ARTISTARIUM

A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics

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ARTISTARIUM

SUPPLEMENTA

IV

OCKHAM AND OCKHAMISTS

ACTS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ORGANIZED BY THE DUTCH SOCIETY FOR MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY *MEDIUM AEVUM* ON THE OCCASION OF ITS 10TH ANNIVERSARY (LEIDEN, 10–12 SEPTEMBER 1986)

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PREFACE

The Society *Medium Aevum* was instituted in October, 1976 as a rendezvous for all those who are engaged in teaching and research in medieval philosophy at the Dutch universities. Not everyone of its members is, however, connected with a Department of Philosophy; there are also some theologians in our midst. Fortunately, they consider the philosopher not as an *ancilla,* but rather as a *collega.*

On its first meeting, Dr. L.M. de Rijk was elected as chairman. It was quite logical that this rank was bestowed on him, for the study of medieval philosophy in the Netherlands owes a great deal to him. In 1979 he was succeeded by Dr. Th. van Velthoven, who remained our chairman until 1985. On May 13, 1986, he quite suddenly passed away. His death touched us deeply and we remember his person and work with gratitude.

The reason why I mention the names of our first two chairmen is not only because of their contribution to our society but especially because their pursuit of medieval philosophy can make clear the appeal and importance of *Medium Aevum.* De Rijk has commanded many areas in his work in medieval philosophy, but certain fields have received his special attention. I am thinking of his *Logica Modernorum* and of his extensive series of articles on metaphysics and semantics. Van Velthoven wrote his doctorate thesis on Nicholas of Cusa (*Gottesschau und menschliche Kreativität,* Leiden 1977). In the years that he was teaching as professor extraordinary at the University of Amsterdam he became increasingly involved in the metaphysics of being. Our chairmen personified as it were the different approaches and fields of interest in the study of medieval philosophy. This diversity is legitimate, for medieval thought is a richly checkered whole.

There is, however, a real danger that the different approaches are treated independently and are isolated from each other. An example of such a tendency I consider to be the *Cambridge History of Late Medieval Philosophy.* With all due respect for the many expert contributions to this volume, it seems to me that the concept of this book is very debatable. Certain aspects and persons of medieval thought are entirely ignored. Meister Eckhart, for example, is nowhere even mentioned in this work. One of the attractive aspects of *Medium Aevum* is that it consists of a mixed company of scholars; it offers its members the opportunity to become acquainted with the different tendencies and approaches in the study of medieval philosophy. In the past ten years papers have been presented on very widely divergent subjects.

For the future of *Medium Aevum* it is important that the position of medieval philosophy is strengthened in the curriculum of the Departments of Philosophy. It will be our task to show the relevance of this period of the Western tradition of thought. The realization of this task was also one of the reasons that lead us to organize, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Society, a Symposium on "Ockham and Ockhamists" in Leiden (September 11-12, 1986).

In the Netherlands the figure of Ockham has only occasionally been the subject of research. Now that the critical edition of his theological and philosophical works have been completed by the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University, there was every reason to draw attention to Ockham's work and influence. The many aspects thereof are reflected in the contributions to the Symposium. Metaphysics and theology, logic and theory of science, ethics and political

theory were all given due attention during the two days of the Symposium. Moreover, we were fortunate to have two foreign scholars accept our invitation to participate: Dr. Ruedi Imbach of Fribourg (Switzerland) and Dr. Jürgen Miethke of Heidelberg (Germany).

Throughout the pages of Umberto Eco's bestseller, *The Name of the Rose*, the spirit of Ockham is clearly present. He is explicitly mentioned (p. 56) in a dialogue between Ubertino da Casale, described as a mystic, and William of Baskerville.

Ubertino: "I don't like him (i.e. Ockham). A man without fervor, all head, no heart".
William: "But the head is beautiful".
Ubertino: "Perhaps, and it will take him to hell".
William: "Then I will see him again down there, and we will argue logic".

I did not have the impression that the Symposium in Leiden was a descent into hell. The participants became during two intensive and fruitful days involved in the thought of the Venerable Inceptor. The success of the Symposium must to a large degree be ascribed to E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop. It is also thanks to their efforts that the papers presented during the Symposium are now published in this volume. Finally, I would like to thank the "Radboudstichting" for its substantial financial support.

Jan A. Aertsen
Chairman Medium Aevum

I METAPHYSICS

OCKHAM, EIN TRANSZENDENTALPHILOSOPH?
Eine kritische Diskussion mit G. Martin

J.A. Aertsen

I

Einen auffallenden Platz in der Ockham-Forschung der letzten Jahrzehnte nimmt eine deutsche Studie ein, die im Jahre 1949 erschien (aber bereits 1938 abgeschlossen war) und von der Hand von G. Martin entstammt mit dem Titel: *Wilhelm von Ockham, Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Ordnungen* (Berlin, 1949). Wie sich schon aus dem Titel ergibt, wird in diesem Buch ein Gebiet betreten, die Ontologie, auf welchem Ockham einem gängigen Vorurteil gemäß wohl gehörig sein 'Schermesser' hantiert hatte, aber zu dem er im Grunde nichts Positives beigetragen hatte. Martins Buch hat einen wichtigen Impuls zur Revision dieses traditionellen Bildes gegeben. Seine These lautet kurz zusammengefasst: Wenn Ockham die Realität der Kategorien, ausser der von Substanz und Qualität, bestreitet, darf dies nicht als 'Nominalismus' verstanden werden sondern als 'Transzendentalphilosophie'. Die Kategorien der Quantität und der Relation — die Kategorien, auf welche sich Martins Studie konzentriert — werden als 'transzendentales Sein' ausgelegt. Ockham wird dargestellt als ein wichtiges Bindeglied in der transzendentalphilosophischen Tradition, welche mit Aristoteles' Erörterung über das Seiende und das Eine im IV. Buch der *Metaphysica* beginnt und bei Kant ihren Abschluss erfährt. Die hier von Martin geforderte Aufmerksamkeit für die zentrale Stellung der mittelalterlichen Lehre von den '*transcendentia*' innerhalb der abendländischen Philosophie und Ockhams eigener Position darin finden wir auch wieder in seinen späteren Veröffentlichungen, seine Kant-Monographie und sein Werk über Metaphysik[1].

Um Martins Ockham-Deutung richtig zu verstehen, bedarf es zuerst noch einer weiteren Entfaltung seiner These. Ausgangspunkt von Ockhams Überlegung ist der Begriff des absoluten Akzidenz, des Akzidenz im eigentlichen Sinn. Dieser Begriff wird erfüllt durch die Kategorie der Qualität. Die Qualität hat eine eigene Realität, ein absolutes Sein, d.h. ein Sein möglicher Selbständigkeit. Die Frage, vor welche Ockham sich nun gestellt sieht, ist, wie die übrigen akzidentalen Bestimmungen, die seiner Meinung nach nicht ein solches Sein besitzen, ausgelegt werden müssen.

Hier nun bot die mittelalterliche Lehre der '*transcendentia*' eine neue Seinsmöglichkeit, die über die einfache Disjunktion von 'ens reale' oder 'ens rationis' hinausgeht. Transzendentale Bestimmungen, 'das Eine', 'das Wahre' und 'das Gute', fügen 'Seiendem' keine distinkte Realität hinzu; sie sind real identisch mit ihm. Doch unterscheiden sie sich qua Begriff von 'Seiendem'. In Teil I ('Einheit und Zahl', S. 1-98) und Teil II ('Die Relation', S. 99-182) seiner

[1] G. Martin, *Immanuel Kant, Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie*, Berlin 1950. Idem, *Allgemeine Metaphysik, Ihre Probleme und ihre Methoden*, Berlin 1965.

Studie versucht Martin zu zeigen, daß Ockham die Kategorien der Quantität und der Relation ontologisch als Transzendentalien betrachtet. Thomas von Aquin hatte, u.a. in *De potentia* q. 9, a. 7, zwischen dem transzendentalen Einen und dem akzidentalen Einen unterschieden. Letzteres fügt Seiendem eine neue Realität hinzu; es ist das Eine, das zur Kategorie der Quantität gehört. Diese Zweiteilung wird von Ockham für unnötig erachtet und verworfen. Für ihn gibt es nur noch eine Weise von Einheit; jede Quantität ist transzendental. Ebenso bestimmt Ockham jede Relation als ein transzendentales Sein. Die Leugnung der Realität von Quantität und Relation hat offenbar bei Ockham keinen anderen Sinn als den, in welchem Thomas bestreitet, das transzendentale Eine sei ein 'hinzugefügtes Ding'.

Im dritten und letzten Teil ('Akzidentales und Transzendentales Sein', S. 183-255) untersucht Martin, wie 'transzendentales Sein' selbst zu verstehen ist. Eine eindeutige Antwort findet er nicht bei Ockham. Negativ kann jedoch gesagt werden, daß Ockham das transzendentale Sein nicht im nominalistischen Sinne auffaßt und diese Möglichkeit niemals ernsthaft in Betracht nimmt. Transzendentales Sein besteht nicht in einem bloßen Gedacht-sein, in einer bloßen Vorstellung. Ockhams Bedeutung liegt aber nicht so sehr im Durchdenken der ontologischen Problematik des transzendentalen Seins, sondern vielmehr in der konsequenten Durchführung des transzendentalen Gesichtspunkts. So sagt Martin in seiner Kant-Monographie (S. 134): "Die philosophische Arbeit von Ockham hat also gewissermaßen eine quantitative Bedeutung, sie bezieht sich in erster Linie nicht auf die Frage, was das transzendentale Sein sei, sondern, wie weit das transzendentale Sein reiche". Ockham trägt den Gedanken des transzendentalen Seins in die Kategorienlehre hinein. Das führt dann auch dazu, daß er eine besondere Lehre von den Transzendentalien fallen läßt. Nicht die alten Transzendentalnoten, sondern die Kategorien, zunächst nur die Quantität und die Relation, sind die allgemeinen, d.h. die transzendentalen Bestimmungen des Dinges als Ding. Diese Entwicklung findet in Kant ihren Abschluß. Das Fazit von Martins Ockham-Buch lautet: "Die Umwandlung der Kategorienlehre zur Transzendentalphilosophie, d.h. also die Umwandlung der Kategorienlehre aus einer Lehre von besonderen Dingen zu einer Lehre von den allgemeinsten Bestimmungen des Dinges hat Ockham in Angriff genommen und ein gutes Stück vorwärts gebracht" (S. 252).

II

Martins Studie ist ein fesselndes und herausforderndes Buch, das in der Ockham-Forschung Aufmerksamkeit und Anerkennung erlangt hat[2]. Zu einer inhaltlichen Diskussion hat seine These jedoch kaum geführt. Auf diesem Symposium möchte ich dazu einen Beitrag liefern. Ist Ockham ein Transzendentalphilosoph?

Aber hier erhebt sich sofort die Frage, was mit diesem Ausdruck eigentlich gemeint ist. Martin konstatiert, daß Ockhams Auffassung von 'transzendentalem Sein' keine Eindeutigkeit aufweist. Hängt dies möglicherweise mit einer terminologischen Undeutlichkeit zusammen, die sich durch

[2] Vgl. T. Barth, 'Wilhelm Ockham und die Philosophie der Ordnungen' in: *Phil. Jahrbuch* 60 (1950), S. 323-334; Ph. Boehner, 'Der Stand der Ockham-Forschung' in: *Collected Articles*, Louvain - Paderborn 1958, S. 21; H. Junghans, *Ockham im Lichte der neueren Forschung*, Berlin - Hambrug 1968, S. 197 ff.; J. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, Berlin 1969, S. XV.

seine ganze Studie hinzieht? Diese Undeutlichkeit läßt sich am besten illustrieren anhand eines Schlüsselbegriffes in Martins Buch, des der 'transzendentalen Kategorien', womit er Ockhams Auslegung der Quantität und der Relation charakterisiert.

Einerseits spricht Martin von der 'aristotelischen Transzendentalphilosophie', so sagt er: "Die Wendung zur aristotelischen Transzendentalphilosophie, so wie sie Thomas durchgeführt hat, ist die eigentliche philosophische Entscheidung der Scholastik" (S. XI; cf. S. 132). Vom Standpunkt der klassischen Ontologie aus gesehen ist jedoch die Verbindung 'transzendentale Kategorien' eine contradictio in terminis. 'Transzendental' im mittelalterlichen Sinn steht gegenüber 'kategorial'. '*Transcendentia*' — 'das Eine', 'Wahre' und 'Gute' — sind Eigenschaften des Seienden als Seiendes, sind die *allgemeinsten* Bestimmungen des Seienden. Kategorien dagegen bezeichnen *spezielle* Seinsweisen, sie bilden die ersten Besonderungen des Seienden. In den Kategorien wird Seiendes kontrahiert, beschränkt auf Substanz, Quantität, Qualität oder Relation. Kategoriale Bestimmungen schließen darum einander auch aus.

Es scheint daher, daß der Ausdruck 'transzendental' in seiner modernen, von Kant ausgehenden, Bedeutung genommen werden muß. Übrigens erwähnt Martin im Vorwort seines Ockham-Buchs, das diese Studie aus einer Untersuchung der historischen Voraussetzungen der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* entstanden ist. In diesem Werk sagt Kant: "Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, sofern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt" (B 25). 'Transzendental' bezieht sich hier auf die Möglichkeitsbedingungen unserer *Erkenntnis*, die im Subjekt a priori verankert liegen. Zu diesen apriorischen Bedingungen gehören die reinen Verstandesbegriffe, die Kant 'Kategorien' nennt. Bei Kant ist daher der Gegensatz zwischen 'transzendental' und 'kategorial' verschwunden.

Trotzdem ist der Ausdruck 'transzendentale Kategorien' nur schwer in den kantischen Ansatz einzufügen. In dieser Begriffsbildung steht ja 'transzendental' gegenüber 'absolut', d.h. gegenüber den Kategorien der Substanz und Qualität. Die Verbindung 'transzendentale Kategorien' ist daher aus einem Gegensatz heraus gedacht, in welchem 'Kategorien' eher im aristotelischen als im kantischen Sinne aufgefaßt sind. Und wenn das Eigentümliche der 'transzendentalen Kategorien' nach Martin darin besteht, daß sie bei Ockham zu allgemeinsten Bestimmungen des Dinges als Ding werden, dann wird 'transzendental' hier im mittelalterlichen Sinn aufgefaßt, d.h. in Gegensatz zu den besonderen Seinsweisen der Kategorien.

Die Frage ist nun, ob die Doppeldeutigkeit des Begriffes 'transzendentale Kategorien' Ockhams eigener Position innerhalb der transzendentalphilosophischen Tradition inhäriert, oder eine Folge von Martins Interpretation ist. Diese zweifache Möglichkeit bildet den Gegenstand meiner folgenden Untersuchung. Von einem Text ausgehend, der in Martins Studie eine kruziale Rolle spielt, nämlich *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, wo Ockham die Unterscheidung von Thomas von Aquin zwischen dem transzendentalen und dem kategorialen Einen kritisiert, möchte ich zwei zentrale Momente in Martins Ockham-Interpretation kritisch betrachten: Primo, läßt Ockham die Lehre der '*transcendentia*' im mittelalterlichen Sinn fallen? Secundo, legt Ockham bestimmte Kategorien aus als 'transzendentales Sein'?

III

In seinem Kommentar zum I. Buch der *Sententiae* behandelt Ockham die Frage, ob die Einheit, durch welche Gott Einer genannt wird, etwas Gott Hinzugefügtes ist (*Utrum unitas qua Deus dicitur unus sit aliquid additum Deo*). Er erwähnt eine Auffassung von Einheit, welche offenbar die des Thomas von Aquin ist, so wie dieser sie in *De potentia* q. 9, a. 7 niederlegt[3]. In diesem Text legt Thomas ausführlich den historischen Hintergrund der 'quaestio' dar. Er stellt fest, daß unter den Philosophen verschiedene Auffassungen über das Eine und das Viele bestehen. So lehrte der Platonismus die Substantialität des Einen; das Eine bildet die Substanz der Dinge. Demgegenüber behauptete Avicenna, daß das Eine etwas Akzidentales sei, etwas der Substanz Hinzugefügtes. Der Grundfehler beider Auffassungen ist nach Thomas darin gelegen, daß das Eine, welches mit Seiendem konvertibel ist, als identisch mit dem Einen, welches Prinzip der Zahl ist, aufgefaßt wird. Das richtige Urteil über das Eine muß von der Überlegung ausgehen, daß Einheit 'Ungeteiltheit' sagt. Der Charakter des Einen muß darum auf der Basis des Charakters der Teilung, die negiert wird, bestimmt werden. Nun können zwei Arten der Teilung unterschieden werden. Die erste ist formaler Art, d.h. eine Teilung nach gegensätzlichen Formen. Diese Teilung übersteigt das Genus der Quantität; darum auch das Eine, das diese Teilung verneint. Dieses Eine fügt Seiendem keine distinkte Realität hinzu. Daneben besteht noch ein anderer Typ von Teilung, der der kontinuierlichen Quantität. Ausschließlich jenes Eine, das diese materielle Teilung verneint, bringt dem, wovon es gesagt wird, etwas Positives hinzu. Die Schlußfolgerung der Darlegung von Thomas besteht daher darin, daß zwei Arten von Einheit zu unterscheiden sind, nämlich das transzendentale Eine und das kategoriale Eine, welches das Prinzip der Zahl ist.

Mit dieser Auffassung setzt sich Ockham kritisch auseinander. Ein von ihm geäußerter Einwand lautet: "Jener (d.h. Thomas) behauptet, daß das Eine, welches mit Seiendem konvertibel ist, nicht eine hinzugefügte positive Realität ausdrückt, daß jedoch das Eine, welches im Genus Quantität ist, dieses sehr wohl tut". Diese Dualität in dem Einen bildet zweifellos das Hauptbedenken von Ockham, denn es ist dieser Einwand, den er mit einer Reihe von Argumenten unterbaut. Sie geben uns die Möglichkeit, die Pointe seiner Stellungnahme zu erkennen.

Als erstes Argument führt Ockham an:

> "Wenn zwei Sachen konvertibel sind und sich so zueinander verhalten, daß keine von beiden der anderen etwas hinzufügt, dann verhält sich alles, was unter die konvertibelen Sachen fällt, so zueinander, daß keines dem anderen etwas hinzufügt. Ergo: so wie die Seiendheit, das Seiende und das Eine, allgemein genommen, sich so verhalten, daß das Eine nicht etwas dem Seienden Hinzugefügtes bezeichnet, ebenso werden die kontinuierliche Quantität und das Eine, welches damit konvertibel ist — d.h. das Prinzip der Zahl nach jenem (Thomas) —, sich so verhalten, daß das Eine, in dieser Weise genommen, nicht etwas Positives der kontinuierlichen Quantität Hinzugefügtes bezeichnen wird"[4].

[3] *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* IV, S. 73-74)

[4] *Ibid.* S. 74: "Quando aliqua duo sunt convertibilia, et sic se habent ad invicem quod neutrum addit aliquid super

Ockham scheint hier Thomas vorzuhalten, daß dieser die These von der Konvertibilität auf dem Niveau der Quantität nicht konsequent anwendet. Dieser Punkt muß jedoch noch näher präzisiert werden. Dazu ist auf den Schluß des zitierten Arguments achtzugeben. Das numerische Eine, so sagt Ockham, fügt nicht etwas Positives der *kontinuierlichen Quantität* hinzu. Nun würde auch Thomas anerkennen, daß das Eine, weil es transzendental ist, in allen Kategorien zu finden ist und somit auch in der Kategorie der Quantität. Quantität-sein ist eine bestimmte Form von Sein, die als solche Einheit besitzt. Aber davon muß das Eine, welches Prinzip der Zahl ist, ausdrücklich unterschieden werden. Ockham antizipiert gleichsam diese Überlegung, denn in der Fortsetzung des Textes schreibt er:

> "Wenn gesagt wird, daß außer der Einheit, die Prinzip der Zahl ist, die kontinuierliche Quantität eine andere Einheit hat, die für sie wesentlich ist und die der kontinuierlichen Quantität nichts hinzufügt und, daß jene Einheit *per se* unter das Eine, das mit Seiendem konvertibel ist, fällt und nicht die Einheit, die Prinzip der Zahl ist, dann stelle ich dem gegenüber: daraus würde folgen, daß es von demselben Ding zwei Einheiten gibt, was unmöglich scheint"[5].

Die Idee, daß es in dem quantitativen Ding eine zweifache Einheit geben solle, ist für Ockham eine Ungereimtheit, aber für Thomas eine von ihm selbst formulierte Konsequenz seines Gedankengangs[6]. Genau auf diesen Punkt spitzt sich der Meinungsunterschied über das Eine zwischen Thomas und Ockham zu. Die Diskussion geht über die Frage, wie das numerische Eine sich zur Kategorie der Quantität verhält. Daß dies den Diskussionsrahmen bildet, ergibt sich auch aus den weiteren Argumenten, die Ockham zur Adstruktion seines Haupteinwandes vorträgt. Sie laufen stets auf die Schlußfolgerung hinaus, daß "das Eine, welches Prinzip der Zahl ist, nichts der Quantität, welche eins ist, hinzufügt, es sei denn lediglich die Privation der Teilung"[7].

Diese Diskussion aus der *Ordinatio* spielt, wie gesagt, in Martins Ockham-Deutung eine kruziale Rolle. Aus dieser Erörterung zieht er den Schluß, daß Ockham den Unterschied zwischen der transzendentalen und der akzidentalen Einheit aufhebt. Das Eine zählt völlig zur Quantität (S. 216), die ein 'transzendentaler Modus' von Sein ist. Für Ockham wird deshalb eine besondere Lehre der Transzendentalien als eine Lehre von den *passiones entis* unnötig (S. 238). Diese weitreichenden Folgerungen entbehren jedoch einer tragfähigen Basis in dem besprochenen Text. Sie finden auch keinen Grund im weiteren Werk von Ockham. Dies möchte

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aliud, tunc quaecumque contenta sub illis convertibilibus sic se habent ad invicem quod neutrum addit aliquid super aliud. Ergo sicut entitas, ens et unum in communi sic se habent quod unum non significat aliquid additum enti, ita quantitas continua et unum convertibile cum ea, — quod est principium numeri, per istum —, sic se habebunt quod unum sic dictum non dicet aliquid positivum additum quantitati continuae".

[5] *Ibid.* S. 75: "Si dicatur quod praeter unitatem quae est principium numeri, habet quantitas continua aliam unitatem sibi essentialem quae nihil addit quantitati continuae, et quod illa per se continetur sub uno convertibili cum ente et non unitas quae est principium numeri, contra: ex isto sequeretur quod eiusdem rei essent duae unitates, quod videtur impossibile".

[6] Siehe *De Potentia* q. 9, a. 7, ad 5, wo Thomas einen Vergleich mit dem Guten anstellt: "Bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod nullam rem supra ens addit; bonum autem quod est in genere qualitatis, addit aliquam qualitatem qua homo dicitur bonus; *et simile est de uno*, sicut ex dictis patet".

[7] *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, S. 76: "Ergo unum quod est principium numeri nihil addit super quantitatem, quae est una, nisi solum privationem divisionis".

ich nun im Verfolg meines Beitrages aufzeigen.

IV

Zunächst, wie ist Ockhams Verhältnis zu den '*transcendentia*' im mittelalterlichen Sinn, von Martin auch als die "eigentlichen" Transzendentalien bezeichnet (S. 216)? Läßt er eine besondere Lehre der Transzendentalien fallen (S. 252)? Ist diese Doktrin für ihn unnötig geworden?

Um eine Antwort auf diese erste Frage zu finden, möchte ich von Ockhams *Summa logicae* ausgehen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient nämlich der Aufbau des ersten Buches, der von den Termini handelt. Dieser Aufbau ist stark durch das *Organon* von Aristoteles und die *Isagoge* von Porphyrius bestimmt, ohne jedoch eigener Akzente zu ermangeln. Nachdem im Kap. 1-13 Einteilung und Definitionen der Termini gegeben sind, sagt Ockham zu Beginn von Kap. 14, daß er erst die Termini der zweiten Intention behandeln will, danach die der ersten Intention. In diesem zweiten Abschnitt folgt dann eine Erörterung der Prädikamente, die Substanz (Kap. 42-43), die Quantität (Kap. 44-48), die Relation (Kap. 49-54), die Qualität (Kap. 55-56) und die sechs letzten Kategorien (Kap. 57-62).

Bei dieser Erörterung merkt Martin an, daß der Zusammenhang der Kategorienlehre Ockhams mit der Lehre von den Transzendentalien besonders verdeckt bleibt. Dies liegt seiner Meinung nach nicht nur an der Kürze der Logik, sondern auch daran, daß entsprechend dem Aufbau des aristotelischen Gesamtwerkes, die Lehre vom *Unum*, aus der ja die Lehre von den Transzendentalien entspringt, nicht zur Logik, sondern zur Metaphysik gehört (S. 60).

Sehr befriedigend, scheint mir, ist diese Erklärung nicht. Es ist doch auffallend, daß Ockham in seiner *Summa*, über die autoritativen Vorlagen hinaus, der Erörterung der Termini, mit denen sich Aristoteles in den *Categoriae* befaßt, eine Besprechung des 'Seienden' und des 'Einen' voranstellt und in diesem Kontext selbst den Terminus 'transcendens' gebraucht. Kap. I, 38 beginnt so:

> "Nachdem von gewissen Termini zweiter Intention und gewissen Termini der zweiten Namengebung die Rede war, müssen jetzt die Termini erster Intention ins Auge gefaßt werden. Dazu gehören die Kategorien. Es ist zuerst von gewissen, allen Kategorien gemeinsamen Termini zu reden, ungeachtet dessen, ob es Dinge sind, welche keine Zeichen sind, oder ob es Zeichen sind. Von dieser Art sind 'Seiendes' und 'Eines'[8]".

Unsere erste Feststellung ist, daß Ockham hier vor den Kategorien die '*transcendentia*' als distinkte Termini-Gruppe introduziert. Kap. 38 handelt über 'Seiendes', Kap. 39 über das 'Eine', von dem gesagt wird, daß es eine *passio entis* ist. Kap. 40 fährt fort mit dem, "was geringer ist im Hinblick auf 'Seiendes', nämlich die zehn Prädikamente" (*restat dicere de inferioribus ad 'ens', quae ponuntur decem praedicamenta*). In diesem Aufbau wird das bereits

[8] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 38 (*Opera Phil.* I, S. 106): "Dicto de terminis quibusdam secundae intentionis et quibusdam secundae impositionis videndum est de terminis primae intentionis; cuiusmodi ponuntur praedicamenta. Primo tamen dicendum est de quibusdam communibus omnibus, sive sint res, quae non sunt signa, sive sint signa; cuiusmodi sunt 'ens' et 'unum'." Die deutsche Übersetzung ist *Wilhelm von Ockham, Texte zur Theorie der Erkenntnis und der Wissenschaft*, hrsg. R. Imbach, Stuttgart 1984, entnommen.

in Kap. 38 angegebene Distinktive der transzendentalen Termini bestätigt: sie sind völlig universal, sie sind allem gemeinsam, gleichgültig, ob es Dinge sind, die keine Zeichen sind, oder ob es Zeichen sind.

Es ist, zweitens, wichtig zu erkennen, daß der hier formulierte Unterschied auf eine frühere Passage der *Summa logicae* zurückverweist, in welcher schon die *'transcendentia'* beiläufig erwähnt wurden. In Kap. 11 behandelt Ockham die Namen erster und zweiter Imposition. Für unseren Zweck genügt es, die Hauptgliederung des Textes bündig wiederzugeben[9].

Namen zweiter Imposition sind 'Namen von Namen', d.h. es sind konventionelle Zeichen, die reine konventionelle Zeichen bedeuten (z. B. 'Verb', 'Konjugation'). Alle übrigen Namen sind Namen erster Imposition. Innerhalb dieser Klasse führt Ockham dann die Unterscheidung zwischen Namen erster und zweiter Intention ein, eine Unterscheidung, die hier also auf gesprochene Zeichen angewandt wird. Namen zweiter Intention sind eingesetzt, um Intentionen der Seele zu bezeichnen (z.B. 'Proposition', 'Prädikat'). Was Namen erster Intention sind, wird folgendermaßen angegeben:

> "'Namen erster Intention' werden alle von den vorausgehenden verschiedenen Namen genannt, jene also, die gewisse Dinge, die keine Zeichen oder etwas zu solchen Zeichen gehöriges sind, bedeuten; von dieser Art sind: Mensch, Tier, Sokrates, Plato, Weiße, Weißes, Seiendes, Wahres, Gutes, und Derartiges. Von diesen Namen bedeuten einige ausdrücklich Dinge, die keine suppositionsfähigen Zeichen sind, andere hingegen bedeuten solche Zeichen und zugleich andere Dinge"[10].

Als Beispiel führt Ockham kategoriale und transzendentale Termini an. Aber zugleich sehen wir, daß innerhalb der Gruppe der Namen erster Intention differenziert wird. Genau auf diese Unterscheidung bezieht sich Ockham zu Beginn von Kap. 38, um zu verdeutlichen, warum vor den Prädikamenten der Terminus 'Seiendes' behandelt werden muß.

Ein gutes Gesamtbild seiner Auffassung bietet Ockhams zusammenfassende Erörterung am Schluß von Kap. 11. Er zählt vier Gruppen von Namen auf. "Gewisse Namen bedeuten ausdrücklich konventionell eingesetzte Zeichen, und zwar nur insofern sie Zeichen sind". Das sind die Namen zweiter Imposition. Sie betreffen die Struktur der Sprache und gehören daher zum Bereich der Grammatik. "Andere Namen hingegen bedeuten einzig konventionell eingesetzte wie auch natürliche Zeichen". Das sind die Namen erster Imposition und zweiter Intention. Sie betreffen die logische Struktur des Denkens und gehören daher zum Gebiet der Logik. "Einige Namen bedeuten ausdrücklich Dinge, welche keine solchen Zeichen sind, die als Teile der Aussage vorkommen". Das sind die Namen erster Imposition und erster Intention. Sie betreffen die ontologische Struktur der Wirklichkeit; aus diesen Termini werden die Propositionen der 'scientia realis' zusammmengesetzt. Schließlich, "einige Namen hingegen

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[9] Vgl. Chr. Knudsen, 'Intentions and Impositions' in: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 1982, S. 479-495.

[10] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 11, S. 40: " 'Nomina' autem 'primae intentionis' vocantur omnia alia nomina a praedictis, quae videlicet significant aliquas res, quae non sunt signa nec consequentia talia signa; cuiusmodi sunt omnia talia 'homo', 'animal', 'Sortes', 'Plato', 'albedo', 'album', 'ens', 'verum', 'bonum' et huiusmodi, quorum aliqua significant praecise res, quae non sunt signa nata supponere pro aliis, aliqua significant talia signa et simul cum hoc alias res".

bedeuten unterschiedslos solche Dinge, die weder Teile der Aussage noch der Rede sind, und derartige Zeichen. Von dieser Art sind Namen wie 'Ding', 'Seiendes', 'etwas' und Derartiges". Hier geht es um Namen erster Intention, die 'transzendental' sind. Und weil 'Seiendes' das Subjekt der Metaphysik ist, gehören sie zum Gebiet dieser Wissenschaft[11].

Aus diesen Texten läßt sich ableiten, daß Ockham keineswegs die 'eigentlichen' Transzendentalien fallen läßt. Im Gegenteil, den transzendentalen Termini wird von ihm ein eigener Platz und Status zuerkannt.

Das Distinktive dieser Namen wird in *Summa logicae* I, cap. 38 zum Ausdruck gebracht, wo Ockham darlegt, daß 'Seiendes' zweifach aufgefaßt werden kann. Zunächst univok, d.h. als "ein allen Dingen gemeinsamer Begriff, der *in quid* von allen Dinge ausgesagt werden kann, in der Weise wie ein Transzendentale *in quid* ausgesagt werden kann"— eine Hinzufügung, die notwendig ist, weil 'Seiendes' ja kein Genus ist. Gleichwohl kann der Name 'Seiendes' auch äquivok aufgefaßt werden, weil er nicht von allen Dingen, von denen er ausgesagt werden kann, bei signifikativen Gebrauch gemäß einem Begriff ausgesagt wird, sondern es entsprechen ihm verschiedene Begriffe.

Die doppelte Weise, auf welche 'Seiendes' aufgefaßt werden kann, bildet die Besonderheit der transzendentalen Termini. Das Eigentümliche der '*transcendentia*' ist zuerst darin gelegen, daß sie durch alle Kategorien hindurchgehen. Nun, es ist genau dieser Punkt, den Ockham für die Äquivozität des Terminus 'Seiendes' herbeibringt. In seinem Porphyrius-Kommentar schreibt er, daß der Grund, warum 'Seiendes' nicht univok ausgesagt wird, darin besteht, daß die Prädikamente die Dinge, für die sie supponieren, nicht auf gleiche Weise bezeichnen[12]. Eine zweite Eigentümlichkeit transzendentaler Termini ist, daß sie auch von Gott gesagt werden. Die traditionelle Frage ist dann, ob z.B. 'Seiendes' und 'Gutes' analog oder gleichsinnig von Gott und dem Kreatürlichen prädiziert werden. Hier wird deutlich, daß Ockhams Auffassung der Univozität des Seienden eine kritische Stellungnahme innerhalb der mittelalterlichen Diskussion über die Art der transzendentalen Termini ist. Was in den '*transcendentia*' auf dem Spiel steht, ist die Möglichkeit der Gotteserkenntnis. Ockhams sorgfältige und ausführliche Argumentation in der *Ordinatio* (*Scriptum in I Sent.* d.2, q.9) für die These, daß "der Begriff Seiendes gleichsinnig für Gott und alle andere Dinge ist", muß vor diesem Hintergrund verstanden werden.

V

Das zweite Moment in Martins Interpretation, daß ich zur Diskussion stellen möchte, betrifft seine These, Ockham habe die aristotelischen Kategorien, außer der Substanz und der Qualität,

[11] *Ibid.* S. 41: "Ex quibus omnibus colligi potest, quod quaedam nomina significant praecise signa ad placitum instituta et nonnisi, dum sunt signa, quaedam autem praecise significant signa tam ad placitum instituta quam signa naturalia. Quaedam vero significant praecise res, quae non sunt signa talia, quae sunt partes propositionis; quaedam indifferenter significant tales res, quae non sunt partes propositionis nec orationis, et etiam signa talia; cuiusmodi sunt talia nomina 'res', 'ens', 'aliquid' et huiusmodi".
Vgl. Ph. Boehner, 'Ockham's Theory of Signification' in: *Collected Articles*, S. 229; E.A. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, New York 1935, S. 44 ff.

[12] *In librum Porphyrii De praedicabilibus* c. 2 (*Opera Phil.* II, S. 43).

nach dem ontologischen Modell, welches die Transzendentalienlehre bot, interpretiert und sie als 'transzendentales Sein' ausgelegt.

Die mittelalterliche Lehre der '*transcendentia*' ist in Zusammenhang mit der Aristoteles-Rezeption entwickelt worden, denn in dessen *Metaphysica* findet sich eine Erörterung, die man als den Ursprung dieser mittelalterlichen Lehre betrachten darf. Im IV. Buch (Kap. 2) sagt Aristoteles (1003 b 22 ff.): "Das Seiende und das Eine sind dasselbe und eine einzige Natur (*physis)* dadurch, daß sie einander folgen (d.h. implizieren) ... jedoch nicht so, daß sie beide durch einen einzigen Wesensbegriff (*logos*) bestimmt werden". In dieser Aussage wird ein Sachverhalt berührt, auf den in der mittelalterlichen Diskussion, auch von Ockham, immer wieder zurückgegriffen wird. Aristoteles erwähnt nämlich zwei Elemente, die bei der Konvertibilität des Seienden und des Einen eine Rolle spielen: es ist ein und dieselbe 'physis', die im 'logos' auseinandergelegt wird. Der Unterschied der transzendentalen Bestimmungen ist im Logos gegründet, erfordert eine Logik.

Dieser aristotelische Gedanke bestimmt die mittelalterliche Reflexion über Identität und Nicht-Identität der '*transcendentia*'. Thomas von Aquin z.B. legt dar, daß '*transcendentia*' real identisch sind; qua *subiectum* oder *suppositum* sind sie dasselbe. Es ist daher ein Kennzeichen transzendentaler Termini, daß sie miteinander vertauschbar sind. Diese Konvertabilität bedeutet jedoch nicht, daß es eine *nugatio*, d. h. eine unnütze Wiederholung desselben, darstelt, wenn man sagt, 'Seiendes' ist 'eines' oder 'wahr'.'Eines' und 'wahr' drücken etwas aus, das nicht durch den Terminus 'Seiendes' ausgedrückt wird; sie fügen qua Begriff 'Seiendem' etwas hinzu. '*Transcendentia*' sind keine Synonyme, denn zwischen ihnen besteht eine begriffliche Nicht-Identität[13].

Bei Ockham finden wir denselben Gedankengang wie bei Thomas. In dem oben erwähnten Text aus dem Sentenzen-Kommentar "Über die Einheit, durch die Gott Einer genannt wird" (d. 24, q. 1) erhebt er den Einwand: "Wenn das, was von etwas prädizierbar ist, nicht etwas Hinzugefügtes bedeutet, dann ist es eine *nugatio*, wenn das eine dem anderen hinzugefügt wird"[14]. Aber in welchem Sinn besteht dann Nicht-Identität zwischen 'dem Einen' und 'dem Seienden'? Ockhams Antwort ist wesentlich die gleiche wie die des Thomas, doch wird sie auf eine neue Weise mit Hilfe der Suppositionslehre formuliert. Wenn die Termini personale Supposition haben, sind 'das Eine' und 'das Seiende' identisch. 'Das Eine' unterscheidet sich dann nicht von 'Seiendem', genausowenig wie 'Seiendes' sich von 'Seiendem' unterscheidet. Aber wenn die Termini *simpliciter* supponieren, dann besteht keine Identität. 'Das Eine' und 'das Seiende' stehen dann für Begriffe, die nicht synonym sind. 'Das Eine' bezeichnet dasselbe, als wofür 'Seiendes' steht, aber auf eine distinkte Weise, weil es etwas anderes — und hier taucht das Schlüsselwort auf — konnotiert[15]. So konnotiert 'das Eine', daß das Seiende nicht (andere) Seienden ist. Ockhams Antwort auf obigen Einwand, daß wenn 'das Eine' 'dem

[13] Thomas von Aquin, *De potentia* q. 9, a. 7, ad 13: "Unum et ens convertuntur secundum supposita; sed tamen unum addit secundum rationem, privationem divisionis; et propter hoc non sunt synonyma, quia synonyma sunt quae significant idem secundum rationem eandem".

[14] *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, S. 73: "Quando aliquid praedicabile de aliquo non significat aliquid additum, addito uno alteri est nugatio".

[15] *Ibid.* S. 85, *Summa logicae* I, cap. 38, S. 105-106, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2 (*Opera Theol.* I, S. 127): "Quando ergo dicitur 'unum, verum, bonum etc. dicunt distinctos conceptus et tamen non distincta entia', dico quod *connotat distincta* "; *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 4 (*Opera Theol.* VI, S. 145): conceptus connotativus.

Seienden' nichts hinzufügt, dies in einer Tautologie resultiert, lautet dann auch, daß um solch eine unnütze Wiederholung zu vermeiden, es ausreicht, daß etwas anderes konnotiert wird (ohne, daß eine distinkte Realität hinzugefügt wird)[16]. Die '*transcendentia*' 'das Eine','Wahre' und 'Gute' sind konnotative Begriffe.

Die Distinktion zwischen absoluten und konnotativen Termini ist für Ockhams Denken fundamental. Diese Unterscheidung wird von ihm in *Summa logicae* I, cap. 10 herausgearbeitet. Absolute Namen beziehen sich direkt auf die durch sie bezeichneten Objekte, ohne etwas anderes mitzubezeichnen. "Ganz absolut sind jene Namen, welche nicht etwas ursprünglich und etwas anderes oder dasselbe an zweiter Stelle bedeuten, sondern alles, was durch einen solchen Namen bedeutet wird, wird in gleicher Weise zuerst bedeutet". Als Beispiele nennt Ockham 'Mensch' und 'Weiße'. Konnotative Termini bedeuten ein Objekt primär und etwas anderes an zweiter Stelle (*secundario*). In der Definition so eines Namens wird etwas, das primär Bedeutete, *in recto* gesetzt und etwas anderes, das Konnotierte, *in obliquo* (in einem anderen Kasus).

Ockham zählt in *Summa logicae* I, cap. 10 mehrere Gruppen solcher konnotativer Termini auf. Dazu gehören zuerst alle relativen Namen. Weiterhin alle Namen, die zur Gattung der Quantität gehören nach der Lehre jener, die annehmen, die Quantität sei kein von der Substanz und der Qualität verschiedenes Ding. Ja, so wird im Verfolg gesagt: "Jene, welche annehmen, jedes Ding sei Substanz oder Qualität, nehmen auch an, daß alles, was unter die Kategorien außer Substanz und Qualität fällt, konnotative Namen sind". Schließlich gehören zu den konnotativen Namen die '*transcendentia*' 'wahr', 'gut', 'eines'. 'Das Wahre' konnotiert den Akt des Erkennens, 'das Gute' den Akt des Wollens. 'Das Wahre' ist zu definieren als "das Reale, was immer es sei, das durch den Intellekt erfaßbar ist"; 'das Gute' als "das Seiende, das geliebt und gewollt werden kann"[17].

In diesem Text fällt zweierlei auf. Zuerst, daß die Kategorien von Relation und Quantität als konnotative Termini ausgelegt werden. Die Auffassung, daß sie keine distinkte Realitäten bezeichnen, ist eine wichtige Innovation von Ockham. Es ist das Verdienst von Martins Studie, hierauf unser Augenmerk gerichtet zu haben. An zweiter Stelle fällt auf, daß die Kategorien der Relation und der Quantität *zusammen mit* transzendentalen Termini als konnotative Namen angeführt werden. Dies gibt Martin Grund zu der Auffassung, daß Ockham diese Kategorien nach dem Modell der '*transcendentia*' auslegt.

Was allerdings keinen Grund findet, ist, so scheint mir, Martins These, Ockham habe die Kategorien als 'transzendentales Sein' ausgelegt. Die Unrichtigkeit dieser Behauptung kann aus der Eigenschaft von konnotativen Termini deutlich gemacht werden. Diese enthalten zwei Elementen, das primär Bedeutete und das Konnotierte. In Martins Deutung wird jedoch das erste

[16] *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, S. 89: "Ad vitandum nugationem sufficit quod (non) connotet aliquid aliud tali modo quo unum connotat, licet illud non addatur".
Das *non* in der kritischen Ausgabe muß — in Übereinstimmung mit einer Anzahl Handschriften — gestrichen werden, weil es Ockhams Absicht in sein Gegenteil verkehrt.

[17] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 10, S. 38: "Sub istis etiam nominibus comprehenduntur omnia talia 'verum', 'bonum', 'unum'... Et eodem modo dicendum est de 'vero' et 'bono', quia 'verum' quod ponitur convertibile cum 'ente', significat idem quod 'intelligibile'. 'Bonum' etiam, quod est convertibile cum 'ente' significat idem, quod haec oratio 'aliquid secundum rectam rationem volibile vel diligibile'." Vgl. *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, S. 127; *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 2, q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* II, S. 23); *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q.4, S. 145-146.

Element, das in der Definition eines konnotativen Terminus *in recto* gesetzt wird, völlig ignoriert. Aber gerade an diesem Punkt bleibt für Ockham ein fundamentaler Unterschied zwischen der transzendentalen und der kategorialen Ordnung bestehen. Was durch die konnotativen '*transcendentia*' primär bezeichnet wird, ist 'Seiendes'; sie sind damit, so wird in *Summa logicae* I, cap. 10 gesagt, konvertibel, was genau das Kennzeichen transzendentaler Termini ist. 'Das Wahre', schreibt Ockham anderswo, bedeutet 'alle Seienden der Welt'. Das gilt jedoch nicht für die konnotativen Kategorien. Sie bedeuten primär ein anderes Prädikament[18].

Wohl kann man anerkennen, daß es eine gewisse Parallelität zwischen kategorialer und transzendentaler Ordnung gibt. So wie es in der prädikamentalen Ordnung absolute Kategorien, nämlich Substanz und Qualität, und konnotative Kategorien gibt, so gibt es in der transzendentalen Ordnung einen absoluten Terminus, nämlich 'Seiendes', und konnotative '*transcendentia*', 'das Eine', 'Wahre' und 'Gute' — man beachte auch, daß in *Summa logicae* I, cap. 10 'Seiendes' nicht bei den konnotativen Termini genannt wird. Was in Martins Deutung eigentlich geschieht, ist, daß die Übereinstimmung, welche zwischen bestimmten Kategorien und bestimmten Transzendentalien im Konnotieren besteht, zu einer Identität im primär Bedeuteten verabsolutiert wird. Darum kann er behaupten, daß bestimmte Kategorien als 'transzendentales Sein' ausgelegt werden und kann er von 'transzendentalen Kategorien' sprechen. Tatsächlich ist aber damit nichts anderes gemeint als 'konnotative Kategorien'. Ausschließlich in diesem Sinn werden sie von Ockham selbst verstanden.

Die terminologische Verbindung 'transzendentale Kategorien' kommt bei Ockham auch nicht vor. Nur an einer Stelle seines Werkes fand ich eine Erörterung, wo der Terminus *transcendens* in Verbindung gebracht wird mit der kategorialen Ordnung. Das geschieht dort aber in einem ganz anderen als von Martin behaupteten Sinn. In *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 13 macht Ockham in einer Auseinandersetzung mit Scotus folgende Aussage: "Obschon Gott mit etwas anderem in dem transzendenten Begriff der Substanz übereinstimmt, so doch nicht in dem eigenen (*proprio*) Begriff des Genus"[19]. *Transcendens* wird hier mit einer Kategorie verbunden, übrigens mit einer absoluten, der Substanz. Aber der Terminus wird von Ockham in einen direkten Gegensatz zu *proprius* gestellt.

Zusammenfassend: Martins Ockham-Interpretation kann ich in den beiden Hauptmomenten nicht teilen, denn erstens hat sich gezeigt, daß Ockham die Lehre von den 'eigentlichen' Transzendentalien nicht fallen läßt, sondern den '*transcendentia*' einen eigenen Platz und Status zuerkennt. Zweitens ist deutlich geworden, daß Ockham die Kategorie der Quantität und der Relation nicht transzendental auslegt, sondern konnotativ. Dieser letztere Begriff ist viel umfassender als der erste, denn er umgreift kategoriale und transzendentale Begriffe.

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[18] *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 4, S. 145: "'Verum' significat omnia entia de mundo sicut facit 'ens', et connotat actum intelligendi", *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 24, q. 2, S. 112: "Praedicamentum relationis... significat rem alterius praedicamenti, connotando unam aliam rem vel eiusdem praedicamenti vel alterius".

[19] *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 13 (*Opera Theol.* IX, S. 750): "Licet Deus conveniat cum alio in conceptu substantiae transcendenti, non tamen convenit in proprio conceptu generis sed in conceptu transcendenti, quo utimur loco generis propter convenientiam cum vero genere substantiae".

CAN GOD BE PROVED TO ACT FREELY?
Ockham's Criticism of an Argument in Thomas

M.J.F.M. Hoenen

Introduction

One perspective from which to bring out the differences between philosophical thought in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages is that of the relationship between the first principle of reality and the rest of reality. The main question at issue here is whether this relationship was considered to be necessary or free. That is to say, is the existence of reality as necessary as the existence of the first principle? The obvious answer would seem to be that authoritative ancient thinkers, notably Aristotle, thought the relation to be a necessary one, whereas medieval thinkers did not[1]. Yet this answer cannot be given so easily. At closer inspection it turns out to be quite difficult to decide on the exact points of comparison between the two realms of thought. There is at least one respect in which medieval and ancient philosophy seem to be particularly different. Whereas philosophy in the Middle Ages can reasonably be characterized as largely a reflective, philosophical articulation of the religious heritage, this does not appear to be the case for the larger part of ancient philosophy before Christ[2]. A fair amount of medieval philosophical thought is, therefore, to be found in theological works, i.e. works that try to articulate reflectively the religious heritage[3]. The philosophy of the main period of ancient thought, however, is not generally to be found in works of an equivalent theological nature.

The thought of e.g. Plato and Aristotle, as compared with that of Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus, does not seem to make any direct reference to the familiar realm of gods and godesses in its discussion of the principle of reality. There is no trace of the idea that Zeus, son of Chronos, is identical with the supreme Good or with the Unmoved Mover[4]. The initial answer to our question was, therefore, given prematurely. We had better consider first how an authoritative Greek thinker, such as Aristotle, would have answered the question as to whether Zeus might

[1] In this spirit, e.g. Jolivet, *Essai sur les rapports entre la pensée grecque et la pensée chrétienne*, Paris 1931, p. 67: "En somme, que manque-t-il à Aristote? C'est...la notion d'une *libre* causalité en Dieu... C'est le point sur lequel saint Thomas insiste fortement".

[2] Of course, on this matter there is a marked difference between ancient philosophy before and after Christ, as can be seen clearly in the works of the Fathers.

[3] The most notable examples are the numerous commentaries on the Sentences, in which philosophy plays a prominent part. On the other hand, the equally numerous works on logic and commentaries on Aristotle demonstrate that, in spite of the theological bias mentioned in the text, medieval philosophy has also managed to develop in relative freedom from purely theological concerns.

[4] Although the first principles are called 'divine' by Plato and Aristotle (because of their perfection), they are not identified with the gods and goddesses of tradition. With Thomas and Scotus, on the other hand, the first principle is unmistakably taken to be identical with the God of Faith. This bias is typically expressed in the opening words of Duns Scotus' *De Primo Principio*, ed. W. Kluxen, Darmstadt 1974, c. 1, nr. 1, p. 2.

have refused to Deucalion the stone from which he wrought man. Aristotle might quite likely have responded that it was possible for Zeus to have ordered man not to be created, or to be created in a different fashion. This response would imply that Aristotle, speaking as a faithful Greek about the Supreme God and His acts, allows for a measure of freedom and contingency, but that this contingency is absent when, as a Greek philosopher, he is speaking about the relationship between the Unmoved Mover and the rest of reality. A thinker of the Middle Ages, however, such as Thomas, would *mutatis mutandis* have answered 'Yes' on both counts: not only as a devout, medieval man, but also as a medieval philosopher, he took it that God has freely brought forth man, as well as creation in general.

In view of these divergent perspectives and consequent answers, a quite interesting problem is raised in the history of philosophy, viz., whether by identifying the God of Faith with the first principle of reality, philosophy in the Middle Ages was able to penetrate more deeply into the subject of the first principle than ancient philosophy had been able to, precisely because it conceived of the first principle as bringing the world into existence freely, and not out of necessity. In trying to reflect on and account for one of the basic tenets of the Christian religious creed, was philosophy in the Middle Ages led to prove something which was held impossible by ancient, pagan thought?

It must be pointed out in advance that there is no reason to suppose that the majority of medieval philosophers thought themselves capable of proving conclusively that God created the world freely. On the other hand, however, this does not mean that they took Aristotle's view of the matter to be definitive. Medieval philosophy's proper contribution to this perennial question, one might say, has been to show us that the problem of the relationship between the first principle and the rest of reality is, in effect, insoluble. Not even medieval philosophy, despite its special position in trying to supply a philosophical foundation for the religious tenet of a freely acting God, was able to give a firm and unequivocal answer on this matter.

Scope and Object

In William of Ockham, we have a philosopher in whom these latter remarks are conveniently exemplified. According to Ockham, it cannot be proved that God acts freely, nor does this imply that God acts out of necessity. The solution to the problem, he argues, is not a matter of strict proof, but can be based only on probable arguments[5]. This view, however, has not been universally endorsed. On the one hand, some philosophers have held, contrary to Ockham, that the only conclusion that is validated by natural reason is the one that was reached by Aristotle. Such was the opinion of e.g. Marsilius of Inghen, who believed Aristotle's reasoning by natural reason to be sound and irrefutable[6]. On the other hand, there have been those who, in opposition to Ockham, held that God can in fact be proved to act freely. Such was the persuasion of, most

[5] *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 43, q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* IV, p. 636) and *Quaestiones in II Sent.* qq. 3-4 (*Opera Theol.* V, p. 55).

[6] Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super IV libros Sent.* I, q. 42, a. 2, ed. Strasbourg 1501, fol. 177rb; I, q. 44, a. 1, fol. 186va and II, q. 1, a. 2, fol. 203 va.

notably, Thomas and the 13th and 14th century Thomists[7].

Our focus will be on the position of Ockham, he being the main subject of this volume. As our point of departure we shall take Ockham's criticism of an argument in Thomas, that achieved great popularity in the 13th and 14th centuries. We shall, firstly, expound Thomas's argument and trace its fundamental presuppositions. Next, we shall set out Ockham's criticism of the argument and of its presuppositions. Finally, we shall discuss Ockham's own reasonings in support of the claim that God acts freely. In order to establish the historical moment of the arguments used by Ockham, their use by other 13th and 14th century theologians and philosophers will be considered.

Thomas's view

In various passages Thomas puts forward arguments to the effect that God's relationship to the world is not a necessary one[8]. We shall concentrate here on one of his main lines of argument. In the *Summa Theologiae*, God is stated to be perfectly good. His goodness cannot be augmented. This means that God does not need the existence of any other being, and that He need only contemplate His own essence in order to achieve His perfection. God can exist, therefore, and can indeed exist in a perfect way, even if there existed no other beings. Consequently, when God brings about the creation, He does so without the least necessity. In bringing forth the creation, too, the object of God's will is His essence. Creation is a mere instrument to this end. Since every creature partakes in the goodness of God's essence, no creature can be such an instrument that without it God would not be able to attain His object, for, as God's will coincides with its object, viz. God's essence, and as this essence consists in perfect goodness, God's will also contains all possible perfections that can be bestowed upon the creation. If God brings forth a world, this is done solely and merely in order to let the creation share in this goodness. Briefly put, because God's goodness is perfect and capable of existing without anything else, there is no necessity for God to produce the creation. Consequently, God brings forth the creation freely[9].

This line of thought, which is proposed by Thomas in several of his works, can properly be reckoned to be among the main arguments put forward to prove God's freedom. It is to be found in Dominican theology in the end of the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th century, in such writers as Thomas of Sutton, Nicholas Trivet, Hervaeus Natalis, and Durandus. It is also prominent in the work of other theologians, such as Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Thomas of Strasbourg[10]. Before dealing presently with Ockham's criticism of these

[7] See note 10.

[8] See, e.g. *Scriptum in I Sententias* d. 43, q. 2, a. 1; *De potentia* q. 3, a. 15; *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cap. 81 sq. and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 3.

[9] *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2: "Licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam: quia bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis".

[10] See Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibeta* III, q. 4, ed. Schmaus and González-Haba, p. 371; Nicholas Trivet, *Quaestiones de causalitate scientiae Dei, Quodlibet* XI, q. 1, ed. Schmaus in: *Divus Thomas* ser. 3 anno 9 (1932), p. 190; Herveus Natalis, *In IV libros Sent. commentaria* I, d. 42, q. 2 a. 1, ed. Paris 1647, p. 167, col. 1B and Durandus, *In Sententias libri IV*, I, d. 43, q. 4, ed. Venice 1571, fol. 114va, n. 6. See also Henry of

reasonings, we shall first examine the argument somewhat more closely and discuss its presuppositions.

There are at least two assumptions implicit in the argument, firstly, that God is infinite, and, secondly, that God can bring forth other beings. The first point is obvious: evidently, God is thought to be infinite, since otherwise His essence could not be said to be perfectly good. Only God is good without participating in the goodness of something else. Hence He can be called infinite. If, as we have seen, God's goodness cannot be augmented by any creature, and if God, as Thomas states, is good in such a way that he surpasses any other conceivable perfection, this means precisely that God is infinite[11]. This point is of fundamental importance. If God were not infinite, His being and His goodness would be bounded, and therefore be caused by something else[12]. In this case it would be impossible for God to be completely free.

The second assumption, that God can bring about other beings, is no less obvious than the first. Supposing that God could not bring forth any other being, it would be pointless to speak of the Creator's attitude towards creation. It would be equally pointless to look for an answer to the question as to whether God brought forth the creation freely or out of necessity.

Ockham's criticism

We are now sufficiently equipped to address ourselves to the criticism put forward by Ockham in response to Thomas's argument. The objection is phrased very succinctly, as follows: "Thomas has failed to prove sufficiently that God's will is contingently directed to creation. Yet this is exactly what he should have done"[13]. What does Ockham mean by this? He does not dwell upon the point any further, but it is not too difficult to elucidate his intentions. According to Ockham, not only has Thomas failed to give conclusive proof of God's freedom in bringing forth the creation, but more importantly, it is indeed impossible to give such a proof at all. The reason for this is dealt with by Ockham a few pages later in his text. "It is impossible to prove by natural reason that God is a contingently acting cause, since it cannot be proved that it is not the case that as many effects are the result of the perfection of the sun naturally, so many entities which otherwise could not have been are the result of the perfection of the divine entity"[14]. According to Ockham, the belief that God acts freely is solely a matter of Faith. Each argument

Ghent, *Quodlibeta* V, q. 4, ed. Paris 1518, fol. 158vO; Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 8, p. 2, q. un., ed. Vat. XVII, p. 102 and Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in IIII Libros Sent.* II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ed. Venice 1564, fol. 128vb.

[11] *Summa contra Gent.* I, cap. 41, § 331: "Deus est bonus per suam essentiam, alia vero per participationem". Also *op. cit.* I, c. 43: "Non potest esse aliquis modus, nec etiam cogitari, quo plenius habeatur aliqua perfectio quam ab eo quod per suam essentiam est perfectum et cuius essentia est sua bonitas. Hoc autem Deus est. Nullo igitur modo potest cogitari aliquid melius vel perfectius Deo. Est igitur infinitus in bonitate".

[12] *Summa contra Gent.* I, cap. 43, § 361.

[13] *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 43, q. 1, p. 626: "Hoc (Thomas's argument) non sufficit, quia non est probatum sufficienter quod voluntas divina contingenter velit ea quae sunt ad finem, et tamen hoc oporteret probare specialiter".

[14] *Ibid.* p. 636: "Dico quod non potest ratione naturali probari quod Deus est causa rerum contingenter agens, quia non potest probari quin sicut ex perfectione solis naturaliter sequuntur effectus multi, ita ex perfectione entitatis divinae sequuntur multae entitates quae aliter esse non possent".

to the effect that God acts freely can be countered by an opposite argument to the effect that God acts out of necessity[15]. Avicenna, for example, argued in favour of the latter conclusion, although he was of the same mind as Thomas in holding that God is wholly perfect and independent of all other beings[16].

Another thinker who, like Ockham, denied the possibility of proving God's freedom of action, was Marsilius of Inghen. He, too, considered belief in God's freedom to be solely attributable to Faith. Using the principles of natural reason, he even proceeds to show that no other conclusion than that of God's necessity of action is open to one not illuminated by the light of Faith.

Now, Ockham denies the possibility of proving that God acts freely. But what about the presuppositions of Thomas's argument? Can they be proved? Ockham does not think so. Let us start with his criticism of the second assumption: can it be proved that God can bring forth other beings?

A separate *quaestio* of Ockham's *Quodlibeta* is devoted to the problem. He argues that it is impossible to prove by natural reason that God is the efficient cause of any effect. It cannot be proved sufficiently, he contends, that other things than the sublunar entities are brought forth. According to Ockham, it is impossible to prove sufficiently that the celestial bodies and the separate substances are produced by an efficient cause. Only sublunar things can be shown to have been caused. The generation and dissolution of the latter, however, can be adequately explained by reference only to the causality of the celestial bodies, i.e. without reference to God[17]. It is of crucial importance, of course, what is meant by 'natural reason' and 'sufficient proof'. In Ockham's view, something can be proved by natural reason if it can be proved sufficiently[18]. Something can be proved sufficiently, if it can be proved either from principles that are evident in themselves, or from experience[19]. God's causality is not provable from principles that are evident in themselves. According to Ockham, God's existence is not evident in itself[20]. Nor, *a fortiori*, is God's causality. God's causality, however, also cannot be proved from experience, because it is the celestial bodies, rather than God, that are experienced by us to be the cause of the things around us[21].

But what about the impossibility of proving that the celestial bodies themselves are caused by a further principle? What has induced Ockham to this thesis? Here we encounter a problem that

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[15] *Quaestiones in II Sent.* qq. 3-4, p. 55. In his *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 43, q. 1, p. 637 sqq. Ockham suits the action to the word. To each argument, gathered by him from the works of Thomas and Scotus, he adds a counter-argument in the spirit of the pagan philosophers.

[16] Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* VIII, c. 6 and IX, c. 1, ed. Van Riet, pp. 412, 434 and 439.

[17] *Quodlibeta* II, q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* IX, p. 108): "Dico quod non potest probari naturali ratione quod Deus sit causa efficiens alicuius effectus, quia non potest probari sufficienter quod sint aliqua effectibilia praeter generabilia et corruptibilia, quorum causae sufficientes sunt corpora naturalia inferiora et corpora caelestia; quia non potest probari sufficienter quod substantia separata quaecumque nec aliquod corpus caeleste causatur a quocumque efficiente".

[18] *Ibid.* p. 107 and note 17 above: "Non potest probari naturali ratione...quia non potest probari sufficienter".

[19] See Baudry, *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham*, Paris 1958, s.v. 'probari sufficienter' and *Quodlibeta* IV, q. 1, p. 295: "Non potest probari ex per se notis nec per experientiam...quia non potest probari sufficienter".

[20] See *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 3, q. 4 (*Opera Theol.* II, p. 432 sqq.) and *Quodlibeta* I, q. 1, p. 2.

[21] *Quodlibeta* II, q. 1, p. 111.

was widely debated at the beginning of the 14th century. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Averroes pointed out that, according to Aristotle, an efficient cause can bring forth only composite substances, i.e. entities that are composed of matter and form[22]. Indeed, an efficient cause works only on the matter, moving and changing it until it has taken on a certain form. The activity of an efficient cause inevitably involves the change of matter, capable of assuming different forms. On this description of 'efficient cause' — the only one known to Aristotle, according to Averroes — the celestial bodies and the separate substances cannot possibly have been brought about, for, unlike the sublunar entities, they are not composed of matter and form[23].

Various medieval philosophers were consequently led to believe that the celestial bodies and the separate substances are not dependent on God as their efficient cause, at least, that is to say, insofar as one agrees with the view of Aristotle and Averroes. For this position, we may refer to such philosophers as John of Jandun, as well as to such theologians as John Baconthorpe and Gregory of Rimini[24]. Conversely, others[25] were of the opinion that one could both follow Aristotle and prove that the celestial bodies and the separate substances are dependent on God as their efficient cause. This view was endorsed by, for example, Scotus and the Thomist Hervaeus Natalis[26].

We have seen just now that in Ockham's opinion it is impossible to prove by natural reason that God is an efficient cause. Is this intended to be an exposition of Aristotle's view of the matter? It is not. Like Scotus and Hervaeus, Ockham holds that Aristotle did in effect teach that God is the efficient cause that brought forth the celestial bodies and the separate substances[27].

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[22] Averroes, *In Aristotelis Metaphysicam* XII, t. 18, ed. Iuntina, fol. 304vH.

[23] Averroes, *In Aristotelis Metaphysicam* XII, t. 44, fol. 328rD and *In Aristotelis De Coelo* I, t. 20, ed. Iuntina, fol. 15rCD.

[24] See John of Jandun, *Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicae* II, q. 5, ed. Venice 1533, fol. 27 rA: "Secundum intentionem Aristotelis et Commentatoris (dicendum est) quod nulla substantia aeterna causata est ab agente simpliciter" and *ibid.* II, q. 5, fol. 27 rG: "Dicit Commentator quod ab agente proprio non procedit nisi abstrahere, et hoc est educere aliquid de potentia ad actum". See also Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super Sent.* II, d. 1 q. 1, ed. Trapp, p. 8 sq. and John Baconthorpe, *Quaestiones in IV libros Sent.* II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, Cremona 1618, p. 424 col. 2C.

[25] See Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 8, p. 2, q. un, p. 77 sqq and Herveus, *Quodlibeta* II, q. 1, ed. Venice 1513, fol. 31rb sqq. According to Buridan, *Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum* XII, q. 6, ed. Paris 1518, fol. 68rb, the interpretation of Aristotle's and Averroes's views on this count is encumbered with grave difficulties, since no unambiguous answer can be extracted from their works. "Ista quaestio (Utrum fuerit intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris quod Deus moveat primum mobile active, an solum quod moveat ipsum per modum causae finalis) est multum difficilis, quia tam auctoritates Aristotelis ad invicem quam etiam auctoritates Commentatoris ad invicem videntur contradicere". In spite of this difficulty, Buridan holds that, according to Aristotle and Averroes, God also is the efficient cause of the celestial bodies. He sides with Scotus and Hervaeus, against Gregory and Baconthorpe (*loc. cit.*). So does Marsilius of Inghen, see *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam Aristotelis* q. 6, ms. Vienna, *Bibl. Pal. Lat.* 5297 (Univ. 894), fol. 155vb (= fol. 156vb). Incidentally, it may be pointed out that these two commentaries on the Metaphysics are remarkably similar in various places. Some passages from Marsilius' commentary map almost verbatim on Buridan's commentary. Probably Marsilius has made use of this latter, while composing his own work.

[26] An especially convenient review of this discussion is offered in John Baconthorpe's and Gregory of Rimini's commentaries on the Sentences, as they let the various participants in the debate amply express their views, each with his own arguments and references to the works of Aristotle and Averroes.

[27] See *Quaestiones in II Sent.* q. 5, p. 84 and 87. The view held by Maurer, 'Ockham on the possibility of a better world' in: *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), p. 295, to the effect that Ockham in his *Quodlibeta* has abandoned the earlier position of his Commentary on the Sentences (viz. that, according to Aristotle, God is the efficient

However, he attributes to Aristotle a different notion of efficient causality than the one imputed by Averroes. Ockham admits that sometimes this latter notion is used by Aristotle. At other times, though, the Philosopher is seen to have used a different notion. In that case 'being an agent principle' boils down to merely 'being the cause of the existence of something else'. In this latter sense, according to Ockham, the celestial bodies and the separate substances can quite properly be said to have been caused, since no assumption is made as to whether the cause acts only on matter[28]. However, it is problematic whether this latter notion of causality is really to be found in Aristotle. Medieval thought on this subject has been less than unanimous. Some philosophers (e.g., Gregory of Rimini) have attributed the second notion to Avicenna[29]. All the same, Ockham does not give the same interpretation of Aristotle as do John of Jandun, Baconthorpe, or Gregory. According to Ockham, on this point Aristotle has evidently supported a belief that cannot be proved by natural reason.

As a consequence of all this, Thomas's argument is severely weakened because one of its presuppositions appears to be unprovable. But what about the other assumption? Can it be proved that God is infinite? Ockham does not think so. He argues that it is impossible to prove that God is infinite, at least if this infinity is taken to involve more than mere eternal existence[30]. As a matter of fact, Thomas's reasoning does involve more than that. The infinity that is assumed in his argument implies that God is infinitely perfect, i.e. that no being can exist or be conceived, which is more perfect than God. In Ockham's view, it is impossible to prove that God is infinite in this sense. A proof of God's infinity, he argues, can only be based on the effects brought about by God. These effects, however, do not sufficiently establish the conclusion of God's infinity[31]. In the first place, this is obvious from our previous result, viz. that it cannot be proved that God has brought about anything at all. But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that such a proof could be given, a proof of God's infinity still cannot be forthcoming. Consider that no effect produced by God is infinite. All things that are caused are finite. Moreover, even if one were to assemble all things that are ever brought forth, still there will never be an infinity of coexisting effects. Finally, one might suppose that God is infinite because He can produce an infinite subsequence of effects. Yet this argument fails as well, since

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cause of the separate substances) is mistaken. Maurer supports his view by the following passage from the *Quodlibeta* (IV, q. 2, p. 309): "Intentio Philosophi fuit quod primum ens sit causa finalis aliorum sed non efficiens, quia posuit quod corpora caelestia cum aliis causis inferioribus producunt omnia ista inferiora". This passage, however, does not prove that Ockham has abandoned his earlier position of the commentary on the Sentences. In fact, another passage from the *Quodlibeta* shows clearly that he has not abandoned this position. See *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 16, p. 763: "Intentio Philosophi et Commentatoris est quod Deus moveat caelum effective".

[28] *Quaestiones in II Sent.* q. 5, p. 86: "Aliquando accipit (viz. Aristotle) causam pro eo ad cuius esse sequitur aliud esse. Et sic potest aliquid causari licet non extrahatur etc." (see note 24 above). An historical exposition of the origin and tradition of this (non-Aristotelian) notion of 'causa efficiens' can be found in Gilson 'Notes pour l'histoire de la cause efficiente' in: *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen-âge* 37 (1962), p. 7 sqq. and in Dumphy 'St. Albert and the five causes' in: *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen-âge* 41 (1966), p. 7 sqq.

[29] See Gregory, *Lectura super Sent.* II, d. 1 q. 1, p. 9. Averroes, too, attributes this view to Avicenna. See *In Aristotelis Metaphysicam* t. 44, fol. 328 rD. Compare Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* VI, c. 1, p. 292.

[30] See *Quodlibeta* II, q. 2, p. 112 sqq.; III, q. 1, p. 199 sqq. and VII, qq. 11-18, p. 738 sqq.

[31] *Quodlibeta* II, q. 2, p. 112: "Infinitas Dei non potest probari nisi per effectum; sed per effectum non potest probari sufficienter, igitur etc."

the sun, too, can produce an infinity of subsequent effects, and it is nevertheless a finite entity[32]. In sum, God's infinity cannot be proved from His effects. This line of reasoning, by the way, is not only found in Ockham, but also in the works of other 14th century theologians[33].

It might be argued that God's infinity can be proved from the fact that God is the most perfect being, i.e. a being such that there cannot possibly be an entity that is more perfect. According to Ockham, however, a proof along these lines is doomed to fail as well[34]. For even if God is the most perfect being in existence, this does not imply that He is infinite. Although all other existing entities may be less perfect than God, it does not follow that God is infinite[35]. Moreover, if one were to argue that God is that than which no more perfect being can be conceived, it is not clear whether this concept corresponds to anything in reality[36]. It certainly cannot be proved that to this concept there is a corresponding infinite first principle in reality, since all effects produced by God are finite. This line of reasoning, too, is not only found in Ockham, but in other 14th century philosophers and theologians as well. Arguments very much like Ockham's are used by e.g. Gregory of Rimini, (Pseudo?)-Marsilius, and Marsilius of Inghen, to criticize this extrapolation from the well-known Anselmian proof[37].

Summarizing our results so far, we may conclude that the argument put forward by Thomas has not remained unimpaired. We have seen that several thinkers, subsequent to Thomas, dispute the provability of some fundamental presuppositions of the argument. One question is left open, however: if the presuppositions cannot be proved, perhaps their opposites can. Can they? Ockham does not think so.

Ockham's view

As we have seen, Ockham is of opinion that it is impossible to prove sufficiently that God has brought forth anything at all. Yet this should not be taken to imply the affirmation of the opposite thesis, viz. that God did in fact not produce anything at all. Actually, in Ockham's view it is more probable that God did produce something rather than nothing. Otherwise, it would indeed be pointless to assume the existence of something like God at all[38]. The same reasoning can be applied to God's infinity. Although this infinity cannot be proved from God's perfection, this does not mean that the opposite thesis can be proved. Furthermore, although it cannot be proved that God is infinite, since all His effects are finite, this does not mean that God is finite. On the contrary, by the creed of our Faith we are assured that God is infinite. God is

[32] *Ibid.* p. 112 sqq.
[33] See, e.g. Michael of Bologna, *Super IV Libros Sent.* I, d. 43 in: ms. Cracow, *Bibl. Jag.* 1459, fol. 66ra and Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super IV libros Sent.* I, q. 42 a. 1, ed. Strasbourg 1501, fol. 176vb.
[34] *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 15, p. 755 sqq. and III, q. 1, p. 200.
[35] *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 15, p. 758: "(Deus) potest esse ens eminentissimum, ita quod nihil sit melius vel eminentius eo, et tamen esse finitum".
[36] *Ibid.* p. 759 sqq.
[37] See Gregory, *Lectura super Sent.* dd. 42-44, q. 3 a. 3, p. 432 sqq.; (Pseudo?)-Marsilius, *Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik* VIII, q. 8; fol. 85ra and Marsilius, *Questiones super IV libros Sent.* I, q. 42, a. 2, fol. 179vb.
[38] *Quodlibeta* II, q. 1, p. 109.

always capable of making a creature that is better and more perfect than any other creature, and this, says Ockham, is exactly what is meant by God's infinity[39].

It is clear from these considerations why Ockham holds that Thomas's proof is not valid, and also why this unprovability should not be taken to imply that God acts out of necessity. According to Ockham, God can bring forth infinitely many things. Now, if God were acting out of necessity, He would actually bring forth all the things that He could possibly bring forth, as it is characteristic of a natural cause to produce without restriction everything within its power. Yet God did not bring forth everything that is within His power. Ockham concludes that this means precisely that God is free[40]. Like the other arguments, this one is not unique. It can be found in the works of several other theologians as well, both before (e.g. Scotus) and after Ockham (e.g. Gregory of Rimini)[41].

Conclusion

All in all it has become evident how in the time subsequent to Thomas certain doubts were raised with respect to the possibility of proving God's freedom of action. Ockham's criticism of an argument in Thomas has served as a convenient point of departure. On the other hand, Thomas's reasoning has managed to strike root in other thinkers. Various theologians, using the same type of argument, have contended that thinkers such as Aristotle, Averroes, and Avicenna, were just wrong on this count. Once more, we may emphasize the fact that medieval thought on the subject of the provability of God's freedom of action has been divided.

In spite of its conspicuous position in the history of thought, of which we have sketched some fairly broad outlines, medieval philosophy has not appeared to be able to give a firm and unequivocal answer to the question as to whether God has brought forth creation freely or out of necessity. Several thinkers, notably Ockham, held that our certainty with respect to God's freedom is not derived from philosophy, but solely from Faith. Philosophy can do no more than show that this religious tenet is not without reason. Did medieval philosophy show us, we may ask in conclusion, that the problem is really insoluble?

[39] See *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 15, p. 758 and VII, q. 18, p. 774 sqq.
[40] See *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 43, q. 1, p. 636; *Quaestiones in II Sent.* qq. 3-4, p. 55 and *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 18, p. 778.
[41] Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 8, p. 2, q. un. p. 100; Gregory, *Lectura super Sent.* I, d. 35-36, q. 1, p. 216.

LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY IN OCKHAM

Some Notes on his View of the Categories of Being and the Nature of Its Basic Principles

L.M. de Rijk

1. *The Task of Logic as a Science*

To any Medieval logician the discussion of the nature of logic and its status among the sciences used to be a main concern. *Qua* science all regarded logic as a collection of habitus (*collectio multorum habituum*) of the mind by which the intellectual soul is affected ('qualified') in an accidental way. As a mental activity logic is ultimately directed towards our understanding of nature, or any kind of natural things[1].

The basic characteristic of logic, however, is that it is a 'rational science' (*scientia rationalis*), in contradistinction with the so-called '*scientiae reales*', i.e. those directly concerned with the real things of the outside world which by nature exist as just as many objects. What logic is basically about is the operations and products of the mind, or, to use Ockham's favourite label 'mental fabrications'[2].

It is of paramount importance, then, to avoid the pitfall of strictly opposing logic to the other sciences as if the former were not at all concerned with the things of the outside world. As a matter of fact, to the medieval mind, logic even has an intrinsic capacity for dealing with things outside the mind. This capacity stems from the significative character of terms. That any term is significative by nature is a common presupposition of Ancient and Medieval thought[3]. Words (either spoken or written) are taken to represent concepts (or intentions of the mind) which, in their turn, signify 'things' and, when actually used in a proposition, they may stand for individual things in the outside world.

In this connection the interesting passage of the *Ordinatio*[4] should be referred to where Ockham, for the sake of those unacquainted with logic (*propter aliquos inexercitatos in logica*) rather amply explains that every science concerns itself with statements and that the 'real' character of our discussions in fact depends upon the actual supposition of the terms used.

Terms, then, are divided into those that signify things of the outside world which, as such, exist by nature, independent of any mental operation whatsoever ('terms of first intention') and those which can refer only to mental fabrications, such as the words 'term', 'definition', 'proposition', 'subject', 'predicate', 'syllogism', 'fallacy' etc. ('terms of second intention').

[1] *Prooemium expositionis in libros artis logicae* (*Opera Phil.* II, pp. 5-6).
[2] Cf. *Prooemium expositionis in libros artis logicae* p. 7, lin. 117: intentiones per animam fabricatae.
[3] This idea is genuinely platonic. Cf. L.M. de Rijk, *Plato's Sophist*, Amsterdam 1986, pp. 84-88.
[4] *Scriptum in I Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 4 (*Opera Theol.* II, pp. 134-140).

The former are used in any discourse about things, as in the real sciences, where the terms stand only for things that (can) exist by nature, whereas the latter occur in logical discourse only, i.e. they are used for 'things' that merely exist due to the operations of human thought.

However, not every term is a significative (or categorematic) term. Some of them are just consignificative (or syncategorematic). A categorematic term is such as to yield a meaningful proposition when substituted for 'x' in 'This is an x' (noun) or 'this x-es' (verb), as is the case with (either nominal or verbal) predicate-expressions, proper names, pronouns when substantively used. Ockham defines them as having a definite and determinate signification[5]. The examples given by Ockham of syncategorematic terms[6] are words as 'every', 'no', 'some', 'all', 'except', 'solely' and 'insofar as', "none <of which expressions>, he says, has a definite and determinate signification, nor does any of them signify anything distinct from what is signified by categorematic terms"[7]. Ockham provides a parallel taken from arithmetics: "as <the figure> zero on its own does not signify anything, but when added to some other figure makes that figure signify, likewise a syncategorematic term does not, properly speaking, signify anything, but when added to another <categorematic> term it makes the latter signify something <else> or supposit for something in a determinate manner, or it performs some other function with regard to the categorematic term"[8].

Hence the following rough sketch may be given of Ockham's view of logic. It primarily deals with our mental tools and operations and is, as such, not primarily concerned with the things of nature. So the logician, to know his own science, need not be acquainted with the natures of all sorts of real things the natural sciences *ex professo* have to deal with[9]. However logic is concerned with natural things insofar as it discusses the mental fabrications we use in dealing with nature. Well, logic is capable of doing this job because of the basically significative nature of the terms, which as *partes orationis* are the vital ingredients of any discourse about the things of nature.

We have to focus our attention, first, to our ways of speaking about 'things', or the significative function of speech.

2. *Speech and What It Is About*

As has been indicated before, for Ockham as for his contemporaries and predecessors as well, speech is basically intended to convey something which itself is of a non-linguistic nature; in a word, speech is significative.

[5] Cf. Michael Loux's translation, Introduction, Notre Dame - London 1975, p. 1.
[6] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 4.
[7] "Non habent finitam significationem et certam, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata", *Summa logicae* I, cap. 4 (*Opera Phil.* I, p. 15, lin. 11-12).
[8] "Sicut ... cifra per se posita nihil significat, sed addita alteri figurae facit eam significare, ita syncategorema proprie loquendo nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum aliquid (*pro* aliud quid?) significare sive facit ipsum pro aliquo, vel aliquibus, modo determinato supponere, vel aliud officium circa categorema exercet" (*ibid.* p. 15, lin. 12-17).
[9] *Summa logicae* III-2, cap. 22, pp. 542-543.

In the *Summa logicae*[10] Ockham discusses the various senses of the correlative words 'sign' (*signum*) and 'signify' (*significare*). I quote[11]:

a. "First, a sign is said to signify something when it stands for (*supponit pro*), or is capable of standing for that thing in such a way that the name involved (*idem nomen*) can, with the verb 'to be' intervening, be predicated of a pronoun referring to that thing. Thus 'the (a) white <thing>'[12] signifies Socrates for 'he is white' is true where 'he' refers to Socrates. And so on with other concrete terms"[13]. It is quite obvious, now, that Ockham is dealing here with the significative function of concrete terms and takes them as predicative expressions. One has to be mindful, however, that Ockham's formula certainly does not imply that he is dealing only with terms when actually used as predicates in a proposition. The only thing he claims is that when saying 'the (or a) white <thing>' (*album*) where the word '*album*' should signify Socrates (e.g. in '*album currit*'), it is required that the expression 'he (standing for Socrates) is white' should be a true proposition. In other words: Ockham is speaking here about the meaning of the term '*album*' ('a or the white <thing>') (e.g. in '*album currit*' = 'the (a) white thing runs') rather than the predicate term 'white' (*albus*) as used in the statement 'he is white' ('*iste est albus*'). To my mind, a term's occurrence in a proposition (which, it is true, is an indispensable requirement for it to have supposition, no doubt about that!) is not in the focus of Ockham's interest here; our author is only dealing with nomination (appellation)[14].

b. "In another sense a term is taken to signify <something> when it is capable of standing for it in a true past, present or future proposition or in a true modal proposition"[15]. Ockham instances 'the or a white' (*album*) in propositions such as '*album potest currere*' ('the (a) white <thing> can run'). Again, the author is discussing what we have called nomination or appellation, a

[10] I, cap. 33.

[11] Cf. Loux's translation, pp. 113-4.

[12] For the suppletion of such 'make-weights', see De Rijk, *Plato's Sophist*, p. 263, n. 13.

[13] "Uno modo dicitur signum aliquid significare quando supponit, vel natum est supponere, pro illo, ita scilicet quod de pronomine demonstrante illud per hoc verbum 'est' illud nomen praedicatur. Et sic 'album' significat Sortem; haec enim est vera: 'iste est albus', demonstrando Sortem. Et sic de multis aliis concretis" (*ibid.* p. 95).

[14] So it is somewhat confusing when Moody (*The Logic of William of Ockham*, New York 1935, p. 113) states that "it is in this sense that a term is significant when it is subject or predicate of a proposition of present time". It should be noted that when paraphrasing what Ockham says about the second sense of 'to signify' (see our item, b) Moody opposes propositions of the present time to the other kinds, where Ockham merely mentions them in juxtaposition with the others. In this connection, special attention should be paid to the order of the enumeration, where the 'present time proposition' is found in between the past and future ones. For that matter, it is remarkable that Moody had elsewhere interpreted the distinction between appellation (name-assignment) and sentential predication correctly and rightly rejected any view which takes the categories as something other than modes of signification; see esp. *op. cit.* pp. 67-71. It should be noted that sometimes even the term '*praedicatio*' is used by Ockham to stand for 'name assignment'. So when Ockham uses the label 'praedicatio denominativa' in his discussion of the denominativa in the *Antepraedicamenta* (*In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 3, *Opera Phil.* II, p. 146, lin. 45ff.). and in *Summa logicae* I, cap. 13), where Moody (*op. cit.* p. 126), again, mistakenly has sentential predication in mind. Of course, the requirement contained in Ockham's definition of significare (*ita scilicet quod* etc.) is needed to guarantee the correct use of the subject term of a proposition. For every appellative noun contains a descriptive value (i.e. its '*significatum*') and accordingly is always used both descriptively and deictically; well, due to this descriptive component an appellative noun can be misused. E.g. if when speaking about a negro's running one were to say: '*hoc album currit*' ('this white <thing> is running').

[15] "Aliter accipitur 'significare' quando illud signum in aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro vel de praesenti vel in aliqua propositione vera de modo potest pro illo supponere" (*ibid.* p. 95, lin. 9-11).

term's use, that is, as a tool for bringing a notion before our (or another's) mind, rather than its use in predicate position. For that matter, the two remaining senses of 'to signify' equally concern primarily the semantic function of 'nominating' rather than the (syntactic) predicative use of terms.

c. "In another sense a term is taken to signify <something> when *that* is said to be signified from which the word itself derives its imposition, or <to express in another way> that which is signified in the first sense <of that term> by the principal concept or the word in its principal form"[16]. In this third sense of 'to signify' the word *'album'* ('the (a) white <thing>') signifies whiteness (for which it does not stand), since whiteness is that from which grammatically speaking 'white' derives, and that which is signified by the 'principal' (*opp.* derivative) word 'whiteness'.

In fact, Ockham here introduces the notion of 'connotation'; see below.

d. "In the broadest sense of all 'to signify' is taken when some sign which is capable of being a part of a proposition, or a whole proposition or *oratio*, conveys (*importat)* something, <and that> whether primarily or secondarily (whether in the nominative or one of the oblique cases), whether by actually expressing or merely connoting it, or signifying it in whatever way, whether affirmatively or negatively"[17]. The last sense is instanced by such words as *'caecus'* ('blind') and *'nihil'* ('nothing'). It should be noticed that for the fourth sense of *'significare'* Ockham also uses *'importare'*, *'exprimere'*, *'dicere'*, *'dare intelligere'*[18].

Of course, this enumeration is a cumulative one (in an inversed order, from the viewpoint of the intension of the notion of signifying) and the underlying division is somewhat inadequate and not a strict one based upon some clear principle. In fact Ockham starts from his favourite sense of the term 'to signify', in which a word immediately refers to some individual inhabitant of the outside world, which is present at the time the word is actually used.

However, let us now start from the other side. In the broadest sense (in Ockham's enumeration the fourth one) the verb 'to signify' seems to serve for a general heading ranging over all sorts of 'conveying' (*importare*) or 'introducing into discourse' or 'bringing before the mind' (*dare intelligere*). Following Loux[19] I label this sense as 'signify$_0$', although Loux does not identify 'signify$_0$' with Ockham's fourth sense and takes it to be neutral as regards the four senses of 'to signify' outlined in chapter 33[20].

As a matter of fact 'things' (or concepts) can be brought before the (speaker's or hearer's) mind in quite different ways. In case of *significare principaliter*, some thing A is signified in such a manner that the statement 'A is (or was, will be, can be) (an) x' obtains. This kind of signification (which may be labelled 'signify$_0$') is called primary signification (*significatio*

[16] "Aliter accipitur 'significare' quando illud dicitur significare a quo ipsa vox imponitur vel illud quod primo modo significatur per conceptum principalem vel vocem principalem" (*ibid.* p. 95, lin. 21-3).

[17] "Aliter accipitur 'significare' communissime quando aliquod signum quod est natum esse pars propositionis vel natum est esse propositio vel oratio, aliquid importat, sive principaliter sive secundario, sive in recto sive in obliquo, sive det intelligere sive connotet illud, vel quocumque alio modo significet, sive significet illud affirmative sive negative" (*ibid.* p. 96, lin. 27-31).

[18] Note the phrase 'a sign *which is capable*... etc.', which proves yet again that Ockham is speaking about nomination (appellation) rather than sentential predication.

[19] p. 6.

[20] Loux, *op. cit.* p. 20, n.8.

primaria or *principalis)* by Medieval logicians and applies in any case in which an object, say A, is called an x; thus in an expression such as 'this (some, every etc.) x' (meaning the object, A), where the expression equals the formula 'that (some etc.) which presently is an x' (which presents us with Ockham's first sense) or the formula 'that (some etc.) which is, was, will be, can be an x', which comes to Ockham's second sense.

Any way of signifying$_0$ (= introducing an object into discourse) other than by means of primary signification ('signify$_1$'), is covered by the term *connotation*. In its vaguest sense it also ranges over such cases as "'blind' connotes sight" since, as a privative term, it draws our attention to sight and so, unavoidably, brings sight before our minds. However, the term 'connotatio' is mostly used in a stricter sense, to refer to what the Medievals generally called 'secondary signification' (*significatio secundaria*). Well, the strict sense of 'connotation' is involved in Ockham's third use of 'to signify', which may be labelled 'signify$_1$'[21].

This leads us to discuss Ockham's division of significative (categorematic) terms into purely absolute and connotative names (terms). "Purely absolute names, Ockham says, are those which do not signify some thing primarily and another thing, or the same thing, secondarily; rather everything signified by such a name is signified primarily"[22]. He instances such names as 'man', 'animal', 'goat', 'stone','tree', as well as 'fire', 'earth', 'water', 'heaven', and even abstract ones such as 'whiteness'[23], 'heat', 'sweetness', 'odor', 'flavor', 'blackness'. All of these only have primary significates (or significates$_1$). A connotative term, on the other hand, is one that signifies some thing primarily and at the same time some other thing secondarily. Ockham gives 'the (a) white <thing>' (*album*) as an example, of which the nominal definition is 'something informed by whiteness' (*informatum albedine*), so that 'whiteness' is connoted (signified$_3$), not primarily signified (signified$_1$). But vague connotation too, is included such as it occurs in the connotative name, 'cause', the definition of which is 'something upon the existence of which another thing follows'. Also relative names, such as 'similar' and expressions like 'true', 'good', 'one', 'potency', 'act', 'intellect', 'intelligible', 'will', 'desirable' are to be taken as connotative names.

Two general remarks should be made, then. First, the distinction as such seems to concern the differentiation of the general notion of 'bringing before the mind' (*importare*; our 'signify$_0$'). Purely absolute terms 'purely' bring their own significates before our mind, while connotative terms do not. Indeed, such words as 'whiteness' (*albedo*) refer to some whiteness, but thinking of some whiteness does not make us think of some white thing (*album*). On the other hand, the word '*album*' (white thing) is bound to bring whiteness before our mind since 'the (a) white thing' is thought of as some thing affected by whiteness.

Secondly. The proper function of the distinction between absolute and connotative terms seems to derive from the need Ockham feels to firmly distinguish between two different modes of being, viz. being *per se* and being *per aliud* (or *per accidens*). Whatever is signified by an

[21] Again, I do not follow Loux who indiscriminately uses the label 'signify,' for strict and vague connotations.
[22] "Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud, vel idem, secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque primo significatur", *Summa logicae* I, cap. 10, p. 35, lin. 6-8.
[23] It should be noted that Ockham's labelling such names as '*albedo*' ('whiteness') as absolute names, does not imply that he recognizes any discernable (Platonic) entity 'whiteness'. For his interpretation of abstract absolute terms, see below, p. 32.

absolute (whether concrete or abstract) term is something which exists (can exist) by itself or, at least, can properly be discerned as such. So 'man' is an absolute term and 'whiteness', 'heat' etc. are as well[24].

3. *Logic and Mental Fabrications*

As has been indicated before[25], to Ockham logic is basically about what he calls 'mental fabrications', most of which are (and this should always be kept in mind) primary intentions, and as such serve for linguistic tools to deal with the inhabitants of the outside world.

First of all it should be noted that logic does not discuss these fabrications qua psychic states or mental operations, which, as a matter of fact, are the 'real' (though immaterial) objects of psychology. Rather, the mental fabrications only concern the logician inasmuch as they are *modi significandi* by means of which the intellective soul deals with the outside world.

Those 'modes of signification' form part of what,in the footsteps of Avicenna, Ockham calls[26] 'our doings' (*opera nostra*) together with all other forms of intellectual discourse (roughly speaking, the *modi proponendi*[27] and *modi concludendi*). However, logic is counted among the practical sciences, more precisely the ostensive ones, being the arts stating how things can be done[28]. Such considerations do not lead Ockham to viewing the mental fabrications involved as completely subjected to our arbitrary options and decisions. The only thing he means to underline is that our logical doings are not obligatorily prescribed by the things existing in nature, however dependent they may be upon our own nature of human intellectual beings. For that matter, the purport of his activities as a logician is precisely to analyze our intellectual nature and to scrutinize its tools and products in order to preserve in them whatever he takes to be of indispensable value and to cut off all dangerous appendages.

The cardinal point seems to lie in the domain of the logic of terms, which, in fact, is that part of logical science which is basically concerned with the different ways in which we bring things of the outside world before the mind (our own as well as that of the hearer). Well any 'bringing before the mind' or 'introducing into discourse' is carried out (as fas as logic is concerned) through concepts (*intentiones*) and terms. The latter are divided into those doing their job in the predicamental (or categorial) order and the so-called metaphysical or transcendent terms (*termini transcendentes*) which are terms of absolute universality and, accordingly, of a corresponding indeterminateness in that they transcend the whole categorial domain of determinate expressions.

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[24] See below, p. 32.
[25] Above, p. 26.
[26] *Prooemium expositionis in libros artis logicae* p. 7.
[27] I take the *significatum propositionis* not to be covered by the doctrine of the *modi significandi*, which are basically associated with the 'logic of terms'.
[28] Cf. *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 11 (*Opera Theol.* I, p. 316, lin. 3-8): "Logica, rhetorica et grammatica sunt vere notitiae practicae et non speculativae, quia vere dirigunt intellectum in operationibus suis quae sunt mediante voluntate in sua potestate, sicut logica dirigit intellectum in syllogizando, discurrendo, et sic de aliis".

4. *Ockham's View of the Aristotelian Categories*

In line with the foregoing considerations it is quite understandable that Ockham also views the Aristotelian categories as the ten different modes in which one may bring things of the outside world into discourse, rather than as a list of the most general kinds to which, objectively, those things may belong. To his mind, the distinctions between the ten categories are not founded upon corresponding ontic differences existing between the natural things; they are rather our own diverse modes of signifying things which are under discussion[29]. In fact, the *Categories* discuss all forms of incomplex signification whereas the *Perihermeneias* deals with complex signification[30].

Thus the ten categories, so to speak, are used as a means of structuralizing the predicamental order which is itself a logical order all elements of which are *de operibus nostris*[31]. One should not claim, Ockham says, that the ontic differences should neatly correspond to the distinctions drawn by us in the predicamental order:

> It should be known that these categories are not things outside the mind really distinct from each other, and it should not be imagined that just as man and whiteness are two things outside the soul entirely distinct <.....> the same should hold good for substance, quantity, relation, and so on, to the effect that indeed substance and relation were two things really distinct <.....> and that, conversely, quantity were a thing really and entirely distinct from substance, relation and quality, and that substance, quantity, relation, action, and so on, were as many things really and each entirely distinct from the other. But one should think that these are distinct words and distinct intentions of the mind, or concepts signifying things outside. However, one should not say that just as the intentions are mutually distinct, because one is not the other, that the things corresponding <to them> differ in the same ways. For there is not always a distinction between significant words or mental intentions which corresponds to the diversity of the things signified. Therefore it is to be said that these categories are distinct but the things signified by these categories are not correspondingly different, but that the same thing (at least in some cases) is signified through diverse categories, although not in the same manner[32].

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[29] See *In librum Praedicamentroum Aristotelis* cap. 7, p. 158, lin. 27ff. quoted below. It is noticeable, in this connection, that, unlike Boethius and most Medieval logicians, Ockham is of the opinion that the sufficientia praedicamentorum is difficult to prove (*ibid.* cap. 7).

[30] Cf. Ockham, *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, prooem. p. 136, lin. 27-30: "In libro *Praedicamentorum* determinatur de vocibus quales res significant. Sed in libro *Perihermeneias* determinatur de vocibus secundum quod vertitatis vel falsitatis propositionis sunt causativae".

[31] See e.g. *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 7, p. 157, lin. 11ff.; cap. 10, p. 229, lin. 89ff. and *Summa logicae* I, cap. 40-1.

[32] "Sciendum quod ista praedicamenta non sunt res extra animam distinctae realiter inter se; ita quod non est imaginandum quod, sicut homo et albedo sunt duae res extra animam distinctae totaliter <.....>, quod ita sit de *substantia, quantitate, relatione et sic de aliis*, quod videlicet substantia et relatio sint duae res realiter distinctae <.....>; et quod econverso quantitas sit una res distincta realiter et totaliter a substantia, relatione et qualitate, et quod substantia, quantitas, relatio, actio etc. sint tot res distinctae realiter et totaliter inter se. Sed est imaginandum quod haec sunt distinctae voces et distinctae intentiones in anima, aut conceptus significantes res

This is further explained along the lines indicated above where the different senses of 'to signify' were discussed[33]:

> Indeed, sometimes one and the same thing is signified through one of the categories without the connotation of one or more other things, and without connoting that it is itself <also> another thing or not another thing; and generally speaking, without any connotation whatsoever; sometimes one and the same thing is <also> signified through another category, with some determinate connotation or consignification of several <other> things. For example, the category of substance conveys the notion of 'this man' (as of any other substance you please), without any connotation. When I say 'father', however, the predicate expression, 'father', which is one of the items included in the category of relation, conveys the notion of this man who is a father, while connoting his son; for it is impossible to understand of him that he is a father without thinking that he has a son. And the same obtains as to the various <other> categories[34].

It may be asked, now, whether that which is formally distinguished in the predicamental domain is to be taken as indistinctly one in the outside world, or to what extent different modes of signification do correspond with articulations (whether similar or not) in the ontological domain. To be more precise, does any abstract term signify an abstract entity in the same manner as its concrete counterpart signifies an individual affected by such an abstract entity (and does it, on top of that, signify or connote the abstract entity involved)? Of course, Ockham's doctrine of absolute vs connotative terms is bound to come up for discussion now. For that matter, the natural interpretation of linguistic expressions seems to treat all abstract terms as absolute and all concrete terms as connotative; so it seems that abstract terms force us to accept abstract entities as existing in their own right as just as many objects over and above the individual substances affected by them[35].

However, it may be clear from our foregoing examinations, that, given the remotest possibility, Ockham would rather get rid of the existence of any abstract entity, since to his

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extra. Non tamens est dicendum quod, sicut istae intentiones sunt distinctae inter se, quarum una non est alia, quod taliter res correspondentes sunt distinctae, quia non est semper consimilis distinctio inter voces vel intentiones in anima significantes et inter ipsa significata. Sic igitur dicendum est quod ista praedicamenta sunt distincta, non tamen consimiliter distinguuntur res significatae per ipsa praedicamenta, sed eadem res, saltem aliqua, significatur per diversa praedicamenta, quamvis non eodem modo". Cf. *In librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* l, cap. 2 (*Opera Phil.* II, p. 42, lin. 27 ff.) and especially the famous passage in *Scriptum in I Sent.* d.30, q.3 (*Opera Theol.* IV, p. 362): "praedicamenta non sunt res extra sed sunt termini importantes res extra. Et quia diversis rebus, et etiam eisdem, possunt correspondere diversi termini eas diversimode importantes, ideo non oportet quod sit tanta distinctio inter res importatas quanta est inter terminos importantes. Et ideo quamvis sunt tot praedicamenta distincta, non tamen oportet quod tot distinctae res correspondeant eis. Et ideo ista opinio non negat distinctionem praedicamentorum sed negat diversitatem talium rerum quales alii possunt".

[33] See above, pp.27-29.

[34] "Quia aliquando eadem res significatur per unum praedicamentum sine connotatione alterius rei vel plurium rerum, et sine connotatione quod ipsa sit alia res vel non alia, et generaliter sine omnconnotatione; et aliquando eadem res significatur per aliud praedicamentum cum aliqua determinata connotatione vel consignificatione plurium rerum. Verbi gratia, praedicamentum substantiae importat istum hominem, sicut quamlibet aliam substantiam, et nihil connotat. Quando autem dico 'pater', hoc praedicatum 'pater', quod est unum contentum sub praedicamento relationis, importat istum hominem qui est pater, connotando filium suum; quia impossibile est intelligere quod sit pater nisi intelligatur quod habeat filium. Et ita est de diversis praedicamentis".

[35] See the instructive discussion of this topic in Loux, *op. cit.* p. 5ff.

mind, whatever exists, is strictly individual. So one may be tempted to make him cancel any abstract absolute term since such a term could be taken (along the lines of natural interpretation) to abstractively signify$_1$ such an entity (e.g. 'manhood', 'whiteness', 'straightness', 'health', and so on). Well, as any reader of Ockham's works knows, the master obstinately rejects any view which suggests that abstract terms in the category of substance (such as 'manhood', *humanitas*) signify$_1$ some abstract entity. On similar lines, Ockham claims that quantitative or relative terms do not signify$_1$ something really distinct from individual substances either[36].

However, as to the category of quality Ockham apparently feels the need to make an important distinction between absolute terms. Their first kind concerns the absolute terms that are concrete and covers all terms in the category of substance (except for essential differentiae which are connotative, such as 'rational'[37], whereas the second kind comprises the abstract absolute terms which are to be found in the first kind of *qualia*[38]. The latter play a noticeable role in Ockham's semantics of incomplex terms.

As is known, qualitative terms of the first kind signify$_1$ according to Aristotle[39] habits or dispositions (a habit differing from a disposition in that it is not easily acquired or lost, whereas a disposition is easily acquired or lost). Well, anything that can be acquired or lost must be something really distinct from the substance that acquires or loses it. So Ockham cannot help attributing such qualities some mode of being really distinct from that of the substance involved; accordingly, he is compelled to take the terms signifying those qualities as absolute terms, i.e. terms that signify things straightforwardly, without connoting some other things, that is.

The picture, then, is the following[40]: the concrete (connotative) term in the category of quality signifies$_1$ a substance affected by a particular quality which is connoted (signified$_2$) by the same term; this quality is taken to be really present in the substance and, accordingly, really distinct from it. The abstract term in the category of quality, on the other hand, signifies$_1$ a real quality actually inhering in some subject (e.g. *this* whiteness inhering in *this* wall[41]), but without connoting (signifying$_2$) another thing. One should be mindful of the fact that, as an absolute term, it does not connote at all. Thus no determinate presence in a substance (*a fortiori* no determinate substance affected by this quality either) is connoted. So such terms are to be taken as common names which may be used to distributively stand for this or that particular quality actually inhering in this of that substance.

The absolute abstract qualitative terms under discussion are dealth with by Ockham in his *Commentary on the Categories* :

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[36] See *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 10, pp. 205-224, cap. 12, pp. 238-250 and passim; *Summa logicae* I, cap. 43-44, cap. 50 and passim; cf. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, pp. 145-51, pp. 156-9 and Loux, *op. cit.* p. 11 ff., who gives a clear exposition of the '*humanitas*' item. Of course, Ockham's principle of economy (or 'Ockham's razor') will cross the reader's mind. A nice formulation of this rule is found in *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 30, q. 1, p. 290, lin. 1-3: "nihil debet poni sine ratione assignata nisi sit per se notum vel per experientiam scitum vel per auctoritatem scripturae sacrae probatum". See the instructive discussion of this topic in Loux, *op. cit.* p. 5ff.

[37] See *Summa logicae* I, cap. 33, p. 95.

[38] As distinguished by Aristotle in *Categories* 8.

[39] *Categories* 8, 8 b 26ff.

[40] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 7 and cap. 16.

[41] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 32.

> Some terms in the category of quality <.....> convey the notion of entirely simple things, and do so in an absolute manner, without any connotation, namely in such a way that each of them can be verified of one thing <.....>. For when it is asked 'of what quality is a (the) man?, an appropriate answer runs: 'he is white' or 'black', 'warm' or 'cold'. Nevertheless, 'warmth', which is the abstract form of 'a (the) warm <thing>', is simply verified of one thing[42]; for this is true: 'this thing is some <individual specimen of> heat' and so on. And this being the case, the thing for which that abstract term stands, belongs to the category of quality such that it does not belong to that of substance. Thus such a concrete term and its corresponding abstract term simply stand for diverse things; e.g. 'a (the) warm thing' simply stands for the subject <underlying the quality> and 'warmth' for the quality informing that subject. So it is of some single thing [i.e. the particular warmth] that the common term [e.g. 'warmth'] is predicated essentially (*in quid*) and in the first mode of *dici per se*[43].

5. *A Semantical Analysis of Some Important Terms*[44]

5.1 *'Ens' and The Other Transcendent Terms*

Let us start with considering the term '*ens*'. As has been indicated before, Ockham claims that the ten categories are as many different modes of signifying individual entities. As a matter of fact he views them as the different modes through which we fill in the general concept of being, to the effect that a statement such as 'album est pater' is to be understood as: 'id quod est album est id quod est pater' (or the ungrammatical formula: *'*album-ens est pater-ens*')[45].

Elsewhere Ockham obviously takes such predicates as *homo* or *asinus* as *esse-hominem* and *esse-asinum* respectively (or, ungrammatically, *'*homo-ens*', *'*asinus-ens*') . In this passage[46] the four *modi enuntiandi* (mentioned in Aristotle[47]) are discussed. Ockham claims that in the formulas '*esse de eo quod est*', '*esse de eo quod non est*', '*non esse de eo quod est*' and '*non esse de eo quod non est*', the phrase '*id quod est*' should be taken for 'that of which the

[42] Ockham means to say: a single quality, not a group of qualities denoted by some single name, such as 'sanitas' ('health'); see *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 14 p. 271, lin. 29ff.

[43] *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 14, pp. 270-271: "Aliqua de genere qualitatis, sive de praedicamento, important res mere simplices, et absolute, sine omni connotatione, ita scilicet quod quodlibet illorum de una re potest verificari <.....>. Nam si quaeratur qualis est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est albus vel niger, calidus vel frigidus; et tamen calor, qui est abstractum 'calidi', de una re simpliciter verificatur, nam haec est vera: 'haec res est calor', et sic de aliis. Et quando ita est, tunc res pro qua supponit illud abstractum, est ita de genere qualitatis quod non est de genere substantiae. Et tunc tale concretum et abstractum sibi correspondens simpliciter pro diversis supponunt, sicut 'calidum' supponit simpliciter pro subiecto et 'calor' pro qualitate informante illud subiectum. Et tunc de aliqua una re praedicatur suum superius in quid, primo modo dicendi per se".

[44] For a broader consideration of the items discussed in this section, see my paper 'War Ockham ein Anti-Metaphysiker?' in: *Philosophie im Mittelalter: Analyse und Kritik* (forthcoming).

[45] Cf. e.g. *In librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* cap. 1, p. 25, lin. 54ff.

[46] *In librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis* I, cap. 5 (*Opera Phil.* II, p. 397, lin. 24ff.).

[47] *De interpretatione* 6, 17 a 26-34.

predicate term is truly said'[48]. So the proposition '*Sortes est homo*', by which the statement type '*esse de eo quod est*' is instanced, is understood as meaning: '*hominem-esse* is said of that which is (conceived of as) a man'. Further on[49]. the predicative expression '*homo*' used in subject position is taken as to stand for: 'that which (actually or merely in thought) is an individual man'; if not, we would not be entitled to defend the inference: '*homo non est non iustus; ergo homo est iustus*' (which is admitted by Aristotle himself, *ad loc.*). Likewise, infinite terms such as '*non-homo*' are taken as equivalent to '*id quod est non-homo*', i.e. some individual thing which is not-man', where the general framework 'being' is implemented with the negative qualification 'not-man'.

Quite in line with the usual grammatical analysis (which equals '*currens*' with '*id quod currit*') the transcendent term '*ens*' is taken to stand for '*id quod est*', where, in Ockham's view, '*id quod*' refers to an individual being in the outside world. The phrase '*id quod est*' contains, so to speak, an open spot which is to be filled in by a predicamental expression. In fact, the syncategorematical term '*ens*' stands for a being insofar as it is still conceived of as indeterminate; the qualification is performed once the categorematic predicamental term comes in, such as in '*id quod est homo*', '*id quod est album*' etc. where these phrases equal the terms '*homo*' or '*album*' whether used in subject or predicate position.

Outside the predicamental domain '*ens*' signifies 'Infinite Being', where the indeterminateness of '*ens*' no longer has its negative overtones and rather expresses the infiniteness of Absolute Being. It should be noticed, then, that for Ockham, in the predicamental domain 'ens' is used equivocally, whereas it is said univocally of God and creatural being[50].

It may be concluded that in Ockham's view 'ens' refers to whatever presents itself to the human mind, whether in the sensible or purely intelligible domain, that is precisely to that which, prior to any categorial qualification, is conceived of by a simple act of apprehension. An equal (conceptual and semantic) status belongs to the convertible passiones entis, '*verum*', '*unum*', '*bonum*', '*res*' and '*aliquid*'[51].

As to these 'transcendent terms' (*termini transcendentes*, never called '*transcendentales*' to be sure!) Ockham's doctrine is substantially the same as the one expounded by Thomas Aquinas in *De veritate*[52]. The six transcendent terms constitute just as many modes of signifying entities, but unlike the five concerning the 'passiones entis', which are connotative terms, 'ens' itself is an absolute term. This means that it refers to 'something' in the outside world in a direct manner, not only connotatively[53].

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[48] *In librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis* I, cap. 5, p. 397, lin. 22-25.
[49] *Ibid.* II, cap. 2, p. 434, lin. 131ff.
[50] See *In librum Porphyrii de Preadicabilibus* cap. 2, p. 42, lin. 43-51; *Summa logicae* I, cap. 38, p. 106, lin. 7 - p. 107, lin. 37; *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q.10; *Quodlibeta* V, q. 14 and *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 3, q. 8, pp. 524-42.
[51] For these concepts, see Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, pp. 45-6, pp. 119-24 and Leff, *William of Ockham*, Manchester 1975, pp. 164-77. For a critical discussion of the thesis defended by Gottfried Martin (in: *Wilhelm von Ockham*, Berlin 1949) on account of the (supposed) transcendental character of Aristotelian categories, see the paper by J.A. Aertsen in the present volume. For another (quite different) 'transcendental deduction' of the Aristotelian categories, see Jaakko Hintikka, 'The Varieties of Being in Aristotle' in: *The Logic of Being*, Dordrecht etc. 1986, pp. 81-114 (esp. p. 105).
[52] *De Veritate* q. 1, a. 1.
[53] For the meaning of these terms, see above, p. 29. For Ockham's view on this account, see *Summa logicae* I, cap. 37, p. 105, lin. 38 - p. 106, lin. 47. The connotative character of a term implies its having merely a

One should be mindful, then, that '*ens*' is an absolute term of a special character, in that it is also a syncategorematic term, just as the verb from which it derives, '*esse*'. This leads us to considering Ockham's view of the copula.

5.2 *'Est' and 'esse'*

The second book of the *Reportatio* contains an important discussion of the semantic role of the copula[54]. There[55] our author claims that, from the conceptual point of view, the copula conveys a notion which is to be well distinguished from the notions of subject and predicate. Given some actual statement, 'S est P' the copula really contributes 'something absolute' ('*absolutum*') to the compound sentential notion '*S esse P*'[56]. Speaking about the precise nature of *inhaerentia* (logical and ontological inherence of an accident<-al property> in a subject) Ockham energetically rejects the view that the copula should refer to real inherence; the incorrectness of this suggestion, he says, appears from statements such as '*angelus est substantia*', '*Deus est ens*', where the essential simplicity of the subjects excludes such a view of the role of the copula. Ockham does certainly not reject any real inherence as such[57]; what he does reject is the view that such an inherence is referred to by the copula. As such the copula '*est*' merely signifies the mental operation of combining S and P[58]. In the same discussion Ockham underlines the syncategorematic nature of the verb '*esse*' (when used as a copula); only when combined with some categorial term ('predicative expression') it contributes to making up a determinate meaning (*finita et certa significatio*).

The concept of 'being' ('*ens*', '*est*', '*esse*') is the outcome of the process of abstraction, as appears from *In III Sent.* q.10. There he defines the semantic value of the term '*ens*' (when univocally said of both the intelligible and the sensible domains) as '*ens quod omnem naturam positivam, substantialem et accidentalem, significat*'[59]. This indeterminate semantic value should be well distinguished from any implementation found in the notions 'substance' or 'accident' (and, consequently, in those of the several categories)[60]. As a matter of fact, the human mind

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definition *quid nominis*. See also *Summa logicae* I, cap. 26 and III-3, cap. 26, p. 689, lin. 2 - p. 690, lin. 13. One has to realize that, if '*ens*' were not an absolute term, statements such as '*Deus est ens*' would be incongruent ones, because of the simplicity of God's nature.

[54] For a fuller discussion of the texts involved, see my paper mentioned above, p. 34, n. 44

[55] *Quaestiones in II Sent.* q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* V, p. 17, lin. 16ff.).

[56] I am afraid that the editors of the critical edition, Gedeon Gál and Rega Wood, were wrong in not following the Giessen manuscript (*G*) at p. 19, lin. 17-21: "Si dicas quod nunc sunt extrema unita in propositione et prius non, igitur oportet quod adquiratur aliquid de novo, absolutum vel respectivum, — respondeo: verum est quod adquiritur absolutum, quia quando sunt unita, tunc est ibi conceptus absolutus copulae, qui non fuit prius, et propter istud absolutum dicuntur modo unita et prius non".

[57] In fact, Ockham accepted not only the real existence of individual substances but also individual instances of immanent qualities, as is patently clear from his view of quality; see e.g. *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 14, p. 270 quoted above, p. 34 and also G. Bergman, 'Some Remarks on the Ontology of Ockham' in: *Phil. Review* 64 (1952), p. 561 ff. Real inherence is referred to by such verbs as '*inhaeret*', '*inest*' when properly used (i.e. not in the sense of '*praedicari de*'), see e.g. *Summa logicae* III-3, cap. 18, p. 653, lin. 53ff.

[58] *Quaestiones in II Sent.* q. 1, p. 21, lin. 1-13 and p. 22, lin. 10-16.

[59] *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 10 (*Opera Theol.* VI, p. 342, lin. 5-17).

[60] *Ibid.* p. 343, lin. 14-19 and p. 344, lin. 1-4.

conceives of the concept of 'being' in order to bring whatever presents itself to us before the mind[61]. It even covers the entia rationis, as is explicitly claimed by our author in the *Commentary on the Physics* [62].

5.3 *Ockham's View of Some Other Basic Notions*

For Ockham, all such distinctions as '*ens per se*' vs '*ens per accidens*', '*ens in actu*' vs '*ens in potentia*', '*essentia*' vs '*existentia*' or the notion of '*materia prima*' are really basic but not metaphysical ones. Indeed, they do not correspond to parallelous distinctions in the outside world. What they really do (and quite important they are to Ockham's mind) is to single out a number of opposing ways in which we bring entities before the mind. Indeed, 'what is' always is *per se* and 'actually being', precisely due to its individual nature. As often as we use absolute terms we bring 'that which is' precisely as 'being in its own right'[63] before the mind, rather than as something considered from another (i.e. non-substantial) categorial perspective. However, whenever we represent the same entity by means of some connotative term, it presents itself as an *ens per accidens* (or *ens per aliud*). Likewise, all being is *in actu;* it only may be thought of with regard to some other thing as a potential being. Ockham refers[64] to Aristotle's discussion of the subject, where the formula '*ens per se* (*per aliud* etc.) *dicitur*' is used, which, indeed, does not mean (as is often assumed) something like this: 'there are several ontic modes, one called '*ens per se*', the other '*ens per accidens*' etc., but rather: 'being is said (i.e. brought before the mind or 'represented') either *per se* or *per accidens,* where these phrases determine our ways of nominating entities, rather than the latters' way of being as taken quite apart from our speaking about them[65]. The absence of any real distinction is discussed in the *Summa logicae* III-2, cap. 27 along the same lines[66].

Quite in line with Aristotle Ockham views form and matter as most basic principles of all material being, but, unlike Aristotle, he assigns actuality to all matter, including prime matter[67]. Matter in itself exists as something real and actual and may be conceived of potential only in relation to form, i.e. when we bring it in some relation to (its) form. Matter's proper being (i.e. *materia in propria natura*), called 'prime matter' may be characterized as 'formless, inchoate being-ness'. Even if there were no form immanent in matter, matter would, however undifferentiated, nevertheless be actual[68]; but although being actual it would be unknowable in

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[61] *Ibid.* p. 345.

[62] *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis* qq. 37-54 (*Opera Phil.* VI, p. 516, lin. 50-51).

[63] 'Being in its own right' definitely does not exclude the causal dependence of all creatural being upon the Prime Cause. Ockham's view of the ways of human conceptualization and discourse cannot be better clarified than by recalling the precise meaning of '*ens per se* '.

[64] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 38, p. 107, lin. 38 - p. 108, lin. 66. Cfr. *ibid.* III-1, cap. 31, p. 442, lin. 85-86 and *Super libros Physicorum* III cap. 2, § 1 (*Opera Phil.* IV, p. 415, lin. 23 - p. 416, lin. 33).

[65] Of course to Aristotle's mind, our way of speaking is based upon corresponding *modi essendi*. For the sense of *kath' hauto* ('in virtue of a thing's own nature') in Aristotle, see L.M. de Rijk, 'On Ancient and Medieval Semantics', *Vivarium* 18 (1980)1, pp. 26-33, For Plato, see *Plato's Sophist*, index, s.v. *autos*.

[66] Cf. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, pp. 263-7 and Leff, *William of Ockham*, pp. 165-6.

[67] See also Leff, *op. cit.* pp. 572-6.

[68] See *Super libros Physicorum* I, cap. 16, p. 171, lin. 26ff.; cf. 176-82; II, 2, p. 249, lin. 105-6; *Brevis Summa*

itself and only accessible to our mind by analogy[69]. Of course, Ockham had good reasons to assign matter its proper actuality. If one is to acknowledge its own ontological role (as a basic ontic principle), that means (for Ockham) that one must assign it singular existence. A corollary is that for Ockham, matter by itself is dimensional without being of any determinate dimension. Thus quantity and extension become properties of matter as such, rather than of material substance. Ockham's view of quantity as not really distinct from substance exactly fits in with this line of thought[70].

5.4 *Ockham's View of Immanent Nature*

Considering Ockham's ontology should imply asking for his view of the status of forms, whether substantial or accidental, present in individual beings. As may be clear from the foregoing discussions, Ockham only recognizes individual being, that means, inasmuch as creatural being is concerned, that each substantial or accidental form, if it be a distinct reality at all (which should be denied of the substantial form and the greater part of 'accidental forms'[71]); is radically individual. Hence it necessarily follows that:

– speaking of a substantial form (*humanitas*), one merely signifies$_1$ the substantial entity itself (*homo*) or to say it otherwise, '*humanitas*' just refers to some singular man in the outside world

– speaking of quality through a concrete (connotative) term, (e.g. '*album*') a substance somehow qualified is signified$_1$ (denoted); when an abstract (absolute) term is used (e.g. '*albedo*') the accidental form present in (and precisely *qua* present in!) the substance is signified$_1$ (denoted)

– speaking of accidental forms other than qualitative ones through any term whatsoever, only the substance itself (as modified such-and-such a way) is signified$_1$ (denoted).

6. *Conclusion*

There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created 'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in creatural being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their (indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to

libri Phys. I, cap. 2 (*Opera Phil.* VI, p.19, lin. 51ff.) and 9-11 and 14. Although matter is never found without form, it is separable from form; see *Brevis Summa libri Phys.* III, cap. 4, p. 52, lin. 46-48 and *Super libros Physicorum* I, cap. 16, p. 181, lin. 48-50 and II, cap. 2, pp. 248-9.

[69] *Summula philosophiae naturalis* I, cap. 9, pp. 180-1; I, cap. 14, pp. 194-5: *Super libros Physicorum* I, cap. 16-18, pp. 176-209 (see esp. 177, lin. 39-41).

[70] For quantity and extension as immanent in matter as such, see *Brevis Summa libri Phys.* III, cap. 4, p. 52, lin. 79-80 and *Summula philosophiae naturalis* I, cap. 12-13, pp. 190-4. For the novelty of Ockham's view of matter, see Leff, *William of Ockham*, p. 577.

[71] See above, our section 4.

make us say that the metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in general) should make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain from speaking about the unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the *onta* ('beings') are as abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (*ontôs einai*, Plato would say). Well, in order to let them *be*, human thinking should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual apparatus.

II THEOLOGY

PHILOSOPHIE UND EUCHARISTIE BEI WILHELM VON OCKHAM

Ein vorläufiger Entwurf

R. Imbach

aliquando ponenda sunt plura miracula
circa aliquid ubi posset fieri per
pauciora.
Wilhelm von Ockham, *Quodlibeta* IV, q. 30.

0. *Einleitung*

Zu den folgenreichsten Herausforderungen, die der christliche Glaube an das philosophische Denken des Mittelalters stellte, gehört zweifelsohne die Lehre von *Abendmahl*. Ockham hat sich mehrmals sehr eingehend mit dem Problem der Eucharistie beschäftigt[1]. Daß diese Auseinandersetzung allerdings sein Denken wesentlich bestimmt hat, wird nicht immer genügend beachtet und soll im folgenden kurz skizziert werden. Will man indessen den besonderen Stellenwert erkennen, den diese Problematik im Denken Ockhams einnimmt, so ist es erforderlich, seine Äußerungen und Gedanken historisch zu situieren.

Der mittelalterliche Streit um das Abendmahl, der im Umkreis von Berengar von Tours seinen wohl berühmtesten Höhepunkt erreicht hat, ist mit der dogmatischen Festlegung des IV. Laterankonzils von 1215, in der die sog. *Transsubstantiationslehre* kodifiziert wird, keineswegs abgeschlossen[2]. Er geht unter neuen Voraussetzungen weiter. Zum *einen* wurde durch das Konzil und dessen Definition des Eucharistiewunders als *transsubstantiatio* der Diskussionsspielraum wesentlich *eingeengt*. Zum *andern* wurde durch die umfassende Aristotelesrezeption im XIII. Jahrhundert die philosophische Diskussionsgrundlage *erweitert*. Daraus folgt: Auf der einen Seite wurde es immer *gefährlicher* die Transsubstantiation zu diskutieren, da die Grenzen der Orthodoxie immer klarer definiert wurden; Ockham selbst erklärt, die Diskussion keines Sakramentes sei gefährlicher[3]. Auf der anderen Seite aber wurde es für die philosophische Vernunft immer *schwieriger* das Dogma zu akzeptieren, da im Horizont der aristotelischen

[1] Vor allem in der *reportatio* zum IV. Sentenzenbuch qq. 6-9 (*Opera Theol.* IV, pp. 62-191); *Quodlibeta* IV, qq. 29-34 (*Opera Theol.* IX, pp. 446-469) und den beiden Traktate zum Altarsakrament: *De sacramento altaris* und *Tractatus de corpore Christi*. Diese beiden Traktaten werden nach der Ausgabe von T.B. Birch zitiert.— Für eine umfassende Darstellung von Ockhams Lehre der Eucharistie vgl. G.N. Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham*, Washington 1950 und E. Iserloh, *Gnade und Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham*, Wiesbaden 1956.

[2] Zur Entwicklung der Abendmahlslehre vgl. E. Iserlohs Artikel: 'Abendmal. Mittelalter' in: *Theologische Realenzyklopaedie*.

[3] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* prologus, ed. Birch, p. 158: "circa nullum sacramentum est error periculosior nec inquisitio laboriosior nec inventio fructuosior".

Metaphysik und Ontologie die Abtrennbarkeit der Akzidentien von der Substanz, wie sie im orthodoxen Verständnis der Eucharistie gefordert wird, schlechthin undenkbar ist.

Weder die Theologie- noch die Philosophiehistorie hat nach meinem Dafürhalten bis jetzt ausreichend zur Kenntnis genommen, im welchem Maße die mit dem Theologoumenon der Transsubstantiation verbundene Fragestellung der Abtrennbarkeit der Akzidentien die philosophischen Diskussionen des XIII. und XIV. Jahrhunderts angeregt und belebt hat[4]. Um der Einfachheit willen, kann man vorerst zwei typische Positionen unterscheiden.

1. *Zwei mögliche Stellungnahmen*

Bei der Darstellung dieser zwei Positionen ist es angebracht, von der überaus signifikanten Tatsache auszugehen, daß Bischof Tempier in der berühmten Verurteilung von 1277 *vier* Artikel verurteilt hat, welche die Separabilität der Akzidentien betreffen[5]. Schon dieses Faktum weist uns darauf hin, daß in jenen Kreisen, die durch die Verurteilung getroffen werden sollten, das fragliche Problem disputiert worden ist. Der Textbefund bestätigt diese Vermutung. Sowohl Boethius von Dacien wie auch Siger von Brabant erörtern das Problem *Utrum accidens possit separari a substantia* eingehend[6] und gelangen zum Ergebnis, daß aus der Perspektive einer aristotelischen Ontologie die Frage eindeutig zu verneinen sei. Das Wesen der Akzidens ist die Inhärenz. Wer deshalb behauptet, ein Akzidens könne losgelöst von der Substanz existieren, verstrickt sich im Widersprüche. Nach Siger ist deshalb die Loslösung des Akzidens von der Substanz philosophisch gesehen unmöglich. Bezeichnenderweise fügt er allerdings hinzu: *licet per miraculum credendum sit hoc posse fieri*[7].

Diese erstaunliche, aber bedeutsame Kautele erlaubt m.E. folgende Feststellung: Das Dogma der Transsubstantiation impliziert einen latenten Konflikt zwischen Vernunft und Glaube, aber Siger will diesem Konflikt *ausweichen*, indem er die Möglichkeit eines Wunders einräumt. Diese Konzession bedeutet allerdings, daß die philosophische Vernunft und der Glaube *nicht* versöhnt werden können.

Die thomistische Bewältigung der skizzierten Aporie weist in eine andere Richtung und liefert uns das zweite Beispiel einer möglichen Haltung[8]. Thomas paßt die aristotelische Ontologie den Anforderungen des Dogmas an, indem er die Akzidentienlehre des Aristoteles in zweifacher Hinsicht korrigiert. Er behauptet nämlich erstens, daß nicht die tatsächliche Inhärenz, das Wesen des Akzidens ausmache, sondern eine Disposition dazu[9]. Zweitens vertritt er die Auffassung,

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[4] Dazu R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik, Zur Diskussion zwischen Nikolaus von Straßburg und Dietrich von Freiburg über die Abtrennbarkeit der Akzidentien' in: *Theologie und Philosophie* 61 (1986), pp. 371-378.

[5] Vgl. R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', p. 371 sowie R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277*, Louvain 1977, pp. 287-291.

[6] Vgl. R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', pp. 373-378.

[7] A. Zimmermann, *Ein Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles aus der Artistenfakultat um 1273*, Berlin 1968, p. 25.

[8] Für eine ausführliche Darstellung vgl. R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', pp. 365-368 sowie E.D. Sylla, 'Autonomous and Handmaiden Science, St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist' in: *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, Dordrecht 1975.

[9] Belege in R. Imbach 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', pp. 366-367.

daß im Falle des Eucharistiewunders die Quantität die Rolle des Subjekts der andern Akzidentien übernehme. Diese doppelte Zurechtlegung ist allerdings auch für Thomas nur unter der Voraussetzung der Allmacht Gottes akzeptabel[10].

Die vorausgehende Skizze verdeutlicht, daß das Problem der Separabilität der Akzidentien die aristotelischen Kategorienlehre in Frage stellt. Wer nicht im Namen dieser Ontologie die mögliche Selbständigkeit schlechthin verwerfen wollte, war gezwungen, die Akzidentienlehre des Aristoteles zu revidieren. Zudem erweist sich das fragliche Problem als ein privilegiertes Paradigma, das die jeweilige Verhältnisbestimmung von philosophischer Vernunft und theologischer Autorität erkennen läßt. Während der thomistische Harmonisierungsversuch eine Adaptation der Philosophie an die Anforderungen der Theologie einschließt[11], kann bei den sog. radikalen Aristotelikern — im Namen der Autonomie der Philosophie — ein Diskussionsverzicht festgestellt werden. Mindestens theoretisch ist eine dritte Position denkbar, nach der die Vernunft weder ihren Maßstab von der Theologie empfängt noch auf eine Auseinandersetzung verzichtet, sondern bestimmt, was auch im Rahmen der Theologie gedacht werden kann. Diesen Standpunkt hat Dietrich von Freiberg vertreten.

2. *Dietrich von Freiberg: Philosophische Kritik an der Theologie*

Der deutsche Dominikaner, dessen persönliche und intellektuelle Beziehungen zu Meister Eckhart heute kaum mehr bezweifelt werden können[12], hat der Thematik der Abtrennbarkeit zwei Traktaten gewidmet: *De accidentibus* und *De quiditatibus entium*[13], in denen er mit einer geradezu erstaunlichen Stringenz sowohl die Harmonisierungsversuche des Thomas wie auch die Kapitulation Sigers zurückweist. Nach der Lehre des Freibergers besteht das Wesen (*essentia*) des Akzidens darin, ein *modus seu dispositio substantiae* zu sein[14]. Daraus ergibt sich, nach den ausführlichen und umständlichen Erörterungen des Dominikaners, daß die Abtrennbarkeit der Akzidentien von der Substanz absolut unmöglich ist, d.h. aber, daß man sie auch *nicht mit wunderhaften* Eingriffen Gottes erklären kann. Dietrich weist diese von Siger zugestandene Ausnahme mit aller wünschbaren Deutlichkeit zurück: *Si enim ratio accidentis est esse dispositionem substantiae, impossibile est non inesse substantiae ... Ergo stante accidente in esse suo et sua essentia impossibile est quacumque virtute posita fieri, ut non insit*[15].

In ihrer Eindeutigkeit ist die Position Dietrichs einmalig und exemplarisch. Der Dominikaner teilt die Intention der Aristoteliker, die aristotelische Ontologie gegen theologische Zurechtlegungen zu *schützen*. Er erklärt ausdrücklich, die Lehre der *separatio* zerstöre die gesamte Ontologie des Stagiriten[16]. Aber Dietrich begnügt sich nicht damit, den Konflikt

[10] Vgl. R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', p. 367.
[11] Vgl. E.D. Sylla, 'Autonomous and Handmaiden Science', pp. 363, 367 und 372.
[12] Dazu L. Sturlese, *Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werk Dietrichs von Freiburg*, Hamburg 1984.
[13] *De accidentibus*, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, in: *Opera omnia* III, pp. 47-90; *De quiditatibus entium*, ed. R. Imbach/ J.-D. Cavigioli, in: *Opera omnia* III, pp. 91-118.
[14] Zum folgenden vgl. R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', pp. 378-384.
[15] *De quiditatibus entium* 12 (4), ed. cit. pp. 117-118.
[16] Vgl. *De accidentibus* 17 (1)-(3), ed. cit. p. 76.

zwischen Vernunft und Glaube offenzulegen, er führt ihn zu einer Entscheidung, indem er die Abtrennung prinzipiell verwirft und keine Ausnahme zuläßt. Diese Haltung impliziert eine Verhältnisbestimmung von Philosophie und Theologie daß die Philosophie im Namen der Rationalität das Recht besitzt, Inhalte des Glaubens zu kritisieren und in Frage zu stellen. Dietrich setzt die Autorität der Vernunft über jene des Glaubens. Auf dieser Weise hat er ein Modell des Philosophierens verwirklicht, das nicht darauf verzichten will, den christlichen Glauben darüber aufzuklären, was geglaubt werden kann. Ockhams Lehre zeigt ihre Orginalität im Lichte der vorausgehenden Anmerkungen.

3. *Ockhams Abgrenzung von Vernunft und Glaube*

Die verschiedenen Fassungen von Ockhams Auslegung der aristotelischen Physik, in denen er gemäß seinen eigenen programmatischen Aussagen die *intentio Philosophi* darstellen will[17], belehren uns über Ockhams Bewußtsein davon, daß die aristotelische Ontologie keine Selbständigkeit der Akzidentien zuläßt. Eine selbständige Existenz der Akzidentien ist *contra principia Aristotelis*[18], sie ist *impossibile secundum viam Aristotelis*[19].

Es ist daher leicht verständlich, daß der Franziskaner diese Voraussetzung als die eigentliche *crux* der Eucharistielehre betrachtet, wenn er im Sentenzenkommentar sagt, von allen Schwierigkeiten, die mit diesem Sakrament zusammenhängen, sei die größte, daß ein Akzidens ohne Subjekt gesetzt werden müsse[20]. Die Lehre der Koexistenz (Konsubstantiation) wäre für die Vernunft annehmbarer[21]. Aber Ockham fügt sich. An mehreren Stellen erklärt er ohne Umschweife, er halte an der Transsubstantiationslehre nur wegen der kirchlichen Autorität fest. Es ist dies die gemeinsame Meinung (*communis opinio*) aller Theologen, "an welcher ich wegen der Festlegung der Kirche und nicht wegen eines Vernunftgrundes festhalte"[22]. Diese Erklärung Ockhams ist überaus aufschlußreich. Sie setzt nicht bloß ein klares Methodenbewußtsein voraus, sondern impliziert eine eindeutige Grenzziehung, welche das, was vernünftig erkannt werden kann, und das, was geglaubt werden muß, deutlich auseinanderhält. Indem der Franziskaner seine Unterwerfung unter die kirchliche Autorität eigens betont, vollzieht er den Verzicht auf jegliche Intelligibilität des Glaubens in vollem Bewußtsein.

Sein gesteigertes methodisches Bewußtsein zeigt sich auch in einer sehr präzisen Abstufung der Autoritäten und ihrer Verbindlichkeit. In der gesamten Diskussion um die Eucharistie unterscheidet er mit Genauigkeit zwischen dem Bereich des *vernünftig Einsehbaren*, der *Autorität der Hl. Schrift*, der *verbindlichen Lehre der Kirche* und der *opinio communis* aller Theologen. Durch diese Abstufung wird der Spielraum theologischer und philosophischer

[17] Vgl. z.B. den Prolog zur *Super libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (*Opera Phil.* IV, pp. 3-14).
[18] *Super libros Physicorum Aristotelis* I cap. 16, p. 179.
[19] *Super libros Physicorum Aristotelis* I cap. 11, p. 117.
[20] *Quaestiones in IV Sent.* q. 8 (*Opera Theol.* VII, p. 139): "...patet, quia inter omnia inconvenientia, quae ponuntur sequi ex isto sacramento maius est quod accidens sit sine subiecto".
[21] *Quaestiones in IV Sent.* q. 8, p. 138; *Quodlibeta* IV, q. 30 (*Opera Theol.* IX, p. 448 ff.); *Tractatus de corpore Christi*, cap. V, ed. Birch, p. 138.
[22] *Quodlibeta* IV, q. 30, pp. 449-450: "quam teneo propter determinationem Ecclesiae et non propter aliquam rationem".

Diskussion klar beschrieben. In Bezug auf die Eucharistie ergibt sich daraus folgendes Fazit: Die Transsubstantiationslehre ist eine *determinatio Ecclesiae*, d.h. eine verpflichtende Glaubenswahrheit[23]. Ockham bekennt sich zu ihr, wenn er sagt "Und dies ist auch mein Glaube, weil dies der katholischen Glaube ist"[24]. Im Gegensatz zur sog. Realpräsenz, die zwar ebenfalls durch die natürliche Vernunft nicht eingesehen werden kann[25], welche aber ein *biblisches* Fundament besitzt[26], ist die Transsubstantiation nur durch die *auctoritas Sanctorum Patrum*[27] und die *determinatio Ecclesiae*[28] bezeugt. Obschon also nach Ockham die *transsubstantiatio* nicht diskutiert werden darf, ist deren *modus* durch die kirchliche Lehre nicht festgelegt und darf diskutiert werden. Es ist insbesondere erlaubt zu fragen, ob es sich bei den fortbestehenden Akzidentien um die Qualität oder die Quantität handle. Zwar ist es nach Ockhams eigenem Geständnis die *communis opinio omnium theologorum*, daß die *quantitas* fortbesteht, was einen Realunterschied zwischen Quantität und Substanz voraussetzt, aber Wilhelm beansprucht vehement das Recht, diese Auffassung zu kritisieren[29]. Ockham wird nicht müde zu beteuern, daß *sein* Lösungsvorschlag, nämlich daß die sinnlichen Qualitäten des Brotes fortbestehen, orthodox sei[30]. Daraus folgt, daß die nach seiner Meinung vernünftig einsehbare These, es bestehe kein Realunterschied zwischen Substanz und Qualität, Qualität und Quantität nicht als häretisch bezeichnet werden darf[31]. Diese Abgrenzung verschiedener Stufen von Verbindlichkeit der kirchlichen und theologischen Tradition zeigt nicht nur, daß Ockham orthodox bleiben will, sondern ebenfalls, in welchem Rahmen für den Theologen Raum besteht für eine *rationale Diskussion*. Diese Gebiet umfaßt all das, was weder durch die Schrift noch durch die verbindliche Lehre der Kirche festgelegt ist. Für diesen klar umschriebenen Freiraum gilt die These von E.D. Sylla, Ockham habe die Autonomie der Wissenschaften gefördert[32]. In der Tat ist er nicht bereit seine Physik, d.h. hier seine Lehre von der Qualität, allzu schnell der Theologie preiszugeben. Er versucht so weit als möglich eine rational vertretbare und trotzdem mit der Transsubstantiation kompatible Physik aufrechtzuhalten.

Allerdings ist das Verhältnis von Vernunft und Glaube bei Ockham wesentlich komplexer.

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[23] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. I, ed. Birch, p. 162: "Et tenetur etiam quod substantia panis transubstantiatur, convertitur seu mutatur ita quod substantia panis non manet sed quod remanent accidentia sola per se existentia sine subiecto".

[24] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. I, ed. Birch, p. 164: "Haec est et mea fides, quoniam haec est catholica fides. Quicquid enim explicite credit Romana Ecclesia, hoc solum et non aliud nihil vel explicite vel implicite credo".

[25] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. II, ed. Birch, p. 166: "Quod corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter continetur per rationem naturalem, ostendi non potest; et ideo ad istius veritatis notitiam oportet per fidem accedere, de qua dubitare non debemus".

[26] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. II, ed. Birch, pp. 166-168.

[27] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. III, ed. Birch, p. 172.

[28] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap.V, ed. Birch, p. 184 u. ö.

[29] Von den doctores moderni sagt er, *De sacramento altaris* q. III, ed. Birch, p. 126: "nihil enim, quod dicunt, est recipiendum, nisi quod possunt probare per rationem evidentem vel per auctoritatem sacrae scripturae vel per determinationem ecclesiae vel per doctores approbatos ab ecclesia. — Und er fügt hinzu: Immo periculosum et temerarium aestimo vel artare quemcumque ad captivandum ingenium suum et ad credendum aliquod quod ratio dictat sibi esse falsum, nisi possit elici ex scriptura sacra vel ex determinatione Ecclesiae Romanae vel ex dictis doctorum approbatorum". Vgl. auch *Quodlibeta* IV, qq. 26 und 28.

[30] Vor allem *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XXXI, ed. Birch, pp. 360-382.

[31] Vgl. *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XXXVI, ed. Birch, p. 436.

Ockham anerkannt, wie bereits erwähnt, im Glauben die *Faktizität* der Transsubstantiation. Diese bewußt vollzogene theologische Zugeständnis an die Irrationalität zeitigt allerdings Rückwirkungen auf das *philosophische Denken*, indem sie dieses Denken mit neuen — unvermuteten — Fragen konfrontiert und es auf diese Weise herausfordert, mit Möglichkeiten zu rechnen, die ohne diese Herausforderung stumm geblieben wären. Man kann paradoxalerweise formulieren, geradezu die anerkannte Irrationalität gewisser Glaubensinhalte habe das rationale Denken stimuliert.

4. *Theologische Kritik philosophischer Thesen*

Zu den bedeutsamsten Innovationen, die Ockham im Bereich der Philosophie durchgesetzt hat, gehört m.E. sein Verständnis der Kategorien. Nach seiner Interpretation sind die *Kategorien* mentale und sprachliche Zeichen, die sich auf Dinge beziehen, die keine Zeichen sind[33], d.h. unverknüpfte Satzteile, aus denen bejahende und verneinende Sätze gebildet werden können[34]. Ihre Unterscheidung ist durch die verschiedenen Fragen bedingt, welche hinsichtlich einer Einzelsubstanz gestellt werden können[35]. Das Entscheidende dieser Lehre besteht darin, daß es ontologisch gesehen nur substanzielle und qualitative Einzeldinge gibt[36]. Daraus folgt, daß alle anderen acht Kategorien oder *Akzidentien* als *konnotative Begriffe* zu deuten sind, denen keine besondere *res* in der extramentalen Wirklichkeit entspricht[37].

Im Zusammenhang dieser interessanten Revision der Kategorienlehre, die nach Ockhams ausdrücklicher Aussage dem Geist des Aristoteles entspricht, nimmt die These, die *Quantität* sei kein von der Substanz oder der Qualität verschiedenes Ding, einen besonders wichtigen Platz ein[38]. Ich bin mit E.D. Sylla[39] der Auffassung, daß diese These, die bereits von Olivi vorbereitet worden war[40], von Ockham vor allem wegen der Eucharistielehre so intensiv diskutiert wurde. Sie hat, so möchte ich formulieren, einen theologischen *Sitz im Leben*. Man kann dies dadurch belegen, daß der Franziskaner zu Beginn der Eucharistiediskussionen im IV. Sentenzenbuch sagt, im Zusammenhang dieses Problems spiele vornehmlich das Problem der Quantität eine

[33] Vgl. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 40 (*Op. Phil.* I, pp. 111-113); *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XXV, ed. Birch, p. 432: "Et ideo praedicamenta non sunt nisi quaedam praedicabilia et signa rerum et incomplexa ex quibus fiunt complexiones verae et falsae". — Zur gesamten Kategorienlehre *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 7 (*Opera Phil.* II, pp. 157-161); *Quodlibeta* V, qq. 21-23.

[34] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 41, p. 115: ... quaedam incomplexa ex quibus affirmatio et negatio ... natae sunt constitui. Nach *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XXXV, ed. Birch, p. 434, sind die Kategorien: conceptus seu intentiones animae quae sunt signa naturaliter significantia res.

[35] Vgl. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 41, pp. 116-117; *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XXXV, ed. Birch, p. 430; *Quodlibeta* IV, q. 22, pp. 567-569.

[36] Diese These begegnet ständig im Werke Ockhams, dazu G. Martin, *Wilhelm von Ockham. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Ordnungen*, passim.

[37] Besonders explizit ausgeführt am Beispiel der Quantität *Quodlibeta* IV, qq. 25-28, und der Relation *Quodlibeta* VI, qq. 8-30. Ebenfalls zu beachten *In librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 12, pp. 238-248.

[38] Vgl. *De sacramento altaris* q. III, ed. Birch, pp. 92-156.

[39] E.D. Sylla, 'Autonomous and Handmaiden Science', p. 371.

[40] Diese Thematik wird ausführlich behandelt von D. Burr, 'Quantity and Eucharistic Presence, The Debate from Olivi through Ockham' in: *Collectanea Franciscana* 44 (1974)

grundlegende Rolle[41]. Historisch gesehen ist dies darin begründet, daß Thomas und nach ihm vor allem Aegidius Romanus der *quantitas dimensiva* wegen der Transsubstantiation einen Sonderstatus zugesprochen hatten[42]. Der theologische Anlaß dieser Diskussion um die wahre Bestimmung der Quantität schließt nicht aus, daß Ockhams Lehre auch unabhängig vom theologischen Kontext einen Sinn ergibt, wie E.D. Sylla in ihrem bedeutsamen Aufsatz darlegt, aber nichtdestotrotz ist die philosophisch bedeutsame Lehre, die als Ausdehnung verstandene Quantität sei kein Ding, vornehmlich, wenn auch sicher nicht ausschließlich durch eine nichtrationale Fragestellung *veranlaßt* worden.

Ein zweites Beispiel mag die komplexen Interaktion von rationalem Diskurs und irrationalem Glaubensinhalt verdeutlichen. Es wurde bereits daran erinnert, daß die Qualität als einziges der Akzidentien ein "Sein möglicher Selbständigkeit" besitzt, wie Gottfried Martin treffend formuliert[43]. Auch bezüglich dieser Lehre betont Ockham, daß es die ursprüngliche Ansicht des Philosophen sei, es gebe nur Substanzen und Qualitäten[44]. Um zu wissen, ob mit dem Begriff der *qualitas* auf eine *res absoluta* Bezug genommen werde, müsse man sich fragen, ob die gemeinte Eigenschaft durch eine Ortsveränderung der Substanz hinreichend erklärt werden könne oder nicht, lehrt Ockham. Falls dies nicht der Fall ist, handelt es sich um eine Qualität im Sinne eines absoluten Dinges. Zugunsten der Realunterscheidung von Substanz und Qualität spricht auch das Argument, daß es sich um eine reale *additio* zur Substanz handeln muß[45]. Gewiß ist im diesem Sinne die Unterscheidung von Substanz und Eigenschaft aristotelisch, aber Ockham deutet die Qualität als *res absoluta*, d.h. als ein Ding das mindestens der Möglichkeit nach selbständig existieren kann. Man darf sich hier die Frage stellen, ob die Unterscheidung zweier Arten von *res absolutae* nicht letztlich überflüssig ist, zumal die Interpretation des Akzidens Qualität als *res absoluta* diese in Richtung auf die Substanz hin interpretiert. Ich vermute, daß Ockham an der Differenz zwischen Substanz und Qualität festgehalten hat, um den Anforderungen der Transsubstantiation, die das Postulat selbständiger Akzidentien impliziert, zu entsprechen. Vielleicht muß man sich vorsichtiger ausdrücken, denn monokausale Erklärungen sind auch in der Philosophiegeschichte eine gefährliche Versuchung: Die Eucharistielehre hat diese Auslegung *gefördert*. Es ist jedenfalls auffallend, daß Ockham in seiner z.T. sehr virulenten Widerlegung der *communis opinio* stets betont, daß seine Lösung der Orthodoxie gerecht werde. Er zitiert in diesem Zusammenhang gerne einen Text des Lombarden, der sinnliche Qualitäten als Beispiele separater Akzidentien anführt[46]. In diesem zweiten Beispiel ist deshalb der Einfluß der Theologie auf eine spezifisch philosophische Lehre wesentlich unmittelbarer als im Falle der Quantität.

Eine *dritte* Reihe von Beispielen verdient am meisten Interesse, weil sie zeigt wie die für die natürliche Vernunft absurde Annahme selbständiger Akzidentien zu *neuen* philosophischen und

[41] *Quaestiones in IV Sent.* q. 6, p. 71: "difficultas istius quaestionis et multarum sequentium consistit in natura quantitatis: quid sit".
[42] Vgl. R. Imbach, 'Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik', pp. 365-369.
[43] G. Martin, *Wilhelm von Ockham. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Ordnungen*, passim.
[44] Vgl. z.B. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 44, pp. 156-157.
[45] Zur Bedeutung von accidens vgl. *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XXXII, ed. Birch, pp. 384-398, und *Quaestiones in IV Sent.* q. 6, p. 88.
[46] *De sacramento altaris* q. III, ed. Birch, pp. 110 -112; *Summa logicae* I, cap. 44, p. 135.

erkenntnistheoretischen Auffassungen führt. Das Transsubstantiationswunder, wie Ockham es versteht, setzt voraus, daß Gott, der Allmächtige, ein Akzidens, nämlich die *qualitas*, losgelöst vom Subjekt, dem es normalerweise inhäriert, erhalten kann, auch wenn die Substanz zerstört ist.

Diese Möglichkeit führt Ockham zu sehr folgenreichen *Grenzbetrachtungen* oder *Gedankenexperimenten*. Sofern man berücksichtigt, daß nach ihm die Akte des Willens oder des Intellekts als Qualitäten der Seele zu begreifen sind, ist man keineswegs überrascht festzustellen, daß Ockham die Hypothese von freischwebenden Willens- und Vernunftsakten erwägt[47]. Es liegt auf der Hand, welche Denkmöglichkeiten durch diese Erwägung freigesetzt werden!

Wenn Gott, so überlegt Ockham weiterhin, ein Akzidens ohne Subjekt erschaffen oder erhalten kann, dann vermag er ebenfalls eine *Substanz ohne Akzidentien* zu erschaffen[48]. Diese Setzung impliziert logischerweise nicht nur, daß Gott die natürliche Wirkung einer Substanz aufheben kann (z.B. ein Feuer, das nicht brennt), sondern ebenfalls, daß er die Wirkung ohne die Ursache erhalten kann[49]. Der Glaube an das Eucharistiewunder hat, so darf man folgern, ernsthafte Zweifel an der natürlichen Kausalitätsbeziehungen zwischen Ursache und Wirkung zur Folge.

Diese durch das Eucharistiewunder nahegelegte Aufhebung natürlicher Zuordnung von *Ursache* und *Wirkung* erweist allerdings ihre bedeutsamsten Konsequenzen im Bereich der Erkenntnistheorie, und zwar im Zusammenhang mit Ockhams Diskussion der intuitiven Erkenntnis, welche er als eine *notitia* versteht, kraft derer gewußt werden kann, ob ein Ding ist oder nicht[50]. Hinsichtlich dieser priviligierten Erkenntnisweise ist bekanntlich ein radikaler Zweifel möglich, indem man sich fragen kann, ob es eine intuitive Erkenntnis eines nichtexistierenden Gegenstandes geben könne. Wenn man Ockhams Darlegungen dieses Zweifels, vor allem im Prolog zum Sentenzenkommentar, untersucht, wird man zur überraschenden Feststellung gezwungen, daß die Überlegung, die ihn zu diesem Zweifel führt, durch das Eucharistiewunder inspiriert ist. Als Begründung dafür, daß es eine intuitive Erkenntinis nichtexistierender Gegenstände geben könne, führt Ockham nämlich den berühmten Satz an: "Jedes absolute Ding, welches dem Ort und Subjekt nach von einem andern absoluten Ding unterschieden ist, kann durch die göttliche Macht ohne jenes existieren"[51].

Aufgrund der vorangehenden Ausführungen kann m.E. kein Zweifel darüber bestehen, daß dieses Argument eine verallgemeinernde Formulierung der *transsubstantiatio* darstellt, wobei Ockham das Ausmaß des Wunders sogar noch einschränkt durch die Hinzufügung von *distincta loco et subiecto*. Entscheidend sind allerdings die Konsequenzen, die der Franziskaner z.T.

[47] *Quaestiones in IV Sent.* q. 9, p. 155: "non est maior contradictio quod accidens absolutum spirituale (d.h. intellectio oder volitio) sit sine subiecto per potentiam Dei quam corporale". — Man denke in diesem Zusammenhang an die Überlegungen von Descartes, der erwägt, dass das sich im cogito entdeckende Subjekt nur eine res cogitans sein könnte.

[48] Vgl. *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XIII, ed. Birch, pp. 222-226. Hier formuliert Ockham: "Nulli fideli, qui credit et tenet quod accidentia sunt in sacramento altaris sine subiecto, debet esse dubium, quin eadem virtute poterit substantia sine accidentibus subsistere" (p. 222).

[49] *Tractatus de corpore Christi* cap. XIII, ed. Birch, p. 224: "Deus omnipotens, cui perfecte oboediunt omnes creaturae, potest actionem causae naturalis suspendere et effectum sine causa secunda conservare".

[50] Vgl. R. Imbach, *Wilhelm von Ockham, Texte zur Theorie der Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft*, Stuttgart 1984, pp. 122-167.

[51] Vgl. R. Imbach, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, pp. 160-161.

selber daraus ableitet. Die natürliche Zuordnung von Subjekt und Objekt ist damit aufgehoben, was zu einer radikalen Neubesinnung der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der Philosophie führen muß. Bereits für Ockham, der zwar die Folgen seiner Grenzbetrachtung nicht absehen konnte, ergibt sich als Korollar, daß der Erkenntnis der eigenen Akte des Willens und des Intellekts ein absoluter erkenntnistheoretischer Primat zukommt. Diese Art intuitiver Erkenntnis ist nämlich unbezweifelbar[52]. Man kann gewiß über den systematischen Stellenwert dieser Hypothese streiten[53], aber es scheint mir *erstens* unbestreitbar, daß ein Zusammenhang besteht zwischen der Transsubstantiation und diesem Gedankenexperiment. *Zweitens* erhellt, daß in diesem Falle eine vernünftig nicht einholbare Hypothese die Reflexion über die Grundlagen rationaler Erkenntnis vorangetrieben hat. In diesem präzisen Sinne kann man von einer *theologischen* Kritik der Philosophie sprechen.

Ich komme zum Schluß: Das Beispiel der Eucharistie verdeutlicht, daß die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Vernunft und Glaube im späteren Mittelalter nicht sosehr als abstrakte Debatte ausgetragen wurde, sondern eher im Zusammenprall von *rationalen Ansprüche* mit *konkreten Fragen*, deren religiöse und gesellschaftliche Relevanz unbestreitbar ist. Philosophisches Fragen entfacht sich — meistens — an Gegenständen nicht philosophischer Herkunft; es bewährt sich, wenn es die Herausforderung, welche seine Zeit an es stellt, aufgreift; es vollendet sich, wenn es ungeachtet möglicher gesellschaftlicher Sanktionen die scheinbar selbstverständliche Autorität von Ideen prüft und kritisiert[54].

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[52] R. Imbach, *Wilhelm von Ockham*, p. 164: "Sed veritates de istis mere intelligibilibus inter omnes veritates contingentes certius et evidentius cognoscuntur a nobis, sicut patet per experientiam... quod, quamvis posset dubitare de istis sensibilibus, non tamen de talibus".

[53] Man denke an die Studien von Ph. Boehner in *Collected Articles on Ockham*.

[54] Bei der vorliegenden Studie handelt es sich um eine Skizze. Ich hoffe, dass ich in einer ausführlicheren Arbeit die hier vorgetragenen Thesen eingehender studieren kann.

III LOGIC

OCKHAM ON PERFORMED AND SIGNIFIED PREDICATION

Gabriel Nuchelmans

1. *Basic predication, signification, and supposition*

Let us start with what may be called basic predication, that is, acts of predication that are not directed, on a relatively higher level, at another predication of a lower rank. Such a basic predication may have regard either to things that are not signs or to mental, vocal, and written signs. An example of a basic predication about things that are not signs would be 'Man is an animal'. According to Ockham, this instance of a primary basic predication contains, in the first place, two categorematic terms, namely, the general conceptions or natural signs of men and of animals, and, in the case of a vocal or written predication, the conventional signs that signify the same objects in subordination to the mental apprehensions. Ockham emphatically rejects the view defended by his contemporary Walter Burleigh, according to which also the things denoted by the categorematic signs may be part of a predication; the categorematic constituents of a predication are always concepts and words, never things that are not signs[1]. Next, the categorematic terms are combined in a specific way by a syncategorematic mental act which adds a certain modification to the signification of the two categorematic terms. That such a manner of thinking of the denoted objects is actually realized in the speaker's mind is indicated by the copula, which is a conventional mark of the fact that at the very moment of utterance an instance of the act of predicating one concept of another is effectively performed by the speaker. By thinking of men and animals in this predicative way the speaker brings about a novel unit of thought and speech, with the meaning that the objects for which the first categorematic term, which has become the subject, stands are objects for which the second categorematic term, which has become the predicate, stands[2]. Although Ockham holds that in an act of predication it is always a concept or word that is predicated of another concept or word, he insists at the same time that the import of the product of that act is not that the first concept or word is the second concept or word, but rather that the things for which the subject supposits are things for which the predicate supposits.

In this connection it becomes important to know what kinds of significates of categorematic terms Ockham admits and what kinds of supposition he ascribes to categorematic terms when they are used in the context of a proposition. As for signification, he distinguishes between concepts of first order, which are mental apprehensions of particular things, and concepts of second order, such as the notions of genus and species, which are natural signs of concepts of first order. In the same vein, spoken and written words, which signify in subordination to their

[1] Cf. *Quodlibeta* III, q. 5.
[2] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 66; *Quodlibeta* III, q. 5.

mental correlates, are divided into those which denote things that are not words and those which denote words in so far as they are conventional signs[3]. It is worthy of note that Ockham repudiates two kinds of significates that were admitted by others. He rejects the view that conventional signs signify primarily the concepts that are associated with them; according to him, spoken and written words signify the same objects as the corresponding concepts, albeit in subordination to those concepts. Further, he denies that there are universals in the world outside thought and language which could be the significates of general terms; the things denoted by concepts of first order are always particulars.

In conformity with this doctrine of signification, which restricts the domain of denotata to particular things and natural or conventional signs, Ockham acknowledges three main types of supposition. In a proposition, a categorematic term stands either for its significates, in personal supposition, or non-significatively for itself, as a concept, in simple supposition, or as a word, in material supposition. In our example 'Man is an animal' both terms have personal supposition, which means that they stand for their significates: individual men and individual animals in the outside world. That both terms have personal supposition may, however, also be true of a secondary kind of basic predication, which is not about things that are not signs but precisely about natural or conventional signs. For instance, in the predications 'Every concept is in the mind' and 'Every vocal noun is part of a proposition' the terms stand for their significates, although at least some of these significates are signs and not things other than signs. A different case is the hackneyed example 'Man is a species'. Ockham is of the opinion that such a sentence is ambiguous between a reading in which 'man' has personal supposition and a reading in which it has simple supposition, standing for the concept of man. On the former interpretation the proposition is obviously false, since it is not the case that any of the individual things signified by 'man' is a species. But as the predicate is a term that applies to concepts or words, a reading with simple supposition is permitted and we may therefore interpret the sentence as stating that the concept of man is a species-concept. Similarly, the sentence 'Man is a noun' is ambiguous between two readings. Because the interpretation that one of the significates of 'man' is a noun is manifestly absurd, the interpreter is forced to look for another possibility, which is indeed provided by the signification of the predicate, and to take 'man' according to material supposition[4]. What is typical of both these examples is that, on the one hand, the ordinary interpretation of the subject according to personal supposition makes the sentence evidently false, but that, on the other hand, the signification of the predicate offers a way out, which consists in taking the subject according to simple supposition or material supposition and thus making it stand for one of the significates of the predicate.

2. *Object predication and higher level predication*

In the primary and secondary kinds of basic predication outlined above the only predication involved is a performed act, an *actus exercitus*, of connecting two categorematic terms as subject

[3] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 11-12; *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 10.
[4] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 65.

and predicate. But this very act of predicating, of which the conventional copula indicates that it is being simultaneously performed by the speaker, may subsequently be made the object of a reflective predication of higher level in which the initial performed act is merely conceived of and described, rather than effectively performed, and thus becomes an *actus significatus*. In such a predication of higher level the categorematic terms that are subject and predicate of the object predication may appear in two different ways. In 'Animal is predicated of man' (*Animal praedicatur de homine*) the terms 'animal' and 'man' cannot possibly have personal supposition, because it is not an individual man or an individual animal that is subject or predicate of the object predication 'Man is an animal'. Since the object predication can contain only concepts or words as terms, the higher level predication has to refer to the concept or word 'animal' and to the concept or word 'man'; and that means that the terms 'animal' and 'man' in so far as they are constituents of the higher level predication must have either simple or material supposition. However, instead of retaining the very terms 'animal' and 'man' of the object predication in the higher level predication, where they then stand for themselves, one may also refer to them in a more general manner, for instance, by saying 'A genus is predicated of a species' (*Genus praedicatur de specie*). In that case the terms 'genus' and 'species', which are concepts of second order, have personal supposition, standing for such concepts of first order as the notions of animal and man, which are among their significates.

In the basic predication 'Man is an animal' the terms 'man' and 'animal' are connected by a syncategorematic act, which is a constituent of an altogether different nature. Whereas through the categorematic apprehensions something is put before the mind as an object merely thought of and signified, the act of predicating one concept of the other is a performance that really takes place in the mind of the speaker, something that he actually does. The conventional copula is nothing but an outward signal that such an act is being effectively carried out, just as such words as 'not', 'only', 'except', are signals that the speaker is actually negating, excluding, or excepting. Now, this performed act or *actus exercitus* which is the kernel of the basic predication becomes an object of mere thought and signification in the higher level predication. There it is put before the mind and denoted by the verb 'to predicate' or similar terms (*subici, verificari, competere*[5]), which as such have no predicating power but are concepts of second order that signify a syncategorematic mental act, which may be considered as a concept of first order in a large sense[6]. The difference between 'is' as a signal of an *actus exercitus* or really performed act of predication and 'to predicate' as the categorematic sign of that act in so far as it is merely contemplated is the same as the difference between 'not' and 'to negate', 'only' and 'to exclude', 'except' and 'to except'[7].

In addition to mentioning the categorematic terms and the performed act of predicating which together form the basic predication, the higher level predication may also contain a characterization of the supposition that the mentioned categorematic terms have in the object predication. The description 'Animal is predicated of man' then becomes 'Animal, taken according to personal supposition, is predicated of man, taken according to personal

[5] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 66; *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 9.
[6] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 12.
[7] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Super universalia Porphyrii quaestiones acutissimae* q. 14, *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding - Vivès I, p. 178.

supposition'. In this case there is a difference between the kind of supposition — simple or material — which the terms 'animal' and 'man' necessarily have in the higher level predication and the kind of supposition — personal — which those terms have in the object predication 'Man is an animal'. By contrast, in 'Species, taken according to personal supposition, is predicated of man, taken according to simple supposition', the term 'man' has the same kind of supposition in both this higher level predication and in the object predication 'Man is a species'. It should be noted, however, that there is still a difference between, for instance, the simple supposition of 'man' in the object predication (and also in the higher level predication), where the term actually stands for the concept of man, in what may be called a *suppositio exercita*, and on the other hand the phrase 'taken according to simple supposition' in the higher level predication, which merely signifies the simple supposition of 'man' in the object predication, without anywise exercising it.

The foregoing remarks about the difference between a predication as an *actus exercitus* and that same predication as an *actus significatus* have been made with an eye to the correct method of getting from a performed predication that is the object of inquiry to a predication of higher level in which the predication concerned is adequately conceptualized and described. This way of viewing the matter may be reversed by setting out from an *actus significatus*, such as 'A genus is predicated of a species', and asking oneself how the signified act of predication is performatively instantiated or exercised (*exercetur*). From the latter viewpoint Ockham frequently emphasizes that it would be wrong to exemplify the description 'A genus is predicated of a species' by the performed predication 'A species is a genus' (*Species est genus*[8]). If the higher level predication is to be true, the predications that exemplify it ought to be true as well; but there is no possibility of interpreting 'A species is a genus' in such a way that it would become true. The correct instantiations are such performed predications as 'Man is an animal', 'Whiteness is a colour'. Similarly, it would be wrong to exemplify 'Blindness (*caecitas*) is predicated of a man' by 'A man is blindness', or 'A relative term (*relativum*) is predicated of a man' by 'A man is a relative term'. Rather, the correct exemplifications are 'A man is blind' and 'A man is a father'[9].

Besides the differences between a predication as *actus exercitus* and as *actus significatus* which have been touched upon already, Ockham also draws attention to the following points[10]. There is a structural difference between the two kinds of predication inasmuch as the subject of 'Man is an animal' becomes (part of) the predicate of 'Animal is predicated of man' and the predicate of the former becomes the subject of the latter. Moreover, the Latin sentence *Animal praedicatur de homine* was held to be ambiguous between a (false) reading in which the subject has personal supposition and a (true) reading in which it has simple supposition[11]. But, since the predicate of 'Man is an animal' is not a term signifying concepts or words, there is no such choice between personal and simple supposition of the subject in the object predication. Lastly, but most importantly, a basic predication and the corresponding predication of higher order

[8] Cf. *In librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* cap. 6 (*Opera Phil.* II, p. 93); *Summa logicae* I, cap. 66; *Quodlibeta* VI, q. 5; VII, q. 9; *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 2, q. 4 (*Opera Theol.* II, p. 144); d. 2, q. 7, p. 259 and p. 264.
[9] Cf. *In librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 17, § 8 (*Opera Phil.* II, p. 312).
[10] Cf. *Summa logicae* I, cap. 66; *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 9.
[11] Cf. also *In librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* cap. 6 (*Opera Phil.* II, p. 94).

differ in that a basic predication may be either about particular things that are not signs or about concepts and words, whereas a true predication of higher level is never about things that are not signs but always and exclusively about concepts or words. Whether the performed predication 'Man is an animal' is truly conceptualized and described by means of 'Animal is predicated of man' or, more generally, by means of 'A genus is predicated of a species', in both versions the categorematic terms have reference only to the concepts or words used in the performed predication. These concepts and words are introduced into the higher level predication either by making them stand for themselves, in simple or material supposition, or by denoting them through concepts of second order among whose significates they are as concepts of first order. In sum, basic predications are first and foremost about particular things other than signs and secondarily about signs. The basic predications themselves, however, never contain things that are not signs, but consist exclusively of mental or verbal elements. Therefore, the predications of higher order which are about those basic predications as mental or verbal units can never be about things other than signs; they concern solely concepts and words.

3. *Problems solved by heeding the distinction*

We are now sufficiently equipped to have a closer look at some of the philosophical and theological problems which Ockham claims to be able to solve by invoking the logico-semantical distinction between predication as an *actus exercitus* and predication as an *actus significatus*. At several places[12] he contends that ignorance or disregard of this crucial distinction is the source of numerous errors. In particular, many authoritative writers have put forward statements which are clearly intended to be true, but which are expressed in such a way that strictly speaking they are false. Mostly, this perplexity is due to the fact that those authors express themselves in a manner that is appropriate to a predication as an *actus exercitus*, whereas what they actually mean ought to be expressed in a way that is appropriate to a predication as an *actus significatus*. A provocative thesis, which was apt to call forth sharp opposition[13].

Let us take as an example the sentence 'Colour is the primary and adequate object of vision'[14]. Taken at face value, according to the proper meaning expressed by that kind of phrasing, such a sentence cannot possibly be true. If we ask for what the term 'colour' is standing, the answer can be only that it has personal supposition; for the predicate is not of such a type as to be applicable solely to concepts or words, so that simple or material supposition is out of the question. But if the subject is taken according to personal supposition, then it stands for the individual colours that it signifies, and no particular colour is the primary and adequate object of vision. Moreover, even those philosophers who hold that the subject of this sentence somehow

[12] *In librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* cap. 6, p. 95; *Summa logicae* I, cap. 66; III-4, cap. 6; *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 9; *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 8, q. 2 (*Opera Theol.* III, p. 198); d. 28, q. unica (*Opera Theol.* IV, p. 275).

[13] Cf. R. Paqué, *Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut*, Berlin - New York 1970, especially pp. 58-61. See also Pseudo-Campsall's remark, cited in Ockham, *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 9 (*Opera Theol.* IX, p. 734, n. 5): "*Abusio est negare tales propositiones concessas a philosophis et doctoribus, et dicere quod falsae sint de virtute sermonis, dando expositiones extortas per actum exercitum et signatum*".

[14] Cf. *In librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis cap.* 9, p. 184; *Summa logicae* I, cap. 66; *Quodlibeta* VII, q. 9; *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 2, q. 4, pp. 140-4.

supposits for a universal in the outside world would have to concede that such an entity cannot be seen, whether primarily or otherwise. Nevertheless, a benevolent interpreter may try to save the truth of the statement by assuming that it is meant as a predication of higher level. Then the correct way of expressing what is actually meant would be 'Being an object of vision is primarily and adequately predicated of colour', a description that is exemplified by the performed compound predication 'Every colour is an object of vision and nothing but a colour is an object of vision'. In the latter predication the terms 'colour' and 'object of vision' have personal supposition, standing for their significates: the particular colours and objects of vision that are indeed apprehensible by the faculty of seeing. The higher level predication, by contrast, is not about any things that are apprehensible by vision, but rather about the general concepts of colour and object of vision. Whereas these concepts have personal supposition in the object predication, they necessarily have simple supposition in the higher level predication.

Along the same lines Ockham treats such sentences as 'Man is primarily capable of laughing' (*Homo est primo risibilis*). Strictly speaking this sentence is false, because neither an individual man nor a postulated universal of manhood is capable of laughing in the sense indicated by 'primarily', according to which the predicate applies to the subject universally and exclusively[15]. The correct wording of what is meant would be 'Being capable of laughing is primarily predicated of man'. This predication of higher level is performatively instantiated by the compound predication 'Every man is capable of laughing and nothing but a man is capable of laughing', where 'man' and 'capable of laughing' supposit for significates which do possess the capacity of laughing. In the higher level predication, however, the same terms do not stand for any things in the outside world at all; they supposit for the concepts themselves, which are said to be connected in a peculiar way in the object predication.

According to Ockham[16], such sentences as 'Colour is the primary and adequate object of vision' and 'Man is primarily capable of laughing' suffer from the kind of ambiguity that used to be classified as the second mode of amphiboly[17]. Just as for instance the expression 'to plough the sands' has both a literal and a metaphorical meaning, these sentences may be understood either literally and according to their proper sense (*de virtute sermonis, secundum proprietatem sermonis, proprie sicut sonat, secundum suam formam, secundum se*) or metaphorically (*improprie, transumptive*). On the former interpretation they are manifestly false. If there is to be truth in them, one is forced to assume that a construction that is appropriate to the domain of predication as an *actus exercitus* is being applied to the domain of predication as an *actus significatus*, where in strictness a quite different way of expressing oneself is called for.

It seems to me that the main reason behind Ockham's insistence that it is safer to avoid the ambiguous type of sentence and to keep rigorously to distinct ways of expressing the two senses involved is the following. If the version 'Colour is the primary and adequate object of vision' is used with the intention of stating a truth, it is fairly evident that none of the three kinds of supposition which Ockham is prepared to admit is capable of yielding that intended truth. Simple supposition, in the sense favoured by Ockham, as well as material supposition are clearly

[15] Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, 4, 73 b 32 ff.
[16] *Summa logicae* III-4, cap. 6.
[17] Cf. Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 4, 166 a 6 ff.

excluded, while taking 'colour' according to personal supposition would make the sentence refer to individual colours, none of which is the primary object of vision. There is, then, a very strong temptation to invoke an additional type of supposition which would preserve and explain the truth of the statement. As a matter of fact, Walter Burleigh[18] maintained that the term 'colour' in the sentence in question has simple supposition in his sense, according to which it stands for its first significate (*pro suo significato primo*), which for him is the universal of being a colour as it really exists in the world outside thought and language. The sentence then states that the universal nature signified by the name 'colour' is shared by everything that is per se and properly visible (*natura communis significata per hoc nomen 'color' est communis omni per se et proprie visibili*); and according to Burleigh, that is true. But in Ockham's eyes this is exactly the point where the misleading character of the sentence concerned becomes most conspicuous: its very structure prompts naïve thinkers to postulate such superfluous entities as universals in the world of things. In his opinion, it is a logical mistake to leave the sentence in its original form and then try to save its truth by adding another kind of supposition to his own three types, which are not capable of making it true. In a logically more satisfactory way the problem can be solved by sticking to the types of supposition accepted by himself and reformulating the troublesome sentence as a predication of higher level. Once that reformulation has been carried out, the temptation to posit other things than particulars has completely vanished, for the simple reason that the terms in a higher level predication, as opposed to the terms of a basic predication, never have reference to things of whatever kind, but only to concepts and words. This logico-semantic ascent is therefore a very effective means of counteracting the tendency to multiply entities without necessity. A similar manoeuvre is mentioned by Burleigh[19] and Jean Buridan[20], yielding such explicit metastatements as '"Man is capable of laughing" is primarily true' and '"Colour or the coloured is visible"is per se and primarily true'[21].

4. *Statements involving the notion of identity*

The view set forth above is generally confirmed by other passages where Ockham makes use of the distinction *actus exercitus/actus significatus* in connection with predication[22]. In conclusion, it may be interesting to add a few words about some places where the distinction is applied to statements involving the notion of identity[23]. If the sentence *Definitio et definitum sunt idem realiter* is taken as an *actus exercitus*, in the sense that a defining concept and the corresponding defined concept are the same in reality, it is obviously false. Actually, it should be reformulated as an *actus significatus*, to the effect that being the same in reality is truly predicated of a

[18] *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1955, p. 15.
[19] *Ibid.* p. 18.
[20] 'Treatise on Supposition', translated by P. King in: *John Buridan's Logic*, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 124.
[21] See also Ockham, *Summa logicae* III-4, cap. 6.
[22] Cf. *In librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis* cap. 9, pp. 184-5; *Summa logicae* I, cap. 43; I, cap. 72; III-3, cap. 18; *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 2, q. 4, pp. 148-9; d. 2, q. 6, pp. 219-20; d. 3, q. 10, p. 567; d. 8, q. 2 (*Opera Theol. III*, p. 198); d. 8, q. 4, pp. 233-4; d. 17, q. 4, pp. 480-1; d. 28, q. unica (*Opera Theol.* IV, pp. 274-5).
[23] Cf. *Summa logicae* III-3, cap. 22; III-4, cap. 6; *Quodlibeta* VI, q. 5; *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 2, q. 7, p. 265; and especially d. 6, q. unica, pp. 87-90.

defining concept and the corresponding defined concept. This higher level predication is exemplified by such true basic predications as 'A man and a rational animal are the same in reality', where the terms 'man' and 'rational animal' have personal supposition. The two concepts are of course distinct, but they signify one and the same thing or set of things. The point is also brought out by Ockham's comment on the rule that what is predicable of a defined concept is always predicable of the defining concept, and the other way round[24]. This rule is valid only when the concepts concerned have personal supposition in the corresponding basic predications: for example, in 'Man is mortal" and 'A rational animal is mortal'. The rule does not apply to cases where the concepts have simple or material supposition, as is clear from the difference in truth-value shown by '"Rational animal" is a phrase (*oratio)* indicating the quiddity of man' and '"Man" is a phrase indicating the quiddity of man'. Here, the distinctness of the concepts or linguistic expressions themselves, as opposed to the identity of their significates, blocks intersubstitution.

In a comparable way Ockham deals with the problem that in using such an expression as 'Some things that are differently conceived of are one and the same thing' (*Aliqua distincta ratione sunt una res*) the speaker is forced to suggest, by the plural of the subject, that at the same time he is talking of more than one thing and of only one thing. This awkward consequence can be avoided by giving the intended statement its proper expression, by means of the higher level predication 'The concept of being one and the same thing is predicated of concepts that are different and have different definitions', which is truly exemplified by, for instance, 'Socrates and white Socrates are one and the same thing', presumably to be expanded into 'Socrates is one thing and white Socrates is the same thing'. Or, to conclude with a weightier example, instead of saying, falsely, 'The divine attributes are in reality one and the same thing, namely, the divine essence' one should rather say 'The concept of being one and the same thing is predicated of the diverse concepts of the divine attributes', which is exemplified by, for instance, 'The divine intellect and the divine will are in reality one and the same thing, namely, the divine essence'. As concepts or terms, 'divine intellect' and 'divine will' are clearly different, but the thing signified by them is the same.

[24] *Quodlibeta* VI, q. 5.

SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS IN SUPPOSITION THEORY

F. Schaeffer

1. *Introduction*

Of the many topics discussed by Ockham in his writings on logic, in recent times most attention has been paid to his theory of supposition. This is not surprising, since the theory of supposition is widely recognized to be the most original medieval contribution to logic, and in Ockham's hands the theory became a strong weapon in the fight about the status of universals. What is surprising, perhaps, is that this attention has been focused almost completely on personal supposition, to the exclusion of material and simple supposition. This can be explained in part by the fact that the notions of material and simple supposition can only be understood against the background of a comprehensive (medieval) philosophy of language, whereas personal supposition can be approached more directly from a modern logical point of view. Indeed, it is clear that techniques and notions drawn from modern logical theory can play an important role in helping to understand personal supposition. But we must be careful not to divorce personal supposition from the larger framework of which it is, after all, only a part.

2. *Ockham's two approaches to supposition*

Ockham distinguishes five modes of personal supposition; he instructs us how to recognize these different modes, and he discusses numerous cases where the determination of the appropriate mode may seem problematic[1]. We can distinguish at least two different approaches.

a) *Semantic (inferential) analysis.*
It is often possible to determine the mode of personal supposition of a term in a proposition, by checking whether particular inferences involving that proposition are valid. I will take as example the mode of determinate supposition[2]. According to Ockham, we may from the proposition "Some man is an animal", validly infer "This man is an animal, or that man is an animal, or ... (and so on for all men)". Note that this conclusion should have as many disjuncts as there are men in existence. Ockham calls this type of inference: descent to the individuals by a disjunction. In the opposite direction there is also a valid inference possible. From the proposition "This man is an animal" (when some individual man is pointed out), we may infer "Some man is an animal". Ockham calls this type of inference: ascent from an individual.

[1] *Summa logicae* I, cap. 70-76 (*Opera Phil.* I, pp. 209-36).
[2] *Ibid.* cap. 70, p. 210.

Now, Ockham gives us a general rule, to the effect that whenever it is possible to descend to the individuals under a general term (occurring in a proposition) by a disjunction, while it is also possible to infer the original proposition from one of the disjuncts (ascent), the term in question has to be taken in determinate supposition. Applying this rule to our example "Some man is an animal", we readily see that the subject term has to have determinate supposition. The same inferential analysis can be applied to the predicate term, leading to the conclusion that in our example (and, in general, in propositions of the I form), both terms have determinate supposition.

In the same vein, inferential rules are given by Ockham for all the other modes of common personal supposition. It is clear that this type of analysis cannot be used to detect an occurrence of discrete supposition (as of "Socrates" in "Socrates is an animal").

b) *Syntactic analysis.*

It is often possible to determine the mode of personal supposition of term in a proposition, by looking at the syntax of that proposition. Again, I will take as my example the mode of determinate supposition. Ockham gives the following general rule: "when in a categorical proposition no universal sign distributing the whole extreme of a proposition is added to a term mediately or immediately (i.e., when neither to an extreme itself nor to a preceding extreme a universal sign is added), and when no negation or any expression equivalent to a negative or a universal sign precedes an extreme, that common term has determinate supposition"[3]. An example will clarify Ockham's intention: in the proposition "Some man is an animal", no universal sign or any negation or any expression involving a universal or negative sign is added to the terms "man" or "animal", and therefore, both terms have determinate supposition.

In this way, Ockham gives syntactic rules relating to all modes of personal supposition[4].

The syntactic approach clearly aims to develop a kind of "logical grammar" in such a way that the semantics of propositions will be reflected in their syntax. Of course, this will not be easy, because Ockham has to deal with the grammatical contingencies of a language that was not designed with the purpose of being logically precise. But nevertheless, it can be shown that Ockham is successful, for example, with regard to the traditional A, E, I, and O forms, and the singular affirmative and negative forms. Ockham tells us exactly in what mode of personal supposition we should take the subject and predicate of these propositions, and this on the basis of their syntactical characterization alone.

The semantic approach is in part complementary to the syntactic approach. But of course, the semantic approach is much more versatile: while the syntactic method is hampered by the contingencies of grammar, the semantic method can rely directly on intuitions about truth and validity.

[3] *Ibid.* cap. 71, pp. 212-3: "quando in categorica nullum signum universale distribuens totum extremum propositionis additur termino, nec mediate nec immediate, hoc est nec a parte eiusdem extremi nec a parte extremi praecedentis, nec negatio praecedit nec aliqua dictio includens aequivalenter negationem vel signum universale, semper talis terminus communis supponit determinate".

[4] Discrete supposition, *ibid.* cap. 70, p. 209; modes of confused supposition, *ibid.* cap. 73-74, pp. 226-230.

3. *Supposition, truth, and validity*

Attempts to give a formal reconstruction of the theory of personal supposition have all taken their lead from the semantic (inferential) approach. The most recent and by far the most sophisticated formalization is the one given by Graham Priest and Stephen Read[5]. Limitations of space make it impossible to give even a rough summary of this work. I will, therefore, confine myself to a critical examination of the authors' conception of the main function of the theory of supposition; in section 5, I will discuss a controversy that has arisen about one particular result of their formalization.

Priest and Read[6] give the following account of the main function of the theory of supposition. The central concern of logic is, and has always been, the notion of (semantic) validity. This notion should be explained in terms of the possible truth values of the premisses and conclusions of arguments. Therefore, the medievals needed (as do we) a theory to account for the truth conditions of propositions. And, so Priest and Read[7] say, "this was the main use to which the theory of supposition was put. Just as moderns give the truth conditions in terms of (world-dependent) reference and extension, so the medievals gave truth conditions in terms of supposition". Again, when summarising their conclusions[8] they say: "The theory of supposition is a theory of reference and the notion of descent by which the modes are characterized provides a way of giving the truth conditions of sentences in terms of truth functions of sentences whose terms have discrete supposition".

It is clear that we cannot simply map supposition theory into modern logic. We must explore the similarities and differences, keeping in mind that Priest and Read propose an analogy in overall theoretical structure. In particular, they want us to see medieval logic as a hierarchy of doctrines, in which a theory of supposition provides a basis for a definition of truth conditions, in order to provide a basis for an account of validity.

Let us see, first, how Ockham uses supposition in order to describe the truth conditions of propositions. As an example, Priest and Read[9] offer "Ockham's infamous doctrine that a singular sentence is true if and only if the subject and the predicate supposit for the same thing". But Ockham doesn't stop here: he gives similar definitions for most of the categoricals, for propositions in the past and future tense, for modal propositions, and for propositions where the subject term has material supposition. Often these definitions are incomplete as stated by Ockham; for example, about propositions of the I form Ockham only mentions that it is sufficient for truth that there be something for which both subject and predicate supposit: it is obvious that this is also necessary[10]. On the other hand, Ockham is precise with regard to the A form: he makes it clear that it is both necessary and sufficient for truth that the predicate

[5] 'The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition' in: *Mind* 86 (1977), pp. 109-13; 'Merely Confused Supposition' in: *Franciscan Studies* 40 (1980), pp. 265-97. In the second article an amended version of the formalization is given.
[6] 'The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition', pp. 266-8
[7] *Ibid.* p. 267.
[8] *Ibid.* p. 297.
[9] *Ibid*, p. 267.
[10] *Summa logicae* II, cap. 3, p. 255.

supposits for everything for which the subject supposits[11].

The notion of descent, which Priest and Read claim to be the main tool used to define truth conditions, is not used in this way at all by Ockham. When discussing truth, Ockham never appeals to the distinctions which are so elegantly defined with the doctrine of descent and ascent. This is simply because the mode of supposition does not affect the range of supposition. And it is the range of supposition that matters for truth and falsity (we need to know "*pro quo*", not "*quo modo*"). For example, in the propositions "All logicians are tenacious" and "Some logicians are tenacious", the subject terms both supposit for all the individuals who are rightly called logician, and the predicate terms supposit for all the individuals who are rightly called tenacious. And this is all we need to know in order to apply the truth conditions described in the previous paragraph.

If it would be possible to reduce, with the help of Ockham's doctrine of descent and ascent, all propositions to truth functions of propositions whose terms have only discrete personal supposition, in the manner suggested by Priest and Read, Ockham would need a truth condition for assertions of identity and a theory of truth functions. And even if he had those, his theory of truth would still not be complete, because the truth conditions for propositions involving material or simple supposition remain to be explained. I will return to this point in the next section.

Secondly, we must consider the question: in what way could supposition theory help to provide an account of validity? Priest and Read answer: by way of the doctrine of descent and ascent (which gives us a theory of truth conditions). But this is surely impossible. For it is obvious that the doctrine of descent and ascent already depends on the notion of valid inference. That a particular descent or ascent is (or is not) possible, or permitted, or allowed, is itself a matter of validity. If we take Ockham to define personal supposition in terms of descent and ascent, we may not, at the same time, take him to define validity (indirectly) in terms of personal supposition.

My conclusion, at this point, is that the doctrine of descent and ascent does not and cannot play the theoretical role, assigned to it by Priest and Read. I want to stress that this in itself does not diminish the real value of their formalization. But it helps to see it in the right perspective.

4. *The internal coherence of supposition theory*

When Ockham, in his *Summa logicae*, sets out to explain the notion of supposition, he attempts to frame a definition that must explain the general idea of supposition, that is, a definition that will cover at once personal, material and simple supposition. The definition is obscure[12], but his examples make his intentions perfectly clear. It is this general notion of supposition that Ockham employs in his description of the truth conditions of propositions. Let me explain how.

A typical example of a proposition where the subject term can be taken in either personal or material supposition is "Homo est nomen"; personal supposition makes the proposition false

[11] *Ibid.* II cap. 4, p. 260.
[12] *Ibid.* I cap. 63, p. 194.

(since no man is a name), and material supposition makes the proposition true. In the first case, it would be natural to classify the proposition as an indefinite proposition, but in the second case, where the word "*homo*" is, so to speak, a proper name of itself, it would be natural to call it a singular proposition. Ockham, after discussing these possible classifications, concludes that there is no genuine problem: he doesn't care much whether we call "*Homo est nomen*" indefinite or singular. The reason he gives is striking: the truth conditions for singular and indefinite propositions are the same, namely, the subject has to supposit for something for which the predicate supposits too[13]. Therefore, whether we take "homo" in personal or in material supposition, the same truth condition applies; the results of our evaluation, of course, will differ. In this way, Ockham's theory of truth conditions neatly embraces personal and material supposition[14].

There is an other feature, usually neglected, that demonstrates this internal coherence of the theory of supposition. This is the fact that Ockham applies the syntactic approach, not only in order to distinguish the modes of personal supposition, but also to characterize propositional contexts in which material or simple supposition may occur. For example, he gives a rule to the effect that, when in a proposition the subject is a term of first imposition and the predicate a term of second imposition, while no universal or particular sign stands with the term of first imposition, we will have to apply a distinction, because the term of first imposition can be taken in either personal or material supposition[15].

What I want to stress here is the similarity of this rule to the one I described above, on p. 63. In both cases, Ockham tells us something about supposition with the help of notions, drawn from a logical grammar.

If someone objects by saying that the distinction between terms of first and second imposition is a semantic and not a syntactic distinction, because it depends on the meanings of terms, I answer that the same applies to, e.g., the distinction between proper names and common names. The point is, in terms of modern logic, that we use lower case letters for the former and capital letters for the latter.

One more point to be noted in this connection is that Ockham gives a characterization of propositional contexts in which a term may be taken in material supposition. The phrase "may be taken" is typical for supposition theory. It is always a user of language, who takes a term in a supposition, be it personal, material or simple; supposition is a feature of language-in-use. A re-evaluation of this pragmatic aspect of supposition theory is long overdue.

5. *Distributive supposition in history*

In this section I will discuss a controversy that has arisen about one particular result of Priest

[13] *Ibid.* II cap. 1, pp. 246-247 and cap. 3, p. 257.

[14] My remarks about material supposition apply mutatis mutandis to simple supposition.

[15] *Ibid.* III-4, cap. 4, p. 761: "Alia regula est quod quando unum extremum propositionis est nomen primae impositionis et aliud extremum est nomen secundae impositionis, si nomen primae impositionis non sumatur cum signo universali vel particulari ista propositio est distinguenda, eo quod nomen primae impositionis potest accipi personaliter vel materialiter".

and Read's formalization, and I want to introduce a new argument into this controversy, whereby more light is thrown on the syntactic approach to supposition.

Priest and Read intend by their formalization to establish that Ockham was mistaken in his analysis of propositions of the form "Some S is not P" (the O form). Ockham says that the predicate should have distributive supposition; but according to the formalization, the predicate has merely confused supposition[16].

This claim inspired John Corcoran and John Swiniarski to write a "defense of Ockham against a baseless charge of error, which, if left unanswered, might tend to diminish Ockham's reputation as a technically competent logician"[17]. In their paper, they show that it is possible to give a complete and consistent account of Ockham's theory of descent and ascent, by which Ockham is correct in his analysis of the O form. They conclude that the Priest-Read formalization is not a formalization of Ockham's theory[18].

In reaction, Priest and Read reasserted their claim, explaining that their intention was not to give a formalization of Ockham's theory by itself, but a formalization of a "mature" form of the theory which was, nevertheless, "essentially to be found in Ockham". They present an overview of the historical development of the notion of descent, in which Ockham appears at a stage of transition, which in the end lead to a doctrine that would, presumably, prove Ockham to have been in error; the traditionally accepted analysis of the O form is nothing but "an entrenched doctrinal mistake"[19].

Unfortunately, Priest and Read do not give an example of a mature supposition theory in which the predicate of O propositions is said to have merely confused supposition. Instead, they point out a lot of other material that clearly invites further research. But this takes us way beyond the scope of the present paper.

It is clear that in this controversy, the interpretation of Ockham's theory *per se* is not at stake. The problem derives from the fact that the analysis of the O form had become unassailable, while, as Priest and Read show, the doctrine of descent and ascent as presented by Ockham was not deemed satisfactory by his successors.

I think it can be explained why this "doctrinal mistake" became entrenched, by looking at the very niche in which it survived seven odd ages of evolution in logical theory: the Table of Distribution. This table tells us that, in the categoricals, the following terms are distributed: the subject of A propositions; the subject and predicate of E propositions; and the predicate of O propositions. This is where Ockham would say (with the tradition) that the terms are to be taken in distributive supposition. With this table, and a few other notions, we can give a purely syntactic characterization of syllogistic validity; the two Laws of Distribution are, that the middle term should be distributed at least once, and that a term distributed in the conclusion should be distributed in a premiss.

Already the pseudo-Scot explained the *dici de omni vel de nullo* in terms of distributive

[16] 'The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition', pp. 111-2.
[17] John Corcoran and John Swiniarski , 'Logical Structures of Ockham's Theory of Supposition' in: *Franciscan Studies* 38 (1978), pp. 161-83.
[18] *Ibid.* p. 163 and p. 181.
[19] 'Merely Confused Supposition', pp. 269-274 and p. 290.

supposition, and he described the two Laws of Distribution[20]. At that time, the semantic justification of the Table of Distribution by way of a doctrine of descent and ascent had not yet reached a final form; in fact, controversy about the notion of distribution has continued well into this century[21]. This divergence between the semantic and syntactic approach is possibly one of the causes of the decay of the theory of personal supposition. But all the same, through the ages, the two Laws of Distribution continued to be used, because they were successful; and despite semantic uncertainty, there were precise syntactic characterizations of the cases in which we should consider terms to be distributed. Ockham, improving on the work of his predecessors, helped to supply these syntactic rules for what he called *suppositio personalis confusa et distributiva mobilis*.

6. *Conclusions*

In this paper, I have argued for the following conclusions.
(1) Ockham uses two distinct approaches to supposition; one, the doctrine of descent and ascent, depends on the notion of valid inference; the other, syntactic approach, does not (Section 2).
(2) The doctrine of descent and ascent does not and cannot play the role, assigned to it by Priest and Read in 'Merely Confused Supposition' (Section 3).
(3) In order to define truth conditions, Ockham uses a basic notion of supposition, undifferentiated between modes (Section 3), or kinds (Section 4).
(4) We can do no justice to supposition theory when we divorce personal from material (and simple) supposition: they are united both in the definitions of truth conditions and in the syntactic approach (Section 4).
(5) The history of distributive supposition shows that the syntactic approach was successful, long before agreement on the semantics of distribution was reached (Section 5).

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[20] W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford 1962, pp. 272-273.
[21] Thomas J. Richards, 'The Two Doctrines of Distribution' in: *Australian Journal of Philosophy* 49 (1979), pp. 290-302.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM AND THE 'PREDICATION OF A THING'

E.P. Bos

1. *Logical predication*

The main key to understand William of Ockham's thought is the sharp distinction he draws between the level of thinking *(ratio)* and that of things *(res)*. Many philosophers, especially after Ockham[1], draw this dividing line, but particularly Ockham keeps the two domains apart.

According to Ockham reality outside the knowing subject consists of individual things, both contingent things, that is: everything which God has created of his free will, and one necessary thing, God himself. Things of a general nature like the Platonic Ideas as conceived by the Medievals, do not exist in reality outside the human mind.

Our knowledge starts from and concerns individuals, otherwise it has no value. Traditionally, however, knowledge is associated with generality and, more specifically, with general natures that cannot be otherwise than they are (that is: that are necessary) and as such are not linked with matter. In the history of Medieval philosophy a problem arises: how is our intellect able to know these individuals, both material things such as horses, stones etcetera, and immaterial things, such as, on the one hand, acts of understanding, emotions etcetera, and, on the other hand, God and angels, substances without matter[2]?

Ockham says that the human intellect in this life can have direct knowledge of concrete individual things, such as horses, stones etcetera by way of what he labels '*intuitive cognition*', that is: incomplex cognition of terms, or of things to which the terms refer[3]. On the basis of this knowledge our intellect can form 'complex knowledge', that is, in Ockham's theory, a proposition about a concrete individual thing, or things. Such a proposition which says that something is the case or that something possesses a certain property, exists primarily in the understanding which is directed towards the thing[4] about which the proposition says something; secondarily the proposition exists in spoken or written language.

In this respect Ockham criticizes at least two other conceptions of the relation existing between knowledge and individual reality. First, he rejects the opinion of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent[5] according to whom the understanding knows individual things only indirectly, by way of turning the attention to the phantasm, in which it apprehends the universal (the *conversio ad phantasmata*, Thomas), or in a reflection on the data of sense-experience (*linea reflexa*, Henry of

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[1] So e.g. Marsilius of Inghen (see Bos, '*Het subject van de menselijke theologie*' in: *Praesidium Libertatis*, Filos. Reeks 13, pp. 269-277).

[2] Cf. De Rijk, *Het ongure individu*, Leiden 1983.

[3] See *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* I, p. 30, lin. 5 - p. 33, lin. 12), and many other texts in Ockham's works. References e.g. in Day, *Intuitive Cognition*, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. - Louvain, and Bérubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel*, Paris - Montréal 1964, pp. 259-277.

[4] The mental proposition can be called the 'depth-structure' of the spoken and written proposition. See e.g. Nuchelmans, *Wijsbegeerte en taal*, Meppel 1976, p. 170.

[5] See *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 3, q. 6 (*Opera Theol.* II, p. 483, lin. 15 - p. 492, lin. 13).

Ghent). Secondly, Ockham opposes the doctrine of the species which he finds in Duns Scotus' teachings. He denies that there is a general nature in individual things which our understanding knows as a *species*[6].

Ockham says that our understanding directly knows individual things and that these things do not possess any general nature. For intellectual knowledge it is not required that our intellect knows a general unchanging nature (because otherwise our immaterial intellect cannot know individuals in matter), but that our intellect receives things in an immaterial way[7]. Ockham defines knowledge of things as knowledge of things (with emphasis on the knowing subject), not as knowledge of things, according to which a nature outside the understanding is the criterion. According to Ockham, the act of understanding is primary.

The intellect can form propositions which are true of individual things: this 'to be true of' reflects Ockham's theory of supposition[8]. Truth cannot be found in the meaning of a term as such (for, according to Ockham's extensionalist semantics, 'horse' (be it in the mind, written or spoken) refers to horses of the past, present and future time), but in a proposition in which our intellect uses a term to refer to things in the past, present or future (e.g. 'this horse runs' refers to a horse in the present of which it is true to say that it is running).

In most of his works Ockham uses what can be called 'logical' predication. In order to think, speak or write about individual things the human intellect uses terms in a propositional context. Though in the proposition a term refers to an individual, generality is always associated with the term: it never looses its signification which is extensionally conceived by Ockham, as has been said above[9]. Our human way of talking about individuals is therefore always on a general level. If one says 'Socrates is white', the signification of white, viz. whiteness, that is, in Ockham's view, the totality of white things is the past, present and future, is always present. Only if Socrates alone would possess whiteness, the predicate 'white' would supposit precisely[10] for Socrates. This, however, is not the case: Plato e.g. is white as well.

Though our human knowledge of individual things is always on the level of generality, it should be remembered that because this generality is in the intellect, it is not therefore in reality. 'The intellect does not posit any thing'[11] is Ockham's phrase here. He sharply distinguishes between the levels of *ratio* and *res*, as has been said before[12]. He regards the mental name (*nomen mentale*) as the bearer of generality and for that reason he can be labelled a 'nominalist'[13]

With regard to the possibility of knowledge of individuals two restrictions should be made which, in my opinion, apply to all Medieval theories on the subject. First, the human understanding cannot know an individual as such: this kind of perfect knowledge is God's privilege[14]. Secondly: in the present state of man as *viator* ('pilgrim on his way to heaven') the

[6] See e.g. in *Quaestiones in II Sent.* q. 12 (*Opera Theol.* V, p. 256, lin. 8-9).
[7] See *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 3, q. 6, p. 493, lin. 15 - p. 494, lin. 7.
[8] See *Summa logicae* I, cap. 63 (*Opera Phil.* I, p. 193, lin. 4 - p. 194, lin. 35).
[9] See above, this page.
[10] See Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, cap. 63, p. 194, lin. 31.
[11] Cf. Pinborg, *Logik und Semantik*, Stuttgart 1972, p. 172.
[12] See above, p. 71.
[13] On this label, see e.g. Pelster, '*Nominales* und *Reales*' in: *Sophia* 111 (1945), pp. 154-161.
[14] See e.g. De Rijk, *Het ongure individu*, p. 20. On his page 12 De Rijk refers to Psalm 7:10 and Isaiah 49:16.

human intellect is limited in its knowledge of God. Only in heaven this intellect can have intuitive knowledge of God[15].

2. *Predication of a thing*

Although in most of his works Ockham favours 'logical' predication, in his earliest period he seems to have defended a 'realist' theory of predication, or at least, to have considered such a possibility. He mentions this kind of predication in two contexts which seem to be related:
1. In his analysis of what can be predicated of God. This analysis can be found in Ockham's *Commentary on the Sentences*.
2. In his discussion of the so-called 'sixth' predicable: individual. This discussion is presented in his *Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge* where Ockham comments on the five traditional predicables: *genus*, species, difference, property, accident.

The best text to enter into Ockham's view on the possibility of a realist predication is, to my mind, his *Commentary on the Sentences*, book I, prologue, question 1[16]. It should be noted here that the parts of the text between section-marks is not found in Manuscript A (Florence, *Bibl. Naz.*, conv. soppr. A.3.801); according to the modern editors Gál and Brown this manuscript gives the incomplete version of Ockham's *Commentary*[17] in contradistinction with the other manuscripts. I shall come back to this distinction below[18].

The text is taken from article 5 of question 1. In this article Ockham solves the main problem of the question: according to His absolute power God can cause in the intellect of a pilgrim evident knowledge of some theological truths, though perhaps not of other ones.

> *'Ad cuius intellectum est sciendum primo, quod praedicabilium de Deo aliquod est vera res extra animam, «secundum unam opinionem», quia quidquid potest intellectus intelligere simplici notitia, potest componere cum alio vel cum se ipso, dicendo 'hoc est hoc'. Aliquod autem praedicabile est conceptus habens tantum esse obiectivum, secundam unam opinionem, qui quidem vere potest praedicari de Deo, non pro se, sed pro re; et iste conceptus vel est simpliciter absolutus, vel connotativus*[19] *vel, secundum alios, respectivus. Exemplum primi: si praedicaretur a tali intellectu pater de Deo, «si tamen res possit praedicari», dicendo: Deus est pater vel paternitas vel Deus. Exemplum secundi dicendo: Deus est ens, Deus est intellectus, et sic de aliis. Exemplum tertii: Deus est creator vel creativus'.*

My translation[20]:

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[15] See *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 1, p. 72, lin. 13-1.
[16] p. 49, lin. 14 - p. 50, lin. 3.
[17] See the introduction to the *Scriptum in I Sent.* (*Opera Theol.* I, pp. 19*-23*).
[18] See below, p. 78.
[19] I have skipped the comma from the text for reasons given below, my note 22.
[20] Cf. Bos, *Willem van Ockham*, Weesp 1984, pp. 151-153.

> 'For a proper understanding <viz. of Ockham's solution of the main problem of the question> it should be noted first that some kind of predicates of God is a real thing outside the soul «according to one opinion». For, whatever the intellect can understand by way of a simple cognition, it can combine with another, or with itself, by saying 'this is this'. Some other kind of predicates are concepts, possessing only an objective being, according to one opinion; this concept can be truly predicated of God, not for itself, but for a thing; this concept is either simply absolute, or connotative or, according to others[21], relative. An example of the first kind of predicates is if father is predicated of God, «if, however, a thing can be predicated», by saying 'God is father or fatherhood or God. Examples of the second kind of predicates are: 'God is being', 'God is intellect' etcetera. An example of the third kind[22] is: 'God is creator' or 'God is creative'.

Another important text on the different kinds of predicates that can be said of God is in book I, question 2[23]. Further there are some smaller remarks in the *Commentary*[24]. These texts present to a great extent the same picture as the one cited above.

In the text above, Ockham says that one kind of predicates are a thing, another kind are concepts (I cannot discuss here the different kinds of concepts noted by Ockham). When predicates are concepts, then there is no disagreement with Ockham's conception of 'logical' predication as explained above. Here we find Ockham's usual distinction between the levels of *ratio* and *res*. However, this distinction seems to be annihilated by the conception of predication of a thing.

It is clear from this and other texts that in the case of predication of a thing the following examples are at issue: 'God (or the divine essence) is Father (or Fatherhood), is Son (or Sonship), is Holy Ghost (or Holy Ghostship), is three persons, is God'. All these predicates concern the Trinity (apart from the identity statement 'God is God'). The properties of the divine nature differ formally, but all examples (including 'God is God') primarily concern God himself. The properties of the Trinity which necessarily flow from God's essence within Him (*ad intra*) do not divide His unity. As a thing (*res*) God is the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, even if there is a formal distinction between the persons[25]. This unity of essence and Fatherhood cannot be found in human beings, because a man may or may not be a father. In book I, question 2 Ockham says in a text within section-mark «...»[26], that in the case of predication of a thing with respect to divine things (*praedicatio rei in divinis*) the act of

[21] The modern editors refer to John of Reading (ca. 1285-1346, a supporter of Duns Scotus); see *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 49, note 2.

[22] Ockham does not seem to be very precise here: the example of the third kind is part of the second kind (viz. connotative or relative predicates) mentioned above.

[23] p. 109, lin. 12 - p. 111, lin. 4.

[24] Notably *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 1, p. 51, lin. 15-24 and p. 72, lin. 19 - p. 73, lin. 1.

[25] As is well known, Ockham rejects the formal distinction on the part of the thing (distinctio formalis a parte rei) in all respects except with regard to the Trinity. See e.g. Leff, *Willem of Ockham*, Manchester 1975, pp. 411-436. A recent study on conceptions on the Trinity in relation to logic in some Medieval philosophers (among which is Ockham) is by Maierù, 'A propos de la doctrine' in: *Medieval Semantics*, Nijmegen 1985.

[26] See p. 110, lin.19-24.

understanding is not the subject or predicate of a proposition, but the *obiectum intellectionis*, by which he apparently means in this case: the thing in reality. Ockham considers this a plausible theory.

In the case of the *praedicatio rei in divinis* Ockham upholds the thesis that the intellect, because it can apprehend things in reality by a simple cognition, can combine these things with themselves or with another thing[27]. Here a proposition is a combination of things intended, and the mental, spoken or written proposition refers ultimately to the proposition in which a thing is predicated. In some way thought and things are combined: our knowledge possesses a primary, unadulterated picture of reality[28]. When speaking of predication of a thing, Ockham can be labelled a 'realist'.

Ockham uses the *praedicatio rei* for God, that is: for an individual thing. There is no question of the predication of one thing over another, as Ockham seems to suggest by his words '*cum alio*': Ockham makes his intention clear by his example '*hoc est hoc*'('this thing is this thing'). God is, in his opinion, an absolute simple thing.

In his question 2 of book I[29] Ockham also points out that this *praedicatio rei in divinis* is not possible for man in the present state (*pro statu isto*), in this time (*pro nunc*), according to the laws which are valid in the present creation (*de lege communi*). The predication of a thing will be possible for our intellect if man stands face to face with God. Then supreme evidence on the basis of unadulterated intuitive cognition is possible.

As has been pointed out above, the *praedicatio rei in divinis* concerns an individual, viz. God. In his *Commentary (expositio) on Porphyry's book on the predicables*[30], which was written, according to the modern editors[31], after the *Commentary on the Sentences*, probably between 1321 and 1324, Ockham again mentions the possibility of the *praedicatio rei*, in the context of his view on *individuum* ('individual'). In the chapter on *genus*, and more specifically in the text on the genus *substance*, he says[32] that some predicables are said of one thing only, e.g. Socrates or this, other predicables are said of more than one: *genus, species, difference, property, accident*. Ockham notes that this division is not the primary division of things within the *genus* substance, but of nouns or concepts, or intentions of the soul: this is certainly true of the five 'classical' predicables. Many philosophers have doubts, however, about the 'predicable' *individuum*, Ockham continues, viz. if a thing outside the intellect can be predicate, or can be subject, of a proposition[33].

In his *Commentary on Porphyry's text* Ockham gives five notes to answer the question what should be understood by individual and how one individual differs from another[34]. For the present purpose it is sufficient to note that in Ockham's view Porphyry sometimes means by 'individuum' the name, sometimes the thing itself. Individuals differ from each other

[27] See above, p. 73.
[28] Note that according to a common Medieval view, when God thinks of things, he thinks realities.
[29] p. 110, lin. 8-10.
[30] *Opera Phil.* II, pp. 3-131.
[31] Introduction, p. 14*.
[32] p. 23, lin. 1-7.
[33] p. 24, lin. 12-13.
[34] p. 52, lin. 14 - p. 53, lin. 62.

essentialiter, that is, in their substance[35]. Because of the properties which an individual substance possesses (not: which an individual substance is) the individuals are better known to us human beings. From another point of view we may detect in Ockham's works on ambiguity in Ockham's works as regards his conception of individuum.

In his *Commentary (expositio) on Aristotle's Categories*, Ockham points out[36] that Boethius often interprets *subiectum* as the subject-term of a proposition but some times as the underlying subject in reality. For sometimes a thing is the subject of another thing: e.g. Socrates is the bearer of his whiteness. Therefore, the name 'white' is predicated of the name 'Socrates'. In this text one also obtains a glimpse of a *praedicatio rei*, because '*subiectum*' is explicitly said not to be the subject-term of a proposition. However, this example is less clearcut than the mentioned above.

In his *Handbook of Logic (Summa logicae)* which he definitely compiled *after* the *Commentary on the Sentences* and after the *Commentary on Porphyry's Introduction*[37], Ockham does not mention the *praedicatio rei* when speaking about individuals (God or creatures). Ockham upholds the logical theory of predication in the sense I have explained above: general terms (primarily in the mind, secondarily spoken or written) *supposit* for individuals[38].

In his *Quodlibeta*, written in Avignon about 1325[39], Ockham again mentions a realist conception of predication which bears some resemblance to the *praedicatio rei*. In the *Quodlibet* III, 12[40] the problem is whether a mental proposition is composed of things or concepts. Without showing any hesitation, Ockham defends the view that a mental proposition is composed of concepts. I cannot discuss his arguments (especially from article 2 of the *Quodlibet*: besides, in his book *The Theory of the Proposition* Nuchelmans has examined the most important ones[41]: a proposition is not e.g. a man to which it refers. Furthermore, in 'the dog eats bread' (*canis comedit panem*), the subject-term does not eat the predicate-term, Ockham says).

Here, I wish to point to one of Ockham's arguments Nuchelmans does not examine, viz. the seventh: If 'the divine intellect is the divine substance' (*intellectus divinus est divina essentia*) were composed of things, the same would be said about itself and the proposition would lose its signification. Here Ockham considers the predication in the logical not in the realist sense, when talking about God.

To sum up: in the earliest period of his works, Ockham seems to uphold a theory of realist predication which is not compatible with his conception of logical predication as he uses it in his other and later works, e.g. in the *Summa logicae* and the *Quodlibeta*. It should be noted that in his *Commentary on the Sentences* Ockham shows hesitation. Between the sectionmarks he adds: 'if a thing can be predicated'. To my mind these kinds of insertion point to a *later revision* of the *Commentary* by Ockham, not to a *complete version* as the modern editors think[42].

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[35] 'Essentialiter' does not mean here 'essentially' as in e.g. Thomas Aquinas.
[36] *Opera Phil.* II, p. 170, lin. 211-216.
[37] Introduction, p. 48*.
[38] See also above, p. 72.
[39] Introduction, p. 40*-41*.
[40] *Opera Theol.* IX, p. 246, lin. 1 - p. 250, lin. 98. In the early print Strasbourg 1491 (reprint Louvain 1962) this is *Quodlibet* III, q. 6.
[41] pp. 219-220.
[42] The other insertions in the text point in the same direction, viz. the insertions which give Ockham's later view

In his *Commentary on the Sentences* Ockham uses the theory of realist predication for speaking about God. In his *Commentary on the Old Logic* Ockham merely mentions the *praedicato rei* in the case of individuals in general terms where he explains Aristotle's and Porphyry's works.

3. *Other medievals on the 'predication of a thing'*

As to Ockham's own view of the *praedicatio rei* in the sense I have tried to explain above, one might ask whom he follows in this respect. In his *Commentary on the Old logic* he ascribes the *praedicatio rei* to many philosophers: who does he have in mind? In the *Quodlibeta* he rejects the view that a mental proposition consists of things: who does he criticize?

It is not easy to solve these questions. To start with the last one: in his *Quodlibeta* Ockham probably criticizes Walter Burley (ca. 1275-1344/5). The modern editor Wey refers to Burley in a note[43]. Nuchelmans thinks that no doubt Burley is the object of Ockham's criticism[44]; Nuchelmans notes, however, that Burley uses the expression *propositio in re* which is not mentioned by Ockham. In this connection Nuchelmans refers to Burley's *Commentary (expositio) on Aristotle's Categories*. This work dates 1337, however, as Nuchelmans himself says[45] following Pinborg[46]. Brown confirms this date[47]. Burley's *Commentary (quaestiones) on the De Interpretatione* would better qualify as the object of Ockham's criticism, because this work was written before Ockham's *Commentary on the Sentences*, viz. in 1301[48]. In his third question[49] Burley says that a proposition in the mind is composed of the things of which the intellect judges that they are the same or diverse. This is not a real composition, like a house consisting of wood and stones, but an intellectual composition[50]. In the *Quodlibeta* Ockham is far from representing Burley's position exactly. Other philosophers who could be the target of Ockham's criticism are Walter Chatton (1285-1344[51]), or perhaps a modist, e.g. Ralph Brito (d. 1320), who says that the subject of the proposition 'man is an animal' is a real man, not a man as known[52].

The idea of a specific kind of connection between thought and thing can already be found in

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on the status of universals. See e.g. *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 1, p. 30, lin. 16 - p. 31, lin. 3.

[43] p. 246, Wey points to Burley, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, prologus f. 18a.

[44] Nuchelmans, *Theory of the Proposition*, Amsterdam - London 1973, p. 220.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Pinborg, 'Walter Burley' in: *Classica et Mediaevalia* 28 (1976), p. 402.

[47] See his introduction to *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, ed. S. F. Brown, in: *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), p. 200

[48] *Ibid.* p. 200. On his p. 201, Brown quotes M°CCC°P° from the manuscript. Does 'p' stand for '4' as would be possible from the point of view of palaeography? If so, the year would be 1304.

[49] *Ibid.* p. 209 ff. (3.553).

[50] *Ibid.* p. 250 (3.554).

[51] Cf. Pinborg, 'Walter Burley', p. 401.

[52] Cf. Pinborg, 'Zum Begriff der *Intentio secunda*' in: *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-âge grec et latin*, 13 (1974), p. 53

[53] Cf. Pinborg, 'Walter Burley', p. 403.

Augustine. Burley in fact refers to the churchfather[53]. In his *On Trinity* [54] Augustine says that when e.g. a stone is seen, three things can be distinguished: 1) the thing that is seen (viz. the stone itself); 2) the act of seeing, which is not there before someone sees the stone; 3) the intention of the soul retains the act of seeing in the thing and makes them into a composition which itself is not the stone or the act of seeing.

4. *Secondary literature*

In the secondary literature the conception of a *praedicatio rei* in Ockham's works has scarcely been noticed, and if so, insufficiently. More than half a century ago, E. Hochstetter has pointed to this kind of predication in Ockham, but he failed to see its relation to Ockham's conception of an individual, perhaps because he did not consult all relevant texts. He says[55] that the conception of the *praedicatio rei* was already advocated by John of Salisbury, who referred to Aristotle in this respect, and that Pseudo-Hrabanus Maurus as well as Abelard critisized the idea. Hochstetter does not give any reference, however. He presumes Ockham is dependent on Duns Scotus for this kind of predication. To my mind this is not completely impossible[56], but, again, Hochstetter does not adduce texts to support his surmise.

R. Guelley[57] also mentions the *predicatio rei* in Ockham, but he does not interpret it correctly, I think. He notes that, according to Ockham, the *predicatio rei in divinis* is not possible for the human intellect in this life, but he fails to appreciate that a specific kind of predication is involved. In his explanation of Ockham's text that the *obiectum intellectionis* is the subject or predicate of a proposition Guelley opines that Ockham's conception of universals as objects of thought (*obiective*) is at issue (that is: Ockham's first conception of the status of universals), which is here not the case[58].

T. de Andrés, who has written a very good book on Ockham's nominalism as a philosophy of language[59], merely repeats Hochstetter's argument on the subject.

G. Leff[60] often mentions a 'predication of things', but he does not make clear in what way it differs from logical predication.

The modern editors of Ockham's *Commentary on the Sentences*, G. Gál and S. Brown, refer in their notes added to the texts[61] in which Ockham mentions the *praedicatio rei*, to Ockham's later conception of universals as subjective beings existing as entities in the soul[62]. But according to Ockham's later conception *all* concepts are a kind of things, and then the contrast between

[53] Cf. Pinborg, 'Walter Burley', p. 403.
[54] XI, 2, ed. W.J. Mountain, Turnhout 1968, p. 334, lin. 1-9.
[55] *Studien zur Metaphysik*, Berlin 1927, p. 80. Cf. Bos, *Willem van Ockham*, p. 150.
[56] In a certain way, Duns Scotus advocates a theory of a *compositio rerum* as bearer of truth and falsity. See Duns Scotus, *In duos libros Perihermeneias* q. 2, *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding-Vivès I, p. 543b.
[57] Guelluy, *Philosophie et théologie*, Louvain - Paris 1947, pp. 155-157.
[58] p. 74
[59] *El nominalismo de Guillermo de Ockham como filosofía del languaje*, Madrid 1969, pp. 158-159.
[60] *William of Ockham*, pp. 360-362.
[61] See above, p. 73.
[62] The reference on p. 49, note 49 and on p. 110, note 2 is to p. 30, note 3.

predicates as things and concepts made by Ockham, loses its significance. By the way, the modern editors do refer in another note to the possibility of a composition of things in mental propositions as discussed in the *Quodlibeta* [63].

[63] On p.50, note 1.

IV THEORY OF SCIENCE

THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
Duns Scotus and Ockham on the formal object of scientific knowledge

H.A. Krop

It is considered as most unfortunate that no commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics written by Ockham has been handed down to us[1]. The student of his works only has access to Ockham's metaphysical views indirectly[2], e.g. in the second *quaestio* of the Prologue of his commentary on the *Sentences*. On the face of it this *quaestio* concerns only a theological problem, viz. the scientific status of evident theological knowledge. In Ockham's view the only evident theological knowledge is the self-knowledge of God and the theological knowledge of the *beati*, i. e. the blessed in heaven face to face with God. Man after the Fall cannot acquire evident theological knowledge[3]; hence, the second *quaestio* is not concerned with human theology[4]. Ockham unfolds his view in his discussion of Duns Scotus' opinion on the Self-knowledge of God. This discussion should be of interest to the philosopher, because there are fundamental metaphysical presuppositions at stake. According to Duns Scotus the sequence of premises and conclusions within the framework of scientific knowledge such as physics or geometry reflects the structure of their formal object. E.g. the line's property of 'being the shortest connection between two points' precedes any other property of the line, which was considered to be the formal object of geometry. So, 'the straight line is the shortest connection between two points' is an axiom of geometry and any other proposition such as 'the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180°' is not.

This presupposition of Scotus' that the order of scientific knowledge reflects the order of its formal object is vehemently rejected by Ockham in the second *quaestio* of the Prologue[5]. Also in this respect there was a sharp distinction between the level of thinking and that of things.

Duns Scotus' view
a) *Scotus' definition of a 'science' sensu stricto*

In the Prologues of the *Reportata* and the *Ordinatio* Scotus discusses the scientific status of God's theology. In the *Reportata* he first gives some definitions of science and of the object of a

[1] E.g. Maurer, 'Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science' in: *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), p. 109.
[2] In 'The Metaphysics of Ockham' in: *Collected Articles*, Louvain - Paderborn 1958, pp. 373-376 Boehner squared with the view that Ockham has no metaphysics.
[3] I. e. factually. *Scriptum in Sent.* prologus q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* I, pp. 48-49) and *Quodlibeta* V q. 1. Cf. Leff, *William of Ockham*, Manchester 1975, pp. 359-360.
[4] Ockham dedicates a special *quaestio* to the problem of the scientific status of human theology.
[5] In several other places of his prologue, particularly in the *quaestiones* 8 en 9 on the formal object (*subiectum primum*) and unity of science, Ockham attacks this presupposition as well.

science[6].

In the Middle Ages several clearly distinguished forms of knowledge were called *scientia*. As a rule one of these forms was called 'science' in a strict sense and was defined with reference to a text from Aristotle's *Analytica Posteriora*[7]. Duns Scotus' definition runs as follows:
Science in a strict sense is knowlegde of a truth which is

1) certain,
2) necessary, or about a necessary object[8].
3) evident. This evidence is based on a cause[9] which is prior in evidence, not on the knowledge of the terms. Scientific knowledge concerns a truth which is evident because of its premises.
4) This truth must form the conclusion of a syllogism[10].

The difference between the third and fourth conditions seems mysterious at first. These conditions appeer to be the same. For, as is stated in the explanation of the third condition, a proposition is known evidently either immediately, i.e. in virtue of the terms used, or mediately, i.e. if it can be deduced from evident premises in a syllogistic discourse. So, if a truth is known mediately (and not by means of its terms) it must be be deduced from premises (and form the conclusion of a syllogism)[11]. The nature of the difference between conditions three and four becomes even more obscure, when we read Scotus' remark in the *Reportata*, that in itself the third clause of the definition is sufficient to distinguish science *sensu stricto* from other forms of knowledge[12]. This would make condition four superfluous.

b) *The complex structure of the formal object (subiectum) of a science*

A little further in the text Scotus himself gives the clue to the answer. "The fourth clause of the definition of science is 'a sign of the imperfection' of scientific knowledge: The discursive character of scientific knowledge does not pertain to science as such". With the last part of this

[6] For the purpose of this article it is not strictly necessary to discuss the medieval terminology. So, for the sake of convenience the term 'formal object of a science' is used in its modern sense, viz. the thing(s) in the outside world studied in a science.
[7] *Analytica Posteriora* I c. 2, 71 b 20-23.
[8] I shall not go into the first conditions.
[9] A premise. A premise was considered to be a cause of the knowledge of the conclusion.
[10] *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a. 1, *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding-Vivès XXII, nr. 4: "Notitia evidentiae posterioris causata a priore per discursum syllogisticum". The other texts in the authentic works of Duns Scotus in which this definition of science without important variants can be found are *Lectura*, prologus q. 3, ed. Vaticana XVI § 107; *Ordinatio*, prologus p. 4, q. 1, ed. Vaticana I § 208 and III d. 24 q. un., *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding-Vivès XV, nr. 13 .
[11] Ockham unites the third and fourth condition of the definition of science. In his opinion, scientific knowledge must be 1) evident and 2) of a necessary truth; 3) The knowledge must be of a conclusion deduced from premises in a syllogism. Cf. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, Berlin 1969, pp. 245-260
[12] *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a. 1, nr. 4: "Tertia conditio est propria .. distinguens scientiam ab intellectu principiorum, quia iste est veri habentis evidentiam ex terminis"

remark Scotus wishes to say that the necessity of syllogistic acquisition of scientific knowledge as stipulated in the fourth clause of the definition does not result from the formal object (or *subiectum*) or a science as such, but is caused by the object in relation to the knowing intellect. Only an intellect that is forced to reason and to procede from the known to the unknown acquires scientific knowledge *sensu stricto*[13]. So, according to condition four only an imperfect, human intellect is able to acquire scientific knowledge.

The aspects of scientific knowledge stipulated by the first three clauses of the definition, Scotus affirms, result from knowing the formal object as such of the science. That is why, he continues, the object of a science must fulfill certain requirements. First it is to be conceived with several concepts[14]. One of these concepts is called *quidditativus*, because by means of this type of concept precisely the essence is conceived, and the others are called *denominativi*[15]. In this context a denominative concept comes down to a concept by means of which the object is not conceived in its essence. Such concepts are more or less 'denominative' according to their relation with the essential concept, e.g. the concepts 'white', 'animal', 'bald', 'thing' etc. which refer to a well-known white and bald scholar instead of 'man'. These denominative concepts are ordered in a hierarchic way according to their approximation of the essential concept. In our example the highest position in the order of the concepts is occupied by 'man' and the lowest by 'thing'.

The formal object of a science not only produces this order of concepts, but also an hierarchy of truths. "Concerning the object of *subiectum* there are necessary truths ordered according to their evidence"[16].

In line with his definition of science Scotus defines the formal object as thàt object which contains primarily and virtually the knowledge of all truths of the science[17]. For the objects, or truths of the science, have an essential order in the sequence of knowing them[18]. Scotus proves this as follows. First premises are known by the terms used. These terms are known by knowing the formal object of the science. From these first premises follow all the conclusions pertaining to that science. So in Duns Scotus' view the succession of knowing scientific truths reflects the structure of its formal object. In order to understand this assertion one should keep in mind that according to Duns Scotus the things studied in a science are somehow or other to be considered 'part' of the formal object. An example to elucidate Duns Scotus' view is the human body as the formal object of medical science. Also another thing, such as a physic, should be considered part of it. A truth about a physic, Duns Scotus would contend, is a less essential medical truth than a truth which directly pertains to the human body as such, *because* a physic occupies a lower rank in the structure of the formal object of medicine, the human body. This

[13] *Ibid.*: "Quarta conditio ... non convenit scientiae, nisi in illo intellectu, cui convenit discurrere et procedere a noto ad ignotum"

[14] *Ibid.*: "De nullo potest aliud sciri, nisi de quo possunt plures conceptus haberi".

[15] For the term *denominativus*, see Guelluy, *Philosophie et Théologie*, Louvain - Paris 1947, pp. 144-146.

[16] *Ibid.*: "Unde tres primae conditiones consequuntur scientiae ex per se ratione subjecti et objecti, de quo natae sunt veritates necessariae esse in evidentia ordinatae. Quartum non ex ratione objecti, sed ex comparatione ad intellectum talem vel talem quem perficit". The nature of the object makes science as a structured whole of truths possible.

[17] *Ordinatio*, prologus q. 3, § 142 en *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a. 1, nr. 5.

[18] *Ibid.*: "Cognoscibilia autem cuiusque scientiae habent ordinem essentialem inter se in cognoscibilitate".

contention is sharply attacked by Ockham.

Concluding this section one could say that condition three concerns the formal object of a science and condition four the syllogistic aquisition of scientific knowledge. That these conditions do not amount to the same thing, Scotus explains in the *Reportata* with the example of God's self-knowledge.

c) *God's self-knowledge*

In Scotus' view God's self-knowledge is not a science. He stresses this several times[19]. Therefore it is quite remarkable that according to Ockham Scotus considers God's theology a science in a strict sense[20].

Like almost all medieval theologians Scotus regards God's intellect as knowing all things immediately and not by syllogistic discourse[21]. He argues as follows: discourse implies a potentiality in the arguing intellect. Such an intellect is actualized in the process of knowing the objects involved[22]. I shall give an example to elucidate Scotus' text. Consider the syllogism:

A triangle is a geometrical figure
An isosceles is a triangle
An isosceles is a geometrical figure

The three terms of this syllogism refer to a figure, an isosceles and triangle, the three things known in the outside world[23]. So, the object of the science containing this syllogism, i.e. geometry, cannot be absolutely simple.

However, the only object which can actualize God's intellect, i.e. stimulate His intellect to know, is God's essence, because no finite thing can make something infinite perfect. God knows all things immediately. So, God's self-knowledge does not fulfill the fourth condition of the definition of science *sensu stricto*.

However, Scotus continues, God's self-knowledge fulfills the other three conditions of science. Generally, medieval theologians considered God's knowledge to be certain and necessary, therefore the fulfillment of the first two conditions causes no problem. Furthermore, His essence is an object the knowledge of which fullfills the third condition, because notwithstanding its simplicity it contains an order. Scotus' proof occupies the second part of the

[19] *Ordinatio*, prologus p. 4, q. 1, § 208: "Theologia in se non est scientia, quantum ad ultimam conditionem scientiae".

[20] *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2 (*Opera Theol.* I, p. 98): "Ideo est alia opinio Doctoris Subtilis quod de talibus veritatibus (i.e. evidently known theological truths) potest esse scientia propria dicta".

[21] E.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 7: "Dicendum quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus".

[22] *Ordinatio*, prologus p. 4, q. 1, § 208 and *In Metaphysicam* I, q. 1, *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding-Vivès VII nr. 40: "sed non est sibi (i.e. God) scientia, quia non est ex notitia sui discursive de aliis acquisita; quamvis enim sciat alia esse per ipsum, non tamen scit ea".

[23] At least three things are involved in a syllogism. So, the link 'science' has with the syllogism implies a structured whole of its object. The object of a science should have 'parts', 'principles', 'properties' etc. (Sometimes, these parts are really distinct, sometimes only conceptually. Cf. Honnefelder, *Ens inquantum ens*, Münster 1979, pp. 103-104). This presupposition is a standardargument against the scientific status of the theology, cf. Köpf, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie*, Tübingen 1974, pp. 131-139.

first *quaestio* of the *Reportata*'s Prologue. His proof is in three steps.

1. A perfect intellect conceives God's essence with several concepts[24]
2. God's essence is the formal object of His Self-knowledge
3. The conceptual order reflects the ontological order in God.

1. *A perfect intellect conceives God's essence with several concepts*

According to Duns Scotus God conceives Himself with different concepts. His proof runs as follows: although in God no real distinctions exist, He can conceive Himself with several concepts[25]. It is not necessary that God's intellect relates His essence to external things. Duns Scotus refutes the view that God's simplicity would lead to one concept of God *in se*, i.e. without its relation to external things, creation. This view, probably held by Thomas Aquinas[26], is not correct according to Duns Scotus, because God's trinity implies that He conceives Himself with several concepts without the existence of creation. Moreover, Scotus continues, God must know Himself with several concepts, otherwise His intellect in its knowing would depend on creation[27].

2. *God's essence is the formal object of His self-knowledge*

Scotus' second thesis is that God's essence as such is the formal object of God's Self-knowledge, or, in other words, God's own theology, because His essence is the aspect (*ratio*)[28]

[24] It goes without saying that the human, imperfect intellect conceives God with several concepts. *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1 a. 3, nr. 16: "Ergo intellectus viatoris, qui non potest illas (perfectiones Dei) unite concipere ut sunt in se, movetur ad formandum distinctos conceptus de illis, proportionales conceptibus istarum perfectionum *in creaturis, quibus tamen pluribus formatis multipliciter quis perfecte concipit illud unum perfecte*, et perfectiones unitas in ipso; et sic intellectus viatoris potest habere de Deo conceptum aliquem quasi quidditativum et alios quasi passionum". Man knows God not directly, but by means of creation.

[25] *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a. 3, nr. 17-37.

[26] In the margin of the Vivès-edition (XXII, p. 16b) the annotator refers to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2. In this article Thomas writes: "Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra.<...>. Et sic manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo, est idem essentiae secundum rem; et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae".
In *Ordinatio* I d. 8, q. 4, ed. Vaticana IV § 60 Duns Scotus quotes a text of Henry of Ghent from his *Quodlibeta* V q. 1: "Quandocumque in uno extremo est differentia rationis cui correspondet in alio extremo differentia realis, distinctio vel differentia sumitur per comparationem ad distincta realiter (Exemplum de dextra et sinistra in columna quae sumitur per respectum ad distinctionem realem in animali)". Ed. Paris 1518, f. 150 A-151 E. Henry's view in this text ressembles Scotus' crucial thesis, cf. p. 86-87.

[27] In Ockhams presentation of Scotus' view (p. 102) the example of 'being' is given.'Being in itself' can be compared with God in the respect that is not composed, but notwithstanding its real simplicity, it is the object of a science, viz. metaphysics. The editors of the Ockham text refer to *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a.3, nr.37 and q. 1, a. 4, nr. 49. Although the example of 'being' is not discussed in those texts. (nr. 37 discusses the *transcendentia verum* and *bonum*), they certainly agree with Scotus' view, cf. *Ordinatio*, prologus q. 3, § 191.

[28] Duns considers all things in God, such as His will, His intellect and His *notiones* (ideas) to be aspects of His essence. According to Duns Scotus, aspects or *rationes* are things in reality, although sometimes only separable by the knowing intellect, e.g. aspects of being like 'good', 'true' etc.

by which all His self-knowledge is virtually included. Scotus proves this as follows: suppose the aspects of God's essence are really distinct and not only rationally[29]. In that case the aspect of His essence would be primary, as is the case with the human body in medicine. For, our knowledge of all objects of medicine depends on our knowledge of the human body. The order, Scotus continues, existing between really distinct objects, also exists between those objects, if they were only rationally distinct.

In the *Reportata* Duns Scotus first of all tries to prove that the knowledge of God's essence is prior to the knowledge of God's other aspects. For example: in the second argument of this section Scotus states that in general essential knowledge is prior to all other knowledge of something. So, God's essence is the primary object of His Self-knowledge.

Furthermore, to be the formal object of God's Self-knowledge it is required that His essence includes all His self-knowledge. This is proved in the Prologue of the *Ordinatio*[30]. As is said before, the only object which is capable to stimulate the Divine intellect to know is the infinite Divine essence, because no finite object is able to stimulate it. Therefore, the Divine essence is the means by which God knows. So, at first the Divine intellect knows the Divine essence itself, secondly all the *quidditates* present in this essence, i. e. the *quidditates* of all things created and uncreated, and thirdly all the truths that can be formed about these *quidditates*[31]. God's theology contains all possible knowledge, which is virtually included in His essence. Therefore God's essence is the formal object of God's theology.

3. *The conceptual order reflects the ontological order in God*

The last stage of Scotus' argument concerns the correspondance between the ontological and conceptual order.

In the last section we saw that in God there exists an order of aspects, although He is absolutely simple. This order is illustrated by the following example[32]: "if the aspects in God were really distinct, perfect memory would include intellect, an object present, an act of the intellect, an act expressing the declarative knowledge of this object which is saying and the knowledge produced by this act, which is the Word. So, memory would be first, saying second and the Word third. A similar sequence could be argued for in the case of the will and the Ghost"[33]. A detailled discussion of this passage would bring us too far in the field of theology, but we can see that Scotus concludes the order of aspects in God from the analogy with a being like man, in which memory, knowledge and intellect are really distinct.

In establishing the order of aspects in God, Scotus also invokes the order of concepts of these

[29] *Reportata Par.* prologus q.1, a.4, nr. 39. In view of God's simplicity, no real distinction between God's aspects exists. They are *entia rationis*, as far as they are thought by God.
A discussion of the ontological kind of the distinction between the aspects in God falls outside the scope of this article. In *Ordinatio* I, d. 8, q. 4 Duns Scotus says that between God's perfections there exists a *formal distinction*. However, it should be noticed that in de *Reportata Par.* Duns Scotus does not make use of the formal distinction, a fact acknowledged by Ockham in his *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 105.
[30] q. 3, § 200/1 en § 206.
[31] According to § 200 this order of knowledge in God is compatible with the non-discursiveness.
[32] Quoted by Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 100.
[33] *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a. 4, nr. 44 (Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 100).

aspects. E.g. in the Prologue of the *Ordinatio* he refutes the opinion that Christ as both God and man is the formal object of theology. One of his arguments starts from the idea that the formal object offers the means to know the truths of a science. Scotus says that one can form the theological proposition "Christ is incarnated" without knowing that Christ has become a man, because the predicate "is incarnated" is predicated of the Word and Christ's aspect of the Word precedes the aspect of His manhood. For we can conceive Christ as Word, without first conceiving Him as man[34].

This text leads us to Scotus' thesis, that the order of concepts reflects the order of His aspects. "The sequence or order in which things can be known is the same as it would be were they really distinct. It makes no difference how the mental existence of one is to be distinguished from that of the other. But if nature, intellect, and external power were really distinct from one another, their order or sequence would be the following: 1) the nature, because it has 2) such an intellect and 3) such a will, would be 4) externally potent in the way that it is. Therefore, no matter what kind of distinction exists between these things, their order of knowability would be the same[35].

In the order of concepts of God the quidditive concept of His essence comes first, the concepts of His essential properties follow and after that the concepts of the properties of His persons. For the more immediate is an aspect to the Divine essence, the more prior is the concept of that aspect[36].

Concluding one could say that according to Duns Scotus God's self-knowledge is not a science, although His knowledge is ordered in accordance with the order of His aspects.

The metaphysical presuppositions which play an important part in Duns Scotus' view are:

1) The complex structure of the objects of science in reality, even of God and being.

2) The correspondence between the ontological and conceptual order.

These presuppositions are rejected by Ockham in the second *quaestio* of the Prologue.

Ockham's view

a. *The scientific status of evident theological knowledge*

Before discussing Ockham's criticism of Duns Scotus I shall briefly deal with his opinion on the

[34] *Ordinatio*, prologus q. 3, § 180: "Patet quod non potest esse humanitatis ratio subiecti repectu primae passionis quae est 'esse incarnatum', quia illud dicitur de Verbo non praeintellecta humanitate in ipso ut subiecto; haec est ratio prima".

[35] *Quodlibeta* 7, *Opera omnia*, ed. Wadding-Vivès XXII, nr. 5 (Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 102): "Qualis est ordo realis inter aliqua si sint distincta realiter, talis est ordo cognoscibilitatis inder eadem qualitercumque sint distincta in esse cognoscibili". The quotation in the main text is from the translation by Alluntis and Wolter. The seventh *quaestio* concerns the possibility of proving the proposition 'God is almighty' a priori. However, Duns Scotus does not say that God's knowledge of this truth is a science.

[36] *Reportata Par.* prologus q. 1, a. 4, nr. 43 (Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 99): "Ordo est inter rationes sub quibus Deus est conceptibilis, ita quod ratio essentiae est omnino prima et aliae sequentes sunt priores aut posteriores secundum quod huic rationi sunt propinquiores aut ab ipsa remotiores". Cf. also the subject-matter of *quaestio* 1 of the *Quodlibeta*: "What in divine things is more immediate to the divine essence, the essential or the notional?"

status of evident theological knowledge[37]. Ockham distinguishes between groups of predicates of evident theological propositions. The first group is formed by the concepts of essential properties of God, e.g. *paternitas*[38], the second by concepts of properties of His persons and the third by concepts predicable of both God and creatures, but predicated of God *in quid*, e.g. 'wise', 'good', 'being'[39]. All theological propositions with this type of predicate are immediate, because subject and predicate have the same denotation, viz. God. They cannot be proved in a syllogism. For if subject and predicate refer to the same thing in reality, no middle can be found to demonstrate the predicate of the subject[40]. So, according to Ockham, the knowledge of this kind of theological propositions is not a science[41].

The fourth and fifth kinds of predicates are formed by negative and connotative concepts. Negative concepts predicable of God are, for example, '*in*finite', '*im*mortal'. Connotative concepts are 'creative', 'omnipotent' or 'good' in its transcendent sense, because these concepts connote a relation with creation.

Theological propositions with concepts that are predicable of God and creation, can in principle be proved. Therefore, evident knowledge of these propositions would constitute a science, because they are *dubitabiles* and can be proved in a syllogistic discourse. Ockham discusses the example of the proposition "God is good". If 'good' is used as a concept, which is predicable of God and creatures, the middle to prove the predicate 'good' of God is 'being'. However, if these common concepts are used *in quid* and predicated only of God, these propositions are immediate and cannot be proved. For predicate and subject refer to the same

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[37] For a more detailed account see Guelluy, *Philosophie et Théologie*, pp. 157-164 and Leff, *William of Ockham*, pp. 362-365.

[38] If *paternitas* in "God is the Father" is a concept and not a thing predicated of God. For a discussion of Ockham's view on the *praedicatio rei*, see the article of E.P. Bos in this volume. I disagree with Leff's remark (*op. cit.* p. 362) that "things predicated to God cannot be known naturally, but concepts can", for certain concepts cannot be naturally known as well.

[39] I. e. only to God, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 114. These common concepts can be taken in two senses, viz. *in quid* and connotatively. This appears from what Ockham says on p. 114, where he discusses an argument with 'good' in the first sense and on p. 115 in the second.

[40] *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 111: "Impossibile est quod aliqua sint idem realiter, et intuitive vel abstractive - distincte tamen - intelligantur et quod dubitetur de identitate eorum. Quia si aliqua propositio sit per se nota, illa erit maxime in qua praedicatur idem realiter de eodem realiter. Sed essentia divina est eadem realiter cum quolibet quod est realiter Deus. Igitur nulla talis propositio est dubitabilis, nec per consequens demonstrabilis. Secundo, omne quod demonstratur de aliquo, per prius praedicatur de alio per quod demonstratur".
Only if the subject- and the predicate-term refer to distinct things, which can be known independently, a proposition is demonstrable, cf. Prologue q. 3; Leff, *William of Ockham*, pp. 308-9 and Webering, *Theory of Demonstration*, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1953, pp. 125-133. Otherwise a proposition is immediate. Terms to be known independently, need to refer to things which are really distinct.
If a categorical and universal statement is to be demonstrated, the order of concepts must be, according to Ockham, the following:
1) One concept is more universal than the other. For example a 'triangle' and an 'isosceles'.
2) One concept is of a whole and the other concept of a part. For example 'man' and 'intellect'.
3) One concept is of a subject and the other of an accident. For example 'warm' and 'making warm'.
4) One concept is of a subject and the other of a property named in a definition expressing the real parts of that subject. For example 'triangle' and 'three angles'.
Ockham takes it for granted that the concepts referring to God are not related in one of the ways just indicated, because of God's simplicity, *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, pp. 119-120, cf. Leff, *William of Ockham*, p. 365 and Webering, *Theory of Demonstration*, pp. 133-142.

[41] A scientific truth is *dubitabilis*, i. e. not known on account of its terms, cf. pp. 76-77 and p. 111 of quaestio 2.

thing in outside reality.

Finally, Ockham discusses the propositions, formed with a complex concept of God as their subject, e.g. 'infinite being'. Man is able to acquire such a concept of God. The predicate may be formed by any concept of God. In principle these propositions can be known scientifically, because they can be demonstrated. For subject and predicate do not refer to the same thing in reality. Ockham gives the example of a blessed who would not know the truth "God exists". Such a blessed could prove this truth with a distinct concept of the Divine essence as a middle. He would argue as follows: "the divine essence exists, God is the divine essence, so God exists[42]". Mortal man, however, does not know the premises of this syllogism with evidence. So, scientific knowledge of these truths exceeds the faculty of mortal man.

Concluding one could say, that Ockham does not consider the Self-knowledge of God to be a science either. God knows Himself immediately and He uses no syllogistic discourse. However, according to Ockham, all the truths known by God are equally immediate. In this respect Ockham rejects the view of Duns Scotus.

Let us now consider in more detail Ockham's criticism of Duns Scotus' presuppositions.

b. *Ockham's criticism of Duns Scotus*

Ockham's main target is the presupposition of the correspondence between the real and conceptual order. Especially Duns Scotus' thesis that the order of things rationally distinct corresponds with those things really distinct is under constant attack[43]. Ockham discusses two possible interpretations of this thesis. In the first place, Ockham says, if Duns Scotus intended to say that between sets of things a similar order could exist, although the things of one set are not really distinct, then his thesis is false[44]. For in that case it would be possible that things were really one and rationally distinct[45].

Ockham's second interpretation is that according to Duns Scotus the conceptual order reflects the real order of things. The fallacy of this view is shown from a comparison between man and whiteness as real things and as concepts. As things the relation is between subject and accident, but the concept 'white' is not an accident of the concept 'man'[46]. Other examples discussed by Ockham are the relations between man and animal, God and being and God and Deity. If man and animal, or God and being, could be really distinct, then man and God would actually exist and animal and being only potentially. The relation between these concepts, however, is that

[42] *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 118; Leff, *William of Ockham*, pp. 364-365.
[43] Cf. *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, pp. 111, 113 and 119-120
[44] *Ibid.* p. 121: "Consimilem ordinem haberent talia secundum rationem ubi sunt distincta secundum rationem et tamen sunt unum realiter".
[45] *Ibid.* p. 121 and *Scriptum in I Sent.* d. 2, q. 2.
[46] *Ibid.*: "Homo et albedo ordinantur sicut subiectum et accidens, non tamen sic ordinantur conceptus correspondentes. Similiter, homo et animal si distinguerentur realiter unum esset potentia et aliud actus". Leff paraphrases: "the comparison between man and whiteness as real things and man and animal as concepts" (p. 365). By this paraphrase the idea, vital to Scotus, of a correspondence between the conceptual and real order is lost. Instead Leff speaks about a formal distinction not mentioned in this context by Ockham, nor by Duns Scotus.

between a more and a less universal concept[47].

Secondly, Ockham attacks Duns Scotus' related presupposition of the complex structure of the formal object of scientific knowledge. In this *quaestio* of the Prologue Ockham stresses again and again that it is impossible to distinguish between a quidditative and a denominational concept of one and the same thing because of its ontological structure[48]. For, if one thing is conceived with two concepts, no argument can be adduced to call one concept 'quidditative' and the others 'denominational'. Concepts denoting the same reality (*realitas*), are only distinct by their connotation and not by the aspects of the thing to which they refer as Duns Scotus would have it.

So, in God's intellect the concepts denoting only God are equally quidditative. This applies to concepts of His essence, His persons and His perfections as 'wise', 'good' etc.[49] If by 'wise' 'uncreated wisdom' is understood, the proposition "God is wise" is even immediate as all other propositions about God, because uncreated wisdom cannot be distinguished from His essence[50]. So, in God an order of concepts does not exist.

What bears upon God, bears upon all formal objects of scientific knowledge. The rejection of Scotus' thesis of the correspondence between the ontological and conceptual order in fact means that according to Ockham the order of scientific knowledge does not need to correspond to the order of things in reality.

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[47] *Ibid.* p. 122.
[48] E.g. *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 2, pp. 103, 121, 127.
[49] The same goes for 'being'. The terms referring to 'being' have the same denotation, but differ in their connotation, p. 127. Cf. the article of J.A. Aertsen in this volume.
[50] *In I Sent.* prologus q. 2, p. 114.

BURIDAN ON THE UNITY OF A SCIENCE
Another chapter in Ockhamism?[1]

J.M.M.H. Thijssen

Introduction

In an article that appeared in 1974, A.A. Maurer traced the contemporary notion of science as a body of knowledge to the 13th and 14th centuries. One may doubt Maurer's suggestion that the development of the notion of science as a body of knowledge is another chapter in the eclipse of Thomism during the Late Middle Ages. Nevertheless he has certainly pointed out an important change in the notion of the unity of a science which took place in the Later Middle Ages[2].

Within the spectrum of medieval opinions on the unity of a science, Maurer was of the opinion that the extreme positions were represented by Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham. The purpose of this paper is to determine the position of John Buridan in the debate on the unity of a science. Because Buridan is generally pictured as an 'Ockhamist', a comparison will be made between the essentials of Buridan's and Ockham's theory of science. Apart from their views on the unity of a science, these essentials also include their views on the immediate object of scientific knowledge in general. In this comparison, priority will be given to Buridan's theory of science, for in contradistinction to Ockham's texts, his texts on this subject are not yet available in a modern edition. Besides, some aspects of Ockham's theory of science which will be touched upon here, have already been studied[3]. So, Ockham's philosophy of science will more serve as general background for the presentation of Buridan's opinions[4].

This presentation will be rounded off with some brief remarks on the vexed question as to whether it really makes sense to designate Buridan as an Ockhamist.

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[1] Research for this paper was made possible by financial support from the Dutch Organization for Pure Scientific Research (Z.W.O.). Thanks are due to Mr. H.H. Thijssen for rendering the English translation from the Dutch original.

[2] A.A. Maurer, 'The Unity of a Science. St. Thomas and the Nominalists' in: *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974*, p. 275 and already in 'Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science' in: *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), pp. 100-101 and p. 104. A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* Leiden - Köln 1965, p. 353 has arrived at the same conclusions with regards to the change that took place in the notion of the unity of a science. This change is also documented in Spade, 'The Unity of Science according to Peter Auriol' in: *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972).

[3] Especially in Maurer, 'Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science', and 'The Unity of a Science. St. Thomas and the Nominalists'. See further Goddu, *The Physics of William of Ockham*, Leiden - Köln 1984, pp. 23-27.

[4] Some aspects of Buridan's theory of the unity of a science are discussed in Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik*, pp. 339-348, but he confines himself exclusively to a presentation of some passages taken from Buridan's *Commentary on the Metaphysics*. He does not provide a real analysis of Buridan's position, and besides, he does not draw attention to the differences that exist between Buridan's and Ockham's theories.

The immediate object of scientific knowledge

It is commonly known that the question of the immediate object of scientific knowledge received different solutions in the 14th century. Some authors proposed that the object of scientific knowledge was the reality signified by the terms of a scientific conclusion. Others defended the view that it was the conclusion itself, or even some special entity, the so called *complexe significabile*[5].

It is also common knowledge that Ockham in this debate held the position that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is the conclusion of a demonstration[6]. The stand Buridan took in this matter, however, is less known[7].

In q. 1 of Book I of his *Commentary on the Physics*, Buridan explains his notion of science. Science (*scientia*) taken in the proper sense of the word is a habit (*habitus*) acquired by a demonstrative syllogism (*demonstratio*)[8]. A habit is a disposition of the mind: it is the skill of applying an ability. According to Buridan, a demonstrative proof (*demonstratio*) involves many things, like premisses, conclusions, terms, and finally the things signified by the terms. Now, solely scientific knowledge of a conclusion is real science. Scientific knowledge of one of the other things mentioned is science in an equivocal sense[9]. Like Ockham, Buridan unmistakably acknowledges here that the immediate object of scientific knowledge is the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism, or, in other words, a proposition.

At the same time, however, Buridan admits that the science we possess of propositions and terms, serves the purpose of acquiring scientific knowledge of the things in reality (*res*), like the heaven, the stars, the plants etc., which are all signified by the terms[10]. The same kind of remarks are made by Ockham, although Buridan, in my opinion, insists more than Ockham does, on the idea that the ultimate purpose of knowing propositions, is knowing the referents of

[5] Cf. Courtenay, 'Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited' in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 44 (1983), pp. 162-164 for a survey of the different opinions that were held on the object of scientific knowledge, and for an extensive bibliography on this subject.

[6] Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 4.

[7] I am aware of the fact that this aspect of Buridan's theory of science has been treated in Scott, 'John Buridan on the Object of Demonstrative Science' in: *Speculum* 40 (1965), but he confines himself almost exclusively to Buridan's *Commentary on the Ethics.*

[8] Buridanus, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 1, ed. Paris 1509, f. 2va: "Notandum est faciliter quod scientia proprie dicta, que vocatur demonstrativa, est habitus per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisitus". This definition is, of course, a reminiscence of Aristotle's concept of science. Cf. *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, 3, 1139 b 19-35.

[9] Buridanus, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 1, f. 2va: "Ad demonstrationem autem plura concurrunt, scilicet premisse et conclusiones et termini ex quibus constituuntur premisse et conclusiones, et res significate per illos terminos. Et de omnibus dicitur haberi scientia, licet non eodem modo, sed equivoce...Nam proprie scientia demonstrativa dicitur esse de conclusione que demonstratur".

[10] Buridanus, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 1, f. 2va: "Quarto modo scientia demonstrativa dicitur esse de aliis rebus, que non sunt propositiones neque termini significativi, quia ille significantur per terminos ex quibus conclusio sive premisse demonstrationis sciuntur. Sic etiam et non aliter dicimus nos habere scientiam de celo et astris, de gravibus et levibus, de plantis et animalibus, de deo et intelligentiis, de sanitate et egritudine, de virtutibus et vitiis, et sic de aliis multis. Immo, manifestum est quod non querimus habere scientiam de tribus primis modis (scil. de conclusionibus, premissis, terminis) nisi propter habere scientiam de isto quarto modo: non enim curaretur artifex de propositionibus et terminis, nisi propter hoc crederet habere scientiam de rebus circa quas intendit agere et sibi utilia procurare". The same opinion is propagated in other texts of Buridan. See e.g. Scott, 'John Buridan on the Object of Demonstrative Science', p. 66.

these propositions, the *res*, that is. A very fine example of Ockham's attitude to the object of science I find his well known remark that one can only talk about reality by means of words and concepts (*mediantibus vocibus vel conceptibus vel aliis signis*)[11].

However, an important difference of opinion between Ockham and Buridan comes to the fore in their solution of the problem on how to meet the Aristotelian requirements of necessity and eternity of objects of science[12]. As we have seen, both Ockham and Buridan maintain that the objects of science are propositions. Propositions are not, of course, eternal in the sense that they will always exist, but yet in a certain sense they are indeed eternal: their truth is eternal. Propositions of demonstrative science are necessarily true, and in this sense they are the eternal objects of science[13].

This solution, however, only brings about a restatement of the problem, for now one may ask what is the relation that exists between necessary propositions of a science and the contingent and corruptible objects in reality to which these propositions refer. This last problem is treated by Buridan in his *Commentary on the Ethics* (Book VI, q. 6). He considers several possible solutions to this problem, including the solution which may be found in Ockham's work.

We need not discuss this text of Buridan here, for this has already sufficiently been done by Scott[14]. To our purpose the most important aspect seems to be that this text brings to our attention the fact that Ockham and Buridan clearly hold different views as to the relation between necessary propositions and the contingent referents in reality of these propositions. Ockham takes the stand that categorical propositions of science are in reality disguised hypothetical propositions. Ockham's intention may be clarified by a medieval standard-example. The proposition "Thunder is a sound in the clouds" would not be true, if there would be no thunder at the time this proposition occurs. However, by interpreting this proposition as a kind of 'shorthand' hypothetical proposition, it becomes true, even if there is no thunder. For the proposition "If there is thunder, then it is a sound in the clouds" is always true[15].

Buridan introduces quite another solution to this problem. He takes the terms of a scientific proposition as having natural supposition (*suppositio naturalis*). In this way the terms refer directly to the things in reality, independently of the fact whether these things existed, exist, or will exist. In this way scientific knowledge is guaranteed of things which do not exist at the moment that a scientific proposition about them is uttered[16].

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[11] *Scriptum in I Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 1 (*Opera Theol.* II, p. 47). Cf. also *Scriptum in Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 4, p. 134 and pp. 137-138, and the Prologue to the *Super libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (*Opera Phil.* IV, pp. 11-12), where this same attitude is displayed. Cf. Murdoch, 'Scientia mediantibus vocibus' in: *Sprache und Erkenntnis*, Berlin - New York 1981, who has used this attitude towards science to explain certain procedures that Ockham uses when he occupies himself with natural science.

[12] Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, 3, 1139 b 19-25.

[13] In the passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* cited in the last note, the terms 'eternal' and 'necessary' are mutual interchangeable. Buridan adopts this use: '*eterna*', '*necessaria*' and '*impossibile aliter se habere*' all have the same meaning here.

[14] Scott, 'John Buridan on the Object of Demonstrative Science', p. 663 and following.

[15] Ockham, *Summula philosopiae naturalis* preambula (*Opera Phil.* VI, p.144); *Summa logicae* III-2, cap. 5 (*Opera Phil.* I, pp. 511-514). Cf. further Scott, 'John Buridan on the Object of Demonstrative Science', p. 668 for the text of Buridan's paraphrase of what supposedly is Ockham's opinion. I would like to emphasize, perhaps superfluously, that this paraphrase gives no indication whatsoever as to whether Buridan had a *direct* knowledge of Ockham's works.

[16] Cf. Scott, 'John Buridan on the Object of Demonstrative Science', p. 669 for the text, and De Rijk, 'The

The unity of a science

In the last section we saw that both Ockham and Buridan are of the conviction that science (*scientia*) is a habit, that is to say, a quality of the intellect, which has propositions as its objects.

Alongside this notion of *scientia*, both Ockham and Buridan use the term *scientia* to designate a science in the sense that physics is a science, and mathematics is another science[17]. Buridan for example holds that no single science deals with all demonstrative conclusions, although a science may deal with all things in reality[18]. Apparently there must be a criterion by which the demonstrated propositions are spread out over several sciences. Before turning to the question which criterion Ockham and Buridan indicate for demarcating the different sciences, I will have to say a few words on the role of *habitus* in this second notion of science: in what way can a science be considered in terms of a habit of the intellect?

At the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century, different answers were put forward to this question. For an author like Thomas Aquinas each science corresponds to one scientific *habitus*. This single habit may extend to several things, but all these things are regarded from one *ratio*, which serves as the formal object of the habit. The acquisition of knowledge of new conclusions in a science is explained by Thomas as an increase in perfection of that single scientific habit[19]. For an author like Ockham, on the other hand, each demonstration gives rise to a new habit of the intellect. This means that a science which, like we saw, consists of many demonstrated propositions, consists of many habits[20]. As a matter of fact, a science is a collection of many habits, and at the same time it is a collection of demonstrated propositions which bring about these habits.

It is quite clear that the opinions of Aquinas and Ockham mark a radical shift that took place in the meaning of a science as a habit[21]. If one tries to locate the position of Buridan between the two extreme poles Aquinas and Ockham, it may not come as a surprise that Buridan's position is very close to Ockham's. Buridan remarks that each demonstrated conclusion is the result of one habit which is called science. In this way four demonstrated conclusions from, let's say geometry, would in fact constitute four mini-sciences[22].

Development of *Suppositio Naturalis*' in: *Vivarium* 11 (1973) 1, pp. 52-57 for an analysis of Buridan's theory of natural supposition.

[17] Ockham, prologue to the *Super libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, pp. 5-6. For Buridan see the next notes.

[18] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 1, f. 2va/b: "Tunc igitur ponende sunt conclusiones. Prima est quod nulla scientia est de omnibus conclusionibus tamquam demonstrativa ... Tertia conclusio quod quarto modo scientia naturalis considerat vel est de omnibus rebus, scilicet tamquam de significatis per terminos conclusionum et premissarum quarum et per quas ipsa est demonstrativa ... Quinta conclusio: non ex omnibus terminis format phisica vel mathematica propositiones quas vel per quas demonstrat".

[19] Cf. Maurer, 'The Unity of Science. St. Thomas and the Nominalists', pp. 271-273.

[20] Cf. Goddu, *The Physics of William of Ockham*, pp. 25-26 and Maurer, *op. cit.* pp. 279-280.

[21] This shift is documented in Maurer, *op. cit.* and in the studies mentioned in note 2.

[22] Buridan, *Questiones super libros Metaphysicorum* IV, q. 3, f. 14rb: "Notandum est breviter quod in totali metaphysica tradita in libris *Metaphysice* continentur valde multe conclusiones, sicut in totali geometria. Et tamen cuiuslibet conclusionis demonstrate, habitus cui assentimus dicitur una scientia. Capiamus gratia exempli quattuor conclusiones geometrie, tunc illarum conclusionum quattuor erunt scientie ab invicem distincte, et quelibet illarum erit scientia mathematica, quia non erit naturalis, nec metaphysicalis".
The following passage in *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 2, f. 3rb has the same purport: "Sed in totali

On the other hand Buridan is fully aware of the fact that the four geometrical conclusions, although they are in a sense four separate sciences, all belong to geometry and not to physics or metaphysics. To Buridan's mind a science is a collection of habits, or to use his own words, it is a *congregatum habitum*.

If one conceives of a science as an aggregate of habits, in what way does this aggregate derive its unity? What accounts for the fact that a certain collection of propositions, and the corresponding collection of partial habits, is thought of as one science, and another is thought of as another science? Buridan and Ockham clearly take different courses in the solving of this problem. First I shall discuss Buridan's solution.

According to Buridan a science derives its unity from the unity of the so called *subiectum proprium*, or proper subject. All things which are dealt with in a certain science, fall, in one way or another, under the proper subject, and this fact accounts for the unity of that science[23]. Buridan literally maintains that the *subiectum proprium* is the cause (*causa*) of the unity of a science.

However, the question as to the explanation of the unity of a science has not yet been completely answered. At least two aspects need further clarification: what is the *subiectum proprium*, and in what way does it bring about the unity of a science? Regarding the *subiectum proprium* Buridan lays down three claims, which contain the answers to these obscurities: 1) The proper subject of a science is the most common genus (*genus communissimum*) of all the things that are being considered in that science. This genus has to be carefully chosen, because it may not exceed the boundaries of that science; 2) The *genus communissimum* functions as subject in relation to the first principles and most common properties (*communissimae passiones*) of a science; 3) Nothing is being considered in a science, unless it is somehow related to the proper subject[24].

At first sight Buridan's remarks may seem to be somewhat cryptic, but in what follows I shall try to explain their meaning.

The three claims which Buridan laid down, clearly reveal that the *subiectum proprium* is the *genus communissimum* of a science. Here Buridan associates with certain remarks of Aristotle, who declared that a science is a unity because it bears upon one *genos*. Aristotle, however, also uses the term *hypokeimenon* (*subiectum*) to indicate the object of a science. So, the connection Buridan, and others, make between *subiectum* and *genus* has a foundation in Aristotle's texts[25].

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scientia naturali multe et diverse sunt conclusiones, et cuiuslibet scientie partialis est unus habitus scientificus in actu distinctus ab habitu scientifico alterius scientie. Et tamen omnes illi habitus partiales dicuntur esse una scientia totalis, distincta contra metaphisicam; igitur necesse est assignare causam et rationem propter quid illa dicantur esse una scientia".

[23] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 2, f. 3rb/va: "Igitur necesse est dicere quod omnis talis totalis scientia dicitur una ex unitate alicuius considerati in ea, propter attributionem omnium aliorum in ea consideratorum ad ipsum secundum illas rationes secundum quas in ea considerantur. Et hoc quodcumque fuerit, vocamus subiectum // proprium in illa assignandum".

[24] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 2, f. 3va: "Huiusmodi subiectum dicitur eo quod est genus communissimum inter considerata in ista scientia non transcendens methas illius scientie, et quod se habet per modum subiecti respectu primorum principiorum et communissimarum passionum illius scientie, et quod nichil in illa scientia consideratur, nisi inquantum habet attributionem ad ipsum".

[25] Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* I, 7, 75 a 37-75b 3 and I, 28, 87a 39-40; *Metaphysica* III, 2, 997 a 17-25. The Aristotelian notion of the unity of a science is discussed in Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* pp.

Later we shall see that Buridan gives a quite un-Aristotelian turn to the nature of the subject-genus of a science.

The three claims do not yet reveal, in what way the proper subject of a science is related to all the things that are treated in that science. To indicate the nature of that relation, Buridan introduces still another notion, that of *passio communissima*, or most common property. Each science has its own *passio communissima*, that specifically belongs to that science.

According to Buridan *subiectum proprium* and *passio communissima* essentially go together. He compares the relation between *subiectum proprium* and *passio communissima* with the relation between subject and passion in a proposition. In a demonstrated conclusion subject and passion are two terms that have the same supposition, that is to say, they refer to the same reality (*pro eodem supponentes*), but they do not signify the same. One of the terms adds something to the signification (*significatio*) of the other term. This prevents the proposition of becoming a mere tautology. In technical semantical jargon, one would say that one of the terms, the *passio*, also has a connotation[26].

The very same connection between subject and passion in a proposition has to exist between the *subiectum proprium* and the *passio communissima* of a science. Proper subject and most common passion are two terms that stand for the same reality, but the latter term (most common passion) also signifies something beyond. This analogy Buridan then uses to account for the relation between the *subiectum proprium* of a science and all the things that are discussed in that science. For, as we have seen, a science deals with propositions, and in every proposition pertaining to a science, a *passio* is predicated to a subject. All the passions that are predicated in a science are subordinated to the most common passion (*passio communissima*) of that science. In every science there is a hierarchy of passions, with at the top of the hierarchy the *passio communissima*. It is proper to speak of a hierarchy, because all passions that are contained in one science have to be definable in terms of the most common passion of that science, for otherwise they would not belong to that science.

Since the *subiectum proprium* serves as subject in relation to the *passio communissima*, this at the same time guarantees that all passions belonging to a certain field of science are in principle also predicable of the *subiectum proprium*. The passions of the proper subject do not have to be demonstrable in a strict sense, but there has to be some kind of attribution (*attributio*). The attribution can take several forms: the property discussed in a science may be a *passio* of the *subiectum proprium*, or a part of a *passio*, or a *passio* of a *passio*, or the opposite of a *passio*, etc.[27] Solely the fact whether a thing that is being considered in a science can be attributed to the

97-99.

[26] Cf. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*, New York 1935, pp. 54-58; Pinborg, *Medieval Semantics*, London 1984, pp. 249-250, and Webering, *The Theory of Demonstration*, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1953, pp. 24-27 for an explanation of the 14th century theory of connotation. Although these authors base themselves on texts of Ockham, we may safely assume that Buridan uses the same notion of connotation. Cf. *Questiones super libros Metaphysicorum* IV, q. 4, f. 15ra/b: "'Subiectum' enim et 'passio' vocantur duo termini pro eodem supponentes, et sic vere de se predicabiles, quorum unus addit super significationem alterius aliquam connotationem. Unde terminus absolutus // a connotatione diceretur 'subiectum', et terminus connotativus diceretur 'passio'. Vel etiam, quamvis uterque terminus esset connotativus, unus tamen minus et alter plus, ille qui esset minus connotativus diceretur subiectum respectu alterius. Et alter diceretur 'passio'."

[27] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 2, f. 3vb: "Tale igitur genus dicitur in aliqua scientia subiectum proprium et adequatum, non quia expresse contineatur in qualibet conclusione illius scientie, sed quia in qualibet

proper subject determines whether that thing properly belongs to that science.

From the foregoing it has become evident that to Buridan the proper subject of a science is a term. This means that the *genus communissimum*, that Buridan identified as the proper subject of a science, exists on a mental level. When one asks where the proper subject of a science exists, Buridan answers that it exists in his own mind as far as it concerns his own science, and that it exists in your mind as far as it concerns your science[28].

So far, the exposition of Buridan's notion of the unity of a science has been put in fairly theoretical terms: we have indicated what Buridan, in general, means by the *subiectum proprium* of a science. Buridan's conception of the unity of a science may be further clarified with the help of a concrete example. Which *genus* should, according to Buridan, be identified as the proper subject of physics[29]? He answers that the term *'ens mobile'* is the proper subject of physics. The proof of Buridan's contention consists of showing that the term '*ens mobile*' meets the three requirements of a proper subject: 1) the term '*ens mobile*' is the most common term of physics which does not exceed the boundaries of physics[30]; 2) the term *'ens mobile'* functions as subject to the most common *passio* of physics. This most common passion (*passio communissima*) is the disjunctive term '*movere vel quiescere*', or '*motus vel quies*' or the like. The fact that the term '*ens mobile*' is subject, means that it is definable in terms of the passion: every *ens mobile*, or in other words, every being that is capable of movement, is in movement or rest[31]; 3) and finally all things that are discussed in physics are somehow related to the term '*ens mobile*'[32]. On

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conclusione aliquid consideratur sub illa ratione secundum quam habet ad ipsum attributionem, vel quia est pars eius, vel passio, vel principium, vel passio passionis eius aut partis eius, vel forte quia sibi <oppositum> aut alicui parti aut passioni ipsius, et sic de aliis multis attributionibus."
Almost verbatim the same passage may be found in *Questiones super libros Metaphysicorum* IV, q. 4, f. 15rb. Buridan adds to that: "Et ideo in omni scientia sic una et aggregata oportet stabilire aliquod subiectum primum ad quod omnia alia considerata habeant attributionem. Nec de aliis scitur quod pertineant ad illam scientiam, nisi per hoc quod scitur attributio illorum ad illud primum".

[28] In *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 3, f. 3ra of Buridan, one of the arguments *quod non* asserts: "Arguitur ergo quod in totali scientia naturali non debeat assignari unum subiectum proprium, quia quereretur ubi esset illud: an in libro *Physicorum* vel in libro *De generatione*, an in libro meo vel in libro tuo, vel in intellectu meo vel in tuo? Et non potest bene responderi; igitur etc." Buridan answers, f. 3vb: "Ad primam dicendum est quod illud genus est in anima mea quantum ad scientiam meam, et in anima tua quantum ad scientiam tuam, et non est idem numero in me et in te, sed consimile".
The same point is made in *Questiones super libros Metaphysicorum* IV, q. 4, f. 15va: "Et quando queritur ubi est ille terminus: utrum in mente tua an in mente mea? Respondetur quod tu habes metaphysicam tuam in mente tua, et ego meam in mente mea. Et sic proportionabiliter est de aliis subiectis".

[29] The same theory of the unity of a science is also applied in *Questiones in libros Physicorum* II, q. 6 and *Questiones super libros Metaphysicorum* VI, q. 2, although without using the term 'subiectum proprium'. In these quaestiones Buridan discusses resp. the division of speculative philosophy in physics, mathematics and metaphysics, and the difference between a mathematician and a natural philosopher. Cf. Thijssen, 'Buridan on Mathematics' in: *Vivarium* 23 (1985)1, pp. 75-76 for a brief discussion of these quaestiones.

[30] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 3, f. 4ra: "Secunda conclusio est quod iste terminus 'ens mobile' est subiectum proprium in scientia naturali assignandum, quia est terminus communissimus inter considerata in scientia naturali et non transcendens limites scientie naturalis".

[31] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 3, f. 4ra/b: "Deinde ille terminus 'mobile' se habet per modum subiecti respectu prime et communissime passionis scientie naturalis, quia iste terminus disiunctus 'movere vel quiescere', 'movens vel quiescens', vel iste terminus 'motus vel quies' dicitur passio communis. Omne enim mobile // movetur vel quiescit, si ipsum est, vel, si ipsum non est, tunc est aptum natum movere vel quiescere".

[32] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 3, f. 4rb: "Etiam in attributione ad illum terminum (scil. 'ens mobile') considerantur omnia que in phisica considerantur; nam de motu et quiete, de actione et passione, et universaliter de transmutatione et de horum speciebus determinatur in scientia naturali secundum quod sunt

these grounds Buridan concludes that the term '*ens mobile*' is a most convenient *subiectum proprium* of physics[33].

Buridan does not explicitly discuss the question in what way we know which terms are the *subiectum proprium* and the *passio communissima* of a given science. Undoubtedly he would make an appeal to our intuitive insight such as: every normal human being knows that physics is about motion, and that mathematics is about quantity, etc. Anyway it is not possible that the *subiectum proprium* and the *passio communissima* of a science are demonstrated in that same science. Only of the 'lower' passions in the hierarchy it can be demonstrated, by means of a discursive process, that they belong to a certain science, since of these passions it can be shown that they are somehow related to the proper subject of that science.

I will now turn to a brief discussion of Ockham's views on the unity of a science. Ockham is of the opinion that, strictly speaking, a science is not a unity. Strictly speaking a science is a collection of mental habits which show a certain order. It is in fact the same opinion that Buridan represents, but in contradistinction to Buridan, Ockham positively denies that this order is brought about by something like a *subiectum proprium*[34]. According to Ockham, a science has not one subject, but it has many subjects, for every scientific conclusion has a subject[35].

Ockham acknowledges the fact that many authors speak of *the* subject of a science, but what they really mean, according to Ockham, is that one subject is primary with respect to all other subjects, and especially primary from the view of predication. However, as soon as they designate such a subject as *the* subject of a science, they commit an error against logic. Saying that the first subject of a science is the subject of that science, is the same error as saying that the first king of the world is king of the world[36]. Thus, one should not attempt to base the unity of a science on the unity of a primary subject.

But in what way then should one, according to Ockham, attempt to distinguish one collection of conclusions from another? How do we mark off physics from metaphysics? Ockham suggests that both diversity on the side of the subject and on the side of the predicate of a scientific conclusion make it possible to distinguish different sciences. If the same subject occurs in conclusions pertaining to different sciences, the sciences are distinghuised because different predicates are attributed to this subject. On the other hand, in the case of an identity of properties predicated in conclusions of different sciences, these sciences are then differentiated by the subjects of their conclusions[37]. In Ockham's view, a science is an ordered collection of

passiones entis mobilis et specierum eius"

[33] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 3, f. 4rb: "Et hoc apparet satis sufficere ad hoc quod iste terminus 'mobile' vel 'ens mobile' concedatur subiectum in scientia naturali assignandum una, cum hoc quod non apparet aliud quod convenientius possit dici".

[34] S.J. Livesey, 'William of Ockham, the Subalternate Sciences' in: *British Journal of the History of Science* 18 (1985), p. 144 has suggested that Buridan and Ockham hold the same opinion on the unity of a science. However, this does not seem to be correct. They only agree in that science is a collection of intellectual habits.

[35] Cf. *Summa logicae*, I, cap. 30, p. 93.

[36] *Summula philosophiae naturalis*, praeambula, p. 142: "Sed forte dices: si aliquid est subiectum primum alicuius scientiae, sequitur quod ipsum sit subiectum illius scientiae. Dico quod intellecto antecedente sub bona intelligentia, consequentia non valet; sicut non sequitur 'iste est primus rex mundi, ergo est rex mundi', cum tantum sit rex unius partis mundi;" More or less the same example occurs in the Prologue to the *Expositio physicorum*, p. 10.

[37] This is Ockham's solution as presented in *Summula philosophiae naturalis*, p. 143: "Et causa huius (scil. quod

propositions, and the subjects or the predicates of these propositions determine whether a certain proposition belongs to one science or another.

When we summarize Buridan's and Ockham's positions on the unity of a science, it appears that both acknowledge the fact that there are many subjects and passions (*passiones*) in one and the same science. However, the conclusions they draw from this observation are completely different. Buridan concludes that the proper subject, from which a science derives its unity, cannot be identified with the subject of a conclusion, but should be identified with the *genus communissimum*[38]. Ockham, on the other hand, maintains that it is not *one* single subject that determines the unity of a science.

Was Buridan an Ockhamist?

We have seen that, although Buridan's startingpoints in the philosophy of science are the same as Ockham's, he comes to conclusions entirely different from Ockham's. He frequently seems to be falling back on older notions such as *suppositio naturalis* and *subiectum proprium*, but he gives them an entirely different meaning. One may therefore ask whether there is any use in construing Buridan's position as Ockhamist.

Although I go along with the idea that historiographic categories such as Thomism and Ockhamism can be very useful in getting a picture of our medieval past, I still maintain that one must ask oneself time and again whether those categories are only mere fictions in the minds of some historians or whether they actually refer to an extra-mental reality[39]. What I mean to say is, that we have to look for sources if we wish to put a certain thinker within a certain intellectual school.

In the various discussions on Buridan's alleged Ockhamism, there has never been mention of any other source but the one of the so called Ockhamist statute of December 29th, 1340. The whole problem of this discussion is based on two foregone conclusions: 1) The above mentioned statute intends to condemn 'Ockhamists'; 2) Buridan was an Ockhamist. As a result another problem was hereby created, namely to come up with an explanation for the fact that in that case Buridan, being rector at the university of Paris, has cooperated in the condemnation of

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ista scientia distinguitur ab aliis) est quia identitas vel diversitas scientiae non tantum dependet ex identitate vel diversitate subiecti sed etiam ex identitate vel diversitate praedicati." The same solution is presented in *Quaestiones Variae* II (*Opera Theol.* VIII, p. 41), in the Prologue to the *Expositio physicorum*, p. 14 and in *Scriptum in I Sent.* prologus q. 8 (*Opera Theol.* I, pp. 219-220). This last passage has been discussed by Maurer, 'The Unity of a Science. St. Thomas and the Nominalists', pp. 284-285.

[38] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Physicorum* I, q. 3, f. 3va: "Quinta conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum (scil. subiectum proprium scientie) non dicitur ex eo quod de ipso dicatur predicatum de qualibet conclusione illius scientie, quia nichil est tale; immo sunt diversa sepe in diversis conclusionibus...Sexta conclusio est quod huiusmodi subiectum non dicitur ex eo quod de ipso debet demonstrari omnis passio que in illa scientia debet demonstrari de aliquo, quia nullum est tale, sed sepius diverse passiones demonstrari debent de diversis subiectis".

[39] The belief in the existence of an Ockhamist-school finds strong expression in Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, Toronto 1982, pp. 265-266: "We observe the hardening of scholasticism into several different schools, the chief of which were the Thomist, Scotist, and Ockhamist, whose rivalry was often bitter and uncompromising". Maurer does not substantiate his observations on the nature of 14th century philosophy with a reference to sources.

'his brothers in the faith'[40].

The first above mentioned forgone conclusion has been convincingly rejected as incorrect: the statute had nothing to do with a crisis over Ockham[41]. The only statute that indeed had something to do with controversies provoked by the views of Ockham, is a statute from the later part of January or early February 1341, promulgated by the Faculty of Arts. Part of its contents has been reconstructed by Courtenay and Tachau[42]. In this statute the *scientia Okamica* was prohibited. The prohibition of certain aspects of Ockham's physics was taken over, and carried one step further by the English-German nation in 1341: members of the nation had to swear not to sustain the *scientia Okamica*[43]. The Ockhamist sect (*secta Okamica*) the existence of which can be derived from these documents, seems to have been only a business of the English-German nation. Without wanting to elaborate on who those Ockhamists were, I must say that in any case Buridan was not one of them: he belonged to the Picardian nation[44].

The second foregone conclusion, stating that Buridan was an Ockhamist has not yet been systematically investigated[45]. Nor can we do that here. What I can do, however, is offer a few suggestions that could be of help for further investigations.

The fact that in modern literature Buridan is being considered an Ockhamist, has undoubtedly been caused for a great deal by 15th and 16th century documents in which Buridan is placed among thinkers to which William Ockham also belongs[46]. It has been sufficiently pointed out in the past that this kind of documents must be interpreted in the light of the growing animosity between the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna*, and although Ockham's name was allied to the *via*

[40] Moody, *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, Berkeley 1975, suggests that the statute did not have Ockham himself in mind, but rather extreme Ockhamists such as Nicolas Autrecourt. Paqué, *Der Pariser Nominalistenstatut*, Berlin - New York 1970, on the other hand maintains that the statute was aimed at Ockham himself. He interprets Buridan's part in these events as a 'diplomatische Leistung', a diplomatic triumph of the first order. Scott, 'Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism' in: *Journal of the History of Philos.* 9 (1971) is also of the opinion that the statute was aimed at Ockham, but adds that, at least in his theory of knowledge, Buridan was not an Ockhamist. Scott is the only one who has compared Buridan's and Ockham's views to some degree. Bottin, *La scienza degli occamisti*, Rimini 1982, pp. 36-37 thinks that the statute was especially aimed at the followers of Ockham, like Autrecourt, but also at Ockham himself.

[41] Cf. Courtenay/Tachau, 'Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris' in: *History of Universities* II (1982), esp. pp. 58-63.

[42] Courtenay/Tachau, 'Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris', pp. 62-63 and Courtenay, 'The Reception of Ockham's Thought' in: *Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris*, pp. 50-51.

[43] For details cf. Courtenay/Tachau, 'Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris', pp. 63-64 and pp. 72-79, and Courtenay, 'The Reception of Ockham's Thought', pp. 50-55.

[44] Cf. Courtenay/Tachau, 'Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris', pp. 71-79 for a reconstruction of the background of these regulations against the *secta Okamica*.

[45] The belief that Buridan was an Ockhamist, is, among others, expressed by Moody, 'Ockhamism' in: *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, p. 534.

[46] One example will do here. It comes from a text by Johannes de Nova Domo. Cf. Weiler, 'Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo' in: Vivarium 6 (1968)2, p. 137: "...dicentes taliter non sunt professores peripatetice veritatis, cuius archidoctor et princeps fuit Aristotiles, sed sunt epicuri litterales sequentes condempnatam parisius occanicam discoliam cum collegiis suis, scilicet Buridani et Marsilii qui Occan anglicus fuit emulator paternarum tradicionum et non insecutor Aristotilis et aliorum antiquorum, qui cum Aristotilis consorcione non acquiescunt. Ideo cum illis et quibusdam aliis in sciencia Aristotilis recusamus disputare". Other examples are given in Gilbert, 'Richard de Bury' in: *Philosophy and Humanism*, Leiden 1976, p. 91 n.11, p. 94 n.22 and p. 106 n.58. For the interpretation of this text, see now also Z. Kaluza, 'Le *De universali reali* de Jean de Maisonneuve et les *epicurici litterales*' in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Phil. und Theol.* 33 (1986), especially pp. 502-507.

moderna, the *via moderna* should not be identified with Ockhamism[47].

Since there are no known 14th century documents in which Buridan is explicitly being called an Ockhamist, there is only one way left for us and that is to try and find hints in Buridan's and Ockham's own works that would justify the conclusion of calling Buridan an Ockhamist. The success of such an undertaking will largely depend on what one means by Ockhamism.

I should like to start with excluding one approach to the problem of Ockhamism that, in my opinion, is not very fruitful. What I mean, is the approach where one gives a general characteristic of Ockham's philosophy with the help of labels such as "nominalism", or "the divorce of theology and philosophy", or "skeptical attitude", etc. and where one then tries to establish whether these labels may also be employed to characterise the philosophy of some other thinker[48]. I think that this is a very unhistorical approach in the first place, and secondly not very useful either. It would be a far better choice to tackle the problem of, for example the Ockhamism of Buridan, by trying to establish whether Buridan shows any explicit or implicit knowledge of the theories of Ockham.

It goes without saying that within this approach, the question of Buridan's Ockhamism must be seen in the broader perspective of Ockham's reception on the continent. The question of Buridan's Ockhamism is at the same time the question of the spread and impact of Ockham's thought outside of England, at the university of Paris. Courtenay has made a start in studying the reception of Ockham's thought at the university of Paris[49]. He has concentrated his studies especially on the commentaries on the Sentences. Another field in which a great deal of investigation has to be made yet is the impact of Ockham in particular and of English thought in general at the faculty of arts of Paris. Walter Burley may prove to be of great influence here[50].

Even in, what I have labelled, the historical approach, Ockhamism may be interpreted in several ways. Basing myself upon a number of studies that have recently appeared and all of which contribute to a new approach to the study of this intellectual current, I want to present three of those interpretations here.

In line with the medieval custom of making distinctions when using a term, one could interpret the term 'Ockhamism' in various ways. In the first place one could take the term strictly and literally. In that case one would have to find passages where Buridan explicitly admits being a follower of Ockham[51]. In Buridan's works one would look in vain for such passages.

The fact that Buridan does not use Ockham's name, whereas he quotes for example Thomas

[47] Cf. Gabriel, '*Via Antiqua* and *Via Moderna* and the Migration of Paris Students' in: *Antiqui und Moderni*, Berlin - New York 1974, and Gilbert, 'Richard de Bury'.

[48] Much of the past discussion on the meaning of Ockhamism has been centered on these kind of characteristics. See e.g. Moody, 'Ockhamism', and Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 264-266.

[49] Cf. Courtenay, 'The Reception of Ockham's Thought', and 'The Role of English Thought' in: *Rebirth, Reform and Resilience, Universities in Transition*, Columbus, Oh. 1984, pp. 105-115.

[50] The matter of English influence in general at Paris, is discussed in Gilbert, 'Richard de Bury'. He has pointed out that it is somewhat puzzling that Richard de Bury, when referring to "Anglican subtleties" which were cultivated in Paris, does not mention Ockham.

[51] A very fine example of the kind of passages that I have in mind, is the one where Marsilius of Inghen declares himself to hold the same opinion as his 'master' John Buridan. Cf. Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super libros De generatione et corruptione*, book II, q. 6, f. 106va: "Et quia hec opinio mihi probabilis apparet, nescio si passionatus ex opinione magistri mei magistri Johannis Buridani qui eam posuit, ideo eam in suis partibus persuadere propono, et eam immediate declarare intendo ..."

Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus in his commentary on the Physics, could be ascribed to political prudence. At first sight it seems to be imprudent to quote condemned thinkers with a certain amount of agreement. However this construction does not hold ground. Works as the *Summa logicae* and the *De quantitate* (i.e. the first part of the *De sacramento altaris*) that at the end of the second decennium of the 14th century were available at Paris, did not become a matter of official concern either[52]. Besides, after 1345 it was no problem at all to quote Ockham in Paris circles[53].

A second interpretation of the term 'Ockhamism', which makes more sense to me, is to establish whether a certain author has taken over a number of ideas, presented by Ockham and has perhaps made them a starting point for the development of his own ideas. Taking over some of Ockham's ideas does not make one a follower and ally of Ockham's theories, although it is true that someone doing this must have knowledge of Ockham's line of thinking. This point is illustrated in certain studies by Tachau, who has shown that there did not exist a coterie of Ockhamists in England: Ockham's epistemology only received prolonged negative response instead of acceptance[54]. On the other hand, however, it is quite clear from her studies that Ockham's thought did receive a *response* (although a negative one), and that one in this sense can speak of an Ockham-reception.

In the same way it may be asked whether Buridan shows some signs of an Ockham-reception, either because he proceeds from the same startingpoints as Ockham does, or because he opposes Ockham?

I must say that the indications are negative; in the first place because of reasons we have indicated in this paper with regards to Ockham's and Buridan's philosophy of science. Not only does Buridan have other ideas than Ockham, but also nothing can be found in the texts that point to a controversy about Ockham's ideas. In the second place, where Buridan does share some of Ockham's views, the latter are not specific enough to support Buridan's so called Ockhamism. I am thinking here of Buridan's stand that science is about propositions and that a science is a unity only in an improper sense.

This picture is, although not intentionally, confirmed in other studies on aspects of Buridan's thought[55]. Although Buridan sometimes holds and sometimes refutes opinions that are strikingly similar to those of Ockham, it cannot be said that they are exclusively Ockham's. We are therefore not certain whether Buridan really had Ockham in mind.

The question of the reception of Ockham's theories is complicated by the fact that his works, unlike those of Buridan, never became compulsory textbooks in the curriculum of any

[52] Cf. Courtenay, 'The Reception of Ockham's Thought', pp. 44-47.

[53] The best illustration of this is Gregorius of Rimini, whose *Commentary on the Sentences* originated in 1341/1342, and who quotes extensively from Ockham's *Commentary on the Sentences*.

[54] Tachau, 'The Response to Ockham's and Aureol's Epistemology' in: *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, Roma 1982 and 'The Problem of the *species in medio*' in: *Mediaeval Studies* 44 (1982).

[55] Cf. Maier, *An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft*, Roma 1952 where it is evident that Buridan turns into another direction with regards to the structure of material substance than Ockham. Cf. further Maier, *Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie*, Roma 1955 and *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie*, Roma 1968 with regards to their different opinions on quantity and their theory of movement. See also Murdoch, 'William of Ockham and the Logic of Infinity' in: *Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought*, Ithaca - London, 1982, p. 169, who remarks that Buridan, with regards to the discussion of the equality of infinites, belongs to another tradition than Ockham.

university[56]. This means that Ockham-reception was a matter of private study, that in most cases will be difficult to trace. All things considered we cannot say of course that Buridan has not made a certain thought of Ockham his own, and thus may be called an Ockhamist, but on the other hand there are no real indications that he has.

In conclusion I must point to a third way of interpreting the term 'Ockhamism', a very broad interpretation, one that was used by Bottin in his book *La scienza degli occamisti*[57]. He uses the historiographic category Ockhamism to indicate a new scientific paradigm, a cultural movement. This interpretation, however, is so broad that it covers about all the interesting developments of the 14th century with regards to natural science and philosophy[58]. Bottin's interpretation of Ockhamism is so broad that it even comprises theories that are diametrically oposed to Ockham. He discusses these theories under the heading of "le polemiche interne all'occamismo"[59]. To him Ockhamism is a new method of dealing with philosophical problems. He also gives a few general characteristics, for example employing meta-linguistic analyses in philosophy, a special concept of the supposition-theory, the use of *subtilitates*, etc.[60] Although the developments, described by Bottin, are undoubtedly typical of 14th century (natural) philosophy, and although I appreciate his synthesis of them, I still find it rather arbitrary to put them all under the one denominator Ockhamism[61].

From the contents of this paper it may have become evident that, personally, I expect the best results of Buridan's position as an Ockhamist from the second interpretation of Ockhamism. In any case it must have become clear, that the question as to whether Buridan has made the 'English subtilities' (*subtilitates anglicanae*), among which those of Ockham, the subject of his furtive vigils, is a matter that has to be dealt with with English subtility[62].

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[56] At the universities of Prague and Vienna lectures in natural philosophy were based on the *Commentary on the Physics* of Buridan. Cf. Markowski, 'L'influence de Jean Buridan' in: *Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris*, and Thijssen,'The Short Redaction' in: *Arch. d'hist. doct. et lit. du moyen-âge* 52 (1986), pp. 251-253.

[57] Bottin, *La scienza degli occamisti*, p. 16: "Per tutti questi motivi ho volutamente fatto uso di un termine storiografico generico come 'occamismo', nel senso che la sua assunzione è la più larga possibile".

[58] Cf. Bottin, *op. cit.* pp. 24-26.

[59] Cf. esp. ch. 3 and 4 of his book.

[60] Bottin, *op. cit.* p. 25.

[61] Bottin, *op. cit.* pp. 16-17 does not find his concept of Ockhamism arbitrary of course: "Questa assunzione del termine 'occamismo', d'altra parte, non è assolutamente arbitraria, ma può trovare sufficienti conferma a livello storico". The only historical testimony, however, with regards to Ockhamism, that he quotes, comes from the work of Antonius Coronel. Coronel is not a reliable source in this matter, because he is writing at a time when the struggle between via antiqua and via moderna had already started.

[62] Some of the historical background of the way 'Anglican subtilities' may have invaded the continent, is provided in Gilbert, 'Richard de Bury'. The actual influence of these 'Anglican subtilities' in fourteenth-century Paris, has been investigated by Murdoch, 'Subtilitates Anglicanae' in: *Marchaut's World, Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century*, New York 1978.

V ETHICS

OCKHAM VERSUS THOMAS D'AQUIN
Le sujet des vertus morales

C. Steel

I

La philosophie morale médiévale s'est développée et organisée autour de la doctrine des vertus. Parmi les multiples questions que les auteurs se posent sur la vertu, on trouve toujours une question *de subiecto virtutis* : sur le sujet ou le siège des vertus. On y définit généralement la vertu comme un *habitus* qui perfectionne une puissance, afin qu'elle puisse produire ses actes avec plus d'aisance[1]. Une telle 'habitude' n'est pas requise au niveau du corps qui est déjà, par sa nature, déterminé à produire une certaine opération[2]. Ainsi le feu n'a pas besoin d'un *habitus* pour acquérir une meilleure capacité de 'chauffer'; ses qualités naturelles suffisent, et même si elles n'étaient pas suffisantes, aucune habitude n'y rémédierait. Mais une disposition habituelle est requise quand un sujet est en puissance par rapport à des activités multiples et parfois opposées (*in potentia ad multa*). Tel est le cas de tout principe rationnel qui est caractérisé comme '*potentia oppositorum*'[3]. On dira donc que les *habitus* qui préparent à une opération résident principalement dans l'âme, bien qu'ils puissent exister secondairement dans le corps "en tant qu'il est préparé et habilité à servir promptement les actes de l'âme"[4]. Ces 'habitudes' ne résident pas directement dans l'essence de l'âme, mais dans ses puissances, car l'âme n'est principe d'opérations qu'au moyen de ses puissances[5]. Reste la question: quelles puissances de l'âme peuvent être 'sujet' d'habitudes vertueuses? Seules les puissances strictement rationnelles ou aussi les puissances de la sensibilité? Seules les puissances appétitives ou aussi les puissances cognitives?

Depuis Aristote, on distingue communément entre vertus morales et vertus intellectuelles. Quant au siège des vertus intellectuelles, il n'y a pas de discussion: c'est l'intellect lui-même. Plus difficile à déterminer est le statut des vertus morales, surtout parce qu'Aristote ne s'est jamais clairement prononcé sur ce sujet. Dans son exposé sur la force et la tempérance, il est dit que "ces vertus semblent se rapporter aux parties *irrationnelles* de l'âme"[6]. D'ailleurs, comment pourraient-elles être le milieu entre des passions opposées si elles n'avaient pas leur siège dans la sensibilité[7]? D'autre part, en ce qui concerne la justice, Aristote dit qu' elle est la vertu par

[1] "complementum potentiae penes hoc quod completam operationem suscipit" (Thomas, *De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 1).
[2] Cf. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 50, a. 1 et, q. 49, a. 4.
[3] Cf. Aristote, *Metaphysica* IX, cap. 2, 1046 b 5.
[4] Cf. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 50, a. 1.
[5] Cf. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 50, a. 2.
[6] Aristote, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, cap. 9, 1117 b 23: "videntur enim irrationabilium partium haec esse virtutes".
[7] Cf. Thomas, *De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.

laquelle l'homme "veut" (*vult*) ce qui est juste[8]. Il en ressort que la justice est un *habitus* de la volonté. D'ailleurs, il existe une relation essentielle entre 'vertu' et 'volonté'. La vertu peut être définie comme *habitus electivus*[9], et l'*habitus* lui-même comme une disposition "*quo quis agit cum voluerit*"[10]. Ce qui n'est pas volontaire, n'appartient pas au domaine de la moralité. "*Omnis virtus (omne peccatum) est voluntaria (-um)*". A cause de ce lien intrinsèque entre vertu et volonté, la plupart des auteurs du moyen âge ont considéré la volonté comme le véritable siège de *toutes* les vertus morales. Cette opinion a été défendue particulièrement par les théologiens appartenant à la tradition augustinienne: ils considèrent la volonté comme le facteur déterminant et même exclusif de l'action morale. Tel est le cas de Bonaventure, de Duns Scot et de Guillaume d'Ockham.

Thomas d'Aquin, par contre, défend, en partant des textes d'Aristote, une position nuancée. La justice et les autres vertus sociales qui y sont annexées, résident comme habitudes dans la volonté. Certes, la volonté est "par sa nature" dirigée vers le bien. Mais ce bien naturel est son propre bien. Afin de réaliser facilement et avec plaisir le *bonum alterius*, la volonté a besoin d'être perfectionnée par les vertus sociales. Le cas de la tempérance et de la force (et leurs vertus annexes) est différent. Selon Thomas, ces vertus ne réalisent pas elles-mêmes l'ordre moral[11]. Elles enlèvent plutôt les obstacles psychiques qui pourraient nous empêcher de faire le bien que la raison a reconnu. Ainsi la force nous pousse à affronter les dangers qui pourraient nous conduire à fuir le bien, tandis que la tempérance écarte les désirs qui vont à l'encontre de ce bien[12]. Ces vertus ce rapportent donc principalement au domaine de la sensibilité: c'est là qu'elles doivent trouver leur siège. Cette opinion de Thomas a été critiquée par Duns Scot[13], G. d'Ockham, Jean Buridan[14] et beaucoup d'autres auteurs. Dans cette étude, je me limiterai à une confrontation entre Thomas et Guillaume d'Ockham concernant le sujet des vertus morales (à l'exception de la justice sur laquelle il n'y a pas chez eux de divergence). Mon exposé sera basé sur les textes suivants: pour Thomas, *Scriptum in III Sententias* d. 33, q. 2, a. 4b; *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 50 et 56; *De Virtutibus* q. 1, a. 4; pour Ockham, *Quaestiones in III Sententias* q. 11 et 12 et *Quodlibeta* II, q. 16.

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[8] Cf. Aristote, *Ethica Nicomachea* V, cap. 1, 1129 a 9.

[9] Cf. Aristote, *Ethica Nicomachea* II, cap. 5, 1106 b 36.

[10] Définition d'Averroès dans *In De Anima* III, 18: "haec enim est diffinitio habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligat...quando voluerit absque eo quod indigeat in hoc aliquo extrinseco" (p. 438, lign. 26-29, ed. F. Stuart Crawford). Définition souvent utilisée dans l'argumentation: cf. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 49, a. 3, *sed contra* et, q. 50, a. 1, arg. 1.

[11] "iustitia est boni factiva, inquantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinet ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservativae huius boni, inquantum scilicet moderantur passiones ne abducant hominem a bono rationis" (*Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 123, a. 12, cf. a. 1).

[12] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 141, a. 2.

[13] Joh. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 33, q. un.: "utrum virtutes morales sint in voluntate sicut in subiecto".

[14] Joh. Buridanus, *Questiones super libros Ethicorum* I, q. 22: "utrum virtutes morales sunt in appetitu sensitivo subjective vel in voluntate" et V, q. 1: "utrum iustitia sit moderativa passionum".

II

L'argumentation de Thomas part de l'idee qu'une *virtus humana* ne peut être que le perfectionnement de ces puissances qui sont principes d'actes *spécifiquement humains*. Mais qu'est-ce qu'un *actus humanus* ? Pour qu'un acte soit reconnu comme 'humain', il ne suffit pas qu'il se produise dans ou par l'homme. La croissance, par exemple, et tout le processus végétatif du corps n'ont rien de spécifiquement humain. Les principes de telles opérations organiques ne peuvent donc être le sujet de vertus humaines. Seuls les actes sur lesquels l'homme peut exercer son *dominium* par la raison et la volonté, sont de véritables *actus humani*[15]. Remarquons toutefois que cette classe n'est pas limitée aux actes 'élicites' de la raison et de la volonté, qui sont rationnels par eux-mêmes; elle contient également tous les autres actes produits par l'homme, qui peuvent *participer* à la rationalité. En effet, à la difference des actes végétatifs, notre sensibilité peut se laisser influencer par les impératifs de la raison. L'irascible et le concupiscible dans l'homme sont donc radicalement différents des puissances homonymes qu'on trouve chez les animaux irrationnels. Il faut les considérer comme des puissances typiquement humaines. Pour cette raison, elles peuvent être le 'siège' de vertus humaines qui n'ont rien en commun avec les vertus des animaux dont on parle parfois[16].

Essayons de préciser davantage le rapport de la sensibilité à la raison. Thomas aime comparer cette relation à celle qui existe entre le corps et son âme[17]. L'organisme corporel obéit dans ses mouvements au moindre signal de l'âme (*ad nutum*) sans aucune contradiction: quand je veux marcher, mes jambes se mettent en mouvement; quand je veux frapper, ma main se lève, sans que mes organes aient le pouvoir de s'opposer à ma volonté. Avec Aristote, on dira que l'âme régit le corps avec un pouvoir *despotique* [18]: l'organe la sert comme un esclave. Par conséquent, le corps n'a pas besoin d'une vertu complémentaire qui lui permettrait de mieux exercer ses fonctions d'organe. Il suffit qu'il ait une disposition naturelle à être mû par l'âme. Tout différent est le cas de l'appétit sensible: l'irascible et le concupiscible ne se laissent pas commander comme des esclaves. Ici, l'*imperium rationis* ou un acte despotique de la volonté ne suffisent pas. En effet, ces appétits gardent leurs "mouvements propres" qui ne sont pas nécessairement en accord avec la raison. Ils ont même la possibilité de s'opposer à ses impératifs. La raison exercera donc sur eux un "pouvoir politique", comme le fait un gouvernant vis-à-vis de ses sujets libres. Dans un régime 'politique', les sujets peuvent faire des difficultés et s'opposer à certaines décisions. Le pouvoir cherchera donc à les faire adhérer spontanément aux ordres donnés. On retrouve un régime analogue à l'interieur de l'homme. Pour accomplir une action humaine vertueuse, il ne suffit pas que la décision de la raison soit parfaite. Il est nécessaire

[15] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 1, a. 1: "actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo (...). Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem".

[16] "Dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se consideratae, prout sunt partes apppetitus sensitivi, communes sunt nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per participationem, sic sunt propriae hominis. Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae" (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 4, ad 1; cf., q. 50, a. 3, ad 2).

[17] Cf. *De Virtutibus* q. 1, a.4; *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 4, ad 3 e q. 58, a. 2.

[18] Cf. *Politica* I, cap. 5, 1254 b 2-9.

aussi que l'appétit sensible ait une disposition parfaite à suivre le jugement de la raison[19]. Sinon, chaque acte vertueux, par exemple un acte de courage, s'accomplirait avec une certaine répugnance et tristesse: car l'inclination sensible aurait l'impression d'être violentée par la raison[20]. Thomas explique ainsi la différence entre *continence* et *tempérance*. On appelle 'continent' celui dont le désir sensible n'est pas encore rectifié, mais qui veut néanmoins se conduire selon les ordres de la raison: il résiste malgré les assauts des passions qui risquent de l'entraîner hors de la voie droite. C'est grâce à la force de sa volonté qu'il ne succombe pas à la 'rébellion' des passions, sans que, néanmoins, il ait réussi à supprimer cette convoitise perverse. L'homme 'tempérant', par contre, a réussi à introduire l'ordre de la raison dans l'appétit sensible: il ne connaît plus la rébellion des passions, car ses désirs donnent spontanément leur assentiment aux ordres de la raison. La tempérance est la vertu parfaite, la continence n'en est qu'un premier stade. Thomas appelle la continence une demi-vertu. En effet, elle n'est que la perfection de la raison, sans que la sensibilité y participe[21].

Il ne faut donc pas penser comme Socrate qu'il suffit de bien penser pour bien agir: notre appétit sensible aussi doit être perfectionné par les habitudes morales. En effet, si une action est causée par deux principes dont l'un est mû par l'autre, elle ne peut être parfaite que si les deux principes le sont. Prenons l'exemple de l'artisan qui fabrique un objet en utilisant un instrument. Pour produire une oeuvre parfaite, il ne suffit pas qu'il soit lui-même bien préparé. Il lui faut en plus un instrument exactement proportionné à cette tâche. Or, une action humaine est généralement le résultat de deux principes (l'appétit sensible et la volonté) dont l'un est mû par l'autre. Dans tous ces cas où opèrent l'irascible et le concupiscible sous l'impulsion de la raison (ou volonté), "il est nécessaire que l'*habitus* qui assure la perfection de leur acte, soit non seulement dans la raison, mais aussi en eux"[22]. C'est pour cette raison que Thomas affirme que les vertus morales doivent résider dans la sensibilité.

Cet argument n'exclut certainement pas que la volonté joue un rôle décisif dans l'établissement des vertus. La notion même de vertu (*habitus electivus*) implique qu'elle a une relation priviligiée avec la volonté[23]. Si nous affirmons que la vertu morale a son siège dans la sensibilité, il ne faut pas en conclure que l'acte intégral ou principale de la vertu y soit établi[24]. La première 'motivation' de la vertu ne peut venir que de l'acte de la volonté. Mais Thomas insiste sur le fait

[19] "habitualis conformitas ad rationem" (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 4 in fine).

[20] "Si appetitus inferior non esset in perfecta dispositione ad sequendum imperium rationis, operatio, quae est appetitus inferioris, (...) non esset in bonitate perfecta; esset enim cum quadam repugnantia sensibilis appetitus" (*De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 4).

[21] Sur la différence entre tempérance et continence, voir *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 155; I-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2; III, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3 (le Christ n'a pas la vertu de la continence, mais la tempérance); *Scriptum in III Sent.* d. 33, q. 2, a. 4b; *In libros Ethicorum* VII, lec. 1. Cf. le commentaire du P. Vergriete dans l'édition de *La Tempérance I* (éd. du Cerf), Paris - Tournai - Rome 1968, pp. 524-527.

[22] "In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili" (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 4; cf. *De Virtutibus*, q.1, a. 4).

[23] "ex ipsa etiam ratione habitus apparet quod habet quandam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem, prout habitus est 'quo quis utitur cum voluerit'" (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q.50, a. 5); "usus voluntatis pertinet ad rationem habitus" (q. 50, a. 3, ad 2).

[24] "Non ergo pro tanto dicitur esse virtus in irascibili vel concupiscibili, quasi per eas totus actus virtutis, vel principalior pars expleatur; sed in quantum, per virtutis habitum, ultimum complementum bonitatis actui virtutis confertur" (*De Virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 4).

qu'un désir rationnel ne peut se réaliser qu'en entraînant avec lui le désir sensible. C'est seulement par l'intermédiaire de la sensibilité que le désir trouve son plein accomplissement dans la réalité: *"opus appetitivae virtutis consumatur in appetitu sensitivo"*[25].

III

La position de Thomas a été sévèrement critiquée par Guillaume d'Ockham. Nous ne nous attarderons pas à l'examen détaillé de ses remarques critiques, mais nous présenterons positivement sa propre doctrine en quatre thèses[26].

1) La volonté a besoin d'*habitus*. Selon Thomas, il n'y a aucune nécessité de postuler des *habitus* dans la volonté parce que cette puissance est par sa nature proportionnée à son objet, le bien (exception faite pour la justice qui a pour objet le *bonum alterius*). Ockham fait remarquer qu'une telle disposition proportionnée par son objet n'exclut pas la nécessité de l'*habitus*. En effet, l'intellect n'est pas moins déterminé par son objet (le vrai) que ne l'est la volonté. Et pourtant personne ne contestera que l'intellect puisse acquérir des *habitus*, les vertus intellectuelles[27]. Dans le cas de la volonté, on pourrait objecter que l'acquisition de vertus constituerait une entrave à sa liberté. Pour répondre à cette objection, Ockham montre qu'un *habitus* n'a pas la même fonction dans une puissance libre que dans un principe naturel. Dans ce dernier cas, l'*habitus* est requis pour déterminer une puissance qui est en soi indifférente, à un certain type d'activité. On ne peut invoquer le même argument pour introduire des *habitus* dans la volonté qui est une puissance libre. Jamais, en effet, une telle puissance ne pourrait être déterminée à produire un certain acte. Même si on répète indéfiniment un acte de la volonté en faveur d'un certain type d'action (par exemple 'l'amour des parents'), il n'en résultera jamais un *habitus* qui incline la volonté dans un certain sens et l'empêche de choisir la direction opposée. Et pourtant il reste utile, et même nécessaire pour la vie morale, que la volonté acquière des habitudes vertueuses. Bien qu'elles ne nous déterminent jamais dans un choix, elles donnent néanmoins facilité et plaisir à faire un certain choix, par contre difficulté et tristesse à choisir dans un autre sens. Ockham donne l'exemple d'un homme qui a commis beaucoup d'actes d'amour envers un autre homme. Cet homme pourrait certainement, s'il le voulait, commencer à haïr cet autre, mais il ne le fera qu'avec dégoût et tristesse. Et "après cet acte il a le remords de sa conscience, ce qui n'est rien d'autre, comme il semble, qu'une certaine tristesse laissée dans sa volonté du fait qu'elle produit un acte qui va à l'encontre de son inclination acquise"[28].

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[25] "Opus appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo" (*Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 5, ad 1; cf. *De Virtutibus*, q.1. a. 4, ad 6). A l'inverse des puissances de l'*appetitus*, l'acte de connaître trouve sa consommation dans la connaissance intellectuelle. En effet, toute connaissance tend vers l'intérieur, en assimilant par le moyen de la sensibilité, les données extérieures. La volonté, par contre, tend vers l'extérieur par le moyen du désir sensible.

[26] On trouve ces quatre conclusions (mais dans un ordre différent) dans *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11 (*Opera Theol.* VI, p. 358, lign. 15 - p. 366, lign. 9). La même doctrine est présentée en deux conclusions dans *Quodlibeta* II, q. 16.

[27] Cf. *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 353, lign. 6-9 (opinio Thomae); p. 354, lign. 8 - p. 356, lign. 9 (refutatio).

[28] "Et post talem actum habet remorsum conscientiae qui non est aliud, ut videtur, quam quaedam tristitia derelicta in voluntate ex hoc quod elicit actum aliquem contra inclinationem adquisitam mediante recto dictamine rationis"

2) Les puissances sensibles peuvent posséder, indépendamment de l'acte de la volonté, des habitudes qui les inclinent vers un certain type d'activités. Nous savons par l'experience que si on répète fréquemment un certain acte sensible, on acquiert un penchant à poser des actes semblables dans le futur, par exemple des actes de bravoure. Une telle inclination est certainement distincte de la volonté, car elle continue à exister sans qu'intervienne la volonté. Le cas d'un homme qui continue à agir selon certaines habitudes sensibles après avoir perdu l'usage de sa raison (et donc de sa volonté) est un bel exemple de cette indépendance. Chez un homme normal, la volonté peut toujours s'opposer à cette inclination, ce qui prouve encore qu'elle ne réside pas dans la volonté[29].

3) Un *habitus* acquis par la sensibilité ne peut jamais être considéré comme une 'vertu' dans le sens strictement éthique de ce terme, c'est-à-dire une disposition dont ne peuvent sortir que des actes vertueux et qui suffit à les produire[30]. Or, les actes auxquels nous sommes enclins à cause des penchants favorables de notre sensibilité, ne sont pas nécessairement vertueux. Ils peuvent être 'bons' ou 'mauvais' selon l'intention de la volonté. Pris en eux-mêmes, ils sont moralement indifférents. Par conséquent, les *habitus* dont ils procèdent, ne sont pas des vertus. Prenons l'exemple d'un homme qui a acquis dans sa sensibilité une disposition à supporter les dangers de mort. Cette disposition ne suffit nullement à produire des actes vertueux. Si cet homme participe au combat avec de mauvaises intentions (avidité de butin, vaine gloire), cette disposition l'inclinera à des actes blâmables. Par contre, s'il risque sa vie dans une guerre juste avec une bonne intention, la même disposition l'aidera à produire des actes vertueux[31]. Pour Ockham, aucun acte de la sensibilité ne peut avoir la prétention d'être 'moral'. Pour illustrer cette position, il examine plusieurs exemples ingénieux. L'exemple le plus célèbre est celui de l'homme qui veut se tuer en se jetant dans un gouffre. Mais, pendant qu'il tombe, il a des remords, et ne veut plus se tuer. Du coup, son acte de sauter qui était pervers, devient moralement neutre[32]. Ou encore, tel homme va à l'église pour louer Dieu: excellente action! Mais chemin faisant il change d'intention (il va à l'église pour être admiré par ses voisins): sa promenade devient une action mauvaise, sans qu'elle subisse aucun changement sensible[33]. Il ressort de ces exemples qu' un acte sensible, ou une disposition à faire des actes sensibles, ne sont jamais intrinsèquement vertueux; ils le sont seulement *denominatione extrinseca*. Une dénomination est purement extrinsèque si l'objet auquel elle se rapporte, peut avoir, sans subir aucun changement en lui-même, des dénominations opposées, par exemple bon/mauvais. Tel est le cas de tout *habitus* de l'âme sensible[34]. *Bonus* y est un simple terme 'connotatif' qui signifie

(*Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 358, lign. 7-10). Sur la *necessitas ponendi habitus in potentiis*, cf. p. 356, lign. 10 - p. 358, lign. 14; excellent résumé à la p. 365, lign. 3-5: "Ideo dico quod habitus est ponendus in voluntate propter maiorem inclinationem et facilitatem ad eliciendum actum, ceteris paribus".

[29] Cf. *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 1, p. 359, lign. 1-8.

[30] "Habitus ille proprie est solum virtus cuius actus est solum virtuosus" (*Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 366, lign. 1-2); "habitus qui mediante cognitione et potentia cuius est habitus, sufficit ad eliciendum actum laudabilem, et qui nullo modo est elicitivus actus vituperabilis" (*Quodlibeta* II q. 16; *Opera Theol.* IX, p. 182, lign. 10-13).

[31] Cf. *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 361, lign.12 - p. 365, lign. 5.

[32] Cf. *Quodlibeta* I, q. 20, p. 103, lign. 83-91; III, q. 14, p. 254, lign. 26-33.

[33] Cf. *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 360, lign. 8 - p. 361, lign. 7; *Quodlibeta* I, q. 20, p. 101, lign. 54-57; III, q. 14, p. 254, lign. 21-25.

[34] "*Tunc iste actus dicitur vitiosus idem numero non variatus in se qui prius dicitur virtuosus, ita quod capit*

principalement l'acte (moralement) neutre, mais qui connote l'acte de la volonté, acte parfaitement vertueux, et la droite raison auxquels il est conforme"[35].

On se souviendra que Thomas avait défini la vertu morale comme *habitualis conformitas ad rationem*[36]. Selon Ockham, une telle conformité extrinsèque ne suffit pas à définir une vertu. Sinon, on pourrait également considérer comme vertus, la disposition de la main d'un copiste ou celle de la bouche d'un chanteur à exécuter certains actes conformément à la raison[37], ou encore la disposition d'un animal domestiqué à agir en conformité avec les ordres de son maître rationnel[38].

4) Seul l'*habitus* de la volonté peut être considéré comme une vertu. D'un bon 'penchant' de la volonté ne peuvent sortir que des actes vertueux, nonobstant les circonstances extérieures. Cette disposition est donc une vertu dans le sens *strict* défini sub 3.

Si on prend le terme 'vertu' dans un sens plus large, rien n'empêche de l'appliquer aussi à nos habitudes sensibles qui favorisent l'action morale. On entend alors par 'vertu': un *habitus* qui résulte d'une certaine fréquence d'actes louables et continue à exister après ces actes[39]: ainsi l'habitude de résister à la gourmandise. Mais, cette habitude ne suffit pas à produire un acte vertueux comme nous venons de le montrer sub 3: elle n'est donc pas une vertu au sens strict.

Reste la question: qu'est-ce que ce résidu, cet *illud* qui demeure après de tels actes dans l'appétit sensible[40]?

Dans son commentaire sur les *Sentences*, Ockham admet encore qu'il s'agit d'un *habitus*. Dans le *Quodlibeta* II,16, par contre, il défend une position plus critique. Ce 'résidu' n'est pas un véritable *habitus*, il n'est qu'une certaine qualité que l'organisme corporel peut acquérir ou perdre. Pour démontrer cette thèse importante, Ockham fait appel à son rasoir: "*frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*"[41]. Si on peut expliquer une disposition à faire des actes sensibles d'un certain type par l'effet d'un changement corporel, il n'y a aucune raison de postuler un autre *habitus* d'une puissance sensible distincte de cette qualité corporelle. Or, nous savons par l'expérience que certaines dispositions favorables (ou défavorables) à l'action morale peuvent être produites par la médecine ou la diététique, sans intervention d'aucun acte de l'âme

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denominationes oppositas; et non intrinsece, constat, igitur extrinsece" (*Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 360, lign. 14-16). Voir J. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, Berlin 1969, pp. 310-312.

[35] "Sed tantum est bonitas illa nomen vel conceptus connotativus, significans principaliter ipsum actum sic neutrum, connotans actum voluntatis perfecte virtuosum et rectam rationem quibus conformiter elicitur. Ideo denominatur virtuosus talis actus denominatione extrinseca" (*Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 389, lign. 1-5; cf. p. 375, lign. 11-13).

[36] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 4 (*in fine*).

[37] "et per consequens in manu scriptoris et in ore cantoris ponerentur virtutes morales..." (*Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 359, lign. 17 - p. 360, lign. 2; même critique chez Duns Scot, *Ordinatio* III, d. 33, q. un. n. 19). L'exemple du copiste n'est pas bien choisi puisqu'il s'agit d'un acte 'productif' qui ressort de l'*ars* et n'a aucun rapport avec la *praxis* morale.

[38] L'objection concernant les animaux domestiqués a trouvé une réponse nuancée chez Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 50, a. 3 ad 2.

[39] "Alio modo accipitur 'habitus virtuosus' magis large pro omni habitu sive quocumque nato causari ex actibus laudabilibus vel existere post actus laudabiles" (*Quodlibeta* II, q. 16, p. 182, lign. 13-15).

[40] "Sed tunc est dubium quid est illud quod remanet post tales actus appetitivos" (*Quodlibeta* II, q. 16, p. 183, lign. 37 et p. 184, lign. 71-72). Sur ce problème, cf. O. Fuchs, *The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham*, New York 1952, pp. 55-61.

[41] Cf. *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 12, p. 399, lign. 8-9.

sensitive. Il est, en effet, parfaitement possible d'"arranger' notre sensibilité par des moyens purement physico-organiques pour la rendre plus 'conforme' à nos impératifs rationnels. Ainsi, quand les passions de la concupiscence sont excessives, on devra affaiblir une certaine qualité corporelle (le 'chaud') qui nous incite à de telles passions. On le fera en jeûnant et en se privant de viande. Ainsi on acquerra une qualité corporelle qui favorise l'exercice de la tempérance. Par contre, pour faciliter les actes de courage, il peut être utile de stimuler notre organisme (par une certaine boisson, par exemple) afin qu'il surmonte la peur. D'ailleurs, notre *complexio* corporelle change selon les âges de la vie sans aucune intervention de la volonté: celui qui est jeune, est plus disposé à des actes de courage que le vieillard, et pour la tempérance, c'est l'inverse.

Tous ces exemples montrent qu'il ne faut pas postuler dans l'âme sensitive des *habitus*, pour expliquer un penchant à agir de telle ou telle manière. Un tel *habitus* serait d'ailleurs superflu, ce qui est démontré par l'exemple suivant. Un homme a réussi, par un effort moral et ascétique continu, à régler sa sensibilité selon l'ordre de la raison. Selon Thomas, un tel homme aurait acquis ainsi dans sa sensibilité la vertu de la tempérance. Grâce à cette vertu, sa vie sensible obéira spontanément aux ordres de la raison. Mais supposons que la complexion corporelle d'un tel homme change soudain (à cause d'une maladie ou par des boissons ou nourritures copieuses). Nous constaterons alors que les passions s'insurgeront aussi violemment que s'il ne s'était jamais habitué à poser des actes vertueux. Ce qui montre clairement qu'aucun *habitus* ne réside dans la sensibilité; sinon cet *habitus* aurait mitigé les passions, et suscité des actes contraires[42].

Enfin, il semble que les puissances sensibles soient incapables de produire directement un *habitus* : elles ne le peuvent que *mediate*, par le moyen de l'organisme corporel. Prenons l'exemple de quelqu'un qui désire boire: il boit une bière; sous l'effet de la boisson, la chaleur augmente dans son corps; à cause de ce changement de sa complexion, il est incliné à désirer boire davantage, etc. On voit donc qu'aucun acte de l'appétit sensible, même s'il est fréquemment répété, ne peut par lui-même engendrer un *habitus* qui l'inclinerait à des actes semblables dans le futur. La disposition qui me fait désirer boire davantage, est directement l'effet d'un changement physique; seulement indirectement, il a été causé par un acte de l'appétit sensible.

Voilà les arguments développés par Ockham pour réfuser l'existence d'un *habitus* dans l'âme sensitive. On aura remarqué l'approche empirique et même 'positiviste' de son argumentation. Il est hors de mon sujet, écrit Ockham, de déterminer quel changement corporel peut influencer positivement ou négativement notre comportement moral: cela regarde les "médecins" qui ont plus d'expérience sur ce sujet[43]. Il lui suffit d'avoir établi que l'hypothèse d'un *habitus* de l'appétit sensible est superflu.

Si nous confrontons Ockham et Thomas, nous ne trouvons pas seulement une conception différente de la vie morale, mais également une conception différente de l'homme.

[42] "quod non esset verum si tales habitus inclinantes ad actus virtuosos ponerentur in appetitu sensitivo, quia tunc illi habitus mitigarent tales passiones" (*Quodlibeta* II, q. 16, p. 184, lign. 59-61).

[43] "Utrum autem ita sit vel non, et qualis debeat esse illa qualitas, pertinet principaliter ad medicos determinare, qui plures experientias de mutatione corporum humorum debent habere" (*Quodlibeta* II, q. 16, p. 185, lign. 84-87; cf. p. 185, lign. 103 - p. 186, lign. 107).

Il me semble que la doctrine morale d'Ockham présuppose une vision dichotomique de l'homme. D'une part, il y a le niveau de la raison et de la volonté, domaine exclusif de la moralité. La valeur éthique ne réside que dans l'acte interne de la volonté. L'extériorisation de l'intention morale n'ajoute rien à la moralité de l'acte, sinon que l'exécution intensifie et corrobore la volonté intérieure[44]. D'autre part, il y a le corps humain et ses fonctions organiques: le domaine des passions auxquelles l'homme doit résister par la force de sa volonté. Eventuellement, on y peut intervenir par des moyens physico-médicaux ou par une dicipline ascétique afin de mieux soumettre notre sensibilité à l'ordre de la raison.

Thomas, par contre, met l'accent sur l'unité fondamentale de l'homme. Selon lui, l'homme n'est pas vraiment vertueux, tant que ses désirs sensibles n'ont pas été intégrés dans le désir rationnel de la volonté. D'ailleurs, la vertu morale est le perfectionnement d'une aptitude naturelle[45]. Pour Thomas, le côté sensible de la vertu est aussi important que son sens spirituel intérieur. Nous devons donc essayer d'incarner l'intention morale, en suscitant dans notre sensibilité toujours changeante et imprévisible, une tendance stable et sûre à réagir conformément à la raison.

Ockham pourrait riposter qu'il ne nie pas l'utilité de certaines dispositions sensibles, mais qu'il refuse de les considérer comme vertus. On se souviendra de l'exemple de l'homme qui a perdu l'usage de la raison: cet homme continuera pendant une certaine période à se comporter conformément à l'ordre moral. Mais personne ne considérera ce comportement comme vertueux[46]. Sur ce point, Thomas serait d'accord: un *habitus* dans la sensibilité, sans acte de la volonté, n'est rien qu'une simple habitude de notre organisme. Mais Ockham a tort de choisir cet exemple dichotomique (un homme sans raison!) pour caractériser le statut de la sensibilité chez l'homme qui possède, par définition, des facultés rationnelles. Normalement, l'appétit sensible n'est pas coupé du désir rationnel auquel il peut participer: c'est par cette participation à la raison que l'*habitus* devient, plus qu'une simple habitude sensible, une vraie vertu. Le fait qu'on peut exciter ou freiner nos désirs par des moyens physiques n'exclut nullement qu'ils puissent participer à un ordre rationnel, sous l'impulsion de la volonté. Leur inclination est donc plus qu'une simple qualité corporelle: elle est une *virtus humana*. Certes, cette vertu n'est pas 'morale' dans le même sens que le sont la justice et les vertus sociales qui résident dans la volonté. Dans une terminologie moderne, on les appellerait plutôt des 'vertus de caractère' pour les distinguer des vertus morales au sens strict. Une telle distinction n'a pas de sens dans l'éthique aristotélicienne. Le mot *èthos* y signifie autant 'moeurs' que 'caractère'. Cette distinction témoigne d'une *moralisation* progressive de la doctrine des vertus (cf. Kant). La doctrine d'Ockham, qui enlève tout caractère moral à la sensibilité pour le situer exclusivement dans l'acte de la volonté, est une étape décisive dans cette évolution.

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[44] "Non ... quod aliqua ratio peccati consistit in opere exteriori, sed quando est operatio exterior, operatio interior intenditur, et fit actus intensior et delectabilior quam prius" (*Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 11, p. 375, lign. 20 - p. 376, lign. 3; cf. p. 375, lign. 19-20 et p. 377, lign. 15-18.)

[45] Thèse critiquée par Ockham dans *Quaestiones in III Sent.* q. 12, p. 392, lign. 12 - p. 395, lign. 5.

[46] Cf. *Quodlibeta* II, q. 16, p. 183, lign. 30-33.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, OCKHAM AND BURIDAN ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A NORMATIVE THEORY OF ETHICS

A. Vedder

Every design of a normative theory of ethics must start from the assumption that man has the capacity to know at least some fundamental moral principles. If this capacity is denied, a normative theory of ethics becomes a sheer impossibility. In the first half of the fourteenth century, when some new ideas about the relationship between God's will and man's morality had been put forward, this requirement became a precarious problem. To make this clear I would like to give a display of some aspects of the ethical theories of three outstanding thinkers who flourished in the second half of the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century: St. Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), William of Ockham (ca. 1285–1349) and John Buridan (ca. 1295–1358).

1. *St. Thomas Aquinas*

According to St. Thomas every man with normal intellectual capacities is able to know the first principles of morality[1]. These principles — which he calls 'natural laws' — reflect the will of God in that they contain His precepts which lead man to happiness. Man is not only able to know these principles, he also has the obligation to know them, just as he should know the prevailing laws of his society[2]. Furthermore he ought to apply these principles to particular situations in which he faces a moral problem and thus is obliged to act according to them out of reverence for the most sovereign legislator — God[3]. Now according to St. Thomas the only thing that can go wrong as regards the reliability of one's moral knowledge, is that one may not have complete or correct information about a particular situation to which a general moral principle must be applied so that the particular conclusion with regard to that situation might be wrong. This problem however is easily overcome. For if such a lack of information is only due to involuntary ignorance, and not to voluntary neglect, the resulting act — although it is morally wrong — must be excused and not be imputed to the person who acts[4]. Where the general principles of morality themselves are concerned, one cannot err. As a result, on the one hand, no one — except the mentally ill — can be excused for a wrong act due to such ignorance. On

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 16, a. 1. St. Thomas's concept of *natural law*: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 2 and q. 94, a. 2 and 4.
[2] Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 17, a. 3 and q. 17, a. 4 , ad 3 and ad 5.
[3] Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 16, a. 3, ad 1 and q. 17, a. 3, ad 5. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae, q. 19, a. 4 and *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 4.
[4] Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 16, a. 3.

the other hand, this implies that no one really needs to be harassed and have doubts whether his moral principles are indeed true and reliable.

To St. Thomas's mind, this reliability of fundamental moral knowledge was of such great significance, that he was of the opinion that not even God could, or would change His precepts that were reflected in the moral principles. He justified his point of view by referring to a property of God that man knows through revelation: His fidelity to Himself and to man.

> 'To the second argument one must say like St. Paul (II Tim. 2,13) says: 'God stays faithful; He cannot deny Himself.' But He would deny Himself if He would abolish this order of His justice. For He Himself is justice itself'[5].

2. *William of Ockham*

Some fifty years later an English theologian took a completely different stand in this matter. According to William of Ockham in the *de facto* existing moral order, man, by natural reason, is indeed able to know the first general principles of morality, which are either directly evident or known from experience. From these principles more particular moral knowledge, which Ockham calls 'subtle, useful and evident', can be deduced[6]. Ockham agrees with St. Thomas that in the existing moral order the only threat to moral knowledge comes from the sometimes incalculable particular situations to which general principles must be applied[7]. Ockham, however, is convinced that there is not the slightest guarantee that this moral order will exist forever. He is of the opinion that Gods absolute power and free will are only limited by the principle of non-contradiction. That means that, with regard to ethics, an appeal to a property assigned by man to God, such as His fidelity, will not do to save the reliability of man's knowledge of the fundamental principles of morality. God is the origin and measure of moral rules, according to Ockham, and that is exactly why He himself is not at all bound to those rules[8]. On the contrary, in several ways He might interfere in the moral order.

God might for instance change the factual psychological framework of morality — a possibility which had not even occurred to St. Thomas. According to Ockham in the *de facto* existing moral order the moral quality of an action is measured by the moral quality of the preceding act of the will by which a person decides to act[9]. This act of the will itself obtains its moral quality from its conformity to a true judgement of the intellect about what is morally required, a conformity which must be motivated by the wish to act according to such a

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[5] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 8, ad 2: 'Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Apostolus dicit II Tim. II: *Deus fidelis permanet, negare seipsum non potest*. Negaret autem seipsum, si ipsum ordinem suae iustitiae auferret: cum ipse sit ipsa iustitia'. Cf. Thomas on the question, whether the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law: *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1, and whether natural law can be changed: *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 5.

[6] *Quodlibeta septem* II, q. 14 (*Opera Theol.* IX, pp. 177-178). Cf. *Quaestiones Variae* q. 6 a. 10 (*Opera Theol.* VIII, pp. 281-283), q. 7 a. 2, pp. 330-331.

[7] *Quaestiones Variae* q. 8, pp. 423-425.

[8] *Quaestiones Variae* q. 7, a. 4, pp. 389-390 and p. 410.

[9] *Quaestiones Variae* q. 7, a. 1, pp. 327-339; q. 7, a. 3, p. 385; *Quodlibeta septem* III q. 14, pp. 253-254) *et al.*

judgment[10]. Now this factual requirement for the moral qualification of an action might be changed by God in such a way that for instance the intellectual activity — the generation of a true judgement about what a person ought to do — is no longer needed to act morally well[11].

A little less far reaching is the possibility that God may simply change the principles of morality by changing His precepts with which man's moral principles in the *de facto* existing moral order correspond. He might for instance change His precepts in such a way that the actions to which the terms 'hate', 'robbery' and 'adultery' — the examples are Ockham's own — formerly referred, are no longer morally wrong but morally right so that these terms can no longer be applied to those actions, because according to Ockham these terms connote that the person acting in accordance with what they refer to is by divine precept obliged to do the opposite, e.g. not hate, not rob or not adulterate[12].

Of all the enormous effects that these points of view have on ethics, Ockham is prepared to consider only one: the problem that might arise when God would postpone His precept 'God ought to be loved' and would prescribe that a person should for some time stop loving Him and instead concentrate on his studies. Now Ockham is of the opinion that obeying the precepts of God simply means to love Him. This, however, means that the person in question cannot do anything that would be right. For if he would not concentrate on his studies and not try not to love God, he simply would offend his precepts, but if he would concentrate on his studies and try not to love God, he would love God and consequently offend His precept. Ockham had to admit that this problem was insoluble[13].

But besides this 'antinomy', as Fr. Boehner has called it[14], we are left with yet some other important problems, which Ockham did not take into consideration. For, if it is indeed possible that God may abolish the psychological framework for morality or that He may change the principles of morality, then it is also possible that one day all efforts in ethics and all moral knowledge may become superfluous and useless. And if that would happen, man would not have the slightest certainty that he would immediately know that his knowledge of principles, which he had always known to be evident, has become outdated and useless. Yes, how should he know whether it has not already happened?[15]

Ockham's ideas — or someone else's that were very similar to Ockham's — in fact soon gave rise to scepticism with regard to moral knowledge. This may be clear from the ethical theory of the philosopher John Buridan.

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[10] *Quaestiones Variae* q. 7, a .3, p. 362; q.7, a. 4, p. 395; q.8, a. 1, pp. 409-410.
[11] *Quaestiones Variae* q. 7, a .3, p. 363.
[12] *Quaestiones in II Sent.* q. 15 (*Opera Theol.* V, pp. 352-353).
[13] *Quodlibeta septem* III, q. 14, pp. 256-257.
[14] Boehner, *Ockham, Philosophical Writings*, London - Edinburgh 1957, pp. XLIX-L.
[15] I do not wish to say that it was Ockham's direct intention to undermine the sheer possibility of ethics. I only wish to say that his views had some radical consequences which — as will be shown — were taken into account by at least one of his contemporaries. Perhaps the fact that Ockham himself did not consider these consequences is one more reason to accept Mr. Miethke's interpretation that Ockham's stressing of the contingency of the existing moral order was only an exemplification of the methodological importance which he assigned to the doctrine of God's absolute power and free will. Cf. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, Berlin 1969, pp. 312-325.

3. *John Buridan*

As Mr. Walsh has repeatedly pointed out, Buridan's theory in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle displays in the essential parts not the slightest resemblance to Ockham's new views[16]. Instead Buridan seems to fall back again and again on some well-known traditional ideas, of which the teleological cosmology which had to form the metaphysical basis for morality is the most striking[17]. What might be the reason of this adherence to tradition? It seems to me that in Buridan's days, after Ockham had stated his new ideas, a moral philosopher had to make a choice: for or against certainty in ethics. Accepting such points of view as Ockham would mean having a highly uncertain basis for ethics. For one logical consequence of such ideas was that the role of human reason could be completely played off against the ultimately inscrutable will of God. The most obvious way out for a philosopher who wished to save the certainty of moral knowledge was to minimize the role of God in ethics and to fall back on the first complete non-theological theory of ethics known in the Middle Ages: Aristotle's ethics, as it was interpreted by Albert the Great (1206–1280) and St. Thomas Aquinas. This is exactly what Buridan did.

According to Buridan God rules over man in two ways: through the common course of nature and through revelation. Aristotle himself had not taken the second kind into account and therefore Buridan wishes not to persue this theme. The first way in which God rules over man however has his interest because it must be identified with the way in which nature rules over man. According to Buridan this identification is permitted because the common course of nature is caused by God and nature at the same time[18]. How then does nature rule over man? It rules over man in that it has bestowed him with an ultimate goal in life, happiness, and with the natural capacity to know the first principles of morality which must enable him to attain this goal[19].

Thus, according to Buridan, every man is able to know the first principles of morality and to see that these principles are evident. Man is able to apply these principles to particular situations and thus to obtain evident conclusions about what he ought to do[20]. Furthermore such a conclusion may at once be universalized as to its subject term, e.g. if one concludes in a certain situation that one ought to save a man from drowning, one knows immediately that every person in that same situation ought to save that man from drowning[21].

Now, from the fact that nature has equipped man so well with means to acquire moral knowledge one must not infer that the evidence of moral knowledge is of the same kind as for

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[16] Walsh, 'Is Buridan a Sceptic about Free Will' in: *Vivarium* 2 (1964)2, cf. Korolec 'La philosophie de la liberté', in: *Studia Mediewist.* 15 (1974); Walsh 'Nominalism and Ethics' in: *Journal of the History of Philos.* 4 (1966), pp. 5-8 and 'Teleology', in: *Journal of the History of Philos.* 18 (1980), p. 267.

[17] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, ed. Paris 1513, f. Vra 17-46. Cf. Albert the Great, *Ethicorum libri X*, 23 and Thomas Aquinas *In libros Ethicorum* I, lectio 1, as opposed to Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* IV q. 2, p. 293, *Quodlibeta* IV q. 4, p. 299 and pp. 302-303 .

[18] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, f. CVII va 28-50.

[19] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, f. VIII ra 63-rb 13.

[20] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, f. CXVI va 41 - vb 17.

[21] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, f. CXXXI ra 59 - rb 12.

instance of the propositions of science. Because of the extremely high variability of the circumstances to which moral principles must be applied it is not always possible to gather all information that is required for an absolutely true conclusion. Buridan however believes that this is no real threat to the reliability of moral knowledge. He stipulates that each kind of knowledge has the evidence which its subject–matter permits it to have. With regard to the propositions of moral knowledge this means that they can be evident if and only if they are acquired after all the relevant circumstances that could be investigated have indeed been investigated, although they may in fact be false because of a wrong observation of the facts for which one cannot be held responsible[22].

Nowhere in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics does Buridan take into account the possibility of divine interference in the moral order by way of changing the psychological framework for morality or the fundamental principles of morality, both of which, from his point of view, would be an interference in the common course of nature. This however does not at all mean that he was completely out of touch with the new ideas concerning such a possible divine interference. This becomes clear from a passage from his commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Here Buridan defends the possibility of evidence in science against the scepticism ascribed to Nicholas of Autrecourt[23]. He warns by way of an *ad hominem*-argument against the destructive effects of an all too rigorous application of the doctrine of God's absolute power and free will for moral knowledge. The passage reads as follows:

> 'But in another way evidence is taken as qualified evidence or evidence from the assumption, like it has been said earlier: from the assumption that things would stick to the common course of nature and that we would thus have evidence of the fact that every fire is hot or that the heaven is being moved, although the contrary may be possible through the power of God. Such kind of evidence suffices for the principles and the conclusions of natural science. There is even another weaker evidence, the one that suffices for acting morally well. For when a man, having considered and examined all created circumstances which he is able to examine carefully, judges according to what such circumstances require, then that judgement will be evident by the evidence that suffices for acting morally well, even if it may be false because of invincible ignorance of some circumstance. (...) Therefore it is concluded as a corrolary that some men, wanting to destroy the natural and moral sciences because there is no absolute evidence in most of their principles and conclusions — for they can be falsified by supernaturally possible instances —, talk as very evil men, since for such kinds of knowledge absolute evidence is not required, but the afore-said kinds of evidence, qualified evidence or evidence from the assumption, suffice'[24].

[22] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, f. CXXV va 24-63.

[23] About the controversy between Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt concerning the evidence of scientific knowledge: Moody, *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, Berkeley 1975, pp. 127-160.

[24] Buridan, *Questiones in libros Metaphysicorum*, ed. Paris 1518, ff. VIIIvb 67 - IXra 20: "Sed alio modo accipitur evidentia secundum quid sive ex suppositione ut prius dicebatur quod observaretur in entibus communis cursus nature, et sic esset nobus evidentia quod omnis ignis est calidus et quod celum movetur, licet contrarium sit possibile per potentiam Dei. Et huiusmodi evidentia sufficit ad principia et conclusiones scientie naturalis. Immo est adhuc alia debilior evidentia que sufficit ad bene agendum moraliter, scilicet, quando visis et inquisitis

This text makes it clear that Buridan did not ignore nor completely deny the possibility of divine interference in the moral order. It indicates, however, that according to Buridan for the sake of morality itself — that is to say for the sake of morally right conduct itself — there is, once this possibility has been accepted or taken for granted, no other way left than to build up a theory of ethics which starts from the assumption that God does not interfere in the moral order. For if one would not do so the basis of moral knowledge, which must also be the basis of a normative theory of ethics, would indeed be demolished immediately. Man could no longer trust his own intellectual capacities in matters of ethics and would be completely delivered to the impredictable will of God. Morally right conduct itself would be a sheer coincidence; ethical theory would be senseless.

Therefore Buridan seems not only to be motivated by optimism about the power of human reason, but also by care for man and man's morality when he says in his Commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics:

> "For someone may stick to his opinions because of many reasons. First there may be the firmness of reason. This is always praiseworthy and not to stick to it would be bad and blameworthy, whether this opinion be true or false. For I call that reason firm that, after all the circumstances that can be observed have been observed, judges right according to what they require, although the reached conclusion may be false because of invincible ignorance of some circumstance. (...) The reason for this is that we do not have any directive principle for our human life other than reason only"[25].

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omnibus circumstantiis factis quas homo cum diligentia potest inquirere, si iudicet secundum exigentiam huiusmodi circumstantiarum, illud iudicium erit evidens evidentia sufficiens ad bene agendum moraliter, etiam licet iudicium sit falsum propter invincibilem ignorantiam alicuius circumstantie. (...) Ideo conclusum est correlarie quod aliqui valde mali dicunt volentes interimere scientias naturales et morales eo quod in pluribus earum principiis et conclusionibus non est evidentia simplex, sed possunt falsificari per casus supernaturaliter possibiles quia non requiritur ad tales scientias evidentia simpliciter, sed sufficiunt predicte evidentie secundum quid sive ex suppositione".

[25] Buridan, *Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum*, f. CL ra 32-47: "Nam immanere potest aliquis oppinionibus suis propter multas causas. Primo propter efficacem rationis. Et hoc est semper laudabile et non immanere vituperabile et malum, sive oppinio fuit vera sive falsa. Voco enim rationem efficassem que circumstantiis omnibus passionibus attendi attentis iudicat recte secundum exigentiam ipsarum, licet conclusio iudicata sit falsa propter invincibilem ignorantiam alicuius circumstantie. (...) Cuius ratio est quia nullum habemus principium vite nostre humane directivum nisi rationem tantum". The manuscript Chartres BV 283 (f.165 va 5-17) reads 'possibilibus' instead of 'passionibus' which I have translated.

VI SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

WILHELM VON OCKHAM UND DIE INSTITUTIONEN DES SPÄTEN MITTELALTERS*

J. Miethke

Rahmenbedingungen politischer Theorie im Spätmittelalter

Im Spätmittelalter formte sich Europa zu der Gestalt, die den europäischen Aufbruch in die Moderne ermöglichen sollte. Solch allgemeine Formulierung gilt auch auf dem Gebiet der Politik und politischen Theorie. Das politische Denken der Zeit war damals nicht eigentlich ein Universitätsfach. Die Magistri, die an der Artes-Fakultät das *Corpus Aristotelicum* auslegten, beschäftigten sich zwar regelmäßig mit der Ethik des Stagiriten, seit sie um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts im Abendland durch die neuen lateinischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen zugänglich geworden war, gar nicht, oder doch sehr selten haben sie aber die aristotelische "Politik" behandelt, noch seltener sind uns ihre exegetischen Bemühungen in Gestalt einer eigenen *Lectura*, eines scholastischen Kommentars, zum Text dieses Buches überliefert[1].

Erst recht gab es kein eigenes ständiges literarisches Genus, in dem man damals Politik theoretisch an den Hochschulen in einer soliden Tradition bedacht und erörtert hätte. Die vorherrschende Traktatform des hohen Mittelalters, die Fürstenspiegel[2], hatte zwar noch lange nicht ihre Funktion verloren, an ihre Leser (die man sich keineswegs nur oder etwa auch nur vorwiegend als die Fürstensöhne der Zeit vorstellen darf) die Grundsätze einer praktischen Philosophie zu vermitteln, diese Traktate reichten aber keineswegs aus, über die politischen Erfahrungen und Konflikte der eigenen Zeit eine hinreichend umfassende Diskussion zu führen. Da aber, anders als in anderen Sparten der aristotelischen Philosophie, weder das Vehikel des regelmäßigen Universitätsunterrichts, noch die zusammenschließende Tradition der Anforderungen aus einem literarischen Genus die Kohärenz einer akademischen theoretischen Debatte sicherte, mußten Ad-hoc-Polemiken, Pamphlete, Streitschriften die theoretische Basis ihrer Argumente allererst selbst explizieren, wurden diese Schriften tendenziell gezwungen, auch noch jene Leistungen zu übernehmen, die ihnen sonst nicht unmittelbar abverlangt werden. Politische Theorie im Mittelalter ist vorwiegend keine akademische, sondern in erster Linie eine

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* Der Vortrag erscheint bewußt nur mit knappen Nachweisen. Auf eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur, der ich gleichwohl verpflichtet bleibe, habe ich hier verzichtet, um den Apparat nicht ausufern zu lassen. In einer englischen Fassung (die ich Herrn Dr. Arnold Bühler verdanke) durfte ich diesen Bericht am 7. Januar 1987 an der University of Chicago vortragen. Den Diskussionen verdanke ich weitere Anregungen.

[1] Zusammenfassend vgl. C. Martin, *The Commentaries on the Politics of Aristotle in the Late Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, with Reference to the Thought and Political Life of the Time*, PhD-Thesis Oxford 1949 (masch.), zuletzt zusammenfassend J. Dunbabin, 'The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle's Politics' in: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, edd. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, Cambridge (usw.) 1982, S. 723-737.

[2] Unübertroffen immer noch W. Berges, *Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späteren Mittelalters* (Schriften des Reichsinstituts für ältere deutsche Geschichteskunde 3), Leipzig 1938.

polemische Gattung.

Diese Behauptung halte ich auch gegenüber dem Einwand noch fest, daß der mittelalterlichen Polemik auch über politische Streitfragen in der Regel der Geruch des Scholastischen ganz unablösbar anhaftet. Gewiß, hier und da sind uns auch direkte Volkslieder und polemische Gedichte erhalten, die Kreuzzugsaufruf oder Kreuzzugskritik, eine bestimmte Schlacht und ihre Kombatanten oder unmittelbar politische Absichten verbreiten, beschreiben, erklären wollen. Außerdem bot ja auch im Mittelalter die Geschichtsschreibung (die im übrigen ebenfalls keine fachliche Basis an den mittelalterlichen Universitäten hatte) immer wieder Gelegenheit zu mehr oder minder ausgedehnten Reflexionen über politische Fragen. Die Masse von politiktheoretisch beachtlicher Literatur aber bleibt der zeitgenössischen Schulmethode zutiefst verpflichtet, bleibt durchtränkt geradezu von der scholastischen Form des Umgangs mit Argumenten, Autoritäten und Problemen.

Das hat nur zum Teil seinen Grund darin, daß fast alle Autoren, die in unserer akademischen Tradition als politische Theoretiker geführt werden, an den Universitäten ihre Ausbildung erhalten hatten. Eine der seltenen Ausnahmen, Dante Aligheri mit seiner Schrift zur *Monarchia*[3], schließt sich doch gerade in diesem Punkte eng an diese Gruppe an. Obwohl Dante (soweit wir wissen) niemals an einer Universität studiert hat, war er durch den Unterricht, den er an den Bettelordensstudien seiner Vaterstadt Florenz genossen hatte, doch intensiv genug mit den scholastischen Wissenschaften vertraut, um sich in dieser Hinsicht fast ärgerlich konform mit seinen Gesprächspartnern zu zeigen. Politische Theorie im Spätmittelalter, wenn sie denn nicht zunächst für die Hörsäle formuliert wurde, kam doch jedenfalls aus den Hörsälen, sie stammte von den Universitätsgelehrten und richtete sich, das sei gleich hinzugefügt, auch vorwiegend an Universitätsgelehrte als Publikum, als Leser, Benutzer und Gesprächspartner[4].

Denn daß die Anwendung der damals modernen methodischen Möglichkeiten der scholastischen Wissenschaften auf politische Fragen für Laien nicht ohne weiteres verständlich war, scheint einsichtig. Allein die schwere scholastische Rüstung der Traktate in gelehrtem Latein ist heute noch dem Nichtspezialisten schwer durchschaubar und machte auch damals eine unmittelbare Adresse an Nichtgelehrte zumindest problematisch, mußte eine unmittelbare Lektüre der Texte durch "Nichtstudierte" bis zur Unmöglichkeit erschweren.

Gewiß, es gab die Möglichkeit der Übersetzungen, und einige der Texte politischer Theorie kamen auch, wie andere gelehrte Handbücher, in den Genuß dieser Verbreiterung ihrer Wirkungschance — ich erinnere hier vor allem an den Fürstenspiegel des Aegidius Romanus, jenen Text des späten 13. Jahrhunderts, der in fast jede europäischen Sprache des mittelalterlichen Abendlandes, einschließlich des Hebräischen, übertragen worden ist[5]. Im 15. Jahrhundert ergänzte man den Fundus der volkssprachlichen, und damit auch dem lesekundigen Laien verfügbaren Literatur. Gerade die zentralen Texte der politischen Theorie des

[3] Dante Alighieri, *Monarchia*, ed. P. G. Ricci (Edizione Nazionale della Società Dantesca 5), Milano 1965.

[4] Einzeluntersuchungen etwa: J. Miethke, 'Marsilius und Ockham, Publikum und Leser ihrer politischen Schriften im späteren Mittelalter' in: *Medioevo* 5 (1980), S. 543-567, oder Miethke, 'Das Konsistorialmemorandum *De potestate pape* des Heinrich von Cremona von 1302 und seine handsschriftliche Überlieferung' in: *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, edd. A. Maierù und A. Paravicini Bagliani (Storia e letteratura 151), Rom 1981, S. 421-451.

[5] Vgl. eine vorläufige Übersicht bei W. Berges (wie Anm. 1), S. 320-328 (hebräische Übersetzung S. 327: zwei Hss.).

Spätmittelalters sind aber selten unter solcher "Fachprosa" zu finden. Die wichtigste Ausnahme wohl von dieser Regel bildet der *Defensor pacis* des Marsilius von Padua, der noch vor den 60er Jahren des 14. Jahrhunderts einen französischen Übersetzer fand (dessen Text uns freilich verloren ist), und der noch 1363 aus dieser französischen Version ins Italienische, ins Florentiner Volgare, übertragen worden ist[6]: diese Übersetzung freilich ist nur in einer einzigen Handschrift (und zwar in einem Manuskript des 15. Jahrhunderts) erhalten geblieben, hat also eine bescheidene eigene Verbreitungsgeschichte aufzuweisen, die erst unter den veränderten Bedingungen des 16. Jahrhunderts durch den Buchdruck in grundsätzlich neue Bahnen gelangte[7].

Für andere Texte desselben Diskussionszusammenhangs ergab sich wenigstens eine mittelbare Chance für eine volkssprachliche Rezeption, wenn sie in die großen Kompilationen von gelehrten Fachleuten einfließen konnten, wie etwa in jene Traktate, die am Hofe des französischen Königs Karls V. zuerst in die lateinische Version des *Somnium viridarii* (von 1376) Eingang fanden, das zwei Jahre später (1378) als *Songe du vergier* eine volkssprachliche Version erhielt und so auch unmittelbar die nichtgelehrten Hofleute zu erreichen vermochte[8].

Dieses Beispiel deutet uns aber zugleich auch an, daß diese volkssprachlichen Kompilationen sicherlich nicht den Zweck hatten, dem "Volke" nützliche Kenntnisse zu vermitteln, oder gar subversive Argumentationshilfe zu liefern, vielmehr diente diese Literatur dazu, jene Übersetzungsarbeit, die von den Klerikern am Hofe ohnedies zu leisten war, zu erleichtern. Texte, wie das *Somnium/Songe* zeigen uns also zugleich an, wie selbst die gelehrtesten Traktate ihr ungelehrtes Publikum noch aufzufinden wußten, auch dann, wenn sie nicht schriftlich in Gänze übersetzt bereitlagen: An den Höfen des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts fehlte es an gelehrten Beratern nicht, die dank ihrer Universitätsausbildung durchaus in der Lage waren, lateinische scholastische Traktate aus der Welt der Hochschulen und Hörsäle in die der Ratsstuben und Kabinette hinein zu übersetzen.

Theoretische Schriften und politische Traktate

Die scholastische politische Theorie hat ihre Hauptwirkung, wie sich vor allem an ihrer Überlieferung zeigen läßt, auf diese Weise genommen. Die Sphäre von Politikberatung und Entscheidungsfindung war der Ort ihrer Wirkung, war auch wohl das Ziel ihrer Absichten. Der englische Franziskaner Wilhelm von Ockham, der die Zeit seines erwachsenen Lebens zwischen

[6] ed. C. Pincin, *Marsilio da Padova , Defensor pacis nella traduzione in volgare fiorentino del 1363*, Turin 1966. Es handelt sich um Ms. Florenz, *Bibl. Med. Laur.*, plut. XLIV, cod. 26 (dazu vgl. bereits *Marsilius von Padua, Defensor pacis*, ed. R. Scholz, Hannover 1932-1933, S. XXIII).

[7] Zur Rezeption des Marsilius im 16. Jh. vgl. vor allem G. Piaia, *Marsilio nella riforma e nella controriforma, fortuna e interpretazione*, Padua 1977.

[8] Das *Somnium* ist immer noch in den alten Drucken zu verwenden, z. B. in M. Goldast, *Monarchia S. Romani imperii*, Tom. I, Hanau 1611 (Neudruck Graz 1960), S. 58-229. Der *Songe* jetzt nach einem der wichtigsten Mss. ed. durch M. Schnerb-Lièvre, *Le Songe du Vergier*, édité d'après le manuscrit Royal 19 C IV de la British Library, Bd. 1-2 (Sources d'histoire médiévale) Paris 1982; dort auch die wichtige Literatur, von der hier nur auf J.-P. Royer, *L'église et le royaume de France au XIVe siècle d'après le Songe du Vergier et la jurisprudence du Parlement*, Paris 1959, hingewiesen sein soll. Zur Überlieferung vgl. auch D. van den Auweele, 'Note sur un manuscrit du *Songe du Vergier*' in: *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 51 (1984), S. 242-245.

den Schulen und dem Hof des deutschen Kaisers Ludwig des Bayern teilen mußte[9], *macht aus* dieser Regel ebensowenig eine Ausnahme wie der italienische Arzt und Artistenmagister Marsilius von Padua, der ebenfalls an der Universität von Paris und am kaiserlichen Hof in München gewirkt hat[10].

Freilich, wenn Marsilius neben seinen politischen Schriften vielleicht auch einige "artistische" *Texte — um dieses Wort im Sinne des 14. Jahrhunderts hier zu gebrauchen —* hinterlassen hat[11], so liegt seine eigentliche Lebensleistung doch nicht auf diesem Felde. Bei Ockham dagegen streiten sich die Gelehrten noch heute, ob er als letzter in der Reihe der großen franziskanischen Theologen der Scholastik, oder ob er als politischer Pamphletist eine größere Wirkung auf seine Gegenwart und die Zukunft Europas genommen hat. Fest steht jedenfalls, daß Positionen der Ockham'schen Theologie, seiner Erkenntnistheorie, Naturphilosophie und insbesondere seiner Logik an den europäischen Universitäten bis in die Neuzeit hinein maßgebend blieben. Luther hat etwa die Theologie der Scholastik vorwiegend als ockhamistisch geprägte Theologie zur Kenntnis genommen und bekämpft, die letzte Auflage von Ockhams *Summa logicae* erschien in Oxford 1675 und damit noch über sechs Jahrzehnte später als der bislang letzte Druck von Ockhams politischem Hauptwerk, dem riesigen Fragment des *Dialogus*, der 1614 in Hanau von dem Protestanten Melchior Goldast in seine *Monarchia Sacri Romani Imperii* aufgenommen worden ist[12].

Doch brauchen wir diesen Streit der Fakultäten um jeweils "ihren" Ockham hier nicht zu entscheiden. Es genügt festzustellen, daß auch die Wirkungsgeschichte es nicht erlaubt, die Frage zu beantworten, welchem Teil der literarischen Hinterlassenschaft Ockhams die größere historische Bedeutung, der höhere Rang einzuräumen ist, den Schriften, die er in Oxford, London und Avignon im Verlaufe einer zügigen, wenn auch durchaus nicht blitzhaften akademischen Karriere als junger Universitätslehrer verfaßt hat, oder seinen Texten, die er als politischer Pamphletist der gelehrten Öffentlichkeit seiner Zeit unterbreitete.

Es ist oft genug bemerkt worden, daß diese beiden Teile seines Oeuvres sich nicht leicht aufeinander beziehen lassen. Es ist nicht nur problematisch, von Ockhams "nominalistischer" politischen Theorie zu sprechen, es scheint geradezu als unsinnig, weil Ockham sich kaum jemals in der Zeit seines deutschen Exils in München an die Texte und Themen seiner universitären Karriere ausdrücklich erinnert und nirgends die Verbindung seiner politischen

[9] Zur Biographie vgl. L. Baudry, *Guillaume d'Occam, l'homme et ses oeuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques, I: l'homme et les oeuvres* (mehr nicht erschienen), Paris 1949, oder J. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, Berlin 1969. Zur politischen Philosophie vgl. auch A. S. McGrade, *The Political Thought of William of Ockham, Personal and Institutional Principles* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, III 7), Cambridge 1974.

[10] Zu seiner Biographie neben der letzten Auflage von G. de Lagarde, *La naissance de l'esprit laique au déclin du moyen âge*, nouvelle édition réfondue, tome III: *Marsile de Padoue*, Paris - Louvain 1970, bes. C. Pincin, *Marsilio* (wie Anm. 6). Unüberholt auch immer noch J. Haller, 'Zur Lebensgeschichte Marsiglios von Padua' in: *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 48 (1929), S. 166-197, jetzt in Haller: *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters*, Stuttgart 1944, S. 335-368.

[11] Vgl. etwa L. Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun (1285/89 -1328), Untersuchungen zur Biographie und Sozialehre eines lateinischen Averroisten*, Stuttgart 1966, S. 96-118; J. Hamesse, 'Marsile de Padoue peut-il être considéré comme l'auteur des *Parvi flores*?' in: *Medioevo* 6 (1980), S. 491-499.

[12] Tomus II, Hanau 1614 (Neudruck Graz 1960, auch gesondert in der von L. Firpo hrsg. Reihe: *Monumenta politica rariora*, ser. I, nr.1, Turin 1959) S. 394-957.

Philosophie und seiner Theologie und Erkenntnislehre expliziert hat. Alle Versuche einer nachträglichen Rekonstruktion sind fehlgeschlagen, die über die selbstverständliche und unbestreitbare allgemeine Wahrheit der Einsicht hinausgehen, daß Ockham seine theoretische Philosophie als politischer Pamphletist nicht "vergessen" hatte. Mit vollem Recht hat der deutsch-amerikanische Franziskaner und Philosophiehistoriker Philotheus Boehner schon 1943 lapidar konstatiert: "Ockham's political ideas in their great outlines could have been developed (...) from any of the classical metaphysics of the 13th century"[13].

Um Ockhams Ansatz und seine Antriebe in seinen politischen Schriften richtig zu bestimmen, dazu bedarf es jedenfalls zunächst nicht eines Rückganges auf die komplexen Probleme, die er in seinen akademischen Schriften subtil durchleuchtet hat. Ockham hat sich in seiner Zeit an der Universität auch selbst in erstaunlicher Abstinenz allen praktischen, erst recht allen politischen Fragen ferngehalten. Selbst seine Quodlibets, eine Literaturgattung, die doch sonst auch franziskanischen Theologen häufig Gelegenheit gab, in aktuelle Streitfragen des Tages einzugreifen[14], beschäftigen sich mit rigider Ausschließlichkeit mit theoretischen und theologischen Problemen. Aus den Äußerungen seiner akademischen Zeit eine politische Philosophie rekonstruieren zu wollen, wäre etwa mit der Aufgabe vergleichbar, aus Wittgensteins *Tractatus* eine politische Philosophie zu eruieren. Auf dieses hoffnungslose Unterfangen wollen wir uns hier nicht einlassen.

Einen angemessenen Einstieg in Ockhams politisches Denken gewinnen wir nur, wenn wir Motivation und Anlaß des "Paradigmenwechsels" in seiner literarischen Produktion zur Kenntnis nehmen. Auf diesem Wege einer genetisch-biographischen Analyse seiner politischen Theorie scheint es aussichtsreich, auch in vielumstrittenen Problemen der Auslegung von Ockhams Meinung zumindest eine Orientierung zu gewinnen, die verläßliche Ergebnisse ermöglicht[15]. Gewiß ist in einem knappen Vortrag nicht möglich, im Einzelnen die Schriften Ockhams, die in der modernen Ausgabe der *Opera politica* bisher 3 Bände umfassen[16] und noch etwa 5 weitere Bände ausfüllen werden, hier zu durchmustern. Ich will mich aber darum bemühen, in einer knappen Skizze die Grundpositionen Ockhams anzudeuten, um von hier aus Absicht und Tragweite seines Institutionenverständnisses zu beleuchten.

Franziscanische Armut

Es liegt mittlerweile auf der Hand, daß der erste Ausgangspunkt von Ockhams politischer

[13] 'Ockham's Political Ideas' in: *The Review of Politics* 3(1943), S. 462-487, jetzt in: Boehner, *Collected Articles on Ockham*, ed. E.M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1958, S. 442-468, Zitat S. 446.

[14] Vgl. knapp etwa J. F. Wippel, 'The Quodlibetal Question as a Distinctive Literary Genre' in: *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales, Définition, critique et exploitation*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1982, S. 67-84, kompendiös Wippel, 'Quodlibetal Questions, chiefly in Theological Faculties' in: *Les questions quodlibetiques dans les Facultés de Théologie, de Droit et de Médicine*, ed. B.C. Bazán, J.F. Wippel, G. Fransen, D. Jacquart, Turnhout 1985.

[15] Dieser Ansatz wurde ausführlicher durchgeführt in: Ockhams Weg (wie Anm. 9).

[16] *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera politica*, ed. J. G. Sikes, H. S. Offler u. a., vol. I - III, Manchester 1943-1963 (zitiert als *Opera politica* I-III", wobei ich Bd. I in der 2. neubearbeiteten Auflage von H. S. Offler, 1974, benutze).

Reflexion eine kontingente Option in einem politischen Konflikt seiner Zeit war, seine Parteinahme für die Überzeugungen seines religiösen Verbandes, des Franziskanerordens, im Konflikt mit den anders gerichteten Absichten und Entscheidungen des Papstes Johannes XXII. Ockham begann und beendete seine Karriere als politischer Pamphletist in einer mit Verve und Genauigkeit zusammengestellten Liste aller "Irrtümer" (*errores*), die er in den päpstlichen Verlautbarungen entdeckt zu haben glaubte[17].

Im sogenannten "Theoretischen Armutsstreit" zwischen dem größten der klassischen Bettelorden der katholischen Kirche und dem Papst in Avignon, in den Ockham eingriff, ging es um uns heute schwer durchschaubare theoretische Fragen des Verständnisses von Armut und Eigentum, Verfügungsgewalt und Gebrauchsrecht an Verbrauchsgütern, um Gehorsamsforderung der Offenbarungsschrift und Gehorsamsforderung des Inhabers kirchlicher Amtsgewalt, und um ähnliche intrikate Probleme[18].

Franz von Assisi hatte in der radikalen Nachfolge des armen Christus eine christusförmige Lebensform sich selbst und seiner rapide wachsenden Schülerschar auferlegt. Schon zu seinen Lebzeiten hatten sich bei aller Kirchenfrömmigkeit des Ordensstifters gewisse Spannungen gezeigt zwischen den Notwendigkeiten, die geradezu explosiv anwachsende Organisation zu regulieren, und dem ethischen Rigorismus des absoluten Armutsgebotes. Noch im *Testament* aus seinen letzten Lebensmonaten hatte Franziskus diesen Spannungen Rechnung getragen, indem er einmal die Maximen seiner Ordensregel, der *Regula* als *vita evangelii Jesu Christi* ausdrücklich seinen Brüdern erneut ohne jede Ermäßigung einzuschärfen versuchte, indem er aber auch auf der anderen Seite zugleich jede Ausflucht glossierender Interpretation, wie sie die werdenden Universitäten an Bibeltext und Kirchenrechtscanones schon vollendet zu handhaben wußten, durch ein beschwörendes "*non mittant glossas*" und erneut durch ein "*sine glossa*" abwehren wollte. Darüber hinaus hat Franziskus in diesem seinem Testament seinen Brüdern auch verboten, sich an der päpstlichen Kurie Rechtsauskünfte über den wahren Rechtsgehalt der Regel zu holen oder gar durch apostolische Privilegien oder Dispense sich das Joch der strikten Regelbeachtung zu erleichtern[19].

Daß und wie diese Bemühungen des heiligen Ordensstifters gleichwohl scheiterten, brauchen wir hier im einzelnen nicht zu verfolgen. Die Franziskaner wurden noch in der Generation, die den Ordensgründer persönlich noch gekannt hatte, zu einem päpstlich privilegierten, geförderten und gelenkten Orden der katholischen Kirche, in dem um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts dann bereits eine ganze Reihe von Regelkommentaren und Regelauslegungen entstanden sind. Sehr

[17] Vgl. insbesondere *Opus Nonaginta Dierum* in: *Opera politica* I, S. 292-368 und *Opera politica* II, S. 395-858, sowie *De imperatorum et pontificum potestate*, in Ergänzung zu R. Scholz: *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern*, Rom 1911-1914 (Neudruck Turin 1974), Bd. 2, S. 453-480 (wo cap. 27 aufgrund eines mechanischen Fehlers der Hs. frühzeitig abbricht), ed. W. Mulder, 'Gulielmi Ockham Tractatus de imperatorum et pontificum potestate' in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 16 (1923), S. 469-492; 17 (1924), S. 72-97 (die Edition im zweiten Teil).

[18] Vgl. etwa J. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg* (wie Anm. 9), S. 348-427.

[19] *Regula non bullata* und *Testamentum*, ed. K. Esser, *Die Opuscula des Hl. Franziskus von Assisi*, Neue textkritische Edition (Specilegium Bonaventurianum 13), Grottaferrata 1976, S. 377-402 und 437-445, Zitate S. 377, 444. Die ersten Schritte des Ordens und des Papstes zur Umgehung der Auflagen des Stiftertestaments hat präzise erläutert H. Grundmann, 'Die Bulle *Quo elongati* Papst Gregors IX' in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 54 (1961), S. 3-25, jetzt in: Grundmann, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, Teil I: *Religiöse Bewegungen*, Stuttgart 1976, S. 222-242.

wohl versuchte dieser Orden sich auf die Forderungen des Alltags und die Forderungen der Regel zugleich einzustellen. Franziskus hatte aber durch sein insistierendes Drängen seinem Orden einen dauerhaften Zwiespalt eingepflanzt, da immer wieder erneut an seinen Worten sich der Widerspruch zur offiziellen Politik der Ordensleitung entzünden konnte und entzündete, zumal die Kluft zwischen dem eigenen radikalen Anspruch und der Adaption an die Wirklichkeit, so subtil sie auch durch Konstruktionen überbrückt werden mochte, am Prüfstein der schlichten Worte des Stifters stets erneut deutlich werden konnte.

Die inneren Krisen des Ordens in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts, die stürmischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Flügeln der Rigorosen und Laxen, die kompromißbereite mittlere Linie, die man schließlich im Ausgleich der Extreme zu finden vermochte, sollen uns hier nicht im einzelnen beschäftigen, das würde mehr als nur einen Vortrag füllen. Jedenfalls war am Ende des Jahrhunderts ein fragiles Gleichgewicht im Selbstverständnis und in der Lebenspraxis des Ordens erreicht worden, das es erlaubte, verbal die rigorosen Auflagen der Regel festzuhalten, die von den Franziskanern eine radikale Armut verlangten, gleichwohl aber die institutionelle Stabilität des auf etwa 30 000 Ordensbrüder angewachsenen Verbandes zu sichern.

Der große scholastische Theologe und Ordensgeneral Bonaventura von Bagnoregio (1217/21-1274), der schließlich, bezeichnend genug, als Kardinal der römischen Kirche starb, hatte die Fundamente gelegt, andere hatten weitergebaut. Jedenfalls schien es dem Orden in seiner großen Mehrheit klar, daß er in absoluter Armut lebte, seine Brüder jedem Besitzanspruch in radikaler Konsequenz sowohl für sich selbst, als auch für den Ordensverband durch ihre Gelübde entsagt hatten, und den Weisungen der Regel und des Heiligen Franziskus gemäß nur von den Zuwendungen anderer lebten. In dieser *altissima paupertas* fand der Orden seine Distinktion, das Kriterium, das ihn von allen anderen Orden der Christenheit zu seinem Vorteil unterschied. Ein Kult der Armut und der Armutstheorie entstand, und bei aller Bandbreite des Selbstverständnisses im einzelnen war man sich doch in dem jeweiligen Anspruch völlig einig, daß man sich in diesem Punkte in nichts von den Forderungen der Regel entfernte.

Wie war das möglich bei dem größten Orden der damaligen Christenheit, der das gesamte Abendland umspannte, seine rund 1300 Konvente in allen Ländern Europas errichtete, der riesige glanzvolle Kirchen erbaute und mit prächtigen Kunstwerken ausschmückte? Sowohl die herrliche Grabeskirche S. Francesco in Assisi, als auch S. Croce in Florenz sind beide noch — um nur diese Beispiele herauszugreifen — im Laufe des 13. Jahrhunderts errichtet worden und haben ihre Ausstattung zum Teil bereits zu Ockhams Lebzeiten erhalten. Wie konnte rigideste Armut einem Orden gelingen, der an den europäischen Universitäten eigene Generalstudien unterhielt[20] und sie mit eigenen Büchern reichlich ausstattete[21], als Manuskripte noch ein Vermögen kosteten? Man hatte sich, nicht zuletzt mit Hilfe von Päpsten, die dem Orden nahestanden oder ihm gar entstammten, allmählich darauf verständigt, daß das rechtliche

[20] D. Berg, *Armut und Wissenschaft. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Studienwesens der Bettelorden im 13. Jahrhundert*, Düsseldorf 1977; *Le scuole degli ordini mendicanti* (secoli XIII - XIV) (Convegni del Centro di Studi sulla Spiritualità Medievale, 17), Todi 1978.

[21] Vgl. nur R. Manselli, 'Due biblioteche di "studia" minoritici: Santa Croce in Firenze e il Santo di Padova' in: *Le scuole* (wie Anm. 20), S. 353-371 (doch vgl. die Anmerkungen von J. Miethke in: *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 61 (1981), S. 413).

Eigentum an all diesen materiellen Gütern nicht auf den Orden übergehen sollte, sondern bei der römischen Kirche verblieb, während der fromme Orden gleichsam als Geschäftsführer ohne Auftrag die Verfügungsgewalt über all die Vermögenswerte in der Hand hielt, die zu einer commoden Existenz vonnöten oder auch nur dienlich waren. Nach seinem eigenen Selbstverständnis war der Orden lediglich Manager fremden Eigentums, und also "arm". Daß er diese Aufgabe dann freilich nicht in dem unmittelbaren Interesse des Eigentümers, sondern im eigensten Ordensinteresse erfüllte, das wurde gar nicht mehr wahrgenommen oder diskutiert.

Abgesichert wurde dieser Stand der Dinge exegetisch, indem man ganz im Sinne des ursprünglichen christomimetischen Selbstverständnisses des Heiligen Franziskus in immer neuen Anläufen nachzuweisen versuchte, daß gerade damit nichts anderes geschah, als die Situation der Urkirche zu wiederholen, daß man dem eigentumslosen Leben Christi und seiner Apostel wiederholend nacheifere, daß man dem entsprach, was man weit später dann den "Kommunismus der Urgemeinde" nennen sollte.

Auch hier wiederum verzichte ich darauf darzulegen, wie dieses Konstrukt aus einer deutlichen Konvergenz zwischen den Interessen der römischen Kurie und denen von starken Kräften im Franziskanerorden zuerst formuliert und rechtlich installiert und schließlich als maßgebliches Selbstverständnis auch durch päpstliche rechtsverbindliche Erklärungen, ja durch Konzilsentscheide[22] festgelegt worden ist. Schwierig wurde die Lage für den Orden erst dann, als ein Papst aus Gründen, die hier nicht zu erläutern sind, das Einverständnis, das bislang unausgesprochen geherrscht hatte, einseitig aufkündigte.

Johannes XXII. hat aber 1321/22 eben dies getan. Er hat sich, vielleicht der Konsequenzen nicht voll bewußt, öffentlich und energisch auf die Seite der Konkurrenten der Franziskaner, des dominikanischen Ordens mit seiner abweichenden Auffassung von der Auslegung von Christi Armut, geschlagen und zunächst eine ausführliche Diskussion der Gelehrten in der Kirche provoziert, endlich eine Lehrentscheidung getroffen, die den sofort energisch protestierenden Franziskanerorden in die äußerste Verlegenheit setzen mußte.

Es war schon schlimm genug, daß der Papst meinte, Christus und seine Apostel hätten keineswegs als Franziskaner avant la lettre auf Erden gelebt. Das müsse gelten aus Gründen des schlichten Menschenverstandes und auch weil es rechtlich nach dem Eigentumsbegriff des römischen Rechts unmöglich sei — hier griff der Papst auf seine eigenen juristischen Studien zurück, den er war ein *doctor decretorum*. Man könne gar nicht, so argumentierte er, auf das *dominium* an *res usu consumptibiles* verzichten und sich ausschließlich deren Gebrauch vorbehalten. Solche Aufsplitterung des natürlichen Umgangs mit Gütern mache gar keinen Sinn im Falle von Verzehrgütern, die im Gebrauch sich verbrauchen, diese Unterscheidung sei vielmehr strikt dem Liegenschaftsrecht, dem Eigentum und Besitz an Grundstücken vorzubehalten. Jeder müsse schon damit zufrieden sein, den Käse, den er esse, den Wein, den er trinke, den Mantel, den er trage, in seine eigene rechtliche Verfügung zu übernehmen, und damit in sein Eigentum. Auch Christus und seine Apostel hätten in diesem Sinne gemeinsam

[22] Kanonische Verbindlichkeit für den Orden gewann schließlich die Entscheidung Papst Nikolaus' III. "Exiit qui seminat" (Potthast Nr. 21628), am leichtesten zugänglich in: VI 5, 12, 3 (ed. Ae. Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, Bd. II, Leipzig 1881, Neudruck Graz 1954, col. 1109-1121). Vgl. auch can. 38 des Konzils von Vienne "Exivi de paradiso" in: *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*, ed. Istituto per le Scienze Religiose, editio tertia, Bologna 1973, S. 392-401 (= Clem. 6, 11, 1, Friedberg II, col. 1193-1200).

über ihre Verbrauchsgüter verfügt[23].

War das schon ein harter Schlag für die Franziskaner, dem sie erbittert begegneten, noch härter mußte sie treffen, daß der Papst mit einem Federstrich am 8. Dezember 1322 erklärte, die römische Kirche hätte zwar unter seinen Vorgängern dem Franziskanerorden jegliches *dominium* an irdischen Gütern abgesprochen, und alles, worüber die Franziskaner verfügten, ins Eigentum des apostolischen Stuhls übernommen, aber diese Verfügung habe den Orden keinerlei Nutzen gebracht, zumal auch die religiöse Vollkommenheit nicht in der äußersten Armut, sondern in der christlichen Liebe, der *caritas* bestünde, neben der ein selbstsüchtiges Befangensein in der Sorge um irdischen Besitz nicht Bestand haben könne. Die Franziskaner aber hätten aus ihrem Verzicht auf Eigentum bisher keinen geistlichen Vorteil gezogen, sie seien nicht etwa weniger besorgt um zeitlichen Besitz als andere Orden, sondern, wie die tägliche Erfahrung zeige, eher noch mehr. Das der römischen Kirche vorbehaltene Eigentum, das *dominium* sei in Wahrheit *nudum, verbale, et aenigmaticum*[24], denn es habe die Kirche keineswegs reicher gemacht, noch würde es sie, wenn sie es denn verlöre, irgendwie beeinträchtigen. Darum entsage er hinfort feierlich solchem der Kirche unnützen und den Franziskanern schädlichen *dominium*. Der Orden habe künftig das offizielle Verfügungsrecht an seinen Gütern wie die anderen Bettelorden auch zu übernehmen. Ihm, dem Papst, bleibe künftig nur das allgemeine Aufsichtsrecht über Kirchengut, das dem Leiter der Kirche an allem Kirchengut gemeinhin zustehe[25].

Auch wenn der Papst wenig später angesichts der empörten Proteste und des Sturms der Entrüstung, die diese Entscheidung hervorrief, sie ein wenig modifizierte[26], indem er die liturgischen Geräte und Bücher der Franziskaner unter dem *dominium*, das heißt in dem Eigentum der römischen Kirche zu belassen geruhte und nur auf die Verbrauchsgüter einen energischen Verzicht aufrecht erhielt, traf er mit dieser Entscheidung den Orden gleichwohl an seiner empfindlichsten Stelle. Die päpstliche Verfügung zu akzeptieren, hätte bedeutet, künftig auf jene Rechtskonstruktion der völligen Armut des Ordens, seiner *altissima paupertas* prinzipiell zu verzichten, sie hätte die Franziskaner gezwungen, ihr traditionelles Verständnis, das von den Päpsten zuvor anerkannt und mitgestaltet worden war, ihr Bild von der Rolle ihres Ordensstifters, von den Forderungen eines der Regel treuen Lebens, ja von christlicher Existenz schlechthin aufzugeben und sich völlig neu zu orientieren. Daß sie dazu nicht bereit waren, müßte man postulieren, könnte man es nicht zeigen.

Ockhams Ausgangsposition

Der sogenannte "Theoretische Armutsstreit" betrifft genau diese Streitfrage. Hieraus erklärt

[23] "Ad conditorem" (1. Fassung), ed. K. Eubel, *Bullarium Franciscanum*, Bd. V, Rom 1898, S. 235-245, nota, vgl. auch B. Tüpfer, 'Die Anschauungen des Papstes Johannes XXII über das *dominium* in der Bulle *Quia vir reprobus*' in: *Folia diplomatica* I, curavit S. Dusková, Brno 1971.

[24] So ist mit Ockham, *Opus Nonaginta Dierum* cap. 77 (*Opera politica* III, S. 625, Z. 630) zu lesen (statt '*mathematicum*' bei Eubel S. 236 b).

[25] wie Anm. 23.

[26] Endgültige Fassung von "Ad conditorem", ed. Eubel, *Bull. Franc.* V, S. 233-246 (=Extrav. Io. XXII., 14, 3, Friedberg II, col. 1225-1229).

sich seine Intensität und die Energie, mit der die Franziskaner ihn führten. In unserem Zusammenhang kommt es mir vor allem darauf an, daß Wilhelm von Ockham exakt an diesem Punkte in die politische Pamphletistik seinen Einstieg genommen hat, daß er aus seiner franziskanischen Option in diesem Kampf seine politische Reflexion entfaltet hat. Ich muß ausdrücklich unterstreichen, daß Ockham als Verteidiger der franziskanischen Normallehre, dieser ideologisch hoch befrachteten Autostereotype, und nicht als radikaler Kritiker einer unvernünftigen Praxis begonnen hat, sich mit Problemen der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung und damit auch der Politik zu beschäftigen. Seine franziskanische Option ist durchaus mittelalterlich, dem 13. Jahrhundert und seinen Ergebnissen verpflichtet, und ohne Rückgriff auf eine Fülle mittelalterlicher Umstände überhaupt nicht zu verstehen. Trotzdem hat diese franziskanische Option erhebliche Konsequenzen für Ockhams gesamte politische Theorie gehabt, und damit für die Entstehung einer politischen Theorie der Moderne, wie ich im folgenden zeigen will.

Daß Ockham sich mit anderen Ordensbrüdern zusammen in den literarischen Fehden um das richtige Verständnis und natürlich auch die absolute Berechtigung der franziskanischen Rechts- und Lebensauffassung kräftig beteiligte, daß er nach der Zuspitzung des Konflikts zusammen mit seinem Ordensgeneral Michael von Cesena und anderen hochkarätigen Intellektuellen und Amtsträgern seines Ordens von der Kurie in Avignon floh, um von außen den Kampf mit aller Verve fortzusetzen, das ist vielleicht weniger auffällig und stellt Ockham nur in eine Reihe mit vielen anderen. Einzigartig ist es, daß es ihm im polemischen Wechsel der strittigen Argumente, an dem viele teilnahmen[27], gelang, zu einer theoretischen Auffassung der sozialen Struktur vorzustoßen, die es ihm ermöglichte, für seine Zeit und Nachwelt weithin sichtbare Orientierungspunkte zu setzen und zur Bewußtseinsbildung der europäischen Intelligenz gerade auch hinsichtlich des Selbstverständnisses innerhalb politischer Institutionen einen wesentlichen Beitrag zu leisten.

Der Ausgangspunkt beim theoretischen Armutsstreit legt Ockham zunächst auf eine strukturelle Klärung von Begriffen wie *'dominium', 'usus iuris', 'simplex usus facti'*, und dergleichen fest. Sein politisches Nachdenken setzt also nicht bei Herrschaftsverhältnissen von Menschen über Menschen an, sondern bei der Herrschaft von Menschen über Sachen, beim Eigentumsbegriff. Das ist insofern von theoriegeschichtlichem Belang, als die Rezeption des römischen Rechts seit dem 11./12. Jahrhundert dem Mittelalter einen scharf ausgearbeiteten Eigentumsbegriff nahegebracht hatte, der den komplizierten faktischen Eigentumsverhältnissen des mittelalterlichen Alltags relativ fremd gegenüber stand und daher einige Anstrengung bei seiner Anwendung erforderte.

Die Situation des Armutsstreites zwang Ockham darüber hinaus, gerade auch die theologischen Traditionen neben den juristischen verstärkt zu berücksichtigen, er mußte sich mit den Gedanken der christlichen Tradition über Christi Vollkommenheit, und damit verbunden über die gottgewollte Schöpfungsordnung, über die menschliche Verfehlung dieser Ordnung und über die Erlösung äußern.

Es war wohl diese Verschlungenheit mit vorwiegend theologischen Themen, die es lange

[27] Zur Literargeschichte der Franziskanerdissidenten überblicksartig vor allem C. Schmitt, *Un pape réformateur et un défenseur de l'unité de l'église, Benoît XII et l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs (1334-1342)*, Quaracchi-Florenz 1959. Instruktiv ist die jüngste Analyse eines gemeinsamen literarischen Produkts der Gruppe durch H. S. Offler, 'Zum Verfasser der *Allegaciones de potestate imperiali* (1338)' in: *Deutsches Archiv* 42 (1986), S. 555-619.

verhindert hat, Ockhams Erstlingsschrift, seinem *Opus nonaginta dierum* jenen Rang in der Erschließung der grundlegenden Strukturen seiner politischen Theorie einzuräumen, der ihr zukommt[28]. Hier soll in aller gebotener Knappheit und ohne philologischen Einzelnachweis angedeutet werden, wie ich die Institutionenauffassung Ockhams auf diese skizzierte Ausgangsposition zurückbeziehen zu müssen glaube.

Ockham hatte die ihm von seinem Ordensgeneral und von ihm selbst gestellte Aufgabe, die franziskanische Position zu verteidigen und die päpstliche Auffassung zu widerlegen, offenbar sofort in breiter Front aufgenommen. Er hat sich in ein ihm bis dahin fremdes Feld der Reflexion sehr rasch und, wie heute noch zu sehen ist, auch gründlich eingearbeitet. Urstandslehre, synoptische Exegese, juristisch-kanonistische Tradition und franziskanische Armutsauffassung durchdringen sich in seiner Argumentation gegenseitig, und Ockham gewinnt dabei einen Ansatzpunkt, auch ganz andersartige Probleme neuartig zu durchdenken, wie er alsbald verdeutlichen sollte.

Er setzt an in franziskanisch-augustinischer Tradition bei einer Urstandslehre des Eigentums, einer Urgeschichte der Sozialverfassung des Menschen, die, Maßstabstheorie und genetische Ursprungslehre zugleich, ihm die Kriterien lieferte, wie in seinen Tagen mit der Sozialinstitution Eigentum umzugehen sei. Im Urzustand vor dem Sündenfall hatte der Mensch kein Eigentum und kein Herrschaftsrecht. Widerstandslos fügte sich die unvernünftige Kreatur dem vernünftigen Wesen, das in freiem Umgang die anderen Geschöpfe vernünftig leitete und gebrauchte, ohne Widerstand und Kampf, ohne Konkurrenz auch und Streit. Diese Herrschaft, dieses *dominium* der vernünftigen über die vernunftlosen Geschöpfe wird als *concreata potestas utendi rebus*[29], als in der Lage des Menschen und also anthropologisch bedingte Gebrauchsbefugnis beschrieben.

Mit dem Sündenfall ändert sich das Weltverhältnis des Menschen gründlich, nicht indem dieses Grundverhältnis des Menschen zur Welt grundsätzlich aufgehoben würde, aber die Erscheinungsformen dieses Weltverhältnisses müssen sich wandeln, so radikal, daß auch die Apostel im Stande der Vollkommenheit die freie Verfügung des Urstandes nicht wiederzugewinnen vermochten. Nach dem Sündenfall ist die ontologisch begründete Herrschaft des Menschen über die Mitgeschöpfe reduziert auf die kreatürliche Gebrauchsbefugnis, die auch die vernunftlosen Tiere an ihren Mitgeschöpfen haben. Diese *potestas utendi*, die schon zuvor die umfassende Kategorie kreatürlichen Weltverhaltens gewesen war, wird nun zur umgreifenden Kompetenz auch für den Menschen. Diese muß aber, gerade weil der Mensch nun nicht mehr Vernunftherrschaft ausübt, sondern nur gegen Widerstand und im Streit auch mit anderen Menschen seine Befugnis ausüben kann, eine zusätzliche Kompetenz erhalten, die Gott ihm auch einräumt, die Befugnis, sich Dinge persönlich zuzuordnen, sie sich anzueignen. Die Menschen erhalten *potestatem appropriandi sibi et dividendi res inter se quoad dominia*[30].

Das bedeutet zunächst, daß Ockham ausdrücklich das konkrete Eigentum nicht auf unmittelbare göttliche Einrichtung zurückführte. Gott gibt dem Menschen nur die Chance, so etwas wie Eigentum zu bilden, die konkreten Formen und Ordnungen solchen Eigentums richten

[28] Vgl. immerhin G. de Lagarde, *La naissance* (wie Anm. 10), nouvelle éd., tome V: *Guillaume d'Ockham, Critique des structures ecclésiales*, Louvain-Paris 1963.
[29] *Opus Nonaginta Dierum* cap. 27 (S. 489, Z. 126-133).
[30] *Opus Nonaginta Dierum* cap. 14 (S. 439, Z. 357 f.).

sich nach den Umständen des historischen Ursprungs, nach Willensentschluß und Entscheidung derjenigen, die ihre anthropologische Befugnis in die Wirklichkeit überführten. Auch wenn Ockham das nicht ausdrückt, so hat er mit dieser Interpretation doch die Freiheit, verschiedene Formen des Eigentums nebeneinander in verschiedenen Völkern zu belassen, vor allem aber gewinnt er eine analytische Möglichkeit, verschiedene Formen der rechtlichen Zuordnung zu unterscheiden.

Das war ihm zur Widerlegung des päpstlichen Angriffes gegen den franziskanischen *simplex usus facti* an Verbrauchsgütern wie Brot oder Schuhen sehr wichtig. Ein altes Argument der kirchlichen Tradition kommt ihm hier zustatten: im Normalfall sind die irdischen Güter durch Eigentum zugeordnet und verteilt, *in casu necessitatis*, im Falle der Gefährdung von Leib und Leben aber *omnia sunt communia, i.e. communicanda*, so stand es überall und auch im Kirchenrecht bei Gratian zu lesen[31].

Was heißt das für Ockham? Während der Eigentümer sein Eigentum der fremden *potestas utendi* entzieht, indem er es durch restriktive Schranken vor einer fremden Aneignungsbefugnis und fremdem Gebrauch abschirmt, kann solche positivrechtliche menschliche Vereinbarung im kreatürlichen Notfall nicht mehr greifen. Die Schranken, die sonst ohne jeden Zweifel gelten, werden dann durchlässig[32]. Der Verhundernde darf sich des Brotes, das ein anderer im Überfluß über seinen eigenen Hunger hinaus in Besitz hat, bedienen, solange er damit die Lebensgefahr abwenden kann. Er darf bei Gefahr des Erfrierens den fremden Mantel gebrauchen. Freilich erwirbt er daran keinesfalls ein positivrechtliches Eigentum (das ihn ja gerade am Gebrauch gehindert hätte) und muß, wenn die Zeit der Not vorüber ist, den Mantel wieder zurückgeben. — Bezeichnend genug gebraucht Ockham hier nicht das Beispiel des Brotes, das verbraucht ist, aber gewiß würde er nicht zögern, zumindest die Rückgabe des "Restes" zu fordern und zu betonen, daß solches Notgebrauchsrecht keinesfalls unmäßige Völlerei gestattet.

Doch wie immer sich das im einzelnen verhalten mag — ich unterlasse hier die Darstellung der Antwort, die Ockham aus dieser Grundannahme für die Lösung der franziskanischen Streitfrage entwickelt — mit dieser anthropologisch fundierten Abstufung der Befugnisse hat Ockham einen theoretischen Ansatz gewonnen, der ihm noch in ganz anderen Bereichen der politischen Reflexion als analytisches Instrument dienen sollte: Der Mensch hat als kreatürliche Ausstattung einmal ein grundsätzliches Weltverhältnis, indem er mit seinen Bedürfnissen auf die Welt sich verwiesen sieht. Die Welt ihrerseits dient genau dem Zwecke, den Bedürfnissen des Menschen aufzuhelfen.

Unter den Bedingungen der nichtparadiesischen Welt, und das heißt unter den Bedingungen der gegenwärtigen menschlichen Erfahrungen, hat der Mensch das weitere Recht, durch Ausgrenzung von eigenen ihm persönlich zugeordneten Bereichen sein allgemeines Weltverhältnis zu spezifizieren, er kann sich sichern und durch gesellschaftliche Verabredung auch Formen des gerichtlichen Streites um solche abgesonderten Güter entwickeln. Die Konkretion dieser Ausgrenzungs- und Aneignungsbefugnis, die als solche immer restriktiv gegen die Ansprüche der Artgenossen ist, hat der Mensch selbst zu verantworten, die Formen, in denen

[31] B. Tierney, *Medieval Poor Law, A Sketch of Canonical Theory Applicated to England*, Los Angeles 1959. G. Couvreur, *Les pauvres ont-ils des droits? Recherches sur le vol en cas d'extrême necessité depuis la Concordia de Gratien (1140) jusqu'à Guillaume d'Auxerre (+1221)*, Rom und Paris 1961.

[32] z. B. *Opus Nonaginta Dierum* cap. 65 (S. 577, Z. 197 - S. 578, Z. 238).

das geschieht, unterliegen prinzipiell der Absprache und damit möglicher Veränderung. Der Mensch kann aber als asketische Übung auch auf den Gebrauch dieser Vollmacht verzichten, vor dem Verhungern wird er durch die Notfallsicherung bewahrt, die *in casu necessitatis* die positivrechtlichen Schranken, die fremden Gebrauch hindern, für die Zeit der Not durchlässig macht.

Es kann nicht verwundern, daß Ockham diese komplexe Beschreibung menschlichen Weltverhältnisses, die er in seiner Eigentumslehre gewonnen hat, später auch in der Beschreibung des menschlichen Verhaltens gegenüber Artgenossen anwendet, auch auf die Beschreibung von Herrschaft des Menschen über Menschen überträgt. Während ich hier das Eigentum als "Sachherrschaft" bezeichnet habe, war das im Mittellateinischen nicht ganz so einfach. Die Parallelisierung, die Ockham vollzieht, ist eine Transferleistung und nicht nur eine fast selbstläufige sprachliche Applikation. *Dominium* heißt im Lateinischen des 14. Jahrhunderts vor allem technisch das Eigentumsinstitut des Römischen Rechts, politische Herrschaft heißt vor anderem *iurisdictio*[33]. Daß beide Beziehungen von gleicher oder analoger Struktur seien, hat Ockham aber allein dadurch verdeutlicht, daß er am Ende seines Lebens, zu Beginn der 40er Jahre in seinem *Breviloquium* beide Begriffe ausdrücklich in Parallele setzt. Jetzt läßt er den Menschen nach dem Sündenfall mit einer *duplex potestas* ausgestattet sein, *scilicet appropriandi res temporales et instituendi rectores iurisdictionem habentes*, und diese doppelte Befugnis ist nicht nur den Christen, sondern allen Menschen als Menschen gegeben[34].

Auch hier wiederum gilt, daß die Konkretion solcher Befugnis im Gebrauch erfolgt. Wie und wann die Römer ihre Weltherrschaft gewonnen haben, die sie unzweifelhaft legitim innehatten, da Christus selbst sich ihr beugte, das wagt Ockham nicht zu entscheiden, *et forte solus Deus novit et quibus ipse revelavit*[35]. Das ist aber für die Entscheidung von konkreten Streitfragen auch gar nicht immer wichtig: jedenfalls läßt sich hier wie dort die fundamentale Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen für die Ordnung seiner Welt nicht übersehen: Von Gott stammt die Ausstattung mit Befugnissen, die seiner Lage entsprechen, der Mensch kann sich Eigentum ausgrenzen, er kann Rechtsprechung als obrigkeitliche Friedensordnung üben, er kann Recht setzen und er kann das vor aller Interferenz seiner religiösen Überzeugungen. Anders als es im 13. Jahrhundert etwa der Hostiensis gemeint hatte, und anders auch, als es noch 40 Jahre vor Ockham der Augustinereremit Aegidius Romanus versichert hat, macht die *infidelitas* die Menschen nicht herrschafts- und rechtsunfähig, sie erhalten ihre *concreata potestas* einer Eigentums- und Herrschaftsbildung als anthropologische Grundausstattung und nicht als heilsgeschichtliche göttliche Begnadung, die der Kirche als Verwalterin der Sakramente ein Mitspracherecht ließe.

Auch hier aber macht Ockham wiederum deutlich, daß er die menschliche Rechtssatzung als

[33] Vgl. auch P. Costa, *Iurisdictio, Semantica del potere politico nella pubblicistica medioevale 1100-1433*, Milano 1969.

[34] *Breviloquium* III, cap. 8 (S. 128), vgl. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg*, S. 549.

[35] *Breviloquium* IV, cap. 10 (S. 160-162, Zitat S. 160, Z. 2-3). Vgl. auch etwa III *Dialogus* tr. II, lib. i, cap. 25 (im Druck bei Joh. Trechsel, Lyon 1494 <Hain nr. 11935 f.>, Neudruck in: Guilielmus de Ockham, *Opera plurima*, London, bzw. Farnborough, Hants. 1962, Tomus I, fol. 244rb-va), wo selbst Haeretikern ein *verum dominium* zugestanden wird: "... non est de iure divino quod heretici nihil proprium habeant, sed de iure humano, et ideo antequam heretici per iura humana privarentur dominio rerum temporalium, habebant verum dominium ..." (vgl. auch ebenda, fol. 243rb-va).

repressiv und restriktiv, unter den Bedingungen der Sünde und zusätzlich dem Menschen gegeben ansieht. Auch hier gewinnt der Herrscher an seiner Herrschaft ein objektives Recht, wie der Eigentümer an seinem Eigentum, aber die Herrschaft hat auch Grenzen, die in der Natur des Menschen und seiner Sittlichkeit liegen. Der Herrscher kann befehlen *in licitis*, er kann richten, so lange er gerecht richtet. Er hat seine Pflichten und seine Rechte. Aber seine Funktion ist nicht schrankenlos, da sie zweckgerichtet ist. *In casu necessitatis* erwacht sozusagen auch hier wieder die allgemeine Ordnungsbefugnis der Menschen insgesamt. Sie können dann etwa, wie Ockham an einer Stelle ausdrücklich schreibt, ihre Verfassung ändern, sie haben die Vollmacht, ihre Regierungsform zu wechseln, eine *potestas variandi principatus*[36].

Hier soll nicht verfolgt werden, wie Ockham an dieser Stelle die aristotelische Lehre von dem Wechsel der Staatsformen ingeniös mit seiner eigenen Theorie verbunden und auf die Verhältnisse der Kirchenlehre appliziert hat. Die Analogie zur Eigentumslehre geht noch weiter. *In casu necessitatis* wird das Herrschaftsrecht wie das Eigentum durchlässig. Wo Herrschaft nicht mehr ihre Funktion erfüllt, kann ein naturrechtliches Widerstandsrecht eingreifen, das die normalen Verhältnisse umkehrt: "*Rex enim superior est regulariter toto regno suo et tamen in casu est inferior regno, quia regnum in casu necessitatis potest regem suum deponere et in custodia detinere. Hoc enim habet ex iure naturali*"[37]. Ockham wußte, wovon er sprach: 1327 war in England der Staatsstreich Edwards III. gegen seinen Vater Edward II. geglückt, auf den er öfter anspielt: "*...quodcumque regnum ... potest pro defectu et crimine depositione dignissimo regem suum deponere, qui tamen non est vasallus eorum nec ab eis tenet regnum*"[38]. Im Laufe des 14. Jahrhunderts sind ja in Europa noch häufig Könige abgesetzt worden.

Ockham legt größten Wert darauf, daß damit nicht die Abhängigkeit der Königsherrschaft von dem *populus* erwiesen sei. Der König hat, sofern der *casus necessitatis* nicht eintritt, durchaus ein Recht auf Herrschaft und Anspruch auf Gehorsam. Aber im Notfall tritt das Eigenrecht des Volkes unter der Decke der historisch gewachsenen Herrschaftsinstitutionen wieder hervor, kann der naturrechtlich begründete Widerstand legitim gegen legalen Machtmißbrauch gewendet werden: "*Generale pactum est societatis humane obtemperare regibus suis in his, que spectant ad bonum commune. Et ideo obligata est societas humana ad obediendum generaliter imperatori in his, que ad utilitatem communem proficiunt, non in aliis, in quibus non dubitant, quod nequaquam bono communi proficiant*"[39].

Das klingt ganz mittelalterlich aristotelisch und fast identisch mit der Bindung des Herrscherwillens an das *bonum commune* bei Thomas von Aquin[40], und doch hat Ockham diese auch bei Thomas formulierte Einbindung der Befehlsgewalt in das "gemeine Beste" ungeheuer dynamisiert, weil er nicht nur theoretisch diese Einbindung konstatiert, die sich vor allem im Gewissen des Herrschers aktualisieren muß, sondern weil er die anderen Beteiligten gewissermaßen mit der Kontrolle der Erfüllung beauftragt.

[36] III *Dialogus* tr. I, lib. ii, cap. 20 u. cap. 27 (fol. 199ra u. 203vb-204ra).
[37] *Octo quaestiones* II, cap. 8 (S. 83).
[38] III *Dialogus* tr. II, lib. ii, cap. 28 (fol. 259ra).
[39] So etwa *Breviloquium* VI, cap. 2 (S. 200, Z. 27-31), vgl. dazu *Octo quaestiones* II, cap. 9 (S. 83, Z. 48-51); I *Dialogus* VI, cap. 55, VI, cap. 58, VII, cap. 45 (fol. 75va-b, 76vb, 145va).
[40] Vgl. etwa Thomas von Aquin, *De regimine principum ad regem Cypri* cap. 10, hier benutzt nach der Ed. durch J. Mathis, Turin (Marietti)1948², S. 12-14.

Ockham ist hier nicht ganz klar, und ich möchte auch die Unterschiede, die auch für ihn zwischen der politischen und der kirchlichen Ordnung bestehen bleiben, nicht einfach einebnen. An der Kirchenverfassung aber hat Ockham das Widerstandsrecht und die Widerstandspflicht eines einzelnen mit dem gesamten sozialen System konfrontiert. Er hat ausführlich dargestellt, was geschehen muß, wenn evident die Institution nicht mehr dem ursprünglichen angestrebten Zwecke dient, das heißt konkret, wenn etwa der Papst selbst als Haupt der Kirche zum Haeretiker geworden ist. Fast der ganze umfängliche Erste Teil des Dialogus dient dem Nachweis, wer dann gefragt und berechtigt ist, einzuschreiten. Es stellt sich für Ockham bei seinem Untersuchungsgang heraus, daß eine institutionelle Sicherung gegen dieses schreckliche, "monströse" Ereignis, das Ockham selbst gerade angesichts des Armutsstreites erleben zu müssen glaubte[41], nirgends verläßlich gegeben war. Der Papst kann irren und der Haeresie verfallen, das stand schon bei Gratian und war sonnenklar durch Präzedenzien zu belegen. Ebenso irren können aber alle weiteren Instanzen der verfaßten Amtskirche, die Kardinäle, die Bischöfe, ein Generalkonzil, alle Priester und Kleriker, alle Männer, auch alle Frauen. Christus kann seine Kirche *in uno solo* bewahren und damit seine Verheißung wahrmachen, daß die Pforten der Hölle seine Kirche nicht überwältigen werden[42].

Politische Theorie als soziale Handlungslehre

Nun könnte es so aussehen, als ob damit grundsätzlich alle soziale Ordnung aufgehoben sei und jeder für sich zu entscheiden hätte, was er tun wolle. Ockhams Meinung wird mit einer solchen Auffassung nicht getroffen. Minuziös legt er dar, wie das Versagen eines Organs des gesamten Corpus den anderen Organen die Pflicht auferlegt, in die Bresche zu springen und zu handeln. In abgestufter Weise zwar, aber letztlich kann das in der Tat jeden treffen. Die Organismusmetapher wird von Ockham hier offenbar ganz drastisch verstanden und angewandt, wenn es einmal heißt: "*Sicut in corpore naturali uno membro deficiente aliud membrum, si aliquo modo potest, supplet defectum eiusdem — qui enim non potest pedibus ambulare, aliter repit vel volvit se, ut potest, et mancus ore accipit de terra vel alio loco, ut potest, cibum necessarium sibi, et qui non potest cultello scindere panem suum, lacerat dentibus, si potest — sic in corpore mystico et in collegio vel in universitate uno deficiente alius, si habet posse naturale, supplet defectum eius. Ubi enim non sunt milites, rustici pugnant pro patria, si possunt, et deficientibus viris mulieres, si valent, patriam et seipsas defendunt*"[43].

Im *corpus mysticum*, also in der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung[44], bedeutet die Organismusmetapher gerade nicht ein statisches "Jeder an seinem Platz", sondern eine supplementäre Pflicht, die auf jedes einzelne Mitglied zukommen kann, das Nötige und Notwendige zu tun.

[41] Vgl. *Epistola* (*Opera politica* III, S. 17, Z. 7).
[42] Zur Vorgeschichte dieses Theorems vgl. Y. M. J. Congar, 'Incidence ecclésiologique d'un thème de devotion mariale' in: *Mélanges de science religieuse* 7 (1950), S. 277-292, abgedruckt in Congar, *Etudes d'ecclésiologie médiévale*, London 1983, nr. X.
[43] *Octo quaestiones* VIII, cap. 6 (S. 200 f.).
[44] Dazu vor allem H. de Lubac, *Corpus mysticum, l'eucharistie et l'église au moyen-âge, étude historique* (Théologie, 3), Paris 1949²; E. H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies, A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton, N. J., 1957, S. 193-232.

Denn das ist nach Ockhams Auffassung gerade der Unterschied zwischen einem natürlichen und einem gesellschaftlichen Organismus: " ... *Non est omnino simile de membris in corpore humano et de membris in ecclesia. Licet enim simile sit quantum ad multa, officia enim propria membrorum in corpore humano ex natura sibi competunt, ita ut unum membrum defectum alterius (ex necessitate quacumque) complere non possit. Sed membra in corpore ecclesie quantum ad multa officia et quodammodo propria possunt mutuo defectus suos supplere ...*"[45]

Die gültige Rechtsordnung stellt demnach wohl eine Regelung bereit, Zuständigkeiten *prima vista* zuzuordnen. *Uno deficiente* aber tritt eine zunächst geregelte Devolution ein, die schließlich auch noch den letzten Einzelnen, der dieser Organisation angehört, treffen kann — in der Kirche jedenfalls, wo jeder Christ als Gläubiger der letzte *unus solus* sein kann, der im allgemeinen Abfall übrigbleibt[46]. Solange der Mensch sein *posse naturale* hat, ist er freilich auch in der politischen Ordnung verpflichtet, das Richtige und Notwendige notfalls zu tun, oder — wie Ockham die traditionelle Parallele zur *necessitas* im *Dialogus* oft und oft aufgreift — auch im Falle einer *evidens utilitas* darf der einzelne nicht zögern, zu handeln, und ist dabei allein an die grundsätzlich mögliche Einsicht in das Richtige gebunden.

Erst hier in der rationalen Ethik und im Erkenntnisoptimismus schließt sich Ockham auch im Bereich seiner politischen Philosophie wieder an seine Lehren aus der Zeit seiner akademischen Karriere an. Daß er für die politische Ordnung vielleicht allzu optimistisch die grundsätzliche Möglichkeit einer Erkenntnis des Richtigen und Notwendigen in eigentlich jedem Falle voraussetzt, und — zumindest in der Kirche — durch ein abgestuftes System rechtlicher Zuständigkeit letzten Endes jeden einzelnen zur Eigenverantwortung jenseits institutioneller Einbindung verpflichtet, das grundiert das Pathos der Freiheit, das immer wieder bei ihm anzutreffen ist und das seine Texte noch heute auf uns ausstrahlen: Das Neue Testament als *lex libertatis* ist offensichtlich das Theorem, das Ockham in Verbindung mit dem aristotelischen Gedanken, daß eine Herrschaft über Freie wertvoller sei als eine Herrschaft über Sklaven, als "*basso ostinato*" in seinen letzten Schriften einsetzt[47]. Das gilt nicht nur für die Herrschaft des Papstes in der Kirche, das gilt offenbar — in Abstufungen, die nirgends deutlich expliziert werden, die aber durchaus vorausgesetzt werden müssen — auch für die weltliche politische Ordnung: "*Dignitati enim humani generis derogaret, si omnes essent servi imperatoris. Et ideo derogaretur eidem, si imperator in omnibus posset tractare liberos sicut servos*"[48].

Somit ergibt sich, daß Ockham jenseits aller Einzelaussagen, die hier nicht zu verfolgen sind, seinen Zeitgenossen wirkungsvolle Instrumente einer politischen Orientierung bereitgestellt hat, indem er weniger nach der absolut besten Ordnung der Welt fragt, auch wenn er durchaus auszudrücken versteht, was er — oder was die Tradition — für die "beste Ordnung" hielt. Vielmehr zeigt er sich ständig viel stärker daran interessiert, dem politischen Handeln in schwieriger Situation eine klare ethisch-theoretische, naturrechtliche Fundierung als Orientierung zu geben.

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[45] III *Dialogus* tr. II, lib. iii, cap. 4 (fol. 261vb).
[46] J. Miethke, 'Repräsentation und Delegation in den politischen Schriften Wilhelms von Ockham' in: *Der Begriff der "repraesentatio" im Mittelalter*, hrsg. von A. Zimmermann (Miscellanea mediaevalia 8), Berlin - New York 1971, S. 163-185.
[47] Vgl. McGrade, *Political Thought* (wie Anm. 9), S. 140-149.
[48] III *Dialogus* tr. II, lib. ii, cap. 20 (fol. 255vb).

Für diese politische Handlungslehre gibt ihm seine Auffassung von den Institutionen eine entscheidende Hilfestellung. Weil Ockham die Institutionen seiner Zeit als Rahmenbedingungen von Handlungen und Aktionen versteht, die ihrerseits auf Handlungen und Aktionen zurückgehen, kann er in der Analyse von Einzelfällen unermüdlich seine Auffassung erfolgreich verdeutlichen, daß die normalerweise das menschliche Handeln bestimmenden und präformierenden Institutionen zwar bindende Regulierungen für den Regelfall enthalten, im Einzelfall aber überholbar bleiben, weil im Einzelfall das höhere Recht in Kraft treten kann: "*Non licet excipere cuilibet casum ad libitum et dicere*: verba legis in tali casu non sunt servanda, *sed si dicit*: in tali casu verba legis non sunt servanda, *oportet quod hoc ostendat per legem superiorem vel per rationem evidentem. Et si altero illorum modorum patenter ostendat (...), standum est dicto suo, non quia ipse dicit, sed quia hoc lex superior vel ratio evidens ostendit*"[49].

Die unermüdliche Kasuistik seiner Darlegungen zielt letztlich auf diese Aussage. Die Institutionen erscheinen somit nicht als radikal aufgehoben, aber als relativiert in ihrer restriktiv-repressiven Undurchdringlichkeit. Sie werden im Notfall durchlässig gemacht, anachronistisch überspitzt gesagt erscheinen sie als historisch geworden und damit auch als historisch veränderbar.

Unter diesen Umständen kommt viel darauf an, daß im Ernstfall die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis des Richtigen und Notwendigen, die prinzipiell erreichbar ist, nicht erschwert, sondern erleichtert wird. Ockham verwendet im Einzelnen viel Mühe und Sorgfalt darauf, die Rolle der Fachleute, der *periti* als wichtigen Faktor bei der Entscheidungsfindung darzustellen. Immer wieder drängt er darauf, daß die Spezialisten gefragt werden und ihr Urteil abgeben können. Freilich hat auch Ockham die bittere Erfahrung gemacht, daß selbst die besten Fachleute aus Zufall oder mit Absicht, aus Irrtum oder aus Bosheit die Wahrheit verfehlen, und also falsch gutachten können und das Zutrauen nicht verdienen, das man ihnen gemeinhin entgegenbringt.

Ebenso nachdrücklich fordert Ockham darum — insbesondere im Falle der gestörten Kirchenordnung, wenn es um den Glauben geht — die Öffentlichkeit der Debatte, die Repräsentativität der Entscheidungsebene, die allgemeine Publikation der Ergebnisse. Ein Konzil soll nicht im Winkel, sondern vor aller Augen stattfinden, und jeder soll sich ein Urteil bilden können, was die Beschlüsse bestimmt hat : "*Concilium generale non debet regulariter occulte seu secrete aut paucis scientibus celebrari, sed vulgandum est per universalem ecclesiam, hoc est per omnes regiones in provincia, in qua seu in quibus catholici commorantur, generale concilium convocari debere, quatinus omnes catholici tacite vel expresse consentiant et quasi auctoritatem contribuant (...) Quod statuitur vel diffinitur in concilio generali non ligat universalem ecclesiam, nisi per universalem ecclesiam fuerit legitime divulgatum*"[50].

Trotzdem kann auch hier Verkehrung und Irrtum, ja Haeresie nicht ausgeschlossen werden. Zuletzt bleibt, jedenfalls in der Kirche, nur das feste Vertrauen auf die göttliche Erhaltung in der Wahrheit, das einen Erfolg sicherstellt. Ich will hier nicht prüfen, ob diese verzweifslungsvolle Hoffnung auf den letzten wahren Christen am Ende des Lebens bei Ockham nach den enttäuschenden Erfahrungen eines jahrelangen ergebnislosen Kampfes nicht schrilleren Ausdruck findet als am Beginn seiner Karriere. Auch Ockham jedenfalls hatte allem

[49] I *Dialogus* VI, cap. 100 (fol. 111ra).
[50] III *Dialogus* tr. I, lib. iii, cap. 13 (fol. 211ra).

Erkenntnisoptimismus zum Trotz durchaus bittere Erfahrungen zu verarbeiten.

In der Mitte seiner Laufbahn, noch optimistischer gestimmt, aber hat der englische Franziskaner mit rhetorischem Schwung klargemacht, daß im Notfall nur das Richtige, nicht das Gewohnte zählt, daß eine *novitas perutilis* nicht zu scheuen sei, wenn sie dem gemeinen Besten diene : "*Quamvis enim novitates inutiles et perniciose et periculose sint omnino vitande, novitates tamen perutiles et necessarie et salubres sunt carius amplectende. Non est aptus ad quecumque ardua peragenda, qui omnes horret novitates. Si Alexander Macedo aggredi novitates timuisset, maiorem partem mundi sibi nullatenus subdidisset. Si civitas Romana novitates minime accepisset, numquam pacem universo orbe fecisset. Quid loquar de sanctis hominibus et apostolis? Si novitates inducere formidassent, ad novam legem gentes nullatenus convertissent. Non sunt ergo novitates penitus respuende, sed sicut vetusta, cum apparuerint onerosa, sunt omnimode abolenda, ita novitates cum utiles, fructuose, necessarie, expedientes secundum rectum iudicium videbuntur, sunt animosius amplectende*"[51].

Mit diesem Hinweis auf die Zukunftsdimension des Handelns, das durch die Tradition zwar kasuistisch nachvollziehbare Direktiven, aber keine endgültige Festlegung erhält, hat Ockham die politische Aktion von traditionalen Bindungen weitgehend befreit, im Not- und Ausnahmefall zwar nur, aber dort radikal. Diese Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Regelfall und Ausnahme, von rechtlich gestecktem Handlungsrahmen und ethisch fundiertem Handeln sollte auch künftig seine Attraktion behalten.

Durch ein vielschichtiges System abgestufter Rechte, die doch niemals das Grundrecht menschlicher Existenz und Würde, welche im Naturrecht gründen, endgültig zuzudecken vermögen, hat sich Ockham nicht nur ein analytisches Instrumentarium erarbeitet, das es ihm ermöglichte, eine unglaubliche Fälle von Argumenten und realen wie fiktiven "kasuistischen" Situationen zu durchleuchten, er ist auch auch dem Wege der Überwindung der ständischen Ordnung, die seiner Zeit selbstverständlich war, ein gutes Stück vorangeschritten. Die naturrechtlich begründete Möglichkeit jedes Einzelnen, das Nötige zu tun, die im Falle der Not zur Pflicht werden kann, scheint mir ein Meilenstein in der Geschichte des Begriffs der politischen Freiheit sowohl, als des Begriffs politischer Institutionen.

[51] I *Dialogus* VII, cap. 72 (fol. 163vb), vgl. auch etwa III *Dialogus* tr. I, lib. ii, cap. 20, 26, 27, 28 (fol. 199rb, 203va, 203vb, 204va), auch III *Dialogus* tr. II, lib. iii, cap. 18 (fol. 272vb-273ra): "sicut tamen saepe periclitantes in mari optimum modum navigandi coguntur dimittere propter pericula evitanda, et nonnumquam viatores vias meliores compelluntur relinquere et longiorem et deteriorem eligere".

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SUPERIOR SECULAR AND SPIRITUAL POWERS ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OF OCKHAM'S *Octo Quaestiones de Potestate Papae*

A. Weiler

I. *Introduction*

Ockham's exposition in regard of the mutual relationship between the papal and the imperial power in his *Octo Quaestiones de Potestate Papae*[1] partly concentrate on the actual problems of his days, viz. on the relations between Lewis IV the Bavarian (1282-1347), Roman-German king since 1314, emperor since 1328 by coronation at the hands of the Romans, and pope John XXII (1316-1334). This pope had Lewis excommunicated already in 1324. The questions submitted to Ockham's consideration were the following: whether the election of a person as Roman king or emperor gave him full administrative power (*administratio*) (qu. 4), whether a king who comes into office through hereditary succession, from the fact that he is anointed, consecrated and crowned, obtains any power in secular matters (qu. 5), whether such a king is in some way subject to the person who crowned him (qu. 6), whether such a king looses the royal title and power because of the fact that he is crowned by another archbishop than the person who was in charge of the coronation ceremony from ancient days or because of the fact that he put the crown on his head with his own hands (qu. 7), whether, finally, the election by the princes-electors gives to the elected Roman king as much power as legitimate hereditary succession gives to a king who comes to his office in that way (qu. 8).

In these questions, William of Ockham is strongly opposed to the theses of Lupold of Bebenburg (c. 1297-1363). Lupold, in his *Tractatus de iuribus regni et imperii*[2] (according to the testimony of the codex Leipzig 543, fol. 62v finished on February 3, 1340), questioned the legitimacy of Lewis's coronation in Aachen by the archbishop of Mainz: in the right place but by the wrong man. Lewis's adversary, Frederick of Austria, had been crowned on the same day, November 25, 1314, by the archbishop of Cologne: by the right man but on the wrong place. The assemblies of the princes in Rense (1338) and Francfort led to questions, too, whether the election as such was sufficient to bestow on the German king also the title and the authority of the Roman emperor.

It has been assumed[3], that William composed his *Octo Quaestiones* between February 3 1340

[1] J.G. Sikes, in: *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Politica*, vol. I, Manchester 1940; second ed. H.S. Offler, Manchester 1974. We refer to this second edition, giving quaestio, capitulum and line.
[2] Ed. Basel 1508. Offler, *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Politica*, vol. I, p. 9.
[3] q. 1, cap. 1, lin. 1-8; Sikes, ed. cit. p. 2; Offler, p. 2. The same, 'The Origins of Ockham's *Octo quaestiones*' in: *English Historical Review* 72 (1967), pp. 323-332; J.Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, Berlin 1969, p. 115.

and August 1342, at the request of king Lewis, who is supposed to have submitted eight questions. Ockham's text, however, does not give any direct indication for that assumption. H.S. Offler has argued that the questions were put to Ockham by someone in the entourage of Baldwin, archbishop of Trier, and that Ockham probably worked on the *Octo Quaestiones* between the summer of 1340 and the late summer of 1341[4].

As a matter of fact, Ockham did hope that his treatise would come into the hands of his adversaries. Therefore, he decided to give an exposition of the various opinions in these matters, as objectively as possible, without — as he says — expressing his own mind: in that way the true lover of the truth of pure reason should have the opportunity to distinguish between what is true and what is untrue[5]. However, not withstanding this policy of quoting various points of view and arguments, and the elaboration of the connections between different opinions, we can clearly find Ockham's opinion in the *Responsiones*, which, most of the time, occurs literally in some of his smaller works, in which he clearly expresses his own position[6], for example in the *Breviloquium de Potestate Papae*[7], which was composed between February 3, 1340 and April 25, 1341.

This observation is important, because in the treatise *Octo Quaestiones* the introductory chapters, actually the first three questions, are of a general and fundamental nature. They deal with the proper nature and origins of the papacy and the imperial office, and with the nature and origins of their mutual relations. These chapters contain the main principles according to which the responses to the more practical questions 4 to 8 are formulated. In these chapters Ockham discusses the opinion of Ptolemy of Lucca, especially in his *Determinatio Compendiosa de Jurisdictione Imperii* (after 1272)[8], and the position attributed to pope Innocent IV; the latter is, as a matter of fact, the position of a curial pamphlet from 1245-1246, stipulating that the church is vested with the spiritual and the secular power[9]. Furthermore, he argues with Aegidius Romanus and Marsilius of Padua[10]. Therefore, they give a good picture of the fundamental discussions concerning the power-structures of those days.

The three introductory general questions derive their specificity exactly from the repeated inquiry into the origins and the proper nature of the secular and the spiritual power, and into their mutual relationship. They run as follows:

1. Are the superior spiritual and the superior laical power *from the nature of things* distinguished from each other to such a degree and opposition that formally and at the same time, they cannot be present in a single man[11]?

2. Does the superior laical power have its own proper nature, in the most proper sense, *immediately from God*[12]?

[4] Ed. cit. p. 2.
[5] Ed. cit. p. 15, lin. 1-21; q. 1, cap. 5, lin. 1-3; q. 4, cap. 3, lin. 1-10.
[6] Offler has listed what he takes to be Ockham's opinion on the main questions: ed. cit. p. 13.
[7] Ed. R. Baudry, Paris 1937; ed. R. Scholz, Stuttgart 1944.
[8] Ed. M. Krammer, Hannover 1909.
[9] Offler, ed. cit. p. 9.
[10] Offler, ed. cit. pp. 34, 98, 99, 101, 102 and 104.
[11] q. 1, cap. 1, lin. 9-11.
[12] q. 2, cap. 1, lin. 1-2.

3. Is it *from the institution by Christ*, that the pope and the Roman church entrust temporal jurisdiction to the emperor and to the other secular princes in such a way, that outside that commitment they cannot exercise this jurisdiction[13]?

It should be noted that the problem of the origins of power is also posed in other questions: do certain power-constellations in and connected with the imperial office stem directly from God (qu. 4), or from an ecclesiastical person (qu. 5), or do they follow from the nature of things (qu. 8)? The inquiry into the origins of power will be our guideline in the following analysis of texts.

II. *The papacy*

Before he discusses secular power, Ockham first expounds the problems related to the proper nature of the papacy. Some people claim that the papacy and the imperial office *from the nature of things* (*ex natura rei*) differ from each other to such a degree, that both functions cannot be united in one person. Others say, that *factually* both powers coincide in one person, the pope: this is the opinion of those who give to the pope such a plenitude of power, that he can do anything that is not explicitly against the divine or the natural law, even if it might be against the law of nations (*ius gentium*), civil or canon law. In nine argumentations it is demonstrated that the superior lay power is vested in the pope. These arguments stem among others from pope Innocent III, from the curial pamphlet attributed to Innocent IV, and from Ptolemy of Lucca.

Ockham himself chooses a position midway between the two extremes[14]. He agrees with the first opinion, that *de facto* the superior spiritual and the superior lay power do not coincide in one person, nor that they should do so, but he makes it clear that both powers do not differ so much from each other from the nature of things, that they could not formally coincide in one person. So far he goes along with the second opinion, but he does not mean that both powers *de facto* coincide in the person of the pope. In his opinion both powers are not, from the nature of things, so much distinguished from each other that they are wholly incompatible; also the spiritual power derives its functional competency in spiritual matters either from consecration or from administration; but lay power as such does not oppose consecration or administration: in these cases lay power is not taken away[15]. — Nevertheless, both powers should not coincide in one person, and this is so by God's ordination, which prevents that in a normal and regular situation (*ordinarie et regulariter*) the same person should be in charge of temporal and divine matters, even if in some case (*casualiter*) this might happen to be so. Holy Scripture, the Church Fathers and sentences of councils do in fact establish that a spiritual person should have no dealings with secular matters.

In this debate it is clear, that Ockham does not want to found an antithesis between laical and spiritual power on the *nature* of each of these powers. There is no question of a *natural* difference, and any argument that wishes to base lay power as against papal power on natural differences is not admitted by Ockham. In the same way he states that there are not from the

[13] q. 3, cap. 1, lin. 1-3
[14] q. 1, cap. 3, lin. 1-28.
[15] q. 1, cap. 3, lin. 20-23.

nature of things two distinguished bodies, the body of lay people, and the body of the clergy. He points to the factual unity of clergy and laity in his own days, who for the sake of the actual unity of Christians (*quae nunc est*) form one body. Both powers may coincide in one person, but normally this is not allowed, according to God's ordination. The possibility, however, that in some cases there might be a deviation from the normal situation, is left open. Ockham remarks that the nature of ecclesiastical power, even with the pope, excludes that this power should coincide with the despotic power over slaves. He is only discussing royal power, and this power is exercised as a power over free men: the church can have no slaves (unless by human ordinance — *ex ordinatione humana* — when slaves are given to a church by their own lord). Ockham formulates his position very clearly and sharply: "*nullus est servus ecclesiae ex vi praelationis ecclesiae institutae a Christo*"[16]. As a consequence of his argumentation he states that the emperor is inferior to the pope factually but that this does not follow from the proper *nature of his power*[17].

With all his energy, Ockham opposes the other extreme position, i.e. that the pope has the plenitude of power in temporal and spiritual matters, in such a way that he can do anything that is not against divine law, natural law, Holy Scripture, positive law and the evidence of reason[18]. The law of the gospel is a law of freedom — with regard to mosaic law —, and the pope simply cannot impose such a slavery on the community of the faithful: they would all be slaves of the pope! — With all kinds of arguments, taken from theology, feudalism, secular law, natural reason, and ecclesiastical praxis, Ockham makes it clear that the pope has no plenitude of power, neither in temporal nor in spiritual matters. The pope cannot do as he pleases with regard to persons or to matters. The power of the keys that is given to him is no compulsory power. Surely, he has the power which is necessary for the government of the faithful, in order that they might obtain eternal life, but he has no power over matters that are not necessary for eternal life. The reasonable rights and freedom of people are not affected by that power[19]. In the same way, the vicar of Christ cannot regularly exercise lay power, even if in certain cases he could.

Ockham thinks that in this argumentation he also gives a sound exposition (*sana expositio*) of the position of pope Innocent III, who had stated that Christ, in transfering the power of the keys to St. Peter, did not except anything[20]. Innocent's words have a *sensus catholicus*, in a twofold way: 1. Christ did not make exceptions with regard to the power he was transferring by his explicit words, but by his deeds; 2. Christ has only given to Peter the necessary power for government of the believers, not the plenitude of power. — Also the position of (the pamphlet attributed to) pope Innocent IV admits a '*sana interpretatio*': the pope has power over every Christian, of whatever status he may be, only *casualiter, ratione peccati*, but not *regulariter*. But the statement, that outside the church there is not any power ordained or given by God, but only admitted, is considered to be heretical[21]: also before the coming of Christ there was true, God-given temporal power, in the same way as nowadays there is true power with the infidels, even

[16] q. 1, cap. 5, lin. 49-50.
[17] q. 1, cap. 5, lin. 69-74.
[18] q. 1, cap. 6, lin. 1-45; cfr. q. 1, cap. 2, lin. 1-27.
[19] q. 1, cap. 7, lin. 30-87.
[20] q. 1, cap. 9, lin. 1-65.
[21] q. 1, cap. 10, lin. 47-53.

if they abuse this power[22].

Ockham therefore does not accept the idea of the plenitude of power in one person, who, in every case, without exception, and *regulariter*, would be the judge of everybody. Neither the pope nor the emperor has such plenitude of power over the community of the faithful: "because none of them is able to take away the rights and freedom of their inferiors without guilt and without reason, unless in case of necessity"[23]. According to Ockham it is an error to hold, that the inferior *regulariter* is subject to the power to which the superior too is subjected[24].

In this way, Ockham elaborates more and more the proper identity and independent substance of the competence of the laity, within the limits of the order of things as established by God and by Christ. But he does not want to hear about a natural difference and opposition between fields of power. He refutes argumentations taken from the Ancient Testament, or from ancient history. He takes it to be an error to hold that the full jurisdiction of the Lord Jesus Christ has been transferred to his vicar, the pope[25]. He does not admit the idea that the pope is free from any law without exception: '*solutus legibus*'. Of course, the pope can change laws of other popes, of synods and of kings, which have a bearing on his own jurisdiction; in such cases the pope is superior to a general council[26]; but he cannot do so with regard to the rights, the freedom and the goods of other persons[27]. He does not even think it necessary that all believers without any exception would obey the pope in those matters which are necessary for the community of the faithful: for the intelligent judgment of what is necessary in these cases, is incumbent on the theologians and the experts, the scientists, — regardless of their rank and status: if the pope errs in his judgment of power, the wise people, even every christian according to his rank and status, has the obligation to withstand him. Ockham devotes his chapter XVII entirely to a discussion about the way and the cases in which the pope has to be submitted to a human judgment, or about the way and cases in which one may appeal against his judgment. Ockham sometimes hides behind the sentences of "*quidam*" and "*isti*"[28], but he clearly expresses his own opinion in concluding that one may judge the pope, or appeal against his judgment not as a rule (*regulariter*), but in certain cases (*casualiter*)[29].

III. *The imperium*

From all the arguments given above it is clear that, according to Ockham, the pope has not the plenitude of power, and that full scope should be given to an independent lay power, to the freedom and rights of believers and non-believers, who are not subject to the pope in all things. The proper substance of that lay power is dealt with in the second *Quaestio*. Ockham discusses

[22] q. 1, cap. 10, lin. 123-126.
[23] q. 1, cap. 11, lin. 16-18 and 34-35.
[24] q. 1, cap. 11, lin. 97-99.
[25] q. 1, cap. 13, lin. 10-12.
[26] q. 1, cap. 15, lin. 13.
[27] q. 1, cap. 15, lin. 14-16.
[28] q. 1, cap. 17, lin. 128 and 140.
[29] q. 1, cap. 17, lin. 208-210.

the proper nature and the origin of that power. The opinions of papalists and imperialists confront each other. The papalists claim that the superior lay power does not have its proper identity, the *imperium*, immediately from God, but only mediately, viz. through the papal power. The pope, in their opinion, has the keys of the heavenly and the temporal kingdom; he is the first head, the highest judge of all mortal beings; he can depose the emperor, or transfer the *imperium* from one people to another. He examines the aptitude of the person elected to be king, he anoints, consecrates and crowns the emperor after his election; the emperor swears the vassal oath of fealty and submission to the pope; the emperor bows his head for him, a symbol of submission, in the same way as the other symbols which express the relationship between the emperor and the pope indicate the relationship of inferior to the superior. The pope has both swords, the spiritual and the secular/temporal, and he is governor of the empire *sede vacante*.

This series of ten arguments, taken from Holy Scripture, from canon and secular law, from the actual situation and the symbolics of the relationship between the emperor and the pope, is advanced in order to demonstrate that the pope has the plenitude of power, over the highest lay power. Mutual differences of opinion between some papalists, whether the imperium stems from the pope by divine or by human law, do not affect the position that the proper identity of the highest lay power stems from the pope anyway.

The imperialists, on the other hand, claim that this identity, the proper nature, of the highest lay power, the *imperium*, stems directly from God. One should, however, hold a sound opinion about this proper nature: *proprietas* in this case does not mean that either the emperor or any king, or the pope, in their respective power has something that in such a way is proper to him, in the strictest sense of the word, that he can do with that power whatever he wishes: the royal principate, as distinguished from the tyrannical or despotic principate, has been instituted for the sake of the *bonum commune*, the common wealth of the subjects, and not for the sake of the *bonum proprium*, the proper individual wealth of the prince. Just for the sake of the *bonum commune*, the *imperium* has been given to the emperor directly by God. One should not think, however, that this direct gift has been donated without any co-jurisdiction or ministry of creatures. With regard to the proper manner of this interference of the creatures, opinions differ. One position states that the electors do not give the power as such, but that they bestow on the elected only the capacity to receive the imperium directly from God. The other positions[30] hold that not only the gift by God, but also the gift by the people is constitutive for the superior lay power. The people ordained that there should be one superior power, elected for itself an emperor, and transferred to the imperial dignity — not to the person of the emperor — some temporal goods, for the sake of this office. God did not immediately from the very first beginning of the institution of the highest lay power, transfer some temporal goods to the highest power by Himself or — by means of some special revelation or command — by men. He gave these *temporalia* by the way of men, who followed natural equity — "*aequitatem naturalem sequentes*" — and had the rule that one prince was the best of governments[31]. After that transfer of temporal goods, the prince holds the proper quality of his power, viz. the *imperium*, only from God, and only He is his superior. By attributing those goods to the

[30] q. 2, cap. 6, lin. 1-12.
[31] q. 2, cap. 6, lin. 56-69.

imperial office, men have translated all their rights to those goods in a regular way — *regulariter* — to the highest lay power, instituted by God.

It is interesting to see, that Ockham does not conceive of the emperorship as the highest lay power as only a wordly institution, created by men and to be abolished by men, if they so wish. The imperial power does not spring only from the community of the (Roman) people, nor does it have its origin from one man, the pope. The *imperium* stems directly from God and from the decision of the people that follow the natural equity in the political ordering of society, and that therefore have instituted one superior power. Such is the regular situation. But here deviations are also possible *in casu necessitatis*, which do not, however, affect the ordering of society as such. Regularly and fundamentally the supreme spiritual power and the supreme temporal power are separated from each other, and do not interfere in the jurisdiction of one another[32]. This principle of non-interference holds each of both supreme powers in its own place: each of them has a divine origin, a divine property, and this divine ordination of both powers must be respected.

At the same time, however, Ockham makes it clear that neither of the two powers can claim to have an absolute property that does not recognize any exterior rule of norm: the imperial office is bound to the *bonum commune*, just like the papacy is ordinated for the government of the faithful with regard to those matters which are *de necessitate salutis*.

IV. *Power and context*

Both powers, the highest laical and the highest spiritual power, have thus been recognized in their proper nature and their divine origin, but they have not been isolated from the community in which and for the sake of which they have been instituted. On account of Christ's factual ordering of the mutual power relationships they work regularly on their own territory, although in the case of necessity exceptions are possible. Argumentations which ground these powers *ex natura rei* in themselves, or which subjugate the temporal power to the spiritual one, also *ex natura rei*, fail to appreciate the conditions of life of the christian society, and enslave the freedom and rights of men in the secular, and evangelical freedom in the spiritual field. As a general principle in church and world it is asserted that the bearer of supreme power is removed regularly from the power of the community, but that in case of necessity he is subject to that same community[33].

Ockham has been successful in giving back to temporal power its proper identity against the claims of the papalists. But neither lay power nor spiritual power is given by him any occasion for totalitarian or absolutist claims of power, neither over each other, nor over its own subjects. The secular and the evangelical idea of the freedom of the christian person with Ockham prevents any absolutism. From this position onwards his political theory points to a future

[32] q. 2, cap. 10, lin. 22-37.
[33] q. 3, cap. 3, lin. 39-60.

which only in passing through a period of royal and papal absolutism[34] would take shape reluctantly.

[34] A.G. Weiler, *Deus in Terris, Middeleeuwse wortels van de totalitaire ideologie*, Hilversum 1965 (inaugural lecture). German translation in: *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* I, Leiden 1966, pp. 22-52.

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