because it does not take into account important factors which influence this process, for instance, the fact that preferences for cultural retention and interaction with other groups actually have to be developed in interaction with others and that

they also depend on specific individual, societal and institutional factors (cf. Berry 2001; Bowskill, Lyons, & Coyle 2007; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar 2009; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga & Szapocznik 2010). Moreover, the model presents only a limited number of mutually exclusive strategies in which there is no place for contextual variations. It does not take into account that individuals might prefer to interact with members of their own ethnic or cultural group in their free time, but do not object to interacting with members of other ethnic and cultural groups in the labour market (cf. Schrauf 2002; Schwartz & Zamboanga 2008).

To understand the factors which influence the integration process, it is not sufficient to restrict any investigation only to the preferences of immigrants and their descendants. Integration studies recognize that the integration process can be influenced by, *inter alia*, *individual*, *institutional* and *societal* factors. Contributory individual factors might be the specific socio-economic background of first generation migrants, which implies examining their level of education, work experience and the reasons for their immigration (Haller, Portes, & Lynch 2011; Shadid 2007: 298). These studies also recognize the influence of social networks encountered at school and at work (Eve 2010).

The effect of institutional factors on the integration process is discussed in various studies, among them those by Crul & Schneider (2010) and Reitz (1998). In their comparison of educational systems in different countries, Crul & Schneider show that differences between national education systems goes a long way towards explaining the differences between the educational attainments of second-generation ethnic Turks (2010: 1258; also see Alba, Sloan & Sperling 2011 and Wiesbrock 2011).[4] Another widely discussed factor which can help or hinder the process is residential segregation. However, so far evidence of a relationship between this factor and the integration process is limited and inconclusive (Musterd & Ostendorf 2009; Phillips 2010).

Finally, societal factors which influence the integration process include discrimination (cf. Vermeulen 2010; Vedder, Sam & Liebkind 2007), which limits opportunities, and normative views on integration—either current in society in general or explicitly formulated in integration policies (cf. Crul & Schneider 2010: 1260).

In *normative* approaches to the integration process, the concept of assimilation is often used to describe an endpoint of change which is reached when immigrants and their descendants have come to resemble the natives in both socio-economic

[4] Specific educational challenges related to increasing ethno-cultural diversity in the classroom have also been studied. See for example Vedder, Horenczyk, Liebkind & Nickmans (2006).

and socio-cultural aspects (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010). This use of the term assimilation is in contradiction to the normative use of the term integration, which describes a process in which immigrants and their descendants do achieve equal opportunities (e.g. in the labour market and in education) but generally retain their own cultural identities (Phillips 2010). Normative ideas about the goals of the integration process are made explicit when they are laid down in policies developed by governments to advance the integration of immigrants and their descendants. These goals can include, but are not limited to, equal treatment and equal opportunities for newcomers (Geddes 2003; Penninx 2005). In recent years, integration policies in several European countries have been amended to include more specifically honed goals, from a practical point of view the newcomers' proficiency in the native language and, something less easy to pinpoint, their knowledge of the norms and values of the receiving society. In some countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, these latter goals—referred to as civic integration (Goodman 2010: 755)—have recently been made requirements even for acquiring temporary and permanent residency, not to mention for obtaining legal citizenship (Goodman 2010; Green 2007; Joppke 2007).

Both empirical studies of and normative views about the integration process often make distinctions between the native group and groups of immigrants and their descendants. These distinctions can be used as tools to detect and describe the disadvantages experienced by certain groups, for example, in the labour market (e.g. Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). However, several authors warn that focusing on this distinction can be problematic in any attempt to explain differences in the course of the integration process (Crul & Schneider 2010; Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 870; Groenendijk 2007: 104). They point out that, in the first place, it can lead to the incorrect perception that the native groups and the various groups of immigrants and their descendants are homogenous entities. This perception can lead to assumptions about causal relations between ethnicity and the integration process that are, 'in the worst case, tautological', as Crul & Schneider (2010: 1255) write, referring to Latour (1999: 71). In practice, there are many differences *between* the various immigrant and native groups in society as well as differences *within* each group (cf. Vermeulen 2010: 1219).[5] It is an inescapable fact that the socio-cultural aspects and structural aspects of integration are related, but, partly because of individual differences, the causal relations between these aspects can be bi-directional and are difficult to investigate

[5] The process of integration will probably only compound these differences. For example, consider the possible effects of intermarriage between natives and immigrants or their descendants – see Song (2010).

pertinently (cf. Portes & Zhou 1993; Dagevos 2001; Veenman 2002; Demant 2005).

Very importantly, as explained in Chapter 3, boundaries between ethno-cultural groups are socially constructed and simultaneously dynamic. Therefore the nub of the matter is not just which ethno-cultural differences can explain aspects of the integration process, but also which differences are perceived to be important in society and why (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013; Eve 2010: 1233). With respect to integration, an important question is therefore which cultural and religious differences between these groups are recognized and accepted and which are not (cf. Shadid 2009; Waldinger 2007). The relationship between actual acceptance and recognition and formal integration policies has been studied by academics whose work leads them to construct national models to describe country-specific regulations and public attitudes towards immigration, citizenship, and integration (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005). These models have been constructed on the basis of empirical studies of the relationships between integration policies, views on national identity and the (mutual) recognition of cultural differences.

This discussion has explicitly revealed that—although no consensus exists on the meaning of the concept of integration—there is a recognition that the process of integration is inexorably influenced by many factors, including institutional and societal factors, such as discrimination and the presence of an integration policy. The next section will shed some light on the principles and goals of integration policies developed by the Dutch government in the period 1980-2013.

5.2.2 Integration of immigrants in the Netherlands: policies and debates

Since the 1980s, both the national and local governments in the Netherlands have developed a series of policies designed to integrate immigrants and their descendants.[6] Over the years, pronounced changes have been made in the principles and goals set out in these policies. These changes will be discussed in this section. Five phases in this discussion will be distinguished (cf. Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007; Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; Penninx 2005): the period of *laissez-faire* without any structural integration policy prior to the 1980s; the Ethnic Minorities policy of the 1980s which was characterized by *accommodation*; the policies of *replacement* (De Zwart & Poppelaars 2007) in the 1990s in which the focus on ethnic groups was replaced by

[6] For an overview of current national integration policies see "Integration", accessed July 25, 2013, http://www.government.nl/issues/integration. An example of local government policies can be found in the overview of policy principles and goals in the municipality of Amsterdam: *Bestuurlijke reactie op de Staat van Integratie Rotterdam – Amsterdam* (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012).

a focus on socio-economic disadvantages; the period between 2002 and 2011 in which *cultural adaptation* was stressed; and the period since 2011 in which the replacement policies of the 1990s have been combined with a focus on the responsibility of the immigrants themselves in the integration process.[7]

In the first phase, prior to 1980, the government constructed its immigration policies on the premise that the Netherlands was not and would not become a country of immigration (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). The question had not yet become pressing as immigrants from former Dutch colonies were considered repatriates, and the presence of the labour migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s was viewed as temporary. As there was not perceived need, no structural policies for immigrant integration were developed (Penninx 2005; Poppelaars & Scholten 2008). Instead, the government adopted *laissez-faire* policies to accommodate the assumed temporary residence of the labour immigrants, who were called 'guest workers' as a consequence (cf. Penninx 1996).

However, during the 1970s it was becoming more obvious that most (of the recently arrived) immigrants had no plans to return to their countries of origin and wanted to remain in the Netherlands permanently. Consequently, the government realized that the *laissez-faire* policies, founded on a premise of temporary migration, needed revision (Penninx 2005). In its search for advice, the government consulted the scientific community. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM), at that time responsible for the welfare of the labour immigrants, established the Advisory Committee on Research related to Minorities (ACOM). Although ACOM advised the government about research matters, a report published in 1979[8] by another advisory body, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), was the factor which led the government to develop its first national and structural integration policy.

This new policy, devised and implemented in the 1980s, was known as the Ethnic Minorities Policy. One of the main principles was, Penninx wrote, '[e]quality in the socio-economic domain, inclusion and participation in the political domain and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional conditions and to the extent feasible' (2005: 38; see also Bijl & Verweij 2012: 242). The government at that time considered such structural factors as discrimination and the immigrants' lack of education, not ethnic and cultural diversity, the main obstacles to their successful integration and socio-economic success. In fact, socio-cultural emancipation was seen to have positive

[7] Chapters 3, 4 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of integration policies.
[8] The report was called *Ethnic Minorities* (WRR 1979).

effects on their integration in society (see also Chapter 6). Hence, the integration policies were targeted at specific ethnic minorities with a low socio-economic status. Therefore, the Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s can be characterized as a policy of accommodation, when accommodation refers to the fact that this policy explicitly targeted groups whose boundaries were defined not just by their socio-economic status, but also and primarily by their ethnic background (De Zwart & Poppelaars 2007).

In its efforts to develop the integration policies in this period, the government commissioned several research reports (Penninx 2005) and also began to monitor the integration process and the effects of its integration policies (Bijl & Verweij 2012: 245). Ever since then, in the formulation of the principles and goals of minorities policies, the government has made use of reports from various scientific institutions such as the above-mentioned WRR, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS), which have all been commissioned by the government to study the process of integration at various times.[9] In this regard, the government has also commissioned researchers to monitor discrimination in the Netherlands. A prominent example is the *Monitor racisme & extremisme*, originally started by Jaap van Donselaar (see Donselaar 1997; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010: 251).

In 1987, the Dutch government requested WRR to evaluate the effects of the Ethnic Minorities Policy, and it presented its report in 1989 (WRR 1989). In this report, WRR concluded that the Ethnic Minority Policy had failed to make an adequate contribution towards improving the socio-economic position of immigrants, especially in the fields of education and employment. As mentioned in Chapter 3, WRR went on to state that a focus on ethnic groups and an excess of government attention paid to the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants could hinder their advancement in the fields of education and the labour market. WRR recommended that the government should take account of the differences between and within the immigrant groups, focus on socio-economic goals and leave the responsibility for the development of their cultural identity to the immigrant groups themselves (WRR 1989: 19-24).

These recommendations were enshrined as principles in the *Contourennota*, a new policy document the government presented in 1994 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). The government opted for what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call 'replacement', in other words the focus on ethnic groups and socio-cultural emancipation in the old policies was replaced by a focus on such

[9] See, for example, Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos (2012) and Huijnk & Dagevos (2012). For a study of this co-operation between researchers and policy makers see Penninx (2005).

socio-economic categories as groups considered to be socio-economically disadvantaged (Scholten & Timmermans 2004) and disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

These changes were reinforced by a focus on civic integration, which has been discussed in Chapter 3. This involved individual immigrants being given training in Dutch language and courses about Dutch society in general and the functioning of the labour market in particular. Initially developed by local governments in the early 1990s, this civic integration policy was implemented nationally as the Newcomers Integration Act (*Wet inburgering nieuwkomers*) in 1998 (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). The courses were made mandatory for new immigrants and those with a temporary residence permit.

The next shift in the integration policy occurred around the year 2000. As mentioned in Chapter 3, several authors claimed, notwithstanding the fact that during the 1990s the socio-economic position of immigrants had improved substantially (Penninx 2005: 42, footnote 7; Ham & Van der Meer 2012: 14), that the integration of immigrants had failed.[10] These authors not only warned that social cohesion was threatened because the norms and values of Muslim immigrants in particular appeared incompatible with Dutch culture. They also argued that immigrants' and their descendants' knowledge of Dutch society and language was inadequate, and this linguistic disadvantage impeded their integration. In 2001 the politician Pim Fortuyn married the ideas about the failure of integration and fears of the threat of Islam together in one political discourse. Weighing up the situation, Penninx argues that other political parties appropriated important parts of this discourse, and that this inevitably influenced integration policies (2005: 43). Integration and immigration became political priorities, especially after the elections of 2002, a shift which was reflected in the attention political parties devoted to the topic in their political programmes.[11]

Under these circumstances, the Dutch Parliament decided that the best move would be to investigate the effects of the integration policies and a parliamentary research committee known as the Blok Commission (chaired by Stef Blok from the VVD, the right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) was established for this purpose. Despite the biased text of the parliamentary motion which led to this investigation, in which no bones were made about the effects of the policies being 'unsatisfactory' (Blok Commission 2004: 9), in its 2004 report the commission concluded that the integration of 'many immigrants has been fully or at least partially successful' (Blok Commission 2004: 105). This conclusion was

[10] Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

[11] See, for example, *Verdeeld verleden, gedeelde toekomst* by the political party PvdA (2009).

supported by statistics which showed immigrants' progress in the fields of education and employment (cf. Gijsberts 2004: 38). Nevertheless, the Blok Commission was criticized for not focusing enough attention on the alleged problems caused by cultural and religious aspects of immigrant integration (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012: 277), and its conclusions were 'widely dismissed as naïve' (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007: 20).

These concerns about the socio-cultural aspects of immigrants' integration were reflected in the *Integration Policy New Style*, formulated by the Dutch government in 2003. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the stated goal of this policy was to promote 'common citizenship', a process which sensibly included the pragmatic step of learning the Dutch language and also the rather less tangible goal of abiding by 'basic Dutch norms' (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004: 8). The text of the policy document quite clearly makes plain that the government linked the goal of integration to national identity and social cohesion. Persistent cultural and religious differences were considered a possible hindrance to social cohesion and therefore an obstacle to integration. Moreover, the national integration policies developed since 2003, focusing on Dutch language tests and courses about Dutch society,[12] have increasingly served as instruments to regulate the admission of immigrants (Groenendijk 2011: 159; see also Chapter 3).

One overriding problem with this focus on cultural and religious aspects as obstacles to integration is that it can lead to the disregarding of individual differences within immigrant and native groups, masking them and causing the other obstacles to integration, including societal and institutional factors, to be underestimated (see the previous section).[13] Analysing Dutch policy debates about setting up a programme to promote the socio-economic integration of non-Western immigrant women, Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos show that these debates

[12] As mentioned in Chapter 3, the most recent law is the *Wet inburgering* (Law on Civic Integration) passed 2006, implemented in 2007. In 2012 this law was slightly amended. The law applies to immigrants from outside the European Union and a group of residents who do not have Dutch citizenship. These immigrants can only obtain a residence permit after passing an exam consisting of tests to assess language skills and knowledge of Dutch society. Applicants in the Netherlands have to contact the municipality which works in conjunction with Regional Educational Centres (ROCs) which are qualified to run courses and set the requisite exams. Individuals outside the EU who want to migrate to the Netherlands have to pass a similar civic integration test at the Dutch embassy or consulate abroad (the *Wet inburgering buitenland* or Law on Civic Integration Abroad). Since 2013, applicants have to pay for the courses and exams themselves. Depending on their circumstances, applicants can apply for a loan to pay the tuition fees. In some cases, those who commenced their courses before 2013 can have their fees paid by the municipality. (See "Integration in the Netherlands", accessed July 25, 2013, http://en.inburgeren.nl.)

[13] However, the development of the policies and regulations to prevent and combat discrimination seem to be much less affected by this debate. See the next section.

'framed the social problems of these women to effectively reduce a diverse range of ethnic minority women into a narrowly defined group of Muslim women' (2013: 109). In short, the complexity of the integration process with all its possible individual, societal and institutional barriers was reduced to a problem of religious and cultural practices.

Around the same time as the introduction of the *Integration Policy New Style*, a discussion about residential segregation commenced in the city of Rotterdam. At its core was the problem of high concentrations of low-income residents as an obstacle to integration.[14] The city launched a trial which meant that people with a minimum income were prevented from renting houses in designated neighbourhoods, a clear example of what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call replacement policies (see above). In 2005, the Equal Treatment Commission ruled that such a policy was discriminatory, as it affected people from certain ethnic backgrounds disproportionately (CGB 2005a). Despite this ruling, Rotterdam persevered with its policy and in 2005 the national government implemented a law,[15] widely known as the Rotterdam law (*Rotterdamwet*), which allows all municipalities to implement similar policies under specific conditions.[16]

Despite this focus on replacement policies, Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) show that policy makers at the local level, who are confronted daily with a diversity of problems and structural barriers to integration, have continued to develop 'tailor-made projects' and to involve immigrant organizations in this process, because the national approach expressed in general policies 'often fails to substantiate' and is simply not up to scratch for tackling the variety of problems and barriers met in reality (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008: 352).[17]

The ongoing immigration debate and the widely voiced criticism of the idea of a multicultural society have been the two mainsprings in the continuous adjustment of principles and goals of integration policies developed by both the national and local governments. One recent adjustment can be found in the government policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011

[14] Although segregation has been an important theme in Dutch housing policies for decades, until 2000 not many policies had been devised to combat segregation (Van Kempen et al. 2000).

[15] The *Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek*, of 22 December 2005.

[16] In a report published in 2007, SCP concluded that the effects of this law and similar policies on ethnic segregation in the Netherlands were either at worst unmapped or at the very most limited (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2007: 240-241).

[17] Many local initiatives have been focused on the social aspect of integration. In a report published in 2007, SCP counted almost 400 projects whose goal was to stimulate social contact between natives and immigrants. Some of these projects aimed to bring people together through shared interests, the goal of others was to familiarize people with each other's ethnic and cultural diversity (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2007: 252).

(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), which, unlike the *Integration Policy New Style* of 2003, explicitly criticizes the integration debate. In its 2011 policy document, the government argues that the debate has created the misconception that the integration of minorities has stagnated and stresses that progress is clearly indicated in the statistics.[18] However, in this document the government does recognize that there are large differences between and within minority groups and that, although there are positive developments, problems still remain. The problems discussed in the document include the over-representation of immigrants and their descendants in the statistics on crime, school drop-outs and unemployment in these groups, their perceptions of discrimination, views in society about the incompatibility of norms and values and distrust between native Dutch and immigrants.

Despite admitting the existence of these problems, the policy document stresses the principle that integration is not the responsibility of the government, but of the immigrants and their descendants themselves. The government also emphasizes that integration policies would no longer target specific groups, thereby reiterating the principles of the national integration policy introduced in 1994 (see above). Instead, the government has argued, the integration process will be encouraged by general policies in the fields of the labour market, education and housing. Any policy focus on specific ethnic groups was thought to be undesirable because it would, the government felt, emphasize the boundaries between groups, thereby creating unwanted separations between group members (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011). This last argument is typical of what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call 'replacement' strategies, in which a focus on ethnic categories is replaced by a focus on such socio-economic issues as school drop-outs and unemployment in general. The most recent government policy document on integration issued in 2013 contains similar principles, and explicitly adds that education plays an important role not only in instilling norms and values in children but also in teaching them how to deal with diversity in society (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).

In a nutshell, the principal message conveyed by this section is that the role of the Dutch government in the process of immigrant integration has undergone pronounced changes during the last few decades. In the 1980s the government developed specific integration policies devised to target ethnic minorities, but since the 1990s the national government has steadily abrogated its position, adopting the stance that, apart from the civic integration courses designed for new immigrants,

[18] A similar argument can be found in a 2004 report by SCP, in which it was argued that the picture of integration would be much more optimistic if the steady rise in the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities were to be taken into account (Gijsberts 2004: 38).

general policies would suffice. These changes have introduced a politicization of the integration debate which is specifically directed towards the cultural adaptation of Muslim immigrants. The section below examines views about immigrant integration prevalent in society.

5.2.3 Views in society on immigrant integration

The discussion in the previous section has brought to light several themes in the debate on immigrant integration which raise questions about the views prevalent in society about this topic. Since 2000, these debates have become more heavily focused on the degree of the retention of the immigrants' home cultures as a perceived obstacle to integration. The government integration policies which targeted specific minority groups in the 1980s have been abandoned in favour of general policies to do with such issues as disadvantaged neighbourhoods and learning how to deal with diversity. Therefore, the investigation in this section will focus on views about the need for government policies on integration and views about the retention of their cultures by immigrants. However, as the most direct way in which native Dutch and immigrants are confronted with the integration process is their mutual social interaction, the frequency of, and views on, inter-ethnic social relations will also be explored.

5.2.3.1 Social contact and views on inter-ethnic relations

The analysis shows that more than one-third (36%) of the native Dutch never have any social contact with immigrants or their descendants in their free time, that 42% of them never interact socially with immigrants of non-Western origin and that 65% never interact socially with Muslims. A little more than half of the native Dutch who *did* report social contact with immigrants mentioned that they interacted with them frequently. The higher the educational level of respondents, the higher the frequency of their social contact with immigrants (β[19] = .21, $p < .001$).[20] Similar results were found by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012: 63).

On the other hand, almost all the immigrants and their descendants in the sample indicate that they interact socially with natives in their free time. This finding differs from the results obtained by Huijnk and Dagevos, who reported that between 14% and 32% of the non-Western immigrants in their sample never interacted socially with native Dutch (2012: 53). Huijnk & Dagevos also found that the number of natives who never interacted socially with immigrants was

[19] Unless otherwise stated, the βs mentioned in this study are standardized.

[20] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income significantly predict the frequency of social contact.

higher than the number of immigrants who never interacted socially with natives. Considering the results presented by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) and Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 228-231), the frequency of social interactions between immigrants and natives appears to have remained mostly stable since 1994.

Views on inter-ethnic relations have been measured by other scholars as 'social distance' (Bogardus 1925; Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 47). To measure this social distance, the questionnaire included items to do with the acceptance of a Dutch person with another ethnic background as a neighbour, colleague, boss, future son-in-law or future daughter-in-law, and an item about children with another ethnic background as the classmates of one's own children. Later in this section, a distance scale will be constructed to explore relationships between these views and other personal variables but the first step is to discuss views about the inter-ethnic relations themselves.

The percentages of native Dutch who either approve or disapprove of the types of inter-ethnic relations adduced are presented in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1[21]

Approval and disapproval by native Dutch in percentages.

Person with another ethnic background as	Approved	Disapproved	Don't know	Total
A classmate of own children	83	13	4	100
A colleague	83	14	3	100
A neighbour	75	21	4	100
Own boss	70	26	4	100
Daughter-in-law	54	39	7	100
Son-in-law	51	41	8	100

Note. n = 468 (sub-sample of native Dutch, see Chapter 2).

The conclusion has to be that the majority of the native Dutch approve of inter-ethnic contact. In this context, expatiating on this they referred to equality, mutual respect and mutual understanding. A sample of some respondents' quotes are 'we are all humans and we are all equal', 'background does not matter, as long as there is mutual respect' and 'as long as they behave according to the law'. Talking about

[21] The questionnaire contains 5 categories for these items, including 'don't know'. Three of those categories measured disapproval: 'unpleasant', 'very unpleasant' and 'I would resist'. Most disapproving respondents scored in the first two categories. The three categories have been merged into the category 'disapproved' for presentation in this table.

mutual understanding, it was stated that inter-ethnic relationships are not a problem 'as long as they speak Dutch', and 'as long as you understand each other's habits'.

However, as is clear from Table 5.1, views on inter-ethnic relations differ with respect to the intimacy of the relationship type presented. Natives are clearly less tolerant of having a future daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic background than of other inter-ethnic relations. Those who disapproved of inter-ethnic relations mentioned the incompatibility of norms and values, and more specifically their fear of extremist Muslims. The percentages are similar to those discussed by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 264-266), and, given the development discussed by these authors, appear to indicate that the views of Dutch natives on inter-ethnic relations have become somewhat more positive in the last few years.

Compared to the natives, immigrants and their descendants, of both Western and of non-Western origin, are much less negative about such inter-ethnic relations. Around 24, as opposed to around 40% of the natives (see Table 5.1 above), disapprove of a future daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic background. Less than 10% disapprove of the other inter-ethnic relations mentioned.

In order to investigate the statistical relationships between views on inter-ethnic relations and other variables, the items discussed above have been used to construct a social distance scale (cf. Bogardus 1925; Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 47). For each respondent, this scale indicates the average degree of approval of the types of inter-ethnic relations presented.[22] The scale varies from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates the smallest social distance, corresponding to most approval for inter-ethnic relations, and 3 indicates the largest social distance, indicating the most disapproval.[23] As might be expected from what has just been said, the native Dutch indicate a larger average social distance with immigrants and their descendants, with a score of 1.34 (SD = 0.49) on the scale, than the reverse, with the immigrants and their descendants scoring an average of 1.16 (SD = 0.33).

[22] The eigenvalues and scree-plot of a CATPCA analysis (see Chapter 2) of the items indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 59%, total VAF was 68.98%.

[23] As mentioned in the footnote of Table 5.1, each item originally contained 5 categories, including 'don't know'. In the construction of the social distance scale, the category 'don't know' has been coded as missing, and the two categories indicating most disapproval were merged. The score for each respondent on the social distance scale was established by calculating the means of all six items. Another way would have been to calculate factor scores from a factor analysis of these items. However, a comparison between these methods did not result in different outcomes for the analyses in this study. Cronbach's Alpha of the items: .87.

To explore the relationships between social distance and such other variables as the frequency of social (inter-ethnic) contact, gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.[24] This analysis indicates that, among the native Dutch, social distance is related to social contact, educational level and political preference.[25] This can be seen in the 'joint plot of category points' below, in which the relationships between the categories are displayed. The strength of these relationships is indicated by the distance between the categories in the plot: : the smaller the distance, the stronger the relationship.

As the ellipses in this plot indicate, three clusters of categories can be distinguished. In each cluster the categories are scattered around one of the social distance categories: 'Large', 'Medium' and 'Minimal'. Obviously these categories are related to the social contact categories, respectively 'Never', 'Moderate' and 'Often'.

The respondents in the first cluster, on the left in the plot, can be characterized as *intolerant* of other ethnic groups. They indicate a large social distance, implying a relatively disapproving view of inter-ethnic relations, rarely or never have social contact with members of ethnic minorities, have a relatively low average educational level and many of them voted for the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom). Not included in this cluster are the categories representing non-voters and voters who support the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) and the SP (left-wing Socialist Party), because these categories are much closer to the other social distance categories ('Medium' and 'Minimal') than the category representing the PVV voters.

The respondents in the second cluster, at the top in the plot, can be characterized as being *moderately tolerant* of other ethnic groups. They indicate a medium social distance, have moderate social contact with members of ethnic minorities and generally voted for the CDA (right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal) or the VVD. Their average educational level is medium to high. The category representing voters for the left-wing Green Left party is not included in this cluster, because this category is much closer to the social distance category 'Minimal'.

Finally, respondents in the third cluster, lower and to the right in the plot, can be characterized as *tolerant* of other ethnic groups, as they seem to acknowledge diversity fully. They indicate a minimal social distance and have relatively frequent social contact with ethnic minority members, and voted for PvdA (left-wing

[24] See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA.

[25] No relationships between social distance and other factors was found for the immigrants and their descendants, clearly because most immigrants in our sample have a minimal social distance from native Dutch.

Labour Party) or D66 (left-wing liberal Democrats 66). Their average educational level is between medium and high.



Figure 5.1: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of social distance and other factors for native Dutch (n=468). (Variable principal normalization.)

This analysis reveals that, among native Dutch respondents, social distance is related to the frequency of their inter-ethnic social contact, educational level and political preference. These conclusions can also be drawn from Categorical Regression analyses.[26] Those who had more frequent contact with ethnic minority

[26] Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income significantly predict social distance.

members indicated a smaller social distance, implying more positive views on inter-ethnic relations (β = -.33, $p < .001$). This relationship between social contact and social distance is in line with Allport's contact hypothesis which states that 'under appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members' (1954). At the same time, the lower the educational level of native Dutch, the larger their social distance, implying relatively disapproving views of inter-ethnic relations (β = -.16, $p < .01$). Finally, a moderate relationship between social distance and political preference can be observed (β = .23, $p < .005$) for the native Dutch. Most voters on the left of the political spectrum (D66, PvdA, Green Left) indicate a lower social distance than those on the right (PVV, SGP). The voters for the parties on the right of the political spectrum (CDA and VVD) indicate a medium social distance, and voters for the SP are divided.

5.2.3.2 Views on retention of immigrants' cultures

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, ideas current in society on the question of the integration of immigrants will also be investigated by examining views on the retention of immigrants' cultures. The reason for this is that since 2000 the integration debates have been increasingly concerned with cultural retention by immigrants as a perceived obstacle to integration. To examine views on retention of immigrants' cultures, the two questionnaires used in the present study included items on the desirability of immigrants' cultural retention in the public and the private spheres. Later in this section, relationships between these views and other variables will be explored. First of all, the views on cultural retention themselves will be discussed.

The analysis shows that around two-thirds of the native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin (69%), as opposed to a minority of the non-Western immigrants (23%) and an even smaller minority of the Muslim immigrants (9%), disapprove of immigrants' cultural retention in the public sphere. These findings are similar to those found by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 262). Results presented by these authors indicate that the opposition to cultural retention in the public sphere has increased since the changes in the political and public debate on the multicultural society in 2000 (see section 5.2.2), from 57% of the total population (16 years of age and older) in 1994 to almost two-thirds in 2006. At the same time, the analysis indicates that less than a third of the natives and very small minorities of the other groups disapprove of cultural retention in the private sphere.

Respondents who disapprove of cultural retention in the public sphere perceived some aspects of immigrants' cultures either as outright obstacles to integration or as not compatible with Dutch culture. In explicating their ideas on

the former, both native Dutch and immigrants referred to a lack of language skills, the wearing of a burqa and discrimination as a consequence of not adapting sufficiently to Dutch culture. Objections to the burqa concentrated on the fact it is important to see someone's face in order to be able to communicate. Explaining their ideas about discrimination, respondents said that they personally did not have any problem with immigrants' cultures, but that immigrants, unfortunately, have to adapt to avoid discrimination in society.

Turning to the perceived incompatibility of some aspects of immigrants' cultures to Dutch culture, both natives and non-Muslim immigrants mentioned that certain aspects of Islamic culture, such as the burqa, the headscarf and mosques did not fit into Dutch society (see Chapter 6 for a more extensive discussion of the recognition of religious practices). Talking about this topic, some natives stressed the importance of maintaining the Christian identity of the Netherlands. Finally, some respondents of immigrant origin said that you simply have to adapt to local norms and values when you want to settle in a new society.

Those who approve of cultural retention by immigrants were either indifferent and referred to the importance of respect for the law, mentioning that, 'It's OK as long as you play by the rules', or were positive, and stressed the value of diversity because it 'colours society' and 'you can learn from people with different cultures and ideas'.

To explore relationships between views on cultural retention and such other variables as gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out.[27] The variables frequency of social inter-ethnic contact and social distance (see previous section) were included in this analysis. The analysis indicates that views on cultural retention are related to social distance, social contact, educational level and political preference. In these relationships, the higher the level of education and the smaller the social distance, the stronger the approval of immigrants' cultural retention in the public sphere (β = .22, p <.001 and β = -.40, p <.001 respectively). The frequency of social inter-ethnic contact was only slightly positively related to this approval (β = .14, p <.01). Similar relationships were found with regard to approval of immigrants' cultural retention in the private sphere. These relationships might also be explained by the contact hypothesis. Less social distance and more social contact could lead to more tolerant views of cultural distinctiveness, although the direction of the causality could not be established in this study.

[27] This analysis included the variables descent, age, gender, educational level, income, political preference, social contact and social distance.

Politically, those who approve of cultural retention in the public sphere generally voted for parties on the left of the political spectrum, PvdA, D66 and Green Left. Voters for the VVD, CDA, SP and the non-voters are divided on the issue, and voters for the PVV and SGP generally disapprove of cultural retention in the public sphere ($\beta = .29$, $p < .001$). The relationship between political preference and views on cultural retention in the private sphere is slightly different. Those who disapprove of this retention generally voted for the PVV and SGP, while those who approve, voted for other parties ($\beta = .24$, $p < .001$).

5.2.3.3 Views on the need for national integration policies

As pointed out in the previous section, national integration policies have undergone pronounced changes. The integration policies targeted at specific minority groups in the 1980s have been abandoned in favour of general policies devised to deal with such issues as disadvantaged neighbourhoods and helping people learn how to deal with diversity. Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, views current in society on the integration of immigrants will also be explored by examining what people think about the need for government policies to deal with this matter.

To examine these views, the two questionnaires used for the present study included items on the need for national policies to ensure the proper functioning of the multicultural society. and they also contained items on the desirability of such specific policies as teaching pupils in schools to deal with diversity in society, the importance of which was stressed in the most recent government policy document on integration (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).[28] Later in this section, relationships between these views and other factors will be explored. First of all, it is important to take a look at the views themselves.

The great majority of all respondents (more than 84%) consider ethnic and cultural diversity important and support the idea that pupils should learn how to deal with cultural diversity in society in school. Proponents explained that this sort of education is an important way to prevent the growth of prejudice and discrimination against various groups. One respondent said that, 'To prevent conflict later, it is important to encourage tolerance in children'. Another said that, 'You have to begin early, because it is difficult to unlearn prejudice later in life'. In a similar vein, one respondent argued that, 'Children still have few prejudices, and you have to help them to keep it that way'.

[28] Note, however, that the questionnaires for the present study were developed before this policy document was published.

Opponents of diversity education are either those who hold the opinion that education about how to deal with diversity does not work or those who believe that schools should not interfere in these matters. Supporters of the former opinion argued that it is more important that both the government and educational institutions promote cultural heterogeneity and combat segregation in neighbourhoods and schools, because children will only be able to learn how to deal with diversity in a culturally diverse environment.[29] Whereas one argument put forward to support the second opinion was that children should be allowed to form their own ideas about how to deal with diversity. 'If children do not want to accept certain others, that's is up to them', one respondent said.

Turning to the need for national policies to be put in place if a multicultural society is to function properly, more than two-thirds of all respondents are of the opinion that such policies should be developed.[30] Their arguments hinge on removing obstacles to integration, promoting tolerance of cultural diversity, preventing a baleful influence of Islam and preventing the abuse of welfare subsidies. When thinking about how to deal with obstacles to integration, respondents mentioned that the government should take the initiative to create the essential preconditions for it and remove barriers to participation, for example, by providing courses on Dutch language and culture. Besides envisaging this role for the government, it was also suggested that an anti-discrimination policy be devised as discrimination is considered to be a real obstacle to participation. Talking about stimulating tolerance of cultural diversity, respondents, especially those with a Muslim background, mentioned that, if a better mutual understanding is to take root, Dutch citizens need to acquire more knowledge about the cultural and religious norms and values of various immigrant groups. Another take on this issue was provided by some non-Muslim respondents who argued that the government has to formulate measures to avoid 'the Islamization' of society and by so doing anticipate the problems this putative process might create. Finally, proponents of government policies stated that proper measures have to be taken to prevent immigrants and their descendants abusing welfare subsidies.

Interestingly, in response to the general issue of policies which would facilitate the proper functioning of the multicultural society, for which no specific directions were suggested, not one person mentioned that policies should be implemented to reduce the substantive disadvantages experienced by (certain) minorities in the labour market.

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[29] This opinion has been substantiated by research conducted by Geel & Vedder (2011).

[30] This opinion was shared by 69% of native Dutch, 72% of immigrants of non-Western origin and 81% of immigrants of Western origin.

The small number of respondents who oppose national policies to facilitate the proper functioning of the multicultural society (around 10% of all groups[31]) expressed the opinion that these sort of policies can lead to unequal treatment. These respondents clearly interpreted 'Policies for the proper functioning of the multicultural society' to be those targeted at specific groups. Whereas some of the opponents did not explicitly mention discrimination, stating instead that the government should not implement policies targeted at specific groups, others said that they felt discriminated against by such policies. As one respondent said: 'The government is already doing too much for immigrants, they are neglecting and discriminating against the real Dutch'.

To explore the statistical relationships between these views and such other variables as social distance and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out.[32] This analysis shows that the lower a respondent's social distance to other frequent groups, the stronger their support for policies to encourage the functioning of the multicultural society and educating pupils in schools how to deal with specifically with ethnic and cultural diversity ($\beta = .32$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .35$, $p < .001$ respectively). Examining their political preference, most opponents of national policies to encourage the proper functioning of the multicultural society are among those who voted for the VVD (19% opposed), the PVV (15%) or were among the non-voters (13%). Among those who voted for other parties, the percentage of opponents of these policies is much lower (around 6%). As explained above, opponents of such policies objected to the fact that the policies are targeted at specific groups. Nevertheless, it might seem surprising that the percentage of PVV voters who oppose such policies is only 15%. However, PVV voters figured largely among the proponents of the view that national policies should be developed to oblige immigrants to learn the Dutch language, norms and values, and should also be extended to prevent 'Islamization' and the abuse of welfare subsidies.

The analysis in this and the previous section show that discrimination is considered an obstacle to the participation of immigrants and their descendants, and that it is also an unwanted side-effect of integration policies. The latter argument will be discussed in more detail in the section on positive action (5.4). In the next section, views on discrimination and policies to combat and prevent this social phenomenon will be explored.

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[31] Around 20% of the respondents did not have an opinion on this issue, more than two-thirds supported such policies, as explained above.

[32] This analysis included the variables descent, age, gender, educational level, income, political preference, social contact and social distance.

5.3 Prejudice and discrimination

As explained at the beginning of this chapter, discrimination implies differential treatment and is therefore the opposite of equal treatment. Basically it limits the opportunities open to individuals and groups. Discrimination of individuals or groups can be motivated by prejudice (Bodenhausen & Richeson 2010; Fiske 2002), which has been defined by Allport as 'an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a group member' (1954: 9).

In response to the debates about immigrant integration ever since the 1980s, policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands for the specific purpose of preventing and combating prejudice, racism and discrimination, the sought-after goals being both the formal equality and the equality of opportunity for citizens of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. It is important to stress that, whereas discrimination and prejudice refer to behaviour and attitudes respectively, the concept of racism relates to an ideology which can be used to justify existing inequality (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 319), hierarchical classification of groups and discrimination on the basis of racial, ethnic or cultural criteria. Statements such as 'minorities should leave the country, because the Netherlands is full' and 'keep the Netherlands white and clean' are expressions of racist views (Shadid 2007: 210).

As part of the exploration of whether and how aspects of equality are formally and publicly recognized and accepted in the Netherlands, in this section Dutch measures to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination will be discussed and the views about these topics prevalent in society will be examined. Before commencing this operation, it is necessary to shed some light on the scientific use of the concept of discrimination, and a brief discussion of the main results of the current scientific research will be presented.

5.3.1 Perspectives on prejudice and discrimination

Discrimination has been extensively studied in a wide range of scientific disciplines, including social psychology, social and cultural anthropology, law, economics and medical sciences (e.g. Bodenhausen & Richeson 2010; Crengle, Robinson, Ameratunga, Clark & Raphael 2012; Havinga 2002; Loenen & Rodrigues 1999; Pager & Shepherd 2008; Visweswaran 1998). Research has also been instigated by or on behalf of policy makers and organizations for human rights at both national and international levels (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2008; McCrudden & Prechal 2009; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010). In these studies, the concept of discrimination is used first and foremost to refer to behaviour, actions,

policies and structures which in a specific context might result in a relative disadvantage for members of groups whose group characteristics are irrelevant in that context. Examples of this are when public education benefits men more than women, women are discriminated against when gender is considered to be irrelevant to this differential treatment. Conversely, when a dark-skinned actor is preferred to a light-skinned actor to play the role of Nelson Mandela in a film, this is usually not considered discrimination because skin colour is relevant in this context.

It is important to take cognizance of the fact that discrimination is used as a legal and as an empirical concept. In a juridical sense, discrimination can be defined as a prohibited form of unequal treatment that results or can result in disadvantage for the discriminated groups (cf. Terlouw 2010: 8-10). Legal discussions focus on which forms of unequal treatment are or should be prohibited. Depending on international and national legislation, exceptions can be made to the principle of equal treatment. Examples are the above-mentioned selection procedure for the role of Nelson Mandela, the prohibition of certain religious manifestations in institutions for denominational education in the Netherlands (discussed in Chapter 6, also see Section 5.3.2), and positive action (see Section 5.4).[33] In contrast, studies in which discrimination is used as an empirical concept generally focus on its effects and its causes, and also include the role of prejudice and racism (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Pager & Shepherd 2008).

A useful definition of discrimination is that in the Dutch Penal Code. This definition stipulates that discrimination 'is to be taken to mean any form of differentiation, any act of exclusion, restriction or preference, that intends or may result in the destruction or infringement of the recognition, enjoyment or equal exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the field of politics or economics, in social or cultural matters or any other area of social life'.[34] This definition is useful because it focuses on behaviour which might result in inequality, but does not presume underlying causes for this behaviour (cf. Pager & Shepherd 2008: 182).

Therefore, this definition covers intentional, unintentional, conscious and unconscious forms of discrimination. As it so happens, direct and indirect discrimination are distinguished in both empirical studies and anti-discrimination legislation of various countries including the Netherlands (cf. McCrudden &

[33] There are also other possible exceptions. For an overview of exceptions in the Netherlands, see *Gelijkebehandelingswetgeving* (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.mensenrechten.nl/gelijkebehandelingswetgeving.

[34] Article 90quater, Dutch Penal Code. Translation of the provisions of the Dutch Penal Code by Rayar & Wadsworth (1997).

Prechal 2009). Direct discrimination refers to acts or policies with the apparent intent to exclude members of specific groups, whereas indirect discrimination can be both intentional and unintentional, and refers to acts, policies or structures which are not directly aimed at specific groups but nevertheless result in disadvantages for members of specific groups.[35] For example, the practice of recruiting new employees by an organization primarily through informal social networks, also known as nepotism, is a form of indirect discrimination when immigrants and their descendants do not have equal access to these networks (Nilsson & Wrench 2009: 38). Nepotism in this example is also referred to as institutional discrimination. Institutional discrimination, sometimes called structural discrimination,[36] can be direct as well as indirect, and refers to acts, policies, ideologies or structures of institutions which disadvantage specific groups (Bovenkerk 1986: 36, 53-54; also see Pager & Shepherd 2008; Shadid 2007: 309-310).

Empirical studies on discrimination and inequality indicate that discrimination is not a social phenomenon which can be consigned to the past. Discrimination is prevalent and persistent, even in such countries as the United States (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; Pager & Shepherd 2008) and the Netherlands (cf. Andriessen, Nievers & Dagevos 2012; Havinga 2002; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010) where there is strong support for the principle of formal equality. In a concise overview, Bobo and Fox (2003: 323) address the causes for the prevalence and persistence of discrimination (also see Pager & Shepherd 2008: 186-200) and the reluctance of members of majority groups to support certain measures, such as positive action which could pave the way for equality. They distinguish three sets of theories which address these issues.

The first set of theories is based on social psychological research which indicates that discriminatory behaviour is not confined to individuals with an explicit racist ideology. These studies suggest that unequal treatment in general is an inevitable consequence of negative stereotypes, prejudice or social categorization. As explained in more detail in Chapter 3, there is convincing evidence that all people categorize themselves and others into social categories and ascribe general characteristics to these categories. A negative consequence of this process is that people tend to overestimate the differences between social categories and, simultaneously, underestimate the differences between individuals within

[35] The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination should not be confused with the distinction between conscious and unconscious discrimination. Both direct and indirect discrimination can be conscious or unconscious. Intentions and aims can be unconscious and the act of direct discrimination can result from unconscious prejudices (Wax 2008).

[36] See Pager & Shepherd (2008: 197) for a discussion.

their own social category, or, to use a social psychological term, their in-group. This leads to bias which implies, 'reacting to a person on the basis of perceived membership in a single human category, ignoring other category memberships and other personal attributes' and can be described as, 'a narrow, potentially erroneous reaction, compared with individuated impressions formed from personal details' (Fiske 2002: 123). Biases underlie stereotypes, prejudice, ethnocentrism (cf. Shadid 2007: 209), discrimination and unequal treatment in general.

The second set of theories distinguished by Bobo and Fox explains discrimination as a consequence of 'competing group interests' (2003: 323). These theories postulate that bias originates when people perceive a threat to their in-group. This threat might be thought to be to 'real or symbolic resources and privileges' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323). It can emerge when in the perception of natives their jobs are being taken by immigrants, or that traditional values are threatened (Fiske 2002: 127). Moreover, dominant groups among whose members these biases originate, 'develop and propagate ideologies that maintain and even legitimize their higher social status' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323), such as racism and sexism.

The third set of theories discussed by Bobo and Fox explains opposition to equality policies among members of majority groups as being rooted in 'race-neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism' (2003: 323). An example is the rejection of positive action measures on the basis of the argument that such measures constitute reverse discrimination. Bobo and Fox argue that such arguments can indeed play a role, but point out that many studies show that opposition to equality policies is usually linked to stereotypes and prejudice. Moreover, it appears to be difficult to reduce prejudice and stereotyping. Bodenhausen and Richeson postulate that adopting the perspective of a member of a disadvantaged group seems to be the best way to reduce bias (2010: 357). The stumbling block to any such move is that, in a real, functioning society, this requires constructive intergroup contact, which, Fiske (2002: 127) states must feature 'equal status within the immediate setting' and co-operation in the pursuit of shared goals. As a consequence, inequalities between groups limit such constructive intergroup contacts and, as research by Brezina and Winder (2003) shows, can even reinforce the negative stereotypes of the group with the lower socio-economic status. In turn, these negative stereotypes can partly explain opposition to equality policies, even among 'egalitarian-minded' majority members (Brezina & Winder 2003: 407).

Related causes for the prevalence and persistence of discrimination are the accumulation of its effects (Pager & Shepherd 2008: 199), and the fact that it is maintained by 'feedback effects' between social domains (Reskin 2012: 31). This

means that a disadvantage in one social domain, for example, the level of prosperity of the neighbourhood one lives in, leads to relative disadvantages in other domains, such as education, which in its turn leads to a lower level of income. As an example, Pager and Shepherd discuss how a disproportionately high number of minority students in the United States attend public schools in 'high poverty neighbourhoods'. Compared to schools in richer neighbourhoods, these schools have fewer resources, provide a lower quality of education and have to deal with more social problems, the upshot being the greater the disadvantages confronting the minority students, a clear example of institutional discrimination (2008: 198). Relative disadvantages as a result of discrimination can also accumulate because, as explained above, negative stereotypes of a certain group can be reinforced by this group's lower socio-economic status. For example, the relatively high unemployment rates in a specific group can lead to the stereotype that it members are unwilling to work. Discrimination occurs when, on the basis of this stereotype, an employer refrains from employing members of this group – a phenomenon which is called statistical discrimination. This implies a self-fulfilling prophecy and an accumulation of disadvantage.

Although these theories explain discrimination and opposition to the implementation of equality policies in different ways, empirical research underlying these theories has definitely shown that prejudice plays an important role, and that discrimination is prevalent and persistent, partly because of its cumulative effects. In the next section, Dutch national policies and regulations to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination will be reviewed.

5.3.2 Prejudice and discrimination in the Netherlands: policies and debates

In the past few decades, policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination on various grounds, such as gender, ethnic origin and disability. In this section, the development of and debates on the desirability and effectiveness of relevant measures regarding ethnic minorities will be discussed.

In 1971, the Dutch Penal Code was adapted to include specific provisions against racial discrimination.[37] These changes followed Dutch acceptance of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), a United Nations convention which came into force in 1969 (Rodrigues 1997). The next significant changes in the Dutch anti-discrimination legislation to do with ethnic minorities occurred in the 1980s when the Constitution was amended in 1983 to include the prohibition of

[37] Where the concept of race refers to skin colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin (Neut 1986).

discrimination in Article 1, which since then reads: 'All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.'[38] The principles laid down in this article were elaborated in more detail in the Equal Treatment Act (ETA)[39] of 1994, which explicitly prohibits both direct and indirect forms of discrimination.[40] This act also provided for the establishment of the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC), an independent semi-judiciary body tasked with, *inter alia*, investigating complaints about discrimination and handing down opinions on individual cases (Goldschmidt & Gonçalves-Ho Kang You 1997).[41]

Notwithstanding these legal developments, national and local governments and organizations in various sectors have recognized that legislation on its own is not enough to prevent and combat discrimination.[42] Therefore, since 1987 codes of conduct in organizations have been established in various sectors, including employment agencies, the insurance sector, labour unions and the national government.[43] The goal of these codes goes beyond providing clear social norms and well-defined complaint procedures, they have also been devised to raise awareness of and support for anti-discrimination measures. Furthermore, since the late 1990s the government has commissioned various researchers, anti-discrimination organizations and scientific institutes to monitor discrimination in the Netherlands. A prominent example is the *Monitor racisme & extremisme*, originally started by Jaap van Donselaar (see Donselaar 1997; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010: 251).[44] Additionally, in the context of the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), held in 2001, the Dutch government developed a National Action Plan against Racism, which includes initiatives undertaken by the national government itself, as well as municipalities, NGOs and schools.[45] These initiatives consist of awareness campaigns, and plans to improve the national monitoring of discrimination and the functioning of local anti-discrimination

[38] For the text of the Dutch Constitution see *Nederlandse Grondwet* (in Dutch), accessed January 18, 2013, www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl.

[39] In Dutch: *Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling* (AWGB).

[40] The ETA explicitly prohibits discrimination in the fields of employment, education, the supply of goods and services, including healthcare and housing.

[41] ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012.

[42] See, for example, Blok Commission (2004: 233-239).

[43] See, for example, *Algemene Bond Uitzendbureaus* (1987) and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2001).

[44] See also Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar & Rodrigues (2010).

[45] *Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme* (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004b; Final report: Tweede Kamer 2006-2007).

bureaus which handle individual questions and complaints.[46] In 2010, the Law Municipal Anti-discrimination Facilities came into force. This law requires municipalities to provide their residents with access to a local complaints office.[47]

These policies and regulations have been developed with the backing of wide political support (Blok Commission 2004: 39, 234; cf. Pellikaan, Van der Meer & De Lange 2003). Only a few populist politicians, such as Fortuyn (also see Section 5.2.2) and the PVV leader Wilders, have advocated the abolition of Article 1 of the Constitution, because, they have argued, it limits freedom of speech. More specifically, their bone of contention is that the principle of equal treatment prevents them from criticizing Islam.[48, 49]

On account of the extent of the policies and regulations it has developed, the Netherlands has been called 'Europe's champion of anti-discrimination policy' (Joppke 2007: 260). Nevertheless, the Netherlands has been criticized, among other bodies by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (see ECRI 2008) which object to proposed government policies and discriminatory statements by politicians. The political parties PVV and SGP, for example, have called for a ban on the construction of mosques,[50] and in the context of the discussion about civic integration the government has proposed such discriminatory measures as the mandatory civic integration courses for immigrants who had already acquired Dutch citizenship (Groenendijk 2011: 164-165).

Criticism has also been expressed about the ineffectiveness of the existing anti-discrimination legislation, as research indicates that discrimination and inequality in the Netherlands are persistent. The unemployment rates of non-Western

[46] These bureaus have been established since the 1980s, see Rodrigues (1997).

[47] The Law Municipal Anti-discrimination Facilities (*Wet Gemeentelijke Antidiscriminatie-voorzieningen* - WGA), implemented on January 28, 2010.

[48] De Volkskrant (February 9, 2002), *De islam is een achterlijke cultuur. Interview met Pim Fortuyn*; De Volkskrant (March 21, 2006), *Wilders wil artikel 1 uit Grondwet schrappen*.

[49] Another criticism regarding the contents of the anti-discrimination legislation concerns the legal exception to the principle of equal treatment for institutions for denominational education, on the basis of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution which guarantees freedom of education. This exception allows these institutions, in their application and admission procedures, to demand from teachers and pupils that they support the ideological or religious principles of the institution. Some critics point out that this makes the exclusion of homosexual teachers from these schools possible, which they find unacceptable. Others argue that Article 23 leads to educational segregation, which, according to them, hinders integration (also see Chapter 6). An overview (in Dutch) of these discussions can be found at *Vrijheid van Onderwijs* (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.vrijheidvanonderwijs.nl.

[50] See Shadid (2009: 14) for several references.

immigrants and their descendants remain disproportionately high,[51] which can at least partly be attributed to discrimination (Andriessen, Nievers & Dagevos 2012; Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). This suggests that the effects of the anti-discrimination legislation might be limited. Havinga (2002) argues that this is indeed the case. One reason for this ineffectiveness, Havinga says, is the limited knowledge of the law in society. In their ignorance, people do not know whether their own behaviour, for example in the context of selection procedures, contravenes the law. As has already been said, this lack of awareness could be partly remedied by the implementation of codes of conduct. However, research indicates that only a few organizations have implemented these codes of conduct, and often only partially.[52] In 2008, ECRI recommended the Dutch government improve the implementation of these codes of conduct, and also consider making human rights, including anti-discrimination, a compulsory subject in the curricula of primary and secondary schools (ECRI 2008).

Another reason for the ineffectualness of the anti-discrimination legislation is sought in the fact that the enforcement of this legislation depends principally on the individuals who feel discriminated against. If the regulations are to be effective, these individuals have to take action, for example, by lodging a complaint. Havinga, referring to Macaulay (1979) and Griffiths (1999), calls this the 'individual rights strategy' (2002: 82; also see Crosby & Ropp 2002). One problem with this strategy is that victims of discrimination are sometimes reluctant to step forward and lodge a complaint for fear of escalation or retaliation (Bochhah 2006; Sechrist, Swim & Stangor 2004). Research also shows that some individuals do not recognize or do not want to admit that they are being discriminated against (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton & Downing 2003), or, instead of lodging a complaint, they adapt their behaviour to avoid further discrimination (Nievers 2007).

Some of these causes have been addressed by the Racial Equality Directive issued by the European Union (EU) which came into force in 2000.[53] In 2004, the Dutch Equal Treatment Act was amended to implement this directive. These changes allowed the sharing of the burden of proof: provided that the plaintiff has established facts supporting the presumption of discrimination, a judge can decide to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Moreover, the changes include better

[51] For example, in February 2014 the employment rates of non-Western immigrants and their descendants was 18.6%, as opposed to 6.7% among native Dutch. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl.

[52] See Bochhah (2002); Masselman (1998); Meloen (1991).

[53] EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC, accessed August 9, 2013, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l33114_en.htm.

protection for those who lodge a discrimination complaint, entailing the stipulation that the defendant is explicitly prohibited to victimize the plaintiff.[54] In another move, since 2009 organizations are required by law to implement such policies as complaints procedures, to protect their employees from discrimination.[55]

Another, more general limitation of the individual rights strategy is that it only indirectly addresses institutional discrimination. For individuals it can be difficult, or indeed impossible, to detect institutional discrimination, for example, during a job selection procedure (Boog, Coenders & Kik 2007). A ruling in an individual case can lead to a change in institutional practices, but these practices are not often directly scrutinized or legally challenged (Boog & Houtzager 2007; cf. Böcker & Havinga 2000). To address this problem, in 2006 and 2007, the municipality of Nijmegen experimented with anonymous job applications, on the premise that this would reduce the number of rejections on the basis of ethnic background in the phase prior to face-to-face job interviews. Although it was impossible to establish whether these experiments had any effect, it was assumed that they did lead to an increased awareness of possible discrimination in selection procedures (Gemeente Nijmegen 2008). Another way to address these limitations of the individual rights strategy is the legal possibility for advocacy groups to file a complaint in the interest of others or in a collective interest such as upholding the non-discrimination principle. Advocacy groups in the Netherlands make use of this instrument, but on a relatively small scale (for an extensive discussion see Rodrigues 2011).

Finally, the effects of the current anti-discrimination legislation are limited by the stumbling block that inequality itself can cause and maintain discrimination. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the lower socio-economic status of a certain group can reinforce negative stereotypes of this group, which, in turn, can lead to discrimination of its members.

To address this effect of inequality and the problem of institutional discrimination, ECRI recommended the government to implement wider measures for positive action (2008; 2012). ECRI also recommended the maximum penalties in the Penal Code provisions against racial discrimination should be increased, racist motivations for an offence as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing be established and to disqualify employers who are found guilty of discrimination from tendering public contracts (ECRI 2008). Among the political parties in the

[54] CGB (2005b).

[55] See "Discriminatie onderdeel Arbowet" (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2009/07/06/discriminatie-onderdeel-arbowet.html.

Netherlands, only the SP and Green Left called for similar measures in their 2012 programmes.[56]

In its most recent policy documents on discrimination, the Dutch government has recognized the persistence of discrimination and how important it is that the authorities, organizations and citizens in a concerted effort continue to be permanently involved in the struggle to prevent and combat discrimination (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2013). Furthermore, the limitations of the individual rights strategy have been implicitly recognized, by stressing the importance of the reporting of discrimination by victims. Various measures, including those to raise awareness, were announced to encourage the willingness of victims to lodge a complaint. However, in these policy documents the government has still failed to address the problem caused by the fact that the individual rights strategy is also limited by institutional discrimination and by inequality itself.

This discussion clearly shows that, although the Netherlands is praised for its anti-discrimination measures, discrimination and inequality are persistent in Dutch society and the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination legislation is limited. In the next section, in order to investigate the public recognition of equality in the Netherlands, prejudice and support for anti-discrimination policies in society will be examined.

5.3.3 Prejudice and views on anti-discrimination policy in society

The discussion in Section 5.3.1 has brought to light the fact that even when a person supports the principle of formal equality, this does not have to imply that he or she also supports anti-discrimination policies in general. This phenomenon has been explained by three sets of theories (Bobo & Fox 2003), which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be motivated either by race-neutral values or by an existing bias towards other groups, directly influenced by social categorization or perception of group threat. Furthermore, Section 5.3.2 has revealed that the effects of the current anti-discrimination policies in the Netherlands appear to be limited. In this section, perceptions of group threat, the support for equal treatment and views on anti-discrimination policies in Dutch society will be explored.

To measure the support for the principle of equal treatment, the questionnaires included items on the desirability of teaching pupils in schools to treat people of various cultural backgrounds equally. A large majority (around 90%) of both Dutch natives and immigrants and their descendants is in favour of such

[56] GroenLinks (2012); Socialistische Partij (2012).

education. Proponents argued that this is important because the older a person the more difficult it is to combat prejudice. Although opponents of this sort of education supported the principle of equal treatment, they thought that children should learn this principle at home and not at school.

Those who do not support this principle appear to have a specific view on who can be fully included in their national group: they attach more importance to the in exclusive (ethnic) criteria of Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background (β = -.22, $p < .001$) discussed in Chapter 3.[57] The support for the principle of equal treatment also appears to be negatively related to educational level (β = -.14, $p < .005$). Furthermore, voters for the PVV and SGP are slightly less in favour of the equal treatment principle (β = .12, $p < .001$).

Nevertheless, as said, this strong support for equal treatment does not imply that respondents are not prejudiced towards other groups. More than a third (37%) of the native Dutch thinks that there are too many immigrants and their descendants living in the Netherlands, but a much lower 24% explicitly disagrees with this point of view. Among immigrants and their descendants of both Western and non-Western origin, 18% holds the opinion that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands. More than 40% do not support this view. These findings are similar to those presented by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259). According to these authors, the percentage of the Dutch population (16 years of age and older) that is of the opinion that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands has decreased, from around 50% in the 1990s and 53% in 2002 to 39% in 2008.

Both natives and immigrants who are of the opinion that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands adduced the argument that immigration generates such problems as segregation and a rise in the crime rate, as well as causing the country unacceptable economic costs. One respondent said, 'They profit from social security benefits and the healthcare system, and we pay for it. The Netherlands is too small.' On the other side of the fence, those who did not think there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands either argued that there is no problem as long as they participated and 'respect the rule of law', or else put forward the idea that the Netherlands is historically an immigration country. As

[57] A Categorical Regression analysis was used to test whether age, gender, educational level, income or political preference significantly predict the support for the equal treatment principle. Categorical Regression analyses were also carried out to test whether this principle is related to the in Chapter 3 discussed types of national belonging. The latter analyses were controlled for descent, age, gender, educational level and income.

one respondent said, responding to the question of whether there are too many immigrants, 'Since when? Since the year 1500?'

These sorts of opinions are related to perceptions of group threat (see threat theory of discrimination in Section 5.3.1). This means that those who think there are too many immigrants agree with the opinion that immigrants take the jobs of the native Dutch ($V = .56$, $p < .001$). In this respect, however, the native Dutch are more concerned about labour migrants from Eastern Europe (55%) than about immigrants with Dutch nationality (36%). The perception of too many immigrants in the Netherlands is also related to the opinion that they present a threat to Dutch culture ($V = .42$, $p < .001$). Of the native Dutch, 44% feel that their culture is under threat. They were concerned that the immigrants' norms, especially those associated with Islam, and values might become too influential. 'It feels threatening, the way Muslims deal with women', one respondent said. A similar percentage (40%) was found in 2008 by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259-260). These authors found that this percentage is on the rise, from 18% in 1995 to 40% in 2008, with the strongest increase taking place in the period 2000-2005, when the political and public debate on the multicultural society peaked (see Section 5.2.2 and Chapter 6).

On the other hand, the native Dutch who do not feel that their culture is threatened (43%) referred to the Netherlands as an immigration country (also see above) and to the contribution of immigrants to Dutch culture, which 'has always been largely shaped by immigrants', as one respondent said.

To explore whether such prejudice is related to such other variables as gender, age, educational level, political preference, the frequency of social (inter-ethnic) contact, and social distance (see Section 5.2.3), a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.[58] This analysis included 6 items indicating such prejudice, including the items discussed above. The relationships can be seen in the following 'joint plot of category points' in which the relationships between categories are displayed. The closer the categories are to each other, the stronger their relationship.

[58] See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA.



Figure 5.2: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of prejudice and other factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal normalization.)

The ellipses in this plot indicate that three clusters can be distinguished. The categories in each cluster are scattered around the categories of the variables indicating prejudice: 'Agree', 'Impoverishment' and 'Negative effect', meaning that respondents were prejudiced, 'Disagree', 'Enrichment' and 'Positive effect',

meaning that they rejected prejudice, and 'Undecided', 'Neither' and 'No effect' meaning that they neither agreed nor disagreed with prejudice. As the six items measuring prejudice appear to be strongly correlated, these items were used to construct a summated scale describing the level of the prejudice that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat.[59] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to assess in more depth to what extent this prejudice is related to the above-mentioned variables.

This analysis and the plot indicate that respondents in the first cluster, on the top left of the plot, can be characterized as *unprejudiced*: they generally reject the idea that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat, indicate a 'Minimal' social distance, generally have a high level of education and voted for parties on the left of the political spectrum (D66, Green Left or PvdA). Respondents in the second cluster, on the top right of the plot, can be characterized as *prejudiced*: they clearly think that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat, indicate a 'Large' social distance to immigrants, rarely or never have social contact with them, are not highly educated and generally voted for the political parties PVV or SGP. The respondents in the third cluster, below in the plot, can be characterized as *ambivalent*: they could not decide whether to agree with or to reject this type of prejudice. Among them is a relatively large number of SP voters. Finally, voters for the VVD are divided with respect to this type of prejudice.

The Categorical Regression analysis shows that the lower respondents' educational level, the stronger their prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat (β = -.33, $p < .001$). The relationship between this prejudice and political preference is moderate (β = .36, $p < .001$). Furthermore, the relationships between this type of prejudice and social distance and the frequency of social inter-ethnic contact (β = .60, $p < .001$ and β = -.25, $p < .001$ respectively) are in line with the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954, also see Section 5.2.3). Unsurprisingly, this type of prejudice is negatively related to the support for the principle of equal treatment discussed above (β = -.19, $p < .001$).

It is also not surprising that the stronger this type of prejudice, the more importance respondents attach to the criteria for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3. The stronger the respondents' prejudice, the more exclusive the type of national belonging they consider to be important, which agrees with studies by Hjerm (1998), Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere and Boen (2010), and Wakefield et al. (2011). Hence, the level of this prejudice towards immigrant groups is most

[59] The eigenvalues and scree-plot of a CATPCA analysis (see Chapter 2) of the items indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 48%, total VAF was 55.85%. Cronbach's Alpha of these six items is .89.

strongly related to the importance attached to the ethnic type of national belonging ($\beta = .56$, $p < .001$), and clearly less strongly to the exclusive legal citizenship ($\beta = .40$, $p < .001$), the territorial ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$) and the civic types ($\beta = .26$, $p < .001$).[60] This relationship can be explained by social identity theory, as research indicates that those who are perceived by the majority to deviate from their own nominal group characteristics, are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005).[61]

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the importance attached to the most exclusive types of Dutch national belonging – ethnic and exclusive legal citizenship – is negatively related to educational level. These relationships between the levels of prejudice and education discussed above have been explained by Kunovich (2009: 585), who argues that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to exclusive criteria for national belonging because they perceive an economic threat from immigrants and their descendants (who generally share their low socio-economic status) (cf. Kaya & Karakoç 2012: 37). The finding that these respondents generally vote for the populist and anti-immigrant political parties PVV or SGP is also in line with the ideas of Fenton (2011) mentioned in Chapter 3.

This type of prejudice also appears to be slightly related to the affective component of national self-identification discussed in Chapter 3 ($\beta = .15$, $p < .05$), and more strongly related to some of the expressions of loyalty to the nation-state discussed in Chapter 4: national-political pride ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$), uncritical patriotism ($\beta = .27$, $p < .001$), nationalist patriotism ($\beta = .22$, $p < .001$) and shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history ($\beta = -.29$, $p < .001$). However, no significant relationships were found between this type of prejudice and the other expressions of loyalty described in Chapter 4: national-cultural pride, symbolic patriotism and the item which indicates constructive patriotism. This ties in with the study of Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) discussed in Section 4.2.2. In it they found that a positive evaluation of one's national in-group (expressed by loyalty) is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrant groups (expressed by prejudice) (see also Coenders 2001; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170).

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[60] Categorical Regression analyses were carried out to test whether this prejudice is related to the types of national belonging discussed in Chapter 3. In these analyses was controlled for descent, age, gender, educational level and income.

[61] As mentioned in Chapter 3, this relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of subtyping (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001).

Despite the fact that more than a third of the native Dutch harbours the prejudice that immigrants and their descendants present a cultural and economic threat, only 13% of them and a similar percentage of immigrants were of the opinion that national anti-discrimination policies are not needed, as is clear from Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2

Opinion about national anti-discrimination policies in percentage.

	Need improvement	Are sufficient	Not needed	Don't know	Total
Native Dutch	44	23	13	20	100
Non-Western Immigrants	62	15	11	12	100
Western immigrants	55	13	13	19	100
Total	47	21	13	19	100

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).

Some opponents of anti-discrimination policies, both native Dutch and immigrants, argued that these policies are not effective because it is impossible to 'cure' adults of prejudice and discrimination simply by putting such measures in place, and that the only way to prevent discrimination is to teach children about equal treatment at a very young age. It must also be pointed out, some native Dutch opponents thought that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated, arguing, for example, that 'it is the immigrants' own fault', because, as one respondent said, 'they want to be different from the Dutch'.

While a minority of respondents (19%) said they have no idea what these policies entail, the majority (68%) approved of anti-discrimination policies, and almost half (47%) was of the opinion that these policies should be improved. Some stated that the current policies are completely ineffectual, and that other measures, such as quota systems and preferential treatment should be introduced. Others mentioned that policies can only be effectual when the government and politicians set a good example, and said that politicians should stop making polarizing statements.

The percentage of non-Western immigrants who believed that these policies should be improved was relatively high (62%). A possible explanation is that they

have more experience of being discriminated against. Unlike the native Dutch, the immigrants referred to their personal experiences when explaining their view that the policies should be improved. Some referred to the difficulty in proving discrimination, and one respondent argued that individuals are powerless to combat discrimination.

To explore whether these views are statistically related to the type of prejudice and other variables discussed, for instance, social distance and political preference, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out. The table above already indicates that non-Western immigrants are more in favour of national anti-discrimination policies than are the native Dutch ($\beta = .14$, $p < .005$). Not surprisingly, opponents of such policies attach more importance to exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western name ($\beta = -.23$, $p < .001$), and exhibit a stronger prejudice that immigrants do pose a cultural and economic threat ($\beta = -.37$, $p < .001$). This is in line with the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1, which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be explained by an existing bias towards other groups caused by social categorization, namely, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging, or the perception of group threat (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Shadid 2007: 209). Finally, voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, SP and Green Left appear to be slightly more in favour of anti-discrimination policies ($\beta = .22$, $p < .001$).

In the next sections, views on the measures to take positive action and its relationships with prejudice will be analysed. But first of all, to provide some background the relevant literature, government policies and political debates concerning the topic of positive action will be passed in review.

5.4 Positive action

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, equal opportunities for individuals and groups in society not only require equal treatment, they must commence from equal starting conditions. A group's disadvantaged position limits the opportunities of its members. Policies, measures and regulations to overcome the effects of these limitations, or, in other words, to achieve substantive equality of opportunity for members of these groups, are referred to as measures for positive action (Bovenkerk 1986; Sabbagh 2011: 109; Waddington & Bell 2011: 1521).

In the Netherlands, positive action policies targeted at women, ethnic minorities and the disabled have been being developed since the 1970s. In the next section some light will be shed on the variety of forms of positive action and on the main results of relevant scientific research..

5.4.1 Perspectives on positive action

Measures for positive action have been introduced in various countries over the years, among them the United States, the United Kingdom (Bovenkerk 1986; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006), India, Malaysia, South Africa (Sabbagh 2011) and the Netherlands (Verbeek & Groeneveld 2010). Different terms are used to refer to such measures in these countries. Although the term positive action is common in Europe, in the United States the term affirmative action is generally used (Waddington & Bell 2011: 1507-1508).

In 1986, Bovenkerk published the results of an extensive comparative study of measures for positive action in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, in which he distinguished various forms of such measures (1986: 21, 56). In his first step, Bovenkerk distinguishes between procedural and substantive measures. The aim of a procedural measure is to increase the opportunities of members of disadvantaged groups, for example, through such outreach efforts as advertising a vacancy in such a way that it reaches all groups in society, instead of exclusively using informal networks to recruit employees.[62] A substantive measure implies that explicit preference is given to members of disadvantaged groups, for example, in job selection procedures or by developing specific training programmes for members of these groups. A distinction can be made between the substantive measures which reduce the application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups, and the substantive measures in which this is not the case. The former type of measures is sometimes called positive discrimination. In the latter type, commonly labelled preferential treatment (Bovenkerk 1986: 22), preference is given to the member of a disadvantaged group, but only when his or her qualifications are at least equal to those of other qualified candidates.

Such procedural and substantive measures are referred to as direct measures when they are implemented by organizations to increase the opportunities of members of disadvantaged groups in these organizations. Indirect measures are those steps take to motivate or oblige other organizations to implement direct measures (Bovenkerk 1986; Verbeek & Penninx 2009: 69). Sometimes, governments might implement both indirect and direct measures to set an example to other organizations (Bovenkerk 1986: 56). An example of an indirect measure is contract compliance. This entails that the government makes the granting of assignments and subsidies to organizations conditional on their implementation of

[62] Another procedural measure worth mentioning here is the policy of replacement (De Zwart & Poppelaars 2007) discussed in Section 5.2.2, which entails that instead of developing policies targeted at specific ethnic groups, additional resources are provided to specific economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods, which in practice benefits the disadvantaged ethnic minorities who live in those neighbourhoods. Sabbagh calls these policies 'indirect affirmative action' (2011: 110).

specific measures to promote the employment of disadvantaged groups (Bovenkerk 1986: 56; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 587). One of the strongest indirect measures the government can implement is a quota system for job allocation (cf. Waddington & Bell 2011: 1509). This means that a minimum number or percentage of the workforce of an organization has to consist of members of a specific group.

The central argument for introducing measures for positive action is that they appear to be the best way to level the playing field by overcoming the limiting effects of disadvantage, whether or not the disadvantage is a direct result of discrimination (cf. Holzer & Neumark 2006: 466). Proponents argue that, because measures for positive action do not rely on an individual rights strategy (see Section 5.3.2), they are more effective in preventing and combating both direct and institutional discrimination than (other) anti-discrimination legislation (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 592). Moreover, measures for positive action contribute, in various ways, to the reduction of bias and the prevention of expressions of bias (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 592). Reducing bias requires a number of preconditions among them constructive intergroup contact, featuring co-operation in the pursuit of shared goals and, very importantly, equal status in the context of the interaction because, among other reasons, negative stereotypes of groups can be reinforced by their lower socio-economic status. In society, intergroup contact featuring equal status of group members is only possible when inequality has been reduced, or, in other words, when the playing field is levelled, for example, by positive action measures (cf. Bovenkerk 1986: 36, 50).

Measures for positive action have been the subject of intensive debates, in which both empirical and normative arguments have been used (for an overview see Bovenkerk 1986). A widely discussed normative argument is that these measures imply reverse discrimination – discrimination against members of non-disadvantaged groups. Opponents argue that giving preference to members of a certain group on the basis of their group membership is an unacceptable violation of the principle of equal treatment. However, proponents argue that when equal treatment is taken to imply that people should be treated equally in equal circumstances, positive action does not imply discrimination because measures for positive action can only apply in unequal circumstances. Moreover, when equality is interpreted as having equal opportunities, equal starting points are required, and this could justify measures for positive action (cf. Bovenkerk 1986: 40).

Apart from the debates about the desirability of positive action measures, there is also discussion about whether empirical research has shown that such measures are really effective, and whether they have negative effects which outweigh their possible positive results. Since the 1990s, it has become easier to address such

questions, because, as Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 586) point out, studies on positive action have become increasingly empirical and interdisciplinary.

Looking at putative negative effects, critics refer to the possibility of resentment and group tensions resulting from the perception by members of non-disadvantaged groups that positive action implies reverse discrimination. Empirical studies discussed by Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 593) indicate that, while poorly implemented diversity programmes can indeed cause resentment, members of non-disadvantaged groups who work for organizations which implement positive action measures or who interact with the beneficiaries of those measures, do not react negatively. By and large, Bovenkerk (1986: 107) says, it can be expected that measures in which requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are reduced do lead to more resentment than measures in which preference to a member of these groups is given only when his or her qualifications are at least equal to if not better than those of other qualified candidates.

Another possible negative effect which measures for positive action might set in train is group stigmatization, suggesting that its beneficiaries cannot succeed on their own. However, Bovenkerk (1986: 107) has argued that when measures for positive action succeed, these stigma will eventually disappear, a hypothesis which has been confirmed in later studies (see Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 593).

The remaining empirical issue is whether positive action can really improve the socio-economic position of minorities. Generally, the available empirical studies indicate that it does indeed have a positive impact on the position of members of disadvantaged groups in the fields of education and employment (Bovenkerk 1986: 69-71; Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 588-591; Holzer and Neumark 2006; Kalev, Kelly & Dobbin 2006). Apart from this, Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 590) also consider increased ethnic diversity, especially at educational institutions, as a positive effect. They refer to research results indicating that this diversity has improved the ability of students to take the perspective of others into account. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, this is probably the best way to reduce bias and the expression of bias.[63]

The crux of the matter is that the success of measures for positive action depends on various factors, including the type of measures taken, the scale of its implementation and also the quality of implementation and the reception of such

[63] Other possible positive effects of increased ethnic diversity on the work floor and in educational institutions are also mentioned, by Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 590-591) and by Bovenkerk (1986). These effects include the improvement of both services and the representation of interests of minority groups, because, as Bovenkerk argues, police officers, doctors, lawyers, social workers and other professionals who are members of disadvantaged groups, are in a better position to assess possible special needs of these groups (1986: 55).

measures by decision makers in the selection procedures, the beneficiaries themselves and the wider society. Successful implementation requires raising awareness of procedures and goals, which must also cover the provision of information about barriers to opportunities and the way these barriers can be overcome by the measures (Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 594). Obviously, poor communication can lead to the stigmatization of the beneficiaries and lack of support from decision makers in selection procedures, which, in turn, can weaken the implementation. Moreover, according to Shadid, the effects of measures for positive action will be limited as long as the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic minorities is not structurally recognized within organizations (2007: 310; also see Chapter 6). This view was confirmed in a longitudinal study (covering the period 1971-2002) of a large sample (n=708) of organizations by Kalev, Kelly & Dobbin (2006). These scholars found that the increase in the employment of minority employees in private sector management was largest in organizations which had structurally embedded accountability, authority and expertise on diversity and positive action (2006: 611).

In the end, to paraphrase Holzer and Neumark, whether and in what form positive action will be implemented, depends on whether citizens believe it is fair to give preference to such disadvantaged groups as ethnic minorities and women in some contexts, 'to overcome the barriers they continue to face from current discrimination, past discrimination, and a variety of other causes. Views on fairness are very subjective, and sometimes impervious to empirical evidence' (2006: 484). In other words, while empirical evidence indicates that positive action has positive effects, whether measures for positive action will be implemented depends on the views on this issue in society and on decisions by politicians. In the next section, these decisions by politicians and debates about positive action in the Netherlands will be discussed.

5.4.2 Positive action in the Netherlands: policies and debates

The discussion in Section 5.3.2 has undeniably revealed that, although the Netherlands is praised for its anti-discrimination measures, discrimination and group inequality do persist in Dutch society and the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination legislation appears to be limited. This section contains a discussion of whether and how these problems have been addressed by implementing measures for positive action.

The first measures for positive action in the Netherlands, introduced in the 1970s and it was devised to improve the position of women on the labour market (Bacchi 1994). In 1986, in the context of the implementation of the first structural integration policies for ethnic minorities, the Advisory Committee on Research

related to Minorities (ACOM) (see Section 5.2.2), recommended the government implement such measures to assist ethnic minorities. However, ACOM explicitly recommended that positive discrimination measures should not be introduced but that instead preferential treatment, without reducing the job or application requirements for members of disadvantaged groups, be adopted to prevent the possible stigmatization of the beneficiaries (see Section 5.4.1) and also to lower the risk of giving places to employees with insufficient qualifications (Bovenkerk 1986: 145). In 1989 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) also recommended the implementation of contract compliance (WRR 1989: 37).

Since 1990, a series of measures for positive action have been implemented by the Dutch government, and municipalities and organizations in various sectors have followed suit (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003; Shadid 2007: 306-307). Legally, the Equal Treatment Act (ETA), which came into force in 1994, allows preferential treatment (but not positive discrimination) for women, ethnic minorities and the disabled. ETA also permits outreach procedures and quota systems, but considers strict quota systems which reserve a specific number of jobs for members of a disadvantaged group are out of the question.[64] Consequently, ETA has complied with EU anti-discrimination legislation. In various directives this legislation has authorized member states to implement measures for positive action.[65]

In 1990, employers and labour unions[66] signed an agreement to allocate 60,000 jobs for members of ethnic minority groups over a period of five years. In the same period, the national government implemented a plan to increase the number of immigrant employees in government service to 5%.[67] The first indirect nation-wide measure for positive action targeted at ethnic minorities was introduced by the government in 1994. This Act for the Stimulation of Proportional Labour Participation (WBEAA)[68] obliged organizations in the private and public sectors with more than 35 employees to implement measures to achieve a proportional representation of ethnic minorities in their workforce. Organizations had to register the ethnicity of their employees so that information on the representation of ethnic minorities among their staff could be made public

[64] See for an overview: *Dossier voorkeursbeleid* (in Dutch), accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.mensenrechten.nl/dossier/voorkeursbeleid.

[65] For a discussion of these aspects of EU law see Waddington & Bell (2011). For an overview of the implementation and practices in EU countries see Wrench (2007). *Nota bene*: the possibility to implement measures for positive action was already included in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which came into force in 1969.

[66] United in the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid).

[67] The EMO plan (Ethnic Minorities in Government Service).

[68] The *Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen* (WBEAA).

(Berkhout, Homburg & Van Waveren 1996). This act was replaced in 1998 by the similar Act on the Stimulation of Labour Market Participation of Minorities (Wet SAMEN),[69] which was abrogated at the end of 2003. Both these acts came into a great deal of from employers and employers' organizations and consequently compliance was weak (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003). Glastra, Schedler and Kats (1998) say that the employers' organizations were generally opposed to measures for equality of opportunity, and they doubted the beneficial effects of such measures. Their preference was for favourable investment to ensure job growth and educational measures to improve the qualifications of ethnic minority members.

Apart from these indirect measures, since 2000 the government has also signed agreements with employers' organizations to increase the labour market participation of ethnic minorities by registering job vacancies. It is hoped that by doing so they will fill these vacancies with more people from ethnic minorities, provide training programmes and develop tailor-made approaches for employment in specific sectors (Schaafsma 2006: 20).[70] The effects of these agreements have generally been evaluated as positive (Blok Commission 2004: 257).

However, since these measures and agreements ended in the early 2000s, no nationwide indirect measures have been implemented and preferential treatment and quota systems have continued to be controversial (Schaafsma 2006; De Zwart 2012).[71] Research in 2006 indicated that both employers and employees, including members of ethnic minority groups, generally rejected preferential treatment measures (Schaafsma 2006: 56-57). Employers perceived such measures to be unfair, and generally explained the under-representation of minorities in their organizations by pointing out that they did not apply or were not sufficiently qualified (cf. Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 599). For their part, members of ethnic minority groups feared the risk of stigmatization (Schaafsma 2006: 68-69).

The effectiveness of positive action measures in the Netherlands has also been questioned. In their analysis of the national indirect measure Wet SAMEN, Verbeek and Groeneveld found no short-term effects of preferential treatment, but suggest that this could be explained by weak implementation (2010: 234).

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[69] The *Wet Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Minderheden* (Wet SAMEN).

[70] Respectively through the MKB Covenant, RGO Covenant and the .KOM Project.

[71] In 2008, the then incumbent Minister of the Interior Ter Horst announced measures for positive action to increase the number of ethnic minority members and women in the management of the police force. This elicited widespread criticism, even within the police force (see NRC Handelsblad (March 10, 2009), *Voorkeursbeleid scheidt minister en politietop*). The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization (in Dutch: *ondersteunende / ambtelijke organisatie*) of Dutch Parliament implemented preferential treatment measures (in 2010 and 2008 respectively), to increase the number of ethnic minority employees (see CGB 2008; CGB 2010).

However, they certainly did find a positive relationship between the increase in ethnic minority representation and the existence of structural diversity policies in organizations (Groeneveld & Verbeek 2012), which is in line with the views of Shadid (2007) on the structural recognition of diversity and the findings of Kalev, Kelly and Dobbin (2006) discussed in Section 5.4.1.

Despite all efforts, the unemployment rates of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands remain disproportionately high.[72] For this reason, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommended the Dutch government should make better use of measures for positive action (ECRI 2008). However, as mentioned in Section 5.2.2, in the policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011) the government emphasized that integration policies would no longer target specific groups. It appears therefore that the government no longer advocates the principle of positive action. Nevertheless, the above mentioned Equal Treatment Act (ETA) still allows preferential treatment for women, ethnic minorities and the disabled. In their programmes for the national elections in 2012, a few political parties, concerned about the above mentioned unemployment rates, advocated outreach measures (Green Left, SP, VVD) and preferential treatment (Green Left) in an effort to assist disadvantaged groups.[73]Nevertheless, their efforts came to nought and the implementation of strong measures for positive action continued to be a pipe-dream. The most recent government policy document on discrimination does not mention measures for positive action (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012) at all, and the most recent policy document on integration announced only one such measure, namely that the government will co-operate with municipalities in supporting young members of ethnic minority and their parents with their entrance into the labour market (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).[74]

What has just been said shows that it goes without saying that the introduction and the effects of positive action measures are controversial in the Netherlands. Part of the problem appears to be that such hard measures as preferential treatment and contract compliance have barely been implemented, and therefore few people

[72] For example, in February 2014, the employment rates of non-Western immigrants and their descendants was 18.6%, as opposed to 6.7% among native Dutch. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl.

[73] GroenLinks (2012); Socialistische Partij (2012); VVD (2012).

[74] The government elected in 2012 also announced a quota system for the disabled, to be enforced in 2015 (Rutte & Samsom 2012: 32).

are familiar with such measures. In the next section, views current in society on such measures will be examined.

5.4.3 Views in society on positive action

As was just stated, the discussion on policies and debates in the Netherlands has revealed that measures for positive action are controversial. Research has shown that, whereas many Dutch natives considered such measures unfair, immigrants and their descendants also viewed them negatively because they feared the risk of stigmatization. Whereas they are still haunted by controversy in the Netherlands, research in the United States has indicated that people who are familiar with these measures tend to view them more positively. Possibly measures for positive action have acquired a bad name in the Netherlands because people equate these measures with positive discrimination and not with preferential treatment, not realizing that positive discrimination is illegal in the Netherlands. As Bovenkerk wrote in 1986, it can be expected that measures for positive discrimination, implying that application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are reduced, would lead to more resentment than measures for preferential treatment, in which preference is only given to the member of a disadvantaged group only when his or her qualifications are at least equal to those of other qualified candidates (1986: 107; also see Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 595).

In this section, the views in Dutch society on measures for positive action will be examined. This will include an analysis of relationships between these views and prejudices or race-neutral values, relationships which are postulated in the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1. Hence, the analysis will not only include the prejudices in society analysed in Section 5.3.3, but also a comparison of views on measures for positive action targeted at ethnic minorities and at women.

Support for positive action was measured by including an item in the questionnaires on the acceptability of preferential treatment for both (naturalized) immigrants and their descendants and for women in the context of job applications. The results are shown in Table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3

Opinions about preferential treatment[a] *in percentages.*

	For immigrants		For women	
	Approve	Disapprove	Approve	Disapprove
Native Dutch	17	74	33	52
Non-Western Immigrants	32	53	38	47
Western immigrants	17	73	29	58
Total[d]	18	72	33	51

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).

[a] But see the analysis below.

From this table it is clear that, although almost a third of all groups approve preferential treatment for women, only 18% approve such measures for immigrants. Among non-Western immigrants the support for such measures is clearly higher (38% and 32% respectively). Muslims in this last group were even more positive (43% and 41% approval respectively).

The main argument of those who support preferential treatment of both women and ethnic minorities was that it is necessary to combat prejudices and discrimination. 'In an ideal world, such measures should not be necessary, but alas, we have to deal with discrimination', one respondent said. Some native Dutch pointed out that increasing ethnic diversity in organizations is not the same as overcoming disadvantages for ethnic minorities. These respondents support preferential treatment as a way to increase diversity, but did not think that the opportunities of ethnic minorities are still limited.

Many native Dutch who approve of preferential treatment for both women and ethnic minorities admitted that, although they support the principle of equal treatment, they have more difficulty approving of preferential treatment for the latter group. As one respondent said, 'After some heart searching, I would say yes to preferential treatment for women, and no to preferential treatment for ethnic minorities. But, with some hesitation, I approve of both, because you have to treat people equally.'

Interestingly, although the strength of the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat appears to explain the opposition to anti-discrimination policies to a substantial extent (see Section 5.3.3), it barely explains

the opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and their descendants (β = -.14, $p < .05$). Moreover, the analysis indicates that this type of prejudice goes only a very little way towards explaining the difference between respondents' opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and their opposition to a similar policy for women. Likewise, this opposition also cannot be explained by respondents' views on who can be fully included in the national group. There are no significant relationships between this opposition and the importance they attach to the criteria for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3, among them having Dutch ancestors or having a Western name. These findings contradict two theories, discussed by Bobo & Fox (2003), which claim that opposition to preferential treatment can be explained by a bias towards immigrants, resulting either from the perception of ethnic threat or from the process of social categorization (that is, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging). This suggests that opposition to such policies in the Netherlands could be explained by a third theory discussed by Bobo and Fox, namely, opposition rooted in 'race-neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; see Section 5.2). Indeed, these sorts of ideas have led respondents to argue that policies like these can cause stigmatization, and that gender or ethnicity are two categories which should never be used as criteria in selection procedures.

The qualitative interviews revealed the problem that preferential treatment is often confused with positive discrimination measures: many respondents mentioned that preferential treatment is unacceptable because it implies 'reverse discrimination'. After the interviewer explained that preferential treatment implies that application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are not reduced, and that positive discrimination is illegal in the Netherlands, most of these respondents said that they do approve of preferential treatment.[75] Therefore, a lack of understanding of such policies might also explain the opposition to some degree. Nonetheless, the substantial difference between the opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and preferential treatment of women remains largely unexplained.

Finally, the analysis revealed no significant relationships between views on preferential treatment – which was apparently understood by many as positive discrimination – and the variables gender, age, educational level and political preference.

[75] This finding cannot be generalized however, as the number of in-depth interviews was only 66 (see Chapter 2).

Chapter 6
Multicultural citizenship and cultural distinctiveness

6.1 Introduction

Cultural distinctiveness is the third dimension of multicultural citizenship to be examined in this study. As discussed in Chapter 1, a society can be characterized as multicultural when the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship, which also include belonging to the national group and the equality of both native and immigrant citizens, are formally and publicly recognized (Shadid 2009: 5-6). This chapter examines views on cultural distinctiveness prevalent in Dutch society, in an attempt to explore how and whether aspects of this dimension of multicultural citizenship are recognized and actually dealt with in practice.

Since the 1980s, various authors have raised the concern that extending citizenship rights specifically to certain groups, among them women and ethnic and racial minorities, has not produced the sought-after social equality (Leydet 2011; Young 1989). They are convinced that it is necessary to recognize such group differences as gender, culture and religion formally, in order to achieve citizen equality (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Shadid 2009). If formal recognition has not been granted, it is an uphill battle to achieve equality, as 'the purported neutrality of difference-blind institutions often belies an implicit bias towards the needs, interests and identities of the majority group' (Leydet 2011, see also Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Consequently, this sort of recognition implies the justification of differential treatment in society and the acknowledgement of special minority rights. Examples of such policies in the Netherlands include, *inter alia*, the recognition of the right of Muslims to build mosques and the right of women to maternity leave. However, such policies, especially those to do with cultural and

religious distinctions, often referred to by scholars and politicians as multiculturalism, have been, and still are, the subject of fierce debates (Wright & Bloemraad 2012: 78). One of the arguments embraced by opponents of multiculturalism is that the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness can hinder immigrants' integration and impede the development of their loyalty to the nation-state (see also Chapter 4). Furthermore, it is argued that formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness, especially when such distinctiveness has anything to do with religion, is incompatible with the neutrality of the state (e.g. Cliteur 2004).

It goes without saying that the recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants is not, and has not been, an issue confined to purely scientific discussions, it has also fuelled political debates in the Netherlands and other nation-states with a history of intensive immigration such as the United States, Australia and Canada. As discussed in Chapter 3, the views on cultural distinctiveness taken by subsequent Dutch governments have undergone pronounced changes in the last few decades. Although the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants was one goal of the integration policies which were developed in the Netherlands in the 1980s, this goal was abandoned in the beginning of the 1990s, and since 2003 cultural differences in society have begun to be considered to be problematic.[1]

Scientific and political debates on citizenship and cultural distinctiveness have addressed various topics, ranging from national belonging, loyalty to the nation-state and immigrant integration to equality, all of which have been examined in previous chapters. In the present chapter, the recognition of cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands will be explored more directly, by addressing Dutch regulations, debates and views on (immigrants') distinctive cultural practices, norms and values. As has been stressed in previous chapters, the current political debates on cultural distinctiveness are primarily concentrated on the religious practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants and their descendants (cf. Beck 2013). One very prominent example is the debate on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf. Indeed, with some perspicuity Maliepaard and Phalet (2012: 131) write that, 'Muslims represent the prototypical "other" in today's Dutch society, as in other Western European societies' (see also Ogan, Willnat, Pennington & Bashir 2014). Therefore, the discussion of the regulations, debates and views on this subject in Dutch society here will focus on interpretations of church-state relations and the perceived incompatibility between Dutch norms and values and the norms and values embraced by Muslim immigrants (cf. Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014: 54; Shadid 2009: 17). The brief discussion of regulations and debates is based on the

[1] See, for example, Tweede Kamer (2003-2004: 8); see also Chapter 3.

current relevant literature, and the views in Dutch society will be explored by analysing empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research. To set the scene, first of all scientific debates about the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness will be discussed.

6.2 Perspectives on the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness

Policies of the formal recognition of cultural and religious distinctions, often labelled multiculturalism, have been the subject of some heated exchanges (Wright & Bloemraad 2012: 78). Various strands of arguments can be distinguished in these debates, especially those about whether this formal recognition is compatible with the neutrality of the state. Other arguments have to do with the effects of the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness on various aspects of immigrant integration, including concerns about social cohesion, the possible incompatibility of certain norms and values, immigrants' social and political participation, their sense of national belonging and their loyalty to the nation-state. A concise review of these arguments will be presented in this section.

Some opponents of multiculturalism assert that the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness engenders relatively weak incentives to learn the language of the host country and to develop interethnic contacts. They say that the upshot of the policy is that it leads to the segregation and socio-economic inequality of immigrants (e.g. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005, but see Demant 2005). Others state that recognizing cultural pluralism weakens the immigrants' affective commitment to the country, and thereby endangers social cohesion, or the development of a common sense of national belonging (e.g. Miller 1995; Barry 2002; see also Chapter 3). One argument closely related to this is that formal recognition of cultural and religious distinctiveness implies a recognition of the fact that immigrants are then free to maintain multiple loyalties, not just to their ethnic groups but to their countries of origin as well, which can undermine their loyalty to the nation-state (see Chapter 4). In the same vein, it is argued that multiculturalism can lead to an emphasis of differences and even to a reification of cultural groups, which again can result in segregation, conflicts and discrimination (e.g. Barry 2002). Last but by no means least, it is said that multiculturalism can lead to the preservation of certain immigrants' norms and values which encourage the unequal treatment of women (e.g. Chesler 2010).

The great weakness in the arguments of these opponents is that they are often quick to criticize policies which they label 'multicultural', without bothering to explain how they define multiculturalism and why they label these policies as such (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 7). Some opponents have criticized policies which

they label 'multicultural', even though these policies clearly did not fit the qualification (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012). Referring to this, Duyvendak and Scholten (2011: 338) argue that some politicians and scholars in the Netherlands use the label 'multicultural' pejoratively: to 'disqualify certain [integration] policies that allegedly have been a failure'. This conclusion agrees with Kymlicka's statement that in many debates the criticism is not directed at the reality of multicultural policies, but at a caricaturish model of multiculturalism. Kymlicka calls this model 'the celebratory model of multiculturalism', as it describes multiculturalism as a policy which takes 'familiar cultural markers of ethnic groups – clothing, cuisine, and music – and treats them as authentic practices to be preserved by their members and safely consumed by others' (2012: 4; see for similar criticism also Pakulski & Markowski 2014: 6). Kymlicka has presented in a nutshell the various ways in which this caricaturish model has been used as a straw man to criticize multiculturalism. First of all, he states that this model ignores the issue of the economic and political inequality of immigrants in society, because these issues 'cannot be solved simply by celebrating cultural differences'. Secondly, the celebration of cultural differences runs the very real risk of ignoring the inevitable fact that certain customs, such as forced marriage, conflict with laws, norms and values in society. More generally, this celebration risks trivializing cultural differences: 'Ignoring the real challenges that differences in cultural and religious values can raise'. Thirdly, this model of multiculturalism can lead to a reification of cultural groups, and this would ignore the processes of cultural adaptation, 'thereby potentially reinforcing perceptions of minorities as eternally "other"'. Once this category has become established it 'can lead to the strengthening of prejudice and stereotyping, and more generally to the polarization of ethnic relations'. Finally, Kymlicka states that this model can 'end up reinforcing power inequalities and cultural restrictions *within* minority groups', as:

> the state generally consults the traditional elites within the group – typically older males – while ignoring the way these traditional practices (and traditional elites) are often challenged by internal reformers, who have difference views about how, say, a "good Muslim" should act (Kymlicka 2012: 4-5).

This caricaturish model bears some similarities to what is called *illiberal* multiculturalism, a concept which implies the *preservation* of cultural identities, a goal which appears unrealistic given the dynamic character of social identities (Appiah 1997; see also Chapter 3).

This having been said, most multicultural policies can be characterized as *liberal*, implying the *recognition* of cultural distinctiveness, which does not preclude

cultural change (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 11-12; 134). Several scholars have remarked that the central aspects or dimensions of liberal multiculturalism include the recognition of national belonging, cultural distinctiveness *and* the principle non-discrimination, the latter principle embracing both the equality of ethnic minorities and equality on other grounds such as gender and sexual orientation (e.g. Shadid 2009; Vermeulen & Slijper 2003; see also Chapter 1).

It is this combination of valuing of equality and the recognition of cultural difference at which the most criticism is levelled and which is described as seemingly ambivalent or paradoxical (e.g. Joppke 1996, see also Prins 2000). This designation is unfair, however, as the combination is only ambivalent when it is assumed that achieving equality always requires ignoring difference. The latter is not the case, as a simple example such as the right to maternity leave for women shows (see also Chapter 5). More generally, the multiculturalists' view is that the recognition of (certain) differences is a necessary precondition for equality, because, as already said in the introduction of this chapter, 'the purported neutrality of difference-blind institutions often belies an implicit bias towards the needs, interests and identities of the majority group' (Leydet 2011, see also Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008).

Furthermore, in most multicultural policies recognition of cultural distinctiveness is mainly symbolic, inserted to strengthen the sense of national belonging of ethnic minorities and to facilitate their integration (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 134; see also WRR 1979 and Chapters 3 and 5). Giving his view on the matter, Kymlicka (2012: 5-10) argues that liberal multicultural policies do much more than celebrate cultural difference. Instead, these policies have always combined cultural recognition with addressing social issues, economic redistribution and political participation. This certainly was the case Netherlands in the 1980s, as the discussion in Chapter 5 in the present study illustrates. Cogently, liberal multicultural policies have not ignored universal human rights either by neglecting customs which violate human rights or by overlooking the real challenges posed by cultural and religious difference. On the contrary, Kymlicka says that: 'multiculturalism is itself a human-rights-based movement', and a fundamental characteristic of multiculturalism is that it is founded on principles of non-discrimination. This same development in the Netherlands is also illustrated in Chapter 5, and will be elaborated on in the present chapter. Kymlicka pursues his argument and states that the focus on universal human rights shows that (liberal) multiculturalism does not reify cultural groups or deny cultural change. Instead, Kymlicka argues that:

> multiculturalism-as-citizenization is a deeply (and intentionally) transformative project, both for minorities and majorities. It requires both dominant and historically subordinated groups to engage in new practices, to enter new relationships, and to embrace new concepts and discourses – all of which profoundly transform people's identities. […] It has created political space for ethnocultural groups to contest inherited hierarchies. But it also requires groups to advance their claims in a very specific language — namely, the language of human rights, civil-rights liberalism, and democratic constitutionalism (Kymlicka 2012: 9).

Indeed, proponents of a liberal conception of multiculturalism argue that it is important to emphasize a civic conception of national belonging, that is, the view that membership of a nation is first and foremost juridical and political, requiring a citizen's respect for institutions and laws (including treating women and men equally), and a sense of national belonging (e.g. Shadid 2009). It is argued that only by granting minority rights through multicultural policies, will these 'bonds of civic solidarity' be strengthened (Kymlicka 2001: 36; Kymlicka 1995). In short, those who favour this policy are asserting that an ethnic conception of national belonging – membership of a nation defined by specific ethnic or cultural criteria – should be rejected (cf. Habermas 1998; see also Chapter 3).[2]

Many debates concentrating on the relationship between multiculturalism and the problem of immigrant integration, social cohesion, the strength of national belonging and loyalty to the nation-state are theoretical and hypothetical (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 160; see also Chapter 4). So far there seems to be no strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis that multicultural policies hinder the process of social and political inclusion and political engagement of immigrants. By and large it has to be said that any empirical evidence of the effects of such policies is actually pretty thin on the ground (Wright & Bloemraad 2012: 79; see also Kymlicka 2012: 10-14). This is not surprising as the processes of immigrant integration are exposed to a wide range of factors, government policies being just one element among many. This situation

[2] Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, loyalty to the country is not the only nor necessarily the strongest motivation for citizens to take their country's side. After all, individuals can be strongly motivated to take the side of their country because of a commitment to protect their family, friends or certain principles, and not so much out of undiluted loyalty to their country. There is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that citizens' loyalty to their country is a better guarantee for furthering or protecting its interests than the other commitments of these citizens. Authors who argue that loyalty to a country is essential to protect its interests are either speculating or they are confusing matters by conflating the structure with the strength of political commitments (Keller 2009: 13-15).

complicates empirical comparisons between the effects of policies which are multicultural and policies which are not (see also Chapter 5). Certainly there are some authors who assume that government policies exert heavy pressure on immigrant integration (e.g. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2010), but they have plenty of opponents who dispute this view (e.g. Demant 2005). Moreover, as mentioned above, views on what exactly constitutes a 'multicultural policy' differ, which complicates the interpretation of empirical studies (Duyvendak, Van Reekum, El-Hajjari & Bertossi 2013). Nevertheless, in view of the need for social recognition, research does indicate that the recognition of cultural distinctiveness is important (see Chapter 3). Such an acknowledgement can strengthen the sense of national belonging and prevent identity conflicts (cf. WRR 1979). In contrast, a policy of assimilation, defined as the opposite of the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, can lead to polarization of ethnic differences (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 139).[3]

Some opponents of multiculturalism do not restrict their remarks to the possible effects of such policies on aspects of immigrant integration, they go on to say that the recognition of cultural and religious distinctions is incompatible with the neutrality of the state (e.g. Cliteur 2004). But what is the 'neutrality of the state'? There are many interpretations of and frameworks constructed for state neutrality in religious affairs. This is no surprise considering the various historically developed church-state relations in such countries as the Netherlands and France.[4] In Europe, church-state relations are certainly not monolithic and a number of variations can be distinguished (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1995: 20-22). In Denmark and the United Kingdom, there is an official state religion and laws have been implemented to guarantee the equal treatment of other religious confessions. In several other countries, among them Belgium and Germany, religious communities are recognized by the state, which implies that religious communities have certain privileges. In France and the Netherlands, there is a separation between church and state.[5] In both countries the goal of this separation is state neutrality, but this is interpreted and implemented differently.

The French system of *laïcité* is an example of exclusive neutrality (Van der Burg 2009; 2011). It means that the state does not support any group on the basis of culture, religion or belief and therefore, theoretically at least, the public sphere

[3] A more extensive discussion of criticism of multiculturalism can be found in Vermeulen & Slijper (2003).

[4] State neutrality is related to, but not synonymous with, the separation between church and state. An example of state neutrality in matters which are not religious is the recognition by the Dutch state of conscientious objections to compulsory military service (Van der Burg 2009).

[5] A more extensive typology can be found in Shadid & Van Koningsveld (1995).

should be free of religious expressions. The Dutch interpretation of church-state relations reflects a system of inclusive neutrality.[6] State neutrality in this system implies that anyone is allowed to express his or her religious identity in the public sphere, and any person enjoys equal entitlement to state support for religious and cultural activities. In short, this system implies formal recognition of cultural and religious distinctiveness, that is, multiculturalism.

What therefore does the Dutch system of state neutrality mean and what do Dutch political debates about multiculturalism imply? These matters will be discussed in more detail below.

6.3 Cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands: regulations, policies and debates

In the course of the past few decades debates on immigrant integration in the Netherlands have become highly politicized. One section of these political debates has concentrated on cultural and religious practices, highlighting the norms and values of immigrants and their descendants, particularly those of Muslims. This section consists of a concise review of the main arguments in the Dutch political debates about the formal recognition and accommodation of cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslim immigrants and their descendants. First of all, some light will have to be shed on the legal context in which these debates have taken place.

6.3.1 Legal context

In the Netherlands, the observance of religious practices and expressions of religious convictions are protected by law. Article 6 of the Dutch Constitution on protecting the freedom of religion and belief stipulates that, 'Everyone shall have the right to profess freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community with others, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law'.[7] Quite apart from this specific article on religion, the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination are established in Article 1 of the Constitution. In 1994, the principles laid down in this article were elaborated in the Equal Treatment Act (ETA), which explicitly prohibits both direct and indirect forms of discrimination (see Chapter 5).[8] Nor does it stop here. A clear example of the Dutch system of

[6] Van der Burg goes further and distinguishes two sub-types of inclusive neutrality: proportional and compensatory neutrality. For a discussion see Van der Burg (2009; 2011).

[7] See "Nederlandse Grondwet" (in Dutch), accessed December 12, 2012, http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl.

[8] For a discussion of rulings of the Equal Treatment Commission regarding (perceived) discrimination of Muslims, see Rodrigues (2008).

inclusive neutrality (see Section 6.2) can be found in Article 23 of the Constitution which guarantees the freedom of education and guarantees denominational schools the same funding conditions, rights and duties as public secular schools. Quite apart from these domestic regulations, international treaties guaranteeing fundamental rights such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also apply in the Netherlands and even take precedence over national laws and regulation (as is outlined in Article 94 of the Constitution).

The debates on whether or not a religious manifestation can be prohibited are held, indeed must be contained, within this legal context, and centre on two central questions: (1) whether the practice or manifestation concerned can be considered the result of an 'accepted' religious prescription and, if yes, (2) whether it is desirable indeed possible to infringe on the freedom of religion and belief by specifically prohibiting it (cf. Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2005: 49; Saharso 2003: 13).

Over the years, those customs of Muslim immigrants which can be considered to emanate from religious prescriptions, have been hotly debated. Among the controversial points which elicit a flood of discussions are religious symbols and dress, notably the Islamic headscarf, the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with persons of the opposite gender, ritual slaughter and the observance of religious holidays (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1995; 2008). On the material level, the right to build mosques and houses of prayer is also an aspect of religious freedom (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1995: 32) and the right to found Muslim schools falls under the aegis of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution which guarantees freedom of education. At this point, it is important to note that a certain manifestation or practice considered to be obedience to religious obligations and prescriptions is not necessarily shared by all adherents of the religion concerned or agreed upon by all denominations in that religion. After all, religion and culture are contingent on interpretation, and therefore diverse and dynamic. Examples are Islamic dressing rules for women. The term *hijab*, usually used to describe a headscarf which covers the head but not the face, also refers to an Islamic principle which prescribes dressing modestly. This principle applies in public places, more specifically to situations in which members of the opposite sex are present who are not close family. Shadid and Van Koningsveld (2005) distinguish three different views on this principle among Muslim scholars. The majority advocate the full covering of the female body, with the exception of the face and hands. A smaller group of scholars believes that modesty also requires women to cover their hands and faces, except the eyes. A third group of scholars say that Islamic prescriptions on modest dress do not apply 'in the current era' (2005: 35). In practice, the majority of

Muslim women does not wear a headscarf or face-covering veil in daily life, except during prayer or when visiting mosques (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2005: 38).

Once it is established that a certain practice or manifestation is the result of a religious prescription, logically the next question is whether it is desirable or legally possible to infringe the right of freedom of religion. Legally, it is possible to infringe the right of freedom of religion in exceptional cases, primarily when it is essential to protect the freedoms of others and in the interests of public safety. This infringement is made quite clear in Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This paragraph reads: 'Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.' In other words, it is possible that (fundamental) rights, such as the freedom of religion and freedom of expression, might collide. As neither ECHR nor the Dutch Constitution prioritizes one fundamental right over the other, when fundamental rights do collide and the parties concerned demand a solution, a judge is obliged to take the specific context and interests into account.

Obvious examples of how freedom of religion can be limited in this legal context concern face-covering veils which are worn as religious expressions, such as the Islamic *niqab* (often confused with the *burqa*). In 2003 the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC – see Chapter 5)[9] ruled in a specific case that wearing face-covering veils at school could be prohibited by the school because it can hinder communication between students and between teachers and students.[10] However, another ruling in a case in 2000 shows that ETC does not assume that wearing a face-covering veil is always a hindrance to communication.[11] The school has to present plausible arguments that communication is indeed hindered before ETC can reach a decision about whether or not a school can prohibit the wearing of face covering veils (also see Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2005: 53). However, in other instances ETC has argued that face-covering veils can also be prohibited in schools in the interest of public safety, as these veils hinder identification which makes it difficult to prevent unauthorized persons from entering school buildings (CGB 2003).

Different problems have arisen when some public schools have argued that, in order not to impinge on state neutrality, their employees should be prohibited from expressing their religion in their appearance or dress. An example is a case in

[9] ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012.
[10] ETC ruling 2003-40.
[11] ETC ruling 2000-63.

1999 in which ETC considered the argument put forward by a public school that, to uphold the neutrality of the school, a trainee teacher should be prohibited from wearing an Islamic headscarf. On this occasion, ETC decided that this ban was in conflict with the principles of non-discrimination. ETC expatiated on its decision, saying that because the trainee teacher 'professes a certain religion and expresses this by wearing a headscarf does not preclude that she has an open attitude and is capable to teach in accordance with the character of the school, being a public educational institution' (see also Saharso & Lettinga 2008: 459).[12]

That said, inevitably interpretations of state neutrality differ (as discussed in Section 6.2), and some interpretations do entail infringements on the freedom of religion in certain institutional contexts, for example, the police force. In political and public debates other arguments on such infringements have also been discussed. Among these is the one asserting that certain religious expressions adhered to by immigrants should be prohibited in order to encourage their integration. The time has now come to give a brief review of these arguments.

6.3.2 Policies and debates concerning cultural distinctiveness

Several phases can be distinguished which are closely related to the course of immigrant integration policies discussed in Chapter 5, in political debates on the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. These include the phases of *laissez-faire* prior to the 1980s, *recognition* in the 1980s, *laissez-faire* once again in the 1990s, *cultural adaptation* from 2000 until 2011, and the most recent phase of *political populism* which commenced in 2011 and is still current. The overriding characteristic of this last phase is the struggle of both the populist right and ultra-orthodox Christian politicians to limit the freedom of religion of Muslim citizens (cf. Lettinga & Saharso 2012; Saharso & Lettinga 2008; Shadid 2006; Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008; Breemer & Maussen 2012).[13]

As mentioned in Chapter 5, prior to the 1980s the Dutch government had taken no steps, however tentative, to develop any structural policies which would have encouraged immigrant integration. It would have amounted to wasted effort, it was felt, as the presence of the labour migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s was considered temporary (Penninx 2005). Hence in this phase a *laissez-faire* approach prevailed, and little attention was paid to the cultural and religious distinctiveness of immigrants. If immigrants retained

[12] ETC ruling 1999-18.

[13] Chapters 3, 4 and 5 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of immigrant groups.

elements of their cultural identities, such a preservation was mainly seen with approbation as facilitating their return to their countries of origin (WRR 1979). Most scientific and policy debates about immigrants centred on such socio-economic issues as their housing and the advantages and disadvantages of certain forms of labour migration (Shadid 2006).

Once the government had woke up to the fact that most labour migrants intended to settle in the Netherlands permanently, in the 1980s it realized that steps to control their settlement were inevitable and structural integration policies, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, were devised. The importance of these new policies was stressed in a report called *Ethnic Minorities*, published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy in 1979 (WRR 1979). Following the recommendations in this report, the new integration policies were devised with a view towards the goal of immigrants achieving equality and their participation in society (Penninx 2005). In later criticism of Dutch integration policies, it has been asserted that the policies of the 1980s mostly emphasized the necessity to preserve the cultural identities of immigrants (Duyvendak & Scholten 2011). At this point, it must be unequivocably stressed that this crticism is not correct (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; Vink 2007). In fact, the WRR report of 1979 explicitly states that the preservation of cultural identities should not be a goal of integration policies, as such encouragement could lead to the 'cultural isolation of ethnic groups', which in the long run could hinder the participation of immigrants in society. Nevertheless, in its report WRR did recommend that it was important to *recognize the cultural distinctiveness* of immigrants. It was thought that this goal could be reached by extending the existing guarantees safeguarding cultural diversity (such as the constitutional right of freedom of religion) to (new) cultural and religious immigrant groups, not only legally but also in practice (1979: XIX; XX-XXII). The expected goal of government policies should be the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants which, in turn, was seen as a precondition for the improvement of their socio-economic position and hence could prevent putative future identity conflicts (see also Chapter 3). Such recommendations imply a plea for multicultural government policies. However, several studies indicate that the resultant integration policies were mainly affected by the institutional legacy of Dutch pillarization,[14] for example, by extending existing rights to build prayer houses and establish denominational schools to all religious groups. The ideology

[14] Pillarization refers to the development in the Netherlands, between the 1900s and the 1970s, in which religious and secular groups established their own separate institutions with the (financial) support of the government. Among them were political parties, (denominational) schools and labour unions (Maussen 2012).

of multiculturalism seems to have been very much an also-ran (Duyvendak & Scholten 2011; 2012).

In this context, various legal, political and general public debates started about the formal and public recognition of the cultural practices and expressions of religious convictions by Muslim and Hindu immigrants and their descendants. These debates have led, *inter alia*, to the inclusion of provisions in collective labour agreements of civil servants and in some collective labour agreements in the private sector to do with the observance of religious holidays. These accords gave Muslim civil servants the right to ask and receive permission for paid leave to observe the two generally recognized Islamic holidays – *Id al-Fitr* and *Id al-Adha*, but only when their duties would permit such leave. Several collective labour agreements in the private sector, enshrined the same conditions which likewise allowed Muslim employees to be entitled to paid leave for one, two or three day(s). Such provisions are similar to more general provisions which allow Dutch employees to be granted permission for paid or unpaid leave on religious holidays (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 162-164). In the same period, proponents of the recognition of cultural identities were arguing that mosques could be built in an 'ethnic architecture to express diversity' (Breemer & Maussen 2012: 292).[15] In a similar vein it was also said that Muslim schools could contribute to the integration and emancipation of Muslim groups (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2006: 84).

Opponents attacked this focus on socio-cultural emancipation, claiming that it could hinder integration (also see Chapter 5). They were convinced that Muslim schools would reduce the social contact of Muslim children with non-Muslim children, and that lack of experience with ethnically mixed groups would hinder the educational careers of these Muslim students (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2006: 84; see also Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 247-258).

The focus, in integration policies, on socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants came increasingly under attack during the 1990s. As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 5, in a new report WRR recommended that the focus in these policies should shift more to the improvement of the immigrants' position in the fields of education and the labour market, and that socio-cultural emancipation was the responsibility of the immigrant groups themselves – implying a governmental attitude of *laissez-faire* towards the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants (WRR 1989: 19-24). Following these new WRR recommendations, the government changed its integration policies and in 1994 presented these

[15] Many discussions concerning mosques in this period had to do with such practical issues as the need for housing, the lack of parking space for mosque-goers , etcetera (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 58-61).

changes in a new policy document, the *Contourennota* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994; see also Chapter 5).

In the following years, various reports about the quality of education in Muslim schools were published. In 1999, the Inspectorate of Education concluded that Muslim schools had not managed to realize their central goal of raising the performance of their students to match the average level of Dutch students.[16] Nevertheless, the Inspectorate also concluded that the performance of students in Muslim schools was no lower than that of students in schools with a comparable number of students of non-Dutch origin.[17] The disappointing performance of their students was attributed to the handicaps with which they entered primary school (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 253-258).

Around the year 2000, political debates entered a new phase in which the *cultural adaptation* of immigrants emerged as a central issue. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, several authors claimed that government integration policies had failed. They stated that social cohesion was being threatened because these policies had focused too much on immigrants' socio-cultural emancipation and too little on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values.[18] These authors hammered on the point that certain norms and values embraced by immigrants and their descendants, especially those of Muslims, are incompatible with Dutch norms and values. The politician Pim Fortuyn combined these ideas into one political discourse, of which important parts were copied by other political parties (Penninx 2005; see also Hoving 2011).

With this change in climate, the political debates on the functioning of mosques and Muslim schools shifted. The debates on mosques became increasingly concerned with ideas about how mosques should play a role in a development towards a more 'modern' Islam which would be compatible with Dutch norms and values (Breemer & Maussen 2012: 292).[19] The focus on Muslim schools altered to deterring the possible influence of 'political Islam' and the consequences of this infiltration for the integration of children attending these schools (for an extensive discussion see Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 258-266). In reports in 2002 and 2003 the Inspectorate of Education concluded that the education in Muslim schools was not in contradiction of the 'basic values of a democratic legal state',

[16] Onderwijsinspectie (1999).

[17] Schools with a relatively high proportion of pupils of non-Dutch origin are often referred to as 'black schools' in the Netherlands. See Vedder (2006).

[18] Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.

[19] As of 2012, there are around 450 mosques in the Netherlands (FORUM 2012).

and moreover that it encouraged the integration of the students.[20] So far so good, the fly in the ointment was that the teaching quality of the religious education in Muslim schools was found to be lacking.[21] On the basis of these reports, in April 2004 the government presented a policy document, in which it stated that there was no need to stand in the way of the establishment of Muslim schools as the contribution of these schools to the problem of segregation was negligible and that the establishment of Muslim schools was in accordance with the constitutional freedom of education. The government also announced that a new teaching method was being developed to improve religious education.[22] The goal of this method, published in 2007, is to help Muslim children gain the required knowledge to be able to develop the attitudes and behaviour necessary to be able to function as a citizen in Dutch society.[23]

The individual religious expressions of Muslim immigrants and their descendants were also more frequently debated in Dutch Parliament. Among the topics broached were religious symbols and dress (notably the Islamic headscarf), the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with persons of the opposite gender, and ritual slaughter.[24] The religious dress of public officials was a regular topic of debate between 2004 and 2006. A majority of Parliament members agreed that the neutrality of the state did not warrant the prohibition of wearing an Islamic headscarf by employees (and pupils) in public educational institutions (see also Section 6.3.1). Despite this liberal attitude, some members of Parliament still

[20] Onderwijsinspectie (2002; 2003). In these reports, the Inspectorate also concluded that the performance of students in Muslim schools did not differ from that of students in schools with a comparable number of students of non-Dutch origin (in line with the results of the study published in 1999).

[21] Moreover, the Inspectorate of Education noted that only 0.5% of all primary school students attended Muslim primary schools, and that whether 'the contribution of Islamic schools to the integration [of their students] is negative or positive, 96% of the students of non-Dutch origin in the Netherlands attend other schools' (Onderwijsinspectie 2003, cited in Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 264).

[22] The functioning of the boards of the Muslim schools was also discussed in this policy document. Since then, the centre of attention in the political and public debate has shifted to the (administrative) problems in specific Muslim schools (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 265). Recent examples are the closure of the Islamitisch College Amsterdam in 2010 because of the poor quality of the education, and the exam fraud by students of the Ibn Ghaldoun school in Rotterdam, both schools offering secondary education.

[23] ISBO & SLO (2007).

[24] There are also discussions of cases which involve only one or a few incidents but do not seem to be exemplary of a larger group. One of these cases involves the Dutch lawyer Mohammed Enait who, in 2008, refused to rise when the judges entered the courtroom. Enait said he did not rise before the judges because of his faith – Islam – which taught him that everyone is equal. See: NRC Handelsblad (December 11, 2009), *Advocaat hoeft niet te staan voor rechters*.

argued that the principle of public neutrality necessitates that public officials in certain functions, for instance, police officers and court personnel, should not openly display their religious affiliation (Lettinga & Saharso 2012: 324). In the wake of these debates, in 2007 the Parliament decided that openly displaying religious affiliation should be prohibited in the police force.[25]

In 2005 the time was ripe for the member of Parliament Wilders, who would later found the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom), to propose that *burqas* should be banned from public spaces.[26] Wilders waged a fierce opposition declaring that wearing a *burqa* is incompatible with Dutch norms and values, the norm of gender equality being that most sinned against. His motion was accepted by Parliament, not because of conflicting norms and values but because such an infringement on the freedom of religion was deemed necessary in the interests of public safety (Lettinga & Saharso 2012). Not unsurprisingly, the right wing and left wing political parties approached the *burqa* in clearly different ways. Whereas Wilders and the VVD (the right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) framed the *burqa* as a symbol of the oppression of Muslim women and argued that a ban would be in the interests of gender equality, left wing parties shrugged this off and stated that not a ban on religious dress but emancipation is the key to gender equality (Lettinga & Saharso 2012).[27]

Although it cannot be denied that a majority of parliamentarians interpreted most issues of religious symbols and dress in the context of church-state relations and the ideal of the freedom of religion, the perception of conflicting norms and values also indubitably played an important role in debates on Muslims who refuse, on religious grounds, to shake hands with persons of the opposite gender. Matters rose to a head in the political discussion in 2006. The discussion was sparked by a ruling handed down by the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC)[28] on the case of a Muslim female teacher who was suspended from her job for such a refusal.[29] The ETC ruling stated that the demand of the school that employees have to be willing to shake hands when greeting others, irrespective of their gender, results in (indirect) discrimination on the grounds of religion.[30] The Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration at the time, Verdonk, criticized this ruling in the media and even

[25] Tweede Kamer (2007-2008).

[26] Tweede Kamer (2005-2006).

[27] In 2012, the government proposed to introduce a ban on face coverings, including the *burqa*. However, as of January 2014, the Parliament has not yet voted on this motion.

[28] ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012.

[29] Only very few such cases have so far come before the ETC: no more than 20 cases between 1998 and the end of 2013. Around half of these cases have led to a ruling (discrimination or not). See "Oordelen", accessed February 27, 2014, http://www.mensenrechten.nl.

[30] ETC Ruling 2006-221.

declared that ETC should be abolished. PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal Democrats 66) and Green Left (all left-wing opposition parties), on this occasion joined by the right-wing government party CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), immediately stated that in their opinion abolition of ETC was just not on the cards, although they added that they did not agree with this particular ETC ruling.[31] Similar cases in later years have also elicited disapproving reactions from politicians.[32] Some, including parliamentarians of the PVV, have taken the line that the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with persons of the opposite gender is a denial of gender equality.[33] This, however, is based on a misunderstanding. The refusal to shake hands is not directed specifically against either women or men for that matter: this norm implies that men should not shake hands with women, *and* vice-versa. Therefore, this norm does not transgress gender equality. Instead, the refusal of these Muslims is meant as an expression of respect (Beck & Wiegers 2008). Other politicians, prominent among them the mayor of Amsterdam, a prominent member of the PvdA, have argued that shaking hands is an important and generally accepted Dutch cultural norm, and that public officials have to abide by that norm.[34] This view is a clear example of an ethnic and exclusive conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3). So far no legislation has been proposed in Parliament to enforce this cultural norm.[35]

These changes in the political debate since 2000 appear to have been mirrored by similar changes in the public debate. In an investigation of the public debate about the Islamic headscarf between 1999 and 2007, Saharso and Lettinga (2008: 469) concluded that, while the headscarf was initially mainly discussed in the context of church-state relations, in 2005 the public debate had taken a different tack and subsequently the headscarf has been discussed mainly in terms of conflicting norms and values and the emancipation of women. Opponents of the Islamic headscarf constantly denounce it as a symbol of the unequal treatment of women, an idea which is often accompanied by the assumption that Muslim women do not have a free choice in whether or not to wear the headdress (see also Chesler 2010: 31). It has also been argued that the Islamic headscarf and *burqa* are undesirable deviations from, or even threats to, Dutch norms and values. Adopting a different stance, others have argued that a prohibition of the Islamic headscarf would imply discrimination on the grounds of religion and impede the participation of Islamic women in society (Saharso & Lettinga 2008: 468-469).

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[31] NRC Handelsblad (November 9, 2006), *Verdonk wil commissie kwijt na uitspraak*.
[32] See, for example, Tillie (2011).
[33] Tillie (2011).
[34] Tillie (2011).
[35] But see Verhaar (2011).

Although the religious practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants and their descendants could be said to have emerged as a central issue in political debates after 2000, the actual attention paid by Dutch politicians to this issue appears to have peaked in the years 2004 to 2006. The neglect of the issue by politicians since 2007 is clearly reflected in recent government policy documents on immigrant integration and in the electoral programmes of Dutch political parties. In the policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* published in 2011, the government stated that Dutch society is based on a 'fundamental continuity of values, views, institutions and customs which shape the predominant culture in Dutch society'.[36] The government continues by saying that these values and customs cannot simply be abandoned, and immigrants must adjust to the fact that: 'Dutch society, in all its diversity, is the society in which those who settle have to learn to live, to which they have to adjust and fit into.' [37] Tellingly, it chose to lay its stress on freedom of religion, which it hastened to add also applies to Muslim citizens. Certainly the government was aware of the fact that some Dutch citizens do worry about Islam, because it introduces other, alien-seeming traditions and views, and has of course recently been associated with 'violence and radicalism'. Opting to go on the defensive, the government considered it to be important to dispel these concerns, but without denying Muslim citizens their freedom of religion and without expressing a principled distrust of Islam (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011).

The only concrete policy measure actually announced in this document has to do with the ban on face covers, including the *burqa*. This infringement on the freedom of religion was justified by proposing a ban on all face coverings in the interests of public safety, and not by making any potentially disruptive remarks about the deviant norms and values of others. Parliament has come thus far, but of January 2014, it had still not yet voted on this motion. The views in Parliament on this issue are still divided. PVV is in favour of a full *burqa* ban, holding fast to its tenet that Islam is a threat to Dutch society and all its expressions or manifestations have to be banned. VVD is in favour of a full ban on face coverings because it thinks it is essential for people to be 'recognizable' in social interactions. PvdA and Green Left oppose a full ban. PvdA argues that a full ban violates freedom of religion, and that face coverings should only be banned in specific circumstances, for instance, in schools when they might hinder communication and compromise security. However, as PvdA pointed out in its 2012 election manifesto, such a ban

[36] In the document the government speaks of, in Dutch, the *leidende cultuur*, possibly referring to the German term *Leitkultur*. This can be translated as 'guiding culture', 'leading culture' or 'predominant culture'. See Pautz (2005).

[37] Author's translation.

is already possible under current legislation (as is explained in Section 6.3.1 above).[38]

Apart from the debate on the *burqa*, there has also been a broad political debate in recent years on the Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter of animals without prior stunning.[39] These debates have concerned a possible collision between the right to freedom of religion and the protection of animal rights. In June 2012, the Dutch Senate voted against a parliamentary motion to ban this type of slaughter. Senate members stated that the arguments presented to support the ban were not strong enough to warrant an infringement on the freedom of religion.[40]

Judging from the election programmes of 2012, only two political parties which still argue that the religious manifestations and expressions of Muslim citizens are undesirable in Dutch society and that the religious freedom of Muslim citizens has to be curtailed are left. PVV considers Islam to be a threat to society and proposes banning various expressions and manifestations related to it, including the Quran, mosques and minarets. On the religious front, the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) is calling for a limitation on manifestations of 'cultures and religions that do not belong in Dutch society'. The party most certainly does not consider Islam an enrichment for Dutch society, and in its protests stresses the 'fanatical and extremely violent aspects' of Islam. It has called for the construction of mosques to be stopped, and has demanded that the public call to prayer from minarets be banned. [41] The proposals of these two parties not only violate freedom of religion, they also run counter to the principles of non-discrimination, as what they are asking for does not contain demands for any similar bans on manifestations and expressions of other religions (see Section 6.3.1 above and Chapter 5).

This discussion has clearly revealed that the Dutch Constitution, especially the articles guaranteeing non-discrimination and freedom of religion, provides the legal context for the formal recognition of cultural and religious distinctiveness in the Netherlands. Whether and how to limit the freedom of religion of Muslim citizens in the Netherlands has been debated from every conceivable angle, especially between 2000 and 2006. After that point, in recent years only the populist right and the ultra-orthodox Christian politicians have been left still battling the tide and trying to limit this right. It is now time to move on to explore the views current in society about the recognition of the religious distinctiveness of Muslims.

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[38] GroenLinks (2012); PvdA (2012); PVV (2012); VVD (2012).

[39] For more information on this practice see Shadid & Van Koningsveld (2008: 151-154).

[40] Questions were asked about whether ritually slaughtered animals suffer more than animals which are stunned prior to slaughter.

[41] PVV (2012); SGP (2012).

6.4 Views in society on cultural distinctiveness

In this section, the views prevalent in Dutch society to do with (immigrants') distinctive cultural practices, norms and values will be examined by analysing empirical data collected in the two questionnaires conducted for this research. As these questionnaires were conducted in 2012 and 2013, the answers reflect the situation as it was several years after the political debates on this issue peaked (see Section 6.3). The analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, the views in society on the value of cultural diversity will be examined, and in the second part the ideas about the recognition of religious distinctiveness will be explored.

6.4.1 Views in society on the value of cultural diversity

To explore general views on the value of cultural diversity, respondents were asked whether they considered the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an enrichment or an impoverishment of Dutch society. The analysis indicates that around 42% do consider the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an enrichment of society. Nevertheless, almost one-fifth (19%) thinks that it has caused an impoverishment, and one-third (32%) have no opinion about whether it results in either an enrichment or impoverishment.

Those who consider cultural diversity to be an enrichment for society referred to its value as a resource for learning and mentioned the value of such well-known cultural markers as cuisine, music and dance. The general theme reflected in what was said was that living in a culturally diverse society improves reflective, critical and creative thinking: 'It is easier to find solutions to problems when you are confronted by and acquainted with the various points of views resulting from cultural difference', as one respondent said. Ely and Thomas (2001: 240) call this kind of enrichment an 'integration-and-learning perspective', when cultural diversity is considered to be a 'resource for learning and adaptive change'.

Those who considered cultural diversity to be an impoverishment of society referred above all to the religious practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants, which they consider to be incompatible with Dutch culture. They referred to Muslims' unequal treatment of women, their negative attitude towards homosexuality and their intolerance of non-Muslims. These arguments will be discussed more extensively in the next section.

To explore the relationships between the appreciation of cultural diversity and variables such as gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.[42] These relationships can be seen in the following 'joint plot of category points' where the strength is indicated by

[42] See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA.

the distance between the categories in the plot: the smaller the distance, the stronger the relationship.



Figure 6.1: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of appreciation of cultural diversity and other factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal normalization.)

As the ellipses in the plot indicate, three clusters can be distinguished. Each cluster is represented by the categories of the items measuring the appreciation of cultural diversity: 'Enrichment', 'Impoverishment' and 'Neither'. As the two items measuring this appreciation appear to be strongly correlated, these items were used to construct a summated scale describing the level of this appreciation of cultural

diversity.[43] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to assess more closely to what extent this appreciation is related to the above mentioned variables.[44]

This analysis and the plot presented above indicate that respondents in the first cluster, on the left in the plot, can be characterized as *rejecters* of cultural diversity. The majority of them voted for the political parties PVV or SGP (political preference: $\beta = .28$, $p < .001$).[45] In contrast, respondents in the second cluster, to the right in the plot, can be characterized as *appreciatives*, the majority of whom have voted for the left-wing political parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left or for the Christian CDA. The third cluster includes those who think cultural diversity neither enriches nor impoverishes society. Many of them voted for the left-wing SP (Socialist Party) or did not vote at all. The voters for the VVD and CU (Christian Union) are clearly divided on the issue. Furthermore, cultural diversity appears to be more appreciated by those with a higher level of education ($\beta = .33$, $p < .001$) and by women ($\beta = .10$, $p < .05$). Not surprisingly, the analysis also indicates that immigrants of both non-Western and Western origin are more appreciative of cultural diversity than are the native Dutch ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$).

As mentioned already, respondents who do not appreciate cultural diversity tend to refer to the norms and values of Muslim immigrants, which are perceived to be incompatible with Dutch norms and values. To explore views on the preservation of Dutch norms and values, respondents were asked whether and why this preservation is important. A large majority (88%) indicated that the preservation of Dutch norms and values is important, and 10% did not have an opinion on the issue. The former applies to more than 95% of voters for Christian and right wing parties (CDA, SGP, CU, VVD, PVV) as opposed to around 82% of the non-voters and voters for left-wing parties (PvdA, D66, SP, Green Left) ($\beta = .28$, $p < .001$).[46] In expressing their views on this preservation in concrete terms, they mentioned such cultural items as the equal treatment of women and homosexuals, freedom of speech and tolerance of cultural diversity. Those who do not consider the preservation of Dutch norms and values to be important and those who do not have an opinion on the issue argued that it is far from obvious which norms and values are typically Dutch and that culture changes over time.

[43] Cronbach's Alpha for these two items is .81.

[44] This analysis included the variables age, gender, educational level, income, descent and political preference. In the CATREG procedure, the summated scale was specified as ordinal and discretized by ranking, as the scale was derived from ordinal items.

[45] All mentioned βs in this Chapter are standardized.

[46] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to explore the relationship between political preference and the importance attached to the preservation of Dutch norms and values, in which was controlled for age, gender, educational level and descent.

However, they did agree that human rights, including equal treatment of women and homosexuals, should be protected.

6.4.2 Views in society on the recognition of religious distinctiveness

In the previous section, it was made clear that respondents who are of the opinion that cultural diversity is an impoverishment for the Netherlands tended to harp on the incompatibility of Dutch and Muslim norms and values. This is not surprising, considering the fact that the political debates on cultural distinctiveness in the last two decades have primarily pivoted around the religious practices and the norms and values of Muslim immigrants and their descendants (see Section 6.3). To examine this finding in more depth, this section will explore the views held on the recognition of religious distinctiveness.

A fifth (21%) of respondents considers Islamic and Dutch norms and values to be compatible. They explained that individuals interpret their religion, including Islam, in various ways and that only the specific norms and values of a small majority of Muslim, Christian and other religious citizens are unacceptable to the majority of Dutch citizens. In contrast, the majority (61%) considers Islamic norms and values to be incompatible with Dutch norms and values. This idea is reflected in respondents' views about wearing religious symbols and specific items of dress. Although a small minority (9%) disapproves of the wearing of *any* religious symbols and dress in public space, a considerably larger proportion of respondents (21%) disapproves of Muslim women wearing a headscarf in public space.

The opposition to certain aspects of the *formal* recognition of religious distinctiveness is even larger, as can be seen in Table 6.1 below. To explore views on these aspects, respondents were asked whether certain expressions and manifestations of religion of 'new' religious groups in the Netherlands should be allowed.

Table 6.1

Opinions on formal recognition of religious distinctiveness of 'new' religious groups (all respondents).

Expression or manifestation	Yes (%)	No (%)
Right of public officials (including teachers) to wear Islamic headscarf	41	47
Right to build prayer houses	56	34
Right to establish denominational schools	22	69
Right to observe religious holidays	58	31
Right to ritual slaughter (without prior stunning)	20	69

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).

The table shows that more than two-thirds (69%) opposes both the legal right to ritual slaughter and granting new religious groups the right to establish their own denominational schools. There is much less opposition to granting new religious groups the right to build prayer houses (34%) and to observe their religious holidays (31%). Respondents tend to be more divided on the issue of public officials, including teachers, wearing the Islamic headscarf, with almost half (47%) opposed.

Those who oppose a formal recognition of the expressions mentioned in the table above argued that manifestations of Islamic culture, such as the Islamic headscarf, mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic holidays, do not belong in the Netherlands. 'Dutch employers should not take Islamic holidays into account, after all, we are in the Netherlands,' one respondent said. They also mentioned the incompatibility of Islamic and Dutch norms and values. They argued that Islamic norms and values are contrary to the principles of the equal treatment of women and homosexuals, and that Muslims are intolerant of non-Muslims. However, although these respondents were of the opinion that the Islamic headscarf does not belong in the Netherlands, only a few considered it to be a symbol of the unequal treatment of women.

Another argument brought forward is that Muslim citizens who observe their religion tend to force their culture and religion on non-Muslims. This can be considered a prejudice against Muslims, especially as those respondents could not substantiate their opinion. Some said that wearing the Islamic headscarf is 'provocative' or 'intentionally conspicuous' in order to force Islam upon non-Muslims. In the same vein, it was argued that there should not be too many manifestations of Islam, because this would force Islam upon non-Muslims.

'Muslims could take over,' respondents said, and 'They have to adapt to our culture, we should not adapt to theirs'. Likewise, some respondents argued that teachers in public schools should not wear an Islamic headscarf because it is too conspicuous and forces the religion of the teacher upon the children. Strikingly, the religious expressions of Christian and Jewish teachers were not considered to be a problem because they are 'less conspicuous' and because 'wearing a cross or yarmulke is typically Dutch, unlike the Islamic headscarf'.

These findings tie in with results of studies discussed by Maliepaard and Phalet (2012: 131-132), who conclude that the 'religious identity, values and ways of life [of Muslims] are devalued by large parts of the majority' of Dutch citizens, and that more than half of the Dutch 'hold unfavorable views of Muslims' and view Dutch and Muslims values as incompatible (see also Huijnk & Dagevos 2012).

Some respondents mentioned arguments which voiced concern about the effects on integration. They were insistent that Muslim schools should be prohibited because they will hinder integration, but Christian and Jewish schools do not. Others worried about problems with the financial and organizational administration of Muslim schools. These arguments about integration seem to be similar to claims made by critics of multiculturalism discussed in Section 6.2, among them Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005). Nevertheless, respondents palpably consider Muslim schools, and not the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as such, to be an obstacle to integration. Only a few respondents argued that all denominational schools, including Christian and Jewish schools, should be banned in order to prevent segregation and facilitate integration. In short, it appears that respondents who oppose the aspects mentioned in the table above do not oppose the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness in itself, but reject the presence of certain manifestations of Islam in the Netherlands.

These respondents did not believe that the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness – for example, allowing police officers to wear an Islamic headscarf – would conflict with the neutrality of the state, in contrast to the ideas of such opponents as Cliteur (2004), mentioned in Section 6.2. Likewise, the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness, such as the freedom of religion, was not associated with the risk of multiple loyalties or decreasing loyalty to the nation-state by respondents, in contrast to the arguments espoused by several Dutch right-wing politicians and scholars, such as Huntington (2004) (see Chapter 4).

Respondents who are in favour of the formal recognition of the religious manifestations mentioned in the table above stress the importance of equal treatment and the freedom of religion. They were also convinced that it is important for children to be able to become acquainted with cultural and religious

diversity at school. In their view, the Islamic headscarf should be allowed in school to show children that tolerance of cultural and religious diversity is an important cultural aspect, and that the headscarf is no more and no less than a religious expression of individuals. However, both the opponents and proponents of the formal recognition of Islamic expressions agreed that the *burqa* should be banned because it hinders communication.

The arguments mentioned in relation to ritual slaughter were clearly different. Opponents did not argue that Islamic and Dutch norms and values are incompatible, but referred to animal rights. They were concerned that ritual slaughter (without prior stunning) causes animals suffering. In contrast, those who did not oppose this doubted whether ritual slaughter causes more suffering for animals than conventional ways of slaughtering.

To explore the relationships between views on the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness and such variables as gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.[47] This analysis included 4 of the above-mentioned items to do with the freedom of religion, and 2 items measuring whether employers and healthcare providers should take the cultural and religious distinctiveness of employees and clients into account. [48] The relationships can be seen in the following 'joint plot of category points' in which relationships between the categories are displayed. The closer the categories in the plot are to each other, the stronger their relationship.

[47] See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA.

[48] This analysis includes the religious manifestations mentioned in Table 6.1 above, with the exception of the item on ritual slaughter, because the discussion on ritual slaughter appears to be more about animal rights than about the perceived incompatibility between Islamic and Dutch norms and values.



Figure 6.2: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of aspects of formal recognition of religious distinctiveness and other factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal normalization.)

The ellipses in the plot indicate two clusters. Each cluster is represented by the categories of the items measuring views on the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness: 'Yes' indicating approval and 'No' indicating disapproval.

As the items measuring these views appear to be strongly correlated, a CATPCA analysis which included these items was carried out. In this analysis, two components were extracted.[49] The first component includes the items to do with religious freedom, and hence represents *tolerance of religious distinctiveness*. The second component represents *consideration for cultural distinctiveness*, as it includes the two items on whether employers and healthcare providers should take the cultural and religious distinctiveness of employees and clients into account. These items were used to construct summated scales to describe the levels of this tolerance and consideration.[50] A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to assess to what extent these two scales are related to the above-mentioned variables.[51]

This analysis and the plot above indicate that respondents in the cluster to the left in the plot can be characterized as *tolerant of religious distinctiveness*. They are in favour of granting ('new') religious groups the right to build prayer houses, establish denominational schools, observe their religious holidays and the right of public officials and teachers to wear the Islamic headscarf. By and large, they are considerate of cultural distinctiveness, that is, hold the view that employers and healthcare providers should take the cultural or religious distinctiveness of employees and patients into account. These respondents generally voted for the left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left and the Christian parties CDA and CU. The cluster on the right includes respondents who can be characterized as *intolerant of religious distinctiveness* – those who are not in favour of the aspects mentioned above. They generally voted for the PVV and SGP. Voters for the VVD and SP, between the two clusters, appear to have an average level of tolerance for religious distinctiveness (political preference: $\beta = .31$, $p < .001$). These results are similar to those presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40), who found that in France, Germany, Spain and the United States, political conservatives appear to have a more negative attitude towards Muslims.

[49] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 2 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 2 components could be extracted, which explained 59.63% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

[50] Cronbach's Alpha for the four items in the scale describing tolerance of religious distinctiveness is .73; Cronbach's Alpha for the two items in the scale describing consideration for cultural distinctiveness is .69.

[51] This analysis included the variables age, gender, educational level, income, descent and political preference. In the CATREG procedure, the summated scales were specified as ordinal and discretized by ranking, as the scales were derived from ordinal items.

Not surprisingly, non-Western immigrants appear to be more tolerant of religious distinctiveness ($\beta = .23$, $p < .001$) and more considerate of cultural distinctiveness ($\beta = .16$, $p < .001$) than Western immigrants and native Dutch, in line with findings of Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) and of Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 113). Generally, the higher the respondents' level of education, the more tolerant ($\beta = .38$, $p < .001$) and considerate ($\beta = .19$, $p < .001$) they are of religious and cultural distinctiveness. The latter finding ties in with results discussed by Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 98) regarding Dutch natives and immigrant groups, and results presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40) who analysed survey data from France, Germany, Spain and the United States.

These levels of tolerance and consideration appear to be relatively strongly and negatively related to the importance respondents attach to exclusive (ethnic) criteria for Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background discussed the in Chapter 3 (tolerance: $\beta = -.50$, $p < .001$; consideration: $\beta = -.22$, $p < .001$). This tolerance and consideration is clearly less strongly (but still negatively) related to the importance they attach to inclusive (civic) criteria for national belonging, such as feeling Dutch (tolerance: $\beta = -.22$, $p < .001$; consideration: $\beta = -.20$, $p < .001$). Similar relationships were found to the importance attached to territorial criteria for national belonging, such as having been born and living for most of one's life in the country (tolerance: $\beta = -.19$, $p < .001$; consideration: $\beta = -.17$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, these levels of tolerance and consideration are strongly negatively related to the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat (discussed in Chapter 5) (tolerance: $\beta = -.61$, $p < .001$; consideration: $\beta = -.43$, $p < .001$) (cf. Stupar, Van de Vijver, Te Lindert & Fontaine 2014: 33). Unsurprisingly, these levels of tolerance and consideration are positively related to support for the principle of equal treatment (discussed in Chapter 5) (tolerance: $\beta = .17$, $p < .001$; consideration: $\beta = .12$, $p < .01$). Similar relationships were found with support for national anti-discrimination policies (also discussed in Chapter 5).

These findings are in line with social identity theory. The analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that the importance respondents attach to criteria of national belonging is positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands, and research in the tradition of social identity theory indicates that group members with a strong affective commitment to the group tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating the differences between their in-group and out-groups, a practice which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination (and hence intolerance) of out-group members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). In this respect, those perceived by the majority group to deviate from the majority's

nominal group characteristics are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005). On the strength of the analysis above, these marginalized group members appear to be Muslim immigrants.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study is synchronic and does not explore changes in public views over time, as the data were collected within a limited time frame (2012-2013). Therefore, it is not possible to assess whether the changes in the political debates and policies concerning immigrants and their descendants, as reviewed in this and the previous chapters, are reflected in changing public views on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship. However, Van de Vijver and his colleagues have carried out cross-sectional and longitudinal studies to examine possible changes in attitudes of Dutch citizens towards multiculturalism (Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar 2008; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar 2009). Interestingly, they found that, despite the changes in the political debates since the year 2000, the public support for multiculturalism 'has remained remarkably stable' between 1999 and 2007 (Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar 2008: 99). However, the scales these authors used to measure attitudes towards multiculturalism do not include specific items to do with aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness and consideration for cultural distinctiveness, as discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, these authors included a wide range of items in their questionnaires, on cultural diversity in general, acculturation by minorities, support for minorities by Dutch natives,[52] and equality.[53]

[52] In various studies, these authors use different terms to describe Dutch natives, including 'Dutch mainstreamers' (Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar 2008), 'Dutch majority members' (Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar 2009) and 'Dutch natives' (Breugelmans & Van de Vijver 2004).

[53] For an overview of these items, see Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar (2009: 659).

Chapter 7
Conclusions and theoretical considerations

7.1 Introduction

This study set out to explore public views on three potentially divisive issues in Western societies which are in the process of becoming increasingly multicultural, that is, ethnically and culturally diverse: the recognition of national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness of both native and immigrant citizens. As said in Chapter 1, multiculturalism is the term used to refer to forms of recognition which can be seen as normative responses to the (cultural) diversity of society (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003). These issues of recognition are potentially divisive, as they concern processes determining the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the nation-state on the basis of their ethnic, cultural and religious distinctiveness (cf. Kymlicka 1995). Consequently, these issues engender fundamental debates on citizenship and are therefore considered central dimensions of multicultural citizenship (Shadid 2009; cf. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Hence, a multicultural society is defined as one which is not only ethnically and culturally diverse, but in which these dimensions of multicultural citizenship are formally and publicly recognized as well (Shadid 2009).

Chapter 1 mentions that the scientific studies on multiculturalism have been many and varied and have included research on policies and regulations which are relevant to the context of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, few studies to with the goal of exploring *public* views about the dimensions of multicultural citizenship have been conducted (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005; Hjerm 1998; Díez Medrano & Koenig 2005). In an effort to step into this breach, this study has focused on answering the main research question about the views of Dutch citizens on the

three dimensions of multicultural citizenship. (*Nota bene:* the goal of this study is *not* to examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible for citizenship.)

It must be stressed that because so few studies of these public views exist, the scope of this study is necessarily wide and it is exploratory in nature. Quantitative and qualitative data have been collected among Dutch citizens, including both native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants, using a survey (n=710) and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66). These methodological aspects have been extensively discussed in Chapter 2.

In this concluding chapter, the time has come to make an attempt to answer the research question by sifting and discussing the main empirical findings relating to public views on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, which have been presented in Chapters 3 to 6. At the same time an assessment will to made to try to discover whether the three theoretically distinguished dimensions of multicultural citizenship are indeed empirically distinct. The thesis will conclude with a brief discussion of recommendations for policy measures.

7.2 Empirical dimensions of multicultural citizenship

In this section, a summary of the main empirical findings of this study will be presented. The section is divided into three parts, each discussing public views on one of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship: national belonging, including loyalty and multiple citizenship (the subject of Chapters 3 and 4), equality (discussed in Chapter 5) and cultural distinctiveness (the subject of Chapter 6).

7.2.1 Public views on national belonging

Respondents disagree about who can be fully included in the Dutch national group. In other words, national belonging is not determined only by the status of legal citizenship, but is inescapably imbued with social aspects as well (see Chapter 3).

The analysis in this study indicates that the respondents have four distinct conceptions of national belonging: *civic*, *territorial*, *ethnic* and *legal* (see Section 3.4.3.2). On average, they appear to attach most importance to the civic type, which refers to such relatively inclusive criteria for belonging to the national group as feeling Dutch, feeling more attached to the Netherlands than to other countries and having a knowledge of Dutch history and culture. At the other end of the scale, least importance is attached to the ethnic type of national belonging, based on such exclusive criteria as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background.

Interestingly, these two types of national belonging appear to be empirically distinct from the territorial type, which includes such criteria as having been born in the Netherlands and having grown up and living for most of one's life in the country. By and large, the respondents consider this type to be almost as important as the civic one and more important than ethnic national belonging. The distinction between the territorial and ethnic types of belonging is explained by the analysis of the qualitative data: those who considered the territorial criteria to be important, also argued that these are necessary preconditions for being able to feel Dutch or having a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In other words, the territorial criteria are seen as preconditions for the civic aspects of national belonging. This finding nuances the distinction between ethnic and civic types of national belonging indicated in studies by Hjerm (1998) and Kunovich (2009). In these studies the territorial criteria – *id est,* having been born and living for most of one's life in the country – are not distinct from, but part of, the ethnic type. Therefore these authors suggest that citizens who attach importance to territorial criteria have an ethnic and exclusive conception of national belonging. In the Netherlands, these territorial criteria appear to be inclusive for the descendants of first-generation immigrants and for those first-generation immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the Netherlands as well (see Sections 3.4.3.2 and 3.2.5).

The fourth type of Dutch national belonging distinguished in the present study – the legal type – implies exclusive legal citizenship, namely, not holding multiple citizenship. Generally speaking, although respondents consider this type almost as important as the civic type of national belonging, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, they found it difficult to explain the necessity of this exclusiveness. Those who did try to elaborate on this issue argued that multiple citizenship can indicate a lack of commitment and fewer feelings of loyalty to the Netherlands. They would say that therefore immigrants who want to naturalize should renounce their original citizenship. This view coincides with theoretical arguments presented by such scholars as Renshon (2004) and by right-wing Dutch politicians, especially members of the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom) and the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party), as discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. This view implies that exclusive legal citizenship is a precondition for the civic aspects of national belonging as well.

The levels of importance respondents attach to these four types of Dutch national belonging are all positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands (see Section 3.4.3.2). This accords with social identity theory, as research in this field indicates that group members with a strong affective group commitment tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating their differences with the out-groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002).

However, it seems that the respondents' commitment to the Netherlands is more strongly related to the civic type than to the other types of national belonging. This, and the above-mentioned importance attached to the civic aspects of Dutch national belonging, corresponds with the findings of Duyvendak (2011), who argues that Dutch citizens are increasingly constructing national group boundaries by stressing the importance of expressions and feelings of national belonging.

All four types of Dutch national belonging distinguished are considered to be more important by native Dutch than they are by non-Western immigrants and their descendants. At the same time, native Dutch consider themselves to be more typically Dutch, which is not surprising considering that social identity theory indicates that members of majority groups tend to deem their own nominal group characteristics to be self-evident (Verkuyten 2005: 59), and hence tend to construct clear and distinctive group boundaries (Theiss-Morse 2009).

Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, the more importance the respondents attach to criteria for national belonging, the stronger their prejudice that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat. (Respondents' prejudice will be discussed in more detail in the next part of this section.) It therefore comes as no surprise that the more exclusive the type of national belonging, the stronger its relationship to this type of prejudice. The strength of this prejudice towards immigrant groups is most strongly related to the ethnic type of national belonging ($\beta = .56$, $p < .001$), and is clearly less strongly related to either the type of exclusive legal citizenship ($\beta = .40$, $p < .001$), the territorial ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$) or the civic type ($\beta = .26$, $p < .001$).[1] This relationship ties in with social identity theory as well, as research indicates that those who are perceived by the majority as deviating from their own nominal group characteristics are not fully recognized as group members and can be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005).[2]

Moreover, the importance attached to the most exclusive types of Dutch national belonging – the ethnic type and exclusive legal citizenship – appears to be negatively related to educational level. These relationships with prejudice and educational level have been explained by Kunovich (2009: 585), who argues that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to exclusive

[1] All values for β mentioned in this chapter are standardized. They are the results of Categorical Regression analyses described in Chapters 3 to 6, in which at least the following predictor variables were included: descent, religion, age, gender, educational level, income and political preference.

[2] As mentioned in Chapter 3, this relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of sub-typing (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001).

criteria for national belonging because they perceive an economic threat from immigrants and their descendants (who generally share their lower socio-economic status) (cf. Kaya & Karakoç 2012: 37).

Finally, the analysis indicates that the importance respondents attach to the types of Dutch national belonging is related to political preference as well. Voters for right-wing parties generally attach more importance to criteria for national belonging, whether they be inclusive or exclusive. Most importance is attached to the types of national belonging by PVV and SGP voters, which corresponds with statements made by the members of Parliament representing these parties, who have repeatedly stressed the importance of (exclusive) boundaries of the Dutch national group during the last decade (as discussed in Sections 3.3, 4.3, 5.2.2 and 6.3).

Despite the finding that immigrant respondents consider themselves to be less typically Dutch than do native Dutch respondents, no significant differences were found in the levels of affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state between native Dutch and Western and non-Western immigrants and their descendants (similar results regarding national self-identification were found by Vroome, Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014: 11-13) (see Sections 3.4.1 and 4.4.2.2). Similarly, no differences in commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands were found between respondents with single citizenship and those with multiple citizenship. Importantly, the affective commitment of immigrants, including those with multiple citizenship, to their own ethnic and religious groups, does not seem to conflict with their affective commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands. On the contrary, their affective commitments to their ethnic and religious groups and to the Netherlands are positively related. (However, research by Martinovic and Verkuyten (2012) among Muslim Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany has indicated that, while national identification and religious group identification are not always mutually exclusive, the relationship between these identities can depend on conditions such as the extent to which 'Western and Islamic ways of life' are seen as compatible, and perceived discrimination.) In other words, it appears that neither ethnic and religious identity nor indeed multiple citizenship undermine immigrants' attachment and loyalty to the nation-state. These findings accord with the insights of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 2007), the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2008), De Hart (2005b) and Ronkainen (2011), and contradict the theoretical and hypothetical arguments put forward by politicians and scholars, as among them Barry (2002), Huntington (2004) and Renshon (2004), who argue that cultural distinctiveness and multiple citizenship undermine commitment and loyalty to the nation-state (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).

Interestingly, it was found that loyalty to the nation-state has several empirically distinct expressions, including various types of patriotism (*nationalist*, *uncritical* and *symbolic*), *national-political pride*, *national-cultural pride* and *shame arising from negative aspects of Dutch national history* (see Section 4.4.2.1).

Nationalist patriotism refers to an idealization of one's nation and feelings of national superiority (cf. Sumner 1906; Druckman 1994). The finding that this expression of loyalty is empirically distinct from the other expressions corresponds to the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007) and Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001) discussed in Section 4.2.2 (who label this type of loyalty 'nationalism' – see also Feshbach 1987, 1990, discussed in Druckman 1994).

A matter of some importance, uncritical patriotism illustrates that not all expressions of loyalty to the country to which a person belongs further its interests, as uncritical patriotism refers to abstaining from or opposing any criticism of one's country, which gainsays the principles of democracy (cf. Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999 discussed in Section 4.2). According with the findings of Parker (2009), uncritical patriotism appears to be distinct from symbolic patriotism, which entails attaching emotional importance to ritual practices or symbolic representations of the country, among them such customs as playing the national anthem or hoisting the national flag (cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007).

In its turn, symbolic patriotism appears to be distinct from national-political pride, which includes pride in Dutch democracy, the economy and the welfare state, Dutch political influence in the world and the according of equal rights in Dutch society, and national-cultural pride, which refers to pride of Dutch achievements in sport, science and technology and the arts and literature. These two components of national pride correspond to the dimensions of national pride found by Hjerm (1998: 343-344) in his analysis of empirical data from Australia, Germany, Britain and Sweden. On the other hand, one expression of national shame was measured: shame arising negative aspects in Dutch national history. This expression involves the shame aroused by Dutch actions negatively affecting 'others' in the past, including Dutch involvement in colonialism and slavery. These expressions of pride and shame relate to what Keller (2007) calls 'loyalty in identification': a strong tendency to identify with the nation-state which can result in feelings of pride and of shame (see Section 4.2.1).

Finally, the analysis also suggests a distinct constructive type of patriotism, expressed by criticizing the country to further its interests (see also Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). However, the questionnaires included only one item which relates to this expression.

Except for the shame aroused by the negative aspects of Dutch national history, all these expressions of loyalty appear to be positively related to, but

simultaneously empirically distinct from, the affective component of national self-identification, corresponding to the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007). Importantly, this means that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state can be considered to be expressions of national attachment, but not to be indicators of the affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.

Although these expressions of attachment to the Dutch nation-state do not appear to be related to the variables descent, multiple citizenship and strength of ethnic or religious identity (mentioned above), it did turn out that some of these expressions are related to prejudice, age, educational level and political preference (see Sections 4.4.2.2 and 5.3.3). The strength of the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat appears to be positively, but only slightly, related to the affective component of national self-identification ($\beta = .15$, $p < .05$), but more strongly related to national-political pride ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$), uncritical patriotism ($\beta = .27$, $p < .001$) and nationalist patriotism ($\beta = .22$, $p < .001$), and negatively related to shame arising from the negative aspects of Dutch national history ($\beta = -.29$, $p < .001$). Nevertheless, no significant relationships were found between this type of prejudice and the other expressions of loyalty mentioned above: national-cultural pride, symbolical patriotism and the item which indicates constructive patriotism. This agrees with the study of Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) discussed in Section 4.2.2. They found that a positive evaluation of one's national in-group (expressed by loyalty) is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrant groups (expressed by prejudice) (see also Coenders 2001; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170).

Furthermore, the relationships between loyalty and this type of prejudice do not appear to be (fully) mediated by educational level, as the calculations of the above mentioned βs were controlled for educational level and other variables (see Section 5.3.3). Regardless of their level of prejudice, the educational level of respondents is negatively related to symbolical patriotism ($\beta = -.15$, $p < .001$) and uncritical patriotism ($\beta = -.17$, $p < .001$) and positively related to national-political pride ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$) and constructive patriotism ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$). It was also found that age is positively related to the affective component of national self-identification ($\beta = .15$, $p < .05$), symbolic patriotism ($\beta = .25$, $p < .001$) and shame felt about the negative aspects of Dutch national history ($\beta = .20$, $p < .05$).

Finally, political preference is related to some of these above-mentioned expressions of loyalty as well. Voters for liberal parties (the right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy – VVD, and the left-wing liberal Democrats 66 – D66) and the right-wing populist PVV clearly feel less shame about the negative aspects of Dutch national history than voters for left wing (the Labour Party – PvdA, and the Green Left party) and Christian parties (the right-

wing Christian Democratic Appeal – CDA, the Christian Union – CU and SGP) (β = .31, p < .001). Voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, CDA and PVV) tend to be more uncritically patriotic than voters for parties on the left of the political spectrum (PvdA, the Socialist Party – SP, D66 and Green Left) and non-voters (β = .21, p < .001). Similarly, Huddy and Khatib (2007) found that those who classified themselves as right-wing conservatives tended to be more uncritically patriotic. They explained this by referring to the relationship between authoritarianism and uncritical patriotism: authoritarians, like uncritical patriots, tend to refrain from or oppose criticism of their own country and authoritarians tend to vote for (conservative) parties on the right of the political spectrum (see Section 4.4.2.2).

7.2.2 Public views on citizens' equality

A large majority (more than 90%) of respondents supports the principle of the equal treatment of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Those who do not support this principle appear to have a specific view about who can be fully included in their national group: they attach more importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background (β = -.22, p < .001). The support for the principle of equal treatment also appears to be negatively related to educational level (β = -.14, p < .005) and, not surprisingly, to the strength of the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -.19, p < .001). Furthermore, PVV and SGP voters are slightly less in favour of the equal treatment principle (β = .12, p < .001) (see Section 5.3.3).

Despite the strong support of respondents for the principle of equal treatment, national anti-discrimination policies are supported by a smaller, but still sizeable majority of 68%. Almost half (47%) of the respondents thinks that these policies should be improved. They are convinced that more effective policies, such as quota measures and preferential treatment, are necessary and should be introduced. They also stated that such policies will and can only be effective when politicians stop making polarizing statements. Around 13% oppose anti-discrimination policies. Some of the native Dutch opponents stated that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated and that 'it is the immigrants' own fault', because, as one respondent said, 'They want to be different from the Dutch'. However, other opponents, both Dutch natives and immigrants, said that such policies are not effective because it is impossible to 'cure' adults of prejudice and discrimination by introducing such measures, and that the only way to prevent discrimination is by teaching children about equal treatment from a very young age.

Immigrants of non-Western origin and their descendants appear to be more in favour of national anti-discrimination policies than the native Dutch ($\beta = .14$, $p < .005$). Furthermore, the opponents of anti-discrimination policies attach more importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western name ($\beta = -.23$, $p < .001$), and have a stronger prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat ($\beta = -.37$, $p < .001$). This concurs with the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1, which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be explained by an existing bias towards other groups caused by social categorization, that is, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging, or the perception of group threat (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Shadid 2007: 209) (see Section 5.3.3).

Not surprisingly, the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat is stronger among native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin than among those of non-Western origin ($\beta = .22$, $p < .001$). This prejudice appears to be strongest among voters for PVV and SGP, followed by voters for VVD, SP and CU. Voters for PvdA, D66, Green Left and CDA are the least prejudiced ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$). In more general terms, this type of prejudice is negatively related to educational level ($\beta = -.33$, $p < .001$) (see Section 5.3.3).

Turning to the items included in the prejudice scale,[3] more than a third (37%) of native Dutch respondents believe that too many immigrants (and their descendants) are living in the Netherlands. These findings are similar to those presented by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259). (According to these authors, the percentage of the Dutch population that is of the opinion that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands has decreased, from around 50% in the 1990s and 53% in 2002 to 39% in 2008.) Those who hold this view, argued that immigration leads to the growth of such problems as segregation, crime, pressure on the job market and are the source of unacceptable economic costs to the country. With respect to the job market, native Dutch were more concerned about labour migrants from Eastern Europe (55%) than about immigrants who held Dutch nationality (36%). A much lower percentage (24%) does not believe there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands. Some asserted that the Netherlands is historically an immigration country and it has absorbed many immigrants from various parts of the world. These views are related to the perception that immigrants present a threat to Dutch culture. Of the native Dutch, 44% feel that their culture is under threat. They were concerned that the norms and values, especially those of Muslim immigrants, might become too influential. A similar

[3] As discussed in Section 5.3.3, a prejudice scale was constructed using six items to explore relationships between this type of prejudice and other variables including educational level.

percentage (40%) was found in 2008 by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259-260). (These authors found that this percentage is on the rise, from 18% in 1995 to 40% in 2008, with the strongest increase taking place in the period 2000-2005, when the political and public debate on the multicultural society peaked) (see Section 5.3.3).

Interestingly, although the strength of the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat appears to explain the opposition to anti-discrimination policies (as discussed above) to a substantial extent, it barely explains the opposition to the preferential treatment of (naturalized) immigrants and their descendants in the context of job applications (β = -.14, $p < .05$). Moreover, the analysis indicates that this type of prejudice accounts only for a small part of the difference between respondents' opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants (74% of native Dutch and 53% of non-Western immigrants opposed) and their opposition to a similar policy for women (around 50% of all groups opposed). Likewise, this opposition cannot be explained by respondents' views on who fully belongs to the national group. There are no significant relationships between this opposition and the importance they attach to such criteria for national belonging as having Dutch ancestors and/or a Western name, just expounded above. These findings contradict two theories discussed by Bobo and Fox (2003), which postulate that opposition to preferential treatment can be explained by a bias towards immigrants, resulting from either the perception of an ethnic threat or from the process of social categorization (namely, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging). This suggests that opposition to such policies in the Netherlands could be explained by a third theory discussed by Bobo and Fox, that is, this opposition is rooted in 'race-neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism' (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; see Section 5.2). Indeed, respondents did argue that such policies can cause stigmatization, and that gender or ethnicity should never be used as criteria in selection procedures.

Cogently, results from the qualitative interviews reveal unmistakably that preferential treatment is often confused with positive discrimination measures: many respondents mentioned that preferential treatment implies 'reverse discrimination' and is therefore unacceptable. Such a lack of understanding of these policies might also explain part of the opposition to them. Nonetheless, the substantial difference between the opposition to preferential treatment for immigrants and preferential treatment for women remains largely unexplained (see Section 5.4.3).

While the preferential treatment of immigrants in the context of job applications appears to be supported by only a small minority, more than two-thirds of respondents is in favour of national policies devised to encourage their

integration. Interestingly, during the in-depth interviews none of the proponents of such policies mentioned that specific measures should be implemented to reduce the substantive disadvantages of minorities on the labour market – which appears to be in line with the opposition to preferential treatment just mentioned. However, they did say that the government should create the necessary preconditions for and remove the barriers for preventing participation, for example, by providing courses teaching Dutch language and culture. Moreover, they suggested an anti-discrimination policy because they considered discrimination an obstacle to full participation. Respondents also mentioned that the government should implement policies to promote tolerance of cultural diversity, or, conversely, counter the 'harmful influences of Islam'. This latter issue which is tied up with the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

7.2.3 Public views on cultural distinctiveness

Respondents' views on who can be fully included in the Dutch national group appear to be related not only to their support of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policies, but also to their views on the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants. At this point, it must be stressed that respondents appear to associate the 'cultural distinctiveness of immigrants' primarily with such Islamic religious manifestations as mosques, Muslim schools and the Islamic headscarf. Importantly, the analysis indicates that both respondents' tolerance of such religious distinctiveness and their appreciation of cultural diversity in general are much lower than their support for the principle of equal treatment. While over 90% of respondents supports the latter principle (as mentioned above), only 42% do consider the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an enrichment of society, and the opposition to certain aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness is substantial. For example, almost half (47%) opposes the right of public officials (including teachers) to wear an Islamic headscarf and 34% oppose granting new religious groups the right to build prayer houses (see Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). These findings concerning the different levels of approval of the principle of equal treatment and cultural distinctiveness tie in with the results presented by Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 113) (see also Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar 2008: 96).

Not surprisingly, the analysis indicates that respondents' tolerance of such religious distinctiveness is relatively strongly and negatively related to the importance they attach to such exclusive (ethnic) criteria for Dutch national belonging, as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background ($\beta = -.50$, $p < .001$). This tolerance is clearly less strongly (but still negatively)

related to the importance respondents attach to more inclusive criteria for national belonging, such as feeling Dutch and having been born and living for most of one's life in the country (civic criteria: $\beta = -.22$, $p < .001$; territorial criteria: $\beta = -.19$, $p < .001$). Finally, this tolerance of religious distinctiveness is strongly and negatively related to the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat ($\beta = -.61$, $p < .001$), and positively related to support for the principle of equal treatment ($\beta = .17$, $p < .001$).

Similar results were found with regard to respondents' consideration for cultural distinctiveness, namely, to what extent do they think it is important that employers and healthcare providers should take the cultural and religious distinctiveness of employees and clients into account. The lower respondents' support for such consideration, the more important they deem the criteria for national belonging and the stronger their prejudice that immigrants are a threat (see Section 6.4.2).

Bearing in mind that the importance respondents attach to criteria of national belonging is positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands, these findings accord with social identity theory. Research in this tradition indicates that group members with a strong affective commitment to the in-group tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating the differences between their in-group and out-groups, an exercise which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination (and thus intolerance) of out-group members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). In a nutshell, those perceived by the majority group as deviating from the majority's nominal group characteristics are not fully recognized as group members and run the risk of being marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005). Looking at the analysis of respondents' views, these marginalized group members appear to be the Muslim immigrants.

Given these findings, it is not surprising that non-Western immigrants appear to be more tolerant of religious distinctiveness than are either Western immigrants or the native Dutch ($\beta = .23$, $p < .001$), in line with findings of Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) and of Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 113). Unsurprisingly, tolerance of religious distinctiveness is positively related to educational level ($\beta = .38$, $p < .001$). This is in line with findings of Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 98) regarding Dutch natives and immigrant groups, and results presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40) who analysed survey data from France, Germany, Spain and the United States. And, considering the public views on national belonging and equality discussed above, it is not surprising that voters for PVV and SGP are the least tolerant, followed by voters for VVD and SP, whereas

voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left are most tolerant of religious distinctiveness ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$). The latter results are similar to those presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40), who found that in France, Germany, Spain and the United States, political conservatives appear to have a more negative attitude towards Muslims than liberals.

Generally, respondents who have a strong tendency to construct national group boundaries and/or who are prejudiced towards immigrants appear to reject such Islamic religious expressions as headscarves and mosques. In other words, they oppose the freedom of religion of Muslim citizens. They stated that these expressions are inappropriate in the Netherlands. They also said that these outward symbols force Islam upon non-Muslims, an assertion which can be considered a prejudice against Muslims, especially because these respondents could not substantiate their opinion. A majority (61%) are convinced that Islamic norms and values are incompatible with Dutch norms and values. Nevertheless, the outward religious symbols adopted by Christian and Jewish teachers are not considered a problem because they are 'less conspicuous' and because 'wearing a cross or yarmulke is typically Dutch, unlike the Islamic headscarf' (see Section 6.4.2).

These findings tie in with results of studies discussed by Maliepaard and Phalet (2012: 131-132), who conclude that the 'religious identity, values and ways of life [of Muslims] are devalued by large parts of the majority' of Dutch citizens, and that more than half of the Dutch 'hold unfavorable views of Muslims', and regard Dutch and Muslims values as incompatible (see also Huijnk & Dagevos 2012).

Some respondents' arguments against the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness appear to be in line with those used by critics of multiculturalism, discussed in Section 6.2. Hence, it was argued that Muslim schools are an obstacle to the integration of Muslim immigrants, an idea similar to arguments defended by Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005). However, it is noteworthy that respondents consider Muslim schools, and not the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as such, to be an obstacle to integration. Only a few respondents argued that all denominational schools, including Christian and Jewish schools, should be banned in order to prevent segregation and facilitate integration. In short, it appears that by and large respondents do not oppose the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as such, but reject the presence of Islamic manifestations in the Netherlands.

Interestingly, those respondents who opposed the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness did not believe that such recognition – for example, allowing police officers to wear an Islamic headscarf – would conflict with the neutrality of the state, in contrast with the ideas of such opponents as Cliteur (2004), mentioned in Section 6.2. Explicitly, the formal recognition of religious

distinctiveness, such as the freedom of religion, was not associated by respondents with the risk of the development of multiple loyalties or any decrease in loyalty to the nation-state, in contrast with arguments propounded by several Dutch right-wing politicians and such scholars as Huntington (2004) (discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.2 respectively).

7.3 Multicultural citizenship: a multi-dimensional concept?

This study was based on the theoretical assumption that the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship set out above are distinct (Shadid 2009). To assess this assumption empirically, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis was carried out including items on the boundaries of the Dutch national group (discussed in Chapter 3), the recognition of social and legal equality (discussed in Chapter 5), and the recognition of cultural distinctiveness (discussed in Chapter 6). The analysis indicates seven distinct components, of which the (rotated) loadings are presented in the following table (7.1).[4]

Items which cluster on these components indicate that public views on the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship, distinguished by Shadid (2009) and suggested by other proponents of multiculturalism (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003), are indeed empirically distinct. In other words, the normative response of citizens to the cultural diversity in their society assumes three distinct aspects.

Two of these dimensions, recognition of national belonging and recognition of cultural distinctiveness, can actually be sub-divided into several components. The components of the dimension of national belonging include the territorial (C2), civic (C3), ethnic (C4) and legal (C6) conceptions as discussed in Section 3.4.3.2 (see also 7.2.1 above). Components of the dimension of cultural distinctiveness include the tolerance of religious distinctiveness (C1) and consideration for cultural distinctiveness (C7), discussed in Section 6.4.2 (see also 7.2.3 above). The component representing the dimension of equality (C5) includes only two items (on the importance of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policies), as views on positive action appeared to be unrelated (see Section 5.4.3). This limitation has been discussed in Chapter 2.

[4] A CATPCA analysis with option 'impute missing values with mode' resulted in 7 components with eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 7 components could be extracted, which explained 60.15% of the total variance. Variance Accounted For per item was higher than 35%. (A CATPCA analysis with option 'exclude missing values' gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background).

Table 7.1

Public views on the recognition of (aspects of) multicultural citizenship. Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis, transformed variables rotated with PCA).

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
Importance of criteria for being perceived as a 'true Dutch person':							
Born in the Netherlands	.03	**.44**	-.18	**.36**	-.11	**-.37**	.05
Lived in the Netherlands for most of one's life	.02	***.88***	.01	.07	.07	.04	.02
Grown up in the Netherlands	-.03	***.83***	.04	.09	-.04	-.11	.08
Lived in the Netherlands for part of one's life	-.01	***.81***	.08	-.07	.14	.15	-.01
Feel Dutch	.04	.07	***.77***	-.12	.09	-.02	.01
Have knowledge of Dutch history and culture	-.05	.02	***.76***	.12	-.07	.10	.01
Feel more attached to the Netherlands and the Dutch than to other countries or other ethnic groups	-.04	.03	***.69***	.13	-.16	-.07	.05
Speak Dutch	.19	.14	**.50**	-.17	-.07	**-.42**	-.08
Proud of the Netherlands	.07	-.11	**.37**	.25	.22	-.26	-.01
Have a Western name	.13	.04	.09	***.76***	-.03	-.04	-.04
Have a Christian background	.00	-.08	.07	***.77***	.12	.19	.04
Have a Western European appearance	.08	.18	.00	***.66***	-.07	-.05	-.01
Have Dutch ancestors	.03	.16	-.05	***.62***	-.23	-.20	.00
Having Dutch nationality	-.05	.06	.19	-.07	-.04	**-.71**	.07
Only have Dutch nationality and no other nationalities	.06	-.10	-.01	.19	.11	***-.60***	.19
Importance of equal treatment of cultural minorities	.02	-.10	-.03	.05	**-.69**	-.14	.01
Importance of anti-discrimination policies	.06	-.06	.16	.00	**-.68**	.29	.21

(Table continued on next page)

(Table 7.1 continued)

Items	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
Acceptability of wearing Islamic headscarf in public	***.79***	-.05	.04	.07	.07	.02	.03
Acceptability of wearing religious dress or symbols	***.66***	,02	.10	.02	.10	.10	.11
Right of public officials (including teachers) to wear Islamic headscarf	***.66***	-.05	-.01	.14	.14	.12	.21
Right to observe religious holidays	***.68***	.08	-.00	.02	-.30	.02	-.17
Right to build prayer houses	***.65***	.01	-.13	.01	-.21	-.19	-.06
Right to establish denominational schools	***.38***	-.01	-.06	-.09	.04	**-.31**	.17
Importance of taking cultural/religious distinctiveness into account by healthcare providers	-.05	.02	.05	.02	-.09	-.02	***.85***
Importance of taking cultural/religious distinctiveness into account by employers	.11	.07	-.05	-.07	-.06	-.09	***.76***
Eigenvalues	5.51	2.57	1.92	1.54	1.26	1.13	1.12
Variance accounted for (%)	22.02	10.26	7.68	6.15	5.05	4.52	4.47

Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including native Dutch (n_1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n_2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n_3 = 33) (see Chapter 2).
Note. The items have been sorted by loadings on each component. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings of the items used as surrogate variables or for constructing scales in Chapters 3 to 6 are italicized.

Finally, these components not only appear to be empirically distinct but as the analysis presented in Sections 5.3.3 and 6.4.2 indicates, they are inter-related, and related to the prejudice that immigrants pose a cultural and economic threat. Consequently, as has been discussed in Section 7.2 above, the fact that respondents disagree about who can be fully included in the national group implies that they also differ in their views on to what extent such citizens' rights as equal treatment and freedom of religion, of certain groups within their nation-state should be upheld.

The finding that support for the principle of equal treatment and national anti-discrimination policies (items on component C5 in the table above) is positively related to tolerance of religious distinctiveness (C1) and consideration for cultural distinctiveness (C7) (see Section 6.4.2), seems to tie in with findings of Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 96). However, the study of the latter authors indicates that issues of cultural diversity (including aspects of

equality) are perceived by Dutch natives[5] on a single dimension, and not on distinct dimensions as indicated by the present study. This difference might be due to the fact that the scales these authors used to measure attitudes towards multiculturalism do not include specific items to do with aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness and consideration for cultural distinctiveness (see also Section 6.4.2).[6]

7.4 Recommendations for policy measures

As said in Chapter 1, debates on multicultural citizenship are potentially divisive, as they concern the processes determining the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the nation-state. In an attempt to contribute to the inclusion of various groups of Dutch citizens in Dutch society, this section includes suggestions for a few recommendations for policy, devised on the basis of the findings of this study. These recommendations relate to the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship: national belonging, equality of citizens and groups' cultural distinctiveness.

National belonging

Considering that Dutch citizenship entails equal rights and duties and considering that the Dutch government is endeavouring to strengthen social cohesion in society and improve the ability of citizens to deal with diversity (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013),

- It is recommended that politicians, other public officials and the media should stress the Dutch national belonging of immigrants who possess Dutch citizenship, irrespective of their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background.

The results presented in Section 3.4.3.2 indicate wide public support for this view: respondents generally consider such inclusive criteria for national belonging as having Dutch citizenship and feeling Dutch, to be more important than such exclusive criteria as having Dutch ancestors or a Christian background. A change to this type of emphasis on national belonging is highly important because respondents who do attach importance to such exclusive criteria for national belonging as having Dutch ancestors tend to oppose granting equal rights to and

[5] These authors use the term 'Dutch mainstreamers'. However, they discuss earlier studies in which the term 'Dutch natives' is used (e.g. Breugelmans & Van de Vijver 2004).

[6] See also Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar (2009: 659).

equal treatment of immigrants and their descendants, and especially the right to freedom of religion of Muslim citizens (see Sections 5.3.3 and 6.4.2).

This means that, as a rule, priority should be given to immigrants' Dutch identity and belonging and that their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background should only be mentioned when relevant to the context concerned. Stressing the latter aspects of citizens' identity in situations in which they are not relevant can lead to the perception that these aspects conflict with 'being Dutch' or with 'Dutch culture', which implies that these citizens do not fully belong to the national group (see also the discussion in Sections 3.2.3 and 5.3.2). The natural upshot is that the national government should recognize that immigrant integration is being hindered not so much by immigrants' cultural or religious distinctiveness, but principally by their socio-economic disadvantages and by discrimination (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).

More specifically, following the example of the municipalities of The Hague and Amsterdam, national and local governments should consider avoiding the term *allochthon*. As discussed in Section 3.3, the use of this term essentially implies ethnic labelling (as it refers to descent), which means that describing someone as *allochthon* can lead to the perception that he or she does not fully belong to the national group. Indeed, the results of this study indicate that this term is generally used by respondents to describe those who do not fully belong to the national group or are considered to present a cultural threat to Dutch society (see Section 3.4.3).

Furthermore, the national government should consider adapting the national canon of Dutch history and supervise the way in which it is used in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. First and foremost, the canon should reflect that the Netherlands has been a country of immigration since at least the sixteenth century (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011), and, by employing proper teaching methods, it should be used to help pupils to recognize the contribution made by immigrants to Dutch culture and society, and this should include those who have come to the Netherlands in the past 50 years. In this respect, religions 'new' to Dutch society, such as Islam and Hinduism, can be considered Dutch religions specific to the 'new' Dutch, as is the case with the many regional cultures (values and practices) in the Netherlands. In a second step, the construction and dynamic character of the canon itself should be discussed in schools. Pupils have to learn to recognize the various factors (such as immigration, ideology, power relations) which are constantly influencing the dynamic process of interpreting and defining important aspects of 'Dutch history', and learn that this process is part of the social construction of 'who we are', that is, our national identity. (See also Section 3.3.)

On a more general level, politicians and other public officials should be careful when making references to an idealized and nostalgic 'national past', and stress the fact that there should be a shift in the focus to that of a shared future, in which migration and cultural diversity are inevitable and not inherently problematic. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the principle of non-discrimination and the tolerance of all ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the Netherlands, including immigrants, are important aspects of Dutch history and culture. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, research by Smeekes, Verkuyten and Poppe (2012) shows that those who perceive Dutch national history to have been tolerant tend to be more accepting of the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslims in the Netherlands. In this wave of positiveness, it is important not to dismiss anxieties about immigration, as these anxieties reflect the fact that national identities are relatively stable and consequently views on national belonging generally change slowly (see Section 3.2.5). Because immigration and cultural diversity are inevitable, the government should communicate about these changes and anxieties regularly and advisedly with the public. Very importantly, politicians should refrain from exploiting these anxieties with an eye to the ballot box.

The national government should also consider amending the Dutch Nationality Act, by abolishing the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship have to renounce their original citizenship. This requirement is problematic, as it suggests that those who have multiple citizenship (currently more than one million citizens) might be less loyal and hence do not fully belong to the Dutch national group. Caution is advised as this requirement requires that the government publicly emphasizes, as it did in 2007,[7] that multiple citizenship does not undermine or hinder immigrants' loyalty to the nation-state, integration and national belonging. This timely emphasis is important, as the results discussed in Section 4.4.1 indicate that almost half (49%) of respondents oppose multiple citizenship because of these perceptions.

A large majority of respondents (84%) supports the idea that pupils should learn how to deal effectively with cultural diversity in society at school (see Section 5.2.3.3). On the basis of this support, this recommendation can be introduced into the educational system, for example, by extending the existing focus on the multicultural character of the Dutch nation-state in school curricula.

Finally, the national government should consider establishing a Multicultural Council, modelled after the Australian Multicultural Council,[8] as an official and

[7] Ministerie van Justitie (2007: 2).

[8] See Australian Multicultural Council, accessed April 25, 2014, http:// http://www.amc.gov.au.

independent advisor to the government on multicultural affairs, that is, the intercultural management of Dutch society.

Citizens' equality

Considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to equal treatment and that discrimination is not permitted, enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution, and considering the fact that the Dutch government recognizes the persistence of discrimination, that it should take the proper steps to prevent and combat any form of it by authorities, organizations and citizens themselves (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2013),

- It is recommended that national and local governments and societal organizations should improve the possibilities for reporting discrimination and extend and strengthen existing anti-discrimination measures.

This study indicates that almost half (47%) of the respondents is of the opinion that national anti-discrimination measures should be improved and that only a small minority (13%) holds the view that such measures are not needed. At the same time, more than 90% supports the principle of equal treatment (see Section 5.3.3).

Respondents in this study frequently referred to the lack of effectiveness of anti-discrimination measures. As the discussion in Section 5.3.2 indicates, there are several possible reasons for this lack of effectiveness. Among the most prominent are a lack of awareness of anti-discrimination legislation, the fact that this legislation is only effective when those individuals who are being discriminated against take action, for example, by lodging a complaint, and the fact that institutional discrimination is not being addressed directly. In order to prevent and combat various forms of discrimination more effectively, the national and local governments and organizations should pass various measures properly devised to raise awareness about and knowledge of what discrimination is about, to improve complaint procedures, to combat and prevent negative stereotypes, and to address institutional discrimination.

In order to raise awareness about and knowledge of discrimination, the implementation of codes of conduct in organizations should be promoted. Such implementation would lower the threshold and facilitate the ability of individuals and organizations to recognize and deal with discriminatory behaviour. Such a set-up can also make provision for complaints procedures. Municipalities should be able to provide individuals and organizations with effective knowledge about what

discrimination is and advice on (preventive) anti-discrimination measures. The national government should regularly run awareness campaigns to inform the public about all the possibilities to report discrimination. In 2009 and 2010 these sorts of campaigns proved to be very successful. In all these measures to raise awareness and knowledge, it should be stressed that discrimination is by no means a phenomenon of the past and that combating and preventing discrimination effectively depends on the willingness of individuals and organizations to discuss the problem openly. This willingness can be encouraged by implementing intercultural management in organizations, central to which is the principle that every employee, student or pupil belongs there as an equal member, irrespective of their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background. Intercultural management should become the basis for promoting tolerance and the principle of non-discrimination.

To uphold the non-discrimination principle, it is extremely important to prevent and combat negative prejudice against all groups in society. At this point, it is important to realize that the overwhelming support for the principle of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policy alluded to above does not imply that the level of negative prejudice is low. As the results discussed in Section 5.3.3 indicate, 37% of Dutch native respondents believes that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands and that their presence is leading to more crime, rising pressure on the job market and unacceptable economic costs to the country. A larger percentage (44%) of Dutch native respondents thinks that immigrants, Muslims in particular, present a threat to Dutch culture.

Despite these perceptions, a large majority (90%) of respondents is in favour of teaching pupils in schools to treat people of various cultural backgrounds equally (see Section 5.3.3). Several measures can be implemented to assure this goal, chief among them avoiding textbooks which contain stereotypes and negative prejudice, and educating pupils about the diversity *within* ethnic, cultural and religious groups. This requires, however, that the ongoing education curriculum for teachers includes learning how to recognize and deal with manifestations of racism and discriminatory behaviour.

Another area in which it is vitally important to prevent and combat negative stereotypes is within organizations, especially among managers and employees' councils. The requirement that managers and members of employees' councils should regularly take courses to recognize and deal with negative stereotypes could be included in the codes of conduct and in collective labour agreements.

In order to address institutional discrimination more effectively, employees' councils (in Dutch: *medezeggenschapsraden* and *personeelsvertegenwoordigingen*) should be allowed sufficient time and be equipped with the knowledge needed to

carry out their existing legal task of combating discrimination and promoting equal treatment within their organizations. Codes of conduct could and indeed should anonymous complaint mechanisms and offer the possibility for positive action measures so as to increase the diversity of employees' councils themselves. Local and national governments should not stand idly by but be prepared to address institutional discrimination, for example, by conditionally disqualifying employers who are found guilty of discrimination from tendering public contracts. On the national level, the national government should consider introducing a clause in the Criminal Code which will allow courts to consider a racist motivation a specific aggravating circumstance, as this could act as a real deterrent.

As the effectiveness of measures to prevent and combat discrimination seems to be limited, the government should also consider combating the *effects* of discrimination, especially in the labour market. The government could reconsider its decision in 2011 that integration policies should no longer target specific groups (as is clear from the policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship*, see Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), and implement temporary measures for positive action more widely, following the examples of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization[9] of Dutch Parliament.[10] However, this requires efforts to increase public support for such measures, as the findings of this study indicate that a majority of the respondents oppose positive action (see Section 5.4.3). This opposition might partly be explained by a misunderstanding of the measures concerned: respondents said that they oppose positive action because it implies positive discrimination. However, positive discrimination is forbidden by law in the Netherlands, whereas preferential treatment is perfectly legal.

Respondents also mentioned that anti-discrimination measures can only be effective if and when the government, and more specifically the politicians, set a good example. Consequently, politicians, other public officials and the media should take a stand against racist discourse and avoid ethnic profiling, for instance, by not making empirically ungrounded suggestions that ethnic or religious background can explain problematic behaviour. As discussed in Sections 3.2.3 and 5.3.1, these suggestions can pave the way to the espousal of prejudice, which in its turn can lead to intolerance and discrimination.

[9] In Dutch: *ondersteunende/ambtelijke organisatie*.

[10] The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization of Dutch Parliament implemented preferential treatment measures (in 2010 and 2008 respectively), to increase the number of ethnic minority employees (see Section 5.4.2).

Cultural distinctiveness

Considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to profess their religion either individually or in a community with others, enshrined in Article 6 of the Constitution, and considering that Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of education and considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to expect equal treatment,

- It is recommended that politicians, other public officials and the media stress that the freedom of religion and freedom of education apply *equally* to all (religious) groups in the Netherlands.

Such an emphasis is of great importance, as the findings discussed in Section 6.4.2 indicate that there is substantial opposition to the freedom of religion and freedom of education for Muslims, although generally speaking respondents do not oppose the *principles* of freedom of religion and freedom of education. Cogently, by and large respondents are not of the opinion that the Dutch interpretation of freedom of religion – which, for example, allows teachers in public schools to wear an Islamic headscarf – conflicts with the neutrality of the state.

Importantly, politicians should realize that wide support for an inclusive conception of national belonging and the principle of equal treatment (discussed above) does not imply a high level of tolerance for all (religious) groups in society. In the context of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, support for the freedom of religion of Muslims can be generated by preventing and combating intolerance of Islamic religious manifestations in Dutch society, including building mosques, establishing Muslim schools and wearing the Islamic headscarf. Despite the substantial intolerance displayed towards these manifestations, the findings of this study indicate a wide support for preventing and combating intolerance and prejudice in general. More than two-thirds of respondents want the government to develop policies to encourage the proper functioning of the multicultural society, including measures to promote tolerance for cultural diversity (see Section 5.2.3.3).

Furthermore, the results in 6.4.2 indicate that respondents who are intolerant of Islamic manifestations think that allowing these manifestations in the public sphere will lead to forcing Islam upon non-Muslims. Therefore it is of the utmost importance to dispel such prejudice about Islam, as the national government noted in its policy document *Integration, Belonging and Citizenship* issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011).

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Summary

Title of this PhD thesis: Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship: Public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands

The growing ethnic and cultural diversity in Western societies since the end of World War II has given rise to issues regarding social equality for citizens of different ethnic backgrounds, and immigrants' cultural and ethnic identity. In the last two decades, debates on these issues have increasingly tended to focus on norms, values and practices of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands and other European countries.

The debates on these issues have been accompanied by scientific studies focusing on whether and to what extent the (policy) responses of Western societies to immigration and the resulting diversity can be characterized as 'multicultural', an adjective which generally means that the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants in society is being taken into account. Such normative response, also referred to as multiculturalism, has three central aspects, which are closely related to fundamental debates on citizenship and are described by Shadid (2009) as the central dimensions of multicultural citizenship. The first of these dimensions concerns the recognition that individuals of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds who have legal citizenship belong to the national group. The second dimension bears upon social equality, not only on grounds such as gender and sexual orientation, but on grounds of ethnic origin and religion as well. The third dimension is the most defining aspect of multiculturalism: the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of the various groups in society, which is seen by proponents of multiculturalism as necessary to achieve citizen equality.

However, many scientific studies of these dimensions focus on regulations, policies and the political discourse of the societies concerned. In contrast, studies of *public* views on the national belonging of (new) citizens of various ethnic and

cultural backgrounds are rare. There has also been little empirical research on the relationship between immigrant's ethnic identity or multiple citizenship status and their loyalty to the nation-state, a specific aspect of the recognition of national belonging which has been increasingly debated and problematized in the last few decades. The purpose of this study is therefore to explore Dutch citizens' views on the three said dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including loyalty to the nation-state. By exploring these views, this study hopes to contribute to the understanding of how the social construction of national belonging is related to various aspects of attitudes towards cultural diversity, including views on equality, prejudice and cultural distinctiveness. By assessing these relationships, this study will also make an empirical exploration of whether the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship are indeed distinct, as theorized by Shadid (2009) (see **Chapter 1**).

The exploratory character and wide scope of this study led to the choice of a mixed-method methodological design, as discussed in **Chapter 2**. This design included a survey (n=710, conducted in November 2012) and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66, carried out between March and August 2013) in which both native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants – holding Dutch citizenship – were interviewed. Most interviewed immigrants are of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean descent, and as such belong to the four largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands (n=202 in the survey and n=25 in the in-depth interviews). Apart from these groups and native Dutch (n=468), the survey included a small group of Western immigrants as well (n=33).

In **Chapters 3** and **4**, public views are explored on the first dimension of multicultural citizenship: the recognition that individuals of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds who have legal citizenship belong to the national group. As mentioned above, this dimension includes views on immigrants' multiple citizenship status and their loyalty to the nation-state. The analyses in these chapters show that respondents disagree on this issue, indicating that national belonging is not determined only by the status of legal citizenship, but is imbued with social aspects as well.

The respondents appear to have four distinct conceptions of national belonging: *civic*, *territorial*, *ethnic* and *legal*. On average, they attach most importance to the civic type, that is, they attach most importance to inclusive criteria for national belonging such as feeling Dutch and having knowledge of Dutch culture. Almost as much importance is attached to the territorial type, which includes such criteria as being born and living for most of one's life in the Netherlands, and to the legal type, which implies exclusive legal citizenship, where the latter type refers to not holding multiple citizenship. Respondents who

considered these territorial criteria and/or the criterion of exclusive legal citizenship to be important, argued that these are necessary preconditions for citizens to develop a sense of belonging and loyalty to the Netherlands. Least importance is attached to the ethnic type of national belonging, which includes exclusive criteria such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background.

The importance the respondents attach to these criteria for national belonging appears to be related to their political preference, their educational level and the strength of their prejudice that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat. With respect to the latter, the more exclusive the type of Dutch national belonging, the stronger its relationship is to this type of prejudice. Furthermore, the importance attached to the most exclusive types – the ethnic type and exclusive legal citizenship – appears to be negatively related to educational level. Finally, voters for right-wing parties generally attach more importance to criteria for national belonging, whether they be inclusive or exclusive. Most importance is attached to the types of national belonging by voters for the right-wing (populist) Popular Party for Freedom (PVV) and the ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party (SGP), which corresponds with statements made by the members of Parliament representing these parties, who have repeatedly stressed the importance of (exclusive) boundaries of the Dutch national group during the last decade.

Almost half of the respondents appear to oppose multiple citizenship, the analysis indicates. While, as mentioned above, some respondents argued that exclusive legal citizenship is an important precondition for developing loyalty to the nation-state, most found it difficult to explain the necessity of this exclusiveness.

However, no significant differences in commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands were found between respondents with single citizenship and those with multiple citizenship. Similarly, no significant differences were found in the levels of affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state between native Dutch and Western and non-Western immigrants and their descendants. Moreover, the affective commitment of immigrants, including those with multiple citizenship, to their own ethnic and religious groups, appears to be positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands. Therefore, the results of this study indicate that neither ethnic and religious identity nor indeed multiple citizenship undermine immigrants' attachment and loyalty to the nation-state.

Views in Dutch society on the second dimension of multicultural citizenship, that is, social equality, are explored in **Chapter 5**. More specifically, views are explored on policies and regulations to achieve both formal equality (equal treatment) and substantive equality of opportunity for those citizens from diverse

ethnic and cultural backgrounds who had come to the country primarily as labour migrants.

A large majority of the respondents supports both the principle of the equal treatment of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds and national anti-discrimination policies. Those who do not support this principle and such policies, appear to attach more importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western name, and, not surprisingly, have a stronger prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat. This prejudice, in its turn, is negatively related to educational level, and appears to be strongest among voters for PVV and SGP, followed by voters for the right-wing liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the left - wing Socialist Party (SP) and the ChristianUnion (CU). Voters for the left-wing Labour Party (PvdA), the left-wing liberal Democrats 66 (D66), the left-wing Green Left party and the right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) are the least prejudiced.

At the same time, almost half of the respondents is of the opinion that anti-discrimination policies should be improved. They argued that more effective policies, such as quota measures and preferential treatment, are necessary and should be introduced. They also stated that such policies will and can only be effective when politicians stop making polarizing statements. In contrast, among those (a small minority) who oppose anti-discrimination policies, some native Dutch respondents argued that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated and that 'it is the immigrants' own fault', because, as one respondent said, 'They want to be different from the Dutch'.

Despite the sizeable support for anti-discrimination policies, a majority of the respondents opposes the preferential treatment of (naturalized) immigrants and their descendants in the context of job applications. Moreover, none of the respondents who do support policies for immigrant integration mentioned that specific measures should be implemented to reduce the substantive disadvantages of minorities on the labour market. Interestingly, the opposition to preferential treatment appears to be explained only to a small extent by the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat and by views on who belongs to the national group. This opposition might partly be explained by a misunderstanding of the measures concerned: respondents said that they oppose positive action because it implies positive discrimination (which is forbidden by law in the Netherlands). Still, this study cannot explain the finding that the opposition to preferential treatment for immigrants is substantially larger than the opposition to preferential treatment for women.

Chapter 6 explores public views on the third dimension of multicultural citizenship: the recognition of cultural distinctiveness. As current political debates on this issue are primarily concentrated on the religious practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants and their descendants, the exploration in Chapter 6 largely focuses on interpretations of church-state relations and the perceived incompatibility between Dutch norms and values and the norms and values embraced by Muslim immigrants. Indeed, the analysis indicates that respondents associate the 'cultural distinctiveness of immigrants' primarily with such Islamic religious manifestations as mosques, Muslim schools and the Islamic headscarf.

Interestingly, the analysis indicates that both respondents' tolerance of such religious distinctiveness and their appreciation of cultural diversity in general are much lower than their support for the principle of equal treatment. Their opposition to certain aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness is substantial: almost half opposes the right of public officials (including teachers) to wear an Islamic headscarf and a third oppose granting new religious groups the right to build prayer houses. Importantly, the analysis indicates that these respondents do not oppose the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as such (including manifestations of all religions), but specifically reject the presence of Islamic manifestations and expressions in the Netherlands. However, respondents who opposed the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness did not argue that such recognition would conflict with the neutrality of the state, or that it would hinder the development of immigrants' loyalty to the Netherlands – arguments that have played a prominent role in the Dutch political debate since the year 2000.

Finally, the respondents' tolerance of religious distinctiveness appears to be positively related to their educational level, and negatively related to both the importance that is attached to relatively exclusive criteria for national belonging (such as having Dutch ancestors) and to the prejudice that immigrants present a cultural and economic threat. Furthermore, voters for PVV and SGP are the least tolerant, followed by voters for VVD and SP. Most tolerant of religious distinctiveness are voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left.

While, as mentioned above, the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 clearly indicate that public views on national belonging are related to views on social equality and the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, the analysis in **Chapter 7** indicates that these three dimensions of multicultural citizenship are empirically distinct. In other words, the normative response of citizens to the cultural diversity in their society assumes three distinct aspects. In Dutch society, this is reflected in the phenomenon that the wide support for an inclusive conception of national

belonging and the principle of equal treatment (discussed above) does not imply a high level of tolerance for religious manifestations of all groups in society.

Samenvatting

Titel van dit proefschrift: Multiculturalisme en multicultureel burgerschap: Publieke opvattingen over nationaal toebehoren, gelijkheid en culturele eigenheid in Nederland

De sinds het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog groeiende etnische en culturele diversiteit in westerse samenlevingen heeft aanleiding gegeven tot discussies over sociale ongelijkheid van burgers met verschillende etnische achtergronden, en over de culturele en etnische identiteit van immigranten. In de laatste twee decennia hebben deze discussies steeds vaker specifiek betrekking op normen, waarden en praktijken van islamitische immigranten in Nederland en andere Europese landen.

De debatten over deze kwesties hebben onder meer geleid tot wetenschappelijke studies over of en in hoeverre de (beleids-)reacties van westerse samenlevingen op immigratie en de daaruit voortvloeiende diversiteit kunnen worden gekarakteriseerd als 'multicultureel', een adjectief dat aanduidt dat de culturele eigenheid van de immigranten in de samenleving wordt erkend. Deze erkenning, ook wel multiculturalisme genoemd, heeft drie centrale aspecten, die nauw verwant zijn aan fundamentele debatten over burgerschap en door Shadid (2009) worden aangeduid als de centrale dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap. De eerste dimensie betreft de erkenning dat burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden behoren tot de nationale groep. De tweede dimensie betreft sociale gelijkheid, niet alleen op grond van geslacht en seksuele geaardheid, maar ook op grond van etnische afkomst en religieuze overtuiging. De derde dimensie is het meest definiërende aspect van multiculturalisme: de erkenning van de culturele eigenheid van de verschillende groepen in de samenleving. Voorstanders van multiculturalisme beschouwen deze erkenning als een voorwaarde voor het bereiken van sociale gelijkheid.

Vele wetenschappelijke studies over deze dimensies richten zich echter op regelgeving, beleid en het politieke discours van de bestudeerde samenlevingen.

Studies van *publieke* opvattingen over het nationale toebehoren van (nieuwe) burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden zijn daarentegen zeldzaam. Ook is er weinig empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen enerzijds de etnische identiteit en de meervoudige nationaliteit van (sommige) immigranten en anderzijds hun loyaliteit aan de natiestaat, een specifiek aspect van de erkenning van het nationale behoren, dat met name in de laatste twee decennia veel aandacht heeft gekregen.

Het doel van deze studie is dan ook het verkennen van opvattingen van Nederlandse burgers over de drie genoemde dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap, met inbegrip van loyaliteit aan de natiestaat. De hoop is dat dit onderzoek daarmee kan bijdragen aan het begrip van hoe de sociale constructie van het nationale behoren is gerelateerd aan opvattingen over specifieke aspecten van culturele diversiteit, waaronder sociale gelijkheid, vooroordelen en culturele eigenheid. Daarmee is deze studie ook een verkenning van de vraag of de drie dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap inderdaad empirisch zijn te onderscheiden, zoals getheoretiseerd door Shadid (2009) (zie **hoofdstuk 1**).

Het verkennende karakter en de brede vraagstelling van dit onderzoek hebben geleid tot de keuze van een *mixed-method* opzet, zoals toegelicht in **hoofdstuk 2**. Deze opzet omvatte een survey (n = 710, uitgevoerd in november 2012) en semigestructureerde diepte-interviews (n = 66, uitgevoerd in de periode maart-augustus 2013), waarin zowel autochtone Nederlanders en eerste- en tweede-generatie allochtonen – allen met de Nederlandse nationaliteit – zijn geïnterviewd. De meeste geïnterviewde immigranten zijn van Turkse, Marokkaanse, Surinaamse of Antilliaanse afkomst, en behoren als zodanig tot de vier grootste niet-westerse allochtone groepen in Nederland (n = 202 in de enquête en n = 25 in de diepte-interviews). Naast deze groepen en autochtone Nederlanders (n = 468), omvatte de enquête een kleine groep westerse allochtonen en (n = 33).

In **hoofdstukken 3** en **4** worden publieke opvattingen over de eerste dimensie van multicultureel burgerschap verkend: de erkenning dat burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden tot de nationale groep behoren. Deze verkenning betreft mede het eerder genoemde specifieke aspect van deze dimensie: de meervoudige nationaliteit van immigranten en hun loyaliteit aan de natiestaat. De analyses in deze hoofdstukken laten zien dat respondenten het oneens zijn over criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. Nationaal toebehoren wordt dus sociaal geconstrueerd, en niet alleen bepaald door de juridische nationaliteit.

De respondenten blijken vier verschillende typen opvattingen over nationaal toebehoren te hebben: *civiel*, *territoriaal*, *etnisch* en *juridisch*. Ze hechten gemiddeld het meeste belang aan het civiele type. Dat wil zeggen dat zij het meeste belang hechten aan inclusieve criteria voor nationaal toebehoren, zoals het 'zich

Nederlands voelen' en het hebben van kennis van de Nederlandse cultuur. Bijna net zoveel belang wordt gehecht aan het territoriale type, dat verwijst naar criteria zoals geboren zijn in, en langdurig wonen in Nederland, en aan het juridische type, dat verwijst naar het niet hebben van meervoudige nationaliteit. Respondenten die deze territoriale criteria en/of het criterium van de exclusieve nationaliteit belangrijk vinden, beschouwen deze als noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor het ontwikkelen van een gevoel van verbondenheid met en loyaliteit aan Nederland. Het minste belang wordt door de respondenten gehecht aan het etnische type van nationaal toebehoren, dat verwijst naar exclusieve criteria zoals het hebben van Nederlandse voorouders, een westerse naam of een christelijke achtergrond.

Het belang dat de respondenten hechten aan deze criteria voor nationaal toebehoren is gerelateerd aan hun politieke voorkeur, opleidingsniveau en de mate waarin ze het vooroordeel hebben dat immigranten een culturele en economische bedreiging vormen. Dit laatste vooroordeel is sterker bij respondenten die meer belang hechten aan exclusieve criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. Daarnaast blijkt de mate waarin respondenten de exclusieve criteria belangrijk vinden (zoals het hebben van Nederlandse voorouders en het niet hebben van meervoudige nationaliteit), negatief gerelateerd te zijn aan hun opleidingsniveau. Tenslotte hechten kiezers voor rechtse politieke partijen in het algemeen meer belang aan alle criteria voor nationaal toebehoren, of deze criteria nu inclusief of exclusief zijn. PVV- en SGP-stemmers hechten het meeste belang aan dergelijke criteria. Dit is wellicht niet verrassend, gezien het feit dat PVV- en SGP-parlementariërs in de afgelopen 10 jaar herhaaldelijk hebben gewezen op het belang van (exclusieve) criteria voor nationaal toebehoren.

Bijna de helft van de respondenten heeft bezwaar tegen een meervoudige nationaliteit, zo blijkt uit de analyse. Hoewel een aantal van deze respondenten, zoals hierboven vermeld, stelt dat het hebben van alleen de Nederlandse nationaliteit een belangrijke voorwaarde is voor de ontwikkeling van loyaliteit aan de natiestaat, vonden de meesten het moeilijk om de noodzaak van deze exclusiviteit te onderbouwen.

De analyse laat echter geen significante verschillen zien in verbondenheid met en loyaliteit aan Nederland tussen respondenten met meervoudige nationaliteit en respondenten met enkelvoudige nationaliteit. Evenzo zijn geen significante verschillen gevonden in de mate van verbondenheid met en loyaliteit aan de Nederlandse natiestaat tussen enerzijds autochtone Nederlanders en anderzijds westerse en niet-westerse immigranten en hun nakomelingen. Ook blijkt de nationale verbondenheid van immigranten, waaronder die met meervoudige nationaliteit, positief gerelateerd te zijn aan hun etnische en religieuze zelfidentificatie. Daarmee laten de resultaten van deze studie zien dat de nationale

verbondenheid en loyaliteit van immigranten niet wordt belemmerd of ondermijnd door hun etnische of religieuze identiteit, en ook niet door meervoudige nationaliteit.

Opvattingen in de Nederlandse samenleving over de tweede dimensie van multicultureel burgerschap – sociale gelijkheid – vormen het onderwerp van **hoofdstuk 5**. Meer in het bijzonder worden in dit hoofdstuk opvattingen verkend over beleid en regelgeving om zowel formele gelijkheid (gelijke behandeling) als gelijkheid van kansen te bereiken, voor burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden die voornamelijk als arbeidsmigranten naar Nederland zijn gekomen.

Een grote meerderheid van de respondenten steunt zowel het beginsel van de gelijke behandeling van burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden als een nationaal antidiscriminatiebeleid. Degenen die dit principe en dergelijk beleid niet steunen, hechten meer waarde aan de exclusieve (etnische) criteria voor nationaal behoren, zoals het hebben Nederlandse voorouders en een westerse naam, en hebben in sterkere mate het vooroordeel dat immigranten een culturele en economische bedreiging vormen. Dit vooroordeel is op zijn beurt negatief gerelateerd aan opleidingsniveau, en is het sterkst onder PVV- en SGP-stemmers, gevolgd door VVD-, SP- en CU-stemmers. Stemmers op PvdA-, D66-, GroenLinks- en CDA zijn het minst bevooroordeeld.

Tegelijkertijd is bijna de helft van de respondenten van mening dat maatregelen ter bestrijding van discriminatie moeten worden verbeterd. Zij voeren aan dat effectiever beleid noodzakelijk is, en noemen daarbij het instellen van quota en voorkeursbeleid. Zij stellen ook dat dergelijk beleid alleen effectief kan zijn als politici stoppen met het doen van polariserende uitspraken over immigranten. Een kleine minderheid onder de respondenten die bezwaar heeft tegen een antidiscriminatiebeleid, stelt dat het probleem van discriminatie wordt overdreven en dat het "de schuld van immigranten zelf is", omdat, zoals een van de respondenten zei, "Zij anders willen zijn dan de Nederlanders".

Ondanks de grote steun voor antidiscriminatiebeleid, is een meerderheid van de respondenten tegen voorkeursbeleid bij sollicitaties voor (genaturaliseerde) immigranten en hun nakomelingen. Bovendien is men niet van mening dat specifieke maatregelen nodig zijn om achterstand van minderheden op de arbeidsmarkt te verminderen, ook niet de respondenten die zich voorstander betoonden van integratiebeleid voor immigranten. Het is opvallend dat de oppositie tegen voorkeursbeleid slechts in geringe mate kan worden verklaard door het vooroordeel dat migranten een culturele en economische dreiging vormen, en door opvattingen over criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. Deze oppositie kan wel gedeeltelijk worden verklaard door een verkeerd begrip van voorkeursbeleid:

respondenten zeiden er tegen te zijn omdat het naar hun mening positieve discriminatie impliceert, terwijl dit laatste in Nederland niet is toegestaan. Toch kan in deze studie de bevinding dat de oppositie tegen voorkeursbeleid voor immigranten aanzienlijk groter is dan die tegen voorkeursbeleid voor vrouwen, niet worden verklaard.

In **hoofdstuk 6** worden publieke opvattingen over de derde dimensie van multicultureel burgerschap onderzocht: de erkenning van culturele eigenheid. Aangezien de huidige politieke debatten over deze kwestie voornamelijk de religieuze praktijken, normen en waarden van islamitische immigranten en hun nakomelingen betreffen, richt een belangrijk deel van de verkenning in dit hoofdstuk zich op aspecten van de scheiding tussen kerk en staat, en op de vermeende onverenigbaarheid van de Nederlandse normen en waarden met de normen en waarden van islamitische immigranten. Uit de analyse blijkt inderdaad dat de respondenten de 'culturele eigenheid van immigranten' in de eerste plaats associëren met islamitische religieuze manifestaties zoals moskeeën, islamitische scholen en de hoofddoek.

Het is opvallend dat de tolerantie voor dergelijke religieuze manifestaties en ook de waardering voor culturele diversiteit in het algemeen, veel lager is dan de steun voor het beginsel van gelijke behandeling. De oppositie tegen bepaalde aspecten van de formele erkenning van religieuze eigenheid is aanzienlijk: bijna de helft is tegen het recht van ambtenaren (inclusief leerkrachten) om een islamitische hoofddoek te dragen en een derde vindt dat nieuwe religieuze groepen niet het recht verleend moet worden om gebedshuizen te bouwen. Uit de analyse blijkt overigens dat deze respondenten geen bezwaar hebben tegen de formele erkenning van religieuze eigenheid als zodanig (met inbegrip van uitingen van alle religies), maar wel en specifiek tegen religieuze uitingen en manifestaties van moslims in Nederland.

De respondenten die tegen de formele erkenning van religieuze eigenheid zijn, beweren echter niet dat een dergelijke erkenning in strijd is met de neutraliteit van de staat, of dat het de loyaliteit van immigranten aan Nederland ondermijnt - argumenten die niettemin een prominente rol hebben gespeeld in het Nederlandse politieke debat sinds het jaar 2000.

De tolerantie van de respondenten voor religieuze manifestaties blijkt overigens positief gerelateerd te zijn aan hun opleidingsniveau, en negatief gerelateerd aan zowel het belang dat ze hechten aan relatief exclusieve criteria voor nationaal toebehoren (zoals het hebben van Nederlandse voorouders) als aan het vooroordeel dat immigranten een culturele en economische bedreiging vormen. Verder blijken PVV- en SGP-stemmers het minst tolerant, gevolgd door VVD- en SP-stemmers.

Het meest tolerant jegens religieuze eigenheid zijn kiezers voor linkse partijen – de PvdA, D66 en GroenLinks.

Zoals hierboven vermeld, wijzen de analyses in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 er op dat publieke opvattingen over nationale behoren gerelateerd zijn aan opvattingen over sociale gelijkheid en de erkenning van de culturele eigenheid van immigranten. Tegelijkertijd wijst de algemene analyse in **hoofdstuk 7** uit dat deze drie dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap empirisch zijn te onderscheiden. Met andere woorden, de normatieve reactie van burgers op de culturele diversiteit in hun samenleving heeft drie verschillende aspecten. In de Nederlandse samenleving komt dit onder meer tot uitdrukking in het verschijnsel dat de brede steun voor zowel een inclusieve opvatting van nationaal toebehoren als het beginsel van gelijke behandeling (hierboven besproken), niet samengaat met een hoge mate van tolerantie voor religieuze manifestaties van alle groepen in de samenleving.

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Curriculum vitae

Igor Boog was born on the 15th of August 1970 in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. From September 1982 until June 1988 he followed secondary education (VWO) at the Dalton Scholengemeenschap in Voorburg. He studied Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University, and worked as a journalist in the Middle East. He received his doctorandus title from Leiden University (2004) for a thesis on activist social movements, based on extensive field research in the Middle East.

In the Netherlands, Igor Boog worked as a researcher and deputy director of the Dutch national expertise centre on discrimination (Art.1). He participated in and supervised research projects (combining quantitative and qualitative methods) on equal treatment and discrimination, commissioned by the Dutch government and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

Igor Boog joined the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University in 2010. He is responsible for the courses on statistics and data-analysis, and lectures about interethnic relations, citizenship and social identity.

This study concerns three central aspects of multiculturalism, which are closely related to fundamental debates on citizenship and are described as the principal dimensions of multicultural citizenship. The first of these dimensions relates to national belonging: the recognition that citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds belong to the national group. The second dimension bears upon social equality, on grounds such as ethnic origin, religion, gender and sexual orientation. The third dimension is the most defining aspect of multiculturalism: the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of the various groups in society, which is considered necessary (by proponents of multiculturalism) to achieve citizen equality.
This study explores views in Dutch society on these potentially divisive issues. Essentially, this study provides insight into the question to which extent society attributes the quality 'Dutch' to Dutch citizens from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

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