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## **The role of civil society in investment treaty arbitration : status and prospects**

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# THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN INVESTMENT TREATY

ARBITRATION:

STATUS AND PROSPECTS

*Farouk Fahmi El-Hosseny*



THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN INVESTMENT TREATY  
ARBITRATION:  
STATUS AND PROSPECTS

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إلى أبي العزيز

*(TO MY DEAR FATHER)*





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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ACHPR – African Commission for Human Rights

ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations

BITs – Bilateral Investment Agreements

CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

CERDS – Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

CESCR – Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

DSU – Dispute Settlement Understanding

ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights

ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EU – European Union

GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GATS – General Agreement on Trade in Services

FDI – Foreign direct investment

FTA – Free Trade Agreements

FTC – NAFTA Free Trade Commission

IACHR – Inter-American Convention on Human Rights

IACtHR – Inter-American Court for Human Rights

ICC – International Chamber of Commerce

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICJ – International Court of Justice

ICSID – International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes

IAs – International Investment Agreements

ILC – International Law Commission

ITO – International Trade Organization

MAI – OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment

NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement

NAALC – North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation

UNCED – United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNCITRAL – United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDRIP – United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UNIDROIT – International Institute for the Unification of Private Law

SIAC – Singapore International Arbitration Center

OAS – Organisation of American States

TBT – Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

TRIPS – Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

TTIP – Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

WTO – World Trade Organisation