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Digital Islam: Changing the Boundaries of Religious Knowledge?

The phenomenal popularization and transnational propagation of communications and information technologies (hereafter referred to as IT) in recent years has generated a wide range of important questions in the context of Islam's sociology of knowledge. How have these technologies transformed Muslim concepts of what Islam is and who possesses the authority to speak on its behalf? Moreover, how are they changing the ways in which Muslims imagine the boundaries of the *umma*?

PETER MANDAVILLE

Detail from: 'Alim' (ISL Software Corporation). See page 37

The book, pamphlet, and newsletter were taken up with urgency by Muslims in the nineteenth century in order to counter the threat posed to the Islamic world by European imperialism. The *ᶜulama* were initially at the forefront of this revolution, using a newly expanded and more widely distributed literature base to create a much broader constituency for their teachings. An inevitable side-effect of this phenomenon, however, was the demise of their stranglehold over the production and dissemination of religious knowledge. Muslims found it increasingly easy to bypass formally-trained religious scholars in the search for authentic Islam and for new ways of thinking about their religion. The texts were in principle now available to anyone who could read them; and to read is, of course, to interpret. These media opened up new spaces of religious contestation where traditional sources of authority could be challenged by the wider public. As literacy rates began to climb almost exponentially in the twentieth century, this effect was amplified even further. The move to print technology hence meant not only a new method for transmitting texts, but also a new idiom of selecting, writing and presenting works to cater to a new kind of reader.[1]

Contemporary Muslims have been speculating about the utility of electronic information technology in the organization of religious knowledge for some time now. Abdul Kadir Barkatulla, director of London's Islamic Computing Centre, explains that he first became attracted to computer-mediated data storage in his capacity as a scholar of *hadith*, a field which involves the archiving and retrieval of thousands upon thousands of textual references. The CD-ROM has provided an invaluable medium for his work. The entire Qur'an (including both text and recitation) along with several collections of *hadith*, *tafsir*, and *fiqh* can easily fit on a single disc. Barkatulla sees this development as having the greatest relevance for those Muslims who live in circumstances where access to religious scholars is limited, such as in the West. For him, such CD-ROM selections offer a useful alternative. 'IT doesn't change the individual's relationship with his religion', he says, 'but rather it provides knowledge supplements and clarifies the sources of information such that Muslims can verify the things they hear for themselves'. Barkatulla sees IT as a useful tool for systematizing religious knowledge, but – crucially – only pre-existing juridical opinions. In his terms, IT is only for working with knowledge that has already been 'cooked', and not for generating new judgements. There are, however, those who disagree with him. Saᶜad al-Faqih, for example, leader of the London-based 'Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia' and another keen advocate of information technology, believes that the average Muslim can now revolutionize Islam with just a basic understanding of Islamic methodology and a CD-ROM. In his view, the technology goes a long way to bridging the 'knowledge gap' between an *ᶜalim* and a lay Muslim by placing all of the relevant texts at the fingertips of the latter. 'I am not an *ᶜalim*', he says, 'but with these tools I can put together something very close to what they would produce when asked for a *fatwa*'.

That is certainly not to say, however, that the *ᶜulama* have been entirely marginalized. In fact, some religious scholars have become quite enthusiastic about computer technology themselves. 'Traditional centres of Islamic learning (such as al-Azhar in Cairo and Qom in Iran) did not respond to the opportunities offered by IT for about ten years', Barkatulla observes, 'but now they are forced to'. He alludes to something like a 'race to digitize Islam' among leading centres of religious learning around the world. Because the modern religious universities have developed comprehensive information systems, the more conservative, traditional institutions are now forced to respond in kind in order to keep up with the times. At the Centre for Islamic Jurisprudence in Qom, Iran, several thousand texts, both Sunni and Shiᶜi, have been converted to electronic form. While Sunni institutions tend to ignore Shiᶜi texts, the Shiᶜa centres are digitizing large numbers of Sunni texts in order to produce databases which appeal to the Muslim mainstream, and hence capture a larger share of the market for digital Islam.

Neither has the rise of electronic 'print Islam' eradicated the saliency of the oral tradition. Electronic media are as adept with sound as they are with the written word. Certainly we have heard much about the role of audio cassettes in Iran's Islamic revolution, where recordings of Khomeini's sermons were smuggled over from his Neauphle-le-Chateau headquarters near Paris and, much to the Shah's dismay, widely distributed in Iran. The Friday sermon, or *khutba*, is today recorded at many mosques throughout the Muslim world and the distribution of these recordings along with addresses by prominent ideologues consciously emulating the rhetoric of influential modern Muslim thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Abu'l Ali Mawdudi, serves to politicize Islam before an audience of unprecedented proportions. Recordings of sermons by dissident Saudi *ᶜulama*, such as Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-ᶜAwda, also circulate widely both inside and outside the Kingdom, and this marks the first time that material openly critical of the Saudi regime has been heard by relatively large sections of that country's population. The website of a London-based Saudi opposition group has also made Salman al-ᶜAwda's sermons available over the Internet using the latest audio streaming technology.[2] 'Now that media technology is increasingly able to deal with other symbolic modes', notes the anthropologist Ulf Hannerz, 'we may wonder whether imagined communities are increasingly moving beyond words'.[3]

It is perhaps on the Internet, however, that some of the most interesting things are happening. Can we meaningfully speak today about the emergence of new forms of Islamic virtual community? To begin with, we need to make sure that we have a more nuanced understanding of those Muslim identities which use the Internet. We cannot start talking about new forms of diasporic Muslim community simply because many users of the Internet happen to be Muslims. Noting that in many instances Muslim uses of the Internet seem to represent little more than the migration of existing messages and ideas into a new context, Jon Anderson rightfully warns that 'new talk has to be distinguished from new people talking about old topics in new settings'.[4] Yet we also have to acknowledge the possibility that the hybrid discursive spaces of the Muslim Internet can give rise, even inadvertently, to new formulations and critical perspectives on Islam and the status of religious knowledge. As regards notions of political community in Islam, there is also the Internet's impact on 'centre-periphery' relations in the Muslim world to be examined. A country such as Malaysia, usually considered to be on the margins of Islam both in terms of geography and religious influence, has invested heavily in information and networking technologies. As a result, when searching on the Internet for descriptions of programmes which offer formal religious training, one is far more likely to encounter the comprehensive course outlines provided by the International Islamic University of Malaysia than to stumble across the venerable institutions of Cairo, Medina, or Mashhad.

Continued on page 23

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Editorial

The inaugural issue of the *ISIM Newsletter* has received favourable response. We tried to reach a large audience and reactions to the first mailing, indeed, came from all over the globe. These positive reactions demonstrate the existence of a demand for information on the multifaceted field of the study of modern Islam and Muslim communities – or 'communities of Muslims' as Filali-Ansary puts it (p. 6) – as well as for an exchange of ideas and findings generated by research. In this second issue, we try to continue along this line. In comparison to the inaugural Newsletter, the geographical spread of the contributions to this issue is expanded, bringing us to the geographical margins of the world of Islam: Vietnam, The Philippines, Australia, South Africa, Trinidad and the Czech Republic. More than anything else, this global expanse shows that the world of Islam – through migration and conversion – is interwoven with other worlds, both old and new. This interwovenness, however, does not mean that the mutual (and self) images and conceptions which Muslims and non-Muslims have necessarily imply social or religious affinities. In several contributions, the rapport – but also the lack thereof – is dealt with directly or indirectly, both within the range of academic and ideological discourse (e.g. secularism in Muslim and Christian experiences) and of societal and political practice (e.g. political representation and radicalization). The growing interest in non-political Islam, too, is evident in this issue; the religious debates within Islam receive increased attention, in particular the more 'liberal' trends, as do the more mystical currents. Mass culture and the new media have recently stimulated fresh research into the swiftly expanding worlds of broadcasted and – even – digital Islam. Issues of gender and of other social and cultural categories, like age (youth) and ethnic background, feature in a number of articles, varying from reflection on methodologies to performing arts and song. Most, but not all, contributions deal directly with Islamic or Muslim categories. Some deal with aspects of societies which are predominantly Muslim in composition, but which have no, or no direct, bearing on religious thought or practice, but then no society of Muslims can be solely understood from religious angles. Furthermore, Muslim societies are also to be understood from the perspective of their historical experiences. More articles in this issue reflect this perspective than in the first.

The *ISIM Newsletter* has the ambition of covering activities concerning the study of Islam and Muslim societies. This information, along with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships, is presented in the ISIM 'Info Pages'. In order to offer updated information, the ISIM relies on its readers. You are invited to send us (by e-mail, fax, etc.) comments on the contents of specific articles or the Newsletter as a whole, and information on activities you think relevant to our audience (also by digital forms on our website). When processed, the information will be made available also on the ISIM website. ✦

DICK DOUWES
editor

MISCELLANEOUS

ISIM Academic Committee

The following scholars have become members of the ISIM Academic Committee, which is still in formation.

Prof. Dr Mamadou Diouf
Prof. Diouf is affiliated with the Université Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar-Fann and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Dakar, Senegal. He is an anthropologist and historian. He is the author of, amongst others, *Le Kajoor au XIX siècle: pouvoir ceddo et conquête coloniale*, Paris, 1990.

Prof. Dr Jean-François Leguil-Bayart
Prof. Leguil-Bayart is director of the Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) in Paris. His interests include political sciences, historicity of the state and foreign politics. His geographical interests are Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey and Iran. Most recently he has published *l'IllusionIdentitaire*, 1996.

Prof. Dr Gudrun Kr mer
Prof. Krämer holds the chair of Islamic Studies at the Free University of Berlin since 1996. Her fields of interest are: modern Middle Eastern history and current Arab affairs, contemporary Islamic political thought, and minorities in the Muslim Arab world. Her main geographical interest is Egypt. To appear soon is *Der Gottesstaat als Republik*.

Sami Zubaida
Sami Zubaida is reader in Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London, and chairman of the Department of Politics and Sociology since 1997. His interests are wide and include religion, ethnicity, and nationalism, and food and culture. His geographical interests comprise Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. He is the author of *Islam, the People and the State*, London, 1993.

ISIM Professorial Fellowhip

The first Professorial Fellowship of ISIM has been granted to Prof. Dr Muhammad Khalid Masud. A graduate of McGill University, Montreal, Professor Masud became affiliated with the Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan (See also ISIM Newsletter 1 page 43 for details on this institute). His interests are wide but he is in particular known for his work on Islamic law and legal philosophy. His geographical interest comprises most parts of the Muslim world, in particular South Asia. Professor Masud is a prolific author and has published books and articles in many scholarly magazines and journals. He is the author of *Iqbal's Reconstruction of Ijtihad*, IRI & Iqbal Academy. Among his most well-known editing works is *Islamic Legal Interpretation: the Muftis and their Fatwas*, co-edited with Brinkley Messick and David Powers, Cambridge, USA, 1996.

Dr S.J. Noorda: President of the University of Amsterdam

On 1 January 1999, Dr S.J. (Sijbelt) Noorda was appointed President of the University of Amsterdam (UvA). He had been acting President after the untimely death of his predecessor, Dr J.K.M. Gevers. Dr Noorda had been vice-president of the University of Amsterdam since 1991. The UvA is one of the founding universities of ISIM. Dr Noorda is Chairman of the Board of ISIM. He studied Theology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and at the Union Theological Seminary/Colombia University in New York and defended his PhD thesis at Utrecht University.

Before embarking on his career as university board member, he worked as a scholarly member of the Bible Translation and Hermeneutics section of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. He is currently Chairman of the project board of the new translation of the Bible into Dutch.

Letters to the Editor

The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM Newsletter. We intend to allow space for reactions to, and comments or opinions on, articles contained in this publication. If you wish to contribute to this section, please do so via one of the following addresses. Be sure to indicate 'Letter to the Editor'.

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Retraction

The ISIM Newsletter editors would like to apologize for a misprint in the inaugural issue. On page 42, the director's name and address of the CIE (Centre for Islam in Europe) figured on the bottom of the page under the information for the NIAASC (Netherlands Institute for Archaeology and Arabic Studies in Cairo).

Thecorrect addresses are as follows:

Centre for Islam in Europe
Director: Professor Herman de Ley
Address: Blandijnberg 2
B-9000 Gent, Belgium
Tel: +32 9 264 40 251
Fax: +32 9 264 6441

Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in Cairo (NVIC)
Former Netherlands Institute for Archaeology and Arabic Studies in Cairo (NIAASC)
Director:
Professor Johannes den Heijer
Address: 1, Mahmud Azmi Street
Zamalek, Cairo Egypt
Tel: +20 2 3400076
Fax: +20 2 3404376

Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo

Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in Cairo (NVIC)

On February 10, 1999 the Netherlands Institute for Archaeology and Arabic Studies in Cairo (NIAASC) changed its name. The NIAASC is now called the Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in Cairo (NVIC) in Cairo (al-Maʿhad al-Hulandi al-Falamanki bi l-Qahira in Arabic). The name change was witnessed by representatives of the Dutch and Belgian governments, the presidents of the General Board and the Scientific Council, and by representatives of participating institutions. Representatives of various Egyptian scholarly and cultural institutions as well as foreign institutions based in Cairo were also present.

At the occasion, the role of the NVIC (NIAASC) in Arab Studies in the Netherlands was highlighted by Prof.Dr R. Kruk of Leiden University, Chairperson of the Scientific Board of the NVIC. Prof. Dr U. Vermeulen of the Catholic University Leuven, member of the Scientific Council of the NVIC, spoke about the role of NVIC in Arab Studies in Flanders.

ISIM
DICK DOUWES

ISIM Opening Day

On Tuesday, 20 October 1998, the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) celebrated its official opening day. Well over 300 people attended the gathering in the renovated Concert Hall of Leiden. It was to become a memorable day, attracting extensive media coverage following protests by Iranian asylum seekers. The morning programme consisted in the more official aspects of the day, featuring an opening speech by State Secretary of Justice and – what sparked off an angry response of the demonstrators – an address by Faezeh Hashemi, member of Parliament of Iran and editor-owner of the oppositional *Zan* periodical. The address did not take place. After a short musical intermezzo, the afternoon programme had a more academic tone: a lecture by anthropologist Professor Dale Eickelman and a forum discussion on the format and plans of the ISIM.

The Guest

The coming of Faezeh Hashemi attracted much attention, although few were to have the opportunity to actually see her. In the week before the opening, news of her participation spread quickly. She had been invited on the basis of her special position in Iran, where she gives voice to certain opposition currents and strives to increase the participation of women in public life. Aimed at softening the restrictive character of the present Islamic regime, Hashemi's activities arouse the suspicion of the more conservative guardians of the Islamic Revolution. Inside Iran, she has gained popularity by her attempts to alter the Islamic regime from within, although she often has to 'walk a thin line'. The fact that she is the daughter of former president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani helps to explain her remarkable performance in the turbulent political environment of present-day Iran. She operates, not without risk, in particular when it comes to the views expressed in the periodical *Zan*, which sometimes are perceived as 'anti-state' by conservative forces, as reflected in the recent trials.

Her presence at the opening was met with curiosity by some, anxiety by others. The Dutch academia and media were curious about this unexpected female guest from a country normally perceived as being hostile to most of our values. During the last year, in particular after the election of Khatami as president of Iran, it had become apparent to many that the `situation in Iran was more complex. The invitation and her acceptance reflected a growing openness in mutual policies. Others were far less welcoming, particularly the community of Iranian refugees in the Netherlands (about 30,000). Word of her participation was received with astonishment and anger. Certain groups strongly opposed to her presence at the opening requested and gained permission of the local police to demonstrate against her and the Islamic Republic. In their eyes, being a Member of Parliament meant that she represented the Iranian regime and, moreover, being the daughter of former president Rafsanjani, some held her accountable for their sufferings during his presidency.

The Demonstration

The morning of the opening, scores of demonstrators assembled at the entrance of the Concert Hall in the main street of the inner city. The supporters of the Mujahidin-i Khalq were clearly the most vocal group. Their slogans were supported by beating drums. They waved banners containing the picture of their leader Rajavi. The other demonstrators belonged to various leftist groups who carefully kept some distance from the Mujahidin. The demonstrations were not limited to the exterior of the building; a number of opponents of the Iranian regime entered the Concert Hall – the opening day was indeed a public affair – and some supporters of the Mujahidin succeeded in approaching Faezeh Hashemi just after she had arrived. In the commotion, Mrs Hashemi decided to leave.

This decision proved to be a wise one, for later, when Dr Martin van Bruinessen attempted to read out the text of Hashemi's speech, many demonstrators in the audience prevented him from doing so, mostly by shouting slogans – including 'Death to Rafsanjani' and 'Death to Khatami'. Some male demonstrators jumped on the stage in an attempt to capture the microphone. The demonstrators could not be quieted down. During lunchtime the organization – with the great help of some Iranians living in the Netherlands – succeeded in convincing the demonstrators that Mrs Hashemi had left. The demonstration was disbanded, allowing the programme to continue as scheduled.

The Opening

The programme started as scheduled with a short word of welcome by the ISIM director-in-charge, Prof. W.A.L. Stokhof, on behalf of the ISIM Board. The Netherlands' State Secretary of Justice, Mr. J. Cohen, then addressed the audience on behalf of the Dutch government. In both speeches, the autonomy of the new research institute was emphasized, as was the importance of national and international cooperation. In the words of Stokhof, '… the ISIM is independent even from the government that made its existence possible. By this autonomy, however, the ISIM depends on the networking of scholars to guide its plans and activities, lighting our way into the future.' Cohen agreed: ' … let me reiterate that the ISIM is an autonomous institution and is to determine its own programmes and activities, but not without the participation of other academic institutions both here in the Netherlands and abroad.'

Stokhof stressed that modern Islam and Muslim societies should be understood within an historical context and that more classical approaches in the field of Islamic Studies are by no means incompatible to the needs of research on modern phenomena. He added that the activities of ISIM are embedded in the *duplex ordo*, dividing science and religion. This does not imply that the activities of ISIM will be left to isolation within the academic community. On the contrary, ISIM should prove its relevance to society at large by rendering the academic research accessible to a broader audience. Cohen situated the founding of ISIM within the Netherlands' government policy to support initiatives aimed at increasing knowledge and research on societies and cultures that are important to the Netherlands and Europe. 'This includes, of course, and increasingly so, the Muslim world – a world which is more and more part of our own. Today, millions of Muslims live in Western Europe, 800,000 of which live here in the Netherlands. In order for the Netherlands to develop a truly coherent multi-cultural society, knowledge of its contributing cultures and societies is essential.'

In contrast to the eventful morning session, the afternoon programme ran smoothly. The Moroccan singer Amina Alaoui and her acoustic ensemble performed four Arabo-Andalusian songs.

Opening Lecture

The opening lecture, 'Islam in the Global Public Sphere', was delivered by Prof. Dr Dale Eickelman, Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations, Dartmouth College (USA). The text in the sidebar is taken from the conclusion of his speech. (The lecture will be published by ISIM shortly.)

Forum

The Opening Day was concluded by a forum discussion on the plans and policies of the ISIM. The forum included the following members:

Prof. Dr Nasr Abu Zayd (Visiting Professor of Islamic Studies, Leiden University), Prof. Dr Dale F. Eickelman (see above), Prof. Dr Nilüfer Göle (Professor of Sociology, Bosphorus University), Prof. Dr P.S. van Koningsveld (Professor of Religious History of Islam in Western Europe, Leiden University), Prof. Dr Peter van der Veer (Professor of Comparative Religion and Dean of the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam). Dr N.H. Biegman, author *of Egypt: Moulids, Saints and Sufis* (London 1990) and currently Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to NATO and WEU, chaired the forum. The presentations given by the members of the forum in general, wholeheartedly welcomed the ISIM as an important initiative in the field of the study of modern Islam and Muslim societies. Prof. Nilüfer Göle highlighted the complex aspects of modernity in the study of Islam, whereas Prof. van der Veer pointed at the possible danger of perceiving and describing developments in the Muslim world as being tantamount to Islam. As representatives of the theological and philological traditions, Prof. Nasr Abu Zayd and Prof. P.S. van Koningsveld stressed the importance of the integration of these traditions into the Institute, in particular the inclusion of scholarly reference to the normative and other texts of the Islamic tradition. Prof. Dale Eickelman agreed to the latter remarks, pointing to the growing number of projects in which scholars of various disciplinary traditions cooperate, thus combining their specializations. ✦

The Emerging Public Sphere

'Without fanfare, the notion of Islam as dialogue and civil debate is gaining ground. Like the "Copernican revolution", the current break in religious authority in the Muslim world is likely to be seen as significant only in retrospect. A new sense of public is emerging throughout Muslim-majority states and Muslim communities elsewhere. It is shaped by increasingly open contests over the use of the symbolic language of Islam. Increasingly, discussions in newspapers, on the Internet, on smuggled cassettes, and on television cross-cut and overlap, contributing to a common public space.

New and accessible modes of communication have made these contests increasingly global, so that even local issues take on transnational dimensions. Muslims, of course, act not just as Muslims but according to class interests, out of a sense of nationalism, on behalf of tribal or family networks, and from all the diverse motives which characterize human endeavour. Increasingly, however, large numbers of Muslims explain their goals in terms of the normative language of Islam. Muslim identity issues are not unitary or identical, but such issues have become a significant force in both Muslim-majority states and those in which Muslims form only a minority of the population. It is in this sense that one can speak of an emerging Muslim public sphere.

This distinctly public sphere exists at the intersections of religious, political, and social life and contributes to the creation of civil society. With access to contemporary forms of communication that range from the press and broadcast media to fax machines, audio and video cassettes, from the telephone to the Internet, Muslims, like Christians, Hindus, Jews, Sikhs, and protagonists of Asian and African values, have more rapid and flexible ways of building and sustaining contact with constituencies than was available in earlier decades. The asymmetries of the earlier mass media revolution are being reversed by new media in new hands. This combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created. It feeds into new senses of a public space that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities.

Just as there is general scholarly recognition that there are multiple paths to modernity,[1] there is a practical awareness of multiple claims to the task of staging virtue,[2] including a public engagement in the name of religion.

Publicly shared ideas of community, identity, and leadership take new shapes in such engagements, even as many communities and authorities claim an unchanged continuity with the past. Mass education, so important in the development of nationalism in an earlier era,[3] and a proliferation of media and means of communication have multiplied the possibilities for creating communities and networks among them, dissolving prior barriers of space and distance and opening new grounds for interaction and mutual recognition.'

Notes

1. S.N. Eisenstadt (1996), *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 396-426.
2. Armando Salvatore (1998), 'Staging Virtue: The Disembodiment of Self-Correctness and the Making of Islam as a Public Norm', *Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam* 1, pp. 87-119.
3. Ernest Gellner (1983), *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 28-9.

The official opening of the ISIM was enlivened by a brief musical concert of the Moroccan-born singer, Amina Alaoui, with her repertoire of the Alcantara. Trained in Arabo-Andalusian music and classical piano, Alaoui has specialized in the style of Arabo-Andalusian gharnati singing of Morocco. Settled in Granada, Amina Alaoui for the first time forged the musical 'Alcantara' (phonetic for the Arabic al-Qantara), bridging via the medium of music, a new style between her native town Fes and her adoptive city of Granada. Alaoui's understanding and interpretation of the 'Alcantara' is a musical



interpretation of a future which is marked by a universal and tolerant humanism. Her presentation of this, as at the ISIM Opening Day, was characterized by her refined vocal range and her passion for Andalusia.

A solo performance on the zarb by Bijane Chemirani following the four songs by Amina Alaoui made up the musical intermezzo. Oneof her songs best indicative of the spirit of universal love and tolerance which she tries to impart through every musical performance is perhaps 'Amours ou trop tard me suis pris', Alaoui's rich, soulful voice reminded everyone present that the only enduring joy is that which comes from a love which seeks only to serve and give love unto others.

ISIM Advanced Degree Programme

In November 1999, the ISIM will begin its Advanced Degree Programme in cooperation with participating research schools. The Advanced Degree prepares students (holders of a Master's degree or its equivalent) for PhD research. It is open to graduates in the humanities, social sciences, religious studies and theology. The applicants must specialize in a field specifically related to Islam or to a Muslim society and must demonstrate outstanding academic qualities. The Advanced Degree programme lasts for one academic year and includes, amongst others, courses in languages (advanced level), research methods (including data organization), and social science and cultural-historical approaches. The emphasis in the selection of Advanced Degree students is clearly placed on proven academic capacity. The programme combines course work and individual supervision. Most students will be stationed in Leiden, however, some may be placed at one of the ISIM participating universities (elsewhere in the Netherlands). Although the Advanced Degree training is a preparatory programme for PhD research, this does not guarantee entry into an ISIM PhD programme.

The tuition fee is 10,000 guilders (currently approximately 5,000 USD). However, (partial) waivers may be obtained in certain cases.
For the academic year 1999-2000, a limited number of full grants (including tuition and living costs) will be offered. For information and application forms, please contact the ISIM secretariat or consult the ISIM website.

The closing date for applications is: **15 April 1999**.

The Netherlands

NICO LANDMAN

Imams in the Netherlands Home-made Better than Import?

In February 1988, the Dutch government published a policy document on imams and their training.[1] In previous years, it had strongly advocated such training. The policy document was the preliminary conclusion of a – sometimes heated – debate: Who is in control of future imams? Will the Dutch borders be closed to imams from Turkey and Morocco?

The Netherlands counts approximately 700,000 persons of Islamic background. Most belong to immigrant communities from Turkey and Morocco, which settled in the Netherlands in the '60s and '70s. Between 200 and 250 imams are employed (with a salary) in the 380 mosques in the Netherlands; in the smaller houses of prayer the religious leaders are usually unpaid. The majority of professional imams are recruited in the country of origin: Turkey or Morocco. The majority of the Turkish imams have been dispatched by the Directorate for Religious Affairs for a period of four years, at the end of which they return to Turkey. Other imams have been educated in the country of origin, but have settled in the Netherlands permanently.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the external recruitment of imams has been criticized as being an unwelcome foreign influence on the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and as being a hindrance to their integration in society. The Dutch government has ordered several investigations since 1994 and in 1998, produced the above-mentioned policy document concerning imams. The document contains the following aims: 1. Stimulation of a theological institution for the training of imams within the Dutch educational system; 2. Refresher courses for imams who have been educated elsewhere; and 3. Restriction on entry for new imams from abroad if candidates in the Netherlands are available.

On the one hand, Muslim organizations have reacted with criticism to this government policy by pointing to the division between Church and State. On the other hand, they have devised educational structures that may be eligible for recognition and funding of the government.

Motives of Those in Favour

The Dutch government regards this matter from the point of view of integration of ethnic minorities. With this, the government means their participation as full citizens in every aspect of society. With disturbing issues such as increasing juvenile unemployment and juvenile delinquency among certain ethnic minorities, the government intends to develop a social-cultural policy in which religion and 'living principles' are included. The role played by religious leaders, *in casu* the imams, can be positive as well as negative. They can convey norms and values that may frustrate the integration of Islamic migrant communities in Dutch society. *In concreto* this means imams who call on their audience to limit, in as much as possible, contact with the unbelieving infidels; or those who discourage young Muslim women from studying or pursuing a career, based on traditional views on the position of women. It is implicitly assumed that imams who have been trained abroad will propagate such conservative ideas. Apart from that, various government bodies – among them the Dutch Internal Intelligence Service – have voiced their concern that imams could act as instruments by means of which foreign authorities or organizations can control Muslim communities in the Netherlands.

On the other hand, one hopes that imams who have a more positive attitude about the society around them can break the isolation of some Muslim groups, or at least decrease it. The government assumes that imams trained in the Netherlands will be well integrated into society.

The need for a new type of religious leader who is better equipped to work in non-Islamic environments and who is completely independent of foreign governments is also sometimes expressed by Muslims in the Netherlands who are critical towards existing Muslim organizations. They blame the present generation of imams for preaching an Islamic message which too much assumes the self-evidence of the truth of Islam and offers too little possibilities to enter into discourse with the non-Muslim environment. It is especially those Muslims who constructively work together with non-Muslims on a daily basis that oppose the isolationist attitude of some imams. Although not doubting the universal truth of the Islamic teaching, they stress that it is essential to further define and accentuate it in the social and cultural context.

The plea for Dutch imam training is further substantiated by the consideration that Islamic theologians should not only function within the confinements of the mosque but also in other social structures, such as hospitals and correctional facilities. These institutions have a tradition of spiritual care for their clients, which is given from either a Christian, Jewish or humanist perspective. The increased number of Muslims in Dutch hospitals, and also in correctional facilities, justifies the appointment of imams next to the great number of ministers and humanist counsellors. This forms part of the greater structure (hospitals, jails, etc.) and presupposes that the imam works together in a team of people who hold different views. The demands of professionalism placed on Christian or humanist spiritual counsellors have not yet been clearly formulated for 'hospital imams'. However, it is clear that theological training in Turkey or Morocco will not be sufficient for this. Therefore, the pursuit of specialized imams in institutions forms an argument for imam training in the Netherlands.

The last argument for training imams in the Netherlands is simply the need for imams who can speak Dutch and who can preach, lecture and give religious advice in that language. Knowledge of the language of their countries of origin strongly decreases amongst Muslims who grow up in the Netherlands. It is evident that an imam with insufficient knowledge of Dutch is severely handicapped in his communication with people of the second and third generations. Concern about the Islamic training of the future generations is the main impetus for most Muslim organizations that want to train their imams locally.

While the motives for imam training in the Netherlands greatly differ with the various actors, and while also the ideological 'colour' of the training they desire varies widely, the need for local training facilities for imams is shared by many.

Objections of Those Against

Despite the arguments in favour of local imam training, proposals to come to bring this to fruition are strongly objected to by existing Muslim organizations. Apart from that, there is doubt about the feasibility of the proposed training structures.

The opposition is mainly triggered by fear of assimilation in the surrounding environment. As Muslims grow increasingly more opposed to the norms and values of secular society, their mistrust of politicians who promote an Islam adapted to Europe increases as well. Some Muslim organizations fear that a theological training supported by the government will have to make unacceptable concessions to the dominant culture. This fear is vented amongst others through the rejection of a 'West European Islam'. Even though no one would deny that the West European context poses specific challenges for Muslims, the universal, unique and revealed character of the Islamic message, which is not open to concessions, is stressed.

In opposing the government policy in favour of local imam training, antagonists refer to the division of Church and State. Through its imam policy, the government would involve itself in the internal affairs of a religious organization. Even though the division of Church and State in the Netherlands is more an ideological image than it is descriptive of the actual situation, it has almost gained the status of a dogma. That is why the government, in its policy document, stresses that it does not want to violate that division in its proposals. It claims only to facilitate the conditions under which the Muslims themselves can create their imam training. Notwithstanding, the government does try to influence the Muslim communities in the Netherlands via the imam policy. A paradox in the discussion about the involvement of the government with the training of imams is the fact that in the present situation a number of imams are under the control of a foreign government, namely Turkish. If the Dutch government interferes in that situation, for instance by severely limiting entrance of these imams, it is to be questioned whether, by doing so it is supporting the autonomy of local Muslim organizations or limiting it.

Those critical of imam training in the Netherlands are also opposed to the negative and overgeneralized view of the present generation of imams. They point to the training that current imams have had for years on end, which begins at early age. They doubt if the same level of religious knowledge can be obtained by means of training conform to the Dutch educational system. They are annoyed by the pejorative attitudes towards the intellectual traditions of *madrasahs* (religious schools) in the Muslim world.

A final question about the proposed imam training concerns its feasibility. If it is assumed – as it is by the Dutch government – that Muslim organizations themselves will have to bear the responsibility, is there enough organizational strength among these internally-divided organizations? And, is there sufficient (paid) employment for students who would finish the training?

Recent Developments

In the policy document mentioned above, concrete measures are announced for 'import' imams: In the future they will have to follow a foundational course during which they have to learn the Dutch language and acquire relevant knowledge about Dutch society necessary for their job. The government is awaiting initiatives from Muslim organizations and universities concerning a new imam training in higher education and limits itself to indicating the legal possibilities and conditions for applications in this field. It does not give any financial commitment. Without embarking on juridical details, it can be stated that the legal barriers for the founding and funding of new institutions for higher education would be difficult. It would be a different matter if an already-existing university would develop Islamic theological training: in that case conditions can be met relatively easily. From the policy document, it can be gathered that the Dutch government would like to see the imam training it desires realized in this way.

At present, the initiatives of Muslim organizations are headed in a different direction. On the one hand, there are organizations such as Suleymanlis, which transplant training structures they have in their country of origin in the Netherlands, without demonstrating any need for recognition or funding by the Dutch government. On the other hand, there are two organizations that do aspire to public recognition and funding, but in doing so, opt for having their own university: the *Islamitische Universiteit Rotterdam* (Islamic University Rotterdam) which began in 1998 with a very limited budget; and the *Stiching voor Islamitisch Hoger Onderwijs* (Foundation for Islamic Higher Education) in Utrecht, which has developed plans for a (an autonomous) Theological University, in cooperation with Utrecht University. The government seems to be getting what it had asked for all these years, namely Islamic theological training at an academic level, but in a form it does not prefer: independent institutions. ✦

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Note

– The integration policy concerning ethnic minorities in relation to their spiritual ministers. *Report of the Minister of Internal Affairs and State Secretary Netelenbos of Education, Culture and Sciences*, Netelenbos, The Hague, 1998.

Secularism

ABDOU FILALI-ANSARY

The Debate on Secularism in Contemporary Societies of Muslims[1]

The 'Islam and secularism' debate began a century ago and does not seem to have progressed. Prevailing attitudes, both 'pro' and 'con', are apparently locked in a stalemate and an endless 'war of positions'. Why are the actors of different trends restating more or less the same formulations on this issue? Is it possible to find a likely interpretation for such a phenomenon?

The Misunderstanding about Secularism

The issue of secularism is addressed in different ways, depending on whether the context is Muslim or Christian. In the latter case, it is treated as a process, i.e. a set of historical changes supposed to have affected the regulation of the social and political order, and to have permeated the prevailing conceptions (or worldviews) within society. When the context is 'Islamic', a clear opposition is posited at the very beginning between 'Secularism' and 'Islam', taken as broad and substantive categories, which are supposed to refer to two separate and irreducible realms of meaning. The question asked in the first case seems to concern 'how secularization *happened* in some European societies at some time, and how it influenced their functioning, and the dominant attitudes of their members'. In the other case, however, the question is most often: 'Is Islam compatible with secularism?' The discussion is therefore drawn to conceptual, theoretical aspects: from the outset it adopts an approach based on the manipulation of broad concepts and discoveries, at one stage or another. It is led to, and often locked in, a kind of *aporia*. Very few studies address the historical aspects of secularization within societies of Muslims,[2] i.e. ask how it affected the life and views of Muslims, or attempt to describe what *actually* happened since the category was discovered and the changes were experienced by Muslims. Therefore, an ideological bias seems to dominate the debate in this field.

The few studies which concentrated on the historical changes within societies of Muslims since the 18th century point to the fact that, although secularization as an ideology (i.e. what the French call *laïcisme*) was received from outside, a real, observable 'secularizing' process began much earlier. This process was indeed a reaction to the perceived European advance and menace. The need for deep reform, and the actions taken in order to set a new organization of state and society based on rational criteria rather than religious traditions, stemmed from the perceived weakness of Muslim polities and from internal drive to overcome this situation. The irruption of the European-originating ideology of secularism, and its imposition on societies of Muslims through the erection of modern nation-states, interrupted the evolution of the initial, 'endogenous' secularizing process.

Whichever credit is given to these conceptions, and assuming that secularization (the 'real' and durable phenomenon) was brought into societies of Muslims from outside, i.e. from an alien culture, it has stirred waves of changes and numerous reactions which deeply influenced the regulation of the social and political order and gave birth to an intense and continuous debate within these societies. On one hand it is remarkable that, since the distinction between the 'secular' and the 'regular' had no equivalent in Arabic, the word chosen initially for secularism was *dahriyin*, a Qur'anic term for atheists.[3] Although it was replaced later by *ladiniyyin*, the semantic choices which were made convey a strong assimilation between secularism and atheism, or at least an opposition to, and reaction against, religion. Even the term *ʿilmani* (this-worldly) which was introduced at a later stage and which prevails to this day, conveys the impression of rejection of the fundamental base of religion, i.e. the idea of transcendence. In all cases, secularism was understood as an alternative to religion, not as an alternative way of ordering society and of conceiving the world. The majority of Muslims thought that secularization imposed abandoning altogether their religious faith, their traditions, their values, etc. Secularization was equated to a complete negation of the self, to a total rejection of all the views, wisdom and practices inherited from the ancestors, and, above all, it was perceived as an alien phenomenon, introduced into societies of Muslims by those who were the 'historical enemies', crusaders of yesterday and colonizers of the day. Then, as still now, it was perceived in the fullest sense of the word, as *alienation*. Hence, the turn taken by the debate in the public arena, with the small exception of some academic circles.[4]

Secularists found themselves, except during some short intervals, (as, for example, when nationalism dominated) on the defensive. Their enthusiastic and vibrant apologies of rationalism, progress, development, freedom, democracy, etc., as by-products of secularism, were often successfully faced by accusations from their opponents of unbelief, disrespect for the 'authentic' values of society and sometimes, implicitly, if not openly, of treason.

Secularism vs. Secularization

The consequence of this evolution may be described as boldly *paradoxical* in a double sense. On one hand, one cannot avoid deep surprise at the fact that Islam, which potentially has less to oppose secularist worldviews and ideals, would come to be seen as the most resistant to secularism. As E. Gellner says: 'The high culture of Islam is endowed with a number of features – unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic – that are congruent, presumably, with requirements of modernity or modernisation.'[5]

Of course, one cannot push aside the widespread argumentation linking the success of secularization within European societies to specific features of Christianity, i. e. the relationship it establishes between the sacred and the profane, between God and Caesar. However, when one considers the long and painful process through which the changes were achieved and the secular order implemented, one can only question the accuracy of this formulation and wonder whether it is rather a late justification rather than a real understanding.

On the other hand, it is easy to observe that secularization has found its way to Muslim societies, and has *deeply* and *irreversibly* permeated their ordering and the prevailing conceptions within them. In almost all countries belonging to the 'Muslim world', positive law and state regulations have replaced traditions and rules drawn from religion or linked to its tenets, with the exception of personal status and family law, which remains the last resort for conservation, or maintenance, of the 'Islamic' identity. At the same time, the prevailing worldviews are strongly permeated by conceptions and attitudes linked to modern science and ideologies. A real 'disenchantment of the world' has made its way to the most disseminated conceptions, even if authors as famous as E. Gellner interpret the change as a mere replacement of 'low' or 'popular' by 'high' Islam.[6] In fact, ideas of determinism, modern expectations, and belief in continuous progress have by and large replaced the traditional attitudes based on resignation and belief in static or cyclical time and in mysterious forces.

The resulting situation is therefore marked by strong contradictions: although *secularization* has, in a way, *happened* (or at least achieved many of its effects), *secularism* is seemingly rejected by the majority of the population. The call for implementation of the *shariᶜa*, which constitutes the main slogan of fundamentalist movements, shows how conservatives feel the disruption of the traditional order and its drifting from what they consider to be the religious norms.

It was Ali Abderraziq (1888-1966) who, in the mid-twenties, proposed what may be the best approach to bring to a match the prevailing conceptions and the actual situation within societies of Muslims. His main idea, which he exposed in his famous essay, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* (*Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*. Cairo, 1925), was to introduce a clear distinction between Islam as a complex of beliefs, moral norms and rituals, which can be traced to sacred texts (first 'meaning'), and Islam as the history of a community who attempted to live up to its beliefs and to implement the morality and perform the rituals which stem from them (second 'meaning'). The community has chosen, for particular historical reasons, to live its faith in a particular way, i.e. through the creation of a polity designed to prolong the sacred community of the Prophet. However, this is not the only way to live the faith and to implement its ethical principles. The real, and most important turn in the history of Muslims is not, as is widely believed, the end of the 'rightly-guided caliphate' (*Al-Khilafa ar-Rachida*), but rather the death of the Prophet, which signalled the end of a sacred community and the creation of a 'caliphate' intended to continue his action. The caliphate, even in its early phases, is Islamic only by name. No such political system could legitimately prevail, since nothing in the sacred corpus (i. e. Islam in the first meaning) allows a claim of this sort.

The reasons for an Impasse

The ideas of Ali Abderraziq were strongly opposed. He was finally silenced, as were other creative thinkers before and after him. In his case, this did not happen as a consequence of popular unrest or of pressure from massive social movements. The 'masses' seemed to be rather sympathetic to his ideas, as they were perceived at that time as an open rebuke of despotism. However, although he had a number of followers in the subsequent years, especially in the academia, the direction he explored remained neglected.

Thus one may nowadays wonder whether the impasse of societies of Muslims is due to the continuous presence of small groups of determined activists who, in the absence of centralized religious authorities, exert a strong censorship on public discourses and blackmail political authorities. The recent events in Iran offer a strong case for this interpretation: although the majority of the population has shown a clear option for liberal attitudes (through the election of Mohamed Khatami), a small group succeeds in blocking the way to any real and durable progress in this direction. ✦

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Notes

1. We opt for this expression instead of 'Muslim societies' for its greater accuracy.
2. To the exception of few authors, like A. Al-Azmeh, A. Charfi and D. Eickelman. See for example: Abdelmajid Charfi: *Al-Islam wa al-Hadathah* (Islam and Modernity). Tunis: 1990, Aziz Al-Azmeh: *Al-ᶜIlmaniya min Mandhur Mukhtalif* (Secularism from a Different Point of View). Beyrouth, 1992 and Dale Eickelman, 'Inside the Islamic Reformation', in *The Wilson Quarterly* 22, Nº 1 (Winter 1998).
3. This choice was made by Jamal-Eddin Al-Afghani in the essay he wrote in reaction to attacks on Islam by Ernest Renan.
4. Even in academic circles, most approaches address the question from the framework of the contrasting terms of Islam and X (X being modernity, democracy, human rights, secularism…) strengthening the reduction of complex issues to mere oppositions between categories. In this, a large number of scholars seem to be driven in their work by media-defined issues and approaches. They contribute to the consolidation and legitimation of artificial or prejudice-born ways of asking, and therefore of answering, questions.
5. Ernest Gellner, 'Up from Imperialism', in: *The New Republic*, 22 May 1989, pp. 35-6.
6. Ernest Gellner (1992), *Postmodernism, Reason andReligion*. London.

Radicalism

OLIVIER ROY

The Radicalization of Sunni Conservative Fundamentalism

The recent burst of violence linked with the Saudi-born Islamic militant, Usama Bin Laden, sheds some light on a recent evolution of Islamic radicalism. In the eighties, most of the violence was linked either to an internal confrontation between a state and its Islamist opposition (Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, and later Algeria) or to a state-sponsored terrorism with strategic goals: for instance, the attacks against US and French barracks in Lebanon in 1983-4 and the hostage-takings of 1985 were aimed at ending the Western support for Iraq in the war with Iran. In the nineties, the internal violence either decreased or is no longer threatening the state apparatus. It is rather being directed at 'side-targets' (like tourists in Egypt, former fellow-Islamists, or the civilian population in Algeria).

Most of the main-stream Islamist movements endeavoured, more or less successfully, to enter the legal political scene (Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Egypt) and largely gave up their supra-national agenda in favour of a national posture (Refah, FIS), if not nationalist (Palestinian Hamas, but also … Islamic Iran). But this normalization of the Islamist movements left aside a new kind of radical fringe.

The bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York (1993) was probably the harbinger of new patterns of radical Islamist violence. The targets are symbolic Western (and more precisely American) buildings or people. There is no longer any strategic goal; more precisely, there is a huge discrepancy between the avowed goals (the departures of Western forces from the Gulf) and the real threat they represent for the Western interests. The involved networks are made of transnational militants, who often have multiple citizenship (or no citizenship at all, like Bin Laden), and do not link their fight with a precise state or nation. Even if they come from some mainstream Islamist movements (like the Muslim Brothers) they do not identify themselves with the present strategy of these movements. They appeal to uprooted transnational militants who travel from one jihad to the other, and identify themselves with a sort of imaginary *ummah*.

Almost all of these militants shared a common point: they spent some time in Afghanistan, in Mujahidin training camps, and they are based between Lahore (Pakistan) and Kandahar (Afghanistan). This Afghan connection dates back to the early eighties. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a joint venture of Pakistani military services (ISI) and Saudi Intelligence (under Prince Turki Bin Faysal), with the support of the CIA, endeavoured to send to Afghanistan a kind of 'Islamic legion' to help the Afghan Mujahidin. The sponsors had different agendas. The Saudis and the Americans wanted to 'bleed the Soviets' and to defuse the growing anti-Western Islamic radicalism by diverting it against communism (especially after the 1983-4 events in Lebanon). The Saudis were also trying to enforce their Islamic credentials against the Iranian brand of Islamism, by fostering a strict Sunni militant Islam. The Pakistanis had a more long-term strategic agenda. They were the only ones who thought in terms of a post-Soviet era. They wanted to establish a kind of protectorate on Afghanistan through fundamentalist and ethnically Pashtun movements (this dual ethnic and religious connection has been a permanent feature of the Pakistani policy, even when they shifted their support from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to the Taliban in 1994).

The purveyors of these networks were mainly Arab Muslim brothers, like Abdallah Azzam. A Palestinian holding a Jordanian passport, he headed the Peshawar office of the 'Mektab ul Khedamat', which worked as the dispatcher of the volunteers flocking from the Muslim world. (Azzam was assassinated in September 1989.) Many militants from repressed radical movements found their way to Afghanistan, among them many Egyptian leaders: Shawki Islambuli, the brother of Sadat's killer; Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman; Tala^{c}at Fuad Qassim; Mustafa Hamza; Abou Hamza of the Gama^{c}at; Al Zawahiri of the Jihad (who co-signed most of Bin Laden's communiqués in early 1998); and others. The fact that Sheikh Abdurrahman easily obtained a US visa from the American consulate in Khartoum, followed by a green card in 1992, is certainly a legacy of this period.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989), followed by the collapse of the USSR (1991), changed the picture. The USA lost interest in these militant networks, but for different reasons the Saudis and Pakistanis still supported them. A turning point was the Gulf War of 1991: suddenly the 'Afghans', as they were called, founded a new jihad, this time against the West.

Many militants, back in their country of origin, founded or joined radical groups, some of them being splinter groups from the mainstream Islamist movements. The GIA in Algeria was founded by 'Afghans' (Tayyeb el Afghani, Jaffar al Afghani, and Sharif al Gusmi), while the pro-GIA journal in London, *al Ansar* was headed by Abu Hamza, an Egyptian who was severely wounded in Afghanistan. The Kashmiri radical movement Harakat al Ansar was also founded by former 'Afghans', as was the Yemenite Jihad, founded by Sheikh Tariq al Fadil, involved in a bloody hostage-taking of Western tourists in December 1998. By the same token, the head of the group held responsible for the attack on a group of tourists in Luxor (November 1997), Mehat Mohammed Abdel Rahman, has also travelled to Afghanistan. In the Philippines, Abu Baker Jenjalani, head of the Abu Sayyaf group (killed in 1998), also has an Afghan background (although he is one of the few to have been supported by Libya).

But other militants did not come back to their own country. They used to travel from one place to the other, fighting a nomadic jihad against the West. A group headed by Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman and Yussuf Ramzi tried to blow up the World Trade Centre in New York in 1993; both were in Afghanistan and the latter fled to Pakistan after the action. The last operation was the bombing of two US embassies in Eastern Africa. The main suspect, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, is a Palestinian who was trained also in Afghanistan.

All these militants and networks have kept their 'Afghan' connections: Usama Bin Laden is living in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. They are also supported in Pakistan by a cluster of political and religious organizations, loosely coordinated in the framework of the Dawat ul Irshad, established near Lahore. One finds the Islamist Jama^{c}at-i Islami, the more conservative Jamiat-Ulama Islami, which controlled the networks of madrasas from which the Taliban movement originated, and more radical splinter groups like the Sepah-i Saheban, whose main goal is to fight Shi^{c}ism. Some high-level former Pakistani officials, like the general Hamid Gul, former Head of the ISI at the end of the Afghan War, are also supporting the movement (Gul protested against the extradition of Ramzi to the USA and the bombings by the US forces of the Mujahidin training camps in August 1998). These groups, which were all involved in supporting the Afghan Mujahidin, have openly turned anti-Western, in phase with a huge part of the Pakistani intelligentsia. If the Pakistani government takes its distance from Bin Laden, it openly supports the Taliban movement.

How can one assess the importance of this radical movement? It is not solely a rear-guard fighting waged by 'lost soldiers'. On one hand, it is one of the consequences of the policy of conservative re-Islamization waged by states like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (but also Egypt), and is in phase with the entry into the labour market of thousands of madrasa students. It is also a consequence of the integration of the mainstream Islamist movements into the domestic political scene, which left out militants with no state or nation. It is not a coincidence if many of these militants are uprooted Palestinian refugees, or come from the periphery of the Middle East (with the notable exception of Egypt). They are not involved in the main Middle Eastern conflict, like Palestine, because the struggle is waged by a well-rooted 'Islamo-nationalist' movement like the Hamas. All the militant actors strongly advocate supra-nationalism and practise it. The Taliban even downgraded the 'Islamic State of Afghanistan' to a 'mere' 'Emirate'. In Usama Bin Laden's networks (the Al Qaida Movement) there are Egyptians, Pakistanis, Sudanese, and Palestinians. Many of the militants, by the way, are really uprooted. They once fought in 'peripheral' jihads, like Bosnia, Kashmir, or Afghanistan, where their relations with the local population remain uneasy. Abu Hamza is an Egyptian, acting for the Algerian GIA in London, whose son-in-law (who has a British passport) was arrested in Yemen (December 1998). Yussuf Ramzi, born in Kuwait to Palestinian and Pakistani parents, went to the Philippines and to the USA. In fact, the militants are a pure product of globalization and the New World Order – using dollars, English, cellular phones, the internet, and living in camps or hotels.

Their second characteristic is that their ideology links a very conservative traditional Islam (shariat and only the shariat) with violence and terrorism. In particular, they are very anti-Shi^{c}ite. Although their anti-shi^{c}ism is well rooted in traditional Sunni fundamentalism, it has been catapulted by the Wahhabi influence.[1] These neo-fundamentalist radicals are rather different from the mainstream Islamist movements, not only in terms of politics but also of ideology. The Islamists, although advocating the implementation of the shariat, have a social and economic programme, coupled with a political agenda; they claim also to bypass the shi^{c}a-sunni divide, to promote women in an Islamic society, and to not confuse Christianism and Western imperialism (Hassan al Banna was eager to establish a relationship with the Copts; Lebanese Hezbullah and the Iranian Islamist governments have also been eager to keep some connections with Christian groups). The conservative background of the neo-fundamentalists is by contrast clearly expressed by their insistence on the mere implementation of the shariat in order to create an Islamic society, on the confinement of women, and on hostility against the Shi^{c}ites (branded heresy),[2] the Jews and the Christians. This hostility is heralded in the name of Bin Laden's movement 'World Islamic Front for the struggle against Christians and Jews'.

Nevertheless, the main weakness of these movements is precisely their lack of constituency among the large Muslim countries (except Pakistan). ✦

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Notes

1. Interestingly enough, the Wahhabi influence had less impact on an other 'heresy': sufism. If Sufi practices have decreased, many of these fundamentalists, like the Taliban do acknowledge their Sufi background and did not indulge in destroying tombs of the 'Saints'.
2. This anti-Shi^{c}as bias is well expressed in a book written by Maulana Nomani, a Pakistani deobandi, Khomeyni, Iranian revolution and the Shi^{c}a faith, with an introduction by the Indian Muslim salafi Sayyed Nadwi, denouncing the Iranian Revolution. *Dharb-ul Mu'min*, a journal close to the Taliban and published in Karachi, has published some khotbas of Sheikh Hudaybi, imam of the Masjid-e Nabavi, who severely criticizes Christians, Jews and Shi^{c}as, called *kuffar* (unbelievers), *rafawiz* (heretics) and *monafiqin* (hypocrites). (August 2 1998, on the Website Taliban.com).

Human Rights

JOE STORK

Human Rights Watch and the Muslim World

Human Rights Watch (HRW), an independent non-governmental organization based in New York, investigates and reports on human rights abuses in some seventy countries, including the United States. HRW's purpose is to hold governments accountable for violations of internationally recognized human rights and humanitarian law, and to generate pressure from other governments, international organizations, and civil societies to end such abuses. We address the practices of governments without regard to ideological or geopolitical orientation, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions. The organization also responds to abuses committed by armed insurgent groups. Among the major concerns of the organization are freedom of thought and expression, due process and equal protection of the law, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and disappearances. HRW recognizes the indivisibility of human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights, although its main work focuses on civil and political rights, including the right of workers to exercise freedom of association and to engage in collective bargaining.

The organization began modestly in 1978 as Helsinki Watch, with the purpose of monitoring compliance by the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with the human rights provisions of the Final Act of the conference, known as the Helsinki Agreement. An Americas Watch division emerged in the early 1980s to monitor human rights developments in Central and Latin America and US human rights policy there. Today HRW also includes divisions that monitor developments in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa. Three thematic divisions focus on Women's Rights, Children's Rights, and Arms (the role of arms transfers to abusive forces and particular weapons systems that are inherently cruel or indiscriminate, such as landmines). A current theme of Human Rights Watch is international justice, which includes support for the special international criminal tribunals in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the campaign to establish an International Criminal Court, and, following on Spain's request to extradite former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, efforts to encourage national judicial systems to prosecute crimes of recognized international jurisdiction such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

HRW premises its efforts on the universality of the core rights specified in the 1948 Universal Declaration and subsequently codified as treaty law in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). From this perspective HRW applies the same criteria when it monitors the practices of governments claiming to be Islamic as when it examines states that discriminate against or persecute Muslims. We have been outspokenly critical of Sudan, for instance, where the Islamist government has invoked religious grounds for its scorched-earth war policy that has targeted civilians in the largely non-Muslim south of the country and generally employed tactics that cannot be justified by the tenets of any religion. HRW has been a main source of documentation of mass killings and other atrocities in former Yugoslavia, notably in Bosnia and now Kosovo, where Muslims comprise the majority of victims. In Indonesia, HRW's Asia division has been monitoring abuses growing out of, and contributing to, communal tensions following the resignation of President Suharto. The violence there has sometimes been directed at, and at other times perpetrated by, Muslims. HRW recently urged the Jakarta embassies of Egypt and Jordan to help form a diplomatic delegation to investigate attacks by security forces in the largely Muslim region of Aceh and to help defuse mounting tensions there. HRW's reports and public advocacy in such circumstances make a point of addressing the economic, political, and social factors underlying conflicts that are expressed primarily in terms of religious identity.

Most situations we investigate do not turn on questions of religious belief. HRW has looked with equivalent scrutiny at the abusive interrogation and detention practices of the governments of Syria, Bahrain, Israel, Iran and Egypt, for example. In some instances these abuses arise out of political or armed conflict involving demands for civil rights and economic justice by communities claiming to suffer from discrimination and exclusion based on religious belief. In cases such as Algeria and Egypt, where armed opposition groups calling themselves Islamic justify atrocities against civilians in those terms, HRW has condemned the violations of humanitarian law unequivocally, but also insisted that the governments counter the violence without recourse to outlawed practices such as torture and arbitrary arrests. Furthermore, HRW insists that governments not abridge the rights to free association and expression of Islamists attempting to promote their political views by peaceful means.

Governments in the newly independent states of Central Asia have reacted warily to growing interest in Islam, preferring to maintain control by appointing clerics and requiring registration of congregations. HRW has decried the repression of independent Muslim activists in Uzbekistan, where the government has arrested hundreds of believers on fabricated drug charges. We have also documented discrimination against pious Muslims in education, such as the dismissal of young men and women from schools and universities for wearing beards and *hijab*.

One area of HRW's work that confronts most directly the claimed Islamic character of certain human rights abuses involves issues of freedom of belief and of religion. HRW published a 1997 report detailing extensive human rights violations by the Islamic Republic of Iran against religious (and ethnic) minorities, notably Baha'is, evangelical Christians, and Sunni Muslims. The organization has similarly criticized Saudi Arabia's official and widespread discrimination against its Shi^{c}a Muslim minority, and its intolerance of non-Wahabi beliefs and practices generally, including non-Wahabi Sunni Muslims. In other cases, HRW has protested a government's failure to protect the rights of citizens threatened by groups attempting to impose their interpretation of Islam. Human Rights Watch has been critical of recent steps by the Egyptian authorities conferring semi-official powers of censorship on the Islamic Research Academy of al-Azhar, for example. We also intervened in the case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a professor of Islamic Studies and Linguistics at Cairo University, who felt compelled to leave Egypt following threats against his life after a group of Islamist lawyers had secured civil court judgements declaring Abu Zayd an apostate on the basis of his scholarly writings and ordering him to be divorced from his wife against their will. HRW initiated a joint letter of protest to President Mubarak signed by twenty-one human rights, women's rights, Arab-American and Muslim American organizations, urging the authorities to support publicly Professor Abu Zayd's right to exercise free expression without harassment and threats of physical harm, to provide him and his wife with adequate security should they return to live in Egypt, and to submit new legislation that would strengthen guarantees and protection of freedom of expression and academic research.

Another area where governments and movements have attempted to impose their understanding of Islamic values is women's rights. In Algeria, HRW has called attention to the actions of armed groups claiming to be Islamic who have raped, mutilated and murdered women, in some cases for defying their rules of dress and work outside the home. The organization has condemned the extreme steps of the Taliban government in Afghanistan stripping women of their rights to work, travel and attend school. HRW has documented the discriminatory impact of civil and criminal codes in Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt, and elsewhere that, in the name of promoting Islamic values, subordinate women's social status and restrict their personal freedoms. The organization also works on the problem of domestic violence around the world, including countries with Muslim majorities or large minorities, in an effort to persuade governments to fulfil their responsibility to protect women's lives and physical security.

In all these areas, Human Rights Watch works closely with local human rights defenders and organizations. While local human rights movements are numerous and active in several Muslim countries, such as Pakistan and Egypt, generally speaking the Middle East and North Africa probably have the youngest and least-developed movement. In many countries the groups lack legal status. In Egypt, where the human rights community has become quite diverse, they operate very much at the uncertain sufferance of the government. More typically, in Syria and Bahrain for instance, no local activity is permitted and international organizations are generally not allowed to conduct fact-finding missions. Tunisia is somewhat unique: few governments in the world devote as much time to promoting their human rights image while systematically silencing their citizens who attempt to present a more accurate picture. The challenges to local human rights defenders, and to international organizations like HRW, go beyond government harassment and repression, however. The overall political environment is generally not hospitable to human rights concerns, which are frequently attacked as self-serving Western constructs not only by the government but also by political opposition groups and media. At the same time, many political activists and commentators, including Islamists, have incorporated human rights into the discourse of their political programmes and objectives. Human Rights Watch sets a high priority on working in consultation with local groups where they exist and in pressing the governments to permit such activity where they presently do not.

The issue of religious persecution has become a contentious one in US legislative politics recently, driven largely by persons who contend that Christian minorities have increasingly become targets of discrimination and abuse in Communist countries like China and Vietnam and in several Muslim countries like Sudan and Egypt. In some cases the government is the source of the abuse; in other cases it is more an issue of the government failing to protect residents against vigilante attacks. Human Rights Watch has consistently included, in its monitoring and advocacy, freedom of religion and the right to practice (or not to practice) one's religious beliefs as among the core universal human rights. We have argued that denial of freedom of belief is almost always part of a more general pattern of repression and denial. In terms of US policy, the problem is not insufficient attention to religious persecution, but rather the overall failure to implement existing human rights legislation to sanction a whole range of grievous abuses, including this one. ✦

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Middle East

JUAN R.I. COLE

The Genesis of the Baha'i Faith in Middle Eastern Modernity

Middle Eastern religion is seldom mentioned in the same breath with modernism, at least in the West. However, the Baha'i faith, which originated in nineteenth-century Iran, poses key conundrums to our understanding of the relationship between modernity and religion in the global South.

Modernity was conceived in binary oppositions, between superstition and reason, absolutism and liberty, nation and Other, civilized and barbarian, and male and female. Proponents of modernity, as Edward Said demonstrated in his masterful *Orientalism*,[1] managed to range a number of such oppositions together, coding reason, liberty, nation, civilization and maleness as European, whereas both Europe's medieval ('immature') past and Europe's Oriental Others, especially Islam, were painted as possessing the opposite and inferior characteristics. European modernity tended to hide from itself its own darker traits, including chauvinist hatreds, industrialized warfare, racism, colonialism and male chauvinism, and the degree to which the modern form of these phenomena was inextricably intertwined with the entire modernist project.

From a postmodern point of view, modernity has lacked a sense of ambiguity and irony, and suffers from limiting its typologies to mere binary oppositions, when in fact social phenomena come in three's, four's, and even higher ordinals, not just in two's. North Atlantic modernists have also privileged the European experience of modernity in ways that seem peculiar to anyone who knows something about world history. Anthony Giddens in *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, 1990), argues that modernity is not a static matter of binary oppositions, but is rather dialectical. Movements against absolutism give rise not only to parliamentary regimes, but also to national security states that appear to many citizens to deprive them of liberties instead of bestowing them, thus generating oppositional grassroots movements campaigning for democracy (as opposed to elitist Liberalism) and for workers' rights. That is, he challenges modernists' insistence that the contenders in political battles can be neatly divided into 'reactionaries' and 'progressives'. Giddens gives the name 'utopian realist' to the movements, such as those of workers, women, peace groups and others, that challenge the industrial, militant nation-states of bourgeois modernity.

Islam's encounter with nineteenth-century modernity produced not only reactionary, revivalist, millenarian, liberal and fundamentalist responses, as some have argued, but in the form of the Baha'i faith it produced a mixture of millenarianism, liberalism and utopian realism that later turned sharply toward a sort of fundamentalism. The latter turn has tended to obscure the original emphases of the religion's founder, which can only be recovered through reading his voluminous letters in their nineteenth-century political and cultural context.

The Baha'i faith developed out of the esoteric, kabbalistic Shaykhi movement of Shi^{c}ite Islam, founded by Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i (1753-1826), and out of the apocalyptic and messianic Babi movement, founded by ^{c}Ali Muhammad Shirazi, the 'Bab' or door to the divine, in 1844, which racked Iran with religious ferment and turmoil, leading to the Bab's execution in 1850 and a retaliatory attempt on the life of Nasiru'd-Din Shah by radical Babis in 1852, and thence to a nation-wide pogrom against the new religion.[2] Out of this maelstrom emerged an entirely different sort of messianic movement, the Baha'i faith, founded in Baghdad in 1863 by Mirza Husayn ^{c}Ali Nuri, Baha'u'llah (1817-1892).

Baha'u'llah, a high notable born in Tehran whose father had been a provincial governor married into the royal family, had emerged after the Bab's execution as a prominent Babi leader, though his more radical younger half-brother, Mirza Yahya Subh-i Azal, was more widely recognized as the vicar of the Bab in the 1850s and early 1860s. Baha'u'llah was exiled first to Ottoman Baghdad (1853), then to Istanbul (1863), Edirne (1863-1868) and finally in 1868 to Akka on the coast of Ottoman Syria, where he lived until his death. In 1867 he had broken decisively with Azal, proclaiming himself the messianic successor of the Bab and founding a new religion, the Baha'i faith. Partly due to his exiles to the Ottoman Empire, which was more directly imbricated in European modernity than Qajar Iran, Baha'u'llah turned Babism from a millenarian protest movement into one that mixed modernist and utopian realist themes. He expressed approval of some aspects of modernity, whereby he critiqued the absolutist Ottoman and Qajar states, including a call for parliamentary democracy, some separation of religion and state, a guarantee of freedom of conscience and expression, greater rights for women, and an end to arbitrary decrees, which should be replaced by tribunals. At the same time, however, he critiqued nineteenth-century modernity itself, condemning chauvinist nationalism (whether religious, linguistic or ethnic in character), European colonialism, industrialized warfare paid for by high taxes on the poor, the anarchy of international relations based upon the absolute sovereignty of nation-states (which he wished to curb through international peace conferences), and what he thought of as overdeveloped civilization, by which he appears to have meant materialism, pollution and massively destructive weaponry.

Baha'u'llah's mixture of rationalization (e.g. parliamentary institutions and due process), appeal to human rights, and yet his communitarian emphasis on the creation of a new, revealed missionary religion, prefigured some of the convergences between the old Right and Left that French sociologist Alain Touraine perceives as characteristic of the turn of the twentieth century. In a fascinating about-face, the later Baha'i faith's leaders turned increasingly to the Right, condemning multi-party democracy as factious and plutocratic, advocating theocracy, and curbing individual freedom of conscience and expression within the community. This right wing shell has preserved the utopian realist core of Baha'u'llah's own emphases, however, creating a unique sectarian community that has remained tiny in the literate world, in part because of its strict controls on discourse, but which has had some success missionizing in India and elsewhere in the global South. The Babi-Bahai movements underwent an odyssey from militancy in the 1840s to pacifist, liberal globalism under Baha'u'llah and thence in the twentieth century to two contending emphases: a liberal stream that maintains a universalist and tolerant outlook and a conservative one that dreams of theocratic domination and insistence on scriptural literalism. The movement thus defies any easy teleology of modernity, and in many ways parallels the major reformist intellectual currents of modern Iran's Shi^{c}ite majority. ✦



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Notes

1. New York: Vintage, 1978.
2. Abbas Amanat (1989), *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Australia

KATY NEBHAN

Australian Muslim Destinies

Images of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, Opera House, Centrepoint Tower, and Darling Harbour flank the mosques of Mecca and Medina on this greeting card designed and printed in Australia. This card reflects on the theological and cultural struggles experienced by Australian Muslims since their period of mass migration to Australia in the 1970s, particularly among the most influential of Australia's Muslims: the migrants and the Australian born and bred generation. The experiences of both these groups may be understood through a remark made in a recent article published in *Salam*, the official magazine of the Federation of Australian Muslim Students and Youth (FAMSY): 'It is our destiny that we found ourselves here (Australia). However, the rest is a test.'[1] Destiny is a fundamental pillar of the Islamic faith. However, as with the practice of Islam, the ways in which destiny is perceived differs between particular places, periods, cultures and peoples. How have members of the Australian Muslim population conceptualized their destiny? Where will it lead them?



A greeting card designed and printed in Australia commemorating the occasion of Eid Al-Adha.

The new interest in Australian Muslims in the last two decades – inspired by the mass migration of the 1970s – has produced numerous studies, literature and audio-visual material within the Australian context. Whilst taking into account the differences which exist among these, both in terms of medium and content, the majority have taken a largely empirical approach centred around the Muslim migrant experience.

Both religious and ethnic identifications are central to understanding the ways in which Australian Muslim migrants have constructed a place for themselves in Australian society. Whilst religious identification may be important to many of these immigrants, it is clear from the designated names of the majority of associations and mosques, that religion, though important, has not generally acted as the socially or organizationally cohesive category. Numerous mosques including the Albanian Mosque in Victoria, the Lakemba Mosque built by the Lebanese Muslim Association in Sydney, and the various organizations including the Bosnian Islamic Society and the Islamic Egyptian Society, point to significant ethnic divisions among Australian Muslims. This is not surprising since the Australian Muslim population represents 64 distinct ethnic groups who speak over 55 languages. Do these ethnic Muslim groups stand detached under the umbrella of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC)? Where do 'other' Muslims fit into their conceptions of their destinies? Is there a sense of a shared Australian Muslim identity?

The tendency to form ethno-religious associations is characteristic of the majority of immigrants to Australia. For many migrants, the establishment of ethnic associations, clubs, places of worship and shopping centres are a means of securing the cultural, linguistic and religious heritage in their new home. Muslim immigrants were no exception. As the majority had poor English language skills, resulting from the conditions and requirements of work which made it difficult to attend English language classes, communication amongst members of the linguistically diverse Australian Muslim population was extremely difficult. A remarkable amount of ethnic newspapers were, and continue to be, published by various ethno-Muslim groups in languages other than English. In many mosques today, the Friday sermons continue to be given in the native languages of the majority of those attending. The highest authoritative figure in Australia and the Pacific, the *mufti*, does not speak English. At present, it appears unlikely that the ethnic basis of many of these already established associations and mosques will dissolve. Further, few of the founding members are willing to give up the security and social networks which these associations provide.

The incorporation of 'Muslim' or 'Islamic' in the titles of many of these 'ethnic' institutions was in some cases informed by the desire to distinguish them from others which shared a common ethnic background but not the faith. In a recent interview I conducted with one of the founders of the Lebanese Muslim Association (est. 1959), the sense of rivalry between Lebanese Christians and Muslims was still given as the reason for which 'Lebanese Muslim' was chosen as the definitive title. He pointed out that just as Lebanese Christians had established themselves in Australia, they too wanted to be identified as a distinct ethnic group albeit with a Muslim identity.

The active display of this Muslim identity and its influence on relations between many of these ethno-religious institutions has not been great. The only significant exception has been the references to the Afghan 'Muslim' contribution to Australia in many of the histories written, with varying degrees of sophistication, by members of these institutions. The modest mosques built by the Afghan cameleers who came to provide much-needed transport in the outback between 1867 and 1910, are regarded by many Muslims as marking the foundation of their destiny in Australia. Though this has not necessarily led to the concept of a single destiny with a dominant Islamic orientation, it has provided a sense of a collective consciousness.

The sense of struggle which marked the experiences of the Afghan cameleers and the later Muslim migrants appears to have brought about identification with this collective consciousness. The White Australia policy which denied Afghans the opportunity to bring spouses and family from their homeland, and the replacement of camel driving by the motor truck in the 1920s, saw the small Afghan population of Australia fade away. Though only a few of their mosques remained in Adelaide, Perth and Broken Hill, for the significant number of working class Muslim immigrants who came to satisfy the labour needs of Australia after 1945, these overseas-born pioneers who worked with a predominantly Anglo-Australian population provided a potent symbol. 'Muslims: helping Australia get off its feet'[2] – these words represent the popular sentiments of most Australian Muslims. These 'tough, successful men, held by many Australians in great respect' provided Muslim working-class immigrants with the semblance of hope they needed at a time when securing good jobs and social mobility was difficult.[3]

It was through this shared experience of struggle and hope that middle and working class Muslim immigrants harmonized the Afghan experience with their own. AFIC – the peak Muslim organizational body in the country – was particularly influential in upholding the memory of the Afghan contribution through its numerous publications, most notably the *Australian Muslim Times*. The Afghan experience was codified and used as a positive foundation around which subsequent Australian Muslims could base their historical origins in Australia. However, for the children of these migrants who now make up the second and third generation of Australian Muslims, the largely migrant character and ethnic orientation of this collective consciousness has proved to be a hindrance. As well as keeping them culturally and socially isolated from the diverse mainstream Australian society, it has also kept them apart from Australian Muslims who may also come from different cultural, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds. Their reaction to these ethno-religious divisions on the one hand, and the use of the past as a prologue for the construction of a collective consciousness on the other, have seen the emergence of a radical movement which aims to promote the unity of an Australian Muslim identity through stronger religious identification.

Some of the earliest institutions to promote the centrality of an 'Australian Muslim' identity over an identity based largely on ethnicity, include FAMSY (est. 1967), the Muslim Women's National Network of Australia (est. 1980s), and more recently the Muslim Community Cooperative Australia (est. 1989). In the last decade, there has also been a marked increase in non-ethnic based suburban associations like the Illawara Islamic Association, and the Islamic Society of Manly Warringah. In 1996, the privately owned *Australian Muslim Times* was replaced by the *Australian Muslim News,* which is owned by AFIC. This saw a major change in the national and widely read paper. Space previously allotted to non-English languages was replaced by a wider variety of local and global news as well as advertising in English.

The importance of language as an agent of change can also be seen through the increase in the number of overseas scholars and academics invited to conferences and seminars held by AFIC, FAMSY and the various state organizations. Whilst many continue to be invited from the Middle East by the various ethno-religious organizations, these scholars and academics are increasingly coming from North America, Canada and the United Kingdom. As the largest group of Muslims in Australia are Australian born, it is not surprising that these English-speaking guests continue to draw large audiences from both the youth and the educated middle class.[4] As well as crossing the linguistic barriers of the members of their audience, their message of tolerance and unity is often more relevant to the second and third generation of Australian Muslims who play an active role in organizing these events. However, it must be pointed out that as with the *Australian Muslim News*, the majority of these events cater to a largely English-speaking Australian Muslim population. Although they acknowledge the benefits of a diverse ethnic, cultural and linguistic Australian Muslim community, their struggle to smooth the disunity which this diversity creates has left a gap in their struggle for tolerance and unity which has yet to be bridged. That is not to say that attempts have not been made.

An example is the annual Australian Multicultural Eid Festival and Fair (MEFF) held at the end of Ramadan in Sydney. MEFF's attempt to create such a bridge is evident in the strategy they developed 'in recognition of the fact that there is a lack of tolerance and acceptance among people of different ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds within the Australian Muslim community.'[5] Creating an exhibitive and socially-relaxed atmosphere with participants from state and regional ethno-religious institutions and non-ethnic based others, government representatives, and visitors from a diverse range of backgrounds including a small number of non-Muslims, MEFF attempts to help Australian Muslims 'adopt and thrive' not only as a unified Muslim community but also as an Australian one. The relative success of their initiative may be seen in the increase in participants from 800 in 1987 to over 30,000 in 1998.

However, with the rapid changes taking place among the Australian Muslim population today, it is difficult to predict what destiny has in store. Ethno-religious institutions continue to yield some influence among migrants, although they are being eclipsed by ethnically and linguistically diverse institutions. The growing number of Australian-born youth continues to set new trends centred around a more religious-based identity through the English language. Although approached in different ways, attempts at tolerance and unity continue to hold the imaginations of the Australian Muslim population. While they have gained some ground in the last two decades, as one article in *Salam* magazine put it, 'It's a long road, mate…' ✦

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Notes

1. H. Ayoubi, 'The Destiny of Muslim Youth in Australia: Expected Role', in: *Salam*, January/February 1998, p. 19.
2. *Islamic Council of New South Wales: Profile 1994*, Sydney: Islamic Council of New South Wales, 1994, p. 22.
3. F. Imam, 'Muslims of Australia', in: *Salam*, February, 1983, p. 9.
4. See table 2 in Omar and Allen (1996), p. 25.
5. Multicultural Eid Festival and Fair: 1996 Annual Report (1996), Sydney: Australian MEFF Consortium, p. 2.

The Philippines

THOMAS M. MCKENNA

Armed Separatism and Muslim Autonomy in the Southern Philippines

From 1972 to 1980, a ferocious war raged throughout the southern Philippines between Muslim separatist rebels and the Philippine military. An estimated 120,000 people died in the fighting, which also created one million internal refugees and caused more than 100,000 Philippine Muslims to flee to Malaysia. That war ended in a stalemate and for the next 18 years an uneasy and fragile cease-fire existed – one periodically broken by armed clashes between the military and separatist fighters who remain under arms in remote camps. A 1996 peace agreement between the Philippine government and the main rebel faction represents the first real progress towards a genuine settlement of the conflict and substantial political autonomy for Philippine Muslims. This article traces the remote and proximate causes of the Philippine Muslim (or *Bangsamoro*) rebellion and its consequences for ordinary Muslims.

A wedding procession near Campo Muslim.
From: *Muslim Rulers and Rebels. Everyday Politics and Armed Seperatism in the Southern Philppines* (by Thomas M. McKenna, University of California Press, 1998)

The Muslim territories of the Philippines mark the periphery of the Eurasian Islamic world. Indeed, with the exception of a few Muslim groups in easternmost Indonesia, no indigenous population of Muslims in the world lives at a farther distance from the Islamic heartland than do the Muslims of the Philippines. There are approximately 3 million Muslims in the Philippines, the only predominately Christian country in Southeast Asia. Though they represent only about 5 percent of the Philippine population, Muslims are geographically concentrated in the south of the country, and are distinguished from Christian Filipinos not only by their profession of Islam but also by their evasion of 300 years of Spanish colonial domination. They thus comprise the largest un-hispanicized population in the Philippines. At the same time, Philippine Muslims have always been separated from one another in this archipelagic nation by significant linguistic and geographic distance. They are divided into three major and ten minor ethnolinguistic groups and dispersed across the southern islands.

Philippine Muslims share their religious culture with the neighbouring majority Muslim nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. They also retain aspects of an indigenous pre-Islamic and pre-colonial Philippine culture – expressed in dress, music, political traditions and a rich array of folk beliefs and practices – that are similar to those found elsewhere in island Southeast Asia, but are today almost entirely absent among Christian Filipinos. Thus, while Philippine Christians and Muslims inhabit the same state and are linked together by various attachments, a profound cultural gulf created by historical circumstance separates them.

That gulf is the outcome of two inter-linked events: the conversion of some regions of the Philippines to Islam, and the Spanish colonial occupation of other regions shortly afterward. Philippine Muslim tradition holds that Islam was brought to the Philippines by a wandering prince, the son of a Malay princess and an Arab sharif, in the very early sixteenth century. Islam may in fact have arrived somewhat earlier or later but, whatever the date, it seems clear that Islam was introduced to the Philippines as part of the last phase of a conversion process that swept across Southeast Asia from west to east beginning in the late thirteenth century. It is also well established that the Islamization process was still under way when the Spaniards gained their foothold in the northern Philippines in 1571, defeating the fledgling Sultanate of Manila to do so. After consolidating control of the northern tier of the Philippine islands, they failed, despite repeated attempts, to subdue the well-organized sultanates of the South.Little historical evidence exists to support claims that the southern sultanates mounted a sustained, unified Muslim resistance to Spanish aggression. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, sultanates just as often fought with one another, sometimes forging temporary alliances with the Spaniards to do so. Nevertheless, the ability of southern sultanates individually to withstand Spanish hegemony for more than 300 years is a testament to their military and diplomatic prowess.

With their Reconquista of Muslim Spain a recent collective memory, the Spaniards assigned to the unsubjugated Muslim peoples of the southern sultanates the label previously bestowed on their familiar Muslim enemies from Mauritania: *Moros* (Moors). The term *Moro* was applied categorically and pejoratively with scant attention paid to linguistic or political distinctions among various *Moro* societies. The American colonizers who succeeded the Spaniards and eventually subdued Philippine Muslims in the early twentieth century by means of overwhelming force, continued the usage of the term *Moro* even though it had become an epithet used by Christian Filipinos to denote savages and pirates. In a bold piece of semantic alchemy, Philippine Muslim nationalists during the late 1960s appropriated the term *Moro*, shook it free of its colonial and pejorative roots, and transformed it into a positive symbol of collective identity – one that denominated the citizens of their newly-imagined nation. For Philippine Muslim nationalists, *Moro* denotes the descendants of those unsubjugated peoples whom the Spaniards and their colonized subjects feared and distrusted. The 'Moro National Liberation Front' was formed to direct the struggle for an independent political entity proclaimed to be the *Bangsa Moro* or Philippine Muslim Nation.

The Rise of Muslim Nationalism and the Armed Separatist Struggle

The Bangsamoro rebellion developed out of a political movement for Muslim separatism that originated among a small set of Philippine Muslim students and intellectuals in the late 1960s. That movement had as its goal the establishment of a single independent homeland for all the Muslim peoples of the Philippines. The remote causes of Muslim separatism in the modern Philippines may be traced to Western colonizers. The Spaniards created two distinct populations in the archipelago – the colonized and Christianized peoples of the North and the unsubjugated and mostly Muslim peoples of the South. American colonizers yoked those two populations unevenly together in a colonial, and then national, state. A more proximate cause may be found in the policies and practices of the postcolonial, Christian-dominated Philippine State. Until the 1950s, Muslims formed the majority population of almost every region of the southern Philippines. In the early 1950s, the Philippine government began to sponsor large-scale migration from the poor and politically troublesome regions of the north and central parts of the country to the agricultural frontiers of the sparsely populated southern islands. The large, fertile, and under-populated island of Mindanao became the primary destination for Christian migration to the southern Philippines and by the late 1960s, Mindanao Muslims found themselves a relatively impoverished minority in their own homeland.

Tensions brought about by massive Christian migration to the Muslim South eventually led to the eruption of sectarian violence in Mindanao in 1970. That violence, which in many cases was initiated or exacerbated by government soldiers, was a primary justification used by President Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law in 1972. One of the very first actions of the martial law regime was an attempt to disarm Philippine Muslims. In response, the underground Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was activated as an armed separatist movement. Muslim separatist rebels, numbering as many as 30,000 armed insurgents, fought the Philippine Armed Forces to a stalemate, obliging the Philippine government to negotiate a cease-fire and peace treaty in 1977. Muslim civilians overwhelmingly supported the separatist insurgents and suffered cruelly at the hands of the Philippine military. The peace settlement, which called for the establishment of a 'Muslim Autonomous Region' in the southern Philippines, was never genuinely implemented by the Marcos administration. As a consequence, fighting broke out once more before the end of 1977, but did not again approach the level of intensity experienced prior to the cease-fire. The Muslim separatist movement entered a period of disarray marked by factional infighting and a weakening of popular support. By the early 1980s, it had refashioned itself in Mindanao into a mass-based and self-consciously Islamic movement guided by Islamic clerics. With the fall of the Marcos regime in 1985, movement leaders (with the now-modified aim of genuine political autonomy for Philippine Muslims) fully adopted the practices of popular politics, organizing mass demonstrations to petition the government for political autonomy. Meanwhile, armed rebel fighters remained in fortified camps in the hills.

Moro Autonomy and the Aspirations of Ordinary Muslims

In 1996, seeking an end to more than 25 years of political instability in the southern provinces, the Philippine government finally signed and implemented a new peace treaty with Nur Misuari, the founder of the MNLF. Misuari became governor of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, consisting of the four provinces in the southern Philippines that retain Muslim majorities. He also heads the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, a three-year experimental body designed to channel development funds to all of the southern Philippines and, in doing so, to convince majority Christian provinces to join the autonomous region. Though many political uncertainties remain, the Muslim Philippines today is more peaceful than it has been in three decades and exhibits more potential for prosperity than anyone might have hoped for just a few years ago.

By the standards of modern ethno-nationalist movements, the *Moro* struggle for self-determination has achieved considerable success. Originating as a largely defensive rebellion to protect communities and cultural practices, the movement has produced not only a significant measure of autonomy for Muslim leaders but also some substantial new benefits for ordinary Muslims. The rebellion drew the attention of the Muslim world and strengthened connections to the Islamic heartland long attenuated by physical distance and disrupted by Western colonialism. One result has been an unprecedented flow of external resources for Islamic education. New institutions established by the separatist leadership allowed Philippine Muslims for the first time to register births and marriages with a formal governmental authority they felt they could trust. However, the most pressing need of ordinary Muslims remains mostly unmet. As a result of decades of governmental neglect and the economic toll taken by the rebellion, the Muslim provinces of the Philippines remain the very poorest in the country. Without improving the economic well-being of the majority of its citizens, the autonomous government for which ordinary Muslims fought and suffered will not have rendered their struggles worthwhile. ✦

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Indonesia
MARGARET KARTOMI

Seudati Inong
The Female Form of the Martial Art Genre
in Meulaboh, West Aceh, Indonesia

Aceh, the northernmost province of Sumatra (known as *Serambi Mekah* 'The Verandah of Mecca') has a wealth of Muslim musical genres and body movement or dance forms. It was one of the first provinces of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago to develop musical art forms associated with Islam. Unlike in many other Muslim societies, the Acehnese have a martial art tradition which is integrated into performances and includes female as well as male heroism.

Seudati

In Sufi mysticism as practised in Aceh and elsewhere, the ecstatic movements of the body are recognized as the expression of spontaneous emotion caused by the experience of the divine. S*eudati* is the best-known Acehnese expression of this. It is believed to have originated in the Pidi area of northeastern Aceh, but is now found all over Aceh's coastal areas and even in parts of the interior. In coastal Aceh, *seudati* is usually performed by men, except in West Aceh, where it is common amongst women as well. The body percussion and dance or concerted body movement used in the performance is a centuries-old Muslim tradition found not only in Aceh but also in parts of North Africa and West Asia.

The ureueng dancers in a seudati inong performance.

In Sumatra, males, not females, perform most Muslim associated art forms. Even when a dance by a mixed couple is portrayed, both roles are played by men. This is because of the Muslim preference not to have women performing on stage in front of men. However, a range of specifically female genres is performed by groups of teenage girls in West Aceh (and elsewhere). They range from laments at the death of a child to *seudati inong*, the female song and dance form based on the art of self-defence.

Seudati is performed in open air, either by a group of eight men, a soloist, and his assistant (*seudati agam*), or by a group of eight women, a soloist and her assistant (*seudati inong*). Whether male or female, the performers accompany their movements with body percussion, beating out interlocking or sharp, striking rhythms with their hands on the ground, hand clapping and chest slapping. The dancers sing poetry in *panton* (Malay) or *syaé* (Acehnese) form with verses either telling of Aceh's past glory or presenting religious themes, topical events, or political ideas. S*eudati* and *seudati inong* are nowadays generally performed at wedding ceremonies or other joyful occasions. In former times, performances often lasted all night for several successive nights. Shorter versions have been devised for present-day use, such as when troupes are invited to perform at a government or corporate function.

In the female s*eudati*, led by a *syék* (female commander and song leader) and her assistant, the performers present a series of song-dance sections in varying tempi. A major feature of the music is tempo change, from relatively slow, through to medium-fast and fast. Another feature is the variety of timbres and rhythmic patterns provided by the girls' body percussion, including finger clicking and hand and thigh clapping (instead of chest beating as in male *seudati*) while they sing.

Three seudati performances

In a sequence of three *seudati inong* performances, which we recorded in Meulaboh in 1983, a group of teenage girls performed the dance-songs based on the art of self-defence. Eight of the ten girls on stage were singer-dancers and two were solo singers who played the role of commander and assistant respectively. Apart from the *syék* and assistant, who sat separately, the whole group kneeled closely together in a row. Following customary practice, the singers began with the standard greeting to request the forgiveness of their audience for any mistakes in the performance, after which they sang a local version of the Arabic phrase *assalaam mulaikum,* and gave thanks to Allah for all His gifts. They moved together in a wave-like fashion – back and forth, or from side to side, sometimes with every second performer moving diagonally backwards while her immediate neighbours moved diagonally forwards. They clapped their hands together or beat their shoulders and other body parts to produce interlocking rhythmic sections or sharp rhythmic statements.

The First Performance

The *syék* opened the first performance by singing a four-tone melody to a text, which offered greetings to the parents of a boy to be circumcised, as well as to the guests present. After a while, the members of the chorus clicked their fingers in a cyclic rhythm. The chorus then echoed the soloist's line, continuing into a section of rhythmic finger clicking which alternated with a section of rhythmic clapping. Subsequent verses referred to the Prophet, sometimes alternating between sections of soft or loud singing and body percussion sections without singing. To the accompaniment of the finger-clicked and hand-clapped rhythms by the members of the *ureueng*, the soloist moved into a medium-fast metre, singing a three-tone melody. Soloists and chorus each sang very short phrases in alternation to their own clapped and finger-clicked rhythmic accompaniment. The last section, in fast tempo, continued to alternate between the soloist's melodic line accompanied by the performers' singing and interlocking body percussion segments.

In this case, the text refers to startling events, including earthquakes and the fasting of heroine Putroe Cut Barén, who possesses mystical powers. The text contains both Muslim and pre-Muslim references (e.g. betel nut offerings).

The Second Performance

In the second performance the *syék* started by singing the customary greeting to Allah and the Prophet as well as the guests. She sang in slow metre to a five-tone palette, after which the chorus repeated the *syék*'s melodic line and text. The slow, unmetered singing by both soloist and chorus without body percussion in some sections contrasted with the metered singing accompanied by body percussion in others. The dancer-singers described their dance movements in their song texts as well as dancing them, dwelling on the fact that they all came from the same school, and alluding to themselves in verse as small yellow birds.

The Third Performance

In the third performance, the two *panton* (quatrain couplets) presented images of boats, the sea, a river, flowers and a garden. They alluded to the verse's real meaning – that the sad male singer is waiting for a girl (a flower) to grow up so that he can marry her, and that he is crying at the thought of such happiness. Since there is a reference to the port of Singkil in the southwest, we may assume that the *panton* verses probably originated or were popular in southwest Aceh. However, the verse is adapted slightly to the occasion of this performance.

The three items described above are in typical *seudati inong* style. The young female dancer-singers produce a specifically female musical sound and movement, but like the extremely vigorous male *seudati agam*, both reflect a specifically Acehnese Muslim piety, fervour, and artistry infused with the Acehnese martial spirit.

Music referred to in this article (with transcribed texts and translations) may be heard on the author's compact disc entitled 'Muslim Music of Indonesia: Aceh', which is part of a 16-volume CD set entitled 'The Music of Islam' (Executive Producer Eckart Rahn), Celestial Harmonies, 1998, available by e-mail at (celestial@harmonies.com) and on internet at http://www.harmonies.com ✦

Seulamat datang bapak ngon ibu	*Welcome, men and women present*
Keunoe neutuju u Aceh Barat	*To this place in West Aceh*
Ranup neupajoh di dalam puan	*We prepare betel nut in the container*
Mulia rakan mameh suara	*We pay our respects in sweet voices*
Ha ellallah alah e han	*Oh*
Han neutem rila Putroe Baren	*Putroe Baren does not want people to do certain things*
Han neutem rila	*Does not want them to do certain things*
Ha ellallah Putroe Cut Baren	*Oh Putroe Cut Baren*
Duek ateueh meuligoe	*Sits on a raised throne*
Ka geuduek sidroe geutueng puasa	*She sits alone and fasts*

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Bismillah ratep meuseukat	*With Allah's permission we sing this sad song*
Taloe peuet urat geupuphon sambong	*Four pieces of rope begin to be joined up (to bear the corpse)*
Allah nibak malam nyoe	*Allah tonight*
Allah kamoe meunari	*Allah we dance*
Allah dalam istana	*Allah in the palace*
Allah kamu meunari	*Allah we dance*
Deungo lon kisah uroe kiamat	*Hear the following story*
Malam Jumeu'at phon teuka geumpa	*On Friday night the earthquake began*
Geumpa keudua malam Aleuhat	*The second earthquake was on Saturday night*
Geumpa ka meuhat 'oh watee isya	*The earthquake happened after Magreb prayers*
Nyawong geutanyoe di dalam badan	*Our souls are contained in our bodies*
Barang pinjaman siat tuhan bri	*Our lives are borrowed for a short time*
Oh troh bak watee ka neucok pulang	*When the time comes (Allah) takes our lives back*
Nyawong lam badan tuhan peuerebre	*From our bodies soon we shall be separated*

Malaysia
CHANDRA MUZAFFAR

Power struggle in Malaysia
The Anwar Crisis

When Anwar Ibrahim was sacked from the government and the ruling party at the beginning of September 1998, the reason given by Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad for his drastic action was Anwar's 'low morals'. Anwar was allegedly guilty of sexual misconduct, including sodomy. Mahathir and his lieutenants were convinced that as soon as the former Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy UMNO President was put on trial, the truth would become obvious to everyone and his massive support among the Malaysian people would decline rapidly.

Now, it appears that the court proceedings are having the opposite effect: many Malaysians are persuaded that the sex charges against Anwar are utterly ludicrous. The contradictory stances of prosecution witnesses; the way in which preposterous bits of evidence have been introduced into the trial; the strenuous attempts by the prosecution to exclude certain other pieces of evidence; and most of all, the decision of the court to amend the charges and to expunge a great deal of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's case, have given the impression to the public that the State is determined to convict Anwar at all costs – however flimsy the evidence may be, and however farcical the trial has become.

The decision to expunge all references to sexual misconduct from the court records has particularly incensed the people. They now realize that the sex charges were introduced in the first instance to humiliate Anwar via the trial, even though the State knew all along that it could not sustain those allegations. It is the shaming of Anwar in such a crude and vulgar manner which has brought Mahathir into odium. It has eroded his support base and has weakened his political position to such an extent that he is now regarded in some quarters as a liability to the ruling party in the coming general election.

The government's failure to identify the police personnel who had assaulted Anwar while he was in police custody and to take action against the culprit or culprits, has created serious doubts in the public mind about the government's integrity. Though an independent Commission of Inquiry has now been established – four months after Anwar's black eye became public knowledge – the damage done to Mahathir's reputation is irreparable.

Anwar's trial and the harsh treatment meted out to him in police custody have helped to convince a substantial segment of Malaysian society that there are ulterior political motives behind his dismissal. Indeed, there are more people today than at the outset of the crisis who believe that Anwar is in fact a victim of a high-level conspiracy to destroy his political career. Anwar has argued all along that Mahathir and some of his cohorts in politics and business are determined to eliminate him because he is an obstacle to their interests.

Relationship

It was Mahathir who brought Anwar into government, in 1982. It was Mahathir who groomed Anwar, accelerated his ascendancy within UMNO, and exposed him to a variety of governmental roles until he assumed the mantle of Deputy UMNO President and Deputy Prime Minister. Anwar was indisputably Mahathir's heir apparent. Though the older man was instrumental in the younger man's meteoric rise, Anwar himself was undoubtedly an astute politician with a knack for mass mobilization and for the intrigues of intra-party manoeuvres. Besides, he was also a gifted orator who enjoyed tremendous rapport with his followers.

Anwar reciprocated Mahathir's patronage by giving unstinted support to the latter whenever he was confronted by a political crisis. This relationship between the two men created quite a bit of resentment within UMNO especially among party stalwarts who had joined the organization long before Anwar was co-opted into government. In fact, from 1982, there were groups who sought to drive a wedge between Mahathir and Anwar through poison-pen letters and whispering campaigns.

Then in May 1997, Mahathir sent the clearest signal yet to UMNO, the government, and the people that Anwar would be his successor. This was by appointing him Acting UMNO President and Acting Prime Minister when he went off on two months' leave. Anwar's adversaries in the party, some corporate figures who regarded his ascendancy as a threat to their interests and a few individuals in certain public institutions viewed his appointment as a sign of danger. In July 1997, they circulated a signed document alleging that Anwar had an adulterous relationship with the wife of his Confidential Secretary, on the one hand, and a homosexual relationship with his wife's former driver, on the other. The Prime Minister, according to the local media, had the police investigate the allegations and in late August 1997, he announced publicly that investigations had revealed that there was no basis to the allegations.

Differences

The sex allegations would have ended there, except for a series of developments since August 1997 which brought them into the limelight again and which had an adverse impact on the Mahathir-Anwar relationship. In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, with the ringgit and the stock market declining, businesses collapsing, and people losing their jobs, the general public became more and more critical of the leadership of Dr Mahathir. Though the crisis was largely due to an external factor – volatile equity capital suddenly exiting East Asian markets – the popular perception was that Dr Mahathir had not managed the economy well.

The foreign media, on the other hand, portrayed Anwar, who was also Finance Minister, as a sober and sensible person who understood global financial markets. Their praise for him created the impression that he was 'their man'. Some of them even suggested that Anwar and not Mahathir should be running the country. In fact, in June 1998 a number of regional and international newspapers and magazines openly called for Mahathir's resignation. The media, in a sense, brought to the surface certain differences in approach between Mahathir and Anwar in their handling of the economic crisis. Right from the outset, Mahathir preferred a credit expansionary policy aimed at stimulating the economy and preventing it from sinking into recession. Anwar took the more conventional route and sought to cut back on expenditure and impose a credit squeeze.

These differences which generated some uneasiness in the market did not, however, cause the split between the Prime Minister and his Deputy-cum-Finance Minister. What exacerbated their relationship was Anwar's initial reluctance to endorse some of the rescue operations of big local corporations hit by the financial crisis. One of these corporations which had accumulated huge debts was Konsortium Perkapalan – a shipping firm associated with Mirzan Mahathir, the Prime Minister's son. There were a couple of other bailouts too, allegedly linked to corporate figures close to the Prime Minister which Anwar was not enthusiastic about.

Demonstrations

As the rift between Mahathir and Anwar widened, yet another factor began to have an impact on their relationship. This was the explosive situation in Indonesia which came to a head in May 1998. Suharto was becoming the principal target of massive street demonstrations that zeroed in upon his long tenure – 32 years in power – and the enormous wealth that his family had accumulated during his rule. In the end, popular fury over his 'nepotism, cronyism and collusion' forced Suharto to quit. Opposition political parties, NGOs, and youth and student groups in Malaysia, already critical of the growing involvement of Mahathir's sons in big business and somewhat unhappy about the Prime Minister's own long stay in power (18 years by July 1999), began to draw parallels between Suharto and Mahathir. Some of them felt that the time had come for Mahathir to retire.[1]

The question of corruption was raised by some UMNO Youth leaders close to Anwar at the party's annual assembly in June 1998. Mahathir saw it as a blatant attack upon his leadership. Though he managed to blunt the attack by revealing that others, including Anwar's family and friends, had also benefited from the allocation of shares and the government's privatization programme, the raising of the 'corruption' issue at the assembly, worsened the deteriorating ties between Mahathir and his heir apparent.

Mahathir was now convinced that the UMNO Youth criticisms, seen against the backdrop of attempts to draw parallels between him and Suharto; Anwar's lukewarm attitude towards certain bailouts; differences in approach towards the economic crisis between him and Anwar; the foreign media's antagonism toward him in contrast to the accolades showered upon Anwar; and the general erosion of support for his leadership, were clear indications that there was an organized, systematic endeavour to force him out of office. The man behind this endeavour, Mahathir reasoned, was Anwar Ibrahim. He therefore decided to move against his protégé.

Allegations

It is revealing that it was around this time, in June 1998, that the sex allegations that Mahathir had dismissed in August 1997, resurfaced through a thick book entitled *50 Reasons why Anwar cannot become Prime Minister,* which included a whole host of other slanderous charges against him. The book, *inter alia*, alleged that Anwar was not only a womanizer and sodomist but also a murderer, who was corrupt, had abused power and was, at the same time, a CIA agent and a traitor to the nation. At the UMNO General Assembly, the book was distributed to party delegates. In spite of a court injunction restraining the distributor from circulating the book or its contents, *50 Reasons* is easily available and has appeared in different forms.

That this poison-pen book designed to smear Anwar should appear almost simultaneously to Mahathir's loss in confidence in him is no coincidence. The book, it is obvious, was written at the behest of Anwar's adversaries in order to character assassinate him. It appears that Mahathir, who was angered and incensed by what he regarded as his heir apparent's betrayal and disloyalty, was not averse to the production and distribution of the book. He knew it would serve his purpose of slandering and shaming someone who had the audacity to go against him. Thus, Anwar's enemies succeeded finally in merging their goal with Mahathir's motive.

Loyalty

Mahathir's insistence on loyalty is not in itself an unusual feature of politics. In most political systems, ancient or modern, a deputy or the number-two man is expected to be loyal to his chief. Within UMNO – given its feudal history and culture – unquestioning loyalty to the paramount leader is one of the most cherished traits of membership. It is because Mahathir was absolutely certain that Anwar had betrayed him that he has marshalled all his resources to annihilate him. The virulence of the annihilation can perhaps be best explained by the fact that Anwar was, all said and done, Mahathir's protégé.

What made the protégé's sin of disloyalty an unpardonable crime was Anwar's reluctance to protect the business interests of Mahathir's family and friends. By questioning the bailout for Mahathir's son, Anwar was telling his boss that he was not prepared to salvage the Mahathir family. For an ageing leader who witnessed what happened in South Korea and what is now happening in Indonesia, Anwar's attitude was the antithesis of the ironclad guarantee he was looking for in a post-Mahathir era.

At the root of the expulsion of Anwar from the government and the party is the question of power. Mahathir sensed an attempt to ease him out of power. He responded to the perceived challenge with vigour and without scruples. Anwar felt that Mahathir's power base was weakening. He sought to send a message – and was repulsed. Though Mahathir has been able to ward off the Anwar challenge for the time being, the question is whether he will be able to perpetuate his power for much longer. ✦

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Note

1. There are significant differences between the Suharto and Mahathir leaderships and between Indonesia and Malaysia which some of Mahathir's critics fail to appreciate. Unlike Suharto, Mahathir is a popularly elected leader who derives his mandate from a democratically constituted electoral process. Unlike the Suharto family, Mahathir's children have not established monopolies over entire sectors of the economy. Neither corruption, nor poverty nor authoritarianism in Malaysia today bears any semblance to the situation in Indonesia under Suharto.

Vietnam

JAY WILLOUGHBY

The Cham Muslims of Vietnam

Islam was brought to Hindu/Buddhist Champa (present-day southern Vietnam) by Arab and Persian sailors and merchants who plied the rich Asian trade routes during the first Islamic century. As the region's aloewood soon became a profitable commodity, small commercial settlements appeared. Islam made slow but steady progress among the Cham aristocracy and educated classes. At the time of Champa's final military defeat and territorial absorption by Vietnam in the 1490s, the Cham were predominantly Muslim. After their loss of political independence and during subsequent Vietnamese dynastic struggles, in which the Cham fared quite badly, many Cham fled to Cambodia. The Cham royal court remained centred in Phan Rang until 1693, after which it moved to Cambodia and continued to function for over a century in a much diminished capacity. The Cham who remained behind were isolated by successive Vietnamese dynasties from the Islamized Malay world, with which they shared a common religion and culture and, to a lesser degree, language. With the incorporation of Vietnam into the French colonial empire during the nineteenth century, all official assimilation policies stopped and were replaced by a policy of benign neglect.

Under the French, the Cham found themselves in two different colonies: Cochin China in the south, and Annam in the centre. As a result, the communities gradually became quite distinct from each other. This remains the case today, and has resisted all attempts at achieving ethnic unity.



Cham historic monuments: Statues in Thap Cham temple near Phan Rang, 1993.

The Cham of Cochin China

In Cochin China, the Cham were largely concentrated in 7 villages in the province of Chau Doc. Their leaders' authority was restricted to village religious affairs. The leading official of each village, the Saykol Islam (Shaykh al Islam), was appointed by the French. Lesser officials of the religious hierarchy, in order of importance, were the *hakem*, who served as judge and village head; the *ong mam* (imam), who was in charge of the village mosque; and the *ahly*, who oversaw the small communal worship halls (*surau*) and religious activities in the countryside.

A *madrasa* was attached to each mosque. Local education consisted in memorizing and reciting the Qur'an, as well as explaining its meaning to the children. The language of instruction was *Jawi* (Malay written in a modified Arabic script). Because of its central importance in Cham communal life, Malay soon became the language of the local Cham elite. In the 1930s, the Cham started to write their own language in a similar modified Arabic script, as the traditional Sanskrit-derived script was no longer in use. A romanized alphabet was also used. Both scripts are still in use today.

The Cham of Annam

In the centre of Vietnam, the French set up the protectorate of Annam, which they ruled through a compliant court in Hue. The local Cham divided themselves into two groups: Cham Bani and Cham Kafir (or Cham Jahit). Both groups, although very unorthodox, saw themselves as true Muslims. Among the Cham Bani, each family provided one person to be trained in religious matters. Known as the *ong char*, this person observed the cult of the ancestors and other religious duties in the village. The *ong mam* prayed and fasted on behalf of the community, while the villagers showed their devotion by prostrating during the prayers and bringing offerings to the temple.

The Cham Kafir followed the old ways. Their worship centred around two Cham kings: Po Klong Garai and Po Rome. Temples to these two kings still stand in Thap Cham (Phan Rang) and have become tourist sites. Each year, the faithful would go to the temple to wash and clothe the statues of the kings, and then parade them outside in a time-honoured ceremony. During the rest of the year, the temple was closed.

The Cham of Annam were concentrated around Phan Rang: in the districts of Phan Ri, Phan Thiet, Ah Phuoc, and Binh Thuan. Originally, the French were in charge of their affairs, but during the 1930s and 1940s the French appointed Cham officials to manage their districts' affairs.

Education, as in Chau Doc, was confined largely to Islam. The Cham 'scholars' taught Kitab (the Qur'an) and Kitab al Hamd, and continued to use the traditional Cham script (*akal tauk*). As their society was closed, the language stagnated and gradually incorporated many Vietnamese words. Currently, approximately two-thirds of the Cham dialect spoken in this area consists of Vietnamese words. As many Malay words have been incorporated into the Cham dialect in the Chau Doc, communication in Cham between the two areas is sometimes problematical.

The Cham Today

Today, the Cham in Vietnam number less than one percent of Vietnam's approximately 70 million people. They are concentrated in three areas: the region surrounding the former Cham capital of Phan Rang, Ho Chi Minh City, and the southern provinces of Tay Ninh and Chau Doc. The province of Chau Doc hosts the local 'institute' of higher Islamic studies. Teaching is supplemented by village elders and others who have some Islamic knowledge. Cham communities remain isolated from the Vietnamese by mutual suspicion. Most of their members are poorly educated, as school is not compulsory and parents need their children's labour in the fields and the home. Schooling is available in the Cham language for approximately 3 years, after which the language of instruction is Vietnamese.

The Cham Jahit have retained pre-Islamic religious elements. For example, I attended *tarawih* prayer services in a Cham Jahit mosque in Phuoc Nhon in 1993. Many worshippers, dressed in white robes, performed the Buddhist triple prostration while facing the direction of prayer. Only the imam and his assistants were fasting and praying their version of the prescribed prayers. Their *adhan* bore no resemblance to the traditional Muslim *adhan*, nor did the prayer ceremonies which were conducted by roughly 10 assistants reciting and bowing before what appeared to be very tall candles while the imam sat to one side and talked with those sitting close to him. I was shown their Qur'an, which was a thick book containing Qur'anic verses in Arabic along with an interlinear Cham explanation. However, as very few of them could read Cham and none could read Arabic, we were told that the book was a mystery. When my travelling companion read it in Arabic and explained it to them in Cham, they were amazed.

The Vietnamese government's attitude toward the Cham is becoming more relaxed, partly due to Hanoi's good relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. Permits to expand or build mosques are granted, usually after lengthy bureaucratic procedures, and the people are allowed to raise money locally and abroad. Islamic literature is allowed, but there are some restrictions. For example, various members of the Cham Muslim Foundation have spent years translating the meaning of the Qur'an into Vietnamese, as well as books on basic Islamic beliefs, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and stories of his Companions. When these books appear in Vietnam, they may or may not be banned. Books also come in through Malaysian and Indonesian diplomatic channels. In the near future, one thousand copies of the Vietnamese translation of the meaning of the Qur'an are scheduled to be printed in Vietnam. Cham students can leave the country to study Islam or other subjects, provided they are high school graduates and academically qualified, and if they have enough money. Almost no Cham can meet these requirements, as their communities are poor and the level of formal education is quite low. In addition, I was told that at least one Vietnamese government official has been sent to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islam so that the government will have a better idea of Islam and Islamic culture. ✦

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India
THEODORE GABRIEL

The Sufi Tariqas of the Lakshadweep Islands, India

The enchanting coral archipelago known as Lakshadweep comprises ten inhabited and seventeen uninhabited islands, which lie about 200 to 400 kilometres off the Indian west coast in the Arabian Sea. The islands span from north to south for approximately 350 kilometres. The inhabitants of all the islands are ethnically very similar and speak a dialect of Malayalam, the language of the neighbouring Indian state of Kerala.[1] The population numbering 50,000 is almost entirely Muslim, mainly Sunnites, apart from a smattering of Wahabis and Ahamadiyyas who are not very popular with the other population.

Sufism and Caste

The islanders are devout Muslims and mainly orthodox in their orientation, but there is a substratum of Sufism underlying their faith and practice. The Sufi leaders, known as Tangals, are extremely popular and highly regarded, and their followers engage in a lot of healing, and performing of miracles. The Sufis of Lakshadweep belong to two orders, namely the Quadiriyya and the Riffai. The two orders are identified with two different caste groups in the islands. Caste-like stratification is noticeable among Muslims in various parts of India, though none of them can compare in rigidity and chauvinism with the caste system of the Lakshadweep Muslims. Many attribute the caste systems among Muslims to the vestiges of their Hindu ancestry.[2] Modernity has attenuated the discrimination and social separatism of the caste system of the islands. However, the castes are still endogamous and caste names are often used in conjunction with Muslim names. The most prominent castes among the islanders are the Koya, the superior caste, traditionally land and sailing ship owners, and the Melacceri, who are their serfs and engaged by the Koyas in coconut tree climbing, toddy making and menial duties. The Quadiriyya and the Riffai Sufi orders of the Lakshadweep islands are associated with the Koya and the Melacceri castes respectively.

The origin of the Quadiriyya *tariqa* in Lakshadweep is obscure. The Hindu inhabitants of the islands are said to have been converted to Islam by Ubaid Allah, a grandson of Caliph Abu Bakr. Ubaid Allah was shipwrecked on Amini Island in 41 AH, where legend has it that he was attacked by the population, but materialized tigers and other wild animals hitherto never seen in the islands. It is said that when he stamped his foot on the western shore, the island tilted towards the West, and this is when the astounded population accepted Islam wholesale. He performed similar miracles in the other islands. These legends laid the foundation for mysticism in the islands and led to a more charismatic form of the faith. Ubaid Allah's *maqbara* (tomb) is still found at the Juma *masjid* in Androth Island and is the scene of a popular and grand festival each year.

Sheikh Mohammed Kasim Tangal (died AH 1140), whose tomb is found in Kavaratti Island, near the picturesque Ujjra mosque that he built, is said to have introduced the thaumaturgical and self-mortificatory Riffai *dhikr* to the islands. The present leadership of the Quadiriyya and the Riffai Tariqas in Lakshadweep are from the Aranikkat and Ekkarpally families of Kavaratti Island, both of whom are considered to be the descendants of Sheikh Mohammed Kasim.

The Mohideen mosques – after Mohideen Sheikh, by which name Abdul Quadr al Gilani is known – are the venues of the Koyas, the upper caste group. The Quadiriyya *dhikr* (a remembrance ritual) performed by them is a sober affair when compared to the Melacceri *dhikr* which involves magical acts of self-mortification (see below). It is interesting that the land owning upper caste group is associated with the more dignified Sufi ritual and the lower castes with the more lively and charismatic *dhikr*. This is in keeping with the ideology of the Riffai order that was inclined to self-mortification, a result of the belief in the ability of the spirit to overcome the flesh. Perhaps this reflects the persecution suffered by the Melacceris at the hands of the upper castes, and their quest to overcome poverty, sorrow and misery by the spiritual acts of the *dhikr*, that exemplified the transcendence of the spiritual over the worldly and the material.

Caste-based discrimination is usually only visible in social and economic affairs. The Melacceris resented its extension to religious matters when they were not allowed to participate in Mohideen ceremonies. Some Melacceri youths secretly learned their songs and in 1950 went to the Mohideen mosque at Amini and forcibly participated in the *dhikr* ceremony being performed there. The Koyas, highly incensed by this intrusion into what they considered their prerogative, complained to the Tangal, the head of the Quadiriyya order. The Tangal, however, held that there was to be no discrimination in matters of faith and would not admonish the Melacceri devotees. The Koyas, taken aback by the Tangal' s unexpected response, established their own mosques in each island and conducted their ceremonies separately, a practice which continues to this day. No caste discrimination is shown at the Mowlid festivals, the annual commemoration of the Sufi saints whose *darghas* abound in the islands. Huge amounts of food are prepared and distributed at these events where all the population of each island takes part.

Dhikr

The Sufi rituals are termed *ratib* in Lakshadweep. The Quadiriyya *ratib* ritual has two rows of singers, ten to sixteen in number, clad in white, with white caps, and holding tambourines in hand. They stand facing each other and sing devotional songs to Allah, the Prophet and Abdul Kadar al Gilani. The singers bow as they sing and tap their tambourines, very slowly at first, the tempo slowly increasing until it reaches a crescendo of singing and genuflecting, when the singing suddenly stops. The euphoria of the singers is clearly visible to the onlookers. The singers' movements and singing are well synchronized. The Head of the order, the Aranikkat Tangal, if present, stands at the head of the group. A copy of the Qur'an is placed on a pillow at the end of the two rows.

The Riffai ritual also includes singing praises to God, Muhammad and the founder of the order, Ahmad ar Riffai. The tambourine wielding singers are also present. However, about six or seven murids, clad only in loincloths also take part in the ceremony. Some swords, knives and awls lie piled up in front of the Tangal, the head of the order, who hands them out to the partially-clad dancers after blessing the instruments. The singing and drumming begin slowly and as it works up to a faster pace, the dancers enter the arena moving slowly at first and as the rhythm and singing work up to a furious pitch, they begin swaying from side to side as though intoxicated. They begin to slash their bellies, pierce their cheeks and throat and hit their heads with hammers, etc. The wounded dancers approach the Tangal who strokes the wound areas softly. It is believed that the dancers are healed instantaneously and completely. Not a drop of blood is shed during the entire ceremony in spite of all the frenzied self-mortificatory acts.

The dancers must perform *wudu* before participating in the rituals, otherwise it is believed that they will suffer pain from their wounds. The elders recount that in former times they even used to gouge out their eyes and slice off their tongues. The islanders also say that it is impossible to photograph the r*atib* ritual and that the pictures come out blank if someone tries to photograph the *dhikr*.

The Tangals

The Tangals of the Sufi orders are all believed to be descendants of the Prophet and are highly regarded, not only in Lakshadweep and in neighbouring Kerala but also in Sri Lanka and even as far away as Malaysia, where they are sought after for their miraculous powers and their teachings. One Androth islander is a teacher at the prestigious Al Azar of Cairo. They are known for their powers and charismatic personalities and many periodically undertake what the islanders call *safar*, journeys to distant lands returning with much wealth from the gifts and donations of their admirers from distant shores.

Some have taken to secular education and secular professions. A member of the Ekkarpally family of the Riffai order Secretary for Planning in the Lakshadweep government. The oldest members of the Aranikkat and Ekkarpally families are of course the Khalifas of the two orders. The descendants of Ubaidallah, the first Muslim missionary of the islands, are mostly to be found in Androth. They are as respected as the Tangals, being charismatic and miracle-performing individuals, though they do not hold particular offices in the Sufi orders.

Legends of the wonder-working deeds of former times abound. For instance, the Sheikh Mohammed Kasim is said to have blessed the ladies of the island with painless childbearing. However, this *sans trauma* child-birth is a blessing only for the native inhabitants of Kavaratti and not for expatriate workers. Similarly, the inhabitants of Chetlat Island were blessed by a local saint with the ability to climb coconut trees without the aid of ropes or any of the usual apparatus, a fact I have observed personally.

The minority community of Wahabis in the Lakshadweep islands is extremely critical of the Sufi rituals. This is in tune with the general Wahabi opposition to Sufism, which holds that this latter abounds in allegedly heretical concepts, such as polytheism in the veneration of saints, idolatry in rituals such as circumambulation and prayers performed at tombs and shrines to saints, and syncretism such as the adoption of concepts and rituals from non-Muslim religions. The Wahabis in Lakshadweep are mostly Arabic teachers who have been in contact with the dynamic Wahabi community of Kerala. They were formerly students in the Arabic madrasas run by Wahabis in Kerala in this neighbouring state. However, unlike in Kerala, Wahabism has not been able to make much headway in Lakshadweep. Moreover, Sufi rituals are seen to be as popular as ever in the islands. The people of Lakshadweep are devoted to Islam. Their faith is strong, as is their adherence to Islamic practice and law. This includes the youth, a mainly university-educated and professional generation. This commitment is in no small measure due to the Sufi ideology and practice in the islands which lend charisma to the practice of the faith, stimulating and attracting the population. ✦

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Notes

1. Except for Minicoy Island which is Maldivian.
2. See, for instance, Ahmad, Imtiaz (1978), *Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims inIndia*, New Delhi, Manohar.

Central Asia

ADEEB KHALID

Jadidism in Central Asia: **Islam and Modernity in the Russian Empire**

Muslim modernism in Central Asia at the turn of the twentieth century remains virtually unknown to scholars of Muslim cultural history. What little we know comes through a thick prism of nationalist or Soviet historiography that loses the Islamic dimension of the movement. Yet, approaching Jadidism, as this movement is usually called, as a Muslim movement allows us to broaden our understanding of the Muslim world's encounter with modernity, and to reconsider many of the categories we habitually invoke in studying the Muslim world.

Jadidism arose in Central Asia in the 1890s, a generation after the Russian conquest. Its proponents, the Jadids, formulated a harsh critique of their society based on a fascination with modernity. The distinct flavour of Central Asian Jadidism is captured in the following exhortation penned by Munawwar Qari in 1906:

O Co-religionists, o compatriots! Let's be just and compare our situation with that of other, advanced nations. Let's secure the future of our coming generations and save them from becoming slaves and servants of others. The Europeans, taking advantage of our negligence and ignorance, took our government from our hands, and are gradually taking over our crafts and trades. If we do not quickly make an effort to reform our affairs in order to safeguard ourselves, our nation, and our children, our future will be extremely difficult. Reform begins with a rapid start in cultivating sciences conforming to our times. Becoming acquainted with the sciences of the present age depends upon the reform of our schools and our methods of teaching.[1]



Behbudi's magazine *Ayina*, the most important Jadid publication in Central Asia.

The sense of decline and impending doom was widely shared by the Jadids. Reform was necessary to avoid extinction. Its advocacy rested on a harsh critique of the corrupt present. Judged by the needs of the age, much, if not all, in Central Asian society was deemed to be in need of urgent change. The solution lay in cultivating knowledge, which appeared as a panacea to the Jadids for the ills they diagnosed in their society. The very name 'Jadidism' is connected with education. It refers to the advocacy by the reformers of the phonetic, or new, method (*usul-i jadid*) of teaching the alphabet in the maktab. From the new method, Jadid reform went to the advocacy of the new-method school, a transformation of the syllabus, and ultimately a new conception of knowledge.

In common with other modernists of the period, the Jadids ascribed the 'decline' and 'degeneration' of their community to its departure from the true path of Islam. When Muslims followed true Islam, the Jadids argued, they were leaders of the world in knowledge, and Muslim empires were mighty. Corruption of the faith led them to ignorance and political and military weakness. The solution was a return to 'true Islam'. But 'true Islam' had come to mean something quite new to the Jadids. The idea of progress, a historical consciousness defined by constant change, and a modern conception of geography, all in different ways transformed the way in which Central Asians could imagine their world. New conceptions of time and space allowed a far-reaching historicization of the world that produced new, rationalist understandings of Islam and being Muslim. True understanding of Islam required not insertion in a chain of authoritative masters, but the mastery of the textual sources of Islam, now available in print. Knowledge alone could lead Muslims to the true faith.

Knowledge also explained the superiority of the 'more advanced' societies (Russia and Europe in general) over Muslims. Up until 1917, the Jadids' view of Russia and Europe was quite positive: they were living examples of the links between knowledge, wealth, and military might that the Jadids constantly asserted. Such positive images were not simply the result of the Jadids' europhilia. They all had a didactic purpose: to exhort their own society to acquire all the aspects of Europe that they admired – knowledge, order, discipline, and power. This fascination with Europe coexisted with a fear that if Muslim societies did not 'catch up', their situation would become 'even more difficult'. The practically unchallenged encroachment of European powers over the rest of the planet sustained these fears. Ultimately, the hope of the Jadids was for Muslims to join the modern world as respected and equal partners. They wanted the modernity of Europe for themselves.

The first proponents of reform often had traditional Muslim education, but they had also experienced the modern world through travel and reading newspapers. The father of Mahmud Khoja Behbudi, the most respected figure in Central Asia, was *qazi* in a village on the outskirts of Samarqand, and Behbudi was taught the standard madrasa texts of the time at home by his father and uncles. The family was prosperous enough for Behbudi to travel abroad. A trip in 1900 to Istanbul and Cairo, en route to the hajj, was a turning point in Behbudi's intellectual trajectory. First-hand experience of modernist reforms in those places convinced him to propagate similar ideas in his own land. Abdurrauf Fitrat, the leading Bukharan Jadid, had studied at a madrasa before he travelled to Istanbul for further education. By about 1910, the Jadid profile begins to change: the younger Jadids still came from traditionally learned families, but their madrasa credentials were scantier.

What the Jadids had in common was a commitment to change and a possession of what Pierre Bourdieu has called 'cultural capital'. This disposed them to conceive of reform in cultural terms, and the modicum of comfort that most enjoyed in their lives allowed them to devote their energies to it. In the end, the Jadids were constituted as a group by their own critical discourse. Their sense of cohesion came from their shared vision of the future as well as their participation in common activities and enterprises. The basic institutions of Jadid reform were the press and the new-method school.

The Jadids avidly read the Turkic-language press of both the Russian and Ottoman empires, as well as newspapers in Persian and even Arabic, published in the Middle East, India, and Europe. This made them part of a transnational public of Muslim newspaper readers, open to ideas developed far away. But in a more fundamental sense, print made Jadidism *possible*. Jadidism was articulated in a print-based public space which disadvantaged the traditional cultural elite to the benefit of the Jadids. The authority of the ulama, for instance, had been based on their cultural capital acquired in years of study in the madrasa. Such cultural markers also served to limit the field of debate over questions of culture and religious authority. Entry into the new public space, by contrast, required only functional literacy. Debates in this public space in turn served to discredit the very assumptions on which the authority of the ulama had rested. Madrasas came to be criticized for not meeting the needs of the age; for producing corrupted versions of Islam; and even for being hotbeds of laziness and docility.

The new-method schools were the site of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the next generation. Through them the Jadids disseminated a cognitive style quite different from that of the maktab and thus created a group in society that was receptive to their ideas. These schools were also crucially important in the social reproduction of the movement. If the first new-method schools had been founded single-handedly by a few dedicated individuals, by 1917 new-method schools were often staffed by their own graduates. The Jadids also enthusiastically adopted such new forms of sociability as benevolent societies.



This very brief exposition of Jadidism allows us to pose a few basic questions about the relation of 'Islam' and 'the West'. The paradigm of 'Westernization' seeks to interpret change in the non-Western world as simply a case of imitation, or the transplantation of ideas or institutions fully developed in a monolithic and homogeneous 'West'. It also assumes clear boundaries between 'cultures', so that influences from 'outside' may clearly be delineated from 'authentic' developments taking place 'inside' a culture. But were the Jadids 'insiders' or 'outsiders'? Does fascination with European might (and wanting it for themselves) make them 'Westernizers'? What is the 'West' in this case anyway, given that the relationship between Russia (the colonizing power here) and 'the West' remains a matter of debate, not least for Russians themselves? Perhaps these categories are not very useful. Rather, it is much more fruitful to see Jadidism as an example of the open-ended transformation of culture at a time of intense social and economic change – a time when new groups in society arise and bring new means of communication and organization to bear on their struggles. A more useful conceptualization would pose the same questions to Muslim modernism that are posed to the transformation of Europe in the early modern period, questions that, instead of emphasizing cultural absolutes, deal with the impact of modern means of order and discipline on society and culture. ✦

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Notes

1. Munawwar Qari Abdurrashid Khan oghli, 'Islah ne demakdadur', *Khurshid* (Tashkent), 28September1906.

Iran
ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI

The Making of **Divorce Iranian Style**

Divorce Iranian Style **is a documentary film directed by Kim Longinotto and Ziba Mir-Hosseini. It is set in a small courtroom in central Tehran, and follows a number of women who come before a non-plussed judge and by turn use whatever they can – reason, argument, charm, outrage, pleas for sympathy, patience, and wit – to get what they each need. There are four main characters: Massy, who wants to divorce her inadequate husband; Ziba, an outspoken 16-year-old who proudly stands up to her 38-year-old husband and his family; Jamileh, who brings her husband to court to teach him a lesson; and Maryam, remarried and desperate to regain custody of her two daughters.[1]**

The idea of making a film about the working of Shari^{c}a law in a Tehran family court was born in early 1996 when a friend introduced me to Kim Longinotto, the documentary filmmaker. I had seen and liked Kim's film, *Hidden Faces* (1991), on women in Egypt. Kim had for some time wanted to make a film in Iran: she was intrigued by the contrast between the images produced by current-affairs television documentaries and those in the work of Iranian fiction filmmakers. The former portrayed Iran as a country of fanatics, the latter conveyed a much gentler, more poetic sense of the culture and people. As she put it, 'you wouldn't think the documentaries and the fiction were about the same place.' We discussed my 1980s research in Tehran family courts and I gave her a copy of my book, *Marriage on trial*.[2]

The first step was to apply to British TV commissioning editors for funding and to Iranian officials for access and permission to film. Kim focused on the first and I on the second. As will become clear, I had to negotiate not only with the Iranian authorities for permission and access, but also with myself. As a novice in film making, I had to deal not only with theoretical and methodological questions of representation and the production of anthropological narratives, but also with personal ethical and professional dilemmas. The film's subject-matter – the operation of Islamic family law in Iran today – inevitably entailed both exposing individuals' private lives in a public domain, and tackling a major issue which divides Islamists and feminists: women's position in Islamic law.

We wrote a proposal for a documentary film to be shot in a court in Tehran, and in March 1996 an application for a permit to film was submitted to the Iranian Embassy in London. We phrased the proposal carefully, knowing the sensitivity of the theme. We stated that our aim was to make a film that would reach a wide audience and challenge prevailing stereotypes about women and Islam. This we wanted to do by addressing a universal theme cutting across cultural and social barriers, which ordinary people could relate to emotionally as well as intellectually. Marriage, divorce and the fate of children, we argued, provide a perfect theme for such a film.

In October 1996, we learned that our application was rejected, no reasons given. But Kim and I were now committed to the project, so we continued to lobby the Iranian Embassy, attending its functions to meet visiting dignitaries and explain our project. In December, we heard that one of our proposals for funding had come through: Channel 4 TV was prepared to fund us to make a feature-length film for its prestigious *True Stories* documentary slot. We were enormously encouraged.

So in mid-January 1997, we decided to go Tehran to follow up our application – to argue our case in person with the Ministry of Islamic Guidance – and also to see whether we could work together. I wanted Kim to see Iran for herself, to get a feel for the place and culture. We talked about our project to people ranging from independent filmmakers to officials in television, the Ministry of Guidance, women's organizations, and so on. All of them wanted us to change our theme, to do a film on an issue which was 'politically correct' and that could give a 'positive image of Iran', such as marriage ceremonies, female members of parliament, or mothers of martyrs. Clearly, what Kim and I saw as enchanting, as positive, were often things that could not be filmed. In our discussions, we had to show how a film about marital disputes, shot in the family courts, could present a 'positive' image. We had to distinguish what we (and we hoped our target audiences) saw as 'positive', from what many people we talked to saw as 'negative', with the potential of turning into yet another sensationalized foreign film on Iran. Images and words, we said, can evoke different feelings in different cultures. For instance, a mother talking of the loss of her children in war as martyrdom for Islam, is more likely in Western eyes to confirm stereotypes of religious zealotry and fanaticism, rather than evoke the Shi^{c}a idea of sacrifice for justice and freedom. What they saw as positive could be seen as negative in Western eyes, and vice versa. One answer was to present viewers with complex social reality and allow them to make up their own minds. Some might react favourably, and some might not, but in the end it could give a much more 'positive' image of Iran than the usual films, if we could show ordinary women, at home and in court, holding their own ground, maintaining the family from within. This would challenge some hostile Western stereotypes.

In the end, the Ministry of Guidance seemed to be convinced: we were told to make a fresh application through the Embassy in London, and were promised a permit in a month. Meanwhile, with the help of the Islamic Human Rights Commission, we sought Ministry of Justice approval to film in the courts: this proved less difficult, as the Public Relations Department of the Ministry was then producing a series of short educational films shot in Tehran family courts for Iranian television.

We returned to London, intending to come back and make the film before the May presidential elections while those who had approved it were still in office. But the months passed and the official permit never arrived. It took a new government, and President Khatami's installation in August 1997, for our project to get off the ground. We submitted another application and, in October, I went to Tehran to follow it up, presenting our case again to the Ministry of Guidance, now headed by a reformist personality. This time, Ministry officials were more open to our ideas; they were not afraid of dealing critically with internal issues and were less frightened of what the outside world thinks. Moreover, they were true to their word. Three weeks later, visas were issued for Kim and sound-recordist Christine Felce, enabling them to bring the 16mm camera and sound equipment.

After their arrival, with letters of introduction from the Ministry of Guidance, and aided by the Public Relations Section of the Ministry of Justice, we visited several Judicial Complexes. There are sixteen of these scattered around Tehran. Each contains a number of courts and deals with disputes filed by local residents, which differ in nature, given Tehran's geographical division along socio-economic lines – broadly, the middle classes in the North, the working classes in the South. This posed a problem for us. Our Ministry guides wanted us to show the diversity of the courts and the range of disputes heard; they were keen for us to film in courts headed by both civil and religious judges and to cover marital disputes in different socio-economic strata – to do a kind of sociological survey. But we wanted to work in a single court, to capture something of the life of the court itself. We knew that in Tehran, with a population of over ten million, no court could be representative, and we did not want to make a 'sociological survey on film'. We wanted to focus on characters and develop storylines. We also knew that our project depended much on the goodwill of the judge and the court staff. It was thus important for us to work in a court where we were welcome, where our project was understood, and where staff members were willing to take part.

This was difficult to explain to the officials, but finally we settled on the Imam Khomeini Judicial Complex, the largest one, located in central Tehran near the Bazaar. It housed some Ministry of Justice offices, including the Public Relations Section, as well as thirty-three General Courts. Two courts dealt with family disputes, both headed by clerical judges: Judge Deldar, who sat only in the morning, and Judge Mahdavi, who sat only in the afternoon. We were introduced to both judges; both said we could film in their courts.

At first we filmed in both courts, but soon we confined ourselves to that of Judge Deldar, which we found more interesting. As Judge Mahdavi dealt only with divorce by mutual consent, that is, cases where both parties had already worked out an agreement, there was little room for negotiation: the dynamics of the cases heard were rather uniform, and the couples rarely revealed the real reasons behind the breakdown of marriage. Judge Deldar, on the other hand, dealt with all kinds of marital disputes, thus we found a much wider range of stories and a more spontaneous environment. Besides, the court staff members were also fascinating characters in their own right, especially Mrs Maher, the court secretary, who had worked in the same branch for over 20 years. She was an extremely capable woman who understood our project, and her daughter Paniz was a real gift. Both soon became fundamental to the film. After a week, we too became part of the court life.

The presence of an all-woman crew changed the gender balance in the courtroom and undoubtedly gave several women courage. Likewise, the fact that the crew had both Iranian and foreign members, I believe, helped transcend the insider/outsider divide. The camera was also a link in this respect, as well as between public and private. We never filmed without people's consent. Before each new case, I approached the two parties in the corridor, explained who we were and what our film was about, and asked whether they would agree to participate. I explained that we wanted to make a film that foreign audiences could relate to, to try and bridge the gap in understanding, to show how Iranian Muslim women, like women in other parts of the world, do the best they can to make sense of the world around them and to better their lives. Some agreed, others refused. On the whole, and perhaps not surprisingly, most women welcomed the project and wanted to be filmed.

We filmed for four weeks in November-December. Back in London, we started editing our over 16 hours of footage. It was already clear to us who the main characters were likely to be. When we put together the rushes, we found we had material on 17 cases, but only in the eventual six cases (only four of them fully developed) shown in the film could we make usable stories. It was heart breaking to have to abandon some very moving, but unresolved stories. In going through the material, rather than focusing on the exotic and the different, we tried to focus on commonalities: how difficult marriage can be and the pain involved in its breakdown. We also tried to show what it is like inside a Tehran law court, and to give glimpses into the lives of ordinary people. Although clearly some 'contextual information' was essential, we were anxious not to overcrowd the film with facts and figures, not to tell viewers what to think, but to allow them to draw their own conclusions. Above all, we wanted to let the women speak, to show how they are strong individuals going through a difficult phase in their lives, and to communicate the pain – and the humour – involved in the breakdown of marriage. ✦

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Notes

1. *Irreconcilable Differences: 'Divorce Iranian Style'*, by Nick Poppy, Indiewire, 9 Dec., 1998: http://www.indiewire.com/film/interviews/int_Longinotto_MirH_981209.html.
   See also our interviews for Women Make Movies, 'Making Divorce Iranian Style': http://www.wmm.com/advscripts/ctmnfrm.asp?source=catpgfrm.asp?recid=454.
   and *Marriage Among the Mullahs*, by CynthiaJoyce, Salon Magazine, 16 Dec. 1998: http://www.salonmagazine.com/mwt/feature/1998/12/16feature.html.
2. *Marriage on Trial, A Study of Islamic Family Law: Iran and Morocco Compared*. London: IB Tauris, 1993.

Egypt

EVERT SCHREUR

National Heritage
Cairo Style

'The Musafirkhana was beautiful. It gave you a feeling for work. You were surrounded by nice woodwork, calligraphy and coloured glass windows. You were in the centre of Cairo, but you didn't hear any noise.' Painter Mohammed Abla is soft-spoken yet very angry. Standing in the courtyard of the burned Musafirkhana palace in the heart of Islamic Cairo, Abla sighs and moans. For 21 years he had his studio in this late 18th-century Ottoman palace. In the '60s, the then Minister of Culture, Sarwat Okasha, had decided in a fit of wisdom to provide studios for artists in the Musafirkhana.

Last October the building burned down and Abla lost 90 per cent of his work. With real estate speculation thriving in the neighbourhood, Abla thinks it was arson. 'The government people say the fire started by a burning rubbish pile in the alley outside. They promised an investigation. I do not believe them. For them the Musafirkhana was just number 20 out of many other numbers. They don't care. Corruption has no feeling.'

Whether arson or negligence, the loss of the Musafirkhana is a case in point in the steady decline of the old Fatimid city of Cairo. On a list of 622 monuments drawn up in 1950, the Musafirkhana was registered as number 20. At the time the list included some 130 buildings that did not exist anymore. They were listed deliberately to meet the UNESCO criterion of 600 historic buildings to secure for the city of Cairo the status of 'world heritage'. Since 1950 another 20 to 30 buildings on the list have been demolished. During the Nasser era, preservation of Islamic architecture was a non-issue. In those days the Egyptian Antiquities Organization had an annual budget of LE600. In the Gamaliyyah district of Islamic Cairo several monuments were demolished to make room for schools. In the '70s and '80s, the notion of preservation finally dawned upon the authorities. However, most attention was given to Egypt's pharaonic past. It was only after the 1992 earthquake – which caused only minor damage – that the government felt challenged by the Islamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, to start paying attention to the country's Islamic architectural heritage. The most manifest initiatives, however, were taken by Ismailis from abroad who felt strongly attracted to the old capital of the their medieval Fatimid caliphate. Apart from the Agha Khan Foundation, a group of Bohras from Pakistan and India raised capital to refurnish the Al Hakim Mosque – named after the disputed Fatimid caliph – in an Indian sub-continental style, with outlandish white stone battlements. By 1998, the Antiquities Organization – meanwhile renamed the Supreme Council for Antiquities – had its budget for Fatimid Cairo raised to LE247 million.

Still very little has been done to save the city from total collapse. The problems are numerous. Especially in Egypt there is no public debate yet on what restoration should be.

Critique and self-critique are taboo. All experts involved in the politically sensitive preservation business, Egyptians and foreigners alike, are only willing to talk on condition of anonymity.

The administration of Cairo's Islamic monuments is chaotic. Most buildings are owned by the Ministry of Awqaf – religious endowments. No rental is collected, apart from the odd two piaster a month for workshops established in some monuments. Quite a few buildings have been turned into schools and are the property of the Ministry of Education. Responsibility for maintenance and restoration, however, rests with the Supreme Council for Antiquities, under the Ministry of Culture. Finally, there is the Cairo Governorate, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Public Works, and the Ministry of Interior (traffic). At a lower level are the various departments of utilities, such as water supply and sewerage. All these services either refuse to cooperate or engage in some form of horse-trading. The result is stagnation and decay.



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The physical situation of the old city is desperate. The streets are so packed with people that they have to work in shifts. As one expert observes: 'You have somebody who is selling *fuul* in the morning, then he moves away and in his place comes a man who sells sweets. Every single square meter is used. The pressure is so high that even if you remove these people you'll have other people very soon coming back. In front of the Sabil Mohammed Ali, on the main north-south thoroughfare of the old Fatimid city, there are clothes stores on the street. The shopkeepers hang their items from makeshift scaffolding. It is like the interior of a big shop and you cannot even pass. Right behind them there is a big empty lot, which can be a wonderful market area. The city has so much unused space, obviously because there is total mess in legal issues.'

Whereas city development and population pressure take their toll, the actual cause for the crumbling of monuments is rising groundwater levels. The process has been going on for more than 30 years. Contrary to popular thinking, it has nothing to do with the Aswan High Dam. In fact the groundwater is up to several metres above the Nile. This is exclusively due to the leaking of water pipes and sewers. Incidentally, this explains why daily water usage per capita in Cairo amounts to an estimated 400 litres, whereas, for instance, in the Netherlands it is 130 litres.

Just off Bab Zuwayla, beyond the Fatimid enclosure, is the 12th-century mosque of Salih Tala^{c}i. The mosque is surrounded by a two-metre deep 'moat'. The bottom of this 'moat' is simply the original street level. Since the 10th century, when Fatimid Cairo was laid out, the city has been rising through the continuous dumping of dirt on the streets. This thick layer of urban fill sits like a sponge on top of the original silt layer. Until last year when a sewer was built from Bab Zuwayla to Bab Al Khalq, the 'moat' of Salih Tala^{c}i was a stinking pool. Unfortunately the US-funded Greater Cairo Waste Water Project has still not been extended to Fatimid Cairo.

Meanwhile water levels keep rising. One expert predicts lakes on the streets of Cairo in the near future. As all buildings are made of limestone, the groundwater penetrates through capillary reaction up to two to three metres above street level. The water evaporates, the salt stays, and starts to attract more water. The salt crystallizes within the stone. This means expansion. Stones turn into powder. Buildings crumble away. In addition, there is aggressive air pollution and the effects of heavy traffic. The inner city has been left to rot.

However, on a recent visit to the old city, President Hosni Mubarak made the on-the-spot decision, 'like all his wise decisions', that the preservation of Fatimid Cairo should be sped up. Over the coming years, the inner city is to be turned into an 'open-air museum'. All governmental, commercial and residential uses that conflict with the requirements of preserving antiquities are to cease. As one long-time observer of dying Cairo sneers: 'This is their concept of preservation; they want to turn Cairo into an Islamo-Disneyland. Anything they think of as historical value is to be locked up and used as a display for Western tourists.' It is the same idea European archaeologists had about pharaonic temples: Clear them from inhabitants, remove everything that is not original – that is, every element of subsequent use – and open it to the public as a museum. This became the accepted idea of what a monument is. In the case of the pharaonic heritage it seems to make sense but now the Egyptian authorities try to apply it to the Islamic city as well. The Antiquities Organization treats monuments as isolated structures. They are no longer dealing with something that is a part of the surrounding city. Even if you have 600 Islamic monuments, there are still some 9000 buildings within the old city and most of them are of some historic value and not registered as such.

On the other hand, all experts call for enforcing stringent building codes, that is, controlled development sympathetic to the old city fabric. They are furious with the concept of sterilizing the city by moving out 'offensive' sights such as the onion and garlic market in front of Al Hakim Mosque and to replace it with tourist shops selling busts of Nefertiti.

Right in the heart of Islamic Cairo stands Qasr Bashtak, a huge Mamluk palace. The building was restored by the Germans in the '80s. It was supposed to be a cultural centre for exhibitions and concerts. It never worked. Besides, how many cultural centres, exhibition rooms, and museums can you have in Cairo? The only chance for the city fabric to survive is if the buildings remain part of the living city, as they once were. This means servicing with piped water, sewerage and electricity, and that requires cooperation among government agencies headed by jealous bureaucrats unwilling to yield power.

And then there is traffic. In the '80s a fly-over was constructed over Al Azhar Street, right into the heart of Islamic Cairo 'to ease congestion'. Of course traffic only got worse and now a tunnel is being drilled under the old city. The contractor managed to start tunnelling exactly on top of the old eastern city wall that had been covered with urban refuse over the centuries. When they hit a tower dating back to Salah Eddin, the authorities immediately fenced off the site, forbidding entry to archaeologists, not even for one day. However, people of the Agha Khan Foundation, who have their office nearby, managed to videotape the demolition from their rooftop.

Some experts wonder whether the government will decide to tear down the fly-over once the tunnel is finished. Others are more cynical: 'They will never regulate traffic. All the talk about pedestrian zones and electric delivery cars is sheer fantasy.' The verdict on the preservation of Islamic Cairo can only be harsh. Countries like Turkey, Syria and Tunisia rank much higher than Egypt in taking care of their heritage. And it is even more disturbing that no one has any recipe to change the course of matters. ✦

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Egypt

VALERIE J. HOFFMAN

Saints and Sheikhs in Modern Egypt

Belief in the existence and powers of 'saints' or 'friend of God' (*wali,* pl. *awliya*) is pervasive throughout the Muslim world. Such individuals are often associated with Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, though the notion of human perfection probably developed first among the Shiᶜa.

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According to some branches of the Shiᶜa, the imams inherited from the Prophet a spark of divine light granting them a perfection and sinlessness denied to ordinary human beings. The perfection of the saints in Sunni Islam is also a divine grace, and is often also associated with putative inheritance from the Prophet, though it usually also derives from the arduous disciplines of self-denial and devotion that are peculiar to the Sufi way. A true Sufi sheikh, or spiritual master, should be a friend of God, one who by virtue of his closeness to God may see by the light of God what no ordinary person can see, and who is therefore qualified to give each disciple the discipline and instruction that befits him or her. Nonetheless, not all those who are recognized as saints are followers of the Sufi path, and not all those who function as sheikhs are commonly recognized as saints.

Since there is no body in Islam authorized to canonize saints, as there is in Catholicism, the process by which sainthood is recognized is entirely informal and necessarily a matter of contention. Typically, disciples regard their masters not only as saints, but usually as the greatest of all saints, the *qutb* (axis) or *ghawth* (help). Nonetheless, the problem of unqualified individuals being granted a certificate to function as Sufi sheikhs has been broadly recognized by Sufis themselves. So who is a saint, and how is he or she recognized?

The qualities typically deemed mandatory for saints include piety, observance of the Shariᶜa, knowledge of God, and the performance of miracles – typically miracles of knowledge, such as the ability to 'read hearts' and to communicate mind-to-mind with other saints or one's own disciples, breaking through barriers of time and space, and providing spectacular assistance to those in need. Yet this inventory of attributes is deceiving, for the experts on Muslim sainthood also tell us that sainthood (*wilaya*) is by definition hidden among God's creatures, especially the saints of the highest rank. So the person who is serving tea to the guests may in fact be of a higher spiritual rank than the sheikh who is revered by his disciples. There is hierarchy among saints, with a diversity of spiritual types, habits and functions. The q*utb*, or axis, is said to be hidden and largely unrecognized. Even a child might be a saint. In Cairo there is a tomb for a boy who, after his death, identified himself as a saint by means of a dream given to a person who had never known him. Nonetheless, the man built a shrine over the place where the dead boy was buried, and his tomb is visited by people seeking his *baraka*.

Some saints ought not to be taken as sheikhs at all. These include the people of *jadhb*, the *majadhib*, who are violently 'attracted' to God, leaving their minds bewildered by the shock of sudden mystical illumination and incapable of carrying out legal obligations. Such people indeed have a sound spiritual state with God, but should not be followed or imitated. An Egyptian sheikh, Ahmad Radwan (d. 1967), warned his followers not to ask the *majadhib* to pray for them, 'because they will pray that you have poverty and illness, since by these God makes the Muslims enter paradise.'[1] Nonetheless, a Sudanese sheikh living in Cairo said that the *majadhib* serve as God's policemen; though they appear to engage in bizarre and meaningless behaviour, they report any misbehaviour among the Sufis to the heavenly court.[2] Often those with mental illness are perceived as *majadhib*, and their presence is seen as a blessing, a notion that has caused some outsiders to ridicule the Sufis, but which allows such individuals to be accepted into society, rather than shunned as they are in the West.

Sufi writings on sainthood assure us that saints exist in all countries and will continue to exist as long as the world exists; indeed, they are essential for the well-being of the world. The Sufi disciple can derive benefit from nothing more than sitting at the feet of a 'knower' (ᶜ*arif*, often translated as 'gnostic'), one who knows God and who knows what medicine will successfully heal the disciple's spirit. This benefit is not limited to explicit teaching, for Ahmad Radwan says that the gnostics 'pour out the bounty of God which He has bestowed upon them onto those who sit with them in the assembly'.[3] In modern and late medieval Sufism, Sufis become saints at least partly by inheriting the *asrar* – spritual essences or 'secrets' – of their masters. This occurs upon the latter's death. Appointment as sheikh in theory ought to follow this inheritance, but clearly this is not always the case. In Egypt, the son of a sheikh inherits the position of his father, which is not seen as a corrupt practice, as often the physical heir is also the spiritual heir. But daughters may inherit as well as sons, though Egypt's Supreme Council of Sufi Orders does not recognize the membership of women in the Orders, much less their leadership. There is also no guarantee that the son of a sheikh will follow his father's inclinations or inherit the full measure of his father's gifts, which may be distributed among a number of the latter's disciples.

Throughout the Muslim world, the presence of saints has been a source of comfort to people. The mere presence of a saint's tomb in the neighbourhood is thought to confer blessings, protection and prosperity. This is a theme that was touchingly interpreted in a novelette written in 1944 by Yahya Haqqi, describing the devotions of the Egyptians to the shrine of the Prophet's granddaughter, Sayyida Zeinab.[4] The oil from a lamp in the saint's shrine was thought to have curative powers, especially for eye diseases. The protagonist, Ismaᶜil, is raised near the shrine. His father sacrificially sends his son to England for medical training, where he becomes an ophthalmologist. When he returns to Egypt he scorns what he now regards as the ignorant superstition of his family and countrymen who venerate Sayyida Zeinab and employ oil from the saint's lamp to try to heal the eyes of his cousin, Fatima. Ismaᶜil tries in vain to heal his cousin using modern Western techniques, and in desperation turns again to the oil of the saint's lamp, which, combined with Western techniques, successfully heals his cousin's affliction. The book beautifully evokes the reverence of the Egyptians for the saint as well as the need for Westernized youth to find their roots in faith while learning the science of the West.

In Egypt, there are occasional newspaper editorials condemning the 'superstition' of the people that drives them to venerate the saints, but visitors to the tombs include the well-educated and politically powerful. The saints are deeply loved and celebrated in annual festivities, the *mawlids* (locally called *moulids*), that sometimes draw pilgrims from very distance provinces. The *moulids* include songs, the performance of *dhikr* (rituals of 'remembrance' of God) and hospitality as well as the compulsory visits to the tombs of the honoured saint. People may be recognized as saints in their lifetimes, and a few even had *moulids* celebrated for them before their deaths. Parents bring their children's school books to living saints so they will lay their hands on them and bless them. Former President Gamal Abdul Nasser constructed a railway station near the remote retreat of Ahmad Radwan in Upper Egypt and sought his advice on political matters. This relationship was not without controversy for both Nasserites and Sufis,[5] but illustrates the continuing relevance of such individuals to public affairs. One of Radwan's disciples, Sheikh ᶜIzz al-ᶜArab al-Hawari, is proud to have a letter from the current President, Husni Mubarak, thanking him for his role in bringing about reconciliation between Muslims and Christians in the Imbaba district of Cairo after fighting broke out between the two communities in 1991.[6] Regardless of the efforts of reformers of both fundamentalist and modernist persuasion to undermine Sufism and faith in saints, belief in the powers and moral authority of God's friends remains deeply rooted among the people. ✦

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Notes

1. Ahmad Radwan (1986), *Al-Nafahat al-rabbaniyya*, 3rd ed. Kom Ombo, Egypt: Yusuf Ja'Lus, pp.242–243.
2. Valerie J. Hoffman (1995), *Sufism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, p. 209. An extended discussion of *jadhb* and *majadhib* is on pp. 208–13.
3. *Nafahat*, p. 39.
4. *Qandil Umm Hashim*, translated by M.M. Badawi as *The Saint's Lamp*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973.
5. Hoffman, *Sufism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt*, pp. 266–7.
6. Personal communication. Sheikh 'Izz's life is described in *Sufism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt*, pp. 270 – 5.

Mauritania

RAHAL BOUBRIK

Traditional 'Men of Religion' and Political Power in Mauritania

Since the early 1980s, the ideological landscape of Mauritania, dominated by an elite that originated from the political struggle for independence, has fallen into decline. In a time of economic, social, and political crisis, neither the political elite nor the military was capable of meeting the expectations of Mauritanian society. The modernist projects, timidly undertaken since the independence, only reinforced economic and cultural dependency on the Western model. The failure of the national elite was blatant, and new social frameworks began to emerge in order to end the 'state of grace' enjoyed by the political power at the time.

From the beginning of the 1980s, and especially with the advent of political pluralism, religion became more than ever central to political, social, cultural, and identity-related issues in Mauritania. A 'religion of contestation' would gain territory not only by criticizing the political power-holders and the moral 'drifting' of society, but also by opposing other traditional religious representations of Islam. This conjunction provoked the returning to force of traditional models, either because those involved in these latter were looking to defend their symbolic space of action, or because they were reactivated by the political power to counteract the emergence of a militant Islam, which threatened the established order.[1]

In denouncing the use of religion in politics under the pretext that the law forbade political parties based on religion: 'Islam can not be the exclusive prerogative of a political party',[2] those in power did not abstain from using religious personalities to reinforce their political legitimacy. The creation of an official institution echoed this; on 16 February 1992, a decree was promulgated concerning the organization and functioning of the 'Islamic High Council' (HCI – Haut Conseil Islamique), a body which had already been announced in article 94 of the 1991 constitution. The five members of the Council were appointed by the president, all belonging to tradition milieus: *fuqahâ'* and leaders of brotherhoods. The president was Mohamed Salam Ould Addoud, descendant of an influential and educated family from Trarza, whose *mahdra* (traditional school) was one of the best known in the country. Addoud situated his official role in the HCI within the conservative sunni tradition, which had managed the rapport between scholar and monarch: 'Since the end of the reign of the four rashidun Califs, all the sovereigns lacked the necessary conduct. There were the just, but there were also the shameless. There were always pious scholars and guides at their side. All maintained, with the regime in power, relations based on integrity, devotion and the accomplishment of duty. They occupied various positions: judges, imams, guides, gatherers (…). They would give no credit to the lies of a sovereign, just as they would not validate his abuses. Nonetheless, they would not seek to plot against him, nor would they seek to incite disorder and anarchy to influence the scene. They limited themselves to enjoining people to do good and forbidding them to commit reprehensible acts.'[3]

Pesident Ould Taya furthermore relied on independent religious figures, such as Bouddah Ould Bousayri, imam of the principle mosque of Nouakchott who had distinguished himself since the eighties by his preaching, which was then to be heard on the radio each Friday. He was considered the unofficial advisor to the president. It was he who advocated peace at the time of the call to *jihâd,* launched by Islamist leader Ould Sidi Yahya on the eve of the rejection of his party's (Omma) legislation (18 November 1991).[4] Still in his role as mediator between civil society and the authorities, he intervened in the arrests of Islamist youths in 1994 and asked the president, during a Friday sermon, to be merciful towards them. The president conceded. Moreover, according to certain sources, it was Ould Taya who asked the imam's intervention to resolve the crisis.[5] The political power thus made pragmatic choices and relied on traditional religious personalities without, however, allowing them the opportunity to develop a notoriety that could go beyond its control.

The second category of men of religion to which the authorities would turn to were the leaders of brotherhoods, who until then had been kept at a distance. With the independence, the State, while opting for Islam, carefully referred to its scriptural aspect, other expressions and models being excluded indirectly. This concealed its will to limit the influence of other traditional religious actors, notably the brotherhood leaders. These latter were denigrated and denounced officially by the state party at the time (Mauritanian People's Party) at its 1968 congress.[6]

The marginalized brotherhood leaders of the post-colonial period were to return to the national political scene with the regional political crisis and the introduction of a multi-party system. During the blood-shattering events of 1989 between Senegal and Mauritania, the leaders were to play an important role in the reconciliation between the two countries. In fact, the ties of brotherhood between the two banks of the Senegal River are century-old. The descendants of the Moorish *shaykh(s)*, who had conquered a large population in Senegal at the beginning of the century, had retained close ties with their followers. Belonging to a brotherhood was more powerful and more concrete than belonging to a nation. The annual pilgrimages made by the faithful to the holy places of their brotherhood leaders were the expression of permanent spiritual connections. This transnational and trans-ethnic spiritual establishment allowed the network of brotherhoods to actively involve itself in the bloody conflict between the black-African community and the Moorish community. Following the 1989 events, and before the opening of the official borders, the *shaykh* brotherhoods worked for reconciliation, not only by official means, but also from the base. Relations between the *shaykh(s)* and their disciples from the two banks remained intact despite ethnic tensions. The transnational position of the brotherhood leaders earned them such sobriquets as 'the man who traverses the two banks', attributed to Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ould Talib Bouya Ould Saad Bouh when the following question was posed to Shaykh Mohamadou Ould Hamahullâh – son of the founder of Hamallism:[7] 'Of what nationality are you (Malian or Mauritanian)?'; he responded: 'My nationality is my brotherhood (*tariqa*) and all my disciples are of the same nationality as I am'.[8]

In the past few years, the brotherhoods have begun to conquer urban areas. They opened *zâwiyya* in the form of traditional educational centres in the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadibou. Although the brotherhood leaders are relatively reticent towards politicians, they have become involved during elections. They were approached from all sides by parties and political personalities to take advantage of the political influence they had to offer. However, in majority, they supported those (already) in power. The son of Hamahullâh, Shaykh Muhammadou declared: 'Ahmed Ould Daddah [president of the UFD: opposition party] came to see me. Hamdi [Hamdi Ould Maknas president of the PPD: opposition party] phoned me. I have his written request for my support. I dedicated prayers to him, as I did for Ahmed Ould Daddah and Mouawiya Ould Sid'Ahmd Taya (PRDS: Parti Republique Democratique et Social]. We are above these political divides'.[9] This displayed neutrality is only superficial, as indicated by the *shaykh* himself when he then stated: 'The people of this village asked me to advise them in their choice amongst the newly emerging parties. I suggested they go to the PRDS for the following reasons: 1 – Its leader is the leader of the State. He won the presidential elections and is more experienced than the others. 2 – He holds something in his hands, as opposed to someone who is seeking'.[10] The villages under the direct influence of the Qâdirî brotherhood leaders as well as the Tijânî vote massively in favour of the party in power, PRDS. The pluralism and opening of the – electoral – political arena facilitated the emergence of traditional leaders as important actors on the local and national political scene. The *fuqahâ'*, the brotherhood leaders and tribal leaders were mobilized, above all, for electoral purposes. These three principal actors coordinated their work in certain domains, all the while remaining in competition and rivalry in order to obtain maximal advantages in return for their service. For this reason, the alliances were often temporary and vague. It should be noted that the tribal factor was very decisive in these alliances, especially during the elections.

The traditional religious body is not homogenous, religious dignitaries grant their support to one political party or another, depending on their personal interests. They react in a social tribal framework, and often play the role of intermediary between political forces and their own tribes, at times in coordination, at others in competition, with tribal leaders. The support that some amongst them granted to the state party or to the opposition is situated more within a traditional alliance between notables than it is in an explicit political alliance. This attitude is not unique to traditional followers of religion; it is also the attitude of modernist political personalities and the vast majority of the young intellectual elite. The leaders of political parties played the game; the most progressive amongst them and the most critical towards tribalism turned to tribal alliances during their electoral campaigns.

The conservative *fuqahâ'* and the leaders of brotherhoods in majority chose for those already in power. While preaching a fundamentalist religious discourse strongly opposed to the Westernization of customs, they remained critical of militant Islam. They felt the threat represented by the new movements focusing on the young generation. Also, they situated their political and social actions in a new religious register. The Islamists, on their side, avoided direct confrontation with the *fuqahâ'* and brotherhood leaders. Nonetheless, they marked their distance with the religious interpretations and practices of that milieu; the declarations of certain streams in this respect are an open discrediting of the traditional religious order.

Thus the ulamas are accused of being 'official clerics good for legitimating any governmental action' (*Nouveaux Horizons*, N° 2, 1991, p. 5) in the same sense they are qualified as 'Ulamas of the Sultan closer to the Ummayad period than to ours' (*Nouveaux Horizons*, N° 5, 1993, p. 4). The men of brotherhood are also criticized as having diffused an archaic *Islam de spectacle* in manipulating the collective religious imagination of the masses (*Nouveaux Horizons*, N° 6 n.d., p. 6).

Islam in its orthodox form transformed itself almost into an official Islam; the men of traditional religion became more or less civil servants of the State which aimed at monopolization and manipulation of the political, social, and cultural fields. Mosques, Qur'anic schools, and institutes for higher education, are controlled directly or indirectly by the authorities in power. The emergence of new religious actors emphasized the State's control over religion and on reactivating all categories of traditional men of religion. This policy cannot halt the development of an Islam of contestation encouraged by a quest for identity, a precarious economic and social situation, the obvious social disparities and a discredited political system. ✦

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Notes

1. The data for this article do not cover the period before 1995: certain parties and political figures have changed since then. However, the spirit remains the same.
2. Art. 4, the regulation relating to promulgated political parties, 25/7/1991, by the Military Committee of National Salvation.
3. *Mauritanie Nouvelle*, N° 103, from 6 to 13 November 1994, p. 7.
4. CLAUSEN, U., *Demokratisierung in Mauretanien*, Deutsche Orient-Institut, Hamburg, 1993, p. 87.
5. *Mauritanie Nouvelle*, N° 102, from 30 Oct. to 6 Nov. 1994, p. 9.
6. *National unity: an old aspiration of our people realized within the PPM*, State Ministry on national orientation, Ministry of Information and Telecommunications, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 1975, p. 38.
7. Branch of the brotherhood Tijâniyya, founded by Hamahullah (d. 1943).
8. *Mauritanie Nouvelle*, N° 91, from 2 to 9 May 1994, p. 19.
9. Ibid, p. 20.
10. Ibid, p. 20.

Morocco

KATHERINE E. HOFFMAN

Singing the Distance
Gendered Experiences of Migration in Anti-Atlas Community Song

The virtual wholesale migration of post-pubescent males from the Igherm region of the Moroccan Anti-Atlas mountains to northern Moroccan cities and to Europe leaves women and young children to inhabit the mountain villages for most of the year. Migrants retain strong emotional and economic links to their home villages, which they reaffirm during the annual summer return. This scattering of people makes it difficult to circumscribe the boundaries of any given local community. But people try to do just that through collectively-produced song: poetry sung in the local Berber vernacular, Tashelhit. Both the implicit rules that govern which individuals sing out and what they literally say articulate ideas about where community boundaries begin and end in the Anti-Atlas, and about how people make sense of the emotional and social ramifications of human movement.

Although some migrant men take their wives and children to Casablanca with them, most women experience migration from their remote mountain villages, watching people and goods come and go, which constantly remind them of their ruralness and the combination of disdain and nostalgia with which city dwellers perceive their way of life. More immediate concerns are tending the sparse, rain-fed barley fields and the animals which provide the staple of their diet, and ensuring peaceful social relations. The work of maintaining community in these unforgiving hills involves ensuring coherence within social groups, establishing where alliances begin and end, and carefully overseeing movements in and out of the villages. This constant monitoring helps ensure a level of comfort within volatile social and economic constraints.

Remittances from migrant workers have been subsidizing the females who stay behind and keep Anti-Atlas traditions alive since at least the first quarter of this century, when French colonial ethnographers began documenting village demographics. One local oral tradition is the call and response genre of *tizrarin* sung poetry, which is sung in four to six-part verses. The *tizrarin* are not flashy; they require bare voices with no accompanying drumming, musical instruments or dancing. They will probably never make it into the 'folklore' circuit performed in package tour hotels in Moroccan cities. Instead, the verses are performed by village females off-stage, so to speak, marking liminal moments and spaces: when people are sitting waiting to be served meals, riding in the back of a pickup truck from the bride's village to that of the groom, or welcoming guests into a village.

These sung verses are never the explicit focus of attention, yet they perform the important function of suggesting cohesion in potentially messy situations, which inevitably characterize gatherings of 300-500 people. Women, both through the practice of singing *tizrarin* and in the words themselves, reaffirm the bonds linking villages and tribes by articulating communally-held norms. Interdependence may be articulated explicitly, such as in the verse sung by a grandmother sitting with the bride's fellow villagers at the home of the groom ▼

a yen anga nkki dun yen shur nsherik
nsherik idek yuta d li'yun arsan nit
u le tagwwa inagh nswa nsu winun

We are one, me and you, we share walls
we share with you boundaries, springs, they remain as they are
and the seguias that nourish us, we drink from yours.

There are significant differences between themes treated by females of a younger generation. Unmarried girls, who presumably have little experience managing inter-village social relations, are more likely to sing about the pain that accompanies parting, whether due to marriage or to migration to the cities ▼

allahu akbar adunit takufremt
ar ukwan taTat mdden wakha suln

By God I swear, the world is a heathen
it divides people although they're still alive.

allah ihanikum a tamdakult a rbbi bdanagh
ighkm tektir ar talagh ighkm tugh henagh

Farewell oh my friend, God divided us
If I remember you I'll cry, if I forget you I'll be fine.

Females who spend the year in the city without hearing these verses cannot produce them even if they understand and can speak Tashelhit, which is not the case for many contemporary schooled city-dwellers, despite their mountain origins. Females who divide the year evenly between city and village tend to have a passive familiarity with the verses but remain quiet. This leaves the year-long mountain residents to sing out. Appropriately enough, the lyrics of their verses reflect very local experience.

The significance of locality takes on a different meaning for migrant villagers estranged from their lands than for the year-round residents. In the Anti-Atlas, this corresponds roughly to a gender division. One recurring theme illustrates this division: that of the *tamazirt*, a word that could be glossed as 'homeland,' or 'countryside,' as well as the more generic 'place.' Both Arabic and Berber-speaking Moroccans presume that for Tashelhit speakers, the homeland *is* the countryside. At an earlier historical moment this may have been true, but generations of rural-urban migration have complicated such an elision.

Male migrants and female villagers dwell differently in the *tamazirt*. Experiences of place are reflected in song as well as everyday terminology. For urban dwellers, the *tamazirt* is a concept, an almost fictive land, a place that in reality they visit about once a year – hence the kind of objectification that leads them to celebrate the concept of the *tamazirt* homeland and its accompanying *amarg*, that is, its 'mood' or 'music.' These two concepts inspired the refrain of one performance of Igherm-area men's collective song and dance (*ahawash*), in which the chorus juxtaposed the terms, singing '*tama tamazirt, amarg amarg, ay*.' Although the lyrics merely accompanied the group dance and drumming, and arguably were not the highlight, it is notable nonetheless that the lyrics were sung by men back from their jobs working in corner grocery stores in Casablanca. Urban dwellers are familiar with mass Moroccan media which posits rural collective song as a symbol of Berber custom; some men taking a break from their *ahawash* even asked this foreign researcher what she thought of their '*folklore*.' It is precisely such objectification of what constitutes local community and customs that can lead to a song refrain which draws on the experience of reflection itself.

In contrast to objectification of the homeland, year-round mountain residents use the term *tamazirt* to mean an inhabited land or a place which can be as small as a hamlet or as large as a nation-state. What migrant men talk about as *the* tamazirt, is for year-round residents a highly-diversified conglomeration of multiple *timizarn*, multiple inhabited places. Women talk informally about how much they want to flee the hard labour of the *tamazirt* for urban conveniences and a break from agricultural work. But their public use of the term *tamazirt* does not imply an urban counterpoint.

One example comes from a grandmother in her mid-50's who refers to the *tamazirt* ('*tamazar*', altered to fit the song metre) as a place, assuming the voice of the bride. She sings ▼

a haii fkigh y timizar ur khaliDagh
ur iyi gis baba ur gis imi qanDgh
ur iyi gis id dada magh imalan

Here I am I was given to a tamazar I'm not familiar with
my father isn't here, my mother isn't here, I'm lonely
there's no older brother to show me how to behave.

In another verse, a woman articulates the widespread Anti-Atlas norm of respecting the boundaries of places that are not one's own ▼

igh ilkm yen imi n tamazirt irard aDar
ardas nan ait tamazirt marhaba serk

If you arrive at the edge of a tamazirt pull back your foot
until the people of that tamazirt welcome you there.

Regardless of whether they spend the bulk of the year in cities or mountains, people attached to the Anti-Atlas are hyper-aware of movement. Men move from the countryside to the city to earn a living. For many women, the most significant move they will undertake is from their parents' home to that of their groom. Marriage in rural Morocco is more about this move than about romance. The common Tashelhit way of saying 'she is going to marry a boy in a place called Tililit' (*tra Tililit*) means 'she is going to Tililit' or literally, 'she wants Tililit'. The theme of movement is reflected in wedding verses, their lyrics reinforced by their being sung while moving and in liminal moments ▶

zayd aoudi zayd ukkan ima lrzq ad gan dar moulay rbbi
ar tawin yen silin ur itm

Go on, my dear, go on still fate is in the Lord's hands
it takes one to places we never would have dreamed.

arja ditawin ay aman arJa jalnas
ad saram yawigh a tamazirt igan darnagh

The hope that you have for finding water that runs from you,
brings you to a land that is ours, that you haven't seen.

wallah amkd usigh aDar a ilih nsen,
is ur inkhalaf ghid d lmakaninu

By God, you won't put down your foot
until we know that this place isn't different from my place.

The grandmothers who act as gatekeepers between the mountain hamlets are the ones authorized to call out such verses. Girls are less interested in maintaining community boundaries than they are in crossing them – whenever possible – to visit saints' tombs or relatives, attend weddings, or any occasion that will broaden their familiarity with the social and geographical landscape.

Migrants are an integral and crucial component of village communities and economies, providing the necessary revenue to sustain the rural population as well as the widely-valued symbolic capital of urban familiarity which they share with villagers during their annual return. The two poles of what sustains the concept of the *tamazirt* – men in the cities who make money and women in the countryside who work their men's fields and maintain family honour – are the people whose voices are heard in collectively-produced community music. Women's singing of the *tizrarin* genre of sung poetry in liminal moments solidifies ties between rural communities and expresses normative emotional aspects of the ways villagers and urban migrants alike experience the displacement of migration. Life for year-round residents of the Anti-Atlas mountains is a balancing act between two extremes of human existence: *temara*, 'hard labour' and *laab* or *lhwa*, 'playing,' which often implies music. 'Playing' brings together the different components of Anti-Atlas communities, but their differential roles in musical production reflect their social roles in maintaining the idea and tangibility of the homeland. Participating in the singing signals adherence to a group with which members share daily labours and simple joys. Just like with words in these communities, it is perhaps less important what one says than the fact that one says something. ✦

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South Africa
ABDULKADER TAYOB

Transitional Islamic Identities in Southern Africa

Until recently, observers were generally unaware of the Islamic presence in southern Africa. It was assumed that Islam, in its southern spread, stopped somewhere around Lake Malawi. Little was known about the arrival of Muslims in the slave hulls of colonialism and during nineteenth-century international trade in sugar, gold and British manufactured goods. This obscurity changed dramatically when groups of Muslims joined anti-apartheid demonstrations in the 1980s, which the international media beamed across the world. Since then, Islam has taken its small but influential place in the media mosaic of southern Africa. In some cases Muslims are important social and political leaders in the region, emerging as champions of dramatic campaigns.

Imams in Capetown, 1991

Islam in South Africa consists of a number of communities that together constitute a broad Islamic presence in the region. In spite of the 'universal nature' of Islam, one which Muslims certainly espouse and experience, plural identities are deeply inscribed in religious institutions and rituals. Muslims in South Africa constitute a cosmopolitan group consisting of a variety of ethnicities, language groups, and social classes. These were formed by a combination of willing and unwilling immigrants during various periods of colonial rule and apartheid, and more recently, indigenous peoples who have converted to Islam. These identities are historically unequal: The economic support of Indians for mosques, in alliance with a particular religious outlook, dominates Islam in South Africa, but other identities continue to thrive. Ironically, the particular history of South Africa, especially its apartheid conundrum, gave concrete shape to an Islamic universalism with two broad tendencies. One supported the nation-building exercise of the new South Africa; the other espoused an exclusionist Islamic position. Both, in one way or another, placed an emphasis on relationships among the local communities, the nation and the international Muslim *umma*.

Muslims first arrived on the southern tip of Africa in 1658 from the Indonesian archipelago. For the next 150 years, a steady stream of political exiles, convicts and slaves from the islands of Southeast Asia and some parts of India, established the foundations of what came to be called the 'Cape Malays'. Shaykh Yusuf, a political exile banished to the Cape in 1694, has become a founding symbol for this first Muslim community in South Africa. However, Muslims were only allowed to establish mosques and schools in the nineteenth century, over a hundred years after Shaykh Yusuf's landing. Since then, however, they have become one of the most significant groups in Cape Town. A second distinct group of Muslims arrived from India from 1860 onwards as British indentured labour on sugar plantations, and a little later as independent traders, merchants and hawkers. The latter contributed to the building of mosques, schools and cemeteries, and have since lived mainly, but not exclusively, in the northern and eastern regions of the country. Muslims from further north, particularly Malawi, but also Zanzibar, form the third component of South African Muslims. Although less influential than the Malays or Indians, they have also contributed to the particular ethos of Islam in South Africa. Finally, conversion has formed another distinct group: During the nineteenth century, the Cape Town region witnessed significant conversion of indigenous people who were assimilated into the Cape Malay community. Missionary activity since the 1950s has led to a more distinctive and notable presence of indigenous African Muslims in the townships of South Africa. They constitute the fourth visible group of the heterogeneous Muslim presence.

South African Muslims represent only 0.2 percent of the total population. While Muslims themselves had given their numbers as close to one million, the last government statistics published in 1991 recorded only 324,400. Nevertheless, Muslims in South Africa are a highly visible urban group concentrated in the major cities of Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. They are now well represented in government and in professions such as medicine, accountancy and law. The economic base in the past had been business and trade among Indians, and building and craftsmanship among the Cape Malays. They have come a long way from being slaves, indentured labourers and hawkers. Muslims from Malawi, however, have been less economically successful as labourers in factories, farms, and forestry.

In 1922, the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal was formed to represent the aspirations of imams and religious scholars. Since then, similar associations have followed, representing different regions and religious orientations. These have played a significant role in promoting Islam. A number of welfare and youth groups also serve the community and express a variety of orientations among Muslims. Sometimes, they represent particular political approaches, such as with the Claremont Muslim Youth Association of 1957 or the Call of Islam in 1983.

The role and place of Muslim women in South African society should be mentioned separately. In the western Cape, they contribute significantly to the financial well-being of the household. This was the case in Durban and Johannesburg as well, but most often in the context of family businesses in which women's contributions were not clearly reflected or acknowledged. Most Muslim homes do not strictly define gender spheres, but men and women generally gravitate around living rooms and kitchens, respectively. The religious sector, however, does not reflect this more liberal social space. Women experts in religious sciences are rare. In the western Cape, there exists a more egalitarian understanding of women's rights within Islam. Women play a large role in religious organizations including anchorpersons at community radio stations, women's movements and more traditional Mawlid organizations. However, under the tutelage of the powerful mosque imams and the dominant interpretations of Islam, a more egalitarian approach to the woman's place in South African Islam is severely limited. The overwhelming majority of religious leaders have resisted any explicit change in this respect, even as Muslim women make progress outside the mosques.

In a forthcoming book from University Press Florida entitled *Mosques, Imams and Sermons*, I have explored the meaning of Islam through some of its enduring institutions, notably the mosque and the imam. These latter are regarded, in the study, as patterns and institutions that shape expectations and future directions for Muslims. A mosque is not simply a building within which religious obligations are performed. More than that, it is an institution developed in the context of a specific history by individuals who make a variety of religious and political choices. In this regard, the history of colonialism and apartheid and a particular understanding of the Hanafi, Shafii, Ashari, and Deobandi approaches have shaped mosques and imams in South Africa.

One can say that Islam in South Africa, and particularly its institutions, reflect the tenacity of a religious group that has been able to withstand a long history of prejudice and denial. Against all odds, they built mosques, schools and welfare organizations and maintained their religious obligations in tightly knit communities on the margins of the greater society. Thus, in spite of their small numbers, there is a mosque in almost every town of South Africa. From the 1950s onwards, however, many Muslims in South Africa began to make tentative moves in the broader social space. Greater and more widespread exposure to modern education led to greater mobility, which has led to an intense debate on how to relate to Islam in the modern world. At the time, the modernization of society was enmeshed with the challenge of apartheid and the debate on how Muslims should respond to it. Not many Muslims openly supported apartheid, but there were many that placed the preservation of the community above the need to stand up for justice. As apartheid drew to a close, the difference between traditionalists and modernists widened, and continues today.

In post-apartheid South Africa, Muslims are redefining themselves in relation to the nation-state, democracy, and human rights. These are the challenges thrown by the State to Muslim individuals and communities as the greater South African society enters the global community. The country's constitution makes provisions for Muslim personal law, which must be in conformity with the bill of rights. Some Muslims, led by the *ulama*, insist that the right to freedom of worship takes precedence over the equality clauses. A small group of Muslims believe that Islamic law may be interpreted in such a way that the basic rights of all are not violated. This is but one example of issues facing Muslims today.

This change since the first democratic elections is not restricted to social and political issues. One can even suggest that Muslims are beginning to rediscover their religious roots because apartheid had cast a shadow on the social and political responses of all religions. There is a visible and palpable increase in Sufi groupings in the country.

Muslims in South Africa can be compared to the recently formed communities in Australia, Europe and North America. Their institutions reflect a modern history of Christian or European dominance of over three hundred years. Some of the choices that Muslims have made during this time may be seen in the contemporary struggles and challenges they face in these regions. Perhaps the history of South Africa may provide interesting ideas for reflection. On the other hand, the politics of apartheid has produced a particular relation with modernity and globalization. It has tended to insulate, and isolate, Muslim communities. Muslims in South Africa can learn a great deal from these much newer communities in more open, democratic societies. ✦

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Further reading

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Ottoman Empire

ELIZABETH FRIERSON

The Debatability of Islam in Late-Ottoman Serials and Censorship

The Hamidian cheap illustrated press was a highly productive arena for debate on Ottoman identities, including discussions of Muslim inflections of daily life, and of patriotic duties and responsibilities. By the end of the century, this debate involved not only hundreds of new professional journalists, but also readers who responded critically to editorials, articles, and advertisements. In addition, the several branches of the Hamidian bureaucracy which participated in censorship – Ministries of Education, Interior, and Police, and other inspection and judiciary offices competed against each other to promote or delimit client publications and journalists.

Once pan-Islamic ideology and Muslim identity became part of official ideology in the Hamidian era, then Islam became debatable, and was debated widely and by far more participants in a public forum than ever before. Journalists, readers, and censors have left a far-reaching record of newly expanded public debate on a variety of topics. A close study reveals subtler and unexpected readings of Islam by newly literate participants in the serial press, as well as alignments of political influence revealed by conflict among and with Hamidian censors over Islam in particular. For example, letters to the editor and conflicting editorials show different, wider perspectives over what, precisely, writers and readers thought was loyal and patriotic to the Ottoman state and sultan. Increasingly in the 1890s and 1900s, loyalty and patriotism, as well as public propriety, were inflected with discussions of Islam, and in many ways which do not always fit into our current notions about how Islam and modernity were debated.

The cheap illustrated press brings forth findings by others (Davison, B. Lewis, McCarthy, Mardin, van Zürcher, to name a few) that Islam came to bear a greater weight as a component of ethnic identity from the 1890s onwards. In this sense, being Muslim acquired much more significance as a public marker of identity towards the middle and end of the Hamidian era, as reforms and rhetoric carried out in the name of a modern Islamic monarchy began to bear fruit among the growing adult literate population. For example, in the cheap illustrated press, Muslims began to play the part of moral and patriotic exemplars, (see illustration) often contrasted with local or foreign Christians, who were increasingly presented as the miscreants in cautionary tales about immorality, criminality, lack of Ottoman patriotism, or just plain weird and freakish behaviours. For example, multiple births to Muslim mothers were reported as *bereket-i tenasül* (abundance or blessing of reproduction), a title with a decidedly positive air, as when the wife of Ismail ibn Shaʿban gave birth to triplets, two boys and one girl, all in fine health and 'among the living'. Births to minority Ottoman women often carried a far different inflection, as with the report of a deformed baby on the island of Patras, with the deformities described in painful detail, or when the editors of a ladies' weekly gazette reported with horror the murder of a child on the island of Rhodes. In Istanbul, the largely Christian minority and European neighbourhood of Galata was the site of shocking chid-related events as well, as described in an article entitled 'Birth in the Streets'. This short item described a woman who was walking in the streets of Galata when she felt her first labour pains and took refuge in a tavern, where she gave birth. Female breaches of propriety were not limited to family matters, though, as proven by the long-running career of a gypsy pickpocket operating at ferry stops.

Illustration 2:14

Clearly being Muslim in the Hamidian era came to hold a number of new or altered valences of identity, especially in attempting to keep separate the distinct *millet*s which social Darwinist notions threatened to blur into a few scientifically flattened categories of human being. There are also some indicators in the cheap illustrated press that lay and non-elite members of society were beginning to re-evaluate Islamic models of male and female piety for the rapidly changing social and economic conditions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This has led me to explore the possibility that this increase in journalistic attention to Muslim identity in the public sphere was accompanied by a spiritual reappraisal of Islam, especially among the non-elite sectors of society represented by the readership (and 'listenership') of the illustrated gazettes. I was unable to come up with definitive conclusions on this point, and so continue to re-read print and archival sources with these questions in mind. Suggestions and feedback would be most welcome. ✦

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Note:

– My findings are drawn mainly from archival records, and from publications of loyalists and the loyal opposition of the Hamidian era from 1876-1908/9, with limited reference to Young Turk publications. A fuller discussion of foreign/local and Muslim/non-Muslim identities can be found in my essay, 'Mirrors Out, Mirrors In: Domestication and rejection of the foreign in late-Ottoman women's magazines (1875-1908)' in the forthcoming volume from SUNY Press, edited by D. Fairchild Ruggles, *Women, Patronage, and Self-Representation in Islamic Societies.*

Continued from front page: Digital Islam / *by Peter Mandaville*

It is usually amongst the diasporic Muslims of the Western world that we find the Internet being appropriated for political purposes. The American media has recently been full of scare-mongering about 'radical fundamentalists' who use the United States as a fundraising base for their overseas operations. Reports often cite the Internet as a primary tool for the dissemination of propaganda by Islamic militants. A more sober examination of the situation, however, reveals that very few of the Muslim groups who have a presence on the Internet are involved in this sort of activity. Moreover, there are also those who argue that the Internet has actually had a moderating effect on Islamist discourse. Saʿad al-Faqih, for example, believes that Internet chat rooms and discussion forums devoted to the debate of Islam and politics serve to encourage greater tolerance. He believes that in these new arenas one sees a greater convergence in the centre of the Islamist political spectrum and a weakening of its extremes.

Thus, for the overwhelming majority of Muslims who seek Islam online, the Internet is a forum for the conduct of politics *within* their religion. In the absence of sanctioned information from recognized institutions, Muslims are increasingly taking religion into their own hands. Through various popular newsgroups and e-mail discussion lists, Muslims can solicit information about what 'Islam' says about any particular problem. Not only that, notes al-Faqih, 'but someone will be given information about what Islam says about such and such and then others will write in to correct or comment on this opinion/interpretation'. Instead of having to go down to the mosque in order to elicit the advice of the local *mullah*, Muslims can also now receive supposedly 'authoritative' religious pronouncements via the various e-mail *fatwa* services which have sprung up in recent months. The Sheikhs of al-Azhar are totally absent, but the enterprising young *mullah* who sets himself up with a colourful website in Alabama suddenly becomes a high-profile representative of Islam for a particular constituency.[5] Due to the largely anonymous nature of the Internet, one can also never be sure whether the 'authoritative' advice received via these services is coming from a classically-trained religious scholar or an electrical engineer moonlighting as an amateur *ʿalim*.

More than anything else, the Internet and other information technologies provide spaces where diasporic Muslims can go in order to find others 'like them'. It is in this sense that we can speak of the Internet as allowing Muslims to create a new form of imagined community, or a re-imagined *umma*. The Muslim spaces of the Internet hence offer a reassuring set of symbols and a terminology which attempt to reproduce and recontextualize familiar settings and terms of discourse in locations far remote from those in which they were originally embedded. As has become apparent, the encounter between Islam and the transnational technologies of communication is as multifaceted as the religion itself. The rise of IT has led to considerable intermingling and dialogue between disparate interpretations of what it means to be 'Islamic' and the politics of authenticity which inevitably ensue from this also serve to further fragment traditional sources of authority, such that the locus of 'real' Islam and the identity of those who are permitted to speak on its behalf become ambiguous. This, in many ways, is an Islam with a distinctly modern, or perhaps even *post*-modern ring to it. The vocabulary here is eclectic, combining soundbites of religious knowledge into novel fusions well suited to complex, transnational contexts. Most importantly, the changing connotations of authority and authenticity in digital Islam appear to be contributing to the critical re-imagination of the boundaries of Muslim politics. ✦

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Notes

1. Geoffrey Roper (1995), 'Faris al-Shidyaq and the Transition from Scribal to Print Culture in the Middle East', in: George N. Atiyeh (ed.), *The Book in the Islamic World: The Written Word and Communication in the Middle East*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1995, p. 210.
2. See http://www.miraserve.com/
3. Ulf Hannerz (1996), *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, London: Routledge, p. 21.
4. Jon Anderson (1996), 'Islam & the Globalization of Politics'. Paper presented to the Council on Foreign Relations Muslim Politics Study Group, New York City, June 25, 1996, p. 1.
5. Some of these sites are registering several thousand hits per day. Their users are often 'nomadic', spending several days or weeks in one discussion forum before moving on to populate another site.

Former Czechoslovakia
MILOŠ MENDEL

Beginnings of the Muslim Religious Community in Former Czechoslovakia

Historically, the Czech experience with Islam was mainly influenced by the 'Turkish Menace' (the 150-year Ottoman presence in Hungary, including land which later became southern Slovakia, and the two Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683). Due to its geographical location and the nature of its historical development, however, the territory of historical Czech Lands (Bohemia and Moravia) never actually had direct contact with Islamic civilization.

Brikcius a few days before his death in1959

There were, of course, marginal contacts on the medieval commercial routes running through the Lands, the negligible participation of the Premyslid Dynasty in the Crusades to the Holy Land, and individual journeys of discovery made by Czech burghers and nobles to the Islamic East. The cultural influence of Islam was also tepid, evidenced only in the orientalist trend of the contemporary nobles (Turkish and other Islamic motifs in fashion and architecture, e.g. the Romantic minaret from the turn of the 18th century at the Liechtenstein estate in Lednice, Southern Moravia) and in certain elements of the urban lifestyle ('Turkish' coffee houses in Prague, etc.). The modern Czech experience with Islam has been, however, somewhat more varied, yet always mediated and shaped within the context of the political rivalry between the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire.

The situation changed markedly only after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 and full annexation in 1908. Thereafter, Bohemia and Moravia were components of a state body which incorporated a significant Islamic community. At first, the Bosnian (as well as Croat) Muslims resisted Austrian intervention, but during the period leading up to World War I, the Muslim national organizations used professed loyalty to the Habsburg authority to fend off the radical nationalism of the Serbs and Croats. Of course, the Austrian annexation brought no important economic benefits to the Bosnian population; some Muslims even took advantage of the mobility within the new borders to seek work elsewhere. From 1878 to 28 October 1918 (foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic), there was a continuous latent migration of 'Bosnians' to the northern regions of the monarchy. Most were minor craftsmen, confectioners, ice cream manufacturers, grocers, and university students in Prague and Brno.

By 15 July 1912, the demographic charges had eventually led to Emperor Franz Josef I's signing of Act no. 159/1912 of the Imperial Code in Bad Ischl, by which the State henceforth recognized the 'Hanafite Islamic religious rite'. On the basis of this Act, the Hanafite *madhad* was 'to be understood within the Crown Lands and those Lands represented in the Imperial Council as a religious community in the sense of the basic constitutional law of 21-12-1867', i.e. the December Constitution, which legally anchored the new constitutional framework as part of Austro-Hungarian settlement. The Act demanded that legal and ritual norms be upheld so as to comply with the established legal customs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Act permitted the participation of *ulama'* from Bosnia in setting up and running the communities within the Empire. However, their work had to be monitored and if it was felt to contravene the 'public interest', it could be forcibly disbanded. In terms of later development, the key section of the Act was para. 7, which stated that 'concerning the marriages of adherents of Islam and the maintenance of birth, marriage and death records' one's own (secular) regulations had to be applied.

The year 1918 marked the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy, but the previous demographic movements did not abate with the creation of the new borders. Many of the Balkan Muslims who had settled in the territory, which had become the Czechoslovak Republic, decided to remain and others were attracted by the better economic situation as well as by previous business and family relationships. These were soon joined by the numerous Islamic emigrants from the Soviet Union (especially the Cherkess and the Tartars). Only in the mid-1930s did the Muslims, mostly residing in Prague and Brno, begin to form a religious association. Before then, only individuals gathered spontaneously to practise Islamic rituals – usually with members of the same nationality.

The first considerations about the establishment of an Islamic community were concretized by the end of 1934. The mixed group of both foreign and Czech individuals assembled a group of practising Prague Muslims to found the 'Muslim Religious Community for Czechoslovakia with a Centre in Prague'. The participants agreed to ascertain the number of Prague Muslims and to evaluate their willingness to take part in building up a community, to obtain as much information as possible about one another, to organize educative and cautious missionary activities and to construct a mosque in Prague. The Community was then solemnly founded on April 25, 1935 as an assembly, which included 'numerous sympathizers' from the Prague intelligentsia, business circles interested in trading with Islamic countries and the diplomatic missions of Islamic states.

Four basic components contributed to the birth of the Community: a) foreign Muslims living in CSR; b) foreign Islamic institutions; c) representative bodies of some Islamic states; and d) Czech converts. Available archive materials reveal that the Community was the focus of a mostly stable set of foreign practising Muslims, who saw in their participation in the Community, an opportunity to reinforce their own spiritual identity amidst a 'foreign' civilization, to organize Islamic rituals in collectivity and to broaden societal life in the spirit of their own traditions. The idea of vehemently spreading the Islamic mission never seemed to be in the forefront – perhaps only because of the foreigners' caution in their relations to the Czech state authorities, which did not seem to express a particular understanding for the Community's purposes. On the government's side, the Ministry of Culture and Education, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice alike, repeatedly postponed and administratively complicated the Community's demands for recognition and some facilities throughout the entire period of the '30s. Even the authorities of *Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren* after 15 March 1939 did not take much notice of the group of foolish 'exhibitionists', excepting the occasional suspicion of citizens of foreign origin.

Besides the 'foreign' Muslims, in terms of modern Czech history (and even current thinking on 'Euro-Islam'), the rather small group of Czechoslovak citizens who had converted to Islam, is worthy of special mention. It was they who made the greatest efforts in spreading the faith in the CSR. The most influential figure among them was Alois Bohdan Brikcius, who assumed the name Mohammed Abdullah after conversion. In addition, his name in his books and in certain official documents is often preceded by the honorary title *Hadji*, which Brikcius had the right to bear as a member of the 1933 pilgrimage to Mecca. This was shortly after accepting the Islamic faith in the French colony of Djibouti with his second wife Marie through the decree of a local *qadi*.

Brikcius was certainly a complex personality to whom the author of this article cannot do justice without a certain subjective impression, even after so many years and with an almost complete documentary background available. The only sources missing are those concerning his alleged imprisonment, having been sentenced to eight years on the basis of president Edvard Beneš' 'little decree', punishing pro-Nazi collaborators.

Brikcius' positive, strongly romantic and emotional relationship with the Arabs and Islamic civilization had been shaped in his youth in the '20s. This rapport was developed during his journeys to the Middle East and had ripened in a context of the international political situation, especially in terms of the British and French rule over much of the Islamic world. Brikcius had some bad experiences with the British authorities. As a European Muslim he was treated with suspicion in India as well as East Africa, and, together with his Muslim friends, he perceived the arrogance of the colonial authorities as a humiliating conspiracy. In this spirit he was also willing to understand the sympathy of the Turks and many Arab nationalists to the Third Reich. This simplified vision prevented him from seeing the danger posed by Nazism to his own country (although unambiguous signs of a tense right-wing nationalism can be found in his pre-Protectorate texts), as well as that posed by Nazi racial theory to his beloved Arabs. His beliefs reached their climax in the years of war, when in *Hlas* (Voice), the mouthpiece of the Community, he had published a couple of purely anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi articles.

Brikcius' image of Islam as a remarkable civilization rather than a religious system can especially be seen in his books and articles. He worked mostly as a journalist in the *Prague Midday Paper* and in the *Vlajka* (The Banner) journal of the Czech Fascists. Only there and in the Community's *Hlas* did he have the opportunity to formulate his sharpest critiques of Britain, 'Jewish Bolshevism' and Zionism and never stopped informing those persuaded Arabs and other Muslims that Germany would rid them of Western colonialism, Marxism and the 'Zionist conspiracy'. However, nowhere in the archive material does Brikcius express sympathy for Nazi ideology as such. Unlike him, most other Czech Muslims of a younger generation lived in a kind of schizophrenia concerning prevailing pro-Nazi feelings in many Islamic countries. In the post-war political milieu, they changed their views immediately.

In their ideas, Brikcius and his adherents were unable to define a clear boundary between Islam as a religious system (or at least a civilization based thereupon) and the actual political situation. When Hadji professed his admiration of Islam, he often referred to its humiliation – most frequently in the form of the betrayal and exploitation of Arabs by the English in 1916 and 1917 in following their own colonial interests. He was a romantic, a person who sincerely and spontaneously adored the Islamic world of deserts, oases and urban oriental architecture, just as he did the openness and hospitality of the local populations. On the other hand, as a leader of a Muslim community, he did not always have very precise ideas about Islamic countries and customs, the peripeteia of Islamic legislation and the plurality of modern currents of Islamic thought.

The Czech Muslim community was at least recognized in December 1941, in the darkest days of Czechoslovak history. No wonder that after May 1945, when the presidential 'decrees' were implemented, all the laws and decrees from the years of occupation were eliminated. Thus, neither the 'First Republic' nor the post-war democratic regime was ready to accept an 'innocent' Muslim group in the midst of the Czech society. It is quite natural that after the Communist takeover (February 1948) the Muslim community practically ceased to exist. The life of Muslims under the Communist rule and after the political events of the year 1989 is a story of quite another chapter of the Czech contemporary history. ✦

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Western Europe

JOCELYNE CESARI

Pluralism in the Context of Globlalization **European Muslim Youth**

Nearly seven million Muslims live in Western Europe, their presence being the unforeseen consequence of migration flows towards the continent at the beginning of the 1960s. Later, during the 1972-4 recession, European immigration policy drastically changed: Governments halted labour immigration yet allowed for family reunification. From the 1970s, religious and cultural dimensions did become important issues in relations between Muslim communities and European societies since the contact surface had been greatly expanded. Islam is a major aspect of this settlement process in terms of the increasing need for mosques, halal butcheries, Koranic schools or Muslim cemeteries.

Around these issues arise questions, doubts, and sometimes-violent oppositions, all linked to the integration of these newcomers in different national communities. The confrontation no longer has the temporary, discreet or even shameful character as it did in the 1950s. Islam is a stable religion with adepts that demonstrate a growing will to be recognized. Muslims are becoming increasingly politically active, reinforced by the emergence of the 'second generation'. This is why the main migration issues are now cultural and political, not only economic. It is noteworthy that it was not until the '80s that Islam became the focus of attention. This resulted from a number of international incidents, such as the Islamic revolution in Iran, the civil war in Lebanon, the Rushdie Affair, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It was suggested that a connection existed between Islamic fundamentalism, as it was developing in many Muslim countries, and the migrant groups in Europe. This contributes to Islam still being defined as a 'problem'. Often only conflict situations, as seen in the Rushdie Affair in Britain or the 'headscarves affair' in France, are taken into account to define Islam in Europe.

This Islam-as-a-threat approach implies a major misperception. It neglects the important transformations in Islamic identity in general and among the new generations born or educated in the West in particular. With the settlement of Muslim groups, the controversial question of Islam and modernity is actually transferred from the Muslim context to that of the West. The key debate on compatibility of Islamic values with secular organizing principles of Western societies, a debate very well known to the Muslim world, is still going on, only this time within the Western democracies. In Europe, the debate does not concern Islamic governance as it does in Muslim societies, but rather the experience of pluralism and democracy. This question must be placed in a dynamic perspective, taking the new context into account. In others words, being a minority in Europe implies deep change in Muslim identities and practices, especially among the new generations born in the West. A relevant analysis should thus take into account changes that concern not only the Muslim groups, but also the host societies. In this perspective, multiculturalism seems to become a real issue, redefining public space as it now means competition amongst differing claims to universalism. Embracing this new phenomenon requires an integrated approach to the main features of Muslims groups and European societies as well. This scientific posture goes beyond the simplistic vision of Islam as a threat; it considers Islam as contributory to the process of integration.

A point worthy of mention here is the competition between ethnic and Islamic ties, which is responsible for the most important cleavages among Muslim communities in Europe. This can be partly attributed to the emergence of 'new Muslims'. This means, on the one hand, new elaboration and discussions on the minority condition, and on the other had, new practices and identifications to Islam.

With reference to the minority condition, the introduction of Islam into democratic societies contributes to changing the terms of the ongoing 'Islam and democracy' debate as far as tolerance and pluralism are concerned. This may pose a challenge as most European Muslims come from countries where Islam is either the religion of the State or the majority.[1] New ways of reflecting upon the Minority condition are now in debate among Muslims in the West by which conventional interpretations of Islamic tradition are being reformulated.[2]

Concerning practices, the major change is in the process of individualization and privatization of Islam. Membership to a post-migration religious minority affects the Islamic identification among contemporary Muslim youth. New forms of religiosity defined by individualism, secularism and privatization replace with increasing frequency the uprooted Islam of the first generation. This emergence of the individual is partially the consequence of the migration process. The process engenders differences in value transmission. For example, among North African migrants, the gap between the values of the first generation and those of their children is more pronounced than among other migrant groups. Parents, for instance, belonging to the working class in French society, have struggled to maintain the cultural system of their country of origin; while their children have been more socialized by French institutions such as schools and social work. Arabic language capacity as well as various cultural practices are lost. The growth of a 'vernacular' Islam in Europe is the most interesting sign of this change. Increasingly, sermons, literature and public discussions are being conveyed in the local European language.

Islam is now embodied in a paradigm of secularization that was, until now, the major specificity of Western society. This means the decline of religious references in structural differentiation of society. Individualization means a sharpening of self-consciousness, privileging personal choice over the constraints of religious tradition. This individualization is most often associated with privatization. This term means that religion is more confined to the private sphere and that religious values and rules are not placed at the centre of one's personal orientation to life, but rather is conceived of as a kind of annex or compartment. As with European Christians, many Muslims now experience religion only during large festivals, at birth, marriage and death. In this way, European Islam is similar to other European religions, especially among the youth. Like 'consumers', people are increasingly choosing which tenets and rules of their religion to recognize and which to ignore. The inculcation of Western values through the educational systems certainly has an influence and can explain the emphasis on critical debate and reflexive questioning.

But individualization as well as reflexive questioning can also be associated with collective and social identification to religion. In others words, fundamentalism or strict observance are also the outcome of individual choice. Thus, within one generation, one can simultaneously observe a wholesale abandonment of Muslim attachments and the attraction of Islam as a global symbol of resistance to Western political and cultural imperialism.[3]

Our own field experience allows us to assert that the rediscovery of Islam can take various forms. First, it is a credible option for those who experienced unemployment, drug and alcohol use, and delinquency. It enabled some youth to recover personal dignity and to project a better image of themselves. This is a classic use of religion as salvation. Second, most of these 'new Muslims' actually come from European societies' middle classes. They want to reaffirm their identity and live according to Islamic teachings, while trying to avoid the temptations of the non-Muslim environment. This identification to Islam, despite common opinion, is not exclusively the expression of an opposition to the West, but often results in an affirmation of self-confidence among young Muslims. Many of these latter are coming back to an Islam 'purified' from the 'accidents' of its traditional readings. For the more educated, it is no longer an Islam of the Moroccan, Algerian or Pakistani countryside, but rather a 'return to the basics' of Islamic teaching direct contact with its sources, the Koran and Sunna. Islam in the West should have a specific and appropriate actualization. This is the message the youth are clearly conveying.

The current reflection on the Koran and Sunna serves to question the relevance of the old concepts of Dar Al-Islam versus Dar Al-Harb. This classic terminology is no longer appropriate to describe the condition of Muslim citizens in the context of secularized democracies. Accordingly, opinions of the ulama in the Muslim world on the situation of Islam in Europe have evolved. Their perception of the European context along with the specific situation of the Muslims has forced them to re-consider previous assertions: to keep distant from the host society; not to take the nationality of a Western society; to keep in mind that they must 'go back home' as soon as possible. All of these statements, presented as fatwa, did not match the reality anymore and a considerable number of ulama have eventually come to the idea that the duty of Muslims in Europe is to reflect upon organizing their future in this area.[4]

So it is necessary to analyse these Islamic identities within the European context. It is impossible to understand the behaviour of new generation Muslims without keeping in mind that they now constitute a part of European youth. In the West, in general, there is a questioning of progress and modernity. When the collective landmarks provided by schools, political parties, and trade unions are weakened or missing and economy is insufficient to define social status, religious membership can contribute to shaping new collective identities for a growing number of young people from all religious groups, not only for Muslims. ✦

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Notes

1. *This politicization of Islam in various countries of origin is a more accurate explanation than the one focusing on the fact that the minority condition within a voluntary migration had not been examined by Muslim Law. According to this explanation, this is because the latter was elaborated between the 8th and 9th centuries, a time when Islam was dominant both culturally and economically. This argument was brought by Bernard Lewis (1994), 'Legal and historical reflections on the position of Muslim populations under non-Muslim rule', in: Lewis, B. and Schnapper, D. (eds), 1994.* Muslims in Europe, *Pinter Publishers, 1, p. 19.*
2. *See for example, the* Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs *published in England.*
3. *About this complex and contradictory use of Islam see J. Cesari (1998),* Musulmans et Republicains, les jeunes, l'islam et la France. *Bruxelles, Complexe.*
4. *For a reflection on this change and the main political and cultural effects of this innovative debate on the relationship to Shari'a, in the French context, see also J. Cesari,* Musulmans et Republicains, les jeunes, l'Islam et la France, *op-cit.*

Belgium
MONIQUE RENAERTS

Elections in the Muslim Community of Belgium

After 25 years of equivocation, the matter concerning the representation of secular affairs of the Muslim community is finally on the verge of finding a resolution acceptable to both the Muslim communities and public authorities. In Belgium, the State recognizes and financially supports various faiths: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican, Jewish, and Muslim. Even secularism is supported. Unlike the other recognized faiths, Islam does not fully benefit from the advantages that are conferred theoretically to its followers. Until now, the absence of a representative body, unanimously recognized by all Muslim groups, has been used in discourse to justify this discriminatory situation.

As in other European countries, Belgium has seen during the last thirty years the nascence of Islam as the second most professed religion in the country. Not having viable statistics at our disposition, which is due to the fact that it is forbidden to register people according to religion, the number of Muslims in Belgium is estimated at approximately 350,000. Included in this number are both practising and non-practising Muslims, as well as those of Muslim origins who have become atheist or agnostic. The number of converts to Islam, however, is highly speculative. According to sources, none of which are genuinely viable, the number of converts could be anywhere from 3,000 to 15,000.

The Executive Body of Muslims in Belgium, temporary interlocutor for public powers of limited function, was set up after long negotiations in the different Muslim communities during the course of 1993. The Executive Body proposed, in agreement with the Minister of Justice, to organize elections in order to give a legitimate and democratic base to a body that would finally be able to obtain official recognition and which would have all of the powers normally conferred to a *Chef de Culte* (Religious Group Leader).

In March 1998, the Executive Body re-submitted its project proposal to the Minister of Justice and, on June 12, the Council of Ministers ratified the project, entrusting the organization of elections to the Executive Body.

On 21 June 1998, the Executive Body invited the representatives of all mosques, religious teachers, and religious charity workers country-wide, in order to explain by means of a multi-media demonstration, the *ins* and *outs* of the project. It was the first time that such an event, bringing together Muslims from diverse ethno-national communities and various dogmatic sensibilities, took place in Belgium.

July 1998 saw the formation of an accompanying committee comprised of, on the one hand, three officials representing the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Centre for Equal Opportunity and the Fight against Racism, and on the other hand three members of the Executive Body. Its purpose was to follow the preparation for elections, the actual elections, and the process of validating results. The project anticipated the election of a 51-member assembly. This assembly was to be increased by 17 co-opted members, 10 of which were to be nominated by the current Executive Body and 7 by those elected, plus the first 10 members.

The goal of co-opting is to allow for continuity in the work of the Executive Body as well as to give equilibrium to results taken from the voting boxes, calling upon Muslims who would be less likely to be elected: women, youth, certain community minorities, and those with specific technical qualifications useful for the community.

These 68 persons would have to assign, from amongst themselves, the Religious Group Leader Organ, which would include 17 members comprised of 7 Moroccans, 4 Turks, 3 converts, and 3 'other nationalities'.

To respect the elective principle, at least three-fourths of the members of the Religious Group Leader Organ should be directly elected.

Regardless of what is claimed by certain religious tendencies, deciding upon a contingent per community group has as its objective to assure, from the outset, equal representation and minority participation. At present, followers still frequent the religious loci of their own communities. However, there are certain minorities of which the converts do not have their own mosques. Not taking this into account would have given preference to Moroccans, who clearly constitute a majority.

Muslims over 18 years of age domiciling in Belgium since more than one year prior, were authorized to register to vote between September 1 and October 31, 1998. On the register form, the voter was asked to indicate his preference for voting either at a mosque or in a public place.

Muslims (male or female) over 25 years of age domiciling in Belgium since more than 5 years prior, utilizing their civil rights, having neither political nor diplomatic mandate and mastering one of the official languages of the country, could present him/herself as a candidate. Each mosque had the right to present from one to three candidates.

In order to give a chance to those who do not frequent a particular mosque, persons wishing to do so could freely present themselves as candidates, 50 supporting signatures being required. ▶

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Those wishing to participate in the Religious Group Leader Organ furthermore should have a secondary school diploma.

At the closing of registration there were 72,000 voters and 264 candidates. Amongst the latter, there were 8 converts, 43 'other nationalities' (Algerian, Tunisian, Pakistani, Egyptian, Syrian, and sub-Saharan African), 170 Moroccans, and 43 Turks. Albanians did not participate in the voting: based on their own statistics, they demanded beforehand a certain number of seats attributed without consultation in the grand assembly of 68.

Days before the election, the voters were called upon by mail. The preferred location for voting, as indicated by the voter on the registration form (mosque or public place), was taken into account, as well as proximity to the voter's domicile. The elections took place on December 13 between 11 a.m. and 5 p.m. at 124 voting stations, of which 20 were in public places (schools, foreign integration centres, communal locales) and 104 in mosques. These latter were chosen from amongst all mosques in the county by drawing lots. The electoral process in the Muslim communities was a first not only for Belgium, but for all of Europe as well. Many countries followed the process with great interest.

The election results were validated on 6 January 1999. The first co-optation took place in the second week of January. Elected members and the first co-opted group came together for the first time on Friday, January 15. They proceeded to co-opting 7 additional persons.

The members that fulfilled the diploma and language requirements were asked whether they wished to take part in the Religious Group Leader Organ. The names of those who responded affirmatively are to be presented to the Ministry of Justice. Though the Minister does not have the right to designate the representatives of religious groups, he can nonetheless reserve the right to refuse certain candidatures for reasons of public security.

Despite the fact that candidates were informed of this step in the process ahead of time, it still risks being the most delicate part of the process. Amongst the names accepted by the Minister, each community group is to choose its representatives for the Religious Group Leader Organ. Should a community group not come to an agreement, the grand assembly will intervene. If the entire process runs smoothly, the Religious Group Leader Organ will be, in theory, instituted by the end of February at the latest. ✦

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Trinidad

HALIMA KASSIM

Muslims and Missionaries of Trinidad

The Caribbean has seen two waves of Muslim migration, the first wave of which was comprised of slaves from Africa. Indentured labourers of India, who came to the shores between 1845 and 1917, formed the second.

The estate proved to be the first place for the reconstitution of organized religion. While men well-versed in Islamic knowledge generally did not leave India, there were a few who arrived and served a full or abbreviated indentureship: Syed Abdul Aziz of Iere Village came to Trinidad in 1883 from Afghanistan; Ruknudeen Meah, a Punjabi of Tunupuna, arrived in 1893; and Hafiz Nazruddeen of Tunupuna came to Trinidad in 1913. These were some of the indentured immigrants who assisted in the reconstitution of Islam. The unlettered immigrants depended upon these learned men to nurture their faith, either on the estate or in the villages. At some estates, for instance that of Waterloo, there were mosques, or 'bamboo sheds near to the barracks where Muslims met nightly to read their prayers and read the Qur'an' (Fazal Ali, interview with ex-indentured immigrant, 26/02/1998).

As village settlements developed, circa 1870, each village or set of villages established its own mosques with imams. John Morton, a Presbyterian missionary, noted in his diary that mosques began to appear as early as the 1860s as 'nice little buildings with galvanized roofs' (Sarah Morton, *John Morton of Trinidad*, 1916). Former immigrants and their descendants, once they became prosperous, built mosques, usually made of wood. The mosques that sprang up throughout Indo-Muslim settlements were primarily male bastions of worship until circa 1928. It was at that point that the females of Peru Village (St. James) began attending certain special mosque activities, such as the ᶜId-ul-Fitr and ᶜId-ul-Adha prayers. By the early 1930s, *maktabs* (religious classes) were held in the mosque compound. These classes were taught by imams or elderly learned men of the district, imparting the rudiments of Islam to young boys and girls. Classes included such subjects as Arabic, Urdu, prayers, and other basic Islamic knowledge. Prior to the establishment of *maktabs*, young boys and girls were socialized into Islam by emulation and by the knowledge imparted by their parents and grandparents. In some instances, this practice continued even after young girls began attending *maktab*.

From the early twentieth century, Muslims began forming religious groups that would cater to their specific needs. These groups pressed for the recognition of Muslim marriages, the right to establish their own schools with state recognition, encouraged island-wide Muslim unity, and sought to improve religious knowledge and increase spiritual awareness. These religious organizations all sought state recognition, first as Friendship Societies and later as incorporated bodies. The first among the multiple religious organizations to be formed was the Islamic Guardian Association (IGA) of Princes Town in 1906. This group was organized by Syed Abdul Aziz, an ex-indentured labourer from Afghanistan, who had settled in Iere Village near a Presbyterian mission. Aziz was also instrumental in the establishment of the East Indian National Association (EINA), an all-Indian pressure group, in 1897. As a believer in Muslim unity, Aziz, along with other prominent Muslims of the colony, held a meeting at Crescent Hall, St. Joseph in 1925. Their intention was to organize the Muslim community into one large religious body. By the following year, the Tackveeyatul Islamia Association (TIA, Society for the Strength of Islam) was formed, and in 1931 it became an incorporated body. Islam was also consolidated through the intermittent arrival of missionaries from India, which began as early as 1914. Each of these missionaries rejuvenated the faith, aiding the continuity of form or remedying discord, which would allow for a revamping of Islam.

Although missionaries were arriving, there was also a reciprocal 'back to India' movement. Yacoob Ali, at age thirteen in 1888, was sent back to India by his father to acquire an Islamic education. He returned ten years later as a *hafiz* and *qari* and established several *maktabs*. In 1923, another youth, Ameer Ali, left for Lahore. He was influenced by *moulvi* Fazal Karim Khan Durrani, a Punjabi missionary of Woking, England, who had been invited to Trinidad by local Muslims in 1921. Durrani left in 1923 and within a few months, Ali, by his encouragement, left for the Ahmaddiya Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam Institute in Lahore.

Ali returned to Trinidad in 1930 as a *moulvi* and immediately became involved with the TIA. He introduced a spirit of inquiry into the faith and preached Islam in conformity with new thought and scientific discoveries. For instance, he propagated that Jesus was dead and that he was not taken up to Heaven alive and as such could not return, and that the *miraj* (ascension) of the Prophet Muhammad (u.w.b.p.) was not in conformity with the ethos of *purdah* (veil or curtain of segregation) as expounded by the Qur'an. Furthermore, he advocated equal privileges for women in order to aid in the social development of community. He also spoke, without condemnation, of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, nineteenth century founder of the Ahmaddiya movement in India. Traditionalists (Sunnis) at the time were prone to persecuting Ahmad for his claims of being a recipient of revelations, the Promised Messiah and *mahdi* (the One Rightfully Guided). Much of his preaching ran counter to the beliefs and interpretations of the faith as understood by the Sunnis.

The ideas introduced by the *moulvi* met with a storm of opposition. He was forced by his peers to declare his position as either Sunni or Ahmadi. Ali refused to condemn Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and it was therefore assumed by the traditionalists that he was indeed a secret believer of his creed. He was consequently accused of being a *kafir* (unbeliever) by the traditionalists. By 1931, a schism developed within the TIA as a result of these varying ideological positions. One faction remained the TIA, more open to the then current intellectual thought and scholarly trends relative to Islam; while the other camp, now known as Anjuman Sunnat-ul-Jamaat Association (ASJA, Propagation Group for the Way of Life of Prophet Muhammad, u.w.b.p.), retained a conservative and traditional view of Islam.

In order to consolidate their positions, these two groups engaged in *dawᶜah*, that is, spreading Islam through preaching and education. They also encouraged foreign missionaries from India to visit the island to substantiate the claims of their respective, traditionalist or modernist, positions. Again, lectures were the medium used to consolidate the varying stances and increase the number of followers.

From circa 1944, the TIA was again plagued by tension, litigation and injunctions resulting from disputes over the rightful claim to leadership. This led to a split in the TIA and the subsequent formation of the Trinidad Muslim League (TML) on August 15, 1947, the same date as the partition of India and Pakistan. The TML, led by *moulvi* Ameer Ali, proclaimed a non-conformist position. That is, they did not conform to any one particular school of thought. In the late 1960s, the TML became linked with the Ahmadi movement, but since 1976 they have abandoned this latter orientation and reverted to their non-conformist position.

Missionaries continued to arrive from India and Pakistan. But simultaneously, around the late 1960s, missionaries from the Middle East began visiting Trinidad and, along with returning nationals educated at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and universities in Saudi Arabia, altered the practice of Islam. They attempted to purge the faith of its Indian and Western influences, hoping to make it 'pure'. While they encountered opposition from the traditional Muslims, the youths disenchanted with the seeming apathy and stagnation within the faith were attracted to their ideas. The Tablighi movement has, in recent times, gained ground in Trinidad. While its followers constitute a minority, their influence is nonetheless felt within some of the mosques of the island. Tablighi missionaries from the subcontinent also visit the island from time to time. Sunni Islam is prevalent, but there are small bands of Ahmadi and Qadiani followers. While Shiᶜite Islam never gained momentum, during the month of Muharram, the battle of Kerbala was celebrated with *tadjahs* (tomb-like structures, usually large, colourful and disposable) in some districts. This practice has continued, but is marked with fierce condemnation by Sunnis. Nevertheless, during the early part of the month of Muharram, there are visits by Shiᶜite missionaries from the United States.

The Muslim community continues to be a minority in Trinidad and Tobago. Still for the most part Sunni, other variations of Islam are present. Islam in Trinidad continues to be open to external influence, just as it was during the epoch of indentureship and post-indentureship. ✦

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Research approaches

AYSHA PARLA INTERVIEWS
LILA ABU-LUGHOD

Feminism, Nationalism, Modernity

Aysha Parla, doctoral candidate in Anthropology at New York University interviews Lila Abu-Lughod, Professor of Anthropology and Middle East Studies at New York University, USA.



A.P. — *Beginning with the 1980s, we observe a proliferation of writing on women in various parts of the Middle East (and also South Asia), in particular on the ways women have been cast as the icons of nationalist identity within distinct modernization projects of postcolonial/ post-independence Middle Eastern nation-states. How would you locate your edited volume on* Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East, *recently published by Princeton University Press, with respect to this body of literature?*

L.A. — There is no doubt that books like Deniz Kandiyoti's edited collection, *Women, Islam and the State*, that insisted that women in the Middle East must be studied not in terms of an undifferentiated 'Islam' or Islamic culture but rather through the differing political projects of nation-states, with their distinct histories, relationships to colonialism and the West, class politics, ideological uses of an Islamic idiom, and struggles over the role of Islamic law in state legal apparatuses, paved the way for *Remaking Women*.

But this ground-breaking work, published in 1991, was only a beginning. Some of what Kandiyoti's volume could not do was accomplished by several books published in the past few years that paid special attention to the crucial moment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the terms of the debates about 'women's emancipation' were set and when, it might be said, 'the history of the present' regarding feminism and its possibilities in the Middle East was made. These books made extensive use of the writings of Middle Eastern women themselves to analyse the period in question. The rediscovery of women's writings and the analysis of the active women's press, especially in turn-of-the-century Egypt, but also in Iran and Ottoman Turkey, has enabled scholars to shift their attention from the prominent male reformers to the many women who were active participants in the shaping of the new discourses on women.

The work of these earlier scholars crystallized for me, and for the contributors to *Remaking Women*, a number of questions that needed to be pursued. First and foremost were questions about the politics of modernity. In particular, we asked ourselves, how might new ideas and practices considered 'modern' and progressive, implanted in Europe's colonies or simply taken up by emerging local elite, have ushered in not only forms of emancipation but new forms of social control? Second were questions about the politics of East/West relations. How are we to think about those discourses that borrowed from Europe, were supported by Europeans, or were shaped in response to colonial definitions of the 'backwardness' of the East? Third were questions about class that enter into both of these, such as who became involved in debates about 'the woman question' and what relationship did their involvement have to consolidating class projects and identities? Pursuing these questions has led us to what I believe are some very new interpretations of 'feminist' projects in the Middle East.

A.P. — *One of the critical terms that marks the collection is 'modernity.' In your introduction, you urge a rethinking of the ways in which discourses of the modern have been deployed by various political groups at critical historical moments. How do you understand/define modernity, and through what sort of critical lens do you view it, especially as it pertains to gender, or to use that favourite phrase of nationalist discourse, to the 'woman question'?*

L.A. — Some people have argued that it is impossible to define modernity. Instead, we should track the diverse ways the insistent claims to being modern are made. One thing we need to do to study 'the woman question' in the Middle East is to explore how notions of modernity have been produced and reproduced through being opposed to the non-modern in various dichotomies. Even more important, however, is to ask how modernity, as a condition, might not be what it purports, or tells itself – in the language of enlightenment and progress – it is.

This kind of critical rethinking of modernity helps us reassess the projects of modernizing Middle Eastern women that have characterized this century. How best to become modern and what role should be given to Islam and how much of the West to emulate were certainly contentious issues. But that something new was to happen was not doubted. The rhetoric of reformers and literate women themselves was full of references to 'the new' – with calls for 'women's awakening' and 'the new woman' reverberating through the magazines, books and speeches of the era. We wanted to explore how in various parts of the Middle East these projects were conceived and promoted, in all their complexity, contradictions, and unintended consequences, but with a critical eye for the ways in which they might not only be liberatory.

A.P. — *You seem to be asserting that there was something distinct to modernity, that something(s) did change in quite fundamental ways. In which sites, or which aspects of women's lives would you situate these transformations?*

L.A. — The calls for remaking women at the turn of the century and into the first half of the twentieth century included advocacy of both women's greater participation in the public world – through education, unveiling, and political participation – and women's enormous responsibility for the domestic sphere. Nationalism and visions of national development were central to both arguments. While some scholars have dismissed the cult of domesticity promoted by writers in women's journals as conservative and as a deplorable extension of women's traditional roles, we suggest that it depended on a radical re-figuring of gender roles. In other words, to be a wife and mother as these modernizers conceived of it was to be a very different kind of subject than the wife and mother of before. It was not insignificant that the 'new' wife and mother was now to be in charge of the scientific management of the orderly household of the modern nation, as well as the rearing and training of the children who now were seen as the future citizens of the modern nation.

This new vision of wifehood and motherhood underwrote developments in the education of women and intersected with nationalist aspirations. Novel visions of child rearing and household management – and the prescriptive literature through which they were reiterated – not only intersected with nationalist projects but articulated the national struggle in terms of a politics of modernity. Moreover, this new domesticity worked to enforce a single bourgeois norm, devaluing other forms of marriage and family. The sources of these new visions of women's roles can be traced to Europe, whose prescriptive literatures were being translated and whose definitions of the modern deeply affected the Middle Easterners' images of themselves and their society.

What I think we have done that is most original is to have critically analysed the ways that these forms of modernization – the induction of women into new domestic roles as 'ministers of the interior', the professionalization of housewifery, the making scientific of child rearing, the drafting into the nationalist project of producing good sons, the organization into nuclear households governed by ideals of bourgeois marriage, and even the involvement in new educational institutions – may have initiated new coercive norms and subjected women to new forms of control and discipline, many self-imposed, even as they undermined other forms of patriarchy.

A.P. — *Given these new modes of subjection – to the nation-state, to the nuclear family, to the conjugal couple – secured through everyday disciplinary regimes which train the body as well as the mind, you are suspicious, then, of the emancipatory claims of the projects of modernity. Do you see a danger, however, that this critical reassessment of modernity and its emancipatory claims, might veer dangerously close to a yearning for a romanticized traditional past?*

L.A. — You are right to point out the dangers. The tricky task in all this is how to be sceptical of modernity's progressive claims of emancipation and critical of its social and cultural operations and yet appreciate the forms of energy, possibility, even power that aspects of it might have enabled, especially for women. How can one question modernity without implying that one longs nostalgically for some pre-modern formation? Feminist scholars feel this dilemma acutely because they cannot ignore the fact that gendered power has taken and can take many forms.

We try in *Remaking Women* to assess the impact for women of the kinds of modernizing projects and discourses that marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Middle East, being aware of the ways these projects, as Afsaneh Najmabadi puts it, might have been simultaneously regulatory and emancipatory. For example, the 'discourse of domesticity' in Iran seems to have provided the very grounds from which the male domain of modern education could be opened up, and with it women's movement into public life and national recognition. Later, women could use notions of serving the State to claim higher education and professions. In Egypt, as Marilyn Booth points out, the prescriptive biographies of famous women that appeared in the Arab press in the first decades of this century seem to have been both constrictive and expansive for women's lives. In sharpening the distinction between the public and private realms, writers of the era could now problematize women's absence from the public (and thus encourage them to enter it) while enforcing new norms of the private, now elaborated as a unique and busy domain in which women should exert themselves.

A.P. — *The implicit term prowling around the already vexed relationship between modernity and feminism, is, as you stress, the West. In nationalist discourses of modernization, we witness over and over women's central role simultaneously as the representatives of civilization and progress, and as the bearers of the so-called unique, authentic, traditional values that distinguish the nation from those aspects of the West seen as corrupting, such as sexual license, excess individualism. Similarly, you emphasize how women's issues have all too easily become the grounds on which battles over cultural authenticity are waged. What does this mean for the place of feminism within postcolonial politics?*

L.A. — You've put your finger on the most troubling question for scholars and activists alike: the relationship between modernity and the West. In colonial or semi-colonial contexts, the distinction between modernity and tradition (with its correlate, backwardness) had a particularly active life because it was paired with that between the West and the non-West.

It is difficult for anyone thinking about 'the woman question' today, as at the turn of the century, to escape the language of accusations and counteraccusations about cultural authenticity. Are attempts to transform the condition of women indigenous or foreign? We try in this book to more calmly interrogate the genealogy of feminism in the Middle East, working against reified notions of separate cultures. To label indigenous the feminism of women who had strong ties to Europeans, not only in the languages in which they wrote, but their formative influences, their interlocutors, and their liberal ideas, risks passing over too quickly the conjunctures between the projects of Europeans and Middle Easterners and the actual role of European discourses in Middle Eastern ones, often mediated, as I said earlier, through the projects of modernity.

But to ignore the differences in local feminisms and projects to reform women is just as misleading. For example, being framed within an Islamic discourse and argued with some of its tools (of reference to the Qur'an, etc.) subtly transformed translated discourses, such as those on motherhood and housewifery. Translations always involved rewritings of the original European texts or framing by commentaries that drew from the texts different meanings. Western cultural forms and ideas were appropriated selectively, often piecemeal. In the Egyptian case, Omnia Shakry shows that European modern notions of child rearing were aligned with Islamic notions of bodily discipline. Even 'Islam' has no doubt been transformed by being made the object of derision by missionaries, the sign of barbarism by the Europeans, and, in response, both the banner of authenticity for those opposing domination and the framework in which debates about society and women have come to take place.

One of the most productive lines of thought made possible by Edward Said's *Orientalism*, which re-framed world history as a global phenomenon, was that the division between East and West had to be understood not as a natural geographic or cultural fact but a product of the historical encounter of imperialism. Following this lead, we argue that condemning 'feminism' as an inauthentic Western import is just as inaccurate as celebrating it as a local or indigenous project. The first position assumes such a thing as cultural purity; the second underestimates the formative power of colonialism in the development of the Middle East. ✦

This is an adapted version from an interview published in the Turkish journal, Cogito *16, Fall1998.*

Research approaches

WALTER ARMBRUST

Mass Culture in Egypt

***Mass Culture and Modernism* in Egypt began as my dissertation research. My plan was to write about concepts of the person in Egypt, and one of my sources was to be media, though this was not necessarily to be the primary focus of the research. At the outset, my plans were quite flexible. I was interested in the relation of local identity to practices associated with both foreign and 'classical' Islamic ideals.**

My potential sources were eclectic. For example, I had hoped to incorporate a historical perspective through looking at late Ottoman-period Turkish-language manuscripts. In particular, I wanted to search for texts that made use of terms of appellation comparable to (or contrasting with) contemporary terms like *ibn al-balad* – literally 'son of the country', though the exact referent can change according to context, evoking various shades of locality in one situation, class distinctions in another, and national identity in still others. Sawsan el-Messiri, the anthropologist who originally analysed the term in the context of modern Egyptian identity, suggested that the term was not frozen, and had taken on a range of contemporary meanings in relatively recent historical memory. I had hoped to elaborate on her observation.

As often happens, once the research began, I changed my focus. Mediated culture is an inescapable part of contemporary Egypt, and yet writing on it was, and remains, astonishingly thin. The idea of trying to augment anthropological research through archival sources began to seem absurd in the face of the massive quantities of mediated material that were all around me. These materials were, of course, meaningful in various ways to my steadily expanding circle of informants and friends. But they were also characterized by historical depth, albeit not as great a depth as I had once hoped to explore through archival documents. In the end, my ethnographic material ranged from 1930s popular magazines and cinema to college students of the 1990s.

By default, the only modern medium that has really mattered in the study of Middle Eastern societies has been print. Not print as a medium of mass communication, but print simply as the vehicle for ideas that could be translated fairly unproblematically. Given the narrow range of Western academic interest in the Middle East (and to a great extent in all non-Western cultures), it has proven exceedingly difficult to think of Egypt as a modern society closely tied to the experience of mediated communication. The media in question are certainly not only, or necessarily even primarily, those that utilize print. Nonetheless the study of media in Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world has remained shackled by an academic division of labour that creates an implicit cultural divide. This is a variant of the sort of high/low cultural divides that have developed in the United States and Europe. In Middle East Studies, research and publishing agendas define low culture as premodern or 'folkloric', and high culture as literate and book-bound. The metagenres of Egyptian popular culture and broad media discourses on modernity employ a language of dichotomy – folk culture/high culture, traditional/modern, religious/secular, etc. But in the mass-mediated popular culture of Egypt and many other colonial and postcolonial societies, the purpose of such discourses has not been to reinforce cultural dichotomies. Rather it is to transcend them, or at least to create a hybrid form of modernity, conceptually linked to the local past, but fully conversant with imported technique.

Such binarisms have, of course, been fiercely criticized in American academia during the past two decades. The effect of such critiques has been to slowly recast research agendas, but also to facilitate an overall decrease in the institutional status of Middle East-oriented scholarship. There are many reasons for this, and certainly there are exceptions to the obsessive American preoccupation with characterizing the Middle East as a place sharply divided between pre-modern and 'westernized' elements – in other words as a place with no real modernity of its own. In short, at precisely the time when intellectual critiques of Middle Eastern Studies and Orientalism might have led to more effective and less rigidly channelled studies of the region, the American political and cultural establishment invested heavily in promoting an image of the Middle East as a threatening cultural opposite, particularly with the demise of the Soviet Union. I would argue that most new PhD's of the past two decades have been out of sync with the campaign of disinformation promoted by the American media and government. Hence there has been a steadily decreasing market for Middle East specialization within American academia. The mainstream of new Middle Eastern scholarship was reduced to a trickle. Consequently the capacity to explore such topics as the role of mass media in constructing modern culture is far less than it would have been if the demand for Middle Eastern specialization had been even a tenth as great as the demand for specialization in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Political and economic interests in those areas have led to vastly greater institutional investment in the United States.

Research agendas, if not the institutional prestige of Middle East specialists, are changing. However, new research agendas are not necessarily leading to a more comprehensive consideration of the sorts of media I wrote about in *Mass Culture and Modernism*. This is because the impetus for the study of media in the Arab world stems from a growing concern for the transnational effects of 'new media' – the internet, fax, and satellite television. Interest in such phenomena is perfectly understandable up to a point. Computers and digital technology are changing the world; Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world are undeniably caught up in these changes. However, I believe that to focus on new media without relating them to the effects and constructed meanings of older media is short-sighted, and leads to a deceptive emphasis on globalization, and the hope (or, for some, the spectre) of a world without borders.

Globalization rhetoric is not innocent of politics. It tends to obscure relations of power between a metropolitan centre (Europe, the United States, parts of Asia), and a formerly colonized periphery. Flows of culture, people, and capital are in fact still structured in favour of the metropolis, despite popular and academic assertions to the contrary. 'The global constructs the local' has become a mantra of American academia, but 'the global' almost always privileges the activities of an Europhone elite. The 'new media' most amenable to globalization rhetoric – the internet and satellite television – were largely still on the horizon in Egypt when I did the fieldwork upon which *Mass Culture and Modernism* is based. They have since become far more prominent. But I do not believe the analysis of new media can be adequately done without due consideration for the effects of media that do not easily fit the 'globalization' mantra.

An emphasis on globalization built through the effects of new media is deceptive because new media never eliminate old media. What actually happens in every case is that new media augment the old. The internet, the newest of the new media, is a metaphor for the way all media work in that it links texts often in non-linear relationships. Songs on cassette, films, celebrities, poetry, magazine imagery, books, and television are intertextual by nature. Communication itself is intertextual. To put it simply, the ability to link diverse texts in individualized networks happens apart from the internet.

The intertextuality of media – old as well as new – was an essential part of *Mass Culture and Modernism*. Often the 'content' of media is inseparable from its deployment in the social networks of everyday life. For example, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, the great singer and composer who died while I was doing my fieldwork, was a historical figure, but also a contemporary social reference point in 1991 for young people who felt compelled to justify their own tastes in music through him. I found that Ahmad Adawiyya, a singer of the younger generation, and for many a controversial figure of dubious taste, was linked in conversation to Abd al-Wahhab, a popular figure of an earlier era who, by the time of his death, was an icon of highbrow sensibilities. The two were not necessarily linked as similar figures – depending on one's attitude toward Adawiyya, the association might well be one of contrast rather than of similarity. But there was no question that Adawiyya made more sense in a network of intertextual references – to Abd al-Wahhab and to many others from many different historical periods – than he would have as a phenomenon relevant only to class and generational segments in 1991.

The rise of Adawiyya certainly is tied to the transnational processes that occupy the attention of American social science. He is a performer emblematic of the age of portable music – of a decentralized system of production in which cheap and easily pirated cassette recordings prevent the sort of market domination that Abd al-Wahhab built through the gramophone, cinema, and national radio broadcasts. And Adawiyya is also representative of a crisis of confidence in the institutional success of modernist and nationalist projects – a crisis of confidence that has contributed to the rise of the Islamist movement. This too is consonant with the globalist rhetoric of the moment. But it is also true that much of what makes Adawiyya meaningful in contemporary Egypt takes place well below the radar of the English-oriented transnational 'new media' that will very likely attract a growing share of scholarly attention in coming years.

The crisis of confidence in modernist and nationalist discourses of the older generations that *Mass Culture and Modernism* characterizes as having occurred since the 1970s is not a negation of modernity itself. My basic assumption in researching and writing the book was that modernity must be thought of as a plural process rather than as something that radiated from Europe. Despite the egregious underemphasis by Western scholars on Egyptian mass-mediated culture, throughout the twentieth century it has been a key factor in creating modernity in Egypt. I am confident that this omission will be corrected – that studies of mass culture and modernity in Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world will flourish in the near future. ✦

An icon of his generation. Anadvertisement for Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab's film Yaum Sa'id (Happy Day, 1940). Abd al-Wahhab brilliantly exploited therelatively centralized media of his day to build a dominant position in Egyptian musical culture.

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Research approaches

SHEILA CARAPICO

Researching Civic Activism in the Arab World

According to classical Western social theory, the institutions, networks, and projects of civil society operate in a pluralistic, continuously contested public civic realm. Distinct from either the government's coercive bureaucratic functions or profit-seeking private businesses, often conceptualized as a buffer between states and households, civil society represents a third, non-governmental, non-profit, voluntary sector of modern society. Viewed differently, the civic realm is a zone where culture interacts with politics and economics. Recent research shows that rates of civic activism – of joining, communicating, demonstrating, donating, organizing, and participating in events and projects that affect community services, public opinion, and national politics – vary across countries and across time. The question is whether cultural 'traditions' explain why the civic sphere is more vibrant in some places and periods than others.

It is important to distinguish a moral economy or 'primordial civic realm' from modern civil society. Historically, Middle Eastern communities provided themselves with collective water supplies, dispute management, schooling, way-stations, market-places, sanitation, policing and other municipal or community services through mechanisms including waqf, zakat, sadaqah, taᶜawun, guild, tribal or ad hoc initiatives. Although states forever strove to centralize legal practice, religious tithes, and private bequests, individual and collective projects reflecting a mix of Muslim piety, political competition, and economic rationality were a centripetal force. In the case of Yemen, philanthropic and community mechanisms for funding and maintaining collective goods, grounded in a pre-capitalist social formation, gave towns and regions relative autonomy from imams and sultans. Religious endowments (waqf) supported independent seminaries where scholars and judges were at least sometimes free to contradict 'official' versions of sharia by, for instance, writing rationales for spending zakat (religious tithes) on local projects (tribal, artisan, and Jewish communities also marshalled a meagre surplus for essential services). It is also important not to romanticize what was a zone for contestation of the allocation of very scarce resources.

Times change, and with them the parameters for civic projects. Almost everywhere in the Middle East, governments have captured endowments, zakat, and education, offering in return public-sector sanitation and infrastructure. Currently there is a veritable explosion in numbers of Arab NGOs, formal organizations that register with the government as non-profit fund-raising bodies. Nowhere in the Arab world (if anywhere), however, has the expansion of civic space been a V-shaped opening, smooth and regular. With the waxing and waning of economic fortunes and with greater or lesser government success in co-opting autonomous initiatives, exigencies and outlets change. My research on twentieth-century Yemen documents three quite distinct periods of civic animation. In the modern enclave of late-colonial Aden, class-based labour syndicates and merchant's associations filled expansive public spaces both physically and metaphorically – the streets, salons, schools, publications, legal loopholes, and access to Yemeni and British public opinion. A second efflorescence of civic activity, the Yemeni self-help (taᶜawun) movement, peaked in the 1970s when recycled migrants' remittances financed country roads, primary schools, mechanized water retrieval, and the first electrical generators in many cities, towns, and villages. Activism in the '90s has been characterized, on the one hand, by unprecedentted overt partisanship, formal political organizing, publishing, and holding of public events; and, on the other, by significant growth of the charitable voluntary sector whose projects include emergency relief, welfare programmes, health clinics, informal and parochial education. The sudden, rapid expansion of political space after unification and its constriction after 1994, together with deepening economic crisis prompted particular responses from various segments of urban and rural society. Different movements have been reactionary or progressive, resisting or inviting commercial markets and/or central political authority. Civic activism tends, then, to be episodic, opportunistic, and contingent, as people act on concrete local circumstances.

If culture is a constant, it cannot explain such wide discrepancies. Of course activism is expressed in Arabic, with ample references to local, Yemeni, or Islamic tradition. Yet what an array of 'traditions' to choose from – a treasure-chest of symbols, customs, and sayings for special occasions. Whereas in an era of road-building, ranchers adapted tribal auto-taxation mechanisms to hire bulldozers, in other times tribes resort to roadblocks to hold the antagonistic state at bay. 'Declarations of public opinion' issued by conferences and available on newsstands mix republican, tribal, sharia, Greek, socialist, historical, and internationalist phrases and concepts in a real, literal contest of public discourses. In lieu of old forms of social capital formation, charitable donations are solicited in the name of a 'new tradition', the formalized jamaᶜiyya khayriyya, or welfare society, as distinctly modern as commercial Islamic banks.

Looking at civil society as a series of projects or initiatives rather than a collection of 'civil societies' has methodological implications. First, studying civic activism is at least partly an archaeological venture of digging around architectural sites and unearthing documents. Who built the mosques, schools, public spaces, clinics, and clubs? How are they used? Maintained? What is the documentation, and how or where is it published or preserved? What, in other words, is the output of civic activism, what material traces are left?

Secondly, we can read texts and public displays. In contemporary Yemen the plethora of newspapers, tabloids, and pamphlets reflect a wide range of opinion and constant competition between the government, political parties, and others for the hearts and minds of an ever-growing reading public. One can fill weekly calendars with seminars, conferences, and meetings, or attending court trials and town council sessions – all scripted scenes open to observation, participation, and contention. Publications and events document dominant and dissident discourses, positions, and projects. Legal defence of newspapers against allegations by the press prosecutor's office is a drama acted out in the press, the courts, in journalists' and attorneys' syndicates, and in human rights organizations.

One case study of tribesmen building roads or activists defying censorship is interesting; in the aggregate, such acts can transform material and political conditions. Thirdly, then, the study of political culture requires comparative use of ethnography, close reading of first-hand accounts by anthropologists, development consultants, human rights monitors, and other outside 'participant observers' as well as 'native' reports. Mapped geographically and arranged chronologically, case studies help show how and why rates of activism vary from one place or season to the next.

Research in Arabic for publication in European languages is partly a translation exercise. Decisions about what to transliterate or abbreviate are crucial: should one render jamaᶜiyya khayriyya as such, or as a welfare society, or as an NGO? Nowadays there is often the further choice of accepting a given English version of an Arabic name and correcting its spelling or wording. In addition to the important question of what to call things, however, is a further issue of the unit of analysis. It is one thing to research non-governmental organizations and quite another to document clusters of activity within spheres such as education, social welfare, legal practice, or publishing that may be nationalized, secularized, privatized, or reinvented depending on national politics and economic circumstances. Current conditions in Arab countries are hardly conducive to widespread formal political participation, but we may nonetheless discover ways in which civil society constitutes a buffer against authoritarianism and deprivation. ✦

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The 1998 Prince Claus Awards

The Netherlands' Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development granted its Prince Claus Awards to 16 artists and inellectuals who have demonstrated exceptional creativity, courage, and commitment in their work in the domains of culture and development. The 1998 winners have proven the capacity to bring about fortuitous change in their surrounding environments and thus deserve the recognition and encouragement given by the awards, which are a means to make the otherwise little-known efforts of these individuals recognised world-wide.

The Prince Claus Fund, in addition to the awards, offers funding, produces publications, stimulates world-wide cultural debate, and supports activities and initiatives which emphasize innovation and experimentation.

The Principal 1998 Prince Claus Award was awarded to the Art of African Fashion represented by three leading figures in that field: Alphadi (Niger); Oumou Sy (Senegal), and Tetteh Adzedu (Ghana). Thirteen other Prince Claus Awards were presented to individuals from the world over. Three of these merit special mention here:

Redza Piyadesa

Redza Piyadasa (1939, Kuantan, Malaysia) devotes himself both to the practice and to the theory of art. During the sixties and seventies he filled a serious vacuum, at a time when there was scarcely any debate on the subject of art history or art criticism in his country. Partly due to his persistent efforts, the situation is now quite different. In his many publications, both in English and in Malay, in his countless articles in the Malay press and also in his work as an artist, he examines the contexts of art and their significance for the construction of artistic traditions and artistic values. His interest is centred on modern Asian art, which he places in relation to traditional Asian art forms and Western contemporary art. Piyadasa's art, such as the collage-like 'Malaysian Series', which he has been working on since 1980, and his art criticism are his answer to neo-nationalistic, Islamic, and globalization currents in Malaysia, which have threatened to marginalize minority groups and alternatives.

Nazek Saba Yareb

Nazed Saba Yareb (1928, Jerusalem, now based in Beirut, Lebanon) is an academic, literary critic, essayist, novelist and human rights activist. She is concerned in human relations, seeking to stimulate a better understanding of other people and other societies. Her literary and academic work reflect this concern. Culture and art are essential in the rebuilding of a country emerging from a terrible civil war (1975 - 1992). It is in this light that one should see Nazek Saba Yareb's commitment to the Baalbeck Festival in Lebanon, which reopened in 1997. She works wholeheartedly and with unflagging energy in order to help her country regain its place on the international cultural map. The themes in her works include: women's issues, marriage, religious fanatacism, minority identities. Through communication between people and cultures, Yareb has stretched out her arms and created new perspectives for Lebanese culture, a new vision for the future of its people.

Rakshan Bani-Etemad

Rakshan Bani-Etemad (1954, Tehran, Iran) was one of the first women to make films after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. She is now the foremost female director in her country, enjoying both national and international renown. Bani-Etemad extends the boundaries of officially permitted imagination. Her work appeals to women in her own country and beyond, subtly researching and presenting womanhood and moving people's hearts and minds. While never alienating the mainstream audience, her films have a distinctly female perspective, a strong sympathy for the feminist cause and a preoccupation with female sensibility and the role of women in love and society. But Bani-Etemad does not want to be called a feminist, since she fears being confined by ideology. She is first an artis, and she needs the freedom to explore and explain positions that may not be placed high on the feminist agenda. The result is a true change of attitude through art. ✦

For further information on the 1998 laureates, please consult Prince Claus Awards, *published by the Prince Clause Fund, The Hague, 1998.*
URL: www.princeclausfund.nl
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Research approaches

RICHARD C. MARTIN

Getting Beyond Fundamentalism in Islamic Studies

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, many of us in Islamic Studies have found ourselves being asked repeatedly by reporters, students, and even university colleagues to explain and interpret Islamic fundamentalism. Certain assumptions often surface in public discussions of Islam. For example, many reporters (and many of my students and colleagues) believe that Islam is an intrinsically violent religion. Another assumption I often encounter is the view that orthodox Muslims (Sunni and Shiᶜi) are medieval, irrational, anti-modern, and dangerously anti-Western intellectually.



It is this modern public perception of Islam that induced Mark R. Woodward and myself to write, with Dwi. S. Atmaja, *Defenders of Reason in Islam: Muᶜtazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997) xv + 251 pages including a glossary, bibliography and index. The following three paragraphs, adapted from the Introduction, entitled 'A Tale of Two Texts', explain our project.

'In the late 1970s, the Indonesian Modernist theologian Harun Nasution published a pamphlet in defense of a Medieval Muslim "rationalist" theological school known as the Muᶜtazila.[1] This was somewhat unusual. Although Muᶜtazili theology is discussed, sometimes positively, by modern Muslim scholars, very few have identified themselves with Muᶜtazilism to the extent that Nasution had.[2] After the heyday of the school in the ninth and tenth centuries, Muᶜtazili dominance in theological discourse (*kalam*) began to wane, giving way to more centrist and populist discourses, such as those of the Ashᶜari and Maturidi theologians (*mutakallimun*), and the Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafiᶜi jurist consults (*fuquha*).'

'Theological rationalism did not altogether disappear in Islamic thought, however. Shiᶜi theologians continued to dictate and comment on medieval Muᶜtazili texts as part of their madrasa curriculum… With the emergence of Islamic modernist thinking in the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, Muᶜtazili rationalism began to enjoy a revival of interest among Sunni Muslim intellectuals. During this past century, the discovery of several Muᶜtazili manuscripts hibernating in Middle Eastern libraries has led to an increase of scholarly interest in Muᶜtazili texts by both Western and Muslim scholars…'

'The current study is structured by two short expositions of Muᶜtazili doctrine, one dictated in Arabic in Iran toward the end of the tenth century C.E., and the other written, as we have indicated, by Harun Nasution in Bahasa Indonesia in the late 1970s-. In addition to Nasution's text, this study also presents the original treatise at the basis of the commentary, ᶜAbd al-Jabbar's *Kitab al-usul al-khamsa* (Book on the five fundamentals).[3] These two texts, ᶜAbd al-Jabbar's original treatise and Harun Nasution's modernist commentary form the two textual and historical foci of this study.'

A premise of this study is that during the past century very few books have been written about Islam by scholars trained in history of religions or comparative studies of religions. Most studies of Islamic fundamentalism written by scholars in the US, for example, have been written by Orientalists, political scientists, public policy specialists in government, or journalists. We wanted to write about the importance of Islamic religious thought today for each of these groups, but our primary target was scholars and students of religion. It is important to note that in North America there are some 900 departments of religion in private colleges and public universities, and that the study of Islam is still woefully underrepresented in these departments. A large number of departments still do not offer courses on Islam; at best they may cross-list a course in anthropology or political science or history by a Middle East specialist in another discipline to teach about the Islamic religion.

In the Introduction, we try to locate the history of Islamic theology in relation to the political dimensions of Islamic and religious studies in the past century. A section entitled 'From the Project of Orientalism to the Fundamentalism Project' argues that the Western textual study of Islamic theological texts, and particularly the rediscovery of a number of Muᶜtazili texts in this century in Yemen and elsewhere, has influenced the direction of both of the modern study of Islamic thought and Islamic thought itself. *Defenders of Reason in Islam* challenges the main theses of the Fundamentalism Project at the University of Chicago headed by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby and the book by Bruce B. Lawrence on the cultural sources of fundamentalism. Indeed, the title *Defenders of Reason in Islam* was inspired by Lawrence's 1989 work, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper and Row). Marty, Appleby and Lawrence have argued that fundamentalism is primarily an ideological reaction to modernity, and particularly to modernism. *Defenders of Reason* argues that so-called fundamentalism in modern Islamic thought is not merely a reaction to modernism; it is a contemporary species of the historically rooted traditionalist reaction to rationalist tendencies in Islamic thought that goes back at least to the circle around Hasan al-Basri in the early eighth century. Hence, the book tells the story of Muᶜtazilism and both the political and theological reactions to it in Islamic history.

The rest of the Introduction has the task of explaining the concepts of 'rationalism', 'traditionalism', and theology (ᶜ*ilm al-kalam*) itself – all of them multivalent terms – in scholarly discourse. The strategy is not to be comprehensive and detailed, but rather to be schematic in order to bring contrasting trends into relief. Historians will easily be able to problematize the information provided in defence of the main theses when they look at particular thinkers and periods. Our purpose, however, was to find theological patterns over what historian Fernand Braudel has termed *la longue durée*, the larger scope of trends over time. The pattern that dominates this study is the long historical tension between Muᶜtazilites and Hanbalites/Ashᶜarites, rationalists and traditionalists, modernists and Islamists. Interestingly, these two conflicting trends were never mutually exclusive: some Hanbalites were accused (accurately, in some cases) of rationalism, and some Muᶜtazilites relied heavily on scriptural arguments. Nonetheless, we argue that Islamic orthodoxy (Sunni and Shiᶜi) was always fluid and pluralistic. Muᶜtazilism and Hanbalism each enjoyed moments of being at the centre of orthodox thinking in various times and places, but for the most part they formed on the margins and each tried to influence the orthodox centre. Since the Middle Ages, Muᶜtazilism has been more successful in Shiᶜi Islam, Hanbalism and certainly Ashᶜarism in Sunni Islam.

Defenders of Reason also claims that the struggles going on within Islamic societies today have to be seen as theological disputes that matter deeply; they can not simply be reduced to social, political, or economic causes, even though a particular political breakdown (*fitna*), for example, may provide a context in which theological arguments are reformulated and vivified. A quote from Christian theologian Alister E. McGrath, citing German sociologist of religion Niklas Luhmann, summarizes the book's concept of the social origins of theology: '[D]octrine arises in response to religious identity, which may be occasioned socially (through encounters with other religious systems) and temporally (through increasing chronological distance from its historical origins and sources of revelation)… Doctrine is thus linked with the affirmation of the need for certain identity-giving parameters for the community, providing theological justification for its continued existence.'[4] Theology, or ᶜ*ilm al-kalam*, then, is a function of what ethnologist Fredrik Barth calls 'boundary formation' and 'boundary maintenance'. It is the language by which members of a group reach an agreement and thus a self-identity (*madhhab*), which is fortified by a corresponding notion of the other – those who are outside the community. The poetics and social uses of that language, theological discourse, as well as its social contexts, constitute data the scholar must take seriously.

The first two parts of the book present translations, textual analyses, and historical expositions of the two texts, ᶜAbd al Jabbar's eleventh-century *Kitab al-usul al-khamsa* and Nasution's twentieth-century *Kaum Muᶜtazilah dan Pandangan Rasionalanya*. A chapter in Part II, 'The Persistence of Traditionalism and Rationalism', summarizes the history of this theological tension from the waning Muᶜtazili influence in the Seljuq Age (eleventh and twelfth centuries) through the fourteenth-century revival of traditionalism of Ibn Taymiyya, down to the modernism of Muhammad ᶜAbduh and its influences in Southeast Asia. In Part III, entitled 'Muᶜtazilism and (Post)Modernity', we look at traces of Muᶜtazilism in the work of contemporary thinkers whose writings are available to our readers in European languages: Fazlur Rahman, Mohammed Arkoun, Fatima Mernissi, and Hasan Hanafi. In the final chapter, 'The Implications of Modernity: Deconstructing the Argument', the bracketed question of the relation of modernity/modernism to fundamentalism closes the book.

The final discussion within that chapter is on 'Other People's Texts'. The post-Enlightenment critical study of religious texts was rooted in nineteenth-century textual and historical criticism, mainly by Protestant scholars examining the Old and New Testaments – the texts of their own faith tradition. The reaction within Christianity to critical biblical scholarship is well known and still at play. The same century saw the beginnings of sustained Western research by some of the same Protestant scholars on the 'Sacred Books of the East', including the Islamic textual tradition. Orientalism and *Religionswissenschaft* have dealt with other people's texts, thus crossing certain boundaries that had been unmarked earlier in post-Enlightenment modern scholarship. During the second half of the twentieth century in particular, those boundaries have become more clearly marked. That is the problem with which *Defenders of Reason in Islam* ends. It is the problem raised by a recent controversial article, 'What is the Koran?', in the popular American magazine *Atlantic Monthly*.[5] It is a problem that defenders of reason and of other warrants in religious studies – Muslim, Christian, Buddhist and non-religious – shall have to negotiate at the boundaries of scholarly and religious domains in the public marketplace. ✦



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Notes

1. *Kaum Muᶜtazilah dan Pandangan Rasionalnya* 'TheMuᶜtazila and Rational Philosophy'.
2. Regretfully, Nasution died in the early fall of 1998.
3. I based the translation on the edition of the Arabic text prepared by Daniel Gimaret, 'Les *Usul al-Hamsa* du Qadi ᶜAbd al-Jabbaret LeursCommentaires,' *Annales Islamologiques* 15(1979).
4. Quoted in *Defenders of Reason*, 17, from Alister E. McGrath, *The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 38.
5. Toby Lester, 'What is the Koran?', *AtlanticMonthly* 283/1 (January 1999): 43-56.

Citizenship

SAMINA YASMEEN

Women as Citizens in Australia

The debates surrounding the theory and practice of citizenship have gained increased prominence in the last decade. They have been partially prompted by an increasing awareness of the role played by the civil society and its relationship to state apparatus. But the emergence of cross-border migration as a major feature of the post-Cold War era has also aided this phenomenon.

With a large number of individuals and groups migrating across the globe due to a variety of political, economic and social reasons, issues have emerged surrounding the rights and responsibilities of citizens, natives and denizens. That analysts are grappling with the effects of these changes is apparent in the publication of a number of good books on citizenship in the last ten years. Will Kymlicka, for instance, has delved into the question of multicultural citizenship, whereas Thomas Janoski has investigated the linkages between civil society and citizenship.[1]

The project on 'Women and Citizenship' at the University of Western Australia is attempting to contribute to this renewed investigation into the theory and practice of citizenship, placing a special emphasis on women. The project, consisting in two distinct phases, has been funded through a Large grant from the Australian Research Council since 1995. Professor Trish Crawford and Dr Philippa Maddern of the History Department, University of Western Australia, directed the first phase, which lasted from 1995-97. It focused on the theoretical issues of citizenship and its implications for women in Australia during the last century. The second phase, currently being directed by Dr Samina Yasmeen from the Department of Political Science, University of Western Australia, is concerned with assessing the views of women from ethnically-diverse backgrounds on being Australian citizens.

To this end, the methodology developed to assess the settlement needs of Muslims in the Perth metropolitan area has become a valuable tool for investigating attitudes towards citizenship among women.[2] Initiated in 1994, the project relied heavily on detailed qualitative interviews that enabled the respondents to identify their most pressing settlement needs and elaborate the reasons behind their specific choices. It also encouraged Muslim women to discuss their own specific needs instead of articulating their views on the needs of other Muslim women and men. The data thus collected indicated significant differences in the manner in which Muslim men and women understood and articulated their settlement needs and elaborated on their relationship to their adopted homeland, Australia. While Muslim men focused on education and employment as their most pressing needs, their female counterparts treated their settlement needs in an integrated and holistic manner. For them, access to female health professionals, availability of halal food, and safety were as important as the educational needs of their children. Significantly, unlike men, who were concerned about preserving the Islamic identity of Muslims living in Australia, women were more concerned about their day-to-day living. This involved their concerns about the acceptability of Muslim women who wore *hijab*, obviously subscribing to a different dress code. Cumulatively, the data collected indicated that Muslim men focused more on the economic and political aspects of citizenship, whereas Muslim women attached equal importance to the psychological aspect of being an Australian citizen.

These ideas raised a number of questions of linkages between religion, ethnicity, gender and citizenship. Why do women migrate to liberal democracies? How do they define their identity? To what extent are their views influenced by their experiences in their home countries? What role does religion play in formulation and articulation of identity? How significant is culture in determining women's notion of citizenship. The methodology used in the project also indicated the value of in-depth interviews in which women were encouraged to voice their opinions on numerous issues without the interference or presence of other members of their family. The experience thus gained has formed the basis for a large-scale sociological survey to ascertain the views of immigrant women on being Australian citizens. A questionnaire has been developed which consists in two parts. The quantitative part deals with the demographic profile of the respondents and uses indices that facilitate placing the information gathered within the larger Australian and Western Australian context. The second part of the questionnaire is essentially qualitative in nature. It is designed to elicit the views of the interviewees on what it means to be an Australian, and how they perceive themselves in relation to other Australians. The respondents are also asked to discuss their conceptions of their rights and duties as Australian citizens and the extent to which they are willing and able to act on the basis of these conceptions. These data are being used to assess linkages between migration, ethnicity, religion and citizenship among Australian women.

With the exception of its native inhabitants, the aborigines, Australians are essentially a nation of migrants. While selecting a sample of immigrant women, therefore, the project on 'Women and Citizenship' has chosen to assess the views of Anglo-Celtic women as well as those from other ethnic communities. The list includes women from Afghanistan, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and the United Kingdom. The sample is not restricted to Muslim women and includes representatives from all major religious groups such as Baha'is, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs. A number of research associates are employed to interview representatives from these communities. They are also entrusted with the task of interpreting the data by using a qualitative data analysis programme, Nu-Dist.

The results of individual sub-projects will be published as an edited volume. The preliminary results, however, have already led to a number of interesting observations. To begin with, a large majority of women interviewed have immigrated to Australia as part of a family unit. Irrespective of their socio-economic background, most of the women interviewed have not dealt with the question of citizenship at a conceptual level. Hence, when asked to define their identity with respect to 'a perceived Australian identity', they refer to the experience of living in a space as the evidence of their 'Australian-ness' rather than discussing the legal rights and duties conferred upon them as Australian citizens. Beyond the existential aspect of their citizenship, however, differences do exist in the manner in which women from different ethnic backgrounds define their identity. An assumed, but not clearly articulated, hierarchy of citizens seems to exist. Those from Anglo-Celtic background, including women who have migrated from Britain, feel more accepted and acknowledged than, for instance, women from Iran, Egypt and even Italy. The level of belonging changes with the duration of stay and is closely linked to the socio-economic background of the respondents. Interestingly, however, Afghan women who migrated since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan do not fit into this pattern. Aware of the impossibility of returning to their home country, these women demonstrate a distinct ability and willingness to operate in both the market and public spheres and ensure that the state structures are aware of their specific needs. They have achieved this in less than 20 years. In fact, these women also are different from a large majority of other Muslim women who shy away from participating in the political and economic spheres.

Equally interestingly, for some women the legal act of being conferred citizenship is not an essential prerequisite for feeling and being an Australian. For instance, some Malaysian and Indonesian women have lived in Australia as permanent residents and chosen not to forego their Malaysian and Indonesian citizenship for economic and legal reasons. Nevertheless, their sense of belonging and willingness to be active members of civil society have not been compromised. 'We feel homesick for Australia when we are away in our home country' is a remark heard from these women.

Culture appears to be the main area in which women tend to distinguish themselves from other fellow Australians. While acknowledging that they are all Australians, most of the women, including immigrants from England, emphasize the differences between themselves and the 'others' in Australia. So dominant is this emphasis on culture that sometimes it even ignores religious differences. Women from Egypt and Iran, for instance, rely more on their cultural identity than their religious identity to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Australians. Similarly, women from India and Pakistan acknowledge the religious and political differences between their home countries, but often refer to the common cultural context in which they operate as citizens in Australia.

This is not to deny the role played by religion in defining a respondent's sense of identity. Rather, the interviews suggest that the women's cultural identity incorporates their religious identity and guides them in the extent to, and the manner in, which they move beyond the private sphere into market, public and state spheres. Nor is it to suggest that religion is always subservient to cultural identity. A number of Muslim women interviewed do refer to themselves as, say, Pakistani, Afghan or Iranian. But for some other women, Islam emerges as the main defining feature of their identity. Some of the Muslim women interviewed, for instance, belong to such nascent Muslim organizations as the Muslim Women's Support Group and the Sisters-in-Islam group. Their social interactions are restricted to these groups which also emerge as a main source of information on Islam for these women. Both these women and others who are not members of associations tend to explain their attitudes towards, and opinions on, social, economic and political issues in terms of Islamic teachings. Religious affiliation and ideas, however, also creates differences among these women and their sense of identity. Some Muslim women, for instance, regularly attend luncheon seminar sessions organized at neutral venues such as educational institutions or government support centres. Others insist on gathering only in places that are clearly 'Islamic' and unquestionably serve halal meals. To put it differently, the data collected for Muslim women through the 'Women and Citizenship' project builds on the knowledge acquired through the project on 'Gender-Based Assessment of Settlement Needs of Muslims Living in Perth Metropolitan Area'. It suggests that while Islam plays a unifying role for Muslims living in Western Australia, different interpretations of Islamic teachings intermingled with cultural differences can also contribute to divisions among Muslim women. These different interpretations can also form the matrix within which Muslim women define their identity as Australian citizens. ✦

For further information, please check our web-site. This can be found by looking up 'projects' at http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/

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Notes

1. Will Kymlicka (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Thomas Janoski (1998), *Citizenship and Civil Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Other examples of good works on citizenship include J.M.Barbelet (1988), *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Bryan Turner (1993), *Citizenship and Social Theory*. Newbury Park, California: Sage; and Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller (1993), *TheAge of Migration.* New York: Guilford Press.
2. Samina Yasmeen and Salma Al-Khudairi, *Gender-Based Assessment of Settlement Needs of Muslims Living in Perth Metropolitan Area*, Research Report submitted to the Department of Immigration, Government of Australia, Canberra, 1998.

Global Networks

STEVEN VERTOVEC

The British Economic and Social Research Council's New Research Programme on **Transnational Communities**

Transnational Communities is a £3.8 million, five-year research programme recently commissioned by the British Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Through a range of commissioned projects, conferences and publications, it aims to increase social scientific understanding of the contemporary rise of various kinds of long-distance social networks affecting both local and large-scale economic patterns, international migration, political movements and cultural inter-penetration.

There are many historical precedents and parallels to such networks. Yet today information technologies – especially involving telecommunications (telephone, faxes, e-mail and the Internet) – serve to connect such networks with increasing speed and efficiency. Transnationalism describes a condition in which, despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national images they represent), many kinds of relationships have been intensified and now take in real time in a planet-spanning arena of activity.

Many different kinds of transnational communities are gaining in power and significance. The overseas Chinese, for example, are estimated to have a national Gross Domestic Product larger than China's. Several countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, El Salvador and the Philippines, are hugely dependent on the remittances of their emigrants. Transnational communities pool resources, distribute information, mobilize politically, and exercise considerable cultural influence across borders. Contemporary transnational communities are at once the products of, and catalysts for, globalization. They also represent challenges to many areas of foreign and domestic policy, such as security, investment and trade, asylum, immigration and multiculturalism.

Among the seventeen projects commissioned within the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme, research concerns topics such as: the role of exiles in post-conflict reconstruction, the Russian diaspora and post-Soviet economic restructuring, Japanese and Korean corporations in Britain, immigrants and dual citizenship, the indigenous people's movement, the place of broadcast media within ethnic diasporas. One of the programme's flagship projects concerns global Islamic networks by way of Sufism.

Entitled 'Ethnicity, politics and transnational Islam: A study of an international Sufi order,' the main aim of this project is to broaden our understanding of how Islam functions across boundaries of states, communities and ethnic groups. The project leaders are: Prof. Jorgen S. Nielsen of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham; Dr Galina Yemelianova of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham; and Dr Martin Stringer of the Department of Theology, University of Birmingham.

While contemporary research attention on Islam has concentrated on its political expressions, the Sufi tradition continues to be important for the majority of Muslims. Through a hierarchical chain of adherence to the spiritual leader, or *shaykh*, the Sufi orders (*tariqas*) link local communities across many different regions. One of the more ubiquitous of such contemporary *tariqas* is that led by Shaykh Nazim al-Qubrusi al-Haqqani. With roots in the Ottoman Empire and especially in the Caucasus, it now has centres in North America, Britain and most of Western Europe, the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. The *tariqa* has had particular success in attracting converts from outside Islam and among young educated professionals in the Muslim world.

Communications play a significant role in maintaining the cohesion of this transnational network and the *tariqa* makes extensive use of all forms of media publication including a notable presence on the Internet managed from the US. Through fieldwork and a detailed analysis of texts, the project aims to develop an understanding of how, and with what degree of success a form of Muslim organization, which is central to traditional Islam, is able to adjust to rapidly changing contemporary environments, to establish the significance of modern electronic communications relative to more traditional media, and to update and refine our knowledge of how Sufi forms of Islam function locally and transnationally.

The project will be based on ethnographic and anthropological fieldwork running concurrently in three locations. In parts of the northern Caucasus, the *tariqa* exists in a more or less traditional form, which is now relating actively to the post-Soviet weakening of the central state and general economic and political instability. In Lebanon, the *tariqa* has grown significantly in the years following the end of the civil war and, with fast-growing telecommunications links, could be seen as being in a state of transition. In Britain, the *tariqa* has a number of centres, some with a mainly ethnic minority following, others with a multi-ethnic composition including significant numbers of converts. Texts in a variety of media forms will also be gathered in the three locations together with a regular survey and recording of materials on the Internet. These will be analysed in terms of content, audience and the circumstances of their production and in relation to the fieldwork results.

The interdisciplinary nature of such study of religious organization is likely to raise a number of theoretical issues to do with the interaction between ideas and organization and how far a shared community can function with different discourses. The project will contribute to a broadening of our understanding of contemporary transnational Islamic organizations and thus assist policy makers, the media, and agencies working with Muslim communities in reaching better informed policies and practices.

Other activities of the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme include: a weekly seminar series; annual conferences; and workshops organized within Britain and abroad, bringing together academics and non-academic users. A *Working Paper Series* has been established in both hardcopy and internet-downloadable formats, and the programme is associated with three academic book series. The Transnational Communities Programme will also be supporting a newsletter, an on-line world news digest and an internet-searchable bibliography. Information on the projects and all other aspects of the research programme can be found on the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme website (http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). ✦

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European Science Foundation
RANDI DEGUILHEM

Seeking the Individual in the Mediterranean Muslim World

This past July, Istanbul's Topkapi Palace welcomed the second plenary gathering of the international research programme, Individual and Society in the Mediterranean Muslim World (ISMM), a European Science Foundation (ESF) programme headquartered in Strasbourg. Initiated and chaired by Robert Ilbert, professor at the University of Provence and founder/director of the MMSH (Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme) in Aix-en-Provence (France), ISMM represents a four-year (1996-99) research programme whose major objective is to study pre-defined aspects of the individual within the Mediterranean Muslim context.

The overall intellectual framework for the research was initially articulated largely around the ideas expressed by Norbert Elias, among others, that the process of individuation allowing a person to differentiate him or herself from others, presupposes a certain liberty in ideological, religious, political and economic choice which only began to arise on a large scale in the post-Gutenberg and Enlightenment era. Yet, this liberty of choice, which purportedly made possible the prevalent appearance of unique individuals, was simultaneously tempered by unconscious and conscious communal, societal and political influences exerted upon the individual. Taking this supposition as its theoretical point of departure, the programme founders and participants theorized whether the process of individuation in the Mediterranean Muslim milieu is comparable to that of the European experience. Despite the oft-repeated concept in the West that the very essence of Islam personifies a unified community of humans intimately and inextricably associated with one another in the pursuit of religiously oriented objectives, research in this programme (and elsewhere) as based upon the abundant and highly diverse primary sources dating from the early centuries of Islam to the present day, has shown that throughout its more than fourteen centuries of existence, the Islamic world has fostered a society of differentiated individuals who pursue their own personal itineraries as well as taking part in their immediate and larger environments. In order to uncover and define the individual in the Mediterranean Muslim context, not only mainstream members of society – men, women and children alike – but also marginals and nonconformists, emphasis is particularly put upon micro-historical and case study approaches.

Nearly 100 papers were presented at the July plenary by participants coming from all over Western Europe as well as Eastern Europe (in particular, from Poland), Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa. Editorial Board and Steering Committee meetings prefaced and closed the Istanbul plenary. Similar to the previous plenary held in Grenada in May 1996, which officially opened our programme's activities, the July 1998 Istanbul plenary provided the venue for an across-the-programme gathering for researchers who have been working, for the past three years, within the framework of the separate seven research teams:

Team 1: Forms of belonging and modes of social integration, subthemes: sources of history for the Arab and Turkish woman, child-woman relations in Middle Eastern Muslim societies, intellectual and social education of the individual; team led by Klaus Kreiser, Bamberg University, seminars also organized by Manuela Marin, CSIC (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas), Madrid and Avner Giladi, Haifa University;

Team 2: Norms, oppositions and marginality, subthemes: marginality and exclusion, the emergence of individual ownership, customary law and individual expression; team led by Walter Dostal, Vienna University, seminars also organized by Eugene Rogan, St. Antony's College, Oxford University, Huri Islamoglu-Inan, Ankara University, Martha Mundy, London School of Economics and Baudouin Dupret, CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) at CEDEJ (Centre de Documentation et d'Etudes Juridiques) in Cairo;

Team 3: Power relationships, subthemes: individual identity and power relationships, the individual and power in the colonial experience, individual paths in Egyptian, Syrian and North African societies; team led by Paul Dumont, Strasbourg University, seminars also organized by Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi and Mohamed-H di Ch rif, Tunis University and Michael Ursinus, University of Heidelberg;

Team 4: Modes of production, subthemes: the individual and his relation to finances in the Mediterranean Muslim world, the individual's place within the political economy and economics, the individual's relation with wealth and poverty; team led by Zafer Toprak, Bosphorus University, Istanbul, seminars also organized by Nelly Hanna, American University in Cairo, Jean-Paul Pascual, CNRS, IREMAM (Institut de Recherches et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman), Aix-en-Provence, and John Davies, All Souls College, Oxford University;

Team 5: Images and representations, subthemes: individuation in literature and art, the poet and the writer's mission as seen by himself, subversity of the individual in art; team led by Robin Ostle, St. John 's College, Oxford University and Remke Kruk, University of Leiden;

Team 6: Religious activity and experiences, subthemes: political action, language and religion in the Mediterranean Muslim basin, conversion to and from Islam; team led by Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, CSIC, Madrid, seminars also organized by Knut Vikor, Bergen University and Jan Hj rpe, Lund University;

Team 7: Muslims in contemporary Western Europe, subthemes: current Islamic discourses in Europe, conversion to Islam in contemporary Europe, team led by Felice Dassetto, Catholic University of Leuven.

As the Istanbul event marked a bit more than the midway point through the programme, emphasis was especially put upon analysing the progress made towards reaching the three major goals expressed at the outset:

– Producing original analytical research within the European context on chosen aspects of the above seven topics with the participation not only of established scholars but also of recent doctorates so that the programme will contribute towards the training of the next generation; this is one of the principal reasons for holding the great majority of our seminars, workshops and symposia in accordance with university calendars and very often, within university premises (between the university years 1996-1999, ISMM has hosted some 50 events within over 30 different university locales held in approximately 130 sessions with more than 550 presentations);

– Encouraging the participation of specialists from the Mediterranean Muslim world not only as paper givers but also as event leaders such as the seminars organized and led for the past three years in Cairo by Nelly Hanna, within the framework of group four and in Tunis by Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi and Mohamed-H di Cherif in group three;

– Preserving the results of the research and circulating it within the larger scientific community by means of a three-tiered publication programme:
  - working papers which, with permission of the individual authors, are copied and circulated among team and other members of the programme;
  - publication *hors s ries*; the first one of this nature appeared just in time for the July plenary: *Individual and Society in the Mediterranean Muslim World: Issues and Sources*, directed by Robert Ilbert, edited by Randi Deguilhem, Paul Roubaud Printers, Aix-en-Provence, 1998; the second which is edited by Felice Dassetto, will appear in spring 1999 in the form of an issue of *The Social Compass* (academic journal published at the Catholic University in Leuven) devoted to New Islamic Discourses in Europe; the third and fourth hors s ries volumes are currently being edited by Stephen Guth, *The Author's Mission in the Mediterranean Muslim World*, German Oriental Institute in Beirut Press and by Robin Ostle and Remke Kruk, *Individuation in Literature and Art: Marginal Voices*, Paul Roubaud Printers, Aix-en-Provence, with both books appearing at the end of 1999 or during 2000, additional volumes are being prepared by seminar leaders;

  - creation of two new publication series consisting of 5-7 books each; ISMM Editorial Board is headed by Leila Fawaz and Manuela Marin, other members are Paul Dumont, Ulrich Haarmann, Robert Ilbert and Remke Kruk, publication series editor is Randi Deguilhem:
    1 Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris (final contract is signed) for French language or mixed French-English books; the first volume in the collection which concerns 'Contemporary Islam in Europe' is now being edited by Felice Dassetto;
    2 SUNY Press, New York (final negotiations are underway) for English language books; the first volume scheduled to appear*: Historical Sources for the Arab Woman*, has been edited by Manuela Marin and Randi Deguilhem; the second book on *Individual Behaviour and Economics in the Mediterranean Muslim World* is currently being edited by Nelly Hanna.

Now into its fourth and final year, ISMM seminars, workshops and symposia taking place throughout 1999 in Vienna, Strasbourg, Heidelberg, Oxford, London, Leiden, Madrid, Leuven, Sarajevo, Salamanca, Cairo, Tunis and Aix-en-Provence have the overall objective of consolidating results of research conducted in the programme over the past three years. Apart from concluding the study of each team's separate topics, a final research objective in 1999 is to further identify and deepen the analysis of transversal themes which cross through the work of the different groups. A special brainstorming session is being organized for the end of 1999 for this specific purpose where programme participants will meet with invited outside scholars to develop transversal themes. One such theme which has particularly emerged from the teams' research concerns the role of the individual Mediterranean Muslim woman in the cultural, social, religious, political and economic spheres from medieval Andalous to contemporary Europe as well as modern Middle East and North Africa. This very theme was the leitmotiv of the Istanbul plenary session where speakers, including two Turkish female professors from Bosphorus University, Yesim Arat and Binnaz Toprak, developed this issue in relation to contemporary Turkey.

Research on the European level regarding the individual's place and role in society within the Mediterranean Muslim world is vital to the understanding of this most highly complex multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual region. While studying a problematic very much in the forefront of current humanities research in Europe, the focus of the ISMM programme is quite innovative in that members of the seven teams have been researching the individual in the Mediterranean Muslim world – man, woman and child – through his or her 'private life' by delving into primary documentary sources. Even if the objective is to go beyond this aspect, this approach highlights the value and brings to the fore persons who are not necessarily studied under the classical approaches normally used in research on Islamic societies, namely, children, women and those living on the fringe of society. It is therefore possible in this way to undertake the research and writing of the history of these neglected spheres in the Southern Mediterranean basin, that is, the history of the family and socialization processes. Over and above the individuals themselves, new light is shed on social and economic behaviour which may therefore be looked at in a new way. The processes of enrichment of the individual, the creation and formulation of property wealth and career profiles are currently the objects of study in the programme, even if not all researchers agree on the use of macro and micro-research procedures. By investigating religious (Sufism and conversion), cultural and artistic experiences, researchers have gone beyond the habitual schemata in studying Islamization processes. New questions have emerged from this approach such as, for example, the question of creativity, which goes right to the heart of studying the conduct of each individual.

Although ISMM's scientific events are scheduled to formally conclude at the end of this year, the intellectual life of the themes studied within the programme will certainly outlast the four years allocated to it through the formal and informal networks which have been woven among the more than 150 participants of the programme, seniors and juniors alike. Individual and Society in the Mediterranean Muslim World has taken its place in the academic landscape. In years to come, researchers associated with our programme will no doubt be involved in projects undertaking comparative analyses for the purpose of studying the specificity (if such be the case) of both the Islamic world and that of the Mediterranean. Although research on the question has been advanced via the ISMM programme, investigation into the processes of individualization as related to the Mediterranean Muslim world is by no means terminated. ✦

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AAR

TAZIM KASSAM

The Study of Islam
American Academy of Religion

The American Academy of Religion is the world's largest learned society and professional association of scholars and teachers in the field of religion. Through academic conferences, publications and a variety of programme and membership services, the American Academy of Religion (AAR) fosters excellence in scholarship and teaching. It also aims to advance publication and scholarly communication on religion; to welcome multiple perspectives on the study of religion; to support racial, ethnic and gender diversity within the Academy; and to seek ways to contribute to the public understanding of religion.

The AAR's annual meeting is held every year in late November and provides a lively and enabling context for free inquiry, disciplined reflection and scholarly exchange on the world's religions. The Study of Islam section is one of fourteen programme units of the AAR and was officially recognized in 1986. It is one of the major sections of the AAR with a long-standing and committed participation of more than a hundred active members. One of the most diverse groups in the AAR, the section's presenters, panellists, and audience represent scholars at all stages of their academic careers. The section also features regular attendance and participation of international scholars from countries including Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Africa, and China.

The Study of Islam section serves as a forum for current research on Islam. The annual meeting of the AAR sponsors at least five sessions related to the study of Muslim faith and practice as well as additional individual presentations on Islamic topics in other programme units and sessions. The cultural and linguistic diversity, the regional and historical range, and the varieties of methodologies currently used in Islamic Studies make the section's offerings rich and diverse from year to year. The themes of the sessions fall under the following categories:

1. The study of Islamic texts and scriptures;
2. The study of lived Islam in various regions and cultures;
3. Methodology and approaches to the study of Islam;
4. Issues such as gender, liberation theology, human rights;
5. Subfields of Islamic studies including Mysticism, Law, Theology, Philosophy, Shi^{c}ism.

Our policy is to encourage methodological sophistication, ideological diversity and inter-disciplinary discussion in our programme. Shared sessions with other programme units of the academy have encompassed fields such as Islamic Ethics, Gender, Islamic and Judaic Studies, and Islam and Academic Teaching, and the Study of Religion. Given the importance of scripture in Islam, the Study of Islam section regularly sets aside one session for Qur'anic Studies. The section encourages the use of inter-disciplinary discourses that bridge textual, philological, sociological and anthropological approaches to the Qur'an as well as other Islamic texts.

An additional aspect of the Study of Islam section is its outreach to the broader membership of the AAR by offering sessions concerning the teaching of Islam in the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum. Many American university programmes in Religious Studies draw upon non-specialists to offer introductory courses on the Islamic world. The sessions on teaching Islam provide a forum for addressing important pedagogical issues. They also offer scholars an opportunity to deliberate on the broader conceptual categories and frameworks used in the study of religions. The Study of Islam section is thus a critical resource within the AAR for other scholars of religion who may not have Islamic experts in their departments.

The Study of Islam section also has an e-mail list for its members called 'Islam-AAR'. The list facilitates communication about scholarly topics and disseminates information about grants, employment, workshops and AAR business. Recent topics of discussion on the list have ranged from the best software for studying the Qur'an to the pros and cons of using novels in undergraduate teaching. In addition to the e-mail list, a special leaflet informing members of all papers and panels with content of special interest to Islamicists is mailed to the membership before the annual meeting. As the premiere international forum for the study of religions, the AAR plays a key role in influencing the way that scholars and teachers of religion in North America and abroad construct their curricula and discipline. Within this context, the Study of Islam section has a unique and important role to play in shaping the academic study of Islam. Considering its growing importance as the world's second largest faith and its social, economic and political relevance in contemporary life, the Islamic world has not received the attention it deserves in higher education. Thus, the Study of Islam section's goals are: to anchor the study of Islam centrally within the wider academic study of religions; to provide a disciplined forum for critical inquiry and high quality, original scholarship in Islamic Studies; and to encourage comparative and inter-disciplinary study of Islamic history and societies. ✦

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- *The Annual Meeting for 1999 is to be held in Boston, November 20-23, 1999.*
- *For more information, please consult the following Internet address: http://www.aar-site.org/*

Institute for Advanced Study
GEORGES KHALIL

The Working Group **Modernity and Islam**

The Working Group Modernity and Islam is a Berlin-based interdisciplinary research network of scholars working at various universities and extra-university institutions on the questions of modernity and Islam. The Working Group, hosted by the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin) is committed to fostering a deeper understanding of Muslim cultures, their histories, and their social structures with the two-fold aim of revealing their complexities and of offering deeper insights into the phenomena of 'modernity' and 'modernization'.

This should be of interest to scholars well beyond the fields of Islamic Studies. The project Modernity and Islam was launched in 1995 with the support of the Körber Foundation in Hamburg. From 1996 on, the German Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology has funded the Working Group's scientific programme, while the Land Berlin finances its business office.

The Working Group was initiated under the impression that in Germany, and indeed in Europe as a whole, the level of scientific and intellectual interest in Islam neither reflects its growing political importance nor its role as a reference for modern and post-modern criticism. Whereas traditional Islamic Studies, as a 'small discipline' – not in relation to the object of study but in comparison to the institutional size of the main academic disciplines – methodically started to embrace the social sciences, history, and economics, representatives of the latter persist in delegating the study of Islam to regional experts. The notions of civilizational or cultural clashes, conflicts and exceptionalisms aptly express Western neglect of the analysis of non-European societies, in particular, the world of Islam. A survey of the social and cultural studies on the Muslim world in the Federal Republic of Germany, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education (see ISIM-Newsletter No 1, p. 40), gave empirical evidence of the need for additional effort to overcome the 'dual marginalization' of Islamic Studies. On the basis of the survey, the Ministry asked the Working Group to formulate recommendations to adequately support and strengthen studies on the Muslim world in Germany.

The Working Group Modernity and Islam does not wish to suggest a fundamental polarity between Muslim societies on the one hand and the modern world on the other. Modernity here also refers to an inherent crisis and thus reflects a genuine European preoccupation as well. The group therefore tries to examine the assimilation of modernity within Islam in conjunction with a range of varying experiences in other parts of the world. The proposal is to articulate common problems facing modern societies, conduct relevant fieldwork in Islamic regions and refer the findings to the analysis of, for instance, European societies. We hope this will pave the way for useful interaction between Islamic Studies and other disciplines. Considerable stress is laid on the principle of 'research with' as opposed to 'research on', the traditional asymmetrical European relationship to Islam ('Orientalism') being replaced by one of genuinely mutual collaboration with researchers from the Islamic world.

Cooperative Framework

The Working Group aims to create optimum working conditions for talented young scholars engaged in innovative projects. In an environment conducive to interdisciplinary cooperation, less orthodox issues also feature high on the agenda. The international character, firmly established through a growing network of foreign institutions, ensures the high quality of the work. Collaboration within the Working Group has assumed various forms. Three elements constitute the basis of its scholarly programme.

The Berlin Seminar

The Berlin Seminar, a regular fortnightly event following the rhythm of the academic year, forms the central pivot of the Working Group Modernity and Islam. It fosters communication amongst the various Berlin institutions, ensuring in particular that younger researchers are no longer arbitrarily, but rather systematically, informed of other activities in the field. The seminar creates an opportunity for younger scholars from Berlin to develop an appropriate style of research by presenting their own work and familiarizing themselves with the work of colleagues from various disciplinary and geographical backgrounds invited within the Working Group's postdoctoral fellowship programme. The seminar thus serves as a bracket for all other activities in an interdisciplinary research environment. Fellows of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin are present in a consultative capacity. Since 1996, the Berlin Seminar was held on themes such as 'processes of modernization', 'the transferability of concepts', 'modernity and the past', 'the relation of modernists to popular Islam' and 'Islam in Europe'. The theme of the seminar in the summer semester of 1999 will be 'notions of law and order in Muslim societies'.

Fellowships/Postdoctoral Stipends

Doctoral stipends are already provided by the various Berlin institutions. An international programme for postdocs has been conceived in order to anchor individual themes in a framework of more complex issues and to strengthen dialogue between the various disciplinary and geographical areas of research. In addition to researchers of Islamic Studies, candidates for the postdoc programme include doctors of the social sciences, historians, law graduates, economists and urban planners. The latter should be formally qualified in the subject of Islam, while those whose background is Islamic Studies should have scientific exposure to some other discipline. Without losing sight of broader issues not specifically connected to Islam, the scholarship holders are given the opportunity to work for one year on a research project related to the Islamic world. In this way, regional findings can be channelled into the mainstream institutional disciplines. Since 1997, ten postdoctoral researchers from Algeria, the Comoro Islands, Georgia, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, the Western Sahara and Germany have been invited to work in Berlin on issues of modernity from architectural, cultural, historical or social-scientific perspectives. The fellowships for the academic year 1999/2000 have been announced under the theme 'notions of law and order in Muslim societies'.

The Summer Academy

In order to guarantee the international and interdisciplinary nature of the programme to promote young scholars, an annual two-week summer academy has been organized since 1996. The venue is either one of the institutions involved in the Working Group Modernity and Islam or a research institute of the Middle East / North Africa. The Academy focuses primarily on doctoral and postdoctoral researchers, offering them a forum to present their research. The idea is to draw up a sort of interim status report, so that the critical findings of the academy can be integrated into the further work of the young scholars. The programme differs from the normal lecture-hall set-up, since the main contributors are the young researchers themselves. Leading scholars attend the academy in an advisory capacity, adding their own methodical questions. After the first pilot academy, directed by Rémy Leveau on 'modernity and Islam' at the French-German Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin, the second academy, directed by Peter Heine on 'processes and counter-processes of modernization' took place in 1997 at the Humboldt University in Berlin. In 1998, the academy was held at the German Orient-Institute in Beirut under the direction of Angelika Neuwirth on 'crisis and memory'. 'Notions of law and order in Muslim societies' will be the theme of the 1999 academy. It will be directed by Gudrun Krämer and be held in cooperation with the Moroccan Fondation du Roi Abdul-Aziz Al Saoud in Casablanca.

Scholarly Partners

The Working Group Modernity and Islam aims at conducting research on socio-scientific, historical and cultural developments in Islam within a European and trans-mediterranean dimension. In this respect, Berlin, with its wealth of university and non-university institutions, provides considerable scholarly potential. Members of the Working Group are:

- Prof. Dr Ingeborg Baldauf, Mittelasienwissenschaft, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Friedemann Büttner, Arbeitsstelle Politik des Vorderen Orients, Freie Universität Berlin;
- Dr Gérard Darmon, Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Yehuda Elkana, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Ulrich Haarmann, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften; Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Peter Heine, Institut für Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Gerhard Höpp, Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Gudrun Krämer, Institut für Islamwissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Wolf Lepenies (chairman), Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Angelika Neuwirth, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Beirut;
- Prof. Dr Udo Steinbach, Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg;
- Prof. Dr Fritz Steppat, Institut für Islamwissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin;
- Prof. Dr Dieter Weiss, Fachgebiet Volkswirschaft des Vorderen Orients, Freie Universität Berlin.

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CDEISI
RICHARD C. MARTIN

Consortium for Islamic Religious Studies in South-Eastern United States

The famous Hadith 'seek knowledge, even in China' expresses a passion that true scholars will always have, although the ways and means of seeking knowledge have changed greatly over the centuries. The hajj was for centuries an important means for Muslims to learn about the world and Islam beyond the local *madrasa*. Steamship, rail, and air travel made Western scholarship on Islam and Muslim scholarship in the West far more accessible than when this Hadith first began to circulate. Computers and the Web have added a whole new dimension of accessibility. Among institutions, consortia of scholars and departments of Islamic Studies, such as those associated with ISIM, are creating fields such as Islamic Studies across many universities into single venues of study. Another example of inter-institutional cooperation in Islamic religious studies in the south-eastern United States is the Carolina Duke Emory Institute for the Study of Islam (CDEISI).

The idea for CDEISI arose out of a circumstance of serendipity in the spring of 1996 in Durham, North Carolina. Three chairs of departments of religion, who also happened to be specialists in Islamic Studies – Bruce Lawrence (Duke University), Carl Ernst (University of North Carolina – UNC), and Richard Martin (Emory University) – along with Gordon Newby (Chair of Middle Eastern Studies at Emory), met at the home of Bruce Lawrence to discuss ways to combine the resources of the three universities. Present at that first meeting was also Vincent Cornell (Duke).

The Need for a Graduate Consortium

The need that brought together five historians of religion who specialize in comparative studies of Islam was the fact that few North American universities train scholars in Islamic religious studies. One of the founding scholars of Islamic religious studies in North America, Prof. Charles J. Adams, studied history of religions with Joachim Wach at the University of Chicago, then turned specifically to Islamic Studies. In 1967, he concluded ruefully: 'As time has gone by, it has proven increasingly difficult to see a direct and fructifying relationship between the activities of Islamicists and those of historians of religions.'[1]

By the 1980s the situation had begun to change,[2] but even at the end of this century specialists in Islamic religious studies are relatively rare in the nearly one thousand departments of religious studies in North American colleges and universities. In order to offer students instruction about Islam, departments of religion typically cross-list courses on the Middle East in departments of history, anthropology, political science, *inter alia*. The absence of Islamic religious studies at the doctoral level has also been striking. Departments of Religion at the top universities have relied heavily on departments of Middle Eastern Studies to guide graduate students who wished to specialize in Islam.

Since the Departments of Religion at UNC, Duke and Emory were among the few in North America that had hired two or more specialists in Islam, the question the five of us asked ourselves in 1996 was: Can we accomplish more together than separately? Can we combine the resources in Islamic religious studies in our three universities in practical ways that would greatly benefit our colleagues and attract the best students? Can we create a national, indeed an international, centre to train historians of religion in the comparative study of Islam? That afternoon was the nascence of CDEISI.

CDEISI Programmes

The CDEISI consortium actually builds on prior local cooperative arrangements among universities in the Research Triangle area of North Carolina, linking Duke, UNC, and North Carolina State University in Islamic and South Asian Studies. Administrative arrangements have now been made among CDEISI universities for graduate students in religion at Duke, Emory or UNC to study at one of the other member institutions for one semester. This enables students to work with additional faculty during their residencies or research phases of their doctoral studies. Their tuition and fellowship arrangements at their home institutions remain unchanged during that term. Thus, for example, a UNC student may choose to study Shi^{c}i texts with Devin Stewart and/or Islam and international human rights with Abdullahi an-Na^{c}im for one semester at Emory; an Emory graduate student can now spend a semester in North Carolina and study Islam in South Asia with Bruce Lawrence at Duke and Carl Ernst at UNC, or Maliki law with Vincent Cornell at Duke.

A second feature of the consortium is the exchange of faculty for guest lectures and faculty colloquia. On two or three occasions each semester (four to six times per year) each department of religion will host a faculty member from a member institution for a couple of days for the purpose of delivering a guest lecture in a graduate or undergraduate class as well as participate in a faculty colloquium on an issue in Islamic Studies and/or a recent scholarly book. Usually a more informal gathering in the evening includes graduate students and colleagues who do not specialize in Islamic religious studies. The exchanges give graduate students brief access to faculty at the other universities and thus opportunities to decide on the possibility of spending a semester working with that professor and his or her colleagues. The faculty visits have become an excellent way for us to communicate our current research and have critical responses among wider circles of colleagues in Islamic Studies than exist at our own institutions, and on a regular basis. The next stage may be for Emory to join Duke and UNC in producing telecourses on Islam. Broadcast from studio-classrooms at each of the universities, such courses could offer students at several institutions lectures by a cast of experts on many aspects of Islamic civilization.

In the nearly three years since CDEISI was formed, colleagues at universities across the country and in Canada have expressed interest in CDEISI. At a conference last year at the University of Washington on teaching Islamic Studies in the undergraduate curriculum, participants discussed the idea of forming several regional consortia, such as the CDEISI in the south-eastern United States, which might then link up with each other through an umbrella organization that could affiliate with a professional society, like the American Academy of Religion or the Middle East Studies Association. That is a project for the beginning of next century. Such consortia must be conceived and developed, however, at the local and regional level. We hope colleagues in Islamic Studies in many regions around the world will have serendipitous moments, such as ours in North Carolina in May of 1996, when they discover how much more they can do programmatically if they can establish a structure and the means to share human, material, and electronic resources in Islamic Studies.

Please visit our new web site, which is still a work in progress: http://www.unc.edu/depts/cdeisi. Inquiries and insights may be sent by e-mail to rcmartin@emory.edu. Relevant information will be shared with the CDEISI executive committee, which includes Bruce Lawrence and Carl Ernst. ✦

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Notes

1. Charles J. Adams (1967), 'The History of Religions and the Study of Islam,' *The History of Religions: Essays on the Problem of Understanding*, ed., Joseph M. Kitagawa, Chicago, Universityof Chicago Press, p. 177.
2. See Richard C. Martin, ed. (1985), *Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies* (e.g., the Foreword by Charles J. Adams and the Introduction by Martin), Tucson, Ariz., University of Arizona Press.

University of Amsterdam
PETER VAN DER VEER

Research Centre **Religion and Society**

It has become increasingly important to study the social force of both religion and nationalism in many contemporary movements all over the world in an analytical framework cutting across conventional dichotomies. Until now, social theory as well as Western common sense have been often content to assume an ideological a priori distinction between the nationalist and the religious imagination.

Nation and Religion

A Comparative Study of Colonizers and Colonized

As the argument goes, nationalism belongs to the realm of legitimate modern politics, and is assumed to be 'secular', since it is thought to develop in a process of secularization and modernization. Religion, in this view, assumes political significance only in the 'underdeveloped' parts of the world – much as it did in the past of 'the West'. When religion manifests itself politically in the contemporary world, it is thus conceptualized as 'fundamentalism'. This term, which derived from early twentieth-century American evangelicalism, is now taken by both scholars and media as an analytical term to describe collective political action by religious movements.[1] It is almost always interpreted as a negative social force directed against science, rationality and secularism; in short, modernity.[2]

The dichotomy between religion and nationalism is an ideological element in the Western discourse of modernity.[3] The research programme is therefore devised as a comparative one. It examines religion and nationalism in three sets of societies: India and Great Britain; Ghana/Tanzania and Great Britain; and Indonesia and Holland. It focuses on the modern period, between 1850 and the present, which is the period of both high colonialism and high nationalism as well as their aftermath. The project is based on the idea that a combination of metropolitan and colonial perspectives should lead to very different kinds of conversations and insights than have previously been possible among scholars who tend to work along the divide of colonizing and colonized nations.[4] It also suggests that comparative work on these issues on both sides of the divide might show that what seemed entirely separate is, in fact, related.[5] This project aims at revitalizing the discussion of the place of religion in modern society which theories of secularization have brought to a dead end.

The project examines the following sets of questions:

1) The 'secular' nature of British society in comparison with the 'religious' nature of Indian, African and Indonesian societies.

Britain and the Netherlands are examples of modern nation-states in Western Europe. The understanding of nationalism in the social sciences depends largely on a conceptualization of historical developments in this area and should therefore fit these two exemplary cases.

It is a fundamental assumption of the discourse of modernity that religion in modern societies loses its social creativity and is forced to choose between either a sterile conservation of its pre-modern characteristics or a self-effacing assimilation to the secularized world. In fact, new and highly original religious organizations proliferated in Britain and the Netherlands in the 19th century, resulting in unprecedented levels of personal involvement of the laity. Ideological pluralization, resulting in ecclesiastical and theological strife, only served to reinforce these mobilizations.

Both in the Netherlands and in Britain, the second half of the 19th century was a period of theological and eccelesiastical strife, and marked a turning-point in the development of organized Christianity. The mechanisms which were developed to pacify tensions between religious groups merit attention. For instance, both in the Netherlands and in Britain the formal re-establishment of a Roman Catholic hierarchy in the 1850s called into question the traditional identification of national identity with an undenominational Protestantism. In the second half of the 19th century this religious nationalism came under attack from different directions. Right-wing Protestant movements rejected its enlightened base. Catholics strove to prove their own adherence to the nation. More modern forms of political discourse endeavoured to found the nation on race or history.

Revival movements of indigenous religion in India, Africa and Indonesia have arisen, at least partly, as a reaction to Christian missionary activity. While much work has been done on their nineteenth-century history, too little is known about the development of these movements in the twentieth century, and it is one of the aims of the programme to write this history. The religious revival in India and Indonesia occurred in a period of great religious activity in Britain and Holland. These socio-religious developments in both the colonized areas and in the metropoles have never been studied in a comparative framework.

2) The Discourse of 'Community' and 'Nation'

The impact of the colonial state and its various institutions on African, Indian and Indonesian societies grew significantly in the second half of the nineteenth century, which saw a massive state project enumerate, classify and thereby control huge native populations of Indians and Indonesians by small groups of British and Dutch officials. In this project, categories such as caste, religious community, gender and race were applied with a great deal of variation.[6] One crucial element of this project was the division of populations into religious communities. When the British sought to apply indigenous law in India, they made a clear-cut division between Hindu and 'Muhammedan' law. This conceptual division was further institutionalized in the census operations which established a Hindu 'majority' and a Muslim 'minority' which became the basis of electoral representative politics. The 'establishment' of the 'Hindu majority' as well as that of the 'Muslim minority' was largely the result of the manner of classification, not of pre-existing facts. In Indonesia the Dutch created a distinction between Islamic and *adat* law, and in Africa, the creation of 'tribes' (as both linguistic, political and religious communities) made for similar divisions.[7] To some extent one may say that the project of the colonial state created these facts.

The division of Hindu and Muslim communities in pre-colonial India is not a colonial invention as such. What was a colonial novelty, however, was to count these communities and to have leaders represent them. This was fundamental to the emergence of religious nationalism. It is this colonial politics of 'community' and 'representation' which have to be examined in relation to notions of 'citizenship', 'democracy' and 'the public sphere' which are often said to characterize politics in the modern West.[8] While nation and state seem to belong together, as expressed in the hyphenated term 'nation-state', 'community' is often used to mean a form of identity which is in direct contestation of the State.

The discourse of 'community' versus 'nation' is also of great importance in the politics of ethnicity which characterize the post-colonial nation-states of Europe. Immigrants have to organize as communities to gain access to the resources of the State. There are a number of questions here, centring on the issues of recognition and entitlement, which are being addressed. For example, what is the relation between the colonial politics of 'community' and the contemporary 'minority' politics? What is the relation between 'ethnicity' and 'religious identity' in the imagination of immigrant communities?[9] The programme also examines the expectations of immigrants from ex-colonial societies about the place of religion in the political systems of the ex-colonizing receiving societies.

3) Missionization and Conversion

In the historical and anthropological study of the missionary project, there has been an almost exclusive interest in the effects of missionization on the target peoples. It is, however, important to look also at the other end of the missionizing process.

The effect of organizing for missionary endeavours on the religious history of the Western countries needs to be studied. In early modern times, Protestant churches had always been closely tied to a particular political regime, with neither the opportunity nor the will to organize missions. The great Protestant missionary societies, founded at the end of the eighteenth century, were not controlled or run by churches. They were the first real mass-organizations and played a crucial role in the transformation of the Protestant churches from the spiritual part of the social order to organizations within society. Yet their effects have hardly been studied at all, and are ignored in modern studies of enlightened sociability.[10] Their 19th-century history – most of them ended up under ecclesiastical control – can serve as an important indication of the fundamental changes which took place in the ways the churches conceived of themselves. The sheer scale of the advertising undertaken by the missionary societies to raise funds served to introduce new notions of religion and conversion in the West.

It is important to look at the ways in which Christian concepts of religion and conversion have been adopted in Hindu, Muslim, and 'pagan' understandings of 'nation', 'religion' and 'conversion'. In India and Indonesia this should be studied in the context of the Islamic da^{c}wa movements as well as in those of the Hindu nationalist shuddhi movements, in Africa, among new regional cults and independent Christian churches. Like the European Christian missionary project, these Asian missions also have a strong transnationalist, globalizing component. Special attention is to be given to the rise of so-called 'fundamentalist' movements and their contribution to the globalization of religion.[14] The impact of the mission is definitely not confined to the 'success' or 'failure' of conversion, but should be studied as an aspect of religious transformation in both the colonizing and colonized areas. ✦

Notes:

1. George Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*. New York, (Oxford University Press), 1980. Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, *The Fundamentalism Project*, five volumes. Chicago, (Chicago University Press), 1992-1995.
2. Bruce Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age*, San Francisco, (Harper and Row), 1989.
3. Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism; Hindus and Muslims in India*. Berkeley, (University of California Press), 1994.
4. Ann Stoler, 'Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 31, 1: 134-161, 1989.
5. Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, Baltimore, (Johns Hopkins University Press), 1993; see also Peter van der Veer's review of this book, Social History 20/3 (1995): 365-71.
6. See Ann Stoler, 'Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 34 (3): 514-551.
7. Mahadi, 'Islam and Law in Indonesia', in: Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rogers (eds) *Indonesian Religion in Transition*, Tucson (University of Arizona Press), 1987, 211-220; L. Vail (ed.), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*, London/Berkeley: James Currey/University of California Press 1989.
8. Jürgen Habermas, 'Öffentlichkeit', Fischer Lexicon, *Staat und Politik*, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, 220-226. Sandria B. Freitag (ed.), 'Aspects of "the Public" in Colonial South Asia', special number of *South Asia*, XIX, 1, 1991.
9. G. Baumann, 'Religious Communities and the Nation-State'. Paper delivered at 3rd Conference, European Association of Social Anthropologists, Oslo, July 1994, and G. Baumann, *Contesting Culture: Discourses of 'Culture' and 'Community' in Multi-Ethnic London*, Cambridge 1996.
10. They are, for instance, consciously ignored in Ulrich Im Hof, *Das gesellige Jahrhundert. Gesellschaft und Gesellschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, München 1982; W.W. Mijnhardt, *Tot Heil van 't Menschdom. Culturele genootschappen in Nederland, 1750-1815*, Amsterdam 1988; the same goes for the impact of Catholic missions in the Netherlands, P. Pels, *The Microphysics of Crisis. Contacts between Missionaries and Waluguru in Late Colonial Tanganyika*, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers (forthcoming), ch. 2.
11. See Rita Smith Kipp, *The Early Years of A Dutch Colonial Mission: the Karo Field*, Ann Arbor: (University of Michigan Press) 1990.
12. P. Pels, *The Microphysics of Crisis. Contacts between Missionaries and Waluguru in Late Colonial Tanganyika*, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers (forthcoming).
13. B. Meyer, *Translating the Devil. An African Appropriation of Pietist Protestantism*, Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1995.
14. Thomas Csordas, 'Oxymorons and Short-Circuits in the Re-enchantment of the World. The Case of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal', Etnofoor 8/1 (1995): 5-26; K. Poewe (ed.), *Charismatic Christianity as a Global Culture.*

Prof. Dr Peter van der Veer is Professor of Comparative Religion, University of Amsterdam, theNetherlands.

Leiden University

MARCEL KURPERSHOEK

Marcel Kurpershoek

Chair of Arabic Literature and Politics at Leiden University

On 18 September 1998, Dr Marcel Kurpershoek delivered his inaugural speech as Professor of Arabic Literature and Politics at the Department of Languages and Cultures of the Islamic Middle East at Leiden University. Its title was*: 'Wie luidt de doodsklok over de Arabieren?': Arabisme, Islam, en de Wereldbank* ('Who Rings the Death Bell on the Arabs?': Arabism, Islam and the World Bank) and is published (in Dutch) by Leiden University. The following is a passage from his speech:

'Awad (Arab poet, literary critic, polemist and indefatigable rebel) remained an inimitable optimist until his death in 1990. But whoever is interested in the fate of liberal thinkers in the Arab world will sometimes get the same feeling as that which the Norwegian Arne expresses in his comments on the Lapps in W.F. Hermans' novel *Nooit Meer Slapen* (Never to Sleep Again): 'I sometimes get the impression that the stubbornness people display in hanging on to their traditions is enough to give up any hope of people becoming happier by implementing rational steps.' Arne's solution is a simple one: 'A Lapp only has to take off his attire and he will become a Norwegian like any other.' 'So why don't they?', Alfred asks. 'Because they think they are different (…). A Lapp fears he will become a fake Norwegian at best (…).' 'But it is highly uncomfortable', Alfred argues. But Arne knows: 'Most people base their self respect on one or another kind of lack of comfort.'

In the academic year of 1998/1999, Prof. Kurpershoek lectures on freedom of speech in the Arab world, together with Prof. Nasr Abu Zayd. This series of lectures runs parallel to a project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'Freedom of Speech in the Middle East and North African Region'. ✦

Prof. Kurpershoek is the author of, amongst others, Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia, *the third volume of which is forthcoming.*



Book presentation

J.G.J. TER HAAR

Johan G.J. Ter Haar

Chair of Persian Language and Literature and the Cultural History of Iran at Leiden University

On 15 May 1998, Dr J.G.J. Ter Haar (1941) delivered his inaugural speech as Professor of Persian Language and Literature and the Cultural History of Iran. The speech was entitled: ***In De Stilte Van De Shar ᶜa, Een debat over de islam in het moderne Iran*** **(In the Silence of the Sharîᶜa; a debate on Islam in Modern Iran). The following is part of his conclusion. The entire speech has been published by the Research School CNWS, Leiden.**

'Sorûsh and his fellows belong to that group of intellectuals which is called rowshanfekrâne dînî in present day Persian. They are – literally translated – the religious intellectuals, the religious intelligentsia, intellectuals who do not only designate a central role in their thinking to their religious convictions, but who also give Islam a not unimportant social and political role, even though they vary amongst themselves in their interpretation of this role. However, not all Iranian intellectuals belong to this category. There are also intellectuals in Iran who as a matter of principle do not see any role for Islam in public life, who hold the opinion that religion is at most something for the private sphere and who advocate a completely secularized society. But, different from the religious intellectuals, who can disseminate their views in *Kiyân* and other magazines, they are not – or virtually not – capable of having their voices heard, at least, not in public. However difficult it is to estimate the size and influence of this movement, it would be a mistake to think that secularism does not exist in Iran. Personally, I am inclined to say that the views of the religious intellectuals in Iranian society are more widely accepted than those taking a purely secularist stance.

On the other hand (…) we should not overestimate the importance and the influence of the debate. Not only since the importance of any intellectual debate should not be overestimated, but also because in Iran many other things are going on in many other fields than the debate on Islam. (…) This does not mean that the debate (…) is for debate's sake only. This is so because in the debate there is a central question that is of great importance for the development of Islam within, as well as outside, Iran. What that question entails has, in my opinion, never been put more poignantly than in the title of the article by Sorûsh in *Kiyân* (April/May 1998), 'Serâthâ-ye Mostaqîm', which means 'the proper ways'. Every Muslim who sees this title will immediately think of the first sura of the Quran, where this is also mentioned, in singular, in the prayer 'lead us to the right path'. The question Sorûsh and his fellows ask is whether there is only one right path in Islam, or whether perhaps more ways lead to Mekkah. ✦

Prof. Ter Haar is the author of, among others, Volgeling en erfgenaam van de profeet: de denkwereld van shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, 1564-1624 (Leiden 1989) (Follower and Heir of the Prophet: the Thinking of shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi) and Volgelingen van de imam: een kennismaking met desjiᶜitische islam (Amsterdam) 1995 (Followers of the Imam: an Introduction to Shiᶜite Islam).

Book presentation

Turkish Religious Foundation
Centre for Islamic Studies

Turkish Religious Foundation **Encyclopaedia of Islam**

This new Turkish encyclopaedia of Islam is an ambitious and wide-ranging project that will rapidly become an indispensable reference work for the study of social, political and cultural aspects of the Muslim world. As stated in the preface to Volume 1, the work is a statement of pride and confidence in the Islamic religious and cultural heritage, at a time when the Muslim world is overcoming, with great determination, its long-held inferiority complex *vis- -vis* the modern West. Accordingly, the *TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi* was conceived and designed by – and is being overwhelmingly executed from within – a community of Muslim scholars, mainly Turkish. It is thus markedly different in scope and in tone from Leiden's *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. This latter is seen by the editors of the new encyclopaedia as primarily a project of European orientalists.

Systematic work on the TDV encyclopaedia began in 1983, with publications averaging almost two volumes annually since 1988. Approximately 40 volumes are envisaged in all. Indices of essential topics in fifteen (later to become seventeen) different subject areas (e.g. Arabic language and literature, history of religions, *hadith*, Islamic arts, geography of Muslim countries, Sufism, Turkish history and civilization, etc.) were compiled mainly by trawling through relevant published works and manuscripts, rather than by relying upon existing encyclopaedic models. The result is a unique combination of 'gazetteer', 'who's who', a dictionary of terminology, and an 'enquiry within and upon everything'. As such, it is certainly a guide to what almost every specialist in Turkish and Middle Eastern / Islamic Studies generally uses.

Entries on persons include, as expected, caliphs, sultans, shahs and vezirs, teachers, judges, seyhs and Sufis, mathematicians, legal experts, artists and literary figures, statesmen and politicians, from the seventh to the twentieth centuries, and from all over the Islamic world, though with an understandable preponderance of Ottomans and Turks in later periods.

In addition to covering all Muslim countries, major cities, staging posts, watering holes, etc., the geographical coverage also includes more surprising entries on, for example, 'Amerika Biirlesik Devletleri', 'Almanya', 'Avrupa', 'Filipinler'. For each country/continent, coverage is generally in three parts: physical and human geography, history, and Islam in that area. The entry 'Avusturya' also has a fourth section on Austrian scholars of Islam from the sixteenth century onwards.

The *TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi* is being published by Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi, which was established in 1975. Among the purposes of this foundation are the following: promoting religious values, relieving the economic problems of the destitute, and offering grants to students. ✦

- *Ístanbul Türkíye Diyanet Vakfi. Vols. 1-18 published c. 550 pp. per volume.*

Book presentation

CORIEN W. HOEK

Shifting Sands Social-economic development in al-Sharqiyah region, Oman

The Sultanate of Oman is endowed with oil resources, as are its neighbouring Gulf countries. Exploitation of the state-owned resources began at the end of the 1960s, and the oil revenues were used by the government to initiate a countrywide process of development. *Shifting Sands* analyses this process for al-Sharqiyah, a region without oil resources of its own, which has as its main economic activities animal husbandry, agriculture, fishing and commerce. The study is based on extensive fieldwork conducted between 1985 and 1990 and a number of visits thereafter.

Regional development in a historical-geographical perspective provides the setting of the book. The present situation is analysed through highlighting the roles of the three major development forces: the government, the private sector and tribal organization. Furthermore, economic activities are investigated in terms of present performance and future prospects. The question at hand concerns the potential of an activity to offer employment to the rapidly growing population. For example, growth in agriculture and herding is defined by the limited water resources and arable land. At the same time, sustained development of agriculture and herding are seen as prerequisites to continued life in the desert and oases settlements. The fisheries sector could potentially be a core business in the region and a large part of this study is devoted to its modernization process.

The study discusses the significant phenomenon of two opposite labour flows in the region. One is represented by an influx of people mainly from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which contributes to commercial expansion yet poses a threat to the employment of Omani people. The other is a temporary outflow of locals employed outside the region, which provides the main source of income to the region. The study considers the rapidly improved living and working conditions and the flexibility of people to adapt to changing opportunities, as assets in the development process.

Macro policies affect the main topics in the regional development process and the region's situation sets conditions to national development. This linkage is explored in the concluding chapter of the book and tentative suggestions are given to attune the two strategic levels. Cooperation at all levels amongst the three major forces (government, the private sector, and the tribal organization – or other comparable social organizations), is seen as vital to a successful approach to development in al-Sharqiyah region. ✦

Dr Corien W. Hoek is an economic anthropologist and works for the Centre of Islamic Culture in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.



Shifting Sands
Social-economic development in al-Sharqiyah region, Oman
Nijmegen University Press, Nijmegen
1998, xviii + 350 pp.
ISBN 90-5710-049-5

Book presentation

CHARLES KURZMAN

Liberal Islam
Not a Contradiction in Terms

Many Westerners, and many Muslims, consider 'Liberal Islam' to be a contradiction in terms. This is not the case. The term 'liberal' has negative connotations in much of the Islamic world, in part because of the hypocrisy of its introduction to the region by colonialists and imperialists who flouted the liberalism they touted. Yet the Islamic world is witnessing a thriving movement of Muslim thinkers who address 'liberal' concerns such as democracy, the separation of Church and State, the rights of women, the rights of minorities, freedom of thought, and the idea of human progress – hardly the only concerns that might be labeled 'liberal', but bedrock themes in the liberal tradition.

While liberal Islam shares parallel concerns with Western liberalism, it is no mere echo of the West. Both traditions may support freedom of thought, for example, but they do so within different discourses. As I have tried to demonstrate in my recent anthology, *Liberal Islam: A Source-Book* (Oxford University Press, 1998), the Islamic discourse has generated three tropes, or meta-narratives, through which liberal concerns are expressed.

The 'Liberal *Shariᶜa*'

The 'liberal *shariᶜa*' trope argues that the revelations of the Qur'an and the practices of the Prophet Muhammad – the body of Islamic guidance and precedence handed down from 7th century Arabia – *command* us to follow liberal positions. For example, in the case of freedom of thought, some 'liberal *shariᶜa*' arguments take verses from the Qur'an that urge the believers to think independently. ᶜAli Shariᶜati (Iran, 1933-77), for example, draws on the Qur'anic distinction between *bashar* (the human animal) and *insan* (the fully human being): 'Humankind is a chooser, that is, the only being who is not only capable of revolting against nature and the order which is ruling over it, but can revolt against its own natural, physical, and psychological needs. Humans can choose things which have neither been imposed on them by nature, nor is their body fit to choose them. This is the most sublime aspect of humanity.' Similarly, Abdelwahab El-Affendi (Sudan, born 1955) argues that all humans must be endowed with free will and the 'freedom to sin', or they will also lack 'the freedom to be virtuous.'

Other 'liberal *shariᶜa*' defences of freedom of thought draw on the right to conduct *ijtihad*, or Islamic interpretation. This was one of the rallying cries of the modernist Islamic movement of the 19th century, as exemplified by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (born in Iran, 1838-97): 'In their beliefs they [the members of each community] must shun submission to conjectures and not be content with mere imitation of their ancestors. For if man believes in things without proof or reason, makes a practice of following unproven opinions, and is satisfied to imitate and follow his ancestors, his mind inevitably desists from intellectual movement, and little by little stupidity and imbecility overcome him – until his mind becomes completely idle and he becomes unable to perceive his own good and evil; and adversity and misfortune overtake him from all sides.' Similarly, Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egypt-Qatar, born 1926) urges those who wish to impose strict interpretations of Islamic law to recognize that those 'who hold different views or approaches are also capable of *ijtihad* like themselves.'

Indeed, Ghulam Ahmad Parwez (India-Pakistan, born 1903) has argued that the Qur'an's protection of individual freedom is so strong that it overrides all forms of authority: 'No person has the right to compel any other person to obey his orders: 'It is not [possible] for any human being unto whom God has given the Scripture and wisdom and prophethood that he should afterward have said unto mankind: "Be slaves of me instead of God" (Sura 3, Verse 79).' Political systems that do allow individual freedom of thought, according to this trope, are un-Islamic.

The 'Silent *Shariᶜa*'

A second trope of liberal Islam I call the 'silent *shariᶜa*'. In this trope, freedom, for example, is not *required* by the *shariᶜa*, but it is *allowed* by the *shariᶜa*. This trope argues that the *shariᶜa* is silent on certain topics – not because the divine revelation was incomplete or faulty, but because the revelation *intentionally* left certain issues for humans to choose. Saᶜid Ramadan of Egypt, for example, has written that 'the *shariᶜa* of God, as embodied in Qur'an and sunna, does not bind mankind in *muᶜamalat* (worldly dealings) except by providing a few broad principles of guidance and a limited number of injunctions. The *shariᶜa* only rarely concerns itself with details. The confinement of the *shariᶜa* to broad principles and its silence in other spheres are due to divine wisdom and mercy. The fact that the *shariᶜa* is silent on these points – and we should bear in mind that, as the Qur'an remarks, "God is not forgetful" – means only that the application of the general injunctions of the *shariᶜa* to the multifarious details of human life, and the confrontation of new problems according to the dictates of *maslaha* (public good) have been left to the discretion of the body of conscious Muslims.'

Within this general argument, definitions of the public good may vary. Nurcholish Madjid (Indonesia, born 1939) phrases the public good in terms of intellectual progress: 'We must have a firm conviction that all ideas and forms of thought, however strange they may sound, should be accorded means of expression. It is by no means rare that such ideas and thoughts, initially regarded as generally wrong, are [later] found to be right. Furthermore, in the confrontation of ideas and thoughts, even error can be of considerable benefit, because it will induce truth to express itself and grow as a strong force. Perhaps it was not entirely small talk when our Prophet said that differences of opinion among his *umma* [community] were a mercy [from God].' Laith Kubba (Iraq-England, born 1954) phrases the public good in terms of economic progress: 'As Muslims devise strategies for economic growth in a competitive world and redefine their priorities, their outlook will shift from the abstract concepts and values of Islam to the realities of the Muslim world. They will continue to turn to Islam as a source of personal and communal identity and moral guidance, but they will also critically assess the legacy handed down by previous generations who may have narrowed Islam in ways that had less to do with the essence of the faith than with historical accidents and parochial circumstances.' In both of these examples, the *shariᶜa* allows Muslims freedom of thought in order to attain these public goods.

The 'Interpreted *Shariᶜa*'

The first trope of liberal Islam holds that the *shariᶜa requires* liberty, and the second trope holds that the *shariᶜa allows* liberty. But there is a third liberal Islamic trope that takes issue with each of the first two. This I call the 'interpreted *shariᶜa*'. According to this view, 'Religion is divine, but its interpretation is thoroughly human and this-worldly.' I quote here from ᶜAbdul-Karim Soroush (Iran, born 1945): 'the text does not stand alone, it does not carry its own meaning on its shoulders, it needs to be situated in a context, it is theory-laden, its interpretation is in flux, and presuppositions are as actively at work here as elsewhere in the field of understanding. Religious texts are no exception. Therefore their interpretation is subject to expansion and contraction according to the assumptions preceding them and/or the questions inquiring them… We look at revelation in the mirror of interpretation, much as a devout scientist looks at creation in the mirror of nature … [so that] the way for religious democracy and the transcendental unity of religions, which are predicated on religious pluralism, will have been paved.'

Similarly, Hassan Hanafi (Egypt, born 1935) has written: 'There is no one interpretation of a text, but there are many interpretations given the difference in understanding between different interpreters. An interpretation of a text is essentially pluralistic. The text is only a vehicle for human interests and even passions. The conflict of interpretation is essentially a socio-political conflict, not a theoretical one. Theory indeed is only an epistemological cover-up. Each interpretation expresses the socio-political commitment of the interpreter.'

Syed Vahiduddin (India, born 1909) said: 'But as the Qur'an's vision of God cannot be confined exclusively to any one of its historical expressions, religion itself cannot be a static construct made once and for all without revealing fresh nuances in its historical development. This static concept of religion neglects the truth that at no point of history can all possibilities be exhausted, though a given point in history might be pregnant with implications for the future. History is a process of creative expression; not a perpetual repetition, and hence it is presumptuous to limit Islam to its classical expression.'

Challenges of Liberal Islam

Liberal Islam is thriving, propelled by rising education in the Islamic world and the global wave of democratization. Yet it has enemies. On one hand, Muslim opponents accuse it of being overly Westernized, of abandoning the core values and traditions of Islam. Liberal Islam, one Muslim scholar wrote me, is the work of Muslims who 'want to do nothing more than fade into the Judaeo-Christian woodwork.' Another Muslim scholar, Gai Eaton, has referred to liberals as 'Uncle Toms' (a derisive term used by African-Americans to describe a black person who is grotesquely servile to whites). The force of these critiques echoes debates of the early 20th century, when a traditionalist Muslim scholar called modernist Islamic thinkers 'stupid' and 'manipulated by Satan'.

On the other hand, many Westerners consider liberal Islam to be overly Islamic. Leonard Binder's *Islamic Liberalism* argues that liberal positions grounded on 'explicit Islamic legislation of divine origin' – what I call the 'liberal *shariᶜa*' trope – constitute an impossible 'anomaly' (p. 244). One wonders whether liberalism based on Christian scripture would be considered similarly anomalous. Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* makes no distinction between liberal and non-liberal Muslims – they are all in the 'other' camp. Similarly, a cartoon in the *New Yorker* magazine in early 1998 showed a caricature of Iranian President Muhammad Khatami saying, 'We are interested in a cultural exchange. We will give you one of our writers, and you will give us Salman Rushdie' – this despite Khatami's support for rule of law in Iran and his opposition to the groups seeking Rushdie's execution.

Liberal Islam thus faces hostility on two fronts, both of which treat it as a contradiction in terms: Muslims who consider it not properly Islamic and Westerners who consider it not properly liberal. Liberal Islam is caught in the crossfire, as the party of war on both sides joins in tacit collusion against those seeking to build bridges in between.

Is this not the same dilemma in which the field of Islamic Studies finds itself? ✦

Dr Charles Kurzman is Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA. He is author of Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook.
(See page 43).
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Book presentation

JAN JUST WITKAM

Manuscripta Indonesica Basic Tools of Research

Since 1993, six volumes have appeared in the series *Manuscripta Indonesica*, now a joint publishing project between INIS (Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, Leiden University) and the Legatum Warnerianum in Leiden University Library. More are in the making. Each volume contains (at least) an actual size black-and-white reproduction of an Indonesian manuscript, with an introduction containing a physical description of the original manuscript and placing it in its cultural or ritual context. The contents of the volume sometimes go beyond these basic descriptions by adding a transliteration, translation or an electronic version.

Not all volumes present an Islamic text. However, all volumes have a direct or indirect relevance to Indonesian culture, thus in most cases to Islam. To date, five of the six originals reproduced originate from the Oriental collections of the Leiden University Library, the sixth being held in a private collection. There are plans to expand through cooperation with other institutions. This is not due to difficulty in choice or reproduction of manuscripts; they are available in overwhelming numbers, both in Leiden and in other public collections. Simply reproducing them as they are would be a merely technical operation. Compiling the introduction to each volume, however, takes time, effort and expertise. Such a detailed introduction gives added value, considered by the editors to be of primary importance, to each volume.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, an impressive number of manuscripts from Southeast Asia have come to the Netherlands, as opposed to the 17th and 18th centuries when few made their way to Europe. British collections were the first (end of the 18th century) to add Southeast Asian materials to their holdings on an organized scale. The collection of Oriental manuscripts at the Leiden University Library comprises one of the largest repositories of Southeast Asian manuscript materials in the world. This collection is enlarged on a regular basis, made possible by governmental and private funding. Gifts or bequests constitute, and have constituted, a considerable amount of the manuscripts acquired. Those manuscripts commissioned by scholars in the field form an important part of the latter categories. In colonial times, manuscripts were sometimes acquired as war booty or by confiscation. Leiden University Library and the library of the Bataviaasch Genootschap, now the Perpustakaan Nasional (National Library) in Jakarta, have equally profited from these circumstances. About two thirds of the approximately 25,000 Oriental manuscripts in the Leiden collection are of Southeast Asian origin. The majority of these originate from the Indonesian archipelago and Malaysia, most of them having been produced in the 19th or 20th century. One may fairly say that all cultures and languages from the areas that have possessed a written tradition are represented in the collection.



In *Manuscripta Indonesica,* the focus is on the manuscript. Publishing the manuscript in facsimile should cause as little alteration as possible with regards to form, size, and overall outward appearance. Some concessions are inevitable, however. The use of contemporary paper would be impossible, and *lontar* (palmleaf), *dluang* (tree bark paper) or other traditional materials even more so. Ideas to manufacture facsimiles of Batak texts on bamboo or tree bark have at some stage been entertained by the editors of the series, only to be quickly discarded as either impractical or too costly to implement. Due to financial considerations it is even out of the question to reproduce the original colours in print, the print-run of the series totalling only a few hundred copies. Furthermore, it is not laxity but rather fundamental theoretical considerations, which have brought the editors to decide not to do any 'textual editing' whatsoever. The original manuscript is held in high esteem and it is therefore reproduced without any editorial modification, thus maintaining all its characteristics of form, spelling and other peculiarities. ✦

Manuscripta Indonesica is edited by Wim Stokhof, Roger Tol and Jan Just Witkam. The volumes appear at irregular intervals. Orders can be sent to Legatum Warnerianum, Leiden University Library, P.O. Box 9501, NL-2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands (e-mail:witkam@rulub.leidenuniv.nl).

Dr Jan Just Witkam is Interpres Legati Warneriani, and Curator of Oriental Collections, LeidenUniversity Library, the Netherlands. E-mail:witkam@rulub.leidenuniv.nl

The following volumes of *Manuscripta Indonesica* (ISSN 0929-6484) have been published:

Volume 1: *Hikayat Isma Yatim by Ismail and Hikayat Sultan Mogul mengajarkan anaknya : a facsimile edition of manuscript Cod. Or. 1693 in the Library of Leiden University* / with an introduction by Roger Tol & Jan Just Witkam. Leiden: Indonesian Linguistics Development Project (ILDEP) in co-operation with Legatum Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden University, 1993. XVI, 144 p., facs; 35 cm. ISBN 90-73006-02-3

Volume 2: *Mukhtasar Tawarikh al-Wusta : a short chronicle of the Riau region : a facsimile edition of manuscript Cod. Or. 1999 in the Library of Leiden University* / with an introduction by Roger Tol & Jan Just Witkam. Leiden: Indonesian Linguistics Development Project (ILDEP) in co-operation with Legatum Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden University, 1993. XIII, 26 p., 36 cm. ISBN90-73006-03-1

Volume 3: *Serat lokapala kawi : an eighteenth-century manuscript of the old Javanese Arjunawijaya by Mpu Tantular : a facsimile edition of manuscript Cod. Or. 2048 in the Library of Leiden University* / with an introduction by Bernard Arps & Willem van der Molen. Leiden: Indonesian Linguistics Development Project (ILDEP) in co-operation with Legatum Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden University, 1994. XLVI, 90 p., facs., 35 cm. ISBN 90-73006-04-X

Volume 4: *Gita Yuddha Mengwi or Kidung Ndèrèt : a facsimile edition of manuscript Cod. Or. 23.059 in the Library of Leiden University* / with an introduction by H.I.R. Hinzler. Leiden: Indonesian Linguistics Development Project (ILDEP) in co-operation with Legatum Warnerianum in The Library of Leiden University, 1994. 32 p., facs., 50 x 20 cm. ISBN 90-73006-05-8

Volume 5: *Mystical illustrations from the teachings of Syaikh Ahmad Al-Qusyasyi : a facsimile edition on paper and CD-ROM of a manuscript from Aceh (Cod. Or. 2222) in the Library of Leiden University* / with introductions by Aad Janson, Roger Tol & Jan Just Witkam. Leiden: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) in co-operation with Legatum Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden University, 1995. XXXIV, 30 p., facs., 27 x 17 cm. ISBN 90-73006-07-4. There is a web presentation of this volume: http://www.leidenuniv.nl/pun/ubhtm/ubor.or2vier.html.

Volume 6: *Nabi Aparas. The shaving of the Prophet Muhammad's hair : a facsimile edition of a Javanese manuscript from Lombok, MS M.53 in the private collection of Dick van der Meij* / with an introduction, transliteration and translation by Dick van der Meij. Leiden: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) in co-operation with Legatum Warnerianum in the Library of Leiden University, 1996. 80 p., facs., 16 x 16 cm. ISBN 90-73006-08-2.

UC Berkeley
LAURENCE MICHALAK
& **RENATE HOLUB**

Report on a Symposium 'Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe'

In October 1998, The Middle East and West Europe Centers of the University of California at Berkeley jointly sponsored a two-day symposium, 'Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe: Culture, Politics and Citizenship in an Era of Globalization'. The programme focused on the deep ideational changes which have been taking place in Europe due to the Muslim populations which have sprung up in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and elsewhere. The symposium explored political and cultural aspects of the emerging identities of these relatively new citizens – how they view themselves and how they are viewed by non-Muslim Europeans, as well as how the relatively indigenous populations of Europe are being forced to rethink their own collective identities, both as Europeans and as citizens of specific countries.

In their symposium prospectus and introductory remarks the organizers argued that these are no longer migration issues in the traditional sense, because most Muslims in Europe are no longer migrants. Muslim populations have been present in Europe for several generations, although many Europeans have been slow to recognize that Islam is now a European religion.

The conference featured six scholars and a number of discussants:

Tariq Modood *(University of Bristol, UK)* pointed out that minorities in the UK are protected as members of ethnic/racial groups rather than as Muslims. As in the US, there has been a shift in emphasis from the right to assimilate, to the right to maintain one's 'differences' and to have them positively valued. Modood contrasted the UK, where a multicultural approach seems to be making headway, with France, which remains essentially assimilationist and anti-multicultural.

Michel Wieviorka *(École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris)* addressed processes of cultural transformation that occur as Muslim youth in Europe inevitably alter the Islamic traditions that shape their responses to non-Islamic environments, calling what results the 'Islam of the Youth'. He placed this in a larger context of French national destructuration and the decline of republicanism and of mechanisms of national integration.

Krishan Kumar *(formerly UK, now University of Virginia)* spoke on 'Europe, the Nation-State and the Question of Identity in an Era of Multiculturalism', comparing different settings in Europe. Kumar spoke about the dilemma of maintaining one's cultural origin in the UK, and of a future of hyphenization, hybridity, syncretization and creolization, but he also eloquently defended assimilation for those who choose that path.

Bassam Tibi *(University of Göttingen, Germany)* focused on themes of cultural and political integration of Muslim groups. The notion of 'cultural co-existence', based on principles of diversity and plurality, was central to his address. Tibi suggested that a 'Euro-Islam', or European form of Islam, is emerging, but he cautioned against turning a blind eye to the more fundamentalist elements which also exist within the spectrum of European Muslim opinion.

Hala Mustafa *(Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al Ahram Foundation, Cairo)* addressed political concerns on a more global level, also emphasizing co-existence. Mustafa called for the transformation of existing unequal power relations between Europe and the Islamic states in the developing world, and noted that current processes of globalization would significantly affect this imbalance.

Paul Lubeck *(UC Santa Cruz)* discussed the economic and sociological issues facing Europe, particularly those issues pertaining to Islamic networks and the challenges they present to citizenship claims. Lubeck noted that the contributions of future Muslim migrants to Europe's economy, and hence to its global competitiveness, will not reside primarily in menial labour. Rather, migration trends from Muslim majority countries contribute to the area of technological skills.

Several issues emerged from the presentations and debates:

Regarding the nation-state, some argued that, with the rise of European institutions, the nation-state is being replaced by wider political entities in terms of both sovereignty and identity. Others argued that such notions are premature, noting also the persistence of sub-national identities, both ethnic and regional.

A second issue is assessing the relative power of assimilationism versus multiculturalism in different national settings. Assimilationists argue that Muslims in Europe will and should gradually become more like other Europeans. Multi-culturalists, on the other hand, argue both the inevitability and the desirability of retaining non-European heritages and promoting cultural diversity.

Finally, how powerful a force is Islam in determining identity? Some suggest that other factors – such as ethnic, national, regional, tribal, class or economic identities – can often be stronger than religion. The identities of Europe's Muslim populations are not fixed but vary in both the short term and historically.

Several speakers cautioned against reifying and attributing causality to Islam, noting that there are important differences amongst Muslims in Europe – especially between Islamic activists and secularists. While many Muslims resist Euro-American post-industrial culture on moral grounds, they often thrive in the infrastructure of globalization, which is the product of capitalism. In any case, there was general agreement that both Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe are articulating new citizenships and new ethnicities through a continuing dialectic.

Participants in the conference are revising their papers for a collective volume which is projected for publication in 1999. ✦



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Cultural and Arts Programme
BRITISH COUNCIL

Mutualities: Britain and Islam Cultural and Arts Programme

From February to July 1999, Visiting arts, a joint venture comprised of arts councils from around the UK, will focus on the cultural and arts activities of Muslim communities from all over the world, the UK included. Arts events taking place in the UK originating from, or influenced by, Muslim cultures will be publicized in the form of a six-month Cultural and Arts Programme. The aim of the Programme is to build on existing initiatives and to encourage new ones, and also to increase awareness of the immensely rich and passionate artistic response to the world's fastest growing religion. The Programme will coincide with The British Council's international conference, 'Mutualities: Britain and Islam' (28-30 April 1999).

To conclude the Programme, and as part of its ongoing contribution to this field, in July 1999, Visiting Arts will hold a seminar on Promoting Muslim Arts in the UK.

In August 1999, Visiting Arts will produce a resource publication for those involved in planning Islam-related arts events. The publication will include: a directory of relevant UK organizations; reports on The British Council's conferences and a full listing of the events included in the Mutualities: Britain and Islam Cultural and Arts Programme, with colour photographs.

Conference on Britain and Islam

The British Council in London is organizing a conference on the relationship between Britain and Islam. The aim of the congress is threefold:
- to emphasize the interdependence and mutual benefit of the relationship through education and trade between Britain and Islam
- to link the cultural pluralism of Britain with the cultural pluralism of the emerging global village
- to strengthen partnerships that transcend the normal institutional contraints.

Conference organizers include Dr Peter Clark OBE, Special Advisor, Middle East and North Africa, British Council; Prof. Jorgen S Nielsen, Director of the Centre of the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations; and Imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid JP, Director of the Brighton Islamic Mission.

The conference will take place at the Royal Commonwealth Society in London, on 28-30 April 1999.

Further information and application forms can be obtained from:

Peter Clark
MENA, The British Council
10, Spring Gardens, London SW1A 2BN, UK
Tel: +44.171.3894029
E-mail: peter.clark@britcoun.org

or:
Anne van de Graaf
British Council The Netherlands
Keizersgracht 269, 1016 ED AMSTERDAM
Tel: 020-5506065
E-mail: anne.vandegraaf@britcoun.nl

***Calligraphy from the Muslim World* (visual, international)**

Venue: Cartwright Hall Art Gallery, Bradford.
January 1999 – December 2000
Promoter: Nilesh Mistry, Cultural Diversity Outreach Officer, Cartwright Hall Art Gallery, Lister Park, Bradford BD9 4NS
Tel: +44 1274 493 313,
Fax: +44 1274 481 045.

The exhibition focuses on calligraphy primarily from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, but includes items from Syria, Iran, Turkey and Egypt. To reflect the versatile nature of this art form, the collection covers a range of media, such as textiles, gemstones, silver, bronze, brass, wood and paper. Also on display are contemporary calligraphic works by Tehmina Shah, Shirazeh Houshirary, Laila Rahman and Shahzia Sikander.

***Painted Poetry: illustrations from the Khamseh of Nizami and Haft Aurang of Jami* (exhibition, India and Iran)**

Venue: British Museum, London
15 February to 5 July 1999
Promoter: Rachel Ward, Assistant Keeper, British Museum Tel: +44 171 323 8457.

This exhibition will include illustrations of the well-known Persian poetical manuscripts: the *Khamseh*, or *Five Tales*, of Nizame and the *Haft Aurang*, or *Seven Thrones*, of Jami. The paintings range in date from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries and come from Timurid and Safavid Iran, and Sultanate and Mughal India.

***Mosaiques 99* (film/literature, France/North Africa)**

Venue: Institut Français, London
17-22 March 1999.
Promoter: Jean Jacques Scaerou, Secretary General, French Cultural Department, Embassy of France, 23 Cromwell Road, London SW7 2EL
Tel: +44 171 838 2078,
Fax: +44 171 838 2088
E-mail: jeanjacques.scaerou@mail.ambafrance.org.uk

This is a programme of cultural and arts events to celebrate the Maghreb's contribution to French culture today. The programme will include fourteen films from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; two exhibitions: *Maghreb* and *Portraits of Arabic Women*; conferences with guests from the Maghreb; calligraphy; storytelling; musical accompaniment. The French Brasserie will offer Tunisian specialities in a traditional North African atmosphere.

***Giving Voice: A Divinity of the Voice* (music, international)**

1-10 April 1999
Venue: Centre for Performance Research (CPR), 8 Science Park, Aberystwyth, Wales.
Promoter: Claire Swatheridge, Administrator, Centre for Performance Research, 8 Science Park, Aberystwyth SY23 3AH, Wales
Tel: +44 1970 622 133
Fax: +44 1970 622 132
E-mail: cgs@aber.ac.uk
URL: http://www.aber.ac.uk/~cprwww

A ten-day international festival of the voice comprising workshops, informative and entertaining lecture-demonstrations, an opportunity for discussions and a wide range of exciting and unusual performances from around the world, such as Croatia, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, India and Pakistan. To book, please contact Fiona Smith at CPR.

Linked to the festival will be the fifth Performance Studies Conference '99, 'Here Be Dragons', which will take place 9-12 April 1999. To book, please contact Ileike Roms at CPR. CPR would like to contact leading female international vocalists who are interested in participating in the festival.

Hossein Omoumi: *The Voice of Love* (music, Iran)

5-6 April 1999
Venue: Centre for Performance Research, 8 Science Park, Aberystwyth, Wales.
Promoter: Claire Swatheridge, Administrator, Centre for Performance Research, 8 Science Park, Aberystwyth SY23 3AH, Wales
Tel: +44 1970 622 133
Fax: +44 1970 622 132
Email: cgs@aber.ac.uk URL: http://www.aber.ac.uk/~cprwww

A two-day workshop led by the Iranian Hossein Omoumi, followed by an evening performance. Omoumi will teach Iranian music, based on Sufi poetry, introducing parts of the Radif in the traditional style: orally and by repetition. There will also be an evening performance for the public on April 6 in Aberystwyth.

***Muslims in China* (lecture/exhibition, China)**

April – May 1999
Venue: tbc
Promoter: Susie Wong, Chinese Cultural Centre, 27 Old Gloucester Street, London WC1N 3XX
Tel/Fax: +44 171-633 9878.

This programme, funded by Visiting Arts, will be the first of its kind in the UK to focus on the arts and culture of China's Muslim populations. The programme will include two lectures: an overview of Muslims in China, and the contribution of Muslim culture in China; and an exhibition on the subject of Chinese mosques.

Bakshi Javaid Salamat Qawwal: *Sounds of the Qawwal*

(music/dance, Pakistan)
July 1999
Venue: APNA Arts, Nottingham Community Arts Centre, 39 Gregory Boulevard, Nottingham.
Promoter (UK): APNA Arts, Nottingham Community Arts Centre, 39 Gregory Boulevard, Nottingham NG7 6BE
Tel: +44 115 942 2479
Fax: +44 115 942 2478.
Promoter (Pakistan): Uxi Mufti, Executive Director, Lok Virsa, Garden Avenue, Shakarpurian, Islamabad, Pakistan
Tel: 00 92 51 9203983
Fax: 00 92 51 9202042
E-mail: mufti@heritage.sdnpk.undp.org

Sounds of the Qawwal is a twelve-week dance music workshop programme run by APNA Arts for young people. The Bakshi Javaid Salamat Qawwali music group from Pakistan will collaborate with an established musician from the UK, Aki Nawaz (Nation Records, Fundamental), fusing centuries-old qawwali tradition with contemporary British-based youth culture dance music. The collaborative work will be recorded and released on CD.

The project also provides the opportunity for live performances, lectures and talks on Sufi concepts and music.
Sounds of the Qawwal is part of NCIusion, a three year programme of high quality arts in the city of Nottingham initiated by Nottingham City Council and funded by the Arts Council. It uses arts as a vehicle to change and challenge attitudes, and provides a rich and varied climate for the interchange of ideas and creativity.
Available to tour. ✦

Art & Culture Agenda

THE NETHERLANDS

Exhibitions

Municipal Museum The Hague
Stadhouderslaan 41
2517 HV The Hague
tel: 31 70 3381111

Continuing
- *exhibition Islamic crafts. Renewed exhibition from its own collection, in particular ceramics. Other objects illustrating Islamic art.*

Museum of Ethnology
Willemskade 25,
3016 DM Rotterdam
tel: 31 10 4112201
fax: 31 10 4118331

- *Due to renovations, the museum will be closed until October 2000. It will reopen with a permanent exhibition of Islamic art from its own collection.*

Thermenmuseum Heerlen
Coriovallumstraat 9
6411 CA Heerlen,
tel: 31 45 5604581

3 October 1998 – January 2000
- *The Bathhouse. Bathing Cultures in East and West.*

Galerie Fi Beiti
Prinsengracht 157-hs
1015 DR Amsterdam
tel: 31 20 626 44 32
fax: 31 20 626 44 33
e-mail: galerie@fibeiti.demon.nl

30 January – 6 March 1999
- *Persheng Warzandegan. Paintings and Ceramics*

Witte de With, Center for Contemporary Art
Witte de Withstraat 50,
3012 BR Rotterdam
tel: 31 10 4110144
fax: 31 10 4117924
e-mail: wdw@wxs.nl
open: Tuesday through Sunday, 11am-6pm

28 January – 21 March 1999
- *From/To is an exhibit in which Palestine is put on the map. The project includes anthropology, cinema, geography, history, photography, etc.*

Music

Stichting Kulsan
WG-plein 126
1054 SC Amsterdam
tel/fax: 31 20 6182164

20 – 30 March 1999
- *Turkish Sufi music and Spanish flamenco*

22 April – 2 May 1999
- *Istanbul Oriental Ensemble with Burhan Öçal*

20 – 30 October 1999
- *Turkish popstar Sezen Aksu & the Dutch Willem Breuker Kollektief*

RASA
Netwerk Non-Western music
Pauwstraat 13a
3512 TG Utrecht
tel: 31 30 2319676
fax: 31 30 2315507
e-mail: Mariekevantellingen@rasa.nl

14 May 1999-23 May 1999
- *Rabita Andalousa (Arabo-andalusian music), various locations. For details please contact Rasa, attn: Marieke van Tellingen*

FRANCE

Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St-Bernard,
75236 Paris
tel: 33 1 40 51 39 60/ 33 1 0
open: Daily 10am – 6pm, Saturday until 8pm. Closed on Monday.

22 October 1998 – 30 April 1999
- *Liban, l'autre rive. Exhibition on Lebanon, with 400 objects, icluding pieces as the sarcophagus of King Ahiram. During the exhibition, a 'saison Libanaise' is organized featuring music, dance, theatre, film and lectures.*

Hassan Massoudy Atelier
18 Quai de la Marne
75019 Paris
tel/fax: 33 1 42 03 15 51
open: Every last Saturday of the month 2pm – 7pm. Other days by telephone appointment.

January – June 1999
- *Original Calligraphies, Lithographies*

GERMANY

Black International Cinema Berlin,
in association with the Humboldt-University and the Hochschule der Künste Seminar für Theaterwissen-schaften/Kulturelle Kommunikation
Sophien Str. 22a., Berlin
tel.: 030 751 84 38/782 16 21
url: http://members.aol.com/bicdance

30. April – 8. May 1999
- *XIV. Black International Cinema Interdisciplinary, Intercultural*
- *Film-/Video-Festival Berlin, Germany & U.S.A., focuses on the African process of liberation; its search for its own identity; its path towards political healing methods, and the results gained by these approaches. It explores these themes through the media of*
- *film, video, music, lectures, seminars, dance and theatre performances.*

UNITED KINGDOM

British Museum
Great Russell Street
London
tel: +44 171 6361555
open: Monday 11-16:50; Tuesday, Friday, Saturday 10-16:50; Sunday 14:30-17:50

22 October – 21 February 1999
- *Art and Artists: The Tunisian culture*

Egee Art Consultancy
9 Chelsea Manor Studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
tel: 44 171 351 6818
fax: 44 171 376 3510
url: www.egeeart.com
open: Monday – Saturday 2-6pm

Continuing
- *Contemporary and antique Middle Eastern Art*

Sony Gallery
25 Connaught Street Marble Arch
London W2
tel/fax: +44 171 262 9101
url: www.sonigallery.com

Continuing
- *International contemporary art especially from the Indo-Pak subcontinent and the Arab World*

Lectures/societies

The British Council
London

April 1999
- *Mutualities: Britain and Islam. Conference to explore the mutualies. A programme of visiting arts featuring cultural arts and arts events related to Islam and Islamic countries runs from February – July 1999.*

SINGAPORE

Asian Civilisations Museum
39 Armenian Street
Singapore 179939

From November 1997
- *Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab Museum Kuwait. The Qur'an was central to the development of the art of beautiful writing. Explored in this exhibition are the various scripts that developed over the centuries and also calligraphy as a decorative motif on various media like ceramics and metalwork.*

UNITED STATES

The Art Museum
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey
08544-1018
tel: +1 609 258-3787/3788

Autumn 1999 or Spring 2000
- *Islamic Art*

County Museum of Art
5905 Wilshire Blvd.,
Los Angeles, CA 90036
tel: +1 323 857-6000.

25 February 1999 – 17 May 1999
- *Letters in Gold: Ottoman Calligraphy from the Sakip Sabanci Collection, Istanbul.*
- *Draws upon one of Turkey's leading private collections to display 70 exceptional examples of Ottoman-era calligraphy.*

Freer Gallery of Art
The Arthur M. Sackler and Freer Galleries of Asian Art,
Smithsonian Institution,
Washington DC 20560

May 3, 1998 – Indefinitely
- *Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60 works – Koran pages, metalwork, ceramics, glass, paintings, and calligraphy from the 9th to 17th centuries are used to explore Islamic artistic traditions. Themes include the forms and functions of the works of art, the role of calligraphy, the use of figurative decoration, and the meaning of abstract designs.*

January 23, 1999 – August 8, 1999
- *Masterworks of Indian Painting III. On view is a changing selection of 16th-19th-century Indian paintings from the Mughal Dynasty (1526-1858) and the Rajput courts, who controled northern and western India between the 17th-19th centuries.*

Sackler Gallery

Through 4 April 1999
- *The Jesuits and the Grand Mogul: Renaissance Art at the Imperial Court of India (1580-1630). It looks at the influence of Western style on Mughal artists in the 16th century.*

KUWAIT

Lectures/Societies

Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah
Ramadi Theatre
Midan Hawalli
Kuwait
tel: 965 565 3006

October 1998 – May 1999
- *A weekly series of public presentations on Islamic art and art history by Kuwaiti and international speakers.*

The Agenda is produced by the Centre of Islamic Culture in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Please send all information with regard to activities related to culture and art in the Islamic World to:

The Centre of Islamic Culture
P.O. Box 361
3000 AJ Rotterdam The Netherlands
fax: 31 10 4118331

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If you wish to have a formula sent by e-mail, fax, or post, please contact the ISIM Secretariat:
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Fax: +31-71-527 7906 /
E-mail: ISIM@rullet.leidenuniv.nl

Newsletters are a vital means of disseminating information on various aspects of Islamic Studies activities and institutions. The ISIM asks that you inform us on any relevant newsletters in the field.

Newsletters

Al-ᶜusur al-wusta Bulletin of Middle East Medievalists
The Oriental Institute
1155 East 58 Street
Chicago, IL 60637 USA

Annual Newsletter of the Edinburgh Institute for the Advanced Study of Islam and the Middle East
The University of Edinburgh
7 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh EH8 9LW, UK
Tel.: +44 131 650 4181/2 or +44 131 650 6615
Fax: +44 131 650 6804
E-mail: Islamic.Studies@ed.ac.uk

BITIG
SOTA, Research Centre for Turkestan andAzerbaijan
P.O. Box 9642
2003 LP Haarlem, The Netherlands
Tel.: + 31 23 529 28 83
Fax: + 31 23 529 28 83
E-mail: sota@turkiye.net

Brismes
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
Centre for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies, University of Durham
South End House, South Road,
Durham DH1 2TG, UK
Tel.: +44 191 374 2821
Fax: +44 191 374 2830
E-mail: A.L.Haysay@durham.ac.uk

Bulletin The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Tel Aviv University
Ramat Aviv 69978, Israel
Tel.: +972 3 640 9646
Fax: +972 3 641 5802
E-mail: dayancen@ccsg.tau.ac.il
URL: http://www.dayan.org

Caraka 'The Messenger'. A Newsletter for Javanists
Dept. of Languages and Cultures of Southeast Asia and Oceania, University of Leiden
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, theNetherlands
Fax: +31 71 5272615
E-mail: Caraka@rullet.leidenuniv.nl

CCAS News
Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies
Georgetown University, ICC 241,
Washington, DC 20057-1020, USA
Tel.: +1 202 687 5793
Fax: +1 202 687 7001
E-mail: ccasinfo@gunet.georgetown.edu
URL: http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/ccas/newsletters.htm

CERES Newsletter
Centre for Resource Studies of Development
P.O. Box 80140, 3508 TC Utrecht,
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 30 253 4815
Fax: +31 30 253 7482
E-mail: ceres@fsw.ruu.nl

CMENAS Newsletter
Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies
University of Michigan
1080 South University, Suite 4640,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1106, USA
Tel.: +1 734 764 0350
Fax: +1 734 764 8523

CMES Newsletter
Center of Middle Eastern Studies
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street, Rm. 517,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Tel.: +1 617 495 4055
E-mail: mideast@fas.harvard.eduKIT

CNWS Newsletter
Research School CNWS, School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA, Leiden,
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 71 527 2171, *Fax:* … 939
E-mail: CNWS@RULLET.LeidenUniv.nl
URL: http://oasis.leidenuniv.nl/interfac/cnws/

Correspondances. Bulletin d'Information Scientifique
Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb contemporain (IRMC)
20, Rue Mohamed Ali Tahar
Mutuelleville – 1002 Tunis, Tunisia
Tel.: +216 1 796722
Fax.: +216 797376
E-mail: irmc@caramail.com
URL: http://w3.cyber-espace.com/irmc
URL: http://www.ambafrance-ma.org/ceshs

CSAS Newsletter
Center for South Asian Studies
University of Virginia
110 Minor Hall, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903, USA
Tel.: +1 804 24 8815

CSSEAS Newsletter
Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies
Suite 3640, 1080 S. University
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1106, USA
Tel: +1 734 764-0352, *Fax:*… 936-0996
E-mail: csseas@umich.edu
URL: http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/csseas/

DAVO Nachrichten
Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Voderer Orient für gegenwartsbezogene Forschung und Dokumentation
Prof. Dr. Günter Meyer
Geographisches Institut Universität
Mainz, 55099 Mainz, Germany
Tel.: +49 6131 392701/393446
Fax: +49 6131 394736
E-mail: DAVO@geo.Uni-Mainz.de
URL: http://www.geo.uni-mainz.de/davo

ENSEAS Newsletter
European Newsletter of South-East Asian Studies (ENSEAS)
KITLV (Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology)
EUROSEAS (European Association for South-East Asian Studies)
C/o KITLV, P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 71 527 2295 / *Fax:* … 2638
E-mail: kitlv@rullet.leidenuniv.nl

ESCAS Newsletter
The European Society for Central Asian Studies
Asst. Prof. Mag. Dr. Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek,
Institute for Ethnology, Cultural and Social Anthropology, University of Vienna, A-1010 Vienna, Universitätsstr. 7/IV, Austria
Tel.: +43 1 4277 485 06, *Fax:* … 94 85
E-mail: gabriele.rasuly@univie.ac.at

European Network for Bangladesh Studies
The European Network for Bangladesh Studies
Centre for Development Studies
University of Bath, Claverton Down,
Bath BA2 7AY, UK

IIAS Newsletter
International Institute for Asian Studies
P.O. Box 9515, NL 2300 RA Leiden,
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 71 527 2227
Fax: +31 71 527 4162
E-mail: IIASNews@RULLET.Leidenuniv.nl
URL: http://iias.leidenuniv.nl

ISESCO Newsletter
Newsletter published by the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Ave. Attine, Hay Riad, P.O. Box 2275,
Zip Code 10104, Rabat, Morocco
Tel.: +212 7 772433/715294/715305/715290
Fax: +212 7 772058/777459

Islamic Area Studies Newsletter
Project Management Office of Islamic Area Studies
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Tokyo, 113, Japan
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E-mail: l-office@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Individual and Society in the Muslim Mediterranean World (ISMM)
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1 quai Lezay-Marnésia, 67080
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E-mail: Myaboubi@esf.org

Middle East Women's Studies Review
Association for Middle East Women's Studies
3000 Lillard Drive # 203
Davis, CA 95616, USA
E-mail: lathompson@ucdavis.edu

NARCE
Newsletter of the American Research Center in Egypt
American Research Center in Egypt,
30 East 20th Street Suite 401,
New York, NY 10003, USA
Tel.: +1 212 529 6661
Fax: +1 212 529 6856
E-mail: arce.center@nyu.edu
URL: http://www.arce.org

Nouvelles du CERI
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Rue de Chevreuse 4, 5006 Paris,
France
Tel.: +33 1 4410 8484
Fax: +33 1 4410 8450
URL: http:/www.ceri-sciencespo.com

The Newsletter of the Islamic Legal Studies Program
at Harvard Law School
Pound Hall 501, Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Tel.: +1 617 496 3941
Fax: +1 617 496 2707
E-mail: ilsp@law.harvard.edu
URL: http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/ILSP

KIT Newsletter
Royal Tropical Institute
P.O. Box 95001, 1090 HA Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31 20 568 8711, *Fax:* … 668 4579
Telex: 15080 KIT NL
URL: http://www.kit.nl/info/Newsletter/news_toc.asp

La Lettre d'Asie Centrale
L'Association de Recherche et d' Information sur l'Asie Centrale (ARIAC)
Maison des Sciences de l'Homme,
Bureau 108, 54 Boulevard Raspail,
75006 Paris, France
Fax: +33 1 4548 8353

MEOC Newsletter
Middle East Center
838 Williams Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
PA 19104-6305, USA
Tel.: +1 215 898 4690
Fax: + 1 215 573 2003
E-mail: marym@mec.sas.upenn.edu

Middle East Studies Association (MESA) Newsletter
University of Arizona
1643 East Helen Street, Tucson,
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Tel.: +1 520 621-5850, *Fax:*… 6-9095
E-mail: mesana@u.arizona.edu
URL: http://www.mesa.arizona.edu

MEWS Review
Association for Middle East Women's Studies (AMEWS)
Editorial Office
64 Alumni Avenue, Providence,
RI02906

Middle East Resources
the Newsletter of the Teaching Resource Center
Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
URL: http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~mideast/llocalres/trcnews.html

News from Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
P.O. Box 1703,
SE-751 47 UPPSALA, Sweden
Tel: +46 18-56 22 00, *Fax:* … 69 56 29
E-mail: nai@nai.uu.se
URL: http://www-hotel.uu.se/nai/misc/instswe.html

News and Notes
The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago
1155 East 58th Street, Chicago,
IL. 60637, USA
Tel.: +1 773 702 1677, *Fax:* … 9853
E-mail: oi-membership@uchicago.edu
URL: http://www-oi.uchicago.edu

Newsletter Centre for the Study of Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations
Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations
Selly Oak Colleges,
Birmingham B29 6LQ, UK
Tel.: +44 121 472 4231
Fax: +44 121 472 8852
E-mail: islam@sellyoak.ac.uk

Newsletter:
Organisation of the Islamic Conference
Research Centre for Islamic History, Art, and Culture
P.O. Box 24
80692 Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey
Tel.: +90 212 259 1742
Fax: +90 212 258 4365
E-mail: ircica@superonline.com
URL: http://ircica.hypermart.net/ircica.html

NIAS nytt Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies
Nordic Insititute of Asian Studies
Leifsgade 33
DK-2300 Copenhagen S
Denmark
Tel: +45 3254 8844
Fax: +45 3296 2530
E-mail: jcs@nias.ku.dk
URL: http://nias.ku.dk/nytt

Nordisk Midtaustenbulletin (NMB)
Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies
SMI, University of Bergen, Parkvn. 22 A,
N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Tel.: +47 5558 2711
Fax: +47-5558 9891
E-mail: knut.vikor@smi.uib.no

NVIC Newsletter
Nederlands Vlaams Instituut in Cairo
P.O. Box 50, 11211 Zamalek Cairo,
Egypt
Tel.: +20 2 340 0076
Fax: +20 2 340 4376
E-mail: niaasc@rite.com
URL: http://www.hf-fak.uib.no/smi/nsm/

OCIS
Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies
George St., Oxford OX1 2AR, UK
Tel.: +44 1865 278730
Fax: +44 1865 248942
E-mail: publications@oxcis.ac.uk

ShowCase Arts Newsletter
51 Edenbridge Road
Bush Hill Park, Enfield EN1 2LW, UK
Tel.: +44 181 373 7719
E-mail: sabina.a2@ukonline.co.uk

SIS News
The Newsletter of the Society for Iranian Studies
C/o Princeton University Library, One, Washington Road, Princeton, NJ
08544-2098, USA
Tel.: +1 609 258 1308
Fax: +1 609 258 0441
E-mail: keslami@phoenix.princeton.edu

The Middle East Institute Newsletter
The Middle East Institute
1761 N Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20036-2882, USA
Tel.: +1 202 785 1141
Fax: +1 202 331 8861
URL: http://www.mideasti.org/mei

Academic Meetings

AAS meeting in Boston
Panel on South Asian Muslims
Date: 11-3-99 to 14-3-99
Venue: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston
Omar Khalidi. Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Room 7-238, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 USA
Tel: +1 617 258 5597
Fax: +1 617 253 9331
okhalidi!@mit.edu

The First Arab Gulf Conference On Folklore and Oral History
Date: 23-3-99 to 25-3-99
Venue: Al-Ain Intercontinental
United Arab Emirates
Zayed Center for Heritage and History
Tel: 97150 6422492/9713 615166
Fax: 9712 657757
Naboodah@uaeu.ac.ae
Naboodah@qmar.uaeu.ac.ae

The Sixth Annual Central Eurasian Studies Conference at Indiana University
Date: 27-3-99
Venue: Indiana University
Goodbody Hall 157
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405
Tel: +1 812 855 9510
Fax: +1 812 855 7500
aces@indiana.edu

British Association of South Asian Studies (BASAS) Annual Conference 1999: Norm and Divergence
Date: 7-4-99 to 9-4-99
Venue: University of Derby, UK
Professor Jamal Malik, Department of Religious Studies
University of Derby, Mickleover, Derby DE3 5GX,UK
J.Malik@derby.ac.uk
Ahmed Andrews, Religious Resource and Research Centre, University of Derby, Mickleover, Derby DE3 5GX, UK
A.Andrews@derby.ac.uk
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/ses/basasc99.html

14th Annual Middle East History and Theory Conference
Date: 10-4-99 to 11-4-99
Venue: University of Chicago, Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Scott Lucas & Rochdi Younsi
MEHTW Coordinators
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Chicago
5828 South University Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637, USA
sclucas@midway.uchicago.edu

International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World
Date: 12-4-99 to 15-4-99
Venue: Besiktas, Turkey
IRCICA, P.O. Box 24
80692 Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey
Fax: +90 212 258 4365
IRCICA@ihlas.net.tr

Iran at the Threshold of the New Millennium. The 17th Annual CIRA Conference
Date: 23-4-99 to 24-4-99
Venue: Boston, Massachusetts, USA
Kamran Dadkhah
Department of Economics,
Northeastern University
Boston, MA 02115 USA
URL: http://www.dac.neu.edu/cira

Social Justice, Social Welfare and Praxis in Islamic Societies in Africa
Date: 23-4-99 to 24-4-99
Venue: Department of Asian and African Studies, University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 59 (Unioninkatu 38 B)
00014 University of Helsinki
Tel: + 358 9 708 4770
holger.weiss@helsinki.fi

American Research Center in Egypt Annual Meeting
Date: 23-4-99 to 25-4-99
Venue: Oriental Institute, University of Chicago, USA
Tel: +1 212 529 6661
Fax: +1 212 529 6856
http://www.arce.org
Arce.center@nyu.edu

Mutualities: Britain and Islam
Date: 28-4-99 to 30-4-99
Venue: Royal Commonwealth Society
18 Northumberland Avenue, London SW1, UK
Promoter: Dr Peter Clark OBE, Special Adviser, Middle East and North Africa
The British Council, 10 Spring Gardens
London SW1A 2BN, UK
Tel.: +44 171-389 4029
Fax: +44 171-389 4758
URL: http://www.britcoun.org/visitingarts/islam/

Uzbekistan in the 21st Century
Date: 12-5-99 to 13-5-99
Venue: Samarkand State Institute of Foreign Languages (SSIFL)
Information: Dr Reuel Hanks
Dept. of Geography, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA
Fax: +1 405 744 5620
Rhanks@okway.okstate.edu

The Fourth Annual Midwest Conference on Asian History and Culture
Date: 14-5-99 to 16-5-99
Venue: The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
Matthew E. Keith or Erica Swarts
The Midwest Conference on Asian History and Culture
106 Dulles Hall
230 West 17th Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43210 USA
Fax: +1 614 292 2282
keith.58@osu.edu
swarts.6@osu.edu
URL: http://www.history.ohio-state.edu/people/keith.58/mcahc

The Resurgence of Islam in Theory and Practice: The Prospect of Islam in the Third Millennium
Date: 21-5-99 to 23-5-99
Venue: Montreal, Canada Indonesian Academic Society XXI
ywahyu@po-box.mcgill.ca,
amakin@po-box.mcgill.ca for English
b7e@musicb.mcgill.ca for French

International Congress of Mulla Sadra (Iran)
Date: 23-5-99 to 27-5-99
Congress Site: http://www.iranpac.net.ir/sadra/index.htm
Mullasadra@www.dci.co.ir

Sudan: Dilemmas and Prospects. Sudan Studies Association Annual Conference
Date: 4-6-99 to 6-6-99
Venue: Medford, MA
Ann. M. Lesch
Villanova University, Political Science Department, 800 Lancaster Ave.,
Villanova PA 19085, USA
Fax: +1 610 519 7487
Alesch@email.vill.edu

The Druzes: 1000 Years of History, Reform, and Tradition
Date: 4-6-99 to 5-6-99
Venue: The Institute of Druze Studies (IDS)
P.O. Box 641025
Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA
Fax: +1 310 474 5900
URL: http://www.idspublications.com
ids@idspublications.com

Mutualities: Britain and Islam
Promoting Muslim arts in the UK
July 1999
Venue: ICA, London (tbc)
Promoter: Rachel Abedi, Visiting Arts, 11 Portland Place, London W1N 4EJ, UK
Tel.: +44 171 389 3019
Fax: +44 171 389 3016
independence@easynet.co.uk

Asean Inter-University Seminar on Social Development
Southeast Asia into the 21st Century: Critical Transitions, Continuity and Change
Date: 16-6-99 to 18-6-99
Venue: CS Thani Hotel, Pattani, Thailand
Asian Seminar Secretariat
Dept. of Sociology
National University of Singapore
19 Kent Ridge Crescent
Singapore 119260
Tel: +73 335093/331620/336096

Iran under Reza Pahlavi 1921-1941. New Perspectives on State and Society
Date: 25-6-99
Venue: Brunei Gallery, SOAS
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square
London WC1H 0XG, UK
Tel: +44 171 323 6164
Fax: +44 171 323 6064
SC45@soas.ac.uk

Foreign Policies of Middle East Studies
Date: 12-7-99 to 15-7-99
Venue: St. Andrews, Scotland
Prof. Raymond Hinnebusch
Dept. of International Relations
University of St. Andrews
St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK
Rh10@st-andrews.ac.uk

Middle East Encounters with European Enlightenment
Date: 26-7-99 to 31-7-99
Dublin, Republic of Ireland
Shelly Ekhtiar. Dept. of English
SUNY Oswego, Oswego NY 13126
ekhtiar@oswego.edu

Second International Malaysian Studies Conference
Date: 2-8-99 to 4-8-99
Venue: Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Foo Ah Hiang
Institute of Postgraduate Studies andResearch
University of Malaya
50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Tel: +60 603 7593606
Fax: +60 603 7567252
Massa22@mailcity.com
Hlfoo@umcsd.um.edu.my
URL: http://ipsp.um.edu.my
URL:
http://members.xoom.com/PSSMMASSA

The 11th International Congress of Turkish Art (ICTA-XI)
Date: 30-8-99 to 4-9-99
Venue: Chair of Islamic Languages and Cultures, Utrecht University
Drift 15, 3512 BR Utrecht
The Netherlands
ICTA-XI@let.uu.nl
URL:
http://www.let.uu.nl/oosters/icta0.ht

The Qajar Epoch: Culture, Art & Architecture in Qajar Persia
Date: 2-9-99 to 4-9-99
Venue: School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK
C/o PO Box 2256, London W1A 1YS
Fax: +44 171 431 7923
info@iranheritage.com

International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR)
XVIII Quinquennial Congress
Date: 5-8-2000 to 12-8-2000
Venue: International Convention Centre, Durban, South Africa
Prof. Pratap Kumar
Department of Science of Religion, University of Durban-Westville, Private Bag X54001, Durban, 4000 South Africa
kumar@pixie. udw.ac.za
General Secretary of the IAHR, Prof. Armin W. Geertz
Department of the Study of Religion, University of Aarhus, Main Building, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
geertz@teologi.aau.dk
URL: http://www.udw.ac.za/iahr/

European Conference of Iranian Studies
Paris, Sept. 1999
Monde Iranien
CNRS – 27, rue Paul Bert 94, 204 IVRY-sur-Seine, France
Tel: +33 0 1 49 60 40 05
Fax: +33 0 1 45 21 94 19
iran@drl.cnrs.fr

The thirteenth Turkish Congress of History
Date: 4-10-99 to 8-10-99
Loction: Ancara (or Bursa), Turkey
Prof. Dr. Yusuf Halacoglu
President of Turkish Historical Society
Turk Tarih Kurumu
Kizilay Sokak No.1
06100 Sihhiye-Ankara-Turkey
Tel: +90 312 310 23 68
Fax: +90 312 310 16 98

Beyond the Border: a New Framework for Understanding the Dynamism of Muslim Societies
Date: 8-10-99 to 10-10-99
Venue: Kyoto International Conference Hall, Kyoto, Japan
Islamic Area Studies
199 International Symposium Committee
The University of Tokyo, Bungakubu Annexe, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan
Tel: + 81 3 5684 3285
Fax: + 81 3 5684 3285
i-inr@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp

International Interdisciplinary Conference on Language, Thought and Reality: Science, Religion and Philosophy
Date: 1-8-2000 to 4-8-2000
Venue: Calcutta, India
Contact: Dr Chandana Chakrabarti
Elon College Campus Box 2336
Elon College, N.C. 27244, USA
Chakraba@numen.elon.edu
http://www.elon.edu/chakraba
Deadline for proposals: 1-4-99

MESA Annual Meetings:

1999
Date: 19-11-99 to 22-11-99
Venue: Marriott Wardman Park Hotel, Washington DC, USA

2000
Date: 16-11-2000 to 19-11-2000
Venue: Disney's Coronado Springs Resort, Orlando, FL, USA

AAR/SBL Annual Meetings:

1999
Date: 20-11-99 to 23-11-99
Boston, Massachusetts

2000
Date: 18-11-2000 to 21-11-2000
Nashville, Tennessee

Contents

international institute
ISIM
for the study of islam in the modern world

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