

## Organising and Financing Zeeland Privateering 1598-1609

*I.J. van Loo*

In May 1606 the secret agent of the English garrison of the cautionary town Flushing, Nicolaes de Blocq, expressed his amazement at the recent growth of privateering in Zeeland in a letter to Sir Robert Sidney, Governor of Flushing:

Trade here stops entirely, for everybody is putting their money into ships which go daily to adventure and freebooty in great numbers.<sup>1</sup>

According to De Blocq, people in Zeeland - whatever their background was - were suddenly attracted to privateering because of the hope of booty. As a consequence they abandoned trade investments and turned to participation in privateering ventures. If De Blocq was right in his statement that the years in which Zeeland privateering came into being went back to 1606 or thereabout, then the first decade of the seventeenth century marks the breakthrough of a development in which Zeeland privateering grew to an extensive and almost constant maritime business later in the seventeenth century. As a result of this development, Zeeland became the most important privateering province within the Dutch Republic as described by the authors Binder, Bruijn and Verhees-Van Meer.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper, the value of the statement of De Blocq will be investigated. Under what circumstances did this supposed sudden rise of privateering in Zeeland come into being in the years between 1598 and 1609? In other words, which factors contributed to the roots of Zeeland privateering in the first decade of the seventeenth century? This period is determined by two important changes in the relationship between the Dutch Republic and Spain. In 1598 the new King of Spain Philip III launched an embargo of Dutch trade and shipping in Spain and in the Spanish and Portuguese colonial areas, while in 1609 the Twelve Years' Truce was signed between both enemies.

The main problem which is dealt with in this paper is the question of how money was used in Zeeland privateering and how privateering was organised. What sort of people thought it would be profitable to invest in privateering

ventures, how did the actual fitting out of ships take place and what were the returns of Zeeland privateering?

### The rise of Zeeland privateering

In the sixteenth century privateering in Zeeland had been used more as a fiscal instrument in the financial policy of the province than as a real means of naval warfare against the King of Spain. Both warships of the Admiralty and privateers controlled the inland waters of Zeeland and the Flemish coast in order to search Dutch and foreign vessels which had evaded the payment of licence-fees.<sup>3</sup> No hostile actions of Zeeland privateers against Spanish shipping and trade in southern waters had taken place.

This situation changed dramatically at the end of the sixteenth century. As a consequence of the 1598 embargo the States General reacted by declaring all goods and possessions of subjects of the King of Spain good prize and forbade both Dutch and foreign people to trade with the Iberian peninsula.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, a fleet of 74 ships under the command of Pieter van der Does was outfitted to blockade the Spanish and Portuguese coasts and raid the Iberian colonies.<sup>5</sup> The expenses of the outfitting of this major expedition however went far beyond the profits of the captured booty. Consequently, the States General were forced to change their policy concerning maritime warfare. A naval policy had to be adopted in which the financial resources of the provinces of the Dutch Republic were spared. By stimulating privateering the States General hoped to continue their maritime struggle against Spain with undiminished strength. In 1599 and 1604 instructions encouraging privateering in the West Indies and East Indies were issued.<sup>6</sup>

This new policy is clearly demonstrated by a major privateering expedition in 1604. In January of the same year the Rotterdam merchant Pieter van der Haghen applied for assistance to the States General and Prince Maurice about '*sekeren aenslach te doen in ende opte custen van de Westindien met eenige schepen ende volck van oorloge, met vertoogh dat denselven aenslach bij goet succes seer dienstich voor den landen soude wesen*'.<sup>7</sup> The States reacted favourably to Van der Haghen's request. They authorized the expedition on condition that the enterprise was done without expenses for the generality. On the other hand the States promised to abandon all claims to booty amounting to more than 1,000,000 guilders. Immediately after the authorisation of the expedition, a squadron of five privateers under the command of Don Rodrigo de Cordua was outfitted in Zeeland

by Pieter van der Haghen and Barthout van Vlooswijk, an important brewer and burgomaster of Rotterdam.

Another important factor by which privateering in Zeeland was greatly influenced was the rising colonial expansion in both the West and East Indies generated by powerful merchants in Holland and Zeeland. At the end of the sixteenth century Zeeland merchant ships started to explore the Spanish and Portuguese colonial areas.<sup>8</sup> In 1595 the first Zeeland ships equipped by the famous Middleburg merchant Balthasar de Moucheron had reached the West Indies, while three years later Zeeland ships arrived at the East Indies.

It seems that in this phase of Dutch colonial expansion, privateering was not a separate maritime activity but still closely related to merchant shipping. As a consequence of the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which forbade all foreign vessels without a Spanish passport from sailing to the Spanish and Portuguese colonial areas, and the embargo of 1598, Dutch ships were regarded by the Spaniards as smugglers or interlopers. In order to parry hostile attacks during their mercantile journeys in both the East and West Indies, Dutch merchants had applied for letters of commission. In this way a defensive privateering or trade privateering came into being. Of all known letters of commission given out by the States General between the years 1598 and 1603, mainly destined for trading journeys to the West Indies, only two out of twenty-three can be regarded as offensive privateering commissions.<sup>9</sup> In November 1599 at least forty merchant ships were ready to sail from the harbours of Holland and Zeeland using their letter of commission '*by maniere van eene sauvegarde, tot meeder versekeringhe van de coopvaarders die voor gheene vrybuyters en willen bekent syn*'.<sup>10</sup>

As the massive expansion in the West Indies went on, trade entailed privateering in its wake. Zeeland merchant shippers used their privateering commission only when a rich booty fell almost accidentally into their hands or when they could not resist the chance to make a fortune in an easy way. Already in 1595 a Spanish prize captured in the West Indies by *De Zwemmende Leeuw* of Balthasar de Moucheron was surreptitiously sold at La Rochelle.<sup>11</sup> In 1601 two salt-carriers of Hoorn brought a great amount of hides, tobacco and other West Indian products to Arnemuiden, which they had taken out of a Spanish bark returning from San Domingo.<sup>12</sup> And in 1606 a ship of Lieven de Meulneer under the command of Cornelis Anthonissen Berghenaer took a Spanish bark. Spanish wines, ivory and gold from this prize were sold in Guinea and the West Indies.<sup>13</sup> Other prizes taken by merchant ships reached the Zeeland harbours.

The Dutch penetration in Asia entailed booty in its wake as well. Joris van Spilbergen took a Spanish carvel which he and his companion De Mouche-ron tried to hide from the officers of the Zeeland Admiralty.<sup>14</sup> The best known case of privateering in Asia is the conquest of the Portuguese carrack *San Jago*, taken in March 1602 near St. Helena by two ships of a Zeeland East India Company and which prize amounted to the amazing sum of 1.5 million guilders.<sup>15</sup>

The last factor which greatly contributed to the rise of Zeeland privateering was directly caused by an important reversal in the diplomatic relationship between England and Spain. In August 1604 the Peace Treaty of London put an end to all hostile actions and Anglo-Spanish rivalry which had taken place since 1585.<sup>16</sup> Just before the conclusion of the peace treaty, the new English king James I had taken measures against piracy, forbidding all direct or indirect assistance to privateers who attacked ships of friendly nations.<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately for King James I, 'the peacemaker', his ideas on peace did not necessarily match the interests of the subjects of his realm. English society had become completely imbued with privateering. Both mighty lords and merchants who were on top of the social scale and common mariners from the coastal areas had many interests in privateering.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, they were not inclined to give up their highly profitable business and sought ways to circumvent the royal interdictions. A solution for their problem was found in a legal construction in international law. English subjects tried to continue their privateering activities under Dutch letters of marque.<sup>19</sup> A deposition of an English merchant shows that even during the peace-negotiations in 1604, English merchants already applied for privateering commissions in The Dutch Republic:

Ad xviii affirmat verum esse that the ar<sup>late</sup> John Randoll in the month of August last mett with his ex<sup>c</sup> at Newhavon in France, and had talk together and this ex<sup>c</sup> asked him whether eany shippers were sett furth out of England against the Spaniardes, and the said Randoll answered there was peace betwixte England and Spaine and the shippers were not sett furth thence against the Spaniards and this ex<sup>c</sup> replienge asked him wether he might not be furnished of shippinge and men in England if he procured Commission from Grave Morris. And the said Randoll answered that if this ex<sup>c</sup> could procure commission from Grave Morris and came therewith to England, he could furnish him with a shipp or two, and victualls, and also other necessities in England for that service. And theruppon this ex<sup>c</sup>

procured a Commission from Grave Morris and came therewith to London and found the said Randoll here and shewed yt to him and he answered he had a suite at lawe that he could not attend that busines until his matter in lawe were ended.<sup>20</sup>

From the summer of 1604 onwards, Dutch harbours were regularly frequented by English privateering ships. This Anglo-Dutch connection was particularly obvious in the harbours of Zeeland. Due to the close geographical position to England and the presence of a flourishing English community in Zeeland, English subjects had a strong influence on the rise of Zeeland privateering. From 1585 to 1616 the cautionary towns Flushing, the Brill and the fortress Ramekins were regarded as English property and a surety for the payment of warfare-expenditures previously paid by England.<sup>21</sup> As a consequence, English garrisons were stationed in Flushing and the fortress Ramekins. Moreover, an important English merchant community was also vividly present in Zeeland. Since 1598 the Court of the Merchant Adventurers was resident in Middleburg.

In this respect, it is not surprising that in November 1604 an Englishman travelled to Zeeland to procure authorisation from the Zeeland Admiralty for five English captains to act as Dutch privateers.<sup>22</sup> As far as is known, in the period June-December 1604 at least 11 English privateers were given permission to operate as Dutch freebooters.<sup>23</sup> Some English privateers were fitted out in England, others in Zeeland. John Jennings left his English place of residence Portsmouth and moved with his wife and children to Flushing.<sup>24</sup> A certain Edward Bailly bought a privateering ship in England and went in person to Prince Maurice of Orange during the siege of Sluis in order to obtain a letter of commission.<sup>25</sup> Because this legal construction was used quite frequently, James I took strong countermeasures. In addition to the Treaty of London a proclamation of March 1<sup>st</sup> 1605 prohibited all forms of English cooperation in foreign privateering enterprises.<sup>26</sup>

The English privateers and their promotors for their part reacted by putting Dutch privateering captains on their ships. When captain Edward Bailly (who had brought a Spanish prize to Middleburg and was preparing a new expedition) became aware of the royal proclamation of 1605, he hired Balten Stevens of Flushing to serve as captain on his ship.<sup>27</sup> In order to mislead the English authorities Dutch crew members were sometimes appointed as captain at the moment privateering ships came into English harbours. In 1606 the same Balten Stevens was used to serve as a captain of *The Dragon*, though actual

command of the privateering ship was in the hands of the Englishman John Exton.<sup>28</sup>

### Rules and regulation

As opposed to a pirate, a Dutch privateer in the international law of the *Ancien Regime* had to be recognized as a legal naval officer of the Dutch Republic by reason of his legally constituted commission. In the period between 1598 and 1609 letters of commission were granted both by the States General and Prince Maurice of Orange by right of his function as Lord Admiral of the Dutch Republic, although officially the stadtholder was the only authorised person to do so. When the privateer or one of his promoters had applied for a commission, this commission was not yet legally valid. Legal letters of commission had to fulfill three conditions.

First, an *attache*, a written permission from the Lieutenant-Admiral of Zeeland concerning the privateering expedition, had to be applied for. This document was affixed to the letter of commission.

Secondly, a privateer was obliged to give some names of persons - most of them the part-owners of a privateering enterprise - who stood surety for the behaviour of the privateering captain. From those sureties the damage would be recovered in case of the privateer became a pirate during his privateering voyage. In 1604 the amount of caution money the sureties had to stand surety for was 6,000 guilders.<sup>29</sup> An exception concerning the suretyship of English privateers was made. If an English privateer with a Dutch letter of commission had no connections with any Zeeland inhabitants at all, he was allowed to go on a privateering voyage on his own recognisance.<sup>30</sup> As a consequence of the increasing amount of complaints concerning the behaviour of Dutch privateers the States General raised the caution money to 20,000 guilders in 1606.<sup>31</sup>

Finally, a privateer had to be sworn in. A privateering captain had to swear an oath of allegiance to the States General in which he promised to take no neutrals, allies or Dutch subjects at sea, to take every prize to a Zeeland harbour and not to sell any booty outside the Dutch Republic. In 1606 captain Jan Janssen Colve was forced to hand over his letter of commission to the Admiralty and was forever banned from serving as a privateer because he and his crew had intended to seize a Baltic ship laden with grain and sell this booty in Barbary.<sup>32</sup>

### Part-ownership in Zeeland privateering

Due to its warlike activity, privateering entailed more risks than merchant shipping. A privateering ship could be lost at sea not only through storm but also through hostile action. Just as in merchant shipping, privateering investors tried to spread these risks by financing the equipage of a privateering journey collectively. Participants were associated in a firm and were known as part-owners or share-holders. Each member's share in profit or in loss as a result of a privateering journey was directly proportional to his share in financing.

Was Zeeland privateering shipowning comparable with merchant shipowning in the early seventeenth century? The data of S. Hart on part-ownership in merchant-shipping suggest that it was most widely spread among people who were concerned with the equipment of ships, the families of shipowners, and shipmasters. For the merchants who owned parts of ships there seems as a rule to be no relationship between their trade and their shipowning.<sup>33</sup> In the period up to 1650 merchant ships of the burden of 100 tons or less were owned by the shipmaster or a few part-owners. Ownership of larger ships was divided into smaller shares. Some part-owners of merchant ships had only a 1/64 interest. According to F. Binder and J.Th.H. Verhees-Van Meer shares of Zeeland privateering ships varied from a half to a 1/132 part during the second half of the seventeenth century and the war of the Spanish Succession.<sup>34</sup>

Although no bookkeeping of any Zeeland privateering expedition from this period survived, something can be said about privateering shipowning from other sources, e.g. legal procedures of the Zeeland Admiralty and the High Court of Admiralty in London.

For one of the first privateering expeditions after the 1598 embargo the complete number of investors and their parts are known. The ship *De Hasewint* under shipmaster Jan Pieters Vries was launched from Veere in 1599 by five part-owners originating from that town.<sup>35</sup> The costs of the equipage were divided into four shares of which the shipmaster himself, Hase Calis the widow of the former captain of the Zeeland Admiralty Cornelis Hermans Calis and a captain of the Admiralty named Pieter Franss Thoger each had a one-fourth part. The last part was financed by Joris Thoniss and Jan Lauwe, a local sail producer and the shipmaster.

In 1604 three English merchants of Middleburg agreed with the privateer Edward Bailly that they would victual his ship *The Sparck* if they each became owners for one-third.<sup>36</sup> In 1607 Alexander de Bock a Middleburg merchant living in London and Sir Noël Caron, Lord of Schonewalle and agent for the

States General in England, were the owners of respectively one-fourth part and one-tenth part in the privateering ship *The Golden Phenix* of the burden of 36 ton.<sup>37</sup> A last example shows that the English captain William Bream was owner of a third part of a privateering voyage under the command of captain Richard Duncomb because Bream had lent his ship to this privateer for the use in the expedition.<sup>38</sup>

From this data it seems that shares of ships in privateering shipowning before 1609, especially in comparison with the period after 1650, were quite large, probably as a consequence of the small tonnage of privateering ships. In order to investigate if this statement is true, one needs to know something about the costs of the fitting out of privateering ships and how much money was put in privateering ventures in practice.

How much money was needed to make a privateering ship ready to go to war? Although no bookkeeping of any privateering venture survived, the costs of the buying and the fitting out of three different ships in which the privateering captain Edward Bailly was part-owner are known. The one-third part of *The Sparck* financed by the three mentioned Englishmen in 1604 was worth 340 pounds sterling.<sup>39</sup> Consequently the costs of the total equipage of this ship must have amounted to 1,020 pounds sterling. The equipage of *De Sterre* with captain Balten Stevens from Flushing amounted to 900 Flemish pounds while the equipage of a third ship, the eighty ton *Zeeland* with ninety men under captain Simon Ysbrantss from Middleburg cost 950 Flemish pounds.<sup>40</sup> According to these figures the costs of a Zeeland privateering ship in the years between 1604 and 1606 amounted to circa 1,000 Flemish pounds or 6,000 guilders.

But how much money was put in privateering ventures in practice? A certain Balten Danielsen Smit in 1605 ventured nine pounds sterling in the ship *The Richard* of the English privateer Richard Duncomb.<sup>41</sup> The three English part-owners of *The Sparck*, Feule Carle, John Randoll and George Lasson, together put 340 pounds sterling in the equipage of this ship, of which sum the latter alone paid fifty pounds. Moreover, some amounts of money invested by certain English part-owners who lived in Middleburg in the man-of-war *The Dragon* are known.<sup>42</sup> The Merchant-Adventurer Gerson Manning and the English tailor John Cane contributed respectively 150 and ten Flemish pounds in the venture while the captain of the ship John Exton and Frances Howes, an Englishman who lived in Rotterdam, together invested 120 Flemish pounds, of which the latter alone put in twenty-six pounds. Prince Maurice of Orange even

invested 10,000 guilders in the 1604 expedition to the West-Indies with five ships under the command of general Don Rodrigo de Cordua.<sup>43</sup>

According to these figures, in combination with the calculated costs of outfitting of privateering ships, it seems that smaller investment shares were also common in Zeeland privateering. To sum up, it seems reasonable to assume that the bulk of privateering ventures was financed by a few part-owners who owned big shares of ships and that the money for the remaining part of these ventures was raised from other investors who purchased smaller shares. Exceptions probably existed to this rule, but nothing can be said about this topic until a bookkeeping of a privateering voyage is found.

### The investors in privateering

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the investors in privateering can be found within each layer of Zeeland society. They were linked to each other by commercial, political, familial or other ties. Within the whole range of investors at least four separate groups can be distinguished, namely 1. the English community in Zeeland, 2. the merchant and regent community of Flushing and Middleburg, 3. the privateers themselves and, to a lesser extent, their victuallers, and 4. investors from outside the province. One has to bear in mind that this division is rather artificial because combinations of part-owners from these groups were also possible.

The first group of privateering promotors is the English community in Zeeland. Due to the residence of the Court of the Merchant Adventurers in Middleburg and the English garrisons in the cautionary towns Flushing and fortress Ramekins, the English community as a whole was an important factor of economic life in Zeeland.<sup>44</sup> For example, many English merchants operated as shareholders in the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC).<sup>45</sup>

As a result of the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1604 in combination with the close geographical position of Zeeland to England and the existing contacts between this part of the Dutch Republic and the Anglo-Saxon world, British investors seem to have played a major role in the rise of Zeeland privateering as well. One of the first privateering ventures which brought booty to Zeeland after the Treaty of London had been ratified was partly financed by Thomas Puddock, a factor of the English nation in Flushing.<sup>46</sup> The privateer of this expedition, John Jennings, had left his English residence of Portsmouth and went to Flushing together with his wife and children. In the same year 1604

three English merchants who lived in Middleburg - probably Merchant Adventurers - namely Feule Carle, John Randoll, and Georg Lasson, were owners of one-third part in the equipage of the privateering ship *The Sparck* which, under the the command of the English captain Edward Bailly, took a Spanish carvel laden with wines near Madeira.<sup>47</sup>

A good example of a Zeeland privateering venture both financed and fitted out by the English Nation in Zeeland was the 1606 expedition of *The Dragon* under captain John Exton.<sup>48</sup> Part-owners of this ship were John Quoker, a Middleburg Merchant Adventurer, John Cane, an English tailor who also lived there, captain Edward Bailly, Frances Howes, an Englishmen from Rotterdam, captain John Exton himself and Gerson Manning, a wealthy merchant who was connected to the De Moucheron family.<sup>49</sup> Manning was also treasurer of the Court of the Merchant Adventurers in Middleburg. He was afraid that he would lose this important function, favourably granted to him by the English King, if it became known that he took part in a privateering venture which was strictly forbidden to Englishmen by the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty and the Royal Proclamation of 1605. For this reason, Manning put his investment in the name of a certain Catharina van Mierop, a widow from Arnemuïden with whom he lived. But when some quarrels arose about the distribution of the booty taken by *The Dragon* between Manning and the sailors, the latter threatened to expose him as a privateering part-owner. Manning turned angry and shouted: 'I am owner and I care not if the whole world knowe it.'<sup>50</sup> He was going to regret these words. The same evening eight English sailors of *The Dragon* signed a document mentioning Manning as a privateering part-owner. This document was later handed over to the Spanish ambassador in London in order to procure their pardon for piracy. When Manning arrived in London in 1607, he was arrested and convicted of piracy. He probably had interests in several other Zeeland privateering ships as well. In 1612 the Spanish ambassador in London estimated the losses of Spanish and Portuguese inhabitants caused by privateers of Manning and his Middleburg part-owner John Kindrick at almost a quarter of a million guilders.<sup>51</sup>

Other merchants living in Zeeland who invested in privateering were Thomas Barnes and Robert Barke both of whom were also shareholders of the VOC.<sup>52</sup> English people from outside Zeeland also invested money in Zeeland privateers. For example, John Courtis was part-owner of captain Georg Langdon from Stonehouse in 1605.<sup>53</sup> With regard to the Scottish merchants who resided

permanently in Veere since 1541, there is, on the other hand, no evidence that they were involved in Zeeland privateering.

A second group of investors can be found among the Zeeland regent and merchant community. For the merchants of Middleburg and Flushing as well as for the members of the magistrate of these cities investments in privateering ventures probably were a new manner of using their money after the regular Zeeland trade had declined after 1598.<sup>54</sup>

As soon as the first prizes were brought to Zeeland by English privateers, Zeeland natives started to fit out privateering ships as well. In the springtide of 1605 the privateers Jacob Adams alias Moy Jacques and Christiaen Joachimsen alias Moy Christiaenss were prepared by the famous Flushing burgomaster Jan de Moor, the Flushing shipmaster Jacob Martssen, a certain Daniel Cornelissen, the Middleburg alderman Floris Janssen, and some other Flushing part-owners.<sup>55</sup> Jan de Moor, the driving force behind Dutch colonisation on The Wild Coast during the Truce, also had shares in a privateering ship together with the Flushing burgomaster Ingel Leunisz.<sup>56</sup> In 1606, Jaspas Bouwens, a Flushing merchant who was involved in trade with Brazil, was part-owner in at least two privateering ventures.<sup>57</sup>

The financial backers of Simon Simonss Danser, the famous pirate who first served as a legal privateer, were Jacques van Hecke, Gerard van Ackeren, Hans Pels, the Middleburg alderman Andries Jansen van der Meulen, and Jacob de Craen of Flushing.<sup>58</sup> The latter was part-owner of Moyens Christiaenss as well, had shares in the VOC and invested in a drainage project in Flanders in 1607.<sup>59</sup> Other merchants involved in privateering were the Middleburg wine merchant Charles Quackelbeen, the Middleburg merchants Gerard Tulleken, Adriaen van Hecke and Hendrick de Witte and the bailiff of Domburg.<sup>60</sup> A certain Cornelis Melssen served as a ship's husband in at least 3 privateering voyages.<sup>61</sup>

A third group of privateering promoters were the privateers themselves and their victuallers. The statement of S. Hart that part-ownership in the Dutch Republic in the decades preceding the year 1650 was widely spread among people who were concerned with the equipment of ships, e.g. the captains, rope producers, sail producers etc., is certainly true for Zeeland privateering in the period up to 1609. In this respect the *De Hasewint*-venture in which, apart from the captain, the shipmaster and a sailproducer both had a 1/8 share is quite obvious.<sup>62</sup>

Apart from his activities as a privateer, captain Edward Bailly was part-owner or ship's husband in at least 4 privateering voyages, and one of the part-

owners of *The Golden Phenix* in 1607 was the former privateering captain Jan d'Eloy.<sup>63</sup> An important shipmaster who acted both as a privateer and a ship's husband in several privateering ventures was Jacob Martssen. Starting as a Flushing shipmaster to Brazil in the years preceding 1602,<sup>64</sup> he used his maritime knowledge in 1606 in order to combine his trading activities with legal plunder in a voyage to Guinea, Brazil and Rio de la Plata.<sup>65</sup> Other captains who were part-owners of privateering ventures are Jan Pieterss Vries, William Bream and John Exton. Privateers were in the period up to 1609 thus not merely shipmasters of the shareholders' firm but respectable part-owners as well. This was especially true in those cases where English captains were involved.

The last group of Zeeland privateering promotors can be found outside the province. Within this category persons with a noble status must be distinguished. Sir Noël Caron, Lord of Schonewalle and agent for the States General in London, had interests in at least two privateering ships.<sup>66</sup> Toussain Coneu, a French nobleman, operated in 1605 as part-owner of the French privateer Yvon Baudeloux from La Rochelle, who brought a Spanish bark to Middleburg.<sup>67</sup> A year later, a ship with ginger and hides worth circa 90,000 guilders taken by a privateer which was fitted out by Don Emanuel, Prince of Portugal, reached the Zeeland waters.<sup>68</sup> Prince Maurice of Orange invested in Zeeland privateering ships as well.

Even merchants from outside the province made use of the Zeeland privateering knowledge. In 1605 five Amsterdam merchants - Jan Meynema, Jan Wyboutsen, Jan Hermansen, Jan van den Einde and Cornelis Janssen Pot - chartered the Flushing privateer Job Lodewijcxss for a voyage to The West-Indies.<sup>69</sup> It has already been mentioned that the famous merchant Pieter van der Haghén and the burgomaster and brewer Barthout van Vlooswijck operated as ship's husbands of Zeeland privateers in the 1604 expedition to the West-Indies.<sup>70</sup>

### **Practical organisation of privateering**

When investors had been brought together and the costs of fitting out the privateering ship had been divided between the share-holders, a written agreement was made both between the part-owners themselves and between the part-owners and the company of the mariners. These documents were drawn up to guarantee each others' share in case any quarrels arose concerning the distribution of profit or loss between the part-owners or between the part-owners

and the privateering crew. For example, in the case of the fitting out of two ships by the company of Jan de Moor and Jacob Martssen in 1605, it was agreed that the mariners should receive their part of the booty according to old customary sea law.<sup>71</sup> At the moment these articles of agreement were made, the equipage of the privateering journey was going to start.

One of the part-owners was appointed by the other shareholders to serve as ship's husband. The ship's husband was the driving force behind Zeeland privateering. He was responsible for the total organisation of a privateering enterprise. The whole acquisition and fitting out of the man-of-war was entrusted to him. He received the ready money from several shareholders for the equipage, applied for the letters of commission, received the prize-money from the auctioneer of the Zeeland Admiralty and distributed this money among the part-owners and the mariners. The ship's husband received - apart from the profits of his part - an extra remuneration for his work. For instance, Pieter van der Haghen and Barthout van Vlooswijck were entitled both two percent of the total costs of the expedition and two percent of the expected profits.

How was the practical fitting out of privateering organised by the ship's husband? There is no evidence that special privateering ships were built in this period: well armed merchantmen were probably used as men-of-war. The first privateering ships came from England. As a result of the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1604 English men-of-war remained unemployed and were brought by English privateers or bought by Dutch privateers and merchants. For instance, Captain Hendrik de Jong bought in 1604 *The Vineyard*, a former Spanish carvel taken by English privateers, in Weymouth.<sup>72</sup> Another ship, *The Golden Phenix*, was bought in 1605 by Alexander de Buck, a Zeeland merchant who lived in England.<sup>73</sup>

Privateers and their ship's husband could also acquire ships at the auction of adjudged prizegoods where captured Spanish and Portuguese ships and their ammunition were sold. In 1604 John Jennings bought a captured bark which was set forth as the man-of-war *The Bountileo* on which he himself was captain.<sup>74</sup> In 1605 the famous Flushing burgomaster and promotor of privateering Jan de Moor bought a Spanish carvel taken by his captain Christiaen Joachimsen.<sup>75</sup> Edward Bailly, Hendrick de Witte, and Jacob Martssen bought ships together with their tackle and furniture at the auction of captured prizegoods as well.<sup>76</sup>

However, not all captured ships and their ammunition were sold at the auction. Shipping equipment could also be handed over to the captains who had taken it at sea. Considering the many requests from captains for keeping the ships

captured by themselves at any reasonable rate, it seems that there was a growing need for privateering ships in Zeeland. In order to stimulate privateering the Zeeland Admiralty often gave them those ships on condition that the ships were fitted out as men-of-war and the privateers brought any captured booty to Zeeland. In those cases, the Admiralty asked the Flushing shipmasters' guild to estimate the value of the captured carvels in order to receive from the privateer of his ship's husband the twenty percent share for the Admiralty and the ten percent for Prince Maurice of Orange. At least five privateers - Richard Duncombe, Georg Langdon, Christiaen Joachimsen, Willem Janssen and Job Lodewijcx - were furnished with a man-of-war in this way.<sup>77</sup>

In those cases where privateering voyages were not that successful, the Admiralty was even more inclined to stimulate Zeeland privateering. In 1605 Edward Bailly was awarded a Spanish bark taken by him because he had left his own ship at sea due to the fact that he had not had enough men on board to carry both ships to Zeeland.<sup>78</sup> A few months later the same captain was acknowledged certain attermination of payment regarding a bark taken by one of his captains and bought by him '*om daermede hem wederomme ter zee te begeven op hope van daermede meer prinsen te becommen*'.<sup>79</sup> Bailly was allowed to pay the sum of 118 Flemish pounds as soon as he had received his prize-money out of his other man-of-war.

Little is known about the types of ships used in privateering. Only a few remarks are made in regard to the captured ships bought on the auction by Zeeland ship's husbands or privateers. These ships are just barks or carvels. John Jennings' *In the Lion* was a small yacht.<sup>80</sup>

In comparison with merchant vessels privateering ships were rather small. Most of the men-of-war had a tonnage between fifty and a hundred tons. The *Why not I* of captain Arthur Fage and the *Grace* of Thomas Pin were of the burden of only fifty tons, *The Vineyard* and two unknown ships sixty tons and the man-of-war *The Hope* of Jan Colve and *Zeeland* of captain Simon Ysbrantss had a tonnage of eighty tons.<sup>81</sup> *The Samson* of Jacob Adams alias Moy Jacques and *De Duyve* of captain Willem Janssen were of the burden of a hundred tons.<sup>82</sup> Of course there were exceptions. According to our knowledge, the smallest ship ever used in Zeeland privateering was the *Golden Phenix* with a burden of only 36 tons, but she was 'a large ship her burden considered ... draweth little water and hath good rome for stowidge off men'.<sup>83</sup> The largest man-of-war used in Zeeland privateering was the *Hope* of the famous Dutch pirate Simon Simons Danser who served first as a Zeeland privateer. This ship had a tonnage of 260

tons, although it must be said that the ship was partly used for merchant shipping in the Mediterranean.<sup>84</sup>

Crews of the men-of-war were very large, certainly in comparison with merchant ships. One half of the crew was normally English, the other half Dutch.<sup>85</sup> Considering the 1607 figures on tonnage and number of crew members on regular and northbound Holland merchant ships published by P.C. van Royen,<sup>86</sup> it seems that Zeeland privateers had at least three to seven times as many men on board as Holland merchant ships. Regular merchant ships of the burden of eighty tons had a crew of only twelve to thirteen mariners whereas the average privateering ship of eighty tons had seventy-two or even ninety men on board. The reason for this difference is quite obvious. Privateering ships were fitted out with extra men in order to overpower merchant ships of the enemy. Above all, extra mariners were needed to carry the captured ships to Zeeland. For example, at the moment a Spanish carvel laden with wood had been taken by John Jennings in 1604, men were put into the prize to carry it to Flushing.<sup>87</sup> Unfortunately for Jennings and his crew, the prize was taken again by an English captain of the *Narrow Seas*.

Apart from the acquisition of ships, the ship's master or privateer was entrusted with the fitting out of a privateering ship. He was the one who was in charge of the buying of victuals and munition for a voyage. For the 1599 expedition of *De Hasewint* from Veere the ship was furnished with bread, meat, cheese, butter and beer, all delivered by a local baker, brewer and a shipmaster from Gouda.<sup>88</sup> Four guns and their munitions and half a dozen spears were hired from Balthasar de Moucheron at the rate of four Flemish pounds monthly.

The victualling of privateering ships was often organised around the group of part-owners themselves. The ship *The Dragon* which was fitted out by the English Nation in Zeeland in 1606 was victualled and provided with shipping-equipment by different Englishmen.<sup>89</sup> John Dougil furnished the ship partly with victuals and John Cane, one of the part-owners, provided the mariners with clothes, shoes and weapons at the total sum of 238 Flemish pounds. An anchor, great sail and a cable used in this privateering journey were owned by Abraham Collins alias Worsick who went on board as a shipmaster under captain John Exton.

### The returns of Zeeland privateering

As soon as captured ships were brought to Flushing or any other port in Zeeland, privateers were obliged to contact the Board of Admiralty. The administration of the captured ships had to be handed over to a member of this board who was in charge of the inspection of the prize.<sup>90</sup> Guards were put on board in order to prevent any part of the booty disappearing. After the booty was inventoried by a member of the Board of Admiralty and an officer (*contrerolleur*), the prizegoods were unloaded and brought into a storehouse of the Admiralty. In order to investigate whether the booty had been seized legally, a procedure was started before the Board of Admiralty. At the moment captured ships were declared good prize, the goods were sold at a public auction.

The auctioneer's accounts allow to calculate the financial results of Zeeland privateering. Since not all prizes were administered in these accounts (the prize captured by a privateer of Don Emanuel, Prince of Portugal, was for example sold without interference of the Zeeland Admiralty), these sellings have to be added. Finally, the estimated value of the ships which were sold to their capturers at a reasonable rate are added up as well (Table 1).

From these calculations it becomes perfectly clear that the annual returns of Zeeland privateering increased enormously after 1604. In the years preceding 1604 only a few prizes taken by merchant ships were brought in. The year 1605 marks the breakthrough of offensive privateering in Zeeland. Driven by the prospect of fortune, Zeeland privateers swarmed out all over the seas to attack Iberian shipping. Off the Spanish and Portuguese coasts near the Canaries and in the West Indies, privateers carried out raids against Brazil sugar ships with an average value of 30,000 to 70,000 guilders. In only three years 34 prizes laden with sugars, Brazilwood and other West Indian products with a total value of 708,138 guilders were brought to Flushing. Almost half of this booty was taken by English privateers, although their influence diminished gradually in 1606 and 1607. The richest booty was a Spanish carvel laden with ginger, hides, sugars and six boxes of silver captured by a privateer of Don Emanuel, Prince of Portugal, in the beginning of 1606.<sup>91</sup> At no time did expectations of privateering run so high. Soon, the belief grew in the Dutch Republic that a fleet of 50 warships was able to dominate the West Indian colonial waters.<sup>92</sup> It is not surprising that in 1606, the year when the returns of Zeeland privateering reached its pre-Truce peak, plans were made in the Dutch Republic for the use of privateering in an institutional connection: the West India Company (WIC) would soon be established.<sup>93</sup> However, this development of privateering into an

Table 1. Number and value of prizes brought to Zeeland 1598-1609 (guilders)

Year	Number	Value
1598	-	-
1599	2	2,466
1600	2	34,170
1601	-	-
1602	1	15,516
1603	-	-
1604	1	1,152
1605	12	176,532
1606	16	385,650
1607	6	145,956
1608	-	-
1609	-	-
Total	40	761,442

important maritime business and means of naval warfare against the Spaniards ended abruptly by a cease-fire of 1607, which culminated in the conclusion of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609.<sup>94</sup>

Although the growth of Zeeland privateering was one of the reasons that Spain started negotiations on a truce with the Dutch Republic, the returns of privateering before 1609 seem at first sight to have remained at a rather modest level when compared to Dutch Brazil trade. The value of Dutch Brazil trade between 1600 and 1624 is estimated at 3 to 6 million guilders a year in which Zeeland had a big share.<sup>95</sup> However, the actual returns of Zeeland privateering must have been much higher since not all booty was taken to Zeeland. Zeeland privateers brought their prizes also to harbours in Holland. Captain Willem Janssen had captured a bark returning from Brazil in cooperation with the privateer Simon Martenss Stuit from Enkhuizen.<sup>96</sup> The prize, which contained 400 chests of sugar, was sold in the place of residence of the last captain. Moreover, many prizes of Zeeland privateers were brought in outside the Dutch Republic though this was officially forbidden. Prizes were sold in England, Barbary, Hamburg and other places. For instance, part of the cargo of the *Nossa Signora de la Batallia* taken by John Exton was sold in Ireland in 1606.<sup>97</sup>

In those cases where the privateers informed the Admiralty about their actions and delivered the proceeds to the secretary of the Admiralty, they were

not accused of piracy. In 1607 Jacob Martssen brought in a bag of Barbary ducats resulting from a selling of certain prizegoods to the Moors.<sup>98</sup> Captain Arthur Adin was treated quite differently when the Admiralty found out that he had surreptitiously sold a Spanish prize in Saphia in 1606. Three years after the selling had taken place the part-owners of the privateer were forced to pay Prince Maurice and the Admiralty the total value of of their *secrete prins*.<sup>99</sup>

### The distribution of the booty

As soon as the buyers of captured prizegoods had paid their money, the auctioneer was obliged to send an account of the auction to the Zeeland Audit. The Audit decided in what manner the booty had to be distributed according to the instructions of prize distribution of the States General. The auctioneer was thereafter ordered to pay the prize-money to the owners.

From the gross amount of prize-money resulting from the auction, first expenses concerning inventorying, guarding, unloading and selling at the the auction were deducted.<sup>100</sup> The net sum, which remained after those costs had been deducted by the auctioneer, was divided between Prince Maurice, the Zeeland Admiralty, the part-owners, the privateer and his crew.

By right of his function as Lord Admiral of the Dutch Republic, Prince Maurice of Orange was entitled to receive ten percent of all booty taken at sea.<sup>101</sup> In order to encourage hostile actions of privateers in Spanish and Portuguese colonial waters in 1602 his share had been reduced to 3.3 %, if the prize had been taken south of the *tropicum Cancrri*.<sup>102</sup> The stadtholder did not participate in prize-money of captured ships and their guns and munition. The auctioneer collected these sums during some years before paying them to the receiver of the stadtholder.

The Zeeland Admiralty received twice as much as Prince Maurice. Twenty percent of the net sum was paid to the receiver-general of the Admiralty. In case prizes were taken south of the tropic of Cancer, the Zeeland Admiralty also received part of the prize-money of the sold ships and their guns and munition from which Prince Maurice got nothing. The remaining sum of the prize-money was divided between the part-owners, the captain and his crew.

This distribution was organised according to old customary sea laws, though part-owners and their crew could settle their own contract of prize-money division as well.<sup>103</sup> In the case of the 1605 expedition organised by Jan de Moor and Jacob Martssen, we have already seen that the part-owners, captain

and the privateering crew before the expedition agreed that the ordinary customs of the distribution of the booty should be followed.

How did this customary division of prize-money actually take place? Although in the Dutch Republic old customary sealaws continued to exist only orally and were never put into writing, something is known about the way th booty was divided from legal procedures. In those cases it has come to light that the remaining part of the booty was divided into three equal shares.<sup>104</sup> The first part was destined for 'the ship', in other words: the expenses concerning the fitting out of the privateering ship had to be paid out of this part. The second and third part were each paid to the part-owners together on the one hand and the total crew - the privateering captain inclusive - on the other hand. In practice this meant that two parts out of three were paid to the part-owners, since the ship's husband was usually one of the part-owners as well. He was also responsible for the distribution of the money that remained after the auction.

Almost nothing is known about the returns of privateering which were paid to individual part-owners. A certain John Courtis who lived in England received 36 pounds sterling in a Brazil prize taken by captain George Langdon in 1605, but that is as far as our knowledge goes.<sup>105</sup>

Little is known also about the distribution of prize-money between the mutual members of a privateering crew. Nevertheless, a division depending on the rank and function on board must have existed: a first helmsman probably had a greater share of prize-money than a second helmsman etc.. The case of the division of the booty captured by *The Dragon* in 1606 demonstrates clearly the followed practice of distributing prize-money among the members of a privateering crew. Several mariners complained that the crew of this ship was financially prejudiced because certain expenses were wrongfully shifted upon their part of the booty completely. As a consequence, the value of a share was lowered from ten to three Flemish pounds. In the words of Abraham Collins, the shipmaster of *The Dragon*:

And in the ende the said Exton Manning and Bayly out of the companyes shares of the said prize payd the some of xxii c<sup>lb</sup> ... who felte the same in his shares as the rest of the company did.<sup>106</sup>

According to the depositions of Collins and others, at least 300 shares were into circulation.<sup>107</sup> Supposing that fifty mariners were on board *The Dragon*<sup>108</sup> the conclusion can be drawn that at least six shares were paid even to mariners in the

lowest rank on board. This customary division of prize-money was still in use after the end of the Twelve Years' Truce.<sup>109</sup>

There were of course other sources of income for the privateering crew. Apart from the regular prize-money which depended on the value of the booty, mariners were by right and custom entitled to a part of the booty; mostly the personal possessions of the prisoners were taken. This '*recht van plunderagie*' allowed the crew to distribute a part of the spoils on board without interference of the Admiralty. In this way captain Christiaen Joachimssen divided 424 *cruzados* among his crew in 1605.<sup>112</sup>

There is no evidence that any monthly wages were paid in cases where prize-money was paid as well, as usually was done in Zeeland privateering during the War of the Spanish Succession.<sup>110</sup> Privateering mariners went to sea either on a regular salary or on a share-of-the-booty-principle. The large-scale expedition organised by Pieter van der Haghen and Barthout van Vlooswijck was one of the main exceptions to the regular pattern in which most of the privateering ships were set forth on a share-in-the-prize-money base.<sup>111</sup>

Above all, according to another old customary sealaw, the mariner who during the privateering voyage first saw the prize received an amount of money, normally 8.6.8 Flemish pounds.<sup>113</sup> In 1606 the lieutenant Jan Poot and the tackler serving under captain Willem Janssen, received this sum each '*over dat zijlieden eerst int sicht gehadt hebben de voors barcquen, volgende de belofte vanden capiteijn int uuijtvaren an zijnen volcke gedaen.*'<sup>114</sup>

## Conclusion

Returning to the statement of Nicolaes de Blocq cited in the beginning of this paper, the conclusion can be drawn that the roots of Zeeland privateering went back to the years around 1606 indeed. The three pillars on which this sudden rise of privateering in Zeeland was based were the policy of encouragement of the States General, the massive rise of Dutch colonial expansion, and the presence of an important English community in Zeeland in combination with the Anglo-Spanish Peace Treaty of 1604.

As a consequence of the financial problems of the boards of admiralty after an enormous Dutch war-fleet had failed to damage Spanish maritime power, the States General were forced to change their policy concerning maritime warfare. Instead of financing large-scale expeditions they turned to a policy of economic warfare waged by private men-of-war. Zeeland colonial

privateering started as a defensive mercantile privateering. Merchant ships with a letter of commission took Iberian vessels only as a by-product of their trade voyages in the West Indies and the East Indies. Only gradually a more offensive privateering developed, which was, however, considerably strengthened by the massive invasion of English privateers in Zeeland in 1604. At the moment English privateers returned to Zeeland with captured Spanish and Portuguese carvels laden with sugar, hides and Brazilwood, Zeeland natives started to invest in privateering ventures as well.

Zeeland privateering was financed by means of part-ownership. De Blocq was also right in his statement that the whole of Zeeland society was involved in the rise of privateering. From the common sail-producer to Prince Maurice, all had shares in privateering enterprises, although privateering was mainly financed by the English (merchant)-community in Zeeland and the merchants and regents from Middleburg and Flushing. The privateers were not merely captains of the shareholder's firm but respectable part-owners as well. The main parts of ships were very large, probably as a result of the small tonnage of privateering ships.

The driving force behind Zeeland privateering was the ship's husband. The whole acquisition and the practical fitting out of the privateering ship was entrusted to him. Many captured ships were equipped as privateering ships by the privateering captains or the ship's husbands. The average privateering ship had a tonnage of fifty to hundred tons and was manned with fifty to seventy crew members. The costs of the fitting out amounted to about 6,000 guilders. In comparison with merchant ships the Zeeland men-of-war had a very extensive crew in order to overpower hostile ships and to carry the captured ship to the Dutch Republic.

After the costs of administration and selling of the booty were deducted the remaining prize-money was divided between the Lord Admiral, Prince Maurice, who received ten percent, the Zeeland Admiralty which received twenty percent and the privateer, his crew, and the part-owners. The privateering crew was entitled to a third part of the remaining sum, whereas the rest (two-thirds) was paid to the part-owners. No regular wages were normally paid to the crew.

Though the returns of Zeeland privateering started to increase fundamentally after 1604 - in the years between 1605 and 1607 these returns rose to 708,138 guilders - , the value of Zeeland West India trade before 1609 seems to have been more important than privateering. This development of privateering in Zeeland into an important instrument of maritime warfare and a

profitable business was only temporarily halted by the the cease-fire of April 1607 and the start of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609. The Truce, however, could not prevent the Zeeland regents and merchant elite from becoming even more inclined to invest in privateering ships after the resumption of hostilities in 1621. In the years from 1621 onwards privateering assumed economic significance for the province of Zeeland and the population became familiar with it. Privateers, partly in service of private promoters and partly in service of the WIC, swarmed out all over the world to resume their raids against Spanish and Portuguese shipping on a much larger scale than they had done before 1609. The first group patrolled the Spanish and Portuguese coasts in Europe. The latter cruised the waters along the American coast. For the Zeeland population privateering brought returns amounting to more than 1 million guilders a year while for the WIC it became the most important and profitable activity of the three pillars - trade, colonisation and privateering - on which the Company was founded.<sup>115</sup>

#### Notes:

1. W.A. Shaw, ed., *Report on the manuscripts of Lord de L'Isle & Dudley preserved at Penthurst Place III* (London 1936) 272, 21 May 1606; M.P. de Bruin, 'Robert Sidney, Gouverneur van Vlissingen 1588-1616', *Archief, vroegere en latere mededelingen voornamelijk in betrekking tot Zeeland* (1968) 49-56.
2. F. Binder, 'Die Zeeländische Kaperfahrt, 1654-1662', *Archief, mededelingen van het Koninklijk Genootschap der Wetenschappen* (1976) 40-92; J.R. Bruijn, 'Privateering during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars', *The Low Countries History Yearbook. Acta Historiae Neerlandicae* 11 (1979) 79-93; J.Th.H. Verhees-Van Meer, *De Zeeuwse kaapvaart tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog, 1702-1713* (Middelburg 1986).
3. H.G. van Grol, 'Het Zeeuwse prijzenhof te Vlissingen van de overgave van Middelburg tot na de Pacificatie van Gent', *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde*, vijfde reeks, vierde deel (1917) 1-46; H.G. van Grol, 'Het Zeeuwse prijzenhof te Vlissingen 1575-1577', *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 37 (1917) 235-370; H.G. van Grol, *Het beheer van het Zeeuwsche zeewezen, 1577-1587* (Vlissingen 1936); V. Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek. Handel en strijd in de Scheldedelta c. 1550-1621* (Leiden 1996) 58-68, 174-179.

4. J.H. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand 1572-1609* II (Utrecht 1931) 227, 235-236.
5. J.H. Abendanon, 'De vlootaanval onder bevel van jhr. Pieter van der Does op de Canarische eilanden en het eiland Santo Thomé in 1599 volgens Nederlandsche en Spaansche bronnen', *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* vijfde reeks, deel 8 (1921) 14-63; Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek*, 183-187.
6. Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609, X, 407, 13 April 1599, 'Instructie voor de gene die brieven van marque van wegen de E. Mo: Heeren Staten Generael vercreghen hebbende'; XIII, 147, 16 March 1604, 'Instructie voor de reeders ende Cap<sup>ten</sup> die bij consent vande heeren Staten Generael der Vereenichde Nederlanden vercrijgen sullen brieven van commissie ter zee van Sijne Ex<sup>tie</sup> als Admirael Generael'. The stimulating role of the instruction 1604 on the beginning of Zeeland privateering is also described by the chronicler Van Boxhorn: Chroniick van Zeelandt, eertijds beschreven door d'Heer Johan Reygersbergen, nu verbeterd, ende vermeerderd door Marcus Zuerius van Boxhorn (Middelburg/Leiden 1644) 206-207: '*Jae oock, heeft [Vlissingen] voorts in neeringhen, rijckdom, ende schoone gebouwen seer toeghenomen, de inwoonders van dien, op haaren buydel, uytreedende schepen, die den vyandt allesints, voornementlijck in sijn verre ende omtrent Brasil, Portugael, ende andere daer omtrent ghelegghen stroomen, grooten afbreuck ghedaen hebben. Waer toe de Heeren Staten Generael, ende den Prince van Orangjen als Admirael van de Zee, niet alleen haer consent ghedragen, maer oock in den jare 1604, den 16 Martij soodanighe instructie voor de Reeders ende Capiteynen gemaect hebben [...]* Hier uyt is gheschiet, dat voornementlijck tot Vlissinghen, vele haer tot desen vryen, den landen dienstich, ende tot afbreuck van den vyandt, grootelijcx streckende neeringhe, begheven, ende groote middelen verkreghen, ende haer meer ende meer hier toe ghewendt hebben.'
7. Resolutiën Staten-Generaal, XIII, 5-6, 5 January 1604; Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief Hof van Holland (HvH) 637, 7 October 1615.
8. J.I. Israel, *Dutch primacy in world trade 1585-1740* (Oxford 1989) 60-73; E. Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanish rivalry in the Carribbean area, 1594-1609', *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 28 (1948) 165-196.
9. ARA, Archief van de Staten-Generaal (SG) 24, 16 October 1598 and 13 November 1598; 25, 18 March 1599, 20 March 1599, 16 April 1599, 20 April 1599, 15 May 1599, 9 June 1599, 21 June 1599, 24 June 1599, 24 July 1599, 16 August 1599 and 31 December 1599; 26, 7 January 1600, 14 January 1600, 18

- April 1600, 21 October 1600, 22 November 1599; 27, 26 July 1601; 28, 2 November 1602.
10. Rijksarchief in Zeeland (RAZ), Staten van Zeeland (SZ) 3070 II, 2 November 1599.
  11. J. van Roey, 'De eerste reis van Middelburg naar West-Indië. De tocht van de Antwerpse schipper Gillis van Dornhoven naar San Domingo, La Margarita en Cumana', *Mededelingen Academie voor Marine van België* 21 (1969/1970) 37-49.
  12. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6340 and 6341; ARA, Archief van de Admiraliteitscolleges (AA) 2450, 21 July 1601.
  13. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6390, 6391, 6400 and 6401; ARA, AA 2447, 17 May 1606.
  14. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6341; ARA, AA 2450, 12 March 1601.
  15. Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek* 195-199.
  16. K.R. Andrews, *Elizabethan privateering. English privateering during the Spanish war 1585-1603* (Cambridge 1964).
  17. J.F. Larkin and P.L. Huges, eds., *Stuart Royal Proclamations. Volume I. Royal proclamations of King James I 1603-1625* (Oxford 1973) 30-32 'A proclamation concerning warlike ships at sea', 23 June 1603; 53-56 'A proclamation to repress all piracies and depredations upon the sea', 30 September 1603.
  18. K.R. Andrews, 'Caribbean rivalry and the Anglo-Spanish peace of 1604', *History* 59 (1974) 1-17, especially 9; K.R. Andrews, 'The Elizabethan seaman', *The mariners' mirror* 68 (1982) 245-262, especially 252-253; C.M. Senior, *A nation of pirates. English piracy in its heyday* (Newton Abbot 1976).
  19. For a legal case concerning the implementation of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty of 1604 see A. Wijffels, *Alberico Gentili and Thomas Crompton. An encounter between an academic jurist and a legal practitioner* (Leiden 1992) and A. Wijffels, 'Recht van handelsbelangen: kaapvaartprocessen voor het Londens Admiraliteitshof onmiddellijk na het Spaans-Engels vredesverdrag van 1604', in: S. Dauchy, ed., *Ter overwinning van een historische drempelvrees. De historische en juridische bronnen* (s.d. s.l.) 83-93.
  20. Public Record Office London (PRO), High Court of Admiralty (HCA) 13/37, fol. 182r. 26 February 1604 [1605] stilo veteri.
  21. M. Poort, 'English garrisons in the United Provinces, 1585-1616', in: P. Hoftijzer ed., *The Dutch in crisis, 1585-1588. People and politics in Leicester's time* (Leiden 1988) 71-83.
  22. ARA, AA 2451, 1 November 1604.

23. ARA, AA 2451, 30 June 1604, 10 July 1604, 28 July 1604, 4 September 1604, 2 October 1604, 16 October 1604, 22 November 1604 and 13 December 1604.
24. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol. 184r., 11 May 1604 [1605] stilo veteri and fol. 187v.-188r., 28 May 1605 stilo veteri.
25. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6427.
26. Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, 108-111, 'A proclamation for revocation of Mariners from forreine services', 1 March 1605.
27. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6427
28. PRO London, HCA 13/97, fol.43r., 15 August 1607 stilo veteri.: 'To the v<sup>th</sup> he sayth one Balthazar Stephens a duch man dwelling in Flusshinge at such tyme as the said Exton with the Dragon came into Cawson bay, was colorably taken for Captaine and so called, howe beit the said Exon at sea was Captaine and as Captaine commanded duringe the viadge'.
29. ARA, AA 2451, 30 June 1604, 10 July 1604, 28 July 1604, 4 September 1604.
30. ARA, AA 2451, 2 October 1604, 11 November 1604 and 16 October 1604; Notulen Staten van Zeeland, 6 October 1604.
31. ARA, SG 32, 12 July 1606; AA 2451, 31 July 1606.
32. ARA, AA 2451, 27 May 1606, 3 June 1606 and 5 June 1606.
33. S. Hart, 'Rederij' in: G. Asaert a.o. ed., *Maritieme Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* ('s-Gravenhage 1976-1978) II, 106-125, especially, 106-111.
34. Binder, 'Die Zeeländische Kaperfarht' 44; Verhees-van Meer, *De Zeeuwse kaapvaart* 32-34.
35. ARA, SG 4894 II.
36. RAZ, Archief van de directe en de indirecte belastingen in Zeeland (ABZ) 5, fol. 236v., 2 April 1605, 237v. 9 and 13 April 1605; ARA, AA 2451, 23 March 1605.
37. RAZ, ADB 6, fol. 126v.-127r., 15 October 1607, fol. 127v.-128, 20 October 1607; PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol.286r., 1 October 1606 s.a.
38. ARA, AA 2451, 12 October 1605, 24 October 1605, 23 November 1605.
39. RAZ, ADB, fol.236v., 2 April 1605, fol.237v., 9 and 13 April 1605; ARA, AA 2451, 23 March 1605.
40. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6427.
41. ARA, AA 2451, 23 November 1605.
42. PRO London, HCA 1/46 fol. 337v.-339r., 29 April 1607 stilo veteri; 24/72 fol. 191r.-195v.; 13/37 fol. 2r.-4r., 13 May 1607 stilo veteri, fol. 6v.-8v., 15 May 1607 stilo veteri, fol. 9r.-11r., 16 May 1607 stilo veteri, fol. 42v.-45r. 15 August 1607 stilo veteri, fol 45r.-46v., 15 August 1607 stilo veteri.
43. ARA, HvH 637, 7 October 1615.

44. Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek* 305-316, 351.
45. W.S. Unger, 'Het inschrijvingsregister van de kamer Zeeland', *Economisch en Sociaal Historisch Jaarboek* 24 (1950) 1-33, especially 7-8; Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek* 342-343.
46. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39300, fol. 63, 27200, fol. 3v. and 27210, fol.11v.
47. RAZ, ADB, fol. 236v, 2 April 1605, fol. 237v., 9 and 13 April 1605; ARA, AA 2451 23 March 1605; RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39300 fol. 26.
48. PRO London, HCA 1/46 fol. 337v-339r., 29 April 1607 stilo veteri; 24/72 fol. 191r-195v.; 13/37, fol.2r-4r. 13 May 1607 stilo veteri, fol 6v-8v., 15 May 1607 stilo veteri, fol 9r-11r. 16 May 1607 stilo veteri, fol. 42v-45r. 15 August 1607 stilo veteri, fol. 45r-46v. 15 August 1607 stilo veteri.
49. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol.339r., 29 April 1607 stilo veteri; J.H. de Stoppelaar, *Jacob Cats te Middelburg 1603-1623* (Middelburg 1860) 16-17.
50. PRO London, HCA 13/97, fol.43v., 15 August 1607 stilo veteri.
51. ARA, AA 2452, 6 June 1607 and 10 September 1612; ARA, SG 37, 26 September 1612. John Kindrick was a Merchant Adventurer who also owned shares in the VOC: RAZ, ADB 7, fol.39-39v., 16 October 1610 and Unger, 'Het inschrijvingsregister' 20.
52. RAZ, ADB 6, fol.18v., 15 April 1606 and fol.41v.-42r., 19 August 1606; Unger, 'Het inschrijvingsregister' 17-18.
53. ARA, AA 2451, 1 October 1605.
54. Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek* 228-234.
55. ARA, AA 2451, 29 October 1605; ARA, SG Loketkast processen 771; RAZ, ADB 6, fol. 78v., 3 December 1606, fol. 82v. 13 January 1607; De magistraat der stad Middelburg, die geregeert hebben sedert anno 1560 (Middelburg s.d.).
56. Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek* 264; ARA, AA 2451 22 July 1606.
57. Gemeente Archief Rotterdam (GAR), Notarieel Archief (NA) 8, 476-477, 26 August 1602; ARA, AA 2451, 12 March 1607 and 14 March 1607.
58. ARA, AA 2452 11 June 1607 and 10 October 1607; RAZ, ADB 6, fol. 82v., 13 January 1607, fol. 135v., 3 December 1607; De magistraat der Stad Middelburg.
59. RAZ, ADB 6, fol. 78v., 30 December 1606; ARA, SG 7475; Unger, 'Het inschrijvingsregister' 23.
60. RAZ, SZ 1632, letter of 6 May 1605; RAZ, ADB 6, fol.186-186v., 23 August 1608, fol. 113-113v., 25 July 1607; ARA, AA 2451, 6 December 1606.
61. RAZ, ADB 6, fol. 19v. 22 April 1606; RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39420, fol. 95-95v., 39440, fol. 117v-118.

62. ARA, SG 4894 II.
63. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6427; ADB 6, fol.113-113v., 25 and 28 July 1607.
64. GAR, NA 8, 476-477, 26 August 1602.
65. ARA, SG Loketkast procesen 771; SG 32 13 September 1606.
66. PRO London, HCA 1/46 fol. 217r. 19 November 1605 stilo veteri; HCA 1/46 fol.285v. 22 September 1606 stilo veteri; RAZ, ADB 6, fol.127v-128, 20 October 1607.
67. RAZ, ADB 5, fol. 250-250v. 13 July 1605; ARA, AA 2451, 6 June 1605, 25 June 1605 and 16 July 1605.
68. Shaw, *Report on the manuscripts of Lord de L'Isle & Dudley*, III, 248-249.
69. Gemeente Archief Amsterdam (GAA), Notarieel Archief (NA) 199, fol. 471-471v., 27 April 1618.
70. Israel, *Dutch primacy* 61,68; E.A. Engelbrecht, *De vroedschap van Rotterdam 1572-1795* (Rotterdam 1973) 66-67.
71. ARA, SG loketkast processen 771.
72. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol.217r.-217v., 19 November 1605 stilo veteri.
73. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol. 286r. 1 October 1606 stilo veteri.
74. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39290; PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol. 184, 11 May 1604 [1605] stilo veteri, and fol. 187v.-188r. 28 May 1605 stilo veteri.
75. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39320.
76. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39430 and 39450.
77. ARA, AA 2451, 1 October 1605, 15 October 1605, 22 February 1606, 4 March 1606 and 28 August 1606.
78. ARA, AA 2451, 9 April 1605; RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39300.
79. ARA, AA 2451, 10 December 1605 and 5 April 1606; RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39520, fol.17r.-17v.
80. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39290, fol.82r.
81. ARA, SG 32, 1 April 1606; AA 2451, 28 July 1604, 4 January 1606; RAZ, Rekenkamer C 6427.
82. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol. 270, 25 July 1606 stilo veteri; ARA, AA 2451, 12 maart 1607.
83. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol.286r., 1 October 1606 stilo veteri.
84. ARA, SG 32, 1 Augustus 1606.
85. Senior, *A nation of pirates* 129-130.
86. P.C. van Royen, *Zeevarenden op de koopvaardijvloot omstreeks 1700* ('s-Gravenhage 1987) 20-21.

87. PRO London, HCA 1/46, fol.184r., 11 May 1604 stilo veteri, fol. 187r.-187v., 28 May 1605 s.a.
88. ARA, SG 4894 II.
89. ARA, AA 2451, 22 November 1606, 1 January 1607 and 6 January 1607.
90. The followed administrative procedure of the Zeeland Admiralty is described in great detail in I.J. van Loo, *Inventaris Rekenkamer C 11 stuk: Rekeningen en bijbehorende stukken ingebracht ter Rekenkamer door de vendumeesters en de contrerolleurs van de Gecommitteerde Raden ter Admiraliteit in Zeeland 1574-1764* (Middelburg 1995) 9-11.
91. Shaw, *Report on the manuscripts of Lord de L'isle & Dudley III* 248-249.
92. C. Rahlenbeck, ed., *Considérations d'estat sur le traicté de la paix avec les sérénissimes archiducz d'Austriche manuscrit de 1607* (1869) 56.
93. J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic world* (Oxford 1982) 6; A.C. Meijer, "Liefhebbers des vaderlands ende beminders van de commercie". De plannen tot oprichting van een generale Westindische Compagnie gedurende de jaren 1606-1609', *Archief van het Koninklijk Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen* (1986) 21-70.
94. W.J.M. van Eysinga, *De wording van het Twaalfjarig Bestand van 9 april 1609* ('s-Gravenhage 1959) 83, 89 and 93; Israel, *The Dutch Republic* 5-7.
95. E. van den Boogaert, 'Los neerlandeses en el mundo comercial atlantico de la Doble Monarquia Iberica 1590-1621', in: E. van den Boogaert, ed., *La expansion holandesa en el atlantico, 1580-1800* (Madrid 1992) 76-103, especially 99-103; Enthoven, *Zeeland en de opkomst van de Republiek*, 268.
96. ARA, AA 2451, 10 June 1606.
97. PRO London, HCA 13/97, fol.2r., 13 May 1607 stilo veteri.
98. ARA, AA 2452, 8 August 1607.
99. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39520, fol. 9r.-9v.
100. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39290: '*Sententie tot voordeel vanden voors volcke van orloge ende de goederen bijden vendum<sup>r</sup> vercocht zijnde, zullen vande pennijngen geprocedeert vande vercochte goederen voordien Cap<sup>n</sup> schipsvolck ende reeders, de voors schip oft schepen tot hunne coste uuijterust hebbende, laten aftrecken voorde gerechticheyt vanden lande oft gemeene zaecke (alvooren affgetrocken zijnde de costen ter cause vande lossinge, inventarisatie als vercoopinge gevallen) drie thiededeelen, daarvan die twee tot proffijcte vanden lande ende een tot proffijcte vanden Admirael Generael sal wesen.*'
101. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39290; RAZ, SZ 2064.

102. ARA, SG 28, 1 April 1600; RAZ, Rekenkamer C 29290; *Notulen Staten van Zeeland*, 21 and 22 August 1602.
103. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39290: 'Ende het surplus zal blijven ten profijte vanden voors reeders, Cap<sup>nen</sup> officieren ende het bootsvolck onder hen te verdeelen nae costuijme ofte zoo anders naede respective contracten behooren zal.'
104. ARA, AA 2451, 23 November 1605; ARA, SG Loketkast processen 771; British Library London (BL), Lansdowne 131, fol.275v.: 'Confessed by the capten Young, that if hee had brought the said prize into Holland th'Estates should have had 2.10. parts, the Admirall one, and the other 7.10. partes should be devided so that the third thereof should goe to the capten and company, which is 2 partes and 1.3 of a part.'
105. ARA, AA 2451, 1 October 1605.
106. PRO London, HCA 13/97, fol.44v., 15 August 1607 stilo veteri.
107. PRO London, HCA 13/97, fol.7v., 15 May 1607 stilo veteri: 'And after the states parte was taken out, the company had nyne hundred pound for their shares at iii<sup>lb</sup> a single share.'
108. The numbers vary slightly in the different depositions.
109. GAA, NA 390, fol.158r., 18 March 1625.
110. Verhees-Van Meer, *De Zeeuwsche kaapvaart*, 54-55.
111. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39520, fol.14r-14v.: 'Voorders is te noteren dat alsoo d'officieren ende bootsvolck den voors bueyt ofte prinse ingebracht hebbende (gedient hebbende onder het beleydt van Don Rodrigo de Cordua, ende Gousman daer d'heer Flooswijck cum suis bewinthebbers van zijn geweest) meest op seker maentgelt ofte gaige ende nyet (gelijck andere) op gedeelte ende part inden bueyt'.
112. ARA, AA 2451, 16 July 1605.
113. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39440, fol. 116 and 39450, fol.35v.
114. RAZ, Rekenkamer C 39420, fol.98r-98v.
115. H. den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de WIC* (Zutphen 1994) 33 and 55-68; J. van Goor, *De Nederlandse Koloniën. Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie 1600-1795* ('s-Gravenhage 1994) 61; D. Roos, *Zeeuwen en de Westindische Compagnie (1621-1674)* (Hulst 1992) especially 69-77.