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ON Η ΔΙΑΣΑΦΗΤΙΚΟΣ AND PROPOSITIONS
CONTAINING ΜΑΛΛΟΝ/ΗΤΤΟΝ

BY

INEKE SLUITER

0. Diogenes Laërtius 7.65 ff.¹⁾ provides us with a report of the Stoic theory of the *axioma*. In ch. 68 a distinction is made between *ἀπλᾶ* ('simple') and *οὐχ ἀπλᾶ* ('non-simple') *axiomata*; concerning the latter we find the following statement (ch. 69) ...ἐν...τοῖς οὐχ ἀπλοῖς ἀξιώμασι (sc. ἐστι) τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἥττον (*lacuna*). Definitions and examples of these seven types of *οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα* are given in ch. 71 f. Every type is characterized by the presence of a certain conjunction—the *axioma* which is formed by means of *εἰ* is conditional/hypothetic, that which contains *ἐπεὶ* is hypothetic/causal, in a copulative complex *axioma* (*καί...καί*) occur, in the disjunctive one *ἢτοι...ἢ* and in the causal one *διότι*. Then it is stated (ch. 72) that *διασαφοῦν...τὸ μᾶλλον ἀξιῶμά ἐστι τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφοῦντος τὸ μᾶλλον συνδέσμου καὶ <ἢ> μέσου τῶν ἀξιωμάτων τασσομένου, οἷον μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστι. διασαφοῦν δὲ τὸ ἥττον ἀξιῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ προκειμένῳ, οἷον ἥττον νύξ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν* ('An *axioma* which makes it clear (that something is the case) 'to a higher degree' is the one construed by means of the conjunction which makes it clear that something is the case to a higher degree and by means of 'ἢ', which is placed in between *axiomata*, e.g. 'it is more/rather day than night'. An *axioma* which makes it clear that something is the case 'to a lesser degree' is the one that is contrary to the former, e.g. 'it is less/not so much night than/as (it is) day'.')

1) In this passage D L probably goes back to the work of Crinis (Egli 1967, 13), who may have been a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon, term p q Archedemus, cf. Epict *diss* III 2,15

Perhaps ch. 72 should read τὸ συνταττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφοῦντος μᾶλλον συνδέσμου. In that case the ‘diasaphetic composite axioma’ would be formed, like the copulative and disjunctive ones, by means of two corresponding conjunctions: καί...καί...; ἤτοι...ἤ; μᾶλλον (ἤττον)...ἤ²). Characteristically, Stoic formalism would place both operators in front of the sentence over which their influence extends. The more usual position for μᾶλλον (= *potius*) operating on a whole sentence would be A μᾶλλον ἢ B, without μᾶλλον ἢ being separated by any other words, cf. KG II.2. 303 A. 3. Later grammatical theory takes it that μᾶλλον is an adverb and so does Apollonius Dyscolus (*coni.* 223.4 τὸ ἐπιτατικὸν ἐπίρρημα, λέγω τὸ μᾶλλον)³), who does, however, judge its case worthy of discussion, precisely because of its use in this construction (*coni.* 221,24 ff. — the discussion itself is now lost).

This paper will be concerned with the problem of meaning and function of the diasaphetic complex axioma.

1. The first question to arise pertains to the status of this list of molecular propositions. Ever since the value of Stoic logic has become recognized again after a long period of having been underestimated, interpreters have almost exclusively concentrated on those aspects which are relevant to the logic of propositions (in a narrow sense), i.e. the first, third and fourth items on our list. Actually, the *synēmmena*, *sympeplegmēna* and *diezeugmēna* were looked upon as the molecular propositions *par excellence*⁴) even in Antiquity itself. This is undoubtedly caused by the fact that the five so-called *anapodeiktōi tropoi*, the basic forms of Stoic propositional logic, are based on these three types of molecular propositions. Gradually, however, the view that Stoic logic should not be exclusively tackled through modern propositional logic has found wide acclaim: for

2) Another possibility, which is also attractive paleographically, would be to replace καί by ἤ (i.e. ὑπὸ τοῦ διασαφοῦντος τὸ μᾶλλον συνδέσμου ἢ μέσου τῶν ἄξιωμαίων τασσομένου)

3) Following the Stoa, C Plinius Secundus and Remmius Palaemon considered *magis*, *potius* and *immo* as conjunctions, which they characterized as *relativae ad aliquid sive comparativae* (cf. Diom. *GL* I 416,27)

4) Cf. S E *AM* VIII = *Adv Log* II 95, 108 ff., 124 ff. Ἐνέσται δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων (sc. the *συνημμένα*) καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ διεzeugμένα κοινῶς ἐπὶ τε τὰ λοιπὰ εἶδη τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν ἄξιωμαίων διαβαίνειν

although such an approach is certainly illuminating on a number of issues, it also tends to obscure others and to introduce problems of its own⁵) For example, four out of the seven molecular propositions listed here are not truth functional according to modern criteria, even though D L does mention truth-conditions for some of them Moreover, the truth-conditions of the *συνημμένα* were a hotly debated issue in Antiquity, so that we cannot simply credit 'the Stoics' with our modern views on this point without further specification We have to ask ourselves what were the criteria the Stoics adopted in composing this list In looking for these criteria we should realize that our conceptions about logic and the Stoic ones coincide only to a very limited extent As Kahn (1969, 158 note 1) justly remarks "For the ancients formal logic was never an autonomous study, independent of a theory of knowledge, language and reality"

Problems also tend to arise if we try a linguistic instead of a logical angle in approaching the list It cannot be meant as an exhaustive catalogue of *syndesmoi*—*a priori* this was unlikely, anyway It is not the *syndesmoi* which are at issue, but the *axiomata* which have been construed by means of them This explains the absence of *e g* the erotematic or diaporetic/aporetic *syndesmoi* *syndesmoi* such as these do not introduce *axiomata*, but *ἐρωτήματα* or *ἐπαπορητικά (πράγματα)*, which belong to another type of speech-act (cf D L 7 63 and 66 whereas an *ἐρώτημα* is an *αὐτοτελές λεκτόν*, it is *not* an *axioma*, cf also ch 68) The fact that no mention is made of the syllogistic ('epiphoric/epiphoretic', 'prosleptic') *syndesmoi* either is also to be explained by the fact that these conjunctions do not connect *axiomata per se*, but (*axiomata* functioning as) parts of a syllogism (*λόγος*, D L 7 76), to wit *λήμμα, πρόσληψις* and *ἐπιφορά* These *syndesmoi* belong, in other words, to an analysis of a higher level⁶)

5) Long 1974, 142 f, Kahn 1969, 158 "in certain respects an ancient doctrine may be obscured rather than revealed by a reconstruction in terms of 20th century logic", Egli, 1978, 135

6) The whole passage in D L shows a hierarchical order At each level smaller units are combined to form larger ones *λέξεως στοιχεῖα* (7,56), *λέξεις - μέρος λόγου* (57) *λόγος*// (from 63) *λεκτόν ἑλλιπές - ἀξίωμα οὐχ ἀπλ ἀξ* *λόγος* Cf Egli 1967, 56 f

It seems best not to study the list within the framework of any specific modern theory. Seven types of οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα are presented here that have been composed by means of those syndesmoi which can play a part at this level. The complex axiomata thus generated have on the one hand a strictly logical function (*e g* the disjunction), but they can also be used to express relationships of a causality-like nature⁷). For these axiomata which are not truth-functional in any modern sense of the word a Stoic may yet come up with truth-conditions (D.L. 7.74). Generally speaking, the nature of the connection between causality and conditionality is not logical (in the strict sense of the word), but metaphysical⁸). Even in Antiquity Carneades reproached Chrysippus for confusing logical and causal necessity (Long 1974, 103). Long (*ibid.*, 144) suggests as a possible Chrysippean defence that “in a universe governed by *logos* causal connexions are in a sense logical connexions and vice versa. It is the universal *logos* which is at work both in the connexion between cause and effect and between premises and conclusions”. Concerning the *sympeplegmenon* Brunschwig (1978, 59-86) has shown that this type of complex axiomata does not have a logical function only, but also serves as a model in ethics and physics. Such interrelatedness of the departments of philosophy need cause no surprise—the Stoa itself always claimed (and prided itself on) a substantial internal coherence for its system (cf. Forschner, 22 f ; D.L. 7.40).

7) Note the careful formulation in 7,72 αἰτιῶδες δὲ ἐστὶν ἀξίωμα τὸ συντασσόμενον διὰ τοῦ ‘διότι’, οἷον ‘διότι ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶν’ οἶονεὶ γὰρ αἰτίον ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου. Strictly speaking an axiomata cannot be a ‘cause’ only *somata* can, cf. SVF II 119, 18 f οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γὰρ and Clem Alex *Strom* VIII 9 (= SVF II 119,39 ff) οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα κυρίως αἰτίον φασὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον καταχρηστικῶς, καὶ οἷον αἰτιωδῶς. See Nuchelmans, 61

8) An instructive text in this respect is SVF II 272,37 ff (= Alex Aphr *de fato* cp 22, p 191,30 ff Bruns) φασὶν δὲ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ... ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν αἰδίων κατὰ εἰρμόν καὶ τάξιν προιοῦσαν, τῶν πρῶτων τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα γινόμενοις αἰτίων γινόμενων καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ συνδεομένων ἀλλήλοις ἀπάντων, καὶ μήτε οὕτως τινὸς ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενου, ὡς μὴ πάντως ἐπακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ συνήφθαι ὡς αἰτίῳ ἕτερόν τι, μήτ’ αὖ τῶν ἐπιγινόμενων τινὸς ἀποελύσθαι δυναμένου τῶν προγεγονότων, ὡς μὴ τινὶ αὐτῶν ἀκολουθεῖν ὡσπερ συνδεόμενον ἀλλὰ παντὶ τε τῷ γινόμενῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἡρτημένον (ἐξ) αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται (the famous chain of causality)

2.1. To return now to the specific problem of the diasaphetic complex axiomata, a first difficulty is formed by the question of the exact meaning of the examples cited above: $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu \eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu \eta \nu\acute{\upsilon}\xi \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$, c.q. $\eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu \nu\acute{\upsilon}\xi \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu \eta \eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$. In principle we may safely assume that obscurity could have been caused by the fact that all examples have been made to conform to a uniform pattern. All complex axiomata have been construed by combining two out of the three sentences $\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ ('it is day'), $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\xi \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$ ('it is night') and $\phi\omega\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ ('it is light') with one or two conjunctions⁹). Mates translates (33): "More likely it is day than it is night" and talks about "propositions indicating greater probability", maybe basing his interpretation on D.L. 7.75 (after a discussion of the criteria for the truth or falsity of *synēmmena*, *parasynēmmena* and *autiōdē* respectively, ch. 73 f.): $\pi\iota\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu \delta\acute{\epsilon} \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu \acute{\alpha}\xi\acute{\iota}\omega\mu\alpha \tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\nu \epsilon\iota\varsigma \sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu, \omicron\iota\omicron\nu \epsilon\iota \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\iota \acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\nu, \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\eta\eta \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\eta\nu\omicron\upsilon \mu\eta\tau\eta\rho \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}. \phi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron: \omicron\upsilon \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \eta \omicron\rho\nu\iota\varsigma \acute{\omega}\omicron\upsilon \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota \mu\eta\tau\eta\rho$. ('Probable' is an axioma which leads to agreement, e.g. 'if someone has given birth to something, she is its mother'.) But this is false, because a bird is not the mother of an egg.) The example given by D.L. (a *synēmmenon*-type sentence) makes it clear, however, that one need not necessarily think primarily in terms of molecular propositions containing $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ ($\eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu$)... η in this case¹⁰).

2.2. Assuming we do not have to do here with propositions indicating a greater or lesser degree of probability, we are left with the following possibilities, which I borrow from D.L. 9.75 ff. In this section D.L. discusses the sceptical method of reaching *ἐποχή* by rejecting the various dogmatic theories. First of all he treats the well-known sceptical adagio 'οὐδὲν $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ ', which could be used *θετικῶς* (οὐδὲν $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ A ἢ B ('in no respect more A than B') = *ὁμοίως* A καὶ B ('similarly A and B, A as much as B') or (by the Sceptics themselves) *ἀναιρετικῶς* (οὐδὲν $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$ A ἢ B = 'A as little as B'))¹¹).

9) I shall ignore the fact that all other molecular propositions can function as major of a syllogism (if necessary in combination with a negation), whereas the axioma *διασαφούν τὸ $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu/\eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu$* cannot, at least not without stretching the imagination somewhat (Cf n 12) As far as I know, the *διασαφ* do not have anything to do with the phenomenon of *μονολήμματοι λόγοι* (cf S E AM VIII 440 ff, 443, PH II 167, Alex in Arist *Tōp* (= SVF II 84, 17 ff)

10) Mates is possibly thinking of Aristotle's *Topica*, cf § 2 2 1 (the second *topos*)

11) I shall not here discuss the development of the use of the expression *οὐ $\mu\tilde{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu$* in connection with the problem of knowledge For an extensive discussion see DeLacy (passim), Declava Caizzi 153 f, Goerler 1985, 324 ff

As a general addition, not specifically connected with any sceptical views, he then states: αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον ποτὲ μὲν συγκριτικῶς ἐκφέρεται, ὡς ὅταν φῶμεν μᾶλλον τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ ἢ τὴν σταφίδα, ποτὲ δὲ θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει· σημαίνομεν γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ, βλάπτει δ' οὐ. ('*Mallon* by itself is sometimes used *comparatively*, as when we say 'honey is more sweet than raisins', sometimes *affirmatively and negatorily*, as when we say 'virtue is beneficial rather than harmful'. For (in this way) we indicate that virtue is beneficial, and (but) not harmful.') In the following I will discuss both possibilities:

2.2.1. Συγκριτικῶς: Propositions of the form *S₁ to a higher degree-P than S₂*, which form part of the logic of relations, go back to the *Topica* of Aristotle (that is, as far as theoretical expositions are concerned)¹²). This is an indication of their epistemological status: the nature of the arguments which are discussed in the *Topica* is not strictly logical, but rather dialectical (in the Aristotelian sense of the word), *ie* of an epistemologically speaking lower level (cf. Brunschwig's introduction to the Budé-edition, ix f., especially xii).

Within the treatment of the topics of the accidens¹³) the μᾶλλον/ἥττον-argumentation is twice given extensive attention: II 114b37-115a26 and III 116a1-119a1 (or -a31)¹⁴). In the first passage (ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον 114b37) four τόποι are distinguished: (1)...εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον εἰ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ μᾶλλον ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν ('If 'more' follows 'more', *eg* if pleasure is good, that too which is pleasure to a higher degree is to a higher degree good'). If an increase in the συμβεβηκός follows the increase in the ὑποκείμενον, one may inductively conclude that the συμβεβηκός is present (114b38-115a6).

12) Cf Mau 56 (referring to Gal *IL XVI 12*) "Die Schlüsse nach dem 'mehr' und 'weniger' weisen auf die Topik des Aristoteles (II Ende bis III Anfang passim), wo eine Vielzahl von Sachverhalten logisch untersucht wird, die nur das gemeinsam haben, dass in ihrer sprachlichen Wiedergabe 'mehr' und 'weniger' vorkommt". Incidentally, the Stoa criticized λόγοι such as τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου μείζον, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τοῦ τρίτου, τὸ ἄρα πρῶτον τοῦ τρίτου μείζον, because the protasis τὸ τοῦ μείζονος μείζον καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἐκείνου μείζον ἐστὶ has been omitted Alex in Arist *An Pr* (CAG 2,1,21,38 ff Wallies)

13) In the *Topica* the topics of the accidens, genus, proprium and definition are discussed consecutively

14) Also mentioned in for instance 119b17-30, 127b18-128a12 In the next section I have generally used the Loeb-translation by E. S. Forster

(2) Ἄλλος (sc. τόπος) ἐνός περὶ δύο λεγομένου, εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον εἰκός ὑπάρχειν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδ' ᾧ ἦττον and vice versa ('Another topos (commonplace): when one predicate is applied to two subjects; if it does not belong to the one to which it is more likely to belong, then neither does it do so to the one to which it is less likely to') (115a6-8)¹⁵).

(3) Πάλιν δυοῖν περὶ ἐνός λεγομένων, εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν δοκοῦν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἦττον and vice versa ('Again, when two predicates are applied to one subject; if that which is more generally believed to belong to it does not belong to it, then neither does that which is less generally believed to') (115a8-11).

(4) Ἐτι δυοῖν περὶ δύο λεγομένων, εἰ τὸ θατέρω μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν δοκοῦν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ and vice versa ('Further, when two predicates are applied to two subjects; if that which is more generally believed to belong to one does not belong to it, then neither does the other to the other') (115a11-14). Aristotle continues by treating the topos of 'ὁμοίως' (115a15ff.).

The second passage (III 116a1 ff.) discusses the 'topics' of the eligible (116a1 f. Πότερον δ' αἰρετώτερον ἢ βέλτιον δυεῖν ἢ πλείονων, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον ('(the question) which is more eligible or better of two or more things must be examined in the light of the following considerations')). According to Brunschwig (introd. p. lviii f.) the first three chapters of this book constitute a unity which is clearly distinct from the preceding and following parts in terms of content and style. He suspects that they led a separate existence before being incorporated in the *Topica*. This section does not just give a general treatment of the *S₁ more-P than S₂*-type of predication, but it is exclusively concerned with the gradations of the predicate αἰρετόν. It is not until chapter V that a generalization takes place.

Aristotle starts by warning us 'that our inquiries do not concern things which are far apart and diverge widely from each other (for

15) This form of *a fortiori* reasoning is criticized in practice in that passage of Pl *Phaed* in which Cebes gives an exposition of his objections to the preceding argumentation, especially 87b4 ff. The argument which is there presented as an example of objectionable reasoning runs as follows - A man has a longer lifespan than a cloak, the cloak still exists, therefore *a fortiori* does the man. *Ἴε ἐνός περὶ δύο λεγομένου (i.e. 'to live'/'to have a certain lifespan')...εἰ ᾧ ἦττον εἰκός ὑπάρχειν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ᾧ μᾶλλον*

no one is at a loss to decide whether happiness or richness is the more eligible), but it is concerned with things that are close to each other, and about which we discuss which we ought preferably to support, because we cannot detect any superiority of the one over the other'. Next, he discusses the various *topoi*, *e.g.* 116b10 ff. *καὶ τὸ φύσει* (sc. ἀγαθόν) *τοῦ μὴ φύσει* (sc. ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον), οἷον ἢ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει, τὸ δ' ἐπίκτητον ('Also, that which is naturally good is more eligible than that which is not so by nature, *e.g.* justice rather than the just man. For the former is naturally good, whereas the goodness of the latter is acquired'). At 119a1 he concludes the first part.

As pointed out above, a generalization of what precedes is given in ch. V (119a12 ff.); this is meant to increase the practical usefulness of the *topoi* which have already been mentioned, by widening their scope. To this end the term ἀγαθόν/αἰρετόν is replaced by τοιοῦτο (119a14 ff. 'It is possible to make some of the above-mentioned *topoi* more generally applicable by adopting a small change of terminology, *e.g.* 'that which is x by nature, is more x than that which is not x by nature', cf. the example given above). In this way we do indeed obtain the schema S_1 more-*P* than S_2 . The 'topics' of eligibility, which had apparently been used originally to tackle problems of an *ethical* nature, is thus adapted to a more general use.

Propositions containing μᾶλλον and ἥττον were used by among others Theophrastus in hypothetical syllogisms¹⁶). As a general term 'hypothetical syllogism' refers to an argument which is based on at least one complex premiss. Alexander (in *Arist. An. Pr.*, CAG 2,1 ed. Wallies, 389 ff.) gives a survey of the hypothetical forms, combining Stoic and older (Peripatetic) terminology. The hypothetical syllogisms include οἱ διὰ συνεχοῦς (the Stoic *συνημμένα*) (used as major premiss) plus a minor premiss; οἱ διὰ τοῦ διαιρετικοῦ καὶ διεζευγμένου; οἱ διὰ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς; and—if they really are in any way different from the preceding ones—οἱ ἐξ ἀναλογίας and οἱ κατὰ ποιότητα¹⁷) (390,7 f. *τούς ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον καὶ ὁμοίως*)

16) Kneale and Kneale, 105; (cf. 106); Graeser, 93 f.

17) This term comes from Aristotle: *Alex. in Arist. An. Pr.* (CAG 2,1, 226,2 f. Wallies).

etc. An instructive example of such reasoning ἐξ ὑποθέσεως may be found in Alex. *l.l.* 265.28 ff. Εἶεν δ' ἂν ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἥττον... (example l. 32) εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τινος ὄν μὴ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττον· ὑγεία δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν οὖσα πλούτου οὐκ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική κτλ. ('The hypotheticals may include those (syllogisms) which are based on 'more', 'equally' and 'less'. If that which is more-something-good than something does not bring about happiness, then neither does that which is less-something-good. Now, health being more-something-good than riches does not bring about happiness'). The example has again been borrowed from ethics. The major, which contains μᾶλλον, has been conditionalized, so that as a matter of fact we are dealing with a *συνημμένον*. This probably explains Alexander's (and possibly Theophrastus' *cum suis*) reserve in acknowledging οἱ κατὰ ποιότητα as a separate group. It is clear, incidentally, that the later Peripatos elaborated the principles which had been laid down by Aristotle in the *Topica*.

Evidently, the Stoic example μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστὶν fits badly into the Aristotelic model. This is caused by the fact that Aristotle's logic is a logic of terms, representing classes, whereas the Stoa developed a logic of propositions. This means that Aristotle substitutes terms for his variables (S_1 more- P than S_2 : the-naturally-good (S_1) is-more-eligible (P) than the-not-naturally-good (S_2)), while the Stoa replaces them with whole sentences, which express propositions (Σ_1 more than Σ_2 : ἡμέρα ἐστὶν (S_1) μᾶλλον ἢ νύξ ἐστὶ (S_2)). This implies that one element less is involved in the comparison¹⁸).

2.2.2. Θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς: In this respect the example μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάβηται is much closer to μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστὶ. The interpretation of this sentence makes us attach the value of, as we would call it, an *eliminative coordinator* to the combination μᾶλλον...ἢ: Simultaneously a θέσις (namely of the member containing μᾶλλον) and an ἀναίρεσις (namely of the member introduced by ἢ) take place, witness the paraphrase ἢ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ,

18) Connected with this is the fact that the Aristotelian examples are mostly construed by means of a gen comparisonis—with ἢ, however, e.g. 116a12 ff., αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ, 116b24

βλάπτει δ' οὐ.—In passing I observe that D.L.'s example also belongs to the department of ethics.—The elimination is, however, a matter of interpretation. Just like the English expression 'rather than' the Greek μάλλον ἤ is probably a more careful way of formulating than the blunt elimination by means of the eliminative 'not A, but B'/'B, but not A'.

Elimination is a linguistic (semantic) rather than a logical phenomenon. Thus, the syndesmos ἀλλά ('but'), which in Greek is the eliminative coordinator *par excellence*, has no part to play whatsoever in logic¹⁹). In Antiquity it is classed among the copulative²⁰) conjunctions. From a logical point of view it makes no difference whether the eliminative coordination of A and B is formulated as 'not A, but B', 'B, but not A', or 'B∧-A'—apart from the fact that formal logic would reject all non-formal expressions as useless. The linguistic component, irrelevant to formal logic, is the semantic incompatibility of (associations of) A and B, which is presupposed in eliminative coordination²¹).

The explanation of this construction which is given by Apollonius Dyscolus also fits an eliminative interpretation of μάλλον...ἤ. In *de coniunctionibus* 215,14 ff. the *diazευκτικοὶ syndesmoi* are discussed, followed by (219,12 ff.) the *paradiazευκτικοὶ* and (221,16 ff.) the *diasaphēτικοὶ*. The conjunction ἤ may be used in all

19) I did find some—later—cases in which the diasaphetic ἤ has been paraphrased by means of ἀλλά Sch Eur *Phoen* 508 (vs 507 i runs τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ χρηστόν, μητερ, οὐχι βούλομαι/ἄλλω παρεῖναι μάλλον ἢ σώζειν ἐμοί) τὸ ἤ νῦν ἀντι τοῦ ἀλλά. Note that the presence of the negation οὐ exerts its influence here 'Ἀλλά as an eliminative coordinator is always combined with a negation in either of the two members (cf Ruijgh, par 134) A, ἀλλ' οὐ B (*eliminatio inuersa*), οὐκ A ἀλλά B. Another factor is that the combination οὐ μάλλον A ἢ B is ambiguous, cf § 2 2 —this makes a paraphrase by means of a clearly eliminative coordinator desirable. A second place is the scholion on *Med* 327 (φιλῶ γὰρ οὐ σὲ μάλλον ἢ δόμους ἐμούς): ὁ ἤ ἀντι τοῦ ἀλλά. In this case the same observation holds true as in the preceding example. See further *EG* 233,57 f πόσα σημαίνει ὁ ἤ σύνδεσμος, ἢ ἀντι τοῦ ἤ τότε [= διαζευκτικός], (Prof C J Ruijgh (p c) has suggested to me that one read ἤτοι for ἤ τότε) ἢ ἀντι τοῦ καί [= παραδιαζευκτικός], ἢ ἀντι τοῦ ἀλλά [= διασαφητικός], and—for a fairly explicit eliminative interpretation (here styled 'corrective') of ἀλλά—the *Lexicon Vindobonense* (ed Nauck) p 26 s v ἀλλά· ἀλλά σύνδεσμος ἐπι διορθώσει λαμβάνεται, οἷον οὐ τοῦτο, ἀλλά ἐκεῖνο. See further *AO* Cramer I 302,16 ff ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ἀπόθεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσιν σχήμασι (cf n 22)

20) *Eg* DTh, *Technē* 89,1 (Uhlig)

21) Cf Slings, 116 ff

three meanings. The following Apollonian passages are relevant to us here: (221,16 ff.) Ἦστι <καὶ τρί>τη διαφορά τοῦ ἤ συνδέσμου, ἥτις καλεῖται διασαφητική. Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ προτέρου ὑπαρξῖν διασαφεί>, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιφερομένου ἀναίρεσιν, βούλομαι πλουτεῖν ἢ πένεσθαι, βούλομαι φιλολογεῖν ἢ σχολάζειν. ποιεῖται καὶ μετὰ τοῦ περ τὴν σύνταξιν, ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ περ νύξ... (23 f.) τῶ...διασαφητικῶ συνδέσμῳ οὐκ ἄλλο τι σύνεστι μόριον ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον... (222,4 ff.) <ἡμέρα> ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ. πλουτεῖν βούλομαι <ἢ πένεσθαι>. ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι· <πλουτεῖν βούλομαι, > οὐ πένεσθαι. ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, οὐχὶ δὲ <νύξ>²²... (222,24 ff.) Φαίνεται δὲ ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη διαφορά τοῦ συνδέσμου ἀπὸ τῆς διαζευκτικῆς συνδέσεως μετέβαλεν εἰς τὴν διασαφητικὴν, ὡσεὶ ἐπικριτικὴ γενομένη τῆς διαζεύξεως. ἐπαγγέλλεται γὰρ τὸ διαζευκτικόν, ἐὰν τοῦτο, οὐ τοῦτο· εἰ τοῦτο μὴ, τοῦτο. καὶ ἔτι, ἢ τοῦτο <ἢ> καὶ τὸ συνὸν ἢ <τὰ> συνόντα... ὅπερ καλεῖται παραδιαζευκτικόν. τὸ δὲ λειπόμενον, τοῦτο, οὐ τοῦτο. τέθειται γὰρ τὸ πλουτεῖν βούλομαι ἀνηρημένου τοῦ πένεσθαι. (221,16 ff.) There is also a third different type (of use) of the conjunction ἤ, which is called ‘diasaphetic’ (‘making completely clear’, ‘determining unambiguously’). For it makes the reality of the first member and the elimination of the second completely clear, e.g. ‘I wish to be rich rather than poor’, ‘I wish to study literature rather than to be idle²³’. It also forms a compound with περ, ‘it is day rather than (ἢπερ) night’ ... (23 f.)

22) Incidentally, Apollonius explicitly discusses the essential difference between ἤ and οὐ (coni 222,1 ff.) For the view that οὐ should be considered a σύνδεσμος, cf. AO Cramer I 302,13 ff. Τινὲς δὲ τὴν οὐ ἄρνησιν συνδέσμου ἔφασαν εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιρρήματος· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολουθητικόν συνδέσμου ἴδιον εἶναι· εἰ οὖν ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀκολουθητικὸν ἔχει τὸν ἀλλὰ ἢ τὸν δέ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ἀπόθεσιν ἢ ἀναιρέσιν σχήμασι, συνδέσμου ἄρα ἐστὶ. φαιμέν οὖν ὅτι τὰ ἀκολουθητικά οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι τὸ ἕτερον τὸ <δ’> ἕτερον παρειαγούσιν (Cramer οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον παρειαγούσιν). ἡ ἀπόφασις δὲ ἀναιροῦσα τὸ ἕτερον παρειαγάγει τὸ ἕτερον· οἷον οὐκ ἔγραφα ἀλλ’ ἀνέγνωσα. καὶ ἄλλως· οὐκ εἴ τι ἀκολουθητικόν ἐστὶ, τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους ἐστὶν· ἰδοὺ γὰρ τὸ ἐνδεέστερον σοφός ἐστὶ Τρύφων ἢπερ γραμματικός· τὸ ἢπερ ἀκολουθεῖ τῶ ἐνδεεστέρω, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους ἐστὶν (I have changed Cramer’s punctuation in several places) The refutation of the rejected view which was defended in ll 13-17 (συνδέσμου ἄρα ἐστὶ) commences with φαιμέν οὖν (l 17) Two different arguments are presented (1) The ἀκολουθητικά (which introduce a second λόγος) are not in themselves expressions of elimination, whereas the negation is (It is not stated explicitly that οὐ does not actually follow another word itself but rather *is* followed by words like ἀλλὰ) (2) An ἀκολουθητικόν does not necessarily belong to the same part of speech as the word it follows

23) Cf. *adv* 132,11 f. προηρούμην τὸ φιλολογεῖν ἢπερ τὸ ῥαθυμεῖν

The diasaphetic conjunction is combined with the words *μᾶλλον* and *ἤττον* only ... (222,4 ff.) ‘It is day, rather than night’, ‘I wish to be rich rather than poor’. The same may be expressed like this: ‘I wish to be rich, not poor’. ‘It is day, and not night’ ... (222,24 ff.)²⁴). It seems that this distinct use of the conjunction provokes a change from disjunctive to diasaphetic connection, because it cuts as it were the knot of the disjunction: the disjunctive (*ἤ*) indicates ‘if this, not that; if not this, that’. And further, ‘either this or also the accompanying member or members’...which is called quasi-disjunctivum²⁵) [so-called inclusive disjunction]. And finally, ‘this, not that’. For ‘I wish to be rich’ is posited, whereas ‘to be poor’ is eliminated.’

Several points met so far recur in the Apollonian discussion:

a) In the first place the name of the conjunction: *ἡ διασαφητικός* no doubt is the conjunction which is used in the Stoic *ἄξιωμα τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον*.

b) *τέθειται* and *ἀνηρημένου* (223,1 f.) correspond to *θέσις* and *ἀναίρεσις* in D.L. (see § 2.2.). Cf. 221,17 f. *ὑπαρξίς* and *ἀναίρεσις*.

c) Apollonius too draws attention to the combination with *μᾶλλον* and *ἤττον*.

d) The fact that Apollonius attaches an eliminative interpretation to *ἡ διασαφητικός* is apparent from (b), and from his paraphrasing it by means of *οὐ* (222,4 ff.) as well as from his describing the diasaphetic construction as *ἐπικριτική τῆς διαζεύξεως* (222,25); this description also seems to be meant as an explanation of the relationship between *ἡ διασαφητικός* and *διαζευκτικός*: whereas diazeuctic *ἡ* leaves open both possibilities A and B, diasaphetic *ἡ* explicitly opts for A and against B (cf. Appendix I). The possibility that the term *διασαφητικός* was created with the intention of underlining its relationship to *διαζευκτικός* is not to be excluded.

It is a well-known fact that Apollonius in *coni.* generally follows the Stoa (cf. *coni.* 214,2 f.). That such is the case here too appears

24) The very word *βούλομαι* is a preeminently apt illustration because of its two meanings ‘to wish’ and ‘to prefer’ (‘to wish A rather than B’) When meaning ‘to prefer’ it may be followed by *ἤ*, when meaning ‘to wish’ by *οὐ*—the result is comparable

25) For the wordformation *παρα-διαζευκτικός*, cf. *παρα-σύμβαμα* (SVF II 59,24 ff (fr 184)) and *παρα-συναπτικός* (ApD *coni* 220,18)

from the occurrence of the typical sentence *ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ(περ) νύξ*. The other examples which are given here are partly borrowed from schoolpractice and have thus probably been developed by a grammarian, *e g* *βούλομαι φιλολογεῖν ἢ σχολάζειν* (221,18 f), *γράφω ἢπερ λέγω, διαλέγομαι ἢπερ ἀναγινώσκω* (222,22)²⁶, another product of (scientific) grammar is the discussion of the philological problem constituted by *Hom Il A 117* and *Od α 164* (cf also the scholia *a l*) (*coni* 223,9 ff) The other example, however, again (cf p 53-4 (Aristotle, Theophrastus) and 55 (D L)) points to an ethical context *βούλομαι πλουτεῖν ἢ πένεσθαι* ('I wish to be rich rather than poor', 221,18, 222,4 ff , 223,1 f)

2 3 After all this I would suggest that the following development took place in Aristotle—in an (Aristotelic-)dialectical context—theoretical observations on arguments containing *μᾶλλον/ἤττον*, which were possibly used originally in problems of an ethical nature, are to be found for the first time Theophrastus adopts these relational arguments in his list of *ὑποθετικοί* (hypothetical propositions and syllogisms) This is at least one of the reasons why they appear in the Stoic series of non-simple axiomata This last step is accompanied by two interdependent changes on the one hand, *μᾶλλον ἢ* no longer indicates the degree to which a predicate belongs to a subject, but it connects two propositions²⁷, on the other hand it has the value of an eliminative coordinator

Thus it appears that although *μᾶλλον/ἤττον*-propositions had indeed acquired a certain traditional status at the time the Stoa adopted them, they did not fit the Stoic schema without some adaptations As the Stoics were prepared actually to go to the trouble of adapting them, it seems no more than reasonable to suppose that they must have envisaged some function for complex propositions of this form Since no traces of a strictly logical function are to be found in the remains of Stoic logic which have come down to us, I should like to devote the final sections of this paper to the suggestion that these axiomata expressed a principle which was of foremost importance in Stoic *ethics*, to wit *ἐκλογή* ('choice')

26) *γράφω ἢπερ λέγω* For parallels, see K G II 2, 303, Blass Debrunner-Rehkopf, *Gramm d neust Griech* , par 245 3 b

27) *I e* in logical theory Linguistically speaking *μᾶλλον ἢ = ἀλλ' οὐ* is a secondary, somewhat idiomatic use of the 'normal' *μᾶλλον ἢ*

3 Stoic ethics strictly differentiate between ἀγαθά and ἀδιάφορα (*bona* and *indifferentia*) There are several ways of subdividing the *adiaphora* (cf Bonhoeffer 1894, 170 ff for the desperate terminological confusion reigning in this area) Some things are absolutely indifferent—is the number of hairs on my head even or uneven?—others may be dispensable for human happiness, but are nevertheless to be preferred to their opposites in our daily life health is preferable to sickness, life to death and riches to poverty, health, life etc arouse an ὀρμή, sickness an ἀφορμή The examples are standard

In the doctrine of the good an important place is occupied by the ἀξία-theory The most important testimonia on this subject are to be found in Stobaeus (II 83 10 ff W) and Diogenes Laertius (7,104 ff)²⁸) As far as the problem of ἡ διασαφητικός is concerned a special relevance should be attributed to the work of Antipater of Tarsos, who distinguished as a separate type of *axia* the *axia eklektikē* (Stob *Ecl* II 83,10 ff W) Πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀξίαν ἔχειν καὶ πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν. Τὴν δὲ ἀξίαν λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τὴν τε δόσιν καὶ τιμὴν καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ. Καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ὁ Ἀντίπατρος ἐκλεκτικὴν προσαγορεύει, καθ' ἣν διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τάδε τινὰ μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρούμεθα, οἷον ὑγίειαν ἀντὶ νόσου καὶ ζωὴν ἀντὶ θανάτου καὶ πλοῦτον ἀντὶ πενίας... ('Everything which is according to nature has value and everything contrary to nature has 'disvalue', objectionableness [ἀπαξία is a *negative* value] *Axia* (value) is used in three ways, as an absolute valuation and estimation (of something) in itself (1) and as the exchange-value defined by the examiner (2) And the third (type of 'value') which Antipater calls 'eclectic' (*eklektikē*), on the basis of which we choose—if the circumstances allow it—one thing rather than the other, *e g* health instead of sickness and life instead of death and riches instead of poverty')

Successively, an absolute valuation²⁹), an explicit fixing of a price ('what an examiner/appraiser would give for it') and, finally,

28) On this matter, cf Goerler 1984

29) δόσις καὶ τιμὴν is a hendiadys Δόσις here means 'evaluation' 'taxation', 'Wertzuweisung' (Goerler 1984, 447) —I will not go into the question whether this δόσις καὶ τιμὴ καθ' αὐτὸ concerns an ἀδιάφορον as Goerler argues or an ἀγαθόν cf Forschner 165 f

the ἀξία ἐκλεκτική are distinguished. The latter is the kind of (relative) estimation that plays a part in making choices. From the examples it would appear that this *axia* is operative in the field of the προηγμένα, those ἀδιάφορα which cause us to undergo a positive ὄρμη ('impulse', 'inclination'). Cf. Stob. II 84,18 ff. προηγμένον δ' εἶναι λέγουσιν ὃ ἀδιάφορον <ὄν> ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον ('A *proëgmenon* they call that which being indifferent we choose on account of primary reasonableness').

The importance of the concept of ἐκλογή is illustrated by its prominence—starting from Diogenes of Babylon—in the Stoic *telos*-formulas: εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ (καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ Stob.) (Diogenes of Babylon)³⁰ ('to be reasonable in the choice (and rejection) of that which is according to nature'), and ζῆν ἐκλεγόμενους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγόμενους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηνεκῶς (Antipater)³¹ ('to live while choosing that which is according to nature and constantly rejecting that which is contrary to nature'). Goerler (454 f.) draws attention to the fact that in the Old Stoa the view was probably held already that "das Sittlich-Gute werde verwirklicht *anhand* der naturgemässen Güter, *bestehe* in deren vernünftigen Auswahl"³². The ἐκλογή (the ἀξία ἐκλεκτική) might be given expression on the level of the sentence³³ by means of the complex axioma which was formed by means of ἡ διασαφητικός³⁴.

30) D L 7,88 and Stob *Ecl* II 76 W (= SVF III 219,9 ff)

31) Stob *Ecl* II 75 W = SVF III 252,37 f, cf 253,3 ff

32) Cf *e g* Plut *comm not* 23,1069E (= SVF III 134,1 ff), *c* 26, 1071B, Epict *diss* 2,6,9 αὐτὸς γὰρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τοιούτων (*i e* τῶν κατὰ φύσιν) ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν See also Long 1967, esp 68 f

33) The relationship between ethical problems and the way these should be linguistically expressed appears from *e g* SVF III 22,19 ff, which deals with ἀγαθὰ and ὠφελήματα. The former are αἰρετά, the latter αἰρετέα, because they are (l 38) κατηγορήματα. The passage continues (l 39 f) Κατηγορημάτων γὰρ αἱ τε αἰρέσεις καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ βουλήσεις γίνονται, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ὄρμαι (cf l 21 ff δι' ὃ αἰρούμεθα μὲν τὸ αἰρετέον, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, ὃ θεωρεῖται παρὰ τὸ ἔχειν φρόνησιν· τὸ δὲ αἰρετόν οὐχ αἰρούμεθα, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἔχειν αὐτὸ αἰρούμεθα) (l 42 f) Τὴν γὰρ φρόνησιν αἰρούμεθα ἔχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μὰ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ κατηγορήματα

34) The same goes for ἀπεκλογή and propositions containing ἦττον ἢ. No practical examples are to be found—a choice in favour of a προηγμένον, expressed by means of μᾶλλον ἢ implies a rejection of the corresponding ἀποπροηγμένον, which might be expressed by means of ἦττον ἢ

In Sextus Empiricus³⁵) the *ἀδιάφορα* are classified as follows (*Adv Eth* 59 f) 1) πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὀρμή μήτε ἀφορμή γίνεται (the absolute *adiaphora*) ('that for which there exists neither inclination nor disinclination'),

2) πρὸς ὃ ὀρμή μὲν καὶ ἀφορμή γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε (*e g* the choice between two identical coins) ('that for which there exists inclination and disinclination, but not more for this thing than for that'),

3) τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον (*e g* health/sickness etc) ('that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness') Maybe we can deduce from this passage that the difference between 2) and 3)—which are together opposed to group 1)—consists in the fact that the ὀρμή or ἀφορμή in 2) is not open to μᾶλλον and ἤττον, whereas those in 3) are, incidentally, ὀρμή is not mentioned explicitly in the third group at all In any case the *ἀδιάφορα* to which ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία was attributed are in this group Thus, for the second group 'οὐ μᾶλλον A ἢ B' would hold, for the third 'μᾶλλον A ἢ B' (There is no denying, by the way, that the relative estimation of the *adiaphora* is not always consequently and automatically formulated by means of the phrase μᾶλλον ἢ)³⁶)

An example of a case from the third group which is expressed by a μᾶλλον ἢ-phrase may be found in S E *PH* III 192 (Some people—the reference is to (adherents of) Aristo of Chios—deny that any such things as φύσει προηγμένα or ἀποπροηγμένα exist at all The *adiaphora* should be judged on the basis of the περιστάσεις ('ex-

35) Translations from Sextus Empiricus are generally taken from the Loeb edition by Bury

36) Maybe it would not be too far-fetched to consider the possibility of Sextus Empiricus' using the expression οὐ μᾶλλον against the Stoa in a more emphatic way than he usually would In *Adv Eth* 147 he argues that a sceptical attitude towards ἀγαθὰ and κακὰ leads to *ataraxia* Anyone who considers riches as an ἀγαθόν and poverty as a κακόν leads a disturbed life On the other hand, ὁ μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἀγαθοῖς τάττων τὸν πλοῦτον μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς, τὴν δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον προφερόμενος φωνήν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τούτου ταραττεται οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ γέγνηθεν, μένει δὲ καθ' ἐκάτερον ἀτάραχος Now, ὁ κακοῖς would have been supported by any Stoic But it is precisely the *ἀδιάφορα* that according to them may be subdivided in προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα by applying the term μᾶλλον to some of them Thus, the usual sceptical formula οὐ μᾶλλον would gain in force because it is used in the precise context where a Stoic would have used 'μᾶλλον'

ternal circumstances’)): εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύονται ὑπὸ τυράννου, οἱ δὲ πένητες εἰρηνεύονται, πᾶς ἂν ἔλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ πλούσιος, ὡς ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον (‘For certainly’, they argue, ‘if the rich were being threatened with attack by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so that riches would be a thing rejected’). Cf. *Adv. Eth.* 64 ff., where the same opinion is discussed, this time illustrated as follows (par. 66) ἐὰν γοῦν δέη τοὺς μὲν ὑγιαίνοντας ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ νοσοῦντας ἀπολυομένους τῆς ὑπηρεσίας συναπολύεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἔλοιτ’ ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ σόφος τὸ νοσεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν (‘Were it for instance obligatory that men in sound health should serve under the tyrant and on this account be destroyed, but that the sick should be set free from that service and freed likewise from destruction, on such an occasion the wise man would choose sickness rather than health’).

By means of μᾶλλον ἢ the relative value of *adiaphora* in comparison to each other may be brought out without passing judgment on any absolute values³⁷). This might explain why the expression μᾶλλον ἢ deserved a separate place in the list of axiomata, although at first sight the combination of a συμπλεκτικός σύνδεσμος and a negation could fulfill its part just as well. This just does not seem to be true after all: as a paraphrase ‘A βούλομαι, οὐ B’ might be acceptable—to a grammarian it certainly would—, but if a choice between *adiaphora* is concerned, this way of expressing oneself may simply be too apodictical. A Stoic could hardly say ‘οὐ βούλομαι νοσεῖν’ without seriously endangering his chances of ever reaching ἀπάθεια³⁸).

4. Support for the connection between the terms ἐκλεκτικός and διασαφητικός may be found *e.g.* SchDTh 291,30 ff.: παρέλειψε δὲ τοὺς

37) For this function of a μᾶλλον ἢ-phrase cf. Pl *Gorg.* 469b12 ff.—Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν,—Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. Because *adiaphora* are devoid of any intrinsic value Aristotle’s condition stipulating that questions about αἰρετώτερον-ship should only be raised in case of a real *dubium* has been implicitly fulfilled (see § 2 2 1)

38) Cf. careful stipulations like διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων (*Antipater apud Stob.*) and *si detur electio* (*Sen. ep.* 92,13)

διασαφητικούς· τίθενται δὲ οὔτοι μεταξύ δύο λόγων, καὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς ποιοῦνται, οἷον πλουτεῖν βούλομαι ἢ πένεσθαι· εἰς ἐπίτασιν δὲ λαμβάνουσι τὰ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως ἐπιρρήματα [περ and/or μᾶλλον are meant], μᾶλλον ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἤπερ νύξ Much more important is the comment *AO I* (ed Cramer) (Epimerisms), 189,22 ἔστι δὲ καὶ διασαφητικός ὁ ἐκλεκτικός (cod ἐλεγκτικός) καλούμενος παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς This text not only explicitly mentions the identification of the διασαφητικοί with ἐκλεκτικοί and consequently with the concept of ἐκλογή, but also ascribes this terminology to the Stoa It continues by claiming that the examples *Il A 117* and *Od α 164* should not be explained disjunctively, ἀλλὰ ἐκλεκτικὸν καὶ διασαφητικὸν Eustathius (62,11 ff v d Valk) mentions the diasaphetic interpretation of *A 117* and adduces a certain Phocion, whose adaptation of this verse for his own purposes is based on this interpretation, as becomes apparent from his use of μᾶλλον (τὸ μᾶλλον χαρακτηριστικὸν ὄν τοῦ ... διασαφητικοῦ τοῦ ἢ ἀπολέσθαι). ἔστι γάρ, φασί, διασαφητικός τοιοῦτος σύνδεσμος ὁ μεταξύ δύο λόγων τιθέμενος καὶ ἐκλεγόμενος τὸ ἕτερον, εἰς ἐπίτασιν δὲ ποτε προσλαμβάνων τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπίρρημα...ἢ τὸν περ σύνδεσμον (‘For such a syndesmos’, they say, ‘which is interposed between two sentences and selects one of them and which sometimes for intensification adopts the adverb *māllon* or the conjunction *per* is diasaphetic’) Priscian too, the follower of Apollonius Dyscolus, combines the two terms, XVI 9,98,25 (*GL III*) *Disertivae vel electivae* (sc *coniunctiones*) [i.e. διασαφητικοί καὶ ἐκλεκτικοί] *sunt, quando diversis propositis aliquid ex eis nos eligere ostendimus, ut ‘dives esse volo quam pauper’*

Later sources, from the time of Herodianus, stress the notion of αἵρεσις *EM 415,45 ff* ὅτι τὸν Η σύνδεσμον ἕξ διαφόρως σημαίνειν φησὶν Ἡρωδιανός (53) Ἔθος δὲ τοῖς διασαφητικοῖς συνδέσμοις δύο πραγμάτων προκειμένων τοῦ μὲν ἐνὸς ποιεῖσθαι αἵρεσιν, τοῦ δὲ ἐτέρου ἀποβολήν. καὶ ἀποβολὴ μὲν ὡς τὸ βούλομ’ ἐγὼ λαὸν σὸον ἔμμεναι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι. Αἵρεσις δὲ ὡς, τὸ *Ῥανὶς φρενῶν μοι μᾶλλον ἢ βυθὸς τύχης*. The last two examples have clearly been added by a compiler who did not understand that αἵρεσις and ἀποβολή occur simultaneously if the construction of ἢ διασαφ is used (cf p 54, 57) The examples are again standardized, cf *EM 415,27 ff*³⁹⁾

39) See further Schneider *comm ad ApD conu 221,23 223,22* (p 225 f) for

5 To sum up, ἡ διασαφητικός originates in forms of argumentation which belong to the logic of relations. After their dialectical use by Aristotle, propositions containing μάλλον/ἤττον ἤ are classified by Theophrastus *cum suis* among οἱ ὑποθετικοί. The Stoa adapts their form in such a way that their schema of two axiomata connected by one or more conjunctions can remain intact. The οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα formed by means of μάλλον (ἤττον) ἤ are eliminative and may have played a part in expressing the *ethical* procedure of ἐκλογή. The fact that μάλλον ἤ-formulas seem to have functioned of old in ethical discussions enhances the probability of this supposition. Apart from considerations of traditionality, their ethical use would constitute an extra reason for the adoption of μάλλον ἤ-axiomata in the list of Diogenes Laertius, especially since there are no good grounds on which to assign a strictly formal logical role to these axiomata.

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APPENDIX I

Without its being used as a *terminus technicus*, the verb διασαφέω occurs several times in contexts which are of interest to our argument (N B I did not make any systematic inquiries to catalogue all places where this verb occurs).

Pl *Prot* 348b (Protagoras is given the choice between answering Socrates' questions himself or having Socrates answering his) Λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπέσαφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὅποτερα ποιήσοι... (Alcibiades) “δοκεῖ σοι...καλῶς Πρ. ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν,” In this context it is a choice from a disjunctively connected couple that we are concerned with.

The next example does not concern *choice*, but διασαφεῖν is here opposed to ‘leaving undecided, undetermined (ἀόριστον)’—*i e* in

more references, to which may be added Mich. Sync. (ed. Donnet) par 191, 1614 f and 1621 Διασαφητικός δὲ οἶον «πλουτεῖν ἐθέλω ἢ πένεσθαι» ὅς καὶ τὸν περ προσλαμβάνει οἶον «ἥπερ πένεσθαι» διασαφεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ὅπερ αἰρεῖται, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητῇ (A117) Suda (II 545,11 ff) does mention ἀναίρεσις διασαφητικός δε, ὅταν τῶν δύο προτεθέντων τὸ ἐν ἀναιρῆται κτλ. The signification is impeccable, so corruption could have been easy.

this case too a standpoint has to be decided upon: Pl. *Leg.* 916e: νομοθέτη δὲ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ τοῦτο ἀόριστον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἢ μείζους ἢ ἐλάττους ὄρους αἰεὶ δεῖ διασαφεῖν.

In Hp. *Ep.* 12 (bd. 9 ed. Littré) the context is eliminative: οὐ μανίην, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς τινὰ ῥῶσιν ὑπερβάλλουσαν διασαφηνέοντος τοῦ ἀνδρός.

E. *Ph.* 398 may be more general: (concerning ἐλπίδες): οὐδ' ὁ χρόνος αὐτὰς διεσάφησ' οὐσας κενάς;, although here too the interpretation that time decides whether hope is εἴτε κενὴ εἴτε μὴ is defensible.

Elimination is implicitly present in the context of ApD *synt.* 166,7, too.

APPENDIX II

I list here some divergent observations concerning ἡ διασαφητικός, which I found in later sources.

— Apart from ἡ(τοι) the Etymologica also mention ἀλλ' ἡ (*EM* 66,38), and ἡγουν and τουτέστι (*EG* 533,14; *EM* 773,15 f.) as διασαφητικοί. In the case of ἀλλ' ἡ this is easily understood. About τουτέστι we find (*EG* 533,14): σύνδεσμος διασαφητικός ἀντὶ τοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχει [l. τοῦ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει I.S.], ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἡγουν. We are not dealing with an eliminative coordinator here; rather, τουτέστι, 'i.e.', is explicative. Thus it is closer to the paradiazeutic than to the diasaphetic ἡ (type: Φαίδων ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς).

— In a passage of the *Anecd. Gr. Boissonade* (III 337), which has, however, come down to us in a rather muddled way, ἡτοι, ἡγουν and εἴτουν are apparently called διασαφητικὰ ἐπιρρήματα. Cf. Ps.-Theodos. (ed. Goettling) 78,26 f. δηλονότι, δηλαδή, ἡγουν ἐξηγηματικά (sc. ἐπιρρήματα). οἷον διασαφητικόν... (29 f.) μενούγγε ἐκλογῆς (cf. Blass-Debr. 450,6). Lascaris (Milan 1476) also considers οἷον, 'e.g.', to be one of τὰ διασαφήσεως.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- AO *Anecdota Graeca e codd MSS Bibl Oxon* , ed J A Cramer, 4 vols , Oxford 1835-7
 ApD Apollonius Dyscolus, his works are cited by page and line of the edition by R Schneider, *Grammatici Graeci* (GG) II 1 (*adv* = *de adverbio*, *coni* = *de coniunctionibus*) and G Uhlig, GG II 11 (*synt* = *syntaxis*)
 CAG *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*
 EG *Etymologicum Graecae linguae Gudianum* (ed F W Sturz), Leipzig 1818 (Hildesheim-New York 1973)
 EM *Etymologicum Magnum* (ed T Gaisford), Oxford 1848 (Amsterdam 1962)
 GL *Grammatici Latini* (ed H Keil), Leipzig 1857-1870 (Hildesheim 1961)
 KG R Kuhner, B Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, Hannover/Leipzig 1904
 SchDTh *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam*, rec A Hilgard, GG I 11, Leipzig 1901 (Hildesheim 1965)
 SchEur *Scholia in Euripidem*, ed E Schwartz, Berlin 1887 (vol I), 1891 (vol II)
 SVF *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, coll I ab Arnim, Leipzig 1905-1924

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